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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Geneva Protocol
+
+Author: David Hunter Miller
+
+Release Date: May 24, 2009 [EBook #28950]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE GENEVA PROTOCOL ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Al Haines
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+[Transcriber's note: Extensive research found no evidence that the U.S.
+copyright on this publication was renewed.]
+
+
+
+
+
+The Geneva Protocol
+
+
+by
+
+DAVID HUNTER MILLER
+
+
+
+
+
+New York
+
+THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
+
+1925
+
+All Rights Reserved
+
+
+
+
+PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
+
+
+COPYRIGHT, 1925,
+
+By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.
+
+
+Set up and printed. Published March, 1925.
+
+
+
+
+{v}
+
+FOREWORD
+
+The sources and history of the Protocol of Geneva of course go far back
+of its date, October 2, 1924.  I have not attempted to trace them
+except in so far as they have a direct bearing on my legal study of the
+Document itself.
+
+The form of the Protocol of Geneva is certainly not yet finally
+written; consideration of its legal aspects is perhaps therefore all
+the more desirable at this time.
+
+The Protocol of Geneva is one chapter in the history of the League of
+Nations, the history of international relations of our time.
+
+D. H. M.
+
+New York City, December, 1924.
+
+
+
+
+{vii}
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+CHAPTER
+
+     I.  THE PROTOCOL OF GENEVA ....................................   1
+    II.  POINTS OF APPROACH ........................................   3
+   III.  THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE PROTOCOL .....................   5
+    IV.  PARTIES TO THE PROTOCOL ...................................  10
+     V.  RELATIONS INTER SE OF THE SIGNATORIES TO THE PROTOCOL .....  13
+    VI.  INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES ....................................  18
+   VII.  THE STATUS QUO ............................................  28
+  VIII.  DOMESTIC QUESTIONS ........................................  46
+    IX.  COVENANTS AGAINST WAR .....................................  50
+     X.  AGGRESSION ................................................  54
+    XI.  THE JAPANESE AMENDMENT ....................................  64
+   XII.  SANCTIONS .................................................  72
+  XIII.  SEPARATE DEFENSIVE AGREEMENTS .............................  82
+   XIV.  THE PROTOCOL AND ARTICLE TEN OF THE COVENANT ..............  84
+    XV.  THE PROTOCOL AS TO NON-SIGNATORIES ........................  86
+   XVI.  THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ................................  87
+  XVII.  DEMILITARIZED ZONES ....................................... 101
+ XVIII.  SECURITY AND THE PROTOCOL ................................. 103
+   XIX.  INTERPRETATION OF THE PROTOCOL ............................ 104
+    XX.  THE "AMENDED" COVENANT .................................... 106
+
+
+{viii}
+
+ANNEXES.
+
+
+A.  THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS .......................... 117
+
+B.  THE PROTOCOL OF GENEVA ......................................... 132
+
+C.  THE REPORT TO THE FIFTH ASSEMBLY ............................... 156
+
+D.  RESOLUTIONS .................................................... 210
+
+E.  REPORT OF THE BRITISH DELEGATES ................................ 217
+
+F.  THE AMERICAN PLAN .............................................. 263
+
+G.  THE "AMENDED" COVENANT ......................................... 271
+
+
+
+
+{1}
+
+The Geneva Protocol
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+THE PROTOCOL OF GENEVA.
+
+The Covenant of the League of Nations[1] lays down the principle that
+national armaments should be reduced to the lowest point consistent
+with national safety and the enforcement by common action of
+international obligations.
+
+Thus, in the Covenant, the problem of disarmament[2] and the problem of
+security are viewed as correlative problems.  Their study has gone on
+in the League of Nations since its organization.  During this same
+period there has been widespread and increasing public interest in the
+matter.
+
+The theory of the Treaties of Peace was that the disarmament of Germany
+and her allies was preliminary to a general reduction of armaments the
+world over.[3]  Except as the result of the Washington Conference, and
+by that to only a very limited extent, there has been almost no
+reduction or limitation of armaments by {2} international agreement
+since the war.[4]  Such lessening of armaments as has taken place has
+been by voluntary national action.
+
+The study of these questions during the last few years has brought
+about a much clearer understanding of them, both in the minds of
+statesmen and generally; and the various proposals that have been made
+have been the subject of detailed and elaborate criticism from all
+sides.
+
+The latest of these proposals is the paper which is called The Protocol
+of Geneva.[5]  The Protocol of Geneva is, however, much more than a
+proposal.  It has the active support of a considerable number of
+Governments.[6]  It was unanimously recommended for acceptance by the
+Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations.  It deserves the serious
+attention of all thoughtful minds.
+
+The object of the Protocol of Geneva cannot be better stated than in
+the words of its authors:[7]
+
+    "to facilitate the reduction and limitation of
+    armaments provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the
+    League of Nations by guaranteeing the security of States
+    through the development of methods for the pacific
+    settlement of all international disputes and the effective
+    condemnation of aggressive war."
+
+
+While this Protocol is, and doubtless always will be, called "The
+Protocol of Geneva," its official name is "Protocol for the Pacific
+Settlement of International Disputes."[8]
+
+
+
+[1] Article 8.  The text of the Covenant is Annex A, p. 117.
+
+[2] Those who criticize the use of the word "disarmament" as meaning a
+reduction or limitation of armaments, should consult the dictionaries.
+The Standard Dictionary gives the following definition:
+
+    "The act of disarming; especially, the reduction of a military or
+    naval establishment to a peace footing."
+
+The Century Dictionary gives this:
+
+    "The act of disarming; the reduction of military and naval forces
+    from a war to a peace footing; as 'a general disarmament is much
+    to be desired.'"
+
+The Century Dictionary also gives the following quotation as an
+instance from Lowe's Life of Bismarck:
+
+    "He (Napoleon) in a fit of irresolution broached in Berlin the
+    question of mutual disarmament."
+
+[3] See, for example, the preamble to the Military, Naval and Air
+Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles: "In order to render possible the
+initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations,
+Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air
+clauses which follow."
+
+[4] The Treaty of Lausanne (A. J. I. L., Vol. XVIII, Supp., pp. 58, 64)
+with its provisions for demilitarized zones, etc., and the Convention
+for the Limitation of Armaments in Central America of February 7, 1923
+(A. J. I. L., Vol. XVII, Supp.  1923, pp. 114, _et seq._), are to be
+noted in this regard.
+
+[5] For the text in French and English, see Annex B, p. 132.
+
+[6] Sixteen States have signed the Protocol and it has been ratified by
+Czechoslovakia.
+
+[7] See Report to the Fifth Assembly, Annex C, p. 156, at p. 164.  This
+Report of MM. Benes and Politis is a notable document, worthy of the
+ability and learning of the two Rapporteurs.
+
+[8] It is herein generally called "the Protocol."
+
+
+
+
+{3}
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+POINTS OF APPROACH.
+
+There are various possible points of approach to the consideration of
+the Protocol of Geneva.  In view of the importance of the document,
+doubtless all such methods are useful.  Indeed, in the discussion of
+such a paper, it is perhaps hardly possible exclusively to adopt only
+one angle of view, such as the historical, the political, etc.  My own
+consideration of the paper, however, is to be primarily from the legal
+viewpoint; without attempting wholly to avoid other points of view I
+shall seek not to stress them.
+
+The Protocol is an elaborate and technical international document; and
+even in attempting to consider it primarily from the legal viewpoint
+there are various methods or arrangements of such a discussion.  The
+general starting point which seems to me to be most desirable is that
+of the legal effect of the Protocol upon the international relations of
+the States which become parties to it, both as among themselves and as
+to States not parties.
+
+It will of course in this connection be necessary to consider the
+obligations fixed by the Protocol in the event of its breach, as well
+as those which are imposed by its acceptance and performance.  These
+latter may, however, very properly be first considered.
+
+Accordingly, the first discussion will relate to the obligations of the
+States which become parties to the Protocol as among themselves,
+particularly in connection with the due performance of these
+obligations by those parties.
+
+Before coming to this first discussion, however, there are certain
+general observations which may be made.
+
+In the first place the paper is called a Protocol.  The precise reason
+for the use of this term does not appear; but it is probably due to the
+fact that the Protocol of Geneva is in a sense supplementary to other
+international agreements such as the Covenant of the League of Nations
+and the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice; and
+perhaps because the {4} Protocol is intended to be preliminary to
+amendments to the Covenant (Article I, paragraph 1, of the Protocol).
+
+Allusion is made to this provisional character of the Protocol of
+Geneva in the Report[1] made by the First and Third Committees to the
+Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations, where it is said:
+
+    "When the Covenant has been amended in this way
+    some parts of the Protocol will lose their value as between
+    the said States: some of them will have enriched the
+    Covenant, while others, being temporary in character, will have
+    lost their object.
+
+    The whole Protocol will remain applicable to relations
+    between signatory States which are Members of the
+    League of Nations and signatory States outside the
+    League,[2] or between States coming within the latter
+    category.
+
+    It should be added that, as the League realizes its aim
+    of universality, the amended Covenant will take the place,
+    as regards all States, of the separate régime of the Protocol."
+
+
+Of course, as is pointed out in some detail by Satow (Diplomatic
+Practice, Second Edition, Vol. II, pages 270 _et seq._), the word
+"protocol" is used with quite a number of different meanings.  In the
+present case the meaning of the word is nothing more nor less than
+treaty or convention.
+
+It is naturally impossible to consider or discuss the effect of the
+Protocol of Geneva without constant reference to the text of the
+Covenant, to which the Protocol refers throughout.  It is also
+necessary to consider to some extent the Statute of the Permanent Court
+of International Justice and even certain of the provisions of the
+Treaties of Peace, other than the Covenant.
+
+Moreover, as any consideration of the legal situation created by the
+Protocol must assume that the document has come into force, it will be
+interesting to sum up the provisions of the Protocol in that regard,
+particularly as they are somewhat unusual.
+
+
+
+[1] The English text of this Report is Annex C, p. 156.
+
+[2] From the theory that the Protocol may properly be signed by
+non-Members of the League, I dissent.  See _infra_, p. 10., _et seq._
+
+
+
+
+{5}
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE PROTOCOL.
+
+The Protocol is dated at Geneva on October 2nd, 1924.  It is drawn up
+in both French and English and the text of both languages is authentic.
+It is written in a single original.  It was recommended to the Members
+of the League for acceptance by a resolution[1] unanimously passed in
+the Assembly by the affirmative vote of 48 Members of the League, and
+it has been signed by the representatives of various countries.
+
+This recommendation by the Assembly, however, and these signatures, do
+not, as to any signatories, bring into force the Protocol, which, by
+its terms, must be ratified, the ratifications to be deposited at the
+Secretariat of the League at Geneva.
+
+The first preliminary to the coming into force of the Protocol is its
+formal ratification by at least 13 Members of the League; and these
+ratifications must include those of at least three of the four Great
+Powers which are Members--Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.  But
+even these ratifications do not bring the Protocol into force.  The
+absence of such ratifications by May 1st, 1925, _may_ result in the
+postponement of the Disarmament Conference from the date provisionally
+fixed, June 15th, 1925.  But this is a matter which I shall discuss
+later.[2]
+
+If and when the ratifications above mentioned are deposited, a
+procès-verbal to that effect is drawn up; but this procès-verbal does
+not, as is usual when a procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications
+is drafted, bring into force the Protocol.  The date of the coming into
+force of the Protocol is stated as follows (Article 21):
+
+    "as soon as the plan for the reduction of armaments
+    has been adopted by the Conference provided for in
+    Article 17."
+
+
+In other words, the Protocol will not bind any State that {6} ratifies
+it unless and until the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments
+adopts a Plan for such reduction.  _If_ such Conference is held and
+_if_ such Plan is adopted, the Protocol will, on the date of the
+adoption of the Plan, come into force as among the States which have
+then ratified it.  Such is the effect of the provisions of Article 21
+of the Protocol.
+
+Other States, which have not at the date mentioned ratified the
+Protocol, may thereafter accede to it, as is provided by the third
+paragraph of Article 3, and of course the obligations of these States
+will commence with the date of such accession.
+
+Furthermore, provision is made[3] by which the Protocol, even after
+coming into force, may become, as it says, "null and void."  It might
+well be argued that the becoming "null and void" of the Protocol
+related back to the date when it came into force.
+
+However this may be, it is important to notice here the provisions in
+this regard.  The Conference for the Reduction of Armaments has, under
+the hypothesis, adopted a Plan for such reduction.  That Conference has
+also to fix the time within which that Plan is to be carried out.  The
+Council of the League is then to consider whether the Plan for the
+Reduction of Armaments adopted by the Conference has or has not been
+carried out within that fixed period.  Presumably such consideration by
+the Council of the League would be had immediately after the expiration
+of the period fixed by the Conference; the Council, if it then
+considers that the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments has not been
+carried out, being limited, however, in such consideration to "the
+grounds" (French text--"conditions") laid down by the Conference in
+that respect, then declares that the Plan has not been carried out and
+the Protocol becomes "null and void."
+
+Accordingly, the Protocol can come into force as a legal obligation
+only on the date of the adoption by the Conference of the Plan for the
+Reduction of Armaments; and from that date till the date when the
+Council of the League of Nations declares that the Plan has or has not
+been carried out, it may be said {7} that the Protocol is only
+_provisionally_ in force; it is subject to avoidance.
+
+The question here arises as to what is meant by the language of the
+Protocol when it speaks of the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments
+being "carried out," or, in the French text, "execute."  This is a
+question rather difficult of answer.  Certainly the expression can
+hardly refer to the actual _physical_ carrying out of such a Plan; for
+that might require a very long period.  It seems to me that the
+expression envisages the formalities requisite for such a Plan.  The
+Conference for the Reduction of Armaments which is to draw up a Plan
+for such reduction is to draw up, in other words, a Treaty or Treaties
+between the parties to bring about such reduction.  Such Treaty, or
+such Treaties, will of course be voluntary agreements and will of
+course require ratification subsequent to the holding of the Conference
+itself.  Accordingly, it is my view that the "carrying out" of the Plan
+for the Reduction of Armaments adopted by the Conference means in the
+Protocol the ratification of such Plan, that is to say, the
+transformation of the Plan into a binding agreement.  Of course, the
+precise terms as to ratification, the number of ratifications required,
+the time of the deposit of ratifications and all such other formalities
+are for the Conference to decide; the reference here, however, is to
+those provisions as they may be drafted.
+
+Accordingly, the "grounds" to be laid down by the Conference for the
+Reduction of Armaments, on which it may be declared by the Council that
+the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments has not been carried out, will
+mean, I take it, the laying down of some requirement that the Plan for
+the Reduction of Armaments be formally ratified within a time stated by
+a certain number of States, including certain named States; in default
+whereof, the Council may and will declare the Plan for the Reduction of
+Armaments not to have been carried out.
+
+It is to be observed that the Protocol in the last paragraph of Article
+21 speaks of the possibility of a Signatory failing to "comply" with
+the reduction of armaments Plan "after the expiration of the period
+fixed by the Conference."
+
+{8}
+
+This refers, I think, to a failure by a particular Signatory to ratify
+the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments, the effect being, so far as
+Article 21 is concerned, that such Signatory would be bound by the
+terms of the Protocol but could not benefit by them.
+
+The language of this last paragraph of Article 21 is, however, broad
+enough to include the case of a State which had ratified the Treaty
+containing the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments and had then failed
+to carry out its agreement regarding such reduction.
+
+It will thus be seen that the Protocol of Geneva is wholly dependent
+upon the success of the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments; and
+the success of that Conference depends wholly upon the voluntary
+agreement then made.  There is nothing in the Protocol which requires
+the States represented at the Conference to agree to any particular
+plan for the reduction of armaments; the assent which they may give to
+such plan must be voluntary.
+
+The question of the proceedings of the Disarmament Conference will be
+discussed hereafter.[4]
+
+However, there is one point that may be mentioned here.  The Plan for
+the Reduction of Armaments drawn up by the Conference or, in other
+words, the Treaty or Treaties drawn up by that Conference, will not be
+perpetual in their operation.  No plan for disarmament, no treaty
+regarding reduction of armaments could possibly be perpetual in its
+detailed provisions.  Not only does this follow from the nature of such
+an agreement, but it is explicitly laid down in Article 8 of the
+Covenant that any such Plan is to be subject to reconsideration and
+revision at least every ten years.  Accordingly, the Treaty or Treaties
+for the Reduction of Armaments to be drawn up by the Conference will be
+in this sense temporary, that they will have a fixed limit of time for
+their operation, precisely as the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament drawn
+up at the Washington Conference may be terminated in 1936.[5]
+
+{9}
+
+There is no provision made in the Protocol of Geneva for the withdrawal
+of any State from its obligations, assuming that those obligations come
+finally into force.  On its face the Protocol is therefore perpetual;
+but it is not really so.  The obligations of the Protocol are so
+intertwined with the obligations of the Covenant that there is no doubt
+in my mind that the withdrawal from the League by a Member thereof
+(when bound by the Protocol) would release that State from the
+obligations of the Protocol as well as from the obligations of the
+Covenant.
+
+The obligations of the Covenant are terminable by any Member of the
+League, as to itself, on two years notice.  The obligations of the
+Protocol go much farther than the obligations of the Covenant.  The
+obligations of the Protocol are, by its terms, later to be merged in
+the Covenant itself, without in any way impairing the withdrawal clause
+of the latter document.
+
+So clearly it is not to be supposed that the obligations of the
+Protocol of Geneva, as to a Member of the League, are eternal.  If the
+lesser obligations of the Covenant end as to a particular Member of the
+League upon withdrawal, surely the greater obligations of the Protocol,
+as to that League Member, end also.
+
+The foregoing shows the fallacy, as a matter of logic, of the idea that
+a non-Member of the League may be bound by the Protocol and yet not be
+a party to the Covenant; for it would mean that a Signatory might be
+forever bound to a subsidiary instrument (the Protocol) although the
+primary instrument (the Covenant) was terminable; but I discuss this
+more at length later.[6]
+
+Furthermore, it should be repeated that the Protocol is intended to be
+only a temporary document in the sense that, if it comes finally into
+force, it is contemplated that the Covenant will be amended
+substantially in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol.
+
+
+
+[1] Annex D, p. 210 at p. 211, _et seq._
+
+[2] p. 97, _et seq._  It is settled that that Conference will be
+postponed.
+
+[3] Article 21.
+
+[4] _Infra_, p. 97, _et seq._
+
+[5] Article XXIII.  See Conference on the Limitation of Armament,
+Government Printing Office, 1922, p. 1603.
+
+[6] p. 10, _et seq._
+
+
+
+
+{10}
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+PARTIES TO THE PROTOCOL.
+
+The theory of the framers of the Protocol of Geneva is that it may be
+signed and ratified by non-Members of the League of Nations as well as
+by Members of the League.
+
+Various words of the Protocol (_e. g._, Article 12) indicate this, the
+Report to the Assembly so states,[1] and the Resolution[2] of the
+Assembly recommending the Protocol for acceptance by the Members of the
+League of Nations specifically says that the Protocol shall be "open
+for signature by all other States" as well as by Members of the League.
+
+Now of course all this is conclusive as to the technical question as to
+whether a non-Member of the League of Nations _may in fact_ sign the
+Protocol.  Such a State _may_ legally sign, because the other Parties
+to the Protocol invite such signature.  And if any such State should
+sign, and ratify, it becomes a Party to the Protocol, regardless of
+logic.
+
+Nevertheless I submit that the whole idea of the possibility of
+Signatories to the Protocol who are non-Members of the League, is
+fundamentally contrary to the whole principle, spirit and terms of the
+Protocol itself.
+
+In the first place, the Protocol is intended as a development of the
+Covenant; the Protocol is meant to be a temporary paper; its provisions
+are to be merged in the Covenant itself by amendment of that Document.
+How then can a State become a party to this temporary and provisional
+paper if it is not a party to the permanent and definitive document?
+
+If we examine the detailed provisions of the Protocol, the logical
+conclusion is equally certain.  Surely a non-Member of the League
+cannot really "make every effort" to secure "introduction into the
+Covenant of amendments" (Article 1).  Is this a matter for non-Members
+of the League?
+
+{11}
+
+Article 3 of the Protocol contemplates that the Signatories thereto
+shall accede to the special protocol regarding the second paragraph of
+Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court.  But if we turn to
+the provisions regarding the Permanent Court we find that such States
+as Russia and Mexico and Egypt are not entitled to accede to that
+special protocol at all, before entering the League.[3]  Accordingly,
+if any one of these three States, non-Members of the League, should
+sign and ratify the Protocol of Geneva, it could not legally carry out
+the engagements of Article 3 thereof.
+
+All the provisions of Articles 4 to 6 inclusive of the Protocol of
+Geneva relate to disputes between the Signatories and contemplate the
+possible submission of any such dispute to the Council or Assembly of
+the League of Nations.  But such submission can take place only under
+the provisions of the Covenant; and under Article 17 of the Covenant a
+non-Member of the League may not come within the provisions of the
+Covenant except upon invitation by the Council and upon terms stated.
+
+Without going into further detail, I repeat that the obligations
+contemplated by the Protocol are, in theory, no more than
+interpretations, or future elaborations, of the obligations of the
+Covenant.  It seems to me logically impossible to suppose that such
+interpretations or amplifications may be made applicable to States
+which are free from the obligations in their primary form.
+
+If this matter is looked at realistically and concretely we find that
+there is hardly any possibility of the Protocol of Geneva being signed
+by any State which is a non-Member of the League.  The United States
+and Russia will certainly not sign; the admission of Germany and Turkey
+to the League is contemplated.  The only other States[4] of any
+international consequence outside the {12} League are Mexico and Egypt;
+and the likelihood of either of these two States becoming a party to
+the Protocol of Geneva is too remote for serious consideration.
+
+Accordingly, in the subsequent discussion, I shall assume that,
+whatever may be the legal possibilities, there is no real possibility
+of any State which is not a Member of the League of Nations becoming a
+party to the Protocol of Geneva.
+
+
+
+[1] Annex C, p. 156 at p. 167.
+
+[2] Annex D, p. 210 at p. 212.
+
+[3] Under the Resolution of the Council of May 17, 1922, any State may
+accept the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court by filing a declaration
+to that effect; but this is not the same thing as acceding to the
+Protocol of December 16, 1920.
+
+[4] See Membership in the League of Nations, by Manley O. Hudson, A. J.
+I. L., July, 1924.
+
+
+
+
+{13}
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+RELATIONS INTER SE OF THE SIGNATORIES TO THE PROTOCOL.
+
+It is here assumed that only Members of the League of Nations may
+become parties to the Protocol of Geneva[1]; the Protocol is a
+development of the Covenant and it would, in any view, be logically
+impossible for any State, not a Member of the League, to become a
+Signatory to the Protocol; on the other hand, Members of the League
+are, of course, not obligated to sign or to ratify the Protocol of
+Geneva.
+
+Accordingly, if the Protocol shall come into force, the Powers of the
+world, from the point of view of the Protocol, will, at least
+theoretically, be divided into three classes:
+
+    1. Members of the League of Nations who are parties to the
+       Protocol.
+
+    2. Members of the League of Nations who are not parties to the
+       Protocol.
+
+    3. Non-Members of the League of Nations who are not parties to
+       the Protocol.
+
+
+From this it follows, again looking at the matter from the point of
+view of the Protocol of Geneva, that the international relations of the
+various countries of the world would fall into the following six
+classes:
+
+    1. Relations _inter se_ of the Signatories to the Protocol.
+
+    2. Relations _inter se_ of the Members of the League not
+       Signatories to the Protocol.
+
+    3. Relations _inter se_ of non-Members of the League.
+
+    4. Relations of the Signatories to the Protocol with the Members
+       of the League not Signatories thereto.
+
+    5. Relations of Members of the League not Signatories to the
+       Protocol with States non-Members of the League.
+
+    6. Relations of the Members of the League Signatories to the
+       Protocol with States non-Members of the League.
+
+
+{14}
+
+It is proposed in this discussion first to consider the first of the
+above six classes, namely, the relations of the Signatories to the
+Protocol, _inter se_; and this discussion will proceed primarily on the
+assumption that the obligations of the Protocol are carried out.
+
+In numerous places the Protocol speaks of the parties thereto as "the
+signatory States," _e. g._, Articles 1, 2, 3, 8, 11, etc.  It is
+curious this is so in view of the meticulous insistence by the British
+Dominions at the Peace Conference, on the use, throughout the text of
+the Covenant generally, of the expression "Members of the League"
+instead of "States Members of the League."[2]
+
+Certainly it is contemplated that ratification of the Protocol may be
+made on behalf of the British Dominions.  Accordingly, I think that the
+use in the Protocol of the expression "signatory States" is probably an
+inadvertence, as in no proper international sense of the word are the
+British Dominions States, despite the fact that they have an
+international status under the League of Nations and even otherwise.[3]
+
+The first point to be noticed is that under Article 2 of the Protocol
+there is a very general and a very sweeping obligation on the part of
+the Signatories not to resort to war.  This is a point of the utmost
+importance.  The obligation goes very much farther than anything in the
+Covenant; the language of this obligation will be examined in detail
+hereafter.
+
+Before coming to that, however, it is well to look at the provisions of
+the Protocol regarding the settlement of international disputes.  War
+is one method for the settlement of such disputes, and, in order to
+make effective the obligation of the Signatories not to resort to war,
+substitute methods of settlement are provided.
+
+It is very natural and proper that this should be done.  A mere
+obligation not to resort to war, without more, would almost imply that
+disputes between the parties to the obligation should {15} find _some_
+other method of settlement.  For if some other method could not be
+found, feelings due to the continuance of the dispute might well arouse
+such passions in one country or another as to sweep away the obligation
+for peace.  The two questions of the ending of war and the settlement
+of disputes between States are not only logically but realistically
+very closely related.
+
+Disputes between States are often regarded as comprising those that
+relate to international questions and those that relate to domestic
+questions, the former being divided into justiciable and
+non-justiciable disputes.
+
+I prefer, however, _for this discussion_, to classify possible
+international disputes in three kinds, namely:
+
+    1. Disputes as to international questions.
+
+    2. Disputes as to domestic questions.
+
+    3. Disputes as to _status quo_.
+
+
+I am aware of the fact that such classification as the foregoing is
+overlapping.  Disputes as to the _status quo_ will to some extent fall
+within the two classes first mentioned; they may relate therefore to
+questions which are international or which are domestic in their
+nature.  However, I think the classification is justified, at least for
+reasons of convenience, and also, in my opinion, for reasons which go
+very much deeper.
+
+Let me illustrate this by reference to questions arising from
+frontiers.  The existence and the location of a frontier are
+essentially questions of international import.  The location of a
+frontier may, in a given case, not only be an international question in
+the sense that it should be settled internationally, but also in the
+sense that it is justiciable, according to the usual idea of
+justiciable questions.  This would be so in a case where the location
+of the frontier depended wholly upon the interpretation of a treaty
+between the two neighboring States.
+
+But it is quite possible to imagine an international question regarding
+a frontier which is not in any way justiciable; such, {16} for example,
+was the question as to where the frontier between Poland and Russia
+should be drawn after the World War.[4]  That some frontier had to be
+drawn was obvious; but there was no possible legal basis for
+determining _where_ it should be drawn.  The question was one of
+judgment, to be settled by agreement between the parties, if possible;
+or otherwise, if it was to be peacefully settled, by reference to some
+sort of tribunal which would decide according to principles[5] of
+equity, impossible to express in any precise legal formula.  In other
+words, the question was an international political one.
+
+Again, suppose that the frontier between the two States has been
+settled by agreement and that there is no doubt whatever where it is.
+One of the two States desires to have that frontier changed; in other
+words, desires that there shall be a cession of territory.  Here is a
+question of the _status quo_.  In a sense it may be called
+international, because it relates to an international frontier; but it
+not only falls wholly outside any idea of justiciable questions in the
+international sense, but also outside any idea of being a political
+question which any tribunal whatever could decide on _any_ basis.  In
+other words, it is within that class of cases of an international
+nature in regard to which two States _may_, if they choose, negotiate,
+but in regard to which either one of them may at its pleasure refuse
+even to consider negotiations.
+
+In any condition of international affairs which it is possible to
+visualize under the present State system, this must continue to be so.
+The State system presupposes necessarily the existence of States.  One
+of the inherent conditions of the existence of a State is its right to
+the possession of its own undisputed territory as against any other
+State,[6] which does not mean, I mention in passing, as against a
+revolutionary movement _within_ the State; that is another story.  The
+putting in question of this undisputed {17} right of one State to hold
+its own territory as against another State would mean the putting in
+question of the existing State order as a whole.
+
+Further, while I have included domestic questions as a separate class
+of questions in the above list, I think that logically many of them
+fall within the thought of questions which concern the _status quo_.  I
+do not dispute that these domestic questions may at times have an
+international aspect; but they are questions which each State has an
+absolute right under law to regulate according to its own pleasure, and
+it is for this reason that they fall within the class of cases which
+are, in theory, not to be questioned internationally.  Of course a
+State may, if it chooses, negotiate regarding them, just as it may, if
+it chooses, negotiate about the cession of part of its territory.  But
+it may also, if it chooses, so to speak end the negotiations by
+refusing to commence them at all.
+
+However, it is proper, none the less, to consider these domestic
+questions as a separate group, for the reason that there is a
+possibility of development toward their international consideration
+within the present State system.  I shall pursue that thought further a
+little later.
+
+
+
+[1] Those who framed the Protocol have a different opinion.  See the
+discussion, _supra_, p. 10, _et seq._
+
+[2] _cf._ the expression in Article 34 of the Court Statute "States or
+Members of the League of Nations."
+
+[3] The exact position of the British Dominions within the League is
+not yet wholly settled.  See the recent British and Irish notes
+regarding the Irish Treaty, London Times, December 16 and 24, 1924.
+
+[4] See Treaty of Versailles, Article 87, third paragraph.
+
+[5] Such as, perhaps, the idea of self determination, the economic
+situation of the inhabitants, etc.
+
+[6] See the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations adopted by
+the American Institute of International Law, specially Paragraph IV, A.
+J. I. L., Vol. X, pp. 212, 213.
+
+
+
+
+{18}
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.
+
+So far as concerns disputes of an international nature, the Protocol,
+taken in connection with the Covenant, provides for a final and binding
+settlement of such disputes between Signatories to the Protocol in
+every case whatsoever.
+
+In order to determine the precise effect of the Protocol in this
+regard, it is necessary first to examine the provisions of the Covenant.
+
+The provisions of the Covenant which particularly cover this matter are
+those of Articles 12, 13 and 15.  Let us therefore consider the text of
+these Articles,[1] looking in the first place at the text of Articles
+12 and 13 and the first paragraph of Article 15, which follow:
+
+    ARTICLE 12.  "The Members of the League agree that, if
+    there should arise between them any dispute likely to
+    lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to
+    arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the
+    Council and they agree in no case to resort to war until
+    three months after the award by the arbitrators or the
+    judicial decision, or the report of the Council.
+
+    "In any case under this Article, the award of the
+    arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a
+    reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made
+    within six months after the submission of the dispute."
+
+    ARTICLE 13.  "The Members of the League agree that,
+    whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they
+    recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration or
+    judicial settlement, and which cannot be satisfactorily
+    settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject
+    matter to arbitration or judicial settlement.
+
+    "Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to
+    any question of international law, as to the existence of
+    any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach
+    of any international obligation, or as to the extent and
+    {19}
+    nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach,
+    are declared to be among those which are generally
+    suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement.
+
+    "For the consideration of any such dispute, the Court
+    to which the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court
+    of International Justice, established in accordance with
+    Article 14, or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the
+    dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between
+    them.
+
+    "The Members of the League agree that they will carry
+    out in full good faith any decision or award that may be
+    rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a
+    Member of the League which complies therewith.  In the
+    event of any failure to carry out such an award or
+    decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken
+    to give effect thereto."
+
+    ARTICLE 15 (first paragraph).  "If there should arise
+    between the Members of the League any dispute likely to
+    lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration
+    or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, the
+    Members of the League agree that they will submit the
+    matter to the Council.  Any party to the dispute may
+    effect such submission by giving notice of the existence
+    of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all
+    necessary arrangements for a full investigation and
+    consideration thereof."
+
+
+Looking at these provisions in their entirety, it will be seen that the
+engagements taken by the Members of the League relate to "any dispute
+likely to lead to a rupture."  This is the language of both Articles 12
+and 15.  We may say that this means any dispute whatever, any serious
+dispute from the point of view of international peace.  We may lay
+aside trifling disputes which cannot lead to serious differences
+between States, whether or not they drag on through years of diplomatic
+negotiation.  Accordingly, we may say that the Covenant in these
+provisions covers any international dispute whatever as to
+international questions in the sense above mentioned.
+
+Further examining the provisions above quoted, we see that {20} the
+Members of the League agree in every such possible case to do one of
+three things: they agree to submit all disputes either (a) to
+arbitration or (b) to judicial settlement or (c) to the Council.  They
+do _not_ agree to submit any particular case or any particular class of
+cases to arbitration; they do _not_ agree to submit any particular case
+or any particular class of cases to judicial settlement; but they do
+specifically agree that all cases that are not submitted to the one or
+to the other, go to the Council.  The effect of such submission to the
+Council will be discussed hereafter; at the moment it is only necessary
+to point out that under these provisions the submission to the Council
+is _obligatory_.  That submission _must_, under Article 15, take place,
+in the absence of submission to arbitration or to the Court.  But the
+submission to arbitrators or to the Court is voluntary.
+
+The first change made in this scheme of the Covenant is that Parties to
+the Protocol agree to accept the so-called "compulsory" jurisdiction of
+the Permanent Court of International Justice in the cases mentioned in
+paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court.  Thus, in such
+cases the dispute between the Parties would go, as a matter of right,
+at the demand of either one of them, to the Court, where it would be
+finally determined.  To that extent the jurisdiction of the Council is
+lessened.
+
+Under the Protocol, this acceptance of the so-called compulsory
+jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice is to take
+place by the signatory States within a month after the coming into
+force of the Protocol, which, as we have seen, would mean within a
+month after the adoption by the Conference on Reduction of Armaments of
+the plan for such reduction.
+
+The Parties to the Protocol thus agree to accept this so-called
+compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court; but it is provided that
+they may do so with appropriate reservations.
+
+Accordingly, it is desirable to consider summarily just what this
+so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of
+International Justice is.
+
+All that the word "compulsory" in this connection means is "agreed to
+in advance."  The general provisions of the Court {21} Statute[2]
+describe the jurisdiction of the Court as extending to any case which
+the Parties, either after it has arisen or by "treaties and conventions
+in force,"[3] choose to submit.  The so-called optional clause relating
+to the so-called compulsory jurisdiction in effect provides that as to
+certain defined classes of cases the parties agree, now, in advance of
+any dispute, that disputes of those particular characters will be
+submitted to the Court.
+
+The definition of these classes of disputes is found in Article 36 of
+the Statute of the Court, and in this regard follows generally in its
+language the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 13 of the
+Covenant, which declares that these particular classes of disputes are
+"among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration
+or judicial settlement."
+
+By the so-called optional clause relating to the Court Statute, it is
+these classes of disputes as to any or all of which the jurisdiction of
+the Court may be accepted as "compulsory _ipso facto_ and without
+special agreement, in relation to any other Member or State accepting
+the same obligation."
+
+The classes of "legal disputes" mentioned in Article 36 of the Court
+Statute are as follows:
+
+    "legal disputes concerning:
+
+    (a) The interpretation of a treaty;
+
+    (b) Any question of international law;
+
+    (c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would
+        constitute a breach of an international obligation;
+
+    (d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for
+        the breach of an international obligation."
+
+
+In regard to these definitions of classes of disputes, it is necessary
+to make some general observations.  No matter what definition may be
+made in advance as to the classes of disputes which are to be submitted
+to the Court, a difference of opinion {22} may exist in any given case
+as to whether the particular dispute which has arisen is or is not
+within one of the defined classes.
+
+It follows that the mere definition of classes of disputes which, by
+agreement in advance, are to be submitted to a particular tribunal, is
+not in itself sufficient; any such definition must be accompanied by a
+provision for a case when one of the parties to a dispute claims that
+the particular dispute is within the defined class and the other party
+to the dispute does not admit that the dispute is within the defined
+class; some method must be provided for determining that preliminary
+question of jurisdiction.
+
+Let me put this concretely: let me suppose that two Members of the
+League have agreed to the optional clause and that a dispute arises
+between them.  One party to the dispute says that the question involved
+concerns the interpretation of a treaty and accordingly submits the
+question to the Permanent Court of International Justice in accordance
+with the procedure under the Statute of that Court.  The other party to
+the dispute says that the dispute does not in any way concern the
+interpretation of the treaty and submits the matter to the Council of
+the League under Article 15 of the Covenant.
+
+Clearly there would be here for decision a preliminary point of
+jurisdiction and, in so far as the optional clause is concerned, the
+matter is covered by the Statute of the Court in the final paragraph of
+Article 36, reading as follows:
+
+    "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has
+    jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of
+    the Court."
+
+
+In other words, by the Court Statute, it is for the Court to say
+whether or not it has jurisdiction in any such case; so that in the
+particular case above supposed, where one party was seeking to go to
+the Court and the other party was seeking to go to the Council, it
+would be for the Court in the first instance to decide as to the
+jurisdiction.  If the Court decided that it had jurisdiction, the
+dispute would come on for decision by the {23} Court; if the Court
+decided that it had not jurisdiction, consideration of the dispute
+would come on before the Council.
+
+The provision in the last paragraph of Article 36 of the Court Statute
+is a wise and necessary one.  It avoids conflicts of jurisdiction and
+it permits a preliminary and easily realizable method of determining
+the question of jurisdiction.
+
+It is unnecessary to consider in further detail the described classes
+of legal disputes mentioned in Article 36 of the Court Statute.  Any
+party to the Protocol may make reservations in acceding to this
+optional clause and, as the Report of the First and Third Committees to
+the Assembly points out,[4] these reservations may be of a very
+extensive character; but the fact that the Signatories to the Protocol
+agree to accede, even to some extent, to this so-called compulsory
+jurisdiction of the Permanent Court is of great importance.
+
+However, the most important change which the Protocol makes in regard
+to the settlement of international disputes concerns the functions of
+the Council in the case of a dispute submitted to it.
+
+The only respect in which the functions of the Council in such a case
+under the Protocol are _precisely_ the same as the functions of the
+Council under the Covenant is that the Council must begin along the
+lines of mediation and conciliation.[5]
+
+This, we may observe, comes directly from the third paragraph of
+Article 15 of the Covenant, which provides that "the Council shall
+endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute."  Such language
+relates to the mediatory and conciliatory functions of friendly
+governments.  The Council is composed of representatives of
+governments, of governments friendly to the parties to the dispute,
+because the governments which are Members {24} of the Council as well
+as the governments which are parties to the dispute have joined in a
+Covenant of Peace.
+
+Accordingly, the first duty of the Council, in the event of any
+submission of a dispute, is to mediate and conciliate.  These are very
+valuable functions.  They permit of delay.  The governments which
+compose the Council may prolong the consideration of the point at
+issue.[6]  The parties to the dispute have come to the Council for a
+settlement; and the Council may deliberate during a reasonable period
+so as to permit passions to cool and reason to resume her sway.
+
+Now, as I remarked, these mediatory functions of the Council remain
+precisely the same under the Protocol as under the Covenant.
+
+Suppose, however, the mediation fails, what is the next duty of the
+Council?  Under the Covenant,[7] the next duty of the Council would be
+this, to consider the dispute; but under the Protocol (Article 4(1)),
+the next duty of the Council is to "endeavour to persuade the parties
+to submit the dispute to judicial settlement or arbitration."  This
+obviously is a very different thing from consideration of the dispute
+by the Council itself.  Instead of considering the dispute, the Council
+says to the parties: Is there not some kind of a tribunal to which you
+are willing to refer it?
+
+Still more striking is the fact that, even if this endeavour fail, it
+does not even then necessarily become the duty of the Council to
+consider the dispute on its merits.  _Either one_ of the parties may
+demand the setting up of a Committee of Arbitrators.  The difference
+between such a provision as this and the provisions of the Covenant is
+remarkably great.  Under the Covenant, when, as the outcome of the
+mediation of the Council, the parties do not themselves agree upon a
+settlement, the Council is inevitably required to consider the merits
+of the case.  Under the Protocol, if the parties do not agree, the
+dispute goes to the Court or to a tribunal of some kind, if such a
+reference is agreed on; it next goes to a Committee of Arbitrators if
+only {25} one of the parties demands it; this means that the Council
+never gets to consideration of the dispute on the merits, unless the
+parties to the dispute at the time are unanimous in wishing that this
+shall happen.
+
+It is obvious that when we have a situation where _any_ party to a
+dispute may demand the appointment of an arbitral committee, the
+Council of the League can only consider cases of dispute which all
+parties thereto, _after_ the dispute has arisen, _unanimously_ agree
+should be considered by the Council.
+
+The reason why I attach the utmost significance to this change, in
+connection with some other changes which are to be noticed, is that it
+is a total departure in theory from the idea of the Covenant that
+political disputes should be settled by a political body such as the
+Council of the League of Nations.  After all, that was the fundamental
+idea of Article 15 of the Covenant, that the Council of the League
+should lay hold of the dispute, at least to the extent of preventing
+war from arising out of it.  _The theory of the Protocol is that every
+kind of international dispute should be settled either by a Court or by
+arbitration, that the functions of the Council are those of mediation
+and conciliation and that the Council is never to consider the merits
+of the dispute unless the parties thereto at the time of the dispute
+unanimously wish such consideration_.  Even then, as we shall see, a
+single dissent in the Council regarding the merits is sufficient to
+render its consideration of no effect, and arbitration again comes into
+play.
+
+It should be pointed out here that if the dispute goes to a Committee
+of Arbitrators at the request of one of the parties, any point of law
+in dispute must be sent by the Committee of Arbitrators to the
+Permanent Court of International Justice for an opinion.[8]
+
+Now, let us proceed with the duties of the Council.  If the dispute has
+gone to arbitration, the functions of the Council are at an end; but if
+no party "asks for arbitration,"[9] then and only {26} then the Council
+takes up the consideration of the dispute.  In this case, the Council
+in fact becomes an arbitral board, _provided_ it can reach a unanimous
+conclusion; but its deliberations and recommendations have no effect
+whatever if it cannot reach a unanimous conclusion.
+
+Under the present composition of the Council the arbitral tribunal
+which it would become in such circumstances would be composed of from
+eight to ten members.  The Council itself would be a body of at least
+ten members, possibly eleven, possibly twelve (if the dispute were
+between two outside parties), but the votes of the disputants would not
+be counted.
+
+It is clear that unanimity would be somewhat difficult to reach in a
+tribunal of that size.  It must be remembered that under the Protocol
+no dispute can reach the Council for such an arbitral decision unless
+(a) the mediatory efforts of the Council have failed and (b) the
+parties have refused to agree upon any form of arbitration and (c)
+neither party wishes arbitration.[10]  Clearly a dispute which had
+reached that stage would be one upon which unanimous agreement by an
+arbitral tribunal of representatives of from eight to ten governments
+would be improbable.
+
+Furthermore, it seems to me almost certain under the new procedure that
+one of the parties would demand arbitration,[10] because it would
+always be in the power of one member of the Council to compel such
+arbitration.  This is a point which, so far as I have observed, has not
+elsewhere been noticed.
+
+The final provision of the Protocol for the settlement of the dispute
+is that if the matter goes to the Council for consideration; and if the
+views of the Council are not unanimous (aside from the parties), there
+is then a "compulsory" arbitration.  The Council proceeds itself to
+determine the composition, the powers and the procedure of the
+Committee of Arbitrators.
+
+So, taking all the provisions together, the whole result is that a
+dispute which is past the stage of mediation either goes to arbitration
+outside the Council or must be unanimously decided {27} by the members
+of the Council; and this puts it in the power of any one member of the
+Council to compel an arbitral award by an outside body.
+
+It should be added that, under the Protocol, as under the Covenant, the
+Assembly may be substituted for the Council in the consideration of a
+dispute.  It would have in such case the same mediatory powers as the
+Council and the same arbitral powers as the Council if all the parties
+refused any other form of arbitration.[11]
+
+A very summary statement of the functions of the Council under the
+Covenant shows what a radical change is made by the provisions of the
+Protocol.  Under the present provisions of Article 15 of the Covenant,
+a dispute which passes the stage of mediation is considered by the
+Council.  If the Council is unanimous in making recommendations, their
+effect is simply to prevent war, not finally to settle the dispute.  If
+the Council is not unanimous, its recommendations may have a moral
+effect, but have no legal effect whatever.
+
+So far as concerns these provisions of the Protocol, they may be summed
+up as follows: they provide that every possible dispute between the
+parties to the Protocol which is subject to international cognizance
+shall be finally determined by a judicial or arbitral tribunal
+resulting in a legally binding decision or award; and the parties to
+the Protocol solemnly agree that they will accept any such decision or
+any such award as final and that they will carry it out in full good
+faith.[12]
+
+
+
+[1] As amended.
+
+[2] Article 36, first paragraph.
+
+[3] For a collection of such agreements, see Publications of the
+Permanent Court of International Justice, Series D, No. 4.
+
+[4] see the discussion as to this in that Report, _infra_, p. 171.
+
+[5] Doubtless the word "conciliation" is not a term of art in this
+regard.  But it seems to me that the functions of the Council under
+Article 15 of the Covenant go somewhat beyond "mediation" in the strict
+sense of the writers.  See Nys, Droit International, Vol. II, p. 543;
+also Vattel (1853 edition), p. 276.  The Protocol (Article 6) calls a
+result from these efforts "an amicable settlement."  The French speaks
+of such efforts as "l'essai de conciliation."
+
+[6] The period of "six months" is mentioned in Article 12 of the
+Covenant.
+
+[7] Article 15, Paragraph 4, _et seq._
+
+[8] Protocol, Article 4 (2) c.
+
+[9] by a Committee of Arbitrators.
+
+[10] By a Committee of Arbitrators.
+
+[11] The powers and duties of the Assembly in such case are stated in
+the last two paragraphs of Article IS of the Covenant.  They are
+continued, to the extent stated, by Article 6 of the Protocol.
+
+[12] The question as to what may happen under the Protocol if such a
+decision or award is _not_ carried out is discussed _infra_, p. 50, _et
+seq._
+
+
+
+
+{28}
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+THE STATUS QUO.
+
+In many recent discussions of international affairs these two
+originally innocent Latin words "_status quo_" have attained a really
+malevolent significance.  They seem to be regarded as meaning the same
+thing as the motto "Whatever is, is wrong," and some who talk about the
+_status quo_ appear to be in the same mind as Omar when he longed
+
+  "To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire
+    ............................. --and then
+  Re-mould it nearer to the heart's desire."
+
+
+It may be well to give some critical examination to this question of
+the _status quo_ and to see what, if anything, is meant by the ideas
+which lie back of these criticisms.
+
+In the first place, the thought of the critics usually relates to
+existing international frontiers and, in some instances, to existing
+international conditions.
+
+Now as to frontiers, if we look at the _status quo_ historically, we
+find that it is practically universally the result of changes in a
+previous _status quo_.  The cause of these changes may have been war,
+may possibly have been agreements and may have been something other
+than either of these.[1]  I shall refer to them later.  But here it
+should be observed that there is hardly any region of the globe where
+the _status quo_ does not result from some one or more of these changes
+within times comparatively recent.
+
+Of course there are some exceptions to this observation, the Arctic and
+Antarctic, for example; but in the populated regions of the globe, the
+_status quo_, so far as frontiers are concerned, is a thing
+comparatively new.
+
+If we look at this existing situation, this _status quo_ of
+international frontiers, we find that under modern conditions a {29}
+comparatively short period of time is all that is necessary to give to
+the _status quo_ the sanctity of universal consent, regardless of its
+origin.  Let me give an instance or two of this.
+
+The Southern frontier of the United States, for part of its extent is
+the direct result of a war between the United States and Mexico, a war
+which by many, and I am among them, is considered to have been a war of
+aggression.  Now no one but a madman would believe that there ought to
+be a change in the _status quo_ of the communities now existing in New
+Mexico, which in 1850 was uninhabited country, by delivering them over
+to Mexican rule.  It is true that, during the World War, Germany
+proposed to Mexico in the celebrated Zimmerman note[2] that this should
+be done; but that incident only emphasizes the truth of my remark.
+
+One of the most recent instances of a change in the _status quo_, so
+far as the United States is concerned, is the case of the Virgin
+Islands, which were bought from Denmark in 1916.[3]  There was a change
+made by agreement, made for a purchase price which was satisfactory to
+the ceding country and made after a plebiscite of the inhabitants, who
+voted almost unanimously for the change.  Here, again, for reasons
+differing from those of the foregoing instance, no one in his senses
+would consider that the existing _status quo_ was not one of justice
+and common sense.
+
+Now, if we take the situation generally, we will find, in accordance
+with the instances that I have mentioned, that the international
+situation as to frontiers the world over[4] is, as to perhaps 99%,
+either consecrated by usage which is the equivalent of common consent
+or at least of common sense, or else is the result of agreement which
+contains in it both elements.
+
+The fact is, as any realist will admit, that every frontier, no matter
+how absurd originally or even now, contains, in the very fact of its
+existence, elements of stability and of reason which to _some extent_
+justify its existence.  The ordinary individual near a {30} frontier,
+as distinguished from the agitator, becomes used to it.  Business
+transactions adjust themselves to it and in a very short time after its
+creation any proposed change implies inherently a certain amount of
+undesirability.  It is impossible, perhaps, to imagine or to draw a
+more absurd frontier than that between Switzerland and France in the
+region of Geneva.[5]  It is a monstrosity, geographically and
+economically, and yet every one is contented with it or at least more
+contented with it than with the idea of changing it.  Naturally there
+are certain attendant annoyances, as in a motor ride out of Geneva
+which involves two or more Customs frontier examinations within a few
+kilometres; and there are certain absurdities involved in catching
+Swiss fish and French fish in different parts of Lake Leman; and one is
+amused in reading Customs regulations which permit cows to pasture in
+one country and be milked in the other without duty; but still every
+one has gotten used to these matters and gets along with them.
+
+So on the whole these two maligned words represent a rather peaceful
+condition.
+
+Before the World War the irritation produced in the minds of many by
+the then existing _status quo_ largely related to the frontiers in
+Eastern Europe and the somewhat similar irritation now existing among
+alleged liberal thinkers is due to the frontiers created by the Peace
+Treaties in general which are so usually and inaccurately referred to
+as the Treaty of Versailles.
+
+Here, I think it is fair to make a certain distinction regarding the
+causes internationally of a given _status quo_ at any particular time
+and of the existing situation in particular.  These causes are two,
+generally speaking--agreement and war.  The instances in modern history
+of changes in frontiers reached by free agreement are innumerable.  I
+do not see how any one who recognizes the existing state system can
+object to them or believe that force should be used to change them.  Of
+course there are critics who object to the existing state system and
+from {31} a theoretical point of view there is something to be said for
+these objections.  The real answer to them at this time is, that
+whether they are good or bad, the present state system is one that, so
+far as any human being can see now, is certain to exist for some more
+centuries at least; and accordingly, outside of dreamland, we must take
+this system as it is.  Given that state system, agreements between
+states as to their frontiers should be sacred.  If a state can make an
+agreement about its frontier, and then, because it made a bad agreement
+or a stupid agreement or because circumstances changed after the
+agreement was made, may go to war to set aside the agreement, the
+result would only be international anarchy--the state system and
+everything else would have disappeared together.
+
+The other source of changes in the _status quo_ is war or strictly
+speaking the treaties of peace that result from war.  I pass by the
+legal position, which is theoretically correct, that a treaty of peace
+made by a vanquished Power with a victor is supposedly a free
+agreement.  This is true enough from the technical point of view but
+has no bearing here.  The fact is that when one side wins a war and the
+other loses it, the treaty of peace is made under compulsion and
+constraint.
+
+The argument that is made by those who criticize the _status quo_ of
+the Peace Treaties of 1919 and 1920 runs about as follows;
+
+    1. In certain respects the frontiers and arrangements created by
+    the Peace Treaties are unjust.
+
+    2. The setting up by the Peace Treaties of an international
+    organization against war is an attempt to sanctify the
+    wickednesses of the _status quo_.
+
+    3. Both the Treaties and the international organization which they
+    set up should at least be denounced and probably rejected.
+    This conclusion in various minds is different and uncertain,
+    but I think that I have stated it fairly.
+
+
+Let us take these points up in their order.
+
+As a preliminary, let me say that the Treaties of Peace in this
+connection cannot include the Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey.
+Certainly at the time that that Treaty was negotiated there was {32} no
+imposed peace on Turkey; as a matter of fact the Turkish negotiators
+had things pretty much their own way with the Allies.  So that we are
+considering merely the Treaties with Germany, Austria, Hungary and
+Bulgaria.
+
+In the first place, the question in many cases as to whether or not
+there is any such thing as a "just" frontier is at least a very
+doubtful one.  I put it this way.  If you have a situation where
+reasonable, impartial and informed minds can differ, you do not have a
+situation where it can be arbitrarily said by any one that any one
+frontier is _the_ just frontier.  Of course I am not talking of the
+type of mind which insists that the particular line that he would draw
+is the one and only line, despite the views of anybody else, because to
+admit such a theory would mean the admission of the existence of
+perhaps fifty different frontiers between the same two countries at the
+same time.
+
+Now as to the Peace Treaties, we certainly have that situation to a
+very large extent.  I do not see how any one could contend that the
+existence of the Polish corridor is a perfect solution, nor do I see
+how any one could contend that the absence of the Polish corridor would
+be a perfect solution.  One of the Polish Delegation said to me in
+Paris in December, 1918, in substance, that it would be impossible to
+draw a frontier between Germany and Poland which would not do an
+injustice to one country or to the other or to both, and I believe that
+his observation is perfectly sound.
+
+The same thing is true as between Roumania and Hungary, and perhaps
+more true.
+
+My sympathies as to Vilna are rather with the Lithuanians than with the
+Poles, but no one can read the documents without seeing that the Poles
+have a case.
+
+My own view has always been that the frontier between Poland and Russia
+is too far to the East, but none the less the Russians, after a
+fashion, agreed to it.
+
+Most of those whose opinions I respect believe that it was wrong to
+give the Austrian Tyrol to Italy.  Despite those views, I have always
+believed that the decision was defensible.
+
+{33}
+
+Different American experts of the highest qualifications, of the utmost
+sincerity and of complete impartiality took different views as to Fiume
+and the Italian-Yugo-Slav frontier generally.  In such circumstances,
+who could say, what tribunal could decide, the "just" frontier?
+
+I am willing to admit that this uncertainty on the question of justice
+may not exist in every case.  I have always believed that some of the
+cessions of territory forced on Bulgaria were utterly indefensible from
+any point of view whatsoever.  I refer, not to Macedonia, that
+impossible jumble of contradictions, but more particularly to Western
+Thrace.
+
+My own view is that, on the whole and taken by and large, the existing
+frontiers in Europe are more near to justice than ever before in modern
+history.
+
+But I am going to assume for the rest of this discussion that some of
+these frontiers are wrong and should be changed.  What is our answer to
+that situation?
+
+Let me point out in the first place that the mere fact that a frontier
+was imposed by force resulting in a peace treaty is not necessarily
+anything against it.  Take the case of Alsace-Lorraine, for example; or
+take a still more striking case, the case of Germany and Denmark.
+Admittedly, in and out of Germany, the result as to Slesvig was just
+and should continue.
+
+Furthermore, it is necessary to point out that the _imposed_ origin of
+a situation may not continue as the cause of that situation.  It _may_
+become accepted and voluntary, a full agreement.  An instance here is
+the reparations question.  The _status quo_ as to reparations (a very
+uncertain one) imposed by the Treaty of Versailles upon Germany, has
+now, under that very Treaty, become an agreed _status quo_ by reason of
+the voluntary adoption by Germany of the Dawes Report; for in reality
+as well as in strictness of law that plan could not have been adopted,
+much less be carried out, without the voluntary assent of Germany to
+its provisions.
+
+However, taking the frontier _status quo_ of the Peace Treaties at its
+worst, that is to say at its alleged worst, admitting, in other {34}
+words, that parts of it are unjust and are the result only of force,
+what are we to say as to the future?
+
+The possibility of change which, under the supposition that I have
+made, would in itself be admittedly desirable, is along two lines, the
+line of agreement or the line of war.  The so-called fixation or
+consecration of this _status quo_ under the League of Nations in no way
+precludes a change by agreement, _the utmost that it can do is to
+preclude a change by war_.
+
+Accordingly, we are confronted at the outset with the question as to
+whether the continuance of this _status quo_ is, or is not, a worse
+evil than war.  Even those who assume or who believe that war is the
+preferable of the two must, in order to reach that belief, hold that
+change by agreement is impossible.  Such an assumption is contrary to
+the facts of history, but for the sake of this discussion it may be
+admitted.
+
+In other words, I am willing to assume that a particular part of the
+frontier _status quo_ is wrong, is unjust, and was brought about by
+force, and should be changed, and that it cannot be changed by
+agreement, and come directly to the question if, in these
+circumstances, it should or should not be changed by war.  My answer to
+this question is: No.  And I do not think it is necessary to put this
+answer merely on the ground of the evil of the war itself, the death,
+the destruction and so on.  It is sufficient to support a negative
+answer to point out that the effect of the war could not be limited.
+War never is limited, it goes to lengths that have nothing to do with
+the supposed injustice for which it is commenced.
+
+Let me give an instance as a concrete supposition.  Take the
+Bulgarian-Greek frontier and suppose, as I do, that it ought to be
+changed, and suppose further, as the advocates of war assert, that it
+should be changed by war between Bulgaria and Greece; one of two things
+would happen in all human probability.  Either Greece would be the
+victor and then not only would the boundary be as unjust to Bulgaria as
+it is now, but much more so.  Or else Bulgaria would be the victor, in
+which case the injustice would simply be reversed; the frontier would
+not move to any {35} theoretical point of justice, but would move to
+the point dictated by the new Peace treaty.
+
+In other words, war is not like a litigation which ends in the
+settlement of a particular dispute.  Any war, in its settlement, goes
+far beyond the dispute which brought it about; every war opens up every
+possible ambition and desire of the victor.[6]  Did the World War end
+merely in deciding the question about the rights of Austria and Serbia
+in connection with the murder of the Archduke?  Where was the fate of
+the German colonies decided--in East Africa and in the Pacific, or on
+the Western Front?
+
+This whole question is of vital importance in connection with the
+Protocol of Geneva.  If that Protocol comes into force and is accepted
+by Germany, by Austria, by Hungary and by Bulgaria, it will have this
+effect at least; it will change what I may call the status of the
+_status quo_ in regard to these countries to this extent, that in lieu
+of that _status quo_ being one imposed by force, it will have become
+one agreed to, at least to the point that it is agreed that the _status
+quo_ may not be changed by war but only by agreement.[7]  As a
+practical example, it will mean, as we now see, that the German effort
+to regain some of her lost colonies under the mandate system, will
+again be an effort of negotiation[8] and not an effort of force.
+
+All that the Covenant or the Protocol of Geneva attempts to do about
+the _status quo_ is to say that frontiers shall not be changed _as a
+result of aggression_.  Indeed, the Protocol[9] protects even an
+aggressor against loss of territory or of independence as a penalty for
+its aggression; discussion, leading up perhaps to peaceful agreement
+but to nothing else, is permitted by Articles 11 and 19 of the
+Covenant, but that is all.
+
+{36}
+
+My view is that these provisions are sound and that they should not be
+extended.
+
+In saying, as I did, that the possibility of change in the _status quo_
+is along only two lines, the line of agreement and the line of war, I
+did not lose sight of the proposals made in various forms that there
+should be some method under the League of Nations or otherwise by which
+a tribunal of some sort would be empowered to make such changes from
+time to time.  Most of these proposals envisage plebiscites in one form
+or another.
+
+These proposals by their advocates are thought to have the advantage of
+adaptability to changing conditions and to be more conformable to the
+theory of the consent of the governed as a basis of Government.[10]
+
+Of course, changes of frontiers made by any form of tribunal would in a
+sense be changes of frontiers made by agreement among the parties; for
+there would be necessarily an agreement in advance setting up such a
+tribunal and engaging to conform to its conclusions.
+
+It may perhaps be imagined that as between two particular countries
+some such arrangement is possible along limited lines and relating to a
+particular area or areas.  I doubt even this possibility; but certainly
+no general agreement in accord with such theories is possible and in my
+judgment it would be highly undesirable if it were possible.
+
+A tribunal which was charged with the duty of determining changes in
+frontiers would clearly be a superstate, full-fledged, and in any sense
+of that much abused term.  Obviously, a change of frontier, if it went
+far enough, might result in the substantial, or even the literal,
+disappearance of one state by its incorporation within the territories
+of another.  It is inconceivable that any country would agree to such a
+proposition.  Even if it were limited very strictly, it would present
+enormous difficulties and would certainly arouse fierce passions, as is
+well illustrated by {37} discussion regarding the tribunal which is now
+sitting to consider the frontier between Northern and Southern Ireland.
+
+Nor would the matter be resolved by the suggested idea of plebiscites.
+Anyone who will consider this question of plebiscites will realize that
+the determining factor is not wholly the vote itself but to a large
+extent the terms in which the plebiscite paper is written.  He who
+drafts the agreement for the plebiscite has much to do with what the
+plebiscite will determine.[11]  The questions are: Is the area to vote
+as a whole or by districts, and where is the line of the voting area to
+be drawn?  The first of these was one of the great questions in the
+Upper Silesia case.  To apply the idea to an existing episode, let us
+again refer to the case of Ireland.  If the plebiscite were in the
+whole of Ireland, it would go for Dublin; if it were in Ulster, it
+would go for Belfast; if it were in Tyrone or Fermanagh, the result
+would perhaps depend on the exact date when it was taken, as recent
+elections indicate.
+
+Another difficulty about plebiscites is this: Is their effect perpetual
+or not, and if not how long does it last?  If Tyrone votes for Dublin
+today, is it an eternal decision or only till another vote in 1930, or
+till when?  There must be some time limit at least; plebiscites cannot
+be held every year or even every five years, a fact which illustrates
+the quiet advantages of some kind of a _status quo_.
+
+Another question about a plebiscite is this: Let us concede that an
+overwhelming vote such as took place in the regions of East Prussia
+under the Peace Treaties is to be decisive forever.  But suppose the
+vote is very close; how about a vote where a little over half of the
+population go one way and a trifle under half go the other?  Is this
+conclusive?  Does it have the same moral effect as a larger vote?  Is a
+majority of one vote just as good as a majority of ninety per cent.?
+
+{38}
+
+In reality, the truth about these proposals for changing frontiers by
+some sort of international procedure is that those who advocate them do
+not believe in them as a general proposition.  An Englishman who
+believes in this sort of thing, for example, believes in it as regards
+Macedonia or some such region; he does not for a moment think that such
+a procedure should enable the people of British Columbia, say, to
+become part of the United States.  I do not mean to intimate that the
+people of British Columbia have any such idea; but how is it going to
+be possible to give the privilege (if it be a privilege) to people
+along a few selected frontiers?
+
+Another point, a fatal objection to such a scheme, is the inevitable
+uncertainty which it would set up.
+
+It may be a better thing to live in Manitoba than in North Dakota, or
+to live in North Dakota than in Manitoba; but worse than almost any
+conceivable place of residence would be a status which might change in
+the future, so that one could not tell say five years ahead in what
+country he was going to live.  A frontier is not merely a line drawn on
+a map or demarcated on the ground; a frontier means a _nexus_ of
+customs, of laws, of traditions and of innumerable other things that
+directly affect the daily life and conduct of every inhabitant.  Any
+lawyer who has had any experience in the matter will realize the
+enormous difficulties that surround any transfer of territory merely in
+connection with the drafting of the necessary papers[12]; and any
+student who wishes to see how far-reaching the practical difficulties
+may be need only consider the present situation in Alsace-Lorraine in
+its bearing upon the relations between France and the Vatican.
+
+The impossibility and the undesirability of setting up any system for
+changing frontiers, such as has been discussed, are equally evident.
+
+There is another phase of this general question of the _status {39}
+quo_ which is sometimes discussed by those who seem to have a natural
+antipathy to the words and that is what I may call the "raw materials"
+phase.  There is, let us say, no coal in Switzerland, and yet
+Switzerland must have coal for her people to exist.  There are no oil
+wells in Norway, and yet in Norway there must be, if civilization is to
+continue, automotive engines.  It is obvious that there can be no
+physical change in such a _status quo_.  People who live in the
+territory that is now Switzerland must get their coal somewhere else,
+and motor transport in Norway must get its gasoline from other lands.
+
+What is the international phase of such situations as this?  There are
+perhaps three possibilities.  One is a war of conquest commenced by a
+country in the situation of Norway in order to obtain dominion over
+foreign oil lands; the second is some kind of agreement such as has
+been suggested in a vague way by the Italians and others for some sort
+of an international supervision in such matters; and the third is that
+the situation shall continue as it is now--a matter of bargain and
+sale, of supply and demand.
+
+There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that, among these three,
+the first would be as impossible as it would be wicked; the second is
+wholly outside the realm of practical politics for centuries to come;
+the third is the _status quo_, which has not in any case of world peace
+resulted in any serious injustice.
+
+Of course, if we go beyond such cases as Norway and Switzerland and
+take countries much less favored, it is always a mystery as to why
+people live in them.  It is very difficult to understand, for example,
+why there are settlers in Labrador, or why people are fond of Greenland
+as a home; none the less these things are so.  And under the existing
+system of exchange of commodities there has perhaps never been a time
+when even the people who live in these countries without certain
+particular natural resources have not generally been able to obtain
+sufficient of them as a result of their own efforts in the occupations
+which the character of those lands permits.
+
+Of course some countries are naturally richer than others and {40} must
+remain so.  In the Delta of the Nile, the land produces as many as four
+crops a year and sells for something like $3,000 an acre.  Such a
+condition cannot be duplicated in a climate where only one crop is
+possible.
+
+But the notion that _any_ State or any combination of States, less than
+world-wide, _could_ be substantially self-sufficient in respect of
+_all_ raw materials is untenable.  Even the United States lacks
+(mentioning minerals only) nickel, cobalt, platinum, tin, diamonds.
+Its supplies of the following are inadequate: antimony, asbestos,
+kaolin, chromate, corundum, garnet, manganese, emery, nitrates, potash,
+pumice, tungsten, vanadium, zirconium.  Outside of minerals we lack
+jute, copra, flax fiber, raw silk, tea, coffee, spices, etc.  This mere
+enumeration suggests the absurdity of the "raw materials" argument
+against the _status quo_.[13]
+
+Without going into it in detail, the mere fact that there are no copper
+mines in Germany[14] or in England has never prevented either country
+from obtaining all the copper that it needed by means of the exchange
+of its own commodities and its own labor for the copper, say, of Spain,
+or of the United States, or of Chili; and from any possible point of
+view that is now conceivable it is only by the continuance of such a
+system that the deficiency of particular articles in particular
+countries can be supplied.
+
+All that we can say is, in other words, that so long as the people in a
+particular country are able to produce enough of something that the
+rest of the world needs, so long will they be able to supply their own
+necessities.  And if in any country, in Labrador, for example, the
+people are unable, because of the situation of the country, to produce
+a sufficiency of consumable and exchangeable commodities, the
+inevitable result will be the evacuation of that country by civilized
+human beings.  If such a result could be changed by conquest, the
+change would be only temporary.  To attempt to change it by agreement
+would be to attempt a sort of international charity by means of which
+{41} people would be able to live in Labrador by the use of part of the
+surplus production, say, of Kentucky, given to them for nothing.
+
+There is a very exaggerated notion in the minds of some as to the
+effect of what is called "control of raw materials."
+
+Of course, in time of war, control of raw materials _has_ importance.
+But this does not mean "control" in the sense of _ownership_ of foreign
+supplies, as, _e. g._, British ownership of Persian oil fields or
+American ownership of Bolivian tin mines.  It means merely either (1)
+the possession of adequate domestic supplies, or (2) safe and unimpeded
+_access_ to foreign sources of supply, as, _e. g._, German access,
+during the war, to Swedish iron ore.  The military significance of raw
+materials, aside from purely domestic supplies, is related to such
+things as naval power, blockade, "freedom of the seas," "free transit,"
+etc., rather than to national _ownership_ of sources of supplies.
+_Access to the market_ is the important thing, although the question of
+finance may be more difficult in respect of foreign supplies than of
+domestic.
+
+But in time of peace, the "control of raw materials" in the last
+analysis means that the owners of those materials can do only two
+things with them, use them or to sell them.  This is perhaps most
+obvious in the case of such raw materials as are perishable, but it is
+true of all.
+
+Take such a product as copper, for example.  Some countries have copper
+mines, others have none.  But the ownership of a copper mine is of no
+possible advantage unless the copper produced from that mine is
+manufactured into something else or is sold.  Of course temporarily a
+mine owner may leave his ore in the ground or may store a supply of
+copper above ground; but these are expedients to be resorted to only in
+some time of over-production and impossible of continuance.  If the
+product of the mine is not either used or sold, its advantage is purely
+a theoretical possibility of the future.  It has no more value in
+present reality than a bank note on a desert island.
+
+The really important factor, as to raw materials, is _access to the
+market_ on an _equal footing_.
+
+{42}
+
+In practice there are only two ways in which a State or its citizens
+can be discriminated against, in time of peace, so far as the State's
+access to supplies of raw materials is concerned.  They are as follows:
+
+(1) By discriminatory export duties, or similar duties.  In practice
+these are _not_ important.
+
+(2) By discrimination in respect of prices, or similar matters, by
+_monopolistic_ producers.  To achieve this result it is necessary not
+merely that one _State_ should have a "monopoly" of the supply of some
+raw materials, but also that _within_ that State, the production and
+sales of the raw materials should be in the hands of monopoly.
+Further, the domestic monopolistic organization, must, in order that
+discrimination should be an outcome of the situation, find it
+_profitable_ (not merely "patriotic") to discriminate in favor of the
+domestic market.  There is _no_ important instance of such
+discrimination.
+
+Such conjunction of circumstances is one which is exceedingly unlikely
+to occur.  There is more chance that there will be discrimination _in
+favor of_ the foreign buyer.  In short, the matter is not one of great
+practical importance, for
+
+       (1) a raw material supplied only by one State
+  and  (2) controlled, _within_ the State, by a monopoly, which
+  also (3) finds it profitable to discriminate against foreign
+           buyers
+
+is something to be found only in imagination.
+
+I venture to say that there has never been a time in modern
+civilization when the people of any country have been prevented by the
+international situation from obtaining any raw material whatever for
+which they had the capacity to pay.  The only possible exception to
+this statement has been in time of war[15]; and the only possible
+change in the situation in time of peace would, as I have suggested,
+amount to some form of compulsory international charity.
+
+{43}
+
+If we look generally at this question of the _status quo_ from the
+international point of view during the past two centuries, we find two
+divergent and irreconcilable lines of treatment.
+
+The jurists and the writers have generally considered that the _status
+quo_ is or ought to be sacred from the point of view of outside
+attack.[16]  In most of the books the question is treated under the
+heading of "Intervention" and, perhaps with some qualifications, the
+writers do not admit the legality of intervention.  They make
+exceptions on the ground of self preservation of the intervening State,
+sometimes on the ground of protection of human life and so on.  But, at
+least with these exceptions, they generally maintain that the State
+against which the intervention is directed may legally object to
+it--that is, may legally insist upon the maintenance of the _status
+quo_ (or of its right, in a proper case, to change the _status
+quo_[17]) and furthermore that such a State might justly, if able (as
+it usually is not), resort to war against the intervention.
+
+On the other hand, the history of international affairs during this
+period is quite to the contrary.[18]  Over and over again States,
+sometimes individually, sometimes some of them collectively, have
+interfered with the affairs of another State with which they Had
+strictly no legal concern, on many different occasions and on all sorts
+of pretexts.  They have defended such intervention at times on the
+vague grounds of the rights of humanity, the interests of commerce, the
+restoration of order and so on.
+
+Any one who is familiar, even in a cursory way, with the history of
+Europe will be able to recall numerous such instances; and it must in
+fairness be admitted that in some of them the result has seemed
+beneficent.[19]
+
+And it must not be forgotten that it is not only the wicked powers of
+Europe that have acted along these lines.  In reference {44} to the
+affairs of other countries, though not its own, the United States has
+maintained this privilege of paternal intervention by force.  We
+maintained it, for example, in Cuba in 1898, chiefly on the ground of
+the sake of humanity.[20]  In connection with the Panama Canal, Mr.
+Root set up the famous proposition[21] that the sovereignty of Columbia
+over the Isthmus was limited and qualified by the general right of
+mankind to have a canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific, and to
+have that canal kept open for the commerce of all.
+
+Many other instances might be cited.  It is, however, worth while to
+recall in connection with this alleged limited right of sovereignty of
+Columbia over part of its territory that the United States subsequently
+paid $25,000,000 to the owner of the qualified fee.
+
+It is perhaps unnecessary to add that this alleged right of
+intervention, as between great powers, was recognized by another name
+as a method of changing the _status quo_, namely, the method of war.
+
+The effect of the Protocol is unquestionably to consecrate the
+international _status quo_ with a definite position of legality, not to
+be disturbed by force.[22]  The views of the writers, as opposed to the
+practice of Great Powers, have been adopted.
+
+Article 2 of the Protocol forbids a resort to war[23] as against any
+{45} other State, a party to the Protocol, "except in case of
+resistance to acts of aggression."[24]
+
+Under Article 8, every Signatory agrees to abstain from any act which
+might constitute a threat of aggression.
+
+Under these provisions and the provisions of the Protocol for the
+settlement of international disputes, intervention to upset the _status
+quo_ (or to prevent a state from changing it where it legally may)
+becomes aggression and is an international crime.
+
+
+
+[1] Such as discovery, occupation of _terra nullius_, etc.  See the
+Treaty of Spitzbergen, A. J. I. L., Vol. XVIII, p. 109.
+
+[2] A. J. I. L., Vol. XI, at p. 626.
+
+[3] A.J. I. L, Vol. XI, Supp. 1917, p. 53.
+
+[4] Some regions of Asia may be exceptions.
+
+[5] See the Franco-Swiss Free Zones, by Louis Schulthess, in Foreign
+Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 331, with map.
+
+[6] "Et il faut bien remarquer, que la Guerre ne décide pas la
+question; la Victoire contraint seulement le vaincu à donner les mains
+au Traité qui termine le différend.  C'est une erreur non moins absurde
+que funeste, de dire, que la Guerre doit décider les Controverses entre
+ceux qui, comme les Nations, ne reconnoissent point de Juge."  Vattel,
+Book III, Section 38.
+
+[7] In general, this is the theory of Article Ten of the Covenant.
+
+[8] See the Genesis of the War, Asquith, pp. 97, 98.
+
+[9] Article 15.
+
+[10] President Wilson's so-called first draft of the Covenant contained
+a provision along these lines in Article III.  See Woodrow Wilson and
+World Settlement, Baker, Vol. III, p. 89.
+
+[11] The statistics of language, etc., even when accurate, do not
+always forecast the popular wish.  Upper Silesia is an instance of this
+fact.  The statistics, as stated in the note of Clemenceau of June 16,
+1919, showed 1,250,000 Poles and 650,000 Germans.  The vote was 717,122
+for Germany and 483,514 for Poland.
+
+[12] The Convention between Germany and Poland relating to the régime
+of Upper Silesia is a document of some 300 pages.
+
+[13]  I am greatly indebted to Professor A. A. Young for some of my
+economic information; but he is in no way responsible for any of my
+conclusions.
+
+[14] Of course this is an over-statement.  Germany produces about
+one-tenth of her consumption of copper.
+
+[15]  Or a period due to war, such as 1919-1920.
+
+[16] See Hall, International Law (Seventh Edition), Chapter VIII, for
+an illuminating discussion.
+
+[17] Such as the right of State A to cede territory to State B,
+notwithstanding the objection of State C to such a cession.
+
+[18] See Moore's Digest, Vol. VI, pp. 2-367.
+
+[19] Such as the intervention in Greece in 1827 by Great Britain,
+France and Russia.  See Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. I, p.
+769.
+
+[20]  See the Message of President McKinley, April 11, 1898, Foreign
+Relations, 1898, p. 750 at p. 757.
+
+[21] The Ethics of the Panama Question, Sen. Doc. 471, 63rd Congress,
+2nd Session, p. 39.
+
+[22] There is a reference to the _status quo_ in the General Report
+(Annex C, p. 181), which uses this language:
+
+    "There is a third class of disputes to which the new system of
+    pacific settlement can also not be applied.  These are disputes
+    which aim at revising treaties and international acts in force,
+    or which seek to jeopardise the existing territorial integrity
+    of signatory States.  The proposal was made to include these
+    exceptions in the Protocol, but the two Committees were unanimous
+    in considering that, both from the legal and from the political
+    point of view, the impossibility of applying compulsory
+    arbitration to such cases was so obvious that it was quite
+    superfluous to make them the subject of a special provision.
+    It was thought sufficient to mention them in this report."
+
+[23] For the view that this includes acts of force, even in the absence
+of a state of war, see _infra_, p. 55.
+
+[24]  The other exception "when acting in agreement with the Council,"
+etc., is not here material.  It is discussed _infra_, p. 50.
+
+
+
+
+{46}
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+DOMESTIC QUESTIONS.
+
+The treatment in the Protocol of so-called domestic questions aroused a
+great deal of discussion not only at the Assembly, last September, but
+since the adoption there of the text.
+
+It may be remembered that there was a similar public discussion at the
+time of the drafting of the Covenant; in that document[1] a domestic
+question is defined as "a matter which by international law is solely
+within the domestic jurisdiction" of a State.
+
+Among instances of domestic questions which have been mentioned from
+time to time, perhaps the two most commonly referred to in this country
+are the tariff and immigration.  Of course it has been pointed out very
+often that even such questions as these, however inherently domestic,
+may become international as soon as they are made the subject of a
+treaty, as they so frequently are.  It should be added that almost any
+question, no matter how "domestic" in its nature originally, _may_
+become the subject of international cognizance by virtue of a treaty.
+There are many treaties of the United States which have related to such
+questions as the inheritance of land, the right to administer the
+estates of decedents, etc.; a very recent instance is a treaty between
+this country and Canada regarding the protection of migratory birds, a
+treaty which has been upheld as valid by the Supreme Court.[2]
+
+None the less, the absolute right of a country to regulate these
+matters in its own discretion must be recognized as a matter of strict
+law.  Any country, in the absence of treaty, may, at its pleasure,
+exclude foreigners from entering into its territory, for example.  I
+think no one questions this.[3]
+
+However, as a matter of fact and as a result of the development of the
+world's commerce, there is hardly any such question which remains
+exclusively domestic.  For example, even in our {47} drastic
+Immigration Law of 1924,[4] there are various treaty rights of entry
+into the country for the purposes of commerce and so on which are
+expressly and in terms saved by the statute.  Furthermore, there is, I
+suppose, hardly a country in the world which does not have various
+most-favored-nation treaties which directly affect tariffs.
+
+Again, modern developments necessitate the extension of international
+discussions and agreements to matters previously undreamed of; the
+erection of wireless stations near frontiers is a very practical
+instance; there must be some kind of agreement to prevent jamming in
+the air.  The negotiations about the opium traffic have gone to the
+length of discussions as to what areas in certain regions should be
+planted with the poppy; a more essentially domestic question than the
+crops to be grown within a country could hardly be imagined.
+
+In my opinion, the Protocol follows the Covenant in its treatment of
+these domestic questions and goes no farther.  The Covenant provides
+that if, upon reference to the Council, it is found that a dispute
+arises "out of a matter which by international law is solely within the
+domestic jurisdiction," the Council shall report to that effect and
+shall not even make a recommendation as to its settlement (Article 15,
+paragraph 8).  In practice the Council will doubtless refer this
+question of law to the Permanent Court for an advisory opinion.[5]
+
+The Protocol (Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2) continues this provision
+and applies it also to any arbitration which takes place by its terms.
+It is provided that if one of the parties to the dispute claims that
+the dispute "or part thereof" arises out of a domestic question, the
+arbitrators must take the advice of the Permanent Court on the point.
+The opinion of the Permanent Court is binding on the arbitrators and if
+the Court holds that the matter is "domestic," the power of the
+arbitrators to decide {48} the question is at an end and they are
+confined merely to recording the Court's opinion.
+
+The further provision of Article 5 on this question is the last
+paragraph of that Article, which reads as follows:[6]
+
+    "If the question is held by the Court or by the Council
+    to be a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of
+    the State, this decision shall not prevent consideration of
+    the situation by the Council or by the Assembly under
+    Article 11 of the Covenant."
+
+So far as this provision goes, I do not think that it adds anything to
+the effect of Article 11 of the Covenant.  The matter would stand
+precisely where it does now, even if this last paragraph of Article 5
+of the Protocol had been omitted.
+
+Under Article 11 of the Covenant, both the Council and the Assembly
+have the right to consider any circumstance which threatens to disturb
+international peace.  This does not mean any right of decision or even
+recommendation in any binding sense.  What it does is to give to the
+Council or to the Assembly the privilege of attempting, by friendly
+offices, to avert war.
+
+To my mind there is nothing very new in this; indeed, it is rather
+inherent in the idea of any international association for the
+prevention of war.  After all, there is no doubt that these so-called
+domestic questions have their international repercussions.  The case
+that was put by way of argument at Geneva was the control of the
+quinine of the world by the Dutch, which is said to be practically
+absolute.  What would happen if the Dutch put an embargo upon the
+exportation of this drug?  It would be idle to say that such an act,
+legal as it would be in the strict sense, would not have a profound
+effect upon civilization generally.  Under Article 11,[7] such an act
+could be discussed before the Council with a representative of the
+Dutch Government present, in an effort to obtain some adjustment, some
+change in what had been done; but that would be all.
+
+In 1898, the United States went to war with Spain over what {49} was,
+technically at least, from the point of view of Spain, a domestic
+question, namely, the internal situation in Cuba.  Shortly before
+hostilities broke out, the six then Great Powers of Europe addressed to
+the United States a friendly note in the matter, to which this
+Government replied.[8]  In principle, I cannot see any difference
+between such diplomatic correspondence and the discussion of the matter
+by the Council of the League, a discussion to which presumably Spain
+and not the United States would have been the party to object, for the
+question was a Spanish domestic question of which we were complaining.
+
+There are other aspects of the treatment by the Protocol of domestic
+questions, in connection with the Covenants against War, and with
+Aggression, under which headings it will be discussed.[9]
+
+
+
+[1] Article 15, paragraph 8.
+
+[2] Missouri _v._ Holland, 252 U. S., 416.
+
+[3] See Moore's Digest, Vol. IV, p. 67, _et seq._, also p. 151, _et
+seq._
+
+[4] Act of May 26, 1924.
+
+[5] As in the case of the Tunis and Morocco nationality decrees,
+Advisory Opinion No. 4, February 7, 1923.
+
+[6] This is one part of the so-called Japanese Amendment, as to which
+see _infra_, p. 64, _et seq._
+
+[7] of the Covenant.
+
+[8] Foreign Relations (U. S.), 1898, pp. 740-741.
+
+[9] See _infra_, p. 50 and p. 54.  Also "The Japanese Amendment," p. 64.
+
+
+
+
+{50}
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+COVENANTS AGAINST WAR.
+
+Under the Protocol, the agreement of the parties thereto (Article 2)
+not to resort to war with one another is, if the terms of the Protocol
+are carried out, absolute.  The only stated exceptions in Article 2 of
+the Protocol are (1) in case of resistance to acts of aggression and
+(2) when acting in agreement with the Council or the Assembly under the
+Covenant or the Protocol.
+
+The first exception relates to defence and, if there be no aggression,
+as there would not be if the Protocol is lived up to, there would never
+be any need of defence against aggression.
+
+The second exception, so far as it relates to a Party to the Protocol
+against whom force might be used, relates primarily to an aggressor, as
+defined in the Protocol.  Of course this second exception in this
+regard goes beyond the question of defence, strictly speaking, because
+it would permit a State, not attacked, to go to the defence of another
+State attacked if and when the application of the Sanctions of the
+Protocol is called for by the Council[1]; but if the Parties to the
+Protocol carry out their agreements as therein expressed, there could
+never be any war between two or more of them.
+
+There appears to be another possibility of the use of force within the
+language of this second exception; this is the case where a State,
+against which has gone a decision of the Court or an arbitral award,
+fails to carry out the decision or award.
+
+The provision of the Covenant regarding such a situation is contained
+in Article 13, where it is said that the Council shall "propose what
+steps should be taken to give effect" to such decision or award.
+Obviously such proposals by the Council would not have any binding
+effect upon the Members of the League.
+
+However, under the Covenant, the State in whose favor the decision or
+award had gone _might_ lawfully have resorted to war against the State
+refusing to carry out the decision or award, {51} provided merely that
+it delayed resort to war for three months thereafter, under the
+language of Article 12 of the Covenant.  In other words, if an award or
+decision was made and a State refused to carry it out, the successful
+party, under the Covenant agreed merely to refrain from war against the
+defeated party for a period of three months.
+
+The Protocol (Article 4(6)), as interpreted by the Report to the
+Assembly, still permits the successful party to use force in such a
+case but only when the Council authorizes the use of force, such
+authorization being brought within the terms of Article 13 of the
+Covenant.
+
+It is true that the Council is first to exert its influence to secure
+compliance with the decision or award and that, if the use of this
+influence fails, the Council may then propose measures short of force
+before authorizing the use of force itself.
+
+Indeed, the Report[2] says that the Council may "institute[3] against
+the recalcitrant party collective sanctions of an economic or financial
+order."  If this means that the Signatories to the Protocol are
+obligated to employ such sanctions in such a case when called on by the
+Council, I can only say that, in my opinion, the statement is not
+warranted by any language of the Protocol or of the Covenant.
+
+However, the final effect of these provisions is that with the
+authorization of the Council the successful party _may_ use force to
+execute a judicial decree or arbitral award.
+
+Furthermore, the Report to the Assembly says that in such a case the
+defeated party could not resist, and that, if it did resist, it would
+become an aggressor against whom all the Sanctions of the Protocol
+might be brought into play.
+
+To see how this would work out, let us suppose that in an arbitration
+between State A and State B, State A obtained an award to the effect
+that State B should pay to it the sum of twenty million dollars.
+Thereupon State B refuses to pay the award and, notwithstanding the
+efforts of the Council, maintains that {52} refusal, thereby violating
+its agreement in the Protocol (and in the Covenant also) to carry out
+any such award.
+
+Thereupon the Council authorizes State A to use force to collect the
+money.  It is no answer to this to say that the Council would not
+authorize the use of force, for we are considering what may be done,
+not what would be done.  State A then begins to use force and, if State
+B resists at all, the entire machinery of the Sanctions of the Protocol
+can be brought into play and these include military and naval Sanctions.
+
+Of course, such a result would be highly improbable, but I submit that
+it ought to be legally impossible.  The provisions of the Protocol in
+this regard go very much farther than they ought to go, and very much
+farther, in my opinion, than the States of the world are now willing to
+go.
+
+The case which I have supposed is one of a money judgment.  A more
+difficult case would be one where the award was for the recovery by
+State A of certain territory in the possession of State B which State B
+thereupon refused to give up.  In such a case there is more to be said
+for the use of force than in the other.
+
+In any case, the refusal of a State to carry out the judicial decision
+or the arbitral award after solemnly agreeing to do so is a very
+serious breach of a treaty; but the idea of the authorization of force
+to execute such a decision seems to me to present a question of the
+very gravest character.  My own view is against it.  I am inclined to
+think that the penalty of expulsion from the League under the fourth
+paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant should be the utmost
+permissible.
+
+Whether this view of mine be correct or not, certainly the countries of
+the world are not going to accept any provision by which they will be
+obligated in advance to join in measures to enforce the result of an
+arbitration or of a litigation before the Permanent Court.  Whether
+they will agree to a provision permitting the successful party, so to
+speak, to execute the decision or award on its own account is perhaps
+doubtful; but certainly they will go no farther, if as far; and this is
+one of the provisions {53} of the Protocol which will have to be
+changed before the document becomes a reality.
+
+Subject to the foregoing exceptions, the general covenant under Article
+2 of the Protocol not to go to war is, in my opinion all inclusive.  It
+obviously includes all cases where there is a dispute of international
+cognizance, for in such cases all parties agree upon a final and
+binding method of decision and agree to carry out the decision.  It
+also includes, as pointed out previously,[4] all cases in which one
+State would seek to change by force the _status quo_, or to prevent by
+force a lawful change in the _status quo_.[5]  Neither the lawful
+maintenance of the _status quo_ nor its lawful change would come within
+the general exceptions of Article 2.
+
+Furthermore, the covenant against war in Article 2 would also exclude
+the going to war about domestic questions.  All that any Signatory
+agrees to do regarding such a question, if, when raised
+internationally, it is not settled by negotiation, is to discuss it
+before the Council or the Assembly.[6]  A State which did that would
+have fulfilled all its obligations regardless of any action or inaction
+as to the domestic question itself; and an attack made on it by any
+other State would then be aggression under the terms of the Protocol.
+There is no exception.  As the Report to the Fifth Assembly says,[7]
+"Our purpose was to make war impossible, to kill it, to annihilate it."
+This, if lived up to by the Parties, the paper does, as among them.
+
+The detailed provisions of Articles 7 to 10 inclusive of the Protocol
+confirm the views above expressed.  The provisions of these Articles
+will be more specially considered in connection with the question of
+Aggression.[8]
+
+
+
+[1] See the discussion on this point, _infra_, p. 72, _et seq._
+
+[2] Annex C, p. 180; see also pp. 168, 169.
+
+[3] The word in the French text of the Report is "déclencher."
+
+[4] p. 45.
+
+[5] An instance of this would be if States A and B agreed on a cession
+of territory from one to the other, to which State C objected.
+
+[6] Under Article 11 of the Covenant.
+
+[7] p. 208, _infra._
+
+[8] p. 54, _et seq._
+
+
+
+
+{54}
+
+CHAPTER X.
+
+AGGRESSION.
+
+The preamble to the Protocol asserts that a war of aggression is an
+international crime.  I have discussed above[1] the agreement of the
+parties to the Protocol not to resort to war except in defence against
+aggression or in aid of defence against aggression or perhaps in
+execution of a judicial decision or arbitral award.  This is the
+general covenant of Article 2 of the Protocol.  It is this resort to
+war, contrary to the terms of the Protocol, which is the chief breach
+of the Protocol against which its chief Sanctions are ordered.
+
+By Article 10 of the Protocol[2] every State which resorts to war in
+violation of the undertakings either in the Covenant or in the
+Protocol, is an aggressor.
+
+It will be necessary to consider only the provisions of the Protocol
+forbidding a resort to war, for it would be impossible to have a resort
+to war contrary to the Covenant which would not also be a resort to war
+contrary to the Protocol.  The provisions of the Protocol go farther
+than those of the Covenant in this regard.
+
+It is true that there are in the Covenant certain engagements by
+Members of the League not to resort to war.  These are found in
+Articles 12, 13 and 15; but it is unnecessary to consider them in
+detail, for any resort to war contrary to the provisions of those
+Articles of the Covenant would clearly also be contrary to the general
+engagements of Article 2 of the Protocol.
+
+The Report to the Assembly[3] seems to infer that a violation of the
+obligation of Article 10 of the Covenant on the part of all Members of
+the League to respect the territorial integrity and political
+independence of other Members might be a resort to war not included in
+the language of the Protocol; but I think that {55} any such forcible
+violation would be within the terms of the Protocol also.
+
+It is against the aggressor that the Sanctions of the Protocol are set
+up and accordingly the provisions of the Protocol defining an aggressor
+and the procedure for determining what State is an aggressor are of the
+utmost consequence.
+
+The definitions of an aggressor under the Protocol are complex in their
+language though not in their fundamental idea, which is that aggression
+is a resort to war instead of to arbitration.[4]  The language of the
+definitions is obscured by certain presumptions (Article 10) and by the
+procedure laid down for the determination of an aggressor.
+
+The general definition of an aggressor in the first paragraph of
+Article 10 of the Protocol I have mentioned above.  It is well,
+however, to quote it in full:
+
+    "Every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings
+    contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an
+    aggressor.  Violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarized
+    zone shall be held equivalent to resort to war."
+
+
+This is the general definition of principle.  It relates back in its
+meaning to Article 2 of the Protocol, the general engagement not to
+resort to war.  Beyond that, it makes the violation of the rules for an
+agreed demilitarized zone the equivalent of a resort to war, the two
+are assimilated.
+
+The first question that arises regarding this general definition is
+whether the words "resort to war" mean necessarily an actual and
+technical state of war only, or whether they include all acts of
+violence and force, even if such acts did not in a particular case
+result in an actual state of war, because, for example, not resisted.
+
+The view of the Report to the Assembly[5] in this matter is that such
+acts of violence are included in the expression.  I am {56} inclined to
+agree with this view, though as a mere matter of language an argument
+to the contrary is possible.
+
+Suppose, however, that there is an actual state of war; how is it to be
+determined which one of the two[6] belligerents is the aggressor?
+
+The Protocol attempts to meet this difficulty by laying down two
+different methods of determining the aggressor.  One is by creating
+certain presumptions, which I shall discuss later; the other is for the
+case in which none of the presumptions is applicable.
+
+In this case, that is to say, in the absence of the presumptions, it is
+for the Council to determine the aggressor and, in order to come to
+such a determination, the Council must act unanimously under the
+general rule of Article 5 of the Covenant.
+
+I have no doubt of this conclusion, which is the conclusion of the
+Report to the Assembly.  It is true that the language of Article 10 of
+the Protocol is not as clear as it might be, since the duty and power
+of the Council to determine the aggressor are not directly stated, but
+rather to be inferred from the language.
+
+What Article 10 of the Protocol says as to this in its last paragraph
+but two[7] is that, apart from the cases when there is a presumption,
+
+    "if the Council does not at once succeed in determining the
+    aggressor, it shall be bound to enjoin upon the belligerents an
+    armistice, and shall fix the terms, acting, if need be, by a
+    two-thirds majority and shall supervise its execution."
+
+
+{57}
+
+So that in those cases where the presumptions hereafter considered do
+not arise, it is the duty of the Council to determine the aggressor; it
+must act unanimously in coming to such a determination; as the Report
+to the Assembly says,
+
+    "Where there is no presumption, the Council has to declare the
+    fact of aggression; a decision is necessary and must be taken
+    unanimously";
+
+and, if the Council is not unanimous, it _must_ enjoin an armistice
+upon the belligerents.
+
+Before coming to the procedure before the Council, I now enumerate
+those cases in which, because of the existence of certain facts, a
+State is "presumed" to be an aggressor; any such presumption can be
+upset only by the _unanimous_ decision of the Council to the contrary.
+These cases are as follows:
+
+    1. If hostilities have broken out and a State has refused to
+    submit the dispute to the procedure for pacific settlement
+    contemplated by the Protocol.
+
+    2. If hostilities have broken out and a State has refused to
+    comply with a decision, award, etc.
+
+    3. If hostilities have broken out and a State has disregarded a
+    determination that the matter in dispute is a domestic matter
+    _and_ has not submitted the question for discussion by the
+    Council or Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant.
+
+    4. If hostilities have broken out and a State has violated the
+    provisional measures against mobilization, etc., contemplated
+    by Article 7 of the Protocol (and which will be mentioned
+    later).
+
+
+Certainly the theory of the first three of the four instances above
+mentioned is the theory stated by Herriot in his speech before the
+Assembly that the State that refuses arbitration is an aggressor.[8]
+In other words, law is substituted for force.
+
+Now it is to be observed that in each of the four foregoing {58} cases
+_hostilities must have broken out_ and in each one of them at least one
+additional fact must have occurred.
+
+In other words, given certain facts, there is a presumption as to the
+aggressor; but who is to say, how it is to be determined, whether or
+not at any particular moment these facts exist?  It is not sufficient
+to say that the facts will be open and notorious, for they might not
+be.  Indeed, if we look critically at each one of what I may call the
+required facts, we find that doubt might arise.
+
+Take the primary fact, which is always required for any presumption to
+arise; this fact is that hostilities shall have broken out.  One's
+first impression might be that this could never be a matter of doubt;
+but this is not so.  Take the case of Corfu, for example.  Italian
+officers had been murdered in Greece by somebody; various individuals
+had been killed at Corfu by a bombardment of the Italian fleet.  Had or
+had not hostilities broken out within the meaning of Article 10 of the
+Protocol?  Surely the point is at least debatable.
+
+Take the next required fact, that a State has refused to submit a
+dispute to the procedure for pacific settlement.  It is very easy to
+suppose cases where there would be a difference of view as to this.  A
+State might claim, for example, that the matter was a domestic question
+which it did not have to submit to the procedure for pacific
+settlement.  There might be a difference of opinion as to whether or
+not the matter had been actually decided by the tribunal.  It is not at
+all uncommon in municipal law for parties to disagree as to whether a
+particular question is or is not _res judicata_; there have been many
+litigations over this very point; and there have been international
+arbitrations in which it was raised.[9]
+
+Similarly, difference of opinion might exist as to whether or not a
+State had disregarded a determination that the matter in dispute was
+domestic or as to whether or not a State had {59} submitted a question
+for discussion under Article 11 of the Covenant.  Such differences of
+opinion could easily arise because of the non-formulation in precise
+terms of just what the dispute was.  Parties do not always agree as to
+what it is they are differing about and they may in fact be at the same
+time differing as to more than one question.  As to whether or not a
+State had violated the provisional measures against mobilization
+contemplated by Article 7 of the Protocol, that document itself
+recognizes that such a question would require investigation, and in
+such case and in such case only the Protocol gives the Council the
+power to determine the question of fact, acting by a two-thirds
+majority.
+
+So we come back to the situation that a presumption as to the aggressor
+can exist only if certain facts exist; and that the existence of one or
+more of these facts may very likely be in doubt or dispute and that,
+with one exception, there is no procedure for determining such
+questions of fact so as to be able to say with certainty that the
+presumption _does_ exist.
+
+What is the answer to this difficulty?  If we look at the matter
+technically, we must conclude that none of the presumptions created by
+Article 10 of the Protocol can ever arise unless the facts[10] were
+admitted by the two[11] disputants.  Such an admission would mean, in
+other words, that one of the parties openly admitted that it was an
+aggressor.
+
+If the facts were in dispute or, in other words, if the existence of
+the presumption was in dispute, the Council could not determine the
+aggressor on the basis of a presumption requiring the unanimous vote of
+the Council to upset it; but would be required to determine the
+aggressor under the general provision which was first mentioned, under
+which no presumption exists and when the Council is required by
+affirmative unanimous vote to determine the aggressor.
+
+Here again, however, there would unquestionably be disputed facts; that
+is to say, unless one of the parties said that it was the aggressor, it
+would require an elaborate investigation to {60} determine under the
+language of Article 10 of the Protocol whether a State _had_ resorted
+to war in violation of its undertaking, or _had_ violated the rules
+laid down for a demilitarized zone.  It is utterly impossible to
+suppose that the Council could ever immediately determine the aggressor
+under such circumstances by unanimous vote; and such determination
+_must_ be immediate.  The language of the text is: "at once"; and in
+the French: "dans le plus bref délai."
+
+Let us look at the matter concretely and take up the question of
+procedure, supposing an actual case before the Council.  There is a
+crisis; hostilities have or are supposed to have broken out; there are
+two States which either are or are thought to be at war; the Council
+meets.  Not only under the realities of the situation, but under the
+express language of the Protocol, the Council must act instantly; the
+peace of the world is at stake.
+
+Now, under those circumstances, there could be only two situations.
+One would be when some Great Power, either by open and announced
+defiance or by its refusal even to meet with the Council, proclaimed
+itself an aggressor.  In that case of course neither the language of
+Article 10 nor any other language would make any difference.  The other
+situation would be that the two States were there before the Council,
+each claiming that the other was in the wrong, each disputing the
+allegations of fact made by the other's representative.  In such case
+clearly no presumption could arise and in such case the Council could
+not ever immediately determine the aggressor by unanimous vote.  The
+mere fact that it would require time to examine into the truth of the
+respective allegations would prevent this.  So the Council, by the
+compelling facts of the situation and indeed in accordance with the
+strictest construction of the Protocol, would be constrained to declare
+and would declare an armistice.
+
+Any dispute as to what State was guilty of aggression prior to that
+time would be put over for subsequent adjustment; the armistice would
+be laid down and would be obeyed.  Of course, in theory, it could be
+violated and the violator of the armistice {61} would become the
+aggressor; but a State that was going to refuse or violate the
+armistice, knowing the procedure, would doubtless not go to the Council
+at all.
+
+So, to my mind, the vital part of the procedure laid down by Article 10
+for determining an aggressor is found in the provision giving the
+Council the power immediately to declare an armistice; and, under the
+procedure, this, in my judgment, is the only power that the Council
+would ever exercise, except in the case suggested, in which a State
+itself denounced itself as an aggressor.
+
+I am aware that the framers of the Protocol are not in accord with
+these views.  In their opinion, the presumptions of Article 10
+establish "an automatic procedure which would not necessarily be based
+on a decision of the Council."  They say that where a presumption has
+arisen and is not unanimously rejected by the Council, "the facts
+themselves decide who is an aggressor" and otherwise that "the Council
+has to declare the fact of aggression."
+
+I can only say that their conclusions, while perhaps admissible as a
+mere matter of language and nothing but language, take no account of
+the inevitable certainty that there will always be at least two views
+of what the facts are; to put it from a legalistic viewpoint, tribunals
+do not deal with facts; they deal with what lawyers call facts, but
+which are merely conclusions based on such evidence as is available.
+This sort of a "fact" is arrived at only after a hearing or a trial of
+some kind; and to suppose that the Council could ever conduct such a
+hearing, and at the same time come to a unanimous and immediate
+conclusion is to suppose a contradiction in terms.[12]
+
+So while from the language of Article 10 of the Protocol difficulty may
+arise in determining an aggressor under its provisions (for there might
+in any case be a disputed or doubtful question of fact; and the Council
+under the provisions of the Covenant would in general have to act
+unanimously) the Protocol provides a solution of any such difficulty by
+saying that if the Council does not immediately determine the
+aggressor, it _must_ {62} (the language is mandatory) proceed to enjoin
+an armistice, to fix its terms and to supervise its execution, acting
+for these purposes by two-thirds majority.  Then the Protocol provides
+that any belligerent which refuses the armistice or violates it shall
+be the aggressor.
+
+These provisions regarding an armistice seem to me to meet any possible
+objection that might be raised to the absence of a more complete and
+detailed system of determining in fact and in law what State is an
+aggressor.
+
+No matter what the presumptions were or even what procedure was laid
+down, it is clear that, after hostilities in any given case had
+actually commenced, there would be enormous difficulty for any tribunal
+whatever in laying down conclusively which State was the aggressor.
+After all, the vital thing is to prevent war; and the opening of
+hostilities, to be immediately followed by an armistice, would not be
+very much of a war.  So I regard these provisions as to an armistice as
+the most ingenious [Transcriber's note: ingenuous?] and, except its
+statements of principle, the most important of all the provisions of
+Article 10 of the Protocol.
+
+The power given to the Council to formulate an armistice would be the
+power exercised if hostilities broke out rather than the power of
+adjudging the aggressor; unless the aggression was openly admitted,
+which would mean that one of the parties to the Protocol really defied
+the others; and, in that case, of course, it would defy the terms of an
+armistice as well as any other terms.  But in any other case a new
+consideration would immediately arise.  The Council would formulate an
+armistice and in the absence of an open defiance by one State, or
+possibly by a group of States, of all the others, the armistice would
+introduce a new situation, a situation in which hostilities were _not_
+going on; and human experience shows that, given an armistice, the
+recommencement of hostilities on the old grounds is a real
+impossibility.
+
+In the view that I take, the Sanctions of the Protocol become less
+important in the light of its provisions as to the determination of an
+aggressor, for it is only against an aggressor that the {63} main
+Sanctions of the Protocol can be brought into play; and these
+provisions for determining the aggressor really mean that an aggressor
+is a State or a combination of States which has finally and
+deliberately determined to begin war and to carry it on regardless of
+its most solemn engagements to the contrary.  In other words, there
+could be no war as between the parties to the Protocol without a
+wilful, wanton and wicked disregard of its provisions.
+
+
+
+[1] p. 50, _et seq._
+
+[2] First paragraph.
+
+[3] Annex C, p. 156 at p. 186.
+
+[4] I use the word here in its largest sense.
+
+[5] Annex C, p. 156 at p. 187.
+
+[6] Of course there may be more than two.
+
+[7] The reason why I have used in regard to Article 10 of the Protocol
+this uncouth language, "its last paragraph but two," is that in the
+English text of Article 10 there is a textual error which is extremely
+confusing.  Article 10 really consists of five paragraphs, and the
+second of these five paragraphs has two sub-heads or sub-paragraphs
+numbered 1 and 2.  The third paragraph of Article 10, in referring to
+these two sub-heads of the second paragraph calls them "paragraphs 1
+and 2."  In other words, the first words of what is here referred to as
+the third paragraph of Article 10 (the paragraph which I call "the last
+paragraph but two") read as follows: "Apart from the cases dealt with
+in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present Article."  They should read
+something like this: "Apart from the cases dealt with in sub-heads 1
+and 2 of the second paragraph of the present article."  Compare the
+French text which is perfectly clear: "Hors les hypothèses visées aux
+numeros 1 et 2 du présent article."  See the English and French Texts
+of Article 10 in full, _infra_, pp. 144, 145.
+
+[8] September 5, 1924.
+
+[9] _e. g._, the Pious Fund case reported in the Hague Arbitration
+Cases, p. 1, and the Interest Case between Russia and Turkey, _op.
+cit._, p. 260.  These two cases are also in Stowell and Munro's
+International Cases, Vol. I, p. 58, _et seq._
+
+[10] I mean the facts from which the presumption as to the aggressor
+would arise.
+
+[11] I assume only two, for convenience.
+
+[12] In the Dogger Bank case, the Commission of Inquiry sat for more
+than two months.  Hague Court Reports, Scott, p. 403.
+
+
+
+
+{64}
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+THE JAPANESE AMENDMENT.
+
+During the framing of the Protocol of Geneva by the Committees of the
+Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations, the language of the document
+was changed by what has been called the Japanese Amendment; and while
+the provisions which constitute that amendment as part of the Protocol
+have been generally considered in the previous discussion in connection
+with the application of various Articles, still that amendment attained
+such prominence in the discussions in the Fifth Assembly and since,
+that it may well be separately reviewed.
+
+The Japanese Amendment related to domestic questions, questions within
+the domestic jurisdiction of a State; and before coming to its terms,
+it will be well to see what the situation as to these domestic
+questions is under the Covenant, taken by itself.
+
+The Covenant, as we have seen,[1] provided for the submission to the
+Council of all disputes between Members of the League which were not
+otherwise adjusted by some kind of agreement or by some kind of
+Tribunal.  In regard to those disputes submitted to the Council, the
+eighth paragraph of Article 15 of the Covenant said that if one of the
+parties claimed, and if the Council found, that the dispute related to
+a question which by international law was entirely within the
+jurisdiction of a State, the Council should so report and make not even
+a recommendation regarding a settlement.  In other words, if the
+dispute related to a domestic question and one of the parties to the
+dispute raised the point, the Council could not proceed at all to make
+any recommendation which would bind the parties to the dispute or
+either of them to anything whatever.
+
+At the same time, under the Covenant, by Article 11, either the Council
+or the Assembly might consider _any_ circumstance tending to threaten
+or disturb international peace.  The language in this regard is
+general.  It means no more than discussion and {65} suggestion, except
+perhaps publicity; but under this language of Article 11, the parties
+were left with their liberty of action in the matter; and indeed, under
+the Covenant, the Members of the League entered into no commitment
+against going to war in the case of a dispute about a domestic question.
+
+So we may sum up the provisions of the Covenant as to a dispute
+regarding a domestic question by saying that while such a dispute might
+go to the Council,[2] still the Council,[2] if the point were raised,
+could make no recommendation about it; but the Council (or the
+Assembly) might take the matter into consideration as a subject of
+discussion when it threatened peace, with the hope and duty to preserve
+the peace if possible; but in regard to this the parties remained free
+to act as they might themselves finally determine.
+
+The Protocol of course, as we have also seen,[3] makes a great change
+in this situation because it contains a general agreement by the
+parties not to resort to war, an agreement which is applicable to
+disputes about domestic questions to the same extent that it is
+applicable to disputes about international questions; this general
+agreement not to go to war includes all questions of both kinds.
+
+Furthermore, the Protocol makes it very much more likely that disputes
+between Members of the League will go for a hearing to a Committee of
+Arbitrators than to the Council; we have seen[4] that the likelihood of
+any dispute going to the Council under the new régime, for
+consideration on the merits, is remote.  The functions of the Council
+regarding disputes are to some extent delegated to the Permanent Court
+of International Justice, but even more largely to Committees of
+Arbitrators agreed on or appointed _ad hoc_.
+
+Now the Japanese amendment is not strictly a single amendment; it is in
+two parts.  The first part is the last (third) paragraph of Article 5
+of the Protocol, reading as follows:
+
+{66}
+
+      "If the question is held by the Court or by the Council to be a
+    matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, this
+    decision shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the
+    Council or by the Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant."
+
+
+We must bear in mind that by the second paragraph of Article 5, any
+Committee of Arbitrators, in its consideration of a dispute is subject
+to the same limitations concerning a dispute about a domestic question
+as are provided for the Council.  The method of so limiting the
+Committee of Arbitrators is that the question of law is decided by the
+Permanent Court of International Justice, and if that Court decides
+that the question is domestic, the Committee of Arbitrators simply so
+declares and proceeds no farther.
+
+What the paragraph of Article 5 above quoted says is that although
+neither the Council nor a Committee of Arbitrators may consider a
+dispute regarding a domestic question if the point is raised, still
+none the less the Council or the Assembly, under Article 11 of the
+Covenant, may consider the situation in its bearing upon the peace of
+the world.  Now such consideration under Article 11 of the Covenant
+would have been possible without this statement, so that, to my mind,
+this portion of the Japanese amendment makes no change in that regard.
+The paragraph does not change the legal situation at all, but simply
+makes explicit what was otherwise implied.
+
+The other portion of the Japanese Amendment is the clause which is
+added to sub-head 1 of the second paragraph of Article 10, beginning
+with the word "nevertheless."
+
+In order to see just what this other portion of the Japanese Amendment
+is, I cite here the second paragraph of Article 10 (omitting certain
+phrases not here material) with the words of the Japanese Amendment
+italicised:
+
+    "In the event of hostilities having broken out, any State shall
+    be presumed to be an aggressor, unless a decision of the Council,
+    which must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare:
+
+{67}
+
+    1. If it * * * has disregarded a unanimous report of the Council,
+    a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognizing that the
+    dispute between it and the other belligerent State arises out of
+    a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic
+    jurisdiction of the latter State; _nevertheless, in the last case
+    the State shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not
+    previously submitted the question to the Council or the Assembly,
+    in accordance with Article 11 of the Covenant_."
+
+
+The language of Article 10 of the Protocol is quite involved, I have
+already discussed it at some length,[5] endeavoring to show that its
+real effect differs greatly from the theory of its framers, a theory
+borne out, perhaps, by the language of Article 10 considered as
+language only.  I sum up _that theory_ as follows:
+
+Laying down the general principle that a State which resorts to war
+contrary to the Covenant or to the Protocol is an aggressor, and
+prescribing a general procedure by which it is for the Council to
+decide, unanimously of course, whether such a violation has taken place
+(and in the absence of such unanimous decision to declare an armistice)
+none the less Article 10 limits or qualifies this general procedure by
+enumerating certain classes of cases in which the facts would
+_supposedly_ be so open, so notorious, so impossible to question, that
+they would create a presumption as to the State which was the
+aggressor; and such presumption could be upset only by unanimous vote
+of the Council against it.
+
+I repeat that this is the theory of MM. Benes and Politis; it is not
+mine.
+
+My own view, heretofore expressed, is that in no case could the
+supposedly notorious facts create a presumption because there would
+always be a difference of opinion as to those very facts themselves.
+
+But proceeding on the other theory, and looking only at the language,
+the presumptions are important; here it is necessary to refer to only
+one of them.
+
+{68}
+
+This presumption arises when a State has "disregarded" a decision by
+the Council, by the Court or by the Arbitrators following the Court,
+that a dispute arises out of a domestic question _and has also not
+submitted_[6] the question to the Council or the Assembly for
+discussion, under Article 11 of the Covenant.
+
+Before the Japanese amendment, the text was that the presumption arose
+when a State "disregarded" such a decision to the effect that the
+dispute arose out of a domestic question.
+
+Now let us see what the difference between the two is, that is to say,
+the difference between the text _prior_ to the Japanese amendment and
+the text _with_ the Japanese amendment.
+
+In either case the decision on the question of law has gone against the
+complaining State.  The proper tribunal has decided that the question
+is a domestic question and that decision in either case is and remains
+conclusive.
+
+In either case, the State "disregarding" that decision and going to war
+is an aggressor.  We may see that this is so by supposing that the
+entire original text as well as the text of this portion of the
+Japanese amendment was stricken out.[7]  Then, clearly, the State would
+be an aggressor under Article 2 of the Protocol and under the first
+paragraph of Article 10; and there is nothing either in the original
+text that we are considering or in the Japanese addition thereto which
+changes that conclusion.[8]
+
+The difference then between the original text and the text with the
+amendment is this: in the original text, a complaining State
+disregarding such a binding decision as to the domestic character of
+the question was _presumed_ an aggressor if it went {69} to war _either
+before or after_ the consideration of the matter by the Council or the
+Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant.  Under the text as amended,
+such a State is _presumed_ to be an aggressor only if it resorts to war
+_before_ such consideration under that Article 11.
+
+In other words, the difference between the original and amended texts
+would arise only in the following circumstances: State A brings a
+dispute against State B before a tribunal (Council, Committee of
+Arbitrators, etc.).  The tribunal renders a binding decision that the
+dispute arises out of a domestic question.  The complaining State,
+bound by that decision, then brings the matter before the Council or
+the Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant and no adjustment
+results; thereupon the complaining State resorts to war.
+
+Under those circumstances, in the original text, the State resorting to
+war would be _presumed_ an aggressor, a presumption to be upset only by
+the unanimous vote of the Council against it.  Under the amended text,
+the complaining State would be an aggressor, but there would be no
+presumption; and the determination that it was an aggressor would come
+on to be made by the Council, which would either have to vote
+unanimously that the complaining State was an aggressor, or else
+proclaim an armistice.
+
+I confess that it is difficult to see why such a refined and subtle and
+technical distinction about the presumption of aggression should be
+made.  If there is a binding decision by a tribunal that a dispute
+arises out of a domestic question, surely a complaining State, under
+the principles of the Protocol, is bound not to go to war, because it
+is legally wrong in its claim and has been so adjudged.  Just why a
+State going to war under such circumstances should be _presumed_ to be
+and be an aggressor if it goes to war _before_ a discussion of the
+matter subsequent to the decision and not be _presumed_ to be an
+aggressor but merely be an aggressor, if it goes to war _after_ such
+discussion, is not logically to be explained.
+
+However, the foregoing discussion resulting in such an {70} obscure and
+technical distinction is, as I intimated, based solely on the language
+of the Article and on the legalistic theory of its framers as to its
+meaning and result.  Earlier in my discussion,[9] I pointed out that I
+do not agree with the conclusions of MM. Benes and Politis, for I do
+not think that the presumptions laid down in Article 10 of the Protocol
+would ever have any material bearing on the decision reached by the
+Council.  In other words, repeating in substance what I said before, I
+believe that the power to declare an armistice is the only power under
+Article 10 of the Protocol which the Council would ever exercise,
+except in a case where a State itself denounced itself as an aggressor.
+
+Furthermore, it seems to me that the very intricacies of the language
+of Article 10 of the Protocol are themselves a very real indication
+that my conclusion is correct.
+
+As a matter of reality, I cannot see that the Japanese amendment in any
+conceivable case would cause any difference in what would happen.  We
+must suppose that war has commenced, for unless there is a resort to
+war, Article 10 of the Protocol is out of the picture entirely.
+Assuming then a resort to war, there are, under Article 10, with all
+its provisions and exceptions and presumptions, only two real
+possibilities:
+
+    a. There is an open and admitted and defiant aggression.
+
+    b. There is a difference as to the facts and it follows that it is
+    not possible for the Council _at once_ to reach a unanimous
+    conclusion in the case; accordingly the Council declares an
+    armistice which each belligerent must accept or become an
+    aggressor.
+
+
+What these two cases come to is obviously one of two alternatives,
+namely, either some State is going on with its fighting, with its war,
+regardless of the Council and regardless of the Protocol, or else there
+is an armistice and the fighting stops.  Under the first circumstance,
+the provisions as to presumptions and as to the decisions of the
+Council are alike of no {71} consequence; and, in the second case, the
+war ends with an armistice as soon as it commences.
+
+The drafting of Article 10 of the Protocol is unfortunately obscure;
+but when the language of the whole Japanese amendment is carefully
+looked at, it seems to me that it certainly adds nothing to the powers
+of either the Council or the Assembly in considering disputes arising
+from domestic questions, and that the legal right of any State to
+determine and control its own domestic matters remains unquestioned;
+indeed, it may be said to remain more unquestioned than it is now; for,
+under the Protocol, that right cannot be questioned by the League,
+either in Council or in Assembly; it cannot be questioned by the
+Permanent Court or by Arbitrators; and it cannot be questioned by war.
+All that is possible is friendly discussion and consideration under
+Article 11 of the Covenant and that, so far as Members of the League
+are concerned, is possible now.
+
+Of course it might be argued that the various possible decisions and
+presumptions under Article 10 of the Protocol might make some
+difference as to the charging of the costs of the aggression under
+Article 15 of the Protocol; but the possibilities involved are too
+remote to be worthy of discussion.
+
+
+
+[1] _Supra_, p. 18, _et seq._
+
+[2] or the Assembly.
+
+[3] _Supra_, p. 50, _et seq._
+
+[4] _Supra_, p. 23, _et seq._
+
+[5] pp. 54-63.
+
+[6] The text says "previously."  Presumably this means before
+hostilities broke out.  It might mean before the "disregard" of the
+decision that the dispute was domestic.  Precisely how a State could
+"disregard" such a decision, except by resort to war, is not very
+clear.  The French is "qui aura passé outre à un rapport," etc.
+
+[7] That is, all the text above quoted as part of sub-head 1 of the
+second paragraph of Article 10, beginning "has disregarded a unanimous
+report of the Council."
+
+[8] The Japanese proposal regarding this Article as it first stood, was
+to strike out all the words referring to the "domestic jurisdiction,"
+etc.; the addition of the clause commencing "nevertheless" was a
+compromise; it would have been a much simpler result and a better one,
+I think, to have omitted the whole clause, as the Japanese proposed.
+
+[9] pp. 61, 67.
+
+
+
+
+{72}
+
+CHAPTER XII.
+
+SANCTIONS.
+
+The Protocol of Geneva provides for sanctions or penalties for its
+breach by a Signatory.
+
+Before considering the main sanctions which are set up by the Protocol,
+it may be mentioned that there are certain provisional measures which
+may be taken which fall short of the chief sanctions.
+
+Under Article 7, in the event of a dispute between Signatories they
+agree, pending its settlement, not to increase their armaments, take
+mobilization measures, etc., and the Council is given the right, upon
+complaint being made, to make enquiries and investigations as to the
+maintenance of these agreements, and to decide upon measures in regard
+thereto, so as to end a threatening situation.  Similar powers are
+given to the Council under Article 8 concerning threats of aggression
+or preparations for war, and in all these cases, the Council may act by
+a two-thirds majority.
+
+The preventive measures which the Council may take as to such
+preliminary matters are not precisely defined.  It is to be pointed
+out, however, that a State violating the engagements of Article 7 or
+Article 8 would not be an aggressor against which the main sanctions of
+the Protocol could be directed, assuming that hostilities had not
+broken out.  Accordingly, the measures which could be "decided upon" by
+the Council would perhaps be limited to those of warning, of advice and
+of publicity; certainly they could not be measures of force; and in my
+opinion, they could not go as far as sanctions of any kind, economic or
+otherwise; the General Report[1] speaks of "the evacuation of
+territories" as a possibly appropriate measure; this indicates that the
+"measures" are to be "taken" by the State guilty of violation of the
+agreements mentioned; _certainly_ there would be no obligation on the
+part of any Signatory to take any steps against a violation of these
+agreements of Articles 7 and 8; but the {73} language is very vague and
+all doubt should be set at rest by changing it particularly as the
+Council may decide by a two-thirds vote.
+
+In considering the main sanctions provided by the Protocol, the first
+point to be emphasized is that they cannot come into play until a state
+of war, in the real sense, exists; hostilities must have broken out, so
+that the world is confronted with fighting actually taking place.  It
+is true that there is a theoretical exception to this in the fact that
+a violation of the rules of a demilitarized zone is equivalent to a
+resort to war; but this exception is more apparent than real for the
+violation of a demilitarized zone would be only a brief prelude to
+hostilities.
+
+The second condition precedent to the application of the sanctions is
+the determination of the aggressor.[2]  And in any case the
+determination by the Council as to which State is the aggressor must
+have taken place before the sanctions are to be applied.
+
+This is laid down in the last paragraph of Article 10, which provides
+that the Council shall "call upon" the Signatories to apply the
+sanctions.[3]  As the sanctions contemplated by the Protocol are _in
+theory_ merely a development of the sanctions contemplated by Article
+16 of the Covenant, it is interesting to note that this preliminary
+calling by the Council upon the States to apply the sanctions
+introduces a new system, at least a system which develops from the view
+taken by the Assembly under Article 16 of the Covenant in 1921; for in
+the elaborate resolutions then adopted,[4] it was stated, among other
+things, that the Council was to give merely an "opinion" as to whether
+there had been a breach of the Covenant by resort to war, but that it
+was for each State to decide "for itself" whether or not its duty to
+apply the sanctions provided by Article 16 of the Covenant had arisen.
+
+{74}
+
+The reason for this development is easy to see.  Even though the
+sanctions of the Protocol may in theory be the same as those of Article
+16 of the Covenant, _they are applicable to a very different state of
+facts_.  The sanctions of Article 16 of the Covenant were to be applied
+to any Member of the League which resorted to war in disregard of
+certain provisions of the Covenant in Articles 12, 13 and 15, and the
+difficulty of determining whether or not, in a given case, a resort to
+war _was_ a violation of those other Articles of the Covenant was not
+solved, particularly as the Covenant does not preclude a resort to war
+in _every_ case.  Under the Protocol, however, every resort to war by
+the parties to it is forbidden (except by way of defense or in aid of
+defense or perhaps in execution of a judgment of some tribunal), and a
+procedure which, in theory at least and probably in practice, would
+always determine the aggressor, is provided.  For if my view is
+correct, an "aggressor" is a State which openly and wilfully defies the
+other Signatories when summoned by the Council under Article 10 of the
+Protocol.  Consequently, it is now for the Council, upon the
+determination of the aggressor, to call for the application of the
+sanctions.
+
+Of course, in all cases of a serious decision such as this would be,
+the Council is not an outside body "calling" upon Governments to do
+something.  The words used lead one almost unconsciously to visualize
+the Council as a sort of entity like a Court, laying down a rule of
+conduct for some one; but this is a false vision; for in any such case
+the Council is a group of representatives of Governments agreeing, in
+the first instance, as such representatives of their own Governments,
+upon a course of action to be taken by those very Governments pursuant
+to a treaty obligation.  We must think of any such action by the
+Council as meaning primarily that the British representative and the
+French representative, and so on, agree that the respective countries
+which they represent will follow a certain course of action in accord.
+If the Council were composed of all the Members of the League, it would
+be proper to describe its action under such a provision as this as
+being a conference of the parties to the {75} treaty to decide as to
+what, if anything, those parties should do, and to come to such
+decision unanimously, if any decision is to be reached.  It is only as
+to the Governments which are not represented on the Council that the
+Council "calls" for action; so far as the Governments represented on
+the Council are concerned, what they do is to _agree_ upon a course of
+action.
+
+In theory, as I have said, the sanctions of the Protocol are no more
+than a development of those of Article 16 of the Covenant.  The
+language of the Protocol indeed, in Article 11, incorporates the
+provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant by reference.
+
+No provisions of the Covenant have been more debated since it was
+written than those of Article 16.  In 1921, various amendments to this
+Article of the Covenant were proposed, none of which has gone into
+force; and, as mentioned above, the Assembly then adopted various
+interpretative resolutions regarding Article 16 which, with the
+proposed amendments (one of which was textually modified in 1924), are
+_provisionally_ in force.[5]
+
+It is unnecessary to attempt any detailed consideration of the exact
+legal effect of Article 16 of the Covenant at the present time in view
+of these interpretative resolutions and proposed amendments; in general
+they are intended to make the system of the economic blockade more
+flexible in its application so far as may be consistent with the
+purpose of the first paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant, namely,
+to institute a complete economic and financial boycott of an aggressor.
+
+This first paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant says also that the
+aggressor shall _ipso facto_ be deemed to have committed an act of war
+against the other Members of the League; this provision does not create
+a state of war; it simply gives the other Members of the League the
+right to consider themselves at war with the aggressor if they see fit;
+this provision is supplemented by the language of Article 10 of the
+Protocol which gives to any signatory State called upon to apply
+sanctions the privilege of exercising the rights of a belligerent, if
+it chooses.
+
+{76}
+
+Paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant made it the duty of the
+Council to "recommend" to the various governments what armed forces
+they should severally contribute for use in protecting the covenants of
+the League.
+
+Now what Article 11 of the Protocol does in its first paragraph is to
+say that the obligations of all States in regard to the sanctions
+mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant will,
+when the call for the application of the sanctions is made by the
+Council, immediately become operative, in order that such sanctions may
+forthwith be employed against the aggressor.
+
+So far as the first paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant is
+concerned--the economic and financial blockade--I do not see that this
+first paragraph of Article 11 of the Protocol adds anything to that
+first paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant, even when the former is
+read in connection with the second paragraph of Article 11 of the
+Protocol.
+
+It is true that in the resolutions about the economic weapon in the
+Assembly of 1921, it was recognized that from practical points of view
+the application of the economic pressure cannot be made equally by all
+countries.  But undoubtedly, subject to the practical difficulties
+mentioned, a definite obligation exists in Article 16 of the Covenant
+to impose economic sanctions against the aggressor, and, as I said, in
+my judgment this obligation is not changed by the Protocol; but it can
+now become an operative obligation only if and when the Council says so.
+
+The vital question regarding sanctions under the Protocol arises under
+the second paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant in connection with
+the first and second paragraphs of Article 11 of the Protocol.  Indeed,
+it is because of this second paragraph of Article 11 of the Protocol
+that the question regarding the use of the British Fleet has been
+raised in England.
+
+Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Covenant reads as follows:
+
+      "It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend
+    to the several Governments concerned what effective naval,
+    military or air force the Members of the League shall severally
+    {77}
+    contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the
+    covenants of the League."
+
+
+Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Protocol read as follows:
+
+    "As soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to
+    apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article
+    10 of the present Protocol, the obligations of the said States,
+    in regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs
+    1 and 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant, will immediately become
+    operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed
+    against the aggressor.
+
+    "Those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the
+    signatory States to co-operate loyally and effectively in support
+    of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in resistance to
+    any act of aggression, in the degree which its geographical
+    position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow."
+
+
+On its face, paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Protocol merely
+interprets paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant; but
+unquestionably _it greatly changes it_.  Under the provisions mentioned
+of the Covenant, the Council had merely the duty of recommendation as
+to forces to be contributed by Members of the League.  Undoubtedly
+under Article 16 of the Covenant, paragraph 1, any Member of the League
+had the right, if it chose, to consider itself at war with an
+aggressor, but equally under that paragraph any Member of the League
+had the right, if it chose, _not_ to consider itself at war with an
+aggressor.  Consequently there was no duty whatever under that Article
+16, not even a moral duty, in my judgment, on the part of any Member of
+the League to contribute any armed forces whatever.  The Council had
+the duty (under Article 16, Paragraph 2, of the Covenant) of making a
+recommendation; but it was merely a recommendation, and there was no
+obligation of the Member of the League to which the recommendation
+applied; there was merely a possible privilege to the Member of the
+League to which the recommendation applied--and that is a very
+different thing.
+
+Now, let us look at paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Protocol, quoted
+above.  Each signatory State is "to cooperate loyally and {78}
+effectively" not only "in support of the Covenant," but "in resistance
+to any act of aggression."  Well, certainly resistance to an act of
+aggression means force and this fact is not qualified but emphasized by
+the words: "in the degree which its geographical position and its
+situation as regards armaments allow."  I grant that these words have a
+qualifying effect in some cases.  They would mean, for example, that if
+Denmark had no army, she could not be under any obligation to use
+infantry.  But they also refer to the other side of that picture, that
+the British do have a navy, that is their particular situation as
+regards armaments, a very particular situation; and under this Article,
+as I read it, the British would be bound "loyally and effectively" to
+cooperate in resistance to an act of aggression in the degree which
+their particular naval situation allowed.
+
+Furthermore, paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Protocol says that the
+"obligations * * * in regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned"
+not only in paragraph 1 but also in paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the
+Covenant "will immediately become operative."  This indicates that
+there are military, naval and air sanctions to be employed and that the
+parties to the Protocol are under obligations to employ them.
+
+Now, it is no answer to this to say that as to the _extent_ of the
+armed forces to be used, the signatory State has its own discretion;
+and it is true that there would be no international command, there
+would be no turning over of the forces of one country to the General
+Staff of another or to an international Staff of all; however, even
+that did not take place during the first three years of the World War,
+except with specific detachments.  So, for example, the British could
+say that they would send five destroyers or ten cruisers under their
+own Admiral, or the Grand Fleet if they chose; but clearly it would be
+bad faith for them to say with this commitment that they would not send
+even a gunboat.
+
+I am entirely satisfied that these provisions greatly extend the
+provisions of the Covenant; for the first time[6] there is {79}
+introduced in the League system a definite military
+commitment--definite in the sense that it is obligatory, and not in the
+sense that it is defined as to extent of force.[7]
+
+It may be argued that the first paragraph of Article 13 of the Protocol
+looks somewhat the other way, but I do not think that it does.  That
+paragraph merely provides that the parties to the Protocol, if they see
+fit, may give to the Council "undertakings"[8] as to the military
+forces which they would use in applying the sanctions of the document.
+There is no obligation to give any such undertaking; it is purely
+optional with each State.  Doubtless if such an undertaking was given
+and accepted by the Council, the State giving it would at least not
+have to do anything more in the way of military action than provided in
+the undertaking; but as the giving of the undertaking is optional, the
+fact of its not having been given would not, in my opinion, limit or
+qualify the obligation "interpreted" in the second paragraph of Article
+11 of the Protocol.
+
+I point out here that the word "contingent" in the first paragraph of
+Article 13 of the Protocol does not relate to the obligatory character
+of the sanctions but to the necessary uncertainty as to the future
+existence of the breach required for their applicability (see the
+French text); and the debate in the Third Committee and more
+particularly the Report unanimously adopted by the Assembly, in its
+discussion of Article 11,[9] make it clear that the above
+interpretation as to the military sanctions is correct; uniform in
+obligation, they are flexible in application.
+
+Consideration of the third paragraph of Article 11 of the Protocol in
+connection with the third paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant tends
+to support the views already expressed.  Without further elaboration, I
+call particular attention to the last clause of the paragraph of the
+Protocol mentioned and cite {80} the respective paragraphs of the two
+documents in parallel columns:
+
+  _Paragraph 3 of Article 16 of        _Paragraph 3 of Article 11 of
+  the Covenant._                       the Protocol._
+
+  "The Members of the League           "In accordance with paragraph
+  agree, further, that they will       3 of Article 16 of the
+  mutually support one another         Covenant the signatory States
+  in the financial and economic        give a joint and several
+  measures which are taken             undertaking to come to the
+  under this Article, in order to      assistance of the State attacked
+  minimize the loss and                or threatened, and to give each
+  inconvenience resulting from the     other mutual support by means
+  above measures, and that they        of facilities and reciprocal
+  will mutually support one            exchanges as regards the
+  another in resisting any special     provision of raw materials and
+  measures aimed at one of their       supplies of every kind, openings
+  number by the Covenant-breaking      of credits, transport and transit,
+  State, and that they                 and for this purpose to take all
+  will take the necessary steps to     measures in their power to
+  afford passage through their         preserve the safety of
+  territory to the forces of any       communications by land and by sea
+  of the Members of the League         of the attacked or threatened
+  which are co-operating to            State."
+  protect the covenants of the
+  League."
+
+
+There are certain other provisions of the Protocol regarding sanctions
+which should be mentioned at least for the sake of completeness.
+
+It is the Council[10] which declares that sanctions are at an end and
+that "normal conditions be re-established" (Article 14).
+
+To the "extreme limit of its capacity," all costs of an aggression are
+to be borne by the aggressor (Article 15).  The language concerning the
+extent of the liability involved is very sweeping, going much farther
+than the categories of damage mentioned in Annex I of the Reparation
+clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.
+
+{81}
+
+The plans to be drawn up by the council for the detailed application of
+the economic and financial sanctions are to be "communicated" to the
+Signatories--in other words, they are advisory, not binding (Article
+12).
+
+Here it should be said that the final words of this Article 12 mention
+"the Members of the League and the other signatory States."  These
+words imply the possibility of States signatory to the Protocol which
+are non-Members of the League.  As pointed out above,[11] no such
+possibility exists, in my opinion.  Even if such a theoretic
+possibility existed, it would be absurd to suppose that any State would
+sign the Protocol, with obligations going beyond those of the Covenant,
+while still being outside the privileges of the Covenant; however, the
+question is of no special importance here.
+
+The main sanctions of the Protocol, _as among the Parties to the
+Protocol_, may be thus summed up: a war of aggression is an
+international crime; a Signatory which either avows itself an aggressor
+or refuses an armistice after hostilities have broken out, commits this
+crime; and accordingly the other Signatories, upon the call of the
+Council, unite in the defence of the Signatory which is not the
+aggressor, according to their respective capacities; which means that
+if and to the extent that they are able to do so, they contribute by
+force to the defence against the aggression, as well as by economic and
+financial measures.
+
+But in view of the other agreements of the Protocol regarding pacific
+settlement of disputes and its covenants against war, the chief
+sanctions of the Protocol would never come into play against a
+Signatory, unless that State finally decided to defy the public opinion
+of the world and to make into a scrap of paper its own solemn written
+pledge.
+
+
+
+[1] Annex C, p. 156 at p. 196.
+
+[2] If there were two parties to the conflict, either one or both might
+be aggressor.  See Article 11 of the Protocol.
+
+[3] I think this means upon _all_ the Signatories.  The system of the
+Protocol is flexible as to the _extent_ to which the Sanctions are to
+be applied by a particular signatory; but all Signatories come under
+the same legal obligation.
+
+[4] On October 4, 1921.  Official Journal, October, 1921, Special
+Supplement No. 6, p. 24.
+
+[5] See League of Nations Official Journal, October, 1921, Special
+Supplement No. 6, pp. 14-15, 24-26, also October, 1924, Special
+Supplement No. 21, p. 9.
+
+[6] Except as to the possibilities of Article 10 of the Covenant, as to
+which see _infra_, p. 84, _et seq._
+
+[7] The debates in the Third Committee of the Fifth Assembly are of
+interest in this regard.
+
+[8] The French is "engagements."
+
+[9] Annex C, p. 156 at p. 197, _et seq._
+
+[10] by unanimous vote.
+
+[11] p. 10, _et seq._
+
+
+
+
+{82}
+
+CHAPTER XIII.
+
+SEPARATE DEFENSIVE AGREEMENTS.
+
+The general character of the Protocol of Geneva is such that separate
+defensive agreements between the parties to it lose substantially all
+of their former importance.  The Protocol itself is, among other
+things, a general defensive agreement; and under such an agreement,
+faithfully lived up to, substantially the only part that could be
+played by separate agreements would be to make more detailed and more
+regional, perhaps, in their obligation and execution, the general
+obligations binding all signatories.
+
+The possibility of these separate defensive agreements is mentioned in
+Article 13 of the Protocol.  It is laid down that they must be public;
+furthermore, action under them cannot take place until the Council "has
+called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions."  Finally, there
+is a most significant provision which illustrates the relatively
+unimportant character of such separate agreements under the
+Protocol--any such agreement must remain open to all Members of the
+League which desire to accede thereto.
+
+This last mentioned provision takes away every possible idea that such
+defensive agreements under the Protocol could be anything like the
+former "defensive" alliances.  Obviously, a defensive agreement which
+is open to any Member of the League is merely a part of the general
+agreement; particularly is this so when the performance of the
+agreement depends and is conditioned upon the request of the Council.
+
+Indeed, in view of the other provisions of the Protocol, it is very
+difficult to see any substantial difference between these so-called
+defensive agreements and the undertakings[1] which, by Article 13,
+States which are signatory to the Protocol may voluntarily give to the
+Council regarding the armed forces which might be used in the
+application of the sanctions.  I say that the {83} two things are
+similar for this reason: if in a given case the Council decides that
+the military sanctions are to be applied any Signatory is then
+entitled, at least if it chooses, to use the whole of its armed forces
+against the aggressor.  This being so, the use of a specified portion
+of these forces in any given case comes to just the same thing whether
+it arises from the general agreement to apply sanctions or from a
+particular undertaking with the Council or from a particular agreement
+with another Signatory.
+
+We may go to this length in thinking of these defensive agreements
+hereafter; in view of the fact that they must be public that any Member
+of the League may adhere to them and that they cannot be performed
+until the Council of the League says so, there could be in such a paper
+no effective provision which would go beyond the engagements under the
+Protocol itself.
+
+Article 13 of the Protocol says that these separate agreements may be
+acceded to by any Member of the League of Nations.  This language would
+include a Member of the League which was not a signatory of the
+Protocol.  Under Article 13, it is only the States signatory to the
+Protocol which may make separate agreements.  The point is doubtless of
+no real importance; but it cannot be intended that these separate
+agreements, if any be made, shall be acceded to by States other than
+those bound by the Protocol, for any such separate agreement would be
+in reality a paper subsidiary to the Protocol.
+
+
+
+[1] Whether these "undertakings" would have the same legal quality as a
+treaty is at least doubtful.
+
+
+
+
+{84}
+
+CHAPTER XIV.
+
+THE PROTOCOL AND ARTICLE TEN OF THE COVENANT.
+
+It is to be remembered that in this portion of the discussion
+consideration is given only to the relations _inter se_ of the
+Signatories to the Protocol.
+
+As among these States the famous Article 10 of the Covenant will have
+lost all its significance.
+
+Article 10 of the Covenant has two distinct aspects.  The more
+important of these is the undertaking by the Members of the League to
+"preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and
+existing political independence" of other Members.  Because of these
+guarantees Article 10 was objected to in this country and in Canada
+chiefly for the reason that it might involve the use of armed force by
+the guarantor States.  The further idea that this use of armed force
+would necessarily come into play upon a decision of the Council of the
+League of Nations was largely fallacious and was practically removed by
+the resolution of the Assembly regarding Article 10.[1]
+
+The other side of these guarantees of Article 10, which has perhaps not
+always been very well appreciated, is that the obligation of a
+guarantor State under Article 10 _may_ be very limited indeed and may
+even be nothing at all, even in the case of a wilful attack.  Article
+10 goes only to two things, territorial integrity and political
+independence.  If an aggressor State respects these two things it can
+do otherwise what it chooses, so far as the guarantor States are
+concerned.  For example, under Article 10 alone _and taking nothing
+else into consideration_, one State could attack another, destroy every
+building in the country, blow up every mine, and lay waste every field,
+and then retire, saying: The territorial integrity of the country
+attacked is now preserved, and its remaining inhabitants retain their
+full political independence.  Under such circumstances, no guarantor
+State under Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations would
+be obliged to do anything.
+
+{85}
+
+Now I say that under the Protocol any significance of Article 10, as
+among the parties to the Protocol, has disappeared; clearly this is so.
+Article 10, so to speak, waited, or at least might wait till the end of
+the war.[2]  If the aggressor State did not in the Treaty of Peace or
+otherwise annex any territory and left the attacked State independent,
+Article 10 did nothing at all.[3]  But the Protocol commences to work
+even before any war commences and certainly at its commencement; there
+must be no attack.[4]  It is not a question of the final result of the
+attack; it is merely a question of the existence of the aggression; and
+it is _then_ that all the other parties to the Protocol come to the
+defence of the attacked State.  The lesser Article 10 of the Covenant
+is swallowed up in the greater Protocol.
+
+The other aspect of Article 10 of the Covenant was the undertaking by
+each Member of the League to _respect_ the territorial integrity and
+political independence of the other Members.  This, of course, is an
+undertaking in regard only to the acts of the State giving it.  Such a
+self-denying clause would be implied in the Covenant if it were not
+expressed and equally, of course, it is inherent in the Protocol.
+
+Indeed, in the Protocol it was thought necessary to insert a provision
+regarding the political independence and territorial integrity, not of
+the attacked State but of the aggressor.  All that is left now of
+Article 10, so far as the signatories to the Protocol _inter se_ are
+concerned, is to be found in the second paragraph of Article 15 of the
+Protocol, which says that the territorial integrity and the political
+independence of the aggressor State shall not be affected by the
+application of the sanctions of the Protocol.
+
+A development of the Covenant by which Article 10 becomes unimportant,
+except as a measure of protection _for_ an aggressor, is perhaps the
+most remarkable and unforeseen of all possible developments.
+
+
+
+[1] September 25, 1923.  Technically, the resolution was not adopted,
+the vote not being unanimous, 29 in favor, one, Persia, opposed, and 22
+absent or abstaining.  League of Nations Official Journal, October,
+1923, Special Supplement No. 11, p. 34.
+
+[2] _i. e._, so far as the Guarantor States are concerned.
+
+[3] In the debates of the First Committee of the Fourth Assembly it was
+asserted that "no forcible invasion" is possible without a violation of
+Article 10 of the Covenant; but in certain circumstances war is
+permissible under the Covenant (Article 15, Paragraph 7); and with a
+permissible war, there could be a permissible invasion.  See Oppenheim,
+3rd edition, Vol. 1, page 739.
+
+[4] _i. e._, no aggression, in the sense intended by the Protocol.
+
+
+
+
+{86}
+
+CHAPTER XV.
+
+THE PROTOCOL AS TO NON-SIGNATORIES.
+
+At the beginning of this discussion[1] it was pointed out that upon the
+coming into force of the Protocol, there would, in theory at least, and
+from the point of view of its provisions, be three classes of Powers in
+the world, to wit, the parties to the Protocol, the Members of the
+League not parties to the Protocol and the non-Members of the League,
+the last named of course being also not parties to the Protocol.
+
+It should also be mentioned again that the possibility of this second
+class of States, namely, the Members of the League not parties to the
+Protocol, is a temporary possibility only.  For certainly if the
+Protocol comes finally into force, its provisions will in due course be
+embodied in the Covenant, as indeed is contemplated by Article 1 of the
+Protocol; and thereupon those Members of the League who have not
+ratified the Protocol will either become parties to the amended
+Covenant or will, under the provisions of Article 26 of the Covenant,
+cease to be Members of the League.
+
+However, temporarily, there will doubtless be certain Members of the
+League of Nations who do not ratify the Protocol and the relation of
+these States to others during this provisional period is to be
+considered.
+
+So far as concerns the relations _inter se_ of this temporary or
+provisional class of States (those which remain Members of the League
+without ratifying the Protocol) it may be said at once that these
+relations, from this point of view, will continue to be governed by the
+Covenant and by the Covenant alone.  The Protocol does not make or
+purport to make any change in this regard; so that, as among those
+States, we might envisage during this temporary period the theoretic
+possibility of a war not forbidden by the Covenant, just as we might
+envisage the possibility, during that period, of a dispute among those
+Powers remaining {87} unsettled.  It is, I suppose, fair to add that
+both of these speculations are here of juristic interest only.
+
+Similarly, the relations of non-Members of the League _inter se_ will
+continue, as they are now, to be governed neither by the Covenant nor
+by the Protocol.  These States would not have bound themselves by
+either document and so far as concerns their relations with each other,
+neither the Covenant nor the protocol attempts to regulate them.
+
+The only provision of either document which has any bearing in this
+regard is to be found in Article 17 of the Covenant, which says in
+substance that in case of a dispute between States not Members of the
+League, such non-Members shall be invited to become _ad hoc_ members
+upon conditions laid down by the Council.  If they refuse, the Council,
+under the last paragraph of Article 17 of the Covenant, may take
+measures toward the prevention of hostilities; but these measures would
+be in the nature of good offices or mediation only and could be
+accepted or rejected by the two non-Members of the League as they saw
+fit; they could decline them wholly and go to war at their pleasure.
+
+There is indeed one question which suggests itself to the mind under
+Article 17 of the Covenant concerning a dispute between two non-Members
+of the League.  Suppose they should be both invited for the purpose of
+settling the dispute to become members _ad hoc_, and one of them
+accepted the invitation and the other refused, would the dispute then
+be considered as being a dispute between a Member and a non-Member?
+The real answer to this question probably is that on issuing the
+invitation the Council would make it a condition that both parties to
+the dispute should accept it.  The legal answer as to the possibility
+of the case supposed is a matter of some doubt.  I incline to the view
+that the invitation contemplated by Article 17 of the Covenant in a
+case when the dispute is between two non-Members, is a joint invitation
+and a joint invitation only.  I do not think that it is intended that a
+non-Member of the League may temporarily seek the protection and
+guarantees of the Covenant against another non-Member.
+
+{88}
+
+However, the question is of interest only from the point of view of the
+meaning of language; if the possibility should arise, it would
+doubtless be taken care of by the Council.
+
+Another and also comparatively unimportant point may be here noticed
+and that is in regard to the relations between the signatories to the
+Protocol and the Members of the League not signatory thereto, another
+phase of the temporary situation heretofore considered.  As to this, it
+may be said very briefly that such relations would continue to be
+governed wholly by the Covenant.  The Members of the League which do
+not ratify the Protocol could not during this temporary period be
+regarded as being in any way affected by what, as to them, would be in
+the nature of proposed amendments to the text of the Covenant itself.
+These non-Signatories of the Protocol would therefore continue to look
+only to the Covenant for the regulation of their relations with any
+Member of the League.  The Protocol does not contemplate a League
+within a League; it simply contemplates, during this temporary phase, a
+situation where certain Members of the League had assumed certain
+obligations without any constraint or effect whatever upon such Members
+as might not choose to assume them.
+
+The really vital question is as to the effect of the Protocol and of
+the Covenant upon non-Members of the League in their relations with
+Signatories to the Protocol.
+
+Even assuming that the plans now proposed for the admission of Germany
+to the League are carried out, there will remain for a considerable
+period two Great Powers, the United States and Russia, outside the
+League; and there are two other States of occasional international
+importance, the admission of which to the League is not, so far as I
+know, presently contemplated, these being Mexico and Egypt.
+
+Accordingly, the possible effect of the Covenant and the Protocol on
+non-Members of the League is one of very great consequence.  It is a
+question which is being actively discussed in so far as it may have a
+bearing on the relations between Great Britain and the United States.
+
+{89}
+
+It is unquestionably true that the Protocol may have a real effect on
+non-Members of the League.  Of course there is a legal formula which
+correctly says that a treaty cannot bind States not parties thereto,
+_res inter alios acta_; but even in the strictest legal sense this
+formula is only part of the truth in international matters.  Any one
+who questions this will be convinced by reading Roxburgh's
+International Conventions and Third States.[2]  A treaty between State
+A and State B may harm State C or it may benefit State C, as the Treaty
+of Versailles benefited Denmark by the cession of Slesvig, though
+Denmark was a neutral and not a party to the Treaty of Peace.[3]
+
+Let us consider the matter first from the point of view of the
+Covenant.  There are sanctions which may be applied under the Covenant
+and the application of these sanctions might affect a non-Member of the
+League either because they were applied against that particular
+non-Member or because they were applied against some other State.
+
+It is rather curious that this question has not been very much
+considered under the Covenant; interest in it has been greatly revived
+by the Protocol; but the possible realities under the Covenant are, it
+seems to me, _in some respects_ more important than those under the
+Protocol alone.
+
+In considering this question it is well to look at it from the concrete
+point of view with a specific instance or example before us.
+
+The sanctions of the Covenant[4] are an economic and financial
+blockade.  These sanctions may be applied either as against a Member of
+the League which resorts to war contrary to the provisions of the
+Covenant or they may be applied against a non-Member of the League
+which resorts to war against a Member after refusing to settle its
+dispute with that Member (Covenant, Article 17, paragraph 3).
+
+Suppose at the time of the Corfu dispute, Italy had gone on {90} to war
+against Greece, and the British had deemed it their duty to apply an
+economic blockade against Italy.
+
+Suppose another case; suppose that Russia attacked Poland and that the
+British deemed it their duty to apply the economic blockade against
+Russia.  We are speaking here in both of these cases merely of the
+provisions of the Covenant; and the question raised is what attitude
+might the United States take in such a case as one of these.
+
+I have suggested two instances for the reason that there is a slight
+difference between them.  That difference lies in the fact that in the
+first instance supposed, Italy, as a Member of the League, would have
+agreed to the application of the sanctions; they would have been
+applied by the British as a result of Italy breaking her treaty.  But
+in the second instance, Russia never having agreed to the Covenant, the
+sanctions would be applied by the British solely as a result of the
+British agreement to apply them and not because of any legal breach by
+Russia, however morally wrong her attack on Poland might be.
+
+I do not think that the difference between the two supposed cases would
+make any difference legally in the attitude that the United States
+might take in the one case or the other.  The blockade would arise from
+the provisions of the Covenant in either case.  To that document the
+United States is not a party.  In each case our correct legal position
+would be that our international rights were not limited by the
+agreement of others.
+
+Accordingly, let us consider the case of the blockade of Russia by the
+British, recalling that, under the hypothesis, Russia has attacked
+Poland and that the economic and financial blockade of the first
+paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant has come into full force.  Now,
+so far as that blockade cut off relations between Great Britain and
+Russia, it would be none of our business.  But the language of Article
+16 includes
+
+    "the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal
+    intercourse between the nationals (residents)[5] of the
+    Covenant-breaking State (Russia, under the hypothesis;
+    {91}
+    see Covenant, Article 17) and the nationals (residents) of
+    any other State, whether a Member of the League or not."
+
+
+What this would mean would be that all intercourse between Russia and
+the United States would be cut off by the British Fleet so far as they
+could do it.  The questions suggested are: Could the United States
+protest; and would we protest?
+
+The first question is a question of law.  Would the United States have
+the right under international law to object to such a blockade?  As a
+preliminary to the answer to this question, it must be pointed out that
+a blockade of Russia by the British might result in two different
+situations.  Russia could undoubtedly regard such a blockade as being
+war, and if she did, no other country, neither the United States nor
+any other country, could then object to the blockade.  The reason for
+that is that, without going into the much debated question as to the
+"legality" of war, under present international law it can at least be
+said that a neutral may not object to the belligerent status of two
+countries at war with each other.  Of course a neutral may object to
+the manner of carrying on the war, or to particular incidents during
+the fighting; a neutral may protest that a particular blockade is not
+binding because not effective, and so on; but these things are not
+immediately important here.  The important thing here is that if the
+blockade resulted in war, we could not object to the fact of war and
+its incidents.
+
+On the other hand, a blockade _might_ continue merely as a blockade,
+without the technical status of war arising.  This is, I suppose, not
+very likely in the case of the blockade of a Great Power, but still it
+is legally possible under the terms of the Covenant.
+
+The situation created would be new under international law.  It would
+have to be considered as arising wholly from treaty and consequently
+not a situation binding on Third States, but as to them simply a
+situation in which their rights were governed by the principles of
+international law.  Under these rules, the nearest approach to such a
+situation is the so-called pacific blockade of the past.
+
+{92}
+
+In my view, which is the view of the vast majority of writers on the
+question, Third States do not have to respect a pacific blockade.  (See
+Oppenheim, 3rd edition, Vol. II, page 56.)  Accordingly, it seems to me
+that the United States would be entitled to regard such a blockade as
+not affecting her commerce with Russia.[6]
+
+If the United States took such a position, as probably she would, the
+practical value of such a blockade would be very largely diminished,
+for I do not think there is any doubt that the Members of the League
+would admit that the blockade only applied to such Third States outside
+the League of Nations as might acquiesce in it.
+
+Under the Protocol, precisely the same legal situation as to the
+blockade of Russia exists as under the Covenant and the same
+conclusions would follow.  However, the probability of such a blockade
+under the Protocol, without an actual state of war resulting, is much
+less than under the Covenant.  The Protocol provides definitely for
+military sanctions and it can hardly be doubted, as a matter of
+reality, that if the sanctions of the Protocol commenced to be applied
+to a State in or out of the League and that State resisted, the result
+would be war as between that resisting State and at least those of the
+Members of the League, like Great Britain, that were taking a real part
+in the application of the sanctions.
+
+And, as pointed out above, the legal situation is much clearer in the
+case of war than in the case of this economic and financial boycott of
+the Covenant.  It would be much "easier"[7] to go to war than it would
+be to apply the economic and financial sanctions alone.  The world has
+gotten more or less used, in a legal sense, to the legalities and
+illegalities of war; but there are no precedents as to the
+corresponding situations[8] in such a {93} blockade as has been
+suggested; and it is, above all, custom and general agreement that make
+international law.
+
+I may sum up my views on this point as follows:
+
+If under either the Covenant or the Protocol, the economic sanctions
+were applied either against a Member of the League or a non-Member of
+the League and the application of these sanctions did not result in
+war, the United States legally could, and very likely would, contend
+that any resulting blockade was not applicable to the United States and
+the commerce and intercourse of her residents; and this view would be
+accepted by the Members of the League as being legally sound; and the
+result of course would be that the practical effect of any such
+blockade would be very much weakened.
+
+However, if the application of the sanctions either of the Covenant or
+of the Protocol resulted in war between the State against which the
+sanctions were applied and the States applying them, the United States
+could not object to that state of war, although of course it would have
+its rights as a neutral in such a war as in any other war and these
+neutral rights would not be affected by any provision of either the
+Covenant or the Protocol.
+
+The next consideration is the possible application of sanctions against
+the United States.  From the foregoing review of the provisions of the
+Covenant and of the Protocol it is evident that such action against the
+United States is possible from a theoretic point of view.  It is,
+however, important here to repeat that there is no possible sanction in
+either paper against a non-Member of the League except after war breaks
+out, a war which the non-Member of the League has commenced against a
+Member or against a Signatory to the Protocol as the case may be.  In
+other words, the sanctions of either paper could only become operative
+against the United States after the United States had gone to war
+against a Member of the League.
+
+Continuing the theoretic view of the matter, it would be idle to
+discuss any difference between one kind of sanction and another in such
+a case.  If the United States went to war with State A, a Member of the
+League, and any other State undertook to {94} apply economic or any
+other sanctions on behalf of State A and against the United States, it
+would here be regarded simply as an act of war, creating two or more
+enemies instead of one.
+
+Perhaps from the common sense outlook, such contingencies are not
+worthy of discussion, for what they would mean if they happened would
+be either that there was another world war, in which case the
+provisions of no document would be very important, or else there would
+be some kind of a minor war such as that between the United States and
+Spain, in which the other Powers of the world would find some way of
+keeping their hands off, regardless of legalistic arguments based on
+the Covenant or on the Protocol or on both.
+
+It may be suggested that in the foregoing discussion I have omitted any
+thought of the possibility of war between the United States and Japan;
+but I have kept that possibility in mind.  Its theoretical
+possibilities, so far as they might exist by reason of the United
+States attacking Japan have been considered above.
+
+Let us consider the opposite possibility, an attack by Japan on the
+United States.
+
+Suppose, then, that Japan attempted to raise before the League the
+question of the treatment of her nationals by the United States; there
+is no way in which such a question could be considered by the League
+except under the vague general clauses of Article 11 of the Covenant;
+all that the League could do, even in theory, would be to ask if the
+United States cared to discuss the matter; and the United States would
+presumably decline to take part in any such discussion.  Further, it
+may be supposed that the United States would not have the slightest
+desire to commence a war in the matter as the United States is
+satisfied with the situation as it is--it is Japan which is
+dissatisfied.  The United States would merely refuse to discuss a
+question which it deemed domestic.
+
+Suppose then that Japan went to the length of declaring war on the
+United States for this cause.  While immaterial from the point of view
+of the United States, I cannot see that such a war would violate the
+Covenant in its letter; of course it would {95} violate its spirit of
+peace; but I do not think there is any specific provision of the
+Covenant which, in terms, forbids it.
+
+The Protocol in this regard goes farther in its language.  The general
+covenant not to resort to war in Article 2 includes such a resort to
+war, not only against a signatory, but also against a State which
+"accepts all the obligations hereinafter set out"; in other words,
+against a sort of _ad hoc_ adherent to the Protocol (Article 16), but
+we may assume that these last words would not include the United States.
+
+The preamble asserts that a war of aggression constitutes a violation
+of the solidarity of the members of the international community, and
+also an international crime.  Article 10 of the Protocol says that
+every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings
+contained in the present Protocol is an aggressor; and in Article 8 the
+document goes to its greatest length, so far as non-Signatories are
+concerned, by saying that the signatory States undertake to abstain
+from any act which might constitute a threat of aggression against
+another State.  These last words "against another State" are the
+important words, because they include every State in the world, not
+only a Signatory.  Furthermore, in that same Article 8 any Signatory
+can bring to the notice of the Council its view that "another State" is
+making preparations for war, which of course would include another
+Signatory.
+
+So it is perhaps arguable that under the Protocol an attack by a
+Signatory against a State which is not a Signatory might be an
+aggression and that the sanctions of the Protocol might be brought into
+play in favor of the non-Signatory.  If that view be correct, then, in
+the case supposed, namely, an attack by Japan upon the United States,
+it would seem that, if the matter were brought before the Council by
+_any_ Signatory (as it undoubtedly would be) the Council _might_
+declare Japan to be an aggressor under the Protocol; and it would then
+become the duty of the other Signatories to apply against Japan all the
+sanctions of the Protocol, at least unless the United States objected
+to such a course and preferred to go it alone.
+
+{96}
+
+However, there is at least grave doubt as to all this.  The provisions
+of Article 16 of the Protocol and of Article 17 of the Covenant rather
+indicate that a State which pays no attention to an invitation to
+become an _ad hoc_ Member or Signatory takes its chances as they exist
+_dehors_ the Covenant or the Protocol.  I think myself that this is the
+better view.  To suppose otherwise would be to suppose that States
+outside the League (or the Protocol) had all the advantages of States
+within, and none of the burdens or obligations, a difficult thing to
+envisage.
+
+So, on the whole, I conclude that an attack by Japan upon the United
+States because of a "domestic" or other question would permit the
+Members of the League, both under the Covenant and under the Protocol,
+to be interested onlookers and nothing more.
+
+
+
+[1] _Supra_, p. 13.
+
+[2] Longmans, Green & Co., 1917.
+
+[3] A subsequent treaty between Denmark and the Principal Allied Powers
+confirmed the cession.  A. J. I. L. Supplement 1923, Vol. XVII, p. 42.
+
+[4] Article 16.
+
+[5] The discussions in the Assembly of Article 16 of the Covenant show
+that the word "nationals" is to be read as "residents."
+
+[6] See Moore's Digest, Vol. VII, pp. 135-142.
+
+[7] That is, in the sense that there would to some extent be known and
+applicable rules of conduct for all States.
+
+[8] Innumerable questions of difficulty as to private contracts might
+be suggested; but I am thinking here of relations between States.
+
+
+
+
+{97}
+
+CHAPTER XVI.
+
+THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE.
+
+Under Article 17 of the Protocol, a Disarmament Conference to which all
+States of the world are to be invited is to meet at Geneva on June
+15th, 1925.  It is made the duty of the Council to draw up a general
+programme for reduction and limitation of armaments to be laid before
+the Conference and to be communicated to the various Governments not
+later than March 15th, 1925.  The provision to this effect says that
+the Council shall give due regard to the undertakings of the Protocol
+regarding sanctions, but the preparation of this general programme is
+in substantial accord with Article 8 of the Covenant.
+
+The Assembly adopted a quite elaborate resolution[1] regarding this
+Conference.  This resolution makes seven or eight suggestions in
+general terms for the agenda of the Disarmament Conference.  While the
+resolution was adopted, it was pointed out in the discussion that the
+Council has a perfectly free hand in the matter and that the requests
+of the Assembly regarding the agenda were nothing more than requests.
+There is perhaps no occasion to go over them in detail, but one or two
+points may be mentioned.
+
+The matter of demilitarized zones figures in this Assembly list.  As
+such zones are specifically mentioned in Articles 9 and 10 of the
+Protocol there is no doubt that this is one of the questions that would
+be on the agenda.  Another suggestion of the Assembly for the agenda of
+the Conference is "the control and investigation of armaments in the
+contracting States."  Such control and investigation were a part of the
+so-called American Plan,[2] and in view of the fact that the control
+and investigation of the armaments of the former enemy States are now
+before the League, there can be no doubt that this matter also would be
+on the agenda of the Disarmament Conference prepared by the Council.
+
+{98}
+
+It was pointed out previously[3] that the date of the Disarmament
+Conference may be postponed.  It now seems very likely that it will
+be.[4]  Indeed, I feel that there was a little too much optimism at
+Geneva in fixing the date as early as June 15th, 1925, involving the
+completion of a programme by March 15th.
+
+Of course, in getting up a programme of general disarmament, and an
+agenda for the Conference on Disarmament, it is true that the Council
+would have available the advice of the Permanent Military Commission
+and of the different bureaus of the Secretariat.  Even so, the task of
+finishing these preparations in three or four months, getting them
+approved by the Council and also by at least the chief of the
+interested Governments, is one that seems to me to be very doubtful of
+accomplishment.
+
+It is perhaps not generally understood what an amount of work and how
+great a number of questions are involved in such discussions as are
+proposed.  There are something like twenty European Governments that
+are vitally interested.  Some of these Governments have quite different
+points of view and all of them have their military, naval, air and
+chemical programmes in force and subject to the control of their own
+Parliaments.[4]  The idea of a general reduction of armaments involves,
+at least provisionally, the recasting of the entire military system of
+Europe.  It is complicated by numerous possibilities of regional
+agreements which in themselves would create new problems of complexity.
+
+Furthermore, it is not generally recognized that a great deal of the
+work of such a Conference as this has to be done in advance.  Doubtless
+no Conference in plenary session ever drew up a paper; no Legislature
+ever wrote a law.  The utmost that any such body can do is to consider
+concrete proposals drawn up often by one individual, but certainly
+always by very small groups.  I venture to say that ten lawyers could
+hardly draw a {99} deed without appointing a sub-committee.  The
+success or failure of the Disarmament Conference will very largely
+depend on the care and judgment used in the preparations for its
+meeting.
+
+We can look back on the Washington Conference and see the truth of some
+of these observations there.  That Conference dealt with only a portion
+of the field of naval armaments, among only five powers, only three of
+which had any substantial naval force.  The naval staffs of the
+countries particularly interested had to prepare in advance elaborate
+studies, and yet with all this the Conference lasted nearly three
+months.  Certainly the task of a general conference on disarmament is
+very much greater than that of the Washington Conference was.
+
+It took nearly four months to draw up the Treaty of Versailles, which
+is by far the most elaborate and complex international agreement ever
+written.  In the circumstances this was a remarkably short time.  The
+most serious detailed criticism that I have seen of the time involved
+suggests that it might have been two or three weeks less.  It is to be
+remembered, however, that the Peace Conference worked at that time
+under a perfectly enormous pressure from all sides to complete its
+task, which, as a matter of fact, would never have been completed
+within anything like the time taken if the decisions had not finally
+been left to three or four men to take.
+
+I need not dwell further on the difficulties of the details.  Any one
+who reads the Disarmament Treaty drawn up at the Washington Conference
+will appreciate something of their nature; but, looking at the matter
+from the larger point of view, there is a question of real
+statesmanship involved.  The possible field to be covered by a general
+conference on disarmament cannot perhaps be limited; but the extent to
+which the first discussion shall go will determine its success or
+failure.  If it attempts to go too far, that will be fatal; if, on the
+other hand, the attempt is only to go a short distance now and to
+continue on the road further later on, the Conference may be a success,
+despite the fact that it will meet with the criticisms of those who
+want to do everything at once.
+
+{100}
+
+The question of a permanent, or rather of a recurrent, Conference on
+Disarmament, as proposed by the so-called American Plan,[6] is one that
+is inevitably bound to come up at any such Conference, for whatever the
+Conference does or whatever it tries to do, it will have to leave much
+undone.  Many questions will remain open, many changes of the future
+will not be foreseen, and those who meet in the Conference will see
+when they end their work that they have only begun it.
+
+It is also to be noted again that the Conference is to fix the period
+within which the plan of reduction which it adopts is to be carried
+out.  If within that time the plan is not carried out, the Council is
+to make a declaration rendering the Protocol null and void.  The
+Conference is also to lay down the grounds on which the Council may
+make such a declaration.
+
+In other words, the Protocol itself is to depend wholly upon the work
+of the Conference; it is to the Conference that the whole
+responsibility is transferred.  If the Conference does not adopt the
+plan, and then if that plan is not carried out[7] within the time and
+on the conditions that the Conference declares, the Protocol falls.
+
+Never, I venture to say, has any important treaty ever been drawn up
+depending upon a more impressive condition subsequent.
+
+
+
+[1] See Annex D, p. 210 at p. 213, _et seq._
+
+[2] Annex F, p. 263.
+
+[3] p. 5.
+
+[4] This was written before the meeting of the Council in Rome in
+December, 1924.  The Disarmament Conference certainly cannot meet
+before 1926.  The present situation of the preliminaries is stated in a
+note to the Resolution of the Council of October 3, 1924, _infra_, p.
+215.
+
+[5] For a statement of existing European armaments, see note to page
+100.
+
+[6] Annex F, p. 263.
+
+[7] See the discussion as to this, _supra_, p. 7, showing that the
+"plan" will be another Treaty or Treaties and that the "carrying out"
+probably means ratification thereof.
+
+NOTE.--A statement of existing European Forces was made to Parliament
+on June 18, 1924 (Hansard, Parliamentary Debates [Commons], N. S., Vol.
+174, page 2151).  It gave the following figures:
+
+  Great Britain ........    155,935     Latvia ...............    20,000
+  Germany ..............    100,000     Lithuania ............    15,000
+  Austria ..............     21,500     Poland ...............   250,000
+  Hungary ..............     35,000     Norway ...............    16,000
+  Jugo Slavia ..........    130,000     Sweden ...............    32,000
+  Rumania ..............    125,000     Denmark ..............    27,000
+  Czecho Slovakia ......    149,877     Greece ...............   110,000
+  Netherlands ..........    163,262     Bulgaria .............    20,000
+  Italy ................    250,000     Turkey ...............    88,000
+  Switzerland ..........    500,000     France ...............   732,248
+  Soviet Union .........  1,003,000     Belgium ..............    86,531
+  Finland ..............     30,000     Spain ................   240,113
+  Esthonia .............     16,000     Portugal .............    40,000
+
+                Total armed forces in Europe, 1924 ........... 4,356,466
+
+
+
+
+{101}
+
+CHAPTER XVII.
+
+DEMILITARIZED ZONES.
+
+Emphasis is laid by the Protocol on the creation and maintenance of
+demilitarized zones along frontiers.  Article 9 of the Protocol treats
+of such zones, and their violation is, by Article 10 made the
+equivalent of a resort to war.
+
+Any question of the real value, in the strict military sense, of
+agreements for demilitarized zones, may be left at one side.
+Undoubtedly, expert opinions differ in this matter.  At least it may be
+said that such agreements have a value in the realm of feeling, which
+is as much a reality in international affairs as is a fleet of
+battleships.
+
+If countries feel more secure because of the creation of such zones,
+certainly agreements regarding them are worth while on each side of a
+frontier.
+
+As mentioned above, the question of demilitarized zones will certainly
+be one of the items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.
+There are quite a number of precedents for the creation of such zones
+in recent international agreements.  For example, the Treaty of
+Versailles[1] creates a demilitarized zone for fifty kilometres east of
+the Rhine.  The Aaland Islands were demilitarized by the Treaty[2]
+which attributed them to Finland; and the Treaty of Lausanne[3] creates
+certain demilitarized zones, not only on each side of the Straits, but
+also in Western Thrace.
+
+It is such agreements as these that are referred to in Article 9 of the
+Protocol as those "already existing under the terms of certain
+treaties."  It is these zones, and others which may be established by
+consent of the neighboring States, which, according to Article 9, may
+be placed under a system of supervision by the League, either temporary
+or permanent.  Obviously, any such supervision would come about by
+means of the voluntary agreement of the States concerned; and, in view
+of the fact that the Protocol makes a violation of a demilitarized zone
+the {102} equivalent of a resort to war (Article 10), supervision by
+the League of the carrying out of these essential agreements would seem
+to be highly desirable.
+
+Indeed, it may be said here that it will almost certainly be found that
+a system of international inspection will inevitably be a part of
+agreements for the reduction and limitation of armaments.  A system of
+general international inspection was suggested as one of the parts of
+the so-called American Plan,[4] and the proposal for a system of
+supervision of demilitarized zones under the League of Nations is a
+part of that general idea.
+
+I do not think it should be lost sight of that the thought of certain
+places where violence is forbidden has roots which go far back in human
+history.  The idea of "sanctuary" is as old as any records that we
+have; and, if it be thought that I am going very far afield in speaking
+of sanctuary, I mention that the legal development of this general
+notion is a very early development.  At least as long ago as
+Anglo-Saxon law in England, it was a peculiarly heinous offence to
+commit a crime on the King's Highway.  It was a much more serious
+matter to break the peace there than elsewhere, because it was a breach
+of the King's peace; and this notion of the King's peace is said by
+high authority to be as old as the Salic Law.
+
+We have heard much in the past of strategic frontiers.  A great deal of
+ability and learning have been devoted toward the problem of making
+frontiers available for attack or for defence.  It is perhaps true, as
+some critics appear to think, that the development of war in the air
+and of chemical warfare has made questions of strategic frontiers in
+general less important than heretofore.  Perhaps that is so.  I
+suggest, however, that even if it is so, that same ability and learning
+may be able to find in a combination of the ideas of demilitarized
+zones and international supervision a real solution of the problems
+arising from these new methods and discoveries; and, as I have pointed
+out, there is a very ancient human feeling behind this whole idea of
+peaceful places, on which popular support for such a programme may be
+based.
+
+
+
+[1] Articles 42 to 44.
+
+[2] A. J. I. L. Supplement 1923, Vol. XVII, p. 1.
+
+[3] A. J. I. L., Vol. XVIII, January, 1924, pp. 58, 63.
+
+[4] Annex F, p. 263.
+
+
+
+
+{103}
+
+CHAPTER XVIII.
+
+SECURITY AND THE PROTOCOL.
+
+For me to discuss the bearing of the Protocol of Geneva upon the
+security of States means that I go outside my brief.
+
+No technical juristic reasoning is applicable to a feeling which lies
+at the heart of national sentiments, sentiments of patriotism and of
+devotion to country, which are as deep rooted in the souls of millions
+as are the love of family and the belief in religion.
+
+This matter of security is in verity a matter of national feeling, a
+state of mind in the truest sense.  For no human agency, no belief, no
+will, outside of the country concerned, can alter or affect it.
+Ourselves alone must say, we and our rulers, whether or not we are in
+fact secure--if we say yes, that is enough; but if we say no, it is not
+for any one else to question, much less for any one else to seek to
+argue the matter.
+
+So I shall merely seek to state the theory of the Protocol in regard to
+this matter of security.  That theory is this: if the nations of the
+world will agree to outlaw war, if they will agree to substitute law
+for force, to settle by pacific means all disputes among them, if they
+will agree to unite against any people which so agrees but then betrays
+humanity by tearing up its own agreement, then we may develop
+intra-nationally a belief in security, a confidence in a settled order,
+a hope for the future, which will slowly but inevitably disarm the
+forces for war and lift the curtain on a new day.
+
+Such is the theory of the Protocol of Geneva.
+
+
+
+
+{104}
+
+CHAPTER XIX.
+
+INTERPRETATION OF THE PROTOCOL.
+
+Article 20 of the Protocol provides that any dispute as to its
+interpretation shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of
+International Justice.  No provision similar to this is to be found in
+the Covenant.
+
+The importance of this provision does not consist chiefly in its
+application to the Protocol.  Even if and when the Protocol comes into
+effect the provision in itself will not be very important, because the
+Protocol is only a temporary document to be transformed into amendments
+to the Covenant.  If these amendments include the incorporation into
+the Covenant of a similar provision to the effect that any dispute as
+to its interpretation shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of
+International Justice, such an amendment will be of supreme importance.
+With the Protocol embodied in the Covenant, the latter document will be
+by far the most important international treaty in existence.  If all
+questions of its interpretation are to be submitted to the Permanent
+Court, that tribunal will have judicial powers of the most far-reaching
+character.
+
+It is true that the extension of the powers of the Court so that they
+would include the interpretation of the Covenant is logical in so far
+as it relates to the settlement of disputes between Members of the
+League or other States; but the Covenant contains many other provisions
+bearing only indirectly upon such disputes.  The Covenant provides for
+the Council and the Assembly and for their meetings, their powers and
+procedure, powers which under Articles 11 and 19 of the Covenant, for
+example, are expressed in the most general terms.  The Covenant
+provides for the mandate system for certain territories and for the
+supervision by the League of numerous international agreements and
+bureaus of all sorts.  Now, in most of these matters the method of
+interpreting the Covenant has been by consent.  Members of the Council
+or, as the case may be, of the Assembly agree on what {105} they may do
+and proceed accordingly.  If differences of view as to the
+interpretation of the Covenant in this regard are to be submitted to
+the Permanent Court, that tribunal would have in some respects a power
+superior to that of either the Council or the Assembly.
+
+Let me give an instance.  The fifth paragraph of Article 4 of the
+Covenant provides as follows:
+
+      "Any Member of the League not represented on the
+    Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as
+    a Member at any meeting of the Council during the
+    consideration of matters specially affecting the interest of
+    that Member of the League."
+
+
+This paragraph gave rise to a difference of opinion as to what States
+are entitled to sit on the Council when it considered questions arising
+under Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles and similar Articles in
+the other Peace Treaties relating to the investigations by the Council
+of the armaments of Germany and other countries.  When the question
+came up, the Council took the opinion of Jurists on it and reached a
+common sense result.[1]  Under a general clause giving jurisdiction to
+the Court in all matters of interpretation,[2] it would seem that any
+Member of the League could require a question as to the composition of
+the Council on a particular occasion to be decided by the Court before
+the Council could meet.  It is obvious that any such method of
+regulating procedure would give rise to impossibilities which should be
+avoided.
+
+
+
+[1] See League of Nations Official Journal, July, 1924, p. 922 and Cmd.
+2287 (Miscellaneous No. 20, 1924), p. 16.
+
+[2] Many people suppose that the Supreme Court of the United States has
+such general powers regarding our Constitution, but this is not so.
+Read, for example, Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution; and see
+Massachusetts _v._ Melton, 262 U. S., 447.
+
+
+
+
+{106}
+
+CHAPTER XX.
+
+THE "AMENDED" COVENANT.
+
+I trust that no one appreciates better than myself that examination of
+a document bit by bit and piece by piece tends to blind the vision.
+One sees the trees and not the forest.  Worse than that, one gets a
+false vision, a picture, if I may change the metaphor, of the buttons
+on the coat but not of the man wearing the coat and still less of the
+soul within the man.
+
+A critical examination of an international legal document leads to a
+discussion of trivialities and to hypotheses of almost impossible
+possibilities.  Of course it is true that the carrying out of a great
+international agreement in the light of the facts and conditions of
+international life as they arise does not proceed along the technical
+lines that I have followed, but rather along those lines of policy
+which really control international action.  I do not mean necessarily
+selfish policy, but policy in the larger sense of decisions based upon
+the best judgment of those in power for the time being.
+
+What really ought to be done in studying any proposal such as the
+Protocol of Geneva, is to realize, if possible, the ultimate purpose of
+the document and to visualize, so far as we can, what would happen if
+it came into force, not so much what _might_ happen under a particular
+phrase, but how the international relations of the world would proceed
+if the whole agreement were a reality.
+
+I have mentioned more than once that the Protocol of Geneva
+contemplates that its provisions shall form part of the Covenant; in
+other words, that the two documents shall be amalgamated, forming an
+amended Covenant.  With the hope of facilitating a general view, I have
+endeavored to put the two documents together in the form of an
+"amended" Covenant, and the result of this effort is set out below.[1]
+
+Looking at the text of this "amended" Covenant, one may observe that
+while twenty of the present twenty-six Articles {107} remain unchanged
+in form, Articles 12 to 17, inclusive, are expanded and somewhat
+rewritten; and eight Articles are added; and I do not think that the
+text of the "amended" Covenant could be phrased in much less language
+than it appears below.
+
+Of course the length of a document in itself is not of much
+consequence; but it is not unimportant to observe that the "amended"
+Covenant is very much longer than the Covenant as it now reads.  This
+fact, I say, is important, because it is the visible evidence of a
+reality.  The Protocol of Geneva is not a mere completion of the
+provisions of the Covenant.  Advocates of the Protocol make a very
+serious mistake when they erroneously say that the Protocol of Geneva
+is merely a rounding out of incomplete and partial agreements of the
+Covenant.
+
+And it must be borne in mind that new or varied phrases in one Article
+may change the whole; the amended Covenant is altered not only in those
+Articles which may be textually amended, but throughout; I attempted to
+show this in detail as to Article 10 of the Covenant[2]; like any other
+document, the entire new paper must be read together.
+
+What the Protocol of Geneva does is to create a new and a different
+League of Nations.  It is true that what I may call the procedural and
+structural functions of the League are not changed; but the system of
+international relations which is now set up under the League is so much
+changed that one may properly say that it is an entirely new and
+different system.
+
+To my mind, there are three outstanding features of the "amended"
+Covenant.  It creates a complete system of compulsory arbitration; it
+consecrates the legality of the _status quo_; and it is a general
+defensive alliance.
+
+Now let us compare these three features of the "amended" Covenant with
+the ideas of the existing Covenant.
+
+The first mentioned, the system of compulsory arbitration, is by far
+the most important and the one that should be the starting point for
+any view of the "amended" Covenant as a whole.  In this arbitration
+system is contained the idea of outlawry of {108} war which the
+document embodies.  The arbitration of disputes under the new system is
+to take the place of war, which is outlawed.
+
+All that the Covenant did was to forbid some wars, to provide for delay
+in every case, and otherwise to rely wholly upon voluntary arbitration
+and, in cases where they could be obtained, upon unanimous
+recommendations of the Council.  The framers of the Covenant were most
+careful to avoid the idea of compulsory arbitration, for all that even
+the unanimous recommendation of the Council could do was to prevent
+hostilities.
+
+Under the "amended" Covenant, the defensive alliance of the Members of
+the League becomes complete.  It is intended to see to it that arbitral
+decrees are carried out; to see to it that the _status quo_ remains
+untouched, except by voluntary agreement; and to see to it that the
+violator is met by the combined forces of other States.
+
+Contrast the provisions of the Covenant, which contemplate no concerted
+action, unless agreed to at the time, other than economic and financial
+pressure; and the preservation of the _status quo_ only so far as
+Article 10 of the Covenant extends.
+
+It would be unfair and untrue to call this new system a super-state,
+for it is nothing of the sort; but it would be in a sense untrue also
+to say that this new system is merely a development of the Covenant
+itself; it is the sort of change that one might call a development if
+it had taken two or three generations or a century to bring it about;
+but not properly to be called a development when it all comes at once.
+
+The natural conclusion to be reached is that such a complete change
+cannot be realized at this time, and that is the sound conclusion.
+That a system of law should be built up governing the international
+relations of the States of the world, by which their differences should
+be adjusted by the orderly processes of legality, excluding as a method
+of adjustment the chaos of war, may be admitted.  Thus far, the changes
+proposed by the Protocol of Geneva are desirable; the question is
+merely as to the length to which the countries of the world are willing
+to go in {109} this direction at this time; and I include as a part of
+this development, the outlawry of war, the agreement that war is not to
+be resorted to by any State, that it should disappear from
+international relations, except in so far as force must necessarily
+remain as defence.
+
+It is to be hoped that this part of the Protocol may stand; and it must
+be admitted that there is inherently and _ipso facto_ to some extent a
+consecration of the legality of the _status quo_ by the outlawry of war
+and by peaceful settlement of disputes by legal means.
+
+On the other hand, various features of what I may call the defensive
+alliance portion of the Protocol seem to me to be impossible and at
+this time inadvisable.  They are supposed to flow logically from the
+system of compulsory arbitration; and certainly the problem which they
+attempt to solve does follow logically from any system of compulsory
+arbitration and outlawry of war.  If we assume war to be outlawed and a
+system by which there is to be a legal settlement of disputes in place
+of war, the question of course arises: Well, what is to happen in a
+given case if some State which has accepted this system and has agreed
+to it should refuse to abide by it, should not carry out an award or
+decision or should even take up arms against it, what then?
+
+The Continental mind very logically answers this question by saying
+there must be a system of execution of decrees and that if you outlaw
+war, you must have a combination for defence.  This is true from the
+point of view of logic; but it is not true from the point of view of
+life.  Compulsory arbitration and outlawry of war are untried ideas,
+and we cannot say now, under all circumstances, what should be done in
+the course of their working, if they are put to work; much less can
+Nations now bind themselves as to a definite and complete course of
+action under all possible and varying future circumstances.  That such
+a system of concerted action against aggression as is proposed by the
+Protocol of Geneva may perhaps in time be worked out along with the
+growth and development of the ideas of outlawry of {110} war and of
+arbitration, may be admitted.  That it can be done now is, to my mind,
+contrary to the realities of life and to the lessons of history.
+
+There is another phase of this last discussion which should be
+particularly noticed.  It is impossible for any such agreement for
+concerted action not to have a direct bearing upon countries which are
+not parties to the agreement; in other words, Russia and the United
+States.  We must admit at least the theoretic possibility of a conflict
+between one of the Members of the League and one of these two Great
+Powers, insisting, if we will, that such a possibility is highly remote
+so far as the United States is concerned, and utterly unknowable so far
+as Russia is concerned; but none the less a possibility.
+
+And certainly, in view of that possibility, any provisions of a
+document which looks toward force as a last resort of defence should,
+in my judgment, be drawn with the utmost care to avoid the idea of a
+possible conflict between the parties to the document on the one hand
+and an outside State on the other.  Outlawry of war and arbitration are
+things to be agreed upon and not to be compelled against those who are
+unwilling to agree; for the breach of such an agreement is a much more
+serious and a very different thing than a refusal to arbitrate, or even
+than going to war when there is no agreement.
+
+That the hospitality, if I may call it so, of the League of Nations
+should be extended to States which are unwilling to join it; that its
+facilities should be offered to these States for the settlement of
+disputes in every case where they are willing to accept them; that the
+covenants of the Members of the League for justice toward an outside
+State should be as explicit and complete as its covenants toward a
+Member, I quite agree; the covenants of the Members of the League
+should be covenants of peace among themselves, and of justice toward
+all.  This is the road to a universal League of all Nations.
+
+If it be said that to Finland or the Baltic States or Poland or
+Roumania or Turkey there is danger from their great neighbour, {111} I
+cannot deny such a possibility; and if any Members of the League are
+willing to join with such States in protection against such danger,
+either in advance of its occurrence or when it happens, I would see no
+objection to it, if such agreements were coupled with all the offers of
+peaceful settlement that could be written, as well as with offers of
+membership in the League, either permanent or _ad hoc_.
+
+To a state which is contemplating the possibility of signing the
+Protocol of Geneva, it may well be that the provisions of that document
+regarding sanctions stand out as the most important, the ones having
+the greatest possibilities as to obligations of future action.  This is
+a very natural point of view, and even a very proper one.  And, while I
+myself am very deeply convinced that, from the point of view of world
+politics, the most far-reaching and vital provisions of this document
+are those which refer to arbitration and to the outlawry of war, yet
+perhaps for that very reason, I am equally convinced that the most
+serious changes which are necessary in the paper are changes in its
+provisions for sanctions and for enforcement.
+
+With the principles of compulsory arbitration I am wholly in accord;
+with the principle that outlawry of war should follow as the necessary
+and natural consequence of the substitution of a reign of law for a
+reign of force I quite agree; and that some tribunal should determine,
+if need arise, that the agreement has been broken and that there is an
+"outlaw," is a natural consequence of those principles; and that there
+may be defence against aggression, if it comes, almost no one will
+deny.  But there, I think, we must stop so far as present agreement is
+concerned.  That any State may, _if it chooses_, go to the defence of
+another against an adjudged aggressor I would concede; but that all
+States can be or should be now required to sign an agreement so to go
+to such defence, I deny.  In the present state of world opinion and
+when its own direct interests are not involved, any free people can
+well say that it will not or ought not to sign such an undertaking.
+
+So I say that, while arbitration may be agreed to in advance {112} and
+outlawry of war may be agreed to in advance, sanctions and assistance
+in defence must be voluntary.
+
+Where does all this leave the problems of disarmament and security?
+
+I answer by saying that the solution of these problems is very
+difficult, because with it are involved feelings of national fear and
+haunting doubts of possible national disaster.  The feeling of security
+must be a plant of slow growth, and progress toward disarmament cannot
+be realized except to the extent that that growth comes.  All that can
+be done now is to make a beginning, and, if too much is attempted, less
+will be accomplished.  The world must rely on the development of the
+new idea of the reign of law and reach its feeling of security as that
+reign succeeds and triumphs.
+
+The Protocol of Geneva is one of the most important of modern
+international documents.  This is true whether it comes into force as a
+binding treaty or whether it does not; and it is true because the
+Protocol represents a development of international thought since the
+World War along lines of what may be called international morality, of
+what may almost be called international religion, which, while not
+novel in the realm of thought, were wholly novel in the diplomatic
+field of action.
+
+The belief that international law must be strengthened, the thought
+that it must lay hold of international questions before the time of war
+and the idea that the security of a country is to be a security for
+peace and not simply a security in war, were the principles upon which
+the Covenant of the League of Nations was based; but in that document
+they were to some extent formulated only as hopes for the future.
+
+These ideas which the Protocol of Geneva seeks to make complete
+realities have fundamentally become a part of international life.  To
+my mind, they are certain to be carried out in some document in the
+near future and one of their incidents will be the realization of
+schemes for the reduction of armament as an incident of the development
+of the feeling which exists as to security.
+
+{113}
+
+The Protocol of Geneva will undoubtedly be much changed as a result of
+the consideration which is now being given to it by the various
+important governments of the world.[3]  In various respects the
+Protocol goes farther than cautious public sentiment of countries like
+Great Britain and her Dominions is, or ought to be, willing now to
+proceed; but it is these very matters which can easily be changed and
+which will be changed.
+
+The Conference on Disarmament and its result are the cornerstones on
+which the Protocol of Geneva rests.  That Conference must be held and
+it must have a result; the public sentiment of the world demands it;
+and the satisfaction of that demand involves the adoption by the
+Members of the League of the Protocol of Geneva, not the document as it
+now is, but as it will be.
+
+
+
+[1] See Annex G, p. 271.
+
+[2] _Supra_, p. 84.
+
+[3] Since this monograph was written, I have received the text of the
+Report of the British Delegates regarding the Protocol of Geneva
+(Miscellaneous No. 21, 1924, Cmd. 2289).  It is reprinted as Annex E,
+page 217.  It is a most valuable and interesting document.  I have
+carefully considered its conclusions, some of which are not the same as
+my own, and despite my very high regard for its authors, I see no
+reason to change anything that I have written.
+
+
+
+
+{116}
+
+ANNEXES.
+
+
+                                                                    PAGE
+
+A.  THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS .......................... 117
+
+B.  THE PROTOCOL OF GENEVA ......................................... 132
+
+C.  THE REPORT TO THE FIFTH ASSEMBLY ............................... 156
+
+D.  RESOLUTIONS .................................................... 210
+
+E.  REPORT OF THE BRITISH DELEGATES ................................ 217
+
+F.  THE AMERICAN PLAN .............................................. 263
+
+G.  THE "AMENDED" COVENANT ......................................... 271
+
+
+
+
+{117}
+
+ANNEX A.
+
+
+THE COVENANT
+
+OF THE
+
+LEAGUE OF NATIONS.[1]
+
+
+THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
+
+In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve
+international peace and security
+
+    by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,
+
+    by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations
+    between nations,
+
+    by the firm establishment of the understandings of
+    international law as the actual rule of conduct among
+    Governments, and
+
+    by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect
+    for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised
+    peoples with one another,
+
+Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.
+
+
+ARTICLE 1.
+
+The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the
+Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such
+of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without
+reservation to this Covenant.  Such accession shall be effected by a
+Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the
+coming into force of the Covenant.  Notice thereof shall be sent to all
+other Members of the League.
+
+Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the
+Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to
+by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective
+guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international
+obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by
+the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and
+armaments.
+
+{118}
+
+Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention
+so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international
+obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been
+fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.
+
+
+ARTICLE 2.
+
+The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through
+the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent
+Secretariat.
+
+
+ARTICLE 3.
+
+The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the
+League.
+
+The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as
+occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place
+as may be decided upon.
+
+The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere
+of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.
+
+At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one
+vote, and may have not more than three Representatives.
+
+
+ARTICLE 4.
+
+The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied
+and Associated Powers, together with Representatives of four other
+Members of the League.  These four Members of the League shall be
+selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion.  Until
+the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the
+League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium,
+Brazil, Spain and Greece shall be members of the Council.
+
+With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name
+additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be
+members of the Council; the Council {119} with like approval may
+increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the
+Assembly for representation on the Council.
+
+The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and
+at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place
+as may be decided upon.
+
+The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere
+of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.
+
+Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be
+invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of
+the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the
+interests of that Member of the League.
+
+At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on
+the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one
+Representative.
+
+
+ARTICLE 5.
+
+Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the
+terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly
+or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the
+League represented at the meeting.
+
+All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council,
+including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular
+matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may
+be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at
+the meeting.
+
+The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council
+shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.
+
+
+ARTICLE 6.
+
+The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the
+League.  The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such
+secretaries and staff as may be required.
+
+{120}
+
+The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex;
+thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council with
+the approval of the majority of the Assembly.
+
+The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the
+Secretary General with the approval of the Council.
+
+The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the
+Assembly and of the Council.
+
+The expenses of the League shall be borne by the Members of the League
+in the proportion decided by the Assembly.
+
+
+ARTICLE 7.
+
+The Seat of the League is established at Geneva.
+
+The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be
+established elsewhere.
+
+All positions under or in connection with the League, including the
+Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.
+
+Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the
+League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy
+diplomatic privileges and immunities.
+
+The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its
+officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be
+inviolable.
+
+
+ARTICLE 8.
+
+The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace
+requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point
+consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of
+international obligations.
+
+The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and
+circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction
+for the consideration and action of the several Governments.
+
+Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least
+every ten years.
+
+After these plans shall have been adopted by the several {121}
+Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be
+exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.
+
+The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private
+enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave
+objections.  The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant
+upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the
+necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to
+manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their
+safety.
+
+The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank
+information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval
+and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are
+adaptable to war-like purposes.
+
+
+ARTICLE 9.
+
+A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on
+the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military,
+naval and air questions generally.
+
+
+ARTICLE 10.
+
+The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against
+external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political
+independence of all Members of the League.  In case of any such
+aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the
+Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be
+fulfilled.
+
+
+ARTICLE 11.
+
+Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the
+Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to
+the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be
+deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.  In case
+any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the
+request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the
+Council.
+
+{122}
+
+It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the
+League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any
+circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens
+to disturb international peace or the good understanding between
+nations upon which peace depends.
+
+
+ARTICLE 12.
+
+The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between
+them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the
+matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by
+the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three
+months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or
+the report by the Council.
+
+In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the
+judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the
+report of the Council shall be made within six months after the
+submission of the dispute.
+
+
+ARTICLE 13.
+
+The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise
+between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to
+arbitration or judicial settlement and which cannot be satisfactorily
+settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to
+arbitration or judicial settlement.
+
+Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of
+international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established
+would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the
+extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are
+declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission
+to arbitration or judicial settlement.
+
+For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case
+is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice,
+established in accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal agreed on by
+the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing
+between them.
+
+{123}
+
+The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good
+faith any award or decision that may be rendered and that they will not
+resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith.
+In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the
+Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.
+
+
+ARTICLE 14.
+
+The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for
+adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of
+International Justice.  The Court shall be competent to hear and
+determine any dispute of an international character which the parties
+thereto submit to it.  The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon
+any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the
+Assembly.
+
+
+ARTICLE 15.
+
+If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely
+to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial
+settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League
+agree that they will submit the matter to the Council.  Any party to
+the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the
+existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all
+necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration
+thereof.
+
+For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the
+Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case
+with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith
+direct the publication thereof.
+
+The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and
+if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving
+such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of
+settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.
+
+If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either {124}
+unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report
+containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the
+recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.
+
+Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a
+statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding
+the same.
+
+If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members
+thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to
+the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to
+war with any party to the dispute which complies with the
+recommendations of the report.
+
+If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to
+by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more
+of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to
+themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider
+necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.
+
+If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is
+found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international
+law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the
+Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its
+settlement.
+
+The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the
+Assembly.  The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either
+party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within
+fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.
+
+In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this
+Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the
+Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided
+that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the
+Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the
+Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive
+in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute,
+shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by
+all the members thereof {125} other than the Representatives of one or
+more of the parties to the dispute.
+
+
+ARTICLE 16.
+
+Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its
+covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall _ipso facto_ be deemed
+to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the
+League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the
+severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all
+intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the
+covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial,
+commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the
+covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a
+Member of the League or not.
+
+It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the
+several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air
+force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed
+forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.
+
+The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually
+support one another in the financial and economic measures which are
+taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and
+inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will
+mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at
+one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will
+take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to
+the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating
+to protect the covenants of the League.
+
+Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League
+may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the
+Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of
+the League represented thereon.
+
+
+{126}
+
+ARTICLE 17.
+
+In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State
+which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of
+the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be
+invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the
+purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem
+just.  If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to
+16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed
+necessary by the Council.
+
+Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately
+institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and
+recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the
+circumstances.
+
+If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of
+membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall
+resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article
+16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.
+
+If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the
+obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such
+dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such
+recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the
+settlement of the dispute.
+
+
+ARTICLE 18.
+
+Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any
+Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat
+and shall as soon as possible be published by it.  No such treaty or
+international engagement shall be binding until so registered.
+
+
+ARTICLE 19.
+
+The Assembly may from time to time advise the {127} reconsideration by
+Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and
+the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might
+endanger the peace of the world.
+
+
+ARTICLE 20.
+
+The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is
+accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings _inter se_
+which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake
+that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent
+with the terms thereof.
+
+In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the
+League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of
+this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate
+steps to procure its release from such obligations.
+
+
+ARTICLE 21.
+
+Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of
+international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional
+understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance
+of peace.
+
+
+ARTICLE 22.
+
+To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late
+war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which
+formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able
+to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern
+world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and
+development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and
+that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in
+this Covenant.
+
+The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that
+the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations
+who by reason of their resources, their experience or their
+geographical position can best undertake this {128} responsibility, and
+who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be
+exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.
+
+The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the
+development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory,
+its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.
+
+Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have
+reached a stage of development where their existence as independent
+nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of
+administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as
+they are able to stand alone.  The wishes of these communities must be
+a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
+
+Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage
+that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the
+territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience
+and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and
+morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms
+traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment
+of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training
+of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of
+territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and
+commerce of other Members of the League.
+
+There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the
+South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their
+population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres
+of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of
+the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under
+the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory,
+subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the
+indigenous population.
+
+In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an
+annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.
+
+{129}
+
+The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by
+the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of
+the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.
+
+A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the
+annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all
+matters relating to the observance of the mandates.
+
+
+ARTICLE 23.
+
+Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international
+conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the
+League:
+
+    (_a_) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane
+    conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in
+    their own countries and in all countries to which their
+    commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that
+    purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international
+    organisations;
+
+    (_b_) undertake to secure just treatment of the native
+    inhabitants of territories under their control;
+
+    (_c_) will entrust the League with the general supervision over
+    the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women
+    and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;
+
+    (_d_) will entrust the League with the general supervision of
+    the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the
+    control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;
+
+    (_e_) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of
+    communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the
+    commerce of all Members of the League.  In this connection, the
+    special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of
+    1914-1918 shall be borne in mind;
+
+    (_f_) will endeavour to take steps in matters of international
+    concern for the prevention and control of disease.
+
+
+{130}
+
+ARTICLE 24.
+
+There shall be placed under the direction of the League all
+international bureaux already established by general treaties if the
+parties to such treaties consent.  All such international bureaux and
+all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest
+hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.
+
+In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general
+convention but which are not placed under the control of international
+bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to
+the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and
+distribute all relevant information and shall render any other
+assistance which may be necessary or desirable.
+
+The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the
+expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the
+direction of the League.
+
+
+ARTICLE 25.
+
+The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the
+establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national
+Red Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health,
+the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout
+the world.
+
+
+ARTICLE 26.
+
+Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the
+Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by
+a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose
+the Assembly.
+
+No such amendments shall bind any Member of the League which signifies
+its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member
+of the League.
+
+
+
+[1] Including Amendments adopted to December, 1924.
+
+
+
+
+_The text of the Protocol of Geneva, which follows as Annex B, is
+printed in French and English on opposite pages._
+
+
+
+[Transcriber's note: In the source book, the French and English texts
+were on facing pages, French on the even/left-hand pages, English on
+the odd/right-hand pages.  The same page order has been preserved in
+this etext, occasionally resulting split paragraphs.]
+
+
+
+
+{132}
+
+ANNEX B.
+
+PROTOCOLE POUR LE REGLEMENT PACIFIQUE DES DIFFERENDS INTERNATIONAUX.
+
+Animés de la ferme volonté d'assurer le maintien de la paix générale et
+la sécurité des peuples dont l'existence, l'indépendance ou les
+territoires pourraient être menacés;
+
+Reconnaissant la solidarité qui unit les membres de la communauté
+internationale;
+
+Affirmant que la guerre d'agression constitue une infraction à cette
+solidarité et un crime international;
+
+Désireux de faciliter la complète application du système prévu au Pacte
+de la Société des Nations pour le règlement pacifique des différends
+entre les Etats et d'assurer la répression des crimes internationaux; et
+
+Afin de réaliser, comme l'envisage l'article 8 du Pacte, la réduction
+des armements nationaux au minimum compatible avec la sécurité
+nationale et avec l'exécution des obligations internationales imposées
+par une action commune,
+
+Les Soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, sont convenus des
+dispositions suivantes:
+
+
+ARTICLE PREMIER.
+
+Les Etats signataires s'engagent à faire tous efforts en leur pouvoir
+pour l'introduction dans le Pacte d'amendements conformes au sens des
+dispositions contenues dans les articles suivants.
+
+Ils conviennent que ces dispositions deviendront obligatoires dans
+leurs rapports respectifs à la date de la mise en vigueur du présent
+Protocole et que, vis-à-vis d'eux, l'Assemblée et le Conseil de la
+Société des Nations seront, dès lors, autorisés à exercer tous les
+droits et devoirs qui leur sont conférés par ce Protocole.
+
+
+ARTICLE 2.
+
+Les Etats signataires conviennent qu'en aucun cas ils ne
+
+
+{133}
+
+ANNEX B.
+
+PROTOCOL FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.
+
+Animated by the firm desire to ensure the maintenance of general peace
+and the security of nations whose existence, independence or
+territories may be threatened;
+
+Recognising the solidarity of the members of the international
+community;
+
+Asserting that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this
+solidarity and an international crime;
+
+Desirous of facilitating the complete application of the system
+provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations for the pacific
+settlement of disputes between States and of ensuring the repression of
+international crimes; and
+
+For the purpose of realising, as contemplated by Article 8 of the
+Covenant, the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point
+consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of
+international obligations;
+
+The Undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, agree as follows:
+
+
+ARTICLE 1.
+
+The signatory States undertake to make every effort in their power to
+secure the introduction into the Covenant of amendments on the lines of
+the provisions contained in the following articles.
+
+They agree that, as between themselves, these provisions shall be
+binding as from the coming into force of the present Protocol and that,
+so far as they are concerned, the Assembly and the Council of the
+League of Nations shall thenceforth have power to exercise all the
+rights and perform all the duties conferred upon them by the Protocol.
+
+
+ARTICLE 2.
+
+The signatory States agree in no case to resort to war either
+
+{134}
+
+doivent recourir à la guerre, ni entre eux ni contre tout Etat qui, le
+cas échéant, accepterait toutes les obligations ci-après définies,
+excepté dans le cas de résistance à des actes d'agression ou quand ils
+agissent en accord avec le Conseil ou l'Assemblée de la Société des
+Nations, selon les dispositions du Pacte et du présent Protocole.
+
+
+ARTICLE 3.
+
+Les Etats signataires s'engagent à reconnaître comme obligatoire, de
+plein droit et sans convention spéciale, la juridiction de la Cour
+permanente de Justice internationale dans les cas visés au paragraphe 2
+de l'Article 36 du Statut de la Cour, mais sans préjudice de la faculté
+pour un Etat quelconque, lorsqu'il adhérera au protocole special ouvert
+le 16 décembre 1920, prévu par ledit article, de formuler les réserves
+compatibles avec ladite clause.
+
+L'adhésion à ce protocole spécial ouvert le 16 décembre 1920 devra être
+faite dans le délai d'un mois qui suivra la mise en vigueur du présent
+Protocole.
+
+Les Etats qui adhéreront au présent Protocole après sa mise en vigueur
+devront s'acquitter de l'obligation ci-dessus dans le mois qui suivra
+leur adhésion.
+
+
+ARTICLE 4.
+
+En vue de compléter les dispositions des alinéas 4, 5, 6 et 7 de
+l'article 15 du Pacte, les Etats signataires conviennent de se
+conformer à la procedure suivante:
+
+    1. Si le différend soumis au Conseil n'a pu être réglé par lui
+    ainsi qu'il est prévu au paragraphe 3 dudit article 15, le Conseil
+    engagera les Parties à soumettre le différend à un règlement
+    judiciaire ou arbitral.
+
+    2. a) Si les Parties s'y refusent, il est procédé, à la demande
+    d'au moins l'une des Parties, à la constitution d'un Comité
+    d'arbitres.  Le Comité sera constitué, autant que possible, par
+    l'accord des Parties.
+
+{135}
+
+with one another or against a State which, if the occasion arises
+accepts all the obligations hereinafter set out, except in case of
+resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the
+Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations in accordance with the
+provisions of the Covenant and of the present Protocol.
+
+
+ARTICLE 3.
+
+The signatory States undertake to recognise as compulsory, _ipso facto_
+and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court
+of International Justice in the cases covered by paragraph 2 of Article
+36 of the Statute of the Court, but without prejudice to the right of
+any State, when acceding to the special protocol provided for in the
+said Article and opened for signature on December 16th, 1920, to make
+reservations compatible with the said clause.
+
+Accession to this special protocol, opened for signature on December
+16th, 1920, must be given within the month following the coming into
+force of the present Protocol.
+
+States which accede to the present Protocol, after its coming into
+force, must carry out the above obligation, within the month following
+their accession.
+
+
+ARTICLE 4.
+
+With a view to render more complete the provisions of paragraphs 4, 5,
+6, and 7 of Article 15 of the Covenant, the signatory States agree to
+comply with the following procedure:
+
+    1. If the dispute submitted to the Council is not settled by it as
+    provided in paragraph 3 of the said Article 15, the Council shall
+    endeavour to persuade the parties to submit the dispute to judicial
+    settlement or arbitration.
+
+    2. (_a_) If the parties cannot agree to do so, there shall, at the
+    request of at least one of the parties, be constituted a Committee
+    of Arbitrators.  The Committee shall so far as possible be
+    constituted by agreement between the parties.
+
+{136}
+
+    _b_) Si, dans le délai que le Conseil aura fixé, elles ne se sont
+    pas entendues en tout ou en partie sur le nombre, le nom et les
+    pouvoirs des arbitres, ainsi que sur la procedure, le Conseil
+    réglera les points en suspens.  Il choisira d'urgence--en
+    consultant les Parties--les arbitres et leur président, parmi les
+    personnes qui, par leur nationalité, leur caractère et leur
+    expérience, lui paraîtront donner les plus hautes garanties de
+    compétence et d'impartialité.
+
+    _c_) Après que les conclusions des Parties auront été formulées,
+    le Comité d'arbitres, à la demande de toute Partie, sollicitera,
+    par l'entremise du Conseil, sur les points de droit contestés,
+    l'avis consultatif de la Cour permanente de Justice
+    Internationale qui, dans ce cas, se réunira d'urgence.
+
+    3. Si aucune des Parties ne demande l'arbitrage, le Conseil
+    reprendra l'examen du différend.  Au cas où le Conseil établit un
+    rapport voté à l'unanimité de ses membres autres que les
+    représentants de toute Partie au différend, les Etats signataires
+    conviennent de se conformer aux solutions recommandées par lui.
+
+    4. Au cas où le Conseil ne peut établir un rapport accepté par
+    tous ses membres autres que les représentants de toute Partie au
+    différend, il soumettra le différend a l'arbitrage.  Il réglera
+    lui-même la composition, les pouvoirs et la procedure du Comité
+    d'arbitres et aura égard, dans le choix des arbitres, aux
+    garanties de compétence et d'impartialité visées au No. 2_b_
+    ci-dessus.
+
+    5. En aucun cas ne pourront être remises en question les solutions
+    ayant déjà fait l'objet d'une recommandation unanime du Conseil
+    acceptée par l'une des Parties interéssées.
+
+    6. Les Etats signataires s'engagent à éxecuter de bonne foi les
+    sentences judiciaires ou arbitrales et à se conformer, comme il
+    a été dit a l'alinéa 3 ci-dessus, aux solutions recommandées par
+    le Conseil.  Dans le cas où un Etat manquerait à ces engagements,
+    le Conseil exercera toute son influence pour en assurer le
+    respect.  S'il ne peut y réussir, il proposera les mesures qui
+    doivent en assurer
+
+{137}
+
+    (_b_) If within the period fixed by the Council the parties have
+    failed to agree, in whole or in part, upon the number, the names
+    and the powers of the arbitrators and upon the procedure, the
+    Council shall settle the points remaining in suspense.  It shall
+    with the utmost possible despatch select in consultation with the
+    parties the arbitrators and their President from among persons
+    who by their nationality, their personal character and their
+    experience, appear to it to furnish the highest guarantees of
+    competence and impartiality.
+
+    (_c_) After the claims of the parties have been formulated, the
+    Committee of Arbitrators, on the request of any party, shall
+    through the medium of the Council request an advisory opinion
+    upon any points of law in dispute from the Permanent Court of
+    International Justice, which in such case shall meet with the
+    utmost possible despatch.
+
+    3. If none of the parties asks for arbitration, the Council shall
+    again take the dispute under consideration.  If the Council
+    reaches a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members
+    thereof other than the representatives of any of the parties to
+    the dispute, the signatory States agree to comply with the
+    recommendations therein.
+
+    4. If the Council fails to reach a report which is concurred in
+    by all its members, other than the representatives of any of the
+    parties to the dispute, it shall submit the dispute to
+    arbitration.  It shall itself determine the composition, the
+    powers and the procedure of the Committee of Arbitrators and, in
+    the choice of the arbitrators, shall bear in mind the guarantees
+    of competence and impartiality referred to in paragraph 2 (_b_)
+    above.
+
+    5. In no case may a solution, upon which there has already been a
+    unanimous recommendation of the Council accepted by one of the
+    parties concerned, be again called in question.
+
+    6. The signatory States undertake that they will carry out in
+    full good faith any judicial sentence or arbitral award that may
+    be rendered and that they will comply, as provided in paragraph 3
+    above, with the solutions recommended by the Council.  In the
+    event of a State failing to carry out the above undertakings, the
+    Council shall exert all its influence to secure compliance
+
+{138}
+
+    l'effet, ainsi qu'il est dit à la fin de l'article 13 du Pacte.
+    Dans le cas où un Etat, manquant à ces engagements, recourrait à
+    la guerre, les sanctions prévues à l'article 16 du Pacte,
+    interpretées de la manière indiquée au présent Protocole, lui
+    deviendraient immédiatement applicables.
+
+    7. Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliquent pas au
+    règlement des différends qui pourraient s'élever à la suite
+    des mesures de guerre prises par un ou plusieurs Etats signataires
+    en accord avec le Conseil ou l'Assemblée.
+
+
+ARTICLE 5.
+
+La disposition de l'alinéa 8 de l'article 15 du Pacte demeure
+applicable devant le Conseil.
+
+Si, pendant le cours d'une des procédures d'arbitrage prévues à
+l'article 4 ci-dessus, l'une des Parties prétend que le différend, ou
+une partie du différend, porte sur une question que le droit
+international laisse à la compétence exclusive de cette Partie, les
+arbitres consulteront sur ce point la Cour permanente de Justice
+internationale par l'entremise du Conseil.  L'avis de la Cour liera les
+arbitres qui se borneront, si cet avis est affirmatif, à le constater
+dans leur sentence.
+
+Si la question est reconnue par la Cour permanente ou par le Conseil
+comme étant de la compétence exclusive d'un Etat, la décision
+intervenue n'empêchera pas que la situation soit examinée par le
+Conseil ou par l'Assemblée, conformément à l'article 11 du Pacte.
+
+
+ARTICLE 6.
+
+Si, conformément à l'alinéa 9 de l'article 15 du Pacte, le différend
+est porté devant l'Assemblée, celle-ci aura, pour le règlement du
+différend, tous les pouvoirs dévolus au Conseil en ce qui concerne
+l'essai de conciliation des Parties, tel qu'il est prévu aux alinéas 1,
+2 ct 3 de l'article 15 du Pacte et au No. 1 de l'article 4 ci-dessus.
+
+A défaut de reglement amiable obténu par l'Assemblée:
+
+{139}
+
+    therewith.  If it fails therein, it shall propose what steps should
+    be taken to give effect thereto, in accordance with the provision
+    contained at the end of Article 13 of the Covenant.  Should a State
+    in disregard of the above undertakings resort to war, the sanctions
+    provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant, interpreted in the
+    manner indicated in the present Protocol, shall immediately become
+    applicable to it.
+
+    7. The provisions of the present article do not apply to the
+    settlement of disputes which arise as the result of measures of war
+    taken by one or more signatory States in agreement with the Council
+    or the Assembly.
+
+
+ARTICLE 5.
+
+The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article 15 of the Covenant shall
+continue to apply in proceedings before the Council.
+
+If in the course of an arbitration, such as is contemplated in Article
+4 above, one of the parties claims that the dispute, or part thereof,
+arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the
+domestic jurisdiction of that party, the arbitrators shall on this
+point take the advice of the Permanent Court of International Justice
+through the medium of the Council.  The opinion of the Court shall be
+binding upon the arbitrators, who, if the opinion is affirmative, shall
+confine themselves to so declaring in their award.
+
+If the question is held by the Court or by the Council to be a matter
+solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, this decision
+shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the Council or by
+the Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant.
+
+
+ARTICLE 6.
+
+If in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article 15 of the Covenant a
+dispute is referred to the Assembly, that body shall have for the
+settlement of the dispute all the powers conferred upon the Council as
+to endeavouring to reconcile the parties in the manner laid down in
+paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant and in paragraph 1
+of Article 4 above.
+
+Should the Assembly fail to achieve an amicable settlement:
+
+{140}
+
+    Si l'une des Parties demande l'arbitrage, il est procédé par le
+    Conseil à la constitution du Comité d'arbitres, dans les
+    conditions prevues au No. 2 de l'article 4 ci-dessus, lettres
+    _a_, _b_ et _c_;
+
+    Si aucune des Parties ne demande l'arbitrage, l'Assemblée reprend,
+    avec les mêmes pouvoirs que le Conseil, l'examen du différend.
+    Les solutions recommandées par le Rapport de l'Assemblée, dans
+    les conditions d'approbation prévues à la fin de l'alinéa 10 de
+    l'article 15 du Pacte, ont la même valeur et produiront les mêmes
+    effets, en tout ce qui concerne le présent Protocole, que celles
+    recommandées par le Rapport du Conseil dans les conditions prévues
+    au No. 3 de l'article 4 ci-dessus.
+
+Si la majorité nécessaire ne peut être obtenue, le différend sera
+soumis a l'arbitrage et le Conseil réglera lui-même la composition, les
+pouvoirs et la procédure du Comité d'arbitres, comme il est dit au No.
+4 dudit article 4.
+
+
+ARTICLE 7.
+
+Dans le cas d'un différend s'elevant entre deux ou plusieurs Etats
+signataires, ceux-ci conviennent que, soit avant que le differénd ait
+été soumis à une procédure de règlement pacifique, soit au cours d'une
+telle procédure, ils ne procéderont à aucune augmentation d'armements
+ou d'effectifs qui pourrait modifier la situation fixée par la
+Conférence pour la réduction des armements prévue à l'article 17 du
+présent Protocole; ils ne procederont non plus à aucune mesure de
+mobilisation militaire, navale, aerienne, industrielle ou économique,
+ni en géneral à aucun acte de nature à aggraver ou à étendre le
+différend.
+
+Conformément aux dispositions de l'article 11 du Pacte, il est du
+devoir du Conseil d'examiner toute plainte en violation des engagements
+ci-dessus, qui pourrait lui être adressée par un ou plusieurs des Etats
+parties au différend.  Si le Conseil considère que la plainte est
+recevable, il doit, s'il l'estime convenable, organiser des enquêtes et
+des investigations dans un ou plusieurs des pays intéressés.  Ces
+enquêtes et ces investigations doivent être faites dans les délais les
+plus brefs, et les Etats signataires s'engagent à donner toutes
+facilités pour leur exécution.
+
+{141}
+
+    If one of the parties asks for arbitration, the Council shall proceed
+    to constitute the Committee of Arbitrators in the manner provided in
+    sub-paragraphs (_a_), (_b_) and (_c_) of paragraph 2 of Article 4
+    above.
+
+    If no party asks for arbitration, the Assembly shall again take the
+    dispute under consideration and shall have in this connection the
+    same powers as the Council.  Recommendations embodied in a report
+    of the Assembly, provided that it secures the measure of support
+    stipulated at the end of paragraph 10 of Article 15 of the Covenant,
+    shall have the same value and effect, as regards all matters dealt
+    with in the present Protocol, as recommendations embodied in a
+    report of the Council adopted as provided in paragraph 3 of Article
+    4 above.
+
+If the necessary majority cannot be obtained, the dispute shall be
+submitted to arbitration and the Council shall determine the
+composition, the powers and the procedure of the Committee of
+Arbitrators as laid down in paragraph 4 of Article 4.
+
+
+ARTICLE 7.
+
+In the event of a dispute arising between two or more signatory States,
+these States agree that they will not, either before the dispute is
+submitted to proceedings for pacific settlement or during such
+proceedings, make any increase of their armaments or effectives which
+might modify the position established by the Conference for the
+Reduction of Armaments provided for by Article 17 of the present
+Protocol, nor will they take any measure of military, naval, air,
+industrial or economic mobilisation, nor, in general, any action of a
+nature likely to extend the dispute or render it more acute.
+
+It shall be the duty of the Council, in accordance with the provisions
+of Article 11 of the Covenant, to take under consideration any
+complaint as to infraction of the above undertakings which is made to
+it by one or more of the States parties to the dispute.  Should the
+Council be of opinion that the complaint requires investigation, it
+shall, if it deems it expedient, arrange for enquiries and
+investigations in one or more of the countries concerned.  Such
+enquiries and investigations shall be carried
+
+{142}
+
+Les mesures ainsi prises par li Conseil sont destinées uniquement à
+faciliter li règlement pacifique des différends et ne doivent préjuger
+en rien du règlement lui-même.
+
+Si, à la suite de ces enquêtes et investigations, une infraction
+quelconque aux dispositions du premier alinéa du présent article est
+établie, il est du devoir du Conseil de sommer l'Etat ou les Etats
+coupables de l'infraction de la faire disparaître.  Si l'Etat ou les
+Etats en question ne se conforment pas à cette sommation, le Conseil
+déclare lesdits Etats coupables d'une violation du Pacte ou du présent
+Protocole et doit décider les mesures à prendre en vue de faire cesser
+au plus tôt une situation de nature à menacer la paix du monde.
+
+Pour l'application du présent article, le Conseil prendra sa décision à
+la majorite des deux tiers.
+
+
+ARTICLE 8.
+
+Les Etats signataires s'engagent à s'abstenir de toute action qui
+pourrait constituer une menace d'agression contre un autre Etat.
+
+Dans li cas où un des Etats signataires estime qu'un autre Etat procédé
+à des préparatifs de guerre, il a le droit d'en saisir le Conseil.
+
+Celui-ci, après avoir vérifié les faits, opère comme il est dit à
+l'article 7, alinéas 2, 4 et 5.
+
+
+ARTICLE 9.
+
+L'existence de zones demilitarisées étant de nature à prévenir les
+agressions et à en faciliter la détermination sans équivoque
+conformément à l'article 10 ci-dessous, l'établissement de pareilles
+zones est recommandé entre les Etats qui y seraient également
+consentants, comme un moyen d'éviter une violation du présent Protocole.
+
+Les zones démilitarisées déjà existantes en vertu de certains Traités
+ou Conventions, ou qui seraient établies à l'avenir entre Etats
+également consentants, pourront faire l'objet d'un contrôle temporaire
+ou permanent, organisé par le Conseil, à la demande et aux frais d'un
+ou de plusieurs Etats limitrophes.
+
+{143}
+
+out with the utmost possible despatch, and the signatory States
+undertake to afford every facility for carrying them out.
+
+The sole object of measures taken by the Council as above provided is
+to facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes and they shall in no
+way prejudge the actual settlement.
+
+If the result of such enquiries and investigations is to establish an
+infraction of the provisions of the first paragraph of the present
+Article, it shall be the duty of the Council to summon the State or
+States guilty of the infraction to put an end thereto.  Should the
+State or States in question fail to comply with such summons, the
+Council shall declare them to be guilty of a violation of the Covenant
+or of the present Protocol, and shall decide upon the measures to be
+taken with a view to end as soon as possible a situation of a nature to
+threaten the peace of the world.
+
+For the purposes of the present Article decisions of the Council may be
+taken by a two-thirds majority.
+
+
+ARTICLE 8.
+
+The signatory States undertake to abstain from any act which might
+constitute a threat of aggression against another State.
+
+If one of the signatory States is of opinion that another State is
+making preparations for war, it shall have the right to bring the
+matter to the notice of the Council.
+
+The Council, if it ascertains that the facts are as alleged, shall
+proceed as provided in paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 of Article 7.
+
+
+ARTICLE 9.
+
+The existence of demilitarised zones being calculated to prevent
+aggression and to facilitate a definite finding of the nature provided
+for in Article 10 below, the establishment of such zones between States
+mutually consenting thereto is recommended as a means of avoiding
+violations of the present Protocol.
+
+The demilitarised zones already existing under the terms of certain
+treaties or conventions, or which may be established in future between
+States mutually consenting thereto, may at the request and at the
+expense of one or more of the conterminous States, be placed under a
+temporary or permanent system of supervision to be organized by the
+Council.
+
+{144}
+
+ARTICLE 10.
+
+Est agresseur tout Etat qui recourt à la guerre en violation des
+engagements prévus au Pacte ou au présent Protocole.  Est assimilée au
+recours à la guerre la violation du statut d'une zone démilitarisée.
+
+Dans le cas d'hostilités engagées, est présumé agresseur, sauf décision
+contraire du Conseil prise à l'unanimité:
+
+    1. Tout Etat qui aura refusé de soumettre le différend à la
+    procédure pour règlement pacifique prévue aux articles 13 et 15
+    du Pacte, complétés par le présent Protocole--ou qui aura refusé
+    de se conformer, soit à une décision judiciaire ou arbitrale,
+    soit à une recommandation unanime du Conseil--ou qui aura passé
+    outre à un rapport unanime du Conseil, à une décision judiciaire
+    ou arbitrale reconnaissant que le différend qui s'est élevé
+    entre lui et l'autre Etat belligérant porte sur une question que
+    le Droit international laisse à la compétence exclusive de cet
+    Etat; toutefois, dans ce dernier cas, l'Etat ne sera présumé
+    agresseur que s'il n'a pas soumis auparavant la question au
+    Conseil ou à l'Assemblée, conformément à l'article 11 du Pacte.
+
+    2. Tout Etat qui aura violé une des mesures provisoires
+    prescrites par le Conseil pendant la période de procédure, visées
+    à l'article 7 du présent Protocole.
+
+
+Hors les hypothèses visées aux numéros 1 et 2 du présent article, si le
+Conseil n'a pu déterminer dans le plus bref délai l'agresseur, il aura
+l'obligation de prescrire aux belligérants un armistice dont il fixera
+les conditions à la majorité des deux tiers et dont il surveillera
+l'observation.
+
+Tout belligérant ayant refusé l'armistice ou en ayant violé les
+conditions, sera réputé agresseur.
+
+Le Conseil enjoindra aux Etats signataires d'appliquer sans retard
+contre l'agresseur les sanctions visées à l'article 11 du présent
+Protocole, et tout Etat signataire, ainsi requis, sera dès lors fondé à
+exercer les droits d'un belligérant.
+
+{145}
+
+ARTICLE 10.
+
+Every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings
+contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an aggressor.
+Violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarised zone shall be held
+equivalent to resort to war.
+
+In the event of hostilities having broken out, any State shall be
+presumed to be an aggressor, unless a decision of the Council, which
+must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare:
+
+    1. If it has refused to submit the dispute to the procedure of
+    pacific settlement provided by Articles 13 and 15 of the Covenant
+    as amplified by the present Protocol, or to comply with a judicial
+    sentence or arbitral award or with a unanimous recommendation of
+    the Council, or has disregarded a unanimous report of the Council,
+    a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognising that the
+    dispute between it and the other belligerent State arises out of
+    a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic
+    jurisdiction of the latter State; nevertheless, in the last case
+    the State shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not
+    previously submitted the question to the Council or the Assembly,
+    in accordance with Article 11 of the Covenant.
+
+    2. If it has violated provisional measures enjoined by the Council
+    for the period while the proceedings are in progress as
+    contemplated by Article 7 of the present Protocol.
+
+
+Apart from the cases dealt with in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present
+Article, if the Council does not at once succeed in determining the
+aggressor, it shall be bound to enjoin upon the belligerents an
+armistice, and shall fix the terms, acting, if need be, by a two-thirds
+majority and shall supervise its execution.
+
+Any belligerent which has refused to accept the armistice or has
+violated its terms shall be deemed an aggressor.
+
+The Council shall call upon the signatory States to apply forthwith
+against the aggressor the sanctions provided by Article 11 of the
+present Protocol, and any signatory State thus called upon shall
+thereupon be entitled to exercise the rights of a belligerent.
+
+{146}
+
+ARTICLE 11.
+
+Dès que le Conseil a fait aux Etats signataires l'injonction prévue au
+dernier alinéa de l'article 10 du présent Protocole, les obligations
+desdits Etats en ce qui concerne les sanctions de toute nature visées
+aux alinéas 1 et 2 de l'article 16 du Pacte, deviennent immédiatement
+opérantes afin que ces sanctions puissent porter leurs effets contre
+l'agresseur sans aucun retard.
+
+Ces obligations doivent être interprétées en ce sens que chacun des
+Etats signataires est tenu de collaborer loyalement et effectivement
+pour faire respecter le Pacte de la Société des Nations et pour
+s'opposer à tout acte d'agression dans la mésure que lui permettent sa
+situation géographique et les conditions spéciales de ses armements.
+
+Conformément à l'alinéa 3 de l'article 16 du Pacte, les Etats
+signataires prennent l'engagement, individuel et collectif, de venir à
+l'aide de l'Etat attaqué ou menacé, et de se prêter un mutuel appui,
+grâce à des facilités et à des échanges réciproques en ce qui concerne
+le ravitaillement en matières premières et denrées de toute nature, les
+ouvertures de crédit, les transports et le transit et, à cet effet, de
+prendre toutes mesures en leur pouvoir pour maintenir la sécurité des
+communications terrestres et maritimes de l'Etat attaqué ou menacé.
+
+Si les deux Parties au différend sont agresseurs au sens de l'article
+10, les sanctions économiques et financières s'appliquent a l'une et à
+l'autre.
+
+
+ARTICLE 12.
+
+En raison de la complexité des conditions dans lesquelles le Conseil
+pourrait être appelé à remplir les fonctions visées à l'article 11
+ci-dessus concernant les sanctions économiques et financières et pour
+préciser les garanties qui sont offertes par le présent Protocole aux
+Etats signataires, le Conseil invitera immédiatement les organisations
+économiques et financières de la Société des Nations à procéder à une
+étude et à
+
+{147}
+
+ARTICLE 11.
+
+As soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply
+sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 10 of the
+present Protocol, the obligations of the said States, in regard to the
+sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 16 of
+the Covenant, will immediately become operative in order that such
+sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor.
+
+Those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the
+signatory States to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of
+the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in resistance to any act of
+aggression, in the degree which its geographical position and its
+particular situation as regards armaments allow.
+
+In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant the
+signatory States give a joint and several undertaking to come to the
+assistance of the State attacked or threatened, and to give each other
+mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as
+regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind,
+openings of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to
+take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of
+communications by land and by sea of the attacked or threatened State.
+
+If both parties to the dispute are aggressors within the meaning of
+Article 10, the economic and financial sanctions shall be applied to
+both of them.
+
+
+ARTICLE 12.
+
+In view of the complexity of the conditions in which the Council may be
+called upon to exercise the functions mentioned in Article 11 of the
+present Protocol concerning economic and financial sanctions, and in
+order to determine more exactly the guarantees afforded by the present
+Protocol to the signatory States, the Council shall forthwith invite
+the economic and financial organisations of the League of Nations to
+consider and report
+
+{148}
+
+soumettre un rapport sur la nature des dispositions à prendre pour
+mettre en vigueur les sanctions et mesures de coopération économique et
+financière, visées à l'article 16 du Pacte et à l'article 11 du present
+Protocole.
+
+En possession de ces informations, le Conseil établira par ses
+organismes compétents:
+
+    1. les plans d'action destinés à faire jouer les sanctions
+    economiques et financières contre un Etat agresseur;
+
+    2. les plans de coopération économique et financière entre
+    un Etat attaqué et les divers Etats lui portant assistance,
+
+et il communiquera ces plans aux Membres de la Société et aux autres
+Etats signataires.
+
+
+ARTICLE 13.
+
+Eu égard aux sanctions militaires, navales et aériennes dont
+l'application éventuelle est prévue à l'article 16 du Pacte et à
+l'article 11 du présent Protocole, le Conseil aura qualité pour
+recevoir les engagements d'Etats déterminant par avance les forces
+militaires, navales et aériennes que ces Etats pourraient faire
+intervenir immédiatement afin d'assurer l'exécution des obligations
+dérivant à ce sujet du Pacte et du présent Protocole.
+
+Dès que le Conseil a fait aux Etats signataires l'injonction prévue au
+dernier alinéa de l'article 10 ci-dessus, ces Etats peuvent en outre
+faire entrer en ligne, suivant les accords antérieurement faits, leurs
+forces militaires, navales et aériennes au secours d'un Etat
+particulier, victime de l'agression.
+
+Les accords visés au précédent alinéa sont enregistrés et publiés par
+le Secrétariat de la Société des Nations; ils restent ouverts à tout
+Etat Membre de la Société, qui voudrait y accéder.
+
+
+ARTICLE 14.
+
+Le Conseil a seul qualité pour déclarer qui'l y a lieu de faire cesser
+l'application des sanctions et de rétablir les conditions normales.
+
+{149}
+
+as to the nature of the steps to be taken to give effect to the
+financial and economic sanctions and measures of co-operation
+contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant and in Article 11 of this
+Protocol.
+
+When in possession of this information, the Council shall draw up
+through its competent organs:
+
+    1. Plans of action for the application of the economic and
+    financial sanctions against an aggressor State;
+
+    2. Plans of economic and financial co-operation between a State
+    attacked and the different States assisting it;
+
+and shall communicate these plans to the Members of the League and to
+the other signatory States.
+
+
+ARTICLE 13.
+
+In view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided
+for by Article 16 of the Covenant and by Article 11 of the present
+Protocol, the Council shall be entitled to receive undertakings from
+States determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which
+they would be able to bring into action immediately to ensure the
+fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from
+the Covenant and the present Protocol.
+
+Furthermore, as soon as the Council has called upon the signatory
+States to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article
+10 above, the said States may, in accordance with any agreements which
+they may previously have concluded, bring to the assistance of a
+particular State, which is the victim of aggression, their military,
+naval and air forces.
+
+The agreements mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be registered
+and published by the Secretariat of the League of Nations.  They shall
+remain open to all States Members of the League which may desire to
+accede thereto.
+
+
+ARTICLE 14.
+
+The Council shall alone be competent to declare that the application of
+sanctions shall cease and normal conditions be re-established.
+
+{150}
+
+ARTICLE 15.
+
+Pour répondre à l'esprit du présent Protocole, les Etats signataires
+conviennent que la totalité des frais de toute opération d'ordre
+militaire, naval ou aérien, entreprise pour la répréssion d'une
+agression, conformément aux termes de ce Protocole, ainsi que la
+réparation de tous dommages subis par les personnes civiles ou
+militaires, et de tous dommages matériels occasionnés par les
+opérations de part et d'autre, seront supportés par l'Etat agresseur
+jusqu'à l'extréme limite de sa capacité.
+
+Toutefois, vu l'article 10 du Pacte, il ne pourra, comme suite à
+l'application des sanctions visées au présent Protocole, être porté
+atteinte en aucun cas à l'intégrité territoriale ou à l'indépendance
+politique de l'Etat agresseur.
+
+
+ARTICLE 16.
+
+Les Etats signataires conviennent qu'en cas de différend entre un ou
+plusieurs parmi eux et un ou plusieurs Etats non signataires du présent
+Protocole értangers à la Société des Nations, ces Etats étrangers
+seront invités, aux conditions prévues à l'article 17 du Pacte, à se
+soumettre aux obligations acceptées par les signataires du présent
+Protocole aux fins de règlement pacifique.
+
+Si l'Etat invité, refusant d'accepter les dites conditions et
+obligations, recourt à la guerre centre un Etat signataire, les
+dispositions de l'article 16 du Pacte, telles qu'elles sont précisées
+par le présent Protocole, lui sont applicables.
+
+
+ARTICLE 17.
+
+Les Etats signataires s'engagent à prendre part à une Conférence
+internationale pour la réduction des armements qui devra être convoquée
+par le Conseil et qui se réunira à Geneve le lundi 15 juin 1925.  Tous
+autres Etats, Membres ou non de la Société, seront invités à cette
+Conférence.
+
+En vue de la convocation de la Conférence, le Conseil
+
+{151}
+
+ARTICLE 15.
+
+In conformity with the spirit of the present Protocol the signatory
+States agree that the whole cost of any military, naval or air
+operations undertaken for the repression of an aggression under the
+terms of the Protocol, and reparation for all losses suffered by
+individuals, whether civilians or combatants, and for all material
+damage caused by the operations of both sides, shall be borne by the
+aggressor State up to the extreme limit of its capacity.
+
+Nevertheless, in view of Article 10 of the Covenant, neither the
+territorial integrity nor the political independence of the aggressor
+State shall in any case be affected as the result of the application of
+the sanctions mentioned in the present Protocol.
+
+
+ARTICLE 16.
+
+The signatory States agree that in the event of a dispute between one
+or more of them and one or more States which have not signed the
+present Protocol and are not Members of the League of Nations, such
+non-Member States shall be invited, on the conditions contemplated in
+Article 17 of the Covenant, to submit, for the purpose of a pacific
+settlement, to the obligations accepted by the States signatories of
+the present Protocol.
+
+If the State so invited, having refused to accept the said conditions
+and obligations, resorts to war against a signatory State, the
+provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant, as defined by the present
+Protocol, shall be applicable against it.
+
+
+ARTICLE 17.
+
+The signatory States undertake to participate in an International
+Conference for the Reduction of Armaments which shall be convened by
+the Council and shall meet at Geneva on Monday, June 15th, 1925.  All
+other States, whether Members of the League or not, shall be invited to
+this Conference.
+
+In preparation for the convening of the Conference, the
+
+{152}
+
+préparera, en tenant compte des engagements prévus aux articles 11 et
+13 du présent Protocole, un programme général pour la reduction et la
+limitation des armements qui sera mis à la disposition de cette
+Conférence et communiqué aux gouvernements le plus tôt possible, et au
+plus tard trois mois avant la réunion.
+
+Si au moins la majorité des Membres représentés en permanence au
+Conseil et dix autres Membres de la Société n'ont pas déposé leur
+ratification pour le 1er mai 1925, le Sécretaire général de la Société
+devra prendre immédiatement l'avis du Conseil pour savoir s'il doit
+annuler les invitations ou simplement ajourner la Conférence à une date
+ultérieure, qui sera fixée par le Conseil pour permettre la réunion du
+nombre necessaire de ratifications.
+
+
+ARTICLE 18.
+
+Toutes les fois que, dans l'article 10 ou dans toutes autres
+dispositions du présent Protocole, il est fait mention d'une décision
+du Conseil, elle s'entend dans le sens de l'article 15 du Pacte, à
+savoir que le vote des représentants des Parties au différend ne compte
+pas dans le calcul de l'unanimité ou de la majorité requise.
+
+
+ARTICLE 19.
+
+A défaut de stipulations expresses, le présent Protocole n'affecte pas
+les droits et les obligations des Membres de la Société des Nations,
+tels qu'ils résultent du Pacte.
+
+
+ARTICLE 20.
+
+Tout différend relatif à l'interpretation du présent Protocole sera
+soumis à la Cour permanente de Justice Internationale.
+
+
+ARTICLE 2l.
+
+Le présent Protocole, dont les textes français et anglais feront foi,
+sera ratifié.
+
+{153}
+
+Council shall draw up with due regard to the undertakings contained in
+Articles 11 and 13 of the present Protocol a general programme for the
+reduction and limitation of armaments, which shall be laid before the
+Conference and which shall be communicated to the Governments at the
+earliest possible date, and at the latest three months before the
+Conference meets.
+
+If by May 1st, 1925, ratifications have not been deposited by at least
+a majority of the permanent Members of the Council and ten other
+Members of the League, the Secretary-General of the League shall
+immediately consult the Council as to whether he shall cancel the
+invitations or merely adjourn the Conference to a subsequent date to be
+fixed by the Council so as to permit the necessary number of
+ratifications to be obtained.
+
+
+ARTICLE 18.
+
+Wherever mention is made in Article 10, or in any other provision of
+the present Protocol, of a decision of the Council, this shall be
+understood in the sense of Article 15 of the Covenant, namely that the
+votes of the representatives of the parties to the dispute shall not be
+counted when reckoning unanimity or the necessary majority.
+
+
+ARTICLE 19.
+
+Except as expressly provided by its terms, the present Protocol shall
+not affect in any way the rights and obligations of Members of the
+League as determined by the Covenant.
+
+
+ARTICLE 20.
+
+Any dispute as to the interpretation of the present Protocol shall be
+submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
+
+
+ARTICLE 21.
+
+The present Protocol, of which the French and English texts are both
+authentic, shall be ratified.
+
+{154}
+
+Le dépôt des ratifications sera effectué au Secrétariat de la Société
+des Nations le plus tôt qu'il sera possible.
+
+Les Etats dont le gouvernement a son siège hors d'Europe auront la
+faculté de se borner à faire connaître au Secrétariat de la Societe des
+Nations que leur ratification a été donnée et, dans ce cas, ils devront
+en transmettre l'instrument aussitôt que faire se pourra.
+
+Dès que la majorité des Membres représentés en permanence au Conseil et
+dix autres Membres de la Société auront déposé ou effectué leur
+ratification, un procès-verbal sera dressé par le Secrétariat pour le
+constater.
+
+La mise en vigueur du Protocole aura lieu après que ce procès-verbal
+aura été dressé et dès que le plan de réduction des armements aura été
+adopté par la Conférence prevue à l'article 17.
+
+Si, dans un délai, à fixer par ladite Conférence après l'adoption du
+plan de réduction des armements, ce plan n'a pas été exécuté, il
+appartiendra au Conseil de le constater; par l'effet de cette
+constatation le présent Protocole deviendra caduc.
+
+Les conditions en vertu desquelles le Conseil pourra constater que le
+plan établi par la Conférence internationale pour la réduction des
+armements n'a pas été exécuté et que, par conséquent, le présent
+Protocole est devenu caduc, seront définies par la Conférence elle-même.
+
+Tout Etat signataire qui ne se conformerait pas, après l'expiration du
+délai fixé par la Conférence, au plan adopté par elle, ne pourra
+bénéficier des dispositions du présent Protocole.
+
+
+En foi de quoi les Soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont signé
+le présent Protocole.
+
+
+Fait à Genève, le deux octobre, mil neuf cent vingt-quatre, en un seul
+exemplaire qui restera déposé dans les archives du Secretariat de la
+Société des Nations et qui sera enregistré par lui à la date de son
+entrée en vigueur.
+
+{155}
+
+The deposit of ratifications shall be made at the Secretariat of the
+League of Nations as soon as possible.
+
+States of which the seat of government is outside Europe will be
+entitled merely to inform the Secretariat of the League of Nations that
+their ratification has been given; in that case, they must transmit the
+instrument of ratification as soon as possible.
+
+So soon as the majority of the permanent Members of the Council and ten
+other Members of the League have deposited or have effected their
+ratifications, a _procès-verbal_ to that effect shall be drawn up by
+the Secretariat.
+
+After the said _procès-verbal_ has been drawn up, the Protocol shall
+come into force as soon as the plan for the reduction of armaments has
+been adopted by the Conference provided for in Article 17.
+
+If within such period after the adoption of the plan for the reduction
+of armaments as shall be fixed by the said Conference, the plan has not
+been carried out, the Council shall make a declaration to that effect;
+this declaration shall render the present Protocol null and void.
+
+The grounds on which the Council may declare that the plan drawn up by
+the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments has not
+been carried out, and that in consequence the present Protocol has been
+rendered null and void, shall be laid down by the Conference itself.
+
+A signatory State which, after the expiration of the period fixed by
+the Conference, fails to comply with the plan adopted by the
+Conference, shall not be admitted to benefit by the provisions of the
+present Protocol.
+
+
+In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised for this purpose,
+have signed the present Protocol.
+
+
+DONE at Geneva, on the second day of October, nineteen hundred and
+twenty-four, in a single copy, which will be kept in the archives of
+the Secretariat of the League and registered by it on the date of its
+coming into force.
+
+
+
+
+{156}
+
+ANNEX C.
+
+GENERAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FIFTH ASSEMBLY ON BEHALF OF THE FIRST
+AND THIRD COMMITTEES BY M. POLITIS (GREECE) AND M. BENES
+(CZECHOSLOVAKIA).
+
+
+I
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+After being examined for several years by the Third Committee, the
+problem of the reduction of armaments has this year suddenly assumed a
+different, a wider and even an unexpected form.
+
+Last year a draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was prepared, which the
+Assembly sent to the Members of the League for their consideration.
+The replies from the Governments were to be examined by the Fifth
+Assembly.
+
+At the very beginning of its work, however, after a memorable debate,
+the Assembly indicated to the Third Committee a new path.  On September
+6th, 1924, on the proposal of the Prime Ministers of France and Great
+Britain, M. Edouard Herriot and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the Assembly
+adopted the following resolution:
+
+    "The Assembly,
+
+    "Noting the declarations of the Governments represented,
+    observes with satisfaction that they contain the basis of
+    an understanding tending to establish a secure peace,
+
+    "Decides as follows:
+
+    "With a view to reconciling in the new proposals the
+    divergences between certain points of view which have been
+    expressed and, when agreement has been reached, to enable
+    an international conference upon armaments to be summoned
+    by the League of Nations at the earliest possible moment:
+
+    "(1) The Third Committee is requested to consider the
+    {157}
+    material dealing with security and the reduction of armaments,
+    particularly the observations of the Governments on the draft
+    Treaty of Mutual Assistance, prepared in pursuance of
+    Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly and other plans prepared
+    and presented to the Secretary-General since the publication
+    of the draft Treaty, and to examine the obligations contained
+    in the Covenant of the League in relation to the guarantees
+    of security which a resort to arbitration and a reduction of
+    armaments may require:
+
+    "(2) The First Committee is requested:
+
+        "(_a_) To consider, in view of possible amendments, the
+        articles in the Covenant relating to the settlement of
+        disputes;
+
+        "(_b_) To examine within what limits the terms of Article
+        36, paragraph 2, of the Statute establishing the Permanent
+        Court of International Justice might be rendered more
+        precise and thereby facilitate the more general acceptance
+    of the clause;
+
+    and thus strengthen the solidarity and the security of the
+    nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes
+    which may arise between States."
+
+
+This resolution had two merits, first, that of briefly summarising all
+the investigations made in the last four years by the different
+organisations of the League in their efforts to establish peace and
+bring about the reduction of armaments, and, secondly, that of
+indicating the programme of work of the Committees in the hope that,
+with the aid of past experience, they would at last attain the end in
+view.
+
+The Assembly had assigned to each Committee a distinct and separate
+task; to the First Committee, the examination of the pacific settlement
+of disputes by methods capable of being applied in every case; to the
+Third Committee, the question of the security of nations considered as
+a necessary preliminary condition for the reduction of their armaments.
+
+Each Committee, after a general discussion which served to {158} detach
+the essential elements from the rest of the problem, referred the
+examination of its programme to a Sub-Committee, which devoted a large
+number of meetings to this purpose.
+
+The proposals of the Sub-Committees then led to very full debates by
+the Committees, which terminated in the texts analysed below.
+
+As, however, the questions submitted respectively to the two Committees
+form part of an indivisible whole, contact and collaboration had to be
+established between the Committees by means of a Mixed Committee of
+nine members and finally by a joint Drafting Committee of four members.
+
+For the same reason, the work of the Committees has resulted in a
+single draft protocol accompanied by two draft resolutions for which
+the Committees are jointly responsible.
+
+Upon these various texts, separate reports were submitted, which, being
+approved by the Committees respectively responsible for them, may be
+considered as an official commentary by the Committees.
+
+These separate reports have here been combined in order to present as a
+whole the work accomplished by the two Committees and to facilitate
+explanation.
+
+Before entering upon an analysis of the proposed texts, it is expedient
+to recall, in a brief historical summary, the efforts of the last four
+years, of which the texts are the logical conclusion.
+
+
+HISTORICAL STATEMENT.
+
+The problem of the reduction of armaments is presented in Article 8 of
+the Covenant in terms which reveal at the outset the complexity of the
+question and which explain the tentative manner in which the subject
+has been treated by the League of Nations in the last few years.
+
+    "The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance
+    of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to
+    {159}
+    the lowest point consistent with national safety and the
+    enforcement by common action of international obligations."
+
+
+Here we see clearly expressed the need of reducing the burden which
+armaments imposed upon the nations immediately after the war and of
+putting a stop to the competition in armaments which was, in itself, a
+threat to the peace of the world.  But, at the same time, there is
+recognised the duty of safeguarding the national security of the
+Members of the League and of safeguarding it, not only by the
+maintenance of a necessary minimum of troops, but also by the
+co-operation of all the nations, by a vast organisation for peace.
+
+Such is the meaning of the Covenant, which, while providing for
+reduction of armaments properly so called, recognises at the same time
+the need of _common action_, by all the Members of the League, with a
+view to compelling a possible disturber of the peace to respect his
+_international obligations_.
+
+Thus, in this first paragraph of Article 8, which is so short but so
+pregnant, mention is made of all the problems which have engaged the
+attention of our predecessors and ourselves and which the present
+Assembly has specially instructed us to solve, the problems of
+_collective security_ and the _reduction of armaments_.
+
+Taking up Article 8 of the Covenant, the First Assembly had already
+outlined a programme.  At its head it placed a pronouncement of the
+Supreme Council:
+
+    "In order to diminish the economic difficulties of Europe,
+    armies should everywhere be reduced to a peace footing.
+    Armaments should be limited to the lowest possible figure
+    compatible with national security."
+
+
+The Assembly also called attention to a resolution of the International
+Financial Conference of Brussels held a short time before:
+
+    "Recommending to the Council of the League of Nations the
+    {160}
+    desirability of conferring at once with the several Governments
+    concerned with a view to securing a general reduction of the
+    crushing burdens which, on their existing scale, armaments
+    still impose on the impoverished peoples of the world, sapping
+    their resources and imperilling their recovery from the ravages
+    of war."
+
+
+It also requested its two Advisory Commissions to set to work at once
+to collect the necessary information regarding the problem referred to
+in Article 8 of the Covenant.
+
+From the beginning the work of the Temporary Mixed Commission and of
+the Permanent Advisory Commission revealed the infinite complexity of
+the question.
+
+The Second Assembly limited its resolutions to the important, but none
+the less (if one may say so) secondary, questions of traffic in arms
+and their manufacture by private enterprise.  It only touched upon the
+questions of military expenditure and budgets in the form of
+recommendations and, as regards the main question of reduction of
+armaments, it confined itself to asking the Temporary Mixed Commission
+to formulate a definite scheme.
+
+It was between the Second and Third Assemblies that the latter
+Commission, which was beginning to get to grips with the various
+problems, revealed their constituent elements.  In its report it placed
+on record that:
+
+    "The memory of the world war was still maintaining in many
+    countries a feeling of insecurity, which was represented
+    in the candid statements in which, at the request of the
+    Assembly, several of them had put forward the requirements
+    of their national security, and the geographical and
+    political considerations which contributed to shape their
+    policy in the matter of armaments."
+
+
+At the same time, however, the Commission stated:
+
+    "Consideration of these statements as a whole has clearly
+    revealed not only the sincere desire of the Governments
+    to reduce national armaments and the corresponding
+    {161}
+    expenditure to a minimum, but also the importance of the results
+    achieved.  These facts"--according to the Commission--"are
+    indisputable, and are confirmed moreover, by the replies
+    received from Governments to the Recommendation of the Assembly
+    regarding the limitation of military expenditure."
+
+
+That is the point we had reached _two years ago_; there was a
+_unanimous desire to reduce armaments_.  Reductions, though as yet
+inadequate, had been begun, and there was a _still stronger desire to
+ensure the security of the world_ by a stable and permanent
+organisation for peace.
+
+That was the position which, after long discussions, gave rise _at the
+Third Assembly to the famous Resolution XIV_ and at the Fourth Assembly
+_to the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance_, for which we are now
+substituting the Protocol submitted to the Fifth Assembly.
+
+What progress has been made during these four years?
+
+Although the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was approved in principle by
+eighteen Governments, it gave rise to certain misgivings.  We need only
+recall the most important of these, hoping that a comparison between
+them and an analysis of the new scheme will demonstrate that the First
+and Third Committees have endeavoured, with a large measure of success,
+to dispose of the objections raised and that the present scheme
+consequently represents an immense advance on anything that has
+hitherto been done.
+
+In the first place, a number of Governments or delegates to the
+Assembly argued that the guarantees provided by the draft Treaty of
+Mutual Assistance did not imply with sufficient definiteness the
+reduction of armaments which is the ultimate object of our work.
+
+The idea of the Treaty was to give effect to Article 8 of the Covenant,
+but many persons considered that it did not, in fact, secure the
+automatic execution of that article.  Even if a reduction of armaments
+was achieved by its means, the amount {162} of the reduction was left,
+so the opponents of the Treaty urged, to the estimation of each
+Government, and there was nothing to show that it would be considerable.
+
+With equal force many States complained that no provision had been made
+for the development of the _juridicial and moral elements of the
+Covenant_ by the side of material guarantees.  The novel character of
+the charter given to the nations in 1919 lay essentially in the advent
+of a moral solidarity which foreshadowed the coming of a new era.  That
+principle ought to have, as its natural consequence, _the extension of
+arbitration and international jurisdiction_, without which no human
+society can be solidly grounded.  A considerable portion of the
+Assembly asked that efforts should also be made in this direction.  The
+draft Treaty seemed from this point of view to be insufficient and
+ill-balanced.
+
+Finally, the articles relating to partial treaties gave rise, as you
+are aware, to certain objections.  Several Governments considered that
+they would lead to the establishment of groups of Powers animated by
+hostility towards other Powers or groups of Powers and that they would
+cause political tension.  The absence of the barriers of compulsory
+arbitration and judicial intervention was evident here as everywhere
+else.
+
+Thus, by a logical and gradual process, there was elaborated the system
+at which we have now arrived.
+
+The reduction of armaments required by the Covenant and demanded by the
+general situation of the world to-day led us to consider the question
+of security as a necessary complement to disarmament.
+
+The support demanded from different States by other States less
+favourably situated had placed the former under the obligation of
+asking for a sort of moral and legal guarantee that the States which
+have to be supported would act in perfect good faith and would always
+endeavor to settle their disputes by pacific means.
+
+It became evident, however, with greater clearness and force {163} than
+ever before, that if the security and effective assistance demanded in
+the event of aggression was the condition _sine quâ non_ of the
+reduction of armaments, it was at the same time the necessary
+complement of the pacific settlement of international disputes, since
+the non-execution of a sentence obtained by pacific methods of
+settlement would necessarily drive the world back to the system of
+armed force.  Sentences imperatively required sanctions or the whole
+system would fall to the ground.
+
+_Arbitration was therefore considered by the Fifth Assembly to be the
+necessary third factor, the complement of the two others with which it
+must be combined in order to build up the new system set forth in the
+Protocol._
+
+Thus, after five years' hard work, we have decided to propose to the
+Members of the League _the present system of arbitration, security and
+reduction of armaments_--a system which we regard as being complete and
+sound.
+
+That is the position with which the Fifth Assembly has to deal to-day.
+The desire to arrive at a successful issue is unanimous.  A great
+number of the decisions adopted in the past years have met with general
+approval.  There has arisen a thoroughly clear appreciation of the
+undoubted gaps which have to be filled and of the reasonable
+apprehensions which have to be dissipated.  Conditions have therefore
+become favourable for arriving at an agreement.
+
+An agreement has been arrived at on the basis of the draft Protocol
+which is now submitted to you for consideration.
+
+
+{164}
+
+II
+
+ANALYSIS OF THE SCHEME.
+
+1.--WORK OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE.
+
+(_Rapporteur_: M. Politis)
+
+DRAFT PROTOCOL FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.
+
+_Preamble._
+
+The object of the Protocol, which is based upon the resolution of
+September 6th, 1924, is to facilitate the reduction and limitation of
+armaments provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of
+Nations by guaranteeing the security of States through the development
+of methods for the pacific settlement of all international disputes and
+the effective condemnation of aggressive war.
+
+These general ideas are summarised in the preamble of the Protocol.
+
+
+COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.
+
+(_Articles 1 to 6, 10, 16, 18 and 19 of the Protocol_)
+
+1.--INTRODUCTION.
+
+Compulsory arbitration is the fundamental basis of the proposed system.
+It has seemed to be the only means of attaining the ultimate aim
+pursued by the League of Nations, viz. the establishment of a pacific
+and legal order in the relations between peoples.
+
+The realisation of this great ideal, to which humanity aspires with a
+will which has never been more strongly affirmed, presupposes, as an
+indispensable condition, the elimination of war, the extension of the
+rule of law and the strengthening of the sentiment of justice.
+
+The Covenant of the League of Nations erected a wall of protection
+around the peace of the world, but it was a first attempt {165} at
+international organisation and it did not succeed in closing the circle
+sufficiently thoroughly to leave no opening for war.  It reduced the
+number of possible wars.  It did not condemn them all.  There were some
+which it was forced to tolerate.  Consequently, there remained, in the
+system which it established, numerous fissures, which constituted a
+grave danger to peace.
+
+The new system of the Protocol goes further.  It closes the circle
+drawn by the Covenant; it prohibits all wars of aggression.  Henceforth
+no purely private war between nations will be tolerated.
+
+This result is obtained by strengthening the pacific methods of
+procedure laid down in the Covenant.  The Protocol completes them and
+extends them to all international disputes without exception, by making
+arbitration compulsory.
+
+In reality, the word "arbitration" is used here in a somewhat different
+sense from that which it has generally had up to now.  It does not
+exactly correspond with the definition given by the Hague Conferences
+which, codifying a century-old custom, saw in it "the settlement of
+disputes between States by judges of their own choice and on the basis
+of respect for law" (Article 37 of the Convention of October 18th,
+1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes).
+
+The arbitration which is now contemplated differs from this classic
+arbitration in various respects:
+
+    (_a_) It is only part of a great machinery of pacific settlement.
+    It is set up under the auspices and direction of the Council of
+    the League of Nations.
+
+    (_b_) It is not only an instrument for the administration of
+    justice.  It is, in addition and above all, an instrument of
+    peace.  The arbitrators must no doubt seek in the first place
+    to apply the rules and principles of international law.  This
+    is the reason why, as will be seen below, they are bound to
+    consult the Permanent Court of International Justice if one
+    of the parties so requests.  But if international law
+    furnishes no rule or principle applicable to the particular
+    {166}
+    case, they cannot, like ordinary arbitrators, refuse to give a
+    decision.  They are bound to proceed on grounds of equity, for
+    in our system arbitration is always of necessity to lead to a
+    definitive solution of the dispute.  This is not to be
+    regretted, for to ensure the respect of law by nations it is
+    necessary first that they should be assured of peace,
+
+    (_c_) It does not rest solely upon the loyalty and good faith
+    of the parties.  To the moral and legal force of an ordinary
+    arbitration is added the actual force derived from the
+    international organisation of which the kind of arbitration
+    in question forms one of the principal elements; the absence
+    of a sanction which has impeded the development of compulsory
+    arbitration is done away with under our system.
+
+
+In the system of the Protocol, the obligation to submit disputes to
+arbitration is sound and practical because it has always a sanction.
+Its application is automatically ensured, by means of the intervention
+of the Council; in no case can it be thrown on one side through the
+ill-will of one of the disputant States.  The awards to which it leads
+are always accompanied by a sanction, adapted to the circumstances of
+the case and more or less severe according to the degree of resistance
+offered to the execution of the sentence.
+
+
+{167}
+
+2.--NATURE OF THE RULES OP THE PROTOCOL.
+
+_Article 1._
+
+The rules laid down in the Protocol do not all have the same scope or
+value for the future.
+
+As soon as the Protocol comes into force, its provisions will become
+compulsory as between the signatory States, and in its dealings with
+them the Council of the League of Nations will at once be able to
+exercise all the rights and fulfil all the duties conferred upon it.
+
+As between the States Members of the League of Nations, the Protocol
+may in the first instance create a dual régime, for, if it is not
+immediately accepted by them all, the relations between signatories and
+non-signatories will still be governed by the Covenant alone while the
+relations between signatories will be governed by the Protocol as well.
+
+But this situation cannot last.  Apart from the fact that it may be
+hoped that all Members of the League will adhere to it, the Protocol is
+in no sense designed to create among the States which accept it a
+restricted League capable of competing with or opposing in any way the
+existing League.  On the contrary, such of its provisions as relate to
+articles of the Covenant will, as soon as possible, be made part of the
+general law by amendment of the Covenant effected in accordance with
+the procedure for revision laid down in Article 26 thereof.  The
+signatory States which are Members of the League of Nations undertake
+to make every effort to this end.
+
+When the Covenant has been amended in this way, some parts of the
+Protocol will lose their value as between the said States: some of them
+will have enriched the Covenant, while others, being temporary in
+character, will have lost their object.
+
+The whole Protocol will remain applicable to relations between
+signatory States which are Members of the League of Nations and
+signatory States outside the League, or between States coming within
+the latter category.
+
+{168}
+
+It should be added that, as the League realises its aim of
+universality, the amended Covenant will take the place, as regards all
+States, of the separate régime of the Protocol.
+
+
+3.--CONDEMNATION OF AGGRESSIVE WAR.
+
+_Article 2._
+
+The general principle of the Protocol is the prohibition of aggressive
+war.
+
+Under the Covenant, while the old unlimited right of States to make war
+is restricted, it is not abolished.  There are cases in which the
+exercise of this right is tolerated; some wars are prohibited and
+others are legitimate.
+
+In future the position will be different.  In no case is any State
+signatory of the Protocol entitled to undertake on its own sole
+initiative an offensive war against another signatory State or against
+any non-signatory State which accepts all the obligations assumed by
+the signatories under the Protocol.
+
+The prohibition affects only aggressive war.  It does not, of course,
+extend to defensive war.  The right of legitimate self-defence
+continues, as it must, to be respected.  The State attacked retains
+complete liberty to resist by all means in its power any acts of
+aggression of which it may be the victim.  Without waiting for the
+assistance which it is entitled to receive from the international
+community, it may and should at once defend itself with its own force.
+Its interests are identified with the general interest.  This is a
+point on which there can be no doubt.
+
+The same applies when a country employs force with the consent of the
+Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations under the provisions
+of the Covenant and the Protocol.  This eventuality may arise in two
+classes of cases: either a State may take part in the collective
+measures of force decided upon by the League of Nations in aid of one
+of its Members which is the victim of aggression; or a State may employ
+force with the authorisation of the Council or the Assembly in order to
+enforce {169} a decision given in its favour.  In the former case, the
+assistance given to the victim of aggression is indirectly an act of
+legitimate self-defence.  In the latter, force is used in the service
+of the general interest, which would be threatened if decisions reached
+by a pacific procedure could be violated with impunity.  In all these
+cases the country resorting to war is not acting on its private
+initiative but is in a sense the agent and the organ of the community.
+
+It is for this reason that we have not hesitated to speak of the
+exceptional authorisation of war.  It has been proposed that the word
+"force" should be used in order to avoid any mention of "war"--in order
+to spare the public that disappointment which it might feel when it
+found that, notwithstanding the solemn condemnation of war, war was
+still authorised in exceptional cases.  We preferred, however, to
+recognise the position frankly by retaining the expression "resort to
+war" which is used in the Covenant.  If we said "force" instead of
+"war," we should not be altering the facts in any way.  Moreover, the
+confession that war is still possible in specific cases has a certain
+value, because the term describes a definite and well-understood
+situation, whereas the expression "resort to force" would be liable to
+be misunderstood, and also because it emphasises the value of the
+sanctions at the disposal of the community of States bound by the
+Protocol.
+
+
+4.--COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
+JUSTICE.
+
+_Article 3._
+
+The general principle of the Protocol could not be accepted unless the
+pacific settlement of all international disputes without distinction
+were made possible.
+
+This solution has been found, in the first place, in the extension of
+the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International
+Justice.
+
+{170}
+
+According to its Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court is, in
+principle, optional.  On the other hand, Article 36, paragraph 2, of
+the Statute, offers States the opportunity of making the jurisdiction
+compulsory in respect of all or any of the classes of legal disputes
+affecting: (_a_) the interpretation of a Treaty; (_b_) any question of
+international law; (_c_) the existence of any fact which, if
+established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
+(_d_) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach
+of an international obligation.  States have only to declare their
+intention through the special Protocol annexed to the Statute.  The
+undertaking then holds good in respect of any other State which assumes
+the same obligation.  It may be given either unconditionally or on
+condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain other
+States; either permanently or for a fixed period.
+
+So far such compulsory jurisdiction has only been accepted by a small
+number of countries.  The majority of States have abstained because
+they did not see their way to accept compulsory jurisdiction by the
+Court in certain cases falling within one or another of the classes of
+dispute enumerated above, and because they were not sure whether, in
+accepting, they could make reservations to that effect.
+
+It was for this reason that the Assembly in its resolution of September
+6th, requested the First Committee to render more precise the terms of
+Article 36, paragraph 2, in order to facilitate its acceptance.
+
+Careful consideration of the article has shown that it is sufficiently
+elastic to allow of all kinds of reservations.  Since it is open to the
+States to accept compulsory jurisdiction by the Court in respect of
+certain of the classes of dispute mentioned and not to accept it in
+respect of the rest, it is also open to them only to accept it in
+respect of a portion of one of those classes; rights need not be
+exercised in their full extent.  In giving the undertaking in question,
+therefore, States are free to declare that it {171} will not be
+regarded as operative in those cases in which they consider it to be
+inadmissible.
+
+We can imagine possible and therefore legitimate, reservations either
+in connection with a certain class of dispute or, generally speaking,
+in regard to the precise stage at which the dispute may be laid before
+the Court.  While we cannot here enumerate all the conceivable
+reservations, it may be worth while to mention merely as examples those
+to which we referred in the course of our discussions.
+
+From the class of disputes relating to "the interpretation of a treaty"
+there may be excluded, for example, disputes as to the interpretation
+of certain specified classes of treaty such as political treaties,
+peace treaties, etc.
+
+From the class of disputes relating to "any point of international law"
+there may be excluded, for example, disputes as to the application of a
+political treaty, a peace treaty, etc., or as to any specified question
+or disputes which might arise as the outcome of hostilities initiated
+by one of the signatory States in agreement with the Council or the
+Assembly of the League of Nations.
+
+Again, there are many possible reservations as to the precise stage at
+which a dispute may be laid before the Court.  The most far-reaching of
+these would be to make the resort to the Court in connection with every
+dispute in respect of which its compulsory jurisdiction is recognised
+contingent upon the establishment of an agreement for submission of the
+case which, failing agreement between the parties, would be drawn up by
+the Court itself, the analogy of the provisions of the Hague Convention
+of 1907 dealing with the Permanent Court of Arbitration being thus
+followed.
+
+It might also be stated that the recognition of the compulsory
+jurisdiction of the Court does not prevent the parties to the dispute
+from agreeing to resort to a preliminary conciliation procedure before
+the Council of the League of Nations or any other {172} body selected
+by them, or to submit their disputes to arbitration in preference to
+going before the Court.
+
+A State might also, while accepting compulsory jurisdiction by the
+Court, reserve the right of laying disputes before the Council of the
+League with a view to conciliation in accordance with paragraphs 1-3 of
+Article 15 of the Covenant, with the proviso that neither party might,
+during the proceedings before the Council, take proceedings against the
+other in the Court.
+
+It will be seen, therefore, that there is a very wide range of
+reservations which may be made in connection with the undertaking
+referred to in Article 36, paragraph 2.  It is possible that
+apprehensions may arise lest the right to make reservations should
+destroy the practical value of the undertaking.  There seems, however,
+to be no justification for such misgivings.  In the first place, it is
+to be hoped that every Government will confine its reservations to what
+is absolutely essential.  Secondly, it must be recognised that, however
+restrictive the scope of the undertaking may be, it will always be
+better than no undertaking at all.
+
+The fact that the signatory States undertake to accede, even though it
+be with reservations, to paragraph 2 of Article 36 may therefore be
+held to constitute a great advance.
+
+Such accession must take place at latest within the month following
+upon the coming into force or subsequent acceptance of the Protocol.
+
+It goes without saying that such accession in no way restricts the
+liberty which States possess, under the ordinary law, of concluding
+special agreements for arbitration.  It is entirely open to any two
+countries signatory of the Protocol which have acceded to paragraph 2
+of Article 36 to extend still further, as between themselves, the
+compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, or to stipulate that before
+having recourse to its jurisdiction they will submit their disputes to
+a special procedure of conciliation or even to stipulate, either before
+or after a dispute {173} has arisen, that it shall be brought before a
+special tribunal of arbitrators or before the Council of the League of
+Nations rather than to the Court.
+
+It is also certain that up to the time of the coming into force or
+acceptance of the Protocol accession to paragraph 2 of Article 36 which
+will thenceforth become compulsory, will remain optional, and that if
+such accession has already taken place it will continue to be valid in
+accordance with the terms under which it was made.
+
+The only point which may cause difficulty is the question what is the
+effect of accessions given to the Protocol if the latter becomes null
+and void.  It may be asked whether such accessions are to be regarded
+as so intimately bound up with the Protocol that they must disappear
+with it.  The reply must be in the negative.  The sound rule of
+interpretation of international treaties is that, unless there is
+express provision to the contrary, effects already produced survive the
+act from which they sprang.
+
+The natural corollary is that any State which wishes to make the
+duration of its accession to Article 36 dependent on the duration of
+the Protocol must make an express stipulation to this effect.  As
+Article 36 permits acceptance of the engagement in question for a
+specified term only, a State may, when acceding, stipulate that it only
+undertakes to be bound during such time as the Protocol shall remain in
+force.
+
+
+5.--STRENGTHENING OF PACIFIC METHODS OF PROCEDURE.
+
+_Article 4._
+
+We have, in the second place, succeeded in making possible the pacific
+settlement of all disputes by strengthening the procedure laid down in
+the Covenant.
+
+_Article 4, paragraph 1._
+
+_Action by the Council with a view to reconciliation_.--If a dispute
+does not come within the compulsory jurisdiction of the {174} Permanent
+Court of International Justice and if the Parties have been unable to
+come to an agreement to refer it to the Court or to submit it to
+arbitration, it should, under the terms of Article 15 of the Covenant,
+be submitted to the Council, which will endeavour to secure a
+settlement by reconciling the parties.  If the Council's efforts are
+successful, it must, so far as it considers it advisable, make public a
+statement giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and
+the terms of settlement thereof as it may deem appropriate.
+
+In this connection no change has been made in the procedure laid down
+by the Covenant.  It appeared unnecessary to specify what particular
+procedure should be followed.  The Council is given the utmost latitude
+in choosing the means most appropriate for the reconciliation of the
+parties.  It may take advice in various quarters; it may hear expert
+opinions; it may proceed to investigations or expert enquiries, whether
+by itself or through the intermediary of experts chosen by it; it may
+even, upon application by one of the parties, constitute a special
+conciliation committee.  The essential point is to secure, if possible,
+a friendly settlement of the dispute; the actual methods to be employed
+are of small importance.  It is imperative that nothing should in any
+way hamper the Council's work in the interests of peace.  It is for the
+Council to examine the question whether it would be expedient to draw
+up for its own use and bring to the notice of the Governments of the
+signatory States general regulations of procedure applicable to cases
+brought before it and designed to test the good-will of the parties
+with a view to persuading them more easily to reach a settlement under
+its auspices.
+
+Experience alone can show whether it will be necessary to develop the
+rules laid down in the first three paragraphs of Article 15 of the
+Covenant.
+
+For the moment it would appear to be expedient to make no addition and
+to have full confidence in the wisdom of the Council, it being
+understood that, whether at the moment in question or at any other
+stage of the procedure, it will be open to the {175} parties to come to
+an agreement for some different method of settlement: by way of direct
+understanding, constitution of a special committee of mediators or
+conciliators, appeal to arbitration or to the Permanent Court of
+International Justice.
+
+The new procedure set up by the Protocol will be applicable only in the
+event of the Council's failing in its efforts at reconciliation and of
+the parties failing to come to an understanding in regard to the method
+of settlement to be adopted.
+
+In such case, before going further, the Council must call upon the
+parties to submit their dispute to judicial settlement or to
+arbitration.
+
+It is only in the case where this appeal--which the Council will make
+in the manner which appears to it most likely to secure a favourable
+hearing--is not listened to that the procedure will acquire the
+compulsory character which is necessary to make certain the final
+settlement of all disputes.  There are three alternatives:
+
+    (_a_) Compulsory arbitration at the request of one of the parties;
+
+    (_b_) A unanimous decision by the Council;
+
+    (_c_) Compulsory arbitration enjoined by the Council.
+
+Appropriate methods are laid down for all three cases.
+
+
+_Article 4, paragraph 2._
+
+_First case of Compulsory Arbitration_.--If the parties, being called
+upon by the Council to submit their dispute to a judicial or arbitral
+settlement, do not succeed in coming to an agreement on the subject,
+there is no question of optional arbitration, but if a single party
+desires arbitration, arbitration immediately becomes compulsory.
+
+The dispute is then _ipso facto_ referred to a Committee of
+Arbitrators, which must be constituted within such time limit as the
+Council shall fix.
+
+{176}
+
+Full liberty is left to the parties themselves to constitute this
+Committee of Arbitrators.  They may agree between themselves in regard
+to the number, names and powers of the arbitrators and the procedure.
+It is to be understood that the word "powers" is to be taken in the
+widest sense, including, _inter alia_, the questions to be put.
+
+It was not considered desirable to develop this idea further.  It
+appeared to be sufficient to state that any result which could be
+obtained by means of an agreement between the parties was preferable to
+any other solution.
+
+It also appeared inexpedient to define precisely the powers which
+should be conferred upon the arbitrators.  This is a matter which
+depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.  According to
+the case, the arbitrators, as is said above, may fill the rôle of
+judges giving decisions of pure law or may have the function of
+arranging an amicable settlement with power to take account of
+considerations of equity.
+
+It has not been thought necessary to lay this down in the form of a
+rule.  It has appeared preferable to leave it in each case to the
+parties to agree between themselves to decide the matter according to
+the circumstances of the case.
+
+Nevertheless, consideration has been given to the possibility that the
+arbitrators need not necessarily be jurists.  It has therefore been
+decided that, when called upon to deal with points of law, they shall,
+if one of the parties so desires, request, through the medium of the
+Council, the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International
+Justice, which must, in such a case, meet with the utmost possible
+despatch.  The opinion of the Court is obtained for the assistance of
+the arbitrators; it is not legally binding upon them, although its
+scientific authority must, in all cases, exercise a strong influence
+upon their judgment.  With a view to preventing abusively frequent
+consultations of this kind, it is understood that the opinion of the
+Court in regard to disputed points of law can only be asked on a single
+occasion in the course of each case.
+
+{177}
+
+The extension which, in the new system of pacific settlement of
+disputes, has been given to the advisory procedure of the Court has
+suggested the idea that it might be desirable to examine whether, even
+in such cases, it might not be well to adopt the system of adding
+national judges which at present only obtains in litigious proceedings,
+and also that of applying to the advisory procedure the provisions of
+Article 24 of the Statute of the Court relating to withdrawal of judges.
+
+If the parties have not been able to come to an understanding on all or
+on some of the points necessary to enable the arbitration to be carried
+out, it lies with the Council to settle the unsettled points, with the
+exception of the formulation of the questions to be answered, which the
+arbitrators must seek in the claims set out by the parties or by one of
+them if the others make default.
+
+In cases where the selection of arbitrators thus falls upon the
+Council, it has appeared necessary--however much confidence may be felt
+in the Council's wisdom--to lay down for the selection of the
+arbitrators certain rules calculated to give the arbitration the
+necessary moral authority to ensure that it will in practice be
+respected.
+
+The first rule is that the Council shall, before proceeding to the
+selection of arbitrators, have regard to the wishes of the parties.  It
+was suggested that this idea should be developed by conferring on the
+parties the right to indicate their preferences and to challenge a
+certain number of the arbitrators proposed by the Council.
+
+This proposal was set aside on account of the difficulty of laying down
+detailed regulations for the exercise of this double right.  But it is
+understood that the Council will have no motive for failing to accept
+candidates proposed to it by the different parties nor for imposing
+upon them arbitrators whom they might wish to reject, nor, finally, for
+failing to take into account any other suggestion which the parties
+might wish to make.  It is indeed evident that the Council will always
+be desirous of acting {178} in the manner best calculated to increase
+to the utmost degree the confidence which the Committee of Arbitrators
+should inspire in the parties.
+
+The second rule is based on the same point of view.  It lays down the
+right of the Council to select the arbitrators and their president from
+among persons who, by their nationality, their personal character and
+their experience, appear to furnish the highest guarantees of
+competence and impartiality.
+
+Here, too, experience will show whether it would be well for the
+Council to draw up general regulations for the composition and
+functioning of the compulsory arbitration now in question and of that
+above referred to, and for the conciliation procedure in the Council
+itself.  Such regulations would be made for the Council's own use but
+would be communicated to the Governments of the signatory States.
+
+_Article 4, paragraph 3._
+
+_Unanimous decision by the Council_.--If arbitration is refused by both
+parties the case will be referred back to the Council, but this time it
+will acquire a special character.  Refusal of arbitration implies the
+consent of both parties to a final settlement of the dispute by the
+Council.  It implies recognition of an exceptional jurisdiction of the
+Council.  It denotes that the parties prefer the Council's decision to
+an arbitral award.
+
+Resuming the examination of the question, the Council has not only the
+latitude which it customarily possesses.  It is armed with full powers
+to settle the question finally and irrevocably if it is unanimous.  Its
+decision, given unanimously by all the members other than those
+representing parties to the dispute, is imposed upon the parties with
+the same weight and the same force as the arbitration award which it
+replaces.
+
+_Article 4, paragraph 4._
+
+_Second case of Compulsory Arbitration_.--If the Council does not
+arrive at a unanimous decision, it has to submit the dispute {179} to
+the judgment of a Committee of Arbitrators, but this time, owing to the
+parties being deemed to have handed their case over to the Council, the
+organisation of the arbitration procedure is taken entirely out of
+their hands.  It will be for the Council to settle all the details, the
+composition, the powers and the procedure of the Committee of
+Arbitrators.  The Council is of course at liberty to hear the parties
+and even to invite suggestions from them, but it is under no obligation
+to do so.  The only regulation with which it must comply is that, in
+the choice of arbitrators, it must bear in mind the guarantees of
+competence and impartiality which, by their nationality, their personal
+character and their experience, these arbitrators must always furnish.
+
+_Article 4.  paragraph 6._
+
+_Effect of, and Sanction enforcing, Decisions_.--Failing a friendly
+arrangement, we are, thanks to the system adopted, in all cases certain
+of arriving at a final solution of a dispute, whether in the form of a
+decree of the Permanent Court of International Justice or in the form
+of an arbitral award or, lastly, in the form of a unanimous decision of
+the Council.
+
+To this solution the parties are compelled to submit.  They must put it
+into execution or comply with it in good faith.
+
+If they do not do so, they are breaking an engagement entered into
+towards the other signatories of the Protocol, and this breach involves
+consequences and sanctions according to the degree of gravity of the
+case.
+
+If the recalcitrant party confines itself to offering passive
+resistance to the solution arrived at, it will first be the object of
+pacific pressure from the Council, which must exercise all its
+influence to persuade it to respect its engagements.  If the Council is
+unsuccessful, it must propose measures calculated to ensure effect
+being given to the decision.
+
+On this point the Protocol has been guided solely by the regulation
+contained at the end of Article 13 of the Covenant.  The {180} Council
+may thus institute against the recalcitrant party collective sanctions
+of an economic and financial order.  It is to be supposed that such
+sanctions will prove sufficient.  It has not appeared possible to go
+further and to employ force against a State which is not itself
+resorting to force.  The party in favour of which the decision has been
+given might, however, employ force against the recalcitrant party if
+authorised to do so by the Council.
+
+But if the State against which the decision has been given takes up
+arms in resistance thereto, thereby becoming an aggressor against the
+combined signatories, it deserves even the severe sanctions provided in
+Article 16 of the Covenant, interpreted in the manner indicated in the
+present Protocol.
+
+_Sphere of Application of Methods of Pacific Procedure_.--Necessary as
+the system which we have laid down is for the purpose of ensuring
+settlement of all disputes, in applying it, the pacific aim which
+underlies it must be the only guide.  It must not be diverted to other
+purposes and used as an occasion for chicanery and tendencious
+proceedings by which the cause of peace would lose rather than gain.
+
+A few exceptions to the rule have also had to be made in order to
+preserve the elasticity of the system.  These are cases in which the
+claimant must be nonsuited, the claim being one which has to be
+rejected _in limine_ by the Council, the Permanent Court of
+International Justice or the arbitrators, as the case may be.
+
+The disputes to which the system will not apply are of three kinds:
+
+_Article 4, paragraph 5._
+
+1. The first concerns disputes relating to questions which, at some
+time prior to the entry into force of the Protocol have been the
+subject of a unanimous recommendation by the Council accepted by one of
+the parties concerned.  It is essential to {181} international order
+and to the prestige of the Council that its unanimous recommendations,
+which confer a right upon the State accepting them, shall not be called
+into question again by means of a procedure based upon compulsory
+arbitration.  Failing a friendly arrangement, the only way which lies
+open for the settlement of disputes to which these recommendations may
+give rise is recourse to the Council in accordance with the procedure
+at present laid down in the Covenant.
+
+_Article 4, paragraph 7._
+
+2. The same applies to disputes which arise as the result of measures
+of war taken by one or more signatory States in agreement with the
+Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations.  It would certainly
+not be admissible that compulsory arbitration should become a weapon in
+the hands of an enemy to the community to be used against the freedom
+of action of those who, in the general interest, seek to impose upon
+that enemy respect for his engagements.
+
+In order to avoid all difficulty of interpretation, these first two
+classes of exceptions have been formally stated in the Protocol.
+
+3. There is a third class of disputes to which the new system of
+pacific settlement can also not be applied.  These are disputes which
+aim at revising treaties and international acts in force, or which seek
+to jeopardise the existing territorial integrity of signatory States.
+The proposal was made to include these exceptions in the Protocol, but
+the two Committees were unanimous in considering that, both from the
+legal and from the political point of view, the impossibility of
+applying compulsory arbitration to such cases was so obvious that it
+was quite superfluous to make them the subject of a special provision.
+It was thought sufficient to mention them in this report.
+
+
+{182}
+
+6.--ROLE OF THE ASSEMBLY UNDER THE SYSTEM SET UP BY THE PROTOCOL.
+
+_Article 6._
+
+The new procedure should be adapted to the old one, which gave the
+Assembly the same powers as the Council when a dispute is brought
+before it, either by the Council itself or at the request of one of the
+parties.
+
+The question has arisen whether the system of maintaining in the new
+procedure this equality of powers between the two organs of the League
+of Nations is a practical one.  Some were of opinion that it would be
+better to exclude intervention by the Assembly.  Finally, however, the
+opposite opinion prevailed; an appeal to the Assembly may, indeed, have
+an important influence from the point of view of public opinion.
+Without going so far as to assign to the Assembly the same rôle as to
+the Council, it has been decided to adopt a mixed system by which the
+Assembly is, in principle, substituted for the Council in order that,
+when a dispute is referred to it in conformity with paragraph 9 of
+Article 15 of the Covenant, it may undertake, in the place of the
+Council, the various duties provided for in Article 4 of the present
+Protocol with the exception of purely executive acts which will always
+devolve upon the Council.  For example, the organisation and management
+of compulsory arbitration, or the transmission of a question to the
+Permanent Court of International Justice, must always be entrusted to
+the Council, because, in practice, the latter is the only body
+qualified for such purposes.
+
+The possible intervention of the Assembly does not affect in any way
+the final result of the new procedure.  If the Assembly does not
+succeed in conciliating the parties and if one of them so requests,
+compulsory arbitration will be arranged by the Council in accordance
+with the rules laid down beforehand.
+
+If none of the parties asks for arbitration, the matter is referred
+back to the Assembly, and if the solution recommended {183} by the
+Assembly obtains the majority required under paragraph 10 of Article 15
+of the Covenant, it has the same value as a unanimous decision of the
+Council.
+
+Lastly, if the necessary majority is not obtained, the dispute is
+submitted to a compulsory arbitration organised by the Council.
+
+In any event, as in the case where the Council alone intervenes, a
+definitive and binding solution of the dispute is reached.
+
+
+7.--DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OF STATES.
+
+_Article 5._
+
+The present Protocol in no way derogates from the rule of Article 15,
+paragraph 8, of the Covenant, which protects national sovereignty.
+
+In order that there might be no doubt on this point, it appeared
+advisable to say so expressly.
+
+Before the Council, whatever be the stage in the procedure set up by
+the Protocol at which the Council intervenes, the provision referred to
+applies without any modification.
+
+The rule is applied also to both cases of compulsory arbitration.  If
+one of the States parties to the dispute claims that the dispute or
+part thereof arises out of a matter which by international law is
+solely within its jurisdiction, the arbitrators must on this point take
+the advice of the Permanent Court of International Justice through the
+medium of the Council, for the question thus put in issue is a legal
+question upon which a judicial opinion should be obtained.
+
+The Court will thus have to give a decision as to whether the question
+in dispute is governed by international law or whether it falls within
+the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned.  Its functions will
+be limited to this point and the question will in any event be referred
+back to the arbitrators.  But, unlike other opinions requested of the
+Court in the course of a compulsory arbitration--opinions which for the
+arbitrators are purely {184} advisory--in the present case the opinion
+of the Court is compulsory in the sense that, if the Court has
+recognised that the question in dispute falls entirely within the
+domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned, the arbitrators will
+simply have to register this conclusion in their award.  It is only if
+the Court holds that the question in dispute is governed by
+international law that the arbitrators will again take the case under
+consideration in order to give a decision upon its substance.
+
+The compulsory character of the Court's opinion, in this case,
+increases the importance of the double question referred to above, in
+connection with Article 4, relating to the calling-in of national
+judges, and the application of Article 24 of the Statute of the Court
+in matters of advisory procedure.
+
+While the principle of Article 15, paragraph 8, of the Covenant is
+maintained, it has been necessary, in order to make its application
+more flexible, to call in aid the rule contained in Article 11 of the
+Covenant, which makes it the duty of the League of Nations, in the
+event of war or a threat of war, to "take any action that may be deemed
+wise and effective to safeguard the peace of nations," and obliges the
+Secretary-General to summon forthwith a meeting of the Council on the
+request of any Member of the League.  It is in this way understood that
+when it has been recognised that a dispute arises out of a matter which
+is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of one of the parties, that
+party or its opponent will be fully entitled to call upon the Council
+or the Assembly to act.
+
+There is nothing new in this simple reference to Article 11.  It leaves
+unimpaired the right of the Council to take such action as it may deem
+wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.  It does not
+confer new powers of functions on either the Council or the Assembly.
+Both these organs of the League simply retain the powers now conferred
+upon them by the Covenant.
+
+In order to dispel any doubt which may arise from the {185} parallel
+which has been drawn between Article 15, paragraph 8, and Article 11 of
+the Covenant, a very clear explanation was given in the course of the
+discussion in the First Committee.  Where a dispute is submitted to the
+Council under Article 15 and it is claimed by one party that the
+dispute arises out of a matter left exclusively within its domestic
+jurisdiction by international law, paragraph 8 prevents the Council
+from making any recommendations upon the subject if it holds that the
+contention raised by the party is correct and that the dispute does in
+fact arise out of a matter exclusively within that State's jurisdiction.
+
+The effect of this paragraph is that the Council cannot make any
+recommendation in the technical sense in which that term is used in
+Article 15, that is to say, it cannot make, even by unanimous report,
+recommendations which become binding on the parties in virtue of
+paragraph G.
+
+Unanimity for the purpose of Article 15 implies a report concurred in
+by all the members of the Council other than the parties to the
+dispute.  Only a report so concurred in is one which the parties to the
+dispute are bound to observe, in the sense that, if they resort to war
+with any party which complies with the recommendations, it will
+constitute a breach of Article 16 of the Covenant and will set in play
+the sanctions which are there referred to.
+
+On the other hand, Article 11 is of different scope: first, it operates
+only in time of war or threat of war; secondly, it confers no right on
+the Council or on the Assembly to impose any solution of a dispute
+without the consent of the parties.  Action taken by the Council or the
+Assembly under this article cannot become binding on the parties to the
+dispute in the sense in which recommendations under Article 15 become
+binding, unless they have themselves concurred in it.
+
+One last point should be made clear.  The reference which is made to
+Article 11 of the Covenant holds good only in the eventuality
+contemplated in Article 15, paragraph 8, of the Covenant.  It is
+obvious that when a unanimous decision of the {186} Council or an
+arbitral award has been given upon the substance of a dispute, that
+dispute is finally settled and cannot again be brought either directly
+or indirectly under discussion.  Article 11 of the Covenant does not
+deal with situations which are covered by rules of law capable of
+application by a judge.  It applies only to cases which are not yet
+regulated by international law.  In fact, it demonstrates the existence
+of loop-holes in the law.
+
+The reference to Article 11 in two of the articles of the Protocol
+(Articles 5 and 10) has advantages beyond those to which attention is
+drawn in the commentary on the text of those articles.  It will be an
+incitement to science to clear the ground for the work which the League
+of Nations will one day have to undertake with a view to bringing
+about, through the development of the rules of international law, a
+closer reconciliation between the individual interests of its Members
+and the universal interests which it is designed to serve.
+
+
+8.--DETERMINATION OF THE AGGRESSOR.
+
+_Article 10._
+
+In order that the procedure of pacific settlement may be accompanied by
+the necessary sanctions, it has been necessary to provide for
+determining exactly the State guilty of aggression to which sanctions
+are to be applied.
+
+This question is a very complex one, and in the earlier work of the
+League the military experts and jurists who had had to deal with it
+found it extremely difficult.
+
+There are two aspects to the problem: first, aggression has to be
+defined, and, secondly, its existence has to be ascertained.
+
+The definition of aggression is a relatively easy matter, for it is
+sufficient to say that any State is the aggressor which resorts in any
+shape or form to force in violation of the engagements contracted by it
+either under the Covenant (if, for instance, being a Member of the
+League of Nations, it has not respected the territorial integrity or
+political independence of another Member {187} of the League) or under
+the present Protocol (if, for instance, being a signatory of the
+Protocol, it has refused to conform to an arbitral award or to a
+unanimous decision of the Council).  This is the effect of Article 10,
+which also adds that the violation of the rules laid down for a
+demilitarised zone is to be regarded as equivalent to resort to war.
+The text refers to resort to war, but it was understood during the
+discussion that, while mention was made of the most serious and
+striking instance, it was in accordance with the spirit of the Protocol
+that acts of violence and force, which possibly may not constitute an
+actual state of war, should nevertheless be taken into consideration by
+the Council.
+
+On the contrary, to ascertain the existence of aggression is a very
+difficult matter, for although the first of the two elements which
+together constitute aggression, namely, the violation of an engagement,
+is easy to verify, the second, namely, resort to force, is not an easy
+matter to ascertain.  When one country attacks another, the latter
+necessarily defends itself, and when hostilities are in progress on
+both sides, the question arises which party began them.
+
+This is a question of fact concerning which opinions may differ.
+
+The first idea which occurs to the mind is to make it the duty of the
+Council to determine who is the aggressor.  But, immediately, the
+question arises whether the Council must decide this question
+unanimously, or whether a majority vote would suffice.  There are
+serious disadvantages in both solutions and they are therefore
+unacceptable.
+
+To insist upon a unanimous decision of the Council exposes the State
+attacked to the loss of those definite guarantees to which it is
+entitled, if one single Member of the Council--be it in good faith or
+otherwise--insists on adhering to an interpretation of the facts
+different from that of all his colleagues.  It is impossible to admit
+that the very existence of a nation should be subject to such a hazard.
+It is not sufficient to point out that {188} the Council would be bound
+to declare the existence of aggression in an obvious case and that it
+could not fail to carry out its duty.  The duty would be a duty without
+a sanction and if by any chance the Council were not to do its duty,
+the State attacked would be deprived of all guarantees.
+
+But it would also be dangerous to rely on a majority vote of the
+Council.  In that case, the danger would be incurred by the State
+called upon to furnish assistance and to support the heavy burden of
+common action, if it still entertained some doubt as to the guilt of
+the country against which it had to take action.  Such a country would
+run the risk of having to conform to a decision with which it did not
+agree.
+
+The only escape from this dilemma appeared to lie in some automatic
+procedure which would not necessarily be based on a decision of the
+Council.  After examining the difficulty and discussing it in all its
+aspects, the First Committee believes that it has found the solution in
+the idea of a presumption which shall hold good until the contrary has
+been established by a unanimous decision of the Council.
+
+The Committee is of opinion that this presumption arises in three
+cases, namely, when a resort to war is accompanied:
+
+    By a refusal to accept the procedure of pacific settlement or
+    to submit to the decision resulting therefrom;
+
+    By violation of provisional measures enjoined by the Council
+    as contemplated by Article 7 of the Protocol;
+
+    Or by disregard of a decision recognising that the dispute
+    arises out of a matter which lies exclusively within the
+    domestic jurisdiction of the other party and by failure or
+    by refusal to submit the question first to the Council or
+    the Assembly.
+
+
+In these cases, even if there is not absolute certainty, there exists
+at any rate a very strong presumption which should suffice for the
+application of sanctions unless proof to the contrary has been
+furnished by a unanimous decision of the Council.
+
+It will be noticed that there is a characteristic difference between
+the first two cases and the third.
+
+{189}
+
+In the first two cases the presumption exists when, in addition to a
+state of war, the special condition referred to is also fulfilled.
+
+In the third case, however, the presumption is dependent upon three
+conditions: disobedience to a decision, wilful failure to take
+advantage of the remedy provided in Article 11 of the Covenant, and the
+existence of a state of war.
+
+This difference is due to the necessity of taking into account the
+provisions of Article 5 analysed above, which, by its reference to
+Article 11 of the Covenant, renders the application of paragraph 8 of
+Article 15 of the Covenant more flexible.  After very careful
+consideration it appeared that it would be unreasonable and unjust to
+regard as _ipso facto_ an aggressor a State which, being prevented
+through the operation of paragraph 8 of Article 15 from urging its
+claims by pacific methods and being thus left to its own resources, is
+in despair driven to war.
+
+It was considered to be more in harmony with the requirements of
+justice and peace to give such a State which has been non-suited on the
+preliminary question of the domestic jurisdiction of its adversary, a
+last chance of arriving at an amicable agreement by offering it the
+final method of conciliation prescribed in Article 11 of the Covenant.
+It is only if, after rejecting this method, it has recourse to war that
+it will be presumed to be an aggressor.
+
+This mitigation of the rigid character of paragraph 8 of Article 15 has
+been accepted, not only because it is just, but also because it opens
+no breach in the barrier set up by the Protocol against aggressive war:
+it in no way infringes the principle--which remains unshaken--that a
+war undertaken against a State whose exclusive jurisdiction has been
+formally recognised is an international crime to be avenged
+collectively by the signatories of the Protocol.
+
+When a State whose demands have been met with the plea of the domestic
+jurisdiction of its adversary has employed the resource provided for in
+Article 11 of the Covenant, the presumption of aggression falls to the
+ground.  The aggression itself {190} remains.  It will be for the
+Council to decide who is responsible for the aggression in accordance
+with the procedure which will be described below.
+
+Apart from the above cases, there exists no presumption which can make
+it possible automatically to determine who is the aggressor.  But this
+fact must be determined, and, if no other solution can be found, the
+decision must be left to the Council.  The same principle applies where
+one of the parties is a State which is not a signatory of the Protocol
+and not a Member of the League.
+
+If the Council is unanimous, no difficulty arises.  If, however, the
+Council is not unanimous, the difficulty is to be overcome by directing
+that the Council must enjoin upon the belligerents an armistice the
+terms of which it will fix if need be by a two-thirds majority and the
+party which rejects the armistice or violates it is to be held to be an
+aggressor.
+
+The system is therefore complete and is as automatic as it can be made.
+
+Where a presumption has arisen and is not rejected by a unanimous
+decision of the Council, the facts themselves decide who is an
+aggressor; no further decision by the Council is needed and the
+question of unanimity or majority does not present itself; the facts
+once established, the Council is bound to act accordingly.
+
+Where there is no presumption, the Council has to declare the fact of
+aggression; a decision is necessary and must be taken unanimously.  If
+unanimity is not obtained, the Council is bound to enjoin an armistice,
+and for this purpose no decision properly speaking has to be taken:
+there exists an obligation which the Council must fulfil; it is only
+the fixing of the terms of the armistice which necessitates a decision,
+and for this purpose a two-thirds majority suffices.
+
+It was proposed to declare that, in cases of extreme urgency, the
+Council might determine the aggressor, or fix the conditions of an
+armistice, without waiting for the arrival of the {191} representative
+which a party not represented among its members has been invited to
+send under the terms of paragraph 5 of Article 4 of the Covenant.
+
+It seemed preferable, however, not to lay down any rule on this matter
+at present but to ask the special Committee which the Council is to
+appoint for the drafting of amendments to the Covenant on the lines of
+the Protocol, to consider whether such a rule is really necessary.
+
+It may in fact be thought that the Council already possesses all the
+necessary powers in this matter and that, in cases of extreme urgency,
+if the State invited to send a representative is too far distant from
+the seat of the Council, that body may decide that the representative
+shall be chosen from persons near at hand and shall attend the meeting
+within a prescribed period, on the expiry of which the matter may be
+considered in his absence.
+
+The fact of aggression having been established by presumption or by
+unanimous decision of the Council or by refusal to accept or violation
+of the armistice, it will only remain to apply the sanctions and bring
+into play the obligations of the guarantor States.  The Council will
+merely call upon them to fulfil their duty; here, again, there is no
+decision to be taken but an obligation to be fulfilled, and the
+question of majority or unanimous vote does not arise.
+
+It is not, indeed, a matter of voting at all.
+
+In order to leave no room for doubt, it has been formally laid down
+that a State which, at the invitation of the Council, engages in acts
+of violence against an aggressor is in the legal position of a
+belligerent and may consequently exercise the rights inherent in that
+character.
+
+It was pointed out in the course of the discussion that such a State
+does not possess entire freedom of action.  The force employed by it
+must be proportionate to the object in view and must be exercised
+within the limits and under the conditions recommended by the Council.
+
+{192}
+
+_Article 18._
+
+Likewise, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, it has been
+stipulated, in a special Article, that unanimity or the necessary
+majority in the Council is always calculated according to the rule
+referred to on several occasions in Article 15 of the Covenant and
+repeated in Article 16 of the Covenant for the case of expulsion of a
+Member from the League, viz., without counting the votes of the
+representatives of the parties to the dispute.
+
+
+9.--DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES SIGNATORY AND STATES NON-SIGNATORY OF THE
+PROTOCOL.
+
+_Article 16._
+
+As regards the settlement of disputes arising between a State signatory
+and one or more States non-signatory and non-Members of the League of
+Nations, the new system has had to be adapted to the former system.
+
+In order that States signatory might enjoy the essential advantages
+offered by the Protocol, which forbids all wars of aggression, it has
+been necessary to bring the rule laid down in Article 17 of the
+Covenant into harmony with the provisions of the Protocol.  It has
+therefore been decided that States non-signatory and non-Members of the
+League of Nations in conflict with a State signatory shall be invited
+to conform to the new procedure of pacific settlement and that, if they
+refuse to do so and resort to war against a State signatory, they shall
+be amenable to the sanctions provided by Article 16 of the Covenant as
+defined by the Protocol.
+
+There is no change in the arrangements laid down in the Covenant for
+the settlement of disputes arising between States Members of the League
+of Nations of which one is a signatory of the Protocol and the other is
+not.  The legal nexus established by the Covenant between two such
+parties does not allow the signatory States to apply as of right the
+new procedure of pacific settlement to non-signatory but Member States.
+All that {193} signatory States are entitled to expect as regards such
+other States is that the Council should provide the latter with an
+opportunity to follow this procedure and it is to be hoped that they
+will do so.  But such States can only be offered an opportunity to
+follow the new procedure; they cannot be obliged to follow it.  If they
+refuse, preferring to adhere to the procedure laid down in the
+Covenant, no sanctions could possibly be applied to them.
+
+The above indicated solution of the case of States non-signatory but
+Members of the League of Nations appears to be so obvious as to require
+no special mention in the Protocol.  A proposal to make a special
+mention of the matter was made, but after explanations had been given,
+the authors withdrew their suggestion, declaring that they would be
+satisfied with the above reference to the subject.
+
+At first sight the difference in the way it is proposed to treat
+non-signatories non-Members of the League of Nations and
+non-signatories Members of the League may cause some surprise, for it
+would seem that the signatory States impose greater obligations on the
+first category than on the second.  This, however, is only an
+appearance.  In reality, the signatory States impose no obligations on
+either category.  They cannot do so because the present Protocol is
+_res inter alias acta_ for all non-signatory States, whether they are
+Members of the League of Nations or not.  The signatories merely
+undertake obligations as between themselves as to the manner in which
+they will behave if one of them becomes involved in a conflict with a
+third State.  But whereas, in possible conflicts with a State
+non-signatory and non-Member of the League, they are entirely free to
+take such action as they choose, in conflicts which may arise between
+them and States non-signatory but Members, like themselves, of the
+League of Nations, their freedom of action is to some extent
+circumscribed because both parties are bound by legal obligations
+arising under the Covenant.
+
+
+{194}
+
+2.--WORK OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE.
+
+(_Rapporteur_: M. BENES)
+
+SECURITY AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.
+
+(_Articles 7 to 9, 11 to 15, 17 and 21 of the Protocol_)
+
+1.--INTRODUCTION.
+
+The special work of the Third Committee was to deal with the problem of
+security (sanctions) and the reduction of armaments.
+
+The work required, above all, important political negotiations.  While
+the question of arbitration only required one political decision of
+principle, namely, the acceptance of compulsory arbitration, and the
+remainder was principally a matter of drafting--without question an
+extremely difficult task--of a scheme for the application of such
+arbitration, the questions of security and disarmament necessitated
+long and laborious political negotiations; for they involved
+fundamental interests, questions of vital importance to the States,
+engagements so far-reaching as radically to change the general
+situation of the various countries.
+
+Although in the work of the First Committee the Assembly had distinctly
+indicated in its resolution of September 6th that there was a
+likelihood--indeed, a necessity--of amending the Covenant, the work of
+the Third Committee as regards questions of security and reduction of
+armaments had, in conformity with the debates of the Assembly, to
+remain within the framework of the Covenant.  Above all, it was a
+question of developing and rendering more precise what is already laid
+down in the Covenant.  All our discussions, all our labours, were
+guided by these principles, and a delicate task was thus imposed upon
+us.  But the spirit of conciliation which pervaded all the discussions
+has permitted us to resolve the two problems which were placed before
+us.  This is, indeed, an important result, and if the solution of the
+problem of arbitration which has been so {195} happily arrived at by
+the First Committee be also taken into consideration, we are in the
+presence of a system the adoption of which may entirely modify our
+present political life.
+
+This is the real import of the articles of the Protocol concerning the
+questions of security and reduction of armaments.
+
+
+2.--THREAT OF AGGRESSION: PREVENTIVE MEASURES.
+
+_Article 7._
+
+The pacific settlement of disputes being provided for in the present
+Protocol, the signatory States undertake, should any conflict arise
+between them, not to resort to preparations for the settlement of such
+dispute by war and, in general, to abstain from any act calculated to
+aggravate or extend the said dispute.  This principle applies both to
+the period preceding the submission of the dispute to arbitration or
+conciliation and to the period in which the case is pending.
+
+This provision is not unaccompanied by sanctions.  Any appeal against
+the violation of the aforesaid undertakings may, in conformity with
+Article 11 of the Covenant, be brought before the Council.  One might
+say that, in addition to such primary dispute as is or might be
+submitted to the Council or to some other competent organ, a second
+dispute arises, caused by the violation of the undertakings provided
+for in the first paragraph.
+
+The Council, unless it be of opinion that the appeal is not worthy of
+consideration, will proceed with the necessary enquiries and
+investigations.  Should it be established that an offence has been
+committed against the provisions of the first paragraph, it will be the
+duty of the Council, in the light of the results of such enquiries and
+investigations, to call upon any State guilty of the offence to put an
+end thereto.  Any such State failing to comply will be declared by the
+Council to be guilty of violation of the Covenant (Article 11) or the
+Protocol.
+
+The Council must, further, take the necessary measures to put an end,
+as soon as possible, to a situation calculated to {196} threaten the
+peace of the world.  The text does not define the nature of these
+preventive measures.  Its elasticity permits the Council to take such
+measures as may be appropriate in each concrete case, as, for example,
+the evacuation of territories.
+
+Any decisions which may be taken by the Council in virtue of this
+Article may be taken by a two-thirds majority, except in the case of
+decisions dealing with questions of procedure which still come under
+the general rule of Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Covenant.  The
+following decisions, therefore, can be taken by a two-thirds majority:
+
+    The decision as to whether there has or has not been an offence
+    against the first paragraph;
+
+    The decision calling upon the guilty State to remedy the offence;
+
+    The decision as to whether there has or has not been refusal to
+    remedy the offence;
+
+    Lastly, the decision as to the measures calculated to put an end,
+    as soon as possible, to a situation calculated to threaten the
+    peace of the world.
+
+
+The original text of Article 7 provided that, in the case of enquiries
+and investigations, the Council should avail itself of the organisation
+to be set up by the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments in order
+to ensure respect for the decisions of that Conference.  There is no
+longer any mention of this organisation, but this omission does not
+prejudice any decisions which the Conference may be called upon to take
+regarding the matter.  It will be entirely free to set up an
+organisation, if it judges this necessary, and the Council's right to
+make use of this body for the enquiries and investigations contemplated
+will, _a fortiori_, remain intact.
+
+_Article 8._
+
+Article 8 must be considered in relation to Article 2.  Article 2
+establishes the obligation not to resort to war, while Article 8,
+giving effect to Article 10 of the Covenant, goes further.  The {197}
+signatories undertake to abstain from any act which might constitute a
+threat of aggression against any other State.  Thus, every act which
+comes within the scope of this idea of a threat of war--and its scope
+is sufficiently elastic--constitutes a breach of the Protocol, and
+therefore a dispute with which the Council is competent to deal.
+
+If, for example, one State alleges that another State is engaged in
+preparations which are nothing less than a particular form of threat of
+war (such as any kind of secret mobilisation, concentration of troops,
+formation of armed bodies with the connivance of the Government, etc.),
+the Council, having established that there is a case for consideration,
+will apply the procedure which may be defined as the procedure of
+preventive measures; it will arrange for suitable enquiries and
+investigations, and, in the event of any breach of the provisions of
+paragraph 1 being established, will take the steps described in Article
+7, paragraph 4.
+
+
+3.--SECURITY--SANCTIONS.
+
+_Article 11._
+
+(_Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Protocol in its relation to
+Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant_)
+
+According to Article 10 of the Covenant, Members of the League
+undertake to preserve as against external aggression the territorial
+integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the
+League.  In case of aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means
+by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.
+
+According to Article 16, should any Member of the League resort to war
+in disregard of its engagements under Articles 12, 13 or 15, all other
+Members of the League undertake immediately to apply economic
+sanctions; furthermore, it shall be the duty of the Council to
+recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military,
+naval or air forces the Members of the League shall severally
+contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the engagements of
+the League.
+
+{198}
+
+At the time when they were drafted at the Peace Conference in Paris in
+1919, these articles gave rise to keen controversy as to the exact
+scope of the engagements entered into in these provisions, that is to
+say, as to the nature and extent of the obligations referred to in
+Article 10, the exact moment at which such obligations arose, and the
+legal consequences of the Council recommendations referred to in
+Article 16, paragraph 2.  This controversy continued, as is well known,
+in the debates here in Geneva, where the question has been discussed in
+previous years.
+
+Article 11 is intended to settle this controversy.  The signatories of
+the present Protocol accept the obligation to apply against the
+aggressor the various sanctions laid down in the Covenant, as
+interpreted in Article 11 of the Protocol, when an act of aggression
+has been established and the Council has called upon the signatory
+States immediately to apply such sanctions (Article 10, last
+paragraph).  Should they fail so to do, they will not be fulfilling
+their obligations.
+
+The nature and extent of this obligation is clearly defined in
+paragraph 2 of Article 11.  According to this paragraph, the reply to
+the question whether a signatory to the Protocol has or has not
+fulfilled its obligation depends on whether it has loyally and
+effectively co-operated in resisting the act of aggression to an extent
+consistent with its geographical position and its particular situation
+as regards armaments.
+
+The State remains in control of its forces, and itself, and not the
+Council, directs them, but paragraph 2 of Article 11 gives us positive
+material upon which to form a judgment as to whether or not the
+obligation has been carried out in any concrete case.  This criterion
+is supplied by the term: _loyally and effectively_.
+
+In answering the question whether a State has or has not fulfilled its
+obligations in regard to sanctions, a certain elasticity in the
+obligations laid down in Article 11 allows of the possibility of
+_taking into account, from every point of view, the position of each
+State which is a signatory to the present Protocol_.  The signatory
+States are not all in possession of equal facilities for {199} acting
+when the time comes to apply the sanctions.  This depends upon the
+geographical position and economic and social condition of the State,
+the nature of its population, internal institutions, etc.
+
+Indeed, during the discussion as to the system of sanctions, certain
+delegations declared that their countries were in a special situation
+by reason of their geographical position or the state of their
+armaments.  These countries desired to co-operate to the fullest extent
+of their resources in resistance to every act of aggression, but they
+drew attention to their special conditions.  In order to take account
+of this situation, an addition has been made to paragraph 2 of Article
+11 pointing out this state of affairs and laying stress on the
+particular situation of the countries in question.  Moreover, Article
+13 of the Protocol allows such countries to inform the Council of these
+matters beforehand.
+
+I would further add that the obligations I refer to are imperfect
+obligations in the sense that no sanctions are provided for against any
+party which shall have failed loyally and effectively to co-operate in
+protecting the Covenant and resisting every act of aggression.  It
+should, however, be emphasised that such a State would have failed in
+the fulfilment of its duties and would be guilty of a violation of
+engagements entered into.
+
+In view of the foregoing, the gist of Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2,
+might be expressed as follows: Each State is the judge of the manner in
+which it shall carry out its obligations but not of the existence of
+those obligations, that is to say, each State remains the judge of what
+it will do but no longer remains the judge of what it should do.
+
+Now that the present Protocol has defined more precisely the origin,
+nature and extent of the obligations arising out of the Covenant, _the
+functions of the Council, as provided in Articles 10 and 16, have
+become clearer and more definite_.
+
+Directly the Council has called upon the signatories to the Protocol to
+apply without delay the sanctions provided in {200} Article 11, it
+becomes a regulating, or rather an advisory, body, but not an executive
+body.  The nature of the acts of aggression may vary considerably; the
+means for their suppression will also vary.  It would frequently be
+unnecessary to make use of all the means which, according to paragraphs
+1 and 2 of Article 11, are, so to speak, available for resisting an act
+of aggression.  It might even be dangerous if, from fear of failing in
+their duties, States made superfluous efforts.  It will devolve upon
+the Council, which, under Article 13 can be put in possession of the
+necessary data, to give _its opinion_, should need occur, as to the
+best means of executing the obligations which arise directly it enjoins
+the application of sanctions, especially as to the sequence in which
+the sanctions must be applied.
+
+The practical application of the sanctions would, however, always
+devolve upon the Governments; the real co-operation would ensue upon
+their getting into touch, through diplomatic channels--perhaps by
+conferences--and by direct relations between different General Staffs,
+as in the last war.  The Council would, of course, be aware of all
+these negotiations, would be consulted and make recommendations.
+
+The difference between the former state of affairs and the new will
+therefore be as follows:
+
+According to the system laid down by the Covenant:
+
+    1. The dispute arises.
+
+    2. In cases where neither the arbitral procedure nor the
+    judicial settlement provided for in Article 13 of the Covenant
+    is applied, the Council meets and discusses the dispute,
+    attempts to effect conciliation, mediation, etc.
+
+    3. If it be unsuccessful and war breaks out, the Council, if
+    unanimous, has to express an opinion as to which party is
+    guilty.  The Members of the League then decide for themselves
+    whether this opinion is justified and whether their
+    obligations to apply economic sanctions become operative.
+
+    4. It then has, _by a unanimous decision, to recommend_
+    military sanctions.
+
+{201}
+
+    5. If unanimity cannot be obtained, the Council ceasing to take
+    action, each party is practically free to act as it chooses.
+
+
+According to the new system defined in the Protocol, the situation is
+as follows:
+
+    1. The dispute arises.
+
+    2. The system of peaceful settlement provided for by the
+    Protocol comes into play.
+
+    3. The Council intervenes, and if, after arbitration has been
+    refused, war is resorted to, if the provisional preventive
+    measures are not observed, etc., the Council decides which
+    party is the aggressor and calls upon the signatory States
+    to apply the sanctions.
+
+    4. This decision implies that such sanctions as the case
+    requires--economic, financial, military, naval and air--shall
+    be applied forthwith, and without further recommendations or
+    decisions.
+
+We have therefore the following new elements:
+
+    (_a_) The obligation to apply the necessary sanctions of every
+    kind as a direct result of the decision of the Council.
+
+    (_b_) The elimination of the case in which all parties would be
+    practically free to abstain from any action.  The introduction
+    of a system of arbitration and of provisional measures which
+    permits of the determination in every case of the aggressor.
+
+    (_c_) No decision is taken as to the strength of the military,
+    naval and air forces, and no details are given as to the
+    measures which are to be adopted in a particular case.  None
+    the less, objective criteria are supplied which define the
+    obligation of each signatory; it is bound, in resistance to an
+    act of aggression, to collaborate _loyally and effectively_ in
+    applying the sanctions in accordance with its geographical
+    situation and its particular situation as regards armaments.
+
+That is why I said that _the great omission in the Covenant has been
+made good_.
+
+{202}
+
+It is true that no burden has been imposed on States beyond the
+sanctions already provided for in the Covenant.  But, at present, a
+State seeking to elude the obligations of the Covenant can reckon on
+two means of escape:
+
+    (1) The Council's recommendations need not be followed.
+
+    (2) The Council may fail to obtain unanimity, making
+    impossible any declaration of aggression, so that no
+    obligation to apply military sanctions will be imposed
+    and everyone will remain free to act as he chooses.
+
+We have abandoned the above system and both these loopholes are now
+closed.
+
+_Article 11, paragraphs 3 and 4._
+
+Paragraph 3 of Article 11 has been drafted with a view to giving
+greater precision to certain provisions of Article 11, paragraph 3, of
+the Covenant.  Article 16, paragraph 3, refers to mutual support in the
+application of financial and economic measures.  Article 11, paragraph
+3, of the present Protocol establishes real economic and financial
+co-operation between a State which has been attacked and the various
+States which come to its assistance.
+
+As, under Article 10 of the Protocol, it may happen that both States
+involved in a dispute are declared to be aggressors, the question arose
+as to what would be the best method of settling this problem.  There
+were three alternatives: to apply the principle contained in paragraph
+1, which is practically equivalent to making a sort of police war on
+both parties--or to leave the matter to pursue its course, or, finally,
+to compel States which disturb the peace of the world to desist from
+acts of war by the employment of means less severe than those indicated
+in paragraph 1.  It is the last method which has been chosen.  Only
+economic measures will be taken against such States, and naturally they
+will not be entitled to receive the assistance referred to in Article
+11, paragraph 3.
+
+{203}
+
+_Article 12._
+
+Article 16, paragraph 1, of the Covenant provides for the immediate
+severance of all trade or financial relations with the aggressor State,
+and paragraph 3 of the same Article provides, _inter alia_, for
+economic and financial co-operation between the State attacked and the
+various States coming to its assistance.
+
+As has already been pointed out, these engagements have been confirmed
+and made more definite in Article 11 of the Protocol.
+
+But the severance of relations and the co-operation referred to
+necessarily involve measures so complex that, when the moment arises,
+doubts may well occur as to what measures are necessary and appropriate
+to give effect to the obligations assumed under the above provisions.
+These problems require full consideration in order that States may know
+beforehand what their attitude should be.
+
+Article 12 defines the conditions of such investigation.
+
+It is not expressly stated that the problem will be examined by the
+Council in collaboration with the various Governments, but the Council
+will naturally, if it deems it necessary, invite the Governments to
+furnish such information as it may require for the purpose of carrying
+out the task entrusted to it under Article 12.
+
+_Article 13, paragraph 1._
+
+The above explanation of Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, contains many
+references to Article 13.
+
+As I have already pointed out, in case sanctions have to be applied, it
+is highly important that there should exist some organ competent to
+express an opinion as to the best way in which their obligations could
+be carried out by the signatories.  As you are aware, this organ,
+according to the Covenant, is the Council.  In order that the Council
+may effectively fulfil this duty, Article 13 empowers it to receive
+undertakings from States, determining _in advance_ the military, naval
+and air forces which they would {204} be able to bring into action
+immediately in order to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in
+regard to sanctions arising, out of the Covenant and the present
+Protocol.
+
+It is also necessary to emphasise the fact that the means which the
+States signatories to the present Protocol have at their disposal for
+the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of Article 11 vary
+considerably owing to the differences in the geographical, economic,
+financial, political and social condition of different States.
+Information as to the means at the disposal of each State is therefore
+indispensable in order that the Council may in full understanding give
+its opinion as to the best method by which such obligations may best be
+carried out.
+
+Finally, as regards the question of the reduction of armaments, which
+is the final goal to which our efforts are tending, the information
+thus furnished to the Council may be of very great importance, as every
+State, knowing what forces will be available for its assistance in case
+it is attacked, will be able to judge to what extent it may reduce its
+armaments without compromising its existence as a State, and every
+State will thus be able to provide the International Conference for the
+Reduction of Armaments with very valuable data.  I should add,
+moreover, that Article 13, paragraph 1, does not render it compulsory
+for States to furnish this information.  It is desirable that States
+should furnish the Council with this information, but they are at
+liberty not to do so.
+
+_Article 13, paragraphs 2 and 3._
+
+The provisions of Article 13, paragraphs 2 and 3, refer to the special
+agreements which were discussed at such length last year.  In view of
+the fact that, according to paragraph 2, such agreements can only come
+into force when the Council has invited the signatory States to apply
+the sanctions, the nature of these agreements may be defined as follows:
+
+Special agreements must be regarded as the means for the rapid
+application of sanctions of every kind in a particular case {205} of
+aggression.  They are additional guarantees which give weaker States an
+absolute assurance that the system of sanctions will never fail.  They
+guarantee that there will always be States prepared immediately to
+carry out the obligations provided for in Article 11 of the Protocol.
+
+In accordance with Article 18 of the Covenant, it is expressly stated
+that these agreements will be registered and published by the
+Secretariat, and it has also been decided that they will remain open
+for signature to any State Member of the League of Nations which may
+desire to accede to them.
+
+
+4.--ENDING OF SANCTIONS: PUNISHMENT OF THE AGGRESSOR.
+
+_Article 14._
+
+Article 14 is in perfect keeping with the last paragraphs of Articles
+10 and 11.  In the paragraphs in question, the coming into operation of
+the sanctions depends upon an injunction by the Council; it therefore
+also devolves upon the Council to declare that the object for which the
+sanctions were applied has been attained.  Just as the application of
+the sanctions is a matter for the States, so it rests with them to
+liquidate the operations undertaken with a view to resisting the act of
+aggression.
+
+_Article 15._
+
+Paragraph 1 is similar to Article 10 of the Draft Treaty of Mutual
+Assistance drawn up last year.
+
+Paragraph 2 is designed to prevent the sanctions provided for in
+Article 11 from undergoing any change in character during the process
+of execution and developing into a war of annexation.
+
+In view of the observations of various delegations regarding the
+punishment of the aggressor, it should be added that it would be
+incorrect to interpret this article as meaning that the only penalties
+to be apprehended by the aggressor as the result of his act shall be
+the burdens referred to in paragraph 1.  If {206} necessary, securities
+against fresh aggression, or pledges guaranteeing the fulfilment of the
+obligations imposed in accordance with paragraph 1, might be required.
+Only annexation of territory and measures involving the loss of
+political independence are declared inadmissible.
+
+"Territory" is to be taken to mean the whole territory of a State, no
+distinction being made between the mother-country and the colonies.
+
+
+5.--REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.
+
+_Articles 17 and 21._
+
+Although it has not been possible to solve the problem of the reduction
+of armaments in the clauses of the document submitted to the Assembly
+for approval, our work paves the way to it and makes it possible.
+
+The reduction of armaments will result, in the first place, from the
+general security created by a diminution of the dangers of war arising
+from the compulsory pacific settlement of all disputes.
+
+It will also ensue from the certainty which any State attacked will
+have of obtaining the economic and financial support of all the
+signatory States, and such support would be especially important should
+the aggressor be a great Power, capable of carrying on a long war.
+
+Nevertheless, for States which, owing to their geographical position,
+are especially liable to attack, and for States whose most important
+centres are adjacent to their frontiers, the dangers of a sudden attack
+are so great that it will not be possible for them to base any plan for
+the reduction of their armaments simply upon the political and economic
+factors referred to above, no matter what the importance of such
+factors may be.
+
+It has also been repeatedly declared that many States would require to
+know what military support they could count on, before the convening of
+the Conference, if they are to submit to {207} the Conference proposals
+for large reductions of armaments; this might necessitate negotiations
+between the Governments and with the Council before the meeting of the
+Conference for the reduction of armaments provided for in Article 17.
+The undertakings referred to in Article 13 of the Protocol should be
+interpreted in the light of the above.
+
+In drawing up the general programme of the Conference, it will also be
+necessary, as stated in paragraph 2 of Article 17, for the Council,
+apart from other criteria "to take into account the undertakings
+mentioned."
+
+In view of the close interdependence of the three great problems
+involved, namely, the pacific settlement of disputes, sanctions against
+those who disturb the peace of the world, and reduction of armaments,
+the Protocol provides for the convening by the Council of a general
+Conference for the Reduction of Armaments and for the preparation of
+the work of such a Conference.  Furthermore, the application of the
+clauses concerning arbitration and sanctions will be conditional on the
+adoption by the said Conference of a plan for the reduction and
+limitation of armaments.
+
+Moreover, in order to preserve the connection between the three big
+problems referred to above, it is provided that the whole Protocol will
+lapse in the event of the non-execution of the scheme adopted by the
+Conference.  It devolves upon the Council to declare this under
+conditions to be determined by the Conference itself.
+
+The last paragraph of Article 21 provides for the case of the partial
+lapsing of the Protocol after it has been put into force.  Should the
+plan adopted by the Conference be regarded as having been put into
+effect, any State which fails to execute it, so far as it is concerned,
+will not benefit by the provisions of the Protocol.
+
+
+{208}
+
+6.--THE COVENANT AND THE PROTOCOL.
+
+_Article 19._
+
+The present Protocol emphasises and defines certain obligations arising
+out of the Covenant.  Those of which the present Protocol makes no
+mention are not affected in any manner.  They still exist.  Examples
+which might be quoted are those laid down in Article 16, paragraph 3,
+of the Covenant, namely, the obligation of the States to give one
+another mutual support in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience
+resulting from the application of the economic and financial sanctions
+or the obligation of the States to take the necessary steps to afford
+passage through their territory to forces which are co-operating to
+protect the covenants of the League.
+
+Moreover, as the Swiss Delegation suggests, attention should be
+directed to the fact that the present Protocol does not in any way
+affect the special position of Switzerland arising out of the
+Declaration of the Council at London on February 13th, 1920.  As the
+special position of Switzerland is in accordance with the Covenant, it
+will also be in accordance with the Protocol.
+
+
+
+III.
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+No further explanations need be added to these comments on the
+articles.  The main principles of the Protocol are clear, as are the
+detailed provisions.
+
+Our purpose was to make war impossible, to kill it, to annihilate it.
+To do this, we had to create a system for the pacific settlement of all
+disputes which might arise.  In other words, it meant the creation of a
+system of arbitration from which no international dispute, whether
+legal or political, could escape.  The plan drawn up leaves no
+loophole; it prohibits wars of every description and lays down that all
+disputes shall be settled by pacific means.
+
+{209}
+
+But this absolute character which has been given to the system of
+arbitration should also belong to the whole of the scheme, to the
+treatment of every question of principle.  If there were one single gap
+in the system, if the smallest opening were left for any measure of
+force, the whole system would collapse.
+
+To this end arbitration is provided for every kind of dispute, and
+aggression is defined in such a way as to give no cause for hesitation
+when the Council has to take a decision.
+
+These reasons led us to fill in the gaps in the Covenant and to define
+the sanctions in such a way that no possible means could be found of
+evading them, and that there should be a sound and definite basis for
+the feeling of security.
+
+Finally, the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments is indissolubly
+bound up with this whole system: _there can be no arbitration or
+security without disarmament, nor can there be disarmament without
+arbitration and security_.
+
+The peace of the world is at stake.
+
+The Fifth Assembly has undertaken a work of worldwide political
+importance which, if it succeeds, is destined profoundly to modify
+present political conditions.  This year great progress in this
+direction has been made in our work.  If we succeed, the League of
+Nations will have rendered an inestimable service to the whole modern
+world.  Such success depends partly upon the Assembly itself and partly
+upon individual Governments.  We submit to the Assembly the fruit of
+our labours: a work charged with the highest hopes.  We beg the
+Assembly to examine our proposals with care, and to recommend them to
+the various Governments for acceptance.
+
+In this spirit and with such hopes do we request the Assembly to vote
+the draft resolutions 1 and 2 that are presented with this Report.
+
+
+
+
+{210}
+
+ANNEX D.
+
+RESOLUTIONS.
+
+
+
+RESOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY, SEPTEMBER 6TH, 1924.
+
+The Assembly,
+
+Noting the declarations of the Governments represented, observes with
+satisfaction that they contain the basis of an understanding tending to
+establish a secure peace,
+
+Decides as follows:
+
+With a view to reconciling in the new proposals the divergences between
+certain points of view which have been expressed and, when agreements
+have been reached, to enable an International Conference upon Armaments
+to be summoned by the League of Nations at the earliest possible moment:
+
+    (1) The Third Committee is requested to consider the material
+        dealing with security and the reduction of armaments,
+        particularly the observations of the Governments on the
+        draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance prepared in pursuance
+        of Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly and other plans
+        prepared and presented to the Secretary-General, since
+        the publication of the draft Treaty, and to examine the
+        obligations contained in the Covenant of the League in
+        relation to the guarantees of security which a resort to
+        arbitration and a reduction of armaments may require:
+
+    (2) The First Committee is requested:
+
+        (_a_) To consider, in view of possible amendments, the
+              articles in the Covenant relating to the settlement
+              of disputes;
+
+        (_b_) To examine within what limits the terms of Article
+              36, paragraph 2, of the statute establishing the
+              Permanent Court of International Justice might be
+              rendered more precise and thereby facilitate the
+              more general acceptance of the clause;
+
+and thus strengthen the solidarity and the security of the nations of
+the world by settling by pacific means all disputes which may arise
+between States.
+
+{211}
+
+RESOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY, SEPTEMBER 27TH, 1924.
+
+Whereas the work of the League of Nations in connection with the
+reduction of armaments is entering this year upon a period of
+re-organisation which requires the direct attention of the Council,
+
+The Assembly entrusts to the Council the question of the co-ordination
+of the work of its Commissions for the Reduction of Armaments.
+
+The Assembly recommends the Council to re-organise the Temporary Mixed
+Commission in conformity with the following principles:
+
+    (1) The Commission shall include the representatives of a
+    certain number of Governments;
+
+    (2) The Commission shall include qualified delegates of the
+    Technical Organisation of the League of Nations, that
+    is to say:
+
+        Representatives of the Economic Committee,
+               "        "   "  Financial Committee,
+               "        "   "  Transit Committee,
+               "        "   "  Permanent Advisory Commission,
+               "        "   "  Employers' and Labour
+                               Groups of the International
+                               Labour Office,
+        Experts, jurists or others elected by the Council.
+
+    (3) Delegates of States not represented on the Commission
+    may be invited to attend whenever the Commission
+    thinks fit.
+
+    (4) The Council may invite any States not Members of the
+    League of Nations which may have notified their intention
+    of taking part in the International Conference for the
+    Reduction of Armaments to appoint representatives to
+    participate in the work of the Commission.
+
+
+
+RESOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER 2ND, 1924.
+
+I.  The Assembly,
+
+Having taken note of the reports of the First and Third {212}
+Committees on the questions referred to them by the Assembly resolution
+of September 6th, 1924,
+
+Welcomes warmly the draft Protocol on the Pacific Settlement of
+International Disputes proposed by the two Committees, of which the
+text is annexed to this resolution, and
+
+Decides
+
+(1) To recommend to the earnest attention of all the Members of the
+League the acceptance of the said draft Protocol;
+
+(2) To open immediately the said Protocol in the terms proposed for
+signature by those representatives of Members of the League who are
+already in a position to sign it and to hold it open for signature by
+all other States;
+
+(3) To request the Council forthwith to appoint a Committee to draft
+the amendments to the Covenant contemplated by the terms of the said
+Protocol;
+
+(4) To request the Council to convene an International Conference for
+the Reduction of Armaments, which shall meet at Geneva as provided by
+the following stipulations of Article 17 of the draft Protocol:
+
+    "In preparation for the convening of the Conference, the
+    Council shall draw up, with due regard to the undertakings
+    contained in Articles 11 and 13 of the present Protocol, a
+    general programme for the reduction and limitation of
+    armaments which shall be laid before the Conference and be
+    communicated to the Governments at the earliest possible
+    date, and at the latest, three months before the
+    Conference meets.
+
+    "If by May 1st, 1925, ratifications have not been deposited
+    by at least a majority of the permanent Members of the
+    Council and ten other Members of the League, the
+    Secretary-General of the League shall immediately consult
+    the Council as to whether he shall cancel the invitations
+    or merely adjourn the Conference to a subsequent date to
+    be fixed by the Council so as to permit the necessary
+    number of ratifications to be obtained."
+
+
+{213}
+
+(5) To request the Council to put into immediate execution the
+provisions of Article 12 of the draft Protocol.
+
+
+
+RECOMMENDATION OF THE ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER 2ND, 1924.
+
+II. The Assembly,
+
+Having taken cognisance of the report of the First Committee upon the
+terms of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court
+of International Justice;
+
+Considering that the study of the said terms shows them to be
+sufficiently wide to permit States to adhere to the special Protocol,
+opened for signature in virtue of Article 36, paragraph 2, with the
+reservations which they regard as indispensable;
+
+Convinced that it is in the interest of the progress of international
+justice, and consistent with the expectations of the opinion of the
+world, that the greatest possible number of States should, to the
+widest possible extent, accept as compulsory the jurisdiction of the
+Court.
+
+Recommends:
+
+States to accede at the earliest possible date to the special Protocol
+opened for signature in virtue of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
+Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
+
+
+
+RESOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER 2ND, 1924.
+
+I. The Assembly recommends the Council to place the question of
+Regional Agreements for the Reduction of Armaments on the agenda of the
+International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments.
+
+II. Whereas the majority of the States which have replied have stated
+that, with certain exceptions, they have not exceeded the expenditure
+on armaments shown in their last budgets, and whereas the
+recommendation addressed to the Governments relates to the period which
+must elapse before the meeting of the International Conference for the
+Reduction of Armaments, which is to take place next year:
+
+{214}
+
+The Assembly does not consider it necessary to repeat the
+recommendation regarding the limitation of expenditure on armaments, as
+this question is to be placed upon the agenda of the International
+Conference for the Reduction of Armaments.
+
+III.  The Assembly is of the opinion:
+
+    1. That another technical conference on naval disarmament is
+    unnecessary.
+
+    2. That the question of naval disarmament should be discussed
+    as part of the general question of disarmament dealt with
+    by the International Conference proposed in the resolution
+    of September 6th, 1924, adopted by the Fifth Assembly, and
+    that it rests with the Council to settle the programme.
+
+IV. The Assembly requests the Council, in preparing the general
+programme of the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments provided for
+in Article 17 of the Protocol, to consider the advisability of
+including in that programme the following points:
+
+    1. General plan for a reduction of armaments in accordance
+       with Article 8 of the Covenant, in particular:
+
+       (_a_) Basis and methods of reduction (budget, peace-time
+       effectives, tonnage of naval and air fleets, population,
+       configuration of frontiers, etc.);
+
+       (_b_) Preparation of a typical budget for expenditure on
+       armaments.
+
+    2. Special position of certain States in relation to the
+       reduction of armaments:
+
+       (_a_) Temporary reservations by countries exposed to
+       special risks;
+
+       (_b_) Recommendation of regional agreements for the
+       reduction (or limitation) of armaments,
+
+    3. Recommendation of the establishment of demilitarised
+       zones (Article 9).
+
+    4. Control and investigation of armaments in the contracting
+       States.
+
+{215}
+
+The Assembly also requests the Council to instruct the competent
+organisations of the League to examine the schemes relating to the
+above questions which have already been submitted to the Third
+Committee, or which may subsequently be received by the Secretariat,
+and to take them into consideration in preparing the programme of the
+Conference.
+
+
+
+RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL, OCTOBER 3RD, 1924.
+
+1. With a view to the preparation of the Conference for the Reduction
+of Armaments, the Council decides to form itself into a Committee.  The
+representatives on the Council who consider that it will not be
+possible to attend the Committee in person will, as soon as possible,
+send to the Secretary-General the names of their substitutes on this
+Committee.
+
+The Committee will hold its first meeting on November 17th, in order to
+draw up a general programme of the work connected with the application
+of Article 12 of the Protocol and with the reduction of armaments.
+
+The Governments of the States represented on the Council are requested
+to give their representatives on the Committee the necessary
+instructions in order that the general lines of the programme may be
+laid down during its meeting of November 17th.[1] {216} The
+Secretary-General will invite the Governments of the States Members of
+the League not represented on the Council to forward through him to the
+Committee any suggestions which they may think useful with a view to
+the preparation of this programme.
+
+2. The Secretariat is requested to collect the data necessary for the
+economic and financial investigations relative to the application of
+Article 12 of the Protocol, and is authorised to distribute these data
+to the competent organs of the League (Economic and Financial
+Organisation and Transit Organisation) with a view to the work which
+will subsequently be required of them by the Committee.
+
+The Secretariat will obtain information from the official documents at
+the disposal of the League or from documents which might, if necessary,
+be furnished by the Governments.
+
+3. In conformity with the Assembly resolution, and in order to assist
+the Committee in co-ordinating the preparatory work for the Conference,
+the Temporary Mixed Commission shall be re-organised and shall take the
+name of the Co-ordination Commission, and be composed as follows:
+
+    (_a_) The Committee of the Council (ten members) assisted by:
+
+    (_b_) The President and one member or two members of each
+          of the three Organisations, Economic, Financial and
+          Transit (six members);
+
+    (_c_) Six members appointed by the Permanent Advisory
+          Commission (six members);
+
+    (_d_) Two members of the Employers' Group and two members
+          of the Workers' Group of the Governing Body of the
+          International Labour Office, appointed by the latter
+          (four members);
+
+    (_e_) If considered advisable, a certain number of
+          experts--jurists and others--appointed by the Council.
+
+The Secretary-General is requested to invite at a suitable moment the
+above-mentioned organisations to appoint their representatives.
+
+
+
+[1] The Council, at its 31st Session at Brussels, October 28th, 1924,
+"decided itself to undertake at its session in Rome (December, 1924)
+the work of preparing for the Conference on the Reduction of
+Armaments," instructing the Council Committee to continue and complete
+this work and report to the Council at its session in March, 1925.
+
+The work of either the Council or its Committee was dependent to a
+large extent upon the receipt of suggestions from Members of the League
+which had been requested from them in a circular letter of the
+Secretary-General, October 11, 1924.
+
+Various items regarding the Protocol of Geneva were on the Agenda of
+the Council for its December, 1924, meeting at Rome.  Preparatory work
+regarding "the general program" under the second paragraph of Article
+17 of the Protocol was the most important.  Two other relevant items
+were (1) the reorganization of the Temporary Mixed Commission and the
+Permanent Advisory Commission into a single co-ordinated Commission;
+and (2) the date of the meeting of the Commission of Jurists (appointed
+at the Brussels session of the Council in October, 1924) to draft the
+amendments to the Covenant contemplated by the Protocol.
+
+A Conservative Government came into power in Great Britain early in
+November, 1924, Mr. Austen Chamberlain becoming Foreign Secretary.  At
+the request of the British Government, the agenda items for the
+December, 1924 meeting of the Council at Rome relating to the Protocol
+of Geneva were postponed until the March meeting.  In the meantime, the
+British Government has suggested to the Dominions a meeting of the
+Imperial Conference for the purpose of adopting a policy of the British
+Commonwealth of Nations regarding the Protocol of Geneva.  Whether such
+a meeting will be held, or whether the general British policy will be
+decided on as a result of correspondence, is not at this writing
+certain.
+
+
+
+
+{217}
+
+ANNEX E.
+
+REPORT OF THE BRITISH DELEGATES RELATING TO THE PROTOCOL FOR THE
+PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.
+
+
+_London, November_ 1, 1924.
+
+Sir,
+
+We have the honour to submit herewith a report on the proceedings at
+the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva this year in
+connection with the Draft Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of
+International Disputes.
+
+
+I.--INTRODUCTION.
+
+The First Assembly of the League of Nations in 1920 prepared to give
+effect to article 8 of the Covenant, the first two paragraphs of which
+read: "The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of
+peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point
+consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of
+International obligations.  The Council .......... shall formulate
+plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the
+several Governments."  That Assembly decided "to instruct a Temporary
+Commission to prepare reports and proposals for the reduction of
+armaments as provided for by article 8 of the Covenant."  In the
+following year the Second Assembly defined the task more clearly in a
+resolution instructing the Temporary Mixed Commission to make proposals
+for the reduction of armaments which, in order to secure precision,
+"should be in the form of a draft Treaty or other equally defined plan,
+to be presented to the Council, if possible, before the Assembly next
+year" (1922).  In the course of the ensuing year the Temporary Mixed
+Commission was able to formulate certain principles which, in its
+opinion, might serve as a basis for the draft Treaty which it had been
+instructed to draw up.  After discussion of these principles the Third
+Assembly passed a resolution--the famous {218} Resolution
+14--recognising that in existing circumstances many Governments would
+be unable to accept responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments
+unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety
+of their country, and suggesting that such guarantee could be found in
+a defensive agreement binding them to provide immediate and effective
+assistance, in accordance with a pre-arranged plan, in the event of one
+of them being attacked.  The Temporary Mixed Commission were instructed
+to prepare a draft Treaty on these lines.  The result of their labours
+was submitted to the Fourth Assembly last year in the form of the Draft
+Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which was referred by the Assembly to the
+Governments for their observations.
+
+2. Certain Governments accepted the draft Treaty in principle: very few
+intimated their readiness to adhere to its actual terms.  His Majesty's
+Government, in a note which has already been made public,[1] explained
+the reasons which would render it impossible for them to subscribe to
+the Treaty.
+
+3. When, therefore, the Fifth Assembly met on the 1st September of this
+year, the labours of four years, which had been devoted to the
+preparation of a scheme for giving effect to the obligation undertaken
+by all signatories in article 8 of the Covenant, had not succeeded in
+establishing agreement, and there seemed no prospect of making any
+further advance along the path which had hitherto been followed.
+
+4. Some new direction would have to be given, and the presence in
+Geneva of the British and French Prime Ministers gave a special
+importance to the meeting.
+
+5. It was realised that the problem was not merely to find a general
+scheme of disarmament and security, but that the particular question of
+French security was of immediate political importance, and would
+shortly require a solution.  The question of "security" had already
+been raised in conversations between Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot in
+July last, at Chequers {219} and in Paris.  During the latter meeting,
+the subject was discussed at some length, and the position as it was
+then left by the two Prime Ministers was set out in the Franco-British
+memorandum of the 9th July concerning the application of the Dawes
+plan.  The relevant paragraph read as follows: "The two Governments
+have likewise proceeded to a preliminary exchange of views on the
+question of security.  They are aware that public opinion requires
+pacification: they agree to co-operate in devising through the League
+of Nations or otherwise, as opportunity presents itself, means of
+securing this, and to continue the consideration of the question until
+the problem of general security can be finally solved."  In a
+declaration made in the Chamber on the 21st August, reporting on the
+results of the London Conference, M. Herriot said "security must be the
+object of another Conference.  He did not see why France should not
+take the initiative ..........  For the rest, the security question
+would be dealt with at Geneva."
+
+6. The debate in the League Assembly was opened by the British Prime
+Minister on the 4th September.  Mr. Ramsay MacDonald began by
+explaining that it was not because they were indifferent to the problem
+of national security that His Majesty's Government had given an adverse
+opinion on the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance.  They believed that
+security could not be based on military alliances, and they hesitated
+to become involved in any agreements which committed them to vague and
+indefinite obligations.  In this respect the Treaty of Mutual
+Assistance was open to criticism, especially in its article 3 and in
+its definition of aggression.  Mr. Ramsay MacDonald emphasised that the
+main problem was the problem of national security in relation to
+national armaments, and the initial difficulty was encountered in the
+definition of such terms as "security" and "aggression."  In regard to
+the latter, he said, "the one method by which we can approximate to an
+accurate attribution of responsibility for aggression is arbitration,"
+and he proposed that the article of the Statute of the Permanent Court
+dealing with {220} arbitration should be carefully examined by a
+Commission, with a view to its being placed before the Assembly in a
+somewhat more precise, expanded and definite form than it now had.
+Such a step would be necessary as a preliminary to the discussion of
+disarmament, which could produce no good result unless an atmosphere of
+confidence were previously created.  To summon a Conference on
+disarmament without such a preparation of the ground would be to court
+immediate and disastrous failure.  Such a Conference must be the
+ultimate aim, and it must include all the nations and must be held in
+Europe.  In his view the Covenant already contained ample provisions
+for starting arbitration, for the sanctions that were necessary and for
+all other eventualities that might arise: what was now required was
+that the Covenant should be elaborated.  "The British Government thinks
+that the matter should now be explored, beginning with the Covenant,
+applying the Covenant to our present circumstances, and, in the spirit
+of the League of Nations, developing a policy that will give security
+and reduce armaments.  The British Government stands by the Covenant.
+The British Government has no wish to reduce the authority of the
+Council.  It rather wishes to extend the authority of the Council
+consistently with the continued existence and prosperity of the League.
+Articles 10, 12, 13, 15 and 16 of the Covenant might well form
+themselves into a charter of peace if we would only apply them and fill
+them out."
+
+7. Speaking on the following day, the French Prime Minister expressed a
+similar view: "It is in the development and the fullest possible
+application of the articles of this solemn instrument (the Covenant)
+that France seeks for the rules which are to guide her future action
+and her foreign policy."  M. Herriot welcomed Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's
+suggestion that arbitration should be the test of aggression, and he
+expressed the hope that the Fifth Assembly would be able to accept the
+principle of arbitration, which would solve the difficulties, as
+henceforth the aggressor would be the party which refused arbitration.
+M. Herriot {221} added: "Arbitration is essential, but it is not
+sufficient.  It is a means, but not an end.  It does not entirely
+fulfil the intentions of article 8 of the Covenant, which are security
+and disarmament.  We in France regard three terms--arbitration,
+security and disarmament--as inseparable."  A nation which accepted
+arbitration had a right to security.  "Justice without might is
+impotent.  Might without justice is tyranny."  In conclusion: "We stand
+by the Covenant, but we wish to make it a living Covenant.  We simply
+claim for each nation the rights conferred upon it by the Covenant, no
+more and no less."
+
+8. It is unnecessary to indicate in detail the views expressed by other
+speakers who participated in this opening debate, from which it was
+evident that there was general agreement on a number of points:--
+
+    (_a_.) That as a preliminary to disarmament there must be provided
+    an inclusive scheme for the pacific settlement of international
+    disputes of all kinds.
+
+    (_b_.) That the Covenant of the League itself provided the basis
+    of such a scheme, but that it required elaboration, precision and
+    extension in certain directions.
+
+    (_c_.) That to give effect to such a scheme States should develop
+    the principle of compulsory arbitration.
+
+    (_d_.) That a State, having accepted this principle, would, if it
+    resorted to force in disregard of its obligation to submit to
+    arbitration, be automatically declared an aggressor, and outlawed.
+
+    (_e_.) That some form of co-operation must be devised for effective
+    resistance to aggression, both as a deterrent to any possible
+    aggressor and as a guarantee of security to all States enabling
+    them to contemplate a reduction of their own armed forces, which
+    at present constituted their sole guarantee of safety.
+
+9. In order to give effect to these ideas, a resolution was submitted
+to the Assembly on the 6th September by the British and French
+delegations in the following terms:--
+
+{222}
+
+    "The Assembly,
+
+    "Noting the declarations of the Governments represented, observes
+    with satisfaction that they contain the basis of an understanding
+    tending to establish a secure peace,
+
+    "Decides as follows:--
+
+    "With a view to reconciling in the new proposals the divergencies
+    between certain points of view which have been expressed, and when
+    agreement has been reached, to enable an international conference
+    upon armaments to be summoned by the League of Nations at the
+    earliest possible moment--
+
+    "(1.) The Third Committee is requested to consider the material
+    dealing with security and reduction of armaments, particularly the
+    observations of the Governments on the draft Treaty of Mutual
+    Assistance prepared in pursuance of Resolution 14 of the Third
+    Assembly, and other plans prepared and presented to the
+    Secretary-General since the publication of the draft Treaty, and
+    to examine the obligations contained in the Covenant of the League
+    in relation to the guarantees of security which a resort to
+    arbitration and a reduction of armaments may require;
+
+    "(2.) The First Committee is requested--
+
+    "(_a_.) To consider, in view of possible amendments, the articles
+    in the Covenant relating to the settlement of disputes;
+
+    "(_b_.) To examine within what limits the terms of article 36,
+    paragraph 2, of the Statute establishing the Permanent Court of
+    International Justice might be rendered more precise, and thereby
+    facilitate the more general acceptance of the clause;
+
+    "And thus strengthen the solidarity and the security of the
+    nations of the world by settling, by pacific means, all disputes
+    which may arise between States."
+
+10. This resolution was carried unanimously by the Assembly, which thus
+deputed the preparatory work to its First Committee (dealing with legal
+and constitutional questions) and its Third Committee (dealing with
+reduction of armaments).
+
+{223}
+
+11. It will be more convenient at once to consider the final results of
+the labours of the two Committees, leaving for the moment any detailed
+account of the progress of their work, in order to see how the draft
+Protocol which they submitted to the Full Assembly on the 1st October
+gave effect to the ideas which had been proclaimed in the course of the
+earlier debate.
+
+12. In the first place it was necessary to complete the scheme of
+arbitration and conciliation provided in the Covenant.  The Covenant
+itself did not provide for every eventuality, and by failing to offer
+pacific means of settlement of all disputes, it left open, or seemed to
+leave open, in certain circumstances resort to force.  Especially was
+this so in article 12 of the Covenant, whereby the Members of the
+League agreed "in no case to resort to war until three months after the
+award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council."  Further,
+paragraph 7 of article 15 of the Covenant laid down that "if the
+Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the
+Members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the
+parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves
+the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the
+maintenance of right and justice."  Under article 2 of the Protocol
+"the signatory States _agree_ in no case to resort to war either with
+one another or against a State which, if the occasion arises, accepts
+all the obligations hereinafter set out, except in case of resistance
+to acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the Council or
+the Assembly of the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions
+of the Covenant and of the present Protocol."  The signatory States
+having agreed in no case to resort to war, the Protocol proceeds to
+prohibit the arbitrament of force and to provide a complete system for
+the pacific settlement of disputes.  As regards cases covered by
+paragraph 2 of article 36 of the statute of the Permanent Court of
+International Justice, the signatory States bind themselves to
+recognize as obligatory the jurisdiction of that Court, "but without
+prejudice to the right of any State, when {224} acceding to the special
+Protocol provided for in the said article and opened for signature on
+the 16th December, 1920, to make reservations compatible with the said
+clause" (article 3).  As regards other subjects of dispute, the
+Protocol provides a procedure (article 4) which supplements and
+completes that defined in article 15 of the Covenant.  Briefly, under
+this procedure, if the Council is at the outset unable to effect a
+settlement, it persuades the parties to submit to arbitration.  If
+neither party should be willing to go to arbitration, the Council again
+takes the matter into consideration: If it reaches a unanimous
+decision, the parties are bound to accept that decision: if it fails to
+achieve unanimity, the Council itself refers to arbitrators, whose
+award is final and binding on the parties to the dispute.
+
+13. Thus for every dispute that may arise there is a procedure of
+pacific settlement, and provision has been made in the Protocol for
+meeting points (_a_), (_b_) and (_c_) in paragraph 8 above.
+
+14. The establishment of a complete and comprehensive system for the
+pacific settlement of all disputes that might arise rendered it easier
+to approach the problem of the definition of "aggression."  As the
+Prime Minister had said, "the one method by which we can approximate to
+an accurate attribution of responsibility for aggression is
+arbitration."  In other words, any State which refused to avail itself
+of the means at hand for a peaceful settlement of a dispute, or which
+refused to accept the award given by the arbitral body or bodies now
+provided, and proceeded to an act of war, would brand itself as the
+aggressor.  This principle is embodied in article 10 of the Protocol,
+which thus gives effect to the idea indicated in paragraph 8 (_d_)
+above.  The definition of aggression is extended by articles 7 and 8 of
+the Protocol to apply to military measures taken before or during
+proceedings for a pacific settlement, and to acts constituting a threat
+of aggression against another State.
+
+15. The point raised in paragraph 8 (_e_) above is dealt with in
+article 11 of the Protocol.  Directly aggression takes place, {225} the
+Council calls upon the signatory States to apply sanctions against the
+aggressor (article 10).  As soon as the Council has thus called upon
+the signatory States, "the obligations of the said States, in regard to
+the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article
+16 of the Covenant, will immediately become operative in order that
+such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor.  Those
+obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory
+States to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant
+of the League of Nations, and in resistance to any act of aggression,
+in the degree which its geographical position and its particular
+situation as regards armaments allow."  Article 12 of the Protocol
+provides for the establishment of plans for putting into effect
+economic and financial sanctions, and article 13, "in view of the
+contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided for by article 16
+of the Covenant," empowers the Council "to receive undertakings from
+States determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which
+they would be able to bring into action immediately to ensure the
+fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from
+the Covenant and the present Protocol."
+
+16. Article 11--the "sanctions" article--has been more closely
+scrutinized and has been the subject of more criticism than any other
+article of the draft Protocol, and a hasty examination of it by some
+critics has led them to object that it goes beyond article 16 of the
+Covenant and imposes fresh obligations on the signatory States.  In
+reply to such critics, it may be best to quote the words used by the
+British delegate in his speech to the Third Committee on the 22nd
+September:--
+
+    "It cannot be too strongly emphasized that everything in this
+    article is already stated or implied in article 16 of the
+    Covenant.  We are remaining within the terms of the Covenant and
+    we are undertaking no new obligations ..........  Surely loyal
+    and effective co-operation in support of the Covenant is what
+    may confidently be expected from every Member of the League of
+    {226}
+    Nations .......... The extent of the co-operation must depend on
+    the actual circumstances not only as regards the aggression but
+    also as regards the geographical position and the resources of
+    all kinds of individual States.  It would be no use to bind
+    oneself to do a variety of things which may not be required.  We
+    must and we can rely on the good faith of the Members of the
+    League to decide themselves how their effective co-operation can
+    best be given if and when the necessity arises."
+
+17. In order to complete the fulfilment of the task assigned to the
+committees by the Assembly's resolution of the 6th September, the
+Protocol finally provides (article 17) for the summoning in June next
+year of an International Conference for the reduction of armaments, to
+meet in Geneva and to include representatives of all states whether
+Members of the League or not.  M. Herriot first, and other speakers
+after him, had emphasised the interdependence of the three great
+problems of arbitration, security and disarmament, and the framers of
+the Protocol, bearing this in mind, have been careful to preserve this
+interdependence in the document itself.  Thus if sufficient
+ratifications of the Protocol have not been received by a certain date,
+the Conference on Disarmament is to be postponed.  In any case, the
+Protocol does not come into force until that Conference shall have
+adopted a plan for the reduction of armaments.  And if within a further
+period, that plan has not been carried out, the Protocol becomes null
+and void.
+
+18. The above brief summary indicates how in the Protocol the
+committees of the Assembly have sought to embody, in concrete form, the
+proposals made to the Assembly itself by the British and French Prime
+Ministers.  The Protocol is an attempt to complete the Covenant, to
+facilitate and develop the procedure of pacific settlement provided
+therein, and to define more clearly the obligations imposed by it on
+States Members of the League.  The Protocol is based on the Covenant
+and keeps within its terms except in so far that it extends the
+Covenant procedure to give an alternative procedure by peaceful {227}
+settlement, even in those cases for which the framers of the Covenant
+in 1919 were unable to find a remedy.  So far as it contains anything
+new, it is to be found in the definition of aggression which follows as
+a necessary corollary to the limitations inserted in the establishment
+of a universal system of peaceful settlement.  But even here the
+principle is not new.  Article 16 of the Covenant decreed that
+sanctions should be applied against any Member of the League that might
+"resort to war in disregard of its Covenants under articles 12, 13 or
+15."  Article 10 of the Protocol decrees sanctions against any State
+resorting to war without availing itself or in defiance of, the
+procedure of pacific settlement provided in the Covenant as amplified
+by the Protocol itself.  The amplification of that procedure to cover
+all cases, so as to remove all excuse for resort to war, has enabled
+the framers of the Protocol to give a more exact definition of
+aggression, and to make that definition more certain and more
+automatic.  The Protocol is thus free from the reproach that had been
+levelled against the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which left a
+wide and dangerous discretion to the Council in determining which party
+to a dispute was the aggressor.  It further discards the system
+proposed in the draft Treaty, whereby power was given to the Council to
+decide on and to direct the military sanctions required.  The draft
+Treaty tended towards the realisation of the idea of the League as a
+"super-State": the Protocol respects the principle of national
+sovereignty.  Every State retains its own liberty of action: it is
+still free to choose what it will do.  The Protocol has stated in
+clearer terms what is expected of those who signed the Covenant in
+1919, and it is to be hoped that this more explicit declaration may
+serve to deter those who would contemplate a violation of the spirit of
+the Covenant, whilst reassuring those who have hitherto sought safety
+in their own armed strength, by giving them confidence in the
+solidarity of the civilised nations and in their determination to
+resist all unscrupulous attempts to plunge the world again into the
+disaster of war.
+
+{228}
+
+19. It remains only to say a few words as to the actual procedure
+adopted by the Assembly for putting into effect the scheme thus
+elaborated.  It was generally agreed that mere resolutions of the
+Assembly would not give sufficient assurance of progress.  The famous
+Resolution 14 of the Third Assembly had been discussed and debated and
+had seemed to lead to an impasse with the rejection of the Treaty of
+Mutual Assistance.  The Prime Minister, in his speech to the Assembly,
+had said: "Let us see to it that even before we rise, before the
+Assembly breaks up, some substantial progress shall be made in
+co-ordinating these ideas and in producing from their apparent
+diversities some measure of agreement and consent."  It was therefore
+decided that the scheme should be embodied in the form of a Protocol,
+ready for signature, and that the Assembly should pass a resolution
+endorsing the principles contained therein, recommending the Protocol
+to the Governments for their acceptance, and directing that it should
+be opened immediately for signature.  The terms of this Resolution,
+which was carried unanimously, have already been published.
+
+20. The Protocol itself was signed in Geneva by Delegates of the
+Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Esthonia, France, Greece, Latvia,
+Poland, Portugal, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Czechoslovakia.  The
+Delegate of France at the same time signed on behalf of his Government
+the special Protocol opened for signature in virtue of article 36,
+paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
+Justice, making the following declaration:--
+
+    "I hereby declare that, subject to ratification, the French
+    Government gives its adhesion to the optional clause of article
+    36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, on the condition of
+    reciprocity, for a period of fifteen years, with power of
+    denunciation, should the Protocol of Arbitration, Security and the
+    Reduction of Armaments, signed this day, lapse, and further,
+    subject to the  observations made at the First Committee of the
+    Fifth Assembly, according to the terms of which 'one of the
+    {229}
+    parties to the dispute may bring the said dispute before the
+    Council of the League of Nations for the purposes of the pacific
+    settlement laid down in paragraph 3 of article 15 of the Covenant,
+    and during such proceedings neither party may take proceedings
+    against the other in the Court.'"
+
+21. Having briefly summarized the discussion which gave rise to the
+elaboration of the draft Protocol, and having examined in what way that
+instrument embodies the ideas expressed in that discussion, it may be
+of interest to review summarily the progress of the work of the two
+Committees of the Assembly that were charged with the drafting of the
+scheme, and to show how the various articles were evolved.
+
+22. It will be seen from the terms of the resolution of the 6th
+September that the scheme of "arbitration, security and disarmament,"
+though forming one indivisible whole, would require the deliberation of
+two of the regular Committees of the Assembly.  The First Committee,
+dealing with the legal questions, would have to develop the principle
+of arbitration, while the Third Committee, dealing with the reduction
+of armaments, would have to consider the problems of security and
+disarmament.
+
+23. It was realised that the work would overlap at many points, and the
+two Committees kept in constant touch throughout, the result of their
+labours being finally co-ordinated by a joint drafting sub-Committee.
+
+24. During the whole period of discussion the British Delegation kept
+in close touch with the Dominion and Indian Delegations, who were
+consulted on all points of difficulty, and who were given every
+opportunity of expressing their views.  This was done, not only by
+means of private consultation, but also at fourteen formal meetings of
+the Delegations.
+
+25. In the following sections an attempt is made to trace the evolution
+of the Protocol through its various stages in the First and Third
+Committees.
+
+
+{230}
+
+II.--WORK OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE.
+
+26. The first plenary meeting of the First Committee was held on the
+2nd September, when Sir Littleton Groom (Australia) was elected
+Chairman, and M. Limburg (Netherlands) Vice-Chairman.  Sir C. Hurst
+represented the British Empire.
+
+27. On the 9th September the Committee began its deliberations on the
+Assembly resolution of the 6th September regarding arbitration,
+security and disarmament.  The Assembly, by this resolution, instructed
+the First Committee:--
+
+    "(_a_.) To consider, in view of possible amendments, the articles
+    in the Covenant relating to the settlement of disputes;
+
+    "(_b_.) To examine within what limits the terms of article 36,
+    paragraph 2, of the Statute establishing the Permanent Court of
+    International Justice might be rendered more precise, and thereby
+    facilitate the more general acceptance of the clause;
+
+"and thus strengthen the solidarity and security of the nations of the
+world by settling by pacific means all disputes which may arise between
+States."
+
+28. The British Delegation commenced their labours by considering the
+second of these two tasks, as it was a British suggestion emanating
+from the Prime Minister himself.  The question of the acceptance by His
+Majesty's Government of the principle of compulsory arbitration for
+legal disputes, as provided in the optional clause referred to in
+article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute establishing the Permanent
+Court of International Justice, had been examined in London before the
+meeting of the Assembly.  This examination had shown so clearly the
+difficulties which might arise in connection with disputes with neutral
+Powers arising out of British naval action in time of war, that the
+limitation of the acceptance by his Majesty's Government of the
+optional clause by the exclusion of disputes arising out of British
+belligerent action at sea was suggested.  To achieve this it was
+proposed that His Majesty's Government {231} should make a reservation
+as to disputes arising out of action taken in conformity with the
+Covenant, or at the request, or with the approval, of the Council of
+the League.
+
+29. The suggestion was accepted by the British Delegation.  As however,
+the question was clearly one which affected the Empire as a whole, the
+Dominion and Indian Delegations were especially consulted in regard to
+it.  The position as it appeared to the British Delegation was fully
+explained to them, and it was understood that they would telegraph to
+their respective Governments, making clear the nature of the
+reservation proposed.
+
+30. The general discussion by the First Committee of the subject of the
+acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of
+International Justice took place at the third plenary meeting on the
+11th September.  The British Delegate reminded the Committee that the
+views of His Majesty's Government had already been explained in the
+Assembly in regard to the optional clause.  The Prime Minister had then
+stated that the British Government wished to sign a clause of this
+kind, subject to its being clearly drafted.  The British Delegate
+proceeded to discuss the position of the British Empire supposing that
+it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and was then
+forced, in support of the Covenant, to go to war at sea.  Sea warfare,
+he said, inevitably brought a belligerent into sharp conflict with the
+nationals of foreign Powers carrying on trade with the enemy State.
+The British Empire might therefore find itself forced to support before
+the International Court the legality of action taken at the request of
+the League itself.  The British Delegation therefore asked the
+Committee to consider whether it would be possible, either by amendment
+of article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court or by the
+admission of a reservation acceptable to other Members of the League,
+to exclude from the acceptance of that clause disputes which arose out
+of action taken, either in accordance with the Covenant, or at the
+request, or with the sanction, of the Council of the League.
+
+{232}
+
+31. The French Delegation were content with the idea of such a
+reservation, and both the Belgian and Brazilian Delegations stated that
+they had no objection to it.  The delegate of Brazil, however, said he
+would prefer to proceed by way of a reservation rather than by any
+modification of the text.  Though the representatives of the
+Netherlands and of Sweden were slightly more critical, it became
+apparent that no real objection would be raised to the British
+reservation.
+
+32. The Belgian Delegate suggested even going further still and
+excluding, when accepting the optional clause, the whole of sub-heading
+(_b_), which relates to questions of international law.  The effect of
+this would be to exclude all questions of international law where that
+law has not yet been codified, as where it has been codified the
+dispute becomes one of the interpretation of a Treaty.  This, the
+British Delegation thought, would be going too far.  It would deprive
+the International Court of the power to build up a case law in the
+international field.  It would, moreover, have gone further than the
+Delegation felt necessary, because it was only in the field of
+established international law, where there are two distinct schools of
+thought--the continental and the Anglo-Saxon--that the difficulties
+referred to by the British Delegate would arise.
+
+33. As regards the question of amendments to the Covenant, the French
+representative did not, during the general discussion in a plenary
+meeting of the First Committee, specify the nature of the amendments
+suggested by the French Delegation.  He contented himself with drawing
+attention to three points.  The first was the last sentence of article
+13 of the Covenant, which provides that in the event of any failure to
+carry out an arbitration award, the Council shall propose what steps
+shall be taken to give effect thereto.  This the French Delegation
+regarded as inadequate.  The second was the provision of article 15 by
+which, if the Council cannot reach a unanimous decision, the parties to
+a dispute which is submitted to the Council recover their liberty of
+action.  Here, he said, was a gap in the {233} Covenant which must be
+filled.  Was the position to be perpetuated, he asked, by which any one
+member of the Council could completely prevent a peaceful settlement of
+a dispute?  The third was paragraph 8 of article 15, which provides
+that in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a State the Council
+can make no recommendation.  The French Delegation asked the Committee
+to consider whether it would not be possible to discover a method of
+friendly conciliation over matters relating to domestic jurisdiction.
+
+34. After the general discussion had been declared closed, the First
+Committee adjourned for a week and entrusted to a sub-committee, known
+as the Fifth Sub-Committee, the task of formulating concrete proposals.
+The work done by this sub-committee was of such importance that it is
+considered desirable to indicate its composition, which was as follows:
+
+  Mr. Adatci (Japan).
+  Count Albert Apponyi (Hungary).
+  M. Loucheur (France).
+  Mr. John O'Byrne (Irish Free State).
+  M. Erich (Finland).
+  M. Raul Fernandez (Brazil).
+  Sir Cecil Hurst (British Empire).
+  M. Nicolas Politis (Greece).
+  M. Rolin (Belgium).
+  M. Vittorio Scialoja (Italy).
+  M. Nicolas Titulesco (Roumania).
+  M. Torriente (Cuba).
+  M. Limburg (Netherlands).
+  M. Unden (Sweden).
+
+35. The discussion was taken up on the 12th September in the
+sub-committee on the lines of the general debate in the full Committee.
+The meetings were not open to the public.  As regards the proposed
+British reservation to the acceptance of the obligatory jurisdiction of
+the Permanent Court of International Justice, by signing the optional
+clause in the Statute of the Court, some opposition developed at first
+from two quarters.  Subsequently, however, it waned and did not
+reappear.
+
+{234}
+
+36. As regards the extension of the principle of arbitration by
+amendments to the Covenant, it at once became clear that there were
+many conflicting views as to the best system to adopt.  The days were
+spent mainly in ascertaining, inside and outside the sub-committee, the
+extent and the nature of the different points of view.
+
+37. The work on which the sub-committee was engaged was intimately
+related to the questions of security and disarmament with which the
+Third Committee was dealing.  On the 16th September, Dr. Benes,
+chairman of the sub-committee of the Third Committee, who had been in
+close touch with the British and French Delegations, produced a draft
+Protocol covering the whole ground, in which he had attempted to
+reconcile opposing points of view and which was intended to serve as a
+basis for discussion.  Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 of this draft Protocol
+concerned the First Committee and were referred to the sub-committee.
+They may be summarised as follows:--
+
+38. _Article_ 1.--The signatories recognise the jurisdiction of the
+Permanent Court of International Justice as compulsory, "subject to the
+following reserves":--
+
+39. _Article_ 2.--The signatories undertake to submit all disputes, not
+covered by articles 12, 13 and 15 of the Covenant, to the Council of
+the League, subject to an express reserve as to the right given
+exclusively to the Assembly in article 19 of the Covenant, whereby the
+Assembly alone is entitled to advise the reconsideration of existing
+treaties.  The Council in such cases to act as an arbitration tribunal
+and to decide by a majority vote.  Pending an examination of the
+dispute the Council may, by a majority, define measures to be taken by
+the parties to avert or put an end to armed conflict.  Similarly, the
+Council may, in case of imminent danger, call upon the parties to
+discontinue any measure likely to cause the dispute to become more
+acute.
+
+40. _Article_ 3.--The procedure laid down in article 2 to apply to the
+Permanent Court in cases concerning the competence of that Court.
+
+{235}
+
+41. _Article_ 5.--Any signatory which does not submit its disputes to
+the methods of pacific settlement indicated above, or which does not
+comply with the provisional measures referred to in article 2, or which
+does not carry out an award of a duly qualified arbitral body, shall,
+if these acts of non-compliance are likely to disturb the peace of the
+world, be declared to be an aggressor and outlawed, the declaration to
+be made by the Permanent Court or by the Council acting, if need be, by
+a majority.  When this declaration has been made, the Council is to
+call on Members of the League to put into operation the sanctions
+contained in article 7.
+
+42. Consideration of these proposals and of those contained in two
+other schemes submitted led to long discussions in the Committee.
+These discussions served mainly to bring into relief the different
+schools of thought.  One favoured the widest possible extension of the
+jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, even into the field of disputes of
+a political nature; the other held that the Court's jurisdiction should
+be rigidly limited to disputes of a legal character, while a
+far-reaching system of arbitration should be established to deal with
+political disputes.  Strong disinclination was shown towards any
+increase in the existing powers of the Council.  On the other hand, it
+was made clear that no decrease of those powers would be tolerated.  On
+one side it was urged that the Council, when acting as an arbitral
+body, should make its decisions by a majority vote; on the other,
+strong exception was taken to any departure from the unanimity rule.
+As regards the application of sanctions, one group held that mere
+refusal to arbitrate or failure to carry out an award should justify
+their application.  Another contended equally strongly that sanctions
+should only be applied when such refusal or failure was accompanied by
+a resort to war.  The extent to which war was legitimate under the
+Covenant in cases relating to domestic jurisdiction was very fully
+discussed.  The net result was a unanimous agreement to leave paragraph
+8 of article 15 untouched.
+
+{236}
+
+43. As regards the filling of the gap in article 15 of the Covenant,
+little progress was made.  On the 19th September, therefore, the
+British representative submitted a scheme to the sub-committee, in
+which he had endeavoured to meet the differences of opinion which had
+been expressed.  This scheme provided for the acceptance as compulsory
+of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court in the cases covered by
+article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, with such
+reserves as may be consistent therewith.  Its main object was, however,
+the amendment of the Covenant on the lines of the following text:--
+
+    "The undersigned will support the introduction of amendments to
+    article 15 of the Covenant for the purpose of amplifying paragraphs
+    4, 5, 6 and 7 of that article on the following lines:--
+
+    "If the dispute submitted to the Council is not settled by it as
+    provided in paragraph 3, the Council shall endeavour to persuade
+    the parties to submit the dispute to judicial settlement or
+    arbitration.
+
+    "If the parties cannot agree to do so, the Council shall again
+    take the dispute under consideration, and, if it reaches a report
+    which is unanimously agreed to by the Members thereof other than
+    the representatives of the parties to the dispute, the Members of
+    the League agree to accept the recommendations contained in the
+    report.
+
+    "If the Council fails to reach a report which is concurred in by
+    all the members other than the representatives of the parties to
+    the dispute, and if the parties are still unable to agree to refer
+    the dispute to arbitration, the Council is empowered to refer the
+    dispute to arbitration on their behalf.  One-half of the members
+    of the tribunal, excluding the president, shall be appointed by
+    the Council, after consultation with one party to the dispute, and
+    the other half after consultation with the other party to the
+    dispute.  The president shall be appointed by the Council after
+    consultation with the Permanent Court of International Justice if
+    in session, or, if not in session, with the members of its chamber
+    of summary jurisdiction.
+
+    "The Members of the League agree that they will comply with the
+    {237}
+    recommendations contained in any award of the Arbitration Tribunal
+    set up by the Council as above.
+
+    "In the event of any failure to comply with the recommendations of
+    a report concurred in by all the Members of the Council other than
+    the parties to the dispute or in any award of an arbitration
+    tribunal set up by the Council as above, the Council shall exert
+    all its influence to secure compliance therewith.  If such failure
+    to carry out the recommendations is accompanied by any resort to
+    war, the sanctions provided for in article 16, interpreted as
+    provided in this Protocol, shall be applied."
+
+44. The British Delegate explained that the willingness of Governments
+to amend the Covenant must be clearly expressed in the Protocol.  In no
+other way could the danger of creating within the League an inner ring
+of Powers, bound towards each other by ties and obligations more close
+than those binding the ordinary members of the League, be avoided.  The
+drafting of amendments to the Covenant was, however, a technical
+matter, and time was short.  He therefore suggested that the Council
+should be asked to set up a committee of experts to draft the
+amendments to the Covenant contemplated by the Protocol.
+
+45. These proposals provided the bases of articles 1, 3 and 4 of the
+Protocol and of paragraph 3 of the Assembly Resolution of the 2nd
+October.  The bases of articles 2 and 5 had already been established.
+Article 10 was beginning to take shape in new drafts in substitution
+for Dr. Benes's definition of an aggressor.  On the 21st September
+these articles were provisionally adopted by the joint drafting
+committee of the First and Third Committees.  At this stage, therefore,
+for the first time, the substance of a workable text on the subjects
+referred to the First Committee began to emerge from the shadow of
+discussion.
+
+46. Throughout this period, however, the negotiations had been carried
+on entirely in the sub-committee in secret sessions.  Although the
+closest possible touch had been kept by the British Delegation with the
+Dominion and Indian Delegations, the British representative felt
+himself to be in a position {238} of great responsibility in carrying
+on the work in the sub-committee.  He felt that a stage had been
+reached where a wider consultation was necessary, as, with the
+exception of the Attorney-General of the Irish Free State, who was
+unfortunately obliged to return to Ireland about this date, he was the
+only British member.  He proposed, therefore, that the work of the
+sub-committee should be reported to the full Committee on which all the
+Dominion and Indian Delegations were represented.  The full Committee
+thereupon met on the 24th September, and then and at further meetings
+held on the 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th September, the articles of the
+Protocol were fully discussed in public sessions.  The articles of the
+Protocol under consideration thus took their shape in the
+sub-committee, they were then submitted to the Joint Drafting Committee
+representing the First and Third Committees, and were then finally
+approved after public discussions in Committee No. 1.  Here, then, it
+will be convenient to deal with the purpose and evolution of each
+article separately.
+
+
+_The Preamble._
+
+47. The draft of the Preamble, as revised by the Joint Drafting
+Committee of the First and Third Committees, was adopted at a plenary
+session of the First Committee on the 27th September.  The Lithuanian
+Delegate made a reservation that the reference to territorial security
+in no way prejudiced existing disputes between States signing the
+Protocol.  The Portuguese Delegate proposed an amendment to substitute
+for the word "territories" in the first sentence, the phrase
+"territories under the sovereignty of States."  The object was to make
+it clear that oversea territories under the sovereignty of a State were
+not excluded, but the British representative reminded the committee of
+the nature of the varied character of the territories of the British
+Empire, and said that if one class of oversea territories were
+mentioned, all must be mentioned.  The amendment was rejected.
+
+{239}
+
+_Article 1._
+
+48. Article 1 was designed to ensure that the universality of the
+League should be maintained even if the Protocol comes into force.  For
+a while there must no doubt be a dual régime.  States signatory to the
+Protocol will be bound by its terms, and the régime of the Covenant
+will continue to exist and to be binding upon States members of the
+League.  This will, however, not last, as the principal provisions of
+the Protocol will be transformed into amendments to the Covenant.
+
+_Article 2._
+
+49. Article 2 was intended to make all aggressive war illegal.
+Exceptions were, however, made to safeguard (1) the right of a State to
+fight in self-defence, and (2) the position of a State acting in
+accordance with the provisions of the Covenant or the Protocol.  A
+proposal, strongly urged, to substitute the words "resort to force" for
+the words "resort to war" was rejected.
+
+_Article 3._
+
+50. Article 3 provides for the compulsory recognition of the
+jurisdiction of the Permanent Court.  The Joint Drafting Committee
+proposed to remove this article from the Protocol, as certain
+Delegations felt it went beyond the Assembly Resolution.  The British
+Empire Delegation feared that this might result in the separation of
+the three principles--arbitration, security and disarmament.  At the
+suggestion of the British representative, therefore, the article was
+retained.  As a result of the discussions on this matter, it was
+generally agreed that the power to make reservations to article 36 of
+the Permanent Court Statute was much wider than had been at first
+believed.  It was understood that the proposed British reservation was
+within the limits admissible.
+
+_Article 4._
+
+51. Article 4 was designed to extend the system of {240} arbitration
+contained in the Covenant and to fill the existing gap in article 15 of
+the Covenant, by which the parties to a dispute recover their liberty
+of action and are entitled to resort to war if the Members of the
+Council are unable to agree upon a unanimous report.  In the
+sub-committee a strong feeling manifested itself against unanimous
+decisions of the Council being binding in cases where one party to a
+dispute, but not both, desired arbitration.  Certain of the smaller
+States, in particular, felt that such a system gave too much power to
+the Council, which was already regarded as a body which expressed only
+the will of the great Powers.
+
+52. Paragraphs 2 (_a_) and (_b_) of article 4 were drafted to avoid
+this difficulty.  Arbitration is to be compulsory at the request of one
+of the parties, and the Council is given power to appoint the arbitral
+body if the parties cannot agree as to its constitution.  A unanimous
+decision of the Council is only to be binding where none of the parties
+ask for arbitration.  If, therefore, any party wishes to avoid a
+decision by the Council, it has only to ask for arbitration.  For
+similar reasons, the words "accepted by one of the parties" were added
+after the words "decision of the Council" in paragraph 5.
+
+53. Discussions in the sub-committee revealed a divergence of view as
+to whether or not sanctions should be applied in the event of passive
+resistance to the award of the Arbitral Commission.  It was finally
+agreed that the provision contained at the end of article 13 of the
+Covenant would be sufficient to meet a case of passive resistance and
+that the sanctions of article 16 should only be applied when such
+resistance was accompanied by a resort to war (_vide_ paragraph 6 of
+article 4).
+
+54. At the request of the British representative, paragraph 7 was added
+to ensure that reservations, similar to that which the British
+Delegation considered that it would be obliged to make if the British
+Empire accepted article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court, would
+also exist in the case of the new system of compulsory arbitration.
+
+{241}
+
+_Article 5._
+
+55. Article 5 was inserted as the result of a unanimous decision of the
+sub-committee to leave untouched paragraph 8 of article 15 of the
+Covenant, which safeguards the rights of States Members in regard to
+matters of domestic jurisdiction.  The whole British Empire Delegation
+held the view that when the Arbitration Commissions were faced with
+such questions, they should be bound to refer them to the Permanent
+Court, and that the opinion of the Court should be binding.  As the
+Permanent Court itself is bound to apply international law, and
+paragraph 8 of article 15 refers to questions which by _international
+law_ are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State
+concerned, this provision ensures that a uniform rule will be applied
+by the Council, the Permanent Court and the arbitral bodies to be set
+up under the new system.
+
+56. The last sentence of article 5 was added to meet certain
+difficulties raised by the Japanese Delegation.  They pointed out that
+the second gap in the Covenant, referred to by the French Delegation
+during the general discussion, had not been filled.  On the 24th
+September, they accordingly proposed an amendment to article 5, which
+appeared to have the effect of giving the Council power, in cases
+relating to domestic jurisdiction, to recommend the parties to adopt
+some solution which would ensure a pacific settlement of the dispute.
+After the discussion in the sub-committee, the Japanese Delegation
+modified this proposal and suggested that the following words be added
+as the final paragraph of article 5:--
+
+    "The above provisions do not prejudice the duty of the Council to
+    endeavour to bring the parties to an agreement so as to ensure
+    the maintenance of peace and a good understanding between nations."
+
+
+This proposal came up before the plenary session of the First Committee
+on the 25th September.  The British Delegation asked for a postponement
+of the discussion.  Immediate steps were {242} taken to consult the
+Dominion and Indian Delegations, and in the subsequent negotiations the
+closest co-operation with them was maintained.
+
+57. It transpired that the Japanese Delegation, if they failed to
+secure acceptance of this amendment to article 5, intended to press for
+the exclusion from article 10 of the sentence at the end of paragraph 2
+(1), which included in the definition of an "aggressor" a State which
+resorted to war and disregarded a unanimous report of the Council or a
+judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognising that the dispute
+arose out of a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the other
+State concerned.  They pointed out that it was unjust that in such
+cases the League, while refusing pacific means of settlement to an
+injured State, should denounce that State as an aggressor if it took
+steps to defend its legitimate interests by force.
+
+58. The possible effect of this alternative amendment was regarded by
+many Delegations with great concern.  It would have suggested the
+legitimacy of a resort to war in connection with a dispute arising out
+of some domestic matter as to which the Council could give no help and
+make no recommendation for its solution.
+
+59. In these circumstances the British Empire Delegation was agreed
+that the best course was to endeavour to find a solution by enlarging
+article 19 of the Protocol, so as to make it clear that the existing
+power of the Council, under article 11 of the Covenant, of endeavouring
+to achieve a pacific settlement in any case where the peace of the
+world was endangered, was not prejudiced by the provisions of the
+Protocol.  Though the discussions of the matter remained very friendly
+in tone this proposal did not prove acceptable to the Japanese
+Delegation.  Accordingly, when the amendment came before the plenary
+meeting of the First Committee on the 28th September, the Japanese
+Delegation withdrew their amendment to article 5 and proposed the
+amendment to article 10.  At the suggestion of the French Delegate the
+question was referred back to the sub-committee.
+
+{243}
+
+60. Late on the 29th September the basis of solution was found.  It was
+immediately submitted to the representatives of the Dominions and
+India, and was fully considered by them at two further meetings on the
+following day.  After slight modifications the text of two amendments
+proved acceptable to the British Empire Delegation, and after being
+accepted by the Japanese and French Delegations, these amendments were
+adopted by the First Committee.  They involved the addition to the last
+sentence of article 5 of the words "this decision shall not prevent
+consideration of the situation by the Council or the Assembly under
+article 11 of the Covenant," and the addition at the end of paragraph 2
+(1) of article 10 of the words "nevertheless in the last case the State
+shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously
+submitted the question to the Council or the Assembly in accordance
+with article 11 of the Covenant."
+
+61. In the opinion of the British Empire Delegation these amendments
+conferred no new powers or functions on either the Council or the
+Assembly.  They merely served to make clear the relationship between
+paragraph 8 of article 15 and article 11 of the Covenant.  Article 11
+of the Covenant only operates in time of war or threat of war, and it
+confers no right on the Council or the Assembly to impose a solution of
+a dispute without the consent of the parties.  The Council or the
+Assembly may mediate and conciliate, but they cannot make
+recommendations which are binding under paragraph 6 of article 15 of
+the Covenant.  When these amendments were adopted at the final plenary
+meeting of the First Committee on the 30th September, the British
+representative made a statement on the above lines.  This
+interpretation proved generally acceptable, and it was agreed to
+incorporate it in the report to be submitted to the Assembly.
+
+62. At the final plenary meeting of the First Committee the British
+representative drew attention to the difficulty in which many
+Delegations were placed, in that they had had no {244} opportunity to
+consult their Governments in regard to these amendments.  The
+Delegations of Australia and several other countries thereupon stated
+that, though they accepted the texts, they could not commit their
+Governments in any way.
+
+_Article 6._
+
+63. Article 6.  When the system of compulsory arbitration, contained in
+article 4, had been established, the British representative pointed out
+that under paragraphs 9 and 10 of article 15 of the Covenant a dispute
+might still be referred to the Assembly.  Article 6 was therefore
+drafted to ensure that the provisions referring to the actions and
+powers of the Council should apply to the Assembly under the new
+system.  After considerable discussion it was decided to reserve
+questions of procedure to the Council as being a more suitable body.
+
+_Article 10._
+
+64. Article 10, which contains the definition of an aggressor, provided
+one of the most difficult tasks of the First Committee.  By the 23rd
+September a number of drafts had been considered but no satisfactory
+text had been found.  The original idea was that it should be the duty
+of the Council to determine the aggressor, but the question then arose
+as to whether, in making this decision, the Council should act
+unanimously or by majority vote.  Adherence to the unanimity rule would
+have made it possible for one State to prevent a decision being
+reached.  Procedure by a majority vote might have resulted in a State
+being obliged to apply sanctions against its own judgment.  The only
+way out of this difficulty was to avoid a decision by the Council at
+all, and to make the test of aggression automatic, when once certain
+conditions had been found to obtain.  This is achieved by establishing
+a presumption which is to hold good until the Council has made a
+unanimous decision to the contrary.  If the presumption stands it is
+considered sufficient to justify the application of sanctions.  Even
+then it was thought that there would have to be something in the nature
+of a {245} "declaration of aggression" in order to initiate the
+enforcement of sanctions, and that this declaration would have to be
+made by unanimity.  Objections were raised to this, but these
+objections were finally satisfied by the insertion of paragraph 3,
+according to which the Council, if it cannot at once determine the
+aggressor is bound, as a matter of course, to enjoin an armistice upon
+the belligerents.
+
+65. The Japanese Delegation were opposed to any presumption of
+aggression arising against a state which was involved in a dispute
+covered by paragraph 8 of article 15 of the Covenant, and found as the
+result that, though it had submitted the dispute to the Council, the
+Council were unable to make any recommendations on the subject.  To
+meet this view, the amendment previously referred to was made to
+article 5, and the words "nevertheless in the last case the State shall
+only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted
+the question to the Council or the Assembly in accordance with article
+11 of the Covenant" were added to paragraph 2 (1) of article 10.  In
+the opinion of the British Delegation, this amendment does not affect
+paragraph 3 of article 10.  If a resort to war occurs, and the Council
+cannot determine the aggressor, it is still bound to impose an
+armistice upon the belligerents.
+
+66. To the final paragraph of article 10 the words "and any signatory
+State thus called upon shall thereupon be entitled to exercise the
+rights of a belligerent" were added at the suggestion of the British
+representative.  This addition was made to safeguard the position of a
+State which, though no party to the dispute, joined in coercive
+measures to uphold the Covenant of the League and in so doing took
+forcible measures against the persons or the property of nationals of
+another State.
+
+_Article 16._
+
+67. The relations between States signatory to the Protocol and States
+non-signatory and non-members of the League presented a problem the
+solution of which required great care.  {246} The various aspects of
+the question were thoroughly examined, and it was finally agreed that
+it would be sufficient to bring the principle contained in article 17
+of the Covenant into harmony with the provisions of the Protocol.
+Sanctions can only be imposed on a State which is not a Member of the
+League if it refuses to accept the conditions and obligations of the
+Protocol when invited to do so, and resorts to war against a signatory
+State.
+
+68. The question was raised of the relationship between States Members
+of the League signatory to the Protocol and non-signatory States
+Members.  After careful examination, it was generally agreed that no
+special arrangement was necessary.  The Members of the League are bound
+_inter se_ by the Covenant and non-signatory Members are entitled, if
+they wish, to prefer the procedure laid down in the Covenant to the new
+procedure of the Protocol.
+
+_Article 18._
+
+69. Article 18 was inserted to satisfy apprehensions which had been
+expressed in certain quarters.  The British Delegation were not
+convinced of its necessity, but saw no reason to object to it.
+
+_Article 19._
+
+70. Article 19 was inserted as a saving clause.  It emphasises the
+intention to preserve the Covenant as the principal document governing
+the relations between States Members of the League.  The relations
+between signatories and non-signatories to the Protocol are still to be
+governed by the Covenant.  The Covenant is to stand, but it is to be
+enriched by the principal provisions of the Protocol.  The amended
+Covenant is intended ultimately to take the place of the separate
+régime of the Protocol.
+
+_Resolution No. 1._
+
+71. It had been originally suggested that the provisions of {247} the
+Protocol should be embodied in the form of resolutions to be submitted
+for adoption by the Assembly.  In view, however, of the fact that
+adoption of such resolutions by the Assembly might be held to commit
+the Governments there represented to the acceptance of its provisions,
+and in view of the difficulty which Delegations found in consulting
+their Governments, this proposal was found to be impracticable.  It was
+thereupon decided that the Protocol should be drawn up as a separate
+instrument, and that its acceptance should be recommended by the
+Assembly to all States Members of the League.
+
+72. The draft of a resolution on these lines, which had been drawn up
+by the British representative, was discussed by the First Committee on
+the 27th September.  Paragraph 1 recommends the acceptance of the
+Protocol.  Paragraph 2 provides that the Protocol shall be open
+immediately for signature for those representatives who were already in
+a position to sign.  This was added in view of the fact that the French
+and several other Delegations had announced their intention to sign the
+Protocol before leaving Geneva.  Paragraph 3 was inserted because it
+was felt that the drafting of amendments to the Covenant was too
+technical a matter to be done hastily.
+
+73. The remaining paragraphs of the resolution relate to the proposed
+Disarmament Conference which was dealt with by the Third Committee.
+The resolution was unanimously adopted by the Assembly on the 2nd
+October.
+
+_Resolution No. 2._
+
+74. This resolution recommends the acceptance of the obligatory
+jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The
+Hague by all Members of the League.  The discussions regarding the
+special Protocol opened for signature in virtue of article 36,
+paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court, had revealed that
+the power to make reservations was wider than had been at first
+thought.  It was therefore decided that no new Protocol was required,
+but that the power to make {248} reservations should be clearly
+recognised in the resolution of the Assembly.
+
+_M. Politis's Report._
+
+75. M. Politis's draft report on the work of the First Committee was
+presented to the Committee on the 28th September, and the discussion
+upon it lasted all day.  This draft, which was very ably drawn up, gave
+a remarkably clear and adequate account of the achievement of the First
+Committee.
+
+76. Some criticism was made by the representative of Hungary and others
+of a tendency in the report to give peace a secondary position to that
+of justice in the predominating idea of arbitration.  As a result, the
+offending passages were redrafted.
+
+77. In its final form M. Politis's report was incorporated in the
+general report submitted to the Fifth Assembly by the First and Third
+Committees.  This general report[2] was adopted unanimously by the
+Assembly on the 2nd October, and it can thus be regarded as the
+official document containing the views of the Members of the League in
+regard to the interpretation of the Protocol.
+
+
+
+III.--WORK OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE.
+
+78. The Third Committee began its deliberations on the Assembly
+resolution on arbitration, security and disarmament on the 9th
+September, under the presidency of M. Duca (Roumania) (subsequently
+replaced by M. Politis [Greece]), and the proceedings opened with a
+general discussion, which was continued until the 13th.  Lord Parmoor
+and Mr. Henderson represented the British Empire.
+
+79. After the method of procedure had been settled, a statement was
+made expressing the standpoint of the British Delegation on the
+questions of arbitration under the three heads of arbitration, court
+decisions and conciliation, and the views then expressed were
+maintained at the subsequent meetings.  A short {249} reference was
+made to the question of sanctions, but any detail was avoided in order
+to leave room for free discussion with the members of the French
+Delegation.  The note of the British Government on the Draft Treaty of
+Mutual Assistance was referred to as expressing the final view and not
+requiring any further comment.
+
+80. Most of the speakers devoted some time to a statement of the views
+of their Governments on the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, against
+which the main objections urged were the uncertainty in regard to the
+definition of aggression, the too wide discretion and powers conferred
+upon the Council and the evils attendant on the system of
+"complementary agreements" sanctioned by the Treaty.  The first defect
+might now be remedied by the extension of the system of arbitration,
+which would simplify the definition of aggression.  As regards the
+"complementary agreements," even those who recognized their harmful
+possibilities were compelled to admit that they could not be abolished
+or prevented, and that their power for evil might be lessened if they
+were controlled and brought within a general scheme of mutual
+assistance under the League.
+
+81. All the speakers were in substance agreed that the Covenant itself
+afforded the best basis for any scheme of mutual assistance; that it
+needed only to be developed and carried to its logical conclusion in
+order that it might provide an adequate basis of security.
+
+82. In summing up the debate the President observed that there appeared
+to be general agreement on the interdependence of the three problems of
+arbitration, security and disarmament, and on the point that a complete
+system could be evolved from the Covenant itself.  Everyone was
+prepared to accept the principle of economic and financial sanctions,
+though some difference might exist on the subject of military
+sanctions.  Little had been said about disarmament, which could only
+follow as a consequence of the solution of the twin problems of
+arbitration and security.
+
+{250}
+
+83. It was then agreed, on the morning of the 13th September, to
+appoint a sub-committee of representatives of twelve Delegations to
+formulate concrete proposals.
+
+84. The sub-committee, known as the Fourth Sub-Committee of the Third
+Committee, was composed as follows:--
+
+  Lord Parmoor or Mr. Henderson (British Empire).
+  M. Paul-Boncour (France).
+  M. Schanzer (Italy).
+  M. Branting (Sweden).
+  M. Benes (Czechoslovakia).
+  M. Villegas (Chile).
+  M. Kalfov (Bulgaria).
+  M. Poullet (Belgium).
+  M. Titulesco (Roumania).
+  Mr. Matsuda (Japan).
+  M. Lange (Norway).
+  M. Skrzynski (Poland).
+
+85. The sub-committee met for the first time on the afternoon of the
+13th September, under the presidency of Dr. Benes.  The first meeting
+was occupied by a discussion on procedure.  In the first instance, it
+was proposed to appoint a drafting committee of three members to draw
+up proposals, keeping in close touch with a similar committee to be
+appointed by the First Committee, but this idea was subsequently
+abandoned, and the President was requested to draw up the outline of a
+scheme, to be submitted to the sub-committee, if possible, on the 15th
+September.  This the President undertook to do, but he was only able to
+submit his proposals for the first time on the 16th September.  The
+delay was due mainly to the necessity of consulting with
+representatives of the First Committee and with certain Delegations.
+In particular, meetings were held on the 15th September between
+representatives of the French and British Delegations who went
+carefully through the scheme and reached a preliminary agreement on a
+number of points of principle.  This agreement greatly facilitated the
+eventual completion of the work.
+
+{251}
+
+86. These proposals were in the form of a draft Protocol, of which
+articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 concerned the First Committee, and have already
+been dealt with in the preceding section of this report.  The remaining
+articles, as originally proposed, may be summarised as follows:--
+
+87. _Article_ 4.--The Council or the Permanent Court may appoint
+International Control Commissions, composed of civilian and military
+experts, to ensure that during the course of the arbitral procedure
+none of the parties makes preparations for economic or military
+mobilisation.
+
+88. _Article_ 6 recommends the establishment of demilitarised zones and
+their control, if desired, by the League of Nations.
+
+89. _Article_ 7.--As soon as the declaration of aggression has been
+made, the obligations of the signatories in regard to the sanctions of
+all kinds in article 16, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Covenant will
+immediately become operative against the aggressor.  These obligations
+to be interpreted as obliging each of the Members of the League to
+co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant of the
+League and in resistance to any act of aggression.
+
+90. In accordance with article 16 of the Covenant the signatories
+undertake, individually or collectively, to come to the assistance of
+the State attacked or threatened, and to give each other mutual support
+by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as regards supplies of
+raw materials and food-stuffs of every kind, openings of credits,
+transports, transit, and for this purpose to ensure the safety of the
+land and sea communications of the attacked or threatened State.
+
+91. If both parties to the dispute are declared aggressors according to
+the above provisions, the economic sanctions to be applied to both of
+them.
+
+92. _Article_ 7A.--The Council of the League of Nations to instruct the
+Economic and Financial Committees, Temporary Mixed Commission and
+Permanent Advisory Commission to draw up (1) plans of action for
+establishing the blockade of {252} the aggressor State, and (2) plans
+of economic and financial co-operation between the State attacked and
+the different States assisting it.
+
+93. _Article_ 8.--The Council to be entitled to accept individual or
+collective undertakings entered into by States, determining in advance
+the military forces which they would immediately place at the Council's
+disposal in order to carry out the measures decided upon, in accordance
+with the preceding articles.
+
+94. When the aggressor has been designated, the signatories may, in
+accordance with undertakings previously entered into, place in the
+field the whole, or such proportion as they may consider necessary, of
+their military forces against the aggressor.
+
+95. _Article_ 8A.--In view of article 10 of the Covenant, the above
+sanctions must not include the violation of the political or
+territorial independence of the aggressor.
+
+96. _Article_ 9.--The signatories to take part as soon as possible in
+an International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments under the
+auspices of the League.  The Council to draw up the programme for this
+Conference.
+
+97. If, within a time limit of (Transcriber's note: blank space in
+source) after the coming into force of the Protocol, the Conference has
+not met, or the scheme for the reduction of armaments drawn up by it
+has not been adopted and carried out, the Council may record the fact,
+and each signatory shall regain its freedom of action.
+
+98. If, during the time limit specified above, a dispute arises, the
+provisions in the Protocol to be applicable in full.
+
+99. _Supplementary Clause_ (to be inserted in article 9).--The
+conditions in which the Council may declare that the scheme of the
+International Conference has not been carried out, shall be defined by
+the Conference itself.
+
+100. _Article_ 10.--Differences relating to the carrying out or
+interpretation of the Protocol to be submitted to the Permanent Court
+of International Justice.
+
+101. _Article_ 11.--The Protocol to be open for signature by {253} all
+States, to be ratified, and the ratifications to be deposited with the
+League.  The Protocol to come into force between the signatories
+ratifying it, as from the date of ratification.
+
+102. The sub-committee held eight meetings in all, finishing its work
+on the 22nd September.  The articles were not discussed in their
+numerical order, and a discussion of one article was often adjourned
+while the examination of another article was begun.  As it is not
+attempted here to give a full summary of the discussions, it will
+perhaps be convenient to take the articles in order and show what
+modifications were introduced.
+
+103. _Article_ 4.--Objection was raised to this article, mainly on the
+ground that it gave the Council or the Permanent Court too wide powers
+of interference, and introduced the idea of a "super-State."  After
+consultation with other Delegations, the British Delegation produced an
+alternative draft which was adopted, and which was substantially
+embodied in the eventual Protocol itself (becoming article 7).  The
+only essential difference between this draft and the eventual text was
+that the former provided, in paragraph 2, that the investigations
+should be carried out "by the organisation set up by the Conference for
+the Reduction of Armaments to ensure respect for the decisions of that
+Conference.
+
+104. _Article_ 6.--Words were inserted to the effect that demilitarised
+zones were recommended "as a means of avoiding violations of the
+present Protocol."  They were to be placed under the supervision of the
+Council at the request "and at the expense" of one or more of the
+conterminous States.
+
+105. _Article_ 7.--There was considerable discussion on the first
+paragraph, and some demand for a distinction to be drawn, as in the
+Covenant, between economic and financial sanctions on the one hand, and
+military sanctions on the other.  It was, however, explained that the
+proposed definition of the aggressor had produced a clearer situation,
+in which there was no reason why the application of sanctions of all
+kinds under article 16 of the Covenant should not be justified.  It was
+pointed out that the {254} wording of this first paragraph was
+illogical.  The "obligations" could not "become operative against an
+aggressor."  Accordingly, it was agreed to substitute the words "the
+obligations will immediately come into force in order that the
+sanctions provided may immediately become operative."  The paragraph
+was then passed with the above amendment.
+
+106. Exception was taken to the words in the third paragraph "undertake
+individually or collectively to come to the assistance."  It might
+prove difficult to evolve collective plans, and it was agreed, on the
+proposal of the British Delegate, to substitute the words "give a joint
+and several undertaking to."
+
+107. In the same paragraph the use of the expression "to ensure the
+safety of the land and sea communications of the attacked or threatened
+State" was questioned in the first place, because it seemed that it
+might imply naval or military operations.  In reply, it was pointed out
+that the words in the same sentence "for this purpose" showed that this
+paragraph related solely to economic and financial sanctions.  In the
+second place the word "ensure" was objected to, on the score that to
+undertake to ensure communications might be to undertake an
+impossibility.  Finally, the words "take measures to preserve the
+safety of communications" were substituted.  It was further pointed out
+that these provisions were to be applied to protect an attacked or
+threatened State and that a similar distinction was expressly contained
+in the Covenant.
+
+108. _Article_ 7A.--The British Delegation desired a redraft of this
+article, taking exception in particular to sub-paragraph (1), in which
+the word "blockade" seemed to suggest belligerent naval action.  They
+at first suggested omitting all words after "Council of the League of
+Nations" and substituting "shall, as soon as possible after the
+Protocol has been ratified, take steps to ascertain from each of the
+signatories what organisation or legislation is necessary to give
+effect to the economic and financial sanctions."  An alternative
+suggestion from another quarter was to substitute the words "putting
+into force the economic and {255} financial sanctions against" for the
+words "establishing the blockade of" in sub-paragraph (1).  It was
+agreed to combine both amendments--to adopt the British text above, and
+to begin a second paragraph with the words "When in possession of this
+information the Council shall draw up, through its competent organs:
+(1) plans of action for the application of the economic and financial
+sanctions of article 16 of the Covenant against an aggressor State," &c.
+
+109. Later, the British Delegation proposed to redraft the first
+paragraph in the form in which it finally appears in the Protocol
+(having become article 12), to delete the remainder, and to substitute
+"It shall communicate this report to the members of the League and to
+the other signatories."  The redraft of the first paragraph was
+accepted, but it was decided to allow the second paragraph to stand, as
+amended above.
+
+110. _Article_ 8.--The British Delegation had objections to raise
+against both paragraphs of this article.  In the first paragraph they
+objected to the words "place at the Council's disposal," and the second
+paragraph they regarded as an attempt to revert to what was the
+operative principle of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance.
+
+111. They suggested as an alternative text:--
+
+    "Having regard to the fact that military sanctions are foreseen in
+    article 16 of the Covenant, the Council may receive undertakings
+    from States fixing in advance the military forces which they would
+    be willing to employ against a Member of the League which was
+    declared to be an aggressor.
+
+    "In view of the right of Members of the League to enter into such
+    arrangements with the Council, no agreement shall in future be
+    concluded between States Members of the League, providing for
+    military action to be taken by them."
+
+112. It became evident that the sub-committee could not be induced to
+accept the second paragraph of this alternative text, and it was
+accordingly withdrawn.  Exception was also taken {256} to the words in
+the first paragraph, "against a Member of the League," &c., and it was
+agreed to substitute the words, "to ensure the fulfilment of the
+obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the Covenant and
+the present Protocol."
+
+113. The French Delegation then proposed that the article should read:--
+
+    "In view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions
+    provided for in article 16 of the Covenant, and article 7 of the
+    present Protocol, the Council shall be entitled to receive
+    undertakings entered into by States determining in advance the
+    military, naval and air forces which they would bring into
+    action immediately to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations
+    in regard to sanctions which result from the Covenant and the
+    present Protocol.
+
+    "When the aggressor is designated, the signatory States may,
+    moreover, place in the field, in accordance with agreements
+    previously entered into, the whole or such part of their
+    military, naval and air forces as they may consider necessary
+    for the assistance of a State which shall have been the victim
+    of aggression.
+
+    "The obligations of the second paragraph shall be duly
+    registered and published by the League of Nations, and shall
+    remain open for adherence by any State Member of the League
+    which so desires."
+
+114. It was the right of States, as the matter then stood, to enter
+into special agreements with one another for determining in advance the
+military, naval and air forces which they would bring to the assistance
+of one another under the conditions indicated.  Under the Protocol,
+these special agreements would only come into force when the Council
+had decided which State is the aggressor: they would simply provide
+means for applying rapidly the sanctions prescribed in the Covenant and
+the Protocol.
+
+115. Before, however, agreeing to this text a statement was made on
+behalf of the British Delegation, expressing regret that the
+sub-committee had not seen its way to make the Protocol an instrument
+whereby the League would only act as a whole.  It was, however,
+recognised that the last paragraph introduced {257} an improvement, as,
+if separate agreements must exist, it would be better that they should
+be registered with the League.  "But that does not alter the fact that
+you are making provision on the face of a new document for that which
+has been turned down in connection with the Draft Treaty of Mutual
+Assistance."  Further opposition to the draft article was not pressed,
+but the British Delegation made known their desire that words should be
+recorded expressing regret that the League was not to act as a whole,
+and to set its face "like flint against anything like the old balance
+of power by allowing these regional pacts to go on under this new
+instrument."  The above text was then adopted.
+
+116. _Article_ 8A.--The British Delegation proposed that the article
+should read: "Shall not affect the territorial integrity or political
+independence of the aggressor State."  This was agreed to, and it was
+also decided to prefix a paragraph relating to the costs of military,
+naval or air operations, similar to article 10 of the Draft Treaty of
+Mutual Assistance.
+
+117. _Article_ 9.--Objection was raised by the British Delegation to
+the last paragraph of article 9, and they moved that the following be
+substituted:--
+
+    "The provisions of the present Protocol in regard to arbitration
+    and sanctions shall come into force when the scheme for the
+    reduction of armaments, drawn up by the International Conference,
+    has been effectively carried out in accordance with the
+    conditions fixed by the Conference itself."
+
+118. The French Delegation maintained strongly that the Protocol must
+be brought into operation before the International Conference could
+meet.  The British Delegation offered a compromise with the suggestion
+that their Government might sign the Protocol, and ask Parliament to
+approve it before the Conference met.  But preparatory arrangements for
+the Conference should go on concurrently.  Directly agreement was
+reached by the Conference, ratifications could 'be deposited.  As this
+failed to meet the views of the French Delegation, the British {258}
+Delegation made a final proposal whereby endeavours should be made to
+secure ratification and deposit of ratifications before the Conference
+met, provided the Protocol itself contained a provision to the effect
+that it should only become operative when the International Conference
+reached a conclusion.  The French Delegation indicated their
+willingness in principle to accept this, but wished to consider an
+actual text.
+
+119. At the next meeting the Chairman submitted the following version:--
+
+    "The undersigned Members of the League of Nations undertake to
+    participate in an International Conference for the Reduction of
+    Armaments which shall be convened by the Council of the League
+    and shall meet at Geneva on Monday, the 15th June, 1925.  States
+    not Members of the League of Nations shall be invited to this
+    Conference.
+
+    "The ratifications of the present Protocol shall be deposited
+    with the Secretariat of the League of Nations at the latest by
+    the 1st May, 1925.  If at least fifteen Members of the League,
+    of which four are permanently represented on the Council, have
+    not deposited their ratification by the 1st, May 1925, the
+    Secretary-General of the League shall cancel the invitations.
+
+    "The entry into force of the present Protocol shall be
+    suspended until a plan for the reduction of armaments has been
+    adopted by the Conference.
+
+    "With a view to the summoning of the latter, the Council,
+    taking into account the undertakings contained in articles 7
+    and 8 of the present Protocol, will prepare a general programme
+    for the reduction of armaments which will be placed at the
+    disposal of the Conference.
+
+    "If, within a period of (Transcriber's note: blank space in source)
+    after the adoption of the plan for the reduction of armaments,
+    that plan has not been carried out, the Council shall make a
+    declaration to that effect; this declaration shall under the
+    present Protocol be null and void.
+
+    "The grounds on which the Council may declare that the plan drawn
+    up by the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments
+    has not been carried out, and that in consequence the present
+    {259}
+    rendered null and void, shall be laid down by the Conference
+    itself.
+
+    "A signatory State which, after the expiration of the period
+    fixed above, fails to comply with the plan adopted by the
+    Conference, shall not be admitted to benefit by the application
+    of sanctions provided in the present Protocol."
+
+120. The sub-committee adopted a proposal to add to the third paragraph
+"and communicated to Governments two months previously."  In view of
+representations made by the Japanese Delegation, this was subsequently
+altered to "and communicated to Governments at the earliest possible
+date, and at the latest three months before the Conference meets."
+
+121. The Swedish Delegation proposed that a clause should be added to
+the effect that "the present Protocol in no way effects obligations
+arising out of the Covenant."  It was agreed that a clause to this
+effect could be either added or inserted as a separate article.  The
+latter alternative was eventually adopted (see article 19 of the final
+Protocol).
+
+122. After some discussion, the number of ratifications required in
+paragraph 2 of this article was finally fixed as now provided in the
+Protocol (see paragraph 4 of article 21 of the final Protocol).
+
+(N. B.--The Joint Drafting Committee of the First and Third Committees
+made a final revise of the whole text, with a view to checking the
+wording of the various articles, their logical arrangement, &c.  In the
+course of this work they removed paragraphs 3, 5, 6 and 7 of this
+article and incorporated them in the "ratification" article of the
+final Protocol--No. 21.)
+
+123. _Article_ 10.--The British Delegation proposed the suppression of
+the words "carrying out."  It was decided to consult the First
+Committee on this point.  (The words are omitted in the final Protocol.)
+
+124. _Article_ 11.--In view of the new text of article 9, it was
+decided to omit the second paragraph of this article.
+
+125. This concluded the work of the sub-committee, and {260} the text
+of the above articles of the Protocol were submitted to the Third
+Committee on the 22nd September.
+
+Dr. Benes, as chairman and _rapporteur_ of the sub-committee, made a
+general report on the sub-committee's work, and it was then agreed to
+discuss the articles seriatim.
+
+126. On _Article_ 4 a debate ensued on an objection raised by the
+Italian Delegation to the proposal that investigations should be
+carried out by the organisation to be set up by the International
+Conference.  In the first place, they disliked the idea of a permanent
+organ of investigation--they considered that, if an investigation were
+necessary, this should be carried out by a special body appointed for
+the purpose if and when the occasion arose.  In the second place, they
+suggested that it would be improper to anticipate, in the Protocol, any
+decision that the International Conference might take.  The British
+Delegation explained that this proposal had been inserted in their
+draft merely as a matter of convenience: thinking that it would be
+necessary for the Conference to appoint some body to ensure that the
+decisions of the Conference were carried out, it had seemed to them
+that it would be only duplicating labour for any other body to be set
+up by the Council to carry out these special investigations.  The
+Italian Delegation finally suggested that the text should run, "such
+enquiries and investigations shall be carried out with the utmost
+possible despatch, and the signatory States undertake to afford every
+facility for carrying them out."  This was accepted, with the
+consequential amendment to the fourth paragraph, which should now
+begin: "If, as a result of these enquiries and investigations, any
+infraction," &c.  The article thus adopted became article 7 of the
+final Protocol.
+
+127. _Articles_ 5 _and_ 6 were adopted without modification, becoming
+articles 10 and 9 respectively of the final Protocol.
+
+128. _Article_ 7.--Owing to a change introduced by the First Committee
+in the text of article 5, in consequence of which it was no longer
+incumbent on the Council to make a declaration of aggression, it became
+necessary to alter the wording of the beginning of article 7.  It was
+decided that this should run, "As {261} soon as the Council has called
+upon the signatory States to apply sanctions against the aggressor
+State, in accordance with article 6, the obligations," &c.
+
+129. In paragraph 2 the words "signatory States" were substituted for
+"Members of the League."
+
+130. The article as a whole came in for some criticism, mainly from the
+Netherlands and Scandinavian Delegations.  Certain remarks made by Dr.
+Benes in introducing the text to the Third Committee had caused
+misgivings to those Delegations, who wished to be assured that the
+obligations in this article did not go beyond those of article 16 of
+the Covenant.  They observed, as had members of the sub-committee, that
+the distinction drawn in the Covenant between economic and financial
+sanctions on the one hand, and military, naval and aerial sanctions on
+the other, had disappeared from the present text, and they sought a
+clear declaration that no fresh obligations were incurred in regard to
+the latter category, and that each Member of the League retained the
+right to decide its own course of action.  In the course of his reply
+Dr. Benes said, "the real application of the sanctions will always be
+within the province of the Government themselves, and true co-operation
+will always take place by direct contract between the Governments."
+The Danish Delegation were not entirely satisfied, and moved to alter
+the second paragraph so as to make it read, "co-operate loyally and
+effectively in the carrying out of the obligations provided for in
+article 16 of the Covenant."  After consultation with the _rapporteur_,
+they abandoned this amendment, and declared themselves satisfied with
+the addition to paragraph 2 of the words, "in the degree which its
+geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments
+allow."  As thus amended, the article was adopted, and became article
+11 of the final Protocol.
+
+131. _Article_ 7A was adopted without amendment, becoming article 12 of
+the final Protocol.
+
+132. _Article_ 8.--The change, referred to above, in the text of
+article 5, rendered necessary an alteration in the wording of the
+second paragraph of this article, which it was agreed should {262}
+begin: "Furthermore, as soon as the Council has called upon the
+signatory States to apply sanctions, as provided," &c.
+
+133. In the same paragraph it was decided to omit the words, "the whole
+or such part of," and make it read, "bring to the assistance of a
+particular State, which is the victim of aggression, their military,
+naval and air forces."  With these modifications, the article was
+adopted, and became article 13 of the final Protocol.
+
+134. _Article_ 8A was adopted, and figures as article 15 in the final
+Protocol.  It was suggested that an addition should be made to this
+article to the effect that "the Council shall alone be competent to
+declare that the application of sanctions shall cease and normal
+conditions be re-established."  The Committee decided that this should
+be inserted as a separate article, and it appears in the final Protocol
+as article 14.
+
+135. _Articles_ 9 _and_ 10 were adopted without modification, article 9
+being embodied, as explained, in articles 17 and 21 of the final
+Protocol, and article 10 becoming article 20.
+
+136. The text of an additional article (which became article 19 of the
+final Protocol) was also approved.
+
+After the work of the First and Third Committees had been concluded,
+the reports of these Committees were submitted as a whole to the
+Assembly.  The Assembly unanimously, with the assent of every
+Delegation represented at that time in the Assembly, approved the
+reports so presented them, and passed the resolutions, the text of
+which has already been published.[3]
+
+  We are,
+      Sir,
+
+  Your obedient servants,
+    ARTHUR HENDERSON.
+    PARMOOR.
+    GILBERT MURRAY.
+    CECIL J. B. HURST.
+
+  The Right. Hon.
+    J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, M. P.,
+      &c. &c. &c.
+
+
+
+[1] Miscellaneous No. 13 (1924), Cmd. 2200.
+
+[2] See Annex C, p. 156.
+
+[3] See Annex D, p. 210.
+
+
+
+
+{263}
+
+ANNEX F.
+
+PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN GROUP.[1]
+
+DECLARATION OUTLAWING AGGRESSIVE WAR.
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+OUTLAWRY OF AGGRESSIVE WAR.
+
+ARTICLE 1.--The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that
+aggressive war is an international crime.  They severally undertake not
+to be guilty of its commission.
+
+ARTICLE 2.--A State engaging in war for other than purposes of defense
+commits the international crime described in Article 1.
+
+ARTICLE 3.--The Permanent Court of International Justice shall have
+jurisdiction, on the complaint of any signatory, to make a judgment to
+the effect that the international crime described in Article 1 has or
+has not in any given case been committed.
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+ACTS OF AGGRESSION.
+
+ARTICLE 4.--The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that acts of
+aggression, even when not amounting to a state of war, and preparations
+for such acts of aggression, are hereafter to be deemed forbidden by
+international law.
+
+{264}
+
+ARTICLE 5.--In the absence of a state of war, measures of force by
+land, by sea or in the air taken by one State against another and not
+taken for the purpose of defense against aggression or for the
+protection of human life shall be deemed to be acts of aggression.
+
+General or partial mobilisation may be deemed to be preparation for an
+act of aggression.
+
+Any signatory which claims that another signatory has violated any of
+the terms of this Declaration shall submit its case to the Permanent
+Court of International Justice.
+
+A signatory refusing to accept the jurisdiction of the Court in any
+such case shall be deemed an aggressor within the terms of this
+Declaration.
+
+Failure to accept the jurisdiction of the Court within four days after
+notification of submission of a claim of violation of this Declaration
+shall be deemed a refusal to accept the jurisdiction.
+
+ARTICLE 6.--The Court shall also have jurisdiction on the complaint of
+any signatory to make a judgment to the effect that there has or has
+not in any given case been committed a violation of international law
+within the terms of Article 4.
+
+ARTICLE 7.--The Court shall, in any case, have the power to indicate,
+if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures
+which ought to be taken to reserve the respective rights of either
+party.
+
+Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall
+forthwith be given to the parties.
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+SANCTIONS.
+
+ARTICLE 8.--In the event of any H.C.P. having been adjudged an
+aggressor pursuant to this Declaration, all commercial, trade,
+financial and property interests of the aggressor shall cease to be
+entitled, either in the territory of the other signatories or on {265}
+the high seas, to any privileges, protection, rights or immunities
+accorded by either international law, national law or treaty.
+
+Any H.C.P. may in such case take such steps towards the severence of
+trade, financial, commercial and personal intercourse with the
+aggressor and its nationals as it may deem proper and the H.C.P. may
+also consult together in this regard.
+
+The period during which any such economic sanction may be continued
+shall be fixed at any time by the Court at the request of any signatory.
+
+In the matter of measures of force to be taken, each signatory shall
+consult its own interests and obligations.
+
+ARTICLE 9.--If any H.C.P. shall be adjudged an aggressor by the
+Permanent Court of International Justice, such Power shall be liable
+for all damage to all other H.C.P. resulting from its aggression.
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+DECREES OF THE PERMANENT COURT.
+
+ARTICLE 10.--The H.C.P. agree to accept the judgment of the Permanent
+Court of International Justice as to the fulfilment of violation of the
+contracts of this Declaration.
+
+Any question arising under this Declaration is _ipso facto_ within the
+jurisdiction of the Court.
+
+ARTICLE 11.--If a dispute arising under this Declaration shall be
+submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice, it is for
+the Court to decide as to its jurisdiction and also whether or not its
+decree has been complied with.
+
+ARTICLE 12.--The High Contracting Parties, recognising that excessive
+armaments constitute a menace of war, agree to participate in the
+Permanent Advisory Conference on Disarmament decided upon by the Fifth
+Assembly of the League of Nations.
+
+ARTICLE 13.--The present Declaration shall be ratified.  The
+ratifications shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Secretary
+General of the League of Nations.
+
+{266}
+
+Any signatory to this Declaration desiring to withdraw therefrom may
+give notice thereof to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.
+Such notice shall take effect one year from the date of deposit thereof
+and only as to the signatory so withdrawing.
+
+Notice of each ratification and of each withdrawal shall be
+communicated by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to each
+signatory hereto.
+
+
+
+RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE DECLARATION OUTLAWING AGGRESSIVE WAR.
+
+1. The Assembly unanimously declares its approval of the Declaration
+Outlawing Aggressive War which was prepared by the Third Committee of
+the Assembly and submitted to the Assembly for its approval.
+
+2. The said Declaration shall be submitted within the shortest possible
+time to the Members of the League of Nations for adoption in the form
+of a protocol duly ratified and declaring their recognition of this
+Declaration.  It shall be the duty of the Council to submit the
+Declaration to the Members.
+
+The said protocol shall likewise remain open for signature by States
+not Members of the League of Nations.
+
+3. As soon as this protocol has been ratified by the majority of the
+Members of the League the said Declaration shall go into force.
+
+
+
+DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION "A."
+
+1. The Assembly, having considered the Report of the Temporary Mixed
+Commission and having also considered the replies of the various
+Governments commenting on the proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance,
+reaffirms the principles set forth in Resolution 14 of the Third
+Assembly,
+
+2. Furthermore, the Assembly is of the opinion that all the {267}
+Nations of the world, whether or not Members of the League of Nations,
+should agree
+
+    a. to limit or reduce their armaments to the basis necessary
+    for the maintenance of peace and national security.
+
+    b. to study the ways and means for future reduction of
+    armaments either as between all Nations or as between any
+    two of them.
+
+3. The Assembly is further of the opinion that reciprocal agreements
+between two or more neighbouring countries for the establishment of
+demilitarised zones would facilitate the security necessary to
+progressive disarmament.
+
+4. In order to facilitate the reduction and limitation of armaments,
+the Assembly requests the Council to call a Permanent Advisory
+Conference upon disarmament which shall meet periodically at intervals
+of not less than once every three years.
+
+Invitations to participate in this Permanent Conference shall be sent
+to all Nations whether Members of the League or not.
+
+The said Conference should from time to time consider the further
+codifying of the principles of international law particularly in
+relation to acts of aggression and preparations for such acts.
+
+In this regard the Conference should take into account matters bearing
+upon the security of the Powers represented and the steps taken toward
+disarmament.
+
+The recommendations of the Conference shall be submitted to the Powers
+for their adoption, and shall also be transmitted to the Permanent
+Court of International Justice.
+
+The said Conference should publish periodical reports concerning the
+actual conditions of the armaments of the Powers.
+
+The said Conference should advise the Powers concerning measures to be
+taken to ensure the carrying out of the principles of the present
+Resolution and it may prepare draft treaties for the establishment of
+demilitarised zones and for the further promotion of disarmament and
+peace.
+
+{268}
+
+5. The said Conference should appoint a Permanent Technical Committee.
+
+6. The said Conference or its Permanent Technical Committee should give
+advice on technical questions to the Permanent Court of International
+Justice at the request of said Court.
+
+7. The expenses of the said Conference and of its agencies should be
+borne by the Powers in the proportion of their respective budgets for
+defense.
+
+
+
+DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION "B."
+
+1. Considering that by the terms of Article 8 of the Covenant of the
+League of Nations
+
+    "The Members of the League undertake to interchange full
+    and frank information as to the scale of their armaments,
+    their military, naval and air programmes and the condition
+    of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike
+    purposes,"
+
+the Assembly, in order to facilitate the carrying out of the said
+engagement, requests the Council to set up a Commission charged with
+the duty of making the necessary official examinations and reports.
+
+2. The said Commission shall proceed under such regulations as the
+Council and the Assembly shall from time to time approve.
+
+3. Subject to such regulations the members of the Commission shall be
+entitled, when they deem it desirable, to proceed to any point within
+the territory of any Member of the League or to send sub-commissions or
+to authorize one or more of their members so to proceed on behalf of
+the Commission.
+
+4. The Members of the League will give all necessary facilities to the
+said Commission in the performance of its duties.
+
+5. All reports made by the said Commission shall be communicated to the
+Members of the League.
+
+
+
+{269}
+
+DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION "C."
+
+The Assembly, taking account of the provisions of the Declaration
+Outlawing Aggressive War, is of opinion
+
+1. Powers which have ratified the said Declaration may, subject to the
+following provisions, conclude, either as between two of them or as
+between a larger number, agreements complementary to the said
+Declaration, exclusively for the purpose of their mutual defense and
+intended solely to facilitate the carrying out of the measures
+prescribed in said Declaration, determining in advance the assistance
+which they would give to each other in the event of any act of
+aggression.
+
+Such agreements may, if the H.C.P. interested so desire, be negotiated
+and concluded under the auspices of the Council.
+
+2. Complementary agreements as defined in the preceding paragraph,
+shall, before being registered, be examined by the Council with a view
+to deciding whether they are in accordance with the principles of said
+Declaration and of the Covenant.
+
+In particular, the Council shall consider if the cases of aggression
+contemplated in these agreements are of a nature to give rise to an
+obligation to give assistance on the part of the other H.C.P.
+
+The Council may, if necessary, suggest changes in the texts of the
+agreements submitted to it.
+
+When recognised, the agreements shall be registered in conformity with
+Article 16 of the Covenant.  They shall be regarded as complementary to
+the said Declaration and shall in no way limit the general obligations
+of the H.C.P. nor the sanctions contemplated against an aggressor under
+the terms of said Declaration.
+
+They will be open to any other H.C.P., Party to said Declaration with
+the consent of the Signatory States.
+
+3. In all cases of aggression, for which provision is made in the
+agreement constituting a defensive group, the H.C.P. which are members
+of such group may undertake to put into operation {270} automatically
+the plan of assistance agreed upon between them; and in all other cases
+of aggression or menace or danger of aggression, directly aimed at
+them, they will consult each other before taking action, and will
+inform the Council of the measures which they are contemplating.
+
+4. The Council, taking into account the reports and opinions of the
+Commission set up under Resolution B of this Assembly, shall at any
+time when requested, consider summarily whether (a) the armaments of
+any State are in excess of those fixed under the provisions of any
+agreement relating to reduction or limitation or armaments; or (b) the
+military or other preparations of any State are of such a nature as to
+cause apprehension of aggression or an eventual outbreak of hostilities.
+
+5. If the Council shall upon such request be of the opinion that there
+is reasonable ground for thinking that a menace of aggression has
+arisen, the parties to the defensive agreements hereinbefore mentioned
+may put into immediate execution the plan of assistance which they have
+agreed upon.
+
+6. If the Council shall, upon such request, not be of the opinion that
+a menace of aggression has arisen, a public report to the effect shall
+be made and in such case no State shall be under any obligation to put
+into execution any plan of assistance to which it is a party; but any
+Member of the League, believing itself to be threatened with a menace
+of aggression, notwithstanding the fact that the Council has not been
+of such opinion, may forthwith notify the Council to that effect, and
+such Member shall thereupon have full liberty of action in military or
+other preparations for defense, subject, however, to the limitations as
+to armament which are imposed by any treaty now in force.
+
+
+
+[1] In their earlier form, as a Draft Treaty of Disarmament and
+Security, these proposals were circulated to the Members of the Council
+of the League in June, 1924.  For the text, see World Peace Foundation
+Pamphlets, Vol. VII, No. 8.  In the form here printed, the so-called
+"American Plan" was given out at Geneva on August 29, 1924, with the
+following note by General Bliss, Professor Shotwell and myself:
+
+"It has been suggested that the proposals of the Draft Treaty of
+Disarmament and Security prepared by the American Group, of which we
+are members, might be drawn up in some form other than that of one
+Treaty.
+
+"In order to facilitate the examination of this suggestion, we have
+prepared the four draft papers which follow.  These papers are a Draft
+Declaration Outlawing Aggressive War (with a Draft Assembly Resolution
+regarding the same) and three Draft Resolutions of the Assembly
+regarding Disarmament.
+
+"Aside from the necessary drafting changes required by the change of
+form, the text of these papers is substantially, and except in a few
+instances, literally the same as that of the Draft Treaty of
+Disarmament and Security above mentioned."
+
+
+
+
+{271}
+
+ANNEX G.
+
+THE COVENANT
+
+OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
+
+
+INCORPORATING THE PROVISIONS OF THE
+
+PROTOCOL OF GENEVA.[1]
+
+[Sidenote: Two clauses added from the Preamble to the Protocol.]
+
+Recognising the solidarity of the members of the international
+community, and
+
+Asserting that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this
+solidarity and an international crime,
+
+THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
+
+In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve
+international peace and security
+
+    by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,
+
+    by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations
+    between nations,
+
+    by the firm establishment of the understandings of international
+    law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and
+
+    by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all
+    treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with
+    one another,
+
+Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.
+
+
+Articles 1 to 11, Inclusive.
+
+Unchanged.
+
+
+Article 11a.
+
+[Sidenote: Article 2 of the Protocol with verbal changes.]
+
+The Members of the League agree in no case to resort to war either with
+one another or against a State which, if the occasion arises, accepts
+all the obligations of the Covenant, except in case of resistance to
+acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the Council or the
+Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant.
+
+
+{272}
+
+Article 12.
+
+[Sidenote: Phrase agreeing not to resort to war for three months,
+omitted as unnecessary.]
+
+The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them
+any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter
+either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the
+Council.
+
+In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the
+judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the
+report of the Council shall be made within six months after the
+submission of the dispute.
+
+
+Article 13.
+
+The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise
+between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to
+arbitration or judicial settlement, and which cannot be satisfactorily
+settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to
+arbitration or judicial settlement.
+
+Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of
+international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if
+established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation,
+or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any
+such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally
+suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement.
+
+[Sidenote: A verbal change in the third paragraph.]
+
+For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case
+is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, or
+any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in
+any convention existing between them.
+
+The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good
+faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they will
+not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies
+therewith.  In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or
+decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give
+effect thereto.
+
+
+Article 14.
+
+[Sidenote: Article 14 of the Covenant, verbally changed.]
+
+The Permanent Court of International Justice shall be competent to hear
+and determine any dispute of an international character which the
+parties thereto submit to it.  The Court may also give an advisory
+opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or
+by the Assembly.
+
+[Sidenote: Article 3 of the Protocol, with some words added.]
+
+The Members of the League undertake to recognize as compulsory, _ipso
+facto_ and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Permanent
+Court of International Justice in the cases covered by paragraph 2 of
+Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, but without prejudice to the
+right of any Member, when acceding to the special protocol provided for
+in the said Article and opened for signature on December 16th, 1920, to
+make reservations compatible with the said clause.
+
+{273}
+
+Accession to this special protocol, opened for signature on December
+16th, 1920, must be given within a month after the coming into force
+hereof, and in the case of Members of the League hereafter admitted,
+within a month after such admission.
+
+[Sidenote: Article 20 of the Protocol.]
+
+Any dispute as to the interpretation of the Covenant shall be submitted
+to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
+
+
+Article 15.
+
+[Sidenote: The first three paragraphs of Article 15 of the Covenant,
+unchanged.]
+
+If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely
+to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial
+settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League
+agree that they will submit the matter to the Council.  Any party to
+the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the
+existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all
+necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration
+thereof.
+
+For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the
+Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case
+with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith
+direct the publication thereof.
+
+The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and,
+if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving
+such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of
+settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.
+
+[Sidenote: Numbers 1 and 2 of Article 4 of the Protocol, very slightly
+changed.]
+
+If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council shall endeavour to
+persuade the parties to submit the dispute to judicial settlement or
+arbitration.
+
+If the parties cannot agree to do so, there shall, at the request of at
+least one of the parties, be constituted a Committee of Arbitrators.
+The Committee shall so far as possible be constituted by agreement
+between the parties.
+
+If within the period fixed by the Council the parties have failed to
+agree, in whole or in part, upon the number, the names and the powers
+of the arbitrators and upon the procedure, the Council shall settle the
+points remaining in suspense.  The Council shall with the utmost
+possible dispatch select in consultation with the parties the
+arbitrators and their President from among persons who by their
+nationality, their personal character and their experience, appear to
+furnish the highest guarantees of competence and impartiality.
+
+After the claims of the parties have been formulated, the Committee of
+Arbitrators, on the request of any party, shall through the medium of
+the Council, request an advisory opinion upon any points of law in
+dispute from the Permanent Court of International Justice, which in
+such case shall meet with the utmost possible dispatch.
+
+{274}
+
+[Sidenote: 3 of Article 4 of the Protocol, and the fourth, fifth and
+sixth paragraphs of Article 15 of the Covenant]
+
+If none of the parties asks for arbitration, the Council shall take the
+dispute under consideration and, either unanimously or by a majority
+vote, shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the
+facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and
+proper in regard thereto.
+
+Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a
+statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding
+the same.
+
+If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the Members
+thereof, other than the Representatives of any of the parties to the
+dispute, the Members of the League agree to comply with the
+recommendations of the report.
+
+[Sidenote: 5 of Article 4 of the Protocol, with verbal changes.  Eighth
+paragraph of Article 15 of the Covenant.]
+
+In no case may a solution, in accordance with a unanimous
+recommendation of the Council accepted by one of the parties concerned,
+be again called in question.
+
+If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is
+found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by international
+law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the
+Council shall so report and shall make no recommendation as to its
+settlement.
+
+[Sidenote: Seventh paragraph of Article 15 of the Covenant, as modified
+by 4 of Article 4 of the Protocol.]
+
+If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to
+by the Members thereof, other than the Representatives of any of the
+parties to the dispute, it shall submit the dispute to arbitration.
+
+The Council shall itself determine the composition, the powers and the
+procedure of the Committee of Arbitrators and, in the choice of the
+arbitrators, shall bear in mind the guarantees of competence and
+impartiality referred to above.
+
+[Sidenote: 6 of Article 4 of the Protocol, omitting clauses now
+unnecessary.]
+
+The Members of the League undertake that they will carry out in full
+good faith any judicial sentence or arbitral award that may be rendered
+and that they will comply, as provided in paragraph ten hereof, with
+the solutions recommended by the Council.  In the event of a Member of
+the League failing to carry out the above undertakings, the Council
+shall exert all its influence to secure compliance therewith.  If the
+Council fails therein, it shall propose what steps should be taken to
+give effect thereto.
+
+[Sidenote: Paragraphs nine and ten of Article 15 of the Covenant, and
+Article 6 of the Protocol.]
+
+The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the
+Assembly.  The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either
+party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within
+fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.
+
+In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this
+Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the
+Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided
+that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the
+Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the
+Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive
+in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the {275}
+dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred
+in by all the Members thereof, other than the Representatives of any of
+the parties to the dispute; and provided further that in any case
+referred to the Assembly, the powers of the Council under paragraphs
+five, six, seven and fourteen hereof shall continue.
+
+[Sidenote: 7 of Article 4 of the Protocol.]
+
+The provisions of this article do not apply to the settlement of
+disputes which arise as the result of measures of war taken by one or
+more Members of the League in agreement with the Council or the
+Assembly.
+
+
+Article 15a.
+
+[Sidenote: From Article 5 of the Protocol.]
+
+If in the course of an arbitration, such as is contemplated in Article
+15, one of the parties claims that the dispute, or part thereof, arises
+out of a matter which by international law is solely within the
+domestic jurisdiction of that party, the arbitrators shall on this
+point take the advice of the Permanent Court of International Justice
+through the medium of the Council.  The opinion of the Court shall be
+binding upon the arbitrators, who, if the opinion is affirmative, shall
+confine themselves to so declaring in their award.
+
+If the question is held by the Court or by the Council to be a matter
+solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, this decision
+shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the Council or by
+the Assembly under Article 11.
+
+
+Article 15b.
+
+[Sidenote: Articles 8 and 7 of the Protocol, slightly changed.]
+
+The Members of the League undertake to abstain from any act which might
+constitute a threat of aggression against another State.
+
+If a Member of the League is of opinion that another State is making
+preparations for war, it shall have the right to bring the matter to
+the notice of the Council.
+
+In the event of a dispute arising between two or more Members of the
+League, they agree that they will not, either before the dispute is
+submitted to proceedings for pacific settlement or during such
+proceedings, make any increase of their armaments or effectives which
+might modify the position established by any agreement in force, nor
+will they take any measure of military, naval, air, industrial or
+economic mobilisation, nor, in general, any action of a nature likely
+to extend the dispute or render it more acute.
+
+It shall be the duty of the Council, in accordance with the provisions
+of Article 11, to take under consideration any complaint as to
+infraction of the above undertakings which is made to it by one or more
+of the parties to the dispute.  Should the Council be of opinion that
+the complaint requires investigation, it shall, if it deems it
+expedient, arrange for inquiries and investigations in one or more of
+the countries concerned.  Such inquiries and investigations shall be
+carried out with the utmost possible dispatch and the Members of the
+League undertake to afford every facility for carrying them out.
+
+{276}
+
+The sole object of measures taken by the Council as above provided is
+to facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes and they shall in no
+way prejudge the actual settlement.
+
+If the result of such inquiries and investigations is to establish an
+infraction of the above undertakings, it shall be the duty of the
+Council to summon the Member or Members of the League guilty of the
+infraction to put an end thereto.  Should any Member of the League in
+question fail to comply with such summons, the Council shall declare it
+to be guilty of a violation of the Covenant, and shall recommend
+measures to be taken with a view to end as soon as possible a situation
+of a nature to threaten the peace of the world.
+
+For the purposes of this Article decisions of the Council may be taken
+by a two-thirds majority.
+
+
+Article 15c.
+
+[Sidenote: Article 9 of the Protocol, slightly changed.]
+
+The existence of demilitarised zones being calculated to prevent
+aggression and to facilitate a definite finding of the nature provided
+for in Article 15d, the establishment of such zones between States
+mutually consenting thereto is to recommend as a means of preserving
+peace.
+
+The demilitarised zones already existing under the terms of certain
+treaties or conventions, or which may be established in future between
+States mutually consenting thereto, may at the request and at the
+expense of one or more of the conterminous States, be placed under a
+temporary or permanent system of supervision to be organised by the
+Council.
+
+
+Article 15d.
+
+[Sidenote: Article 10 of the Protocol, with verbal changes.]
+
+Any Member of the League which resorts to war in violation of the
+undertakings contained in the Covenant is an aggressor.  Violation of
+the rules laid down for a demilitarised zone shall be held equivalent
+to resort to war.
+
+In the event of hostilities having broken out, any Member of the League
+shall be presumed to be an aggressor (unless a decision of the Council,
+which must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare) which
+
+(a) has refused to submit the dispute to the procedure of pacific
+settlement provided by the Covenant, or
+
+(b) has refused to comply with a judicial sentence or arbitral award or
+with a unanimous recommendation of the Council, or
+
+(c) has disregarded a unanimous report of the Council, a judicial
+sentence or an arbitral award recognizing that the dispute between it
+and the other belligerent arises out of a matter which by international
+law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the latter State, and
+has not previously submitted the question to the Council or the
+Assembly, in accordance with Article 11, or
+
+(d) has violated provisional measures enjoined by the Council {277} for
+the period while the proceedings are in progress as contemplated by
+Article 15b.
+
+Apart from the cases dealt with in sub-heads a, b, c and d of this
+Article, if the Council does not at once, by unanimous vote, succeed in
+determining the aggressor, it shall be bound to enjoin upon the
+belligerents an armistice, and shall fix the terms, acting if need be,
+by a two-thirds majority and shall supervise its execution.
+
+Any belligerent which refuses to accept the armistice or violates its
+terms shall be deemed an aggressor.
+
+The Council shall call upon the Members of the League to apply
+forthwith against the aggressor the sanctions provided by the Covenant,
+and any Member of the League thus called upon shall thereupon be
+entitled to exercise the rights of a belligerent.
+
+[Sidenote: Article 14 of the Protocol.]
+
+The Council shall alone be competent to declare that the application of
+sanctions shall cease and normal conditions be reestablished.
+
+
+Article 16.
+
+[Sidenote: This combines Article 16 of the Covenant and Article 11 of
+the Protocol.  It omits much of the pending amendments to Article 16 of
+the Covenant as superfluous.]
+
+Should any Member of the League resort to war, in disregard of its
+covenants, it shall _ipso facto_ be deemed to have committed an act of
+war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake
+immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial
+relations and to prohibit all intercourse, at least between persons
+resident within their territories and persons resident within the
+territory of the covenant-breaking State, and, if they deem it
+expedient, also between their nationals and the nationals of the
+covenant-breaking State, and to prevent all financial, commercial or
+personal intercourse at least between persons resident within the
+territory of that State and persons resident within the territory of
+every other State, and, if they deem it expedient, also between the
+nationals of that State and the nationals of every other State.
+
+It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the
+several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air
+force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed
+forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the League.
+
+As soon as the Council has called upon the Members of the League to
+apply sanctions, as provided in Article 15d, the obligations of the
+Members of the League in regard to the sanctions mentioned in
+paragraphs one and two of this Article will immediately become
+operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed
+against the aggressor.
+
+Those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each Member of the
+League to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the
+Covenant, and in resistance to any act of aggression, in the degree
+which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards
+armaments allow.
+
+The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually
+support one another in the financial and economic measures {278} which
+are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and
+inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will
+mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at
+one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will
+take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to
+the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating
+to protect the covenants of the League.
+
+The Members of the League jointly and severally undertake to come to
+the assistance of the State attacked or threatened, and to give each
+other mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as
+regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind,
+openings of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to
+take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of
+communications by land and by sea of the attacked or threatened State.
+
+If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept of
+Article 15d, the economic and financial sanctions shall be applied to
+both of them.
+
+Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League
+may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the
+Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of
+the League represented thereon.
+
+
+Article 16a.
+
+[Sidenote: Article 12 of the Protocol, with slight changes.]
+
+In view of the complexity of the conditions in which the Council may be
+called upon to exercise the functions mentioned in Article 16
+concerning economic and financial sanctions, and in order to determine
+more exactly the guarantees afforded to the Members of the League, the
+Council shall from time to time invite the economic and financial
+organizations of the League to consider and report as to the nature of
+the steps to be taken to give effect to the financial and economic
+sanctions and measures of co-operation contemplated in Article 16.
+
+From time to time, the Council shall draw up through its competent
+organs:
+
+    1. Plans of action for the application of the economic and
+       financial sanctions against an aggressor State;
+
+    2. Plans of economic and financial co-operation between a
+       State attacked and the different States assisting it;
+
+and shall communicate these plans to the Members of the League.
+
+
+Article 16b.
+
+[Sidenote: Article 13 of the Protocol, with slight changes.]
+
+In view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided
+for by Article 16, the Council shall be entitled to receive
+undertakings from Members of the League determining in advance the
+military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into
+action immediately to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in
+regard to sanctions which result from the Covenant.
+
+{279}
+
+Furthermore, as soon as the Council has called upon the Members of the
+League to apply sanctions, as provided in Article 15d, the said Members
+of the League may, in accordance with any agreements which they may
+previously have concluded, bring to the assistance of a particular
+State, which is the victim of aggression, their military, naval and air
+forces.
+
+The agreements mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be registered
+and published by the Secretariat.  They shall remain open to all
+Members of the League which may desire to accede thereto.
+
+
+Article 17.
+
+[Sidenote: Article 17 of the Covenant, with verbal changes.]
+
+In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State
+which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of
+the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be
+invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the
+purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem
+just.  If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of the Covenant
+shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by
+the Council.
+
+Upon such invitation being given, the Council shall immediately
+institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and
+recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the
+circumstances.
+
+If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of
+membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute and shall
+resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article
+16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.
+
+If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the
+obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such
+dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such
+recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the
+settlement of the dispute.
+
+
+Article 17a.
+
+[Sidenote: Article 15 of the Protocol, with verbal changes.]
+
+The Members of the League agree that the whole cost of any military,
+naval or air operations undertaken for the repression of an aggression
+under the terms of the Covenant, and reparation for all losses suffered
+by individuals, whether civilians or combatants, and for all material
+damage caused by the operations of both sides, shall be borne by the
+aggressor State up to the extreme limit of its capacity.
+
+Nevertheless, in view of Article 10, neither the territorial integrity
+nor the political independence of the aggressor State shall in any case
+be affected as the result of the applications of the sanctions of the
+Covenant.
+
+
+Articles 18 to 26, Inclusive.
+
+Unchanged.
+
+
+
+[1] This is my draft.  See _supra_, p. 106.  In the text it is called
+the "amended" Covenant.
+
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's notes:
+
+In the source book, footnotes on each page were lettered from 'a'.  For
+this ebook, each chapter's footnotes were numbered, sequentially from
+1, and moved to the end of the chapter.
+
+Page numbers in this ebook  are indicated by numbers enclosed in curly
+braces, e.g. {99}.  They have been located where page breaks occurred
+in the original book, in accordance with Project Gutenberg's FAQ-V-99.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller
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