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diff --git a/29247.txt b/29247.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..83c3ddc --- /dev/null +++ b/29247.txt @@ -0,0 +1,19700 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Academic Questions by M. T. Cicero + + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no +restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under +the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or +online at http://www.gutenberg.org/license + + + +Title: The Academic Questions + +Author: M. T. Cicero + +Release Date: June 26, 2009 [Ebook #29247] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: US-ASCII + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ACADEMIC QUESTIONS*** + + + + + + The Academic Questions, + + Treatise De Finibus. + + and + + Tusculan Disputations + + Of + + M. T. Cicero + + With + + A Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by Cicero. + + Literally Translated by + + C. D. Yonge, B.A. + + London: George Bell and Sons + + York Street + + Covent Garden + + Printed by William Clowes and Sons, + + Stamford Street and Charing Cross. + + 1875 + + + + + +CONTENTS + + +A Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by Cicero. +Introduction. +First Book Of The Academic Questions. +Second Book Of The Academic Questions. +A Treatise On The Chief Good And Evil. + First Book Of The Treatise On The Chief Good And Evil. + Second Book Of The Treatise On The Chief Good And Evil. + Third Book Of The Treatise On The Chief Good And Evil. + Fourth Book Of The Treatise On The Chief Good And Evil. + Fifth Book Of The Treatise On The Chief Good And Evil. +The Tusculan Disputations. + Introduction. + Book I. On The Contempt Of Death. + Book II. On Bearing Pain. + Book III. On Grief Of Mind. + Book IV. On Other Perturbations Of The Mind. + Book V. Whether Virtue Alone Be Sufficient For A Happy Life. +Footnotes + + + + + + +A SKETCH OF THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS MENTIONED BY CICERO. + + +In the works translated in the present volume, Cicero makes such constant +references to the doctrines and systems of the ancient Greek Philosophers, +that it seems desirable to give a brief account of the most remarkable of +those mentioned by him; not entering at length into the history of their +lives, but indicating the principal theories which they maintained, and +the main points in which they agreed with, or differed from, each other. + +The earliest of them was _Thales_, who was born at Miletus, about 640 B.C. +He was a man of great political sagacity and influence; but we have to +consider him here as the earliest philosopher who appears to have been +convinced of the necessity of scientific proof of whatever was put forward +to be believed, and as the originator of mathematics and geometry. He was +also a great astronomer; for we read in Herodotus (i. 74) that he +predicted the eclipse of the sun which happened in the reign of Alyattes, +king of Lydia, B.C. 609. He asserted that water is the origin of all +things; that everything is produced out of it, and everything is resolved +into it. He also asserted that it is the soul which originates all motion, +so much so, that he attributes a soul to the magnet. Aristotle also +represents him as saying that everything is full of Gods. He does not +appear to have left any written treatises behind him: we are uncertain +when or where he died, but he is said to have lived to a great age--to 78, +or, according to some writers, to 90 years of age. + +_Anaximander_, a countryman of Thales, was also born at Miletus, about 30 +years later; he is said to have been a pupil of the former, and deserves +especial mention as the oldest philosophical writer among the Greeks. He +did not devote himself to the mathematical studies of Thales, but rather +to speculations concerning the generation and origin of the world; as to +which his opinions are involved in some obscurity. He appears, however, to +have considered that all things were formed of a sort of matter, which he +called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, or The Infinite; which was something everlasting and +divine, though not invested with any spiritual or intelligent nature. His +own works have not come down to us; but, according to Aristotle, he +considered this "Infinite" as consisting of a mixture of simple, +unchangeable elements, from which all things were produced by the +concurrence of homogeneous particles already existing in it,--a process +which he attributed to the constant conflict between heat and cold, and to +affinities of the particles: in this he was opposed to the doctrine of +Thales, Anaximenes, and Diogenes of Apollonia, who agreed in deriving all +things from a single, not _changeable_, principle. + +Anaximander further held that the earth was of a cylindrical form, +suspended in the middle of the universe, and surrounded by water, air, and +fire, like the coats of an onion; but that the interior stratum of fire +was broken up and collected into masses, from which originated the sun, +moon, and stars; which he thought were carried round by the three spheres +in which they were respectively fixed. He believed that the moon had a +light of her own, not a borrowed light; that she was nineteen times as +large as the earth, and the sun twenty-eight. He thought that all animals, +including man, were originally produced in water, and proceeded gradually +to become land animals. According to Diogenes Laertius, he was the +inventor of the gnomon, and of geographical maps; at all events, he was +the first person who introduced the use of the gnomon into Greece. He died +about 547 B.C. + +_Anaximenes_ was also a Milesian, and a contemporary of Thales and +Anaximander. We do not exactly know when he was born, or when he died; but +he must have lived to a very great age, for he was in high repute as early +as B.C. 544, and he was the tutor of Anaxagoras, B.C. 480. His theory was, +that air was the first cause of all things, and that the other elements of +the universe were resolvable into it. From this infinite air, he imagined +that all finite things were formed by compression and rarefaction, +produced by motion, which had existed from all eternity; so that the earth +was generated out of condensed air, and the sun and other heavenly bodies +from the earth. He thought also that heat and cold were produced by +different degrees of density of this primal element, air; that the clouds +were formed by the condensing of the air; and that it was the air which +supported the earth, and kept it in its place. Even the human soul he +believed to be, like the body, formed of air. He believed in the eternity +of matter, and denied the existence of anything immaterial. + +_Anaxagoras_, who, as has been already stated, was a pupil of Anaximenes, +was born at Clazomenae, in Ionia, about B.C. 499. He removed to Athens at +the time of the Persian war, where he became intimate with Pericles, who +defended him, though unsuccessfully, when he was prosecuted for impiety: +he was fined five talents, and banished from the city; on which he retired +to Lampsacus, where he died at the age of 72. He differed from his +predecessors of the Ionic School, and sought for a higher cause of all +things than matter: this cause he considered to be {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, _intelligence_, +or _mind_. Not that he thought this {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} to be the creator of the world, +but only that principle which arranged it, and gave it motion; for his +idea was, that matter had existed from all eternity, but that, before the +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} arranged it, it was all in a state of chaotic confusion, and full of +an infinite number of homogeneous and heterogeneous parts; then the {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} +separated the homogeneous parts from the heterogeneous, and in this manner +the world was produced. This separation, however, he taught, was made in +such a manner that everything contains in itself parts of other things, or +heterogeneous elements; and is what it is only on account of certain +homogeneous parts which constitute its predominant and real character. + +_Pythagoras_ was earlier than Anaxagoras, though this latter has been +mentioned before him to avoid breaking the continuity of the Ionic School. +His father's name was Mnesarchus, and he was born at Samos about 570 B.C., +though some accounts make him earlier. He is said by some writers to have +been a pupil of Thales, by others of Anaximander, or of Pherecydes of +Scyros. He was a man of great learning, as a geometrician, mathematician, +astronomer, and musician; a great traveller, having visited Egypt and +Babylon, and, according to some accounts, penetrated as far as India. + +Many of his peculiar tenets are believed to have been derived from the +Tyrrhenian Pelasgians, with whom he is said to have been connected. His +contemporaries at Crotona in South Italy, where he lived, looked upon him +as a man peculiarly connected with the gods; and some of them even +identified him with the Hyperborean Apollo. He himself is said to have +laid claim to the gifts of divination and prophecy. The religious element +was clearly predominant in his character. Grote says of him, "In his +prominent vocation, analogous to that of Epimenides, Orpheus, or Melampus, +he appears as the revealer of a mode of life calculated to raise his +disciples above the level of mankind, and to recommend them to the favour +of the gods." (Hist. of Greece, iv. p. 529.) + +On his arrival at Crotona, he formed a school, consisting at first of +three hundred of the richest of the citizens, who bound themselves by a +sort of vow to himself and to each other, for the purpose of cultivating +the ascetic observances which he enjoined, and of studying his religious +and philosophical theories. All that took place in this school was kept a +profound secret; and there were gradations among the pupils themselves, +who were not all admitted, or at all events not at first, to a full +acquaintance with their master's doctrines. They were also required to +submit to a period of probation. The statement of his forbidding his +pupils the use of animal food is denied by many of the best authorities, +and that of his insisting on their maintaining an unbroken silence for +five years, rests on no sufficient authority, and is incredible. It is +beyond our purpose at present to enter into the question of how far the +views of Pythagoras in founding his school or club of three hundred, +tended towards uniting in this body the idea of "at once a philosophical +school, a religious brotherhood, and a political association," all which +characters the Bishop of St. David's (Hist. of Greece, vol. ii. p. 148) +thinks were inseparably united in his mind; while Mr. Grote's view of his +object (Hist. of Greece, vol. iv. p. 544) is very different. In a +political riot at Crotona, a temple, in which many of his disciples were +assembled, was burnt, and they perished, and some say that Pythagoras +himself was among them; though according to other accounts he fled to +Tarentum, and afterwards to Metapontum, where he starved himself to death. +His tomb (see Cic. de Fin. v. 2) was shown at Metapontum down to Cicero's +time. Soon after his death his school was suppressed, and did not revive, +though the Pythagoreans continued to exist as a sect, the members of which +kept up the religious and scientific pursuits of their founder. + +Pythagoras is said to have been the first who assumed the title of +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}; but there is great uncertainty as to the most material of his +philosophical and religious opinions. It is believed that he wrote nothing +himself, and that the earliest Pythagorean treatises were the work of +Philolaus, a contemporary of Socrates. It appears, however, that he +undertook to solve by reference to one single primary principle the +problem of the origin and constitution of the universe. His predilection +for mathematics led him to trace the origin of all things to _number_; for +"in _numbers_ he thought that they perceived many analogies of things that +exist and are produced, more than in fire, earth, or water: as, for +instance, they thought that a certain condition of numbers was justice; +another, soul and intellect, ... And moreover, seeing the conditions and +ratios of what pertains to harmony to consist in numbers, since other +things seemed in their entire nature to be formed in the likeness of +numbers, and in all nature numbers are the first, they supposed the +elements of numbers to be the elements of all things." (Arist. Met. i. 5.) + +Music and harmony too, played almost as important a part in the +Pythagorean system as mathematics, or numbers. His idea appears to be, +that order or harmony of relation is the regulating principle of the whole +universe. He drew out a list of ten pairs of antagonistic elements, and in +the octave and its different harmonic relations, he believed that he found +the ground of the connexion between them. In his system of the universe +_fire_ was the important element, occupying both the centre and the +remotest point of it; and being the vivifying principle of the whole. +Round the central fire the heavenly bodies he believed to move in a +regular circle; furthest off were the fixed stars; and then, in order, the +planets, the moon, the sun, the earth, and what he called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, a sort +of other half of the earth, which was a distinct body from it, but moving +parallel to it. + +The most distant region he called Olympus; the space between the fixed +stars and the moon he called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}; the space between the moon and the +earth {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. He, or at least his disciples, taught that the earth +revolved on its axis, (though Philolaus taught that its revolutions were +not round its axis but round the central fire). The universe itself they +considered as a large sphere, and the intervals between the heavenly +bodies they thought were determined according to the laws and relations of +musical harmony. And from this theory arose the doctrine of the Music of +the Spheres; as the heavenly bodies in their motion occasioned a sort of +sound depending on their distances and velocities; and as these were +determined by the laws of harmonic intervals, the sounds, or notes, formed +a regular musical scale. + +The light and heat of the central fire he believed that we received +through the sun, which he considered a kind of lens: and perfection, he +conceived to exist in direct ratio to the distance from the central fire. + +The universe, itself, they looked upon as having subsisted from all +eternity, controlled by an eternal supreme Deity; who established both +limits and infinity; and whom they often speak of as the absolute {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, +or unity. He pervaded (though he was distinct from) and presided over the +universe. Sometimes, too, he is called the absolute _Good_,--while the +origin of evil is attributed not to him, but to matter which prevented him +from conducting everything to the best end. + +With respect to man, the doctrine of Pythagoras was that known by the name +of the Metempsychosis,--that the soul after death rested a certain time +till it was purified, and had acquired a forgetfulness of what had +previously happened to it; and then reanimated some other body. The ethics +of the Pythagoreans consisted more in ascetic practice and maxims for the +restraint of the passions, than in any scientific theories. Wisdom they +considered as superior to virtue, as being connected with the +contemplation of the upper and purer regions, while virtue was conversant +only with the sublunary part of the world. Happiness, they thought, +consisted in the science of the perfection of the soul; or in the perfect +science of numbers; and the main object of all the endeavours of man was +to be, to resemble the Deity as far as possible. + +_Alcmaeon_ of Crotona was a pupil of Pythagoras; but that is all that is +known of his history. He was a great natural philosopher; and is said to +have been the first who introduced the practice of dissection. He is said, +also, to have been the first who wrote on natural philosophy. Aristotle, +however, distinguishes between the principles of Alcmaeon and Pythagoras, +though without explaining in what the difference consisted. He asserted +the immortality of the soul, and said that it partook of the divine +nature, because, like the heavenly bodies themselves, it contained in +itself the principle of motion. + +_Xenophanes_, the founder of the Eleatic school, was a native of Colophon; +and flourished probably about the time of Pisistratus. Being banished from +his own country, he fled to the Ionian colonies in Sicily, and at last +settled in Elea, or Velia. His writings were chiefly poetical. He was +universally regarded by the ancients as the originator of the doctrine of +the oneness of the universe: he also maintained, it is said, the unity of +the Deity; and also his immortality and eternity; denounced the +transference of him into human form; and reproached Homer and Hesiod for +attributing to him human weaknesses. He represented him as endowed with +unwearied activity, and as the animating power of the universe. + +_Heraclitus_ was an Ephesian, and is said to have been a pupil of +Xenophanes, though this statement is much doubted; others call him a pupil +of Hippasus the Pythagorean. He wrote a treatise on Nature; declaring that +the principle of all things was fire, from which he saw the world was +evolved by a natural operation; he further said that this fire was the +human life and soul, and therefore a rational intelligence guiding the +whole universe. In this primary fire he considered that there was a +perpetual longing to manifest itself in different forms: in its perfectly +pure state it is in heaven; but in order to gratify this longing it +descends, gradually losing the rapidity of its motion till it settles in +the earth. The earth, however, is not immovable, but only the slowest of +all moving bodies; while the soul of man, though dwelling in the lowest of +all regions, namely, in the earth, he considered a migrated portion of +fire in its pure state; which, in spite of its descent, had lost none of +its original purity. The _summum bonum_ he considered to be a contented +acquiescence in the decrees of the Deity. None of his writings are extant; +and he does not appear to have had many followers. + +_Diogenes_ of Apollonia, (who must not be confounded with his Stoic or +Cynic namesake,) was a pupil of Anaximenes, and wrote a treatise on +Nature, of which Diogenes Laertius gives the following account: "He +maintained that air was the primary element of all things; that there was +an infinite number of worlds and an infinite vacuum; that air condensed +and rarefied produced the different members of the universe; that nothing +was generated from nothing, or resolved into nothing; that the earth was +round, supported in the centre, having received its shape from the +whirling round it of warm vapours, and its concrete nature and hardness +from cold." He also imputed to air an intellectual energy, though he did +not recognise any difference between mind and matter. + +_Parmenides_ was a native of Elea or Velia, and flourished about 460 B.C., +soon after which time he came to Athens, and became acquainted with +Socrates, who was then very young. Theophrastus and Aristotle speak +doubtfully of his having been a pupil of Xenophanes. Some authors, +however, reckon him as one of the Pythagorean school; Plato and Aristotle +speak of him as the greatest of the Eleatics; and it is said that his +fellow-countrymen bound their magistrates every year to abide by the laws +which he had laid down. He, like Xenophanes, explained his philosophical +tenets in a didactic poem, in which he speaks of two primary forms, one +the fine uniform etherial fire of flame ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}), the other the cold +body of night, out of the intermingling of which everything in the world +is formed by the Deity who reigns in the midst. His cosmogony was carried +into minute detail, of which we possess only a few obscure fragments; he +somewhat resembled the Pythagoreans in believing in a spherical system of +the world, surrounded by a circle of pure light; in the centre of which +was the earth; and between the earth and the light was the circle of the +Milky Way, of the morning and evening star, of the sun, the planets, and +the moon. And the differences in perfection of organization, he attributed +to the different proportions in which the primary principles were +intermingled. The ultimate principle of the world was, in his view, +necessity, in which Empedocles appears to have followed him; he seems to +have been the only philosopher who recognised with distinctness and +precision that the Existent, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, as such, is unconnected with all +separation or juxtaposition, as well as with all succession, all relation +to space or time, all coming into existence, and all change. It is, +however, a mistake to suppose that he recognised it as a Deity. + +_Democritus_ was born at Abdera, B.C. 460. His father Hegesistratus had +been so rich as to be able to entertain Xerxes, when on his march against +Greece. He spent his inheritance in travelling into distant countries, +visiting the greater part of Asia, and, according to some authors, +extending his travels as far as India and AEthiopia. Egypt he certainly was +acquainted with. He lived to beyond the age of 100 years, and is said to +have died B.C. 357. + +He was a man of vast and varied learning, and a most voluminous author, +though none of his works have come down to us;--in them he carried out the +theory of atoms which he had derived from Leucippus; insisting on the +reality of a vacuum and of motion, which he held was the eternal and +necessary consequence of the original variety of atoms in this vacuum. +These atoms, according to this theory, being in constant motion and +impenetrable, offer resistance to one another, and so create a whirling +motion which gives birth to worlds. Moreover, from this arise combinations +of distinct atoms which become real things and beings. The first cause of +all existence he called _chance_ ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}), in opposition to the {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} of +Anaxagoras. But Democritus went further; for he directed his +investigations especially to the discovery of causes. + +Besides the infinite number of atoms, he likewise supposed the existence +of an infinite number of worlds, each being kept together by a sort of +shell or skin. He derived the four elements from the form, quality, and +proportionate magnitude of the atoms predominating in each; and in +deriving individual things from atoms, he mainly considered the qualities +of warm and cold; the soul he considered as derived from fire atoms; and +he did not consider mind as anything peculiar, or as a power distinct from +the soul or sensuous perception; but he considered knowledge derived from +reason to be a sensuous perception. + +In his ethical philosophy, he considered (as we may see from the _de +Finibus_) the acquisition of peace of mind as the end and ultimate object +of all our actions, and as the last and best fruit of philosophical +inquiry. Temperance and moderation in prosperity and adversity were, in +his eyes, the principal means of acquiring this peace of mind. And he +called those men alone pious and beloved by the Gods who hate whatever is +wrong. + +_Empedocles_ was a Sicilian, who flourished about the time when +Thrasydaeus, the son of Theron, was expelled from Agrigentum, to the +tyranny of which he had succeeded; in which revolution he took an active +part: it is even said that the sovereignty of his native city was offered +to and declined by him. + +He was a man of great genius and extensive learning; it is not known whose +pupil he was, nor are any of his disciples mentioned except Gorgias. He +was well versed in the tenets of the Eleatic and Pythagorean schools; but +he did not adopt the fundamental principles of either; though he agreed +with Pythagoras in his belief in the metempsychosis, in the influence of +numbers, and in one or two other points; and with the Eleatics in +disbelieving that anything could be generated out of nothing. Aristotle +speaks of him as very much resembling in his opinions Democritus and +Anaxagoras. He was the first who established the number of four elements, +which had been previously pointed out one by one, partly as fundamental +substances, and partly as transitive changes of things coming into +existence. He first suggested the idea of two opposite directions of the +moving power, an attractive and a repelling one: and he believed that +originally these two coexisted in a state of repose and inactivity. He +also assumed a periodical change of the formation of the world; or +perhaps, like the philosophers of the pure Ionic school, a perpetual +continuance of pure fundamental substances; to which the parts of the +world that are tired of change return, and prepare the formation of the +sphere for the next period of the world. Like the Eleatics, he strove to +purify the notion of the Deity, saying that he, "being a holy infinite +spirit, not encumbered with limbs, passes through the world with rapid +thoughts." At the same time he speaks of the eternal power of Necessity as +an ancient decree of the Gods, though it is not quite clear what he +understood by this term. + +_Diagoras_ was a native of Melos, and a pupil of Democritus, and +flourished about B.C. 435. He is remarkable as having been regarded by all +antiquity as an Atheist. In his youth he had some reputation as a lyric +poet; so that he is sometimes classed with Pindar, Simonides, and +Bacchylides. Aristophanes, in the Clouds, alludes to him where he calls +Socrates "the Melian;" not that he was so, but he means to hint that +Socrates was an atheist as well as the Melian Diagoras. He lived at Athens +for many years till B.C. 411, when he fled from a prosecution instituted +against him for impiety, according to Diodorus, but probably for some +offence of a political nature; perhaps connected with the mutilation of +the Hermae. + +That he was an atheist, however, appears to have been quite untrue. Like +Socrates, he took new and peculiar views respecting the Gods and their +worship; and seems to have ridiculed the honours paid to their statues, +and the common notions which were entertained of their actions and +conduct. (See De Nat. Deor. iii. 37.) He is said also to have attacked +objects held in the greatest veneration at Athens, such as the Eleusinian +Mysteries, and to have dissuaded people from being initiated into them. He +appears also, in his theories on the divine nature, to have substituted in +some degree the active powers of nature for the activity of the Gods. In +his own conduct he was a man of strict morality and virtue. He died at +Corinth before the end of the century. + +_Protagoras_ was a native of Abdera; the exact time of his birth is +unknown, but he was a little older than Socrates. He was the first person +who gave himself the title of {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, and taught for pay. He came to +Athens early in life, and gave to the settlers who left it for Thurium, +B.C. 445, a code of laws, or perhaps adapted the old laws of Charondas to +their use. He was a friend of Pericles. After some time he was impeached +for impiety in saying, That respecting the Gods he did not know whether +they existed or not; and banished from Athens (see De Nat. Deor. i. 23). +He was a very prolific author: his most peculiar doctrines excited Plato +to write the Theaetetus to oppose them. + +His fundamental principle was, that everything is motion, and that that is +the efficient cause of everything; that nothing _exists_, but that +everything is continually _coming into existence_. He divided motion +(besides numerous subordinate divisions) into active and passive; though +he did not consider either of these characteristics as permanent. From the +concurrence of two such motions he taught that sensations and perceptions +arose, according to the rapidity of the motion. Therefore he said that +there is or exists for each individual, only that of which he has a +sensation or perception; and that as sensation, like its objects, is +engaged in a perpetual change of motion, opposite assertions might exist +according to the difference of the perception respecting such object. +Moral worth he attributed to taking pleasure in the beautiful; and virtue +he referred to a certain sense of shame implanted in man by nature; and to +a certain conscious feeling of justice, which secures the bonds of +connexion in private and political life. + +_Socrates_, the son of Sophroniscus, a statuary, and Phaenarete, a midwife, +was born B.C. 468. He lived all his life at Athens, serving indeed as a +soldier at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and in the battle of Delium; but with +these exceptions he never left the city; where he lived as a teacher of +philosophy; not, however, founding a school or giving lectures, but +frequenting the market-place and all other places of public resort, +talking with every one who chose to address him, and putting questions to +every one of every rank and profession, so that Grote calls him "a public +talker for instruction." He believed himself to have a special religious +mission from the Gods to bring his countrymen to knowledge and virtue. He +was at last impeached before the legal tribunals, on the ground of +"corrupting the youth of the city, and not worshipping the Gods whom the +city worshipped;" and disdaining to defend himself, or rather making a +justificatory defence of such a character as to exasperate the judges, he +was condemned to death, and executed by having hemlock administered to +him, B.C. 399. + +From his disciples Plato and Xenophon we have a very full account of his +habits and doctrines; though it has been much disputed which of the two is +to be considered as giving the most accurate description of his opinions. +As a young man he had been to a certain extent a pupil of Archelaus (the +disciple of Anaxagoras), and derived his fondness for the dialectic style +of argument from Zeno the Eleatic, the favourite Pupil of Parmenides. He +differed, however, from all preceding philosophers in discarding and +excluding wholly from his studies all the abstruse sciences, and limiting +his philosophy to those practical points which could have influence on +human conduct. "He himself was always conversing about the affairs of +men," is the description given of him by Xenophon. Astronomy he pronounced +to be one of the divine mysteries which it was impossible to understand +and madness to investigate; all that man wanted was to know enough of the +heavenly bodies to serve as an index to the change of seasons and as +guides for voyages, etc.; and that knowledge might, he said, easily be +obtained from pilots and watchmen. Geometry he reduced to its literal +meaning of land-measuring, useful to enable one to act with judgment in +the purchase or sale of land; but he looked with great contempt on the +study of complicated diagrams and mathematical problems. As to general +natural philosophy, he wholly discarded it; asking whether those who +professed to apply themselves to that study knew _human_ affairs so well +as to have time to spare for _divine_; was it that they thought that they +could influence the winds, rain, and seasons, or did they desire nothing +but the gratification of an idle curiosity? Men should recollect how much +the wisest of them who have attempted to prosecute these investigations +differ from one another, and how totally opposite and contradictory their +opinions are. + +Socrates, then, looked at all knowledge from the point of view of human +practice. He first, as Cicero says, (Tusc. Dis. v. 4,) "called philosophy +down from heaven and established it in the cities, introduced it even into +private houses, and compelled it to investigate life, and manners, and +what was good and evil among men." He was the first man who turned his +thoughts and discussions distinctly to the subject of Ethics. Deeply +imbued with sincere religious feeling, and believing himself to be under +the peculiar guidance of the Gods, who at all times admonished him by a +divine warning voice when he was in danger of doing anything unwise, +inexpedient, or improper, he believed that the Gods constantly manifested +their love of and care for all men in the most essential manner, in +replying through oracles, and sending them information by sacrificial +signs or prodigies, in cases of great difficulty; and he had no doubt that +if a man were diligent in learning all that the Gods permitted to be +learnt, and if besides he was assiduous in paying pious court to them and +in soliciting special information by way of prophecy, they would be +gracious to him and signify their purposes to him. + +Such then being the capacity of man for wisdom and virtue, his object was +to impart that wisdom to them; and the first step necessary, he considered +to be eradicating one great fault which was a barrier to all improvement. +This fault he described as "the conceit of knowledge without the reality." +His friend and admirer Chaerephon had consulted the oracle at Delphi as to +whether any man was wiser than Socrates; to which the priestess replied +that no other man was wiser. Socrates affirms that he was greatly +disturbed at hearing this declaration from so infallible an authority; +till after conversing with politicians, and orators, and poets, and men of +all classes, he discovered not only that they were destitute of wisdom, +but that they believed themselves to be possessed of it; so that he was +wiser than they, though wholly ignorant, inasmuch as he was conscious of +his own ignorance. He therefore considered his most important duty to be +to convince men of their ignorance, and to excite them to remedy it, as +the indispensable preliminary to virtue; for virtue he defined as doing a +thing well, after having learnt it and practised it by the rational and +proper means; and whoever performed his duties best, whether he was a +ruler of a state or a husbandman, was the best and most useful man and the +most beloved by the Gods. + +And if his objects were new, his method was no less so. He was the parent +of dialectics and logic. Aristotle says, "To Socrates we may +unquestionably assign two novelties--inductive discourses, and the +definitions of general terms." Without any predecessor to copy, Socrates +fell as it were instinctively into that which Aristotle describes as the +double tract of the dialectic process, breaking up the one into the many, +and recombining the many into the one; though the latter or synthetical +process he did not often perform himself, but strove to stimulate his +hearer's mind so as to enable him to do it for himself. + +The fault of the Socratic theory is well remarked by Grote to be, that +while he resolved all virtue into knowledge or wisdom, and all vice into +ignorance or folly, he omitted to notice what is not less essential to +virtue, the proper condition of the passions, desires, &c., and limited +his views too exclusively to the intellect; still while laying down a +theory which is too narrow, he escaped the erroneous consequences of it by +a partial inconsistency. For no one ever insisted more emphatically on the +necessity of control over the passions and appetites, of enforcing good +habits, and on the value of that state of the sentiments and emotions +which such a course tended to form. He constantly pointed out that the +chief pleasures were such as inevitably arise from the performance of +one's duty, and that as to happiness, a very moderate degree of good +fortune is sufficient as to external things, provided the internal man be +properly disciplined. + +Grote remarks further, (and this remark is particularly worth remembering +in the reading of Cicero's philosophical works,) that "Arcesilaus and the +New Academy thought that they were following the example of Socrates, (and +Cicero appears to have thought so too,) when they reasoned against +everything, and laid it down as a system, that against every affirmative +position an equal force of negative argument could be brought as a +counterpoise: now this view of Socrates is, in my judgment, not only +partial, but incorrect. He entertained no such doubts of the powers of the +mind to attain certainty. About physics he thought man could know nothing; +but respecting the topics which concern man and society, this was the +field which the Gods had expressly assigned, not merely to human practice, +but to human study and knowledge; and he thought that every man, not only +might know these things, but ought to know them; that he could not +possibly act well unless he did know them; and that it was his imperative +duty to learn them as he would learn a profession, otherwise he was +nothing better than a slave, unfit to be trusted as a free and accountable +being. He was possessed by the truly Baconian idea, that the power of +steady moral action depended upon, and was limited by, the rational +comprehension of moral ends and means." + +The system, then, of Socrates was animated by the truest spirit of +positive science, and formed an indispensable precursor to its attainment. +And we may form some estimate of his worth and genius if we recollect, +that while the systems and speculations of other ancient philosophers +serve only as curiosities to make us wonder, or as beacons to warn us into +what absurdities the ablest men may fall, the principles and the system of +Socrates and his followers, and of that school alone, exercise to this day +an important influence on all human argument and speculation. + +_Aristippus_ (whom we will consider before Plato, that Aristotle may +follow Plato more immediately) came when a young man to Athens, for the +express purpose of becoming acquainted with Socrates, with whom he +remained almost till his death. He was, however, very different from his +master, being a person of most luxurious and sensual habits. He was also +the first of Socrates' disciples who took money for teaching. He was the +founder of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy, which followed Socrates in +limiting all philosophical inquiries to ethics; though under this name +they comprehended a more varied range of subjects than Socrates did, +inasmuch as one of the parts into which they divided philosophy, referred +to the feelings; another to causes, which is rather a branch of physics; +and a third to proofs, which is clearly connected with logic. + +He pronounced pleasure to be the chief good, and pain the chief evil; but +he denied that either of these was a mere negative inactive state, +considering them, on the contrary, both to be motions of the soul,--pain a +violent, and pleasure a moderate one. + +As to actions, he asserted that they were all morally indifferent, that +men should only look to their results, and that law and custom are the +only authorities which make an action either good or bad. Whatever +conduces to pleasure, he thought virtue; in which he agreed with Socrates +that the mind has the principal share. + +_Plato_, the greatest of all the disciples of Socrates, was the son of +Ariston and Perictione, and was born probably in the year B.C. 428, and +descended, on the side of his father, from Codrus, and on his mother's +side related to Solon. At the age of twenty, he became a constant +attendant of Socrates, and lived at Athens till his death. After this +event, in consequence of the unpopularity of the very name of his master, +he retired to Megara, and subsequently to Sicily. He is said also to have +been at some part of his life, after the death of Socrates, a great +traveller. About twelve years after the death of Socrates he returned to +Athens, and began to teach in the Academy, partly by dialogue, and partly, +probably, by connected lectures. He taught gratuitously; and besides +Speusippus, Xenocrates, Aristotle, Heraclides Ponticus, and others, who +were devoted solely to philosophical studies, he is said to have +occasionally numbered Chabrias, Iphicrates, Timotheus, Phocion, Isocrates, +and (by some) Demosthenes among his hearers. He died at a great age, B.C. +347. + +His works have come down to us in a more complete form than those of any +other ancient author who was equally voluminous; and from them we get a +clear idea of the principal doctrines which he inculcated on his +followers. + +Like Socrates, he was penetrated with the idea, that knowledge and wisdom +were the things most necessary to man, and the greatest goods assigned to +him by God. Wisdom he looked on as the great purifier of the soul; and as +any approach to wisdom presupposes an original communion with _Being_, +properly so called, this communion also presupposes the divine nature, and +consequent immortality of the soul, his doctrine respecting which was of a +much purer and loftier character than the usual theology of the ancients. +Believing that the world also had a soul, he considered the human soul as +similar to it in nature, and free from all liability to death, in spite of +its being bound up with the appetites, in consequence of its connexion +with the body, and as preserving power and consciousness after its +separation from the body. What he believed, however, to be its condition +after death is far less certain, as his ideas on this subject are +expressed in a mythical form. + +The chief point, however, to which Plato directed his attention, was +ethics, which, especially in his system, are closely connected with +politics. He devotes the Protagoras, and several shorter dialogues, to +refute the sensual and selfish theories of some of his predecessors, in +order to adopt a more scientific treatment of the subject; and in these +dialogues he urges that neither happiness nor virtue are attainable by the +indulgence of our desires, but that men must bring these into proper +restraint, if they are desirous of either. He supposes an inward harmony, +the preservation of which is pleasure, while its disturbance is pain; and +as pleasure is always dependent on the activity from which it springs, the +more this activity is elevated the purer the pleasure becomes. + +Virtue he considered the fitness of the soul for the operations that are +proper to it; and it manifests itself by means of its inward harmony, +beauty, and health. Different phases of virtue are distinguishable so far +as the soul is not pure spirit, but just as the spirit should rule both +the other elements of the soul, so also should wisdom, as the inner +development of the spirit, rule the other virtues. + +Politics he considered an inseparable part of ethics, and the state as the +copy of a well-regulated individual life: from the three different +activities of the soul he deduced the three main elements of the state, +likening the working class to the appetitive element of the soul, both of +which equally require to be kept under control; the military order, which +answered, in his idea, to the emotive element, ought to develop itself in +thorough dependence on the reason; and from that the governing order, +answering to the rational faculty, must proceed. The right of passing from +a subordinate to a dominant position must depend on the individual +capacity and ability for raising itself. But from the difficulties of +realizing his theories, he renounces this absolute separation of ranks in +his book on Laws, limits the power of the governors, attempts to reconcile +freedom with unity and reason, and to mingle monarchy with democracy. + +With respect to his theology, he appears to have agreed entirely with +Socrates. + +_Aristotle_ was born at Stageira, B.C. 384. His father, Nicomachus, was +physician to Amyntas II., king of Macedon. At the age of seventeen he went +to Athens, in hopes to become a pupil of Plato; but Plato was in Sicily, +and did not return for three years, which time Aristotle applied to severe +study, and to cultivating the friendship of Heraclides Ponticus. When +Plato returned, he soon distinguished him above all his other pupils. He +remained at Athens twenty years, maintaining, however, his connexion with +Macedonia; but on the death of Plato, B.C. 347, which happened while +Aristotle was absent in Macedonia on an embassy, he quitted Athens, +thinking, perhaps, that travelling was necessary to complete his +education. After a short period, he accepted an invitation from Philip to +superintend the education of Alexander. He remained in Macedonia till B.C. +335, when he returned to Athens, where he found Xenocrates had succeeded +Speusippus as the head of the Academy. Here the Lyceum was appropriated to +him, in the shady walks ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}) of which he delivered his lectures to +a number of eminent scholars who flocked around him. From these walks the +name of Peripatetic was given to the School which he subsequently +established. Like several others of the Greek philosophers, he had a +select body of pupils, to whom he delivered his esoteric doctrines; and a +larger, more promiscuous, and less accomplished company, to whom he +delivered his exoteric lectures on less abstruse subjects. When he had +resided thirteen years at Athens, he found himself threatened with a +prosecution for impiety, and fled to Chalcis, in Euboea, and died soon +after, B.C. 322. + +His learning was immense, and his most voluminous writings embraced almost +every subject conceivable; but only a very small portion of them has come +down to us. Cicero, however, alludes to him only as a moral philosopher, +and occasionally as a natural historian; so that it may be sufficient here +for us to confine our view of him to his teaching on the Practical +Sciences; his Ethics, too, being one of his works which has come down to +us entire. + +God he considered to be the highest and purest energy of eternal +intellect,--an absolute principle,--the highest reason, the object of whose +thought is himself; expanding and declaring, in a more profound manner, +the {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} of Anaxagoras. With respect to man, the object of all action, he +taught, was happiness: and this happiness he defines to be an energy of +the soul (or of life) according to virtue, existing by and for itself. +Virtue, again, he subdivided into moral and intellectual, according to the +distinction between the reasoning faculty and that quality in the soul +which obeys reason. Again, moral virtue is the proper medium between +excess and deficiency, and can only be acquired by practice; intellectual +virtue can be taught; and by the constant practice of moral virtue a man +becomes virtuous, but he can only practise it by a resolute determination +to do so. Virtue, therefore, is defined further as a habit accompanied by, +or arising out of, deliberate choice, and based upon free and conscious +action. From these principles, Aristotle is led to take a wider view of +virtue than other philosophers: he includes friendship under this head, as +one of the very greatest virtues, and a principal means for a steady +continuance in all virtue; and as the unrestricted exercise of each +species of activity directed towards the good, produces a feeling of +pleasure, he considers pleasure as a very powerful means of virtue. + +Connected with Aristotle's system of ethics was his system of politics, +the former being only a part, as it were, of the latter; the former aiming +at the happiness of individuals, the latter at that of communities; so +that the latter is the perfection and completion of the former. For +Aristotle looked upon man as a "political animal"--as a being, that is, +created by nature for the state, and for living in the state; which, as a +totality consisting of organically connected members, is by nature prior +to the individual or the family. The state he looked upon as a whole +consisting of mutually dependent and connected members, with reference as +well to imaginary as to actually existing constitutions. The constitution +is the arrangement of the powers in the state--the soul of the state, as it +were,--according to which the sovereignty is determined. The laws are the +determining principles, according to which the dominant body governs and +restrains those who would, and punishes those who do, transgress them. He +defines three kinds of constitutions, each of them having a corresponding +perversion:--a republic, arising from the principle of equality; this at +times degenerates into democracy; monarchy, and aristocracy, which arise +from principles of inequality, founded on the preponderance of external or +internal strength and wealth, and which are apt to degenerate into tyranny +and oligarchy. The education of youth he considers as a principal concern +of the state, in order that, all the individual citizens being trained to +a virtuous life, virtue may become predominant in all the spheres of +political life; and, accordingly, by means of politics the object is +realized of which ethics are the groundwork, namely, human happiness, +depending on a life in accordance with virtue. + +_Heraclides_ Ponticus, as he is usually called, was, as his name denotes, +a native of Pontus. He migrated to Athens, where he became a disciple of +Plato, who, while absent in Sicily, entrusted him with the care of his +school. + +_Speusippus_ was the nephew of Plato, and succeeded him as President of +the Academy; but he continued so but a short time, and, within eight years +of the death of Plato, he died at Athens, B.C. 339. He refused to +recognise _the Good_ as the ultimate principle; but, going back to the +older theologians, maintained that the origin of the universe was to be +set down indeed as a cause of the Good and Perfect, but was not the Good +and Perfect itself; for that was the result of generated existence or +development, just as plants are of the seeds. When, with the Pythagoreans, +he reckoned _the One_ in the series of good things, he probably thought of +it only in opposition to _the Manifold_, and wished to point out that it +is from _the One_ that _the Good_ is to be derived. He appears, however, +(see De Nat. Deor. i. 13,) to have attributed vital activity to the +primordial unity, as inseparably belonging to it. + +_Theophrastus_ was a native of Eresus, from whence he migrated to Athens, +where he became a follower of Plato, and afterwards of Aristotle, by whom, +when he quitted Athens for Chalcis, he was designated as his successor in +the presidency of the Lyceum; while in this position, he is said to have +had two thousand disciples, and among them the comic poet Menander. When, +B.C. 305, the philosophers were banished from Athens, he also left the +city, but returned the next year on the repeal of the law. He lived to a +great age, though the date of his birth is not certainly known. + +He was a very voluminous writer on many subjects, but directed his chief +attention to continuing the researches into natural history which had been +begun by Aristotle. As, however, only a few fragments of his works have +come down to us, and these in a very corrupt state, we know but little +what peculiar views he entertained; though we learn from Cicero (De Inv. +i. 42-50) that he departed a good deal from the doctrines of Aristotle in +his principles of ethics, and also in his metaphysical and theological +speculations; and Cicero (De Nat. Deor. i. 13) complains that he did not +express himself with precision or with consistency about the Deity; and in +other places (Acad. i. 10, Tusc. Quaest. v. 9), that he appeared unable to +comprehend a happiness resting merely on virtue; so that he had attributed +to virtue a rank very inferior to its deserts. + +_Xenocrates_ was a native of Chalcedon, born probably B.C. 396. He was a +follower of Plato, and accompanied him to Sicily. After his death, he +betook himself, with Aristotle, to the court of Hermias, tyrant of +Ptarneus, but soon returned to Athens, and became president of the Academy +when Speusippus, through ill health, was forced to abandon that post. He +died B.C. 314. + +He was not a man of great genius, but of unwearied industry and the purest +virtue and integrity. None of his works have come down to us; but, from +the notices of other writers, we are acquainted with some of his peculiar +doctrines. He stood at the head of those who, regarding the universe as +imperishable and existing from eternity, looked upon the chronic +succession in the theory of Plato as a form in which to denote the +relations of conceptual succession. He asserted that the soul was a +self-moving member,--called Unity and Duality deities, considering the +former as the first male existence, ruling in heaven, father and Jupiter; +the latter as the female, as the mother of the Gods, and the soul of the +universe, which reigns over the mutable world under heaven. He +approximated to the Pythagoreans in considering Number as the principle of +consciousness, and consequently of knowledge; supplying, however, what was +deficient in the Pythagorean theory by the definition of Plato, that it is +only in as far as number reconciles the opposition between _the same_ and +the different, and can raise itself to independent motion, that it is +soul. + +In his ethics he endeavoured to render the Platonic theory more complete, +and to give it a more direct applicability to human life; admitting, +besides the good and the bad, of something which is neither good nor bad, +and some of these intermediate things, such as health, beauty, fame, good +fortune, he would not admit to be absolutely worthless and indifferent. He +maintained, however, in the most decided manner, that virtue is the only +thing valuable in itself, and that the value of everything else is +conditional, (see Cic. de Fin. iv. 18, de Leg. i. 21, Acad. i. 6, Tusc. +Quaest. v. 10-18,) that happiness ought to coincide with the consciousness +of virtue. He did not allow that mere intellectual scientific wisdom was +the only true wisdom to be sought after as such by men: and in one point +he came nearer the precepts of Christianity than any of the ancients, when +he asserted the indispensableness of the morality of the thoughts to +virtue, and declared it to be the same thing, whether a person cast +longing eyes on the possessions of his neighbour, or attempted to possess +himself of them by force. + +_Antisthenes_ was older than Plato; though the exact time of his birth is +uncertain: but he fought at the battle of Tanagra, B.C. 420, though then +very young. He became a disciple of Gorgias, and afterwards of Socrates, +at whose death he set up a school in the Cynosarges, a gymnasium for the +use of Athenians born of foreign mothers, near the temple of Hercules, +from which place of assembly his followers were called Cynics. He lived to +a great age, though the year of his death is not known, but he certainly +was alive after the battle of Leuctra, B.C. 371. + +In his philosophical system, which was almost confined to ethics, he +appears to have aimed at novelty rather than truth or common sense. He +taught that in all that the wise man does he conforms to perfect virtue, +and that pleasure is so far from being necessary to man, that it is a +positive evil. He is reported also to have gone the length of pronouncing +pain and infamy blessings rather than evils, though when he spoke of +pleasure as worthless, he probably meant that pleasure which arises from +the gratification of sensual or artificial desires; for he praised that +which arises from the intellect, and from friendship. The _summum bonum_ +he placed in a life according to virtue. + +In a treatise in which he discussed the nature of the Gods he contended +for the unity of the Deity, and asserted that man is unable to know him by +any sensible representation, since he is unlike any being on earth; and +demonstrated the sufficiency of virtue for happiness, by the doctrine that +outward events are regulated by God so as to benefit the wise and good. + +_Diogenes_, a native of Sinope in Pontus, who was born B.C. 412, was one +of his few disciples; he came at an early age to Athens, and became +notorious for the most frantic excesses of moroseness and self-denial. On +a voyage to AEgina he was taken by pirates and sold as a slave to Xeniades, +a Corinthian, over whom he acquired great influence, and was made tutor to +his children. His system consisted merely in teaching men to dispense with +even the simplest necessaries of civilized life: and he is said to have +taught that all minds are air, exactly alike, and composed of similar +particles; but that in beasts and in idiots they are hindered from +properly developing themselves by various humors and incapacities of their +bodies. He died B.C. 323, the same year that Epicurus came to Athens. + +_Zeno_ was born at Citium, a city of Cyprus; but having been shipwrecked +near Cyprus, he settled in that city, where he devoted himself to severe +study for a great length of time, cultivating, it is said, the +acquaintance of the philosophers of the Megaric school, Diodorus and +Philo, and of the Academics, Xenocrates and Polemo. After he had completed +his studies, he opened a school himself in the porch, adorned with the +paintings of Polygnotus ({~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}), from which his followers were +called Stoics. The times of his birth and of his death are not known with +any exactness; but he is said to have reached a great age. + +In speaking of the Stoic doctrines, it is not very clear how much of them +proceeded from Zeno himself, and how much from Chrysippus and other +eminent men of the school in subsequent years. In natural philosophy he +considered that there was a primary matter which was never increased or +diminished, and which was the foundation of everything which existed: and +which was brought into existence by the operative power,--that is, by the +Deity. He saw this operative power in fire and in aether as the basis of +all vital activity, (see Cic. Acad. i. 11, ii. 41; de Nat. Deor. ii. 9, +iii. 14,) and he taught that the universe comes into being when the +primary substance passing from fire through the intermediate stage of air +becomes liquefied, and then the thick portion becomes earth, the thinner +portion air, which is again rarefied till it becomes fire. This fire he +conceived to be identical with the Deity, (Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 22,) and +to be endowed with consciousness and foresight. At other times he defined +the Deity as that law of nature which ever accomplishes what is right, and +prevents the opposite, and identified it with unconditional necessity. The +soul of man he considered as being of the nature of fire, or of a warm +breath, (Cic. Tusc. Quaest. i. 9; de Nat. Deor. iii. 4,) and therefore as +mortal. + +In ethics he agreed with the Cynics in recognising the constitutional +nature of moral obligations, though he differed from them with respect to +things indifferent, and opposed their morose contempt for custom, though +he did not allow that the gratification of mere external wants, or that +external good fortune, had any intrinsic value. He comprised everything +which could make life happy in virtue alone (Cic. Acad. i. 10), and called +it the only good which deserved to be striven after and praised for its +own sake (Cic. de Fin. iii. 6, 8), and taught that the attainment of it +must inevitably produce happiness. But as virtue could, according to his +system, only subsist in conjunction with the perfect dominion of reason, +and vice only in the renunciation of the authority of reason, he inferred +that one good action could not be more virtuous than another, and that a +person who had one virtue had all, and that he who was destitute of one +was destitute of all. + +_Cleanthes_ was born at Assos in the Troas, about 300 B.C.; he came to +Athens at an early age, and became the pupil of Zeno, whom at his death he +succeeded in his school. He differed from his master in regarding the soul +as immortal, and approximated to the Cynics in denying that pleasure was +agreeable to nature, or in any respect good. He died of voluntary +starvation at the age of eighty. + +_Chrysippus_ was born B.C. 280, at Soli in Cilicia. He came at an early +age to Athens, and became a pupil of Cleanthes; and among the later Stoics +he was more regarded than either Zeno or Cleanthes. He died B.C. 207. + +His doctrines do not appear to have differed from those of Zeno; only +that, from feeling the dangerous influence of the Epicurean principles, he +endeavoured to popularize the Stoic ethics. + +_Epicurus_ was an Athenian of the Attic demos Gargettus, whence he is +sometimes simply called the Gargettian. He was, however, born at Samos, +B.C. 342, and did not come to Athens till the age of eighteen, when he +found Xenocrates at the head of the Academy, and by some authors is said +to have become his pupil, though he himself would not admit it (Cic. de +Nat. Deor. i. 26). At the outbreak of the Samian war he crossed over to +Colophon, where he collected a school. It is said that the first thing +that excited him to the study of philosophy was the perusal of the works +of Democritus while he resided at Colophon. From thence he went to +Mitylene and Lampsacus, and B.C. 306 he returned to Athens, and finally +established himself as a teacher of philosophy. His own life was that of a +man of simple, pure, and temperate habits. He died of the stone, B.C. 270, +and left Hermarchus of Mitylene as his successor in the management of his +school. + +None of his works have come down to us. With regard to his philosophical +system, in spite of his boast of being self-taught and having borrowed +from no one, he clearly derived the chief part of his natural philosophy +from Democritus, and of his moral philosophy from Aristippus and the +Cyrenaics. He considered human happiness the end of all philosophy, and +agreed with the Cyrenaics that pleasure constituted the greatest +happiness; still this theory in his hands acquired a far loftier +character; for pleasure, in his idea, was not a mere momentary and +transitory sensation, but something lasting and imperishable, consisting +in pure mental enjoyments, and in the freedom from pain and any other +influence which could disturb man's peace of mind. And the _summum bonum_, +according to him, consisted in this peace of mind; which was based upon +correct wisdom ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}). + +In his natural philosophy he embraced the atomic theories of Democritus +and Diagoras, carrying them even further than they themselves had done, to +such a degree that he drew upon himself the reproach of Atheism. He +regarded the Gods themselves as consisting of atoms, and our notions of +them as based upon the images ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) which are reflected from them, and +so pass into our minds. And he believed that they exercised no influence +whatever on the world, or on the actions or fortunes of man. + +_Theodorus_ was a native of Cyrene, who flourished about B.C. 320. He was +of the Cyrenaic sect, and the founder of that branch of it which was +called after him, the Theodorean; though we scarcely know in what his +doctrines differed from those of Aristippus, unless they were, if +possible, of a still more lax character. He taught, for instance, that +there was nothing really wrong or disgraceful in theft, adultery, or +sacrilege; but that they were branded by public opinion to restrain fools. +He is also reproved with utter atheism; and Cicero classes him with +Diagoras, as a man who utterly denied the existence of any Gods at all. + +_Pyrrho_ was a contemporary of Alexander the Great, whose expedition into +Asia he joined. He appears, as far as his philosophy went, to have been an +universal sceptic. He impeached, however, none of the chief principles of +morality, but, regarding Socrates as his model, directed all his +endeavours towards the production in his pupils of a firm well-regulated +moral character. + +_Crantor_ was a native of Soli in Cilicia; we do not know when he was born +or when he died, but he came to Athens before B.C. 315. He was the first +of Plato's followers who wrote commentaries on the works of his master. He +died of dropsy, and left Arcesilaus his heir. + +_Arcesilaus_, or _Arcesilas_, flourished about B.C. 280; he was born at +Pitane, but came to Athens and became the pupil of Theophrastus and of +Crantor, and afterwards of some of the more sceptical philosophers. On the +death of Crantor he succeeded to the chair of the Academy, in the +doctrines of which he made so many innovations that he is called the +founder of the New Academy. What his peculiar views were is, however, a +matter of great uncertainty. Some give him the credit of having restored +the doctrines of Plato in an uncorrupted form; while, according to Cicero, +on the other hand, (Acad. i. 12,) he summed up all his opinions in the +statement that he knew nothing, not even his own ignorance. He, and the +New Academy, do not, however, seem to have doubted the existence of truth +in itself, but only the capacity of man for arriving at the knowledge of +it. + +_Carneades_ was born at Cyrene about B.C. 213. He went early to Athens, +and at first attended the lectures of the Stoics; but subsequently +attached himself to the Academy, and succeeded to the chair on the death +of Hegesinus. In the year B.C. 155, he came to Rome on an embassy, but so +offended Cato by speaking one day in praise of justice as a virtue, and +the next day, in answer to all his previous arguments, that he made a +motion in the senate, that he should be ordered to depart from Rome. He +died B.C. 129. + +_Philo_ of Larissa, who is often mentioned by Cicero, was his own master, +having removed to Rome after the conquest of Athens by Mithridates, where +he settled as a teacher of philosophy and rhetoric. He would not admit +that there was any difference between the Old and New Academy, in which he +differed from his pupil Antiochus. The exact time of his birth or death is +not known; but he was not living when Cicero composed his Academics. (ii. +6.) + +_Antiochus_ of Ascalon has been called by some writers the founder of the +Fifth Academy; he also was a teacher of Cicero during the time he studied +at Athens; he had also a school at Alexandria, and another in Syria, where +he died. He studied under Philo, but was so far from agreeing with him +that he wrote a treatise on purpose to refute what he considered as the +scepticism of the Academics. And undoubtedly the later philosophers of +that school had exaggerated the teaching of Plato, that the senses were +not in all cases trustworthy organs of perception, so as to infer from it +a denial of the certainty of any knowledge whatever. Antiochus professed +that his object was to revive the real doctrines of Plato in opposition to +the modern scepticism of Carneades and Philo. He appears to have +considered himself as an eclectic philosopher, combining the best parts of +the doctrines of the Academic, Peripatetic, and Stoic schools. + +_Diodorus_ of Tyre flourished about B.C. 110. He lived at Athens, where he +succeeded Critolaus as the head of the Peripatetic school. Cicero, +however, denies that he was a genuine Peripatetic, and says that his +doctrine that the _summum bonum_ consisted in a combination of virtue with +the absence of pain was an attempt to reconcile the theory of the Stoics +with that of the Epicureans. + +_Panaetius_ was a native of Rhodes; his exact age is not known, but he was +a contemporary of Scipio AEmilianus, who died B.C. 129. He went to Athens +at an early age, where he is said to have been a pupil of Diogenes of +Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus, and also of Polemo Periegetes. He became +associated with P. Scipio AEmilianus, who valued him highly. The latter +part of his life he spent at Athens, where he had succeeded Antipater as +head of the Stoic school. He was the author of a treatise on "What is +Becoming," which Cicero professes to have imitated, though carried rather +further, in his De Officiis. He softened down the harsher features of the +Stoic doctrines, approximating them in some degree to the opinions of +Xenocrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and made them attractive by the elegance +of his style; indeed, he modified the principles of the school so much, +that some writers called him a Platonist. In natural philosophy he +abandoned the Stoic doctrine of the conflagration of the world; +endeavoured to simplify the division of the faculties of the soul; and +doubted the reality of the science of divination. In ethics he followed +the method of Aristotle; and, in direct opposition to the earlier Stoics, +vindicated the claim of certain pleasurable sensations to be regarded as +in accordance with nature. + +_Polemo_ was a pupil of Xenocrates, and succeeded him as the head of his +school. There is a story that he had been a very dissolute young man, and +that one day, at the head of a band of revellers, he burst into the school +of Xenocrates, when his attention was so arrested by the discourse of the +philosopher, which happened to be on the subject of temperance, that he +tore off his festive garland, remained till the end of the lecture, and +devoted himself to philosophy all the rest of his life. He does not appear +to have varied at all from the doctrines of his master. He died B.C. 273. + +_Archytas_ was a native of Tarentum: his age is not quite certain, but he +is believed to have been a contemporary of Plato, and he is even said to +have saved his life by his interest with the tyrant Dionysius. He was a +great general and statesman, as well as a philosopher. In philosophy he +was a Pythagorean; and, like most of that school, a great mathematician; +and applied his favourite science not only to music, but also to +metaphysics. Aristotle is believed to have borrowed from him his System of +Categories. + +The limits of this volume forbid more than the preceding very brief sketch +of the chiefs of the ancient philosophy. For a more detailed account the +reader is referred to the Biographical Dictionary edited by Dr. Smith, +from which valuable work much of this sketch has been derived. The account +of Socrates has been principally derived from Mr. Grote's admirable +history of Greece: in which attention has so successfully been devoted to +the history of philosophy and the sophists, that a correct idea of the +subject can hardly be acquired without a careful study of that work. + +It was intended to subjoin a comparison of the systems of the different +sects, but it would take more space than can be spared; and it is moreover +unnecessary, as, the distinctive tenets of each having been explained, the +reader is supplied with sufficient materials to institute such a +comparison for himself. He will not wonder that men without the guidance +of revelation should at times have lost their way in speculations beyond +the reach of human faculties, but will the more admire that genius and +virtue which manifested itself in such men as Socrates, Plato, and Cicero, +for the perpetual enlightenment of the human race. + + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + + +The following account of the two Books of the Academics is extracted from +the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography, edited by Dr. W. Smith:-- + +"The history of this work, before it finally quitted the hands of its +author, is exceedingly curious and somewhat obscure; but must be clearly +understood before we can explain the relative position of those portions +of it which have been transmitted to modern times. By comparing carefully +a series of letters written to Atticus, in the course of B.C. 45 (Ep. ad +Att. xiii. 32;(1) 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 35, 44), we find +that Cicero had drawn up a treatise upon the Academic Philosophy, in the +form of a dialogue between Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius; and that it +was comprised in two books, the first bearing the name of Catulus, the +second that of Lucullus. A copy was sent to Atticus; and, soon after it +reached him, two new Introductions were composed, the one in praise of +Catulus, the other in praise of Lucullus. Scarcely had this been done, +when Cicero, from a conviction that Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius, +although men of highly cultivated minds, and well acquainted with general +literature, were known to have been little conversant with the subtle +arguments of abstruse philosophy, determined to withdraw them altogether, +and accordingly substituted Cato and Brutus in their place. Immediately +after this change had been introduced, he received a communication from +Atticus, representing that Varro was much offended by being passed over in +the discussion of topics in which he was so deeply versed. Thereupon +Cicero, catching eagerly at the idea thus suggested, resolved to recast +the whole piece, and quickly produced, under the old title, a new and +highly improved edition, divided into four books instead of two, +dedicating the whole to Varro, to whom was assigned the task of defending +the tenets of Antiochus; while Cicero himself undertook to support the +views of Philo, Atticus also taking a share in the conversation. + +"But, although these alterations had been effected with extreme rapidity, +the copy originally sent to Atticus had in the meantime been repeatedly +transcribed; hence both editions passed into circulation, and a part of +each has been preserved. One section, containing twelve chapters, is a +short fragment of the second or Varronian edition. The other, containing +forty-nine chapters, is the entire second book of the first edition; to +which is prefixed the new introduction, together with the proper title of +Lucullus. The scene of the _Catulus_ was the villa of that statesman, at +Cumae; while the _Lucullus_ is supposed to have been held at the mansion of +Hortensius, near Bauli. + +"The object proposed was to give an account of the rise and progress of +the Academic Philosophy, to point out the various modifications introduced +by successive professors, and to demonstrate the superiority of the +principles of the New Academy, as taught by Philo, over those of the old, +as advocated by Antiochus." + + + + + +FIRST BOOK OF THE ACADEMIC QUESTIONS. + + +I. When a short time ago my friend Atticus(2) was with me at my villa in +the district of Cumae, news was sent us by Marcus(3) Varro, that he had +arrived in Rome the day before in the evening, and that if he had not +found himself too tired after his journey he should have proceeded at once +to see us. But when we heard this, we thought that we ought not to suffer +anything to delay our seeing a man so intimately connected with us by an +identity of studies, and by a very long standing intimacy and friendship. +And so we set out at once to go to see him; and when we were no great +distance from his villa we saw him coming towards us; and when we had +embraced him, as the manner of friends is, after some time we accompanied +him back to his villa. And as I was asking a few questions, and inquiring +what was the news at Rome, Never mind those things, said Atticus, which we +can neither inquire about nor hear of without vexation, but ask him rather +whether he has written anything new; for the muse of Varro has been silent +much longer than usual; though I rather suppose he is suppressing for a +time what he has written, than that he has been really idle. You are quite +wrong, said he; for I think it very foolish conduct in a man to write what +he wishes to have concealed. But I have a great work on hand; for I have +been a long time preparing a treatise which I have dedicated to my friend +here, (he meant me,) which is of great importance, and is being polished +up by me with a good deal of care. + +I have been waiting to see it a long time, Varro, said I, but still I have +not ventured to ask for it. For I heard from our friend Libo, with whose +zeal you are well acquainted, (for I can never conceal anything of that +kind,) that you have not been slackening in the business, but are +expending a great deal of care on it, and in fact never put it out of your +hands. But it has never hitherto come into my mind to ask you about it; +however now, since I have begun to commit to a durable record those things +which I learnt in your company, and to illustrate in the Latin language +that ancient philosophy which originated with Socrates, I must ask you why +it is that, while you write on so many subjects, you pass over this one, +especially when you yourself are very eminent in it; and when that study, +and indeed the whole subject, is far superior in importance to all other +studies and arts. + +II. You are asking me, he replied, about a matter on which I have often +deliberated and frequently revolved in my mind. And, therefore, I will +answer you without any hesitation; still, however, speaking quite +off-hand, because I have, as I said just now, thought over the subject +both deeply and frequently. For as I saw that philosophy had been +explained with great care in the Greek language, I thought that if any of +our countrymen were engrossed by the study of it, who were well versed in +Greek literature, they would be more likely to read Greek treatises than +Latin ones: but that those men who were averse to Greek science and to the +schools of the Greek philosophers would not care the least for such +matters as these, which could not be understood at all without some +acquaintance with Greek literature. And, therefore, I did not choose to +write treatises which unlearned men could not understand, and learned men +would not be at the trouble of reading. And you yourself are aware of +this. For you have learnt that we cannot resemble Amafanius(4) or +Rabirius,(5) who without any art discuss matters which come before the +eyes of every one in plain ordinary language, giving no accurate +definitions, making no divisions, drawing no inferences by well-directed +questions, and who appear to think that there is no such thing as any art +of speaking or disputing. But we, in obedience to the precepts of the +logicians and of orators also, as if they were positive laws, (since our +countrymen consider skill in each of these branches to be a virtue,) are +compelled to use words although they may be new ones; which learned men, +as I have said before, will prefer taking from the Greeks, and which +unlearned men will not receive even from us; so that all our labour may be +undertaken in vain. But now, if I approved of the doctrines of Epicurus, +that is to say, of Democritus, I could write of natural philosophy in as +plain a style as Amafanius. For what is the great difficulty when you have +put an end to all efficient causes, in speaking of the fortuitous +concourse of corpuscules, for this is the name he gives to atoms. You know +our system of natural philosophy, which depends upon the two principles, +the efficient cause, and the subject matter out of which the efficient +cause forms and produces what it does produce. For we must have recourse +to geometry, since, if we do not, in what words will any one be able to +enunciate the principles he wishes, or whom will he be able to cause to +comprehend those assertions about life, and manners, and desiring and +avoiding such and such things? + +For those men are so simple as to think the good of a sheep and of a man +the same thing. While you know the character and extent of the accuracy +which philosophers of our school profess. Again, if you follow Zeno, it is +a hard thing to make any one understand what that genuine and simple good +is which cannot be separated from honesty; while Epicurus asserts that he +is wholly unable to comprehend what the character of that good may be +which is unconnected with pleasures which affect the senses. But if we +follow the doctrines of the Old Academy which, as you know, we prefer, +then with what accuracy must we apply ourselves to explain it; with what +shrewdness and even with what obscurity must we argue against the Stoics! +The whole, therefore, of that eagerness for philosophy I claim for myself, +both for the purpose of strengthening my firmness of conduct as far as I +can, and also for the delight of my mind. Nor do I think, as Plato says, +that any more important or more valuable gift has been given to men by the +gods. But I send all my friends who have any zeal for philosophy into +Greece; that is to say, I bid them study the Greek writers, in order to +draw their precepts from the fountain-head, rather than follow little +streams. But those things which no one had previously taught, and which +could not be learnt in any quarter by those who were eager on the subject, +I have laboured as far as I could (for I have no great opinion of anything +which I have done in this line) to explain to our fellow-countrymen. For +this knowledge could not be sought for among the Greeks, nor, after the +death of our friend Lucius AElius,(6) among the Latins either. And yet in +those old works of ours which we composed in imitation of Menippus,(7) not +translating him, sprinkling a little mirth and sportiveness over the whole +subject, there are many things mingled which are drawn from the most +recondite philosophy, and many points argued according to the rules of +strict logic; but I added these lighter matters in order to make the whole +more easy for people of moderate learning to comprehend, if they were +invited to read those essays by a pleasing style, displayed in panegyrics, +and in the very prefaces of my books of antiquities. And this was my +object in adopting this style, however I may have succeeded in it. + +III. The fact, I replied, is just as you say, Varro. For while we were +sojourners, as it were, in our own city, and wandering about like +strangers, your books have conducted us, as it were, home again, so as to +enable us at last to recognise who and where we were. You have discussed +the antiquity of our country, and the variety of dates and chronology +relating to it. You have explained the laws which regulate sacrifices and +priests; you have unfolded the customs of the city both in war and peace; +you have described the various quarters and districts; you have omitted +mentioning none of the names, or kinds, or functions, or causes of divine +or human things; you have thrown a great deal of light on our poets, and +altogether on Latin literature and on Latin expressions; you have yourself +composed a poem of varied beauties, and elegant in almost every point; and +you have in many places touched upon philosophy in a manner sufficient to +excite our curiosity, though inadequate to instruct us. + +You allege, indeed, a very plausible reason for this. For, you say, those +who are learned men will prefer reading philosophical treatises in Greek, +and those who are ignorant of Greek will not read them even in Latin. +However, tell me now, do you really agree with your own argument? I would +rather say, those who are unable to read them in the one language will +read them in the other; and even those who can read them in Greek will not +despise their own language. For what reason can be imagined why men +learned in Greek literature should read the Latin poets, and not read the +Latin philosophers? Or again, if Ennius,(8) Pacuvius, Accius, and many +others who have given us, I will not say the exact expressions, but the +meaning of the Greeks, delight their readers; how much more will the +philosophers delight them, if, as the poets have imitated AEschylus, +Sophocles, and Euripides, they in like manner imitate Plato, Aristotle, +and Theophrastus? I see, too, that any orators among us are praised who +imitate Hyperides or Demosthenes. + +But I, (for I will speak the plain truth,) as long as ambition and the +pursuit of public honours and the pleading of causes, and not a mere +regard for the republic, but even a certain degree of concern in its +government, entangled me in and hampered me with the numerous duties in +which those occupations involved me; I kept, I say, all these matters to +myself, and brushed them up, when I could, by reading, to prevent their +getting rusty. But now, having been stricken to the ground by a most +severe blow of fortune, and being discharged from all concern in the +republic, I seek a medicine for my sorrow in philosophy, and consider this +study the most honourable pastime for my leisure. For I may look upon it +as most suitable to my age, and most especially consistent with any +memorable exploits which I may have performed, and inferior to no other +occupation in its usefulness for the purpose of educating my +fellow-countrymen. Or even if this be too high a view to take of it, at +all events I see nothing else which I can do. My friend Brutus, indeed, a +man eminent for every kind of virtue, has illustrated philosophy in the +Latin language in such a way that he has left Greece nothing to wish for +on those subjects. And he adopts the same opinions that you do. For he was +for some time a pupil of Aristus, at Athens, whose brother Antiochus was +your own preceptor. And therefore do you also, I entreat you, apply +yourself to this kind of literature. + +IV. Then he replied. I will indeed consider of these matters, but only in +your company. But still, said he, what is this which I hear about you +yourself? On what subject? said I. Why, that the old system is deserted by +you, and that you have espoused the principles of the new school. What of +that? said I. Why should Antiochus, my own intimate friend, be more at +liberty to return back again from the new school to the old, than I myself +to migrate to the new from the old? For certainly everything that is most +recent is corrected and amended in the highest degree; although Philo, the +master of Antiochus, a great man, as you yourself consider him, used to +deny in his books that there were two Academies (and we ourselves have +heard him assert the same things in his lectures); and he convicts those +who say that there are, of palpable mistake. It is as you say, said he, +but I do not imagine that you are ignorant of what Antiochus has written +in reply to the arguments of Philo. Certainly, said I, I am not, and I +should like to hear the whole cause of the Old Academy, from which I have +been so long absent, recapitulated by you, if it is not giving you too +much trouble; and let us sit down now, if you have no objection. That will +suit me very well, said he, for I am not at all strong. But let us +consider whether Atticus will be pleased with that compliance of mine, +which I see that you yourself are desirous of. Indeed I shall, said he; +for what could I prefer to being reminded of what I long ago heard from +Antiochus, and seeing at the same time whether those ideas can be +expressed with sufficient suitableness in Latin? So after this preface we +all sat down looking at one another. And Varro began as follows:-- + +Socrates appears to me, and indeed it is the universal opinion, to have +been the first person who drew philosophy away from matters of an abstruse +character, which had been shrouded in mystery by nature herself, and in +which all the philosophers before his time had been wholly occupied, and +to have diverted it to the objects of ordinary life; directing its +speculations to virtues and vices, and generally to whatever was good or +bad. And he thought that the heavenly bodies were either far out of the +reach of our knowledge, or that, even if we became ever so intimately +acquainted with them, they had no influence on living well. In nearly all +his discourses, which have been reported in great variety and very fully +by those who were his pupils, he argues in such a manner that he affirms +nothing himself, but refutes the assertions of others. He says that he +knows nothing, except that one fact, that he is ignorant; and that he is +superior to others in this particular, that they believe that they do know +what they do not, while he knows this one thing alone, that he knows +nothing. And it is on that account that he imagines he was pronounced by +Apollo the wisest of all men, because this alone is the whole of wisdom, +for a man not to think that he knows what he does not know. And as he was +always saying this, and persisting in the maintenance of this opinion, his +discourse was entirely devoted to the praise of virtue, and to encouraging +all men to the study of virtue; as may be plainly seen in the books of the +disciples of Socrates, and above all in those of Plato. But by the +influence of Plato, a man of vast and varied and eloquent genius, a system +of philosophy was established which was one and identical, though under +two names; the system namely of the Academics and Peripatetics. For these +two schools agreed in reality, and differed only in name. For when Plato +had left Speusippus, his sister's son, the inheritor as it were of his +philosophy, and also two pupils most eminent for industry and genius, +Xenocrates of Chalcedon, and Aristotle the Stagirite; those who adhered to +Aristotle were called Peripatetics, because they disputed while walking(9) +in the Lyceum. And the others, who according to the fashion of Plato +himself were accustomed to hold their meetings and discussions in the +Academy, which is a second Gymnasium, took their name from the place where +they used to meet. But both these schools, being impregnated with the +copiousness of Plato, arranged a certain definite system of doctrine, +which was itself copious and luxuriant; but abandoned the Socratic plan of +doubting on every subject, and of discussing everything without ever +venturing on the assertion of a positive opinion. And thus there arose +what Socrates would have been far from approving of, a certain art of +philosophy, and methodical arrangement, and division of the school, which +at first, as I have already said, was one under two names. For there was +no real difference between the Peripatetics and the old Academy. +Aristotle, at least such is my opinion, was superior in a certain +luxuriance of genius; but both schools had the same source, and adopted +the same division of things which were to be desired and avoided. But what +am I about? said he, interrupting himself; am I in my senses while I am +explaining these things to you? for although it may not be exactly a case +of the pig teaching Minerva, still it is not very wise of any one to +attempt to impart instruction to that goddess. + +V. I entreat you however, said Atticus, I entreat you to go on, Varro. For +I am greatly attached to my own countrymen and to their works; and those +subjects delight me beyond measure when they are treated in Latin, and in +such a manner as you treat them. And what, said I, do you think that I +must feel, who have already engaged to display philosophy to our nation? +Let us then, said he, continue the subject, since it is agreeable to you. + +A threefold system of philosophising, then, was already received from +Plato. One, on the subject of life and morals. A second, on nature and +abstruse matters. The third, on discussion, and on what is true or false; +what is right or wrong in a discourse; what is consistent or inconsistent +in forming a decision. + +And that first division of the subject, that namely of living well, they +sought in nature herself, and said that it was necessary to obey her; and +that that chief good to which everything was referred was not to be sought +in anything whatever except in nature. And they laid it down that the +crowning point of all desirable things, and the chief good, was to have +received from nature everything which is requisite for the mind, or the +body, or for life. But of the goods of the body, they placed some in the +whole, and others in the parts. Health, strength, and beauty in the whole. +In the parts, soundness of the senses, and a certain excellence of the +individual parts. As in the feet, swiftness; in the hands, strength; in +the voice, clearness; in the tongue, a distinct articulation of words. The +excellences of the mind they considered those which were suitable to the +comprehension of virtue by the disposition. And those they divided under +the separate heads of nature and morals. Quickness in learning and memory +they attributed to nature; each of which was described as a property of +the mind and genius. Under the head of "morals" they classed our studies, +and, I may say, our habits, which they formed, partly by a continuity of +practice, partly by reason. And in these two things was contained +philosophy itself, in which that which is begun and not brought to its +completion, is called a sort of advance towards virtue; but that which is +brought to completion is virtue, being a sort of perfection of nature and +of all things which they place in the mind; the one most excellent thing. +These things then are qualities of the mind. + +The third division was that of life. And they said that those things which +had influence in facilitating the practice of virtue were connected with +this division. For virtue is discerned in some good qualities of the mind +and body, which are added not so much to nature as to a happy life. They +thought that a man was as it were a certain part of the state, and of the +whole human race, and that he was connected with other men by a sort of +human society. And this is the way in which they deal with the chief and +natural good. But they think that everything else is connected with it, +either in the way of increasing or of maintaining it; as riches, power, +glory, and influence. And thus a threefold division of goods is inferred +by them. + +VI. And these are those three kinds which most people believe the +Peripatetics speak of: and so far they are not wrong; for this division is +the work of that school. But they are mistaken if they think that the +Academicians--those at least who bore this name at that time--are different +from the Peripatetics. The principle, and the chief good asserted by both +appeared to be the same--namely, to attain those things which were in the +first class by nature, and which were intrinsically desirable; the whole +of them, if possible, or, at all events, the most important of them. But +those are the most important which exist in the mind itself, and are +conversant about virtue itself. Therefore, all that ancient philosophy +perceived that a happy life was placed in virtue alone; and yet that it +was not the happiest life possible, unless the good qualities of the body +were added to it, and all the other things which have been already +mentioned, which are serviceable towards acquiring a habit of virtue. From +this definition of theirs, a certain principle of action in life, and of +duty itself, was discovered, which consisted in the preservation of those +things which nature might prescribe. Hence arose the avoidance of sloth, +and contempt of pleasures; from which proceeded the willingness to +encounter many and great labours and pains, for the sake of what was right +and honourable, and of those things which are conformable to the objects +of nature. Hence was generated friendship, and justice, and equity; and +these things were preferred to pleasure and to many of the advantages of +life. This was the system of morals recommended in their school, and the +method and design of that division which I have placed first. + +But concerning nature (for that came next), they spoke in such a manner +that they divided it into two parts,--making one efficient, and the other +lending itself, as it were, to the first, as subject matter to be worked +upon. For that part which was efficient they thought there was power; and +in that which was made something by it they thought there was some matter; +and something of both in each. For they considered that matter itself +could have no cohesion, unless it were held together by some power; and +that power could have none without some matter to work upon; for that is +nothing which is not necessarily somewhere. But that which exists from a +combination of the two they called at once body, and a sort of quality, as +it were. For you will give me leave, in speaking of subjects which have +not previously been in fashion, to use at times words which have never +been heard of (which, indeed, is no more than the Greeks themselves do, +who have been long in the habit of discussing these subjects). + +VII. To be sure we will, said Atticus. Moreover, you may even use Greek +words when you wish, if by chance you should be at a loss for Latin ones. +You are very kind; but I will endeavour to express myself in Latin, except +in the case of such words as these--_philosophia_, _rhetorica_, _physica_, +or _dialectica_, which, like many others, fashion already sanctions, as if +they were Latin. I therefore have called those things _qualitates_ +(qualities), which the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}--a word which, even among the +Greeks, is not one in ordinary use, but is confined to philosophers. And +the same rule applies to many other expressions. As for the Dialecticians, +they have no terms in common use: they use technical terms entirely. And +the case is the same with nearly every art; for men must either invent new +names for new things, or else borrow them from other subjects. And if the +Greeks do this, who have now been engaged in such matters for so many +ages, how much more ought this licence to be allowed to us, who are now +endeavouring to deal with these subjects for the first time? But, said I, +O Varro, it appears to me that you will deserve well of your +fellow-countrymen, if you enrich them, not only with an abundance of new +things, as you have done, but also of words. We will venture, then, said +he, to employ new terms, if it be necessary, armed with your authority and +sanction. + +Of these qualities, then, said he, some are principal ones, and others +arise out of them. The principal ones are of one character and simple; but +those which arise out of them are various, and, as it were, multiform. +Therefore, air (we use the Greek word {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} as Latin), fire, water, and +earth are principal ones; and out of them there arise the forms of living +creatures, and of those things which are produced out of the earth. +Therefore, those first are called principles and (to translate the Greek +word) elements: from which air and fire have the power of movement and +efficiency: the other divisions--I mean, water and the earth--have the power +of receiving, and, as it were, of suffering. The fifth class, from which +the stars and winds were formed, Aristotle considered to be a separate +essence, and different from those four which I have mentioned above. + +But they think that there is placed under all of these a certain matter +without any form, and destitute of all quality (for we may as well, by +constant use, make this word more usual and notorious), from which all +things are sketched out and made; which can receive everything in its +entirety, and can be changed in every manner and in every part. And also +that it perishes, not so as to become nothing, but so as to be dissolved +with its component parts, which again are able to be cut up and divided, +_ad infinitum_; since there is absolutely nothing in the whole nature of +things which cannot be divided: and those things which are moved, are all +moved at intervals, which intervals again are capable of being infinitely +divided. And, since that power which we have called quality is moved in +this way, and is agitated in every direction, they think also that the +whole of matter is itself entirely changed, and so that those things are +produced which they call qualities, from which the world is made, in +universal nature, cohering together and connected with all its divisions; +and, out of the world, there is no such thing as any portion of matter or +any body. + +And they say that the parts of the world are all the things which exist in +it, and which are maintained by sentient nature; in which perfect reason +is placed, which is also everlasting: for that there is nothing more +powerful which can be the cause of its dissolution. And this power they +call the soul of the world, and also its intellect and perfect wisdom. And +they call it God, a providence watching over everything subject to its +dominion, and, above all, over the heavenly bodies; and, next to them, +over those things on earth which concern men: which also they sometimes +call necessity, because nothing can be done in a manner different from +that in which it has been arranged by it in a destined (if I may so say) +and inevitable continuation of eternal order. Sometimes, too, they call it +fortune, because it brings about many unforeseen things, which have never +been expected by us, on account of the obscurity of their causes, and our +ignorance of them. + +VIII. The third part of philosophy, which is next in order, being +conversant about reason and discussion, was thus handled by both schools. +They said that, although it originated in the senses, still the power of +judging of the truth was not in the senses. They insisted upon it that +intellect was the judge of things. They thought that the only thing +deserving of belief, because it alone discerned that which was always +simple and uniform, and which perceived its real character. This they call +_idea_, having already received this name from Plato; and we properly +entitle it _species_. + +But they thought that all the senses were dull and slow, and that they did +not by any means perceive those things which appeared subjected to the +senses; which were either so small as to be unable to come under the +notice of sense, or so moveable and rapid that none of them was ever one +consistent thing, nor even the same thing, because everything was in a +continual state of transition and disappearance. And therefore they called +all this division of things one resting wholly on opinion. But they +thought that science had no existence anywhere except in the notions and +reasonings of the mind; on which account they approved of the definitions +of things, and employed them on everything which was brought under +discussion. The explanation of words also was approved of--that is to say, +the explanation of the cause why everything was named as it was; and that +they called etymology. Afterwards they used arguments, and, as it were, +marks of things, for the proof and conclusion of what they wished to have +explained; in which the whole system of dialectics--that is to say, of an +oration brought to its conclusion by ratiocination, was handed down. And +to this there was added, as a kind of second part, the oratorical power of +speaking, which consists in developing a continued discourse, composed in +a manner adapted to produce conviction. + +IX. This was the first philosophy handed down to them by Plato. And if you +like I will explain to you those discussions which have originated in it. +Indeed, said I, we shall be glad if you will; and I can answer for Atticus +as well as for myself. You are quite right, said he; for the doctrine both +of the Peripatetics and of the old Academy is most admirably explained. + +Aristotle, then, was the first to undermine the doctrine of species, which +I have just now mentioned, and which Plato had embraced in a wonderful +manner; so that he even affirmed that there was something divine in it. +But Theophrastus, a man of very delightful eloquence, and of such purity +of morals that his probity and integrity were notorious to all men, broke +down more vigorously still the authority of the old school; for he +stripped virtue of its beauty, and made it powerless, by denying that to +live happily depended solely on it. For Strato, his pupil, although a man +of brilliant abilities, must still be excluded entirely from that school; +for, having deserted that most indispensable part of philosophy which is +placed in virtue and morals, and having devoted himself wholly to the +investigation of nature, he by that very conduct departs as widely as +possible from his companions. But Speusippus and Xenocrates, who were the +earliest supporters of the system and authority of Plato,--and, after them, +Polemo and Crates, and at the same time Crantor,--being all collected +together in the Academy, diligently maintained those doctrines which they +had received from their predecessors. Zeno and Arcesilas had been diligent +attenders on Polemo; but Zeno, who preceded Arcesilas in point of time, +and argued with more subtilty, and was a man of the greatest acuteness, +attempted to correct the system of that school. And, if you like, I will +explain to you the way in which he set about that correction, as Antiochus +used to explain it. Indeed, said I, I shall be very glad to hear you do +so; and you see that Pomponius intimates the same wish. + +X. Zeno, then, was not at all a man like Theophrastus, to cut through the +sinews of virtue; but, on the other hand, he was one who placed everything +which could have any effect in producing a happy life in virtue alone, and +who reckoned nothing else a good at all, and who called that honourable +which was single in its nature, and the sole and only good. But as for all +other things, although they were neither good nor bad, he divided them, +calling some according to, and others contrary to nature. There were +others which he looked upon as placed between these two classes, and which +he called intermediate. Those which were according to nature, he taught +his disciples, deserved to be taken, and to be considered worthy of a +certain esteem. To those which were contrary to nature, he assigned a +contrary character; and those of the intermediate class he left as +neutrals, and attributed to them no importance whatever. But of those +which he said ought to be taken, he considered some worthy of a higher +estimation and others of a less. Those which were worthy of a higher +esteem, he called _preferred_; those which were only worthy of a lower +degree, he called _rejected_. And as he had altered all these things, not +so much in fact as in name, so too he defined some actions as +intermediate, lying between good deeds and sins, between duty and a +violation of duty;--classing things done rightly as good actions, and +things done wrongly (that is to say, sins) as bad actions. And several +duties, whether discharged or neglected, he considered of an intermediate +character, as I have already said. And whereas his predecessors had not +placed every virtue in reason, but had said that some virtues were +perfected by nature, or by habit, he placed them all in reason; and while +they thought that those kinds of virtues which I have mentioned above +could be separated, he asserted that that could not be done in any manner, +and affirmed that not only the practice of virtue (which was the doctrine +of his predecessors), but the very disposition to it, was intrinsically +beautiful; and that virtue could not possibly be present to any one +without his continually practising it. + +And while they did not entirely remove all perturbation of mind from man, +(for they admitted that man did by nature grieve, and desire, and fear, +and become elated by joy,) but only contracted it, and reduced it to +narrow bounds; he maintained that the wise man was wholly free from all +these diseases as they might be called. And as the ancients said that +those perturbations were natural, and devoid of reason, and placed desire +in one part of the mind and reason in another, he did not agree with them +either; for he thought that all perturbations were voluntary, and were +admitted by the judgment of the opinion, and that a certain unrestrained +intemperance was the mother of all of them. And this is nearly what he +laid down about morals. + +XI. But about natures he held these opinions. In the first place, he did +not connect this fifth nature, out of which his predecessors thought that +sense and intellect were produced, with those four principles of things. +For he laid it down that fire is that nature which produces everything, +and intellect, and sense. But he differed from them again, inasmuch as he +thought it absolutely impossible for anything to be produced from that +nature which was destitute of body; which was the character attributed by +Xenocrates and his predecessors to the mind, and he would not allow that +that which produced anything, or which was produced by anything, could +possibly be anything except body. + +But he made a great many alterations in that third part of his philosophy, +in which, first of all, he said some new things of the senses themselves: +which he considered to be united by some impulse as it were, acting upon +them from without, which he called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, and which we may term +_perception_. And let us recollect this word, for we shall have frequent +occasion to employ it in the remainder of our discourse; but to these +things which are perceived, and as it were accepted by the senses, he adds +the assent of the mind, which he considers to be placed in ourselves and +voluntary. He did not give credit to everything which is perceived, but +only to those which contain some especial character of those things which +are seen; but he pronounced what was seen, when it was discerned on +account of its own power, _comprehensible_--will you allow me this word? +Certainly, said Atticus, for how else are you to express {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}? But +after it had been received and approved, then he called it +_comprehension_, resembling those things which are taken up +(_prehenduntur_) in the hand; from which verb also he derived this noun, +though no one else had ever used this verb with reference to such matters; +and he also used many new words, for he was speaking of new things. But +that which was comprehended by sense he called _felt_ (_sensum_,) and if +it was so comprehended that it could not be eradicated by reason, he +called it knowledge; otherwise he called it ignorance: from which also was +engendered opinion, which was weak, and compatible with what was false or +unknown. But between knowledge and ignorance he placed that comprehension +which I have spoken of, and reckoned it neither among what was right or +what was wrong, but said that it alone deserved to be trusted. + +And from this he attributed credit also to the senses, because, as I have +said above, comprehension made by the senses appeared to him to be true +and trustworthy. Not because it comprehended all that existed in a thing, +but because it left out nothing which could affect it, and because nature +had given it to us to be as it were a rule of knowledge, and a principle +from which subsequently all notions of things might be impressed on our +minds, from which not only principles, but some broader paths to the +discovery of reason are found out. But error, and rashness, and ignorance, +and opinion, and suspicion, and in a word everything which was +inconsistent with a firm and consistent assent, he discarded from virtue +and wisdom. And it is in these things that nearly all the disagreement +between Zeno and his predecessors, and all his alteration of their system +consists. + +XII. And when he had spoken thus--You have, said I, O Varro, explained the +principles both of the Old Academy and of the Stoics with brevity, but +also with great clearness. But I think it to be true, as Antiochus, a +great friend of mine, used to assert, that it is to be considered rather +as a corrected edition of the Old Academy, than as any new sect. Then +Varro replied--It is your part now, who revolt from the principles of the +ancients, and who approve of the innovations which have been made by +Arcesilas, to explain what that division of the two schools which he made +was, and why he made it; so that we may see whether that revolt of his was +justifiable. Then I replied--Arcesilas, as we understand, directed all his +attacks against Zeno, not out of obstinacy or any desire of gaining the +victory, as it appears to me, but by reason of the obscurity of those +things which had brought Socrates to the confession of ignorance, and even +before Socrates, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and nearly all the +ancients; who asserted that nothing could be ascertained, or perceived, or +known: that the senses of man were narrow, his mind feeble, the course of +his life short, and that truth, as Democritus said, was sunk in the deep; +that everything depended on opinions and established customs; that nothing +was left to truth. They said in short, that everything was enveloped in +darkness; therefore Arcesilas asserted that there was nothing which could +be known, not even that very piece of knowledge which Socrates had left +himself. Thus he thought that everything lay hid in secret, and that there +was nothing which could be discerned or understood; for which reasons it +was not right for any one to profess or affirm anything, or sanction +anything by his assent, but men ought always to restrain their rashness +and to keep it in check so as to guard it against every fall. For rashness +would be very remarkable when anything unknown or false was approved of; +and nothing could be more discreditable than for a man's assent and +approbation to precede his knowledge and perception of a fact. And he used +to act consistently with these principles, so as to pass most of his days +in arguing against every one's opinion, in order that when equally +important reasons were found for both sides of the same question, the +judgment might more naturally be suspended, and prevented from giving +assent to either. + +This they call the New Academy, which however appears to me to be the old +one, if, at least, we reckon Plato as one of that Old Academy. For in his +books nothing is affirmed positively, and many arguments are allowed on +both sides of a question; everything is investigated, and nothing positive +affirmed. Still let the school whose principles I have explained, be +called the Old Academy, and this other the New; which, having continued to +the time of Carneades, who was the fourth in succession after Arcesilas, +continued in the same principles and system as Arcesilas. But Carneades, +being a man ignorant of no part of philosophy, and, as I have learnt from +those who had been his pupils, and particularly from Zeno the Epicurean, +who, though he greatly differed from him in opinion, still admired him +above all other men, was also a person of incredible abilities... + +_The rest of this Book is lost._ + + + + + +SECOND BOOK OF THE ACADEMIC QUESTIONS. + + +I. Lucius Lucullus was a man of great genius, and very much devoted to the +study of the most important arts; every branch of liberal learning worthy +of a man of high birth, was thoroughly understood by him; but at the time +when he might have made the greatest figure in the forum, he was wholly +removed from all participation in the business of the city. For while he +was very young, he, uniting with his brother, a man of equal sense of duty +and diligence with himself, followed up the quarrel(10) bequeathed to him +by his father to his own exceeding credit; afterwards having gone as +quaestor into Asia, he there governed the province for many years with +great reputation. Subsequently he was made aedile in his absence, and +immediately after that he was elected praetor; for his services had been +rewarded by an express law authorizing his election at a period earlier +than usual. After that he was sent into Africa; from thence he proceeded +to the consulship, the duties of which he discharged in such a manner, +that every one admired his diligence, and recognised his genius. +Afterwards he was sent by the Senate to conduct the war against +Mithridates, and there he not only surpassed the universal expectation +which every one had formed of his valour, but even the glory of his +predecessors. And that was the more admirable in him, because great skill +as a general was not very much looked for in one who had spent his youth +in the occupations of the forum, and the duration of his quaestorship in +peace in Asia, while Murena was carrying on the war in Pontus. But the +incredible greatness of his genius did not require the aid of experience, +which can never be taught by precepts. Therefore, having devoted the whole +time occupied in his march and his voyage, partly to making inquiries of +those who were skilful in such matters, and partly in reading the accounts +of great achievements, he arrived in Asia a perfect general, though he had +left Rome entirely ignorant of military affairs. For he had an almost +divine memory for facts, though Hortensius had a better one for words. But +as in performing great deeds, facts are of more consequence than words, +this memory of his was the more serviceable of the two; and they say, that +the same quality was conspicuous in Themistocles, whom we consider beyond +all comparison the first man in Greece. And a story is told of him, that, +when some one promised to teach him the art of memory, which was then +beginning to be cultivated, he answered, that he should much prefer +learning to forget; I suppose, because everything which he had either +heard or seen stuck in his memory. + +Lucullus having this great genius, added to it that study which +Themistocles had despised: therefore, as we write down in letters what we +wish to commit to monuments, he, in like manner, had the facts engraved in +his mind. Therefore, he was a general of such perfect skill in every kind +of war, in battles, and sieges, and naval fights, and in the whole +equipment and management of war, that that king, the greatest that has +ever lived since the time of Alexander, confessed, that he considered him +a greater general than any one of whom he had ever read. He also displayed +such great prudence in arranging and regulating the affairs of the +different cities, and such great justice too, that to this very day, Asia +is preserved by the careful maintenance of the regulations, and by +following as it were in the footsteps of Lucullus. But although it was +greatly to the advantage of the republic, still that great virtue and +genius was kept abroad at a distance from the eyes both of the forum and +the senate-house, for a longer time than I could have wished. Moreover, +when he had returned victorious from the war against Mithridates, owing to +the calumnies of his adversaries, he did not celebrate his triumph till +three years later than he ought to have done. For I may almost say, that I +myself when consul led into the city the chariot of that most illustrious +man, and I might enlarge upon the great advantage that his counsel and +authority were to me, in the most critical circumstances, if it were not +that to do so would compel me to speak of myself, which at this moment is +not necessary. Therefore, I will rather deprive him of the testimony due +to him, than mix it up now with a commendation of myself. + +II. But as for those exploits of Lucullus, which were entitled to be +celebrated by the praises of the nation, they have been extolled both in +Greek and Latin writings. For those outward exploits of his are known to +us in common with the multitude; but his interior excellences (if I may so +call them) we and a few of his friends have learnt from himself. For +Lucullus used to apply himself to every kind of literature, and especially +to philosophy, with greater eagerness than those who were not acquainted +with him believed. And he did so, not only at his first entrance into +life, but also when he was proquaestor, as he was for several years, and +even during the time of war itself, a time when men are usually so fully +occupied with their military business, that very little leisure is left to +the general, even in his own tent. And as of all the philosophers of that +day, Antiochus, who had been a pupil of Philo, was thought to excel in +genius and learning, he kept him about him while he was quaestor, and some +years afterwards when he was general. And as he had that extraordinary +memory which I have mentioned already, by hearing frequently of things, he +arrived at a thorough acquaintance with them; as he recollected everything +that he had heard of only once. And he was wonderfully delighted in the +reading books of which he heard any one speak. + +And I sometimes fear lest I may even diminish the glory of such characters +as his, even while wishing to enhance it; for there are many people who +are altogether averse to Greek literature, still more who have a dislike +to philosophy, and men in general, even though they do not positively +disapprove of them, still think the discussion of such matters not +altogether suitable for the chiefs of the state. But I, having heard that +Marcus Cato learnt Greek in his old age, and learning from history that +Panaetius was above all other men the chosen companion of Publius +Africanus, in that noble embassy which he was employed on before he +entered on the censorship, think I have no need of any other instance to +justify his study of Greek literature or of philosophy. + +It remains for me to reply to those men who disapprove of such dignified +characters being mixed up in discussions of this sort; as if the meetings +of illustrious men were bound to be passed in silence, or their +conversation to be confined to jesting, and all the topics to be drawn +from trifling subjects. In truth, if in any one of my writings I have +given philosophy its due praise, then surely its discussion is thoroughly +worthy of every excellent and honourable man; nor is anything else +necessary to be taken care of by us, whom the Roman people has placed in +our present rank, except that we do not devote to our private pursuits, +the time which ought to be bestowed on the affairs of the public. But if, +while we are bound to discharge our duties, we still not only never omit +to give our assistance in all public meetings, but never even write a +single word unconnected with the forum, who then will blame our leisure, +because even in that moment we are unwilling to allow ourselves to grow +rusty and stupid, but take pains rather to benefit as many people as +possible? + +And I think, that not only is the glory of those men not diminished, but +that it is even increased by our adding to their popular and notorious +praises these also which are less known and less spoken of. Some people +also deny that those men who are introduced in our writings as disputants +had any knowledge of those affairs which are the subjects of discussion. +But they appear to me to be showing their envy, not only of the living but +also of the dead. + +III. There remains one class of critics who disapprove of the general +principles of the Academy. Which we should be more concerned at if any one +approved of any school of philosophy except that which he himself +followed. But we, since we are in the habit of arguing against every one +who appears to himself to know anything, cannot object to others also +dissenting from us. Although our side of the question is an easier one, +since we wish to discover the truth without any dispute, and we seek for +that with the greatest anxiety and diligence. For although all knowledge +is beset with many difficulties, and there is that obscurity in the things +themselves and that infirmity in our own judgment, that it is not without +reason that the most learned and ancient philosophers have distrusted +their power of discovering what they wished; yet they have not been +deficient in any respect, nor do we allow ourselves to abandon the pursuit +of truth through fatigue; nor have our discussions ever any other object +except that of, by arguing on each side, eliciting, and as it were, +squeezing out something which may either be the truth itself, or may at +least come as near as possible to it. Nor is there any difference between +us and those people who fancy that they know something, except that they +do not doubt at all that those doctrines which they uphold are the truth, +while we account many things as probable which we can adopt as our belief, +but can hardly positively affirm. + +And in this we are more free and unfettered than they are, because our +power of judging is unimpeached, and because we are not compelled by any +necessity to defend theories which are laid upon as injunctions, and, if I +may say so, as commands. For in the first place, those of the other +schools have been bound hand and foot before they were able to judge what +was best; and, secondly, before their age or their understanding had come +to maturity, they have either followed the opinion of some friend, or been +charmed by the eloquence of some one who was the first arguer whom they +ever heard, and so have been led to form a judgment on what they did not +understand, and now they cling to whatever school they were, as it were, +dashed against in a tempest, like sailors clinging to a rock. For as to +their statement that they are wholly trusting to one whom they judge to +have been a wise man, I should approve of that if that were a point which +they, while ignorant and unlearned, were able to judge of, (for to decide +who is a wise man appears to me most especially the task of one who is +himself wise.) But they have either formed their opinion as well as they +could from a hearing of all the circumstances, and also from a knowledge +of the opinions of philosophers of all the other schools; or else, having +heard the matter mentioned once, they have surrendered themselves to the +guidance of some one individual. But, I know not how it is, most people +prefer being in error, and defending with the utmost pugnacity that +opinion which they have taken a fancy to, to inquiring without any +obstinacy what is said with the greatest consistency. + +And these subjects were very frequently and very copiously discussed by us +at other times, and once also in the villa of Hortensius, which is at +Bauli, when Catulus, and Lucullus, and I myself had arrived there the day +after we had been staying with Catulus. And we had come thither rather +early in the day, because we had intended, if the wind was fair, to set +sail, Lucullus for his villa near Naples, and I myself towards mine, in +the district of Pompeii. When, therefore, we had had a short conversation +on the terrace, we sat down where we were. + +IV. Then Catulus said,--Although what we were inquiring into yesterday was +almost wholly explained in such a manner that nearly the whole question +appears to have been discussed, still I long to hear what you promised to +tell us, Lucullus, as being what you had learnt from Antiochus. I, indeed, +said Hortensius, did more than I intended, for the whole matter ought to +have been left untouched for Lucullus, and indeed, perhaps it was: for I +only said such things as occurred to me at the moment; but I hope to hear +something more recondite from Lucullus. + +Lucullus rejoined, I am not much troubled, Hortensius, at your +expectation, although there is nothing so unfavourable for those who wish +to give pleasure; but still, as I am not very anxious about how far I can +prove to your satisfaction the arguments which I advance, I am the less +disturbed. For the arguments which I am going to repeat are not my own, +nor such that, if they are incorrect, I should not prefer being defeated +to gaining the victory; but, in truth, as the case stands at present, +although the doctrines of my school were somewhat shaken in yesterday's +discussion, still they do seem to me to be wholly true. I will therefore +argue as Antiochus used to argue; for the subject is one with which I am +well acquainted. For I used to listen to his lectures with a mind quite +unengaged, and with great pleasure, and, moreover, he frequently discussed +the same subject over again; so that you have some grounds for expecting +more from me than you had from Hortensius a little while ago. When he had +begun in this manner we prepared to listen with great attention. + +And he spoke thus:--When I was at Alexandria, as proquaestor, Antiochus was +with me, and before my arrival, Heraclitus, of Tyre, a friend of +Antiochus, had already settled in Alexandria, a man who had been for many +years a pupil of Clitomachus and of Philo, and who had a great and +deserved reputation in that school, which having been almost utterly +discarded, is now coming again into fashion; and I used often to hear +Antiochus arguing with him; but they both conducted their discussions with +great gentleness. And just at that time those two books of Philo which +were yesterday mentioned by Catulus had been brought to Alexandria, and +had for the first time come under the notice of Antiochus; and he, though +naturally a man of the mildest disposition, (nor indeed was it possible +for any one to be more peaceable than he was,) was nevertheless a little +provoked. I was surprised, for I had never seen him so before: but he, +appealing to the recollection of Heraclitus, began to inquire of him +whether he had seen those works of Philo, or whether he had heard the +doctrines contained in them, either from Philo or from any one else of the +Academic school? And he said that he had not; however, he recognised the +style of Philo, nor, indeed, could there be any doubt about it; for some +friends of mine, men of great learning, Publius and Caius Setilius, and +Tetrilius Rogus were present, who said that they heard Philo advance such +operations at Rome; and who said that they had written out those two books +from his dictation. Then Antiochus repeated what Catulus mentioned +yesterday, as having been said to Philo by his father, and many other +things besides; nor did he forbear even to publish a book against his own +master, which is called "Sosus." + +I therefore, then, as I was much interested in hearing Heraclitus arguing +against Antiochus, and Antiochus against the Academicians, paid great +attention to Antiochus, in order to learn the whole matter from him. +Accordingly, for many days, collecting together Heraclitus and several +learned men, and among them Aristus, the brother of Antiochus, and also +Ariston and Dion, men whom he considered only second to his brother in +genius, we devoted a great deal of time to that single discussion. + +But we must pass over that part of it which was bestowed on refuting the +doctrines of Philo; for he is a less formidable adversary, who altogether +denies that the Academicians advance those arguments which were maintained +yesterday. For although he is quite wrong as to the fact, still he is a +less invincible adversary. Let us speak of Arcesilas and Carneades. + +V. And having said this, he began again:--You appear to me, in the first +place, (and he addressed me by name,) when you speak of the old natural +philosophers, to do the same thing that seditious citizens are in the +habit of doing when they bring forward some illustrious men of the +ancients, who they say were friends of the people, in the hope of being +themselves considered like them. They go back to Publius Valerius, who was +consul the first year after the expulsion of the kings. They enumerate all +the other men who have passed laws for the advantage of the people +concerning appeals when they were consuls; and then they come down to +these better known men, Caius Flaminius, who, as tribune of the people, +passed an Agrarian law some years before the second Punic war, against the +will of the senate, and who was afterwards twice elected consul; to Lucius +Cassius and Quintus Pompeius; they are also in the habit of classing +Publius Africanus in the same list; and they assert that those two +brothers of infinite wisdom and exceeding glory, Publius Crassus and +Publius Scaevola, were the advisers of Tiberius Gracchus, in the matter of +the laws which he proposed; the one, indeed, as we see, openly; the other, +as we suspect, in a more concealed manner. They add also Caius Marius; and +with respect to him they speak truly enough: then, having recounted the +names of so many illustrious men, they say that they are acting up to +their principles. + +In like manner, you, when you are seeking to overturn a well-established +system of philosophy, in the same way as those men endeavoured to overturn +the republic, bring forward the names of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, +Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, and even Plato and Socrates. But +Saturninus, (that I may name my own enemy rather than any one else,) had +nothing in him resembling those ancient men; nor are the ungrounded +accusations of Arcesilas to be compared to the modesty of Democritus. And +yet those natural philosophers, though very seldom, when they have any +very great difficulty, make loud and violent outcries, as if under the +influence of some great excitement, Empedocles, indeed, does so to such a +degree, that he appears to me at times to be mad, crying out that all +things are hidden, that we feel nothing, see nothing, and cannot find out +the true character of anything whatever. But for the most part all those +men appear to me to affirm some things rather too positively, and to +profess that they know more than they really do know. But if they then +hesitated while discussing new subjects, like children lately born, are we +for that reason to think that nothing has been explained in so many ages +by the greatest genius and the most untiring industry? May we not say +that, after the establishment of some wise and important schools of +philosophy, then, as Tiberius Gracchus arose in an excellent constitution, +for the purpose of throwing everything into confusion, so Arcesilas rose +up to overturn the established philosophy, and to shelter himself under +the authority of those men who asserted that nothing could be known or +perceived; in which number we ought not to include Plato or Socrates; the +one because he left behind him a most perfect school, namely, the +Peripatetics and Academics, differing in name, but agreeing in all +substantial matters: and from whom the Stoics themselves differ in words +rather than in opinions. But Socrates, who always disparaged himself in +arguing, attributed more knowledge to those whom he wished to refute. So, +as he was speaking differently from what he really thought, he was fond of +using that kind of dissimulation which the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}; which +Fannius says Africanus also was in the habit of indulging in, and that +that ought not be considered a bad habit in him, as it was a favourite +practice of Socrates. + +VI. But, however, we will allow, if you like, that all those things were +unknown to the ancients:--was nothing effected then, by their being +thoroughly investigated, after that Arcesilas, disparaging Zeno, (for that +is supposed to have been his object,) as discovering nothing new, but only +correcting previous changes of names, while seeking to upset his +definitions, had attempted to envelop the clearest possible matters in +darkness? And his system, which was at first not at all approved of, +although it was illustrated both by acute genius and by an admirable +wittiness of language, was in the next generation adopted by no one but +Lacydes; but subsequently it was perfected by Carneades, who was the +fourth in succession from Arcesilas; for he was the pupil of Hegesinus, +who had been the pupil of Evander, the disciple of Lacydes, and Lacydes +himself had been the pupil of Arcesilas; but Carneades maintained it for a +long time, for he lived ninety years; and those who had been his pupils +had a very high reputation, of whom Clitomachus displayed the most +industry, as the number of books which he composed testifies; nor was +there less brilliancy of genius in him than there was of eloquence in +Charmadas, or of sweetness in Melanthius of Rhodes. But Metrodorus of +Stratonice was thought to be the one who had the most thorough +understanding of Carneades. And your friend Philo attended the lectures of +Clitomachus for many years; but as long as Philo was alive the Academy was +never in want of a head. + +But the business that we now propose to ourselves, of arguing against the +Academicians, appears to some philosophers, and those, too, men of no +ordinary calibre, to be a thing that ought not to be done at all; and they +think that there is no sense at all in, and no method of disputing with +men who approve of nothing; and they blame Antipater, the Stoic, who was +very fond of doing so, and say that there is no need of laying down exact +definitions of what knowledge is, or perception, or, if we want to render +word for word, comprehension, which they call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}; and they say that +those who wish to persuade men that there is anything which can be +comprehended and perceived, are acting ignorantly; because there is +nothing clearer than {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, as the Greeks call it, and which we may +call perspicuity, or evidentness if you like,--coining words, if you will +permit us to do so, that this fellow (meaning me) may not think that he is +the only person to whom such liberties are permitted. Still they thought +that no discourse could be found which should be more intelligible than +evidentness itself; and they thought that there was no need of defining +things which were so clear. + +But others declared that they would never be the first to speak in behalf +of this evidentness; but they thought that a reply ought to be made to +those arguments which were advanced against it, to prevent any one being +deceived by them. There are also many men who do not disapprove of the +definitions of the evident things themselves, and who think the subject +one worthy of being inquired into, and the men worthy of being argued +with. + +But Philo, while he raises some new questions, because he was scarcely +able to withstand the things which were said against the obstinacy of the +Academicians, speaks falsely, without disguise, as he was reproached for +doing by the elder Catulus; and also, as Antiochus told him, falls into +the very trap of which he was afraid. For as he asserted that there was +nothing which could be comprehended, (for that is what we conceive to be +meant by {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~},) if that was, as Zeno defined it, such a perception, +(for we have already spent time enough yesterday in beating out a word for +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~},) then a perception was extracted and produced out of that from +which it originated, such as could be produced from that from which it did +not originate. And we say that this matter was most excellently defined by +Zeno; for how can anything be comprehended, so that you may feel +absolutely sure that it has been perceived and known, which is of such a +character that it is even possible that it may be false? Now when Philo +upsets and denies this, he takes away also all distinction between what is +known and unknown; from which it follows that nothing can be comprehended; +and so, without intending it, he is brought back to the point he least +intended. Wherefore, all this discourse against the Academy is undertaken +by us in order that we may retain that definition which Philo wished to +overturn; and unless we succeed in that, we grant that nothing can be +perceived. + +VII. Let us begin then with the senses--the judgments of which are so clear +and certain, that if an option were given to our nature, and if some god +were to ask of it whether it is content with its own unimpaired and +uncorrupted senses, or whether it desires something better, I do not see +what more it could ask for. Nor while speaking on this topic need you wait +while I reply to the illustration drawn from a bent oar, or the neck of a +dove; for I am not a man to say that everything which seems is exactly of +that character of which it seems to be. Epicurus may deal with this idea, +and with many others; but in my opinion there is the very greatest truth +in the senses, if they are in sound and healthy order, and if everything +is removed which could impede or hinder them. Therefore we often wish the +light to be changed, or the situation of those things which we are looking +at; and we either narrow or enlarge distances; and we do many things until +our sight causes us to feel confidence in our judgment. And the same thing +takes place with respect to sounds, and smell, and taste, so that there is +not one of us who, in each one of his senses, requires a more acute +judgment as to each sort of thing. + +But when practice and skill are added, so that one's eyes are charmed by a +picture, and one's ears by songs, who is there who can fail to see what +great power there is in the senses? How many things do painters see in +shadows and in projections which we do not see? How many beauties which +escape us in music are perceived by those who are practised in that kind +of accomplishment? men who, at the first note of the flute-player, +say,--That is the Antiope, or the Andromache, when we have not even a +suspicion of it. There is no need for me to speak of the faculties of +taste or smell; organs in which there is a degree of intelligence, however +faulty it may be. Why should I speak of touch, and of that kind of touch +which philosophers call the inner one, I mean the touch of pleasure or +pain? in which alone the Cyrenaics think that there is any judgment of the +truth, because pleasure or pain are felt. Can any one then say that there +is no difference between a man who is in pain and a man who is in +pleasure? or can any one think that a man who entertains this opinion is +not flagrantly mad? + +But such as those things are which we say are perceived by the senses, +such also are those things which are said to be perceived, not by the +senses themselves, but by the senses after a fashion; as these things--that +is white, this is sweet, that is tuneful, this is fragrant, that is rough. +We have these ideas already comprehended by the mind, not by the senses. +Again, this is a house, that is a dog. Then the rest of the series +follows, connecting the more important links; such as these, which +embrace, as it were, the full comprehension of things;--If he is a man, he +is a mortal animal partaking of reason:--from which class of arguments the +notions of things are impressed upon us, without which nothing can be +understood, nor inquired into, nor discussed. But if those notions were +false, (for you seemed to me to translate {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} _notions_,) if, I say, +they were false, or impressed, or perceptions of such a kind as not to be +able to be distinguished from false ones; then I should like to know how +we were to use them? and how we were to see what was consistent with each +thing and what was inconsistent with it? Certainly no room at all is here +left for memory, which of all qualities is the one that most completely +contains, not only philosophy, but the whole practice of life, and all the +arts. For what memory can there be of what is false? or what does any one +remember which he does not comprehend and hold in his mind? And what art +can there be except that which consists not of one, nor of two, but of +many perceptions of the mind? and if you take these away, how are you to +distinguish the artist from the ignorant man? For we must not say at +random that this man is an artist, and deny that that man is; but we must +only do so when we see that the one retains the things which he has +perceived and comprehended, and that the other does not. And as some arts +are of that kind that one can only see the fact in one's mind, others such +that one can design and effect something, how can a geometrician perceive +those things which have no existence, or which cannot be distinguished +from what is false? or how can he who plays on the lyre complete his +rhythm, and finish verses? And the same will be the case with respect to +similar arts, whose whole work consists in acting and in effecting +something. For what is there that can be effected by art, unless the man +who exercises the art has many perceptions? + +VIII. And most especially does the knowledge of virtues confirm the +assertion that many things can be perceived and comprehended. And in those +things alone do we say that science exists; which we consider to be not a +mere comprehension of things, but one that is firm and unchangeable; and +we consider it also to be wisdom, the art of living which, by itself, +derives consistency from itself. But if that consistency has no perception +or knowledge about it, then I ask whence it has originated and how? I ask +also, why that good man who has made up his mind to endure every kind of +torture, to be torn by intolerable pain, rather than to betray his duty or +his faith, has imposed on himself such bitter conditions, when he has +nothing comprehended, perceived, known, or established, to lead him to +think that he is bound to do so? It cannot, then, by any possibility be +the case that any one should estimate equity and good faith so highly as +to shrink from no punishment for the sake of preserving them, unless he +has assented to those facts which cannot be false. But as to wisdom +itself, if it be ignorant of its own character, and if it does not know +whether it be wisdom or not, in the first place, how is it to obtain its +name of wisdom? Secondly, how will it venture to undertake any exploit, or +to perform it with confidence, when it has nothing certain to follow? But +when it doubts what is the chief and highest good, being ignorant to what +everything is referred, how can it be wisdom? + +And that also is manifest, that it is necessary that there should be laid +down in the first place a principle which wisdom may follow when it begins +to act; and that principle must be adapted to nature. For otherwise, the +desire, (for that is how I translate {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~},) by which we are impelled to +act, and by which we desire what has been seen, cannot be set in motion. +But that which sets anything in motion must first be seen and trusted, +which cannot be the case if that which is seen cannot be distinguished +from what is false. But how can the mind be moved to desire anything, if +it cannot be perceived whether that which is seen is adapted to nature or +inconsistent with it? + +And again, if it does not occur to a man's mind what his duty is, he will +actually never do anything, he will never be excited to any action, he +will never be moved. But if he ever is about to do anything, then it is +necessary that that which occurs to him must appear to him to be true. +What! But if those things are true, is the whole of reason, which is, as +it were, the light and illumination of life, put an end to? And still will +you persist in that wrong-headedness? For it is reason which has brought +men the beginning of inquiry, which has perfected virtue, after reason +herself had been confirmed by inquiry. But inquiry is the desire of +knowledge; and the end of inquiry is discovery. But no one can discover +what is false; nor can those things which continue uncertain be +discovered. But when those things which have, as it were, been under a +veil, are laid open, then they are said to be discovered; and so reason +contains the beginning of inquiry, and the end of perceiving and +comprehending. Therefore the conclusion of an argument, which in Greek is +called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, is thus defined:--Reason, which leads one from facts +which are perceived, to that which was not perceived. + +IX. But if all things which are seen were of that sort that those men say +they are, so that they either could possibly be false, or that no +discernment could distinguish whether they were false or not, then how +could we say that any one had either formed any conclusion, or discovered +anything? Or what trust could be placed in an argument when brought to a +conclusion? And what end will philosophy itself have, which is bound to +proceed according to reason? And what will become of wisdom? which ought +not to doubt about its own character, nor about its decrees, which +philosophers call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}; none of which can be betrayed without +wickedness. For when a decree is betrayed, the law of truth and right is +betrayed too. From which fault betrayals of friendships and of republics +often originate. It cannot, therefore be doubted, that no rule of wisdom +can possibly be false; and it ought not to be enough for the wise man that +it is not false, but it ought also to be steady, durable, and lasting; +such as no arguments can shake. But none can either be, or appear such, +according to the principle of those men who deny that those perceptions in +which all rules originate are in any respect different from false ones; +and from this assertion arose the demand which was repeated by Hortensius, +that you would at least allow that the fact that nothing can be perceived +has been perceived by the wise man. But when Antipater made the same +demand, and argued that it was unavoidable that the man who affirmed that +nothing could be perceived should nevertheless admit that this one thing +could be perceived,--namely, that nothing else could,--Carneades resisted +him with great shrewdness. For he said that this admission was so far from +being consistent with the doctrine asserted, that it was above all others +incompatible with it: for that a man who denied that there was anything +which could be perceived excepted nothing. And so it followed of +necessity, that even that very thing which was not excepted, could not be +comprehended and perceived in any possible manner. + +Antiochus, on this topic, seems to press his antagonist more closely. For +since the Academicians adopted that rule, (for you understand that I am +translating by this word what they call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~},) that nothing can be +perceived, he urged that they ought not to waver in their rule as in other +matters, especially as the whole of their philosophy consisted in it: for +that the fixing of what is true and false, known and unknown, is the +supreme law of all philosophy. And since they adopted this principle, and +wished to teach what ought to be received by each individual, and what +rejected, undoubtedly, said he, they ought to perceive this very thing +from which the whole judgment of what is true and false arises. He urged, +in short, that there were these two principal objects in philosophy, the +knowledge of truth, and the attainment of the chief good; and that a man +could not be wise who was ignorant of either the beginning of knowledge, +or of the end of desire, so as not to know either where to start from, or +whither to seek to arrive at. But that to feel in doubt on these points, +and not to have such confidence respecting them as to be unable to be +shaken, is utterly incompatible with wisdom. + +In this manner, therefore, it was more fitting to demand of them that they +should at least admit that this fact was perceived, namely, that nothing +could be perceived. But enough, I imagine, has been said of the +inconsistency of their whole opinion, if, indeed, you can say that a man +who approves of nothing has any opinion at all. + +X. The next point for discussion is one which is copious enough, but +rather abstruse; for it touches in some points on natural philosophy, so +that I am afraid that I may be giving the man who will reply to me too +much liberty and licence. For what can I think that he will do about +abstruse and obscure matters, who seeks to deprive us of all light? But +one might argue with great refinement the question,--with how much +artificial skill, as it were, nature has made, first of all, every animal; +secondly, man most especially;--how great the power of the senses is; in +what manner things seen first affect us; then, how the desires, moved by +these things, followed; and, lastly, in what manner we direct our senses +to the perception of things. For the mind itself, which is the source of +the senses, and which itself is sense, has a natural power, which it +directs towards those things by which it is moved. Therefore it seizes on +other things which are seen in such a manner as to use them at once; +others it stores up; and from these memory arises: but all other things it +arranges by similitudes, from which notions of things are engendered; +which the Greeks call, at one time {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, and at another {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. And +when to this there is added reason and the conclusion of the argument, and +a multitude of countless circumstances, then the perception of all those +things is manifest, and the same reason, being made perfect by these +steps, arrives at wisdom. + +As, therefore, the mind of man is admirably calculated for the science of +things and the consistency of life, it embraces knowledge most especially. +And it loves that {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, (which we, as I have said, will call +_comprehension_, translating the word literally,) for its own sake, (for +there is nothing more sweet than the light of truth,) and also because of +its use; on which account also it uses the senses, and creates arts, which +are, as it were, second senses; and it strengthens philosophy itself to +such a degree that it creates virtue, to which single thing all life is +subordinate. Therefore, those men who affirm that nothing can be +comprehended, take away by their assertion all these instruments or +ornaments of life; or rather, I should say, utterly overturn the whole of +life, and deprive the animal itself of mind (_animo_), so that it is +difficult to speak of their rashness as the merits of the case require. + +Nor can I sufficiently make out what their ideas or intentions really are. +For sometimes, when we address them with this argument,--that if the +doctrines which we are upholding are not true, then everything must be +uncertain: they reply,--Well, what is that to us? is that our fault? blame +nature, who, as Democritus says, has buried truth deep in the bottom of +the sea. + +But others defend themselves more elegantly, who complain also that we +accuse them of calling everything uncertain; and they endeavour to explain +how much difference there is between what is uncertain and what cannot be +perceived, and to make a distinction between them. Let us, then, now deal +with those who draw this distinction, and let us abandon, as incurable and +desperate, those who say that everything is as uncertain as whether the +number of the stars be odd or even. For they contend, (and I noticed that +you were especially moved by this,) that there is something probable, and, +as I may say, likely; and that they adopt that likelihood as a rule in +steering their course of life, and in making inquiries and conducting +discussions. + +XI. But what rule can there be, if we have no notion whatever of true or +false, because it is impossible to distinguish one from the other? For, if +we have such a notion, then there must be a difference between what is +true and what is false, as there is between what is right and what is +wrong. If there is no difference, then there is no rule; nor can a man to +whom what is true and what is false appear under one common aspect, have +any means of judging of, or any mark at all by which he can know the +truth. For when they say, that they take away nothing but the idea of +anything being able to appear in such a manner that it cannot possibly +appear false in the same manner but that they admit everything else, they +are acting childishly. For though they have taken away that by which +everything is judged of, they deny that they take away the rest; just as +if a person were to deprive a man of his eyes, and then say that he has +not taken away from him those things which can be seen. For just as those +things are known by the eyes, so are the other things known by the +perceptions; but by a mark belonging peculiarly to truth, and not common +to what is true and false. + +Wherefore, whether you bring forward a perception which is merely +probable, or one which is at once probable and free from all hindrance, as +Carneades contended, or anything else that you may follow, you will still +have to return to that perception of which we are treating. But in it, if +there be but one common characteristic of what is false and true, there +will be no judgment possible, because nothing peculiar can be noted in one +sign common to two things: but if there be no such community, then I have +got what I want; for I am seeking what appears to me to be so true, that +it cannot possibly appear false. + +They are equally mistaken when, being convicted and overpowered by the +force of truth, they wish to distinguish between what is evident and what +is perceived, and endeavour to prove that there is something +evident,--being a truth impressed on the mind and intellect,--and yet that +it cannot be perceived and comprehended. For how can you say distinctly +that anything is white, when it may happen that that which is black may +appear white? Or how are we to call those things evident, or to say that +they are impressed faithfully on the mind, when it is uncertain whether it +is really moved or only in an illusory manner? And so there is neither +colour, nor body, nor truth, nor argument, nor sense, nor anything certain +left us. And, owing to this, it frequently happens that, whatever they +say, they are asked by some people,--Do you, then, perceive that? But they +who put this question to them are laughed at by them; for they do not +press them hard enough so as to prove that no one can insist upon any +point, or make any positive assertion, without some certain and peculiar +mark to distinguish that thing which each individual says that he is +persuaded of. + +What, then, is this probability of yours? For if that which occurs to +every one, and which, at its first look, as it were, appears probable, is +asserted positively, what can be more trifling? But if your philosophers +say that they, after a certain degree of circumspection and careful +consideration, adopt what they have seen as such, still they will not be +able to escape from us. First of all, because credit is equally taken from +all these things which are seen, but between which there is no difference; +secondly, when they say that it can happen to a wise man, that after he +has done everything, and exercised the most diligent circumspection, there +may still be something which appears probable, and which yet is very far +removed from being true,--how can they then trust themselves, even if they +(to use their own expression) approach truth for the most part, or even if +they come as near to it as possible? For, in order to trust themselves, +the distinctive mark of truth ought to be thoroughly known to them; and if +that be obscure or concealed, what truth is there which they can seem to +themselves to arrive at? And what can be so absurd a thing to say as,--This +indeed is a sign of that thing, or a proof of it, and on that account I +follow it; but it is possible that that which is indicated may either be +false, or may actually have no existence at all? + +XII. However, we have said enough about perception. For if any one wishes +to invalidate what has been said, truth will easily defend itself, even if +we are absent. + +These things, then, which have now been explained, being sufficiently +understood, we will proceed to say a little on the subject of assent and +approbation, which the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. Not that the subject +itself is not an extensive one, but because the foundations have been +already laid a little while ago. For when we were explaining what power +there was in the senses, this point was at the same time established, that +many things were comprehended and perceived by the senses, which is a +thing which cannot take place without assent. Secondly, as this is the +principal difference between an inanimate and an animated being, that the +inanimate being does nothing, but the animated one does something (for it +is impossible even to imagine what kind of animal that can be which does +nothing)--either sense must be taken from it, or else assent (which is +wholly in our own power) must be given. But mind is in some degree denied +to those beings whom they will not allow either to feel or to assent. For +as it is inevitable that one scale of a balance must be depressed when a +weight is put in it, so the mind, too, must yield to what is evident; for +just as it is impossible for any animal to forbear discerning what is +manifestly suited to its nature (the Greeks call that {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}), so it is +equally impossible for it to withhold its assent to a manifest fact which +is brought under its notice. + +Although, if those principles which we have been maintaining are true, +there is no advantage whatever in discussing assent. For he who perceives +anything, assents immediately. But these inferences also follow,--that +memory can have no existence without assent, no more can notions of things +or arts. And what is most important of all is, that, although some things +may be in our power, yet they will not be in the power of that man who +assents to nothing. Where, then, is virtue, if nothing depends on +ourselves? But it is above all things absurd that vices should be in the +power of the agents, and that no one should do wrong except by deliberate +consent to do so, and yet that this should not be the case with virtue; +all the consistency and firmness of which depends on the things to which +it has assented, and which it has approved. And altogether it is necessary +that something should be perceived before we act, and before we assent to +what is perceived; wherefore, he who denies the existence of perception or +assent, puts an end to all action in life. + +XIII. Now let us examine the arguments which are commonly advanced by this +school in opposition to these principles. But, first of all, you have it +in your power to become acquainted with what I may call the foundations of +their system. They then, first of all, compound a sort of art of those +things which we call perceptions, and define their power and kinds; and at +the same time they explain what the character of that thing which can be +perceived and comprehended is, in the very same words as the Stoics. In +the next place, they explain those two principles, which contain, as it +were, the whole of this question; and which appear in such a manner that +even others may appear in the same, nor is there any difference between +them, so that it is impossible that some of them should be perceived, and +that others should not be perceived; but that it makes no difference, not +only if they are in every part of the same character, but even if they +cannot be distinguished. + +And when these principles are laid down, then these men comprehend the +whole cause in the conclusion of one argument. But this conclusion, thus +compounded, runs in this way: "Of the things which are seen, some are true +and some are false; and what is false cannot be perceived, but that which +appears to be true is all of such a character that a thing of the same +sort may seem to be also false. And as to those things which are perceived +being of such a sort that there is no difference between them, it cannot +possibly happen that some of them can be perceived, and that others +cannot; there is, then, nothing seen which can really be perceived." + +But of the axioms which they assume, in order to draw the conclusions +which they desire, they think that two ought to be granted to them; for no +one objects to them. They are these: "That those perceptions which are +false, cannot really be perceived;" and the second is--"Of those +perceptions between which there is no difference, it is impossible that +some should be of such a character that they can be perceived, and others +of such a character that they cannot." + +But their other propositions they defend by numerous and varied arguments, +and they likewise are two in number. One is--"Of those things which appear, +some are true and others false;" the other is--"Every perception which +originates in the truth, is of such a character as it might be of, though +originating in what is false." And these two propositions they do not pass +by, but they expand in such a manner as to show no slight degree of care +and diligence. For they divide them into parts, and those also large +parts; first of all into the senses, then into those things which are +derived from the senses, and from universal custom, the authority of which +they wish to invalidate. Then they come to the point of laying it down +that nothing can be perceived even by reason and conjecture. And these +universal propositions they cut up into more minute parts. For as in our +yesterday's discussion you saw that they acted with respect to the senses, +so do they also act with respect to everything else. And in each separate +thing which they divide into the most minute parts, they wish to make out +that all these true perceptions have often false ones added to them, which +are in no respect different from the true ones; and that, as they are of +such a character, nothing can be comprehended. + +XIV. Now all this subtlety I consider indeed thoroughly worthy of +philosophy, but still wholly unconnected with the case which they advocate +who argue thus. For definitions, and divisions, and a discourse which +employs these ornaments, and also similarities and dissimilarities, and +the subtle and fine-drawn distinctions between them, belong to men who are +confident that those arguments which they are upholding are true, and +firm, and certain; and not to men who assert loudly that those things are +no more true than false. For what would they do if, after they had defined +anything, some one were to ask them whether that definition could be +transferred to something else? If they said it could, then what reason +could they give why it should be a true definition? If they said no,--then +it must be confessed, since that definition of what is true cannot be +transferred to what is false, that that which is explained by that +definition can be perceived; which is the last thing they mean. + +The same thing may be said on every article of the division. For if they +say that they see clearly the things about which they are arguing, and +they cannot be hindered by any similarity of appearance, then they will +confess that they are able to comprehend those things. But if they affirm +that true perceptions cannot be distinguished from false ones, how can +they go any further? For the same objections will be made to them which +have been made already; for an argument cannot be concluded, unless the +premises which are taken to deduce the conclusion from are so established +that nothing of the same kind can be false. + +Therefore, if reason, relying on things comprehended and perceived, and +advancing in reliance on them, establishes the point that nothing can be +comprehended, what can be found which can be more inconsistent with +itself? And as the very nature of an accurate discourse professes that it +will develop something which is not apparent, and that, in order the more +easily to succeed in its object, it will employ the senses and those +things which are evident, what sort of discourse is that which is uttered +by those men who insist upon it that everything has not so much an +existence as a mere appearance? + +But they are convicted most of all when they assume, as consistent with +each other, these two propositions which are so utterly incompatible: +first of all,--That there are some false perceptions;--and in asserting this +they declare also that there are some which are true: and secondly, they +add at the same time,--That there is no difference between true perceptions +and false ones. But you assumed the first proposition as if there were +some difference; and so the latter proposition is inconsistent with the +former, and the former with the latter. + +But let us proceed further, and act so as in no respect to seem to be +flattering ourselves; and let us follow up what is said by them, in such a +manner as to allow nothing to be passed over. + +In the first place, then, that evidentness which we have mentioned has +sufficiently great power of itself to point out to us the things which are +just as they are. But still, in order that we may remain with firmness and +constancy in our trust in what is evident, we have need of a greater +degree of either skill or diligence, in order not, by some sort of +juggling or trick, to be driven away from those things which are clear of +themselves. For Epicurus, who wished to remedy those errors, which seem to +perplex one's knowledge of the truth, and who said that it was the duty of +a wise man to separate opinion from evident knowledge, did no good at all; +for he did not in the least remove the errors of opinion itself. + +XV. Wherefore, as there are two causes which oppose what is manifest and +evident, it is necessary also to provide oneself with an equal number of +aids. For this is the first obstacle, that men do not sufficiently exert +and fix their minds upon those things which are evident, so as to be able +to understand how great the light is with which they are surrounded. The +second is, that some men, being deluded and deceived by fallacious and +captious interrogatories, when they cannot clear them up, abandon the +truth. It is right, therefore, for us to have those answers ready which +may be given in defence of the evidentness of a thing,--and we have already +spoken of them,--and to be armed, in order to be able to encounter the +questions of those people, and to scatter their captious objections to the +winds: and this is what I propose to do next. + +I will, therefore, explain their arguments one by one; since even they +themselves are in the habit of speaking in a sufficiently lucid manner. + +In the first place, they endeavour to show that many things can appear to +exist, which in reality have no existence; when minds are moved to no +purpose by things which do not exist, in the same manner as by things that +do. For when you say (say they) that some visions are sent by God, as +those, for instance, which are seen during sleep, and those also which are +revealed by oracles, and auspices, and the entrails of victims, (for they +say that the Stoics, against whom they are arguing, admit all these +things,) they ask how God can make those things probable which appear to +be false; and how it is that He cannot make those appear so which plainly +come as near as possible to truth? Or if He can likewise make those appear +probable, why He cannot make the others appear so too, which are only with +great difficulty distinguished from them? And if He can make these appear +so, then why He cannot also make those things appear so which are +absolutely different in no respect whatever? + +In the next place, since the mind is moved by itself,--as those things +which we picture to ourselves in thought, and those which present +themselves to the sight of madmen or sleeping men declare,--is it not, say +they, probable that the mind is also moved in such a manner, that not only +it does not distinguish between the perceptions, as to whether they be +true or false, but that there really is no difference between them? As, +for instance, if any men of their own accord trembled and grew pale, on +account of some agitation of mind, or because some terrible object came +upon them from without, there would be no means of distinguishing one +trembling and paleness from the other, nor indeed would there be any +difference between the external and internal alarm which caused them. + +Lastly, if no perceptions are probable which are false, then we must seek +for other principles; but if they are probable, then why may not one say +the same of such as are not easily distinguished from one another? Why not +also of such as have actually no difference at all between them? +Especially when you yourselves say that the wise man when enraged +withholds himself from all assent, because there is no distinction between +his perceptions which is visible to him. + +XVI. Now on all these empty perceptions Antiochus brought forward a great +many arguments, and one whole day was occupied in the discussion of this +subject. But I do not think that I ought to adopt the same course, but +merely to give the heads of what he said. + +And in the first place, they are blameable in this, that they use a most +captious kind of interrogation. And the system of adding or taking away, +step by step, minute items from a proposition, is a kind of argument very +little to be approved of in philosophy. They call it sorites,(11) when +they make up a heap by adding grain after grain; a very vicious and +captious style of arguing. For you mount up in this way:--If a vision is +brought by God before a man asleep of such a nature as to be probable +(_probabile_), why may not one also be brought of such a nature as to be +very like truth (_verisimile_)? If so, then why may not one be brought +which can hardly be distinguished from truth? If so, then why may there +not be one which cannot be distinguished at all? If so, then why may there +not be such that there is actually no difference between them?--If you come +to this point because I have granted you all the previous propositions, it +will be my fault; but if you advance thither of your own accord, it will +be yours. For who will grant to you either that God can do everything, or +that even if He could He would act in that manner? And how do you assume +that if one thing may be like another, it follows that it may also be +difficult to distinguish between them? And then, that one cannot +distinguish between them at all? And lastly, that they are identical? So +that if wolves are like dogs, you will come at last to asserting that they +are the same animals. And indeed there are some things not honourable, +which are like things that are honourable; some things not good, like +those that are good; some things proceeding on no system, like others +which are regulated by system. Why then do we hesitate to affirm that +there is no difference between all these things? Do we not even see that +they are inconsistent? For there is nothing that can be transferred from +its own genus to another. But if such a conclusion did follow, as that +there was no difference between perceptions of different genera, but that +some could be found which were both in their own genus and in one which +did not belong to them, how could that be possible? + +There is then one means of getting rid of all unreal perceptions, whether +they be formed in the ideas, which we grant to be usually the case, or +whether they be owing to idleness, or to wine, or to madness. For we say +that clearness, which we ought to hold with the greatest tenacity, is +absent from all visions of that kind. For who is there who, when he +imagines something and pictures it to himself in his thoughts, does not, +as soon as he has stirred up himself, and recovered himself, feel how much +difference there is between what is evident and what is unreal? The case +of dreams is the same. Do you think that Ennius, when he had been walking +in his garden with Sergius Galba, his neighbour, said to himself,--I have +seemed to myself to be walking with Galba? But when he had a dream, he +related it in this way,-- + + + The poet Homer seem'd to stand before me. + + +And again in his Epicharmus he says-- + + + For I seem'd to be dreaming, and laid in the tomb. + + +Therefore, as soon as we are awakened, we despise those things which we +have seen, and do not regard them as we do the things which we have done +in the forum. + +XVII. But while these visions are being beheld, they assume the same +appearance as those things which we see while awake. There is a good deal +of real difference between them; but we may pass over that. For what we +assert is, that there is not the same power or soundness in people when +asleep that there is in them while waking, either in intellect or in +sensation. What even drunken men do, they do not do with the same +deliberate approbation as sober men. They doubt, they hesitate, they check +themselves at times, and give but a feeble assent to what they see or +agree too. And when they have slept off their drunkenness, then they +understand how unreal their perceptions were. And the same thing is the +case with madmen; that when their madness is beginning, they both feel and +say that something appears to them to exist that has no real existence. +And when their frenzy abates, they feel and speak like Alcmaeon;-- + + + But now my heart does not agree + With that which with my eyes I see. + + +But even in madness the wise man puts restraint upon himself, so far as +not to approve of what is false as if it were true. And he does so often +at other times, if there is by chance any heaviness or slowness in his +senses, or if those things which are seen by him are rather obscure, or if +he is prevented from thoroughly examining them by the shortness of the +time. Although the whole of this fact, that the wise man sometimes +suspends his assent, makes against you. For if there were no difference +between his perceptions, he would either suspend it always or never. + +But from the whole character of this discussion we may see the worthless +nature of the argument of those men who wish to throw everything into +confusion. We want judgment, marked with gravity, consistency, firmness, +and wisdom: and we use the examples of men dreaming, mad, or drunk. I +press this point, that in all this discussion we are speaking with great +inconsistency. For we should not bring forward men sunk in wine or sleep, +or deprived of sense, in such an absurd manner as at one time to say there +is a difference between the perceptions of men awake and sober and +sensible, and those of men in a different condition, and at other times +that there was no difference at all. + +They do not even perceive that by this kind of argument they are making +out everything to be uncertain, which they do not wish to do. I call that +uncertain which the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. For if the fact be that there is +no difference between the appearance that a thing presents to a madman and +to a person in his senses, then who can feel quite sure of his own sanity? +And to wish to produce such an effect as that is a proof of no ordinary +madness. But they follow up in a childish manner the likenesses of twins, +or of impressions of rings. For who of us denies that there are such +things as likenesses, when they are visible in numbers of things? But if +the fact of many things being like many other things is sufficient to take +away knowledge, why are you not content with that, especially as we admit +it? And why do you rather insist upon that assertion which the nature of +things will not suffer, that everything is not in its own kind of that +character of which it really is? and that there is a conformity without +any difference whatever in two or more things; so that eggs are entirely +like eggs, and bees like bees? What then are you contending for? or what +do you seek to gain by talking about twins? For it is granted that they +are alike; and you might be content with that. But you try to make them +out to be actually the same, and not merely alike; and that is quite +impossible. + +Then you have recourse to those natural philosophers who are so greatly +ridiculed in the Academy, but whom you will not even now desist from +quoting. And you tell us that Democritus says that there are a countless +number of worlds, and that there are some which are not only so like one +another, but so completely and absolutely equal in every point, that there +is no difference whatever between them, and that they are quite +innumerable; and so also are men. Then you require that, if the world be +so entirely equal to another world that there is absolutely not the +slightest difference between them, we should grant to you that in this +world of ours also there must be something exactly equal to something +else, so that there is no difference whatever or distinction between them. +For why, you will say, since there not only can be, but actually are +innumerable Quinti Lutatii Catuli formed out of those atoms, from which +Democritus affirms that everything is produced, in all the other worlds, +which are likewise innumerable,--why may not there be a second Catulus +formed in this identical world of ours, since it is of such a size as we +see it? + +XVIII. First of all I reply, that you are bringing me to the arguments of +Democritus, with whom I do not agree. And I will the more readily refute +them, on account of that doctrine which is laid down very clearly by the +more refined natural philosophers, that everything has its own separate +property. For grant that those ancient Servilii who were twins were as +much alike as they are said to have been, do you think that that would +have made them the same? They were not distinguished from one another out +of doors, but they were at home. They were not distinguished from one +another by strangers, but they were by their own family. Do we not see +that this is frequently the case, that those people whom we should never +have expected to be able to know from one another, we do by practice +distinguish so easily that they do not appear to be even in the least +alike? + +Here, however, you may struggle; I will not oppose you. Moreover, I will +grant that that very wise man who is the subject of all this discussion, +when things like one another come under his notice, in which he has not +remarked any special character, will withhold his assent, and will never +agree to any perception which is not of such a character as a false +perception can never assume. But with respect to all other things he has a +certain art by which he can distinguish what is true from what is false; +and with respect to those similitudes he must apply the test of +experience. As a mother distinguishes between twins by the constant +practice of her eyes, so you too will distinguish when you have become +accustomed to it. Do you not see that it has become a perfect proverb that +one egg is like another? and yet we are told that at Delos (when it was a +flourishing island) there were many people who used to keep large numbers +of hens for the sake of profit; and that they, when they had looked upon +an egg, could tell which hen had laid it. Nor does that fact make against +our argument; for it is sufficient for us to be able to distinguish +between the eggs. For it is impossible for one to assent to the +proposition that this thing is that thing more, than by admitting that +there is actually no difference at all between the two. For I have laid it +down as a rule, to consider all perceptions true which are of such a +character as those which are false cannot be. And from this I may not +depart one finger's breadth, as they say, lest I should throw everything +into confusion. For not only the knowledge of what is true and false, but +their whole nature too, will be destroyed if there is no difference +between one and the other. And that must be very absurd which you +sometimes are in the habit of saying, when perceptions are imprinted on +the mind, that what you say is, not that there is no difference between +the impressions, but only that there is none between certain appearances +and forms which they assume. As if perceptions were not judged of by their +appearance, which can deserve or obtain no credit if the mark by which we +are to distinguish truth from falsehood be taken away. + +But that is a monstrous absurdity of yours, when you say that you follow +what is probable when you are not hindered by anything from doing so. In +the first place, how can you avoid being hindered, when what is false does +not differ from what is true? Secondly, what judgment can be formed of +what is true, when what is true is undistinguishable from what is false? +From these facts there springs unavoidably {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}, that is to say, a +suspension of assent: for which Arcesilas is more consistent, if at least +the opinions which some people entertain of Carneades are correct. For if +nothing can be perceived, as they both agree in thinking, then all assent +is taken away. For what is so childish as to talk of approving of what is +not known? But even yesterday we heard that Carneades was in the habit, at +times, of descending to say that a wise man would be guided by opinion, +that is to say, would do wrong. To me, indeed, it is not so certain that +there is anything which can be comprehended, a question which I have now +spent too much time in discussing, as that a wise man is never guided by +opinion, that is to say, never assents to anything which is either false +or unknown. + +There remains this other statement of theirs, that for the sake of +discovering the truth, one ought to speak against every side, and in +favour of every side. I wish then to see what they have discovered. We are +not in the habit, says he, of showing that. What then is the object of all +this mystery? or why do you conceal your opinion as something +discreditable? In order, says he, that those who hear us may be influenced +by reason rather than led by authority. What if they are influenced by +both? would there be any harm in that? However, they do not conceal one of +their theories, namely, that there is nothing which can be conceived. Is +authority no hindrance to entertaining this opinion? It seems to me to be +a great one. For who would ever have embraced so openly and undisguisedly +such perverse and false principles, if there had not been such great +richness of ideas and power of eloquence in Arcesilas, and, in a still +greater degree, in Carneades? + +XIX. These are nearly the arguments which Antiochus used to urge at +Alexandria, and many years afterwards, with much more positiveness too, in +Syria, when he was there with me, a little before he died. But, as my case +is now established, I will not hesitate to warn you, as you are my dearest +friend, (he was addressing me,) and one a good deal younger than myself. + +Will you, then, after having extolled philosophy with such panegyrics, and +provoked our friend Hortensius, who disagrees with us, now follow that +philosophy which confounds what is true with what is false, deprives us of +all judgment, strips us of the power of approval, and robs us of all our +senses? Even the Cimmerians, to whom some god, or nature, or the foulness +of the country that they inhabited, had denied the light of the sun, had +still some fires which they were permitted to avail themselves of as if +they were light. But those men whom you approve of, after having enveloped +us in such darkness, have not left us a single spark to enable us to look +around by. And if we follow them, we become bound with such chains that we +cannot move. For when assent is taken away, they take away at the same +time all motion of our minds, and all our power of action; which not only +cannot be done rightly, but which cannot possibly be done at all. Beware, +also, lest you become the only person who is not allowed to uphold that +opinion. Will you, when you have explained the most secret matters and +brought them to light, and said on your oath that you have discovered +them, (which, indeed, I could swear to also, since I learnt them from +you,)--will you, I say, assert that there is nothing which can be known, +comprehended, or perceived? Beware, I entreat you, lest the authority of +those most beautiful actions be diminished by your own conduct. + +And having said this he stopped. But Hortensius, admiring all he said very +greatly, (so much, indeed, that all the time that Lucullus was speaking he +kept lifting up his hands; and it was no wonder, for I do not believe that +an argument had ever been conducted against the Academy with more +acuteness,) began to exhort me, either jestingly or seriously, (for that +was a point that I was not quite sure about,) to abandon my opinions. +Then, said Catulus, if the discourse of Lucullus has had such influence +over you,--and it has been a wonderful exhibition of memory, accuracy, and +ingenuity,--I have nothing to say; nor do I think it my duty to try and +deter you from changing opinion if you choose. But I should not think it +well for you to be influenced merely by his authority. For he was all but +warning you, said he, jestingly, to take care that no worthless tribune of +the people, of whom you know what a number there will always be, seize +upon you, and ask of you in the public assembly how you are consistent +with yourself, when at one time you assert that nothing certain can be +discovered, and at another time affirm that you yourself have discovered +something. I entreat you, do not let him terrify you. But I would rather +have you disagree with him on the merits of the case itself. But if you +give in to him, I shall not be greatly surprised; for I recollect that +Antiochus himself, after he had entertained such opinions for many years, +abandoned them as soon as he thought it desirable. When Catulus had said +this, they all began to fix their eyes on me. + +XX. Then I, being no less agitated than I usually am when pleading +important causes, began to speak something after this fashion:-- + +The discourse of Lucullus, O Catulus, on the matter itself, moved me a +good deal, being the discourse of a learned and ingenious and quick-witted +man, and of one who passes over nothing which can be said for his side; +but still I am not afraid but that I may be able to answer him. But no +doubt such authority as his would have influenced me a good deal, if you +had not opposed your own to it, which is of equal weight. I will +endeavour, therefore, to reply to him after I have said a few words in +defence of my own reputation, as it were. + +If it is by any desire of display, or any zeal for contentious disputes, +that I have been chiefly led to rank myself as an adherent of this school +of philosophy, I should think not only my folly, but also my disposition +and nature deserving of severe censure; for if obstinacy is found fault +with in the most trifling matters, and if also calumny is repressed, +should I choose to contend with others in a quarrelsome manner about the +general condition and conduct of my whole life, or to deceive others and +also my own self? Therefore, if I did not think it foolish in such a +discussion to do what, when one is discussing affairs of state, is +sometimes done, I would swear by Jupiter and my household gods, that I am +inflamed with a desire of discovering the truth, and that I do truly feel +what I say. For how can I avoid wishing to discover the truth, when I +rejoice if I have discovered anything resembling the truth? But although I +consider to see the truth a most beautiful thing, so also do I think it a +most disgraceful one to approve of what is false as if it were true. Not, +indeed, that I am myself a man who never approve of anything false, who +never give assent to any such thing, and am never guided by opinion; but +we are speaking of a wise man. But I myself am very apt to adopt opinions, +for I am not a wise man, and I direct my thoughts, steering not to that +little Cynosura, + + + The nightly star, which shining not in vain, + Guides the Phoenician sailor o'er the main, + + +as Aratus says;--and those mariners steer in a more direct course because +they keep looking at the constellation, + + + Which in its inner course and orbit brief + Surely revolves;-- + + +but looking rather towards Helice, and the bright north star, that is to +say, to these reasons of a more expansive kind, not polished away to a +point; and therefore I roam and wander about in a freer course. However, +the question, as I said just now, is not about myself, but about a wise +man. For when these perceptions have made a violent impression on the +intellect and senses, I admit them, and sometimes I even assent to them, +but still I do not perceive them: for I do not think that anything can be +perceived. I am not a wise man, therefore I submit to perceptions and +cannot resist them: but Arcesilas, being on this point in agreement with +Zeno, thinks that this is the most important part of the power of a wise +man, that he can guard against being entangled, and provide against being +deceived. For there is nothing more incompatible with the idea which we +have of the gravity of a wise man than error, levity, and temerity. Why, +then, need I speak of the firmness of a wise man? whom even you too, +Lucullus, admit to be never guided by mere opinion. And since this is +sanctioned by you, (if I am dealing irregularly with you at this moment, I +will soon return to the proper order of your arguments,) just consider +what force this first conclusion has. + +XXI. If the wise man ever assents to anything, he will likewise sometimes +form opinions: but he never will form opinions: therefore he will never +assent to anything. This conclusion was approved of by Arcesilas, for it +confirmed both his first and second proposition. But Carneades sometimes +granted that minor premiss, that the wise man did at times assent: then it +followed that he also was at times guided by opinion; which you will not +allow; and you are right, as it seems to me: but the first proposition, +that the wise man, if he expresses assent, must also be guided by opinion, +is denied by the Stoics and their follower on this point, Antiochus. + +For they say that they can distinguish what is false from what is true, +and what cannot be perceived from what can. But, in the first place, even +if anything can be perceived, still the very custom of expressing assent +appears to us to be perilous and unsure. Wherefore, as it is plain that is +so faulty a proceeding, to assent to anything that is either false or +unknown, all assent must rather be removed, lest it should rush on into +difficulties if it proceeds rashly. For what is false is so much akin to +what is true, and the things which cannot be perceived to those which can, +(if, indeed, there are any such, for we shall examine that point +presently,) that a wise man ought not to trust himself in such a hazardous +position. + +But if I assume that there is actually nothing which can be perceived, and +if I also take what you grant me, that a wise man is never guided by +opinion, then the consequence will be that the wise man will restrain all +assent on his part; so that you must consider whether you would rather +have it so, or let the wise man sometimes form opinions. You do not +approve of either, you will say. Let us, then, endeavour to prove that +nothing can be perceived; for that is what the whole controversy turns +upon. + +XXII. But first I must say a few words to Antiochus; who under Philo +learnt this very doctrine which I am now defending, for such a length of +time, that it is certain that no one was ever longer studying it; and who +wrote on these subjects with the greatest acuteness, and who yet attacked +it in his old age with no less energy than he had defended it in his +youth. Although therefore he may have been a shrewd arguer, as indeed he +was, still his authority is diminished by his inconsistency. For what day, +I should like to know, will ever dawn, which shall reveal to him that +distinctive characteristic of what is true and what is false, of which for +so many years he denied the existence? Has he devised anything new? He +says the same that the Stoics say. Does he repent of having held such an +opinion? Why did he not cross over to some other school, and especially to +the Stoics? for this disagreement with the Academy was peculiarly theirs. +What? did he repent of Mnesarchus or Dardanus, who at that time were the +chiefs of the Stoics at Athens? He never deserted Philo till after the +time when he himself began to have pupils. + +But from whence was the Old Academy on a sudden recalled? He appears to +have wished to preserve the dignity of the name, after he had given up the +reality; which however some people said, that he did from a view to his +own glory, and that he even hoped that those who followed him might be +called Antiochians. But to me it seems, that he could not stand that +concourse of all the philosophers. In truth, there are among them all, +some common principles on the other points; but this doctrine is peculiar +to the Academicians, and not one of the other philosophers approves of it. +Therefore, he quitted it; and, like those men who, where the new shops +stand, cannot bear the sun, so he, when he was hot, took refuge under the +shade of the Old Academicians, as those men do under the shade of the old +shops near the pillar of Maenius. There was also an argument which he was +in the habit of employing, when he used to maintain that nothing could be +perceived; namely, asking whether Dionysius of Heraclea had comprehended +the doctrine which he had espoused for many years, because he was guided +by that certain characteristic, and whether he believed the doctrine of +his master Zeno, that whatever was honourable was the only good; or, +whether he adopted the assertion which he defended subsequently, that the +name of honourableness is a mere phantom, and that pleasure is the chief +good: for from this change of opinion on his part he wished to prove, that +nothing can be so stamped on our minds by the truth, that it cannot also +be impressed on them in the same manner by falsehood; and so he took care +that others should derive from his own conduct the same argument which he +himself had derived from Dionysius. + +XXIII. But we will argue this point more at length another time; at +present we will turn what has been said, Lucullus, to you. And in the +first place, let us examine the assertion which you made at the beginning, +and see what sort of assertion it is; namely, that we spoke of the ancient +philosophers in a manner similar to that in which seditious men were in +the habit of speaking of illustrious men, who were however friends of the +people. These men do not indeed pursue good objects, but still wish to be +considered to resemble good men; but we say that we hold those opinions, +which you yourselves confess to have been entertained by the most +illustrious philosophers. Anaxagoras said, that snow was black: would you +endure me if I were to say the same? You would not bear even for me to +express a doubt on the subject. But who is this man? is he a Sophist? for +by that name were those men called, who used to philosophize for the sake +of display or of profit. The glory of the gravity and genius of that man +was great. Why should I speak of Democritus? Who is there whom we can +compare with him for the greatness, not merely of his genius, but also of +his spirit? a man who dared to begin thus: "I am going to speak of +everything." He excepts nothing, so as not to profess a knowledge of it. +For indeed, what could there possibly be beyond everything? Who can avoid +placing this philosopher before Cleanthes, or Chrysippus, or all the rest +of his successors? men who, when compared with him, appear to me to be in +the fifth class. + +But he does not say this, which we, who do not deny that there is some +truth, declare cannot be perceived: he absolutely denies that there is any +truth. He says that the senses are not merely dim, but utterly dark; for +that is what Metrodorus of Chios, who was one of his greatest admirers, +says of them, at the beginning of his book on Nature. "I deny," says he, +"that we know whether we know anything or whether we know nothing; I say +that we do not even know what is ignorance and knowledge; and that we have +no knowledge whether anything exists or whether nothing does." + +Empedocles appears to you to be mad; but to me he seems to utter words +very worthy of the subjects of which he speaks. Does he then blind us, or +deprive us of our senses, if he thinks that there is but little power in +them to judge of those things which are brought under their notice? +Parmenides and Xenophanes blame, as if they were angry with them, though +in no very poetical verses, the arrogance of those people who, though +nothing can be known, venture to say that they know something. And you +said that Socrates and Plato were distinct from these men. Why so? Are +there any men of whom we can speak more certainly? I indeed seem to myself +to have lived with these men; so many of their discourses have been +reported, from which one cannot possibly doubt that Socrates thought that +nothing could be known. He excepted one thing only, asserting that he did +know that he knew nothing; but he made no other exception. What shall I +say of Plato? who certainly would never have followed up these doctrines +in so many books if he had not approved of them; for there was no object +in going on with the irony of the other, especially when it was so +unceasing. + +XXIV. Do I not seem to you, not, like Saturninus, to be content with +naming illustrious men, but also sometimes even to imitate them, though +never unless they are really eminent and noble? And I might have opposed +to you men who are annoying to you, but yet disputants of great accuracy; +Stilpo, Diodorus, and Alexinus: men who indulged in far-fetched and +pointed sophisms; for that was the name given usually to fallacious +conclusions. But why need I enumerate them, when I have Chrysippus, who is +considered to be the great support of the portico of the Stoics? How many +of the arguments against the senses, how many against everything which is +approved by ordinary practice, did he not refute! It is true that I do not +think very much of his refutations; but still, let us grant that he did +refute them. Certainly he would never have collected so many arguments to +deceive us with their excessive probability, unless he saw that it was not +easily possible to resist them. + +What do you think of the Cyrenaic School? philosophers far from +contemptible, who affirm that there is nothing which can be perceived +externally; and that they perceive those things alone which they feel by +their inmost touch, such as pain, or pleasure. And that they do not know +what colour anything is of, or what sound it utters; but only feel that +they themselves are affected in a certain manner. + +We have said enough about authors: although you had asked me whether I did +not think that since the time of those ancient philosophers, in so many +ages, the truth might have been discovered, when so many men of genius and +diligence were looking for it? What was discovered we will consider +presently, and you yourself shall be the judge. But it is easily seen that +Arcesilas did not contend with Zeno for the sake of disparaging him; but +that he wished to discover the truth. No one, I say, of preceding +philosophers had said positively, no one had even hinted that it was +possible for man never to form opinions: and that for a wise man it was +not only possible, but indispensable. The opinion of Arcesilas appeared +not only true, but honourable and worthy of a wise man. + +Perhaps he asked of Zeno what would happen if a wise man could not +possibly perceive anything, and if to form mere opinion was unworthy of a +wise man? He answered, I suppose, that the wise man never would form mere +opinion, since there were things which admitted of being perceived. What +then were they? Perceptions, I suppose. What sort of perceptions then? In +reply to this he gave a definition, That it was such as is impressed and +stamped upon and figured in us, according to and conformably to something +which exists. Afterwards the question was asked, whether, if such a +perception was true, it was of the same character as one that was false? +Here Zeno saw clearly enough that there was no perception that could be +perceived at all, if the perception derived from that which is, could +possibly resemble that which is derived from that which is not. + +Arcesilas was quite right in admitting this. An addition was made to the +definition; namely, That nothing false could be perceived; nor anything +true either, if it was of such a character as that which was false. But he +applied himself diligently to these discussions, in order to prove that no +perception originated in what was true of such a kind that there might not +be a similar one originating in what was false. And this is the one +subject of controversy which has lasted to this day. For the other +doctrine, that the wise man would never assent to anything, had nothing to +do with this question. For it was quite possible for a man to perceive +nothing, and nevertheless to be guided at times by opinion; which is said +to have been admitted by Carneades. I, indeed, trusting rather to +Clitomachus than to Philo or Metrodorus, believe that he argued this point +rather than that he admitted it. + +XXV. However, let us say no more about this. Undoubtedly, when opinion and +perception are put an end to, the retention of every kind of assent must +follow; as, if I prove that nothing can be perceived, you would then grant +that a philosopher would never assent to anything. What is there then that +can be perceived, if even the senses do not warn us of the truth? But you, +O Lucullus, defend them by a common topic; and to prevent you from being +able to do so it was, that I yesterday, when it was not otherwise +necessary, said so much against the senses. But you say that you are not +at all moved by "the broken oar" or "the dove's neck." In the first place, +I will ask why?--for in the case of the oar, I feel that that which appears +to be the case, is not really so; and that in the dove's neck there appear +to be many colours, but are not in reality more than one. Have we, then, +said nothing more than this? Let all our arguments stand: that man is +tearing his cause to pieces; he says that his senses are voracious. +Therefore you have always one backer who will plead the cause at his own +risk: for Epicurus brings the matter down to this point, that if once in a +man's life one of his senses has decided wrongly, none of them is ever to +be trusted. This is what he calls being true, and confiding in his own +witnesses, and urging his proofs to their just conclusion; therefore +Timagoras the Epicurean declares, that when he had twisted his eye with +his hand, he had never seen two flames appear out of one candle: for that +the error was one of opinion, and not one of his eyes; just as if the +question were what the fact is, and not what it appears to be. However, he +is just like his predecessors. But as for you, who say that of the things +perceived by your senses, some are true and some false, how do you +distinguish between them? Cease, I beg of you, to employ common topics: we +have plenty of them at home. + +If any god were to ask you, while your senses are sound and unimpaired, +whether you desire anything further, what would you answer? I wish, +indeed, he would ask me! You should hear how ill he treats us: for how far +are we to look in order to see the truth? I can see the Cumaean villa of +Catulus from this place, but not his villa near Pompeii; not that there is +any obstacle interposed, but my eyesight cannot extend so far. What a +superb view! We see Puteoli, but we do not see our friend Avianus, though +he may perhaps be walking in the portico of Neptune; there was, however, +some one or other who is often spoken of in the Schools who could see +things that were a thousand and eighty furlongs off; and some birds can +see further still. I should therefore answer your god boldly, that I am +not at all contented with these eyes of mine. He will tell me, perhaps, +that I can see better than some fishes; which are not seen by us, and +which even now are beneath our eyes, and yet they cannot look up far +enough to see us: therefore, as water is shed around them, so a dense air +is around us. But we desire nothing better. What? do you suppose that a +mole longs for light?--nor would he complain to the god that he could not +see far, but rather that he saw incorrectly. Do you see that ship? It +appears to us to be standing still; but to those who are in that ship, +this villa appears to be moving. Seek for the reason why it seems so, and +if you discover it ever so much, and I do not know whether you may not be +able to, still you will have proved, not that you have a trustworthy +witness, but that he has not given false evidence without sufficient +reason. + +XXVI. What need had I to speak of the ship? for I saw that what I said +about the oar was despised by you; perhaps you expect something more +serious. What can be greater than the sun, which the mathematicians affirm +to be more than eighteen times as large as the earth? How little does it +appear to us! To me, indeed, it seems about a foot in diameter; but +Epicurus thinks it possible that it may be even less than it seems, but +not much; nor does he think that it is much greater, but that it is very +near the size it seems to be: so that our eyes are either quite correct, +or, at all events, not very incorrect. What becomes then of the exception, +"If once...?" However, let us leave this credulous man, who does not +believe that the senses are ever wrong,--not even now, when that sun, which +is borne along with such rapidity that it is impossible even to conceive +how great its velocity is, nevertheless seems to us to be standing still. + +However, to abridge the controversy, consider, I pray you, within what +narrow bounds you are confined. There are four principles which conduct +you to the conclusion that there is nothing which can be known, or +perceived, or comprehended;--and it is about this that the whole dispute +is. The first principle is, that some perceptions are false; the second, +that such cannot be perceived; the third, that of perceptions between +which there is no difference, it is not possible that some of them can be +perceived and that others cannot; the fourth, that there is no true +perception proceeding from the senses, to which there is not some other +perception opposed which in no respect differs from it, and which cannot +be perceived. Now of these four principles, the second and third are +admitted by every one. Epicurus does not admit the first, but you, with +whom we are now arguing, admit that one too,--the whole contest is about +the fourth. + +The man, then, who saw Publius Servilius Geminus, if he thought that he +saw Quintus, fell into a perception of that kind that could not be +perceived; because what was true was distinguished by no characteristic +mark from what was false: and if this distinctive mark were taken away, +what characteristic of the same kind could he have by which to recognise +Caius Cotta, who was twice consul with Geminus, which could not possibly +be false? You say that such a likeness as that is not in the nature of +things. You fight the question vigorously, but you are fighting a +peaceably disposed adversary. Grant, then, that it is not; at all events, +it is possible that it should seem to be so; therefore it will deceive the +senses. And if one likeness deceives them, it will have made everything +doubtful; for when that judgment is once taken away by which alone things +can be known, then, even if the person whom you see, be really the person +whom he appears to you to be, still you will not judge by that +characteristic which you say you ought, being of such a character that one +of the same kind cannot be false. If, therefore, it is possible that +Publius Geminus may appear to you to be Quintus, what certainty have you +that he may not appear to you to be Cotta though he is not, since some +things do appear to you to be what they are not? You say that everything +has its own peculiar genus; that there is nothing the same as something +else. That is a stoic doctrine, and one not very credible, for they say +that there is not a single hair or a single grain in every respect like +another hair or grain. These things could all be refuted, but I do not +wish to be contentious; for it has nothing in the world to do with the +question whether the things which are seen do not differ at all in any +part, or whether they cannot be distinguished from another even though +they do differ. But, granting that there cannot be such a likeness between +men, can there not be such between statues? Tell me, could not Lysippus, +using the same brass, the same composition of metals, the same atmosphere, +water, and all other appliances, have made a hundred Alexanders exactly +alike? How then could you distinguish between them? Again; if I, with this +ring, make a hundred impressions on the same piece of wax, is it possible +that there should be any difference to enable you to distinguish one from +the other?--or, shall you have to seek out some ring engraver, since you +have already found us a Delian poulterer who could recognise his eggs? + +XXVII. But you have recourse to art, which you call in to the aid of the +senses. A painter sees what we do not see; and as soon as a flute-player +plays a note the air is recognised by a musician. Well? Does not this +argument seem to tell against you, if, without great skill, such as very +few persons of our class attain to, we can neither see nor hear? Then you +give an excellent description of the skill with which nature has +manufactured our senses, and intellect, and the whole construction of man, +in order to prevent my being alarmed at rashness of opinions. Can you +also, Lucullus, affirm that there is any power united with wisdom and +prudence which has made, or, to use your own expression, manufactured man? +What sort of a manufacture is that? Where is it exercised? when? why? how? +These points are all handled ingeniously, they are discussed even +elegantly. Let it be said even that they appear likely; only let them not +be affirmed positively. But we will discuss natural philosophy hereafter, +and, indeed, we will do so that you, who said a little while ago that I +should speak of it, may appear not to have spoken falsely. + +However, to come to what is clearer, I shall now bring forward general +facts on which whole volumes have been filled, not only by those of our +own School, but also by Chrysippus. But the Stoics complain of him, that, +while he studiously collected every argument which could be brought +forward against the senses and clearness, and against all custom, and +against reason, when he came to reply to himself, he was inferior to what +he had been at first; and therefore that, in fact, he put arms into the +hands of Carneades. Those arguments are such as have been ingeniously +handled by you. You said that the perceptions of men asleep, or drunk, or +mad, were less vigorous than those of men awake, sober, and sane. How do +you prove that? because, when Ennius had awakened, he would not say that +he had seen Homer, but only that Homer had seemed to be present. And +Alcmaeon says-- + + + My heart distrusts the witness of my eyes. + + +And one may say the same of men who are drunk. As if any one denied that +when a man has awakened he ceases to think his dreams true; and that a man +whose frenzy has passed away, no longer conceives those things to be real +which appeared so to him during his madness. But that is not the question: +the question is, how those things appear to us, at the time when they do +appear. Unless, indeed, we suppose that Ennius heard the whole of that +address-- + + + O piety of the soul.... + + +(if, indeed, he did dream it), just as he would have heard it if he had +been awake. For when awake, he was able to think those things phantoms--as, +in fact, they were--and dreams. But while he was asleep, he felt as sure of +their reality as if he had been awake. Again, Iliona, in that dream of +hers, where she hears-- + + + Mother, I call on you.... + + +does she not believe that her son has spoken, just as she would have +believed it if she had been awake? On which account she adds-- + + + Come now, stand here, remain, and hear my words, + And once again repeat those words to me. + + +Does she here seem to place less trust in what she has seen than people do +when awake? + +XXVIII. Why should I speak of madmen?--such as your relation Tuditanus was, +Catulus. Does any man, who may be ever so much in his senses, think the +things which he sees as certain as he used to think those that appeared to +him? Again, the man who cries out-- + + + I see you now, I see you now alive, + Ulysses, while such sight is still allow'd me; + + +does he not twice cry out that he is seeing what he never sees at all? +Again, when Hercules, in Euripides, shot his own sons with his arrows, +taking them for the sons of Eurystheus,--when he slew his wife,--when he +endeavoured even to slay his father,--was he not worked upon by false +ideas, just as he might have been by true ones? Again, does not your own +Alcmaeon, who says that his heart distrusts the witness of his eyes, say in +the same place, while inflamed by frenzy-- + + + Whence does this flame arise? + + +And presently afterwards-- + + + Come on; come on; they hasten, they approach; + They seek for me. + + +Listen, how he implores the good faith of the virgin:-- + + + O bring me aid; O drive this pest away; + This fiery power which now doth torture me; + See, they advance, dark shades, with flames encircled, + And stand around me with their blazing torches. + + +Have you any doubt here that he appears to himself to see these things? +And then the rest of his speech:-- + + + See how Apollo, fair-hair'd God, + Draws in and bends his golden bow; + While on the left fair Dian waves her torch. + + +How could he have believed these things any more if they had really +existed than he did when they only seemed to exist? For it is clear that +at the moment his heart was not distrusting his eyes. But all these +instances are cited in order to prove that than which nothing can be more +certain, namely, that between true and false perceptions there is no +difference at all, as far as the assent of the mind is concerned. But you +prove nothing when you merely refute those false perceptions of men who +are mad or dreaming, by their own recollection. For the question is not +what sort of recollection those people usually have who have awakened, or +those who have recovered from madness, but what sort of perception madmen +or dreamers had at the moment when they were under the influence of their +madness or their dream. However, we will say no more about the senses. + +What is there that can be perceived by reason? You say that Dialectics +have been discovered, and that that science is, as it were, an arbiter and +judge of what is true and false. Of what true and false?--and of true and +false on what subject? Will a dialectician be able to judge, in geometry, +what is true and false, or in literature, or in music? He knows nothing +about those things. In philosophy, then? What is it to him how large the +sun is? or what means has he which may enable him to judge what the chief +good is? What then will he judge of? Of what combination or disjunction of +ideas is accurate,--of what is an ambiguous expression,--of what follows +from each fact, or what is inconsistent with it? If the science of +dialectics judges of these things, or things like them, it is judging of +itself. But it professed more. For to judge of these matters is not +sufficient for the resolving of the other numerous and important questions +which arise in philosophy. But, since you place so much importance in that +art, I would have you to consider whether it was not invented for the +express purpose of being used against you. For, at its first opening, it +gives an ingenious account of the elements of speaking, and of the manner +in which one may come to an understanding of ambiguous expressions, and of +the principles of reasoning: then, after a few more things, it comes to +the sorites, a very slippery and hazardous topic, and a class of argument +which you yourself pronounced to be a vicious one. + +XXIX. What then, you will say; are we to be blamed for that viciousness? +The nature of things has not given us any knowledge of ends, so as to +enable us, in any subject whatever, to say how far we can go. Nor is this +the case only in respect of the heap of wheat, from which the name is +derived, but in no matter whatever where the argument is conducted by +minute questions: for instance, if the question be whether a man is rich +or poor, illustrious or obscure,--whether things be many or few, great or +small, long or short, broad or narrow,--we have no certain answer to give, +how much must be added or taken away to make the thing in question either +one or the other. + +But the sorites is a vicious sort of argument:--crush it, then, if you can, +to prevent its being troublesome; for it will be so, if you do not guard +against it. We have guarded against it, says he. For Chrysippus's plan is, +when he is interrogated step by step (by way of giving an instance), +whether there are three, or few, or many, to rest a little before he comes +to the "many;" that is to say, to use their own language, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. Rest +and welcome, says Carneades; you may even snore, for all I care. But what +good does he do? For one follows who will waken you from sleep, and +question you in the same manner:--Take the number, after the mention of +which you were silent, and if to that number I add one, will there be +many? You will again go on, as long as you think fit. Why need I say more? +for you admit this, that you cannot in your answers fix the last number +which can be classed as "few," nor the first, which amounts to "many." And +this kind of uncertainty extends so widely, that I do not see any bounds +to its progress. + +Nothing hurts me, says he; for I, like a skilful driver, will rein in my +horses before I come to the end, and all the more if the ground which the +horses are approaching is precipitous. And thus, too, says he, I will +check myself, and not reply any more to one who addresses me with captious +questions. If you have a clear answer to make, and refuse to make it, you +are giving yourself airs; if you have not, even you yourself do not +perceive it. If you stop, because the question is obscure, I admit that it +is so; but you say that you do not proceed as far as what is obscure. You +stop, then, where the case is still clear. If then all you do is to hold +your tongue, you gain nothing by that. For what does it matter to the man +who wishes to catch you, whether he entangles you owing to your silence or +to your talking? Suppose, for instance, you were to say, without +hesitation, that up to the number nine, is "few," but were to pause at the +tenth; then you would be refusing your assent to what is certain and +evident, and yet you will not allow me to do the same with respect to +subjects which are obscure. + +That art, therefore, does not help you against the sorites; inasmuch as it +does not teach a man, who is using either the increasing or diminishing +scale, what is the first point, or the last. May I not say that that same +art, like Penelope undoing her web, at last undoes all the arguments which +have gone before? Is that your fault, or ours? In truth, it is the +foundation of dialectics, that whatever is enunciated (and that is what +they call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, which answers to our word _effatum_,) is either true or +false. What, then, is the case? Are these true or false? If you say that +you are speaking falsely, and that that is true, you are speaking falsely +and telling the truth at the same time. This, forsooth, you say is +inexplicable; and that is more odious than our language, when we call +things uncomprehended, and not perceived. + +XXX. However, I will pass over all this. I ask, if those things cannot be +explained, and if no means of judging of them is discovered, so that you +can answer whether they are true or false, then what has become of that +definition,--"That a proposition (_effatum_) is something which is either +true or false?" After the facts are assumed I will add, that of them some +are to be adopted, others impeached, because they are contrary to the +first. What then do you think of this conclusion,--"If you say that the sun +shines, and if you speak truth, therefore the sun does shine?" At all +events you approve of the kind of argument, and you say that the +conclusion has been most correctly inferred. Therefore, in teaching, you +deliver that as the first mood in which to draw conclusions. Either, +therefore, you will approve of every other conclusion in the same mood, or +that art of yours is good for nothing. Consider, then, whether you are +inclined to approve of this conclusion;--"If you say that you are a liar, +and speak the truth, then you are a liar. But you do say that you are a +liar, and you do speak the truth, therefore you are a liar." How can you +avoid approving of this conclusion, when you approved of the previous one +of the same kind? + +These are the arguments of Chrysippus, which even he himself did not +refute. For what could he do with such a conclusion as this,--"If it +shines, it shines: but it does shine, therefore it does shine?" He must +give in; for the principle of the connexion compels you to grant the last +proposition after you have once granted the first. And in what does this +conclusion differ from the other,--"If you lie, you lie; but you do lie, +therefore you do lie?" You assert that it is impossible for you either to +approve or disapprove of this: if so, how can you any more approve or +disapprove of the other? If the art, or the principle, or the method, or +the force of the one conclusion avails, they exist in exactly the same +degree in both. + +This, however, is their last resource. They demand that one should make an +exception with regard to these points which are inexplicable. I give my +vote for their going to some tribune of the people; for they shall never +obtain this exception from me. In truth, when they cannot prevail on +Epicurus, who despises and ridicules the whole science of dialectics, to +grant this proposition to be true, which we may express thus--"Hermachus +will either be alive to-morrow or he will not;" when the dialecticians lay +it down that every disjunctive proposition, such as "either yes or no" is +not only true but necessary; you may see how cautious he is, whom they +think slow. For, says he, if I should grant that one of the two +alternatives is necessary, it will then be necessary either that Hermachus +should be alive to-morrow, or not. But there is no such necessity in the +nature of things. Let the dialecticians then, that is to say, Antiochus +and the Stoics, contend with him, for he upsets the whole science of +dialectics. + +For if a disjunctive proposition made up of contraries, (I call those +propositions contraries when one affirms and the other denies,) if, I say, +such a disjunctive can be false, then no one is ever true. But what +quarrel have they with me who am following their system? When anything of +that kind happened, Carneades used to joke in this way:--"If I have drawn +my conclusion correctly, I gain the cause: if incorrectly, Diogenes shall +pay back a mina;" for he had learnt dialectics of that Stoic, and a mina +was the pay of the dialecticians. + +I, therefore, follow that system which I learnt from Antiochus; and I find +no reason why I should judge "If it does shine, it does shine" to be true, +because I have learnt that everything which is connected with itself is +true; and yet not judge "If you lie, you lie," to be connected with itself +in the same manner. Either, therefore, I must judge both this and that to +be true, or, if I may not judge this to be true, then I cannot judge that +to be. + +XXXI. However, to pass over all those prickles, and all that tortuous kind +of discussion, and to show what we are:--after having explained the whole +theory of Carneades, all the quibbles of Antiochus will necessarily fall +to pieces. Nor will I say anything in such a way as to lead any one to +suspect that anything is invented by me. I will take what I say from +Clitomachus, who was with Carneades till his old age, a man of great +shrewdness, (indeed, he was a Carthaginian,) and very studious and +diligent. And he has written four books on the subject of withholding +assent; but what I am going to say is taken out of the first. + +Carneades asserts that there are two kinds of appearances; and that the +first kind may be divided into those which can be perceived and those +which cannot; and the other into those which are probable and those which +are not. Therefore, those which are pronounced to be contrary to the +senses and contrary to evidentness belong to the former division; but that +nothing can be objected to those of the second kind. Wherefore his opinion +is, that there is no appearance of such a character that perception will +follow it, but many such as to draw after them probability. Indeed, it +would be contrary to nature if nothing were probable; and that entire +overturning of life, which you were speaking of, Lucullus, would ensue. +Therefore there are many things which may be proved by the senses; only +one must recollect that there is not in them anything of such a character +that there may not also be something which is false, but which in no +respect differs from it in appearance; and so, whatever happens which is +probable in appearance, if nothing offers itself which is contrary to that +probability, the wise man will use it; and in this way the whole course of +life will be regulated. + +And, in truth, that wise man whom you are bringing on the stage, is often +guided by what is probable, not being comprehended, nor perceived, nor +assented to, but only likely; and unless a man acts on such circumstances +there is an end to the whole system of life. For what must happen? Has the +wise man, when he embarks on board ship, a positive comprehension and +perception in his mind that he will have a successful voyage? How can he? +But suppose he goes from this place to Puteoli, thirty furlongs, in a +seaworthy vessel, with a good pilot, and in fine weather like this, it +appears probable that he will arrive there safe. According to appearances +of this kind, then, he will make up his mind to act or not to act; and he +will be more willing to find the snow white than Anaxagoras, who not only +denied that fact, but who affirmed, because he knew that water, from which +snow was congealed, was of a dark colour, that snow did not even look +white. And he will be influenced by anything which affects him in such a +way that the appearance is probable, and not interfered with by any +obstacle. For such a man is not cut out of stone or hewn out of oak. He +has a body, he has a mind, he is influenced by intellect, he is influenced +by his senses, so that many things appear to him to be true, and yet not +to have conspicuous and peculiar characteristics by which to be perceived. +And therefore the wise man does not assent to them, because it is possible +that something false may exist of the same kind as this true thing. Nor do +we speak against the senses differently from the Stoics, who say that many +things are false, and are very different from the appearance which they +present to the senses. + +XXXII. But if this is the case, that one false idea can be entertained by +the senses, you will find some one in a moment who will deny that anything +can be perceived by the senses. And so, while we are silent, all +perception and comprehension is done away with by the two principles laid +down, one by Epicurus and the other by you. What is Epicurus's maxim?--If +anything that appears to the senses be false, then nothing can be +perceived. What is yours?--The appearances presented to the senses are +false.--What is the conclusion? Even if I hold my tongue, it speaks for +itself, that nothing can be perceived. I do not grant that, says he, to +Epicurus. Argue then with him, as he is wholly at variance with you, but +leave me alone, who certainly agree with you so far, that the senses are +liable to error. Although nothing appears so strange to me, as that such +things should be said, especially by Antiochus, to whom the propositions +which I have just mentioned were thoroughly known. For although, if he +pleases, any one may find fault with this, namely with our denying that +anything can be perceived; at all events it is not a very serious reproof +that we can have to endure. But as for our statement that some things are +probable, this does not seem to you to be sufficient. Grant that it is +not. At least we ought to escape the reproaches which are incessantly +bandied about by you, "Can you, then, see nothing? can you hear nothing? +is nothing evident to you?" + +I explained just now, on the testimony of Clitomachus, in what manner +Carneades intended those statements to be taken. Hear now, how the same +things are stated by Clitomachus in that book which he dedicated to Caius +Lucilius, the poet, after he had written on the same subject to Lucius +Censorinus, the one, I mean, who was consul with Marcus Manilius; he then +used almost these very words; for I am well acquainted with them, because +the first idea and arrangement of those very matters which we are now +discussing is contained in that book. He then uses the following language-- + +"The philosophers of the Academy are of opinion that there are differences +between things of such a kind that some appear probable, and others the +contrary. But that it is not a sufficient reason for one's saying that +some of these can be perceived and that others cannot, because many things +which are false are probable; but nothing false can be perceived and +known. Therefore, says he, those men are egregiously wrong who say that +the Academics deny the existence of the senses; for they have never said +that there is no such thing as colour, or taste, or sound; the only point +they argue for is, that there is not in them that peculiar characteristic +mark of truth and certainty which does not exist anywhere else." + +And after having explained this, he adds, that there are two senses in +which the wise man may be said to suspend his assent: one, when it is +understood that he, as a general rule, assents to nothing; the other, when +he forbears answering, so as to say that he approves or disapproves of +anything, or, so as to deny or affirm anything. This being the case, he +approves of the one sense, so as never to assent to anything; and adheres +to the other, so as to be able to answer yes, or no, following probability +whenever it either occurs or is wanting. And that one may not be +astonished at one, who in every matter withholds himself from expressing +his assent, being nevertheless agitated and excited to action, he leaves +us perceptions of the sort by which we are excited to action, and those +owing to which we can, when questioned, answer either way, being guided +only by appearances, as long as we avoid expressing a deliberate assent. +And yet we must look upon all appearances of that kind as probable, but +only those which have no obstacles to counteract them. If we do not induce +you to approve of these ideas, they may perhaps be false, but they +certainly do not deserve odium. For we are not depriving you of any light; +but with reference to the things which you assert are perceived and +comprehended, we say, that if they be only probable, they appear to be +true. + +XXXIII. Since, therefore, what is probable, is thus inferred and laid +down, and at the same time disencumbered of all difficulties, set free and +unrestrained, and disentangled from all extraneous circumstances; you see, +Lucullus, that that defence of perspicuity which you took in hand is +utterly overthrown. For this wise man of whom I am speaking will survey +the heaven and earth and sea with the same eyes as your wise man; and will +feel with the same senses all those other things which fall under each +respective sense. That sea, which now, as the west wind is rising over it, +appears purple to us, will appear so too to our wise man, but nevertheless +he will not sanction the appearance by his assent; because, to us +ourselves it appeared just now blue, and in the morning it appeared +yellow; and now, too, because it sparkles in the sun, it is white and +dimpled, and quite unlike the adjacent continent; so that, even if you +could give an account why it is so, still you could not establish the +truth of the appearance that is presented to the eyes. + +Whence then,--for this was the question which you asked,--comes memory, if +we perceive nothing, since we cannot recollect anything which we have seen +unless we have comprehended it? What? Did Polyaenus, who is said to have +been a great mathematician, after he had been persuaded by Epicurus to +believe all geometry to be false, forget all the knowledge which he had +previously possessed? But that which is false cannot be comprehended as +you yourselves assert. If, therefore, memory is conversant only with +things which have been perceived and comprehended, then it retains as +comprehended and perceived all that every one remembers. But nothing false +can be comprehended; and Scyron recollects all the dogmas of Epicurus; +therefore they are all true. For all I care, they may be; but you also +must either admit that they are so, and that is the last thing in your +thoughts, or else you must allow me memory, and grant that there is plenty +of room for it, even if there be no comprehension or perception. + +What then is to become of the arts? Of what arts? of those, which of their +own accord confess that they proceed on conjecture more than on knowledge; +or of those which only follow what appears to them, and are destitute of +that art which you possess to enable them to distinguish between truth and +falsehood? + +But there are two lights which, more than any others, contain the whole +case; for, in the first place, you deny the possibility of any man +invariably withholding his assent from everything. But that is quite +plain; since Panaetius, almost the greatest man, in my opinion, of all the +Stoics, says that he is in doubt as to that matter, which all the Stoics +except him think absolutely certain, namely as to the truth of the +auspices taken by soothsayers, and of oracles, and dreams, and prophecies; +and forbears to express any assent respecting them. And why, if he may +pursue this course concerning those matters, which the men of whom he +himself learnt considered unquestionable, why may not a wise man do so too +in all other cases? Is there any position which a man may either approve +or disapprove of after it has been asserted, but yet may not doubt about? +May you do so with respect to the sorites whenever you please, and may not +he take his stand in the same manner in other cases, especially when +without expressing his assent he may be able to follow a probability which +is not embarrassed by anything? + +The second point is that you declare that man incapable of action who +withholds his assent from everything. For first of all we must see in what +assent consists. For the Stoics say that the senses themselves are +assents; that desire comes after them, and action after desire. But that +every thing is at an end if we deny perception. + +XXXIV. Now on this subject many things have been said and written on both +sides, but the whole matter may be summed up in a few words. For although +I think it a very great exploit to resist one's perceptions, to withstand +one's vague opinions, to check one's propensity to give assent to +propositions,--and though I quite agree with Clitomachus, when he writes +that Carneades achieved a Herculean labour when, as if it had been a +savage and formidable monster, he extracted assent, that is to say, vague +opinion and rashness, from our minds,--yet, supposing that part of the +defence is wholly omitted, what will hinder the action of that man who +follows probability, without any obstacle arising to embarrass him? This +thing of itself, says he, will embarrass him,--that he will lay it down, +that even the thing he approves of cannot be perceived. And that will +hinder you, also, in sailing, in planting, in marrying a wife, in becoming +the parent of children, and in many things in which you follow nothing +except what is probable. + +And, nevertheless, you bring up again that old and often repudiated +objection, to employ it not as Antipater did, but, as you say, in a closer +manner. For you tell us that Antipater was blamed for saying, that it was +consistent in a man who affirmed that nothing could be comprehended, to +say that at least this fact of that impossibility could be comprehended; +which appeared even to Antiochus to be a stupid kind of assertion, and +contradictory to itself. For that it cannot be said with any consistency +that nothing can be comprehended, if it is asserted at the same time that +the fact of the impossibility can be comprehended. He thinks that +Carneades ought rather to be pressed in this way:--As the wise man admits +of no dogma except such as is comprehended, perceived, and known, he must +therefore confess that this very dogma of the wise man, "that nothing can +be perceived," is perceived; as if the wise man had no other maxim +whatever, and as if he could pass his life without any. But as he has +others, which are probable, but not positively perceived, so also has he +this one, that nothing can be perceived. For if he had on this point any +characteristic of certain knowledge, he would also have it on all other +points; but since he has it not, he employs probabilities. Therefore he is +not afraid of appearing to be throwing everything into confusion, and +making it uncertain. For it is not admissible for a person to say that he +is ignorant about duty, and about many other things with which he is +constantly mixed up and conversant; as he might say, if he were asked +whether the number of the stars is odd or even. For in things uncertain, +nothing is probable; but as to those matters in which there is +probability, in those the wise man will not be at a loss what to do, or +what answer to give. + +Nor have you, O Lucullus, omitted that other objection of Antiochus (and, +indeed, it is no wonder, for it is a very notorious one,) by which he used +to say that Philo was above all things perplexed. For when one proposition +was assumed, that some appearances were false, and a second one that there +was no difference between them and true ones, he said that that school +omitted to take notice that the former proposition had been granted by +him, because there did appear to be some difference between appearances; +but that that was put an end to by the second proposition, which asserted +that there was no difference between false and true ones; for that no two +assertions could be more contradictory. And this objection would be +correct if we altogether put truth out of the question: but we do not; for +we see both true appearances and false ones. But there is a show of +probability in them, though of perception we have no sign whatever. + +XXXV. And I seem to myself to be at this moment adopting too meagre an +argument; for, when there is a wide plain, in which our discourse may rove +at liberty, why should we confine it within such narrow straits, and drive +it into the thickets of the Stoics? For if I were arguing with a +Peripatetic, who said "that everything could be perceived which was an +impression originating in the truth," and who did not employ that +additional clause,--"in such a way as it could not originate in what was +false," I should then deal plainly with a plain man, and should not be +very disputatious. And even if, when I said that nothing could be +comprehended, he was to say that a wise man was sometimes guided by +opinion, I should not contradict him; especially as even Carneades is not +very hostile to this idea. As it is, what can I do? For I am asking what +there is that can be comprehended; and I am answered, not by Aristotle, or +Theophrastus, or even Xenocrates or Polemo, but by one who is of much +later date than they,--"A truth of such a nature as what is false cannot +be." I find nothing of the sort. Therefore I will, in truth, assent to +what is unknown;--that is to say, I will be guided by opinion. This I am +allowed to do both by the Peripatetics and by the Old Academy; but you +refuse me such indulgence, and in this refusal Antiochus is the foremost, +who has great weight with me, either because I loved the man, as he did +me, or because I consider him the most refined and acute of all the +philosophers of our age. + +And, first of all, I will ask him how it is that he is a follower of that +Academy to which he professes to belong? For, to pass over other points, +who is there, either of the Old Academy or of the Peripatetics, who has +ever made these two assertions which are the subject of discussion,--either +that that alone could be perceived which was a truth of such a nature, as +what was false could not be; or that a wise man was never guided by +opinion? Certainly no one of them ever said so. Neither of these +propositions was much maintained before Zeno's time. But I consider both +of them true; and I do not say so just to serve the present turn, but it +is my honest opinion. + +XXXVI. This is what I cannot bear. When you forbid me to assent to what I +do not know, and say such a proceeding is most discreditable, and full of +rashness,--when you, at the same time, arrogate so much to yourself, as to +take upon yourself to explain the whole system of wisdom, to unfold the +nature of all things, to form men's manners, to fix the limits of good and +evil, to describe men's duties, and also to undertake to teach a complete +rule and system of disputing and understanding, will you be able to +prevent me from never tripping while embracing all those multitudinous +branches of knowledge? What, in short, is that school to which you would +conduct me, after you have carried me away from this one? I fear you will +be acting rather arrogantly if you say it is your own. Still you must +inevitably say so. Nor, indeed, are you the only person who would say such +a thing, but every one will try and tempt me to his own. Come; suppose I +resist the Peripatetics, who say that they are closely connected with the +orators, and that illustrious men who have been instructed by them have +often governed the republic;--suppose that I withstand the Epicureans, so +many of whom are friends of my own,--excellent, united, and affectionate +men;--what am I to do with respect to Deodotus the Stoic, of whom I have +been a pupil from my youth,--who has been living with me so many years,--who +dwells in my house,--whom I admire and love, and who despises all those +theories of Antiochus? Our principles, you will say, are the only true +ones. Certainly the only true ones, if they are true at all; for there +cannot be many true principles incompatible with one another. Are we then +shameless who are unwilling to make mistakes; or they arrogant who have +persuaded themselves that they are the only people who know everything? I +do not, says he, assert that I, but that the wise man knows everything. +Exactly so; that he knows those things which are the principles of your +school. Now, in the first place, what an assertion it is that wisdom +cannot be explained by a wise man.--But let us leave off speaking of +ourselves; let us speak of the wise man, about whom, as I have often said +before, the whole of this discussion is. + +Wisdom, then, is distributed by most people, and indeed by us, into three +parts. First therefore, if you please, let us consider the researches that +have been made into the nature of things. Is there any one so puffed up +with a false opinion of himself as to have persuaded himself that he knows +those things? I am not asking about those reasons which depend on +conjecture, which are dragged every way by discussions, and which do not +admit any necessity of persuasion. Let the geometricians look to that, who +profess not to persuade men to believe them, but to compel them to do so; +and who prove to you everything that they describe. I am not asking these +men for those principles of the mathematicians, which, if they be not +granted, they cannot advance a single step; such as that a point is a +thing which has no magnitude,--that an extremity or levelness, as it were, +is a space which has no thickness,--that a line is length without breadth. +Though I should grant that all these axioms are true, if I were to add an +oath, do you think a wise man would swear that the sun is many degrees +greater than the earth, before Archimedes had, before his eyes, made out +all those calculations by which it is proved? If he does, then he will be +despising the sun which he considers a god. But if he will not believe the +mathematical calculations which employ a sort of constraint in +teaching,--as you yourselves say,--surely he will be very far from believing +the arguments of philosophers; or, if he does believe any such, which +school will he believe? One may explain all the principles of natural +philosophers, but it would take a long time: I ask, however, whom he will +follow? Suppose for a moment that some one is now being made a wise man, +but is not one yet,--what system and what school shall he select above all +others? For, whatever one he selects, he will select while he is still +unwise. But grant that he is a man of godlike genius, which of all the +natural philosophers will he approve of above all others? For he cannot +approve of more than one. I will not pursue an infinite number of +questions; only let us see whom he will approve of with respect to the +elements of things of which all things are composed; for there is a great +disagreement among the greatest men on this subject. + +XXXVII. First of all, Thales, one of the seven, to whom they say that the +other six yielded the preeminence, said that everything originated out of +water; but he failed to convince Anaximander, his countryman and +companion, of this theory; for his idea was that there was an infinity of +nature from which all things were produced. After him, his pupil, +Anaximenes, said that the air was infinite, but that the things which were +generated from it were finite; and that the earth, and water, and fire, +were generated, and that from them was produced everything else. +Anaxagoras said that matter was infinite; but that from it were produced +minute particles resembling one another; that at first they were confused, +but afterwards brought into order by divine intellect. Xenophanes, who was +a little more ancient still, asserted that all things were only one single +being, and that that being was immutable and a god, not born, but +everlasting, of a globular form. Parmenides considered that it is fire +that moves the earth, which is formed out of it. Leucippus thought that +there was a _plenum_, and a _vacuum_; Democritus resembled him in this +idea, but was more copious on other matters: Empedocles adopts the theory +of the four ordinary and commonly known elements. Heraclitus refers +everything to fire; Melissus thinks that what exists is infinite, +immutable, always has existed, and always will. Plato thinks that the +world was made by God, so as to be eternal, out of matter which collects +everything to itself. The Pythagoreans affirm that everything proceeds +from numbers, and from the principles of mathematicians. + +Now of all these different teachers the wise man will, I imagine, select +some one to follow; all the rest, numerous, and great men as they are, +will be discarded by him and condemned; but whichever doctrine he approves +of he will retain in his mind, being comprehended in the same manner as +those things which he comprehends by means of the senses; nor will he feel +any greater certainty of the fact of its now being day, than, since he is +a Stoic, of this world being wise, being endowed with intellect, which has +made both itself and the world, and which regulates, sets in motion, and +governs everything. He will also be persuaded that the sun, and moon, and +all the stars, and the earth, and sea, are gods, because a certain animal +intelligence pervades and passes through them all: but nevertheless that +it will happen some day or other that all this world will be burnt up with +fire. + +XXXVIII. Suppose that all this is true: (for you see already that I admit +that something is true,) still I deny that these things are comprehended +and perceived. For when that wise Stoic of yours has repeated all that to +you, syllable by syllable, Aristotle will come forward pouring forth a +golden stream of eloquence, and pronounce him a fool; and assert that the +world has never had a beginning, because there never existed any beginning +of so admirable a work from the adoption of a new plan: and that the world +is so excellently made in every part that no power could be great enough +to cause such motion, and such changes; nor could any time whatever be +long enough to produce an old age capable of causing all this beauty to +decay and perish. It will be indispensable for you to deny this, and to +defend the former doctrine as you would your own life and reputation; may +I not have even leave to entertain a doubt on the matter? To say nothing +about the folly of people who assent to propositions rashly, what value am +I to set upon a liberty which will not allow to me what is necessary for +you? Why did God, when he was making everything for the sake of man, (for +this is your doctrine,) make such a multitude of water-serpents and +vipers? Why did he scatter so many pernicious and fatal things over the +earth? You assert that all this universe could not have been made so +beautifully and so ingeniously without some godlike wisdom; the majesty of +which you trace down even to the perfection of bees and ants; so that it +would seem that there must have been a Myrmecides(12) among the gods; the +maker of all animated things. + +You say that nothing can have any power without God. Exactly opposite is +the doctrine of Strato of Lampsacus, who gives that God of his exemption +from all important business. But as the priests of the gods have a +holiday, how much more reasonable is it that the gods should have one +themselves? He then asserts that he has no need of the aid of the gods to +account for the making of the world. Everything that exists, he says, was +made by Nature: not agreeing with that other philosopher who teaches, that +the universe is a concrete mass of rough and smooth, and hooked and +crooked bodies, with the addition of a vacuum: this he calls a dream of +Democritus, and says that he is here not teaching, but wishing;--but he +himself, examining each separate part of the world, teaches that whatever +exists, and whatever is done, is caused, or has been caused, by natural +weights and motions. In this way he releases God from a great deal of hard +work, and me from fear; for who is there who, (when he thinks that he is +an object of divine care,) does not feel an awe of the divine power day +and night? And who, whenever any misfortunes happen to him (and what man +is there to whom none happen?) feels a dread lest they may have befallen +him deservedly--not, indeed, that I agree with that; but neither do I with +you: at one time I think one doctrine more probable, and at other times I +incline to the other. + +XXXIX. All these mysteries, O Lucullus, lie concealed and enveloped in +darkness so thick that no human ingenuity has a sight sufficiently +piercing to penetrate into heaven, and dive into the earth. We do not +understand our own bodies: we do not know what is the situation of their +different parts, or what power each part has: therefore, the physicians +themselves, whose business it was to understand these things, have opened +bodies in order to lay those parts open to view. And yet empirics say that +they are not the better known for that; because it is possible that, by +being laid open and uncovered, they may be changed. But is it possible for +us, in the same manner, to anatomize, and open, and dissect the natures of +things, so as to see whether the earth is firmly fixed on its foundations +and sticks firm on its roots, if I may so say, or whether it hangs in the +middle of a vacuum? Xenophanes says that the moon is inhabited, and that +it is a country of many cities and mountains. These assertions seem +strange, but the man who has made them could not take his oath that such +is the case; nor could I take mine that it is not the case. You also say +that, opposite to us, on the contrary side of the earth, there are people +who stand with their feet opposite to our feet, and you call them +Antipodes. Why are you more angry with me, who do not despise these +theories, than with those who, when they hear them, think that you are +beside yourselves? + +Hiretas of Syracuse, as Theophrastus tells us, thinks that the sun, and +moon, and stars, and all the heavenly bodies, in short, stand still; and +that nothing in the world moves except the earth; and, as that turns and +revolves on its own axis with the greatest rapidity, he thinks that +everything is made to appear by it as if it were the heaven which is moved +while the earth stands still. And, indeed, some people think that Plato, +in the Timaeus, asserts this, only rather obscurely. What is your opinion, +Epicurus? Speak. Do you think that the sun is so small?--Do I? Do you +yourselves think it so large? But all of you are ridiculed by him, and you +in your turn mock him. Socrates, then, is free from this ridicule, and so +is Ariston of Chios, who thinks that none of these matters can be known. + +But I return to the mind and body. Is it sufficiently known by us what is +the nature of the sinews and of the veins? Do we comprehend what the mind +is?--where it is?--or, in short, whether it exists at all, or whether, as +Dicaearchus thinks, there is no such thing whatever? If there is such a +thing, do we know whether it has three divisions, as Plato thought; those +of reason, anger, and desire?--or whether it is single and uniform? If it +is single and uniform, do we know whether it is fire, or breath, or +blood?--or, as Xenocrates says, number without a body?--though, what sort of +thing that is, is not very easy to understand. And whatever it is, do we +know whether it is mortal or eternal? For many arguments are alleged on +both sides. + +XL. Some of these theories seem certain to your wise man: but ours does +not even see what is most probable; so nearly equal in weight are the +opposite arguments in most cases. If you proceed more modestly, and +reproach me, not because I do not assent to your reasoning, but because I +do not assent to any, I will not resist any further: but I will select +some one with whom I may agree. Whom shall I choose?--whom? Democritus? +for, as you know, I have always been a favourer of noble birth. I shall be +at once overwhelmed with the reproaches of your whole body. Can you think, +they will say to me, that there is any vacuum, when everything is so +filled and close packed that whenever any body leaves its place and moves, +the place which it leaves is immediately occupied by some other body? Or +can you believe that there are any atoms to which whatever is made by +their combination is entirely unlike? or that any excellent thing can be +made without intellect? And, since this admirable beauty is found in one +world, do you think that there are also innumerable other worlds, above, +below, on the right hand and on the left, before, and behind, some unlike +this one, and some of the same kind? And, as we are now at Bauli, and are +beholding Puteoli, do you think that there are in other places like these +a countless host of men, of the same names and rank, and exploits, and +talents, and appearances, and ages, arguing on the same subjects? And if +at this moment, or when we are asleep, we seem to see anything in our +mind, do you think that those images enter from without, penetrating into +our minds through our bodies? You can never adopt such ideas as these, or +give your assent to such preposterous notions. It is better to have no +ideas at all than to have such erroneous ones as these. + +Your object, then, is not to make me sanction anything by my assent. If it +were, consider whether it would not be an impudent, not to say an arrogant +demand, especially as these principles of yours do not seem to me to be +even probable. For I do not believe that there is any such thing as +divination, which you assent to; and I also despise fate, by which you say +that everything is regulated. I do not even believe that this world was +formed by divine wisdom; or, I should rather say, I do not know whether it +was so formed or not. + +XLI. But why should you seek to disparage me? May I not confess that I do +not understand what I really do not? Or may the Stoics argue with one +other, and may I not argue with them? Zeno, and nearly all the rest of the +Stoics, consider AEther as the Supreme God, being endued with reason, by +which everything is governed. Cleanthes, who we may call a Stoic, _Majorum +Gentium_, the pupil of Zeno, thinks that the Sun has the supreme rule over +and government of everything. We are compelled, therefore, by the +dissensions of these wise men, to be ignorant of our own ruler, inasmuch +as we do not know whether we are subjects of the Sun or of AEther. But the +great size of the sun, (for this present radiance of his appears to be +looking at me,) warns me to make frequent mention of him. Now you all +speak of his magnitude as if you had measured it with a ten-foot rule, +(though I refuse credit to your measurement, looking on you as but bad +architects.) Is there then any room for doubt, which of us, to speak as +gently as possible, is the more modest of the two? Not, however, that I +think those questions of the natural philosophers deserving of being +utterly banished from our consideration; for the consideration and +contemplation of nature is a sort of natural food, if I may say so, for +our minds and talents. We are elevated by it, we seem to be raised above +the earth, we look down on human affairs; and by fixing our thoughts on +high and heavenly things we despise the affairs of this life, as small and +inconsiderable. The mere investigation of things of the greatest +importance, which are at the same time very secret, has a certain pleasure +in it. And when anything meets us which appears likely, our minds are +filled with pleasure thoroughly worthy of a man. Both your wise man and +ours, then, will inquire into these things; but yours will do so in order +to assent, to feel belief, to express affirmation; ours, with such +feelings that he will fear to yield rashly to opinion, and will think that +he has succeeded admirably if in matters of this kind he has found out +anything which is likely. + +Let us now come to the question of the knowledge of good and evil. But we +must say a few words by way of preface. It appears to me that they who +speak so positively about those questions of natural philosophy, do not +reflect that they are depriving themselves of the authority of those ideas +which appear more clear. For they cannot give a clearer assent to, or a +more positive approval of the fact that it is now daylight, than they do, +when the crow croaks, to the idea that it is commanding or prohibiting +something. Nor will they affirm that that statue is six feet high more +positively after they have measured it, than that the sun, which they +cannot measure, is more than eighteen times as large as the earth. From +which this conclusion arises: if it cannot be perceived how large the sun +is, he who assents to other things in the same manner as he does to the +magnitude of the sun, does not perceive them. But the magnitude of the sun +cannot be perceived. He, then, who assents to a statement about it, as if +he perceived it, perceives nothing. Suppose they were to reply that it is +possible to perceive how large the sun is; I will not object as long as +they admit that other things too can be perceived and comprehended in the +same manner. For they cannot affirm that one thing can be comprehended +more or less than another, since there is only one definition of the +comprehension of everything. + +XLII. However, to go back to what I had begun to say--What have we in good +and bad certainly ascertained? (we must, of course, fix boundaries to +which the sum of good and evil is to be referred;) what subject, in fact, +is there about which there is a greater disagreement between the most +learned men? I say nothing about those points which seem now to be +abandoned; or about Herillus, who places the chief good in knowledge and +science: and though he had been a pupil of Zeno, you see how far he +disagrees with him, and how very little he differs from Plato. The school +of the Megaric philosophers was a very celebrated one; and its chief, as I +see it stated in books, was Xenophanes, whom I mentioned just now. After +him came Parmenides and Zeno; and from them the Eleatic philosophers get +their name. Afterwards came Euclid of Megara, a pupil of Socrates, from +whom that school got the name of Megaric. And they defined that as the +only good which was always one, alike, and identical. They also borrowed a +great deal from Plato. But the Eretrian philosophers, who were so called +from Menedumus, because he was a native of Eretria, placed all good in the +mind, and in that acuteness of the mind by which the truth is discerned. +The Megarians say very nearly the same, only that they, I think, develop +their theory with more elegance and richness of illustration. If we now +despise these men, and think them worthless, at all events we ought to +show more respect for Ariston, who, having been a pupil of Zeno, adopted +in reality the principles which he had asserted in words; namely, that +there was nothing good except virtue, and nothing evil except what was +contrary to virtue; and who denied altogether the existence of those +influences which Zeno contended for as being intermediate, and neither +good nor evil. His idea of the chief good, is being affected in neither +direction by these circumstances; and this state of mind he calls +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}; but Pyrrho asserts that the wise man does not even feel them; +and that state is called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}. + +To say nothing, then, of all these opinions, let us now examine those +others which have been long and vigorously maintained. Some have accounted +pleasure the chief good; the chief of whom was Aristippus, who had been a +pupil of Socrates, and from whom the Cyrenaic school spring. After him +came Epicurus, whose school is now better known, though he does not +exactly agree with the Cyrenaics about pleasure itself. But Callipho +thought that pleasure and honour combined made up the chief good. +Hieronymus placed it in being free from all annoyance; Diodorus in this +state when combined with honour. Both these last men were Peripatetics. To +live honourably, enjoying those things which nature makes most dear to +man, was the definition both of the Old Academy, (as we may learn from the +writings of Polemo, who is highly approved of by Antiochus,) and of +Aristotle, and it is the one to which his friends appear now to come +nearest. Carneades also introduced a definition, (not because he approved +of it himself, but for the sake of opposition to the Stoics,) that the +chief good is to enjoy those things which nature has made man consider as +most desirable. But Zeno laid it down that that honourableness which +arises from conformity to nature is the chief good. And Zeno was the +founder and chief of the Stoic school. + +XLIII. This now is plain enough, that all these chief goods which I have +mentioned have a chief evil corresponding to them, which is their exact +opposite. I now put it to you, whom shall I follow? only do not let any +one make me so ignorant and absurd a reply as, Any one, provided only that +you follow some one or other. Nothing more inconsiderate can be said: I +wish to follow the Stoics. Will Antiochus, (I do not say Aristotle, a man +almost, in my opinion, unrivalled as a philosopher, but will Antiochus) +give me leave? And he was called an Academic; but he would have been, with +very little alteration, something very like a Stoic. The matter shall now +be brought to a decision. For we must either give the wise man to the +Stoics or to the Old Academy. He cannot belong to both; for the contention +between them is not one about boundaries, but about the whole territory. +For the whole system of life depends on the definition of the chief good; +and those who differ on that point, differ about the whole system of life. +It is impossible, therefore, that those of both these schools should be +wise, since they differ so much from one another: but one of them only can +be so. If it be the disciple of Polemo, then the Stoic is wrong, who +assents to an error: and you say that nothing is so incompatible with the +character of a wise man as that. But if the principles of Zeno be true, +then we must say the same of the Old Academics and of the Peripatetics; +and as I do not know which is the more wise of the two, I give my assent +to neither. What? when Antiochus in some points disagrees with the Stoics +whom he is so fond of, does he not show that these principles cannot be +approved of by a wise man? + +The Stoics assert that all offences are equal: but Antiochus energetically +resists this doctrine. At least, let me consider before I decide which +opinion I will embrace. Cut the matter short, says he, do at last decide +on something. What? The reasons which are given appear to me to be both +shrewd and nearly equal: may I not then be on my guard against committing +a crime? for you called it a crime, Lucullus, to violate a principle; I, +therefore, restrain myself, lest I should assent to what I do not +understand; and this principle I have in common with you. + +Here, however, is a much greater difference.--Zeno thinks that a happy life +depends on virtue alone. What says Antiochus? He admits that this is true +of a happy life, but not of the happiest possible life. The first is a +god, who thinks that nothing can be wanting to virtue; the latter is a +miserable man, who thinks that there are many things besides virtue, some +of which are dear to a man, and some even necessary. But I am afraid that +the former may be attributing to virtue more than nature can bear; +especially since Theophrastus has said many things with eloquence and +copiousness on this subject; and I fear that even he may not be quite +consistent with himself. For though he admits that there are some evils +both of body and fortune, he nevertheless thinks that a man may be happy +who is afflicted by them all, provided he is wise. I am perplexed here; at +one time the one opinion appears to me to be more probable, and at another +time the other does. And yet, unless one or the other be true, I think +virtue must be entirely trampled under foot. + +XLIV. However, they differ as to this principle. What then? Can we +approve, as true, of those maxims on which they agree; namely, that the +mind of the wise man is never influenced by either desire or joy? Come, +suppose this opinion is a probable one, is this other one so too; namely, +that it never feels either alarm or grief? Cannot the wise fear? And if +his country be destroyed, cannot he grieve? That seems harsh, but Zeno +thinks it inevitable; for he considers nothing good except what is +honourable. But you do not think it true in the least, Antiochus. For you +admit that there are many good things besides honour, and many evils +besides baseness; and it is inevitable that the wise man must fear such +when coming, and grieve when they have come. But I ask when it was decided +by the Old Academy that they were to deny that the mind of the wise man +could be agitated or disturbed? They approved of intermediate states, and +asserted that there was a kind of natural mean in every agitation. We have +all read the treatise on Grief, by Crantor, a disciple of the Old Academy. +It is not large, but it is a golden book, and one, as Panaetius tells +Tubero, worth learning by heart. And these men used to say that those +agitations were very profitably given to our minds by nature; fear, in +order that we may take care; pity and melancholy they called the whetstone +of our clemency; and anger itself that of our courage. Whether they were +right or wrong we may consider another time. How it was that those stern +doctrines of yours forced their way into the Old Academy I do not know, +but I cannot bear them; not because they have anything in them +particularly disagreeable to me; for many of the marvellous doctrines of +the Stoics, which men call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, are derived from Socrates. But where +has Xenocrates or where has Aristotle touched these points? For you try to +make out the Stoics to be the same as these men. Would they ever say that +wise men were the only kings, the only rich, the only handsome men? that +everything everywhere belonged to the wise man? that no one was a consul, +or praetor, or general, or even, for aught I know, a quinquevir, but the +wise man? lastly, that he was the only citizen, the only free man? and +that all who are destitute of wisdom are foreigners, exiles, slaves, or +madmen? last of all, that the writings of Lycurgus and Solon and our +Twelve Tables are not laws? that there are even no cities or states except +those which are peopled by wise men? Now these maxims, O Lucullus, if you +agree with Antiochus, your own friend, must be defended by you as +zealously as the bulwarks of your city; but I am only bound to uphold them +with moderation, just as much as I think fit. + +XLV. I have read in Clitomachus, that when Carneades and Diogenes the +Stoic were standing in the capitol before the senate, Aulus Albonus (who +was praetor at the time, in the consulship of Publius Scipio and Marcus +Marcellus, the same Albonus who was consul, Lucullus, with your own +grandfather, a learned man, as his own history shows, which is written in +Greek) said jestingly to Carneades--"I do not, O Carneades, seem to you to +be praetor because I am not wise, nor does this seem to be a city, nor do +the inhabitants seem to be citizens, for the same reason." And he +answered--"That is the Stoic doctrine." Aristotle or Xenocrates, whom +Antiochus wished to follow, would have had no doubt that he was praetor, +and Rome a city, and that it was inhabited by citizens. But our friend is, +as I said before, a manifest Stoic, though he talks a little nonsense. + +But you are all afraid for me, lest I should descend to opinions, and +adopt and approve of something that I do not understand; which you would +be very sorry for me to do. What advice do you give me? Chrysippus often +testifies that there are three opinions only about the chief good which +can be defended; he cuts off and discards all the rest. He says that +either honour is the chief good, or pleasure, or both combined. For that +those who say that the chief good is to be free from all annoyance, shun +the unpopular name of pleasure, but hover about its neighbourhood. And +those also do the same who combine that freedom from annoyance with +honour. And those do not much differ from them who unite to honour the +chief advantages of nature. So he leaves three opinions which he thinks +may be maintained by probable arguments. + +Be it so. Although I am not easily to be moved from the definition of +Polemo and the Peripatetics, and Antiochus, nor have I anything more +probable to bring forward. Still, I see how sweetly pleasure allures our +senses. I am inclined to agree with Epicurus or Aristippus. But virtue +recalls me, or rather leads me back with her hand; says that these are the +feelings of cattle, and that man is akin to the Deity. I may take a middle +course; so that, since Aristippus, as if we had no mind, defends nothing +but the body, and Zeno espouses the cause of the mind alone, as if we were +destitute of body, I may follow Callipho, whose opinion Carneades used to +defend with such zeal, that he appeared wholly to approve of it; although +Clitomachus affirmed that he never could understand what Carneades +approved of. But if I were to choose to follow him, would not truth +itself, and all sound and proper reason, oppose me? Will you, when honour +consists in despising pleasure, unite honour to pleasure, joining, as it +were, a man to a beast? + +XLVI. There is now, then, only one pair of combatants left--pleasure and +honour; between which Chrysippus, as far as I can see, was not long in +perplexity how to decide. If you follow the one, many things are +overthrown, especially the fellowship of the human race, affection, +friendship, justice, and all other virtues, none of which can exist at all +without disinterestedness: for the virtue which is impelled to action by +pleasure, as by a sort of wages, is not really virtue, but only a +deceitful imitation and pretence of virtue. Listen, on the contrary, to +those men who say that they do not even understand the name of honour, +unless we call that honourable which is accounted reputable by the +multitude; that the source of all good is in the body; that this is the +law, and rule, and command of nature; and that he who departs from it will +never have any object in life to follow. Do you think, then, that I am not +moved when I hear these and innumerable other statements of the same kind? +I am moved as much as you are, Lucullus; and you need not think me less a +man than yourself. The only difference is that you, when you are agitated, +acquiesce, assent, and approve; you consider the impression which you have +received true, certain, comprehended, perceived, established, firm, and +unalterable; and you cannot be moved or driven from it by any means +whatever. I think that there is nothing of such a kind that, if I assent +to it, I shall not often be assenting to what is false; since there is no +distinct line of demarcation between what is true and what is false, +especially as the science of dialectics has no power of judging on this +subject. + +I come now to the third part of philosophy. There is an idea advanced by +Protagoras, who thinks that that is true to each individual which seems so +to him; and a completely different one put forward by the Cyrenaics, who +think that there is no such thing as certain judgment about anything +except the inner feelings: and a third, different from either, maintained +by Epicurus, who places all judgment in the senses, and in our notions of +things, and in pleasure. But Plato considered that the whole judgment of +truth, and that truth itself, being abstracted from opinions and from the +senses, belonged to the province of thought and of the intellect. Does our +friend Antiochus approve of any of these principles? He does not even +approve of those who may be called his own ancestors in philosophy: for +where does he follow Xenocrates, who has written a great many books on the +method of speaking, which are highly esteemed?--or Aristotle himself, than +whom there is no more acute or elegant writer? He never goes one step +without Chrysippus. + +XLVII. Do we then, who are called Academics, misuse the glory of this +name? or why are we to be compelled to follow those men who differ from +one another? In this very thing, which the dialecticians teach among the +elements of their art, how one ought to judge whether an argument be true +or false which is connected in this manner, "If it is day, it shines," how +great a contest there is;--Diodorus has one opinion, Philo another, +Chrysippus a third. Need I say more? In how many points does Chrysippus +himself differ from Cleanthes, his own teacher? Again, do not two of the +very princes of the dialecticians, Antipater and Archidemus, men most +devoted to hypothesis, disagree in numbers of things? Why then, Lucullus, +do you seek to bring me into odium, and drag me, as it were, before the +assembly? And why, as seditious tribunes often do, do you order all the +shops to be shut? For what is your object when you complain that all +trades are being suppressed by us, if it be not to excite the artisans? +But, if they all come together from all quarters, they will be easily +excited against you; for, first of all, I will cite all those unpopular +expressions of yours when you called all those, who will then be in the +assembly, exiles, and slaves, and madmen: and then I will come to those +arguments which touch not the multitude, but you yourselves who are here +present. For Zeno and Antiochus both deny that any of you know anything. +How so? you will say; for we allege, on the other hand, that even a man +without wisdom comprehends many things. But you affirm that no one except +a wise man knows one single thing. And Zeno professed to illustrate this +by a piece of action; for when he stretched out his fingers, and showed +the palm of his hand, "Perception," said he, "is a thing like this." Then, +when he had a little closed his fingers, "Assent is like this." +Afterwards, when he had completely closed his hand, and held forth his +fist, that, he said, was comprehension. From which simile he also gave +that state a name which it had not before, and called it {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. But +when he brought his left hand against his right, and with it took a firm +and tight hold of his fist, knowledge, he said, was of that character; and +that was what none but a wise man possessed. But even those who are +themselves wise men do not venture to say so, nor any one who has ever +lived and been a wise man. According to that theory, you, Catulus, do not +know that it is daylight; and you, Hortensius, are ignorant that we are +now in your villa. + +Now, are these arguments less formidable than yours? They are not, +perhaps, very refined; and those others show more acuteness. But, just as +you said, that if nothing could be comprehended, all the arts were +destroyed at once, and would not grant that mere probability was a +sufficient foundation for art; so I now reply to you, that art cannot +exist without knowledge. Would Zeuxis, or Phidias, or Polycletus allow +that they knew nothing, when they were men of such marvellous skill? But +if any one had explained to them how much power knowledge was said to +have, they would cease to be angry; they would not even be offended with +us, when they had learnt that we were only putting an end to what did not +exist anywhere; but that we left them what was quite sufficient for them. + +And this doctrine is confirmed also by the diligence of our ancestors, who +ordained, in the first place, that every one should swear "according to +the opinion of his own mind;" secondly, that he should be accounted guilty +"if he knowingly swore falsely," because there was a great deal of +ignorance in life; thirdly, that the man who was giving his evidence +should say that "he thought," even in a case where he was speaking of what +he had actually seen himself. And that when the judges were giving their +decision on their evidence, they should say, not that such and such a +thing had been done, but that such and such a thing appeared to them. + +XLVIII. But since the sailor is making signals, and the west wind is +showing us too, by its murmur, that it is time for us, Lucullus, to set +sail, and since I have already said a great deal, I must now conclude. But +hereafter, when we inquire into these subjects, we will discuss the great +disagreements between the most eminent on the subject of the obscurity of +nature, and the errors of so many philosophers who differ from one another +about good and evil so widely, that, as more than one of their theories +cannot be true, it is inevitable that many illustrious schools must fall +to the ground, rather than the theories about the false impressions of the +eyes and the other senses, and sorites, or false syllogism,--rods which the +Stoics have made to beat themselves with. + +Then Lucullus replied, I am not at all sorry that we have had this +discussion; for often, when we meet again, especially in our Tusculan +villas, we can examine other questions which seem worth investigation. +Certainly, said I; but what does Catulus think? and Hortensius? I? said +Catulus. I return to my father's opinion, which he used to say was derived +from Carneades, and think that nothing can be perceived; but still I +imagine that a wise man will assent to what is not actually perceived--that +is to say, will form opinions: being, however, aware at the same time that +they are only opinions, and knowing that there is nothing which can be +comprehended and perceived. And, practising that {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} so as to take +probability for a guide in all things, I altogether assent to that other +doctrine, that nothing can be perceived. I see your meaning, said I; and I +do not very much object to it. But what is your opinion, Hortensius? He +laughed, and said, I suspend my judgment. I understand, said I; for that +is the peculiar principle of the Academy. + +So, after we had finished our discourse, Catulus remained behind, and we +went down to the shore to embark in our vessels. + + + + + +A TREATISE ON THE CHIEF GOOD AND EVIL. + + +Introduction. + +The following treatise was composed by Cicero a little before the +publication of his Tusculan Disputations. It consists of a series of +Dialogues, in which the opinions of the different schools of Greek +philosophy, especially the Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics, on the +Supreme Good, as the proper object or end (_finis_) of our thoughts and +actions, are investigated and compared. It is usually reckoned one of the +most highly finished and valuable of his philosophical works; though from +the abstruse nature of some of the topics dwelt upon, and the subtlety of +some of the arguments adduced, it is unquestionably the most difficult. + +He gives an account himself of the work and of his design and plan in the +following terms. (Epist. ad Att. xiii. 19.) "What I have lately written is +in the manner of Aristotle, where the conversation is so managed that he +himself has the principal part. I have finished the five books De Finibus +Bonorum et Malorum, so as to give the Epicurean doctrine to Lucius +Torquatus, the Stoic to Marcus Cato, and the Peripatetic to Marcus Cato. +For I considered that their being dead would preclude all jealousy." He +does not, however, maintain the unity of scene or character throughout the +five books. In the first book he relates a discussion which is represented +as having taken place in his villa near Cumae, in the presence of Caius +Valerius Triarius, between himself and Lucius Manlius Torquatus, who is +spoken of as being just about to enter his office as praetor, a +circumstance which fixes the date of this imaginary discussion to B.C. 50, +a time agreeing with the allusion (B. ii. 18,) to the great power of +Pompey. In the first book he attacks the doctrines of the Epicurean +school, and Torquatus defends them, alleging that they had been generally +misunderstood; and in the second book Cicero enumerates the chief +arguments with which the Stoics assailed them. + +In the third book the scene is laid in the library of Lucullus, where +Cicero had accidentally met Cato; and from conversing on the books by +which they were surrounded they proceeded to discuss the difference +between the ethics of the Stoics, and those of the Old Academy and the +Peripatetics; Cicero insisting that the disagreement was merely verbal and +not real, and that Zeno was wrong in leaving Plato and Aristotle and +establishing a new school; but Cato asserts, on the other hand, that the +difference is a real one, and that the views held by the Stoics of the +Supreme Good are of a much loftier and purer character than those which +had been previously entertained. In the fourth book Cicero gives us the +arguments with which the philosophers of the New Academy assailed the +Stoics. And this conversation is supposed to have been held two years +before that in the first book: for at the beginning of Book IV. there is a +reference to the law for limiting the length of the speeches of counsel +passed in the second consulship of Pompey, B.C. 55, as being only just +passed. + +In the fifth book we are carried back to B.C. 79, and the scene is laid at +Athens, where Cicero was at that time under Antiochus and Demetrius. He +and his brother Quintus, Lucius Cicero his cousin, Pomponius Atticus, and +Marcus Pupius Piso are represented as meeting in the Academia; and Piso, +at the request of his companions, lays open the precepts inculcated by +Aristotle and his school on the subject of the Summum Bonum; after which +Cicero states the objections of the Stoics to the Peripatetic system, and +Piso replies. While giving the opinions of these above-named sects with +great fairness and impartiality Cicero abstains throughout from +pronouncing any judgment of his own. + + + + +First Book Of The Treatise On The Chief Good And Evil. + + +I. I was not ignorant, Brutus, when I was endeavouring to add to Latin +literature the same things which philosophers of the most sublime genius +and the most profound and accurate learning had previously handled in the +Greek language, that my labours would be found fault with on various +grounds. For some, and those too, far from unlearned men, are disinclined +to philosophy altogether; some, on the other hand, do not blame a moderate +degree of attention being given to it, but do not approve of so much study +and labour being devoted to it. There will be others again, learned in +Greek literature and despising Latin compositions, who will say that they +would rather spend their time in reading Greek; and, lastly, I suspect +that there will be some people who will insist upon it that I ought to +apply myself to other studies, and will urge that, although this style of +writing may be an elegant accomplishment, it is still beneath my character +and dignity. And to all these objections I think I ought to make a brief +reply; although, indeed, I have already given a sufficient answer to the +enemies of philosophy in that book in which philosophy is defended and +extolled by me after having been attacked and disparaged by +Hortensius.(13) And as both you and others whom I considered competent +judges approved highly of that book, I have undertaken a larger work, +fearing to appear able only to excite the desires of men, but incapable of +retaining their attention. But those who, though they have a very good +opinion of philosophy, still think it should be followed in a moderate +degree only, require a temperance which is very difficult in a thing +which, when once it has the reins given it, cannot be checked or +repressed; so that I almost think those men more reasonable who altogether +forbid us to apply ourselves to philosophy at all, than they who fix a +limit to things which are in their nature boundless, and who require +mediocrity in a thing which is excellent exactly in proportion to its +intensity. + +For, if it be possible that men should arrive at wisdom, then it must not +only be acquired by us, but even enjoyed. Or if this be difficult, still +there is no limit to the way in which one is to seek for truth except one +has found it; and it is base to be wearied in seeking a thing, when what +we do seek for is the most honourable thing possible. In truth, if we are +amused when we are writing, who is so envious as to wish to deny us that +pleasure? If it is a labour to us, who will fix a limit to another +person's industry? For as the Chremes(14) of Terence does not speak from a +disregard of what is due to men when he does not wish his new neighbour + + + To dig, or plough, or any toil endure: + + +for he is not in this dissuading him from industry, but only from such +labour as is beneath a gentleman; so, on the other hand those men are over +scrupulous who are offended by my devoting myself to a labour which is far +from irksome to myself. + +II. It is more difficult to satisfy those men who allege that they despise +Latin writings. But, first of all, I may express my wonder at their not +being pleased with their native language in matters of the highest +importance, when they are fond enough of reading fables in Latin, +translated word for word from the Greek. For what man is such an enemy (as +I may almost call it) to the Roman name, as to despise or reject the Medea +of Ennius, or the Antiope of Pacuvius? and to express a dislike of Latin +literature, while at the same time he speaks of being pleased with the +plays of Euripides? "What," says such an one, "shall I rather read the +Synephebi of Caecilius,(15) or the Andria of Terence, than either of these +plays in the original of Menander?" But I disagree with men of these +opinions so entirely, that though Sophocles has composed an Electra in the +most admirable manner possible, still I think the indifferent translation +of it by Atilius(16) worth reading too, though Licinius calls him an iron +writer; with much truth in my opinion; still he is a writer whom it is +worth while to read. For to be wholly unacquainted with our own poets is a +proof either of the laziest indolence, or else of a very superfluous +fastidiousness. + +My own opinion is, that no one is sufficiently learned who is not well +versed in the works written in our own language. Shall we not be as +willing to read-- + + + Would that the pine, the pride of Pelion's brow, + + +as the same idea when expressed in Greek? And is there any objection to +having the discussions which have been set out by Plato, on the subject of +living well and happily, arrayed in a Latin dress? And if we do not limit +ourselves to the office of translators, but maintain those arguments which +have been advanced by people with whom we argue, and add to them the +exposition of our own sentiments, and clothe the whole in our own +language, why then should people prefer the writings of the Greeks to +those things which are written by us in an elegant style, without being +translated from the works of Greek philosophers? For if they say that +these matters have been discussed by those foreign writers, then there +surely is no necessity for their reading such a number of those Greeks as +they do. For what article of Stoic doctrine has been passed over by +Chrysippus? And yet we read also Diogenes,(17) Antipater,(18) +Mnesarchus,(19) Panaetius,(20) and many others, and especially the works of +my own personal friend Posidonius.(21) What shall we say of Theophrastus? +Is it but a moderate pleasure which he imparts to us while he is handling +the topics which had been previously dilated on by Aristotle? What shall +we say of the Epicureans? Do they pass over the subjects on which Epicurus +himself and other ancient writers have previously written, and forbear to +deliver their sentiments respecting them? But if Greek authors are read by +the Greeks, though discussing the same subjects over and over again, +because they deal with them in different manners, why should not the +writings of Roman authors be also read by our own countrymen? + +III. Although if I were to translate Plato or Aristotle in as bold a +manner as our poets have translated the Greek plays, then, I suppose, I +should not deserve well at the hands of my fellow-countrymen, for having +brought those divine geniuses within their reach. However, that is not +what I have hitherto done, though I do not consider myself interdicted +from doing so. Some particular passages, if I think it desirable, I shall +translate, especially from those authors whom I have just named, when +there is an opportunity of doing so with propriety; just as Ennius often +translates passages from Homer, and Afranius(22) from Menander. Nor will +I, like Lucilius, make any objection to everybody reading my writings. I +should be glad to have that Persius(23) for one of my readers; and still +more to have Scipio and Rutilius; men whose criticism he professed to +fear, saying that he wrote for the people of Tarentum, and Consentia, and +Sicily. That was all very witty of him, and in his usual style; but still, +people at that time were not so learned as to give him cause to labour +much before he could encounter their judgment, and his writings are of a +lightish character, showing indeed, a high degree of good breeding, but +only a moderate quantity of learning. But whom can I fear to have read my +works when I ventured to address a book to you, who are not inferior to +the Greeks themselves in philosophical knowledge? Although I have this +excuse for what I am doing, that I have been challenged by you, in that to +me most acceptable book which you sent me "On Virtue." + +But I imagine that some people have become accustomed to feel a repugnance +to Latin writing because they have fallen in with some unpolished and +inelegant treatises translated from bad Greek into worse Latin. And with +those men I agree, provided they will not think it worth while to read the +Greek books written on the same subject. But who would object to read +works on important subjects expressed in well-selected diction, with +dignity and elegance; unless, indeed, he wishes to be taken absolutely for +a Greek, as Albucius was saluted at Athens by Scaevola, when he was praetor? +And this topic has been handled by that same Lucilius with great elegance +and abundant wit; where he represents Scaevola as saying-- + + + You have preferr'd, Albucius, to be call'd + A Greek much rather than a Roman citizen + Or Sabine, countryman of Pontius, + Tritannius, and the brave centurions + And standard-bearers of immortal fame. + So now at Athens, I, the praetor, thus + Salute you as you wish, whene'er I see you, + With Greek address, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} noble Titus, + Ye lictors, and attendants {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}. + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} noble Titus. From this day + The great Albucius was my enemy. + + +But surely Scaevola was right. However, I can never sufficiently express my +wonder whence this arrogant disdain of everything national arose among us. +This is not exactly the place for lecturing on the subject; but my own +feelings are, and I have constantly urged them, that the Latin language is +not only not deficient, so as to deserve to be generally disparaged; but +that it is even more copious than the Greek. For when have either we +ourselves, or when has any good orator or noble poet, at least after there +was any one for him to imitate, found himself at a loss for any richness +or ornament of diction with which to set off his sentiments? + +IV. And I myself (as I do not think that I can be accused of having, in my +forensic exertions, and labours, and dangers, deserted the post in which I +was stationed by the Roman people,) am bound, forsooth, to exert myself as +much as I can to render my fellow-countrymen more learned by my labours +and studies and diligence, and not so much to contend with those men who +prefer reading Greek works, provided that they really do read them, and do +not only pretend to do so; and to fall in also with the wishes of those +men who are desirous either to avail themselves of both languages, or who, +as long as they have good works in their own, do not care very much about +similar ones in a foreign tongue. But those men who would rather that I +would write on other topics should be reasonable, because I have already +composed so many works that no one of my countrymen has ever published +more, and perhaps I shall write even more if my life is prolonged so as to +allow me to do so. And yet, whoever accustoms himself to read with care +these things which I am now writing on the subject of philosophy, will +come to the conclusion that no works are better worth reading than these. +For what is there in life which deserves to be investigated so diligently +as every subject which belongs to philosophy, and especially that which is +discussed in this treatise, namely, what is the end, the object, the +standard to which all the ideas of living well and acting rightly are to +be referred? What it is that nature follows as the chief of all desirable +things? what she avoids as the principal of all evils? + +And as on this subject there is great difference of opinion among the most +learned men, who can think it inconsistent with that dignity which every +one allows to belong to me, to examine what is in every situation in life +the best and truest good? Shall the chief men of the city, Publius Scaevola +and Marcus Manilius argue whether the offspring of a female slave ought to +be considered the gain of the master of the slave; and shall Marcus Brutus +express his dissent from their opinion, (and this is a kind of discussion +giving great room for the display of acuteness, and one too that is of +importance as regards the citizens,) and do we read, and shall we continue +to read, with pleasure their writings on this subject, and the others of +the same sort, and at the same time neglect these subjects, which embrace +the whole of human life? There may, perhaps, be more money affected by +discussions on that legal point, but beyond all question, this of ours is +the more important subject: that, however, is a point which the readers +may be left to decide upon. But we now think that this whole question +about the ends of good and evil is, I may almost say, thoroughly explained +in this treatise, in which we have endeavoured to set forth as far as we +could, not only what our own opinion was, but also everything which has +been advanced by each separate school of philosophy. + +V. To begin, however, with that which is easiest, we will first of all +take the doctrine of Epicurus, which is well known to most people; and you +shall see that it is laid down by us in such a way that it cannot be +explained more accurately even by the adherents of that sect themselves. +For we are desirous of ascertaining the truth; not of convicting some +adversary. + +But the opinion of Epicurus about pleasure was formerly defended with +great precision by Lucius Torquatus, a man accomplished in every kind of +learning; and I myself replied to him, while Caius Triarius, a most +learned and worthy young man, was present at the discussion. For as it +happened that both of them had come to my villa near Cumae to pay me a +visit, first of all we conversed a little about literature, to which they +were both of them greatly devoted; and after a while Torquatus said--Since +we have found you in some degree at leisure, I should like much to hear +from you why it is that you, I will not say hate our master Epicurus--as +most men do who differ from him in opinion--but still why you disagree with +him whom I consider as the only man who has discerned the real truth, and +who I think has delivered the minds of men from the greatest errors, and +has handed down every precept which can have any influence on making men +live well and happily. But I imagine that you, like my friend Triarius +here, like him the less because he neglected the ornaments of diction in +which Plato, and Aristotle, and Theophrastus indulged. For I can hardly be +persuaded to believe that the opinions which he entertained do not appear +to you to be correct. See now, said I, how far you are mistaken, +Torquatus. I am not offended with the language of that philosopher; for he +expresses his meaning openly and speaks in plain language, so that I can +understand him. Not, however, that I should object to eloquence in a +philosopher, if he were to think fit to employ it; though if he were not +possessed of it I should not require it. But I am not so well satisfied +with his matter, and that too on many topics. But there are as many +different opinions as there are men; and therefore we may be in error +ourselves. What is it, said he, in which you are dissatisfied with him? +For I consider you a candid judge; provided only that you are accurately +acquainted with what he has really said. Unless, said I, you think that +Phaedrus or Zeno have spoken falsely (and I have heard them both lecture, +though they gave me a high opinion of nothing but their own diligence,) +all the doctrines of Epicurus are quite sufficiently known to me. And I +have repeatedly, in company with my friend Atticus, attended the lectures +of those men whom I have named; as he had a great admiration for both of +them, and an especial affection even for Phaedrus. And every day we used to +talk over what we heard, nor was there ever any dispute between us as to +whether I understood the scope of their arguments; but only whether I +approved of them. + +VI. What is it, then, said he, which you do not approve of in them, for I +am very anxious to hear? In the first place, said I, he is utterly wrong +in natural philosophy, which is his principal boast. He only makes some +additions to the doctrine of Democritus, altering very little, and that in +such a way that he seems to me to make those points worse which he +endeavours to correct. He believes that atoms, as he calls them, that is +to say bodies which by reason of their solidity are indivisible, are borne +about in an interminable vacuum, destitute of any highest, or lowest, or +middle, or furthest, or nearest boundary, in such a manner that by their +concourse they cohere together; by which cohesion everything which exists +and which is seen is formed. And he thinks that motion of atoms should be +understood never to have had a beginning, but to have subsisted from all +eternity. + +But in those matters in which Epicurus follows Democritus, he is usually +not very wrong. Although there are many assertions of each with which I +disagree, and especially with this--that as in the nature of things there +are two points which must be inquired into,--one, what the material out of +which everything is made, is; the other, what the power is which makes +everything,--they discussed only the material, and omitted all +consideration of the efficient power and cause. However, that is a fault +common to both of them; but these blunders which I am going to mention are +Epicurus's own. + +For he thinks that those indivisible and solid bodies are borne downwards +by their own weight in a straight line; and that this is the natural +motion of all bodies. After this assertion, that shrewd man,--as it +occurred to him, that if everything were borne downwards in a straight +line, as I have just said, it would be quite impossible for one atom ever +to touch another,--on this account he introduced another purely imaginary +idea, and said that the atoms diverged a little from the straight line, +which is the most impossible thing in the world. And he asserted that it +is in this way that all those embraces, and conjunctions, and unions of +the atoms with one another took place, by which the world was made, and +all the parts of the world, and all that is in the world. And not only is +all this idea perfectly childish, but it fails in effecting its object. +For this very divergence is invented in a most capricious manner, (for he +says that each atom diverges without any cause,) though nothing can be +more discreditable to a natural philosopher than to say that anything +takes place without a cause; and also, without any reason, he deprives +atoms of that motion which is natural to every body of any weight (as he +himself lays it down) which goes downwards from the upper regions; and at +the same time he does not obtain the end for the sake of which he invented +all these theories. + +For if every atom diverges equally, still none will ever meet with one +another so as to cohere; but if some diverge, and others are borne +straight down by their natural inclination, in the first place this will +be distributing provinces as it were among the atoms, and dividing them so +that some are borne down straight, and others obliquely; and in the next +place, this turbulent concourse of atoms, which is a blunder of Democritus +also, will never be able to produce this beautifully ornamented world +which we see around us. Even this, too, is inconsistent with the +principles of natural philosophy, to believe that there is such a thing as +a minimum; a thing which he indeed never would have fancied, if he had +been willing to learn geometry from his friend Polyaenus,(24) instead of +seeking to persuade him to give it up himself. + +The sun appears to Democritus to be of vast size, as he is a man of +learning and of a profound knowledge of geometry. Epicurus perhaps thinks +that it is two feet across, for he thinks it of just that size which it +appears to be, or perhaps a little larger or smaller. So what he changes +he spoils; what he accepts comes entirely from Democritus,--the atoms, the +vacuum, the appearances, which they call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, to the inroads of which +it is owing not only that we see, but also that we think; and all that +infiniteness, which they call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, is borrowed from Democritus; and +also the innumerable worlds which are produced and perish every day. And +although I cannot possibly agree myself with all those fancies, still I +should not like to see Democritus, who is praised by every one else, +blamed by this man who has followed him alone. + +VII. And as for the second part of philosophy, which belongs to +investigating and discussing, and which is called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}, there your +master as it seems to me is wholly unarmed and defenceless. He abolishes +definitions; he lays down no rules for division and partition; he gives no +method for drawing conclusions or establishing principles; he does not +point out how captious objections may be refuted, or ambiguous terms +explained. He places all our judgments of things in our senses; and if +they are once led to approve of anything false as if it were true, then he +thinks that there is an end to all our power of distinguishing between +truth and falsehood. + +But in the third part, which relates to life and manners, with respect to +establishing the end of our actions, he utters not one single generous or +noble sentiment. He lays down above all others the principle, that nature +has but two things as objects of adoption and aversion, namely, pleasure +and pain: and he refers all our pursuits, and all our desires to avoid +anything, to one of these two heads. And although this is the doctrine of +Aristippus, and is maintained in a better manner and with more freedom by +the Cyrenaics, still I think it a principle of such a kind that nothing +can appear more unworthy of a man. For, in my opinion, nature has produced +and formed us for greater and higher purposes. It is possible, indeed, +that I may be mistaken; but my opinion is decided that that Torquatus, who +first acquired that name, did not tear the chain from off his enemy for +the purpose of procuring any corporeal pleasure to himself; and that he +did not, in his third consulship, fight with the Latins at the foot of +Mount Vesuvius for the sake of any personal pleasure. And when he caused +his son to be executed, he appears to have even deprived himself of many +pleasures, by thus preferring the claims of his dignity and command to +nature herself and the dictates of fatherly affection. What need I say +more? Take Titus Torquatus, him I mean who was consul with Cnaeus Octavius; +when he behaved with such severity towards that son whom he had allowed +Decimus Silanus to adopt as his own, as to command him, when the +ambassadors of the Macedonians accused him of having taken bribes in his +province while he was praetor, to plead his cause before his tribunal: and, +when he had heard the cause on both sides, to pronounce that he had not in +his command behaved after the fashion of his forefathers, and to forbid +him ever to appear in his sight again; does he seem to you to have given a +thought to his own pleasure? + +However, to say nothing of the dangers, and labours, and even of the pain +which every virtuous man willingly encounters on behalf of his country, or +of his family, to such a degree that he not only does not seek for, but +even disregards all pleasures, and prefers even to endure any pain +whatever rather than to forsake any part of his duty; let us come to those +things which show this equally, but which appear of less importance. What +pleasure do you, O Torquatus, what pleasure does this Triarius derive from +literature, and history, and the knowledge of events, and the reading of +poets, and his wonderful recollection of such numbers of verses? And do +not say to me, Why all these things are a pleasure to me. So, too, were +those noble actions to the Torquati. Epicurus never asserts this in this +manner; nor would you, O Triarius, nor any man who had any wisdom, or who +had ever imbibed those principles. And as to the question which is often +asked, why there are so many Epicureans--there are several reasons; but +this is the one which is most seductive to the multitude, namely, that +people imagine that what he asserts is that those things which are right +and honourable do of themselves produce joy, that is, pleasure. Those +excellent men do not perceive that the whole system is overturned if that +is the case. For if it were once granted, even although there were no +reference whatever to the body, that these things were naturally and +intrinsically pleasant; then virtue and knowledge would be intrinsically +desirable. And this is the last thing which he would choose to admit. + +These principles, then, of Epicurus, I say, I do not approve of. As for +other matters, I wish either that he himself had been a greater master of +learning, (for he is, as you yourself cannot help seeing, not sufficiently +accomplished in those branches of knowledge which men possess who are +accounted learned,) or at all events that he had not deterred others from +the study of literature: although I see that you yourself have not been at +all deterred from such pursuits by him. + +VIII. And when I had said this, more for the purpose of exciting him than +of speaking myself, Triarius, smiling gently, said,--You, indeed, have +almost entirely expelled Epicurus from the number of philosophers. For +what have you left him except the assertion that, whatever his language +might he, you understood what he meant? He has in natural philosophy said +nothing but what is borrowed from others, and even then nothing which you +approved of. If he has tried to amend anything he has made it worse. He +had no skill whatever in disputing. When he laid down the rule that +pleasure was the chief good, in the first place he was very short-sighted +in making such an assertion; and secondly, even this very doctrine was a +borrowed one; for Aristippus had said the same thing before, and better +too. You added, at last, that he was also destitute of learning. + +It is quite impossible, O Triarius, I replied, for a person not to state +what he disapproves of in the theory of a man with whom he disagrees. For +what could hinder me from being an Epicurean if I approved of what +Epicurus says? especially when it would be an amusement to learn his +doctrines. Wherefore, a man is not to be blamed for reproving those who +differ from one another; but evil speaking, contumely, ill-temper, +contention, and pertinacious violence in disputing, generally appear to me +quite unworthy of philosophy. + +I quite agree with you, said Torquatus; for one cannot dispute at all +without finding fault with your antagonist; but on the other hand you +cannot dispute properly if you do so with ill-temper or with pertinacity. +But, if you have no objection, I have an answer to make to these +assertions of yours. Do you suppose, said I, that I should have said what +I have said if I did not desire to hear what you had to say too? Would you +like then, says he, that I should go through the whole theory of Epicurus, +or that we should limit our present inquiry to pleasure by itself; which +is what the whole of the present dispute relates to? We will do, said I, +whichever you please. That then, said he, shall be my present course. I +will explain one matter only, being the most important one. At another +time I will discuss the question of natural philosophy; and I will prove +to you the theory of the divergence of the atoms, and of the magnitude of +the sun, and that Democritus committed many errors which were found fault +with and corrected by Epicurus. At present, I will confine myself to +pleasure; not that I am saying anything new, but still I will adduce +arguments which I feel sure that even you yourself will approve of. +Undoubtedly, said I, I will not be obstinate; and I will willingly agree +with you if you will only prove your assertions to my satisfaction. I will +prove them, said he, provided only that you are as impartial as you +profess yourself: but I would rather employ a connected discourse than +keep on asking or being asked questions. As you please, said I. + +On this he began to speak;-- + +IX. First of all then, said he, I will proceed in the manner which is +sanctioned by the founder of this school: I will lay down what that is +which is the subject of our inquiry, and what its character is: not that I +imagine that you do not know, but in order that my discourse may proceed +in a systematic and orderly manner. We are inquiring, then, what is the +end,--what is the extreme point of good, which, in the opinion of all +philosophers, ought to be such that everything can be referred to it, but +that it itself can be referred to nothing. This Epicurus places in +pleasure, which he argues is the chief good, and that pain is the chief +evil; and he proceeds to prove his assertion thus. He says that every +animal the moment that it is born seeks for pleasure, and rejoices in it +as the chief good; and rejects pain as the chief evil, and wards it off +from itself as far as it can; and that it acts in this manner, without +having been corrupted by anything, under the promptings of nature herself, +who forms this uncorrupt and upright judgment. Therefore, he affirms that +there is no need of argument or of discussion as to why pleasure is to be +sought for, and pain to be avoided. This he thinks a matter of sense, just +as much as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet; none of which +propositions he thinks require to be confirmed by laboriously sought +reasons, but that it is sufficient merely to state them. For that there is +a difference between arguments and conclusions arrived at by +ratiocination, and ordinary observations and statements:--by the first, +secret and obscure principles are explained; by the second, matters which +are plain and easy are brought to decision. For since, if you take away +sense from a man, there is nothing left to him, it follows of necessity +that what is contrary to nature, or what agrees with it, must be left to +nature herself to decide. Now what does she perceive, or what does she +determine on as her guide to seek or to avoid anything, except pleasure +and pain? But there are some of our school who seek to carry out this +doctrine with more acuteness, and who will not allow that it is sufficient +that it should be decided by sense what is good and what is bad, but who +assert that these points can be ascertained by intellect and reason also, +and that pleasure is to be sought for on its own account, and that pain +also is to be avoided for the same reason. + +Therefore, they say that this notion is implanted in our minds naturally +and instinctively, as it were; so that we _feel_ that the one is to be +sought for, and the other to be avoided. Others, however, (and this is my +own opinion too,) assert that, as many reasons are alleged by many +philosophers why pleasure ought not to be reckoned among goods, nor pain +among evils, we ought not to rely too much on the goodness of our cause, +but that we should use arguments, and discuss the point with precision, +and argue, by the help of carefully collected reasons, about pleasure and +about pain. + +X. But that you may come to an accurate perception of the source whence +all this error originated of those people who attack pleasure and extol +pain, I will unfold the whole matter; and I will lay before you the very +statements which have been made by that discoverer of the truth, and +architect, as it were, of a happy life. For no one either despises, or +hates, or avoids pleasure itself merely because it is pleasure, but +because great pains overtake those men who do not understand how to pursue +pleasure in a reasonable manner. Nor is there any one who loves, or +pursues, or wishes to acquire pain because it is pain, but because +sometimes such occasions arise that a man attains to some great pleasure +through labour and pain. For, to descend to trifles, who of us ever +undertakes any laborious exertion of body except in order to gain some +advantage by so doing? and who is there who could fairly blame a man who +should wish to be in that state of pleasure which no annoyance can +interrupt, or one who shuns that pain by which no subsequent pleasure is +procured? But we do accuse those men, and think them entirely worthy of +the greatest hatred, who, being made effeminate and corrupted by the +allurements of present pleasure, are so blinded by passion that they do +not foresee what pains and annoyances they will hereafter be subject to; +and who are equally guilty with those who, through weakness of mind, that +is to say, from eagerness to avoid labour and pain, desert their duty. + +And the distinction between these things is quick and easy. For at a time +when we are free, when the option of choice is in our own power, and when +there is nothing to prevent our being able to do whatever we choose, then +every pleasure may be enjoyed, and every pain repelled. But on particular +occasions it will often happen, owing either to the obligations of duty or +the necessities of business, that pleasures must be declined and +annoyances must not be shirked. Therefore the wise man holds to this +principle of choice in those matters, that he rejects some pleasures, so +as, by the rejection, to obtain others which are greater, and encounters +some pains, so as by that means to escape others which are more +formidable. + +Now, as these are my sentiments, what reason can I have for fearing that I +may not be able to accommodate our Torquati to them--men whose examples you +just now quoted from memory, with a kind and friendly feeling towards us? +However, you have not bribed me by praising my ancestors, nor made me less +prompt in replying to you. But I should like to know from you how you +interpret their actions? Do you think that they attacked the enemy with +such feelings, or that they were so severe to their children and to their +own blood as to have no thought of their own advantage, or of what might +be useful to themselves? But even wild beasts do not do that, and do not +rush about and cause confusion in such a way that we cannot understand +what is the object of their motions. And do you think that such +illustrious men performed such great actions without a reason? What their +reason was I will examine presently; in the meantime I will lay down this +rule,--If there was any reason which instigated them to do those things +which are undoubtedly splendid exploits, then virtue by herself was not +the sole cause of their conduct. One man tore a chain from off his enemy, +and at the same time he defended himself from being slain; but he +encountered great danger. Yes, but it was before the eyes of the whole +army. What did he get by that? Glory, and the affection of his countrymen, +which are the surest bulwarks to enable a man to pass his life without +fear. He put his son to death by the hand of the executioner. If he did so +without any reason, then I should be sorry to be descended from so inhuman +and merciless a man. But if his object was to establish military +discipline and obedience to command, at the price of his own anguish, and +at a time of a most formidable war to restrain his army by the fear of +punishment, then he was providing for the safety of his fellow-citizens, +which he was well aware embraced his own. And this principle is one of +extensive application. For the very point respecting which your whole +school, and yourself most especially, who are such a diligent investigator +of ancient instances, are in the habit of vaunting yourself and using +high-flown language, namely, the mention of brave and illustrious men, and +the extolling of their actions, as proceeding not from any regard to +advantage, but from pure principles of honour and a love of glory, is +entirely upset, when once that rule in the choice of things is established +which I mentioned just now,--namely, that pleasures are passed over for the +sake of obtaining other greater pleasures, or that pains are encountered +with a view to escape greater pains. + +XI. But, however, for the present we have said enough about the +illustrious and glorious actions of celebrated men; for there will be, +hereafter, a very appropriate place for discussing the tendency of all the +virtues to procure pleasure. + +But, at present, I will explain what pleasure itself is, and what its +character is; so as to do away with all the mistakes of ignorant people, +and in order that it may be clearly understood how dignified, and +temperate, and virtuous that system is, which is often accounted +voluptuous, effeminate, and delicate. For we are not at present pursuing +that pleasure alone which moves nature itself by a certain sweetness, and +which is perceived by the senses with a certain pleasurable feeling; but +we consider that the greatest of all pleasures which is felt when all pain +is removed. For since, when we are free from pain, we rejoice in that very +freedom itself, and in the absence of all annoyance,--but everything which +is a cause of our rejoicing is pleasure, just as everything that gives us +offence is pain,--accordingly, the absence of all pain is rightly +denominated pleasure. For, as when hunger and thirst are driven away by +meat and drink, the very removal of the annoyance brings with it the +attainment of pleasure, so, in every case, the removal of pain produces +the succession of pleasure. And therefore Epicurus would not admit that +there was any intermediate state between pleasure and pain; for he +insisted that that very state which seems to some people the intermediate +one, when a man is free from every sort of pain, is not only pleasure, but +the highest sort of pleasure. For whoever feels how he is affected must +inevitably be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. But +Epicurus thinks that the highest pleasure consists in an absence of all +pains; so that pleasure may afterwards be varied, and may be of different +kinds, but cannot be increased or amplified. + +And even at Athens, as I have heard my father say, when he was jesting in +a good-humoured and facetious way upon the Stoics, there is a statue in +the Ceramicus of Chrysippus, sitting down with his hand stretched out; and +this attitude of the hand intimates that he is amusing himself with this +brief question, "Does your hand, while in that condition in which it is at +present, want anything?"--Nothing at all. But if pleasure were a good, +would it want it? I suppose so. Pleasure, then, is not a good. And my +father used to say that even a statue would not say this if it could +speak. For the conclusion was drawn as against the Stoics with sufficient +acuteness, but it did not concern Epicurus. For if that were the only +pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which +overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even +a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing +motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, +to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was +correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was +in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that +if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it +for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure. + +XII. But that pleasure is the boundary of all good things may be easily +seen from this consideration. Let us imagine a person enjoying pleasures +great, numerous, and perpetual, both of mind and body, with no pain either +interrupting him at present or impending over him; what condition can we +call superior to or more desirable than this? For it is inevitable that +there must be in a man who is in this condition a firmness of mind which +fears neither death nor pain, because death is void of all sensation; and +pain, if it is of long duration, is a trifle, while if severe it is +usually of brief duration; so that its brevity is a consolation if it is +violent, and its trifling nature if it is enduring. And when there is +added to these circumstances that such a man has no fear of the deity of +the gods, and does not suffer past pleasures to be entirely lost, but +delights himself with the continued recollection of them, what can be +added to this which will be any improvement to it? + +Imagine, on the other hand, any one worn out with the greatest pains of +mind and body which can possibly befal a man, without any hope being held +out to him that they will hereafter be lighter, when, besides, he has no +pleasure whatever either present or expected; what can be spoken of or +imagined more miserable than this? But if a life entirely filled with +pains is above all things to be avoided, then certainly that is the +greatest of evils to live in pain. And akin to this sentiment is the +other, that it is the most extreme good to live with pleasure. For our +mind has no other point where it can stop as at a boundary; and all fears +and distresses are referable to pain: nor is there anything whatever +besides, which of its own intrinsic nature can make us anxious or grieve +us. Moreover, the beginnings of desiring and avoiding, and indeed +altogether of everything which we do, take their rise either in pleasure +or pain. And as this is the case, it is plain that everything which is +right and laudable has reference to this one object of living with +pleasure. And since that is the highest, or extreme, or greatest good, +which the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, because it is referred to nothing else +itself, but everything is referred to it, we must confess that the highest +good is to live agreeably. + +XIII. And those who place this in virtue alone, and, being caught by the +splendour of a name, do not understand what nature requires, will be +delivered from the greatest blunder imaginable if they will listen to +Epicurus. For unless those excellent and beautiful virtues which your +school talks about produced pleasure, who would think them either +praiseworthy or desirable? For as we esteem the skill of physicians not +for the sake of the art itself, but from our desire for good health,--and +as the skill of the pilot, who has the knowledge how to navigate a vessel +well, is praised with reference to its utility, and not to his ability,--so +wisdom, which should be considered the art of living, would not be sought +after if it effected nothing; but at present it is sought after because it +is, as it were, the efficient cause of pleasure, which is a legitimate +object of desire and acquisition. And now you understand what pleasure I +mean, so that what I say may not be brought into odium from my using an +unpopular word. For as the chief annoyances to human life proceed from +ignorance of what things are good and what bad, and as by reason of that +mistake men are often deprived of the greatest pleasures, and tortured by +the most bitter grief of mind, we have need to exercise wisdom, which, by +removing groundless alarms and vain desires, and by banishing the rashness +of all erroneous opinions, offers herself to us as the surest guide to +pleasure. For it is wisdom alone which expels sorrow from our minds, and +prevents our shuddering with fear: she is the instructress who enables us +to live in tranquillity, by extinguishing in us all vehemence of desire. +For desires are insatiable, and ruin not only individuals but entire +families, and often overturn the whole state. From desires arise hatred, +dissensions, quarrels, seditions, wars. Nor is it only out of doors that +these passions vent themselves, nor is it only against others that they +run with blind violence; but they are often shut up, as it were, in the +mind, and throw that into confusion with their disagreements. + +And the consequence of this is, to make life thoroughly wretched; so that +the wise man is the only one who, having cut away all vanity and error, +and removed it from him, can live contented within the boundaries of +nature, without melancholy and without fear. For what diversion can be +either more useful or more adapted for human life than that which Epicurus +employed? For he laid it down that there were three kinds of desires; the +first, such as were natural and necessary; the second, such as were +natural but not necessary; the third, such as were neither natural nor +necessary. And these are all such, that those which are necessary are +satisfied without much trouble or expense: even those which are natural +and not necessary, do not require a great deal, because nature itself +makes the riches, which are sufficient to content it, easy of acquisition +and of limited quantity: but as for vain desires, it is impossible to find +any limit to, or any moderation in them. + +XIV. But if we see that the whole life of man is thrown into disorder by +error and ignorance; and that wisdom is the only thing which can relieve +us from the sway of the passions and the fear of danger, and which can +teach us to bear the injuries of fortune itself with moderation, and which +shows us all the ways which lead to tranquillity and peace; what reason is +there that we should hesitate to say that wisdom is to be sought for the +sake of pleasure, and that folly is to be avoided on account of its +annoyances? And on the same principle we shall say that even temperance is +not to be sought for its own sake, but because it brings peace to the +mind, and soothes and tranquillizes them by what I may call a kind of +concord. For temperance is that which warns us to follow reason in +desiring or avoiding anything. Nor is it sufficient to decide what ought +to be done, and what ought not; but we must adhere to what has been +decided. But many men, because they are enfeebled and subdued the moment +pleasure comes in sight, and so are unable to keep and adhere to the +determination they have formed, give themselves up to be bound hand and +foot by their lusts, and do not foresee what will happen to them; and in +that way, on account of some pleasure which is trivial and unnecessary, +and which might be procured in some other manner, and which they could +dispense with without annoyance, incur terrible diseases, and injuries, +and disgrace, and are often even involved in the penalties of the legal +tribunals of their country. + +But these men who wish to enjoy pleasure in such a way that no grief shall +ever overtake them in consequence, and who retain their judgment so as +never to be overcome by pleasure as to do what they feel ought not to be +done; these men, I say, obtain the greatest pleasure by passing pleasure +by. They often even endure pain, in order to avoid encountering greater +pain hereafter by their shunning it at present. From which consideration +it is perceived that intemperance is not to be avoided for its own sake; +and that temperance is to be sought for, not because it avoids pleasures, +but because it attains to greater ones. + +XV. The same principle will be found to hold good with respect to courage. +For the discharge of labours and the endurance of pain are neither of them +intrinsically tempting; nor is patience, nor diligence, nor watchfulness, +nor industry which is so much extolled, nor even courage itself: but we +cultivate these habits in order that we may live without care and fear, +and may be able, as far as is in our power, to release our minds and +bodies from annoyance. For as the whole condition of tranquil life is +thrown into confusion by the fear of death, and as it is a miserable thing +to yield to pain and to bear it with a humble and imbecile mind; and as on +account of that weakness of mind many men have ruined their parents, many +men their friends, some their country, and very many indeed have utterly +undone themselves; so a vigorous and lofty mind is free from all care and +pain, since it despises death, which only places those who encounter it in +the same condition as that in which they were before they were born; and +it is so prepared for pain that it recollects that the very greatest are +terminated by death, and that slight pains have many intervals of rest, +and that we can master moderate ones, so as to bear them if they are +tolerable, and if not, we can depart with equanimity out of life, just as +out of a theatre, when it no longer pleases us. By all which +considerations it is understood that cowardice and idleness are not +blamed, and that courage and patience are not praised, for their own +sakes; but that the one line of conduct is rejected as the parent of pain, +and the other desired as the author of pleasure. + +XVI. Justice remains to be mentioned, that I may not omit any virtue +whatever; but nearly the same things may be said respecting that. For, as +I have already shown that wisdom, temperance, and fortitude are connected +with pleasure in such a way that they cannot possibly be separated or +divided from it, so also we must consider that it is the case with +justice. Which not only never injures any one; but on the contrary always +nourishes something which tranquillizes the mind, partly by its own power +and nature, and partly by the hopes that nothing will be wanting of those +things which a nature not depraved may fairly derive. + +Since rashness and lust and idleness always torture the mind, always make +it anxious, and are of a turbulent character, so too, wherever injustice +settles in any man's mind, it is turbulent from the mere fact of its +existence and presence there; and if it forms any plan, although it +executes it ever so secretly, still it never believes that what has been +done will be concealed for ever. For generally, when wicked men do +anything, first of all suspicion overtakes their actions; then the common +conversation and report of men; then the prosecutor and the judge; and +many even, as was the case when you were consul, have given information +against themselves. But if any men appear to themselves to be sufficiently +fenced round and protected from the consciousness of men, still they dread +the knowledge of the Gods, and think that those very anxieties by which +their minds are eaten up night and day, are inflicted upon them by the +immortal Gods for the sake of punishment. And how is it possible that +wicked actions can ever have as much influence towards alleviating the +annoyances of life, as they must have towards increasing them from the +consciousness of our actions, and also from the punishments inflicted by +the laws and the hatred of the citizens? And yet, in some people, there is +no moderation in their passion for money and for honour and for command, +or in their lusts and greediness and other desires, which acquisitions, +however wickedly made, do not at all diminish, but rather inflame, so that +it seems we ought rather to restrain such men than to think that we can +teach them better. Therefore sound wisdom invites sensible men to justice, +equity, and good faith. And unjust actions are not advantageous even to +that man who has no abilities or resources; inasmuch as he cannot easily +do what he endeavours to do, nor obtain his objects if he does succeed in +his endeavours. And the gifts of fortune and of genius are better suited +to liberality; and those who practise this virtue gain themselves +goodwill, and affection, which is the most powerful of all things to +enable a man to live with tranquillity; especially when he has absolutely +no motive at all for doing wrong. + +For those desires which proceed from nature are easily satisfied without +any injustice; but those which are vain ought not to be complied with. For +they desire nothing which is really desirable; and there is more +disadvantage in the mere fact of injustice than there is advantage in what +is acquired by the injustice. Therefore a person would not be right who +should pronounce even justice intrinsically desirable for its own sake; +but because it brings the greatest amount of what is agreeable. For to be +loved and to be dear to others is agreeable because it makes life safer, +and pleasure more abundant. Therefore we think dishonesty should be +avoided, not only on account of those disadvantages which befal the +wicked, but even much more because it never permits the man in whose mind +it abides to breathe freely, and never lets him rest. + +But if the praise of those identical virtues in which the discourse of all +other philosophers so especially exults, cannot find any end unless it be +directed towards pleasure, and if pleasure be the only thing which calls +and allures us to itself by its own nature; then it cannot be doubtful +that that is the highest and greatest of all goods, and that to live +happily is nothing else except to live with pleasure. + +XVII. And I will now explain in a few words the things which are +inseparably connected with this sure and solid opinion. + +There is no mistake with respect to the ends themselves of good and evil, +that is to say, with respect to pleasure and pain; but men err in these +points when they do not know what they are caused by. But we admit that +the pleasures and pains of the mind are caused by the pleasures and pains +of the body. Therefore I grant what you were saying just now, that if any +philosophers of our school think differently (and I see that many men do +so, but they are ignorant people) they must be convicted of error. But +although pleasure of mind brings us joy, and pain causes us grief, it is +still true that each of these feelings originates in the body, and is +referred to the body; and it does not follow on that account that both the +pleasures and pains of the mind are not much more important than those of +the body. For with the body we are unable to feel anything which is not +actually existent and present; but with our mind we feel things past and +things to come. For although when we are suffering bodily pain, we are +equally in pain in our minds, still a very great addition may be made to +that if we believe that any endless and boundless evil is impending over +us. And we may transfer this assertion to pleasure, so that that will be +greater if we have no such fear. + +This now is entirely evident, that the very greatest pleasure or annoyance +of the mind contributes more to making life happy or miserable than either +of these feelings can do if it is in the body for an equal length of time. +But we do not agree that, if pleasure be taken away, grief follows +immediately, unless by chance it happens that pain has succeeded and taken +the place of pleasure; but, on the other hand, we affirm that men do +rejoice at getting rid of pain even if no pleasure which can affect the +senses succeeds. And from this it may be understood how great a pleasure +it is not to be in pain. But as we are roused by those good things which +we are in expectation of, so we rejoice at those which we recollect. But +foolish men are tortured by the recollection of past evils; wise men are +delighted by the memory of past good things, which are thus renewed by the +agreeable recollection. But there is a feeling implanted in us by which we +bury adversity as it were in a perpetual oblivion, but dwell with pleasure +and delight on the recollection of good fortune. But when with eager and +attentive minds we dwell on what is past, the consequence is, that +melancholy ensues, if the past has been unprosperous; but joy, if it has +been fortunate. + +XVIII. Oh what a splendid, and manifest, and simple, and plain way of +living well! For as certainly nothing could be better for man than to be +free from all pain and annoyance, and to enjoy the greatest pleasures of +both mind and body, do you not see how nothing is omitted which can aid +life, so as to enable men more easily to arrive at that chief good which +is their object! Epicurus cries out--the very man whom you pronounce to be +too devoted to pleasure--that man cannot live agreeably, unless he lives +honourably, justly, and wisely; and that, if he lives wisely, honourably, +and justly, it is impossible that he should not live agreeably. For a city +in sedition cannot be happy, nor can a house in which the masters are +quarrelling. So that a mind which disagrees and quarrels with itself, +cannot taste any portion of clear and unrestrained pleasure. And a man who +is always giving in to pursuits and plans which are inconsistent with and +contrary to one another, can never know any quiet or tranquillity. + +But if the pleasure of life is hindered by the graver diseases of the +body, how much more must it be so by those of the mind? But the diseases +of the mind are boundless and vain desires of riches, or glory, or +domination, or even of lustful pleasures. Besides these there are +melancholy, annoyance, sorrow, which eat up and destroy with anxiety the +minds of those men who do not understand that the mind ought not to grieve +about anything which is unconnected with some present or future pain of +body. Nor is there any fool who does not suffer under some one of these +diseases. Therefore there is no fool who is not miserable. Besides these +things there is death, which is always hanging over us as his rock is over +Tantalus; and superstition, a feeling which prevents any one who is imbued +with it from ever enjoying tranquillity. Besides, such men as they do not +recollect their past good fortune, do not enjoy what is present, but do +nothing but expect what is to come; and as that cannot be certain, they +wear themselves out with grief and apprehension, and are tormented most +especially when they find out, after it is too late, that they have +devoted themselves to the pursuit of money, or authority, or power, or +glory, to no purpose. For they have acquired no pleasures, by the hope of +enjoying which it was that they were inflamed to undertake so many great +labours. There are others, of little and narrow minds, either always +despairing of everything, or else malcontent, envious, ill-tempered, +churlish, calumnious, and morose; others devoted to amatory pleasures, +others petulant, others audacious, wanton, intemperate, or idle, never +continuing in the same opinion; on which account there is never any +interruption to the annoyances to which their life is exposed. + +Therefore, there is no fool who is happy, and no wise man who is not. And +we put this much more forcibly and truly than the Stoics: for they assert +that there is no good whatever, but some imaginary shadow which they call +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, a name showy rather than substantial; and they insist upon it, +that virtue relying on this principle of honour stands in need of no +pleasure, and is content with its own resources as adequate to secure a +happy life. + +XIX. However, these assertions may be to a certain extent made not only +without our objecting to them, but even with our concurrence and +agreement. For in this way the wise man is represented by Epicurus as +always happy. He has limited desires; he disregards death; he has a true +opinion concerning the immortal Gods without any fear; he does not +hesitate, if it is better for him, to depart from life. Being prepared in +this manner, and armed with these principles, he is always in the +enjoyment of pleasure; nor is there any period when he does not feel more +pleasure than pain. For he remembers the past with gratitude, and he +enjoys the present so as to notice how important and how delightful the +joys which it supplies are; nor does he depend on future good, but he +waits for that and enjoys the present; and is as far removed as possible +from those vices which I have enumerated; and when he compares the life of +fools to his own he feels great pleasure. And pain, if any does attack +him, has never such power that the wise man has not more to rejoice at +than to be grieved at. + +But Epicurus does admirably in saying that fortune has but little power +over the wise man, and that the greatest and most important events of such +a man's life are managed by his own wisdom and prudence; and that greater +pleasure cannot be derived from an eternity of life than such a man enjoys +from this life which we see to be limited. + +But in your dialectics he thought that there was no power which could +contribute either to enable men to live better, or argue more +conveniently. To natural philosophy he attributed a great deal of +importance. For by the one science it is only the meaning of words and the +character of a speech, and the way in which arguments follow from or are +inconsistent with one another, that can be seen; but if the nature of all +things is known, we are by that knowledge relieved from superstition, +released from the fear of death, exempted from being perplexed by our +ignorance of things, from which ignorance horrible fears often arise. +Lastly, we shall be improved in our morals when we have learnt what nature +requires. Moreover, if we have an accurate knowledge of things, preserving +that rule which has fallen from heaven as it were for the knowledge of all +things, by which all our judgments of things are to be regulated, we shall +never abandon our opinions because of being overcome by any one's +eloquence. + +For unless the nature of things is thoroughly known, we shall have no +means by which we can defend the judgments formed by our senses. Moreover, +whatever we discern by our intellect, all arises from the senses. And if +our senses are all correct, as the theory of Epicurus affirms, then +something may be discerned and understood accurately; but as to those men +who deny the power of the senses, and say that nothing can be known by +them, those very men, if the senses are discarded, will be unable to +explain that very point which they are arguing about. Besides, if all +knowledge and science is put out of the question, then there is an end +also of all settled principles of living and of doing anything. + +Thus, by means of natural philosophy, courage is desired to withstand the +fear of death, and constancy to put aside the claims engendered by +superstition; and by removing ignorance of all secret things, tranquillity +of mind is produced; and by explaining the nature of desires and their +different kinds, we get moderation: and (as I just now explained) by means +of this rule of knowledge, and of the judgment which is established and +corrected by it, the power of distinguishing truth from falsehood is put +into man's hands. + +XX. There remains a topic necessary above all others to this discussion, +that of friendship, namely: which you, if pleasure is the chief good, +affirm to have no existence at all. Concerning which Epicurus speaks thus: +"That of all the things which wisdom has collected to enable man to live +happily, nothing is more important, more influential, or more delightful +than friendship." Nor did he prove this assertion by words only, but still +more by his life, and conduct, and actions. And how important a thing it +is, the fables of the ancients abundantly intimate, in which, many and +varied as they are, and traced back to the remotest antiquity, scarcely +three pairs of friends are found, even if you begin as far back as +Theseus, and come down to Orestes. But in one single house, and that a +small one, what great crowds of friends did Epicurus collect, and how +strong was the bond of affection that held them together! And this is the +case even now among the Epicureans. However, let us return to our subject: +it is not necessary for us to be discussing men. + +I see, then, that the philosophers of our school have treated the question +of friendship in three ways. Some, as they denied that those pleasures +which concerned our friends were to be sought with as much eagerness for +their own sake, as we display in seeking our own, (by pressing which topic +some people think that the stability of friendship is endangered,) +maintain that doctrine resolutely, and, as I think, easily explain it. +For, as in the case of the virtues which I have already mentioned, so too +they deny that friendship can ever be separated from pleasure. For, as a +life which is solitary and destitute of friends is full of treachery and +alarm, reason itself warns us to form friendships. And when such are +formed, then our minds are strengthened, and cannot be drawn away from the +hope of attaining pleasure. And as hatred, envy, and contempt are all +opposed to pleasures, so friendships are not only the most faithful +favourers, but also are the efficient causes of pleasures to one's friends +as well as to oneself; and men not only enjoy those pleasures at the +moment, but are also roused by hopes of subsequent and future time. And as +we cannot possibly maintain a lasting and continued happiness of life +without friendship, nor maintain friendship itself unless we love our +friends and ourselves equally, therefore this very effect is produced in +friendship, and friendship is combined with pleasure. + +For we rejoice in the joy of our friends as much as we do in our own, and +we are equally grieved at their sorrows. Wherefore the wise man will feel +towards his friend as he does towards himself, and whatever labour he +would encounter with a view to his own pleasure, he will encounter also +for the sake of that of his friend. And all that has been said of the +virtues as to the way in which they are invariably combined with pleasure, +should also be said of friendship. For admirably does Epicurus say, in +almost these exact words: "The same science has strengthened the mind so +that it should not fear any eternal or long lasting evil, inasmuch as in +this very period of human life, it has clearly seen that the surest +bulwark against evil is that of friendship." + +There are, however, some Epicureans who are rather intimidated by the +reproaches of your school, but still men of sufficient acuteness, and they +are afraid lest, if we think that friendship is only to be sought after +with a view to our own pleasure, all friendships should, as it were, +appear to be crippled. Therefore they admit that the first meetings, and +unions, and desires to establish intimacy, do arise from a desire of +pleasure; but, they say, that when progressive habit has engendered +familiarity, then such great affection is ripened, that friends are loved +by one another for their own sake, even without any idea of advantage +intermingling with such love. In truth, if we are in the habit of feeling +affection for places, and temples, and cities, and gymnasia, and the +Campus Martius, and for dogs, and horses, and sports, in consequence of +our habit of exercising ourselves, and hunting, and so on, how much more +easily and reasonably may such a feeling be produced in us by our intimacy +with men! + +But some people say that there is a sort of agreement entered into by wise +men not to love their friends less than themselves; which we both imagine +to be possible, and indeed see to be often the case; and it is evident +that nothing can be found having any influence on living agreeably, which +is better suited to it than such a union. From all which considerations it +may be inferred, not only that the principle of friendship is not hindered +by our placing the chief good in pleasure, but that without such a +principle it is quite impossible that any friendship should be +established. + +XXI. Wherefore, if the things which I have been saying are clearer and +plainer than the sun itself; if all that I have said is derived from the +fountain of nature; if the whole of my discourse forces assent to itself +by its accordance with the senses, that is to say, with the most +incorruptible and honest of all witnesses; if infant children, and even +brute beasts, declare almost in words, under the teaching and guidance of +nature, that nothing is prosperous but pleasure, nothing hateful but +pain--a matter as to which their decision is neither erroneous nor +corrupt--ought we not to feel the greatest gratitude to that man who, +having heard this voice of nature, as I may call it, has embraced it with +such firmness and steadiness, that he has led all sensible men into the +path of a peaceful, tranquil, and happy life? And as for his appearing to +you to be a man of but little learning, the reason of that is, that he +thought no learning deserving of the name except such as assisted in the +attainment of a happy life. Was he a man to waste his time in reading +poets, as Triarius and I do at your instigation? men in whose works there +is no solid utility, but only a childish sort of amusement; or to devote +himself, like Plato, to music, geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy? +studies which, starting from erroneous principles, cannot possibly be +true; and which, if they were true, would constitute nothing to our living +more agreeably, that is to say, better. Should he, then, pursue such +occupations as those, and abandon the task of laying down principles of +living, laborious, but, at the same time, useful as they are? + +Epicurus, then, was not destitute of learning; but those persons are +ignorant who think that those studies which it is discreditable for boys +not to have learnt, are to be continued till old age. + +And when he had spoken thus,--I have now, said he, explained my opinions, +and have done so with the design of learning your judgment of them. But +the opportunity of doing so, as I wished, has never been offered me before +to-day. + + + + +Second Book Of The Treatise On The Chief Good And Evil. + + +I. On this, when both of them fixed their eyes on me, and showed that they +were ready to listen to me:--In the first place, said I, I intreat you not +to fancy that I, like a professed philosopher, am going to explain to you +the doctrines of some particular school; a course which I have never much +approved of when adopted by philosophers themselves. For when did +Socrates, who may fairly be called the parent of philosophy, ever do +anything of the sort? That custom was patronized by those who at that time +were called Sophists, of which number Georgias of Leontium was the first +who ventured in an assembly to demand a question,--that is to say, to +desire any one in the company to say what he wished to hear discussed. It +was a bold proceeding; I should call it an impudent one, if this fashion +had not subsequently been borrowed by our own philosophers. But we see +that he whom I have just mentioned, and all the other Sophists, (as may be +gathered from Plato,) were all turned into ridicule by Socrates; for he, +by questioning and interrogating them, was in the habit of eliciting the +opinions of those with whom he was arguing, and then, if he thought it +necessary, of replying to the answers which they had given him. And as +that custom had not been preserved by those who came after him, Arcesilaus +re-introduced it, and established the custom, that those who wished to +become his pupils were not to ask him questions, but themselves to state +their opinions; and then, when they had stated them, he replied to what +they had advanced; but those who came to him for instruction defended +their own opinions as well as they could. + +But with all the rest of the philosophers the man who asks the question +says no more; and this practice prevails in the Academy to this day. For +when he who wishes to receive instruction has spoken thus, "Pleasure +appears to me to be the chief good," they argue against this proposition +in an uninterrupted discourse; so that it may be easily understood that +they who say that they entertain such and such an opinion, do not of +necessity really entertain it, but wish to hear the arguments which may be +brought against it. We follow a more convenient method, for not only has +Torquatus explained what his opinions are, but also why he entertains +them: but I myself think, although I was exceedingly delighted with his +uninterrupted discourse, that still, when you stop at each point that +arises, and come to an understanding what each party grants, and what he +denies, you draw the conclusion you desire from what is admitted with more +convenience, and come to an end of the discussion more readily. For when a +discourse is borne on uninterruptedly, like a torrent, although it hurries +along in its course many things of every kind, you still can take hold of +nothing, and put your hand on nothing, and can find no means of +restraining that rapid discourse. + +II. But every discourse which is concerned in the investigation of any +matter, and which proceeds on any system and principle, ought first to +establish the rule (as is done in lawsuits, where one proceeds according +to set formulas), in order that it may be agreed between the parties to +the discussion, what the subject of the discussion really is. This rule +was approved by Epicurus, as it was laid down by Plato in his "Phaedrus," +and he considered that it ought to be adopted in every controversy. But he +did not perceive what was the necessary consequence of it, for he asserts +that the subject ought not to be defined; but if this be not done, it is +sometimes impossible that the disputants should agree what the matter is +that is the subject of discussion, as in this very case which we are +discussing now, for we are inquiring into the End of Good. How can we know +what the character of this is, if, when we have used the expression the +End of Good, we do not compare with one another our ideas of what is meant +by the End, and of what the Good itself is? + +And this laying open of things covered up, as it were, when it is once +explained what each thing is, is the definition of it; which you sometimes +used without being aware of it; for you defined this very thing, whether +it is to be called the End, or the extremity, or the limit, to be that to +which everything which was done rightly was referred, and which was itself +never referred to anything. So far was very well said; and, perhaps, if it +had been necessary, you would also have defined the Good itself, and told +us what that was; making it to be that which is desirable by nature, or +that which is profitable, or that which is useful, or that which is +pleasant: and now, since you have no general objections to giving +definitions, and do it when you please, if it is not too much trouble, I +should be glad if you would define what is pleasure, for that is what all +this discussion relates to. + +As if, said he, there were any one who is ignorant what pleasure is, or +who is in need of any definition to enable him to understand it better. + +I should say, I replied, that I myself am such a man, if I did not seem to +myself to have a thorough acquaintance with, and an accurate idea and +notion of, pleasure firmly implanted in my mind. But, at present, I say +that Epicurus himself does not know, and that he is greatly in error on +this subject; and that he who mentions the subject so often ought to +explain carefully what the meaning of the words he uses is, but that he +sometimes does not understand what the meaning of this word pleasure is, +that is to say, what the idea is which is contained under this word. + +III. Then he laughed, and said,--This is a capital idea, indeed, that he +who says that pleasure is the end of all things which are to be desired, +the very extreme point and limit of Good, should be ignorant of what it +is, and of what is its character. But, I replied, either Epicurus is +ignorant of what pleasure is, or else all the rest of the world are. How +so? said he. + +Because all men feel that this is pleasure which moves the senses when +they receive it, and which has a certain agreeableness pervading it +throughout. What then, said he, is Epicurus ignorant of that kind of +pleasure? Not always, I replied; for sometimes he is even too well +acquainted with it, inasmuch as he declares that he is unable even to +understand where it is, or what any good is, except that which is enjoyed +by the instrumentality of meat or drink, or the pleasure of the ears, or +sensual enjoyment: is not this what he says? As if, said he, I were +ashamed of these things, or as if I were unable to explain in what sense +these things are said. I do not doubt, I replied, that you can do so +easily; nor is there any reason why you need be ashamed of arguing with a +wise man, who is the only man, as far as I know, who has ever ventured to +profess himself a wise man. For they do not think that Metrodorus himself +professed this, but only that, when he was called wise by Epicurus, he was +unwilling to reject such an expression of his goodwill. But the Seven had +this name given to them, not by themselves, but by the universal suffrage +of all nations. However, in this place, I will assume that Epicurus, by +these expressions, certainly meant to intimate the same kind of pleasure +that the rest do; for all men call that pleasing motion by which the +senses are rendered cheerful, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} in Greek, and _voluptas_ in Latin. + +What is it, then, that you ask? I will tell you, said I, and that for the +sake of learning rather than of finding fault with either you or Epicurus. +I too, said he, should be more desirous to learn of you, if you can impart +anything worth learning, than to find fault with you. + +Well, then, said I, you are aware of what Hieronymus(25) of Rhodes says is +the chief good, to which he thinks that everything ought to be referred? I +know, said he, that he thinks that the great end is freedom from pain. +Well, what are his sentiments respecting pleasure? He affirms, he replied, +that it is not to be sought for its own sake; for he thinks that rejoicing +is one thing, and being free from pain another. And indeed, continued he, +he is in this point greatly mistaken, for, as I proved a little while ago, +the end of increasing pleasure is the removal of all pain. I will examine, +said I, presently, what the meaning of the expression, freedom from pain, +is; but unless you are very obstinate, you must admit that pleasure is a +perfectly distinct thing from mere freedom from pain. You will, however, +said he, find that I am obstinate in this; for nothing can be more real +than the identity between the two. Is there, now, said I, any pleasure +felt by a thirsty man in drinking? Who can deny it? said he. Is it, asked +I, the same pleasure that he feels after his thirst is extinguished? It +is, replied he, another kind of pleasure; for the state of extinguished +thirst has in it a certain stability of pleasure, but the pleasure of +extinguishing it is pleasure in motion. Why, then, said I, do you call +things so unlike one another by the same name? Do not you recollect, he +rejoined, what I said just now,--that when all pain is banished, pleasure +is varied, not extinguished? I recollect, said I; but you spoke in +admirable Latin, indeed, but yet not very intelligibly; for _varietas_ is +a Latin word, and properly applicable to a difference of colour, but it is +applied metaphorically to many differences: we apply the adjective, +_varias_, to poems, orations, manners, and changes of fortune; it is +occasionally predicated also of pleasure, when it is derived from many +things unlike one another, which cause pleasures which are similarly +unlike. Now, if that is the variety you mean, I should understand you, as, +in fact, I do understand you, without your saying so: but still, I do not +see clearly what that variety is, because you say, that when we are free +from pain we are then in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasure; but when +we are eating those things which cause a pleasing motion to the senses, +then there is a pleasure in the emotion which causes a variety in the +pleasure; but still, that that pleasure which arises from the freedom from +pain is not increased;--and why you call that pleasure I do not know. + +IV. Is it possible, said he, for anything to be more delightful than +freedom from pain? Well, said I, but grant that nothing is preferable to +that, (for that is not the point which I am inquiring about at present,) +does it follow on that account, that pleasure is identical with what I may +call painlessness? Undoubtedly it is identical with it, said he; and that +painlessness is the greatest of pleasures which no other can possibly +exceed. Why, then, said I, do you hesitate, after you have defined the +chief good in this manner, to uphold, and defend, and maintain the +proposition, that the whole of pleasure consists in freedom from pain? For +what necessity for your introducing pleasure among the council of the +virtues, any more than for bringing in a courtezan to an assembly of +matrons? The very name of pleasure is odious, infamous, and a just object +of suspicion: therefore, you are all in the constant habit of saying that +we do not understand what Epicurus means when he speaks of pleasure. And +whenever such an assertion is made to me,--and I hear it advanced pretty +often,--although I am usually a very peaceful arguer, still I do on such +occasions get a little angry. Am I to be told that I do not know what that +is which the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}, and the Latins _voluptas_? Which language +is it, then, that I do not understand? Then, too, how comes it about that +I do not understand, though every one else does, who chooses to call +himself an Epicurean? when the disciples of your school argue most +excellently, that there is no need whatever for a man, who wishes to +become a philosopher, to be acquainted with literature. Therefore, just as +our ancestors tore Cincinnatus away from his plough to make him Dictator, +in like manner you collect from among the Greeks all those men, who may in +truth be respectable men enough, but who are certainly not over-learned. + +Do they then understand what Epicurus means, and do I not understand it? +However, that you may know that I do understand, first of all I tell you +that _voluptas_ is the same thing that he calls {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}. And, indeed, we +often have to seek for a Latin word equivalent to, and exactly equipollent +to a Greek one; but here we had nothing to seek for: for no word can be +found which will more exactly express in Latin what {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} does in Greek, +than _voluptas_. Now every man in the world who understands Latin, +comprehends under this word two things,--joy in the mind, and an agreeable +emotion of pleasantness in the body. For when the man in Trabea(26) calls +an excessive pleasure of the mind joy, (_laetitia_,) he says much the same +as the other character in Caecilius's play, who says that he is joyful with +every sort of joy. + +However, there is this difference, that pleasure is also spoken of as +affecting the mind; which is wrong, as the Stoics think, who define it +thus: "An elation of the mind without reason, when the mind has an idea +that it is enjoying some great good." But the words _laetitia_ (gladness), +and _gaudium_ (joy), do not properly apply to the body. But the word +_voluptas_ (pleasure) is applied to the body by the usage of all people +who speak Latin, whenever that pleasantness is felt which moves any one of +the senses. Now transfer this pleasantness, if you please, to the mind; +for the verb _juvo_ (to please) is applied both to body and mind, and the +word _jucundus_ is derived from it; provided you understand that between +the man who says, + + + I am transported with gladness now + That I am scarce myself.... + + +and him who says, + + + Now then at length my mind's on fire, ... + + +one of whom is beside himself with joy, and the other is being tormented +with anguish, there is this intermediate person, whose language is, + + + Although this our acquaintance is so new, + + +who feels neither gladness nor anguish. And, in the same manner, between +the man who is in the enjoyment of the pleasures of the body, which he has +been wishing for, and him who is being tormented with extreme anguish, +there is a third man, who is free alike from pleasure and from pain. + +V. Do I not, then, seem to you sufficiently to understand the meaning of +words, or must I at this time of life be taught how to speak Greek, and +even Latin? And yet I would have you consider, whether if I, who, as I +think, understand Greek very fairly, do still not understand what Epicurus +means, it it may not be owing to some fault of his for speaking so as not +to be intelligible. And this sometimes happens in two ways, without any +blame; either if you do so on purpose, as Heraclitus did, who got the +surname of {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~},(27) because he spoke with too much obscurity about +natural philosophy; or when the obscurity of the subject itself, not of +the language, prevents what is said from being clearly understood, as is +the case in the Timaeus of Plato. But Epicurus, as I imagine, is both +willing, if it is in his power, to speak intelligibly, and is also +speaking, not of an obscure subject like the natural philosophers, nor of +one depending on precise rules, as the mathematicians are, but he is +discussing a plain and simple matter, which is a subject of common +conversation among the common people. Although you do not deny that we +understand the usual meaning of the word _voluptas_, but only what he +means by it: from which it follows, not that we do not understand what is +the meaning of that word, but that he follows his own fashion, and +neglects our usual one; for if he means the same thing that Hieronymus +does, who thinks that the chief good is to live without any annoyance, why +does he prefer using the term "pleasure" rather than freedom from pain, as +Hieronymus does, who is quite aware of the force of the words which he +employs? But, if he thinks that he ought to add, that pleasure which +consists in motion, (for this is the distinction he draws, that this +agreeable pleasure is pleasure in motion, but the pleasure of him who is +free from pain is a state of pleasure,) then why does he appear to aim at +what is impossible, namely, to make any one who knows himself--that is to +say, who has any proper comprehension of his own nature and +sensations--think freedom from pain, and pleasure, the same thing? + +This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out +of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who +can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: +first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; +thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and +you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in +such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a +man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men +who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state +between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who +are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do +you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some +wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both +enjoying the same pleasure? + +VI. Then, said he, a truce, if you please, to all your questions; and, +indeed, I said at the beginning that I would rather have none of them, for +I had a provident dread of these captious dialectics. Would you rather, +then, said I, that we should argue rhetorically than dialectically? As if, +said he, a continuous discourse belonged solely to orators, and not to +philosophers also! I will tell you, said I, what Zeno the Stoic said; he +said, as Aristotle had said before him, that all speaking was divided into +two kinds, and that rhetoric resembled the open palm, dialectics the +closed fist, because orators usually spoke in a rather diffuse, and +dialecticians in a somewhat compressed style. I will comply, then, with +your desires, and will speak, if I can, in an oratorical style, but still +with the oratory of the philosophers, and not that which we use in the +forum; which is forced at times, when it is speaking so as to suit the +multitude, to submit to a very ordinary style. But while Epicurus, O +Torquatus, is expressing his contempt for dialectics, an art which by +itself contains the whole science both of perceiving what the real subject +is in every question, and also of judging what the character of each thing +is, by its system and method of conducting the argument, he goes on too +fast, as it seems to me, and does not distinguish with any skill at all +the different points which he is intent upon proving, as in this very +instance which we were just now speaking of. + +Pleasure is pronounced to be the chief good. We must then open the +question, What is pleasure? for otherwise, the thing which we are seeking +for cannot be explained. But, if he had explained it, he would not +hesitate; for either he would maintain that same definition of pleasure +which Aristippus did, namely, that it is that feeling by which the senses +are agreeably and pleasantly moved, which even cattle, if they could +speak, would call pleasure; or else, if he chose rather to speak in his +own style, than like + + + All the Greeks from high Mycenae, + All Minerva's Attic youth, + + +and the rest of the Greeks who are spoken of in these anapaests, then he +would call this freedom from pain alone by the name of pleasure, and would +despise the definition of Aristippus; or, if he thought both definitions +good, as in fact he does, he would combine freedom from pain with +pleasure, and would employ the two extremes in his own definition: for +many, and they, too, great philosophers, have combined these extremities +of goods, as, for instance, Aristotle, who united in his idea the practice +of virtue with the prosperity of an entire life. Callipho(28) added +pleasure to what is honourable. Diodorus, in his definition, added to the +same honourableness, freedom from pain. Epicurus would have done so too, +if he had combined the opinion which was held by Hieronymus, with the +ancient theory of Aristippus. For those two men disagree with one another, +and on this account they employ separate definitions; and, while they both +write the most beautiful Greek, still, neither does Aristippus, who calls +pleasure the chief good, ever speak of freedom from pain as pleasure; nor +does Hieronymus, who lays it down that freedom from pain is the chief +good, ever use the word "pleasure" for that painlessness, inasmuch as he +never even reckons pleasure at all among the things which are desirable. + +VII. They are also two distinct things, that you may not think that the +difference consists only in words and names. One is to be without pain, +the other to be with pleasure. But your school not only attempt to make +one name for these two things which are so exceedingly unlike, (for I +would not mind that so much,) but you endeavour also to make one thing out +of the two, which is utterly impossible. But Epicurus, who admits both +things, ought to use both expressions, and in fact he does divide them in +reality, but still he does not distinguish between them in words. For +though he in many places praises that very pleasure which we all call by +the same name, he ventures to say that he does not even suspect that there +is any good whatever unconnected with that kind of pleasure which +Aristippus means; and he makes this statement in the very place where his +whole discourse is about the chief good. But in another book, in which he +utters opinions of the greatest weight in a concise form of words, and in +which he is said to have delivered oracles of wisdom, he writes in those +words which you are well acquainted with, O Torquatus. For who is there of +you who has not learnt the {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} of Epicurus, that is to say, his +fundamental maxims? because they are sentiments of the greatest gravity +intended to guide men to a happy life, and enunciated with suitable +brevity. Consider, therefore, whether I am not translating this maxim of +his correctly. "If those things which are the efficient causes of +pleasures to luxurious men were to release them from all fear of the gods, +and of death, and of pain, and to show them what are the proper limits to +their desires, we should have nothing to find fault with; as men would +then be filled with pleasures from all quarters, and have on no side +anything painful or melancholy, for all such things are evil." + +On this Triarius could restrain himself no longer. I beg of you, +Torquatus, said he, to tell me, is this what Epicurus says?--because he +appeared to me, although he knew it himself, still to wish to hear +Torquatus admit it. But he was not at all put out, and said with great +confidence, Indeed, he does, and in these identical words; but you do not +perceive what he means. If, said I, he says one thing and means another, +then I never shall understand what he means, but he speaks plainly enough +for me to see what he says. And if what he says is that luxurious men are +not to be blamed if they are wise men, he talks absurdly; just as if he +were to say that parricides are not to be found fault with if they are not +covetous, and if they fear neither gods, nor death, nor pain. And yet, +what is the object of making any exception as to the luxurious, or of +supposing any people, who, while living luxuriously, would not be reproved +by that consummate philosopher, provided only they guard against all other +vices. Still, would not you, Epicurus, blame luxurious men for the mere +fact of their living in such a manner as to pursue every sort of pleasure; +especially when, as you say, the chief pleasure of all is to be free from +pain? But yet we find some debauched men so far from having any religious +scruples, that they will eat even out of the sacred vessels; and so far +from fearing death that they are constantly repeating that passage out of +the Hymnis,(29)-- + + + Six months of life for me are quite sufficient, + The seventh may be for the shades below,-- + + +and bringing up that Epicurean remedy for pain, as if they were taking it +out of a medicine chest: "If it is bitter, it is of short duration; if it +lasts a long time, it must be slight in degree." There is one thing which +I do not understand, namely, how a man who is devoted to luxury can +possibly have his appetites under restraint. + +VIII. What then is the use of saying, I should have nothing to reproach +them with if they only set bounds to their appetites? This is the same as +saying, I should not blame debauched men if they were not debauched men. +In the same way one might say, I should not blame even wicked men if they +were virtuous. This man of strict morality does not think luxury of itself +a thing to be blamed. And, indeed, O Torquatus, to speak the truth, if +pleasure is the chief good, he is quite right not to think so. For I +should be sorry to picture to myself, (as you are in the habit of doing,) +men so debauched as to vomit over the table and be carried away from +banquets, and then the next day, while still suffering from indigestion, +gorge themselves again; men who, as they say, have never in their lives +seen the sun set or rise, and who, having devoured their patrimony, are +reduced to indigence. None of us imagine that debauched men of that sort +live pleasantly. You, however, rather mean to speak of refined and elegant +_bons vivans_, men who, by the employment of the most skilful cooks and +bakers, and by carefully culling the choicest products of fishermen, +fowlers, and hunters, avoid all indigestion-- + + + Men who draw richer wines from foaming casks. + + +As Lucilius says, men who + + + So strain, so cool the rosy wine with snow, + That all the flavour still remains uninjured-- + + +and so on--men in the enjoyment of luxuries such that, if they are taken +away, Epicurus says that he does not know what there is that can be called +good. Let them also have beautiful boys to attend upon them; let their +clothes, their plate, their articles of Corinthian _vertu_, the +banqueting-room itself, all correspond, still I should never be induced to +say that these men so devoted to luxury were living either well or +happily. From which it follows, not indeed that pleasure is not pleasure, +but that pleasure is not the chief good. Nor was Laelius, who, when a young +man, was a pupil of Diogenes the Stoic, and afterwards of Panaetius, called +a wise man because he did not understand what was most pleasant to the +taste, (for it does not follow that the man who has a discerning heart +must necessarily have a palate destitute of discernment,) but because he +thought it of but small importance. + + + O sorrel, how that man may boast himself, + By whom you're known and valued! Proud of you, + That wise man Laelius would loudly shout, + Addressing all our epicures in order. + + +And it was well said by Laelius, and he may be truly called a wise man,-- + + + You Publius, Gallonius, you whirlpool, + You are a miserable man; you never + In all your life have really feasted well, + Though spending all your substance on those prawns, + And overgrown huge sturgeons. + + +The man who says this is one who, as he attributes no importance to +pleasure himself, denies that the man feasts well who refers everything to +pleasure. And yet he does not deny that Gallonius has at times feasted as +he wished: for that would be speaking untruly: he only denies that he has +ever feasted well. With such dignity and severe principle does he +distinguish between pleasure and good. And the natural inference is, that +all who feast well feast as they wish, but that it does not follow that +all who feast as they wish do therefore feast well. Laelius always feasted +well. How so? Lucilius shall tell you-- + + + He feasted on well season'd, well arranged-- + + +what? What was the chief part of his supper? + + + Converse of prudent men,-- + + +Well, and what else? + + + with cheerful mind. + + +For he came to a banquet with a tranquil mind, desirous only of appeasing +the wants of nature. Laelius then is quite right to deny that Gallonius had +ever feasted well; he is quite right to call him miserable; especially as +he devoted the whole of his attention to that point. And yet no one +affirms that he did not sup as he wished. Why then did he not feast well? +Because feasting well is feasting with propriety, frugality, and good +order; but this man was in the habit of feasting badly, that is, in a +dissolute, profligate, gluttonous, unseemly manner. Laelius, then, was not +preferring the flavour of sorrel to Gallonius's sturgeon, but merely +treating the taste of the sturgeon with indifference; which he would not +have done if he had placed the chief good in pleasure. + +IX. We must then discard pleasure, not only in order to follow what is +right, but even to be able to talk becomingly. Can we then call that the +chief good in life, which we see cannot possibly be so even in a banquet? + +But how is it that this philosopher speaks of three kinds of +appetites,--some natural and necessary, some natural but not necessary, and +others neither natural nor necessary? In the first place, he has not made +a neat division; for out of two kinds he has made three. Now this is not +dividing, but breaking in pieces. If he had said that there are two kinds +of appetites, natural and superfluous ones, and that the natural appetites +might be also subdivided into two kinds, necessary and not necessary, he +would have been all right. And those who have learnt what he despises do +usually say so. For it is a vicious division to reckon a part as a genus. +However, let us pass over this, for he despises elegance in arguing; he +speaks confusedly. We must submit to this as long as his sentiments are +right. I do not, however, approve, and it is as much as I can do to +endure, a philosopher speaking of the necessity of setting bounds to the +desires. Is it possible to set bounds to the desires? I say that they must +be banished, eradicated by the roots. For what man is there in whom +appetites(30) dwell, who can deny that he may with propriety be called +appetitive? If so, he will be avaricious, though to a limited extent; and +an adulterer, but only in moderation; and he will be luxurious in the same +manner. Now what sort of a philosophy is that which does not bring with it +the destruction of depravity, but is content with a moderate degree of +vice? Although in this division I am altogether on his side as to the +facts, only I wish he would express himself better. Let him call these +feelings the wishes of nature; and let him keep the name of desire for +other objects, so as, when speaking of avarice, of intemperance, and of +the greatest vices, to be able to indict it as it were on a capital +charge. However, all this is said by him with a good deal of freedom, and +is often repeated; and I do not blame him, for it is becoming in so great +a philosopher, and one of such a great reputation, to defend his own +degrees fearlessly. + +But still, from the fact of his often appearing to embrace that pleasure, +(I mean that which all nations call by this name,) with a good deal of +eagerness, he is at times in great difficulties, so that, if he could only +pass undetected, there is nothing so shameful that it does not seem likely +that he would do it for the sake of pleasure. And then, when he has been +put to the blush, (for the power of nature is very great,) he takes refuge +in denying that any addition can possibly be made to the pleasure of the +man who is free from pain. But that state of freedom from pain is not +called pleasure. I do not care, says he, about the name. But what do you +say about the thing being utterly different?--I will find you many men, or +I may say an innumerable host, not so curious nor so embarrassing as you +are, whom I can easily convince of whatever I choose. Why then do we +hesitate to say that, if to be free from pain is the highest degree of +pleasure, to be destitute of pleasure is the highest degree of pain? +Because it is not pleasure which is the contrary to pain, but the absence +of pain. + +X. But this he does not see, that it is a great proof that at the very +moment when he says that if pleasure be once taken away he has no idea at +all what remaining thing can be called good, (and he follows up this +assertion with the statement that he means such pleasure as is perceptible +by the palate and by the ears, and adds other things which decency ought +to forbid him to mention,) he is, like a strict and worthy philosopher, +aware that this which he calls the chief good is not even a thing which is +worth desiring for its own sake, that he himself informs us that we have +no reason to wish for pleasure at all, if we are free from pain. How +inconsistent are these statements! If he had learnt to make correct +divisions or definitions of his subject, if he had a proper regard to the +usages of speaking and the common meaning of words, he would never have +fallen into such difficulties. But as it is, you see what it is he is +doing. That which no one has ever called pleasure at all, and that also +which is real active pleasure, which are two distinct things, he makes but +one. For he calls them agreeable and, as I may say, sweet-tasted +pleasures. At times he speaks so lightly of them that you might fancy you +were listening to Marcus Curius. At times he extols them so highly that he +says he cannot form even the slightest idea of what else is good--a +sentiment which deserves not the reproof of a philosopher, but the brand +of the censor. For vice does not confine itself to language, but +penetrates also into the manners. He does not find fault with luxury +provided it to be free from boundless desires and from fear. While +speaking in this way he appears to be fishing for disciples, that men who +wish to become debauchees may become philosophers first. + +Now, in my opinion, the origin of the chief good is to be sought in the +first origin of living animals. As soon as an animal is born it rejoices +in pleasure, and seeks it as a good; it shuns pain as an evil. And +Epicurus says that excellent decisions on the subject of the good and the +evil are come to by those animals which are not yet depraved. You, too, +have laid down the same position, and these are your own words. How many +errors are there in them! For by reference to which kind of pleasure will +a puling infant judge of the chief good; pleasure in stability or pleasure +in motion?--since, if the gods so will, we are learning how to speak from +Epicurus. If it is from pleasure as a state, then certainly nature desires +to be exempt from evil herself; which we grant; if it is from pleasure in +motion, which, however, is what you say, then there will be no pleasure so +discreditable as to deserve to be passed over. And at the same time that +just-born animal you are speaking of does not begin with the highest +pleasure; which has been defined by you to consist in not being in pain. + +However, Epicurus did not seek to derive this argument from infants, or +even from beasts, which he looks upon as mirrors of nature as it were; so +as to say that they, under the guidance of nature, seek only this pleasure +of being free from pain. For this sort of pleasure cannot excite the +desires of the mind; nor has this state of freedom from pain any impulse +by which it can act upon the mind. Therefore Hieronymus blunders in this +same thing. For that pleasure only acts upon the mind which has the power +of alluring the senses. Therefore Epicurus always has recourse to this +pleasure when wishing to prove that pleasure is sought for naturally; +because that pleasure which consists in motion both allures infants to +itself, and beasts; and this is not done by that pleasure which is a state +in which there is no other ingredient but freedom from pain. How then can +it be proper to say that nature begins with one kind of pleasure, and yet +to put the chief good in another? + +XI. But as for beasts, I do not consider that they can pronounce any +judgment at all. For although they are not depraved, it is still possible +for them to be wrong. Just as one stick may be bent and crooked by having +been made so on purpose, and another may be so naturally; so the nature of +beasts is not indeed depraved by evil education, but is wrong naturally. +Nor is it correct to say that nature excites the infant to desire +pleasure, but only to love itself and to desire to preserve itself safe +and unhurt. For every animal the moment that it is born loves itself, and +every part of itself, and above all does it love its two principal parts, +namely its mind and body, and afterwards it proceeds to love the separate +parts of each. For there are in the mind and also in the body some parts +of especial consequence; and as soon as it has got a slight perception of +this fact, it then begins to make distinctions, so as to desire those +things which are by nature given to it as its principal goods, and to +reject the contrary. Now it is a great question whether among these +primary natural goods, pleasure has any place or not. But to think that +there is nothing beyond pleasure, no limbs, no sensations, no emotions of +the mind, no integrity of the body, no health, appears to me to be a token +of the greatest ignorance. And on this the whole question of good and evil +turns. Now Polemo and also Aristotle thought those things which I +mentioned just now the greatest of goods. And from this originated that +opinion of the Old Academy and of the Peripatetic School, which led them +to say that the greatest good was to live in accordance with nature--that +is to say, to enjoy the chief good things which are given by nature, with +the accompaniment of virtue. Callipho added nothing to virtue except +pleasure; Diodorus nothing except freedom from pain. And all these men +attach the idea of the greatest good to some one of these things which I +have mentioned. Aristippus thought it was simple pleasure. The Stoics +defined it to be agreeing with nature, which they say can only be living +virtuously, living honourably. And they interpret it further thus--to live +with an understanding of those things which happen naturally, selecting +those which are in accordance with nature, and rejecting the contrary. So +there are three definitions, all of which exclude honesty:--one, that of +Aristippus or Epicurus; the second, that of Hieronymus; the third, that of +Carneades: three in which honesty is admitted with some qualifying +additions; those, namely, of Polemo, Callipho, and Diodorus: one single +one, of which Zeno is the author, which is wholly referred to what is +becoming; that is to say, to honesty. For Pyrrho, Aristo, and Herillus, +have long since sunk into oblivion. The rest have been consistent with +themselves, so as to make their ends agree with their beginnings; so that +Aristippus has defined it to be pleasure; Hieronymus, freedom from pain; +and Carneades, the enjoyment of what are pointed out by nature as the +principal goods. + +XII. But when Epicurus had given pleasure the highest rank, if he meant +the same pleasure that Aristippus did he ought to have adopted the same +thing as the chief good that he did; if he meant the same that Hieronymus +did, he would then have been assigning the first rank to Hieronymus's +pleasure, and not to that of Aristippus. + +For, as to what he says, that it is decided by the senses themselves that +pleasure is a good and that pain is an evil, he has attributed more weight +to the senses than the laws allow them. We are the judges of private +actions, but we cannot decide anything which does not legally come under +the cognisance of our tribunal; and, in such a case, it is to no purpose +that judges are in the habit, when they pronounce sentence, of adding, "if +the question belongs to my jurisdiction;" for, if the matter did not come +under their jurisdiction, this additional form of words would not any the +more give validity to their decision. Now, what is it that the senses are +judges of? Whether a thing is sweet or bitter, soft or hard, near or far +off; whether it is standing still or moving; whether it is square or +round. What sentence, then, will reason pronounce, having first of all +called in the aid of the knowledge of divine and human affairs, which is +properly called wisdom; and having, after that, associated to itself the +virtues which reason points out as the mistresses of all things, but which +you make out to be only the satellites and handmaidens of pleasures? The +sentence, however, of all these qualities, will pronounce first of all, +respecting pleasure, that there is no room for it; not only no room for +its being placed by itself in the rank of the chief good, which is what we +are looking for, but no room even for its being placed in connexion even +with what is honourable. + +The same sentence will be passed upon freedom from pain; Carneades also +will be disregarded; nor will any definition of the chief good be approved +of, which has any close connexion with pleasure, or freedom from pain, or +which is devoid of what is honourable. And so it will leave two, which it +will consider over and over again; for it will either lay down the maxim, +that nothing is good except what is honourable, nothing evil except what +is disgraceful; that everything else is either of no consequence at all, +or, at all events, of only so much, that it is neither to be sought after +nor avoided, but only selected or rejected; or else, it will prefer that +which it shall perceive to be the most richly endowed with what is +honourable, and enriched, at the same time, with the primary good things +of nature, and with the perfection of the whole life; and it will do so +all the more clearly, if it comes to a right understanding whether the +controversy between them is one of facts, or only of words. + +XIII. I now, following the authority of this man, will do the same as he +has done; for, as far as I can, I will diminish the disputes, and will +regard all their simple opinions in which there is no association of +virtue, as judgments which ought to be utterly removed to a distance from +philosophy. First of all, I will discard the principles of Aristippus, and +of all the Cyrenaics,--men who were not afraid to place the chief good in +that pleasure which especially excited the senses with its sweetness, +disregarding that freedom from pain. These men did not perceive that, as a +horse is born for galloping, and an ox for ploughing, and a dog for +hunting, so man, also, is born for two objects, as Aristotle says, namely, +for understanding and for acting as if he were a kind of mortal god. But, +on the other hand, as a slow moving and languid sheep is born to feed, and +to take pleasure in propagating his species, they fancied also that this +divine animal was born for the same purposes; than which nothing can +appear to me more absurd; and all this is in opposition to Aristippus, who +considers that pleasure not only the highest, but also the only one, which +all the rest of us consider as only one of the pleasures. + +You, however, think differently; but he, as I have already said, is +egregiously wrong,--for neither does the figure of the human body, nor the +admirable reasoning powers of the human mind, intimate that man was born +for no other end than the mere enjoyment of pleasure; nor must we listen +to Hieronymus, whose chief good is the same which you sometimes, or, I +might say, too often call so, namely, freedom from pain; for it does not +follow, because pain is an evil, that to be free from that evil is +sufficient for living well. Ennius speaks more correctly, when he says,-- + + + The man who feels no evil, does + Enjoy too great a good. + + +Let us define a happy life as consisting, not in the repelling of evil, +but in the acquisition of good; and let us seek to procure it, not by +doing nothing, whether one is feeling pleasure, as Aristippus says, or +feeling no pain, as Hieronymus insists, but by doing something, and giving +our mind to thought. And all these same things may be said against that +chief good which Carneades calls such; which he, however, brought forward, +not so much for the purpose of proving his position, as of contradicting +the Stoics, with whom he was at variance: and this good of his is such, +that, when added to virtue, it appears likely to have some authority, and +to be able to perfect a happy life in a most complete manner, and it is +this that the whole of this present discussion is about; for they who add +to virtue pleasure, which is the thing which above all others virtue +thinks of small importance, or freedom from pain, which, even if it be a +freedom from evil, is nevertheless not the chief good, make use of an +addition which is not very easily recommended to men in general, and yet I +do not understand why they do it in such a niggardly and restricted +manner: for, as if they had to bring something to add to virtue, first of +all they add things of the least possible value; afterwards they add +things one by one, instead of uniting everything which nature had approved +of as the highest goods, to pleasure. And as all these things appeared to +Aristo and to Pyrrho absolutely of no consequence at all, so that they +said that there was literally no difference whatever between being in a +most perfect state of health, and in a most terrible condition of disease, +people rightly enough have long ago given up arguing against them; for, +while they insisted upon it that everything was comprised in virtue alone, +to such a degree as to deprive it of all power of making any selection of +external circumstances, and while they gave it nothing from which it could +originate, or on which it could rely, they in reality destroyed virtue +itself, which they were professing to embrace. But Herillus, who sought to +refer everything to knowledge, saw, indeed, that there was one good, but +what he saw was not the greatest possible good, nor such an one that life +could be regulated by it; therefore, he also has been discarded a long +time ago, for, indeed, there has been no one who has argued against him +since Chrysippus. + +XIV. Your school, then, is now the only one remaining to be combated; for +the contest with the Academicians is an uncertain one, for they affirm +nothing, and, as if they despaired of arriving at any certain knowledge, +wish to follow whatever is probable. But we have more trouble with +Epicurus, because he combines two kinds of pleasure, and because he and +his friends, and many others since, have been advocates of that opinion; +and somehow or other, the people, who, though they have the least +authority, have nevertheless the greatest power, are on his side; and, +unless we refute them, all virtue, and all reputation, and all true glory, +must be abandoned. And so, having put aside the opinions of all the rest, +there remains a contest, not between Torquatus and me, but between virtue +and pleasure; and this contest Chrysippus, a man of great acuteness and +great industry, is far from despising; and he thinks that the whole +question as to the chief good is at stake in this controversy: but I +think, if I show the reality of what is honourable, and that it is a thing +to be sought for by reason of its own intrinsic excellence, and for its +own sake, that all your arguments are at once overthrown; therefore, when +I have once established what its character is, speaking briefly, as the +time requires, I shall approach all your arguments, O Torquatus, unless my +memory fails me. + +We understand, then, that to be honourable which is such that, leaving all +advantage out of the question, it can be deservedly praised by itself, +without thinking of any reward or profit derived from it. And what its +character is may be understood, not so much by the definition which I have +employed, (although that may help in some degree,) as by the common +sentiments of all men, and by the zeal and conduct of every virtuous man; +for such do many things for this sole reason, because they are becoming, +because they are right, because they are honourable, even though they do +not perceive any advantage likely to result from them: for men differ from +beasts in many other things indeed, but especially in this one particular, +that they have reason and intellect given to them by nature, and a mind, +active, vigorous, revolving many things at the same time with the greatest +rapidity, and, if I may so say, sagacious to perceive the causes of +things, and their consequences and connexions, and to use metaphors, and +to combine things which are unconnected, and to connect the future with +the present, and to embrace in its view the whole course of a consistent +life. The same reason has also made man desirous of the society of men, +and inclined to agree with them by nature, and conversation, and custom; +so that, setting out with affection for his friends and relations, he +proceeds further, and unites himself in a society, first of all of his +fellow-countrymen, and subsequently of all mortals; and as Plato wrote to +Archytas, recollects that he has been born, not for himself alone, but for +his country and his family; so that there is but a small portion of +himself left for himself. And since the same nature has implanted in man a +desire of ascertaining the truth, which is most easily visible when, being +free from all cares, we wish to know what is taking place, even in the +heavens; led on from these beginnings we love everything that is true, +that is to say, that is faithful, simple, consistent, and we hate what is +vain, false and deceitful, such as fraud, perjury, cunning and injustice. + +The same reason has in itself something large and magnificent, suited for +command rather than for obedience; thinking all events which can befal a +man not only endurable, but insignificant; something lofty and sublime, +fearing nothing, yielding to no one, always invincible. And, when these +three kinds of the honourable have been noticed, a fourth follows, of the +same beauty and suited to the other three, in which order and moderation +exist; and when the likeness of it to the others is perceived in the +beauty and dignity of all their separate forms, we are transported across +to what is honourable in words and actions; for, in consequence of these +three virtues which I have already mentioned, a man avoids rashness, and +does not venture to injure any one by any wanton word or action, and is +afraid either to do or to say anything which may appear at all unsuited to +the dignity of a man. + +XV. Here, now, O Torquatus, you have a picture of what is honourable +completely filled in and finished; and it is contained wholly in these +four virtues which you also mentioned. But your master Epicurus says that +he knows nothing whatever of it, and does not understand what, or what +sort of quality those people assert it to be, who profess to measure the +chief good by the standard of what is honourable. For if everything is +referred to that, and if they say that pleasure has no part in it, then he +says that they are talking idly, (these are his very words,) and do not +understand or see what real meaning ought to be conveyed under this word +honourable; for, as custom has it, he says that that alone is honourable +which is accounted glorious by common report; and that, says he, although +it is often more pleasant than some pleasures, still is sought for the +sake of pleasure. Do you not see how greatly these two parties differ? A +noble philosopher, by whom not only Greece and Italy, but all the +countries of the barbarians are influenced, says that he does not +understand what honourableness is, if it be not in pleasure, unless, +perchance, it is that thing which is praised by the common conversation of +the populace. But my opinion is, that this is often even dishonourable, +and that real honourableness is not called so from the circumstance of its +being praised by the many, but because it is such a thing that even if men +were unacquainted with it, or if they said nothing about it, it would +still be praiseworthy by reason of its own intrinsic beauty and +excellence. + +And so he again, being forced to yield to the power of nature, which is +always irresistible, says in another place what you also said a little +while ago,--that a man cannot live pleasantly unless he also lives +honourably. Now then, what is the meaning of honourably? does it mean the +same as pleasantly? If so, this statement will come to this, that a man +cannot live honourably unless he lives honourably. Is it honourably +according to public report? Therefore he affirms that a man cannot live +pleasantly without he has public report in his favour. What can be more +shameful than for the life of a wise man to depend on the conversation of +fools? What is it, then, that in this place he understands by the word +honourable? Certainly nothing except what can be deservedly praised for +its own sake; for if it be praised for the sake of pleasure, then what +sort of praise, I should like to know, is that which can be sought for in +the shambles? He is not a man, while he places honourableness in such a +rank that he affirms it to be impossible to live pleasantly without it, to +think that honourable which is popular, and to affirm that one cannot live +pleasantly without popularity; or to understand by the word honourable +anything except what is right, and deservedly to be praised by itself and +for itself, from a regard to its own power and influence and intrinsic +nature. + +XVI. Therefore, Torquatus, when you said that Epicurus asserted loudly +that a man could not live pleasantly if he did not also live honourably, +and wisely, and justly, you appeared to me to be boasting yourself. There +was such energy in your words, on account of the dignity of those things +which were indicated by those words, that you became taller, that you rose +up, and fixed your eyes upon us as if you were giving a solemn testimony +that honourableness and justice are sometimes praised by Epicurus. How +becoming was it to you to use that language, which is so necessary for +philosophers, that if they did not use it we should have no great need of +philosophy at all! For it is out of love for those words, which are very +seldom employed by Epicurus--I mean wisdom, fortitude, justice, and +temperance--that men of the most admirable powers of mind have betaken +themselves to the study of philosophy. + +"The sense of our eyes," says Plato, "is most acute in us; but yet we do +not see wisdom with them. What a vehement passion for itself would it +excite if it could be beheld by the eyes!" Why so? Because it is so +ingenious as to be able to devise pleasures in the most skilful manner. +Why is justice extolled? or what is it that has given rise to that old and +much-worn proverb, "He is a man with whom you may play(31) in the dark." +This, though applied to only one thing, has a very extensive application; +so that in every case we are influenced by the facts, and not by the +witness. + +For those things which you were saying were very weak and powerless +arguments,--when you urged that the wicked were tormented by their own +consciences, and also by fear of punishment, which is either inflicted on +them, or keeps them in constant fear that it will be inflicted. One ought +not to imagine a man timid, or weak in his mind, nor a good man, who, +whatever he has done, keeps tormenting himself, and dreads everything; but +rather let us fancy one, who with great shrewdness refers everything to +usefulness--an acute, crafty, wary man, able with ease to devise plans for +deceiving any one secretly, without any witness, or any one being privy to +it. Do you think that I am speaking of Lucius Tubulus?--who, when as praetor +he had been sitting as judge upon the trial of some assassins, took money +to influence his decision so undisguisedly, that the next year Publius +Scaevola, being tribune of the people, made a motion before the people, +that an inquiry should be made into the case. In accordance with which +decree of the people, Cnaeus Caepio, the consul, was ordered by the senate +to investigate the affair. Tubulus immediately went into banishment, and +did not dare to make any reply to the charge, for the matter was +notorious. + +XVII. We are not, therefore, inquiring about a man who is merely wicked, +but about one who mingles cunning with his wickedness, (as Quintus +Pompeius(32) did when he repudiated the treaty of Numantia,) and yet who +is not afraid of everything, but who has rather no regard for the stings +of conscience, which it costs him no trouble at all to stifle; for a man +who is called close and secret is so far from informing against himself, +that he will even pretend to grieve at what is done wrong by another; for +what else is the meaning of the word crafty (_versutus_)? I recollect on +one occasion being present at a consultation held by Publius Sextilius +Rufus, when he reported the case on which he asked advice to his friends +in this manner: That he had been left heir to Quintus Fadius Gallus; in +whose will it had been written that he had entreated Sextilius to take +care that what he left behind him should come to his daughter. Sextilius +denied that he had done so. He could deny it with impunity, for who was +there to convict him? None of us believed him; and it was more likely that +he should tell a lie whose interest it was to do so, than he who had set +down in his will that he had made the request which he ought to have made. +He added, moreover, that having sworn to comply with the Voconian(33) law, +he did not dare to violate it, unless his friends were of a contrary +opinion. I myself was very young when I was present on this occasion, but +there were present also many men of the highest character, not one of whom +thought that more ought to be given to Fadia than could come to her under +the provisions of the Voconian law. Sextilius retained a very large +inheritance; of which, if he had followed the opinion of those men who +preferred what was right and honourable to all profit and advantage, he +would never have touched a single penny. Do you think that he was +afterwards anxious and uneasy in his mind on that account? Not a bit of +it: on the contrary, he was a rich man, owing to that inheritance, and he +rejoiced in his riches, for he set a great value on money which was +acquired not only without violating the laws, but even by the law. And +money is what you also think worth seeking for, even with great risk, for +it is the efficient cause of many and great pleasures. As, therefore, +every danger appears fit to be encountered for the sake of what is +becoming and honourable, by those who decide that what is right and +honourable is to be sought for its own sake; so the men of your school, +who measure everything by pleasure, must encounter every danger in order +to acquire great pleasures, if any great property or any important +inheritance is at stake, since numerous pleasures are procured by money. +And your master Epicurus must, if he wishes to pursue what he himself +considers the chief of all good things, do the same that Scipio did, who +had a prospect of great glory before him if he could compel Annibal to +return into Africa. And with this view, what great dangers did he +encounter! for he measured the whole of his enterprise by the standard of +honour, not of pleasure. And in like manner, your wise man, being excited +by the prospect of some advantage, will fight(34) courageously, if it +should be necessary. If his exploits are undiscovered, he will rejoice; if +he is taken, he will despise every kind of punishment, for he will be +thoroughly armed for a contempt of death, banishment, and even of pain, +which you indeed represent as intolerable when you hold it out to wicked +men as a punishment, but as endurable when you argue that a wise man has +always more good than evil in his fortune. + +XVIII. But picture to yourself a man not only cunning, so as to be +prepared to act dishonestly in any circumstances that may arise, but also +exceedingly powerful; as, for instance, Marcus Crassus was, who, however, +always exercised his own natural good disposition; or as at this day our +friend Pompeius is, to whom we ought to feel grateful for his virtuous +conduct; for, although he is inclined to act justly, he could be unjust +with perfect impunity. But how many unjust actions can be committed which +nevertheless no one could find any ground for attacking! Suppose your +friend, when dying, has entreated you to restore his inheritance to his +daughter, and yet has never set it down in his will, as Fadius did, and +has never mentioned to any one that he has done so, what will you do? You +indeed will restore it. Perhaps Epicurus himself would have restored it; +just as Sextus Peducaeus the son of Sextus did; he who has left behind him +a son, our intimate friend, a living image of his own virtue and honesty, +a learned person, and the most virtuous and upright of all men; for he, +though no one was aware that he had been entreated by Caius Plotius, a +Roman knight of high character and great fortune, of the district of +Nursia, to do so, came of his own accord to his widow, and, though she had +no notion of the fact, detailed to her the commission which he had +received from her husband, and made over the inheritance to her. But I ask +you (since you would certainly have acted in the same manner yourself), do +you not understand that the power of nature is all the greater, inasmuch +as you yourselves, who refer everything to your own advantage, and, as you +yourselves say, to pleasure, still perform actions from which it is +evident that you are guided not by pleasure, but by principles of duty, +and that your own upright nature has more influence over you than any +vicious reasoning? + +If you knew, says Carneades, that a snake was lying hid in any place, and +that some one was going ignorantly to sit down upon it whose death would +bring you some advantage, you would be acting wickedly if you did not warn +him not to sit down there; and yet you could not be punished, for who +could possibly convict you? However, I am dwelling too long on this point; +for it is evident, unless equity, good faith and justice proceed from +nature, and if all these things are referred to advantage, that a good man +cannot possibly be found. But on this subject we have put a sufficient +number of arguments into the mouth of Laelius, in our books on a Republic. + +XIX. Now apply the same arguments to modesty, or temperance, which is a +moderation of the appetites, in subordination to reason. Can we say that a +man pays sufficient regard to the dictates of modesty, who indulges his +lusts in such a manner as to have no witnesses of his conduct? or is there +anything which is intrinsically flagitious, even if no loss of reputation +ensues? What do brave men do? Do they enter into an exact calculation of +pleasure, and so enter the battle, and shed their blood for their country? +or are they excited rather by a certain ardour and impetuosity of courage? +Do you think, O Torquatus, that that imperious ancestor of yours, if he +could hear what we are now saying, would rather listen to your sentiments +concerning him, or to mine, when I said that he had done nothing for his +own sake, but everything for that of the republic; and you, on the +contrary, affirm that he did nothing except with a view to his own +advantage? But if you were to wish to explain yourself further, and were +to say openly that he did nothing except for the sake of pleasure, how do +you think that he would bear such an assertion? + +Be it so. Let Torquatus, if you will, have acted solely with a view to his +own advantage, for I would rather employ that expression than pleasure, +especially when speaking of so eminent a man,--did his colleague too, +Publius Decius, the first man who ever was consul in that family, did he, +I say, when he was devoting himself, and rushing at the full speed of his +horse into the middle of the army of the Latins, think at all of his own +pleasures? For where or when was he to find any, when he knew that he +should perish immediately, and when he was seeking that death with more +eager zeal than Epicurus thinks even pleasure deserving to be sought with? +And unless this exploit of his had been deservedly extolled, his son would +not have imitated it in his fourth consulship; nor, again, would his son, +when fighting against Pyrrhus, have fallen in battle when he was consul, +and so offered himself up for the sake of the republic as a third victim +in an uninterrupted succession from the same family. I will forbear giving +any more examples. I might get a few from the Greeks, such as Leonidas, +Epaminondas, and three or four more perhaps. And if I were to begin +hunting up our own annals for such instances, I should soon establish my +point, and compel Pleasure to give herself up, bound hand and foot, to +virtue. But the day would be too short for me. And as Aulus Varius, who +was considered a rather severe judge, was in the habit of saying to his +colleague, when, after some witnesses had been produced, others were still +being summoned, "Either we have had witnesses enough, or I do not know +what is enough;" so I think that I have now brought forward witnesses +enough. + +For, what will you say? Was it pleasure that worked upon you, a man +thoroughly worthy of your ancestors, while still a young man, to rob +Publius Sylla of the consulship? And when you had succeeded in procuring +it for your father, a most gallant man, what a consul did he prove, and +what a citizen at all times, and most especially after his consulship! +And, indeed, it was by his advice that we ourselves behaved in such a +manner as to consult the advantage of the whole body of the citizens +rather than our own. + +But how admirably did you seem to speak, when on the one side you drew a +picture of a man loaded with the most numerous and excessive pleasures, +with no pain, either present or future; and on the other, of a man +surrounded with the greatest torments affecting his whole body, with no +pleasure, either present or hoped for; and asked who could be more +miserable than the one, or more happy than the other? and then concluded, +that pain was the greatest evil, and pleasure the greatest good. + +XX. There was a man of Lanuvium, called Lucius Thorius Balbus, whom you +cannot remember; he lived in such a way that no pleasure could be imagined +so exquisite, that he had not a superfluity of it. He was greedy of +pleasure, a critical judge of every species of it, and very rich. So far +removed from all superstition, as to despise the numerous sacrifices which +take place, and temples which exist in his country; so far from fearing +death, that he was slain in battle fighting for the republic. He bounded +his appetites, not according to the division of Epicurus, but by his own +feelings of satiety. He took sufficient exercise always to come to supper +both thirsty and hungry. He ate such food as was at the same time nicest +in taste and most easy of digestion; and selected such wine as gave him +pleasure, and was, at the same time, free from hurtful qualities. He had +all those other means and appliances which Epicurus thinks so necessary, +that he says that if they are denied, he cannot understand what is good. +He was free from every sort of pain; and if he had felt any, he would not +have borne it impatiently, though he would have been more inclined to +consult a physician than a philosopher. He was a man of a beautiful +complexion, of perfect health, of the greatest influence, in short, his +whole life was one uninterrupted scene of every possible variety of +pleasures. Now, you call this man happy. Your principles compel you to do +so. But as for me, I will not, indeed, venture to name the man whom I +prefer to him--Virtue herself shall speak for me, and she will not hesitate +to rank Marcus Regulus before this happy man of yours. For Virtue asserts +loudly that this man, when, of his own accord, under no compulsion, except +that of the pledge which he had given to the enemy, he had returned to +Carthage, was, at the very moment when he was being tortured with +sleeplessness and hunger, more happy than Thorius while drinking on a bed +of roses. + +Regulus had had the conduct of great wars; he had been twice consul; he +had had a triumph; and yet he did not think those previous exploits of his +so great or so glorious as that last misfortune which he incurred, because +of his own good faith and constancy; a misfortune which appears pitiable +to us who hear of it, but was actually pleasant to him who endured it. For +men are happy, not because of hilarity, or lasciviousness, or laughter, or +jesting, the companion of levity, but often even through sorrow endured +with firmness and constancy. Lucretia, having been ravished by force by +the king's son, called her fellow-citizens to witness, and slew herself. +This grief of hers, Brutus being the leader and mover of the Roman people, +was the cause of liberty to the whole state. And out of regard for the +memory of that woman, her husband and her father were made consuls(35) the +first year of the republic. Lucius Virginius, a man of small property and +one of the people, sixty years after the reestablishment of liberty, slew +his virgin daughter with his own hand, rather than allow her to be +surrendered to the lust of Appius Claudius, who was at that time invested +with the supreme power. + +XXI. Now you, O Torquatus, must either blame all these actions, or else +you must abandon the defence of pleasure. And what a cause is that, and +what a task does the man undertake who comes forward as the advocate of +pleasure, who is unable to call any one illustrious man as evidence in her +favour or as a witness to her character? For as we have awakened those men +from the records of our annals as witnesses, whose whole life has been +consumed in glorious labours; men who cannot bear to hear the very name of +pleasure: so on your side of the argument history is dumb. I have never +heard of Lycurgus, or Solon, Miltiades, or Themistocles, or Epaminondas +being mentioned in the school of Epicurus; men whose names are constantly +in the mouth of all the other philosophers. But now, since we have begun +to deal with this part of the question, our friend Atticus, out of his +treasures, will supply us with the names of as many great men as may be +sufficient for us to bring forward as witnesses. Is it not better to say a +little of these men, than so many volumes about Themista?(36) Let these +things be confined to the Greeks: although we have derived philosophy and +all the liberal sciences from them, still there are things which may be +allowable for them to do, but not for us. The Stoics are at variance with +the Peripatetics. One sect denies that anything is good which is not also +honourable: the other asserts that it allows great weight, indeed, by far +the most weight, to what is honourable, but still affirms that there are +in the body also, and around the body, certain positive goods. It is an +honourable contest and a splendid discussion. For the whole question is +about the dignity of virtue. + +But when one is arguing with philosophers of your school, one is forced to +hear a great deal about even the obscure pleasures which Epicurus himself +continually mentions. You cannot then, Torquatus, believe me, you cannot +uphold those principles, if you examine into yourself, and your own +thoughts and studies. You will, I say, be ashamed of that picture which +Cleanthes was in the habit of drawing with such accuracy in his +description. He used to desire those who came to him as his pupils, to +think of Pleasure painted in a picture, clad in beautiful robes, with +royal ornaments, and sitting on a throne. He represented all the Virtues +around her, as her handmaidens, doing nothing else, and thinking nothing +else their duty, but to minister to Pleasure, and only just to whisper in +her ear (if, indeed, that could be made intelligible in a picture) a +warning to be on her guard to do nothing imprudent, nothing to offend the +minds of men, nothing from which any pain could ensue. We, indeed, they +would say, we Virtues are only born to act as your slaves; we have no +other business. + +XXII. But Epicurus (for this is your great point) denies that any man who +does not live honourably can live agreeably; as if I cared what he denies +or what he affirms. What I inquire is, what it is consistent for that man +to say who places the chief good in pleasure. What reason do you allege +why Thorius, why Chius, why Postumius, why the master of all these men, +Orata, did not live most agreeably? He himself, as I have already said, +asserts that the life of men devoted to luxury is not deserving of blame, +unless they are absolute fools, that is to say, unless they abandon +themselves to become slaves to their desires or to their fears. And when +he promises them a remedy for both these things, he, in so doing, offers +them a licence for luxury. For if you take away these things, then he says +that he cannot find anything in the life of debauched men which deserves +blame. You then, who regulate everything by the standard of pleasure, +cannot either defend or maintain virtue. For he does not deserve to be +accounted a virtuous or a just man who abstains from injustice in order to +avoid suffering evil. You know the line, I suppose-- + + + He's not a pious man whom fear constrains + To acts of piety ... a man-- + + +And nothing can be more true. For a man is not just while he is in a state +of alarm. And certainly when he ceases to be in fear, he will not be just. +But he will not be afraid if he is able to conceal his actions, or if he +is able, by means of his great riches and power, to support what he has +done. And he will certainly prefer being regarded as a good man, though he +is not one, to being a good man and not being thought one. And so, beyond +all question, instead of genuine and active justice, you give us only an +effigy of justice, and you teach us, as it were, to disregard our own +unvarying conscience, and to go hunting after the fleeting vagabond +opinions of others. + +And the same may be said of the other virtues also; the foundation of all +which you place in pleasure, which is like building on water. For what are +we to say? Can we call that same Torquatus a brave man? For I am +delighted, though I cannot, as you say, bribe you; I am delighted with +your family and with your name. And, in truth, I have before my eyes Aulus +Torquatus,(37) a most excellent man, and one greatly attached to me; and +both of you must certainly be aware how great and how eminent his zeal in +my behalf was in those times which are well known to every one. And that +conduct of his would not have been delightful to me, who wish both to be, +and to be considered, grateful, if I did not see clearly that he was +friendly to me for my own sake, not for his own; unless, indeed, you say, +it was for his own sake, because it is for the interest of every one to +act rightly. If you say that, we have gained our point. For what we are +aiming at, what we are contending for, is, that duty itself is the reward +of duty. But that master of yours will not admit this, and requires +pleasure to result from every action as a sort of wages. + +However, I return to him. If it was for the sake of pleasure that +Torquatus, when challenged, fought with the Gaul on the Anio, and out of +his spoils took his chain and earned his surname, or if it was for any +other reason but that he thought such exploits worthy of a man, then I do +not account him brave. And, indeed, if modesty, and decency, and chastity, +and, in one word, temperance, is only upheld by the fear of punishment or +infamy, and not out of regard to their own sanctity, then what lengths +will adultery and debauchery and lust shrink from proceeding to, if there +is a hope either of escaping detection, or of obtaining impunity or +licence? + +What shall I say more? What is your idea, O Torquatus, of this?--that you, +a man of your name, of your abilities, of your high reputation, should not +dare to allege in a public assembly what you do, what you think, what you +contend for, the standard to which you refer everything, the object for +the sake of which you wish to accomplish what you attempt, and what you +think best in life. For what can you claim to deserve, when you have +entered upon your magistracy, and come forward to the assembly, (for then +you will have to announce what principles you intend to observe in +administering the law, and perhaps, too, if you think fit, you will, as is +the ancient custom, say something about your ancestors and +yourself,)--what, I say, can you claim as your just desert, if you say that +in that magistracy you will do everything for the sake of pleasure? and +that you have never done anything all your life except with a view to +pleasure? Do you think, say you, that I am so mad as to speak in that way +before ignorant people? Well, say it then in the court of justice, or if +you are afraid of the surrounding audience, say it in the senate: you will +never do so. Why not, except that such language is disgraceful? Do you +then think Triarius and me fit people for you to speak before in a +disgraceful manner? + +XXIII. However, be it so. The name of pleasure certainly has no dignity in +it, and perhaps we do not exactly understand what is meant by it; for you +are constantly saying that we do not understand what you mean by the word +pleasure: no doubt it is a very difficult and obscure matter. When you +speak of atoms, and spaces between worlds, things which do not exist, and +which cannot possibly exist, then we understand you; and cannot we +understand what pleasure is, a thing which is known to every sparrow? What +will you say if I compel you to confess that I not only do know what +pleasure is (for it is a pleasant emotion affecting the senses), but also +what you mean by the word? For at one time you mean by the word the very +same thing which I have just said, and you give it the description of +consisting in motion, and of causing some variety: at another time you +speak of some other highest pleasure, which is susceptible of no addition +whatever, but that it is present when every sort of pain is absent, and +you call it then a state, not a motion: let that, then, be pleasure. Say, +in any assembly you please, that you do everything with a view to avoid +suffering pain: if you do not think that even this language is +sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently honourable, say that you will do +everything during your year of office, and during your whole life, for the +sake of your own advantage; that you will do nothing except what is +profitable to yourself, nothing which is not prompted by a view to your +own interest. What an uproar do you not suppose such a declaration would +excite in the assembly, and what hope do you think you would have of the +consulship which is ready for you? And can you follow these principles, +which, when by yourself, or in conversation with your dearest friends, you +do not dare to profess and avow openly? But you have those maxims +constantly in your mouth which the Peripatetics and Stoics profess. In the +courts of justice and in the senate you speak of duty, equity, dignity, +good faith, uprightness, honourable actions, conduct worthy of power, +worthy of the Roman people; you talk of encountering every imaginable +danger in the cause of the republic--of dying for one's country. When you +speak in this manner we are all amazed, like a pack of blockheads, and you +are laughing in your sleeve: for, among all those high-sounding and +admirable expressions, pleasure has no place, not only that pleasure which +you say consists in motion, and which all men, whether living in cities or +in the country, all men, in short, who speak Latin, call pleasure, but +even that stationary pleasure, which no one but your sect calls pleasure +at all. + +XXIV. Take care lest you find yourselves obliged to use our language, +though adhering to your own opinions. But if you were to put on a feigned +countenance or gait, with the object of appearing more dignified, you +would not then be like yourself; and yet are you to use fictitious +language, and to say things which you do not think, or, as you have one +dress to wear at home, and another in which you appear in court, are you +to disguise your opinions in a similar manner, so as to make a parade with +your countenance, while you are keeping the truth hidden within? Consider, +I intreat you, whether this is proper. My opinion is that those are +genuine sentiments which are honourable, which are praiseworthy, which are +creditable; which a man is not ashamed to avow in the senate, before the +people, in every company and every assembly, so that he will be ashamed to +think what he is ashamed to say. + +But what room can there be for friendship, or who can be a friend to any +one whom he does not love for his own sake? And what is loving, from which +verb (_amo_) the very name of friendship (_amicitia_) is derived, but +wishing a certain person to enjoy the greatest possible good fortune, even +if none of it accrues to oneself? Still, you say, it is a good thing for +me to be of such a disposition. Perhaps it may be so; but you cannot be so +if it is not really your disposition; and how can you be so unless love +itself has seized hold of you? which is not usually generated by any +accurate computation of advantage, but is self-produced, and born +spontaneously from itself. But, you will say, I am guided by prospects of +advantage. Friendship, then, will remain just as long as any advantage +ensues from it; and if it be a principle of advantage which is the +foundation of friendship, the same will be its destruction. But what will +you do, if, as is often the case, advantage takes the opposite side to +friendship? Will you abandon it? what sort of friendship is that? Will you +preserve it? how will that be expedient for you? For you see what the +rules are which you lay down respecting friendship which is desirable only +for the sake of one's own advantage:--I must take care that I do not incur +odium if I cease to uphold my friend. Now, in the first place, why should +such conduct incur odium, except because it is disgraceful? But, if you +will not desert your friend lest you should incur any disadvantage from so +doing, still you will wish that he was dead, to release you from being +bound to a man from whom you get no advantage. But suppose he not only +brings you no advantage, but you even incur loss of property for his sake, +and have to undertake labours, and to encounter danger of your life; will +you not, even then, show some regard for yourself, and recollect that +every one is born for himself and for his own pleasures? Will you go bail +to a tyrant for your friend in a case which may affect your life, as that +Pythagorean(38) did when he became surety to the Tyrant of Sicily? or, +when you are Pylades, will you affirm that you are Orestes, that you may +die for your friend? or, if you were Orestes, would you contradict +Pylades, and give yourself up? and, if you could not succeed then, would +you intreat that you might be both put to death together? + +XXV. You, indeed, O Torquatus, would do all these things. For I do not +think that there is anything deserving of great praise, which you would be +likely to shrink from out of fear of death or pain: nor is it the question +what is consistent with your nature, but with the doctrines of your +school--that philosophy which you defend, those precepts which you have +learnt, and which you profess to approve of, utterly overthrow +friendship--even though Epicurus should, as indeed he does, extol it to the +skies. Oh, you will say, but he himself cultivated friendship. As if any +one denied that he was a good, and courteous, and kind-hearted man; the +question in these discussions turns on his genius, and not on his morals. +Grant that there is such perversity in the levity of the Greeks, who +attack those men with evil speaking with whom they disagree as to the +truth of a proposition. But, although he may have been courteous in +maintaining friendships, still, if all this is true, (for I do not affirm +anything myself), he was not a very acute arguer. Oh, but he convinced +many people. And perhaps it was quite right that he should; still, the +testimony of the multitude is not of the greatest possible weight; for in +every art, or study, or science, as in virtue itself, whatever is most +excellent is also most rare. And to me, indeed, the very fact of he +himself having been a good man, and of many Epicureans having also been +such, and being to this day faithful in their friendships, and consistent +throughout their whole lives, and men of dignified conduct, regulating +their lives, not by pleasure, but by their duty, appears to show that the +power of what is honourable is greater, and that of pleasure smaller. For +some men live in such a manner that their language is refuted by their +lives; and as others are considered to speak better than they act, so +these men seem to me to act better than they speak. + +XXVI. However, all this is nothing to the purpose. Let us just consider +those things which have been said by you about friendship, and among them +I fancied that I recognized one thing as having been said by Epicurus +himself, namely, that friendship cannot be separated from pleasure, and +that it ought on that account to be cultivated, because without it men +could not live in safety, and without fear, nor even with any kind of +pleasantness. Answer enough has been given to this argument. You also +brought forward another more humane one, invented by these more modern +philosophers, and never, as far as I know, advanced by the master himself, +that at first, indeed, a friend is sought out with a view to one's own +advantage, but that when intimacy has sprung up, then the man is loved for +himself, all hope or idea of pleasure being put out of the question. Now, +although this argument is open to attack on many accounts, still I will +accept what they grant; for it is enough for me, though not enough for +them: for they admit that it is possible for men to act rightly at times, +without any expectation of, or desire to acquire pleasure. + +You also affirmed that some people say that wise men make a kind of treaty +among themselves, that they shall have the same feelings towards their +friends that they entertain for themselves, and that that is possible, and +is often the case, and that it has especial reference to the enjoyment of +pleasures. If they could make this treaty, they at the same time make that +other to love equity, moderation, and all the virtues for their own sake, +without any consideration of advantage. But if we cultivate friendships +for the sake of their profits, emoluments, and advantages which may be +derived from them, if there is to be no affection which may make the +friendship desirable for its own sake, on its own account, by its own +influences, by itself and for itself, is there any doubt at all that in +such a case we must prefer our farms and estates to our friends? And here +you may again quote those panegyrics which have been uttered in most +eloquent language by Epicurus himself, on the subject of friendship. I am +not asking what he says, but what he can possibly say which shall be +consistent with his own system and sentiments. + +Friendship has been sought for the sake of advantage; do you, then, think +that my friend Triarius, here, will be more useful to you than your +granaries at Puteol? Think of all the circumstances which you are in the +habit of recollecting; the protection which friends are to a man. You have +sufficient protection in yourself, sufficient in the laws, sufficient also +in moderate friendships. As it is, you cannot be looked upon with +contempt; but you will easily avoid odium and unpopularity, for precepts +on that subject are given by Epicurus. And yet you, by employing such +large revenues in purposes of liberality, even without any Pyladean +friendship, will admirably defend and protect yourself by the goodwill of +numbers. But with whom, then, is a man to share his jests, his serious +thoughts, as people say, and all his secrets and hidden wishes? With you, +above all men; but if that cannot be, why with some tolerably intimate +friend. However, grant that all these circumstances are not unreasonable; +what comparison can there be between them and the utility of such large +sums of money? You see, then, if you measure friendship by the affection +which it engenders, that nothing is more excellent; if by the advantage +that is derived from it, then you see that the closest intimacies are +surpassed by the value of a productive farm. You must therefore love me, +myself, and not my circumstances, if we are to be real friends. + +XXVII. But we are getting too prolix in the most self-evident matters; +for, as it has been concluded and established that there is no room +anywhere for either virtues or friendships if everything is referred to +pleasure, there is nothing more which it is of any great importance should +be said. And yet, that I may not appear to have passed over any topic +without a reply, I will, even now, say a few words on the remainder of +your argument. + +Since, then, the whole sum of philosophy is directed to ensure living +happily, and since men, from a desire of this one thing, have devoted +themselves to this study; but different people make happiness of life to +consist in different circumstances; you, for instance, place it in +pleasure; and, in the same manner you, on the other hand, make all +unhappiness to consist in pain: let us consider, in the first place, what +sort of thing this happy life of yours is. But you will grant this, I +think, that if there is really any such thing as happiness, it ought to be +wholly in the power of a wise man to secure it; for, if a happy life can +be lost, it cannot be happy. For who can feel confident that a thing will +always remain firm and enduring in his case, which is in reality fleeting +and perishable? But the man who distrusts the permanence of his good +things, must necessarily fear that some day or other, when he has lost +them, he will become miserable; and no man can be happy who is in fear +about most important matters. No one, then, can be happy; for a happy life +is usually called so, not in some part only, but in perpetuity of time; +and, in fact, life is not said to be happy at all till it is completed and +finished. Nor is it possible for any man to be sometimes happy and +sometimes miserable; for he who thinks it possible that he may become +miserable, is certainly not happy. For, when a happy life is once +attained, it remains as long as the maker of the happy life herself, +namely, wisdom; nor does it wait till the last period of a man's +existence, as Herodotus says that Croesus was warned by Solon. + +But, as you yourself were saying, Epicurus denies that length of time has +any influence on making life happy, and that no less pleasure can be felt +in a short time than would be the case if the pleasure were everlasting. +Now these statements are most inconsistent. For, when he places the chief +good in pleasure, he denies that pleasure can be greater in infinite time, +than it can in a finite and moderate period. The man who places all good +in virtue, has it in his power to say that a happy life is made so by the +perfection of virtue; for he consistently denies that time can bring any +increase to his chief good. But he who thinks that life is made happy by +pleasure, must surely be inconsistent with himself if he denies that +pleasure is increased by length of time: if so, then pain is not either. +Shall we, then, say that all pain is most miserable in proportion as it is +most lasting, and yet that duration does not make pleasure more desirable? +Why, then, is it that Epicurus always speaks of God as happy and eternal? +For, if you only take away his eternity, Jupiter is in no respect more +happy than Epicurus; for each of them is in the enjoyment of the chief +good, namely, pleasure. Oh, but Epicurus is also liable to pain. That does +not affect him at all; for he says that if he were being burnt, he would +say, "How pleasant it is." In what respect, then, is he surpassed by the +God, if he is not surpassed by him because of his eternity? For what good +has the God, except the highest degree of pleasure, and that, too, +everlasting! What, then, is the good of speaking so pompously, if one does +not speak consistently? Happiness of life is placed in pleasure of body, +(I will add of mind also, if you please, as long as that pleasure of the +mind is derived from the pleasure of the body.) What? who can secure this +pleasure to a wise man in perpetuity? For the circumstances by which +pleasures are generated are not in the power of a wise man; for happiness +does not consist in wisdom itself, but in those things which wisdom +provides for the production of pleasure. And all these circumstances are +external; and what is external is liable to accident. And thus fortune is +made the mistress of happiness in life,--Fortune, which, Epicurus says, has +but little to do with a wise man. + +XXVIII. But you will say, Come, these things are trifles. Nature by +herself enriches the wise man; and, indeed, Epicurus has taught us that +the riches of nature are such as can be acquired. This is well said, and I +do not object to it; but still these same assertions are inconsistent with +one another. For Epicurus denies there is less pleasure derived from the +poorest food, from the most despised kinds of meat and drink, than from +feasting on the most delicious dishes. Now if he were to assert that it +makes no difference as to the happiness of life what food a man ate, I +would grant it, I would even praise him for saying so; for he would be +speaking the truth; and I know that Socrates, who ranked pleasure as +nothing at all, said the same thing, namely, that hunger was the best +seasoning for meat, and thirst for drink. But I do not comprehend how a +man who refers everything to pleasure, lives like Gallonius, and yet talks +like that great man Frugi Piso; nor, indeed, do I believe that what he +says is his real opinion. He has said that natural riches can be acquired, +because nature is contented with a little. Certainly, unless you estimate +pleasure at a great value. No less pleasure, says he, is derived from the +most ordinary things than from the most valuable. Now to say this, is not +only not to have a heart, but not to have even a palate. For they who +despise pleasure itself, may be allowed to say that they do not prefer a +sturgeon to a herring. But the man who places his chief good in pleasure, +must judge of everything by his sensations, not by his reason, and must +pronounce those things best which are most pleasant. + +However, be it so. Let him acquire the greatest possible pleasures, not +only at a cheap rate, but, as far as I am concerned, for nothing at all, +if he can manage it. Let there be no less pleasure in eating a nasturtium, +which Xenophon tells us the Persians used to eat, than in those Syracusan +banquets which are so severely blamed by Plato. Let, I say, the +acquisition of pleasure be as easy as you say it is. What shall we say of +pain? the torments of which are so great that, if at least pain is the +greatest of evils, a happy life cannot possibly exist in company with it. +For Metrodorus himself, who is almost a second Epicurus, describes a happy +man in these words. When his body is in good order, and when he is quite +certain that it it will be so for the future. Is it possible for any one +to be certain in what condition his body will be, I do not say a year +hence, but even this evening? Pain, therefore, which is the greatest of +evils, will always be dreaded even if it is not present. For it will +always be possible that it may be present. But how can any fear of the +greatest possible evil exist in a happy life? + +Oh, says he, Epicurus has handed down maxims according to which we may +disregard pain. Surely, it is an absurdity to suppose that the greatest +possible evil can be disregarded. However, what is the maxim? The greatest +pain, says he, is short-lived. Now, first of all, what do you call +short-lived? And, secondly, what do you call the greatest pain? For what +do you mean? Cannot extreme pain last for many days? Aye, and for many +months? Unless, indeed, you intend to assert that you mean such pain as +kills a man the moment it seizes on him. Who is afraid of that pain? I +would rather you would lessen that pain by which I have seen that most +excellent and kind-hearted man, Cnaeus Octavius, the son of Marcus +Octavius, my own intimate friend, worn out, and that not once, or for a +short time, but very often, and for a long period at once. What agonies, O +ye immortal gods, did that man use to bear, when all his limbs seemed as +if they were on fire. And yet he did not appear to be miserable, (because +in truth pain was not the greatest of evils,) but only afflicted. But if +he had been immersed in continued pleasure, passing at the same time a +vicious and infamous life, then he would have been miserable. + +XXIX. But when you say that great pains last but a short time, and that if +they last long they are always light, I do not understand the meaning of +your assertion. For I see that some pains are very great, and also very +durable. And there is a better principle which may enable one to endure +them, which however you cannot adopt, who do not love what is honourable +for its own sake. There are some precepts for, and I may almost say laws +of, fortitude, which forbid a man to behave effeminately in pain. +Wherefore it should be accounted disgraceful, I do not say to grieve, (for +that is at times unavoidable,) but to make those rocks of Lemnos +melancholy with such outcries as those of Philoctetes-- + + + Who utters many a tearful note aloud, + With ceaseless groaning, howling, and complaint. + + +Now let Epicurus, if he can, put himself in the place of that man-- + + + Whose veins and entrails thus are racked with pain + And horrid agony, while the serpent's bite + Spreads its black venom through his shuddering frame. + + +Let Epicurus become Philoctetes. If his pain is sharp it is short. But in +fact he has been lying in his cave for ten years. If it lasts long it is +light, for it grants him intervals of relaxation. In the first place it +does not do so often; and in the second place what sort of relaxation is +it when the memory of past agony is still fresh, and the fear of further +agony coming and impending is constantly tormenting him. Let him die, says +he. Perhaps that would be the best thing for him; but then what becomes of +the argument, that the wise man has always more pleasure than pain? For if +that be the case I would have you think whether you are not recommending +him a crime, when you advise him to die. Say to him rather, that it is a +disgraceful thing for a man to allow his spirit to be crushed and broken +by pain, that it is shameful to yield to it. For as for your maxim, if it +is violent it is short, if it lasts long it is slight, that is mere empty +verbiage. The only real way to mitigate pain is by the application of +virtue, of magnanimity, of patience, of courage. + +XXX. Listen, that I may not make too wide a digression, to the words of +Epicurus when dying; and take notice how inconsistent his conduct is with +his language. "Epicurus to Hermarchus greeting. I write this letter," says +he, "while passing a happy day, which is also the last day of my life. And +the pains of my bladder and bowels are so intense that nothing can be +added to them which can make them greater." Here is a man miserable, if +pain is the greatest possible evil. It cannot possibly be denied. However, +let us see how he proceeds. "But still I have to balance this a joy in my +mind, which I derive from the recollection of my philosophical principles +and discoveries. But do you, as becomes the goodwill which from your youth +upwards you have constantly discovered for me and for philosophy, protect +the children of Metrodorus." After reading this, I do not consider the +death of Epaminondas or Leonidas preferable to his. One of whom defeated +the Lacedaemonians at Mantinea,(39) and finding that he had been rendered +insensible by a mortal wound, when he first came to himself, asked whether +his shield was safe? When his weeping friends had answered him that it +was, he then asked whether the enemy was defeated? And when he received to +this question also the answer which he wished, he then ordered the spear +which was sticking in him to be pulled out. And so, losing quantities of +blood, he died in the hour of joy and victory. + +But Leonidas, the king of the Lacedaemonians, put himself and those three +hundred men, whom he had led from Sparta, in the way of the enemy of +Thermopylae,(40) when the alternative was a base flight, or a glorious +death. The deaths of generals are glorious, but philosophers usually die +in their beds. But still Epicurus here mentions what, when dying, he +considered great credit to himself. "I have," says he, "a joy to +counterbalance these pains." I recognise in these words, O Epicurus, the +sentiments of a philosopher, but still you forgot what you ought to have +said. For, in the first place, if those things be true, in the +recollection of which you say you rejoice, that is to say, if your +writings and discoveries are true, then you cannot rejoice. For you have +no pleasure here which you can refer to the body. But you have constantly +asserted that no one ever feels joy or pain except with reference to his +body. "I rejoice," says he, "in the past." In what that is past? If you +mean such past things as refer to the body, then I see that you are +counterbalancing your agonies with your reason, and not with your +recollection of pleasures which you have felt in the body. But if you are +referring to your mind, then your denial of there being any joy of the +mind which cannot be referred to some pleasure of the body, must be false. +Why, then, do you recommend the children of Metrodorus to Hermarchus? In +that admirable exercise of duty, in that excellent display of your good +faith, for that is how I look upon it, what is there that you refer to the +body? + +XXXI. You may twist yourself about in every direction as you please, +Torquatus, but you will not find in this excellent letter anything written +by Epicurus which is in harmony and consistent with the rules he laid +down. And so he is convicted by himself, and his writings are upset by his +own virtue and goodness. For that recommendation of those children, that +recollection of them, and affectionate friendship for them, that attention +to the most important duties at the last gasp, indicates that honesty +without any thought of personal advantage was innate in the man; that it +did not require the invitation of pleasure, or the allurements of +mercenary rewards. For what greater evidence can we require that those +things which are honourable and right are desirable of themselves for +their own sake, than the sight of a dying man so anxious in the discharge +of such important duties? But, as I think that letter deserving of all +commendation of which I have just given you a literal translation, +(although it was in no respect consistent with the general system of that +philosopher,) so also I think that his will is inconsistent not only with +the dignity of a philosopher, but even with his own sentiments. For he +wrote often, and at great length, and sometimes with brevity and suitable +language, in that book which I have just named, that death had nothing to +do with us; for that whatever was dissolved was void of sensation, and +whatever was void of sensation had nothing whatever to do with us. Even +this might have been expressed better and more elegantly. For when he lays +down the position that what has been dissolved is void of sensation, that +is such an expression that it is not very plain what he means by the word +dissolved. However, I understand what he really does mean. But still I ask +why, when every sensation is extinguished by dissolution, that is to say, +by death, and when there is nothing else whatever that has any connexion +with us, he should still take such minute and diligent care to enjoin +Amynomachus and Timocrates, his heirs, to furnish every year what in the +opinion of Hermarchus shall be enough to keep his birthday in the month +Gamelion, with all proper solemnity. And also, shall every month, on the +twentieth day of the month, supply money enough to furnish a banquet for +those men who have studied philosophy with him, in order that his memory, +and that of Metrodorus, may be duly honoured. Now I cannot deny that these +injunctions are in keeping with the character of a thoroughly accomplished +and amiable man; but still I utterly deny that it is inconsistent with the +wisdom of a philosopher, especially of a natural philosopher, which is the +character he claims for himself, to think that there is such a day as the +birthday of any one. What? Can any day which has once passed recur over +again frequently. Most indubitably not; or can any day like it recur? Even +that is impossible, unless it may happen after an interval of many +thousand years, that there may be a return of all the stars at the same +moment to the point from which they set out. There is, therefore, no such +thing as anybody's birthday. But still it is considered that there is. As +if I did not know that. But even if there be, is it to be regarded after a +man's death? And is a man to give injunctions in his will that it shall be +so, after he has told you all, as if with the voice of an oracle, that +there is nothing which concerns us at all after death? These things are +very inconsistent in a man who, in his mind, had travelled over +innumerable worlds and boundless regions, which were destitute of all +limits and boundaries. Did Democritus ever say such a thing as this? I +will pass over every one else, and call him only as a witness whom +Epicurus himself followed to the exclusion of others. + +But if a day did deserve to be kept, which was it more fitting to observe, +the day on which a man was born, or that on which he became wise? A man, +you will say, could not have become wise unless he had been born. And, on +the same principle, he could not if his grandmother had never been born. +The whole business, Torquatus, is quite out of character for a learned man +to wish to have the recollection of his name celebrated with banquets +after his death. I say nothing of the way in which you keep these days, +and to how many jokes from witty men you expose yourselves. There is no +need of quarrelling. I only say that it would have been more becoming in +you to keep Epicurus's birthday, than in him to leave injunctions in his +will that it should be kept. + +XXXII. However, to return to our subject, (for while we were talking of +pain we digressed to that letter of his,) we may now fairly come to this +conclusion. The man who is in the greatest evil, while he is in it, is not +happy. But the wise man is always happy, and is also occasionally in pain. +Therefore, pain is not the greatest evil. What kind of doctrine, then, is +this, that goods which are past are not lost to a wise man, but that he +ought not to remember past evils. First of all, is it in our power to +decide what we will remember. When Simonides, or some one else, offered to +Themistocles to teach him the art of memory, "I would rather," said he, +"that you would teach me that of forgetfulness; for I even now recollect +what I would rather not; but I cannot forget what I should like to." This +was a very sensible answer. But still the fact is that it is the act of a +very arbitrary philosopher to forbid a man to recollect. It seems to me a +command very much in the spirit of your ancestor, Manlius, or even worse, +to command what it is impossible for me to do. What will you say if the +recollection of past evils is even pleasant? For some proverbs are more +true than your dogmas. Nor does Euripides speak all when he says, I will +give it you in Latin, if I can, but you all know the Greek line-- + + + Sweet is the memory of sorrows past.(41) + + +However, let us return to the consideration of past goods. And if you were +to utter such maxims as might be capable of consoling Caius Marius, and +enabling him when banished, indigent, and up to his neck in a marsh, to +relieve his anguish by the recollection of his past trophies, I would +listen to you, and approve of all you could say. Nor, indeed, can the +happiness of a philosopher be complete or continue to the end, if all the +admirable discoveries which he has made, and all his virtuous actions, are +to be lost by his own forgetfulness. But, in your case, you assert that +the recollection of pleasures which have been felt makes life happy, and +of such pleasures too, as affect the body. For if there are any other +pleasures, then it is incorrect to say that all the pleasures of the mind +originate in its connexion with the body. + +But if pleasures felt by the body, even when they are past, can give +pleasure, then I do not understand why Aristotle should turn the +inscription on the tomb of Sardanapalus into so much ridicule; in which +the king of Assyria boasts that he has taken with him all his lascivious +pleasures. For, says Aristotle, how could those things which even while he +was alive he could not feel a moment longer than while he was actually +enjoying them, possibly remain to him after he was dead? The pleasure, +then, of the body is lost, and flies away at the first moment, and oftener +leaves behind reasons for repenting of it than for recollecting it. +Therefore, Africanus is happier when addressing his country in this +manner-- + + + Cease, Rome, to dread your foes.... + + +And in the rest of his admirable boast-- + + + For you have trophies by my labour raised. + + +He is rejoicing here in his labours which are past. But you would bid him +exult in past pleasures. He traces back his feelings to things which had +never had any reference to his body. You cling to the body to the +exclusion of everything else. + +XXXIII. But how can that proposition possibly be maintained which you +urge, namely, that all the pleasures and pains of the mind are connected +inseparably with the pleasures and pains of the body? Is there, then, +nothing which ever delights you, (I know whom I am addressing,) is there +nothing, O Torquatus, which ever delights you for its own sake? I say +nothing about dignity, honourableness, the beauty of virtue, which I have +mentioned before. I will put all these things aside as of less +consequence. But is there anything when you are writing, or reading a +poem, or an oration, when you are investigating the history of exploits or +countries, or anything in a statue, or picture, or pleasant place; in +sports, in hunting, or in a villa of Lucullus, (for if I were to say of +your own, you would have a loophole to escape through, saying that that +had connexion with your body,) is there any of all these things, I say, +which you can refer to your body, or do they not please you, if they +please you at all, for their own sake? + +You must either be the most obstinate of men, if you persist in referring +these things, which I have just mentioned, to the body, or else you must +abandon Epicurus's whole theory of pleasure, if you admit that they have +no connexion with it. + +But as for your argument, that the pleasures and pains of the mind are +greater than those of the body, because the mind is a partaker of three +times,(42) but nothing but what is present is felt by the body; how can it +possibly be allowed that a man who rejoices for my sake rejoices more than +I do myself? The pleasure of the mind originates in the pleasure of the +body, and the pleasure of the mind is greater than that of the body. The +result, then, is, that the party who congratulates the other is more +rejoiced than he whom he congratulates. But while you are trying to make +out the wise man to be happy, because he is sensible of the greatest +pleasures in his mind, and, indeed, of pleasures which are in all their +parts greater than those which he is sensible of in his body, you do not +see what really happens. For he will also feel the pains of the mind to be +in every respect greater than those of the body. And so he must +occasionally be miserable, whom you endeavour to represent as being always +happy. Nor, indeed, will it be possible for you ever to fill up the idea +of perfect and uninterrupted happiness while you refer everything to +pleasure and pain. + +On which account, O Torquatus, we must find out something else which is +the chief good of man. Let us grant pleasure to the beasts, to whom you +often appeal as witnesses on the subject of the chief good. What will you +say, if even the beasts do many things under the guidance of their various +natures, partly out of indulgence to other beasts, and at the cost of +their own labour, as, for instance, it is very visible in bringing forth +and rearing their young, that they have some other object in view besides +their own pleasure? and partly, too, when they rejoice in running about +and travelling; and some assemble in herds, in such a manner as to imitate +in some degree a human state. In some species of birds we see certain +indications of affection, knowledge, and memory; in many we see what even +looks like a regular system of action. Shall there, then, be in beasts +some images of human virtues, quite unconnected with pleasure, and shall +there be no virtue in man except for the sake of pleasure? and though he +is as superior as can be to all the other animals, shall we still affirm +that he has no peculiar attributes given to him by nature? + +XXXIV. But we, if indeed all things depend on pleasure, are greatly +surpassed by beasts, for which the earth, of her own accord, produces +various sorts of food, in every kind of abundance, without their taking +any trouble about it; while the same necessaries are scarcely (sometimes I +may even use stronger language still) supplied to us, when we seek them +with great labour. Nor is it possible that I should ever think that the +chief good was the same in the case of a beast and a man. For what can be +the use of having so many means and appliances for the carrying out of the +most excellent arts,--what can be the use of such an assemblage of most +honourable pursuits, of such a crowd of virtues, if they are all got +together for no other end but pleasure? As if, when Xerxes, with such vast +fleets, such countless troops of both cavalry and infantry, had bridged +over the Hellespont and dug through Mount Athos, had walked across the +sea, and sailed(43) over the land, if, when he had invaded Greece with +such irresistible violence, any one had asked him for the cause of +collecting so vast an army, and waging so formidable a war, and he had +replied that he wished to get some honey from Hymettus, certainly he would +have been thought to have undertaken such an enterprise for an +insufficient cause. And in like manner, if we were to say that a wise man, +furnished and provided with numerous and important virtues and +accomplishments, not, indeed, travelling like him over sea on foot, and +over mountains with his fleet, but embracing the whole heaven, all the +earth, and the universal sea with his mind, had nothing in view but +pleasure, we might say that he, too, was taking a great deal of trouble +for a little honey. + +Believe me, Torquatus, we were born for more lofty and noble ends; and you +may see this, not only by considering the parts of the mind, in which +there is the recollection of a countless number of things, (and from +thence proceed infinite conjectures as to the consequences of them, not +very far differing from divination; there is also in them shame, which is +the regulator of desire, and the faithful guardianship of justice, so +necessary to human society, and a firm enduring contempt for pain and +death, shown in the enduring of labours and the encountering of dangers.) +All these things, I say, are in the mind. But I would have you consider +also the limbs and the senses, which, like the other parts of the body, +will appear to you to be not only the companions of the virtues, but also +their slaves. What will you say, if many things in the body itself appear +to deserve to be preferred to pleasure? such as strength, health, +activity, beauty? And if this is the case, how many qualities of the mind +will likewise seem so? For in the mind, the old philosophers--those most +learned men--thought that there was something heavenly and divine. But if +the chief good consisted in pleasure, as you say, then it would be natural +that we should wish to live day and night in the midst of pleasure, +without any interval or interruption, while all our senses were, as it +were, steeped in and influenced wholly by pleasure. But who is there, who +is worthy of the name of a man, who would like to spend even the whole of +one day in that kind of pleasure? The Cyrenaic philosophers, indeed, would +not object. Your sect is more modest in this respect, though their's is +perhaps the more sincere. + +However, let us contemplate with our minds, not, indeed, these most +important arts, which are so valuable, that those who were ignorant of +them were accounted useless by our ancestors; but I ask you whether you +think that (I will not say Homer, or Archilochus, or Pindar, but) Phidias, +or Polycletus, or Zeuxis directed the whole of their skill to cause more +pleasure. Shall, then, an artist propose to himself a higher aim, with +reference to the beauty of figures, than a virtuous citizen with reference +to the nobleness of action? But what other cause can there be for such a +blunder being so widely and extensively diffused, except that he who +determines that pleasure is the chief good, deliberates not with that part +of his mind in which reason and wisdom dwell, but with his desires, that +is to say, with the most trifling portion of his mind. For I put the +question to you yourself, if there are gods, as you think that there are, +how have they the power of being happy, when they are not able to feel any +pleasure in their bodies? or if they are happy, though destitute of that +kind of pleasure, why do you refuse to recognize the possibility of a +similar exertion of intellect on the part of a wise man? + +XXXV. Read, O Torquatus, the panegyrics, not of those men who have been +praised by Homer, not the encomiums passed on Cyrus, or Agesilaus, or +Aristides, or Themistocles, or Philip, or Alexander; but read the praises +of our own fellow-countrymen, of the heroes of your own family. You will +not find any one praised on the ground of having been a cunning contriver, +or procurer, of pleasure. The eulogies on their monuments signify no such +thing; like this one which is at one of our gates, "In whose favour many +nations unanimously agree that he was the noblest man of the nation." Do +we think that many nations judged of Calatinus, that he was the noblest +man of the nation, because he was the most skilful in the devising of +pleasures? Shall we, then, say that there is great hope and an excellent +disposition in those young men whom we think likely to consult their own +advantage, and to see what will be profitable to themselves? Do we not see +what a great confusion of everything would ensue? what great disorder? +Such a doctrine puts an end to all beneficence, to all gratitude, which +are the great bonds of agreement. For if you do good to any one for your +own sake, that is not to be considered a kindness, but only usury; nor +does any gratitude appear due to the man who has benefited another for his +own sake. + +But if pleasure is the dominant power, it is inevitable that all the +virtues must be trampled under foot. For there are many kinds of base +conduct, which, unless honourableness is naturally to have the most +influence, must, or at least it is not easy to explain why they should +not, overcome a wise man; and, not to go hunting for too many instances, +it is quite clear, that virtue deservedly praised, must cut off all the +approaches of pleasure. + +Do not, now, expect any more arguments from me. Look, Torquatus, yourself, +into your own mind; turn the question over in all your thoughts; examine +yourself, whether you would prefer to pass your life in the enjoyment of +perpetual pleasure, in that tranquillity which you have often felt, free +from all pain, with the addition also of that blessing which you often +speak of as an addition, but which is, in fact, an impossible one, the +absence of all fear; or, while deserving well of all nations, and bearing +assistance and safety to all who are in need of it, to encounter even the +distresses of Hercules. For so our ancestors, even in the case of a god, +called labours which were unavoidable by the most melancholy name, +distresses.(44) I would require you, and compel you to answer me, if I +were not afraid that you might say that Hercules himself performed those +exploits, which he performed with the greatest labour for the safety of +nations, for the sake of pleasure. + +And when I had said this,--I know, said Torquatus, who it is that I have to +thank for this; and although I might be able to do something myself, yet I +am still more glad to find my friends better prepared than I am. + +I suppose you mean Syro and Philodemus, excellent citizens and most +learned men. You are right, said he. Come, then, said I. But it would be +more fair for Triarius to give some opinion on this discussion of ours. +Indeed, said he smiling, it would be very unfair, at least on this +subject: for you manage the question more gently; but this man attacks us +after the fashion of the Stoics. Then Triarius said, Hereafter I will +speak more boldly still: for I shall have all these arguments which I have +just heard ready to my hand; and I will not begin before I see you +equipped by those philosophers whom you mention. + +And when this had been said, we made an end both of our walk and of our +discussion. + + + + +Third Book Of The Treatise On The Chief Good And Evil. + + +I. I think, Brutus, that Pleasure, if she were to speak for herself, and +had not such pertinacious advocates, would yield to Virtue, as having been +vanquished in the preceding book. In truth, she would be destitute of +shame if she were to resist Virtue any longer, or persist in preferring +what is pleasant to what is honourable, or were to contend that a tickling +pleasure, as it were, of the body, and the joy arising out of it, is of +more importance than dignity of mind and consistency. So that we may +dismiss Pleasure, and desire her to confine herself within her own +boundaries, so that the strictness of our discussions may not be hindered +by her allurements and blandishments. For we have now to inquire what that +chief good is which we are anxious to discover; since pleasure is quite +unconnected with it, and since nearly the same arguments can be urged +against those who have considered freedom from pain as the greatest of +goods. + +Nor, indeed, can anything be admitted to be the chief good which is +destitute of virtue, to which nothing can be superior. Therefore, although +in that discourse which was held with Torquatus we were not remiss, still +we have now a much sharper contest before us with the Stoics. For the +statements which are made about pleasure are not expressed with any great +acuteness or refinement. For they who defend it are not skilful in +arguing, nor have those who take the opposite side a very difficult cause +to oppose. Even Epicurus himself says, that one ought not even to argue +about pleasure, because the decision respecting it depends on the +sensations, so that it is sufficient for us to be warned respecting it, +and quite unnecessary for us to be instructed. And on this account, that +previous discussion of ours was a simple one on both sides; for there was +nothing involved or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own +language, as it seems to me, was very clear. But you are not ignorant what +a subtle, or I might rather say, thorny kind of arguing it is which is +employed by the Stoics. And if it is so among the Greeks, much more so is +it among us, who are forced even to invent words, and to give new names to +new things. And this is what no one who is even moderately learned will +wonder at, when he considers that in every art which is not in common and +ordinary use, there is a great variety of new names, as appellations are +forced to be given to everything about which each art is conversant. +Therefore, both dialecticians and natural philosophers use those words +which are not common in the ordinary conversation of the Greeks; and +geometricians, musicians, and grammarians, all speak after a peculiar +fashion of their own. And even the rhetoricians, whose art is a forensic +one, and wholly directed to the people, still in giving their lessons use +words which are, as it were, their peculiar private property. + +II. And, without dwelling on the case of these liberal and gentlemanly +professions, even artisans would not be capable of exercising their trades +properly if they did not use technical words, which are not understood by +us, though in common use among them. Agriculture, also, which is as +distant as can be from all polite refinement, still marks those matters +with which it is conversant by new names. And much more is this course +allowable in a philosopher; for philosophy is the art of life, and a man +who is discussing that cannot borrow his language from the forum,--although +there is no school of philosophers which has made so many innovations as +the Stoics. Zeno too, their chief, was not so much a discoverer of new +things as of new words. But if, even in that language which most people +consider richer than our own, Greece has permitted the most learned men to +use words not in ordinary use about subjects which are equally unusual, +how much more ought the same licence to be granted to us, who are now +venturing to be the very first of our countrymen to touch on such matters? +And though we have often said,--and that, too, in spite of some complaints +not only of the Greeks, but of those men also who would prefer being +accounted Greeks to being thought our own countrymen,--that we are so far +from being surpassed by the Greeks in the richness and copiousness of our +language, that we are even superior to them in that particular; we must +labour to establish this point, not only in our own national arts, but in +those too which we have derived from them. Although, since they have +become established by habit, we may fairly consider those words as our own +which, in accordance with ancient custom, we use as Latin words; such as +_philosophia_ itself, _rhetorica_, _dialectica_, _grammatica_, +_geometria_, _musica_,--although they could, no doubt, be translated into +more genuine Latin. + +Enough, however, of the names of things. But with respect to the things +themselves, I am often afraid, Brutus, that I may be blamed when I am +writing to you, who have made so much progress, not only in philosophy, +but in the most excellent kind of philosophy. And if I wrote as if I were +giving you any instruction, I should deserve to be blamed; but such +conceit is far from me. Nor do I send letters to you under the idea of +making you acquainted with what is thoroughly known to you before; but +because I am fond of supporting myself by your name, and because also I +consider you the most candid critic and judge of those studies which both +you and I apply ourselves to in common. I know, therefore, that you will +pay careful attention to what I write, as is your wont, and that you will +decide on the dispute which took place between your uncle--a most +heavenly-minded and admirable man--and myself. + +For when I was at my villa near Tusculum, and was desirous to make use of +some books in the library of the young Lucullus, I went one day to his +house, in order to take away (as I was in the habit of doing) the books +which I wanted. And when I had arrived there, I found Marcus Cato, whom I +did not know to be there, sitting in the library, surrounded by a number +of the books of the Stoics. For he had, as you know, a boundless desire +for reading, one which was quite insatiable,--so much so, indeed, that he +was not afraid of the causeless reproaches of the common people, but was +accustomed to continue reading even in the senate-house itself, while the +senate was assembling, without, however, at all relaxing in his attention +to the affairs of the republic. And now, being in the enjoyment of +complete leisure, and being surrounded by a great abundance of such +treasures, he appeared to be completely gorging himself with books, if I +may use such an expression about so respectable a subject. And as it so +happened that neither of us expected to see the other, he at once rose up +on my entrance; and, after the first salutations which are usual at such a +meeting, What object has brought you here? said he; for I presume you are +come from your own villa, and if I had known that you had been there, I +should have come myself to see you. I only, said I, left the city +yesterday after the commencement of the games, and got home in the +evening. But my object in coming here was to take some books away with me; +and it will be a pity, Cato, if our friend Lucullus does not some day or +other become acquainted with all these treasures; for I would rather have +him take delight in these books than in all the rest of the furniture of +the villa. For he is a youth I am very anxious about; although, indeed, it +is more peculiarly your business to take care that he shall be so educated +as to do credit to his father, and to our friend Caepio, and to you who are +such a near relation of his.(45) But I myself have some right to feel an +interest in him; for I am influenced by my recollection of his +grandfather,--and you well know what a regard I had for Caepio, who, in my +opinion, would now be one of the first men of the city if he were alive; +and I also have Lucullus himself always before my eyes,--a man not only +excelling in every virtue, but connected with me both by friendship and a +general resemblance of inclination and sentiment. You do well, said he, to +retain a recollection of those persons, both of whom recommended their +children to your care by their wills, and you are right too to be attached +to this youth. And as for your calling it my peculiar business, I will not +decline the office, but I claim you for my partner in the duty. I will say +this also, that the boy has already shown me many indications both of +modesty and of ability; but you see how young he is as yet. To be sure I +do, said I; but even now he ought to receive a tincture of those +accomplishments which, if he drinks of them now while he is young, will +hereafter make him more ready for more important business. And so we will +often talk over this matter anxiously together, and we will act in +concert. However, let us sit down, says he, if you please. So we sat down. + +III. Then Cato said: But now, what books in the world are they that you +are looking for here, when you have such a library at home? I want, said +I, some of the Aristotelian Commentaries, which I know are here; and I +came to carry them off, to read when I have leisure, which is not, as you +know, very often the case with me. How I wish, said he, that you had an +inclination towards our Stoic sect; for certainly it is natural for you, +if it ever was so for any one, to think nothing a good except virtue. May +I not, I replied, rejoin that it would be natural for you, as your opinion +in reality is the same as mine, to forbear giving new names to things? for +our principles are the same,--it is only our language that is at variance. +Indeed, said he, our principles are not the same at all; for I can never +agree to your calling anything desirable except what is honourable, and to +your reckoning such things among the goods,--and, by so doing, +extinguishing honourableness, which is, as it were, the light of virtue, +and utterly upsetting virtue herself. Those are all very fine words, said +I, O Cato; but do you not see that all those pompous expressions are +shared by you in common with Pyrrho and Aristo, who think all things +equal? And I should like to know what your opinion of them is. Mine? said +he; do you want to know what I think of them? I think that those men whom +we have either heard of from our ancestors, or seen ourselves, to be good, +brave, just, and moderate in the republic,--those who, following nature +herself, without any particular learning or system, have done many +praiseworthy actions, have been educated by nature herself better than +they could have been educated by philosophy, if they had adopted any other +philosophy except that which ranks nothing whatever among the goods except +what is honourable, and nothing among the evils except what is +disgraceful. As for all other systems of philosophy, they differ entirely +in their estimate of good and evil; but still I consider no one of them +which classes anything destitute of virtue among either the goods or the +evils, as being of any use to men, or as uttering any sentiment by which +we may become better; but I think that they all tend rather to deprave +nature herself. For if this point be not conceded, that that alone is good +which is honourable, it follows that it must be impossible to prove that +life is made happy by virtue. And if that be the case, then I do not see +why any attention should be bestowed on philosophy; for if a wise man can +be miserable, then of a truth I do not consider that virtue, which is +accounted so glorious and memorable a thing, of any great value. + +IV. All that you have been saying, Cato, I replied, you might say if you +agreed with Pyrrho or Aristo; for you are not ignorant that they consider +that honourableness not only the chief good, but also (as you yourself +maintain) the only good. And if this is the case, the consequence which I +see you aim at follows necessarily, that all wise men are always happy. Do +you then praise these men, and do you think that we ought to follow their +opinion? By no means, said he; for as this is a peculiar attribute of +virtue to make its selection of those things which are in accordance with +nature, those who have made all things equal in such a manner as to +consider all things on either side perfectly indifferent, so as to leave +no room for any selection, have utterly put an end to virtue. You say +right, said I; but I ask you whether you, too, must not do the same thing, +when you say that there is nothing good which is not right and honourable, +and so put an end to all the difference between other things? That would +be the case, said he, if I did put an end to it; but I deny the fact--I +leave it. How so, said I? If virtue alone,--if that thing alone which you +call honourable, right, praiseworthy, and creditable, (for it will be more +easily seen what is the character that you ascribe to it, if it be pointed +out by many words tending to the same point,)--if, I say, that is the sole +good, what else will there be for you to follow? And, on the other hand, +if nothing is evil except what is disgraceful, dishonourable, unbecoming, +wrong, flagitious, and base, (to make this also manifest by giving it many +names,) what else will there be which you can say ought to be avoided? + +I will not, said he, reply to each point of your question, as you are not, +as I suspect, ignorant of what I am going to say, but seeking rather to +find something to carp at in my brief answer: I will rather, since we have +plenty of time, explain to you, unless you think it foreign to the +subject, the whole opinion of Zeno and the Stoics on the matter. Very far +from foreign to the subject, said I; indeed, your explanations will be of +great service in elucidating to me the points about which I am inquiring. +Let us try, then, said he, although this system of the Stoics has in it +something rather difficult and obscure; for, as formerly, when these +matters were discussed in the Greek language, the very names of things +appeared strange which have now become sanctioned by daily use, what do +you think will be the case when we are discussing them in Latin? Still, +said I, we must do so; for if Zeno might take the liberty when he had +discovered anything not previously common, to fix on it a name that was +likewise unprecedented, why may not Cato take the same? Nor will it be +necessary for you to render what he has said word for word, as translators +are in the habit of doing who have no command of language of their own, +whenever there is a word in more ordinary use which has the same meaning. +I indeed myself am in the habit, if I cannot manage it any other way, of +using many words to express what the Greeks have expressed in one; and yet +I think that we ought to be allowed to use a Greek word on occasions when +we cannot find a Latin one, and to employ such terms as _proegmena_ and +_apoproegmena_, just as freely as we say _ephippia_ and _acratophori_, +though it may be sufficient to translate these two particular words by +_preferred_ and _rejected_. I am much obliged to you, said he, for your +hint; and I will in preference use those Latin terms which you have just +mentioned; and in other cases, too, you shall come to my assistance if you +see me in difficulties. I will do so, said I, with great goodwill; but +fortune favours the bold. So make the attempt, I beg of you; for what more +divine occupation can we have? + +V. Those philosophers, said he, whose system I approve of, consider that +as soon as an animal is born, (for this is where we must begin,) he is +instinctively induced and excited to preserve himself and his existing +condition, and to feel attachment to those things which have a tendency to +preserve that condition; and to feel an abhorrence of dissolution, and of +those circumstances which appear to be pregnant with dissolution. And they +prove that this is the case, because, before either pleasure or pain has +affected it, even while it is very little, it seeks what is salutary, and +shuns the contrary: and this would not be the case if they were not fond +of their condition, and afraid of dissolution; and it would not be +possible for them to seek any particular thing if they had not some sense +of themselves, and if that did not influence them to love themselves and +what belongs to them. From which it ought to be understood that it is from +the animal itself that the principle of self-love in it is derived. But +among these natural principles of self-love most of the Stoics do not +admit that pleasure ought to be classed; and I entirely agree with them, +to avoid the many discreditable things which must ensue if nature should +appear to have placed pleasure among those things which are the first +objects of desire. But it appears to be proof enough why we naturally love +those things which are by nature placed in the first rank, that there is +no one, who, when either alternative is equally in his power, would not +prefer to have all the parts of his body in a suitable and entire +condition, rather than impaired by use, or in any particular distorted or +depraved. + +But as for the knowledge of things--or if you do not so much approve of +this word _cognitio_, or find it less intelligible, we will call it +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}--that we think is naturally to be acquired for its own sake, +because it contains something which has, as it were, embraced and seized +upon truth. And this is perceptible even in infants; whom we see amused if +they have succeeded in finding out anything themselves by reason, even +though it may be of no service whatever to them. And moreover, we consider +arts worth attending to on their own account, both because there is in +them something worth acceptance, and also because they depend upon +knowledge, and contain in themselves something which proceeds on system +and method. But I think that we are more averse to assent on false grounds +than to anything else which is contrary to nature. Now of the limbs, that +is to say, of the parts of the body, some appear to have been given to us +by nature because of the use which, they are of to us, as, for instance, +the hands, legs, and feet, and also those internal organs of the body, of +which I may leave it to the physicians to explain the exceeding +usefulness; but others with no view to utility, but for ornament as it +were, as the tail is given to the peacock, plumage of many colours to the +dove, breasts and a beard to man. Perhaps you will say this is but a dry +enumeration; for these things are, as it were, the first elements of +nature, which cannot well have any richness of language employed upon +them; nor indeed am I thinking of displaying any; but when one is speaking +of more important matters, then the subject itself hurries on the +language: and then one's discourse is at the same time more impressive and +more ornate. It is as you say, said I; but still everything which is said +in a lucid manner about a good subject appears to me to be said well. And +to wish to speak of subjects of that kind in a florid style is childish; +but to be able to explain them with clearness and perspicuity, is a token +of a learned and intelligent man. + +VI. Let us then proceed, said he, since we have digressed from these first +principles of nature, which everything which follows ought to be in +harmony with. But this is the first division of the subject. A thing is +said to be estimable: for so we may, I think, call that which is either +itself in accordance with nature, or else which is the efficient cause of +something of such a character that it is worthy of being selected because +it has in it some weight worth appreciating, which he calls {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}; and, on +the other hand, something not estimable, which is the contrary of the +preceding. The first principles, therefore, being laid down, that those +things which are according to nature are to be chosen for their own sakes, +and those which are contrary to it are in like manner to be rejected; the +first duty (for that is how I translate the word {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}) is, for a man to +preserve himself in his natural condition; next to that, to maintain those +things which are in accordance with nature, and reject what is opposite to +it; and when this principle of selection and rejection has been +discovered, then follows selection in accordance with duty; and then that +third kind, which is perpetual, and consistent to the end, and +corresponding to nature, in which there first begins to be a proper +understanding of what there is which can be truly called good. For the +first attraction of man is to those things which are according to nature. +But as soon as he has received that intelligence, or perhaps I should say, +notion, which they call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, and has seen the order and, if I may so +say, the harmony in which things are to be done, he then estimates it at a +higher value than all the things which he loved at first; and by this +knowledge, and by reasoning, he comes to such a conclusion that he decides +that the chief good of man, which deserves to be praised and desired for +its own sake, is placed in what the Stoics call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, and we +agreement, if you approve of this translation of the term; as therefore it +is in this that that good is placed to which all things [which are done +honourably] are to be referred, and honour itself, which is reckoned among +the goods, although it is only produced subsequently, still this alone +deserves to be sought for on account of its intrinsic power and worth; but +of those things which are the principal natural goods there is not one +which is to be sought for its own sake. + +But as those things which I have called duties proceed from the first +principles of nature, they must necessarily be referred to them; so that +it may be fairly said that all duties are referred to this end, of +arriving at the principles of nature; not, however, that this is the +highest of all goods, because there is no such thing as honourable action +in the first attractions of nature; for that is what follows, and arises +subsequently, as I have said before. But still it is according to nature, +and encourages us to desire itself much more than all those things which +have been previously mentioned. But, first of all, we must remove a +mistake, that no one may think that it follows that there are two supreme +goods. For as, if it were the purpose of any one to direct an arrow or a +spear straight at any object, just as we have said that there is an +especial point to be aimed at in goods,--the archer ought to do all in his +power to aim straight at the target, and the other man ought also to do +his endeavour to hit the mark, and gain the end which he has proposed to +himself: let this then which we call the chief good in life be, as it +were, his mark; and his endeavour to hit it must be furthered by careful +selection, not by mere desire. + +VII. But as all duties proceed from the first principles of nature, it +follows inevitably that wisdom itself must proceed from the same source. +But as it often happens, that he who has been recommended to any one +considers him to whom he has been recommended of more importance than him +who recommended him; so it is not at all strange that in the first +instance we are recommended to wisdom by the principles of nature, but +that subsequently wisdom herself becomes dearer to us than the starting +place from which we arrive at it. And as limbs have been given to us in +such a way that it is plain they have been given for some purpose of life; +so that appetite of the mind which in Greek is called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}, appears to +have been given to us, not for any particular kind of life, but rather for +some especial manner of living: and so too is system and perfect method. +For as an actor employs gestures, and a dancer motions, not practising any +random movement, but a regular systematic action; so life must be passed +according to a certain fixed kind, and not any promiscuous way, and that +certain kind we call a suitable and harmonious one. Nor do we think wisdom +similar to the art of navigation or medicine, but rather to that kind of +action which I have spoken of, and to dancing; I mean, inasmuch as the +ultimate point, that is to say, the production of the art, lies in the art +itself, and is not sought for from foreign sources. And yet there are +other points in which there is a difference between wisdom and those arts; +because in those arts those things which are done properly do nevertheless +not comprise all the parts of the arts of which they consist. But the +things which we call right, or rightly done, if you will allow the +expression, and which they call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, contain in them the whole +completeness of virtue. For wisdom is the only thing which is contained +wholly in itself; and this is not the case with the other arts. + +And it is only out of ignorance that the object of the art of medicine or +navigation is compared with the object of wisdom; for wisdom embraces +greatness of mind and justice, and judges all the accidents which befal +mankind beneath itself: and this too is not the case in the other arts. +But no one will be able to maintain those very virtues of which I have +just made mention, unless he lays down a rule that there is nothing which +is of any importance, nothing which differs from anything else, except +what is honourable or disgraceful. + +VIII. Let us see now how admirably these rules follow from those +principles which I have already laid down. For as this is the ultimate +(_extremum_) point, (for you have noticed, I dare say, that I translate +what the Greek philosopher calls {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, sometimes by the word _extremum_, +sometimes by _ultimum_, and sometimes by _summum_, and instead of +_extremum_ or _ultimum_, I may also use the word _finis_,)--as, then, this +is the ultimate point, to live in a manner suitable to and harmonising +with nature; it follows of necessity that all wise men do always live +happily, perfectly, and fortunately; that they are hindered by nothing, +embarrassed by nothing; that they are in want of nothing. And that which +holds together not more that school of which I am speaking than our lives +and fortunes, that is to say, the principle of accounting what is +honourable to be the sole good, may indeed easily be embellished and +enlarged upon at great length, with great richness of illustration, with +great variety of carefully chosen expressions, and with the most pompous +sentiments in a rhetorical manner; but I prefer the brief, acute, +conclusive arguments of the Stoics. Now their conclusions are arrived at +in this manner: "Everything which is good is praiseworthy; but everything +which is praiseworthy is honourable;--therefore, everything which is good +is honourable." Does not this appear properly deduced? Undoubtedly;--for +the result which was obtained from the two premises which were assumed, +you see was contained in them. But of the two premises from which the +conclusion was inferred it is only the major one which can be +contradicted--if you say that it is not the case, that everything which is +good is praiseworthy: for it is granted that whatever is praiseworthy is +honourable. But it is utterly absurd to say, that there is anything good +which is not to be sought for; or, that there is anything which ought to +be sought for which is not pleasing; or, that if it is pleasing it ought +not likewise to be loved. Then it ought also to be approved of. Then it is +praiseworthy. But what is praiseworthy is honourable. And so the result +is, that whatever is good is also honourable. In the next place, I ask, +who can boast of a life which is miserable; or avoid boasting of one which +is happy?--therefore men boast only of a life which is happy. From which +the consequence follows, that a happy life deserves to be boasted of; but +this cannot properly be predicated of any life which is not an honourable +one. From this it follows, that a happy life must be an honourable one. +And since the man to whom it happens to be deservedly praised has some +eminent qualities tending to credit and glory, so that he may rightly be +called happy on account of such important qualities; the same thing is +properly predicated of the life of such a man. And so, if a happy life is +discerned by its honourableness, then what is honourable ought to be +considered the sole good. And, as this cannot possibly be denied, what man +do we say can ever exist of a stable and firm and great mind,--whom, in +fact, can we ever call brave,--unless the point is established, that pain +is not an evil? For as it is impossible that the man who ranks death among +evils should not fear it, so in every case it is impossible for a man to +disregard what he judges to be an evil, and to despise it. And when this +point has been laid down, and ratified by universal assent, this is +assumed next, that the man who is of a brave and magnanimous spirit +despises and utterly disregards every accident which can befal a man. And +as this is the case, the consequence is, that there is nothing evil which +is not disgraceful. And that man of lofty and excellent spirit,--that +magnanimous and truly brave man, who considers all human accidents beneath +his notice,--the man I mean whom we wish to make so, whom at all events we +are looking for,--ought to confide in himself, and in his own life both +past and to come, and to form a favourable judgment of himself, laying +down as a principle, that no evil can happen to a wise man. From which +again the same result follows, that the sole good is that which is +honourable; and that to live happily is to live honourably, that is, +virtuously. + +IX. Not that I am ignorant that the opinions of philosophers have been +various, of those I mean who have placed the chief good, that which I call +the end, in the mind. And although some people have followed them very +incorrectly, still I prefer their theory, not only to that of the three +sects who have separated virtue from the chief good, while ranking either +pleasure, or freedom from pain, or the original gifts of nature among +goods, but also to the other three who have thought that virtue would be +crippled without some reinforcement, and on that account have each added +to it one of those other particulars which I have just enumerated. I, +however, as I said, prefer to all these the men, whoever they may be, who +have described the chief good as consisting in the mind and in virtue. But +nevertheless, those also are extremely absurd who have said that to live +with knowledge is the highest good, and who have asserted that there is no +difference between things, and so, that a wise man will surely be a happy +one, never at any moment of his life preferring one thing to another: as +some of the Academics are said to have laid it down, that the highest good +and the chief duty of a wise man is to resist appearances, and firmly to +withhold his assent from them. + +Now people often make very lengthy replies to each of these assertions; +yet what is very clear ought not to be long. But what is more evident +than, if there be no selection made, discarding those things which are +contrary to nature, and selecting those which are according to nature, all +that prudence which is so much sought after and extolled would be done +away with? If, then, we discard those sentiments which I have mentioned, +and all others which resemble them, it remains that the chief good must be +to live, exercising a knowledge of those things which happen by nature, +selecting what is according to nature, and rejecting any which are +contrary to nature; that is to say, to live in a manner suitable and +corresponding to nature. + +But in other arts, when anything is said to have been done according to +the rules of art, there is something to be considered which is subsequent +and follows upon such compliance; which they call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. But +when we say in any matter that a thing has been done wisely, that same +thing is from the first said also to have been done most properly; for +whatever proceeds from a wise man must at once be perfect in all its +parts: for in him is placed that quality which we say is to be desired. +For as it is a sin to betray one's country, to injure one's parents, to +plunder temples, which are all sins of commission; so it is likewise a sin +to be afraid, to grieve, to be under the dominion of lust, even if no +overt act follows these feelings. But, as these are sins, not in their +later periods and consequences, but at once from the first moment; so +those actions which proceed from virtue are to be considered right at the +first moment that they are undertaken, and not only when they are +accomplished. + +X. But it may be as well to give an explanation and definition of the word +good, which, has been so often employed in this discourse. But the +definitions of those philosophers differ a good deal from one another, and +yet have all reference to the same facts. I myself agree with Diogenes, +who has defined good to be that which in its nature is perfect. But that +which follows, that which is profitable (for so we may translate his +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}), he considered to be a motion, or a state, arising out of the +nature of the perfect. And as the notions of things arise in the mind, if +anything has become known either by practice, or by combination, or by +similitude, or by the comparison of reason; then by this fourth means, +which I have placed last, the knowledge of good is arrived at. For when, +by a comparison of the reason, the mind ascends from those things which +are according to reason, then it arrives at a notion of good. And this +good we are speaking of, we both feel to be and call good, not because of +any addition made to it, nor from its growth, nor from comparing it with +other things, but because of its own proper power. For as honey, although +it is very sweet, is still perceived to be sweet by its own peculiar kind +of taste, and not by comparison with other things; so this good, which we +are now treating of, is indeed to be esteemed of great value; but that +valuation depends on kind and not on magnitude. For as estimation, which +is called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}, is not reckoned among goods, nor, on the other hand, among +evils, whatever you add to it will remain in its kind. There is, +therefore, another kind of estimation proper to virtue, which is of weight +from its character, and not because of its increasing. Nor, indeed, are +the perturbations of the mind, which make the lives of the unwise bitter +and miserable, and which the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}, (I might translate the word +itself by the Latin _morbi_, but it would not suit all the meanings of the +Greek word; for who ever calls pity, or even anger, a disease--_morbus_)? +but the Greeks do call such a feeling {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. Let us then translate it +perturbation, which is by its very name pointed out to be something +vicious. Nor are these perturbations, I say, excited by any natural force; +and they are altogether in kind four, but as to their divisions they are +more numerous. There is melancholy, fear, lust, and that feeling which the +Stoics call by the common name which they apply to both mind and body, +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}, and which I prefer translating joy (_laetitia_), rather than a +pleasurable elation of an exulting mind. But perturbations are not excited +by any force of nature; and all those feelings are judgments and opinions +proceeding from light-mindedness; and, therefore, the wise man will always +be free from them. + +XI. But that everything which is honourable is to be sought for its own +sake, is an opinion common to us with many other schools of philosophers. +For, except the three sects which exclude virtue from the chief good, this +opinion must be maintained by all philosophers, and above all by us, who +do not rank anything whatever among goods except what is honourable. But +the defence of this opinion is very easy and simple indeed; for who is +there, or who ever was there, of such violent avarice, or of such +unbridled desires as not infinitely to prefer that anything which he +wishes to acquire, even at the expense of any conceivable wickedness, +should come into his power without crime, (even though he had a prospect +of perfect impunity,) than through crime? and what utility, or what +personal advantage do we hope for, when we are anxious to know whether +those bodies are moving whose movements are concealed from us, and owing +to what causes they revolve through the heavens? And who is there that +lives according to such clownish maxims, or who has so rigorously hardened +himself against the study of nature, as to be averse to things worthy of +being understood, and to be indifferent to and disregard such knowledge, +merely because there is no exact usefulness or pleasure likely to result +from it? or, who is there who--when he comes to know the exploits, and +sayings, and wise counsels of our forefathers, of the Africani, or of that +ancestor of mine whom you are always talking of, and of other brave men, +and citizens of pre-eminent virtue--does not feel his mind affected with +pleasure? and who that has been brought up in a respectable family, and +educated as becomes a freeman, is not offended with baseness as such, +though it may not be likely to injure him personally? Who can keep his +equanimity while looking on a man who, he thinks, lives in an impure and +wicked manner? Who does not hate sordid, fickle, unstable, worthless men? +But what shall we be able to say, (if we do not lay it down that baseness +is to be avoided for its own sake), is the reason why men do not seek +darkness and solitude, and then give the rein to every possible infamy, +except that baseness of itself detects them by reason of its own intrinsic +foulness? Innumerable arguments may be brought forward to support this +opinion; but it is needless, for there is nothing which can be less a +matter of doubt than that what is honourable ought to be sought for its +own sake; and, in the same manner, what is disgraceful ought to be +avoided. + +But after that point is established, which we have previously mentioned, +that what is honourable is the sole good; it must unavoidably be +understood that that which is honourable, is to be valued more highly than +those intermediate goods which we derive from it. But when we say that +folly, and rashness, and injustice, and intemperance are to be avoided on +account of those things which result from them, we do not speak in such a +manner that our language is at all inconsistent with the position which +has been laid down, that that alone is evil which is dishonourable. +Because those things are not referred to any inconvenience of the body, +but to dishonourable actions, which arise out of vicious propensities +(_vitia_). For what the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} I prefer translating by _vitium_ +rather than by _malitia_. + +XII. Certainly; Cato, said I, you are employing very admirable language, +and such as expresses clearly what you mean; and, therefore, you seem to +me to be teaching philosophy in Latin, and, as it were, to be presenting +it with the freedom of the city. For up to this time she has seemed like a +stranger at Rome, and has not put herself in the way of our conversation; +and that, too, chiefly because of a certain highly polished thinness of +things and words. For I am aware that there are some men who are able to +philosophise in any language, but who still employ no divisions and no +definitions; and who say themselves that they approve of those things +alone to which nature silently assents. Therefore, they discuss, without +any great degree of labour, matters which are not very obscure. And, on +this account, I am now prepared to listen eagerly to you, and to commit to +memory all the names which you give to those matters to which this +discussion refers. For, perhaps, I myself may some day have reason to +employ them too. + +You, then, appear to me to be perfectly right, and to be acting in strict +accordance with our usual way of speaking, when you lay it down that there +are vices the exact opposites of virtues; for that which is blameable +(_vituperabile_) for its own sake, I think ought, from that very fact, to +be called a vice; and perhaps this verb, _vitupero_, is derived from +_vitium_. But if you had translated {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} by _malitia_,(46) then the usage +of the Latin language would have limited us to one particular vice; but, +as it is, all vice is opposed to all virtue by one generic opposite name. + +XIII. Then he proceeded:--After these things, therefore, are thus laid +down, there follows a great contest, which has been handled by the +Peripatetics somewhat too gently, (for their method of arguing is not +sufficiently acute, owing to their ignorance of dialectics;) but your +Carneades has pressed the matter with great vigour and effect, displaying +in reference to it a most admirable skill in dialectics, and the most +consummate eloquence; because he has never ceased to contend throughout +the whole of this discussion, which turns upon what is good and what is +bad, that the controversy between the Stoics and Peripatetics is not one +of things, but only of names. But, to me, nothing appears so evident as +that the opinions of these two schools differ from one another far more as +to facts than to names; I mean to say, that there is much greater +difference between the Stoics and Peripatetics in principle than in +language. Forasmuch as the Peripatetics assert that everything which they +themselves call good, has a reference to living happily; but our school +does not think that a happy life necessarily embraces everything which is +worthy of any esteem. + +But can anything be more certain than that, according to the principles of +those men who rank pain among the evils, a wise man cannot be happy when +he is tormented on the rack? While the principles of those who do not +consider pain among the evils, certainly compels us to allow that a happy +life is preserved to a wise man among all torments. In truth, if those men +endure pain with greater fortitude who suffer it in the cause of their +country, than those who do so for any slighter object; then it is plain +that it is opinion, and not nature, which makes the force of pain greater +or less. Even that opinion of the Peripatetics is more than I can agree +to, that, as there are three kinds of goods, as they say, each individual +is the happier in proportion as he is richer in the goods of the body or +external goods, so that we must be forced also to approve of this +doctrine, that that man is happier who has a greater quantity of those +things which are accounted of great value as affecting the body. For they +think that a happy life is made complete by bodily advantages; but there +is nothing which our philosophers can so little agree to. For, as our +opinion is that life is not even made in the least more happy by an +abundance of those goods which we call goods of nature, nor more +desirable, nor deserving of being more highly valued, then certainly a +multitude of bodily advantages can have still less effect on making life +happy. In truth, if to be wise be a desirable thing, and to be well be so +too, then both together must be more desirable than wisdom by itself; but +it does not follow, if each quality deserves to be esteemed, that +therefore, the two taken together deserve to be esteemed more highly than +wisdom does by itself. For we who consider good health worthy of any +esteem, and yet do not rank it among the goods, think, at the same time, +that the esteem to which it is entitled is by no means such as that it +ought to be preferred to virtue. But this is not the doctrine of the +Peripatetics; and they ought to tell us, that that which is an honourable +action and unaccompanied by pain, is more to be desired than the same +action would be if it were attended with pain. We think not: whether we +are right or wrong may be discussed hereafter; but can there possibly be a +greater disagreement respecting facts and principles? + +XIV. For as the light of a candle is obscured and put out by the light of +the sun; and as a drop of brine is lost in the magnitude of the AEgaean sea; +or an addition of a penny amid the riches of Croesus; or as one step is of +no account in a march from here to India; so, if that is the chief good +which the Stoics affirm is so, then, all the goods which depend on the +body must inevitably be obscured and overwhelmed by, and come to nothing +when placed by the side of the splendour and importance of virtue. And +since opportunity, (for that is how we may translate {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~},) is not +made greater by extending the time, (for whatever is said to be opportune +has its own peculiar limit;) so a right action, (for that is how I +translate {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, and a right deed I call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~},)--a right action, +I say, and suitableness, and, in short, the good itself, which depends on +the fact of its being in accordance with nature, has no possibility of +receiving any addition or growth. For as that opportunity is not made +greater by the extension of time, so neither are these things which I have +mentioned. And, on that account, a happy life does not seem to the Stoics +more desirable or more deserving of being sought after, if it is long than +if it is short; and they prove this by a simile:--As the praise of a buskin +is to fit the foot exactly, and as many buskins are not considered to fit +better than few, and large ones are not thought better than small ones; +so, in the case of those the whole good of which depends upon its +suitableness and fitness; many are not preferred to few, nor what is +durable to what is short-lived. Nor do they exhibit sufficient acuteness +when they say, if good health is more to be esteemed when it lasts long +than when it lasts only a short time, then the longest possible enjoyment +of wisdom must clearly be of the greatest value. They do not understand +that the estimate of good health is formed expressly with reference to its +duration; of virtue with reference to its fitness of time; so that men who +argue in this manner, seem as if they would speak of a good death, or a +good labour, and call one which lasted long, better than a short one. They +do not perceive that some things are reckoned of more value in proportion +to their brevity; and some in proportion to their length. Therefore, it is +quite consistent with what has been said, that according to the principles +of those who think that that end of goods which we call the extreme or +chief good, is susceptible of growth, they may also think that one man can +be wiser than another; and, in like manner then, one man may sin more, or +act more rightly than another. But such an assertion is not allowable to +us, who do not think the end of goods susceptible of growth. For as men +who have been submerged under the water, cannot breathe any more because +they are at no great depth below the surface, (though they may on this +account be able at times to emerge,) than if they were at the bottom, nor +can the puppy who is nearly old enough to see, as yet see any more than +one who is but this moment born; so the man who has made some progress +towards the approach to virtue, is no less in a state of misery than he +who has made no such advance at all. + +XV. I am aware that all this seems very strange. But as unquestionably the +previous propositions are true and uncontrovertible, and as these others +are in harmony with, and are the direct consequences of them; we cannot +question their truth also. But although some people deny that either +virtues or vices are susceptible of growth, still they believe that each +of them is in some degree diffused, and as it were extended. But Diogenes +thinks that riches have not only such power, that they are, as it were, +guides to pleasure and to good health, but that they even contain them: +but that they have not the same power with regard to virtue, or to the +other arts to which money may indeed be a guide, but which it cannot +contain. Therefore, if pleasure or if good health be among the goods, +riches also must be classed among the goods; but if wisdom be a good, it +does not follow that we are also to call riches a good; nor can that which +is classed among the goods be contained by anything which is not placed in +the same classification. And on that account, because the knowledge and +comprehension of those things by which arts are produced, excite a desire +for them, as riches are not among the goods, therefore no art can be +contained in riches. + +But if we grant this to be true with respect to arts, still it is not to +follow that the same rule holds good with respect to virtue; because +virtue requires a great deal of meditation and practice, and this is not +always the case with arts; and also because virtue embraces the stability, +firmness, and consistency of the entire life; and we do not see that the +same is the case with arts. + +After this, we come to explain the differences between things. And if we +were to say that there is none, then all life would be thrown into +confusion, as it is by Aristo. Nor could any office or work be found for +wisdom, if there were actually no difference between one thing and +another, and if there were no power of selection at all requisite to be +exerted. Therefore, after it had been sufficiently established that that +alone was good which was honourable, and that alone evil which was +disgraceful, they asserted that there were some particulars in which those +things which had no influence on the misery or happiness of life, differed +from one another, so that some of them deserved to be esteemed, some to be +despised, and others were indifferent. But as to those things which +deserved to be esteemed, some of them had in themselves sufficient reason +for being preferred to others, as good health, soundness of the senses, +freedom from pain, glory, riches, and similar things. But others were not +of this kind. And in like manner, as to those things which were worthy of +no esteem at all, some had cause enough in themselves why they should be +rejected, such as pain, disease, loss of senses, poverty, ignominy, and +things like them, and some had not. And thus, from this distinction, came +what Zeno called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, and on the other hand what he called +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, as though writing in so copious a language, he chose to +employ new terms of his own invention; a license which is not allowed to +us in this barren language of ours; although you often insist that it is +richer than the Greek. But it is not foreign to our present subject, in +order that the meaning of the word may be more easily understood, to +explain the principle on which Zeno invented these terms. + +XVI. For as, says he, no one in a king's palace says that the king is, as +it were, led forward towards his dignity (for that is the real meaning of +the word {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, but the term is applied to those who are of some rank +whose order comes next to his, so as to be second to the kingly dignity); +so in life too, it is not those things which are in the first rank, but +those which are in the second which are called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, or led forward. +And we may translate the Greek by _productum_ (this will be a strictly +literal translation), or we may call it and its opposite _promotum_ and +_remotum_, or as we have said before, we may call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, _praepositum_ +or _praecipuum_, and its opposite _rejectum_. For when the thing is +understood, we ought to be very ductile as to the words which we employ. + +But since we say that everything which is good holds the first rank, it +follows inevitably that this which we call _praecipuum_ or _praepositum_, +must be neither good nor bad. And therefore we define it as something +indifferent, attended with a moderate esteem. For that which they call +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, it occurs to me to translate _indifferens_. Nor, indeed, was it +at all possible that there should be nothing left intermediate, which was +either according to nature or contrary to it; nor, when that was left, +that there should be nothing ranked in this class which was tolerably +estimable; nor, if this position were once established, that there should +not be some things which are preferred. This distinction, then, has been +made with perfect propriety, and this simile is employed by them to make +the truth more easily seen. For as, say they, if we were to suppose this +to be, as it were, the end and greatest of goods, to throw a die in such a +manner that it should stand upright, then the die which is thrown in such +a manner as to fall upright, will have some particular thing preferred as +its end, and _vice versa_. And yet that preference of the die will have no +reference to the end of which I have been speaking. So those things which +have been preferred are referred indeed to the end, but have no reference +at all to its force or nature. + +Next comes that division, that of goods some have reference to that end +(for so I express those which they call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}, for we must here, as we +have said before, endure to express in many words, what we cannot express +by one so as to be thoroughly intelligible,) some are efficient causes, +and some are both together. But of those which have reference to that end, +nothing is good except honourable actions; of those which are efficient +causes, nothing is good except a friend. But they assert that wisdom is +both a referential and an efficient good. For, because wisdom is suitable +action, it is of that referential character which I have mentioned; but +inasmuch as it brings and causes honourable actions, it may be so far +called efficient. + +XVII. Now these things which we have spoken of as preferred, are preferred +some for their own sake, some because they effect something else, and some +for both reasons. Some are preferred for their own sake, such as some +particular appearance or expression of countenance, some particular kind +of gait, or motion, in which there are some things which may well be +preferred, and some which may be rejected. Others are said to be preferred +because they produce something, as money; and others for a combination of +both reasons, as soundness of the senses, or good health. But respecting +good reputation, (for what they call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} is more properly called, in +this place, good reputation than glory,) Chrysippus and Diogenes denied +its whole utility, and used to say that one ought not even to put forth a +finger for the sake of it, with whom I entirely and heartily agree. But +those who came after them, being unable to withstand the arguments of +Carneades, said that this good reputation, as I call it, was preferred for +its own sake, and ought to be chosen for its own sake, and that it was +natural for a man of good family, who had been properly brought up, to +wish to be praised by his parents, his relations, and by good men in +general, and that too for the sake of the praise itself, and not of any +advantage which might ensue from it. And they say, too, that as we wish to +provide for our children, even for such as may be posthumous children, for +their own sake, so we ought also to show a regard for posthumous fame +after our death, for its own sake, without any thought of gain or +advantage. + +But as we assert that what is honourable is the only good, still it is +consistent with this assertion to discharge one's duty, though we do not +class duty among either the goods or the evils. For there is in these +things some likelihood, and that of such a nature that reasons can be +alleged for there being such; and therefore of such a nature, that +probable reasons may be adduced for adopting such a line of conduct. From +which it follows that duty is a sort of neutral thing, which is not to be +classed either among the goods or among the opposites of goods. And since, +in those things which are neither ranked among the virtues nor among the +vices, there is still something which may be of use; that is not to be +destroyed. For there is a certain action of that sort, and that too of +such a character that reason requires one to do and perform it. But that +which is done in obedience to reason we call duty; duty, then, is a thing +of that sort, that it must not be ranked either among the goods or among +the opposites of goods. + +XVIII. And this also is evident, that in these natural things the wise man +is not altogether inactive. He therefore, when he acts, judges that that +is his duty; and because he is never deceived in forming his judgment, +duty must be classed among neutral things; and this is proved also by this +conclusion of reason. For since we see that there is something which we +pronounce to have been rightly done (for that is duty when accomplished), +there must also be something which is rightly begun: as, if to restore +what has been justly deposited belongs to the class of right actions, then +it must be classed among the duties to restore a deposit; and the addition +of the word "justly" makes the duty to be rightly performed: but the mere +fact of restoring is classed as a duty. And since it is not doubtful, that +in those things which we call intermediate or neutral, some ought to be +chosen and others rejected, whatever is done or said in this manner comes +under the head of ordinary duty. And from this it is understood, since all +men naturally love themselves, that a fool is as sure as a wise man to +choose what is in accordance with nature, and to reject what is contrary +to it; and so there is one duty in common both to wise men and to fools; +from which it follows that duty is conversant about those things which we +call neutral. But since all duties proceed from these things, it is not +without reason that it is said that all our thoughts are referred to these +things, and among them our departure from life, and our remaining in life. + +For he in whom there are many things which are in accordance with nature, +his duty it is to remain in life; but as to the man in whom there either +is or appears likely to be a preponderance of things contrary to nature, +that man's duty is to depart from life. From which consideration it is +evident, that it is sometimes the duty of a wise man to depart from life +when he is happy, and sometimes the duty of a fool to remain in life +though he is miserable. For that good and that evil, as has been often +said, comes afterwards. But those principal natural goods, and those which +hold the second rank, and those things which are opposite to them, all +come under the decision of, and are matters for the reflection of the wise +man; and are, as it were, the subject matter of wisdom. Therefore the +question of remaining in life, or of emigrating from it, is to be measured +by all those circumstances which I have mentioned above; for death is not +to be sought for by those men who are retained in life by virtue, nor by +those who are destitute of virtue. But it is often the duty of a wise man +to depart from life, when he is thoroughly happy, if it is in his power to +do so opportunely; and that is living in a manner suitable to nature, for +their maxim is, that living happily depends upon opportunity. Therefore a +rule is laid down by wisdom, that if it be necessary a wise man is even to +leave her herself. + +Wherefore, as vice has not such power as to afford a justifying cause for +voluntary death, it is evident that it is the duty even of fools, and of +those too who are miserable, to remain in life, if they are surrounded by +a preponderance of those things which we call according to nature. And +since such a man is equally miserable, whether departing from life, or +abiding in it, and since the duration of misery is not any the more a +cause for fleeing from life, therefore it is not a causeless assertion, +that those men who have the power of enjoying the greatest number of +natural goods, ought to abide in life. + +XIX. But they think it is very important with reference to this subject, +that it should be understood that it is the work of nature, that children +are beloved by their parents; and that this is the first principle from +which we may trace the whole progress of the common society of the human +race. And that this may be inferred, in the first place, from the figure +and members of the body, which of themselves declare that a due regard for +everything connected with generation has been exhibited by nature; nor can +these two things possibly be consistent with one another, that nature +should desire that offspring should be propagated, and yet take no care +that what is propagated should be loved. But even in beasts the power of +nature may be discerned; for when we see such labour bestowed upon the +bringing forth and bearing of their offspring, we seem to be hearing the +voice of nature herself. Wherefore, as it is evident that we are by nature +averse to pain; so also it is clear that we are impelled by nature herself +to love those whose existence we have caused. And from this it arises that +there is such a recommendation by nature of one man to another, that one +man ought never to appear unfriendly to another, for the simple reason +that he is a man. + +For as among the limbs some appear to be created for themselves as it +were, as the eyes and ears; others assist the rest of the limbs, as the +legs and hands; so there are some monstrous beasts born for themselves +alone: but that fish which floats in an open shell and is called the +pinna, and that other which swims out of the shell, and, because it is a +guard to the other, is called the pinnoteres, and when it has withdrawn +within the shell again, is shut up in it, so that it appears that it has +given it warning to be on its guard; and also ants, and bees, and storks, +do something for the sake of others. Much more is this the case with +reference to the union of men. And therefore we are by nature adapted for +companionship, for taking counsel together, for forming states. But they +think that this world is regulated by the wisdom of the gods, and that it +is, as it were, a common city and state of men and gods, and that every +individual of us is a part of the world. From which that appears to follow +by nature, that we should prefer the general advantage to our own. For as +the laws prefer the general safety to that of individuals, so a good and +wise man, and one who obeys the laws and who is not ignorant of his duty +as a citizen, consults the general advantage rather than that of any +particular individual, or even than his own. Nor is a betrayer of his +country more to be blamed, than one who deserts the general advantage or +the general safety on account of his own private advantage or safety. From +which it also follows, that that man deserves to be praised who encounters +death voluntarily for the sake of the republic, because it is right that +the republic should be dearer to us than ourselves. And since it is said +to be a wicked thing, and contrary to human nature, for a man to say that +he would not care if, after his own death, a general conflagration of the +whole world were to happen, which is often uttered in a Greek(47) verse; +so it is certainly true that we ought to consult the interests of those +who are to come after us, for the sake of the love which we bear them. + +XX. It is in this disposition of mind that wills, and the recommendations +of dying persons, have originated. And because no one would like to pass +his life in solitude, not even if surrounded with an infinite abundance of +pleasures, it is easily perceived that we are born for communion and +fellowship with man, and for natural associations. But we are impelled by +nature to wish to benefit as many persons as possible, especially by +instructing them and delivering them precepts of prudence. Therefore, it +is not easy to find a man who does not communicate to some other what he +knows himself; so prone are we not only to learn, but also to teach. And +as the principle is by nature implanted in bulls to fight in behalf of +their calves with the greatest vigour and earnestness, even against lions; +so those who are rich or powerful, and are able to do so, are excited by +nature to preserve the race of mankind, as we have heard by tradition was +the case with Hercules and Libera. And also when we call Jupiter +all-powerful and all-good, and likewise when we speak of him as the +salutary god, the hospitable god, or as Stator, we mean it to be +understood that the safety of men is under his protection. But it is very +inconsistent, when we are disregarded and despised by one another, to +entreat, that we may be dear to and beloved by the immortal gods. As, +therefore, we make use of our limbs before we have learnt the exact +advantage with a view to which we are endowed with them, so also we are +united and associated by nature in a community of fellow-citizens. And if +this were not the case, there would be no room for either justice or +benevolence. + +And as men think that there are bonds of right which connect man with man, +so also there is no law which connects man with the beasts. For well did +Chrysippus say, that all other animals have been born for the sake of men +and of the gods; but that men and gods have been born only for the sake of +their own mutual communion and society, so that men might be able to use +beasts for their own advantage without any violation of law or right. And +since the nature of man is such that he has, as it were, a sort of right +of citizenship connecting him with the whole human race, a man who +maintains that right is just, and he who departs from it is unjust. + +But as, although a theatre is publicly open, still it may be fairly said +that the place which each individual has occupied belongs to him; so in a +city, or in the world, which is likewise common to all, there is no +principle of right which hinders each individual from having his own +private property. But since we see that man has been born for the purpose +of defending and preserving men, so it is consistent with this nature that +a wise man should wish to manage and regulate the republic; and, in order +to live in compliance with nature, to marry a wife and beget children. Nor +do philosophers think virtuous love inconsistent with a wise man. But +others say that the principles and life of the Cynics are more suited to a +wise man; if, indeed, any chance should befal him which might compel him +to act in such a manner; while others wholly deny it. + +XXI. But in order that the society, and union, and affection between man +and man may be completely preserved, they have laid it down that all +benefits and injuries, which they call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} and {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, are +likewise common; of which the former are advantageous, and the latter +injurious. Nor have they been contented with calling them common, but they +have also asserted their equality. But as for disadvantages and +advantages, (by which words I translate {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} and {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~},) +those they assert to be common, but they deny that they are equal. For +those things which profit or which injure are either good or evil; and +they must necessarily be equal. But advantages and disadvantages are of +that kind which we have already called things preferred or rejected; and +they cannot be equal. But advantages are said to be common; but things +done rightly, and sins, are not considered common. But they think that +friendship is to be cultivated because it is one of that class of things +which is profitable. But although, in friendship, some people assert that +the interest of a man's friend is as dear to him as his own; others, on +the other hand, contend that every man has a greater regard for his own. +Yet these latter confess that it is inconsistent with justice, for which +we seem to be born, to take anything from another for the purpose of +appropriating it to oneself. But philosophers of this school which I am +speaking of, never approve of either friendship or justice being exercised +or sanctioned for the sake of its usefulness: for they say that the same +principles of usefulness may, at times, undermine or overturn them. In +truth, neither justice nor friendship can have any existence at all, +unless they be sought for their own sake. They contend also that all +right, which has any pretence to the name and appellation, is so by +nature; and that it is inconsistent with the character of a wise man, not +only to do any injustice to any one, but even to do him any damage. Nor is +it right to make such a league with one's friends as to share in all their +good deeds, or to become a partner in every act of injustice; and they +argue, with the greatest dignity and truth, that justice can never be +separated from usefulness: and that whatever is just and equitable is also +honourable; and, reciprocally, that whatever is honourable must be also +just and equitable. + +And to those virtues which we have discussed, they also add dialectics and +natural philosophy; and they call both these sciences by the name of +virtues: one, because it has reason, so as to prevent our assenting to any +false proposition, or being even deceived by any plausible probability; +and to enable us to maintain and defend what we were saying about good and +evil. For without this act they think that any one may be led away from +the truth and deceived; accordingly, if rashness and ignorance is in every +case vicious, this power which removes them is properly named virtue. + +XXII. The same honour is also attributed to natural philosophy, and not +without reason, because the man who wishes to live in a manner suitable to +nature, must begin by studying the universal world, and the laws which +govern it. Nor can any one form a correct judgment of good and evil +without being acquainted with the whole system of nature, and of the life +of the gods also, and without knowing whether or not the nature of man +agrees with universal nature. He must also have learnt the ancient rules +of those wise men who bid men yield to the times, and obey God, and know +oneself, and shun every kind of excess. Now, without a knowledge of +natural philosophy, no man can see what great power these rules have; and +it is as great as can be: and also this is the only knowledge which can +teach a man how greatly nature assists in the cultivation of justice, in +the maintenance of friendship and the rest of the affections. Nor can +piety towards the Gods, nor the gratitude which is due to them, be +properly understood and appreciated without a correct understanding of the +laws of nature. + +But I feel now that I have advanced further than I had intended, or than +the subject before me required. But the admirable arrangement of the Stoic +doctrine, and the incredible beauty of the system, drew me on. And, in the +name of the immortal gods! can you forbear to admire it? For what is there +in all nature--though nothing is better or more accurately adapted to its +ends than that--or what can be found in any work made by the hand, so well +arranged, and united, and put together? What is there which is posterior, +which does not agree with what has preceded it? What is there which +follows, and does not correspond to what has gone before? What is there +which is not connected with something else in such a manner, that if you +only move one letter the whole will fall to pieces? Nor, indeed, is there +anything which can be moved. + +But what a grand and magnificent and consistent character is that of the +wise man which is drawn by them! For he, after reason has taught him that +that which is honourable is alone good, must inevitably be always happy, +and must have a genuine right to those names which are often ridiculed by +the ignorant. For he will be more properly called king than Tarquin, who +was able to govern neither himself nor his family; he will deserve to be +called the master of the people more than Sylla, who was only the master +of three pestiferous vices, luxury, avarice, and cruelty; he will be +called rich more properly than Crassus, who would never have desired to +cross the Euphrates without any legitimate cause for war, if he had not +been in want of something. Everything will be properly said to belong to +that man, who alone knows how to make use of everything. He will also +rightly be called beautiful, for the features of the mind are more +beautiful than those of the body: he will deservedly be called the only +free man, who is neither subject to the domination of any one, nor +subservient to his own passions. He will fairly be called invincible, on +whose mind, even though his body be bound with chains, no fetters can ever +be imposed. Nor will he wait till the last period of his life, so as to +have it decided whether he has been happy or not, after he has come to the +last day of life and closed his eyes in death, in the spirit of the +warning which one of the wise men gave to Croesus, without showing much +wisdom in so doing. For if he had ever been happy, then he would have +borne his happy life with him, even as far as the funeral pile built for +him by Cyrus. + +But if it be true that no one except a good man is happy, and that all +good men are happy, then what deserves to be cultivated more than +philosophy, or what is more divine than virtue? + + + + +Fourth Book Of The Treatise On The Chief Good And Evil. + + +I. And when he had made an end of saying these things, I replied, Truly, O +Cato, you have displayed a wonderful memory in explaining to us such a +number of things, and in laying such obscure things so clearly before us. +So that we must either give up having any meaning or wish contrary to what +you have said, or else we must take time to deliberate: for it is not easy +to learn thoroughly the principles of a school which has not only had its +foundation laid, but which has even been built up with such diligence, +although perhaps with some errors as to its truth, (which, however, I will +not as yet dare to affirm,) but at all events with such care and accuracy. +Then, said he, is that what you say, when I have seen you, in obedience to +this new law, reply to the prosecutor on the same day on which he has +brought forward his charge, and sum up for three hours; and then do you +think that I am going to allow an adjournment in this cause? which, +however, will not be conducted by you better than those which are at times +entrusted to you. Wherefore, I desire that you will now apply yourself to +this one, especially as it has been handled by others, and also by +yourself several times; so that you cannot be at a loss for arguments or +language. + +I replied, I do not, in truth, venture to argue inconsiderately against +the Stoics, not because I agree with them in any great degree, but I am +hindered by shame; because they say so much that I hardly understand. I +confess, said he, that some of our arguments are obscure; not that we make +them so on purpose, but because there is some obscurity in the subjects +themselves. Why, then, said I, when the Peripatetics discuss the same +subjects, does not a single word occur which is not well understood? Do +they discuss the same subjects? said he; or have I failed to prove to you +that the Stoics differ from the Peripatetics, not in words only, but in +the whole of the subject, and in every one of their opinions? But, said I, +if, O Cato, you can establish that, I will allow you to carry me over, +body and soul, to your school. I did think, said he, that I had said +enough on that point; wherefore answer me on that head first, if you +please; and afterwards you can advance what arguments you please. I do not +think it too much, said I, if I claim to answer you on that topic as I +myself please. As you will, said he; for although the other way would have +been more common, yet it is only fair to allow every one to adopt his own +method. + +II. I think, then, said I, O Cato, that those ancient pupils of Plato, +Speusippus, Aristotle and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils, Polemo +and Theophrastus, had a system laid down with sufficient richness and +eloquence of language; so that Zeno had no reason, after having been a +pupil of Polemo, for deserting him and his predecessors who had +established this school. And in this school I should like you to observe +what you think ought to be changed, and not to wait while I am replying to +everything which has been said by you. For I think that I must contend +with the whole of their system, against the whole of yours. + +And as these men said that we are born with the view of being generally +well adapted to those virtues which are well known and conspicuous, I mean +justice and temperance, and others of the same kind, all which resemble +the other arts, and differ only for the better in their subject matter and +way of handling;--and as they saw that we desired those very virtues in a +somewhat magnificent and ardent spirit; and that we had also a certain +instruction, or, I should rather say, innate desire of knowledge; and that +we were born for companionship with men, and for society and communion +with the human race, and that these qualities are most conspicuous in the +greatest geniuses;--they divided all philosophy into three parts; and we +see that this same division was retained by Zeno: and as one of these +parts is that by which the manners are thought to be formed, I postpone +the consideration of that part, which is, as it were, the foundation of +this question. For what is the chief good I will discuss presently; but at +this moment I only say that that topic which I think we shall be right in +calling the civil one, and which the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, has been +treated of in a dignified and copious manner by the ancient Peripatetics +and Academicians who, agreeing in parts, differed from one another only in +words. + +III. How many books have these men written on the republic! how many on +laws! How many precepts in art, and, more than that, how many instances of +good speaking in orations have they bequeathed to us! For, in the first +place, they said with the greatest degree of polish and fitness those very +things which were to be argued in a subtle manner, laying down both +definitions and divisions: as your friends have also done: but you have +done it in a more shabby manner; while you see how brilliant their +language is. In the second place, with what splendid language have they +adorned that part of the subject which required ornate and impressive +eloquence! how gloriously have they illustrated it! discussing justice, +and fortitude, and friendship, and the method of passing life, and +philosophy, and the government of the state, and temperance, not like men +picking out thorns, like the Stoics, or laying bare the bones, but like +men who knew how to handle great subjects elegantly, and lesser ones +clearly. What, therefore, are their consolations? What are their +exhortations? What also are their warnings and advice written to the most +eminent men? For their practice in speaking was, like the nature of the +things themselves, of a two-fold character. For whatever is made a +question of, contains a controversy either as to the genus itself, without +reference to persons or times; or else, with these additions, a dispute as +to the fact, or the right, or the name. And therefore, they exercised +themselves in both kinds; and that discipline it was which produced that +great copiousness of eloquence among them in both kinds of argumentation. +Now Zeno, and those who imitated him, were either unable to do much in +this kind of argument, or else were unwilling, or at all events they did +not do it. Although Cleanthes wrote a treatise on the art of rhetoric, and +so too did Chrysippus, but still in such a manner, that if any one were to +wish to be silent, he ought to read nothing else. Therefore you see how +they speak. They invent new words--they abandon old established terms. + +But what great attempts do they make? They say that this universal world +is our town; accordingly, this excites those who hear such a statement. +You see, now, how great a business you are undertaking; to make a man who +lives at Circeii believe that this universal world is merely a town for +himself to live in. What will be the end of this? Shall he set fire to it? +He will rather extinguish it, if he has received it on fire. The next +thing said is that list of titles which you briefly enumerated,--king, +dictator, rich man, the only wise man; words poured out by you decorously +and roundly: they well might be, for you have learnt them from the +orators. But how vague and unsubstantial are those speeches about the +power of virtue! which they make out to be so great that it can, by +itself, secure the happiness of man. They prick us with narrow little bits +of questions as with pins; and those who assent to them are not at all +changed in their minds, and go away the same as they came: for matters +which are perhaps true, and which certainly are important, are not handled +as they ought to be, but in a more minute and petty manner. + +IV. The next thing is the principle of arguing, and the knowledge of +nature. For we will examine the chief good presently, as I said before, +and apply the whole discussion to the explanation of it. There was, then, +in those two parts nothing which Zeno wished to alter. For the whole +thing, in both its divisions, is in an excellent state; for what has been +omitted by the ancients in that kind of argument which is of influence in +discussion? For they have both given many definitions, and have bequeathed +to us titles for defining; and that important addition to definition, I +mean the dividing of the subject into parts, is both done by them, and +they have also left us rules to enable us to do so too; and I may say the +same of contraries; from which they came to genera, and to the forms of +genera. Now, they make those things which they call evident, the beginning +of an argument concluded by reason: then they follow an orderly +arrangement; and the conclusion at last shows what is true in the separate +propositions. But what a great variety of arguments, which lead to +conclusions according to reason, do they give us, and how dissimilar are +they to captious questions! What shall we say of their denouncing, as it +were, in many places, that we ought neither entirely to trust our senses +when unsupported by reason, nor reason when unsupported by our senses; but +that, at the same time, we ought to keep the line between the two clearly +marked? What shall I say more? Were not all the precepts which the +dialecticians now deliver and teach, originally discovered and established +by them? And although they were very much elaborated by Chrysippus, still +they were much less practised by Zeno than by the ancients. And there were +several things in which he did not improve on the ancients; and some which +he never touched at all. And as there are two arts by which reason and +oratory are brought to complete perfection, one that of discovering, the +other that of arguing,--both the Stoics and Peripatetics have handed us +down this latter, but the Peripatetics alone have given us rules for the +former, while the Stoics have altogether avoided it. For the men of your +school never even suspected the places from which arguments might be drawn +as out of magazines; but the Peripatetics taught a regular system and +method. + +And the consequence is, that it is not necessary for one now to be always +repeating a sort of dictated lesson on the same subject, or to be afraid +to go beyond one's note-books: for he who knows where everything is +placed, and how he can arrive at it, even if anything be completely +buried, will be able to dig it up, and will always have his wits about him +in every discussion. And although men who are endowed with great +abilities, attain to a certain copiousness of eloquence without any +definite principles of oratory, still art is a surer guide than nature. +For it is one thing to pour out words after the fashion of poets, and +another to distinguish on settled principles and rules all that you say. + +V. Similar things may be said about the explanation of natural philosophy, +which both the Peripatetics and Stoics apply themselves to; and that not +on two accounts only, as Epicurus thinks, namely, to get rid of the fears +of death and of religion; but besides this, the knowledge of heavenly +things imparts some degree of modesty to those who see what great +moderation and what admirable order there is likewise among the gods: it +inspires them also with magnanimity when they contemplate the arts and +works of the gods; and justice, too, when they come to know how great is +the power and wisdom, and what the will is also, of the supreme ruler and +master of the world, whose reason, in accordance with nature, is called by +philosophers the true and supreme law. There is in the same study of +nature, an insatiable kind of pleasure derived from the knowledge of +things; the only pleasure in which, when all our necessary actions are +performed, and when we are free from business, we can live honourably, and +as becomes free men. Therefore, in the whole of this ratiocination on +subjects of the very highest importance, the Stoics have for the most part +followed the Peripatetics; so far at all events as to admit that there are +gods, and to assert that everything consists of one of four elements. But +when an exceedingly difficult question was proposed, namely, whether there +did not seem to be a sort of fifth nature from which reason and +intelligence sprang; (in which question another was involved respecting +the mind, as to what class that belonged to;) Zeno said that it was fire; +and then he said a few more things--very few, in a novel manner; but +concerning the most important point of all, he spoke in the same way, +asserting that the universal world, and all its most important parts, were +regulated by the divine intellect and nature of the gods. But as for the +matter and richness of facts, we shall find the Stoics very poorly off, +but the Peripatetics very rich. + +What numbers of facts have been investigated and accumulated by them with +respect to the genus, and birth, and limbs, and age of all kinds of +animals! and in like manner with respect to those things which are +produced out of the earth! How many causes have they developed, and in +what numerous cases, why everything is done, and what numerous +demonstrations have they laid open how everything is done! And from this +copiousness of theirs most abundant and undeniable arguments are derived +for the explanation of the nature of everything. Therefore, as far as I +understand, there is no necessity at all for any change of name. For it +does not follow that, though he may have differed from the Peripatetics in +some points, he did not arise out of them. And I, indeed, consider +Epicurus, as far as his natural philosophy is concerned, as only another +Democritus: he alters very few of his doctrines; and I should think him so +even if he had changed more: but in numerous instances, and certainly on +all the most important points, he coincides with him exactly. And though +the men of your school do this, they do not show sufficient gratitude to +the original discoverers. + +VI. But enough of this. Let us now, I beg, consider the chief good, which +contains all philosophy, and see whether Zeno has brought forward any +reason for dissenting from the original discoverers and parents of it, as +I may call them. While speaking, then, on this topic--although, Cato, this +summit of goods, which contains all philosophy, has been carefully +explained by you, and though you have told us what is considered so by the +Stoics, and in what sense it is called so--yet I also will give my +explanation, in order that we may see clearly, if we can, what new +doctrine has been introduced into the question by Zeno. For as preceding +philosophers, and Polemo most explicitly of all, had said that the chief +good was to live according to nature, the Stoics say that three things are +signified by these words: one, that a man should live exercising a +knowledge of those things which happen by nature; and they say that this +is the chief good of Zeno, who declares, as has been said by you, that it +consists in living in a manner suitable to nature: the second meaning is +much the same as if it were said that a man ought to live attending to +all, or nearly all, the natural and intermediate duties. But this, when +explained in this manner, is different from the former. For the former is +right, which you called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, and it happens to the wise man alone; +but this is only a duty which is begun and not perfected, and this may +happen to some who are far from being wise: the third is that a man should +live, enjoying all things, or at least all the most important things which +are according to nature; but this does not always depend on ourselves, for +it is perfected both out of that kind of life which is bounded by virtue, +and out of those things which are according to nature, and which are not +in our own power. + +But this chief good, which is understood in the third signification of the +definition, and that life which is passed in conformity with that good, +can happen to the wise man alone, because virtue is connected with it. And +that summit of good, as we see it expressed by the Stoics themselves, was +laid down by Xenocrates and by Aristotle; and so that first arrangement of +the principles of nature, with which you also began, is explained by them +in almost these very words. + +VII. All nature desires to be a preserver of itself, in order that it may +be both safe itself, and that it may be preserved in its kind. They say +that for this end arts have been invented to assist nature, among which +that is accounted one of the most important which is the art of living so +as to defend what has been given by nature, and to acquire what is +wanting; and, at the same time, they have divided the nature of man into +mind and body. And, as they said that each of these things was desirable +for its own sake, so also they said that the virtues of each of them were +desirable for their own sake. But when they extolled the mind with +boundless praises, and preferred it to the body, they at the same time +preferred the virtues of the mind to the goods of the body. + +But, as they asserted that wisdom was the guardian and regulator of the +entire man, being the companion and assistant of nature, they said that +the especial office of wisdom was to defend the being who consisted of +mind and body,--to assist him and support him in each particular. And so, +the matter being first laid down simply, pursuing the rest of the argument +with more subtlety, they thought that the goods of the body admitted of an +easy explanation, but they inquired more accurately into those of the +mind. And, first of all, they found out that they contained the seeds of +justice; and they were the first of all philosophers to teach that the +principle that those which were the offspring should be beloved by their +parents, was implanted in all animals by nature; and they said, also, that +that which precedes the birth of offspring, in point of time,--namely, the +marriage of men and women,--was a bond of union suggested by nature, and +that this was the root from which the friendships between relations +sprang. And, beginning with these first principles, they proceeded to +investigate the origin and progress of all the virtues; by which course a +great magnanimity was engendered, enabling them easily to resist and +withstand fortune, because the most important events were in the power of +the wise man; and a life conducted according to the precepts of the +ancient philosophers was easily superior to all the changes and injuries +of fortune. + +But when these foundations had been laid by nature, certain great +increases of good were produced,--some arising from the contemplation of +more secret things, because there is a love of knowledge innate in the +mind, in which also the fondness for explaining principles and for +discussing them originates; and because man is the only animal which has +any share of shame or modesty; and because he also covets union and +society with other men, and takes pains in everything which he does or +says, that he may do nothing which is not honourable and becoming;--these +foundations being, as I have said, implanted in us by nature like so many +seeds, temperance, and modesty, and justice, and all virtue, was brought +to complete perfection. + +VIII. You here, O Cato, have a sketch of the philosophers of whom I am +speaking; and, now that I have given you this, I wish to know what reason +there is why Zeno departed from their established system; and which of all +their doctrines it was that he disapproved of? Did he object to their +calling all nature a preserver of itself?--or to their saying that every +animal was naturally fond of itself, so as to wish to be safe and +uninjured in its kind?--or, as the end of all arts is to arrive at what +nature especially requires, did he think that the same principle ought to +be laid down with respect to the art of the entire life?--or, since we +consist of mind and body, did he think that these and their excellences +ought to be chosen for their own sakes?--or was he displeased with the +preeminence which is attributed by the Peripatetics to the virtue of the +mind?--or did he object to what they said about prudence, and the knowledge +of things, and the union of the human race, and temperance, and modesty, +and magnanimity, and honourableness in general? The Stoics must confess +that all these things were excellently explained by the others, and that +they gave no reason to Zeno for deserting their school. They must allege +some other excuse. + +I suppose they will say that the errors of the ancients were very great, +and that he, being desirous of investigating the truth, could by no means +endure them. For what can be more perverse--what can be more intolerable, +or more stupid, than to place good health, and freedom from all pain, and +soundness of the eyes and the rest of the senses, among the goods, instead +of saying that there is no difference at all between them and their +contraries? For that all those things which the Peripatetics called goods, +were only things preferable, not good. And also that the ancients had been +very foolish when they said that these excellences of the body were +desirable for their own sake: they were to be accepted, but not to be +desired. And the same might be said of all the other circumstances of +life, which consists of nothing but virtue alone,--that that life which is +rich also in the other things which are according to nature is not more to +be desired on that account, but only more to be accepted; and, though +virtue itself makes life so happy that a man cannot be happier, still +something is wanting to wise men, even when they are most completely +happy; and that they labour to repel pain, disease, and debility. + +IX. Oh, what a splendid force is there in such genius, and what an +excellent reason is this for setting up a new school! Go on; for it will +follow,--and, indeed, you have most learnedly adopted the principle,--that +all folly, and all injustice, and all other vices are alike, and that all +errors are equal; and that those who have made great progress, through +natural philosophy and learning, towards virtue, if they have not arrived +at absolute perfection in it, are completely miserable, and that there is +no difference between their life and that of the most worthless of men,--as +Plato, that greatest of men, if he was not thoroughly wise, lived no +better, and in no respect more happily, than the most worthless of men. +This is, forsooth, the Stoic correction and improvement of the old +philosophy; but it can never find any entrance into the city, or the +forum, or the senate-house. For who could endure to hear a man, who +professed to be a teacher of how to pass life with dignity and wisdom, +speaking in such a manner--altering the names of things; and though he was +in reality of the same opinion as every one else, still giving new names +to the things to which he attributed just the same force that others did, +without proposing the least alteration in the ideas to be entertained of +them? Would the advocate of a cause, when summing up for a defendant, deny +that exile or the confiscation of his client's property was an evil?--that +these things were to be rejected, though not to be fled from?--or would he +say that a judge ought not to be merciful? + +But if he were speaking in the public assembly,--if Hannibal had arrived at +the gates and had driven his javelin into the wall, would he deny that it +was an evil to be taken prisoner, to be sold, to be slain, to lose one's +country? Or could the senate, when it was voting a triumph to Africanus, +have expressed itself,--Because by his virtue and good fortune ... if there +could not properly be said to be any virtue or any good fortune except in +a wise man? What sort of a philosophy, then, is that which speaks in the +ordinary manner in the forum, but in a peculiar style of its own in books? +especially when, as they intimate themselves in all they say, no +innovations are made by them in the facts,--none of the things themselves +are changed, but they remain exactly the same, though in another manner. +For what difference does it make whether you call riches, and power, and +health goods, or only things preferred, as long as the man who calls them +goods attributes no more to them than you do who call them things +preferred? Therefore, Panaetius--a noble and dignified man, worthy of the +intimacy which he enjoyed with Scipio and Laelius--when he was writing to +Quintus Tubero on the subject of bearing pain, never once asserted, what +ought to have been his main argument, if it could have been proved, that +pain was not an evil; but he explained what it was, and what its character +was, and what amount of disagreeableness there was in it, and what was the +proper method of enduring it; and (for he, too, was a Stoic) all that +preposterous language of the school appears to me to be condemned by these +sentiments of his. + +X. But, however, to come, O Cato, more closely to what you have been +saying, let us treat this question more narrowly, and compare what you +have just said with those assertions which I prefer to yours. Now, those +arguments which you employ in common with the ancients, we may make use of +as admitted. But let us, if you please, confine our discussion to those +which are disputed. I do please, said he: I am very glad to have the +question argued with more subtlety, and, as you call it, more closely; for +what you have hitherto advanced are mere popular assertions, but from you +I expect something more elegant. From me? said I. However, I will try; +and, if I cannot find arguments enough, I will not be above having +recourse to those which you call popular. + +But let me first lay down this position, that we are so recommended to +ourselves by nature, and that we have this principal desire implanted in +us by nature, that our first wish is to preserve ourselves. This is +agreed. It follows, that we must take notice what we are, that so we may +preserve ourselves in that character of which we ought to be. We are, +therefore, men: we consist of mind and body,--which are things of a +particular description,--and we ought, as our first natural desire +requires, to love these parts of ourselves, and from them to establish +this summit of the chief and highest good, which, if our first principles +are true, must be established in such a way as to acquire as many as +possible of those things which are in accordance with nature, and +especially all the most important of them. This, then, is the chief good +which they aimed at. I have expressed it more diffusely,--they call it +briefly, living according to nature. This is what appears to them to be +the chief good. + +XI. Come, now let them teach us, or rather do so yourself, (for who is +better able?) in what way you proceed from these principles, and prove +that to live honourably (for that is the meaning of living according to +virtue, or in a manner suitable to nature) is the chief good; and in what +manner, or in what place, you on a sudden get rid of the body, and leave +all those things which, as they are according to nature, are out of our +own power; and, lastly, how you get rid of duty itself. + +I ask, therefore, how it is that all these recommendations, having +proceeded from nature, are suddenly abandoned by wisdom? But if it were +not the chief good of man that we were inquiring into, but only that of +some animal, and if he were nothing except mind (for we may make such a +supposition as that, in order more easily to discover the truth), still +this chief good of yours would not belong to that mind. For it would wish +for good health, for freedom from pain; it would also desire the +preservation of itself, and the guardianship of these qualities, and it +would appoint as its own end to live according to nature, which is, as I +have said, to have those things which are according to nature, either all +of them, or most of them, and all the most important ones. For whatever +kind of animal you make him out, it is necessary, even though he be +incorporeal, as we are supposing him, still that there must be in the mind +something like those qualities which exist in the body; so that the chief +good cannot possibly be defined in any other manner but that which I have +mentioned. + +But Chrysippus, when explaining the differences between living creatures, +says, that some excel in their bodies, others in their minds, some in +both. And then he argues that there ought to be a separate chief good for +each description of creature. But as he had placed man in such a class +that he attributed to him excellence of mind, he determined that his chief +good was not that he appeared to excel in mind, but that he appeared to be +nothing else but mind. + +XII. But in one case the chief good might rightly be placed in virtue +alone, if there were any animal which consisted wholly of mind; and that, +too, in such a manner that that mind had in itself nothing that was +according to nature, as health is. But it cannot even be imagined what +kind of thing that is, so as not to be inconsistent with itself. But if he +says that some things are obscure, and are not visible because they are +very small, we also admit that; as Epicurus says of pleasure, that those +pleasures which are very small are often obscured and overwhelmed. But +that kind has not so many advantages of body, nor any which last so long, +or are so great. Therefore, in those in which obscuration follows because +of their littleness, it often happens that we confess that it makes no +difference to us whether they exist at all or not; just as when the sun is +out, as you yourself said, it is of no consequence to add the light of a +candle, or to add a penny to the riches of Croesus. But in those matters in +which so great an obscuration does not take place, it may still be the +case, that the matter which makes a difference is of no great consequence. +As if, when a man had lived ten years agreeably, an additional month's +life of equal pleasantness were given to him, it would be good, because +any addition has some power to produce what is agreeable; but if that is +not admitted, it does not follow that a happiness of life is at once put +an end to. + +But the goods of the body are more like this instance which I have just +mentioned. For they admit of additions worthy of having pains taken about +them; so that on this point the Stoics appear to me sometimes to be +joking, when they say that, if a bottle or a comb were given as an +addition to a life which is being passed with virtue, a wise man would +rather choose that life, because these additions were given to it, but yet +that he would not be happier on that account. Now, is not this simile to +be upset by ridicule rather than by serious discourse? For who would not +be deservedly ridiculed, if he were anxious whether he had another bottle +or not? But if any one relieves a person from any affection of the limbs, +or from the pain of any disease, he will receive great gratitude. And if +that wise man of yours is put on the rack of torture by a tyrant, he will +not display the same countenance as if he had lost his bottle; but, as +entering upon a serious and difficult contest, seeing that he will have to +fight with a capital enemy, namely, pain, he will summon up all his +principles of fortitude and patience, by whose assistance he will proceed +to face that difficult and important battle, as I have called it. + +We will not inquire, then, what is obscured, or what is destroyed, because +it is something very small; but what is of such a character as to complete +the whole sum of happiness. One pleasure out of many may be obscured in +that life of pleasure; but still, however small an one it may be, it is a +part of that life which consists wholly of pleasure. One coin is lost of +the riches of Croesus, still it is a part of his riches. Wherefore those +things, too, which we say are according to nature, may be obscured in a +happy life, still they must be parts of the happy life. + +XIII. But if, as we ought to agree, there is a certain natural desire +which longs for those things which are according to nature, then, when +taken altogether, they must be considerable in amount. And if this point +is established, then we may be allowed to inquire about those things at +our leisure, and to investigate the greatness of them, and their +excellence, and to examine what influence each has on living happily, and +also to consider the very obscurations themselves, which, on account of +their smallness, are scarcely ever, or I may say never, visible. + +What should I say about that as to which there is no dispute? For there is +no one who denies that that which is the standard to which everything is +referred resembles every nature, and that is the chief thing which is to +be desired. For every nature is attached to itself. For what nature is +there which ever deserts itself, or any portion of itself, or any one of +its parts or faculties, or, in short, any one of those things, or motions, +or states which are in accordance with nature? And what nature has ever +been forgetful of its original purpose and establishment? There has never +been one which does not observe this law from first to last. How, then, +does it happen that the nature of man is the only one which ever abandons +man, which forgets the body, which places the chief good, not in the whole +man, but in a part of man? And how, as they themselves admit, and as is +agreed upon by all, will it be preserved, so that that ultimate good of +nature, which is the subject of our inquiry, shall resemble every nature? +For it would resemble them, if in other natures also there were some +ultimate point of excellence. For then that would seem to be the chief +good of the Stoics. Why, then, do you hesitate to alter the principles of +nature? For why do you say that every animal, the moment that it is born, +is prone to feel love for itself, and is occupied in its own preservation? +Why do you not rather say that every animal is inclined to that which is +most excellent in itself, and is occupied in the guardianship of that one +thing, and that the other natures do nothing else but preserve that +quality which is the best in each of them? But how can it be the best, if +there is nothing at all good besides? But if the other things are to be +desired, why, then, is not that which is the chief of all desirable things +inferred from the desire of all those things, or of the most numerous and +important of them? as Phidias can either begin a statue from the +beginning, and finish it, or he can take one which has been begun by +another, and complete that. + +Now wisdom is like this: for wisdom is not herself the parent of man, but +she has received him after he has been commenced by nature. And without +regard to her, she ought to complete that work of her's, as an artist +would complete a statue. What kind of man, then, is it that nature has +commenced? and what is the office and task of wisdom? What is it that +ought to be finished and completed by her? If there is nothing to be made +further in man, except some kind of motion of the mind, that is to say, +reason, then it follows, that the ultimate object is to mould the life +according to virtue. For the perfection of reason is virtue. If there is +nothing but body, then the chief goods must be good health, freedom from +pain, beauty, and so on. The question at this moment is about the chief +good of man. + +XIV. Why do we hesitate, then, to inquire as to his whole nature, what has +been done? For as it is agreed by all, that the whole duty and office of +wisdom is to be occupied about the cultivation of man, some (that you may +not think that I am arguing against none but the Stoics) bring forward +opinions in which they place the chief good among things of a kind which +are wholly out of our own power, just as if they were speaking of one of +the brute beasts; others, on the contrary, as if man had no body at all, +so entirely exclude everything from their consideration except the mind, +(and this, too, while the mind itself, in their philosophy, is not some +unintelligible kind of vacuum, but something which exists in some +particular species of body,) that even that is not content with virtue +alone, but requires freedom from pain. So that both these classes do the +same thing, as if they neglected the left side of a man, and took care +only of the right; or as if they (as Herillus did) attended only to the +knowledge of the mind itself, and passed over all action. For it is but a +crippled system which all those men set up who pass over many things, and +select some one in particular to adhere to. But that is a perfect and full +system which those adopt who, while inquiring about the chief good of man, +pass over in their inquiry no part either of his mind or body, so as to +leave it unprotected. But your school, O Cato, because virtue holds, as we +all admit, the highest and most excellent place in man, and because we +think those who are wise men, perfect and admirable men, seeks entirely to +dazzle the eyes of our minds with the splendour of virtue. For in every +living creature there is some one principal and most excellent thing, as, +for instance, in horses and dogs; but those must be free from pain and in +good health. Therefore, you do not seem to me to pay sufficient attention +to what the general path and progress of nature is. For it does not pursue +the same course in man that it does in corn, (which, when it has advanced +it from the blade to the ear, it leaves and considers the stubble as +nothing,) and leave him as soon as it has conducted him to a state of +reason. For it is always taking something additional, without ever +abandoning what it has previously given. Therefore, it has added reason to +the senses; and when it has perfected his reason, it still does not +abandon the senses. + +As if the culture of the vine, the object of which is to cause the vine, +with all its parts, to be in the best possible condition, (however that is +what we understand it to be, for one may, as you often do yourselves, +suppose anything for the purpose of illustration,) if, then, that culture +of the vine be in the vine itself, it would, I presume, desire everything +else which concerns the cultivation of the vine, to be as it has been +before. But it would prefer itself to every separate part of the vine, and +it would feel sure that nothing in the vine was better than itself. In +like manner sense, when it has been added to nature, protects it indeed, +but it also protects itself. But when reason is also added, then it is +placed in a position of such predominant power, that all those first +principles of nature are put under its guardianship. Therefore it does not +abandon the care of those things over which it is so set, that its duty is +to regulate the entire life: so that we cannot sufficiently marvel at +their inconsistency. For they assert that the natural appetite, which they +call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}, and also duty, and even virtue herself, are all protectors of +those things which are according to nature. But when they wish to arrive +at the chief good, they overleap everything, and leave us two tasks +instead of one--namely, to choose some things and desire others, instead of +including both under one head. + +XV. But now you say that virtue cannot properly be established, if those +things which are external to virtue have any influence on living happily. +But the exact contrary is the case. For virtue cannot possibly be +introduced, unless everything which it chooses and which it neglects is +all referred to one general end. For if we entirely neglect ourselves, we +then fall into the vices and errors of Ariston, and shall forget the +principles which we have attributed to virtue itself. But if we do not +neglect those things, and yet do not refer them to the chief good, we +shall not be very far removed from the trivialities of Herillus. For we +shall have to adopt two different plans of conduct in life: for he makes +out that there are two chief goods unconnected with each other; but if +they were real goods, they ought to be united; but at present they are +separated, so that they never can be united. But nothing can be more +perverse than this. Therefore, the fact is exactly contrary to your +assertion: for virtue cannot possibly be established firmly, unless it +maintains those things which are the principles of nature as having an +influence on the object. For we have been looking for a virtue which +should preserve nature, not for one which should abandon it. But that of +yours, as you represent it, preserves only one part, and abandons the +rest. + +And, indeed, if the custom of man could speak, this would be its language. +That its first beginnings were, as it were, beginnings of desire that it +might preserve itself in that nature in which it had been born. For it had +not yet been sufficiently explained what nature desired above all things. +Let it therefore be explained. What else then will be understood but that +no part of nature is to be neglected? And if there is nothing in it +besides reason, then the chief good must be in virtue alone. But if there +is also body, then will that explanation of nature have caused us to +abandon the belief which we held before the explanation. Is it, then, +being in a manner suitable to nature to abandon nature? As some +philosophers do, when having begun with the senses they have seen +something more important and divine, and then abandoned the senses; so, +too, these men, when they had beheld the beauty of virtue developed in its +desire for particular things, abandoned everything which they had seen for +the sake of virtue herself, forgetting that the whole nature of desirable +things was so extensive that it remained from beginning to end; and they +do not understand that they are taking away the very foundations of these +beautiful and admirable things. + +XVI. Therefore, all those men appear to me to have made a blunder who have +pronounced the chief good to be to live honourably. But some have erred +more than others,--Pyrrho above all, who, having fixed on virtue as the +chief good, refuses to allow that there is anything else in the world +deserving of being desired; and, next to him, Aristo, who did not, indeed, +venture to leave nothing else to be desired, but who introduced influence, +by which a wise man might be excited, and desire whatever occurred to his +mind, and whatever even appeared so to occur. He was more right than +Pyrrho, inasmuch as he left man some kind of desire; but worse than the +rest, inasmuch as he departed wholly from nature: but the Stoics, because +they place the chief good in virtue alone, resemble these men: but +inasmuch as they seek for a principle of duty, they are superior to +Pyrrho; and as they do not admit the desire of those objects which offer +themselves to the imagination, they are more correct than Aristo; but, +inasmuch as they do not add the things which they admit to be adopted by +nature, and to be worthy of being chosen for their own sakes, to the chief +good, they here desert nature, and are in some degree not different from +Aristo: for he invented some strange kinds of occurrences; but these men +recognise, indeed, the principles of nature, but still they disconnect +them from the perfect and chief good; and when they put them forward, so +that there may be some selection of things, they appear to follow nature; +but when they deny that they have any influence in making life happy, they +again abandon nature. + +And hitherto I have been showing how destitute Zeno was of any good reason +for abandoning the authority of previous philosophers: now let us consider +the rest of his arguments; unless, indeed, O Cato, you wish to make any +reply to what I have been saying, or unless we are getting tedious. +Neither, said he; for I wish this side of the question to be completely +argued by you; nor does your discourse seem to me to be at all tedious. I +am glad to hear it, I replied; for what can be more desirable for me than +to discuss the subject of virtue with Cato, who is the most virtuous of +men in every point? But, first of all, remark that that imposing sentiment +of yours, which brings a whole family after it, namely, that what is +honourable is the only good, and that to live honourably is the chief +good, will be shared in common with you by all who define the chief good +as consisting in virtue alone; and, as to what you say, that virtue cannot +be formed if anything except what is honourable is included in the +account, the same statement will be made by those whom I have just named. +But it appeared to me to be fairer, advancing from one common beginning, +to see where Zeno, while disputing with Polemo, from whom he had learnt +what the principles of nature were, first took his stand, and what the +original cause of the controversy was; and not to stand on their side, who +did not even allow that their own chief good was derived from nature, and +to employ the same arguments which they did, and to maintain the same +sentiments. + +XVII. But I am very far from approving this conduct of yours, that when +you have proved, as you imagine, that that alone is good which is +honourable, then say again that it is necessary that beginnings should be +put forward which are suitable and adapted to nature; by a selection from +which virtue might be called into existence. For virtue ought not to have +been stated to consist in selection, so that that very thing which was +itself the chief good, was to acquire something besides itself; for all +things which are to be taken, or chosen, or desired, ought to exist in the +chief good, so that he who has attained that may want nothing more. Do you +not see how evident it is to those men whose chief good consists in +pleasure, what they ought to do and what they ought not? so that no one of +them doubts what all their duties ought to regard, what they ought to +pursue, or avoid. Let this, then, be the chief good which is now defended +by me; it will be evident in a moment what are the necessary duties and +actions. But you, who set before yourselves another end except what is +right and honourable, will not be able to find out where your principle of +duty and action is to originate. + +Therefore you are all of you seeking for this, and so are those who say +that they pursue whatever comes into their mind and occurs to them; and +you return to nature. But nature will fairly reply to you, that it is not +true that the chief happiness of life is to be sought in another quarter, +but the principles of action in herself: for that there is one system +only, in which both the principles of action and the chief good too is +contained; and that, as the opinion of Aristo is exploded, when he says +that one thing does not differ from another, and that there is nothing +except virtue and vice in which there was any difference whatever; so, +too, Zeno was in the wrong, who affirmed that there was no influence in +anything, except virtue or vice, of the very least power to assist in the +attainment of the chief good: and as that had no influence on making life +happy, but only in creating a desire for things, he said that there was +some power of attraction in them: just as if this desire had no reference +to the acquisition of the chief good. But what can be less consistent than +what they say, namely, that when they have obtained the knowledge of the +chief good they then return to nature, in order to seek in it the +principle of action, that is to say, of duty? For it is not the principle +of action or duty which impels them to desire those things which are +according to nature; but desire and action are both set in motion by those +things. + +XVIII. Now I come to those brief statements of yours which you call +conclusions; and first of all to that--than which, certainly, nothing can +be more brief--that "everything good is praiseworthy; but everything +praiseworthy is honourable; therefore everything good is honourable." Oh, +what a leaden dagger!--for who will grant you your first premises? And if +it should be granted to you, then you have no need of the second: for if +everything good is praiseworthy, so is everything honourable; who, then, +will grant you this, except Pyrrho, Aristo, and men like them?--whom you do +not approve of. Aristotle, Xenocrates, and all that school, will not grant +it; inasmuch as they call health, strength, riches, glory, and many other +things good, but not praiseworthy; and they therefore do not think that +the chief good is contained in virtue alone, though still they do prefer +virtue to everything else. What do you think that those men will do who +have utterly separated virtue from the chief good, Epicurus, Hieronymus, +and those too, if indeed there are any such, who wish to defend the +definition of the chief good given by Carneades? And how will Callipho and +Diodorus be able to grant you what you ask, men who join to honourableness +something else which is not of the same genus?--Do you, then, think it +proper, Cato, after you have assumed premises which no one will grant to +you, to derive whatever conclusion you please from them? Take this +sorites, than which you think nothing can be more faulty: "That which is +good is desirable; that which is desirable ought to be sought for; that +which ought to be sought for is praiseworthy," and so on through all the +steps. But I will stop here, for in the same manner no one will grant to +you that whatever ought to be sought is therefore praiseworthy; and that +other argument of theirs is far from a legitimate conclusion, but a most +stupid assertion, "that a happy life is one worthy of being boasted of." +For it can never happen that a person may reasonably boast, without +something honourable in the circumstances. Polemo will grant this to Zeno; +and so will his master, and the whole of that school, and all the rest +who, preferring virtue by far to everything else, still add something +besides to it in their definition of the chief good. For, if virtue be a +thing worthy of being boasted of, as it is, and if it is so far superior +to all other things that it can scarcely be expressed how much better it +is; then a man may, possibly, be happy if endowed with virtue alone, and +destitute of everything else; and yet he will never grant to you that +nothing whatever is to be classed among goods, except virtue. + +But those men whose chief good has no virtue in it, will perhaps not grant +to you that a happy life has anything in it of which a man can rightly +boast, although they also, at times, represent virtues as subjects for +boasting. You see, therefore, that you are either assuming propositions +which are not admitted, or else such as, even if they are granted, will do +you no good. + +XIX. In truth, in all these conclusions, I should think this worthy both +of philosophy and of ourselves,--and that, too, most especially so when we +were inquiring into the chief good,--that our lives, and designs, and +wishes should be corrected, and not our expressions. For who, when he has +heard those brief and acute arguments of yours which, as you say, give you +so much pleasure, can ever have his opinion changed by them? For when men +fix their attention on them, and wish to hear why pain is not an evil, +they tell him that to be in pain is a bitter, annoying, odious, unnatural +condition, and one difficult to be borne; but, because there is in pain no +fraud, or dishonesty, or malice, or fault, or baseness, therefore it is +not an evil. Now, the man who hears this said, even if he does not care to +laugh, will still depart without being a bit more courageous as to bearing +pain than he was when he came. But you affirm that no one can be +courageous who thinks pain an evil. Why should he be more courageous if he +thinks it--what you yourself admit it to be--bitter and scarcely endurable? +For timidity is generated by things, and not by words. And you say, that +if one letter is moved, the whole system of the school will be undermined. +Do I seem, then, to you to be moving a letter, or rather whole pages? For +although the order of things, which is what you so especially extol, may +be preserved among them, and although everything may be well joined and +connected together, (for that is what you said,) still we ought not to +follow them too far, if arguments, having set out from false principles, +are consistent with themselves, and do not wander from the end they +propose to themselves. + +Accordingly, in his first establishment of his system, your master, Zeno, +departed from nature; and as he had placed the chief good on that +superiority of disposition which we call virtue, and had affirmed that +there was nothing whatever good which was not honourable, and that virtue +could have no real existence if in other things there were things of which +one was better or worse than another; having laid down these premises, he +naturally maintained the conclusions. You say truly; for I cannot deny it. +But the conclusions which follow from his premises are so false that the +premises from which they are deduced cannot be true. For the +dialecticians, you know, teach us that if the conclusions which follow +from any premises are false, the premises from which they follow cannot be +true. And so that conclusion is not only true, but so evident that even +the dialecticians do not think it necessary that any reasons should be +given for it--"If that is the case, this is; but this is not; therefore +that is not." And so, by denying your consequence, your premise is +contradicted. What follows, then?--"All who are not wise are equally +miserable; all wise men are perfectly happy: all actions done rightly are +equal to one another; all offences are equal." But, though all these +propositions at first appear to be admirably laid down, after a little +consideration they are not so much approved of. For every man's own +senses, and the nature of things, and truth itself, cried out, after a +fashion, that they could never be induced to believe that there was no +difference between those things which Zeno asserted to be equal. + +XX. Afterwards that little Phoenician of yours (for you know that the +people of Citium, your clients, came from Phoenicia), a shrewd man, as he +was not succeeding in his case, since nature herself contradicted him, +began to withdraw his words; and first of all he granted in favour of +those things which we consider good, that they might be considered fit, +and useful, and adapted to nature; and he began to confess that it was +more advantageous for a wise--that is to say for a perfectly happy--man, to +have those things which he does not venture indeed to call goods, but yet +allows to be well adapted to nature. And he denies that Plato, if he were +not a wise man, would be in the same circumstances as the tyrant +Dionysius; for that to die was better for the one, because he despaired of +attaining wisdom, but to live was better for the other, because of his +hope of doing so. And he asserts that of offences some are tolerable, and +some by no means so, because many men passed by some offences, and there +are others which very few people pass by, on account of the number of +duties violated. Again, he said that some men are so foolish as to be +utterly unable ever to arrive at wisdom; but that there are others who, if +they had taken pains, might have attained to it. Now, in this he expressed +himself differently from any one else, but he thought just the same as all +the rest. Nor did he think those things deserving of being valued less +which he himself denied to be goods, than they did who considered them as +goods. What, then, did he wish to effect by having altered these names? At +least he would have taken something from their weight, and would have +valued them at rather less than the Peripatetics, in order to appear to +think in some respects differently from them, and not merely to speak so. + +What more need I say? What do you say about the happy life to which +everything is referred? You affirm that it is not that life which is +filled with everything which nature requires; and you place it entirely in +virtue alone. And as every controversy is usually either about a fact or a +name, both kinds of dispute arise if either the fact is not understood or +if a mistake is made as to the name; and if neither of these is the case, +we must take care to use the most ordinary language possible, and words as +suitable as can be,--that is, such as make the subject plain. Is it, then, +doubtful that if the former philosophers have not erred at all as to the +fact itself, they certainly express themselves more conveniently? Let us, +then, examine their opinions, and then return to the question of names. + +XXI. They say that the desire of the mind is excited when anything appears +to it to be according to nature; and that all things which are according +to nature are worthy of some esteem; and that they deserve to be esteemed +in proportion to the weight that there is in each of them: and that of +those things which are according to nature, some have in themselves +nothing of that appetite of which we have already frequently spoken, being +neither called honourable nor praiseworthy; and some, again, are +accompanied by pleasure in the case of every animal, and in the case of +man also with reason. And those of them which are suitable are honourable, +beautiful, and praiseworthy; but the others, mentioned before, are +natural, and, when combined with those which are honourable, make up and +complete a perfectly happy life. But they say, too, that of all these +advantages--to which those people do not attribute more importance who say +that they are goods, than Zeno does, who denies it--by far the most +excellent is that which is honourable and praiseworthy; but that if two +honourable things are both set before one, one accompanied with good +health and the other with sickness, it is not doubtful to which of them +nature herself will conduct us: but, nevertheless, that the power of +honourableness is so great, and that it is so far better than, and +superior to, everything else, that it can never be moved by any +punishments or by any bribes from that which it has decided to be right; +and that everything which appears hard, difficult, or unfortunate, can be +dissipated by those virtues with which we have been adorned by nature; not +because they are trivial or contemptible--or else where would be the merit +of the virtues?--but that we might infer from such an event, that it was +not in them that the main question of living happily or unhappily +depended. + +In short, the things which Zeno has called estimable, and worth choosing, +and suitable to nature, they call goods; but they call that a happy life +which consists of those things which I have mentioned, or, if not of all, +at least of the greatest number of them, and of the most important. But +Zeno calls that the only good which has some peculiar beauty of its own to +make it desirable; and he calls that life alone happy which is passed with +virtue. + +XXII. If we are to discuss the reality of the case, then there cannot +possibly, Cato, be any disagreement between you and me: for there is +nothing on which you and I have different opinions; let us only compare +the real circumstances, after changing the names. Nor, indeed, did he fail +to see this; but he was delighted with the magnificence and splendour of +the language: and if he really felt what he said, and what his words +intimate, then what would be the difference between him and Pyrrho or +Aristo? But if he did not approve of them, then what was his object in +differing in language with those men with whom he agreed in reality? + +What would you do if these Platonic philosophers, and those, too, who were +their pupils, were to come to life again, and address you thus:--"As, O +Marcus Cato, we heard that you were a man exceedingly devoted to +philosophy, a most just citizen, an excellent judge, and a most +conscientious witness, we marvelled what the reason was why you preferred +the Stoics to us; for they, on the subject of good and evil things, +entertain those opinions which Zeno learnt from Polemo; and use those +names which, when they are first heard, excite wonder, but when they are +explained, move only ridicule. But if you approved those doctrines so +much, why did you not maintain them in their own proper language? If +authority had influence with you, how was it that you preferred some +stranger to all of us and to Plato himself? especially while you were +desirous to be a chief man in the republic, and might have been +accomplished and equipped by us in a way to enable you to defend it to +your own great increase of dignity. For the means to such an end have been +investigated, described, marked down, and enjoined by us; and we have +written detailed accounts of the government of all republics, and their +descriptions, and constitutions, and changes,--and even of the laws, and +customs, and manners of all states. Moreover, how much eloquence, which is +the greatest ornament to leading men,--in which, indeed, we have heard that +you are very eminent,--might you have learnt, in addition to that which is +natural to you, from our records!" When they had said this, what answer +could you have made to such men? I would have entreated you, said he, who +had dictated their speech to them, to speak likewise for me, or else +rather to give me a little room to answer them myself, only that now I +prefer listening to you; and yet at another time I should be likely to +reply to them at the same time that I answer you. + +XXIII. But if you were to answer truly, Cato, you would be forced to say +this--That you do not approve of those men, men of great genius and great +authority as they are. But that you have noticed that the things which, by +reason of their antiquity they have failed to see, have been thoroughly +comprehended by the Stoics, and that these latter have discussed the same +matters with more acuteness, and have also entertained more dignified and +courageous sentiments, inasmuch as, in the first place, they deny that +good health is to be desired, though they admit that it may be chosen; not +because to be well is a good, but because it is not to be utterly +disregarded, and yet that it does not appear to them of more value that it +does to those who do not hesitate to call it a good. And that you could +not endure that those ancients, those bearded men (as we are in the habit +of calling our own ancestors), should believe that the life of that man +who lived honourably, if he had also good health and a good reputation, +and was rich, was more desirable, better, and more to be sought for, than +that of him who was equally a good man in many respects, like the Alcmaeon +of Ennius-- + + + Surrounded by disease, and exile sad, + And cruel want. + + +Those ancients, then, must have been far from clever, to think that life +more desirable, better, and happier. But the Stoics think it only to be +preferred if one has a choice; not because this life is happier, but +because it is better adapted to nature; and they think that all who are +not wise are equally miserable. The Stoics, forsooth, thought this; but it +had entirely escaped the perception of those philosophers who preceded +them, for they thought that men stained with all sorts of parricide and +wickedness were not at all more miserable than those who, though they +lived purely and uprightly, had not yet attained complete wisdom. + +And while on this topic, you brought forth those similes which they are in +the habit of employing, which are, in truth, no similes at all. For who is +ignorant that, if many men should choose to emerge from the deep, those +would be nearer breathing who came close to the surface, but still would +not be actually able to breathe any more than those who are at the bottom? +Therefore, on your principles, it is of no avail to make progress and +advancement in virtue, in order to be less utterly miserable before you +have actually arrived at it, since it is of no use in the case of men in +the water. And since puppies who are on the point of opening their eyes, +are just as blind as those that are but this moment born; it is plain also +that Plato, as he had not yet seen wisdom, was as blind in his intellect +as Phalaris. + +XXIV. These cases are not alike, Cato. For in these instances, though you +may have made a good deal of progress, still you are in exactly the same +evil from which you wish to be free, till you have entirely escaped. For a +man does not breathe till he has entirely emerged, and puppies are just as +blind till they have opened their eyes, as if they were never going to +open them. I will give you some instances that really are like. One man's +eyes are bad, another is weak in his body; these men are both gradually +relieved by the daily application of remedies. The one gets better every +day, and the other sees better. Now these men resemble all those who study +virtue. They are relieved of their vices; they are relieved of their +errors. Unless, perchance, you think that Tiberius Gracchus, the father, +was not happier than his son, when the one laboured to establish the +republic, and the other to subvert it. And yet he was not a wise man. For +who taught him wisdom? or when? or where? or whence did he learn it? +Still, because he consulted his twin glory and dignity, he had made great +progress in virtue. + +But I will compare your grandfather, Drusus, with Caius Gracchus, who was +nearly his contemporary. He healed the wounds which the other inflicted on +the republic. But there is nothing which makes men so miserable as impiety +and wickedness. Grant that all those who are unwise are miserable, as, in +fact, they are; still he is not equally miserable who consults the +interest of his country with him who wishes for its destruction. +Therefore, those men are already a great deal relieved from their vices +who have made any considerable advance towards virtue. But the men of your +school admit that advance towards virtue can be made, but yet assert that +no relief from vices takes place in consequence. + +But it is worth while to consider on what arguments acute men rely for +proving this point. Those arts, say they, of which the perfection can be +increased, show that the completeness of their contraries can likewise be +increased. But no addition can be made to the perfection of virtue. +Therefore, also, vices will not be susceptible of any increase, for they +are the contraries of virtues. Shall we say, then, that things which are +doubtful are made plain by things which are evident, or that things which +are evident are obscured by things that are doubtful? But this is evident, +that different vices are greater in different people. This is doubtful, +whether any addition can be made to that which you call the chief good. +But you, while what you ought to do is to try and illustrate what is +doubtful by what is evident, endeavour to get rid of what is evident by +what is doubtful. And, therefore, you will find yourself hampered by the +same reasoning which I used just now. For if it follows that some vices +are not greater than others, because no addition can be made to that chief +good which you describe, since it is quite evident that the vices of all +men are not equal, you must change your definition of the chief good. For +we must inevitably maintain this rule, that when a consequence is false, +the premises from which the consequence proceeds cannot be true. + +XXV. What, then, is the cause of these difficulties? A vain-glorious +parade in defining the chief good. For when it is positively asserted that +what is honourable is the sole good, all care for one's health, all +attention to one's estate, all regard for the government of the republic, +all regularity in transacting business, all the duties of life, in short, +are put an end to. Even that very honourableness, in which alone you +assert that everything is comprised, must be abandoned. All which +arguments are carefully urged against Ariston by Chrysippus. And from that +embarrassment it is that all those fallaciously speaking wiles, as Attius +calls them, have arisen. For because wisdom had no ground on which to rest +her foot, when all the duties were taken away, (and duties were taken away +when all power of selection and discrimination was denied; for what +choice, or what discrimination could there be when all things were so +completely equal that there was no difference whatever between them?) from +these difficulties there arose worse errors than even those of Aristo. For +his arguments were at all events simple; those of your school are full of +craft. + +For suppose you were to ask Aristo whether these things, freedom from +pain, riches, and good health, appear to him to be goods? He would deny +it. What next? Suppose you ask him whether the contraries of these things +are bad? He would deny that equally. Suppose you were to ask Zeno the same +question? He would give you the same answer, word for word. Suppose +further, that we, being full of astonishment, were to ask them both how it +will be possible for us to live, if we think that it makes not the least +difference to us whether we are well or sick; whether we are free from +pain or tormented by it; whether we are able or unable to endure cold and +hunger? You will live, says Aristo, magnificently and excellently, doing +whatever seems good to you. You will never be vexed, you will never desire +anything, you will never fear anything. What will Zeno say? He says that +all these ideas are monstrous, and that it is totally impossible for any +one to live on these principles; but that there is some extravagant, some +immense difference between what is honourable and what is base; that +between other things, indeed, there is no difference at all. He will also +say--(listen to what follows, and do not laugh, if you can help it)--all +those intermediate things, between which there is no difference, are +nevertheless such that some of them are to be chosen, others rejected, and +others utterly disregarded; that is to say, that you may wish for some, +wish to avoid others, and be totally indifferent about others. But you +said just now, O Zeno, that there was no difference whatever between these +things. And now I say the same, he replies; and that there is no +difference whatever as respects virtues and vices. Well, I should like to +know who did not know that? + +XXVI. However, let us hear a little more. Those things, says he, which you +have mentioned, to be well, to be rich, to be free from pain, I do not +call goods; but I will call them in Greek {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} (which you may +translate by the Latin _producta_, though I prefer _praeposita_ or +_praecipua_, for they are more easily comprehended and more applicable +terms). And again, the contraries, want, sickness, and pain, I do not call +evils, though I have no objection to styling them (if you wish) things to +be rejected. And, therefore, I do not say that I seek for them first, but +that I choose them; not that I wish for them, but that I accept them. And +so, too, I do not say that I flee from the contraries; but that I, as it +were, keep aloof from them. What says Aristotle and the rest of the +disciples of Plato? Why, that they call everything good which is according +to nature; and that whatever is contrary to nature they call evil. + +Do you not see, then, that your master Zeno agrees with Aristo in words, +but differs from him as to facts; but that he agrees with Aristotle and +those other philosophers as to facts, but differs from them only in words? +Why, then, when we are agreed as to facts, do we not prefer speaking in +the ordinary manner? Let him teach me either that I shall be more prepared +to despise money, if I reckon it only among things preferred, than if I +count it among goods; and that I shall have more fortitude to endure pain +if I call it bitter, and difficult to bear, and contrary to nature, than +if I pronounce it an evil. Marcus Piso, my intimate, also was a very witty +man, and used to ridicule the Stoics for their language on this topic: for +what was he used to say? "You deny that riches are a good, but call them +something to be preferred. What good do you do by that? do you diminish +avarice? But if we mind words, then, in the first place, your expression, +to be preferred, is longer than good." "That has nothing to do with the +matter." "I dare say it has not, but still it is a more difficult +expression. For I do not know what the word good is derived from; but the +word preferred I suppose means that it is preferred to other things. That +appears to me to be important." Therefore, he insisted upon it, that more +consequence was attributed to riches by Zeno, who placed them among things +preferred, than by Aristotle, who admitted that they were a good. Still he +did not say that they were a great good, but rather such an one as was to +be despised and scorned in comparison of what was right and honourable, +and never one to be greatly sought after. And altogether, he argued in +this way, about all those expressions which had been altered by Zeno, both +as to what he denied to be goods, and as to those things to which he +referred the name of evil; saying that the first received from him a more +joyful title than they did from us; and the latter a more gloomy one. + +XXVII. Piso, then--a most excellent man, and, as you well know, a great +friend of yours--used to argue in this manner. And now let us make an end +of this, after we have just said a few additional words. For it would take +a long time to reply to all your assertions. + +For from the same tricks with words, originate all those kingdoms, and +commands, and riches, and universal dominion which you say belong to the +wise man. You say besides, that he alone is handsome, he alone is free, he +alone is a citizen; and that everything which is the contrary of all these +things belongs to the foolish man, who is also insane, as you assert they +call these assertions {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}; we may call them marvellous. And yet what +marvel is there in them when you come nearer to them? I will just examine +the matter with you, and see what meaning you affix to each word; there +shall be no dispute between us. You say that all offences are equal. I +will not speak to you now, as I spoke on the same subject when I was +defending Lucius Murena, whom you prosecuted; then I was addressing an +unphilosophical audience; something too was to be directed to the +bystanders in court; at present, we must proceed more precisely. In what +way can all offences be called equal? Because nothing is more honourable +than what is honourable; nothing more base than what is base. Go on a +little further, for there is a great dispute as to this point; let us +examine those arguments, which are especially your own, why all offences +are equal. As, says he, in many lyres, if not one of them is so well in +tune as to be able to preserve the harmony, all are equally out of tune; +so because offences differ from what is right, they will differ equally; +therefore they are equal: now here we are being mocked with an ambiguous +expression. For it equally happens to all the lyres to be out of tune, but +not to them all to be equally out of tune. Therefore, that comparison does +not help you at all. For it would not follow if we were to say that every +avarice is equally avarice, that therefore every case of avarice was +equal. Here is another simile which is no simile; for as, says he, a pilot +blunders equally if he wrecks a ship loaded with straw, as if he wrecks +one loaded with gold; so, too, he sins equally who beats his parent, with +him who beats a slave unjustly. This is not seeing that it has no +connexion with the art of the pilot what cargo the ship carries: and +therefore that it makes no difference with respect to his steering well or +ill, whether his freight is straw or gold. But it can and ought to be +understood what the difference is between a parent and a slave; therefore +it makes no difference with respect to navigation, but a great deal with +respect to duty, what the description of thing may be which is affected by +the blunder. And if, in navigation, a ship has been wrecked through +carelessness, the offence then becomes more serious if gold is lost, than +if it is only straw. For in all arts we insist upon the exercise of what +is called common prudence; which all men who have the management of any +business entrusted to them are bound to possess. And so even in this +instance offences are not equal. + +XXVIII. However, they press on, and relax nothing. Since, say they, every +offence is one of imbecility and inconsistency, and since these vices are +equally great in all fools, it follows necessarily that offences are +equal: as if it were admitted that vices are equally great in all fools, +and that Lucius Tubulus was a man of the same imbecility and inconsistency +as Publius Scaevola, on whose motion he was condemned; and as if there were +no difference at all between the things themselves which are the subject +of the offences; so that, in proportion as they are more or less +important, the offences committed in respect of them are so too. + +Therefore, for I may now bring this discourse to an end, your Stoics seem +to me to be most especially open to this charge, that they fancy they can +support two opposite propositions. For what is so inconsistent as for the +same person to say that what is honourable is the only good, and also that +the desire of things adapted for human life proceeds from nature? But when +they wish to maintain the arguments which are suitable for the former +propositions, they agree with Aristo; when they avoid that, they in +reality are upholding the same doctrines as the Peripatetics; they cling +to words with great tenacity; and as they cannot bear to have them taken +from them one after another, they become more fierce, and rough, and +harsher both in their language and manners. But Panaetius, wishing to avoid +their moroseness and asperity, would not approve of either the bitterness +of their sentiments, or their captious way of arguing: and so in one +respect he was more gentle, and in the other more intelligible. And he was +always quoting Plato, and Aristotle, and Xenocrates, and Theophrastus, and +Dicaearchus, as his own writings show. And indeed, I feel very sure that it +would do you a great deal of good if you too were to study those authors +with care and diligence. + +But since it is getting towards evening, and I must return to my villa, we +will stop this discussion at this point, but we will often return to it on +other occasions. Indeed we will, said he, for what can we do better? And +indeed I shall require of you to give me a hearing while I refute what you +have said; but recollect that you approve of all our opinions, charging us +only with using words incorrectly; but that we do not approve of one +single one of your ideas. You are throwing a stone at me as I depart, said +I; however, we shall see. And when we had thus spoken we separated. + + + + +Fifth Book Of The Treatise On The Chief Good And Evil. + + +I. One day when I had been hearing Antiochus lecture, as I was in the +habit of doing, O Brutus, in company with Marcus Piso, in that gymnasium +which is called Ptolemy's, my brother Quintus being with me, and Titus +Pomponius, and Lucius Cicero, our cousin on the father's side as to +relationship, but our own brother as to affection, we determined to take +our afternoon's walk in the Academy, principally because at that time of +day that place was free from any crowd. Accordingly, at the appointed time +we all met at Piso's house, and from thence we walked half-a-dozen +furlongs from the Dipylus to the Academy, beguiling the road with +discourse on various subjects; and when we had arrived at the deservedly +celebrated space of the Academy, we there found the solitude which we +desired. Then said Piso--Shall I say that this is implanted in us by +nature, or by some mistake, that when we see those places which we have +heard that men who deserve to be had in recollection have much frequented, +we are more moved than when we hear even of their actual deeds, or than +when we read some one of their writings?--just as I am affected now. For +the remembrance of Plato comes into my mind, whom we understand to have +been the first person who was accustomed to dispute in this place; and +whose neighbouring gardens not only recal him vividly to my recollection, +but seem even to place the man himself before my eyes. Here Speusippus, +here Xenocrates, here his pupil Polemo used to walk; and the latter used +to sit in the very spot which is now before us. There is our senate-house +(I mean the Curia Hostilia,(48) not this new one, which always seems to me +smaller, though in fact it is larger): whenever I have looked upon that I +have always thought of Scipio, and Cato, and Laelius, and more especially +of my own grandfather. So great a power of reminding one of circumstances +exists in the places themselves, that it is not without reason that some +people have built up a system of memory in them. Then Quintus said--It is +just as you say, Piso: for as I was coming here just now, that district of +Colonos drew my attention to itself, whose inhabitant, Sophocles, was +brought at once before my eyes: for you know how I admire, and how I +delight in him: and accordingly a sort of appearance moved me, an +unsubstantial one indeed, but still it did move me to a more vivid +recollection of OEdipus coming hither, and asking in most melodious verse +what all these places were. Then Pomponius said--I whom you all are always +attacking as devoted to Epicurus, am often with Phaedrus, who is a +particular friend of mine, as you know, in the gardens of Epicurus, which +we passed by just this moment; but, according to the warning of the old +proverb, I remember the living; still I may not forget Epicurus, even if +were to wish to do so, whose likeness our friends have not only in +pictures, but even on their goblets and rings. + +II. On this I chimed in:--Our friend Pomponius, said I, appears to be +joking, and perhaps he has a right to do so; for he has established +himself at Athens in such a way that he has almost become an Athenian, and +indeed so as to seem likely to earn such a surname. But I, Piso, agree +with you that we do get into a habit of thinking a good deal more +earnestly and deeply on illustrious men in consequence of the warnings of +place. For you know that once I went with you to Metapontum, and did not +turn into the house of my entertainer until I had seen the very place +where Pythagoras passed his life, and his house; and at this present time, +although all over Athens there are many traces of eminent men in the +places themselves, still I am greatly affected by this seat which is +before me. For here Charmadas lately sat,--a man whom I seem to see, for +his likeness is well known to me, and I can fancy that his voice is +regretted by the very seat itself, deprived as it is now of such a +brilliant genius. Then Piso said--Since, now, we have all said something, +what does our friend Lucius think? is he glad to visit that spot where +Demosthenes and AEschines used to contend together? for every one is +chiefly attracted by his own particular study. And he blushed, and +answered--Do not ask me, who went down even to the harbour of Phalerum, +where they say that Demosthenes used to declaim to the waves, in order to +accustom himself to outvoice the roaring of the sea. I turned aside also +out of the road, a little to the right, to approach the tomb of Pericles; +although, indeed, such records are countless in this city, for wherever we +step we place our foot on some history. + +Then Piso continued:--But, Cicero, said he, those inclinations are the +inclinations of clever men, if they lead to the imitation of great men; +but if they only tend to bringing up again the traces of ancient +recollections, that is mere curiosity. But we all exhort you,--though you +of your own accord, as I hope, are running that way,--to imitate those men +whom you wish that you had known. Although, I replied, our friend Piso +here does, as you see, what you recommended, still your exhortation is +pleasing to me. Then said he, in a most friendly manner, as was his +wont,--Let all of us, then, contribute every assistance to his youth, +especially urging him to devote some of his studies to philosophy, either +for the sake of imitating you whom he loves, or else of being able to do +what he is desirous to do with more elegance. But do you, O Lucius, said +he, require to be exhorted by us, or are you inclined that way of your own +accord? You appear, indeed, to me to be very assiduous in your attendance +on Antiochus, whose pupil you are. Then replied he, timidly,--or, I ought +rather to say, modestly,--I am indeed; but did you not just now hear +Charmadas's name mentioned? I am attracted in that direction, but +Antiochus drags me back again; nor is there any one else whose lectures it +would be possible to attend. + +III. Piso replied--Although, while our friend here (meaning me) is present, +this matter will perhaps not be quite so easy; yet I will endeavour to +call you back from this New Academy to that ancient one, in which (as you +used to hear Antiochus say) those men are not alone reckoned who are +called Academics,--Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor, and the rest; +but the old Peripatetics also, the chief of whom was Aristotle, whom, next +to Plato, I think I may fairly call the prince of philosophers. Turn +yourself, therefore, I entreat you, to those men; for from their writings +and systems all liberal learning, all history, all elegance of language, +may be derived; and also, so great is the variety of arts of which they +were masters, that no one can come properly armed for any business of +importance and credit without being tolerably versed in their writings. It +is owing to them that men have turned out orators, generals, and +statesmen; and, to descend to less important matters, it is from this +Academy, as from a regular magazine of all the arts, that mathematicians, +poets, musicians, aye, and physicians too, have proceeded. + +I replied--You know well, O Piso, that my opinion is the same: but still +the mention of it by you was very seasonable; for my relation Cicero is +anxious to hear what was the doctrine of that Old Academy which you have +been speaking of, and of the Peripatetics, about the chief good; and we +think that you can very easily explain it to us, because you entertained +Staseas the Neapolitan in your house for many years, and because, too, we +are aware that you have been many months at Athens, investigating these +very things, as a pupil of Antiochus. And he said, with a laugh, Come, +come,--for you have very cleverly drawn me in to begin the discussion,--let +us explain it to the young man if we can; for this solitude gives us the +opportunity: but, even if a god had told me so, I would never have +believed that I should be disputing in the Academy, like a philosopher. +However, I hope I shall not annoy the rest of you while complying with his +request. Annoy me, said I, who asked you? Quintus and Pomponius also said +that they entertained the same wish; so he began. And I beg of you, +Brutus, to consider whether what he said appears to you to sufficiently +embrace the doctrines of Antiochus, which I know you, who were a constant +attendant on the lectures of his brother Aristus, approve of highly. Thus +he spoke:-- + +IV. What great elegance there is in the Peripatetic system I have +explained a little time ago, as briefly as I could. But the form of the +system, as is the case with most of the other schools, is threefold: one +division being that of nature; the second, that of arguing; the third, +that of living. Nature has been investigated by them so thoroughly that +there is no part of heaven, or earth, or sea (to speak like a poet), which +they have passed over. Moreover, after having treated of the origin of +things, and of the universal world, so as to prove many points not only by +probable arguments, but even by the inscrutable demonstrations of +mathematicians, they brought from the subjects which they had investigated +abundant materials to assist in attaining to the knowledge of secret +things. Aristotle investigated the birth, and way of living, and figure of +every animal; Theophrastus examined the causes, and principles, and +natures of plants, and of almost everything which is produced out of the +earth; by which knowledge the investigation of the most secret things is +rendered easier. Also, they have given rules for arguing, not only +logically, but oratorically; and a system of speaking in both these +manners, on every subject, has been laid down by Aristotle, their chief; +so that he did not always argue against everything, as Arcesilas did; and +yet he furnished one on every subject with arguments to be used on both +sides of it. + +But, as the third division was occupied about the rules of living well, it +was also brought back by those same people, not only to the system of +private life, but also to the direction of affairs of state. For from +Aristotle we have acquired a knowledge of the manners, and customs, and +institutions of almost every state, not of Greece only, but also of the +Barbarians; and from Theophrastus we have learnt even their laws: and each +of them taught what sort of man a leader in a state ought to be, and also +wrote at great length to explain what was the best constitution for a +state. But Theophrastus also detailed very copiously what were the natural +inclinations of affairs, and what the influences of opportunities which +required regulating as occasion might demand. And as for living, a quiet +method of life appeared to them to be the best, passed in the +contemplation and knowledge of things; which, inasmuch as it had the +greatest resemblance to the life of the gods, appeared to them to be most +worthy of a wise man; and on these subjects they held very lofty and +dignified language. + +V. But respecting the chief good, because there are two kinds of +books,--one addressed to the people, which they used to call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, +the other written in a more polished style, which they left behind in +commentaries,--they appear not always to say the same thing; and yet in +their ultimate conclusion there is no variety in the language of the men +whom I have named, nor is there any disagreement between them. But, as a +happy life is the object of search, and as that is the only thing which +philosophy ought to pursue and regard, there never appears to be the least +difference or doubt in their writings, as to whether happiness is wholly +in the power of the wise man, or whether it can be undermined or taken +from him by adversity. And this point is the especial subject of the book +of Theophrastus, on a Happy Life; in which a great deal is attributed to +fortune: and if that theory is correct, then wisdom cannot make life +happy. Now, this seems to me rather too tender (if I may say so) and +delicate a doctrine, more so than the power and importance of virtue can +sanction. Wherefore let us rather hold with Aristotle, and his son +Nicomachus,--whose admirably written books on Morals are said, indeed, to +be Aristotle's; but I do not see why the son may not have been like his +father; but, in most cases, let us apply to Theophrastus, as long as we +attribute a little more firmness and strength to virtue than he did. + +Let us, then, be content with these guides; for their successors are wiser +men, indeed, in my opinion, than the philosophers of other schools: but +still they degenerate so from these great men, that they seem to me rather +to have arisen from themselves than from them. In the first place, Strato, +the pupil of Theophrastus, called himself a natural philosopher: and +though, in truth, he is an eminent man in that line, still most of what he +said was novel; and he said very little about morals. His pupil Lyco was +rich in eloquence, but very meagre in matter. Then his pupil Aristo was a +neat and elegant writer, but still he had not that dignity which we look +for in a great philosopher: he wrote a great deal, certainly, and in a +polished style; but, somehow or other, his writings do not carry any +weight. I pass over several, and among them that learned man and pleasant +writer, Hieronymus; and I do not know why I should call him a Peripatetic, +for he defined the chief good to be freedom from pain: and he who +disagrees with me about the chief good, disagrees with me about the whole +principle of philosophy. Critolaus wished to copy the ancients; and, +indeed, he comes nearest to them in dignity, and his eloquence is +preeminent: still he adheres to the ancient doctrine. Diodorus, his pupil, +adds to honourableness freedom from pain: he, too, clings to a theory of +his own; and, as he disagrees from them about the chief good, he is hardly +entitled to be called a Peripatetic. But my friend Antiochus seems to me +to pursue the opinions of the ancients with the greatest care; and he +shows that they coincided with the doctrines of Aristotle and Polemo. + +VI. My young friend Lucius, therefore, acts prudently when he wishes +chiefly to be instructed about the chief good; for when this point is once +settled in philosophy, everything is settled. For in other matters, if +anything is passed over, or if we are ignorant of anything, the +inconvenience thus produced is no greater than the importance the matter +is of in which the omission has taken place; but if one is ignorant of +what is the chief good, one must necessarily be ignorant of the true +principles of life; and from this ignorance such great errors ensue that +they cannot tell to what port to betake themselves. But when one has +acquired a knowledge of the chief ends,--when one knows what is the chief +good and the chief evil,--then a proper path of life, and a proper +regulation of all the duties of life, is found out. + +There is, therefore, an object to which everything may be referred; from +which a system of living happily, which is what every one desires, may be +discovered and adopted. But since there is a great division of opinion as +to what that consists in, we had better employ the division of Carneades, +which our friend Antiochus prefers, and usually adopts. He therefore saw +not only how many different opinions of philosophers on the subject of the +chief good there were, but how many there could be. Accordingly, he +asserted that there was no art which proceeded from itself; for, in truth, +that which is comprehended by an art is always exterior to the art. There +is no need of prolonging this argument by adducing instances; for it is +evident that no art is conversant about itself, but that the art itself is +one thing, and the object which is proposed to be attained by the art +another. Since, therefore, prudence is the art of living, just as medicine +is of health, or steering of navigation, it follows unavoidably that that +also must have been established by, and must proceed from, something else. +But it is agreed among almost all people, that that object with which +prudence is conversant, and which it wishes to arrive at, ought to be +fitted and suited to nature, and to be of such a character as by itself to +invite and attract that desire of the mind which the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}. But +as to what it is which causes this excitement, and which is so greatly +desired by nature from its first existence, it is not agreed; and, indeed, +there is a great dissension on the subject among philosophers whenever the +chief good is the subject of investigation: for the source of this whole +question which is agitated as to the chief good and evil, when men inquire +what is the extreme and highest point of either, must be traced back, and +in that will be found the primitive inducements of nature; and when it is +found, then the whole discussion about the chief good and evil proceeds +from it as from a spring. + +VII. Some people consider the first desire to be a desire of pleasure, and +the first thing which men seek to ward off to be pain: others think that +the first thing wished for is freedom from pain, and the first thing +shunned, pain; and from these men others proceed, who call the first goods +natural ones; among which they reckon the safety and integrity of all +one's parts, good health, the senses unimpaired, freedom from pain, +strength, beauty, and other things of the same sort, the images of which +are the first things in the mind, like the sparks and seeds of the +virtues. And of these three, as there is some one thing by which nature is +originally moved to feel desire, or to repel something, and as it is +impossible that there should be anything except these three things, it +follows unavoidably that every duty, whether of avoiding or of pursuing +anything, is referred to some one of these things; so that that prudence, +which we have called the art of life, is always conversant about some one +of these three things from which it derives the beginning of the whole +life: and from that which it has pronounced to be the original cause by +which nature is excited, the principle of what is right and honourable +arises; which can agree with some one of these three divisions; so that it +is honourable to do everything for the sake of pleasure, even if you do +not obtain it; or else for the sake of avoiding pain, though you may not +be able to compass that; or else of getting some one of those things which +are according to nature. And thus it comes about that there is as much +difference between the chief good and the chief evil as there is in their +natural principles. Others again, starting from the same beginning, refer +everything either to pleasure or to freedom from pain, or else to the +attainment of those primary goods which are according to nature. + +Now then that we have detailed six opinions about the chief good, these +are the chief advocates of the three last-mentioned opinions,--Aristippus, +the advocate of pleasure; Hieronymus, of freedom from pain; and Carneades, +of the enjoyment of those things which we have called the principal things +in accordance with nature (though he, indeed, was not the author of this +theory, but only its advocate, for the sake of maintaining a debate). Now, +the three former were such as might possibly be true, though only one of +them was defended, and that was vehemently maintained. For no one says, +that to do everything for the sake of pleasure, or that, even though we +obtain nothing, still the very design of acting so is of itself desirable, +and honourable, and the only good; no one ever even placed the avoidance +of pain (not even if it could be avoided) among things intrinsically +desirable; but to do everything with a view to obtain the things which are +according to nature, even though we do not succeed in obtaining them, the +Stoics do affirm to be honourable, and the only thing to be desired for +its own sake, and the only good. + +VIII. These, then, are six plain opinions about the chief good and the +chief evil,--two having no advocate, but four being defended. But of united +and twofold explanations of the chief good there were in all three; nor +could there be more if you examine the nature of things thoroughly. For +either pleasure can be added to honourableness, as Callipho and Dinomachus +thought; or freedom from pain, as Diodorus asserted; or the first gifts of +nature, as the ancients said, whom we call at the same time Academics and +Peripatetics. But, since everything cannot be said at once, at present +these things ought to be known, that pleasure ought to be excluded; since, +as it will presently appear, we have been born for higher purposes; and +nearly the same may be said of freedom from pain as of pleasure. Since +then we have discussed pleasure with Torquatus, and honourableness (in +which alone every good was to consist) with Cato; in the first place, the +arguments which were urged against pleasure are nearly equally applicable +to freedom from pain. Nor, indeed, need we seek for any others to reply to +that opinion of Carneades; for in whatever manner the chief good is +explained, so as to be unconnected with honourableness, in that system +duty, and virtue, and friendship, can have no place. But the union of +either pleasure or freedom from pain with honourableness, makes that very +honourableness which it wishes to embrace dishonourable; for to refer what +you do to those things, one of which asserts the man who is free from evil +to be in the enjoyment of the chief good, while the other is conversant +with the most trifling part of our nature, is rather the conduct of a man +who would obscure the whole brilliancy of honourableness--I might almost +say, who would pollute it. + +The Stoics remain, who after they had borrowed everything from the +Peripatetics and Academics, pursued the same objects under different +names. It is better to reply to them all separately. But let us stick to +our present subject; we can deal with those men at a more convenient +season. But the "security" of Democritus, which is as it were a sort of +tranquillity of the mind which they all {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, deserved to be separated +from this discussion, because that tranquillity of the mind is of itself a +happy life. What we are inquiring, however, is not what it is, but whence +it is derived. The opinions of Pyrrho, Aristo, and Herillus, have long ago +been exploded and discarded, as what can never be applicable to this +circle of discussion to which we limit ourselves, and which had no need to +have been ever mentioned; for as the whole of this inquiry is about the +chief, and what I may call the highest good and evil, it ought to start +from that point which we call suitable and adapted to nature, and which is +sought of itself for itself. Now this is wholly put out of the question by +those who deny that in those things in which there is nothing either +honourable or dishonourable, there is any reason why one thing should be +preferred to another, and who think that there is actually no difference +whatever between those things. And Herillus, if he thought that nothing +was good except knowledge, put an end to all reason for taking counsel, +and to all inquiry about duty. Thus, after we have got rid of the opinions +of the rest, as there can be no other, this doctrine of the ancients must +inevitably prevail. + +IX. Therefore, after the fashion of the ancients, which the Stoics also +adopt, let us make this beginning:--Every animal loves itself, and as soon +as it is born labours to preserve itself, because this is the first desire +given to it by nature, to regulate its whole life, to preserve itself, and +to be so disposed as it best may in accordance with nature. At the +beginning it has such a confused and uncertain kind of organization that +it can only just take care of itself, whatever it is; but it does not +understand either what it is, or what its powers are, or what its nature +is. But when it has advanced a little, and begins to perceive how far +anything touches it, or has reference to it, then it begins gradually to +improve, and to comprehend itself, and to understand for what cause it has +that appetite of the mind which I have spoken of; and begins also to +desire those things which it feels to be suited to its nature, and to keep +off the contrary. Therefore, in the case of every animal, what it wishes +is placed in that thing which is adapted to its nature. And so the chief +good is to live according to nature, with the best disposition and the +most suitable to nature that can be engendered. + +But since every animal has his own peculiar nature, it is plain that the +object of each must be to have his nature satisfied. For there is no +hindrance to there being some things in common to all other animals, and +some common both to men and beasts, since the nature of all is common. But +that highest and chief good and evil which we are in search of, is +distributed and divided among the different kinds of animals, each having +its own peculiar good and evil, adapted to that end which the nature of +each class of animal requires. Wherefore, when we say that the chief good +to all animals is to live according to nature, this must be understood as +if we said that they had all the same chief good. But as it may truly be +said to be common to all arts to be conversant about some science, and +that there is a separate science belonging to each art, so we may say that +it is common to all animals to live according to nature, but that there +are different natures; so that the horse has by nature one chief good, the +ox another, man another; and yet in all there is one common end; and that +is the case too, not only in animals, but also in all those things which +nature nourishes, causes to grow, and protects; in which we see that those +things which are produced out of the earth, somehow or other by their own +energy create many things for themselves which have influence on their +life and growth, and so each in their own kind they arrive at the chief +good. So that we may now embrace all such in one comprehensive statement; +and I need not hesitate to say, that every nature is its own preserver; +and has for its object, as its end and chief good, to protect itself in +the best possible condition that its kind admits of; so that it follows +inevitably that all things which flourish by nature have a similar but +still not the same end. And from this it should be understood, that the +chief and highest good to man is to live according to nature which we may +interpret thus,--to live according to that nature of a man which is made +perfect on all sides, and is in need of nothing. These things then we must +explain; and if our explanation is rather minute, you will excuse it; for +we are bound to consider the youth of our hearer, and the fact that he is +now perhaps listening to such a discourse for the first time. Certainly, +said I; although what you have said hitherto might be very properly +addressed to hearers of any age. + +X. Since then, said he, we have explained the limit of those things which +are to be desired, we must next show why the facts are as I have stated +them. Wherefore, let us set out from the position which I first laid down, +which is also in reality the first, so that we may understand that every +animal loves itself. And though there is no doubt of this, (for it is a +principle fixed deep in nature itself, and is comprehended by the sense of +every one, in such a degree that if any one wished to argue against it, he +would not be listened to,) yet, that I may not pass over anything, I think +it as well to adduce some reasons why this is the case. Although, how can +any one either understand or fancy that there is any animal which hates +itself? It would be a contradiction of facts; for when that appetite of +the mind has begun designedly to attract anything to itself which is an +hindrance to it, because it is an enemy to itself,--when it does that for +its own sake, it will both hate itself and love itself, which is +impossible. It is unavoidable that, if any one is an enemy to himself, he +must think those things bad which are good, and, on the other hand, those +things good which are bad; that he must avoid those things which he ought +to seek, and seek what he ought to avoid; all which habits are indubitably +the overturning of life. For even if some people are found who seek for +halters or other modes of destruction, or, like the man in Terence, who +determined "for such a length of time to do less injury to his son," (as +he says himself,) "until he becomes miserable," it does not follow that +they are to be thought enemies to themselves. But some are influenced by +pain, others by desire; many again are carried away by passion, and while +they knowingly run into evils, still fancy that they are consulting their +own interests most excellently; and, therefore, they unhesitatingly say-- + + + That is my way; do you whate'er you must-- + + +like men who have declared war against themselves, who like to be tortured +all day and tormented all night, and who yet do not accuse themselves of +having omitted to consult their own interests; for this is a complaint +made by those men who are dear to and who love themselves. + +Wherefore, whenever a man is said to be but little obliged to himself, to +be a foe and enemy to himself, and in short to flee from life, it should +be understood that there is some cause of that kind lying beneath the +surface; so that it may be understood from that very instance that every +one is dear to himself. Nor is it sufficient that there has never been any +one who hated himself; but we must understand also that there is no one +who thinks that it is a matter of indifference to him in what condition he +is; for all desire of the mind will be put an end to if, as in those +things between which there is no difference we are not more inclined to +either side, so also, in the case of our own selves, we think it makes no +difference to us in what way we are affected. + +XI. And this also would be a very absurd thing if any one were to say it, +namely, that a man is loved by himself in such a manner that that vehement +love is referred to some other thing, and not to that very man who loves +himself. Now when this is said in the case of friendship, of duty, or of +virtue, however it is said, it is still intelligible what is meant by it; +but in regard to our own selves, it cannot even be understood that we +should love ourselves for the sake of something else, or in a word, for +the sake of pleasure. For it is for our sakes that we love pleasure, and +not for the sake of pleasure that we love ourselves; although what can be +more evident than that every one is not only dear, but excessively dear to +himself? For who is there, or at all events how few are there, who when +death approaches, does not find + + + His heart's blood chill'd with sudden fear, + His cheek grow pale? + + +and if it is a vice to dread the dissolution of nature so excessively, +(and the same thing on the same principle may be asserted of our aversion +to pain,) still the fact that nearly every one is affected in this manner, +is a sufficient proof that nature abhors destruction. And though some men +show this dread or aversion to such a degree that they are deservedly +blamed for it, still this may show us that such feelings would not be so +excessive in some people, if a moderate degree of them were not implanted +in mankind by nature. + +Nor, indeed, do I mean that fear of death which is shown by those men who, +because they think that they are being deprived of the goods of life, or +because they fear some terrible events after death, or who, because they +are afraid of dying in pain, therefore shun death; for in the case of +children, who can have no such ideas or apprehensions, they often show +fear if, when playing with them, we threaten to throw them down from any +place; and even beasts, as Pacuvius says, + + + Who have no cunning, or prophetic craft + To ward off danger ere it come, + + +shudder when the fear of death comes before them. And, indeed, who +entertains a different opinion of the wise man himself? who, even when he +has decided that he must die, still is affected by the departure from his +family, and by the fact that he must leave the light of day. And above all +is the power of nature visible in the human race, since many endure +beggary to preserve life, and men worn out with old age are tortured with +the idea of the approach of death, and endure such things as we see +Philoctetes in the play suffer, who, while he was kept in torture by +intolerable pains, nevertheless preserved his life by the game which he +could kill with his arrows. + + + He, though slow, o'ertook the swift, + He stood and slew the flying-- + + +as Attius says, and made himself coverings for his body by plaiting the +feathers together. I am speaking of mankind, and, indeed, generally of all +animals, though plants and trees have nearly the same nature, whether, as +is the opinion of some most learned men, because some predominant and +divine cause has implanted this power in them, or whether it is +accidental. We see those things which the earth produces preserved in +vigour by their bark and roots, which happens to animals by the +arrangement of their senses, and a certain compact conformation of limb. +And with reference to this subject, although I agree with those men who +think that all these things are regulated by nature, and that if nature +neglected to regulate them, the animals themselves could not exist, still +I grant that those who differ on this subject may think what they please, +and may either understand that when I say the nature of man I mean man +(for it makes no difference); for a man will be able to depart from +himself sooner than he can lose the desire of those things which are +advantageous to him. Rightly, therefore, have the most learned +philosophers sought the principle of the chief good in nature, and thought +that that appetite for things adapted to nature is implanted in all men, +for they are kept together by that recommendation of nature in obedience +to which they love themselves. + +XII. The next thing which we must examine is, what is the nature of man, +since it is sufficiently evident that every one is dear to himself by +nature; for that is the thing which we are really inquiring about. But it +is evident that man consists of mind and body, and that the first rank +belongs to the mind, and the second to the body. In the next place we see, +also, that his body is so formed as to excel that of other animals, and +that his mind is so constituted as to be furnished with senses, and to +have excellence of intellect which the whole nature of man obeys, in which +there is a certain admirable force of reason, and knowledge, and science, +and all kinds of virtues; for the things which are parts of the body have +no authority to be compared with that possessed by the parts of the mind; +and they are more easily known. Therefore, let us begin with them. + +It is evident, now, how suitable to nature are the parts of our body, and +the whole general figure, form, and stature of it; nor is there any doubt +what kind of face, eyes, ears and other features are peculiar to man. But +certainly it is necessary for them to be in good health and vigorous, and +to have all their natural movements and uses; so that no part of them +shall be absent, or disordered, or enfeebled; for nature requires +soundness. For there is a certain action of the body which has all its +motions and its general condition in a state of harmony with nature, in +which if anything goes wrong through any distortion or depravity, either +by any irregular motion or disordered condition,--as if, for instance, a +person were to walk on his hands, or to walk not forwards but +backwards,--then he would evidently appear to be flying from himself, and +to be putting off his manhood, and to hate his own nature. On which +account, also, some ways of sitting down, and some contorted and abrupt +movements, such as wanton or effeminate men at times indulge in, are +contrary to nature. So that even if that should happen through any fault +of the mind, still the nature of the man would seem to be changed in his +body. Therefore, on the contrary, moderate and equal conditions, and +affections, and habits of the body, seem to be suitable to nature. But now +the mind must not only exist, but must exist in a peculiar manner, so as +to have all its parts sound, and to have no virtue wanting: but each sense +has its own peculiar virtue, so that nothing may hinder each sense from +performing its office in the quick and ready perception of those things +which come under the senses. + +XIII. But there are many virtues of the mind, and of that part of the mind +which is the chief, and which is called the intellect; but these virtues +are divided into two principal classes: one, consisting of those which are +implanted by nature, and are called involuntary; the other, of those which +depend on the will, and are more often spoken of by their proper name of +virtues; whose great excellence is attributed to the mind as a subject of +praise. Now in the former class are docility, memory, and others, nearly +all of which are called by the one name of _ingenium_, and those who +possess them are called _ingeniosi_. The other class consists of those +which are great and real virtues; which we call voluntary, such as +prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice, and others of the same kind. And +this was what might be said briefly of both mind and body; and this +statement supplies a sort of sketch of what the nature of man +requires:--and from this it is evident, since we are beloved by ourselves, +and since we wish everything both in our minds and bodies to be perfect, +that those qualities are dear to us for their own sakes, and that they are +of the greatest influence towards our living well. For he to whom +self-preservation is proposed as an object, must necessarily feel an +affection for all the separate parts of himself; and a greater affection +in proportion as they are more perfect and more praiseworthy in their +separate kinds. For that kind of life is desired which is full of the +virtues of the mind and body; and in that the chief good must unavoidably +be placed, since it ought to be of such a character as to be the highest +of all desirable things. And when we have ascertained that, there ought to +be no doubt entertained, that as men are dear to themselves for their own +sake, and of their own accord, so, also, the parts of the body and mind, +and of those things which are in the motion and condition of each, are +cultivated with a deserved regard, and are sought for their own sakes. And +when this principle has been laid down, it is easy to conjecture that +those parts of us are most desirable which have the most dignity; so that +the virtue of each most excellent part which is sought for its own sake, +is also deserving of being principally sought after. And the consequence +will be, that the virtue of the mind is preferred to the virtue of the +body, and that the voluntary virtues of the mind are superior to the +involuntary; for it is the voluntary ones which are properly called +virtues, and which are much superior to the others, as being the offspring +of reason; than which there is nothing more divine in man. In truth, the +chief good of all those qualities which nature creates and maintains, and +which are either unconnected or nearly so with the body, is placed in the +mind; so that it appears to have been a tolerably acute observation which +was made respecting the sow, that that animal had a soul given it instead +of salt to keep it from getting rotten. + +XIV. But there are some beasts in which there is something resembling +virtue, such as lions, dogs, and horses; in which we see movements not of +the body only, as we do in pigs, but to a certain extent we may discern +some movements of mind. But in man the whole dominant power lies in the +mind; and the dominant power of the mind is reason: and from this proceeds +virtue, which is defined as the perfection of reason: which they think is +to be gradually developed day by day. Those things, too, which the earth +produces have a sort of gradual growth towards perfection, not very unlike +what we see in animals. Therefore we say that a vine lives, and dies; we +speak of a tree as young, or old; being in its prime, or growing old. And +it is therefore not inconsistent to speak, as in the case of animals, of +some things in plants, too, being conformable to nature, and some not: and +to say that there is a certain cultivation of them, nourishing, and +causing them to grow, which is the science and art of the farmer, which +prunes them, cuts them in, raises them, trains them, props them, so that +they may be able to extend themselves in the direction which nature points +out; in such a manner that the vines themselves, if they could speak, +would confess that they ought to be managed and protected in the way they +are. And now indeed that which protects it (that I may continue to speak +chiefly of the vine) is external to the vine: for it has but very little +power in itself to keep itself in the best possible condition, unless +cultivation is applied to it. But if sense were added to the vine, so that +it could feel desire and be moved by itself, what do you think it would +do? Would it do those things which were formerly done to it by the +vine-dresser, and of itself attend to itself? Do you not see that it would +also have the additional care of preserving its senses, and its desire for +all those things, and its limbs, if any were added to it? And so too, to +all that it had before, it will unite those things which have been added +to it since: nor will it have the same object that its dresser had, but it +will desire to live according to that nature which has been subsequently +added to it: and so its chief good will resemble that which it had before, +but will not be identical with it; for it will be no longer seeking the +good of a plant, but that of an animal. And suppose that not only the +senses are given it, but also the mind of a man, does it not follow +inevitably that those former things will remain and require to be +protected, and that among them these additions will be far more dear to it +than its original qualities? and that each portion of the mind which is +best is also the dearest? and that its chief good must now consist in +satisfying its nature, since intellect and reason are by far the most +excellent parts of it? And so the chief of all the things which it has to +desire, and that which is derived from the original recommendation of +nature, ascends by several steps, so as at last to reach the summit; +because it is made up of the integrity of the body, and the perfect reason +of the intellect. + +XV. As, therefore, the form of nature is such as I have described it, if, +as I said at the beginning, each individual as soon as he is born could +know himself, and form a correct estimate of what is the power both of his +entire nature and of its separate parts, he would see immediately what +this was which we are in search of, namely, the highest and best of all +the things which we desire: nor would it be possible for him to make a +mistake in anything. But now nature is from the very beginning concealed +in a wonderful manner, nor can it be perceived nor comprehended. But as +our age advances, we gradually, or I should rather say slowly, come to a +kind of knowledge of ourselves. Therefore, that original recommendation +which is given to us by our nature, is obscure and uncertain; and that +first appetite of the mind only goes the length of wishing to secure our +own safety and soundness. But when we begin to look around us, and to feel +what we are, and in what we differ from all the other animals, then we +begin to pursue the objects for which we were born. And we see a similar +thing take place in beasts, who at first do not move from the place in +which they were born; but afterwards all move, influenced by some desire +of their own. And so we see snakes crawl, ducks swim, blackbirds fly, oxen +use their horns, scorpions their stings; and we see nature a guide to each +animal in its path of life. + +And the case is similar with the human race. For infants at their first +birth lie as if they were utterly devoid of mind; but when a little +strength has been added to them, they use both their mind and their +senses, and endeavour to raise themselves up and to use their hands; and +they recognise those by whom they are being brought up; and afterwards +they are amused with those of their own age, and gladly associate with +them, and give themselves up to play, and are attracted by hearing +stories, and are fond of pleasing others with their own superfluities; and +take curious notice of what is done at home, and begin to make remarks, +and to learn; and do not like to be ignorant of the names of those whom +they see; and in their sports and contests with their fellows, they are +delighted if they win, and if they are beaten they are dejected and lose +their spirits. And we must not think that any of these things happen +without reason; for the power of man is produced in such a way by nature, +that it seems made for a perception of all excellence: and on that account +children, even without being taught, are influenced by likeness of those +virtues of which they have the seeds in themselves; for they are the +original elements of nature: and when they have acquired growth, then the +whole work of nature is accomplished. For as we have been born and created +so as to contain in ourselves the principles of doing something, and of +loving somebody, and of liberality, and of gratitude; and so as to have +minds adapted for knowledge, prudence, and fortitude, and averse to their +opposites; it is not without cause that we see in children those sparks, +as it were, of virtue which I have mentioned, by which the reason of a +philosopher ought to be kindled to follow that guide as if it were a god, +and so to arrive at the knowledge of the object of nature. + +For, as I have often said already, the power of nature is discerned +through a cloud while we are of a weak age and feeble intellect; but when +our mind has made progress and acquired strength, then it recognises the +power of nature, but still in such a way that it can make more progress +still, and that it must derive the beginning of that progress from itself. + +XVI. We must therefore enter into the nature of things, and see thoroughly +what it demands; for otherwise we cannot arrive at the knowledge of +ourselves. And because this precept was too important an one to be +discerned by a man, it has on that account been attributed to God. The +Pythian Apollo, then, enjoins us to know ourselves: but this knowledge is +to know the power of our mind and body, and to follow that course of life +which enjoys the circumstances in which it is placed. And since that +desire of the mind to have all the things which I have mentioned in the +most perfect manner in which nature could provide them, existed from the +beginning, we must admit, when we have obtained what we desired, that +nature consists in that as its extreme point, and that that is the chief +good: which certainly must in every case be sought for spontaneously for +its own sake, since it has already been proved, that even all its separate +parts are to be desired for their own sake. But if, in enumerating the +advantages of the body, any one should think that we have passed over +pleasure, that question may be postponed till another opportunity; for it +makes no difference with regard to the present subject of our discussion, +whether pleasure consists in those things which we have called the chief +things in accordance with nature, or whether it does not. For if, as I +indeed think, pleasure is not the crowning good of nature, it has been +properly passed over: but if that crowning good does exist in pleasure, as +some assert, then the fact does not at all hinder this idea of ours of the +chief good from being the right one. For, if to those things which are the +principal goods of nature, pleasure is added, then there will have been +added just one advantage of the body; but no change will have been made in +the original definition of the chief good which was laid down at first. + +XVII. And hitherto, indeed, reason has advanced with us in such a way as +to be wholly derived from the original recommendation of nature. But now +we must pursue another kind of argument, namely, that we are moved in +these matters of our own exceeding goodwill, not only because we love +ourselves, but because there is both in the body and in the mind a +peculiar power belonging to each part of nature. And, (to begin with the +body,) do you not see that if there is anything in their limbs deformed, +or weak, or deficient, men conceal it? and take pains, and labour +earnestly, if they can possibly contrive it, to prevent that defect of the +body from being visible, or else to render it as little visible as +possible? and that they submit to great pain for the sake of curing any +such defect? in order that, even though the actual use of the limb, after +the application of the remedy, be likely to be not greater, but even less, +still the appearance of the limb may be restored to the ordinary course of +nature. In truth, as all men fancy that they are altogether desirable by +nature, and that too, not on any other account, but for their own sakes, +it follows inevitably that each part of them should be desired for its own +sake, because the whole body is sought for its own sake. What more need I +say? Is there nothing in the motion and condition of the body which nature +herself decides ought to be noticed? for instance, how a person walks or +sits, what the expression of his countenance is, what his features are; is +there nothing in all these things which we think worthy or unworthy of a +free man, as the case may be? Do we not think many men deserving of +hatred, who appear by some motion or condition to have despised the laws +and moderation of nature? And since these things are derived from the +body, what is the reason why beauty also may not fairly be said to be a +thing to be desired for its own sake? + +For if we consider distortion or disfigurement of the body a thing to be +avoided for its own sake, why should we not also, and perhaps still more, +cultivate dignity of form for its own sake? And if we avoid what is +unseemly, both in the condition and motion of the body, why may we not on +the other hand pursue beauty? And we also desire health, strength, and +freedom from pain, not merely because of their utility, but also for their +own sakes. For since nature wishes to be made complete in all her parts, +she desires this condition of the body, which is most according to nature, +for its own sake: but nature is put into complete confusion if the body is +either sick, or in pain, or destitute of strength. + +XVIII. Let us consider the parts of the mind, the appearance of which is +more noble; for in proportion as they are more sublime, they give a more +clear indication of their nature. So vehement a love, then, of knowledge +and science is innate in us, that no one can doubt that the nature of man +is drawn to them without being attracted by any external gain. Do we not +see how boys cannot be deterred even by stripes from the consideration and +investigation of such and such things? how, though they may be beaten, +they still pursue their inquiries, and rejoice in having acquired some +knowledge? how they delight in telling others what they have learnt? how +they are attracted by processions, and games, and spectacles of that kind, +and will endure even hunger and thirst for such an object? Can I say no +more? Do we not see those who are fond of liberal studies and arts regard +neither their health nor their estate? and endure everything because they +are charmed with the intrinsic beauty of knowledge and science? and that +they put the pleasures which they derive from learning in the scale +against the greatest care and labour? And Homer himself appears to me to +have had some such feeling as this, which he has developed in what he has +said about the songs of the Sirens: for they do not seem to have been +accustomed to attract those who were sailing by with the sweetness of +their voices, or with any novelty or variety in their song, but the +profession which they made of possessing great knowledge; so that men +clung to their rocks from a desire of learning. For thus they invite +Ulysses, (for I have translated several passages of Homer, and this among +them)-- + + + Oh stay, O pride of Greece! Ulysses, stay! + Oh, cease thy course, and listen to our lay! + Blest is the man ordain'd our voice to hear: + Our song instructs the soul and charms the ear. + Approach, thy soul shall into raptures rise; + Approach, and learn new wisdom from the wise. + We know whate'er the kings of mighty name + Achieved at Ilium in the field of fame; + Whate'er beneath the sun's bright journey lies-- + Oh stay, and learn new wisdom from the wise.(49) + + +Homer saw that the story would not be probable if he represented so great +a man as caught by mere songs; so they promise him knowledge, which it was +not strange that a man desirous of wisdom should consider dearer than his +country. And, indeed, to wish to know everything of every kind, is natural +to the curious; but, to be attracted by the contemplation of greater +objects, to entertain a general desire for knowledge, ought to be +considered a proof of a great man. + +XIX. What ardour for study do you not suppose there must have been in +Archimedes, who was so occupied in drawing some mathematical figures in +the sand, that he was not aware that his city was taken? And what a mighty +genius was that of Aristoxenus which, we see, was devoted to music? What +fondness, too, for study, must have inspired Aristophanes, to dedicate his +whole life to literature! What shall we say of Pythagoras? Why should I +speak of Plato and of Democritus, by whom, we see, that the most distant +countries were travelled over, on account of their desire for learning? +And those who are blind to this have never loved anything very worthy of +being known. And here I may say, that those who say that those studies +which I have mentioned are cultivated for the sake of the pleasures of the +mind, do not understand that they are desirable for their own sakes, +because the mind is delighted by them, without the interruption of any +ideas of utility, and rejoices in the mere fact of knowledge, even though +it may possibly produce inconvenience. But why need we seek for more +instances to prove what is so evident? For let us examine our own selves, +and inquire how the motions of the stars, and the contemplation of the +heavenly bodies, and the knowledge of all those things which are hidden +from us by the obscurity of nature, affect us; and why history, which we +are accustomed to trace back as far as possible, delights us; in the +investigation of which we go over again all that has been omitted, and +follow up all that we have begun. Nor, indeed, am I ignorant that there is +a use, and not merely pleasure, in history. What, however, will be said, +with reference to our reading with pleasure imaginary fables, from which +no utility can possibly be derived? Or to our wishing that the names of +those who have performed any great exploits, and their family, and their +country, and many circumstances besides, which are not at all necessary, +should be known to us? How shall we explain the fact, that men of the +lowest rank, who have no hope of ever performing great deeds themselves, +artisans in short, are fond of history; and that we may see that those +persons also are especially fond of hearing and reading of great +achievements, who are removed from all hope of ever performing any, being +worn out with old age? + +It must, therefore, be understood, that the allurements are in the things +themselves which are learnt and known, and that it is they themselves +which excite us to learning and to the acquisition of information. And, +indeed, the old philosophers, in their fictitious descriptions of the +islands of the blessed, intimate the kind of life which the wise pass, +whom they imagine to be free from all care, requiring no cultivation or +appointments of life as necessary, and doing, and about to do nothing else +but devote their whole time to inquiring and learning and arriving at a +knowledge of nature. But we see that that is not only the delight of a +happy life, but also a relief from misery. Therefore, many men while in +the power of enemies or tyrants, many while in prison or in exile, have +relieved their sorrow by the study of literature. A great man of this +city, Demetrius Phalereus, when he had been unjustly banished from his +country, fled to Alexandria, to king Ptolemy; and, as he was very eminent +for his knowledge of this philosophy to which we are exhorting you, and +had been a pupil of Theophrastus, he wrote many admirable treatises during +the time of that unfortunate leisure of his, not, indeed, for any utility +to himself, for that was out of his reach, but the cultivation of his mind +was to him a sort of sustenance for his human nature. + +I, indeed, have often heard Cnaeus Aufidius, a man of praetorian rank, of +great learning, but blind, say that he was affected more by a regret for +the loss of light, than of any actual benefit which he derived from his +eyes. Lastly, if sleep did not bring us rest to our bodies, and a sort of +medicine after labour, we should think it contrary to nature, for it +deprives us of our senses, and takes away our power of action. Therefore, +if either nature were in no need of rest, or if it could obtain it by any +other means, we should be glad, since even now we are in the habit of +doing without sleep, in a manner almost contrary to nature, when we want +to do or to learn something. + +XX. But there are tokens supplied by nature, still clearer, or, I may say, +entirely evident and indubitable,--more especially, indeed, in man, but +also in every animal,--that the mind is always desirous to be doing +something, and can in no condition endure perpetual rest. It is easy to +see this in the earliest age of children; for although I fear that I may +appear prolix on this subject, still all the ancient philosophers, and +especially those of our own country, have recourse to the cradle for +illustrations, because they think that in childhood they can most easily +detect the will of nature. We see, then, that even infants cannot rest; +but, when they have advanced a little, then they are delighted with even +laborious sports, so that they cannot be deterred from them even by +beating: and that desire for action grows with their growth. Therefore, we +should not like to have the slumber of Endymion given to us, not even if +we expected to enjoy the most delicious dreams; and if it were, we should +think it like death. Moreover, we see that even the most indolent men, men +of a singular worthlessness, are still always in motion both in mind and +body; and when they are not hindered by some unavoidable circumstance, +that they demand a dice-box or some game of some kind, or conversation; +and, as they have none of the liberal delights of learning, seek circles +and assemblies. Even beasts, which we shut up for our own amusement, +though they are better fed than if they were free, still do not willingly +endure being imprisoned, but pine for the free and unrestrained movements +given to them by nature. Therefore, in proportion as every one is born and +prepared for the best objects, he would be unwilling to live at all if, +being excluded from action, he were able only to enjoy the most abundant +pleasures. + +For men wish either to do something as individuals, or those who have +loftier souls undertake the affairs of the state, and devote themselves to +the attainment of honours and commands, or else wholly addict themselves +to the study of learning; in which path of life they are so far from +getting pleasures, that they even endure care, anxiety and sleeplessness, +enjoying only that most excellent portion of man which may be accounted +divine in us, I mean the acuteness of the genius and intellect, and they +neither seek for pleasure nor shun labour. Nor do they intermit either +their admiration of the discoveries of the ancients, or their search after +new ones; and, as they are insatiable in their pursuit of such, they +forget everything else, and admit no low or grovelling thoughts; and such +great power is there in those studies, that we see even those who have +proposed to themselves other chief goods, which they measure by advantage +or pleasure, still devote their lives to the investigation of things, and +to the explanation of the mysteries of nature. + +XXI. This, then, is evident, that we were born for action. But there are +several kinds of action, so that the lesser are thrown into the shade by +those more important. But those of most consequence are, first of all, as +it appears to me, and to those philosophers whose system we are at present +discussing, the consideration and knowledge of the heavens, and of those +things which are hidden and concealed by nature, but into which reason can +still penetrate. And, next to them, the management of state affairs, or a +prudent, temperate, courageous principle of government and knowledge, and +the other virtues, and such actions as are in harmony with those virtues, +which we, embracing them all in one word, call honourable; to the +knowledge and practice of which we are led by nature herself, who goes +before us as our guide, we having been already encouraged to pursue it. +For the beginnings of all things are small, but, as they proceed, they +increase in magnitude, and that naturally: for, at their first birth, +there is in them a certain tenderness and softness, so that they cannot +see or do what is best. For the light of virtue and of a happy life, which +are the two principal things to be desired, appears rather later; and much +later still in such a way that it can be plainly perceived of what +character they are. + +For, admirably does Plato say, "That man is happy to whom, even in his old +age, it is allowed to arrive at wisdom and correctness of judgment." +Wherefore, since we have said enough of the first advantages of nature, we +will now examine those which are more important, and which are later in +point of time. + +Nature, then, has made and fashioned the body of man in such a manner, +that it makes some parts of him perfect at his first birth, and forms +others as he advances in age; and, at the same time, does not employ many +external or adventitious aids. But she has filled up the perfection of the +mind in the same way as that of the body; for she has adorned it with +senses suitable for the effecting of its purposes, so that it is not in +the least, or not much, in want of any assistance for strengthening +itself. But that which is most excellent and important in man it has +abandoned: although it has given him an intellect able to receive every +kind of virtue, and has implanted in him, even without instruction, a +slight knowledge of the most important things, and has begun, as it were, +to teach him, and has led him on to those elements as I may call them, of +virtue which existed in him. But it has only begun virtue itself, nothing +more. Therefore it belongs to us,--when I say to us, I mean to our art,--to +trace back the consequences to those principles which we have received, +until we have accomplished our object, which is indeed of a good deal more +consequence, and a good deal more to be desired for its own sake, than +either the senses, or those parts of the body which we have mentioned; +which the excellent perfection of the mind is so far superior to, that it +can scarcely be imagined how great the difference is. Therefore, all +honour, all admiration, all study is referred to virtue, and to those +actions which are consistent with virtue; and all those things which are +either in our minds in that state, or are done in that manner, are called +by one common name--honourable. And we shall presently see what knowledge +we have of all these things, and what is meant by the different names, and +what the power and nature of each is. + +XXII. But at present we need only explain that these things which I call +honourable, (besides the fact of our living ourselves on their account,) +are also by their own nature deserving of being sought for their own sake. +Children show this, in whom nature is perceived as in a mirror. What +eagerness is there in them when contending together! how vigorous are +their contests! how elated are those who win! how ashamed those who are +beaten! how unwilling are they to be blamed! how eager to be praised! what +labours will they not endure to surpass their fellows! what a recollection +have they of those who are kind to them! how anxious are they to prove +their gratitude! and these qualities are most visible in the best +dispositions; in which all these honourable qualities which we appreciate +are filled up as it were by nature. But in children they are only +sketched. + +Again, in more mature age, who is so unlike a man as not to be moved to a +dislike of baseness and approval of what is honourable? Who is there who +does not loathe a libidinous and licentious youth? who, on the contrary, +does not love modesty and constancy in that age, even though his own +interest is not at all concerned? Who does not detest Pullus Numitorius, +of Fregellae, the traitor, although he was of use to our own republic? who +does not praise Codrus, the saviour of his city, and the daughters of +Erectheus? Who does not detest the name of Tubulus? and love the dead +Aristides? Do we forget how much we are affected at hearing or reading +when we are brought to the knowledge of anything which has been done in a +pious, or friendly, or magnanimous spirit? Why should I speak of men like +ourselves, who have been born and brought up and trained to praise and +glory? What shouts of the common people and of the unlettered crowd are +excited in the theatres when this sentence is uttered-- + + + I am Orestes: + + +and when, on the other hand, the other actor says-- + + + No; it is I, 'tis I who am Orestes. + + +But when one of them is allowed to depart by the perplexed and bewildered +king, and they demand to die together, is this scene ever acted without +being accompanied by the most violent expressions of admiration? There is +no one, then, who does not approve of and praise this disposition of mind; +by which not only no advantage is sought, but good faith is preserved even +at the expense of one's advantage. And not only are imaginary fables, but +true histories also, and especially those of our country, full of such +instances: for we selected our most virtuous citizen to receive the Idaean +sacred vessels; we have sent guardians to kings; our generals have devoted +their lives for the safety of the republic; our consuls have warned a king +who was our greatest enemy, when he was actually approaching our walls, to +beware of poison. In our republic, a woman has been found to expiate, by a +voluntary death, a violation which was inflicted on her by force; and a +man to kill his daughter to save her from being ravished. All which +instances, and a countless host of others, prove to the comprehension of +every one that those who performed those deeds were induced to do so by +the brilliancy of virtue, forgetful of their own advantage, and that we, +when we praise those actions, are influenced by nothing but their +honourable character. + +XXIII. And having briefly explained these matters, (for I have not sought +to adduce the number of examples which I might have done, because there +was no doubt on the subject,) it is shown sufficiently by these facts that +all the virtues, and that honourableness which arises from these virtues, +and clings to them, are worthy to be sought for their own sake. But in the +whole of this honourableness of which we are speaking, there is nothing so +eminent, nor so extensive in its operation, as the union of man with man, +and a certain partnership in and communication of advantages, and the +affection itself of the human race; which originating in that first +feeling according to which the offspring is loved by the parent, and the +whole house united by the bonds of wedlock and descent, creeps gradually +out of doors, first of all to one's relations, then to one's connexions, +then to one's friends and neighbours, then to one's fellow-countrymen, and +to the public friends and allies of one's country; then it embraces the +whole human race: and this disposition of mind, giving every one his due, +and protecting with liberality and equity this union of human society +which I have spoken of, is called justice, akin to which are piety, +kindness, liberality, benevolence, courtesy, and all other qualities of +the same kind. But these, though peculiarly belonging to justice, are also +common to the other virtues. + +For as the nature of man has been created such that it has a sort of +innate principle of society and citizenship, which the Greeks call +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, whatever each virtue does will not be inconsistent with that +principle of common union, and that human affection and society which I +have spoken of; and justice, as she founds herself in practice on the +other virtues, will also require them, for justice cannot be maintained +except by a courageous and wise man. Honourableness itself, then, is a +thing of the same character as all this conspiracy and agreement of the +virtues which I have been speaking of; since it is either virtue itself, +or an action virtuously performed. And a life acting in harmony and +consistency with this system, and with virtue, may fairly be thought +upright and honourable, and consistent, and natural. And this union and +combination of virtues is nevertheless divided by philosophers on some +principle of their own. For though they are so joined and connected as to +be all partners with one another, and to be unable to be separated from +one another, yet each has its peculiar sphere of duty; as, for instance, +fortitude is discerned in labour and danger; temperance, in the disregard +of pleasures; prudence, in the choice of good and evil; justice, in giving +every one his due. Since, then, there is in every virtue a certain care +which turns its eyes abroad, as it were, and which is anxious about and +embraces others, the conclusion is, that friends, and brothers, and +relations, and connexions, and fellow-countrymen, and in short everybody, +since we wish the society of all mankind to be one, are to be sought after +for their own sakes. But still, of all these things and people there is +nothing of such a kind that it can be accounted the chief good. And from +this it follows, that there are found to be two kinds of goods which are +to be sought for their own sake. One kind which exists in those things in +which that chief good is brought to perfection: and they are qualities of +either the mind or body. But these things which are external, that is to +say, which are in neither mind nor body, such as friends, parents, +children, relations, or one's country, are indeed dear to me for their own +sake, but still are not of the same class as the other kind. Nor, indeed, +could any one ever arrive at the chief good, if all those things which are +external, although desirable, were contained in the chief good. + +XXIV. How then, you will say, can it be true that everything is referred +to the chief good, if friendship, and relationship, and all other external +things are not contained in the chief good? Why, on this +principle,--because we protect those things which are external with those +duties which arise from their respective kinds of virtue. For the +cultivation of the regard of a friend or a parent, which is the discharge +of a duty, is advantageous in the actual fact of its being such, inasmuch +as to discharge a duty is a good action; and good actions spring from +virtues; and wise men attend to them, using nature as a kind of guide. + +But men who are not perfect, though endued with admirable talents and +dispositions, are often excited by glory, which has the form and likeness +of honourableness. But if they were to be thoroughly acquainted with the +nature of that honourableness which is wholly complete and perfect, that +one thing which is the most admirable of all things, and the most +praiseworthy, with what joy would they be filled, when they are so greatly +delighted at its outline and bare idea! For who that is given up to +pleasure, and inflamed with the conflagration of desire in the enjoyment +of those things which he has most eagerly wished for, can we imagine to be +full of such joy as the elder Africanus after he had conquered Hannibal, +or the younger one after he had destroyed Carthage? What man was there who +was so much elated with the way in which all the people flocked to the +Tiber on that day of festivity as Lucius Paullus, when he was leading in +triumph king Perses as his prisoner, who was conveyed down on the same +river? + +Come now, my friend Lucius, build up in your mind the lofty excellence of +virtue, and you will not doubt that the men who are possessed of it, and +who live with a magnanimous and upright spirit, are always happy; men who +are aware that all the movements of fortune, all the changes of affairs +and circumstances, must be insignificant and powerless if ever they come +to a contest with virtue. For those things which are considered by us as +goods of the body, do indeed make up a happy life, but still not without +leaving it possible for a life to be happy without them. For so slight and +inconsiderable are those additions of goods, that as stars in the orbit of +the sun are not seen, so neither are those qualities, but they are lost in +the brilliancy of virtue. And as it is said with truth that the influence +of the advantages of the body have but little weight in making life happy, +so on the other hand it is too strong an assertion to say that they have +no weight at all: for those who argue thus appear to me to forget the +principles of nature which they themselves have contended for. + +We must, therefore, allow these things some influence: provided only that +we understand how much we ought to allow them. It is, however, the part of +a philosopher, who seeks not so much for what is specious as for what is +true, neither utterly to disregard those things which those very boastful +men used to admit to be in accordance with nature; and at the same time to +see that the power of virtue, and the authority, if I may say so, of +honourableness, is so great that all those other things appear to be, I +will not say nothing, but so trivial as to be little better than nothing. +This is the language natural to a man who, on the one hand, does not +despise everything except virtue, and who, at the same time, honours +virtue with the praises which it deserves. This, in short, is a full and +perfect explanation of the chief good; and as the others have attempted to +detach different portions from the main body of it, each individual among +them has wished to appear to have established his own theory as the +victorious one. + +XXV. The knowledge of things has been often extolled in a wonderful manner +by Aristotle and Theophrastus for its own sake. And Herillus, being +allured by this single fact, maintained that knowledge was the chief good, +and that there was no other thing whatever that deserved to be sought for +its own sake. Many things have been said by the ancients on the subject of +despising and contemning all human affairs. This was the one principle of +Aristo; he declared that there was nothing which ought to be avoided or +desired except vice and virtue. And our school has placed freedom from +pain among those things which are in accordance with nature. Hieronymus +has said that this is the chief good: but Callipho, and Diodorus after +him, one of whom was devoted to pleasure, and the other to freedom from +pain, could neither of them allow honourableness to be left out, which has +been especially praised by our countrymen. Moreover, even the advocates of +pleasure seek for subterfuges, and are talking of virtue whole days +together; and say that pleasure is at first only wished for; that +afterwards it, through custom, becomes a second nature, by which men are +excited to do many things without at all seeking pleasure. + +The Stoics remain to be mentioned. They, indeed, have borrowed not one +idea or another from us, but have appropriated our whole system of +philosophy. And as other thieves alter the marks on the things which they +have stolen, so they, in order to be able to use our opinions as their +own, have changed the names which are like the private marks on things. +And so this school alone remains worthy of those men who study the liberal +arts, worthy of the learned, worthy of eminent men, worthy of princes, +worthy of kings. + +And when he had said this, and then stopped to take breath for a while; +What is the matter? said he; do I not seem to have said enough in your +presence for my own defence? I replied,--Indeed, O Piso, as has often been +the case before, you have seemed to-day to have so thorough an +acquaintance with all these things, that, if we could always have the +advantage of your company, I should not think that we had much reason to +have recourse to the Greeks. Which, indeed, I have been the more pleased +with, because I recollect that Staseas, the Neapolitan, your preceptor, a +very illustrious Peripatetic, was at times accustomed to discuss these +points differently, agreeing with those men who attributed a great deal of +weight to prosperity and adversity, and to the good or evil qualities of +the body. It is as you say, he replied: but these points are argued with +much more accuracy and impressiveness by my friend Antiochus than they +used to be by Staseas. Although I do not ask what I have proved to your +satisfaction, but what I have proved to the satisfaction of this friend of +mine, the young Cicero, a pupil whom I wish to seduce from you. + +XXVI. Then Lucius said,--Indeed, I quite agree with what you have said, and +I think my brother does too. Then said Piso to me: Is it so? Do you pardon +the youth? or would you rather that he should learn these things which, +when he has learnt thoroughly, he will know nothing at all? I give him +leave, said I. But do not you recollect that I am allowed to express my +approval or disapproval of what has been said by you? For who can avoid +approving of what appears to him to be probable? Can any, we said, approve +of anything of which he has not a thorough perception, comprehension, and +knowledge? There is, said I, no great dispute between us, Piso; for there +is no other reason why it appears to me that nothing can be perceived +except that the faculty of perceiving is defined in such a manner by the +Stoics that they affirm that nothing can be perceived except what is so +true that it cannot possibly be false. Therefore there is a dispute +between us and the Stoics, but none between us and the Peripatetics. +However, we may pass over this, for it would open the door to a long and +sufficiently bitter dispute. + +It seemed to me that it was too hasty an assertion of yours that all wise +men were always happy. I know not how such a sentence escaped you; but +unless it is proved, I fear that the assertion which Theophrastus made +with respect to fortune, and pain, and bodily torture be true, with which +he did not consider that a happy life could possibly be joined, must be +true. For it is exceedingly inconsistent that the same person should be +happy, and afflicted with many misfortunes; and how these things can be +reconciled, I do not at all understand. Which assertion then, said he, is +it that you object to? Do you deny that the power of virtue is so great +that she can by herself be sufficient for happiness? or, if you admit +that, do you think it impossible that those persons who are possessed of +virtue may be happy, even if they are afflicted with some evils? I, +indeed, I replied, wish to attribute as much power as possible to virtue; +however, we may discuss at another time how great her power is; at present +the only question is, whether she has so much power as this, if anything +external to virtue is reckoned among the goods. But, said he, if you grant +to the Stoics that virtue alone, if it be present, makes life happy, you +grant it also to the Peripatetics; for those things which they do not +venture to call evils, but which they admit to be unpleasant and +inconvenient, and to be rejected, and odious to nature we call evils, but +slight, and, indeed, exceedingly trifling ones. Wherefore, if that man can +be happy who is among disagreeable things which ought to be rejected, he +also may be so who is among slight evils. And I say, O Piso, if there is +any one who in causes is used to have a clear insight into what the real +question is, you are the man: wherefore I beg of you to take notice; for, +hitherto, owing perhaps to my fault, you do not perceive what it is that I +am seeking. I am attending, said he; and I am waiting to see what answer +you will make to the questions that I ask. + +XXVII. I will answer, said I, that I am not inquiring at present what +virtue can effect, but what is said consistently on the subject, and why +the assertions are at variance with one another. How so? said he. Because, +said I, when this pompous assertion is uttered by Zeno, as if he were an +oracle,--"Virtue requires nothing beyond herself to enable a man to live +happily"--why? said he--"Because there is no other good except what is +honourable." I do not ask now whether that is true; I only say that what +he says is admirably consistent. Epicurus will say the same thing--"that +the wise man is always happy;" which, indeed, he is in the habit of +spouting out sometimes. And he says that this wise man, when he is being +torn to pieces with the most exquisite pains, will say, "How pleasant it +is! how I disregard it!" I will not argue with the man as to why there is +so much power in nature; I will only urge that he does not understand what +he ought to say, after he has said that pain is the greatest evil. + +Now I will address the same language to you. You say that all the goods +and evils are the same that those men pronounce them to be who have never +even seen a philosopher in a picture, as the saying is--namely, health, +strength, stature, beauty, the soundness of all a man's nails, you call +good--deformity, disease, weakness you call evils. These are all externals; +do not go on any more; but at all events you will reckon these things +among the goods, as the goods of the body which help to compose them, +namely, friends, children, relations, riches, honour, power. Take notice +that I say nothing against this. If those are evils into which a wise man +can fall, then it follows that to be a wise man is not sufficient to +secure a happy life. Indeed, said he, it is very little towards securing a +perfectly happy one, but enough for securing a tolerably happy one. + +I have noticed, said he, that you made this distinction a little while +ago, and I know that our friend Antiochus used to speak in this manner. +But what can be less approved of than the idea of a person being happy, +and yet not happy enough? For when anything is enough, then whatever is +added to that is excess: and no one is too happy: and no one is happier +than a happy man. Therefore, said he, was not Quintus Metellus, who saw +three of his sons consuls, one of whom was also censor and celebrated a +triumph, and a fourth praetor; and who left them all in safety behind him, +and who saw his three daughters married, having been himself consul, +censor and augur, and having celebrated a triumph; was he not, I say, in +your opinion, (supposing him to have been a wise man,) happier than +Regulus, who being in the power of the enemy, was put to death by +sleeplessness and hunger, though he may have been equally wise? + +XXVIII. Why do you ask me that? said I; ask the Stoics. What answer, then, +said he, do you suppose they will make? They will say that Metellus was in +no respect more happy than Regulus. Let us, then, said he, hear what they +have got to say. But, said I, we are wandering from our subject; for I am +not asking what is true, but what each person ought to say. I wish, +indeed, that they would say that one man is happier than another: you +should see the ruin I would make of them. For, as the chief good consists +in virtue alone, and in honourableness; and as neither virtue, as they +say, nor honourableness is capable of growth, and as that alone is good +which makes him who enjoys it necessarily happy, as that in which alone +happiness is placed cannot be increased, how is it possible that one +person can be happier than another? Do you not see how all these things +agree together? And, in truth, (for I must avow what I feel,) the mutual +dependence of all these things on one another is marvellous: the last part +corresponds to the first, the middle to each extremity, and each extremity +to the other. They see all that follows from, or is inconsistent with +them. In geometry, if you grant the premises the conclusion follows. Grant +that there is nothing good except what is honourable, and you must grant +that happiness is placed in virtue alone. Try it the other way. If you +grant this conclusion, you must grant the premises; but this is not the +case with the arguments of your school. There are three kinds of goods. +The assertions go trippingly on: he comes to the conclusion: he sticks +fast: he is in a difficulty; for he wishes to say, that nothing can be +wanting to a wise man to complete his happiness--a very honourable +sentiment, one worthy of Socrates, or even of Plato. Well, I do venture to +assert that, says he. It is impossible, unless you remodel your premises: +if poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy be he ever so wise. But Zeno +ventured to call such a man not only happy, but also rich. + +To be in pain is an evil; the man who is fastened to a cross cannot be +happy. Children are a good; childlessness is an evil. One's country is a +good; exile is an evil. Health is a good; disease is an evil. Vigour of +body is a good; feebleness is an evil. Clear sight is a good; blindness is +an evil. But, though a man may be able to alleviate any single one of +these evils by consolation, how will he be able to endure them all? For, +suppose one person were blind, feeble, afflicted with grievous sickness, +banished, childless, in indigence, and put to the torture; what will you +call him, Zeno? Happy, says he. Will you call him most perfectly happy? To +be sure I will, says he, when I have taught him that happiness does not +admit of degrees any more than virtue, the mere possession of which makes +him happy. This seems to you incredible that he can call him perfectly +happy. What is your own doctrine? is that credible? For if you appeal to +the people, you will never convince them that a man in such a condition is +happy. If you appeal to prudent men, perhaps they will doubt as to one +point, namely, whether there is so much force in virtue that men endued +with that can be happy, even in Phalaris's bull; but they will not doubt +at all that the Stoic language is consistent with itself and that yours is +not. + +Do you then, says he, approve of the book of Theophrastus on a happy life? +We are wandering from our subject; and that I may not be too tedious--if, +said I, Piso, those things are evils, I wholly approve of it. Do not they +then, said he, seem to you to be evils? Do you ask that? said I; whatever +answer I give you, you will find yourself in embarrassment. How so? said +he. Because, if they are evils, a man who is affected with them cannot be +happy. If they are not evils, there is an end to the whole system of the +Peripatetics. And he laughing replied, I see what you are at; you are +afraid I shall carry off your pupil. You may carry him off, said I, if he +likes to follow you; for he will still be with me if he is with you. + +XXIX. Listen then, said he, O Lucius; for, as Theophrastus says, I must +direct my discourse to you,--the whole authority of philosophy consists in +making life happy; for we are all inflamed with a desire of living +happily. This, both your brother and I agree upon. Wherefore we must see +whether the system of the philosophers can give us this. It promises to do +so certainly: for, unless it made that promise, why did Plato travel over +Egypt, to learn numbers and knowledge of the heavenly mysteries from +barbarian priests? Why afterwards did he go to Tarentum to Archytas; and +to the other Pythagoreans of Locri, Echecrates, Timaeus, and Acrion; in +order, after he had drained Socrates to the dregs, to add the doctrine of +the Pythagoreans to his, and to learn in addition those things which +Socrates rejected? Why did Pythagoras himself travel over Egypt, and visit +the Persian Magi; why did he go on foot over so many countries of the +barbarians, and make so many voyages? Why did Democritus do the same? who, +(whether it is true or false, we will not stop to inquire,) is said to +have put out his own eyes; certainly, in order that his mind might be +abstracted from contemplation as little as possible; he neglected his +patrimony, and left his lands uncultivated, and what other object could he +have had except a happy life? And if he placed that in the knowledge of +things, still from that investigation of natural philosophy he sought to +acquire equanimity; for he called the summum bonum {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, and very often +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, that is to say, a mind free from alarm. But, although this was +well said, it was not very elegantly expressed; for he said very little +about virtue, and even what he did say, he did not express very clearly. +For it was not till after his death that these subjects were discussed in +this city, first by Socrates, and from Socrates they got entrance into the +Academy. Nor was there any doubt that all hope of living well and also +happily was placed in virtue: and when Zeno had learnt this from our +school, he began to express himself on the same subject in another manner, +as lawyers do on trials. And now you approve of this conduct in him. Will +you then say that he by changing the names of things escaped the charge of +inconsistency, and yet not allow us to do so too? + +He asserts that the life of Metellus was not happier than that of Regulus, +but admits that it was preferable to it; he says it was not more to be +sought after, but still to be taken in preference; and that if one had a +choice, one would choose the life of Metellus, and reject that of Regulus. +What then he calls preferable, and worthy to be chosen in preference, I +call happier; and yet I do not attribute more importance to that sort of +life than the Stoics do. For what difference is there between us, except +that I call well-known things by well-known names, and that they seek for +new terms to express the same ideas? And so, as there is always some one +in the senate who wants an interpreter, we, too, must listen to them with +an interpreter. I call that good which is in accordance with nature; and +whatever is contrary to nature I call evil. Nor do I alone use the +definition; you do also, O Chrysippus, in the forum and at home; but in +the school you discard it. What then? Do you think that men in general +ought to speak in one way, and philosophers in another, as to the +importance of which everything is? that learned men should hold one +language, and unlearned ones another? But as learned men are agreed of how +much importance everything is, (if they were men, they would speak in the +usual fashion,) why, as long as they leave the facts alone, they are +welcome to mould the names according to their fancy. + +XXX. But I come now to the charge of inconsistency, that you may not +repeat that I am making digressions; which you think exist only in +language, but which I used to consider depended on the subject of which +one was speaking. If it is sufficiently perceived (and here we have most +excellent assistance from the Stoics), that the power of virtue is so +great, that if everything else were put on the opposite side, it would not +be even visible, when all things which they admit at least to be +advantages, and to deserve to be taken, and chosen, and preferred, and +which they define as worthy of being highly estimated; when, I say, I call +these things goods which have so many names given them by the Stoics, some +of which are new, and invented expressly for them, such as _producta_ and +_reducta_, and some of which are merely synonymous; (for what difference +can it make whether you wish for a thing or choose it? that which is +chosen, and on which deliberate choice is exercised, appears to me to be +the better) still, when I have called all these things goods, the question +is merely how great goods I call them; when I say they deserved to be +wished for, the question is,--how eagerly? + +But, if I do not attribute more importance to them when I say that they +deserve to be wished for, than you do who say they only deserve to be +chosen, and if I do not value them more highly when I call them _bona_, +than you, when you speak of them as _producta_; then all these things must +inevitably be involved in obscurity, and put out of sight, and lost amid +the rays of virtue like stars in the sunbeams. But that life in which +there is any evil cannot be happy. Then a corn-field full of thick and +heavy ears of corn is not a corn-field if you see any tares anywhere; nor +is traffic gainful if, amid the greatest gains, you incur the most +trifling loss. Do we ever act on different principles in any circumstances +of life; and will you not judge of the whole from its greatest part? or is +there any doubt that virtue is so much the most important thing in all +human affairs, that it throws all the rest into the shade? + +I will venture, then, to call the rest of the things which are in +accordance with nature, goods, and not to cheat them of their ancient +title, rather than go and hunt for some new name for them; and the dignity +of virtue I will put, as it were, in the other scale of the balance. +Believe me, that scale will outweigh both earth and sea; for the whole +always has its name from that which embraces its largest part, and is the +most widely diffused. We say that one man lives merrily. Is there, then, +an end of this merry life of his if he is for a moment a little poor? + +But, in the case of that Marcus Crassus, who, Lucilius says, laughed once +in his life, the fact of his having done so did not deliver him from being +called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. They call Polycrates of Samos happy. Nothing had ever +happened to him which he did not like, except that he had thrown into the +sea a ring which he valued greatly; therefore he was unhappy as to that +one annoyance; but subsequently he was happy again when that same ring was +found in the belly of a fish. But he, if he was unwise (which he certainly +was, since he was a tyrant), was never happy; if he was wise he was not +miserable, even at the time when he was crucified by Oroetes, the +lieutenant of Darius. But he had great evils inflicted on him. Who denies +that?--but those evils were overcome by the greatness of his virtue. + +XXXI. Do you not grant even this to the Peripatetics, that they may say +that the life of all good, that is, of all wise men, and of men adorned +with every virtue, has in all its parts more good than evil? Who says +this? The Stoics may say so. By no means. But do not those very men who +measure everything by pleasure and pain, say loudly that the wise man has +always more things which he likes than dislikes? When, then, these men +attribute so much to virtue, who confess that they would not even lift a +finger for the sake of virtue, if it did not bring pleasure with it, what +ought we to do, who say that ever so inconsiderable an excellence of mind +is so superior to all the goods of the body, that they are put wholly out +of sight by it? For who is there who can venture to say, that it can +happen to a wise man (even if such a thing were possible) to discard +virtue for ever, with a view of being released from all pain? Who of our +school, who are not ashamed to call those things evils which the Stoics +call only bitter, would say that it was better to do anything +dishonourably with pleasure than honourably with pain? To us, indeed, +Dionysius of Heraclea appears to have deserted the Stoics in a shameful +manner, on account of the pain of his eyes; as if he had learnt from Zeno +not to be in pain when he was in pain. He had heard, but he had not +learnt, that it was not an evil, because it was not dishonourable, and +because it might be borne by a man. If he had been a Peripatetic he would, +I suppose, have adhered to his opinion, since they say that pain is an +evil. And with respect to bearing its bitterness, they give the same +precepts as the Stoics; and, indeed, your friend Arcesilas, although he +was a rather pertinacious arguer, was still on our side; for he was a +pupil of Polemo; and when he was suffering under the pain of the gout, and +Carneades, a most intimate friend of Epicurus, had come to see him, and +was going away very melancholy, said, "Stay awhile, I entreat you, friend +Carneades; for the pain does not reach here," showing his feet and his +breast. Still he would have preferred being out of pain. + +XXXII. This, then, is our doctrine, which appears to you to be +inconsistent, since, by reason of a certain heavenly, divine, and +inexpressible excellence of virtue, so great, that wherever virtue and +great, desirable, and praiseworthy exploits done by virtue are, there +misery and grief cannot be, but nevertheless labour and annoyance can be, +I do not hesitate to affirm that all wise men are always happy, but still, +that it is possible that one man may be more happy than another. + +But this is exactly the assertion, Piso, said I, which you are bound to +prove over and over again; and if you establish it, then you may take with +you not only my young Cicero here, but me too. Then, said Quintus, it +appears to me that this has been sufficiently proved. I am glad, indeed, +that philosophy, the treasures of which I have been used to value above +the possession of everything else (so rich did it appear to me, that I +could ask of it whatever I desired to know in our studies),--I rejoice, +therefore, that it has been found more acute than all other arts, for it +was in acuteness that some people asserted that it was deficient. Not a +mite more so than ours, surely, said Pomponius, jestingly. But, seriously, +I have been very much pleased with what you have said; for what I did not +think could be expressed in Latin has been expressed by you, and that no +less clearly than by the Greeks, and in not less well adapted language. +But it is time to depart, if you please; and let us go to my house. + +And when he had said this, as it appeared that we had discussed the +subject sufficiently, we all went into the town to the house of Pomponius. + + + + + +THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. + + + + +Introduction. + + +In the year A.U.C. 708, and the 62d year of Cicero's age, his daughter, +Tullia, died in childbed; and her loss afflicted Cicero to such a degree +that he abandoned all public business, and, leaving the city, retired to +Asterra, which was a country house that he had near Antium; where, after a +while, he devoted himself to philosophical studies, and, besides other +works, he published his Treatise de Finibus, and also this Treatise called +the Tusculan Disputations, of which Middleton gives this concise +description:-- + +"The first book teaches us how to contemn the terrors of death, and to +look upon it as a blessing rather than an evil; + +"The second, to support pain and affliction with a manly fortitude; + +"The third, to appease all our complaints and uneasinesses under the +accidents of life; + +"The fourth, to moderate all our other passions; + +"And the fifth explains the sufficiency of virtue to make men happy." + +It was his custom in the opportunities of his leisure to take some friends +with him into the country, where, instead of amusing themselves with idle +sports or feasts, their diversions were wholly speculative, tending to +improve the mind and enlarge the understanding. In this manner he now +spent five days at his Tusculan villa in discussing with his friends the +several questions just mentioned. For, after employing the mornings in +declaiming and rhetorical exercises, they used to retire in the afternoon +into a gallery, called the Academy, which he had built for the purpose of +philosophical conferences, where, after the manner of the Greeks, he held +a school as they called it, and invited the company to call for any +subject that they desired to hear explained, which being proposed +accordingly by some of the audience became immediately the argument of +that day's debate. These five conferences or dialogues he collected +afterwards into writing in the very words and manner in which they really +passed; and published them under the title of his Tusculan Disputations, +from the name of the villa in which they were held. + + + + +Book I. On The Contempt Of Death. + + +I. At a time when I had entirely, or to a great degree, released myself +from my labours as an advocate, and from my duties as a senator, I had +recourse again, Brutus, principally by your advice, to those studies which +never had been out of my mind, although neglected at times, and which +after a long interval I resumed: and now since the principles and rules of +all arts which relate to living well depend on the study of wisdom, which +is called philosophy, I have thought it an employment worthy of me to +illustrate them in the Latin tongue: not because philosophy could not be +understood in the Greek language, or by the teaching of Greek masters; but +it has always been my opinion, that our countrymen have, in some +instances, made wiser discoveries than the Greeks, with reference to those +subjects which they have considered worthy of devoting their attention to, +and in others have improved upon their discoveries, so that in one way or +other we surpass them on every point: for, with regard to the manners and +habits of private life, and family and domestic affairs, we certainly +manage them with more elegance, and better than they did; and as to our +republic, that our ancestors have, beyond all dispute, formed on better +customs and laws. What shall I say of our military affairs; in which our +ancestors have been most eminent in valour, and still more so in +discipline? As to those things which are attained not by study, but +nature, neither Greece, nor any nation, is comparable to us: for what +people has displayed such gravity, such steadiness, such greatness of +soul, probity, faith--such distinguished virtue of every kind, as to be +equal to our ancestors. In learning, indeed, and all kinds of literature, +Greece did excel us, and it was easy to do so where there was no +competition; for while amongst the Greeks the poets were the most ancient +species of learned men,--since Homer and Hesiod lived before the foundation +of Rome, and Archilochus(50) was a contemporary of Romulus,--we received +poetry much later. For it was about five hundred and ten years after the +building of Rome before Livius(51) published a play in the consulship of +C. Claudius, the son of Caecus, and M. Tuditanus, a year before the birth +of Ennius, who was older than Plautus and Naevius. + +II. It was, therefore, late before poets were either known or received +amongst us; though we find in Cato de Originibus that the guests used, at +their entertainments, to sing the praises of famous men to the sound of +the flute; but a speech of Cato's shows this kind of poetry to have been +in no great esteem, as he censures Marcus Nobilior, for carrying poets +with him into his province: for that consul, as we know, carried Ennius +with him into AEtolia. Therefore the less esteem poets were in, the less +were those studies pursued: though even then those who did display the +greatest abilities that way, were not very inferior to the Greeks. Do we +imagine that if it had been considered commendable in Fabius,(52) a man of +the highest rank, to paint, we should not have had many Polycleti and +Parrbasii. Honour nourishes art, and glory is the spur with all to +studies; while those studies are always neglected in every nation, which +are looked upon disparagingly. The Greeks held skill in vocal and +instrumental music as a very important accomplishment, and therefore it is +recorded of Epaminondas, who, in my opinion, was the greatest man amongst +the Greeks, that he played excellently on the flute; and Themistocles some +years before was deemed ignorant because at an entertainment he declined +the lyre when it was offered to him. For this reason musicians flourished +in Greece; music was a general study; and whoever was unacquainted with +it, was not considered as fully instructed in learning. Geometry was in +high esteem with them, therefore none were more honourable than +mathematicians; but we have confined this art to bare measuring and +calculating. + +III. But on the contrary, we early entertained an esteem for the orator; +though he was not at first a man of learning, but only quick at speaking; +in subsequent times he became learned; for it is reported that Galba, +Africanus, and Laelius, were men of learning; and that even Cato, who +preceded them in point of time, was a studious man: then succeeded the +Lepidi, Carbo, and Gracchi, and so many great orators after them, down to +our own times, that we were very little, if at all, inferior to the +Greeks. Philosophy has been at a low ebb even to this present time, and +has had no assistance from our own language, and so now I have undertaken +to raise and illustrate it, in order that, as I have been of service to my +countrymen, when employed on public affairs, I may, if possible, be so +likewise in my retirement; and in this I must take the more pains, because +there are already many books in the Latin language which are said to be +written inaccurately, having been composed by excellent men, only not of +sufficient learning: for indeed it is possible that a man may think well, +and yet not be able to express his thoughts elegantly; but for any one to +publish thoughts which he can neither arrange skilfully nor illustrate so +as to entertain his reader, is an unpardonable abuse of letters and +retirement: they, therefore, read their books to one another, and no one +ever takes them up but those who wish to have the same licence for +careless writing allowed to themselves. Wherefore, if oratory has acquired +any reputation from my industry, I shall take the more pains to open the +fountains of philosophy, from which all my eloquence has taken its rise. + +IV. But, as Aristotle,(53) a man of the greatest genius, and of the most +various knowledge, being excited by the glory of the rhetorician +Isocrates,(54) commenced teaching young men to speak, and joined +philosophy with eloquence: so it is my design not to lay aside my former +study of oratory, and yet to employ myself at the same time in this +greater and more fruitful art; for I have always thought, that to be able +to speak copiously and elegantly on the most important questions, was the +most perfect philosophy. And I have so diligently applied myself to this +pursuit that I have already ventured to have a school like the Greeks. And +lately when you left us, having many of my friends about me, I attempted +at my Tusculan villa what I could do in that way; for as I formerly used +to practise declaiming, which nobody continued longer than myself, so this +is now to be the declamation of my old age. I desired any one to propose a +question which he wished to have discussed: and then I argued that point +either sitting or walking, and so I have compiled the scholae, as the +Greeks call them, of five days, in as many books. We proceeded in this +manner: when he who had proposed the subject for discussion had said what +he thought proper, I spoke against him; for this is, you know, the old and +Socratic method of arguing against another's opinion; for Socrates thought +that thus the truth would more easily be arrived at. But to give you a +better notion of our disputations, I will not barely send you an account +of them, but represent them to you as they were carried on; therefore let +the introduction be thus:-- + +V. _A._ To me death seems to be an evil. + +_M._ What to those who are already dead? or to those who must die? + +_A._ To both. + +_M._ It is a misery then, because an evil? + +_A._ Certainly. + +_M._ Then those who have already died, and those who have still got to +die, are both miserable? + +_A._ So it appears to me. + +_M._ Then all are miserable? + +_A._ Every one. + +_M._ And, indeed, if you wish to be consistent, all that are already born, +or ever shall be, are not only miserable, but always will be so; for +should you maintain those only to be miserable, you would not except any +one living, for all must die; but there should be an end of misery in +death. But seeing that the dead are miserable, we are born to eternal +misery, for they must of consequence be miserable who died a hundred +thousand years ago; or rather, all that have ever been born. + +_A._ So, indeed, I think. + +_M._ Tell me, I beseech you, are you afraid of the three-headed Cerberus +in the shades below, and the roaring waves of Cocytus, and the passage +over Acheron, and Tantalus expiring with thirst, while the water touches +his chin; and Sisyphus, + + + Who sweats with arduous toil in vain + The steepy summit of the mount to gain? + + +Perhaps, too, you dread the inexorable judges, Minos and Rhadamanthus; +before whom neither L. Crassus, nor M. Antonius can defend you; and where, +since the cause lies before Grecian judges, you will not even be able to +employ Demosthenes: but you must plead for yourself before a very great +assembly. These things perhaps you dread, and therefore look on death as +an eternal evil. + +VI. _A._ Do you take me to be so imbecile as to give credit to such +things? + +_M._ What? do you not believe them? + +_A._ Not in the least. + +_M._ I am sorry to hear that. + +_A._ Why, I beg? + +_M._ Because I could have been very eloquent in speaking against them. + +_A._ And who could not on such a subject? or, what trouble is it to refute +these monstrous inventions of the poets and painters?(55) + +_M._ And yet you have books of philosophers full of arguments against +these. + +_A._ A great waste of time, truly! for, who is so weak as to be concerned +about them? + +_M._ If, then, there is no one miserable in the infernal regions, there +can be no one there at all. + +_A._ I am altogether of that opinion. + +_M._ Where, then, are those you call miserable? or what place do they +inhabit? for, if they exist at all, they must be somewhere? + +_A._ I, indeed, am of opinion that they are nowhere. + +_M._ Then they have no existence at all. + +_A._ Even so, and yet they are miserable for this very reason, that they +have no existence. + +_M._ I had rather now have you afraid of Cerberus, than speak thus +inaccurately. + +_A._ In what respect? + +_M._ Because you admit him to exist whose existence you deny with the same +breath. Where now is your sagacity? when you say any one is miserable, you +say that he who does not exist, does exist. + +_A._ I am not so absurd as to say that. + +_M._ What is it that you do say, then? + +_A._ I say, for instance, that Marcus Crassus is miserable in being +deprived of such great riches as his by death; that Cn. Pompey is +miserable, in being taken from such glory and honour; and in short, that +all are miserable who are deprived of this light of life. + +_M._ You have returned to the same point, for to be miserable implies an +existence; but you just now denied that the dead had any existence; if, +then, they have not, they can be nothing; and if so, they are not even +miserable. + +_A._ Perhaps I do not express what I mean, for I look upon this very +circumstance, not to exist after having existed, to be very miserable. + +_M._ What, more so than not to have existed at all? therefore, those who +are not yet born, are miserable because they are not; and we ourselves, if +we are to be miserable after death, were miserable before we were born: +but I do not remember that I was miserable before I was born; and I should +be glad to know, if your memory is better, what you recollect of yourself +before you were born. + +VII. _A._ You are pleasant; as if I had said that those men are miserable +who are not born, and not that they are so who are dead. + +_M._ You say, then, that they are so? + +_A._ Yes, I say that because they no longer exist after having existed, +they are miserable. + +_M._ You do not perceive, that you are asserting contradictions; for what +is a greater contradiction, than that they should be not only miserable, +but should have any existence at all, which does not exist? When you go +out at the Capene gate and see the tombs of the Calatini, the Scipios, +Servilii, and Metelli, do you look on them as miserable? + +_A._ Because you press me with a word, henceforward I will not say they +are miserable absolutely, but miserable on this account, because they have +no existence. + +_M._ You do not say, then, "M. Crassus is miserable," but only "Miserable +M. Crassus." + +_A._ Exactly so. + +_M._ As if it did not follow, that whatever you speak of in that manner, +either is or is not. Are you not acquainted with the first principles of +logic? for this is the first thing they lay down, Whatever is asserted, +(for that is the best way that occurs to me, at the moment, of rendering +the Greek term, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, if I can think of a more accurate expression +hereafter I will use it,) is asserted as being either true or false. When, +therefore, you say, "Miserable M. Crassus," you either say this, "M. +Crassus is miserable," so that some judgment may be made whether it is +true or false, or you say nothing at all. + +_A._ Well, then, I now own that the dead are not miserable, since you have +drawn from me a concession, that they who do not exist at all, cannot be +miserable. What then? we that are alive, are we not wretched, seeing we +must die? for what is there agreeable in life, when we must night and day +reflect that, at some time or other, we must die? + +VIII. _M._ Do you not, then, perceive how great is the evil from which you +have delivered human nature? + +_A._ By what means? + +_M._ Because, if to die were miserable to the dead, to live would be a +kind of infinite and eternal misery: now, however, I see a goal, and when +I have reached it, there is nothing more to be feared; but you seem to me +to follow the opinion of Epicharmus,(56) a man of some discernment, and +sharp enough for a Sicilian. + +_A._ What opinion? for I do not recollect it. + +_M._ I will tell you if I can in Latin, for you know I am no more used to +bring in Latin sentences in a Greek discourse, than Greek in a Latin one. + +_A._ And that is right enough: but what is that opinion of Epicharmus? + +_M._ + + + I would not die, but yet + Am not concerned that I shall be dead. + + +_A._ I now recollect the Greek, but since you have obliged me to grant +that the dead are not miserable, proceed to convince me that it is not +miserable to be under a necessity of dying. + +_M._ That is easy enough, but I have greater things in hand. + +_A._ How comes that to be so easy? and what are those things of more +consequence? + +_M._ Thus: because, if there is no evil after death, then even death +itself can be none; for that which immediately succeeds that is a state +where you grant that there is no evil; so that even to be obliged to die +can be no evil; for that is only the being obliged to arrive at a place +where we allow that no evil is. + +_A._ I beg you will be more explicit on this point, for these subtle +arguments force me sooner to admissions than to conviction. But what are +those more important things about which you say that you are occupied? + +_M._ To teach you, if I can, that death is not only no evil, but a good. + +_A._ I do not insist on that, but should be glad to hear you argue it, for +even though you should not prove your point, yet you will prove that death +is no evil: but I will not interrupt you, I would rather hear a continued +discourse. + +_M._ What, if I should ask you a question, would you not answer? + +_A._ That would look like pride; but I would rather you should not ask but +where necessity requires. + +IX. _M._ I will comply with your wishes, and explain as well as I can, +what you require; but not with any idea that, like the Pythian Apollo, +what I say must needs be certain and indisputable; but as a mere man, +endeavouring to arrive at probabilities by conjecture, for I have no +ground to proceed further on than probability. Those men may call their +statements indisputable who assert that what they say can be perceived by +the senses, and who proclaim themselves philosophers by profession. + +_A._ Do as you please, we are ready to hear you. + +_M._ The first thing, then, is to inquire what death, which seems to be so +well understood, really is; for some imagine death to be the departure of +the soul from the body; others think that there is no such departure, but +that soul and body perish together, and that, the soul is extinguished +with the body. Of those who think that the soul does depart from the body, +some believe in its immediate dissolution; others fancy that it continues +to exist for a time; and others believe that it lasts for ever. There is +great dispute even what the soul is, where it is, and whence it is +derived: with some, the heart itself (cor) seems to be the soul, hence the +expressions, _excordes_, _vecordes_, _concordes_; and that prudent Nasica, +who was twice consul, was called Corculus, _i.e._ wise-heart; and AElius +Sextus is described as _Egregie cordatus homo, catus AEliu' Sextus_--that +great _wise-hearted_ man, sage AElius. Empedocles imagines the blood, which +is suffused over the heart, to be the soul; to others, a certain part of +the brain seems to be the throne of the soul; others neither allow the +heart itself, nor any portion of the brain, to be the soul; but think +either that the heart is the seat and abode of the soul; or else that the +brain is so. Some would have the soul, or spirit, to be the _anima_, as +our schools generally agree; and indeed the name signifies as much, for we +use the expressions _animam agere_, to live; _animam efflare_, to expire; +_animosi_, men of spirit; _bene animati_, men of right feeling; _exanimi +sententia_, according to our real opinion--and the very word _animus_ is +derived from _anima_. Again, the soul seems to Zeno the Stoic to be fire. + +X. But what I have said as to the heart, the blood, the brain, air, or +fire being the soul, are common opinions: the others are only entertained +by individuals; and indeed there were many amongst the ancients who held +singular opinions on this subject, of whom the latest was Aristoxenus, a +man who was both a musician and a philosopher; he maintained a certain +straining of the body, like what is called harmony in music, to be the +soul; and believed that, from the figure and nature of the whole body, +various motions are excited, as sounds are from an instrument. He adhered +steadily to his system, and yet he said something, the nature of which, +whatever it was, had been detailed and explained a great while before by +Plato. Xenocrates denied that the soul had any figure, or anything like a +body; but said it was a number, the power of which, as Pythagoras had +fancied, some ages before, was the greatest in nature: his master, Plato, +imagined a three-fold soul; a dominant portion of which, that is to say, +reason, he had lodged in the head, as in a tower; and the other two parts, +namely, anger and desire, he made subservient to this one, and allotted +them distinct abodes, placing anger in the breast, and desire under the +praecordia. But Dicaearchus, in that discourse of some learned disputants, +held at Corinth, which he details to us in three books; in the first book +introduces many speakers; and in the other two he introduces a certain +Pherecrates, an old man of Phthia, who, as he said, was descended from +Deucalion; asserting, that there is in fact no such thing at all as a +soul; but that it is a name, without a meaning; and that it is idle to use +the expression, "animals," or "animated beings;" that neither men nor +beasts have minds or souls; but that all that power, by which we act or +perceive, is equally infused into every living creature, and is +inseparable from the body, for if it were not, it would be nothing; nor is +there anything whatever really existing except body, which is a single and +simple thing, so fashioned, as to live and have its sensations in +consequence of the regulations of nature. Aristotle, a man superior to all +others, both in genius and industry (I always except Plato), after having +embraced these four known sorts of principles, from which all things +deduce their origin, imagines that there is a certain fifth nature, from +whence comes the soul; for to think, to foresee, to learn, to teach, to +invent anything, and many other attributes of the same kind, such as, to +remember, to love, to hate, to desire, to fear, to be pleased or +displeased; these, and others like them, exist, he thinks, in none of +those first four kinds: on such account he adds a fifth kind, which has no +name, and so by a new name he calls the soul {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, as if it were a +certain continued and perpetual motion. + +XI. If I have not forgotten anything unintentionally, these are the +principal opinions concerning the soul. I have omitted Democritus, a very +great man indeed, but one who deduces the soul from the fortuitous +concourse of small, light, and round substances; for, if you believe men +of his school, there is nothing which a crowd of atoms cannot effect. +Which of these opinions is true, some god must determine. It is an +important question for us, which has the most appearance of truth. Shall +we, then, prefer determining between them, or shall we return to our +subject? + +_A._ I could wish both, if possible; but it is difficult to mix them; +therefore, if without a discussion of them we can get rid of the fears of +death, let us proceed to do so; but if this is not to be done without +explaining the question about souls, let us have that now, and the other +at another time. + +_M._ I take that plan to be the best, which I perceive you are inclined +to; for reason will demonstrate that, whichever of the opinions which I +have stated is true, it must follow, then, that death cannot be an evil; +or that it must rather be something desirable, for if either the heart, or +the blood, or the brain, is the soul, then certainly the soul, being +corporeal, must perish with the rest of the body; if it is air, it will +perhaps be dissolved; if it is fire, it will be extinguished; if it is +Aristoxenus's harmony, it will be put out of tune. What shall I say of +Dicaearchus, who denies that there is any soul? In all these opinions, +there is nothing to affect any one after death; for all feeling is lost +with life, and where there is no sensation, nothing can interfere to +affect us. The opinions of others do indeed bring us hope; if it is any +pleasure to you to think that souls, after they leave the body, may go to +heaven as to a permanent home. + +_A._ I have great pleasure in that thought, and it is what I most desire; +and even if it should not be so, I should still be very willing to believe +it. + +_M._ What occasion have you, then, for my assistance? am I superior to +Plato in eloquence? Turn over carefully his book that treats of the soul, +you will have there all that you can want. + +_A._ I have, indeed, done that, and often; but, I know not how it comes to +pass, I agree with it whilst I am reading it, but when I have laid down +the book, and begin to reflect with myself on the immortality of the soul, +all that agreement vanishes. + +_M._ How comes that? do you admit this, that souls either exist after +death, or else that they also perish at the moment of death? + +_A._ I agree to that. And if they do exist, I admit that they are happy; +but if they perish, I cannot suppose them to be unhappy, because, in fact, +they have no existence at all. You drove me to that concession but just +now. + +_M._ How, then, can you, or why do you, assert that you think that death +is an evil, when it either makes us happy, in the case of the soul +continuing to exist, or, at all events, not unhappy, in the case of our +becoming destitute of all sensation. + +XII. _A._ Explain, therefore, if it is not troublesome to you, first, if +you can, that souls do exist after death; secondly, should you fail in +that, (and it is a very difficult thing to establish,) that death is free +from all evil; for I am not without my fears that this itself is an evil; +I do not mean the immediate deprivation of sense, but the fact that we +shall hereafter suffer deprivation. + +_M._ I have the best authority in support of the opinion you desire to +have established, which ought, and generally has, great weight in all +cases. And first, I have all antiquity on that side, which the more near +it is to its origin and divine descent, the more clearly, perhaps, on that +account did it discern the truth in these matters. This very doctrine, +then, was adopted by all those ancients, whom Ennius calls in the Sabine +tongue, Casci, namely, that in death there was a sensation, and that, when +men departed this life, they were not so entirely destroyed as to perish +absolutely. And this may appear from many other circumstances, and +especially from the pontifical rites and funeral obsequies, which men of +the greatest genius would not have been so solicitous about, and would not +have guarded from any injury by such severe laws, but from a firm +persuasion that death was not so entire a destruction as wholly to abolish +and destroy everything, but rather a kind of transmigration, as it were, +and change of life, which was, in the case of illustrious men and women, +usually a guide to heaven, while in that of others, it was still confined +to the earth, but in such a manner as still to exist. From this, and the +sentiments of the Romans, + + + In heaven Romulus with Gods now lives; + + +as Ennius saith, agreeing with the common belief; hence, too Hercules is +considered so great and propitious a god amongst the Greeks, and from them +he was introduced among us, and his worship has extended even to the very +ocean itself. This is how it was that Bacchus was deified, the offspring +of Semele; and from the same illustrious fame we receive Castor and Pollux +as gods, who are reported not only to have helped the Romans to victory in +their battles, but to have been the messengers of their success. What +shall we say of Ino, the daughter of Cadmus? is she not called Leucothea +by the Greeks, and Matuta by us? Nay more; is not the whole of heaven (not +to dwell on particulars) almost filled with the offspring of men? + +Should I attempt to search into antiquity, and produce from thence what +the Greek writers have asserted, it would appear that even those who are +called their principal gods, were taken from among men up into heaven. + +XIII. Examine the sepulchres of those which are shown in Greece; +recollect, for you have been initiated, what lessons are taught in the +mysteries; then will you perceive how extensive this doctrine is. But they +who were not acquainted with natural philosophy, (for it did not begin to +be in vogue till many years later,) had no higher belief than what natural +reason could give them; they were not acquainted with the principles and +causes of things; they were often induced by certain visions, and those +generally in the night, to think that those men, who had departed from +this life, were still alive. And this may further be brought as an +irrefragable argument for us to believe that there are gods,--that there +never was any nation so barbarous, nor any people in the world so savage, +as to be without some notion of gods: many have wrong notions of the gods, +for that is the nature and ordinary consequence of bad customs, yet all +allow that there is a certain divine nature and energy. Nor does this +proceed from the conversation of men, or the agreement of philosophers; it +is not an opinion established by institutions or by laws; but, no doubt, +in every case the consent of all nations is to be looked on as a law of +nature. Who is there, then, that does not lament the loss of his friends, +principally from imagining them deprived of the conveniences of life? Take +away this opinion, and you remove with it all grief; for no one is +afflicted merely on account of a loss sustained by himself. Perhaps we may +be sorry, and grieve a little; but that bitter lamentation, and those +mournful tears, have their origin in our apprehensions that he whom we +loved is deprived of all the advantages of life, and is sensible of his +loss. And we are led to this opinion by nature, without any arguments or +any instruction. + +XIV. But the greatest proof of all is, that nature herself gives a silent +judgment in favour of the immortality of the soul, inasmuch as all are +anxious, and that to a great degree, about the things which concern +futurity;-- + + + One plants what future ages shall enjoy, + + +as Statius saith in his Synephebi. What is his object in doing so, except +that he is interested in posterity? Shall the industrious husbandman, +then, plant trees the fruit of which he shall never see? and shall not the +great man found laws, institutions, and a republic? What does the +procreation of children imply--and our care to continue our names--and our +adoptions--and our scrupulous exactness in drawing up wills--and the +inscriptions on monuments, and panegyrics, but that our thoughts run on +futurity? There is no doubt but a judgment may be formed of nature in +general, from looking at each nature in its most perfect specimens; and +what is a more perfect specimen of a man, than those are who look on +themselves as born for the assistance, the protection, and the +preservation of others? Hercules has gone to heaven; he never would have +gone thither, had he not, whilst amongst men, made that road for himself. +These things are of old date, and have, besides, the sanction of universal +religion. + +XV. What will you say? what do you imagine that so many and such great men +of our republic, who have sacrificed their lives for its good, expected? +Do you believe that they thought that their names should not continue +beyond their lives? None ever encountered death for their country, but +under a firm persuasion of immortality! Themistocles might have lived at +his ease; so might Epaminondas; and, not to look abroad and amongst the +ancients for instances, so might I myself. But, somehow or other, there +clings to our minds a certain presage of future ages; and this both exists +most firmly and appears most clearly, in men of the loftiest genius and +greatest souls. Take away this, and who would be so mad as to spend his +life amidst toils and dangers? I speak of those in power. What are the +poet's views but to be ennobled after death? What else is the object of +these lines-- + + + Behold old Ennius here, who erst + Thy fathers' great exploits rehearsed? + + +He is challenging the reward of glory from those men whose ancestors he +himself had ennobled by his poetry. And in the same spirit he says in +another passage-- + + + Let none with tears my funeral grace, for I + Claim from my works an immortality. + + +Why do I mention poets? the very mechanics are desirous of fame after +death. Why did Phidias include a likeness of himself in the shield of +Minerva, when he was not allowed to inscribe his name on it? What do our +philosophers think on the subject? do not they put their names to those +very books which they write on the contempt of glory? If, then, universal +consent is the voice of nature, and if it is the general opinion +everywhere, that those who have quitted this life are still interested in +something; we also must subscribe to that opinion. And if we think that +men of the greatest abilities and virtue see most clearly into the power +of nature, because they themselves are her most perfect work; it is very +probable that, as every great man is especially anxious to benefit +posterity, there is something of which he himself will be sensible after +death. + +XVI. But as we are led by nature to think there are gods, and as we +discover, by reason, of what description they are, so, by the consent of +all nations, we are induced to believe that our souls survive; but where +their habitation is, and of what character they eventually are, must be +learned from reason. The want of any certain reason on which to argue has +given rise to the idea of the shades below, and to those fears, which you +seem, not without reason, to despise: for as our bodies fall to the +ground, and are covered with earth (_humus_), from whence we derive the +expression to be interred (_humari_), that has occasioned men to imagine +that the dead continue, during the remainder of their existence, under +ground; which opinion has drawn after it many errors, which the poets have +increased; for the theatre, being frequented by a large crowd, among which +are women and children, is wont to be greatly affected on hearing such +pompous verses as these-- + + + Lo! here I am, who scarce could gain this place, + Through stony mountains and a dreary waste; + Through cliffs, whose sharpen'd stones tremendous hung, + Where dreadful darkness spread itself around: + + +and the error prevailed so much, though indeed at present it seems to me +to be removed, that although men knew that the bodies of the dead had been +burned, yet they conceived such things to be done in the infernal regions +as could not be executed or imagined without a body; for they could not +conceive how disembodied souls could exist; and, therefore, they looked +out for some shape or figure. This was the origin of all that account of +the dead in Homer. This was the idea that caused my friend Appius to frame +his Necromancy; and this is how there got about that idea of the lake of +Avernus, in my neighbourhood,-- + + + From whence the souls of undistinguish'd shape, + Clad in thick shade, rush from the open gate + Of Acheron, vain phantoms of the dead. + + +And they must needs have these appearances speak, which is not possible +without a tongue, and a palate, and jaws, and without the help of lungs +and sides, and without some shape or figure; for they could see nothing by +their mind alone, they referred all to their eyes. To withdraw the mind +from sensual objects, and abstract our thoughts from what we are +accustomed to, is an attribute of great genius: I am persuaded, indeed, +that there were many such men in former ages: but Pherecydes(57) the +Syrian is the first on record who said that the souls of men were +immortal; and he was a philosopher of great antiquity in the reign of my +namesake Tullus. His disciple Pythagoras greatly confirmed this opinion, +who came into Italy in the reign of Tarquin the Proud: and all that +country which is called Great Greece was occupied by his school, and he +himself was held in high honour, and had the greatest authority: and the +Pythagorean sect was for many ages after in such great credit, that all +learning was believed to be confined to that name. + +XVII. But I return to the ancients. They scarcely ever gave any reason for +their opinion but what could be explained by numbers or definitions. It is +reported of Plato, that he came into Italy to make himself acquainted with +the Pythagoreans; and that when there, amongst others, he made an +acquaintance with Archytas(58) and Timaeus,(59) and learned from them all +the tenets of the Pythagoreans; and that he not only was of the same +opinion with Pythagoras concerning the immortality of the soul, but that +he also brought reasons in support of it; which, if you have nothing to +say against it, I will pass over, and say no more at present about all +this hope of immortality. + +_A._ What, will you leave me when you have raised my expectations so high? +I had rather, so help me Hercules! be mistaken with Plato, whom I know how +much you esteem, and whom I admire myself from what you say of him, than +be in the right with those others. + +_M._ I commend you; for, indeed, I could myself willingly be mistaken in +his company. Do we, then, doubt, as we do in other cases, (though I think +here is very little room for doubt in this case, for the mathematicians +prove the facts to us,) that the earth is placed in the midst of the +world, being as it were a sort of point, which they call a {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, +surrounded by the whole heavens; and that such is the nature of the four +principles, which are the generating causes of all things, that they have +equally divided amongst them the constituents of all bodies; moreover that +earthy and humid bodies are carried at equal angles, by their own weight +and ponderosity, into the earth and sea; that the other two parts consist +one of fire and the other of air? As the two former are carried by their +gravity and weight into the middle region of the world; so these, on the +other hand, ascend by right lines into the celestial regions; either +because, owing to their intrinsic nature, they are always endeavouring to +reach the highest place, or else because lighter bodies are naturally +repelled by heavier; and as this is notoriously the case, it must +evidently follow, that souls, when once they have departed from the body, +whether they are animal, (by which term I mean capable of breathing,) or +of the nature of fire, must mount upwards: but if the soul is some number, +as some people assert, speaking with more subtlety than clearness, or if +it is that fifth nature, for which it would be more correct to say that we +have not given a name to, than that we do not correctly understand +it--still it is too pure and perfect, not to go to a great distance from +the earth. Something of this sort, then, we must believe the soul to be, +that we may not commit the folly of thinking that so active a principle +lies immerged in the heart or brain; or, as Empedocles would have it, in +the blood. + +XVIII. We will pass over Dicaearchus,(60) with his contemporary and +fellow-disciple Aristoxenus,(61) both indeed men of learning. One of them +seems never even to have been affected with grief, as he could not +perceive that he had a soul; while the other is so pleased with his +musical compositions, that he endeavours to show an analogy betwixt them +and souls. Now, we may understand harmony to arise from the intervals of +sounds, whose various compositions occasion many harmonies; but I do not +see how a disposition of members, and the figure of a body without a soul, +can occasion harmony; he had better, learned as he is, leave these +speculations to his master Aristotle, and follow his own trade, as a +musician; good advice is given him in that Greek proverb,-- + + + Apply your talents where you best are skill'd. + + +I will have nothing at all to do with that fortuitous concourse of +individual light and round bodies, notwithstanding Democritus insists on +their being warm, and having breath, that is to say, life. But this soul, +which is compounded of either of the four principles from which we assert +that all things are derived, is of inflamed air, as seems particularly to +have been the opinion of Panaetius, and must necessarily mount upwards; for +air and fire have no tendency downwards, but always ascend; so should they +be dissipated, that must be at some distance from the earth; but should +they remain, and preserve their original state, it is clearer still that +they must be carried heavenward; and this gross and concrete air, which is +nearest the earth, must be divided and broken by them; for the soul is +warmer, or rather hotter than that air, which I just now called gross and +concrete; and this may be made evident from this consideration,--that our +bodies, being compounded of the earthy class of principles, grow warm by +the heat of the soul. + +XIX. We may add, that the soul can the more easily escape from this air, +which I have often named, and break through it; because nothing is swifter +than the soul; no swiftness is comparable to the swiftness of the soul; +which, should it remain uncorrupt and without alteration, must necessarily +be carried on with such velocity as to penetrate and divide all this +atmosphere, where clouds, and rain, and winds are formed; which, in +consequence of the exhalations from the earth, is moist and dark; but, +when the soul has once got above this region, and falls in with, and +recognises a nature like its own, it then rests upon fires composed of a +combination of thin air and a moderate solar heat, and does not aim at any +higher flight. For then, after it has attained a lightness and heat +resembling its own, it moves no more, but remains steady, being balanced, +as it were, between two equal weights. That, then, is its natural seat +where it has penetrated to something like itself; and where, wanting +nothing further, it may be supported and maintained by the same aliment +which nourishes and maintains the stars. + +Now, as we are usually incited to all sorts of desires by the stimulus of +the body, and the more so, as we endeavour to rival those who are in +possession of what we long for, we shall certainly be happy when, being +emancipated from that body, we at the same time get rid of these desires +and this rivalry: and, that which we do at present, when, dismissing all +other cares, we curiously examine and look into anything, we shall then do +with greater freedom; and we shall employ ourselves entirely in the +contemplation and examination of things; because there is naturally in our +minds a certain insatiable desire to know the truth; and the very region +itself where we shall arrive, as it gives us a more intuitive and easy +knowledge of celestial things, will raise our desires after knowledge. For +it was this beauty of the heavens, as seen even here upon earth, which +gave birth to that national and hereditary philosophy, (as Theophrastus +calls it,) which was thus excited to a desire of knowledge. But those +persons will in a most especial degree enjoy this philosophy, who, while +they were only inhabitants of this world and enveloped in darkness, were +still desirous of looking into these things with the eye of their mind. + +XX. For, if those men now think that they have attained something who have +seen the mouth of the Pontus, and those straits which were passed by the +ship called Argo, because, + + + From Argos she did chosen men convey, + Bound to fetch back the golden fleece, their prey; + + +or those who have seen the straits of the ocean, + + + Where the swift waves divide the neighbouring shores + Of Europe, and of Afric. + + +What kind of sight do you imagine that will be, when the whole earth is +laid open to our view? and that, too, not only in its position, form, and +boundaries, nor those parts of it only which are habitable, but those also +that lie uncultivated, through the extremities of heat and cold to which +they are exposed; for not even now is it with our eyes that we view what +we see, for the body itself has no senses; but (as the naturalists, aye, +and even the physicians assure us, who have opened our bodies, and +examined them), there are certain perforated channels from the seat of the +soul to the eyes, ears, and nose; so that frequently, when either +prevented by meditation, or the force of some bodily disorder, we neither +hear nor see, though our eyes and ears are open, and in good condition; so +that we may easily apprehend that it is the soul itself which sees and +hears, and not those parts which are, as it were, but windows to the soul; +by means of which, however, she can perceive nothing, unless she is on the +spot, and exerts herself. How shall we account for the fact, that by the +same power of thinking we comprehend the most different things; as colour, +taste, heat, smell, and sound? which the soul could never know by her five +messengers, unless everything was referred to her, and she were the sole +judge of all. And we shall certainly discover these things in a more clear +and perfect degree when the soul is disengaged from the body, and has +arrived at that goal to which nature leads her; for at present, +notwithstanding nature has contrived, with the greatest skill, those +channels which lead from the body to the soul, yet are they, in some way +or other, stopped up with earthy and concrete bodies; but when we shall be +nothing but soul, then nothing will interfere to prevent our seeing +everything in its real substance, and in its true character. + +XXI. It is true, I might expatiate, did the subject require it, on the +many and various objects with which the soul will be entertained in those +heavenly regions; when I reflect on which, I am apt to wonder at the +boldness of some philosophers, who are so struck with admiration at the +knowledge of nature, as to thank, in an exulting manner, the first +inventor and teacher of natural philosophy, and to reverence him as a God: +for they declare that they have been delivered by his means from the +greatest tyrants, a perpetual terror, and a fear that molested them by +night and day. What is this dread--this fear? what old woman is there so +weak as to fear these things, which you, forsooth, had you not been +acquainted with natural philosophy, would stand in awe of? + + + The hallow'd roofs of Acheron, the dread + Of Orcus, the pale regions of the dead. + + +And does it become a philosopher to boast that he is not afraid of these +things, and that he has discovered them to be false? And from this we may +perceive how acute these men were by nature, who, if they had been left +without any instruction would have believed in these things. But now they +have certainly made a very fine acquisition in learning that when the day +of their death arrives they will perish entirely; and, if that really is +the case, for I say nothing either way, what is there agreeable or +glorious in it? Not that I see any reason why the opinion of Pythagoras +and Plato may not be true: but even although Plato were to have assigned +no reason for his opinion (observe how much I esteem the man), the weight +of his authority would have borne me down; but he has brought so many +reasons, that he appears to me to have endeavoured to convince others, and +certainly to have convinced himself. + +XXII. But there are many who labour on the other side of the question, and +condemn souls to death, as if they were criminals capitally convicted; nor +have they any other reason to allege why the immortality of the soul +appears to them to be incredible, except that they are not able to +conceive what sort of thing the soul can be when disentangled from the +body; just as if they could really form a correct idea as to what sort of +thing it is, even when it is in the body; what its form, and size, and +abode are; so that were they able to have a full view of all that is now +hidden from them in a living body, they have no idea whether the soul +would be discernible by them, or whether it is of so fine a texture that +it would escape their sight. Let those consider this, who say that they +are unable to form any idea of the soul without the body, and then they +will see whether they can form any adequate idea of what it is when it is +in the body. For my own part, when I reflect on the nature of the soul, it +appears to me a far more perplexing and obscure question to determine what +is its character while it is in the body, a place which, as it were, does +not belong to it, than to imagine what it is when it leaves it, and has +arrived at the free aether, which is, if I may so say, its proper, its own +habitation. For unless we are to say that we cannot apprehend the +character or nature of anything which we have never seen, we certainly may +be able to form some notion of God, and of the divine soul when released +from the body. Dicaearchus, indeed, and Aristoxenus, because it was hard to +understand the existence, and substance, and nature of the soul, asserted +that there was no such thing as a soul at all. It is, indeed, the most +difficult thing imaginable, to discern the soul by the soul. And this, +doubtless, is the meaning of the precept of Apollo, which advises every +one to know himself. For I do not apprehend the meaning of the god to have +been, that we should understand our members, our stature, and form; for we +are not merely bodies; nor, when I say these things to you, am I +addressing myself to your body: when, therefore, he says, "Know yourself," +he says this, "Inform yourself of the nature of your soul;" for the body +is but a kind of vessel, or receptacle of the soul, and whatever your soul +does is your own act. To know the soul, then, unless it had been divine, +would not have been a precept of such excellent wisdom, as to be +attributed to a god; but even though the soul should not know of what +nature itself is, will you say that it does not even perceive that it +exists at all, or that it has motion? on which is founded that reason of +Plato's, which is explained by Socrates in the Phaedrus, and inserted by +me, in my sixth book of the Republic. + +XXIII. "That which is always moved is eternal; but that which gives motion +to something else, and is moved itself by some external cause, when that +motion ceases, must necessarily cease to exist. That, therefore, alone, +which is self-moved, because it is never forsaken by itself, can never +cease to be moved. Besides, it is the beginning and principle of motion to +everything else; but whatever is a principle has no beginning, for all +things arise from that principle, and it cannot itself owe its rise to +anything else; for then it would not be a principle did it proceed from +anything else. But if it has no beginning, it never will have any end; for +a principle which is once extinguished, cannot itself be restored by +anything else, nor can it produce anything else from itself; inasmuch as +all things must necessarily arise from some first cause. And thus it comes +about, that the first principle of motion must arise from that thing which +is itself moved by itself; and that can neither have a beginning nor an +end of its existence, for otherwise the whole heaven and earth would be +overset, and all nature would stand still, and not be able to acquire any +force, by the impulse of which it might be first set in motion. Seeing, +then, that it is clear, that whatever moves itself is eternal, can there +be any doubt that the soul is so? For everything is inanimate which is +moved by an external force; but everything which is animate is moved by an +interior force, which also belongs to itself. For this is the peculiar +nature and power of the soul; and if the soul be the only thing in the +whole world which has the power of self-motion, then certainly it never +had a beginning, and therefore it is eternal." + +Now, should all the lower order of philosophers, (for so I think they may +be called, who dissent from Plato and Socrates and that school,) unite +their force, they never would be able to explain anything so elegantly as +this, nor even to understand how ingeniously this conclusion is drawn. The +soul, then, perceives itself to have motion, and at the same time that it +gets that perception, it is sensible that it derives that motion from its +own power, and not from the agency of another; and it is impossible that +it should ever forsake itself; and these premises compel you to allow its +eternity, unless you have something to say against them. + +_A._ I should myself be very well pleased not to have even a thought arise +in my mind against them, so much am I inclined to that opinion. + +XXIV. _M._ Well then, I appeal to you, if the arguments which prove that +there is something divine in the souls of men are not equally strong? but +if I could account for the origin of these divine properties, then I might +also be able to explain how they might cease to exist; for I think I can +account for the manner in which the blood, and bile, and phlegm, and +bones, and nerves, and veins, and all the limbs, and the shape of the +whole body, were put together and made; aye, and even as to the soul +itself, were there nothing more in it than a principle of life, then the +life of a man might be put upon the same footing as that of a vine or any +other tree, and accounted for as caused by nature; for these things, as we +say, live. Besides, if desires and aversions were all that belonged to the +soul, it would have them only in common with the beasts; but it has, in +the first place, memory, and that, too, so infinite, as to recollect an +absolute countless number of circumstances, which Plato will have to be a +recollection of a former life; for in that book which is inscribed Menon, +Socrates asks a child some questions in geometry, with reference to +measuring a square; his answers are such as a child would make, and yet +the questions are so easy, that while answering them, one by one, he comes +to the same point as if he had learned geometry. From whence Socrates +would infer, that learning is nothing more than recollection; and this +topic he explains more accurately, in the discourse which he held the very +day he died; for he there asserts that any one who seeming to be entirely +illiterate, is yet able to answer a question well that is proposed to him, +does in so doing manifestly show that he is not learning it then, but +recollecting it by his memory. Nor is it to be accounted for in any other +way, how children come to have notions of so many and such important +things, as are implanted, and as it were sealed up in their minds, (which +the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~},) unless the soul before it entered the body had +been well stored with knowledge. And as it had no existence at all, (for +this is the invariable doctrine of Plato, who will not admit anything to +have a real existence which has a beginning and an end; and who thinks +that that alone does really exist which is of such a character as what he +calls {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, and we species,) therefore, being shut up in the body, it +could not while in the body discover what it knows: but it knew it before, +and brought the knowledge with it, so that we are no longer surprised at +its extensive and multifarious knowledge: nor does the soul clearly +discover its ideas at its first resort to this abode to which it is so +unaccustomed, and which is in so disturbed a state; but after having +refreshed and recollected itself, it then by its memory recovers them; +and, therefore, to learn implies nothing more than to recollect. But I am +in a particular manner surprised at memory; for what is that faculty by +which we remember? what is its force? what its nature? I am not inquiring +how great a memory Simonides(62) may be said to have had, or +Theodectes,(63) or that Cineas,(64) who was sent to Rome as ambassador +from Pyrrhus, or in more modern times Charmadas;(65) or very lately, +Metrodorus,(66) the Scepsian, or our own contemporary Hortensius:(67) I am +speaking of ordinary memory, and especially of those men who are employed +in any important study or art, the great capacity of whose minds it is +hard to estimate, such numbers of things do they remember. + +XXV. Should you ask what this leads to, I think we may understand what +that power is, and whence we have it. It certainly proceeds neither from +the heart, nor from the blood, nor from the brain, nor from atoms; whether +it be air or fire, I know not, nor am I, as those men are, ashamed in +cases where I am ignorant, to own that I am so. If in any other obscure +matter I were able to assert anything positively, then I would swear that +the soul, be it air or fire, is divine. Just think, I beseech you,--can you +imagine this wonderful power of memory to be sown in, or to be a part of +the composition of the earth, or of this dark and gloomy atmosphere? +Though you cannot apprehend what it is, yet you see what kind of thing it +is, or if you do not quite see that, yet you certainly see how great it +is. What then? shall we imagine that there is a kind of measure in the +soul, into which, as into a vessel, all that we remember is poured? that +indeed is absurd; for how shall we form any idea of the bottom, or of the +shape or fashion of such a soul as that? and again how are we to conceive +how much it is able to contain? Shall we imagine the soul to receive +impressions like wax, and memory to be marks of the impressions made on +the soul? What are the characters of the words, what of the facts +themselves? and what again is that prodigious greatness which can give +rise to impressions of so many things? What, lastly, is that power which +investigates secret things, and is called invention and contrivance? Does +that man seem to be compounded of this earthly, mortal, and perishing +nature, who first invented names for everything, which, if you will +believe Pythagoras, is the highest pitch of wisdom? or he, who collected +the dispersed inhabitants of the world, and united them, in the bonds of +social life? or he, who confined the sounds of the voice, which used to +seem infinite, to the marks of a few letters? or he who first observed the +courses of the planets, their progressive motions, their laws? These were +all great men; but they were greater still, who invented food, and +raiment, and houses; who introduced civilization amongst us, and armed us +against the wild beasts; by whom we were made sociable and polished, and +so proceeded from the necessaries of life to its embellishments. For we +have provided great entertainments for the ears, by inventing and +modulating the variety and nature of sounds; we have learnt to survey the +stars, not only those that are fixed, but also those which are improperly +called wandering; and the man who has acquainted himself with all their +revolutions and motions, is fairly considered to have a soul resembling +the soul of that Being who has created those stars in the heavens: for +when Archimedes described in a sphere the motions of the moon, sun, and +five planets, he did the very same thing as Plato's God, in his Timaeus, +who made the world; causing one revolution to adjust motions differing as +much as possible in their slowness and velocity. Now, allowing that what +we see in the world could not be effected without a God, Archimedes could +not have imitated the same motions in his sphere without a divine soul. + +XXVI. To me, indeed, it appears that even those studies which are more +common and in greater esteem are not without some divine energy: so that I +do not consider that a poet can produce a serious and sublime poem, +without some divine impulse working on his mind; nor do I think that +eloquence, abounding with sonorous words and fruitful sentences, can flow +thus, without something beyond mere human power. But as to philosophy, +that is the parent of all the arts, what can we call that but, as Plato +says, a gift, or as I express it, an invention of the Gods? This it was +which first taught us the worship of the Gods; and then led us on to +justice, which arises from the human race being formed into society: and +after that it imbued us with modesty, and elevation of soul. This it was +which dispersed darkness from our souls, as it is dispelled from our eyes, +enabling us to see all things that are above or below, the beginning, end, +and middle of every thing. I am convinced entirely, that that which could +effect so many and such great things must be a divine power. For what is +memory of words and circumstances? what, too, is invention? Surely they +are things than which nothing greater can be conceived in a God! for I do +not imagine the Gods to be delighted with nectar and ambrosia, or with +Juventas presenting them with a cup; nor do I put any faith in Homer, who +says that Ganymede was carried away by the Gods, on account of his beauty, +in order to give Jupiter his wine. Too weak reasons for doing Laomedon +such injury! These were mere inventions of Homer, who gave his Gods the +imperfections of men. I would rather that he had given men the perfections +of the Gods! those perfections, I mean, of uninterrupted health, wisdom, +invention, memory. Therefore the soul (which is, as I say, divine,) is, as +Euripides more boldly expresses it, a God. And thus, if the divinity be +air or fire, the soul of man is the same: for as that celestial nature has +nothing earthly or humid about it, in like manner the soul of man is also +free from both these qualities: but if it is of that fifth kind of nature, +first introduced by Aristotle, then both Gods and souls are of the same. + +XXVII. As this is my opinion, I have explained it in these very words, in +my book on Consolation.(68) The origin of the soul of man is not to be +found upon earth, for there is nothing in the soul of a mixed or concrete +nature, or that has any appearance of being formed or made out of the +earth; nothing even humid, or airy, or fiery: for what is there in natures +of that kind which has the power of memory, understanding, or thought? +which can recollect the past; foresee the future; and comprehend the +present? for these capabilities are confined to divine beings; nor can we +discover any source from which men could derive them, but from God. There +is therefore a peculiar nature and power in the soul, distinct from those +natures which are more known and familiar to us. Whatever, then, that is +which thinks, and which has understanding, and volition, and a principle +of life, is heavenly and divine, and on that account must necessarily be +eternal: nor can God himself, who is known to us, be conceived to be +anything else except a soul free and unembarrassed, distinct from all +mortal concretion, acquainted with everything, and giving motion to +everything, and itself endued with perpetual motion. + +XXVIII. Of this kind and nature is the intellect of man. Where, then, is +this intellect seated, and of what character is it? where is your own, and +what is its character? are you able to tell? If I have not faculties for +knowing all that I could desire to know, will you not even allow me to +make use of those which I have? The soul has not sufficient capacity to +comprehend itself; yet, the soul, like the eye, though it has no distinct +view of itself, sees other things: it does not see (which is of least +consequence) its own shape; perhaps not, though it possibly may; but we +will pass that by: but it certainly sees that it has vigour, sagacity, +memory, motion, and velocity; these are all great, divine, eternal +properties. What its appearance is, or where it dwells, it is not +necessary even to inquire. As when we behold, first of all, the beauty and +brilliant appearance of the heavens; secondly, the vast velocity of its +revolutions, beyond power of our imagination to conceive; then the +vicissitudes of nights and days; the four-fold division of the seasons, so +well adapted to the ripening of the fruits of the earth, and the +temperature of our bodies; and after that we look up to the sun, the +moderator and governor of all these things; and view the moon, by the +increase and decrease of its light, marking, as it were, and appointing +our holy days; and see the five planets, borne on in the same circle, +divided into twelve parts, preserving the same course with the greatest +regularity, but with utterly dissimilar motions amongst themselves; and +the nightly appearance of the heaven, adorned on all sides with stars; +then, the globe of the earth, raised above the sea, and placed in the +centre of the universe, inhabited and cultivated in its two opposite +extremities; one of which, the place of our habitation, is situated +towards the north pole, under the seven stars:-- + + + Where the cold northern blasts, with horrid sound, + Harden to ice the snowy cover'd ground,-- + + +the other, towards the south pole, is unknown to us; but is called by the +Greeks {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}: the other parts are uncultivated, because they are +either frozen with cold, or burnt up with heat; but where we dwell, it +never fails in its season, + + + To yield a placid sky, to bid the trees + Assume the lively verdure of their leaves: + The vine to bud, and, joyful in its shoots, + Foretell the approaching vintage of its fruits: + The ripen'd corn to sing, whilst all around + Full riv'lets glide; and flowers deck the ground:-- + + +then the multitude of cattle, fit part for food, part for tilling the +ground, others for carrying us, or for clothing us; and man himself, made +as it were on purpose to contemplate the heavens and the Gods, and to pay +adoration to them; lastly, the whole earth, and wide extending seas, given +to man's use. When we view these, and numberless other things, can we +doubt that they have some being who presides over them, or has made them +(if, indeed, they have been made, as is the opinion of Plato, or if, as +Aristotle thinks, they are eternal), or who at all events is the regulator +of so immense a fabric and so great a blessing to men? Thus, though you +see not the soul of man, as you see not the Deity, yet, as by the +contemplation of his works you are led to acknowledge a God, so you must +own the divine power of the soul, from its remembering things, from its +invention, from the quickness of its motion, and from all the beauty of +virtue. Where, then, is it seated, you will say? + +XXIX. In my opinion it is seated in the head, and I can bring you reasons +for my adopting that opinion. At present, let the soul reside where it +will, you certainly have one in you. Should you ask what its nature is? It +has one peculiarly its own; but admitting it to consist of fire, or air, +it does not affect the present question; only observe this, that as you +are convinced there is a God, though you are ignorant where he resides, +and what shape he is of; in like manner you ought to feel assured that you +have a soul, though you cannot satisfy yourself of the place of its +residence, nor its form. In our knowledge of the soul, unless we are +grossly ignorant of natural philosophy, we cannot but be satisfied that it +has nothing but what is simple, unmixed, uncompounded, and single; and if +this is admitted, then it cannot be separated, nor divided, nor dispersed, +nor parted, and therefore it cannot perish; for to perish implies a +parting asunder, a division, a disunion of those parts which, whilst it +subsisted, were held together by some band; and it was because he was +influenced by these and similar reasons that Socrates neither looked out +for anybody to plead for him when he was accused, nor begged any favour +from his judges, but maintained a manly freedom, which was the effect not +of pride, but of the true greatness of his soul: and on the last day of +his life, he held a long discourse on this subject; and a few days before, +when he might have been easily freed from his confinement, he refused to +be so, and when he had almost actually hold of that deadly cup, he spoke +with the air of a man not forced to die, but ascending into heaven. + +XXX. For so indeed he thought himself, and thus he spoke:--"That there were +two ways, and that the souls of men, at their departure from the body, +took different roads, for those which were polluted with vices, that are +common to men, and which had given themselves up entirely to unclean +desires, and had become so blinded by them as to have habituated +themselves to all manner of debauchery and profligacy, or to have laid +detestable schemes for the ruin of their country, took a road wide of that +which led to the assembly of the Gods: but they who had preserved +themselves upright and chaste, and free from the slightest contagion of +the body, and had always kept themselves as far as possible at a distance +from it, and whilst on earth, had proposed to themselves as a model the +life of the Gods, found the return to those beings from whom they had come +an easy one." Therefore he argues, that all good and wise men should take +example from the swans, who are considered sacred to Apollo, not without +reason, but particularly because they seem to have received the gift of +divination from him, by which, foreseeing how happy it is to die, they +leave this world with singing and joy. Nor can any one doubt of this, +unless it happens to us who think with care and anxiety about the soul, +(as is often the case with those who look earnestly at the setting sun,) +to lose the sight of it entirely: and so the mind's eye viewing itself, +sometimes grows dull, and for that reason we become remiss in our +contemplation. Thus our reasoning is borne about, harassed with doubts and +anxieties, not knowing how to proceed, but measuring back again those +dangerous tracts which it has passed, like a boat tossed about on the +boundless ocean. But these reflections are of long standing, and borrowed +from the Greeks. But Cato left this world in such a manner, as if he were +delighted that he had found an opportunity of dying; for that God who +presides in us, forbids our departure hence without his leave. But when +God himself has given us a just cause, as formerly he did to Socrates, and +lately to Cato, and often to many others,--in such a case, certainly every +man of sense would gladly exchange this darkness, for that light: not that +he would forcibly break from the chains that held him, for that would be +against the law; but like a man released from prison by a magistrate, or +some lawful authority, so he too would walk away, being released and +discharged by God. For the whole life of a philosopher is, as the same +philosopher says, a meditation on death. + +XXXI. For what else is it that we do, when we call off our minds from +pleasure, that is to say, from our attention to the body, from the +managing our domestic estate, which is a sort of handmaid and servant of +the body, or from duties of a public nature, or from all other serious +business whatever? What else is it, I say, that we do, but invite the soul +to reflect on itself? oblige it to converse with itself, and, as far as +possible, break off its acquaintance with the body? Now to separate the +soul from the body, is to learn to die, and nothing else whatever. +Wherefore take my advice; and let us meditate on this, and separate +ourselves as far as possible from the body, that is to say, let us +accustom ourselves to die. This will be enjoying a life like that of +heaven even while we remain on earth; and when we are carried thither and +released from these bonds, our souls will make their progress with more +rapidity: for the spirit which has always been fettered by the bonds of +the body, even when it is disengaged, advances more slowly, just as those +do who have worn actual fetters for many years: but when we have arrived +at this emancipation from the bonds of the body, then indeed we shall +begin to live, for this present life is really death, which I could say a +good deal in lamentation for if I chose. + +_A._ You have lamented it sufficiently in your book on Consolation; and +when I read that, there is nothing which I desire more than to leave these +things: but that desire is increased a great deal by what I have just +heard. + +_M._ The time will come, and that soon, and with equal certainty whether +you hang back or press forward; for time flies. But death is so far from +being an evil, as it lately appeared to you, that I am inclined to +suspect, not that there is no other thing which is an evil to man, but +rather that there is nothing else which is a real good to him; if, at +least, it is true, that we become thereby either Gods ourselves, or +companions of the Gods. However, this is not of so much consequence, as +there are some of us here who will not allow this. But I will not leave +off discussing this point till I have convinced you that death can, upon +no consideration whatever, be an evil. + +_A._ How can it, after what I now know? + +_M._ Do you ask how it can? There are crowds of arguers who contradict +this; and those not only Epicureans, whom I regard very little, but, some +how or other, almost every man of letters; and, above all, my favourite +Dicaearchus is very strenuous in opposing the immortality of the soul: for +he has written three books, which are entitled Lesbiacs, because the +discourse was held at Mitylene, in which he seeks to prove that souls are +mortal. The Stoics, on the other hand, allow us as long a time for +enjoyment as the life of a raven; they allow the soul to exist a great +while, but are against its eternity. + +XXXII. Are you willing to hear then why, even allowing this, death cannot +be an evil? + +_A._ As you please; but no one shall drive me from my belief in mortality. + +_M._ I commend you indeed, for that; though we should not be too confident +in our belief of anything; for we are frequently disturbed by some subtle +conclusion; we give way and change our opinions even in things that are +more evident than this; for in this there certainly is some obscurity. +Therefore, should anything of this kind happen, it is well to be on our +guard. + +_A._ You are right in that, but I will provide against any accident. + +_M._ Have you any objection to our dismissing our friends the Stoics? +those, I mean, who allow that the souls exist after they have left the +body, but yet deny that they exist for ever. + +_A._ We certainly may dismiss the consideration of those men who admit +that which is the most difficult point in the whole question, namely, that +a soul can exist independently of the body, and yet refuse to grant that, +which is not only very easy to believe, but which is even the natural +consequence of the concession which they have made, that if they can exist +for a length of time, they most likely do so for ever. + +_M._ You take it right; that is the very thing: shall we give, therefore, +any credit to Panaetius, when he dissents from his master, Plato? whom he +everywhere calls divine, the wisest, the holiest of men, the Homer of +philosophers; and whom he opposes in nothing except this single opinion of +the soul's immortality: for he maintains what nobody denies, that +everything which has been generated will perish; and that even souls are +generated, which he thinks appears from their resemblance to those of the +men who begot them; for that likeness is as apparent in the turn of their +minds as in their bodies. But he brings another reason; that there is +nothing which is sensible of pain which is not also liable to disease; but +whatever is liable to disease must be liable to death; the soul is +sensible of pain, therefore it is liable to perish. + +XXXIII. These arguments may be refuted; for they proceed from his not +knowing that while discussing the subject of the immortality of the soul, +he is speaking of the intellect, which is free from all turbid motion; but +not of those parts of the mind in which those disorders, anger and lust, +have their seat, and which he whom he is opposing, when he argues thus, +imagines to be distinct and separate from the mind. Now this resemblance +is more remarkable in beasts, whose souls are void of reason. But the +likeness in men consists more in the configuration of the bodies; and it +is of no little consequence in what bodies the soul is lodged; for there +are many things which depend on the body that give an edge to the soul, +many which blunt it. Aristotle indeed, says, that all men of great genius +are melancholy; so that I should not have been displeased to have been +somewhat duller than I am. He instances many, and, as if it were matter of +fact, brings his reasons for it: but if the power of those things that +proceed from the body be so great as to influence the mind, (for they are +the things, whatever they are, that occasion this likeness,) still that +does not necessarily prove why a similitude of souls should be generated. +I say nothing about cases of unlikeness. I wish Panaetius could be here; he +lived with Africanus; I would inquire of him which of his family the +nephew of Africanus's brother was like? Possibly he may in person have +resembled his father; but in his manners, he was so like every profligate +abandoned man, that it was impossible to be more so. Who did the grandson +of P. Crassus, that wise, and eloquent, and most distinguished man +resemble? Or the relations and sons of many other excellent men, whose +names there is no occasion to mention? But what are we doing? Have we +forgotten that our purpose was, when we had sufficiently spoken on the +subject of the immortality of the soul, to prove that, even if the soul +did perish, there would be, even then, no evil in death? + +_A._ I remembered it very well; but I had no dislike to your digressing a +little from your original design, whilst you were talking of the soul's +immortality. + +_M._ I perceive you have sublime thoughts, and are eager to mount up to +heaven. + +XXXIV. I am not without hopes myself that such may be our fate. But admit +what they assert; that the soul does not continue to exist after death. + +_A._ Should it be so, I see that we are then deprived of the hopes of a +happier life. + +_M._ But what is there of evil in that opinion? For let the soul perish as +the body: is there any pain, or indeed any feeling at all in the body +after death? No one, indeed, asserts that; though Epicurus charges +Democritus with saying so; but the disciples of Democritus deny it. No +sense, therefore, remains in the soul; for the soul is nowhere; where, +then, is the evil? for there is nothing but these two things. Is it +because the mere separation of the soul and body cannot be effected +without pain? but even should that be granted, how small a pain must that +be! Yet I think that it is false; and that it is very often unaccompanied +by any sensation at all, and sometimes even attended with pleasure: but +certainly the whole must be very trifling, whatever it is, for it is +instantaneous. What makes us uneasy, or rather gives us pain, is the +leaving all the good things of life. But just consider, if I might not +more properly say, leaving the evils of life; only there is no reason for +my now occupying myself in bewailing the life of man, and yet I might, +with very good reason; but what occasion is there, when what I am +labouring to prove is that no one is miserable after death, to make life +more miserable by lamenting over it? I have done that in the book which I +wrote, in order to comfort myself as well as I could. If, then, our +inquiry is after truth, death withdraws us from evil, not from good. This +subject is indeed so copiously handled by Hegesias, the Cyrenaic +philosopher, that he is said to have been forbid by Ptolemy from +delivering his lectures in the schools, because some who heard him made +away with themselves. There is too, an epigram of Callimachus,(69) on +Cleombrotus of Ambracia; who, without any misfortune having befallen him, +as he says, threw himself from a wall into the sea, after he had read a +boot of Plato's. The book I mentioned of that Hegesias, is called +{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, or "A Man who starves himself," in which a man is represented +as killing himself by starvation, till he is prevented by his friends, in +reply to whom he reckons up all the miseries of human life: I might do the +same, though not so fully as he, who thinks it not worth any man's while +to live. I pass over others. Was it even worth my while to live, for, had +I died before I was deprived of the comforts of my own family, and of the +honours which I received for my public services, would not death have +taken me from the evils of life, rather than from its blessings? + +XXXV. Mention, therefore, some one, who never knew distress; who never +received any blow from fortune. The great Metellus had four distinguished +sons; but Priam had fifty, seventeen of which were born to him by his +lawful wife: Fortune had the same power over both, though she exercised it +but on one: for Metellus was laid on his funeral pile by a great company +of sons and daughters, grandsons, and grandaughters; but Priam fell by the +hand of an enemy, after having fled to the altar, and having seen himself +deprived of all his numerous progeny. Had he died before the death of his +sons and the ruin of his kingdom, + + + With all his mighty wealth elate, + Under rich canopies of state; + + +would he then have been taken from good or from evil? It would indeed, at +that time, have appeared that he was being taken away from good; yet +surely, it would have turned out advantageous for him; nor should we have +had these mournful verses,-- + + + Lo! these all perish'd in one flaming pile; + The foe old Priam did of life beguile, + And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defile. + + +As if anything better could have happened to him at that time, than to +lose his life in that manner; but yet, if it had befallen him sooner, it +would have prevented all those consequences; but even as it was it +released him from any further sense of them. The case of our friend +Pompey(70) was something better: once, when he had been very ill at +Naples, the Neapolitans on his recovery put crowns on their heads, as did +those of Puteoli; the people flocked from the country to congratulate +him;--it is a Grecian custom, and a foolish one; still it is a sign of good +fortune. But the question is, had he died, would he have been taken from +good, or from evil? Certainly from evil. He would not have been engaged in +a war with his father-in-law;(71) he would not have taken up arms before +he was prepared; he would not have left his own house, nor fled from +Italy; he would not, after the loss of his army, have fallen unarmed into +the hands of slaves, and been put to death by them; his children would not +have been destroyed; nor would his whole fortune have come into the +possession of the conquerors. Did not he, then, who, if he had died at +that time would have died in all his glory, owe all the great and terrible +misfortunes into which he subsequently fell to the prolongation of his +life at that time? + +XXXVI. These calamities are avoided by death, for even though they should +never happen, there is a possibility that they may; but it never occurs to +a man, that such a disaster may befal him himself. Every one hopes to be +as happy as Metellus: as if the number of the happy exceeded that of the +miserable; or as if there were any certainty in human affairs; or again, +as if there were more rational foundation for hope than fear. But should +we grant them even this, that men are by death deprived of good things, +would it follow that the dead are therefore in need of the good things of +life, and are miserable on that account? Certainly they must necessarily +say so. Can he who does not exist, be in need of anything? To be in need +of, has a melancholy sound, because it in effect amounts to this,--he had, +but he has not; he regrets, he looks back upon, he wants. Such are, I +suppose, the distresses of one who is in need of. Is he deprived of eyes? +to be blind is misery. Is he destitute of children? not to have them is +misery. These considerations apply to the living, but the dead are neither +in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. But when I am +speaking of the dead I am speaking of those who have no existence. But +would any one say of us, who do exist, that we want horns or wings? +Certainly not. Should it be asked, why not? the answer would be, that not +to have what neither custom nor nature has fitted you for, would not imply +a want of them, even though you were sensible that you had them not. This +argument should be pressed over and over again, after that point has once +been established, which if souls are mortal there can be no dispute +about--I mean, that the destruction of them by death is so entire, as to +remove even the least suspicion of any sense remaining. When, therefore, +this point is once well grounded and established, we must correctly define +what the term, to want, means; that there may be no mistake in the word. +To want, then, signifies this; to be without that which you would be glad +to have: for inclination for a thing is implied in the word want; +excepting when we use the word in an entirely different sense, as we do +when we say that a fever is wanting to any one. For it admits of a +different interpretation, when you are without a certain thing, and are +sensible that you are without it, but yet can easily dispense with having +it. "To want," then, is an expression which you cannot apply to the dead, +nor is the mere fact of wanting something necessarily lamentable. The +proper expression ought to be, "that they want a good," and that is an +evil. + +But a living man does not want a good, unless he is distressed without it; +and yet, we can easily understand how any man alive can be without a +kingdom. But this cannot be predicated of you with any accuracy: it might +have been asserted of Tarquin, when he was driven from his kingdom: but +when such an expression is used respecting the dead it is absolutely +unintelligible. For to want, implies to be sensible; but the dead are +insensible; therefore the dead can be in no want. + +XXXVII. But what occasion is there to philosophize here, in a matter with +which we see that philosophy is but little concerned? How often have not +only our generals, but whole armies, rushed on certain death! but if it +had been a thing to be feared, L. Brutus would never have fallen in fight, +to prevent the return of that tyrant whom he had expelled; nor would +Decius the father have been slain in fighting with the Latins; nor would +his son, when engaged with the Etruscans, nor his grandson with Pyrrhus, +have exposed themselves to the enemy's darts. Spain would never have seen, +in one campaign, the Scipios fall fighting for their country; nor would +the plains of Cannae have witnessed the death of Paulus and Geminus; or +Venusia, that of Marcellus: nor would the Latins have beheld the death of +Albinus; nor the Lucanians, that of Gracchus. But are any of these +miserable now? nay, they were not so even at the first moment after they +had breathed their last: nor can any one be miserable after he has lost +all sensation. Oh, but the mere circumstance of being without sensation is +miserable. It might be so if being without sensation were the same thing +as wanting it; but as it is evident there can be nothing of any kind in +that which has no existence, what can there be afflicting to that which +can neither feel want, nor be sensible of anything? We might be said to +have repeated this over too often, only that here lies all that the soul +shudders at, from the fear of death. For whoever can clearly apprehend +that which is as manifest as the light, that when both soul and body are +consumed, and there is a total destruction, then that which was an animal, +becomes nothing; will clearly see, that there is no difference between a +Hippocentaur, which never had existence, and king Agamemnon; and that M. +Camillus is no more concerned about this present civil war, than I was at +the sacking of Rome, when he was living. + +XXXVIII. Why, then, should Camillus be affected with the thoughts of these +things happening three hundred and fifty years after his time? And why +should I be uneasy if I were to expect that some nation might possess +itself of this city, ten thousand years hence? Because so great is our +regard for our country, as not to be measured by our own feeling, but by +its own actual safety. + +Death, then, which threatens us daily from a thousand accidents, and +which, by reason of the shortness of life, can never be far off, does not +deter a wise man from making such provision for his country and his +family, as he hopes may last for ever; and from regarding posterity, of +which he can never have any real perception, as belonging to himself. +Wherefore a man may act for eternity, even though he be persuaded that his +soul is mortal; not, indeed, from a desire of glory, which he will be +insensible of, but from a principle of virtue, which glory will inevitably +attend, though that is not his object. The process, indeed, of nature is +this; that just in the same manner as our birth was the beginning of +things with us, so death will be the end; and as we were no ways concerned +with anything before we were born, so neither shall we be after we are +dead; and in this state of things where can the evil be? since death has +no connexion with either the living or the dead; the one have no existence +at all, the other are not yet affected by it. They who make the least of +death consider it as having a great resemblance to sleep; as if any one +would choose to live ninety years on condition that, at the expiration of +sixty, he should sleep out the remainder. The very swine would not accept +of life on those terms, much less I: Endymion, indeed, if you listen to +fables, slept once on a time, on Latmus, a mountain of Caria, and for such +a length of time that I imagine he is not as yet awake. Do you think that +he is concerned at the Moon's being in difficulties, though it was by her +that he was thrown into that sleep, in order that she might kiss him while +sleeping; for what should he be concerned for who has not even any +sensation? You look on sleep as an image of death, and you take that on +you daily; and have you, then, any doubt that there is no sensation in +death, when you see there is none in sleep, which is its near resemblance? + +XXXIX. Away, then, with those follies which are little better than the old +women's dreams, such as that it is miserable to die before our time. What +time do you mean? That of nature? But she has only lent you life, as she +might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for its repayment. +Have you any grounds of complaint, then, that she recals it at her +pleasure? for you received it on these terms. They that complain thus, +allow, that if a young child dies the survivors ought to bear his loss +with equanimity; that if an infant in the cradle dies, they ought not even +to utter a complaint; and yet nature has been more severe with them in +demanding back what she gave. They answer by saying, that such have not +tasted the sweets of life; while the other had begun to conceive hopes of +great happiness, and indeed had begun to realize them. Men judge better in +other things, and allow a part to be preferable to none; why do they not +admit the same estimate in life? Though Callimachus does not speak amiss +in saying, that more tears had flowed from Priam than his son; yet they +are thought happier who die after they have reached old age. It would be +hard to say why; for I do not apprehend that any one, if a longer life +were granted to him, would find it happier. There is nothing more +agreeable to a man than prudence, which old age most certainly bestows on +a man, though it may strip him of everything else; but what age is long? +or what is there at all long to a man? Does not + + + Old age, though unregarded, still attend + On childhood's pastimes, as the cares of men? + + +But because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long; all these +things are said to be long or short, according to the proportion of time +they were given us for. Aristotle saith, there is a kind of insect near +the river Hypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe into the +Pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at the eighth +hour, die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are very old, +especially when the days are at the longest. Compare our longest life with +eternity and we shall be found almost as short-lived as those little +animals. + +XL. Let us, then, despise all these follies--for what softer name can I +give to such levities?--and let us lay the foundation of our happiness in +the strength and greatness of our minds, in a contempt and disregard of +all earthly things, and in the practice of every virtue. For at present we +are enervated by the softness of our imaginations, so that, should we +leave this world before the promises of our fortune-tellers are made good +to us, we should think ourselves deprived of some great advantages, and +seem disappointed and forlorn. But if, through life, we are in continual +suspense, still expecting, still desiring, and are in continual pain and +torture, good Gods! how pleasant must that journey be which ends in +security and ease! How pleased am I with Theramenes! of how exalted a soul +does he appear! For, although we never read of him without tears, yet that +illustrious man is not to be lamented in his death, who, when he had been +imprisoned by the command of the thirty tyrants, drank off, at one +draught, as if he had been thirsty, the poisoned cup, and threw the +remainder out of it with such force, that it sounded as it fell; and then, +on hearing the sound of the drops, he said, with a smile, "I drink this to +the most excellent Critias," who had been his most bitter enemy; for it is +customary among the Greeks, at their banquets, to name the person to whom +they intend to deliver the cup. This celebrated man was pleasant to the +last, even when he had received the poison into his bowels, and truly +foretold the death of that man whom he named when he drank the poison, and +that death soon followed. Who that thinks death an evil, could approve of +the evenness of temper in this great man at the instant of dying? Socrates +came, a few years after, to the same prison and the same cup, by as great +iniquity on the part of his judges as the tyrants displayed when they +executed Theramenes. What a speech is that which Plato makes him deliver +before his judges, after they had condemned him to death! + +XLI. "I am not without hopes, O judges, that it is a favourable +circumstance for me that I am condemned to die; for one of these two +things must necessarily happen, either that death will deprive me entirely +of all sense, or else, that by dying I shall go from hence into some other +place; wherefore, if all sense is utterly extinguished, and if death is +like that sleep which sometimes is so undisturbed as to be even without +the visions of dreams--in that case, O ye good Gods! what gain is it to +die! or what length of days can be imagined which would be preferable to +such a night? And if the constant course of future time is to resemble +that night, who is happier than I am? But if, on the other hand, what is +said be true, namely, that death is but a removal to those regions where +the souls of the departed dwell, then that state must be more happy still, +to have escaped from those who call themselves judges, and to appear +before such as are truly so, Minos, Rhadamanthus, AEacus, Triptolemus, and +to meet with those who have lived with justice and probity!(72) Can this +change of abode appear otherwise than great to you? What bounds can you +set to the value of conversing with Orpheus, and Musaeus, and Homer, and +Hesiod? I would even, were it possible, willingly die often, in order to +prove the certainty of what I speak of. What delight must it be to meet +with Palamedes, and Ajax, and others, who have been betrayed by the +iniquity of their judges! Then, also, should I experience the wisdom of +even that king of kings, who led his vast troops to Troy, and the prudence +of Ulysses and Sisyphus: nor should I then be condemned for prosecuting my +inquiries on such subjects in the same way in which I have done here on +earth. And even you, my judges, you, I mean, who have voted for my +acquittal, do not you fear death, for nothing bad can befal a good man, +whether he be alive or dead; nor are his concerns ever overlooked by the +Gods, nor in my case either has this befallen me by chance; and I have +nothing to charge those men with who accused or condemned me, but the fact +that they believed that they were doing me harm." In this manner he +proceeded: there is no part of his speech which I admire more than his +last words: "But it is time," says he, "for me now to go hence, that I may +die; and for you, that you may continue to live. Which condition of the +two is the best, the immortal Gods know; but I do not believe that any +mortal man does." + +XLII. Surely I would rather have had this man's soul, than all the +fortunes of those who sat in judgment on him; although that very thing +which he says no one except the Gods knows, namely, whether life or death +is most preferable, he knows himself, for he had previously stated his +opinion on it; but he maintained to the last that favourite maxim of his, +of affirming nothing. And let us, too, adhere to this rule of not thinking +anything an evil, which is a general provision of nature: and let us +assure ourselves, that if death is an evil, it is an eternal evil, for +death seems to be the end of a miserable life; but if death is a misery, +there can be no end of that. But why do I mention Socrates, or Theramenes, +men distinguished by the glory of virtue and wisdom? when a certain +Lacedaemonian, whose name is not so much as known, held death in such +contempt, that, when led to it by the ephori, he bore a cheerful and +pleasant countenance; and, when he was asked by one of his enemies whether +he despised the laws of Lycurgus? "On the contrary," answered he, "I am +greatly obliged to him, for he has amerced me in a fine which I can pay +without borrowing, or taking up money at interest." This was a man worthy +of Sparta! and I am almost persuaded of his innocence because of the +greatness of his soul. Our own city has produced many such. But why should +I name generals, and other men of high rank, when Cato could write, that +legions have marched with alacrity to that place from whence they never +expected to return? With no less greatness of soul fell the Lacedaemonians +at Thermopylae, on whom Simonides wrote the following epitaph:-- + + + Go, stranger, tell the Spartans, here we lie, + Who to support their laws durst boldly die.(73) + + +What was it that Leonidas, their general, said to them? "March on with +courage, my Lacedaemonians; to-night, perhaps, we shall sup in the regions +below." This was a brave nation whilst the laws of Lycurgus were in force. +One of them, when a Persian had said to him in conversation, "We shall +hide the sun from your sight by the number of our arrows and darts;" +replied, "We shall fight then in the shade." Do I talk of their men? how +great was that Lacedaemonian woman, who had sent her son to battle, and +when she heard that he was slain, said, "I bore him for that purpose, that +you might have a man who durst die for his country." However, it is a +matter of notoriety that the Spartans were bold and hardy, for the +discipline of a republic has great influence. + +XLIII. What, then, have we not reason to admire Theodorus the Cyrenean, a +philosopher of no small distinction? who, when Lysimachus threatened to +crucify him, bade him keep those menaces for his courtiers: "to Theodorus +it makes no difference whether he rot in the air or under ground." By +which saying of the philosopher I am reminded to say something of the +custom of funerals and sepulture, and of funeral ceremonies, which is, +indeed, not a difficult subject, especially if we recollect what has been +before said about insensibility. The opinion of Socrates respecting this +matter is clearly stated in the book which treats of his death; or which +we have already said so much; for when he had discussed the immortality of +the soul, and when the time of his dying was approaching rapidly, being +asked by Criton how he would be buried, "I have taken a great deal of +pains," saith he, "my friends, to no purpose, for I have not convinced our +Criton, that I shall fly from hence, and leave no part of me behind: +notwithstanding, Criton, if you can overtake me, wheresoever you get hold +of me, bury me as you please: but believe me, none of you will be able to +catch me when I have flown away from hence." That was excellently said, +inasmuch as he allows his friend to do as he pleased, and yet shows his +indifference about anything of this kind. Diogenes was rougher, though of +the same opinion, but in his character of a Cynic, he expressed himself in +a somewhat harsher manner; he ordered himself to be thrown anywhere +without being buried. And when his friends replied, "What, to the birds +and beasts?" "By no means," saith he; "place my staff near me, that I may +drive them away." "How can you do that," they answer, "for you will not +perceive them?" "How am I then injured by being torn by those animals, if +I have no sensation?" Anaxagoras, when he was at the point of death, at +Lampsacus, and was asked by his friends, whether, if anything should +happen to him, he would not choose to be carried to Clazomenae, his +country, made this excellent answer,--"There is," says he, "no occasion for +that, for all places are at an equal distance from the infernal regions." +There is one thing to be observed with respect to the whole subject of +burial, that it relates to the body, whether the soul live or die. Now +with regard to the body, it is clear that whether the soul live or die, +that has no sensation. + +XLIV. But all things are full of errors. Achilles drags Hector, tied to +his chariot; he thinks, I suppose, he tears his flesh, and that Hector +feels the pain of it; therefore, he avenges himself on him, as he +imagines; but Hecuba bewails this as a sore misfortune-- + + + I saw (a dreadful sight!) great Hector slain, + Dragg'd at Achilles' car along the plain. + + +What Hector? or how long will he be Hector? Accius is better in this, and +Achilles, too, is sometimes reasonable-- + + + I Hector's body to his sire convey'd, + Hector I sent to the infernal shade. + + +It was not Hector that you dragged along, but a body that had been +Hector's. Here another starts from underground, and will not suffer his +mother to sleep-- + + + To thee I call, my once loved parent, hear, + Nor longer with thy sleep relieve thy care; + Thine eye which pities not is closed--arise, + Ling'ring I wait the unpaid obsequies. + + +When these verses are sung with a slow and melancholy tune, so as to +affect the whole theatre with sadness, one can scarce help thinking those +unhappy that are unburied-- + + + Ere the devouring dogs and hungry vultures ... + + +He is afraid he shall not have the use of his limbs so well if they are +torn to pieces, but is under no such apprehensions if they are burned-- + + + Nor leave my naked bones, my poor remains, + To shameful violence, and bloody stains. + + +I do not understand what he could fear who could pour forth such excellent +verses to the sound of the flute. We must, therefore, adhere to this, that +nothing is to be regarded after we are dead, though many people revenge +themselves on their dead enemies. Thyestes pours forth several curses in +some good lines of Ennius, praying, first of all, that Atreus may perish +by a shipwreck, which is certainly a very terrible thing, for such a death +is not free from very grievous sensations. Then follow these unmeaning +expressions:-- + + + May + On the sharp rock his mangled carcase lie, + His entrails torn, to hungry birds a prey; + May he convulsive writhe his bleeding side, + And with his clotted gore the stones be dyed. + + +The rocks themselves were not more destitute of feeling than he who was +hanging to them by his side; though Thyestes imagines he is wishing him +the greatest torture. It would be torture indeed, if he were sensible; but +as he is not, it can be none; then how very unmeaning is this! + + + Let him, still hovering o'er the Stygian wave, + Ne'er reach the body's peaceful port, the grave. + + +You see under what mistaken notions all this is said. He imagines the body +has its haven, and that the dead are at rest in their graves. Pelops was +greatly to blame in not having informed and taught his son what regard was +due to everything. + +XLV. But what occasion is there to animadvert on the opinions of +individuals, when we may observe whole nations to fall into all sorts of +errors? The Egyptians embalm their dead, and keep them in their houses; +the Persians dress them over with wax, and then bury them, that they may +preserve their bodies as long as possible. It is customary with the Magi, +to bury none of their order, unless they have been first torn by wild +beasts. In Hyrcania, the people maintain dogs for the public use, the +nobles have their own; and we know that they have a good breed of dogs; +but every one, according to his ability, provides himself with some, in +order to be torn by them; and they hold that to be the best kind of +interment. Chrysippus, who is curious in all kinds of historical facts, +has collected many other things of this kind, but some of them are so +offensive as not to admit of being related. All that has been said of +burying, is not worth our regard with respect to ourselves, though it is +not to be neglected as to our friends, provided we are thoroughly aware +that the dead are insensible; but the living, indeed, should consider what +is due to custom and opinion, only they should at the same time consider +that the dead are no ways interested in it. But death truly is then met +with the greatest tranquillity, when the dying man can comfort himself +with his own praise. No one dies too soon who has finished the course of +perfect virtue. I myself have known many occasions when I have seemed in +danger of immediate death; oh! how I wish it had come to me, for I have +gained nothing by the delay. I had gone over and over again the duties of +life; nothing remained but to contend with fortune. If reason, then, +cannot sufficiently fortify us to enable us to feel a contempt for death, +at all events, let our past life prove that we have lived long enough, and +even longer than was necessary; for notwithstanding the deprivation of +sense, the dead are not without that good which peculiarly belongs to +them, namely, the praise and glory which they have acquired, even though +they are not sensible of it. For although there be nothing in glory to +make it desirable, yet it follows virtue as its shadow. And the genuine +judgment of the multitude on good men, if ever they form any, is more to +their own praise, than of any real advantage to the dead; yet I cannot +say, however it may be received, that Lycurgus and Solon have no glory +from their laws, and from the political constitution which they +established in their country; or that Themistocles and Epaminondas have +not glory from their martial virtue. + +XLVI. For Neptune shall sooner bury Salamis itself with his waters, than +the memory of the trophies gained there; and the Boeotian Leuetra shall +perish, sooner than the glory of that great battle. And longer still shall +fame be before it deserts Curius, and Fabricius, and Calatinus, and the +two Scipios, and the two Africani, and Maximus, and Marcellus, and Paulus, +and Cato, and Laelius, and numberless other heroes; and whoever has caught +any resemblance of them, not estimating it by common fame, but by the real +applause of good men, may with confidence, when the occasion requires, +approach death, on which we are sure that even if the chief good is not +continued, at least no evil is. Such a man would even wish to die, whilst +in prosperity; for all the favours that could be heaped on him, would not +be so agreeable to him, as the loss of them would be painful. That speech +of the Lacedaemonian seems to have the same meaning, who, when Diagoras the +Rhodian, who had himself been a conqueror at the Olympic games, saw two of +his own sons conquerors there on the same day, approached the old man, and +congratulating him, said, "You should die now, Diagoras, for no greater +happiness can possibly await you." The Greeks look on these as great +things; perhaps they think too highly of them, or rather they did so then. +And so he who said this to Diagoras, looking on it as something very +glorious, that three men out of one family should have been conquerors +there, thought it could answer no purpose to him, to continue any longer +in life, where he could only be exposed to a reverse of fortune. + +I might have given you a sufficient answer, as it seems to me, on this +point, in a few words, as you had allowed the dead were not exposed to any +positive evil; but I have spoken at greater length on the subject for this +reason, because this is our greatest consolation in the losing and +bewailing of our friends. For we ought to bear with moderation any grief +which arises from ourselves, or is endured on our own account, lest we +should seem to be too much influenced by self-love. But should we suspect +our departed friends to be under those evils, which they are generally +imagined to be and to be sensible of them, then such a suspicion would +give us intolerable pain; and accordingly I wished, for my own sake, to +pluck up this opinion by the roots, and on that account I have been +perhaps somewhat more prolix than was necessary. + +XLVII. _A._ More prolix than was necessary? certainly not, in my opinion. +For I was induced by the former part of your speech, to wish to die; but, +by the latter, sometimes not to be unwilling, and at others to be wholly +indifferent about it. But the effect of your whole argument is, that I am +convinced that death ought not to be classed among the evils. + +_M._ Do you, then, expect that I am to give you a regular peroration, like +the rhetoricians, or shall I forego that art? + +_A._ I would not have you give over an art which you have set off to such +advantage; and you were in the right to do so, for, to speak the truth, it +also has set you off. But what is that peroration? for I should be glad to +hear it, whatever it is. + +_M._ It is customary in the schools, to produce the opinions of the +immortal gods on death; nor are these opinions the fruits of the +imagination alone of the lecturers, but they have the authority of +Herodotus and many others. Cleobis and Biton are the first they mention, +sons of the Argive priestess; the story is a well-known one. As it was +necessary that she should be drawn in a chariot to a certain annual +sacrifice, which was solemnized at a temple some considerable distance +from the town, and the cattle that were to draw the chariot had not +arrived, those two young men whom I have just mentioned, pulling off their +garments, and anointing their bodies with oil, harnessed themselves to the +yoke. And in this manner the priestess was conveyed to the temple; and +when the chariot had arrived at the proper place, she is said to have +entreated the goddess to bestow on them, as a reward for their piety, the +greatest gift that a God could confer on man. And the young men, after +having feasted with their mother, fell asleep; and in the morning they +were found dead. Trophonius and Agamedes are said to have put up the same +petition, for they having built a temple to Apollo at Delphi, offered +supplications to the god, and desired of him some extraordinary reward for +their care and labour, particularizing nothing, but asking for whatever +was best for men. Accordingly, Apollo signified to them that he would +bestow it on them in three days, and on the third day at daybreak they +were found dead. And so they say that this was a formal decision +pronounced by that god, to whom the rest of the deities have assigned the +province of divining with an accuracy superior to that of all the rest. + +XLVIII. There is also a story told of Silenus, who, when taken prisoner by +Midas, is said to have made him this present for his ransom; namely, that +he informed him(74) that never to have been born, was by far the greatest +blessing that could happen to man; and that the next best thing was, to +die very soon; which very opinion Euripides makes use of in his +Cresphontes, saying,-- + + + When man is born, 'tis fit, with solemn show, + We speak our sense of his approaching woe, + With other gestures, and a different eye, + Proclaim our pleasure when he's bid to die.(75) + + +There is something like this in Crantor's Consolation; for he says, that +Terinaeus of Elysia, when he was bitterly lamenting the loss of his son, +came to a place of divination to be informed why he was visited with so +great affliction, and received in his tablet these three verses,-- + + + Thou fool, to murmur at Euthynous' death + The blooming youth to fate resigns his breath: + The fate, whereon your happiness depends, + At once the parent and the son befriends.(76) + + +On these and similar authorities they affirm that the question has been +determined by the Gods. Nay more; Alcidamas, an ancient rhetorician of the +very highest reputation, wrote even in praise of death, which he +endeavoured to establish by an enumeration of the evils of life; and his +Dissertation has a great deal of eloquence in it, but he was unacquainted +with the more refined arguments of the philosophers. By the orators, +indeed, to die for our country is always considered not only as glorious, +but even as happy; they go back as far as Erechtheus,(77) whose very +daughters underwent death, for the safety of their fellow-citizens: they +instance Codrus, who threw himself into the midst of his enemies, dressed +like a common man, that his royal robes might not betray him; because the +oracle had declared the Athenians conquerors, if their king was slain. +Menoeceus(78) is not overlooked by them, who, in compliance with the +injunctions of an oracle, freely shed his blood for his country. Iphigenia +ordered herself to be conveyed to Aulis, to be sacrificed, that her blood +might be the cause of spilling that of her enemies. + +XLIX. From hence they proceed to instances of a fresher date. Harmodius +and Aristogiton are in everybody's mouth; the memory of Leonidas the +Lacedaemonian, and Epaminondas the Theban, is as fresh as ever. Those +philosophers were not acquainted with the many instances in our country--to +give a list of whom would take up too much time--who, we see, considered +death desirable as long as it was accompanied with honour. But, +notwithstanding this is the correct view of the case, we must use much +persuasion, speak as if we were endued with some higher authority, in +order to bring men to begin to wish to die, or cease to be afraid of +death. For if that last day does not occasion an entire extinction, but a +change of abode only, what can be more desirable? and if it on the other +hand destroys, and absolutely puts an end to us, what can be preferable to +the having a deep sleep fall on us, in the midst of the fatigues of life, +and being thus overtaken, to sleep to eternity? And, should this really be +the case, then Ennius's language is more consistent with wisdom than +Solon's; for our Ennius says-- + + + Let none bestow upon my passing bier + One needless sigh or unavailing tear. + + +But the wise Solon says-- + + + Let me not unlamented die, but o'er my bier + Burst forth the tender sigh, the friendly tear.(79) + + +But let us, if indeed it should be our fate to know the time which is +appointed by the Gods for us to die, prepare ourselves for it, with a +cheerful and grateful mind, thinking ourselves like men who are delivered +from a jail, and released from their fetters, for the purpose of going +back to our eternal habitation, which may be more emphatically called our +own; or else to be divested of all sense and trouble. If, on the other +hand, we should have no notice given us of this decree, yet let us +cultivate such a disposition as to look on that formidable hour of death +as happy for us, though shocking to our friends; and let us never imagine +anything to be an evil, which is an appointment of the immortal Gods, or +of nature, the common parent of all. For it is not by hazard or without +design that we have been born and situated as we have. On the contrary, +beyond all doubt there is a certain power, which consults the happiness of +human nature; and this would neither have produced nor provided for a +being, which after having gone through the labours of life was to fall +into eternal misery by death. Let us rather infer, that we have a retreat +and haven prepared for us, which I wish we could crowd all sail and arrive +at; but though the winds should not serve, and we should be driven back, +yet we shall to a certainty arrive at that point eventually, though +somewhat later. But how can that be miserable for one which all must of +necessity undergo? I have given you a peroration, that you might not think +I had overlooked or neglected anything. + +_A._ I am persuaded you have not; and, indeed, that peroration has +confirmed me. + +_M._ I am glad it has had that effect; but it is now time to consult our +health; to-morrow, and all the time we continue in this Tusculan villa, +let us consider this subject; and especially those portions of it which +may ease our pain, alleviate our fears, and lessen our desires, which is +the greatest advantage we can reap from the whole of philosophy. + + + + +Book II. On Bearing Pain. + + +I. Neoptolemus, in Ennius, indeed, says, that the study of philosophy was +expedient for him; but that it required limiting to a few subjects, for +that to give himself up entirely to it, was what he did not approve of. +And for my part, Brutus, I am perfectly persuaded that it is expedient for +me to philosophize; for what can I do better, especially as I have no +regular occupation? but I am not for limiting my philosophy to a few +subjects, as he does; for philosophy is a matter in which it is difficult +to acquire a little knowledge without acquainting yourself with many, or +all its branches, nor can you well take a few subjects without selecting +them out of a great number; nor can any one, who has acquired the +knowledge of a few points, avoid endeavouring with the same eagerness to +understand more. But still, in a busy life, and in one mainly occupied +with military matters, such as that of Neoptolemus was at that time, even +that limited degree of acquaintance with philosophy may be of great use, +and may yield fruit, not perhaps so plentiful as a thorough knowledge of +the whole of philosophy, but yet such as in some degree may at times +deliver us from the dominion of our desires, our sorrows, and our fears; +just as the effect of that discussion which we lately maintained in my +Tusculan villa seemed to be, that a great contempt of death was +engendered; which contempt is of no small efficacy towards delivering the +mind from fear; for whoever dreads what cannot be avoided, can by no means +live with a quiet and tranquil mind. But he who is under no fear of death, +not only because it is a thing absolutely inevitable, but also because he +is persuaded that death itself hath nothing terrible in it, provides +himself with a very great resource towards a happy life. However, I am not +ignorant, that many will argue strenuously against us; and, indeed, that +is a thing which can never be avoided, except by abstaining from writing +at all. For if my Orations, which were addressed to the judgment and +approbation of the people, (for that is a popular art, and the object of +oratory is popular applause,) have been criticised by some people who are +inclined to withhold their praise from every thing but what they are +persuaded they can attain to themselves, and who limit their ideas of good +speaking by the hopes which they conceive of what they themselves may +attain to, and who declare, when they are overwhelmed with a flow of words +and sentences, that they prefer the utmost poverty of thought and +expression to that plenty and copiousness; (from which arose the Attic +kind of oratory, which they who professed it were strangers to, though +they have now been some time silenced, and laughed out of the very courts +of justice;) what may I not expect, when at present I cannot have the +least countenance from the people, by whom I used to be upheld before? For +philosophy is satisfied with a few judges, and of her own accord +industriously avoids the multitude, who are jealous of it, and utterly +displeased with it; so that, should any one undertake to cry down the +whole of it, he would have the people on his side; while, if he should +attack that school which I particularly profess, he would have great +assistance from those of the other philosophers. + +II. But I have answered the detractors of philosophy in general, in my +Hortensius. And what I had to say in favour of the Academics, is, I think, +explained with sufficient accuracy in my four books of the Academic +Question. + +But yet I am so far from desiring that no one should write against me, +that it is what I most earnestly wish; for philosophy would never have +been in such esteem in Greece itself, if it had not been for the strength +which it acquired from the contentions and disputations of the most +learned men; and therefore I recommend all men who have abilities to +follow my advice, to snatch this art also from declining Greece, and to +transport it to this city; as our ancestors by their study and industry +have imported all their other arts, which were worth having. Thus the +praise of oratory, raised from a low degree, is arrived at such +perfection, that it must now decline, and, as is the nature of all things, +verge to its dissolution in a very short time. Let philosophy then derive +its birth in Latin language from this time, and let us lend it our +assistance, and bear patiently to be contradicted and refuted; and +although those men may dislike such treatment who are bound and devoted to +certain predetermined opinions, and are under such obligations to maintain +them that they are forced, for the sake of consistency, to adhere to them +even though they do not themselves wholly approve of them; we, on the +other hand, who pursue only probabilities, and who cannot go beyond that +which seems really likely, can confute others without obstinacy, and are +prepared to be confuted ourselves without resentment. Besides, if these +studies are ever brought home to us, we shall not want even Greek +libraries, in which there is an infinite number of books, by reason of the +multitude of authors among them;--for it is a common practice with many to +repeat the same things which have been written by others, which serves no +purpose, but to stuff their shelves: and this will be our case, too, if +many apply themselves to this study. + +III. But let us excite those, if possible, who have had a liberal +education, and are masters of an elegant style, and who philosophize with +reason and method. + +For there is a certain class of them who would willingly be called +philosophers, whose books in our language are said to be numerous, and +which I do not despise, for indeed I never read them: but still because +the authors themselves declare that they write without any regularity, or +method, or elegance, or ornament, I do not care to read what must be so +void of entertainment. There is no one in the least acquainted with +literature, who does not know the style and sentiments of that school; +wherefore, since they are at no pains to express themselves well, I do not +see why they should be read by anybody except by one another: let them +read them, if they please, who are of the same opinions: for in the same +manner as all men read Plato, and the other Socratics, with those who +sprung from them, even those who do not agree with their opinions, or are +very indifferent about them; but scarcely any one except their own +disciples, take Epicurus, or Metrodorus, into their hands; so they alone +read these Latin books, who think that the arguments contained in them are +sound. But, in my opinion, whatever is published, should be recommended to +the reading of every man of learning; and though we may not succeed in +this ourselves, yet nevertheless we must be sensible that this ought to be +the aim of every writer. And on this account I have always been pleased +with the custom of the Peripatetics, and Academics, of disputing on both +sides of the question; not solely from its being the only method of +discovering what is probable on every subject, but also because it affords +the greatest scope for practising eloquence; a method that Aristotle first +made use of, and afterward all the Aristotelians; and in our own memory +Philo, whom we have often heard, appointed one time to treat of the +precepts of the rhetoricians, and another for philosophical discussion, to +which custom I was brought to conform by my friends at my Tusculum; and +accordingly our leisure time was spent in this manner. And therefore, as +yesterday before noon, we applied ourselves to speaking; and in the +afternoon went down into the Academy: the discussions which were held +there I have acquainted you with, not in the manner of a narration, but in +almost the very same words which were employed in the debate. + +IV. The discourse, then, was introduced in this manner, whilst we were +walking, and it was commenced by some such an opening as this. + +_A._ It is not to be expressed how much I was delighted, or rather +edified, by your discourse of yesterday. For although I am conscious to +myself that I have never been too fond of life, yet at times, when I have +considered that there would be an end to this life, and that I must some +time or other part with all its good things, a certain dread and +uneasiness used to intrude itself on my thoughts; but now, believe me, I +am so freed from that kind of uneasiness, that there is nothing that I +think less worth any regard. + +_M._ I am not at all surprised at that, for it is the effect of +philosophy, which is the medicine of our souls; it banishes all groundless +apprehensions, frees us from desires, and drives away fears: but it has +not the same influence over all men; it is of very great influence when it +falls in with a disposition well adapted to it. For not only does Fortune, +as the old proverb says, assist the bold, but reason does so in a still +greater degree; for it, by certain precepts, as it were, strengthens even +courage itself. You were born naturally great and soaring, and with a +contempt for all things which pertain to man alone; therefore a discourse +against death took easy possession of a brave soul. But do you imagine +that these same arguments have any force with those very persons who have +invented, and canvassed, and published them, excepting indeed some very +few particular persons? For how few philosophers will you meet with, whose +life and manners are conformable to the dictates of reason! who look on +their profession, not as a means of displaying their learning, but as a +rule for their own practice! who follow their own precepts, and comply +with, their own decrees! You may see some of such levity, and such vanity, +that it would have been better for them to have been ignorant; some +covetous of money, some others eager for glory, many slaves to their +lusts; so that their discourses and their actions are most strangely at +variance; than which nothing in my opinion can be more unbecoming: for +just as if one who professed to teach grammar, should speak with +impropriety; or a master of music sing out of tune; such conduct has the +worse appearance in these men, because they blunder in the very particular +with which they profess that they are well acquainted: so a philosopher, +who errs in the conduct of his life, is the more infamous, because he is +erring in the very thing which he pretends to teach, and whilst he lays +down rules to regulate life by, is irregular in his own life. + +V. _A._ Should this be the case, is it not to be feared that you are +dressing up philosophy in false colours? for what stronger argument can +there be that it is of little use, than that some very profound +philosophers live in a discreditable manner? + +_M._ That, indeed, is no argument at all, for as all the fields which are +cultivated are not fruitful, (and this sentiment of Accius is false, and +asserted without any foundation, + + + The ground you sow on, is of small avail; + To yield a crop good seed can never fail:) + + +it is not every mind which has been properly cultivated that produces +fruit;--and to go on with the comparison, as a field, although it may be +naturally fruitful cannot produce a crop, without dressing, so neither can +the mind, without education; such is the weakness of either without the +other. Whereas philosophy is the culture of the mind: this it is which +plucks up vices by the roots; prepares the mind for the receiving of +seeds, commits them to it, or, as I may say, sows them, in the hope that, +when come to maturity, they may produce a plentiful harvest. Let us +proceed, then, as we begun; say, if you please, what shall be the subject +of our disputation. + +_A._ I look on pain to be the greatest of all evils. + +_M._ What, even greater than infamy? + +_A._ I dare not indeed assert that, and I blush to think I am so soon +driven from my ground. + +_M._ You would have had greater reason for blushing had you persevered in +it; for what is so unbecoming--what can appear worse to you, than disgrace, +wickedness, immorality? To avoid which, what pain is there which we ought +not (I will not say to avoid shirking, but even) of our own accord to +encounter, and undergo, and even to court? + +_A._ I am entirely of that opinion; but notwithstanding that pain is not +the greatest evil, yet surely it is an evil. + +_M._ Do you perceive, then, how much of the terror of pain you have given +up on a small hint? + +_A._ I see that plainly; but I should be glad to give up more of it. + +_M._ I will endeavour to make you do so, but it is a great undertaking, +and I must have a disposition on your part, which is not inclined to offer +any obstacles. + +_A._ You shall have such: for as I behaved yesterday, so now I will follow +reason wherever she leads. + +VI. _M._ First, then, I will speak of the weakness of many philosophers, +and those too of various sects; the head of whom, both in authority and +antiquity, was Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, who hesitated not to +say, that pain was the greatest of all evils. And after him Epicurus +easily gave into this effeminate and enervated doctrine. After him +Hieronymus, the Rhodian, said, that to be without pain was the chief good, +so great an evil did pain appear to him to be. The rest, with the +exceptions of Zeno, Aristo, Pyrrho, were pretty much of the same opinion +that you were of just now, that it was indeed an evil, but that there were +many worse. When then nature herself and a certain generous feeling of +virtue at once prevents you from persisting in the assertion that pain is +the chief evil, and when you were driven from such an opinion when +disgrace was contrasted with pain, shall philosophy, the preceptress of +life, cling to this idea for so many ages? What duty of life, what praise, +what reputation would be of such consequence that a man should be desirous +of gaining it at the expense of submitting to bodily pain, when he has +persuaded himself that pain is the greatest evil? On the other side, what +disgrace, what ignominy, would he not submit to, that he might avoid pain, +when persuaded that it was the greatest of evils? Besides, what person, if +it be only true that pain is the greatest of evils, is not miserable, not +only when he actually feels pain, but also whenever he is aware that it +may befal him? And who is there whom pain may not befal? so that it is +clear that there is absolutely no one who can possibly be happy. +Metrodorus, indeed, thinks that man perfectly happy, whose body is free +from all disorders, and who has an assurance that it will always continue +so; but who is there who can be assured of that? + +VII. But Epicurus, indeed, says such things that it should seem that his +design was only to make people laugh; for he affirms somewhere, that if a +wise man were to be burned, or put to the torture,--you expect, perhaps, +that he is going to say he would bear it, he would support himself under +it with resolution! he would not yield to it, and that, by Hercules! would +he very commendable, and worthy of that very Hercules whom I have just +invoked: but even this will not satisfy Epicurus, that robust and hardy +man! No; his wise man, even if he were in Phalaris's bull, would say, How +sweet it is! how little do I regard it! What sweet? is it not sufficient, +if it is not disagreeable? But those very men who deny pain to be an evil, +are not in the habit of saying that it is agreeable to any one to be +tormented; they rather say, that it is cruel, or hard to bear, afflicting, +unnatural, but still not an evil: while this man who says that it is the +only evil, and the very worst of all evils, yet thinks that a wise man +would pronounce it sweet. I do not require of you to speak of pain in the +same words which Epicurus uses--a man, as you know, devoted to pleasure: he +may make no difference, if he pleases, between Phalaris's bull, and his +own bed: but I cannot allow the wise man to be so indifferent about pain. +If he bears it with courage, it is sufficient; that he should rejoice in +it, I do not expect; for pain is, beyond all question, sharp, bitter, +against nature, hard to submit to, and to bear. Observe Philoctetes: We +may allow him to lament, for he saw Hercules himself groaning loudly +through extremity of pain on mount OEta: the arrows with which Hercules +presented him, were then no consolation to him, when + + + The viper's bite, impregnating his veins + With poison, rack'd him with its bitter pains. + + +And therefore he cries out, desiring help, and wishing to die, + + + Oh! that some friendly hand its aid would lend, + My body from this rock's vast height to send + Into the briny deep! I'm all on fire, + And by this fatal wound must soon expire. + + +It is hard to say that the man who was obliged to cry out in this manner, +was not oppressed with evil, and great evil too. + +VIII. But let us observe Hercules himself, who was subdued by pain at the +very time when he was on the point of attaining immortality by death. What +words does Sophocles here put in his mouth, in his Trachiniae? who, when +Deianira had put upon him a tunic dyed in the centaur's blood, and it +stuck to his entrails, says, + + + What tortures I endure no words can tell, + Far greater these, than those which erst befel + From the dire terror of thy consort, Jove; + E'en stern Eurystheus' dire command above; + This of thy daughter, OEneus, is the fruit, + Beguiling me with her envenom'd suit, + Whose close embrace doth on my entrails prey, + Consuming life; my lungs forbid to play; + The blood forsakes my veins, my manly heart + Forgets to beat; enervated, each part + Neglects its office, whilst my fatal doom + Proceeds ignobly from the weaver's loom. + The hand of foe ne'er hurt me, nor the fierce + Giant issuing from his parent earth. + Ne'er could the Centaur such a blow enforce, + No barbarous foe, nor all the Grecian force; + This arm no savage people could withstand, + Whose realms I traversed to reform the land. + Thus, though I ever bore a manly heart, + I fall a victim to a woman's art. + + IX. Assist, my son, if thou that name dost hear, + My groans preferring to thy mother's tear; + Convey her here, if, in thy pious heart, + Thy mother shares not an unequal part: + Proceed, be bold, thy father's fate bemoan, + Nations will join, you will not weep alone. + O what a sight is this same briny source, + Unknown before, through all my labours' course! + That virtue, which could brave each toil but late, + With woman's weakness now bewails its fate. + Approach, my son; behold thy father laid, + A wither'd carcase that implores thy aid; + Let all behold; and thou, imperious Jove, + On me direct thy lightning from above: + Now all its force the poison doth assume, + And my burnt entrails with its flame consume. + Crest-fallen, unembraced I now let fall + Listless, those hands that lately conquer'd all; + When the Nemaean lion own'd their force, + And he indignant fell a breathless corse: + The serpent slew, of the Lernean lake, + As did the Hydra of its force partake: + By this, too, fell the Erymanthian boar: + E'en Cerberus did his weak strength deplore. + This sinewy arm did overcome with ease + That dragon, guardian of the golden fleece. + My many conquests let some others trace; + It's mine to say, I never knew disgrace.(80) + + +Can we, then, despise pain, when we see Hercules himself giving vent to +his expressions of agony with such impatience? + +IX. Let us see what AEschylus says, who was not only a poet, but a +Pythagorean philosopher, also, for that is the account which you have +received of him; how doth he make Prometheus bear the pain he suffered for +the Lemnian theft, when he clandestinely stole away the celestial fire, +and bestowed it on men, and was severely punished by Jupiter for the +theft. Fastened to mount Caucasus, he speaks thus: + + + Thou heav'n-born race of Titans here fast bound, + Behold thy brother! As the sailors sound + With care the bottom, and their ships confine + To some safe shore, with anchor and with line: + So, by Jove's dread decree the god of fire + Confines me here the victim of Jove's ire. + With baneful art his dire machine he shapes; + From such a god what mortal e'er escapes? + When each third day shall triumph o'er the night, + Then doth the vulture, with his talons light, + Seize on my entrails; which, in rav'nous guise, + He preys on! then with wing extended flies + Aloft, and brushes with his plumes the gore: + But when dire Jove my liver doth restore, + Back he returns impetuous to his prey, + Clapping his wings, he cuts th' ethereal way. + Thus do I nourish with my blood this pest, + Confined my arms, unable to contest; + Entreating only, that in pity Jove + Would take my life, and this cursed plague remove. + But endless ages past, unheard my moan, + Sooner shall drops dissolve this very stone.(81) + + +And therefore it scarcely seems possible to avoid calling a man who is +suffering, miserable; and if he is miserable, then pain is an evil. + +XI. _A._ Hitherto you are on my side; I will see to that by-and-by; and, +in the meanwhile, whence are those verses? I do not remember them. + +_M._ I will inform you, for you are in the right to ask. Do you see that I +have much leisure? + +_A._ What then? + +_M._ I imagine, when you were at Athens, you attended frequently at the +schools of the philosophers. + +_A._ Yes, and with great pleasure. + +_M._ You observed then, that, though none of them at that time were very +eloquent, yet they used to mix verses with their harangues. + +_A._ Yes, and particularly Dionysius, the Stoic, used to employ a great +many. + +_M._ You say right; but they were quoted without any appropriateness or +elegance. But our friend Philo used to give a few select lines and well +adapted; and in imitation of him, ever since I took a fancy to this kind +of elderly declamation, I have been very fond of quoting our poets, and +where I cannot be supplied from them, I translate from the Greek, that the +Latin language may not want any kind of ornament in this kind of +disputation. + +But do you not see how much harm is done by poets? They introduce the +bravest men lamenting over their misfortunes: they soften our minds, and +they are besides so entertaining, that we do not only read them, but get +them by heart. Thus the influence of the poets is added to our want of +discipline at home, and our tender and delicate manner of living, so that +between them they have deprived virtue of all its vigour and energy. Plato +therefore was right in banishing them from his commonwealth, where he +required the best morals, and the best form of government. But we, who +have all our learning from Greece, read and learn these works of theirs +from our childhood; and look on this as a liberal and learned education. + +XII. But why are we angry with the poets? we may find some philosophers, +those masters of virtue, who have taught that pain was the greatest of +evils. But you, young man, when you said but just now that it appeared so +to you, upon being asked by me what appeared greater than infamy, gave up +that opinion at a word. Suppose I ask Epicurus the same question. He will +answer, that a trifling degree of pain is a greater evil than the greatest +infamy; for that there is no evil in infamy itself, unless attended with +pain. What pain then attends Epicurus, when he says this very thing, that +pain is the greatest evil; and yet nothing can be a greater disgrace to a +philosopher than to talk thus. Therefore, you allowed enough when you +admitted that infamy appeared to you to be a greater evil than pain. And +if you abide by this admission, you will see how far pain should be +resisted: and that our inquiry should be not so much whether pain be an +evil; as how the mind may be fortified for resisting it. The Stoics infer +from some petty quibbling arguments, that it is no evil, as if the dispute +was about a word, and not about the thing itself. Why do you impose upon +me, Zeno? for when you deny what appears very dreadful to me to be an +evil; I am deceived, and am at a loss to know why that which appears to me +to be a most miserable thing, should be no evil. The answer is, that +nothing is an evil but what is base and vicious. You return to your +trifling, for you do not remove what made me uneasy. I know that pain is +not vice,--you need not inform me of that: but show me, that it makes no +difference to me whether I am in pain or not. It has never anything to do, +say you, with a happy life, for that depends upon virtue alone; but yet +pain is to be avoided. If I ask, why? it is disagreeable, against nature, +hard to bear, woful and afflicting. + +XIII. Here are many words to express that by so many different forms, +which we call by the single word, evil. You are defining pain, instead of +removing it, when you say, it is disagreeable, unnatural, scarcely +possible to be endured or borne: nor are you wrong in saying so; but the +man who vaunts himself in such a manner should not give way in his +conduct, if it be true that nothing is good but what is honest, and +nothing evil but what is disgraceful. This would be wishing, not +proving.--This argument is a better one, and has more truth in it, that all +things which nature abhors are to be looked upon as evil; that those which +she approves of, are to be considered as good: for when this is admitted, +and the dispute about words removed, that which they with reason embrace, +and which we call honest, right, becoming, and sometimes include under the +general name of virtue, appears so far superior to everything else, that +all other things which are looked upon as the gifts of fortune, or the +good things of the body, seem trifling and insignificant: and no evil +whatever, nor all the collective body of evils together, appears to be +compared to the evil of infamy. Wherefore, if, as you granted in the +beginning, infamy is worse than pain, pain is certainly nothing; for while +it appears to you base and unmanly to groan, cry out, lament, or faint +under pain--while you cherish notions of probity, dignity, honour, and +keeping your eye on them, refrain yourself--pain will certainly yield to +virtue, and by the influence of imagination, will lose its whole +force.--For you must either admit that there is no such thing as virtue, or +you must despise every kind of pain. Will you allow of such a virtue as +prudence, without which no virtue whatever can even be conceived? What +then? will that suffer you to labour and take pains to no purpose? Will +temperance permit you to do anything to excess? Will it be possible for +justice to be maintained by one who through the force of pain discovers +secrets, or betrays his confederates, or deserts many duties of life? Will +you act in a manner consistently with courage, and its attendants, +greatness of soul, resolution, patience, and contempt for all worldly +things? Can you hear yourself called a great man, when you lie groveling, +dejected, and deploring your condition, with a lamentable voice; no one +would call you even a man, while in such a condition: you must therefore +either abandon all pretensions to courage, or else pain must be put out of +the question. + +XIV. You know very well, that even though part of your Corinthian +furniture were gone, the remainder might be safe without that; but if you +lose one virtue (though virtue in reality cannot be lost), still if, I +say, you should acknowledge that you were deficient in one, you would be +stripped of all. Can you, then, call yourself a brave man, of a great +soul, endued with patience and steadiness above the frowns of fortune? or +Philoctetes? for I choose to instance him, rather than yourself, for he +certainly was not a brave man, who lay in his bed, which was watered with +his tears, + + + Whose groans, bewailings, and whose bitter cries, + With grief incessant rent the very skies. + + +I do not deny pain to be pain; for were that the case, in what would +courage consist? but I say it should be assuaged by patience, if there be +such a thing as patience: if there be no such thing, why do we speak so in +praise of philosophy? or why do we glory in its name? Does pain annoy us? +let it sting us to the heart: if you are without defensive armour, bare +your throat to it; but if you are secured by Vulcanian armour, that is to +say by resolution, resist it; should you fail to do so, that guardian of +your honour, your courage, will forsake and leave you.--By the laws of +Lycurgus, and by those which were given to the Cretans by Jupiter, or +which Minos established under the direction of Jupiter, as the poets say, +the youths of the state are trained by the practice of hunting, running, +enduring hunger and thirst, cold and heat. The boys at Sparta are scourged +so at the altars, that blood follows the lash in abundance, nay, +sometimes, as I used to hear when I was there, they are whipped even to +death; and yet not one of them was ever heard to cry out, or so much as +groan. What then? shall men not be able to bear what boys do? and shall +custom have such great force, and reason none at all? + +XV. There is some difference betwixt labour and pain; they border upon one +another, but still there is a certain difference between them. Labour is a +certain exercise of the mind or body, in some employment or undertaking of +serious trouble and importance; but pain is a sharp motion in the body, +disagreeable to our senses.--Both these feelings, the Greeks, whose +language is more copious than ours, express by the common name of {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}; +therefore they call industrious men, pains-taking, or rather fond of +labour; we, more conveniently, call them laborious; for labouring is one +thing and enduring pain another. You see, O Greece, your barrenness of +words, sometimes, though you think you are always so rich in them. I say, +then, that there is a difference betwixt labouring and being in pain. When +Caius Marius had an operation performed for a swelling in his thigh, he +felt pain; when he headed his troops in a very hot season, he laboured. +Yet these two feelings bear some resemblance to one another; for the +accustoming ourselves to labour makes the endurance of pain more easy to +us.--And it was because they were influenced by this reason, that the +founders of the Grecian form of government provided that the bodies of +their youth should be strengthened by labour, which custom the Spartans +transferred even to their women, who in other cities lived more +delicately, keeping within the walls of their houses, but it was otherwise +with the Spartans. + + + The Spartan women, with a manly air, + Fatigues and dangers with their husbands share: + They in fantastic sports have no delight, + Partners with them in exercise and fight. + + +And in these laborious exercises pain interferes sometimes; they are +thrown down, receive blows, have bad falls, and are bruised, and the +labour itself produces a sort of callousness to pain. + +XVI. As to military service, (I speak of our own, not of that of the +Spartans, for they used to march slowly to the sound of the flute, and +scarce a word of command was given without an anapaest;) you may see in the +first place whence the very name of an army (Exercitus)(82) is derived; +and secondly, how great the labour is of an army on its march; then +consider that they carry more than a fortnight's provision, and whatever +else they may want: that they carry the burthen of the stakes,(83) for as +to shield, sword, or helmet, they look on them as no more encumbrance than +their own limbs, for they say that arms are the limbs of a soldier, and +those indeed they carry so commodiously, that when there is occasion they +throw down their burdens, and use their arms as readily as their limbs. +Why need I mention the exercises of the legions? and how great the labour +is which is undergone in the running, encounters, shouts! Hence it is, +that their minds are worked up to make so light of wounds in action. Take +a soldier of equal bravery, but undisciplined, and he will seem a woman. +Why is it that there is this sensible difference betwixt a raw recruit and +a veteran soldier? The age of the young soldiers is for the most part in +their favour, but it is practice only that enables men to bear labour, and +despise wounds. Moreover, we often see, when the wounded are carried off +the field, the raw untried soldier, though but slightly wounded, cries out +most shamefully; but the more brave experienced veteran only inquires for +some one to dress his wounds, and says, + + + Patroclus, to thy aid I must appeal + Ere worse ensue, my bleeding wounds to heal; + The sons of AEsculapius are employ'd, + No room for me, so many are annoy'd. + + +XVII. This is certainly Eurypylus himself. What an experienced man!--Whilst +his friend is continually enlarging on his misfortunes, you may observe +that he is so far from weeping, that he even assigns a reason why he +should bear his wounds with patience. + + + Who at his enemy a stroke directs, + His sword to light upon himself expects. + + +Patroclus, I suppose, will lead him off to his chamber to bind up his +wounds, at least if he be a man: but not a word of that; he only inquires +how the battle went. + + + Say how the Argives bear themselves in fight?-- + + +And yet no words can show the truth as well as those, your deeds and +visible sufferings. + + + Peace! and my wounds bind up; + + +but though Eurypylus could bear these afflictions, AEsopus could not, + + + Where Hector's fortune press'd our yielding troops; + + +and he explains the rest, though in pain; so unbounded is military glory +in a brave man! Shall, then, a veteran soldier be able to behave in this +manner, and shall a wise and learned man not be able? Surely the latter +might be able to bear pain better, and in no small degree either: at +present, how ever, I am confining myself to what is engendered practice +and discipline. I am not yet come to speak of reason and philosophy. You +may often hear of old women living without victuals for three or four +days: but take away a wrestler's provisions but for one day, and he will +implore the aid of Jupiter Olympius, the very God for whom he exercises +himself: he will cry out that he cannot endure it. Great is the force of +custom! Sportsmen will continue whole nights in the snow: they will bear +being almost frozen upon the mountains. From practice boxers will not so +much as utter a groan, however bruised by the cestus. But what do you +think of those to whom a victory in the Olympic games seemed almost on a +par with the ancient consulships of the Roman people? What wounds will the +gladiators bear, who are either barbarians, or the very dregs of mankind! +How do they, who are trained to it, prefer being wounded to basely +avoiding it! How often do they prove that they consider nothing but the +giving satisfaction to their masters or to the people! for when covered +with wounds, they send to their masters to learn their pleasure; if it is +their will, they are ready to lie down and die. What gladiator, of even +moderate reputation, ever gave a sigh? who ever turned pale? who ever +disgraced himself either in the actual combat, or even when about to die? +who that had been defeated ever drew in his neck to avoid the stroke of +death? So great is the force of practice, deliberation, and custom! Shall +this, then, be done by + + + A Samnite rascal, worthy of his trade; + + +and shall a man born to glory have so soft a part in his soul as not to be +able to fortify it by reason and reflection? The sight of the gladiators' +combats is by some looked on as cruel and inhuman, and I do not know, as +it is at present managed, but it may be so; but when the guilty fought, we +might receive by our ears perhaps (but certainly by our eyes we could not) +better training to harden us against pain and death. + +XVIII. I have now said enough about the effects of exercise, custom, and +careful meditation; proceed we now to consider the force of reason, unless +you have something to reply to what has been said. + +_A._ That I should interrupt you! by no means; for your discourse has +brought me over to your opinion. Let the Stoics, then, think it their +business to determine whether pain be an evil or not, while they endeavour +to show by some strained and trifling conclusions, which are nothing to +the purpose, that pain is no evil. My opinion is, that whatever it is, it +is not so great as it appears; and I say, that men are influenced to a +great extent by some false representations and appearance of it, and that +all which is really felt is capable of being endured. Where shall I begin, +then? shall I superficially go over what I said before, that my discourse +may have a greater scope? + +This, then, is agreed upon by all, and not only by learned men, but also +by the unlearned, that it becomes the brave and magnanimous, those that +have patience and a spirit above this world, not to give way to pain. Nor +has there ever been any one who did not commend a man who bore it in this +manner. That, then, which is expected from a brave man, and is commended +when it is seen, it must surely be base in any one to be afraid of at its +approach, or not to bear when it comes. But I would have you consider +whether, as all the right affections of the soul are classed under the +name of virtues, the truth is that this is not properly the name of them +all, but that they all have their name from that leading virtue which is +superior to all the rest: for the name, "virtue," comes from _vir_, a man, +and courage is the peculiar distinction of a man: and this virtue has two +principal duties, to despise death and pain. We must, then, exert these, +if we would be men of virtue, or rather, if we would be men, because +virtue (_virtus_) takes its very name from _vir_, man. + +XIX. You may inquire, perhaps, how? and such an inquiry is not amiss, for +philosophy is ready with her assistance. Epicurus offers himself to you, a +man far from a bad, or, I should rather say, a very good man; he advises +no more than he knows. "Despise pain," says he. Who is it saith this? Is +it the same man who calls pain the greatest of all evils? It is not, +indeed, very consistent in him. Let us hear what he says:--"If the pain is +excessive it must needs be short." I must have that over again, for I do +not apprehend what you mean exactly by "excessive" or "short." That is +excessive, than which nothing can be greater; that is short, than which +nothing is shorter. I do not regard the greatness of any pain from which, +by reason of the shortness of its continuance, I shall be delivered almost +before it reaches me. But, if the pain be as great as that of Philoctetes, +it will appear great indeed to me, but yet not the greatest that I am +capable of bearing; for the pain is confined to my foot: but my eye may +pain me, I may have a pain in the head, or sides, or lungs, or in every +part of me. It is far, then, from being excessive; therefore, says he, +pain of a long continuance has more pleasure in it than uneasiness. Now I +cannot bring myself to say so great a man talks nonsense; but I imagine he +is laughing at us. My opinion is that the greatest pain (I say the +greatest, though it may be ten atoms less than another) is not therefore +short, because acute; I could name to you a great many good men who have +been tormented many years with the acutest pains of the gout. But this +cautious man doth not determine the measure of that greatness or of +duration, so as to enable us to know what he calls excessive, with regard +to pain, or short, with respect to its continuance. Let us pass him by, +then, as one who says just nothing at all; and let us force him to +acknowledge, notwithstanding he might behave himself somewhat boldly under +his cholic and his strangury, that no remedy against pain can be had from +him who looks on pain as the greatest of all evils. We must apply, then, +for relief elsewhere, and nowhere better (if we seek for what is most +consistent with itself) than to those who place the chief good in honesty, +and the greatest evil in infamy. You dare not so much as groan, or +discover the least uneasiness in their company, for virtue itself speaks +to you through them. + +XX. Will you, when you may observe children at Lacedaemon, and young men at +Olympia, and barbarians in the amphitheatre, receive the severest wounds, +and bear them without once opening their mouths,--will you, I say, if any +pain should by chance attack you, cry out like a woman? will you not +rather bear it with resolution and constancy? and not cry, It is +intolerable, nature cannot bear it. I hear what you say,--Boys bear this +because they are led thereto by glory: some bear it through shame, many +through fear, and yet are we afraid that nature cannot bear what is borne +by many, and in such different circumstances? Nature not only bears it, +but challenges it, for there is nothing with her preferable, nothing which +she desires more, than credit, and reputation, and praise, and honour, and +glory. I choose here to describe this one thing under many names, and I +have used many that you may have the clearer idea of it; for what I mean +to say is, that whatever is desirable of itself, proceeding from virtue, +or placed in virtue, and commendable on its own account, (which I would +rather agree to call the only good than deny it to be the chief good,) is +what men should prefer above all things. And as we declare this to be the +case with respect to honesty, so we speak in the contrary manner of +infamy; nothing is so odious, so detestable, nothing so unworthy of a man: +and if you are thoroughly convinced of this (for, at the beginning of this +discourse, you allowed that there appeared to you more evil in infamy than +in pain), it follows that you ought to have the command over yourself, +though I scarcely know how this expression may seem an accurate one, which +appears to represent man as made up of two natures, so that one should be +in command and the other be subject to it. + +XXI. Yet this division does not proceed from ignorance; for the soul +admits of a two-fold division, one of which partakes of reason, the other +is without it; when, therefore, we are ordered to give a law to ourselves, +the meaning is, that reason should restrain our rashness. There is in the +soul of every man, something naturally soft, low, enervated in a manner, +and languid. Were there nothing besides this, men would be the greatest of +monsters; but there is present to every man reason, which presides over, +and gives laws to all; which, by improving itself, and making continual +advances, becomes perfect virtue. It behoves a man, then, to take care +that reason shall have the command over that part which is bound to +practise obedience. In what manner? you will say. Why, as a master has +over his slave, a general over his army, a father over his son. If that +part of the soul which I have called soft behaves disgracefully, if it +gives itself up to lamentations and womanish tears, then let it be +restrained, and committed to the care of friends and relations, for we +often see those persons brought to order by shame, whom no reasons can +influence. Therefore, we should confine those feelings, like our servants, +in safe custody, and almost with chains. But those who have more +resolution, and yet are not utterly immovable, we should encourage with +our exhortations, as we would good soldiers, to recollect themselves, and +maintain their honour. That wisest man of all Greece, in the Niptrae, does +not lament too much over his wounds, or rather, he is moderate in his +grief:-- + + + Move slow, my friends, your hasty speed refrain, + Lest by your motion you increase my pain. + + +Pacuvius is better in this than Sophocles, for in the one Ulysses bemoans +his wounds too vehemently; for the very people who carried him after he +was wounded, though his grief was moderate, yet, considering the dignity +of the man, did not scruple to say, + + + And thou, Ulysses, long to war inured, + Thy wounds, though great, too feebly hast endured. + + +The wise poet understood that custom was no contemptible instructor how to +bear pain. But the same hero complains with more decency, though in great +pain,-- + + + Assist, support me, never leave me so; + Unbind my wounds, oh! execrable woe! + + +He begins to give way, but instantly checks himself:-- + + + Away, begone, but cover first the sore; + For your rude hands but make my pains the more. + + +Do you observe how he constrains himself; not that his bodily pains were +less, but because he checks the anguish of his mind? Therefore, in the +conclusion of the Niptrae, he blames others, even when he himself is +dying:-- + + + Complaints of fortune may become the man, + None but a woman will thus weeping stand. + + +And so that soft place in his soul obeys his reason, just as an abashed +soldier does his stern commander. + +XXII. The man, then, in whom absolute wisdom exists (such a man, indeed, +we have never as yet seen, but the philosophers have described in their +writings what sort of man he will be, if he should exist); such a man, or +at least that perfect and absolute reason which exists in him, will have +the same authority over the inferior part as a good parent has over his +dutiful children, he will bring it to obey his nod, without any trouble or +difficulty. He will rouse himself, prepare and arm himself to oppose pain +as he would an enemy. If you inquire what arms he will provide himself +with, they will be contention, encouragement, discourse with himself; he +will say thus to himself, Take care that you are guilty of nothing base, +languid, or unmanly. He will turn over in his mind all the different kinds +of honour. Zeno of Elea will occur to him, who suffered everything rather +than betray his confederates in the design of putting an end to the +tyranny. He will reflect on Anaxarchus, the pupil of Democritus, who +having fallen into the hands of Nicocreon king of Cyprus, without the +least entreaty for mercy, or refusal, submitted to every kind of torture. +Calanus the Indian will occur to him, an ignorant man and a barbarian, +born at the foot of Mount Caucasus, who committed himself to the flames by +his own free, voluntary act. But we, if we have the tooth-ache, or a pain +in the foot, or if the body be any ways affected, cannot bear it. For our +sentiments of pain, as well as pleasure, are so trifling and effeminate, +we are so enervated and relaxed by luxuries, that we cannot bear the sting +of a bee without crying out. But Caius Marius, a plain country-man, but of +a manly soul, when he had an operation performed on him, as I mentioned +above, at first refused to be tied down; and he is the first instance of +any one's having had an operation performed on him without being tied +down. Why, then, did others bear it afterwards? Why, from the force of +example. You see, then, that pain exists more in opinion than in nature, +and yet the same Marius gave a proof that there is something very sharp in +pain, for he would not submit to have the other thigh cut. So that he bore +his pain with resolution as a man; but, like a reasonable person, he was +not willing to undergo any greater pain without some necessary reason. The +whole, then, consists in this, that you should have command over yourself. +I have already told you what kind of command this is; and by considering +what is most consistent with patience, fortitude, and greatness of soul, a +man not only restrains himself, but somehow or other mitigates even pain +itself. + +XXIII. Even as in a battle, the dastardly and timorous soldier throws away +his shield on the first appearance of an enemy, and runs as fast as he +can, and on that account loses his life sometimes, though he has never +received even one wound, when he who stands his ground has nothing of the +sort happen to him; so, they who cannot bear the appearances of pain, +throw themselves away, and give themselves up to affliction and dismay; +but they that oppose it, often come off more than a match for it. For the +body has a certain resemblance to the soul: as burdens are more easily +borne the more the body is exerted, while they crush us if we give way; so +the soul by exerting itself resists the whole weight that would oppress +it; but if it yields, it is so pressed, that it cannot support itself. And +if we consider things truly, the soul should exert itself in every +pursuit, for that is the only security for its doing its duty. But this +should be principally regarded in pain, that we must not do anything +timidly, or dastardly, or basely, or slavishly, or effeminately, and above +all things we must dismiss and avoid that Philoctetean sort of outcry. A +man is allowed sometimes to groan, but yet seldom; but it is not +permissible even in a woman to howl; for such a noise as this is +forbidden, by the twelve tables, to be used even at funerals. Nor does a +wise or brave man ever groan, unless when he exerts himself to give his +resolution greater force, as they who run in the stadium make as much +noise as they can. The wrestlers, too, do the same when they are training; +and the boxers, when they aim a blow with the cestus at their adversary, +give a groan, not because they are in pain, or from a sinking of their +spirits, but because their whole body is put upon the stretch by the +throwing out of these groans, and the blow comes the stronger. + +XXIV. What! they who would speak louder than ordinary, are they satisfied +with working their jaws, sides, or tongue, or stretching the common organs +of speech and utterance? the whole body and every muscle is at full +stretch, if I may be allowed the expression, every nerve is exerted to +assist their voice. I have actually seen the knees of Marcus Antonius +touch the ground when he was speaking with vehemence for himself, with +relation to the Varian law. For as the engines you throw stones or darts +with, throw them out with the greater force the more they are strained and +drawn back; so it is in speaking, running, or boxing, the more people +strain themselves, the greater their force. Since, therefore, this +exertion has so much influence--if in a moment of pain groans help to +strengthen the mind, let us use them; but if they be groans of +lamentation, if they be the expression of weakness or abjectness, or +unmanly weeping, then I should scarcely call him a man who yielded to +them. For even supposing that such groaning could give any ease, it still +should be considered, whether it were consistent with a brave and resolute +man. But, if it does not ease our pain, why should we debase ourselves to +no purpose? for what is more unbecoming in a man than to cry like a woman? +But this precept which is laid down with respect to pain is not confined +to it; we should apply this exertion of the soul to everything else. Is +anger inflamed? is lust excited? we must have recourse to the same +citadel, and apply to the same arms; but since it is pain which we are at +present discussing, we will let the other subjects alone. To bear pain, +then, sedately and calmly, it is of great use to consider with all our +soul, as the saying is, how noble it is to do so, for we are naturally +desirous (as I said before, but it cannot be too often repeated) and very +much inclined to what is honourable, of which, if we discover but the +least glimpse, there is nothing which we are not prepared to undergo and +suffer to attain it. From this impulse of our minds, this desire for +genuine glory and honourable conduct, it is that such dangers are +supported in war, and that brave men are not sensible of their wounds in +action, or if they are sensible of them, prefer death to the departing but +the least step from their honour. The Decii saw the shining swords of +their enemies when they were rushing into the battle. But the honourable +character and the glory of the death which they were seeking, made all +fear of death of little weight. Do you imagine that Epaminondas groaned +when he perceived that his life was flowing out with his blood? No; for he +left his country triumphing over the Lacedaemonians, whereas he had found +it in subjection to them. These are the comforts, these are the things +that assuage the greatest pain. + +XXV. You may ask, how the case is in peace? what is to be done at home? +how we are to behave in bed? You bring me back to the philosophers, who +seldom go to war. Among these, Dionysius of Heraclea, a man certainly of +no resolution, having learned fortitude of Zeno, quitted it on being in +pain; for, being tormented with a pain in his kidneys, in bewailing +himself he cried out, that those things were false which he had formerly +conceived of pain. And when his fellow-disciple, Cleanthes, asked him why +he had changed his opinion, he answered, "That the case of any man who had +applied so much time to philosophy, and yet was unable to bear pain, might +be a sufficient proof that pain is an evil. That he himself had spent many +years at philosophy, and yet could not bear pain. It followed, therefore, +that pain was an evil." It is reported that Cleanthes on that struck his +foot on the ground, and repeated a verse out of the Epigonae-- + + + Amphiaraus, hear'st thou this below? + + +He meant Zeno: he was sorry the other had degenerated from him. + +But it was not so with our friend Posidonius, whom I have often seen +myself, and I will tell you what Pompey used to say of him: that when he +came to Rhodes, after his departure from Syria, he had a great desire to +hear Posidonius, but was informed that he was very ill of a severe fit of +the gout; yet he had great inclination to pay a visit to so famous a +philosopher. Accordingly, when he had seen him, and paid his compliments, +and had spoken with great respect of him, he said he was very sorry that +he could not hear him lecture. But indeed you may, replied the other, nor +will I suffer any bodily pain to occasion so great a man to visit me in +vain. On this Pompey relates that, as he lay on his bed, he disputed with +great dignity and fluency on this very subject--That nothing was good but +what was honest; and that in his paroxysms he would often say, "Pain, it +is to no purpose, notwithstanding you are troublesome, I will never +acknowledge you an evil." And in general all celebrated and notorious +afflictions become endurable by disregarding them. + +XXVI. Do we not observe, that where those exercises called gymnastic are +in esteem, those who enter the lists never concern themselves about +dangers: that where the praise of riding and hunting is highly esteemed, +they who practise these arts decline no pain. What shall I say of our own +ambitious pursuits, or desire of honours? What fire have not candidates +run through to gain a single vote? Therefore Africanus had always in his +hands Xenophon, the pupil of Socrates, being particularly pleased with his +saying, that the same labours were not equally heavy to the general and to +the common man, because the honour itself made the labour lighter to the +general. But yet, so it happens, that even with the illiterate vulgar, an +idea of honour is of great influence, though they cannot understand what +it is. They are led by report and common opinion to look on that as +honourable, which has the general voice. Not that I would have you, should +the multitude be ever so fond of you, rely on their judgment, nor approve +of everything which they think right; you must use your own judgment. If +you are satisfied with yourself when you have approved of what is right, +you will not only have the mastery over yourself, (which I recommend to +you just now,) but over everybody, and everything. Lay this down, then, as +a rule, that a great capacity, and lofty elevation of soul, which +distinguishes itself most by despising and looking down with contempt on +pain, is the most excellent of all things, and the more so, if it does not +depend on the people, and does not aim at applause, but derives its +satisfaction from itself. Besides, to me indeed everything seems the more +commendable the less the people are courted, and the fewer eyes there are +to see it. Not that you should avoid the public, for every generous action +loves the public view; yet no theatre for virtue is equal to a +consciousness of it. + +XXVII. And let this be principally considered, that this bearing of pain, +which I have often said is to be strengthened by an exertion of the soul, +should be the same in everything. For you meet with many who, through a +desire of victory, or for glory, or to maintain their rights, or their +liberty, have boldly received wounds, and borne themselves up under them; +and yet those very same persons, by relaxing that intenseness of their +minds, were unequal to bearing the pain of a disease. For they did not +support themselves under their former sufferings by reason or philosophy, +but by inclination and glory. Therefore some barbarians and savage people +are able to fight very stoutly with the sword, but cannot bear sickness +like men: but the Grecians, men of no great courage, but as wise as human +nature will admit of, cannot look an enemy in the face, yet the same will +bear to be visited with sickness tolerably, and with a sufficiently manly +spirit; and the Cimbrians and Celtiberians are very alert in battle, but +bemoan themselves in sickness; for nothing can be consistent which has not +reason for its foundation. But when you see those who are led by +inclination or opinion, not retarded by pain in their pursuits, nor +hindered by it from succeeding in them, you may conclude, either that pain +is no evil, or that, notwithstanding you may choose to call an evil +whatever is disagreeable and contrary to nature, yet it is so very +trifling an evil, that it may so effectually be got the better of by +virtue as quite to disappear. And I would have you think of this night and +day; for this argument will spread itself, and take up more room sometime +or other, and not be confined to pain alone; for if the motives to all our +actions are to avoid disgrace and acquire honour, we may not only despise +the stings of pain, but the storms of fortune, especially if we have +recourse to that retreat which was pointed out in our yesterday's +discussion: for as, if some God had advised a man who was pursued by +pirates to throw himself overboard, saying, There is something at hand to +receive you; either a dolphin will take you up, as it did Arion of +Methymna; or those horses sent by Neptune to Pelops (who are said to have +carried chariots so rapidly as to be borne up by the waves) will receive +you, and convey you wherever you please; cast away all fear: so, though +your pains be ever so sharp and disagreeable, if the case is not such that +it is worth your while to endure them, you see whither you may betake +yourself. I think this will do for the present. But perhaps you still +abide by your opinion. + +_A._ Not in the least, indeed; and I hope I am freed by these two days' +discourses from the fear of two things that I greatly dreaded. + +_M._ To-morrow then for rhetoric, as we were saying; but I see we must not +drop our philosophy. + +_A._ No, indeed, we will have the one in the forenoon, and this at the +usual time. + +_M._ It shall be so, and I will comply with your very laudable +inclinations. + + + + +Book III. On Grief Of Mind. + + +I. What reason shall I assign, O Brutus, why, as we consist of mind and +body, the art of curing and preserving the body should be so much sought +after, and the invention of it, as being so useful, should be ascribed to +the immortal Gods; but the medicine of the mind should not have been so +much the object of inquiry, whilst it was unknown, nor so much attended to +and cultivated after its discovery, nor so well received or approved of by +some, and accounted actually disagreeable, and looked upon with an envious +eye by many? Is it because we, by means of the mind, judge of the pains +and disorders of the body, but do not, by means of the body, arrive at any +perception of the disorders of the mind? Hence it comes that the mind only +judges of itself, when that very faculty by which it is judged is in a bad +state. Had nature given us faculties for discerning and viewing herself, +and could we go through life by keeping our eye on her--our best +guide--there would be no reason certainly why any one should be in want of +philosophy or learning: but, as it is, she has furnished us only with some +feeble rays of light, which we immediately extinguish so completely by +evil habits and erroneous opinions, that the light of nature is nowhere +visible. The seeds of virtues are natural to our constitutions, and, were +they suffered to come to maturity, would naturally conduct us to a happy +life; but now, as soon as we are born and received into the world, we are +instantly familiarized with all kinds of depravity and perversity of +opinions; so that we may be said almost to suck in error with our nurse's +milk. When we return to our parents, and are put into the hands of tutors +and governors, we are imbued with so many errors, that truth gives place +to falsehood, and nature herself to established opinion. + +II. To these we may add the poets; who, on account of the appearance they +exhibit of learning and wisdom, are heard, read, and got by heart, and +make a deep impression on our minds. But when to these are added the +people, who are as it were one great body of instructors, and the +multitude, who declare unanimously for what is wrong, then are we +altogether overwhelmed with bad opinions, and revolt entirely from nature; +so that they seem to deprive us of our best guide, who have decided that +there is nothing better for man, nothing more worthy of being desired by +him, nothing more excellent than honours and commands, and a high +reputation with the people; which indeed every excellent man aims at; but +whilst he pursues that only true honour, which nature has in view above +all other objects, he finds himself busied in arrant trifles, and in +pursuit of no conspicuous form of virtue, but only some shadowy +representation of glory. For glory is a real and express substance, not a +mere shadow. It consists in the united praise of good men, the free voice +of those who form a true judgment of preeminent virtue; it is, as it were, +the very echo of virtue; and being generally the attendant on laudable +actions, should not be slighted by good men. But popular fame, which would +pretend to imitate it, is hasty and inconsiderate, and generally commends +wicked and immoral actions, and throws discredit upon the appearance and +beauty of honesty, by assuming a resemblance of it. And it is owing to +their not being able to discover the difference between them that some +men, ignorant of real excellence, and in what it consists, have been the +destruction of their country and of themselves. And thus the best men have +erred, not so much in their intentions, as by a mistaken conduct. What, is +no cure to be attempted to be applied to those who are carried away by the +love of money, or the lust of pleasures, by which they are rendered little +short of madmen, which is the case of all weak people? or is it because +the disorders of the mind are less dangerous than those of the body? or +because the body will admit of a cure, while there is no medicine whatever +for the mind? + +III. But there are more disorders of the mind than of the body, and they +are of a more dangerous nature; for these very disorders are the more +offensive, because they belong to the mind, and disturb it; and the mind, +when disordered, is, as Ennius says, in a constant error; it can neither +bear nor endure anything, and is under the perpetual influence of desires. +Now, what disorders can be worse to the body than these two distempers of +the mind (for I overlook others), weakness and desire? But how, indeed, +can it be maintained that the mind cannot prescribe for itself, when she +it is who has invented the medicines for the body, when, with regard to +bodily cures, constitution and nature have a great share, nor do all, who +suffer themselves to be cured, find that effect instantly; but those minds +which are disposed to be cured, and submit to the precepts of the wise, +may undoubtedly recover a healthy state? Philosophy is certainly the +medicine of the soul, whose assistance we do not seek from abroad, as in +bodily disorders, but we ourselves are bound to exert our utmost energy +and power in order to effect our cure. But as to philosophy in general, I +have, I think, in my "Hortensius," sufficiently spoken of the credit and +attention which it deserves: since that, indeed, I have been continually +either disputing or writing on its most material branches: and I have laid +down in these books all the discussions which took place between myself +and my particular friends at my Tusculan Villa: but as I have spoken in +the two former of pain and death, this book shall be devoted to the +account of the third day of our disputations. + +We came down into the Academy when the day was already declining towards +afternoon, and I asked one of those who were present to propose a subject +for us to discourse on; and then the business was carried on in this +manner. + +IV. _A._ My opinion is, that a wise man is subject to grief. + +_M._ What, and to the other perturbations of mind, as fears, lusts, anger? +For these are pretty much like what the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}. I might call +them diseases, and that would be a literal translation, but it is not +agreeable to our way of speaking. For envy, delight, and pleasure, are all +called by the Greeks diseases, being affections of the mind not in +subordination to reason: but we, I think, are right, in calling the same +motions of a disturbed soul perturbations, and in very seldom using the +term diseases; though, perhaps, it appears otherwise to you. + +_A._ I am of your opinion. + +_M._ And do you think a wise man subject to these? + +_A._ Entirely, I think. + +_M._ Then that boasted wisdom is but of small account, if it differs so +little from madness? + +_A._ What? does every commotion of the mind seem to you to be madness? + +_M._ Not to me only; but I apprehend, though I have often been surprised +at it, that it appeared so to our ancestors many ages before Socrates: +from whom is derived all that philosophy which relates to life and morals. + +_A._ How so? + +_M._ Because the name madness(84) implies a sickness of the mind and +disease, that is to say an unsoundness, and an unhealthiness of mind, +which they call madness. But the philosophers call all perturbations of +the soul diseases, and their opinion is that no fool is ever free from +these: but all that are diseased are unsound; and the minds of all fools +are diseased; therefore all fools are mad. For they held that soundness of +the mind depends on a certain tranquillity and steadiness; and a mind +which was destitute of these qualities they called insane, because +soundness was inconsistent with a perturbed mind just as much as with a +disordered body. + +V. Nor were they less ingenious in calling the state of the soul devoid of +the light of the mind, "a being out of one's mind," "a being beside +oneself." From whence we may understand, that they who gave these names to +things were of the same opinion with Socrates, that all silly people were +unsound, which the Stoics have carefully preserved as being derived from +him; for whatever mind is distempered, (and as I just now said, the +philosophers call all perturbed motions of the mind distempers,) is no +more sound than a body is when in a fit of sickness. Hence it is, that +wisdom is the soundness of the mind, folly a sort of unsoundness, which is +insanity, or a being out of one's mind: and these are much better +expressed by the Latin words than the Greek; which you will find the case +also in many other topics. But we will discuss that point elsewhere: let +us now attend to our present subject. The very meaning of the word +describes the whole thing about which we are inquiring, both as to its +substance and character. For we must necessarily understand by "sound," +those whose minds are under no perturbation from any motion as if it were +a disease. They who are differently affected we must necessarily call +"unsound." So that nothing is better than what is usual in Latin, to say, +that they who are run away with by their lust or anger, have quitted the +command over themselves; though anger includes lust, for anger is defined +to be the lust of revenge. They, then, who are said not to be masters of +themselves, are said to be so because they are not under the government of +reason, to which is assigned by nature the power over the whole soul. Why +the Greeks should call this {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, I do not easily apprehend; but we +define it much better than they, for we distinguish this madness +(_insania_), which, being allied to folly, is more extensive, from what we +call _furor_, or raving. The Greeks indeed would do so too, but they have +no one word that will express it: what we call _furor_, they call +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, as if the reason were affected only by a black bile, and not +disturbed as often by a violent rage, or fear, or grief. Thus we say +Athamas, Alcmaeon, Ajax, and Orestes, were raving (_furere_): because a +person affected in this manner was not allowed, by the twelve tables, to +have the management of his own affairs; therefore the words are not, if he +is mad (_insanus_), but, if he begins to be raving (_furiosus_). For they +looked upon madness to be an unsettled humour, that proceeded from not +being of sound mind; yet such a person might perform his ordinary duties, +and discharge the usual and customary requirements of life: but they +considered one that was raving as afflicted with a total blindness of the +mind, which, notwithstanding it is allowed to be greater than madness, is +nevertheless of such a nature, that a wise man may be subject to raving +(_furor_), but cannot possibly be afflicted by insanity (_insania_). But +this is another question: let us now return to our original subject. + +VI. I think you said that it was your opinion that a wise man was liable +to grief. + +_A._ And so, indeed, I think. + +_M._ It is natural enough to think so, for we are not the offspring of +flints: but we have by nature something soft and tender in our souls, +which may be put into a violent motion by grief, as by a storm; nor did +that Crantor, who was one of the most distinguished men that our Academy +has ever produced, say this amiss: "I am by no means of their opinion who +talk so much in praise of I know not what insensibility, which neither can +exist, nor ought to exist: I would choose," says he, "never to be ill; but +should I be so, still I should choose to retain my sensation, whether +there was to be an amputation, or any other separation of anything from my +body. For that insensibility cannot be but at the expense of some +unnatural ferocity of mind, or stupor of body." But let us consider +whether to talk in this manner be not allowing that we are weak, and +yielding to our softness. Notwithstanding, let us be hardy enough, not +only to lop off every arm of our miseries, but even to pluck up every +fibre of their roots: yet still something perhaps may be left behind, so +deep does folly strike its roots: but whatever may be left, it will be no +more than is necessary. But let us be persuaded of this, that unless the +mind be in a sound state, which philosophy alone can effect, there can be +no end of our miseries. Wherefore, as we begun, let us submit ourselves to +it for a cure; we shall be cured if we choose to be. I shall advance +something further. I shall not treat of grief alone, though that indeed is +the principal thing; but, as I originally proposed, of every perturbation +of the mind, as I termed it, disorder, as the Greeks call it: and first, +with your leave, I shall treat it in the manner of the Stoics, whose +method is to reduce their arguments into a very small space; afterwards I +shall enlarge more in my own way. + +VII. A man of courage is also full of faith; I do not use the word +confident, because, owing to an erroneous custom of speaking, that word +has come to be used in a bad sense, though it is derived from confiding, +which is commendable. But he who is full of faith, is certainly under no +fear; for there is an inconsistency between faith and fear. Now whoever is +subject to grief is subject to fear; for whatever things we grieve at when +present, we dread when hanging over us and approaching. Thus it comes +about, that grief is inconsistent with courage: it is very probable, +therefore, that whoever is subject to grief, is also liable to fear, and +to a broken kind of spirits and sinking. Now whenever these befal a man, +he is in a servile state, and must own that he is overpowered: for whoever +admits these feelings, must admit timidity and cowardice. But these cannot +enter into the mind of a man of courage; neither therefore can grief: but +the man of courage is the only wise man; therefore grief cannot befal the +wise man. It is besides necessary, that whoever is brave, should be a man +of great soul; that whoever is a man of a great soul, should be +invincible: whoever is invincible looks down with contempt on all things +here, and considers them beneath him. But no one can despise those things +on account of which he may be affected with grief: from whence it follows, +that a wise man is never affected with grief: for all wise men are brave; +therefore a wise man is not subject to grief. And as the eye, when +disordered, is not in a good condition for performing its office properly; +and as the other parts, and the whole body itself, when unsettled, cannot +perform their office and business; so the mind, when disordered, is but +ill-fitted to perform its duty. The office of the mind is to use its +reason well; but the mind of a wise man is always in condition to make the +best use of his reason, and therefore is never out of order. But grief is +a disorder of the mind; therefore a wise man will be always free from it. + +VIII. And from these considerations we may get at a very probable +definition of the temperate man, whom the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, and they +call that virtue {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, which I at one time call temperance, at +another time moderation, and sometimes even modesty; but I do not know +whether that virtue may not be properly called frugality, which has a more +confined meaning with the Greeks; for they call frugal men {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, +which implies only that they are useful: but our name has a more extensive +meaning; for all abstinence, all innocency, (which the Greeks have no +ordinary name for, though they might use the word {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, for innocency +is that disposition of mind which would offend no one,) and several other +virtues, are comprehended under frugality; but, if this quality were of +less importance, and confined in as small a compass as some imagine, the +surname of Piso(85) would not have been in so great esteem. But as we +allow him not the name of a frugal man (_frugi_), who either quits his +post through fear, which is cowardice; or who reserves to his own use what +was privately committed to his keeping, which is injustice; or who fails +in his military undertakings through rashness, which is folly; for that +reason the word frugality takes in these three virtues of fortitude, +justice, and prudence, though it is indeed common to all virtues, for they +are all connected and knit together. Let us allow, then, frugality itself +to be another and fourth virtue; for its peculiar property seems to be, to +govern and appease all tendencies to too eager a desire after anything, to +restrain lust, and to preserve a decent steadiness in everything. The vice +in contrast to this is called prodigality (_nequitia_). Frugality, I +imagine, is derived from the word _fruge_, the best thing which the earth +produces; _nequitia_ is derived (though this is perhaps rather more +strained, still let us try it; we shall only be thought to have been +trifling if there is nothing in what we say) from the fact of everything +being to no purpose (_nequicquam_) in such a man; from which circumstance +he is called also _Nihil_, nothing. Whoever is frugal, then, or, if it is +more agreeable to you, whoever is moderate and temperate, such a one must +of course be consistent; whoever is consistent, must be quiet; the quiet +man must be free from all perturbation, therefore from grief likewise: and +these are the properties of a wise man; therefore a wise man must be free +from grief. + +IX. So that Dionysius of Heraclea is right when, upon this complaint of +Achilles in Homer-- + + + Well hast thou spoke, but at the tyrant's name + My rage rekindles, and my soul's in flame: + 'Tis just resentment, and becomes the brave, + Disgraced, dishonour'd like the vilest slave(86)-- + + +he reasons thus: Is the hand as it should be, when it is affected with a +swelling? or is it possible for any other member of the body, when swollen +or enlarged, to be in any other than a disordered state? Must not the +mind, then, when it is puffed up, or distended, be out of order? But the +mind of a wise man is always free from every kind of disorder; it never +swells, never is puffed up: but the mind when in anger is in a different +state. A wise man therefore is never angry; for when he is angry, he lusts +after something; for whoever is angry naturally has a longing desire to +give all the pain he can to the person who he thinks has injured him; and +whoever has this earnest desire must necessarily be much pleased with the +accomplishment of his wishes; hence he is delighted with his neighbour's +misery; and as a wise man is not capable of such feelings as these, he is +therefore not capable of anger. But should a wise man be subject to grief, +he may likewise be subject to anger; for as he is free from anger, he must +likewise be free from grief. Again, could a wise man be subject to grief, +he might also be liable to pity, or even might be open to a disposition +towards envy (_invidentia_); I do not say to envy (_invidia_), for that +can only exist by the very act of envying: but we may fairly form the word +_invidentia_ from _invidendo_, and so avoid the doubtful name _invidia_; +for this word is probably derived from _in_ and _video_, looking too +closely into another's fortune; as it is said in the Melanippus, + + + Who envies me the flower of my children? + + +where the Latin is _invidit florem_. It may appear not good Latin, but it +is very well put by Accius; for as _video_ governs an accusative case, so +it is more correct to say _invideo florem_ than _flori_. We are debarred +from saying so by common usage: the poet stood in his own right, and +expressed himself with more freedom. + +X. Therefore compassion and envy are consistent in the same man; for +whoever is uneasy at any one's adversity, is also uneasy at another's +prosperity: as Theophrastus while he laments the death of his companion +Callisthenes, is at the same time disturbed at the success of Alexander; +and therefore he says, that Callisthenes met with a man of the greatest +power and good fortune, but one who did not know how to make use of his +good fortune. And as pity is an uneasiness which arises from the +misfortunes of another, so envy is an uneasiness that proceeds from the +good success of another: therefore whoever is capable of pity, is capable +of envy. But a wise man is incapable of envy, and consequently incapable +of pity. But were a wise man used to grieve, to pity also would be +familiar to him; therefore to grieve, is a feeling which cannot affect a +wise man. Now, though these reasonings of the Stoics, and their +conclusions, are rather strained and distorted, and ought to be expressed +in a less stringent and narrow manner, yet great stress is to be laid on +the opinions of those men who have a peculiarly bold and manly turn of +thought and sentiment. For our friends the Peripatetics, notwithstanding +all their erudition, gravity, and fluency of language, do not satisfy me +about the moderation of these disorders and diseases of the soul which +they insist upon; for every evil, though moderate, is in its nature great. +But our object is to make out that the wise man is free from all evil; for +as the body is unsound if it is ever so slightly affected, so the mind +under any moderate disorder loses its soundness: therefore the Romans +have, with their usual accuracy of expression, called trouble, and +anguish, and vexation, on account of the analogy between a troubled mind +and a diseased body, disorders. The Greeks call all perturbation of mind +by pretty nearly the same name; for they name every turbid motion of the +soul {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, that is to say, a distemper. But we have given them a more +proper name; for a disorder of the mind is very like a disease of the +body. But lust does not resemble sickness; neither does immoderate joy, +which is an elated and exulting pleasure of the mind. Fear, too, is not +very like a distemper, though it is akin to grief of mind, but properly, +as is also the case with sickness of the body, so too sickness of mind has +no name separated from pain. And therefore I must explain the origin of +this pain, that is to say, the cause that occasions this grief in the +mind, as if it were a sickness of the body. For as physicians think they +have found out the cure, when they have discovered the cause of the +distemper; so we shall discover the method of curing melancholy, when the +cause of it is found out. + +XI. The whole cause, then, is in opinion; and this observation applies not +to this grief alone, but to every other disorder of the mind, which are of +four sorts, but consisting of many parts. For as every disorder or +perturbation is a motion of the mind, either devoid of reason, or in +despite of reason, or in disobedience to reason, and as that motion is +excited by an opinion of either good or evil; these four perturbations are +divided equally into two parts: for two of them proceed from an opinion of +good, one of which is an exulting pleasure, that is to say, a joy elated +beyond measure, arising from an opinion of some present great good; the +other is a desire which may fairly be called even a lust, and is an +immoderate inclination after some conceived great good, without any +obedience to reason. Therefore these two kinds, the exulting pleasure, and +the lust, have their rise from an opinion of good, as the other two, fear +and grief, have from an opinion of evil. For fear is an opinion of some +great evil impending over us, and grief is an opinion of some great evil +present; and, indeed, it is a freshly conceived opinion of an evil so +great, that to grieve at it seems right: it is of that kind, that he who +is uneasy at it thinks he has good reason to be so. Now we should exert +our utmost efforts to oppose these perturbations--which are, as it were, so +many furies let loose upon us, and urged on by folly--if we are desirous to +pass this share of life that is allotted to us with ease and satisfaction. +But of the other feelings I shall speak elsewhere; our business at present +is to drive away grief if we can, for that shall be the object of our +present discussion, since you have said that it was your opinion that a +wise man might be subject to grief, which I can by no means allow of; for +it is a frightful, miserable, and detestable thing, which we should fly +from with our utmost efforts--with all our sails and oars, as I may say. + +XII. That descendant of Tantalus, how does he appear to you? he who sprung +from Pelops, who formerly stole Hippodamia from her father-in-law, king +OEnomaus, and married her by force? He who was descended from Jupiter +himself, how broken-hearted and dispirited does he not seem!-- + + + Stand off, my friends, nor come within my shade, + That no pollutions your sound hearts pervade, + So foul a stain my body doth partake. + + +Will you condemn yourself, Thyestes, and deprive yourself of life, on +account of the greatness of another's crime? What do you think of that son +of Phoebus? do you not look upon him as unworthy of his own father's light? + + + Hollow his eyes, his body worn away, + His furrow'd cheeks his frequent tears betray; + His beard neglected, and his hoary hairs + Rough and uncomb'd, bespeak his bitter cares. + + +O foolish AEetes, these are evils which you yourself have been the cause +of, and are not occasioned by any accidents with which chance has visited +you; and you behaved as you did, even after you had been inured to your +distress, and after the first swelling of the mind had subsided! whereas +grief consists (as I shall show) in the notion of some recent evil; but +your grief, it is very plain, proceeded from the loss of your kingdom, not +of your daughter, for you hated her, and perhaps with reason, but you +could not calmly bear to part with your kingdom. But surely it is an +impudent grief which preys upon a man for not being able to command those +that are free. Dionysius, it is true, the tyrant of Syracuse, when driven +from his country taught a school at Corinth; so incapable was he of living +without some authority. But what could be more impudent than Tarquin? who +made war upon those who could not bear his tyranny; and when he could not +recover his kingdom by the aid of the forces of the Veientians and the +Latins, is said to have betaken himself to Cuma, and to have died in that +city, of old age and grief! + +XIII. Do you, then, think that it can befal a wise man to be oppressed +with grief, that is to say, with misery? for, as all perturbation is +misery, grief is the rack itself. Lust is attended with heat, exulting joy +with levity, fear with meanness, but grief with something greater than +these; it consumes, torments, afflicts, and disgraces a man; it tears him, +preys upon his mind, and utterly destroys him: if we do not so divest +ourselves of it as to throw it completely off, we cannot be free from +misery. And it is clear that there must be grief where anything has the +appearance of a present sore and oppressing evil. Epicurus is of opinion, +that grief arises naturally from the imagination of any evil; so that +whosoever is eye-witness of any great misfortune, if he conceives that the +like may possibly befal himself, becomes sad instantly from such an idea. +The Cyrenaics think that grief is not engendered by every kind of evil, +but only by unexpected, unforeseen evil; and that circumstance is, indeed, +of no small effect on the heightening of grief; for whatsoever comes of a +sudden appears more formidable. Hence these lines are deservedly +commended-- + + + I knew my son, when first he drew his breath, + Destined by fate to an untimely death; + And when I sent him to defend the Greeks, + War was his business, not your sportive freaks. + + +XIV. Therefore, this ruminating beforehand upon future evils which you see +at a distance, makes their approach more tolerable; and on this account, +what Euripides makes Theseus say, is much commended. You will give me +leave to translate them, as is usual with me-- + + + I treasured up what some learn'd sage did tell, + And on my future misery did dwell; + I thought of bitter death, of being drove + Far from my home by exile, and I strove + With every evil to possess my mind, + That, when they came, I the less care might find.(87) + + +But Euripides says that of himself, which Theseus said he had heard from +some learned man, for the poet had been a pupil of Anaxagoras, who, as +they relate, on hearing of the death of his son, said, "I knew that my son +was mortal;" which speech seems to intimate that such things afflict those +men who have not thought on them before. Therefore, there is no doubt but +that all those things which are considered evils are the heavier from not +being foreseen. Though, notwithstanding this is not the only circumstance +which occasions the greatest grief, still, as the mind, by foreseeing and +preparing for it, has great power to make all grief the less, a man should +at all times consider all the events that may befal him in this life; and +certainly the excellence and divine nature of wisdom consists in taking a +near view of, and gaining a thorough acquaintance with, all human affairs, +in not being surprised when anything happens, and in thinking, before the +event, that there is nothing but what may come to pass. + + + Wherefore ev'ry man, + When his affairs go on most swimmingly, + E'en then it most behoves to arm himself + Against the coming storm: loss, danger, exile, + Returning ever, let him look to meet; + His son in fault, wife dead, or daughter sick: + All common accidents, and may have happen'd, + That nothing shall seem new or strange. But if + Aught has fall'n out beyond his hopes, all that + Let him account clear gain.(88) + + +XV. Therefore, as Terence has so well expressed what he borrowed from +philosophy, shall not we, from whose fountains he drew it, say the same +thing in a better manner, and abide by it with more steadiness? Hence came +that steady countenance, which, according to Xantippe, her husband +Socrates always had; so that she said that she never observed any +difference in his looks when he went out, and when he came home. Yet the +look of that old Roman, M. Crassus, who, as Lucilius says, never smiled +but once in his lifetime, was not of this kind, but placid and serene, for +so we are told. He, indeed, might well have had the same look at all times +who never changed his mind, from which the countenance derives its +expression. So that I am ready to borrow of the Cyrenaics those arms +against the accidents and events of life, by means of which, by long +premeditation, they break the force of all approaching evils; and at the +same time, I think that those very evils themselves arise more from +opinion than nature, for, if they were real, no forecast could make them +lighter. But I shall speak more particularly on these matters after I have +first considered Epicurus's opinion, who thinks that all people must +necessarily be uneasy who believe themselves to be in any evils, let them +be either foreseen and expected, or habitual to them; for, with him, evils +are not the less by reason of their continuance, nor the lighter for +having been foreseen; and it is folly to ruminate on evils to come, or +such as, perhaps, never may come; every evil is disagreeable enough when +it does come; but he who is constantly considering that some evil may +befal him, is loading himself with a perpetual evil, and even should such +evil never light on him, he voluntarily takes upon himself unnecessary +misery, so that he is under constant uneasiness, whether he actually +suffers any evil, or only thinks of it. But he makes the alleviation of +grief depend on two things, a ceasing to think on evil, and a turning to +the contemplation of pleasure. For he thinks that the mind may possibly be +under the power of reason, and follow her directions; he forbids us, +therefore, to mind trouble, and calls us off from sorrowful reflections: +he throws a mist over our eyes to hinder us from the contemplation of +misery. Having sounded a retreat from this statement, he drives our +thoughts on again, and encourages them to view and engage the whole mind +in the various pleasures with which he thinks the life of a wise man +abounds, either from reflecting on the past, or from the hope of what is +to come. I have said these things in my own way, the Epicureans have +theirs: however, let us examine what they say; how they say it is of +little consequence. + +XVI. In the first place, they are wrong in forbidding men to premeditate +on futurity, and blaming their wish to do so; for there is nothing that +breaks the edge of grief and lightens it more, than considering, during +one's whole life, that there is nothing which it is impossible should +happen; or, than considering what human nature is, on what conditions life +was given, and how we may comply with them. The effect of which is, that +we are always grieving, but that we never do so; for whoever reflects on +the nature of things, the various turns of life, and the weakness of human +nature, grieves, indeed, at that reflection; but while so grieving he is, +above all other times, behaving as a wise man: for he gains these two +things by it; one, that while he is considering the state of human nature +he is performing the especial duties of philosophy, and is provided with a +triple medicine against adversity: in the first place, because he has long +reflected that such things might befal him, and this reflection by itself +contributes much towards lessening and weakening all misfortunes; and, +secondly, because he is persuaded that we should bear all the accidents +which can happen to a man, with the feelings and spirit of a man; and +lastly, because he considers that what is blameable is the only evil; but +it is not your fault that something has happened to you which it was +impossible for man to avoid. For that withdrawing of our thoughts which he +recommends when he calls us off from contemplating our misfortunes, is an +imaginary action; for it is not in our power to dissemble or to forget +those evils which lie heavy on us; they tear, vex, and sting us--they burn +us up, and leave no breathing-time; and do you order us to forget them, +(for such forgetfulness is contrary to nature,) and at the same time +deprive us of the only assistance which nature affords, the being +accustomed to them? for that, though it is but a slow medicine (I mean +that which is brought by lapse of time), is still a very effectual one. +You order me to employ my thoughts on something good, and forget my +misfortunes. You would say something worthy a great philosopher, if you +thought those things good which are best suited to the dignity of human +nature. + +XVII. Should Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato, say to me, Why are you +dejected, or sad? Why do you faint, and yield to fortune, which, perhaps, +may have power to harass and disturb you, but should not quite unman you? +There is great power in the virtues; rouse them if they chance to droop. +Take fortitude for your guide, which will give you such spirits, that you +will despise everything that can befal man, and look on it as a trifle. +Add to this temperance, which is moderation, and which was just now called +frugality, which will not suffer you to do anything base or bad--for what +is worse or baser than an effeminate man? Not even justice will suffer you +to act in this manner, though she seems to have the least weight in this +affair; but still, notwithstanding, even she will inform you that you are +doubly unjust when you both require what does not belong to you, inasmuch +as though you who have been born mortal, demand to be placed in the +condition of the immortals, and at the same time you take it much to heart +that you are to restore what was lent you. What answer will you make to +prudence, who informs you that she is a virtue sufficient of herself both +to teach you a good life, and also to secure you a happy one? And, indeed, +if she were fettered by external circumstances, and dependent on others, +and if she did not originate in herself and return to herself, and also +embrace everything in herself, so as to seek no adventitious aid from any +quarter, I cannot imagine why she should appear deserving of such lofty +panegyrics, or of being sought after with such excessive eagerness. Now, +Epicurus, if you call me back to such goods as these, I will obey you, and +follow you, and use you as my guide, and even forget, as you order me, all +my misfortunes; and I will do this the more readily from a persuasion that +they are not to be ranked amongst evils at all. But you are for bringing +my thoughts over to pleasure. What pleasures? pleasures of the body, I +imagine, or such as are recollected or imagined on account of the body. Is +this all? Do I explain your opinion rightly? for your disciples are used +to deny that we understand at all what Epicurus means. This is what he +says, and what that subtle fellow, old Zeno, who is one of the sharpest of +them, used, when I was attending lectures at Athens, to enforce and talk +so loudly of; saying that he alone was happy who could enjoy present +pleasure, and who was at the same time persuaded that he should enjoy it +without pain, either during the whole or the greatest part of his life; or +if, should any pain interfere, if it was very sharp, then it must be +short; should it be of longer continuance, it would have more of what was +sweet than bitter in it; that whosoever reflected on these things would be +happy, especially if satisfied with the good things which he had already +enjoyed, and if he were without fear of death, or of the Gods. + +XVIII. You have here a representation of a happy life according to +Epicurus, in the words of Zeno, so that there is no room for contradiction +in any point. What then? Can the proposing and thinking of such a life +make Thyestes grief the less, or AEetes's, of whom I spoke above, or +Telamon's, who was driven from his country to penury and banishment? in +wonder at whom men exclaimed thus:-- + + + Is this the man surpassing glory raised? + Is this that Telamon so highly praised + By wondering Greece, at whose sight, like the sun, + All others with diminish'd lustre shone? + + +Now, should any one, as the same author says, find his spirits sink with +the loss of his fortune, he must apply to those grave philosophers of +antiquity for relief, and not to these voluptuaries: for what great +abundance of good do they promise? Suppose that we allow that to be +without pain is the chief good? yet that is not called pleasure. But it is +not necessary at present to go through the whole: the question is, to what +point are we to advance in order to abate our grief? Grant that to be in +pain is the greatest evil; whosoever, then, has proceeded so far as not to +be in pain, is he, therefore, in immediate possession of the greatest +good? Why, Epicurus, do we use any evasions, and not allow in our own +words the same feeling to be pleasure, which you are used to boast of with +such assurance? Are these your words or not? This is what you say in that +book which contains all the doctrine of your school; for I will perform, +on this occasion, the office of a translator, lest any one should imagine +that I am inventing anything. Thus you speak: "Nor can I form any notion +of the chief good, abstracted from those pleasures which are perceived by +taste, or from what depends on hearing music, or abstracted from ideas +raised by external objects visible to the eye, or by agreeable motions, or +from those other pleasures which are perceived by the whole man by means +of any of his senses; nor can it possibly be said that the pleasures of +the mind are excited only by what is good; for I have perceived men's +minds to be pleased with the hopes of enjoying those things which I +mentioned above, and with the idea that it should enjoy them without any +interruption from pain." And these are his exact words, so that any one +may understand what were the pleasures with which Epicurus was acquainted. +Then he speaks thus, a little lower down: "I have often inquired of those +who have been called wise men, what would be the remaining good if they +should exclude from consideration all these pleasures, unless they meant +to give us nothing but words? I could never learn anything from them; and +unless they choose that all virtue and wisdom should vanish and come to +nothing, they must say with me, that the only road to happiness lies +through those pleasures which I mentioned above." What follows is much the +same, and his whole book on the chief good everywhere abounds with the +same opinions. Will you, then, invite Telamon to this kind of life to ease +his grief? and should you observe any one of your friends under +affliction, would you rather prescribe him a sturgeon than a treatise of +Socrates? or advise him to listen to the music of a water-organ rather +than to Plato? or lay before him the beauty and variety of some garden, +put a nosegay to his nose, burn perfumes before him, and bid him crown +himself with a garland of roses and woodbines? Should you add one thing +more, you would certainly wipe out all his grief. + +XIX. Epicurus must admit these arguments; or he must take out of his book +what I just now said was a literal translation; or rather he must destroy +his whole book, for it is crammed full of pleasures. We must inquire, +then, how we can ease him of his grief, who speaks in this manner:-- + + + My present state proceeds from fortune's stings; + By birth I boast of a descent from kings; + Hence may you see from what a noble height + I'm sunk by fortune to this abject plight. + + +What! to ease his grief, must we mix him a cup of sweet wine, or something +of that kind? Lo! the same poet presents us with another sentiment +somewhere else:-- + + + I, Hector, once so great, now claim your aid. + + +We should assist her, for she looks out for help. + + + Where shall I now apply, where seek support? + Where hence betake me, or to whom resort? + No means remain of comfort or of joy, + In flames my palace, and in ruins Troy; + Each wall, so late superb, deformed nods, + And not an altar's left t' appease the gods. + + +You know what should follow, and particularly this:-- + + + Of father, country, and of friends bereft, + Not one of all these sumptuous temples left; + Which, whilst the fortune of our house did stand, + With rich-wrought ceilings spoke the artist's hand. + + +O excellent poet! though despised by those who sing the verses of +Euphorion. He is sensible that all things which come on a sudden are +harder to be borne. Therefore, when he had set off the riches of Priam to +the best advantage, which had the appearance of a long continuance, what +does he add?-- + + + Lo, these all perish'd in one blazing pile; + The foe old Priam of his life beguiled, + And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defiled. + + +Admirable poetry! There is something mournful in the subject, as well as +in the words and measure. We must drive away this grief of her's: how is +that to be done? Shall we lay her on a bed of down: introduce a singer; +shall we burn cedar, or present her with some pleasant liquor, and provide +her something to eat? Are these the good things which remove the most +afflicting grief? for you but just now said you knew of no other good. I +should agree with Epicurus that we ought to be called off from grief to +contemplate good things, if we could only agree upon what was good. + +XX. It may be said, What! do you imagine Epicurus really meant this, and +that he maintained anything so sensual? Indeed I do not imagine so, for I +am sensible that he has uttered many excellent things and sentiments, and +delivered maxims of great weight. Therefore, as I said before, I am +speaking of his acuteness, not of his morals. Though he should hold those +pleasures in contempt, which he just now commended, yet I must remember +wherein he places the chief good. For he was not contented with barely +saying this, but he has explained what he meant: he says, that taste, and +embraces, and sports, and music, and those forms which affect the eyes +with pleasure, are the chief good. Have I invented this? have I +misrepresented him? I should be glad to be confuted; for what am I +endeavouring at, but to clear up truth in every question? Well, but the +same man says, that pleasure is at its height where pain ceases, and that +to be free from all pain is the very greatest pleasure. Here are three +very great mistakes in a very few words. One is, that he contradicts +himself; for, but just now, he could not imagine anything good, unless the +senses were in a manner tickled with some pleasure; but now he says that +to be free from pain is the highest pleasure. Can any one contradict +himself more? The next mistake is, that where there is naturally a +threefold division, the first, to be pleased; next, to be in pain; the +last, to be affected neither by pleasure nor pain: he imagines the first +and the last to be the same, and makes no difference betwixt pleasure and +a cessation of pain. The last mistake he falls into in common with some +others; which is this: that as virtue is the most desirable thing, and as +philosophy has been investigated with a view to the attainment of it, he +has separated the chief good from virtue. But he commends virtue, and that +frequently; and indeed C. Gracchus, when he had made the largest +distributions of the public money, and had exhausted the treasury, +nevertheless spoke much of defending the treasury. What signifies what men +say, when we see what they do? That Piso, who was surnamed Frugal, had +always harangued against the law that was proposed for distributing the +corn, but when it had passed, though a man of consular dignity, he came to +receive the corn. Gracchus observed Piso standing in the court, and asked +him, in the hearing of the people, how it was consistent for him to take +corn by a law he had himself opposed? "It was," said he, "against your +distributing my goods to every man as you thought proper; but, as you do +so, I claim my share." Did not this grave and wise man sufficiently show +that the public revenue was dissipated by the Sempronian law? Read +Gracchus's speeches, and you will pronounce him the advocate of the +treasury. Epicurus denies that any one can live pleasantly who does not +lead a life of virtue; he denies that fortune has any power over a wise +man: he prefers a spare diet to great plenty, and maintains that a wise +man is always happy. All these things become a philosopher to say, but +they are not consistent with pleasure. But the reply is, that he doth not +mean _that_ pleasure: let him mean any pleasure, it must be such a one as +makes no part of virtue. But suppose we are mistaken as to his pleasure, +are we so too as to his pain? I maintain therefore the impropriety of +language which that man uses when talking of virtue, who would measure +every great evil by pain? + +XXI. And indeed the Epicureans, those best of men, for there is no order +of men more innocent, complain, that I take great pains to inveigh against +Epicurus. We are rivals, I suppose, for some honour or distinction. I +place the chief good in the mind, he in the body; I in virtue, he in +pleasure; and the Epicureans are up in arms, and implore the assistance of +their neighbours, and many are ready to fly to their aid. But, as for my +part, I declare that I am very indifferent about the matter, and that I +consider the whole discussion which they are so anxious about at an end. +For what! is the contention about the Punic war? on which very subject, +though M. Cato and L. Lentulus were of different opinions, still there was +no difference betwixt them. But these men behave with too much heat, +especially as the opinions which they would uphold are no very spirited +ones, and such as they dare not plead for either in the senate, or before +the assembly of the people, or before the army, or the censors: but, +however, I will argue with them another time, and with such a disposition +that no quarrel shall arise between us; for I shall be ready to yield to +their opinions when founded on truth. Only I must give them this advice: +That were it ever so true, that a wise man regards nothing but the body; +or, to express myself with more decency, never does anything except what +is expedient, and views all things with exclusive reference to his own +advantage; as such things are not very commendable, they should confine +them to their own breasts, and leave off talking with that parade of them. + +XXII. What remains is the opinion of the Cyrenaics, who think that men +grieve when anything happens unexpectedly. And that is, indeed, as I said +before, a great aggravation of a misfortune; and I know that it appeared +so to Chrysippus, "Whatever falls out unexpected is so much the heavier." +But the whole question does not turn on this; though the sudden approach +of an enemy sometimes occasions more confusion than it would if you had +expected him, and a sudden storm at sea throws the sailors into a greater +fright than one which they have foreseen; and it is the same in many other +cases. But when you carefully consider the nature of what was expected, +you will find nothing more, than that all things which come on a sudden +appear greater; and this upon two accounts: first of all, because you have +not time to consider how great the accident is; and secondly, because you +are probably persuaded that you could have guarded against it had you +foreseen it, and therefore the misfortune, having been seemingly +encountered by your own fault, makes your grief the greater. That it is +so, time evinces; which, as it advances, brings with it so much +mitigation, that though the same misfortunes continue, the grief not only +becomes the less, but in some cases is entirely removed. Many +Carthaginians were slaves at Rome, and many Macedonians when Perseus their +king was taken prisoner. I saw, too, when I was a young man, some +Corinthians in the Peloponnesus. They might all have lamented with +Andromache,-- + + + All these I saw...; + + +but they had perhaps given over lamenting themselves, for by their +countenances, and speech, and other gestures, you might have taken them +for Argives or Sicyonians. And I myself was more concerned at the ruined +walls of Corinth, than the Corinthians themselves were, whose minds by +frequent reflection and time had become callous to such sights. I have +read a book of Clitomachus, which he sent to his fellow-citizens, who were +prisoners, to comfort them after the destruction of Carthage; there is in +it a treatise written by Carneades, which, as Clitomachus says, he had +inserted into his book; the subject was, "That it appeared probable that a +wise man would grieve at the state of subjection of his country," and all +the arguments which Carneades used against this proposition are set down +in the book. There the philosopher applies such a strong medicine to a +fresh grief, as would be quite unnecessary in one of any continuance; nor, +if this very book had been sent to the captives some years after, would it +have found any wounds to cure, but only scars; for grief, by a gentle +progress and slow degrees, wears away imperceptibly. Not that the +circumstances which gave rise to it are altered, or can be, but that +custom teaches what reason should, that those things which before seemed +to be of some consequence, are of no such great importance after all. + +XXIII. It may be said, What occasion is there to apply to reason, or to +any sort of consolation such as we generally make use of, to mitigate the +grief of the afflicted? For we have this argument always at hand, that +nothing ought to appear unexpected. But how will any one be enabled to +bear his misfortunes the better by knowing that it is unavoidable that +such things should happen to man? Saying this subtracts nothing from the +sum of the grief: it only asserts that nothing has fallen out but what +might have been anticipated; and yet this manner of speaking has some +little consolation in it, though I apprehend not a great deal. Therefore +those unlooked-for things have not so much force as to give rise to all +our grief; the blow perhaps may fall the heavier, but whatever happens +does not appear the greater on that account; no, it is the fact of its +having happened lately, and not of its having befallen us unexpectedly, +that makes it seem the greater. There are two ways then of discerning the +truth, not only of things that seem evil, but of those that have the +appearance of good. For we either inquire into the nature of the thing, of +what description, and magnitude, and importance it is,--as sometimes with +regard to poverty, the burden of which we may lighten when by our +disputations we show how few things nature requires, and of what a +trifling kind they are,--or, without any subtle arguing, we refer them to +examples, as here we instance a Socrates, there a Diogenes, and then again +that line in Caecilius, + + + Wisdom is oft conceal'd in mean attire. + + +For as poverty is of equal weight with all, what reason can be given, why +what was borne by Fabricius should be spoken of by any one else as +unsupportable when it falls upon themselves? Of a piece with this is that +other way of comforting, which consists in pointing out that nothing has +happened but what is common to human nature; for this argument doth not +only inform us what human nature is, but implies that all things are +tolerable which others have borne and are bearing. + +XXIV. Is poverty the subject? they tell you of many who have submitted to +it with patience. Is it the contempt of honours? they acquaint you with +some who never enjoyed any, and were the happier for it; and of those who +have preferred a private retired life to public employment, mentioning +their names with respect; they tell you of the verse(89) of that most +powerful king, who praises an old man, and pronounces him happy, because +he was unknown to fame, and seemed likely to arrive at the hour of death +in obscurity and without notice. Thus too they have examples for those who +are deprived of their children; they who are under any great grief are +comforted by instances of like affliction; and thus the endurance of every +misfortune is rendered more easy by the fact of others having undergone +the same, and the fate of others causes what has happened to appear less +important than it has been previously thought, and reflection thus +discovers to us how much opinion had imposed on us. And this is what that +Telamon declares, "I, when my son was born," etc.; and thus Theseus, "I on +my future misery did dwell;" and Anaxagoras, "I knew my son was mortal." +All these men, by frequently reflecting on human affairs, had discovered +that they were by no means to be estimated by the opinion of the +multitude; and indeed it seems to me to be pretty much the same case with +those who consider beforehand as with those who derive their remedies from +time, excepting that a kind of reason cures the one, and the other remedy +is provided by nature; by which we discover (and this contains the whole +marrow of the matter) that what was imagined to be the greatest evil, is +by no means so great as to defeat the happiness of life. And the effect of +this is, that the blow is greater by reason of its not having been +foreseen, and not, as they suppose, that when similar misfortunes befal +two different people, that man only is affected with grief whom this +calamity has befallen unexpectedly. So that some persons, under the +oppression of grief, are said to have borne it actually worse for hearing +of this common condition of man, that we are born under such conditions as +render it impossible for a man to be exempt from all evil. + +XXV. For this reason Carneades, as I see our friend Antiochus writes, used +to blame Chrysippus for commending these verses of Euripides,-- + + + Man, doom'd to care, to pain, disease, and strife, + Walks his short journey thro' the vale of life: + Watchful attends the cradle and the grave, + And passing generations longs to save: + Last, dies himself: yet wherefore should we mourn? + For man must to his kindred dust return; + Submit to the destroying hand of fate, + As ripen'd ears the harvest-sickle wait.(90) + + +He would not allow a speech of this kind to avail at all to the cure of +our grief, for he said it was a lamentable case itself, that we were +fallen into the hands of such a cruel fate; and that a speech like that, +preaching up comfort from the misfortunes of another, was a comfort +adapted only to those of a malevolent disposition. But to me it appears +far otherwise; for the necessity of bearing what is the common condition +of humanity forbids your resisting the will of the Gods, and reminds you +that you are a man; which reflection greatly alleviates grief; and the +enumeration of these examples is not produced with a view to please those +of a malevolent disposition, but in order that any one in affliction may +be induced to bear what he observes many others have previously borne with +tranquillity and moderation. For they who are falling to pieces, and +cannot hold together through the greatness of their grief, should be +supported by all kinds of assistance. From whence Chrysippus thinks that +grief is called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}, as it were {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, that is to say, a dissolution of +the whole man. The whole of which I think may be pulled up by the roots, +by explaining, as I said at the beginning, the cause of grief; for it is +nothing else but an opinion and judgment formed of a present acute evil. +And thus any bodily pain, let it be ever so grievous, may be endurable +where any hopes are proposed of some considerable good; and we receive +such consolation from a virtuous and illustrious life, that they who lead +such lives are seldom attacked by grief, or but slightly affected by it. + +XXVI. But as besides this opinion of great evil there is this other added +also, that we ought to lament what has happened, that it is right so to +do, and part of our duty; then is brought about that terrible disorder of +mind, grief. And it is to this opinion that we owe all those various and +horrid kinds of lamentation, that neglect of our persons, that womanish +tearing of our cheeks, that striking on our thighs, breasts, and heads. +Thus Agamemnon, in Homer and in Accius,-- + + + Tears in his grief his uncomb'd locks;(91) + + +from whence comes that pleasant saying of Bion, that the foolish king in +his sorrow tore away the hairs of his head, imagining that his grief would +be alleviated by baldness. But men do all these things from being +persuaded that they ought to do so. And thus AEschines inveighs against +Demosthenes for sacrificing within seven days after the death of his +daughter. But with what eloquence, with what fluency does he attack him! +what sentiments does he collect! what words does he hurl against him! You +may see by this that an orator may do anything; but nobody would approve +of such licence if it were not that we have an idea innate in our minds, +that every good man ought to lament the loss of a relation as bitterly as +possible. And it is owing to this that some men, when in sorrow, betake +themselves to deserts, as Homer says of Bellerophon;-- + + + Distracted in his mind, + Forsook by heaven, forsaking human kind, + Wide o'er the Aleian field he chose to stray, + A long, forlorn, uncomfortable way!(92) + + +And thus Niobe is feigned to have been turned into stone, from her never +speaking, I suppose, in her grief. But they imagine Hecuba to have been +converted into a bitch, from her rage and bitterness of mind. There are +others who love to converse with solitude itself, when in grief, as the +nurse in Ennius,-- + + + Fain would I to the heavens and earth relate + Medea's ceaseless woes and cruel fate.(93) + + +XXVII. Now all these things are done in grief, from a persuasion of their +truth, and propriety, and necessity; and it is plain, that those who +behave thus, do so from a conviction of its being their duty; for should +these mourners by chance drop their grief, and either act or speak for a +moment in a more calm or cheerful manner, they presently check themselves +and return to their lamentations again, and blame themselves for having +been guilty of any intermissions from their grief. And parents and masters +generally correct children not by words only, but by blows, if they show +any levity by either word or deed when the family is under affliction, +and, as it were, oblige them to be sorrowful. What? does it not appear, +when you have ceased to mourn, and have discovered that your grief has +been ineffectual, that the whole of that mourning was voluntary, on your +part? What does that man say, in Terence, who punishes himself, the +Self-tormentor? + + + I think I do my son less harm, O Chremes, + As long as I myself am miserable. + + +He determines to be miserable: and can any one determine on anything +against his will? + + + I well might think that I deserved all evil. + + +He would think he deserved any misfortune, were he otherwise than +miserable! Therefore, you see the evil is in opinion, not in nature. How +is it, when some things do of themselves prevent your grieving at them? as +in Homer, so many died and were buried daily, that they had not leisure to +grieve: where you find these lines,-- + + + The great, the bold, by thousands daily fall, + And endless were the grief to weep for all. + Eternal sorrows what avails to shed? + Greece honours not with solemn fasts the dead: + Enough when death demands the brave to pay + The tribute of a melancholy day. + One chief with patience to the grave resign'd, + Our care devolves on others left behind.(94) + + +Therefore it is in our own power to lay aside grief upon occasion; and is +there any opportunity (seeing the thing is in our own power) that we +should let slip of getting rid of care and grief? It was plain, that the +friends of Cnaeus Pompeius, when they saw him fainting under his wounds, at +the very moment of that most miserable and bitter sight were under great +uneasiness how they themselves, surrounded by the enemy as they were, +should escape, and were employed in nothing but encouraging the rowers and +aiding their escape; but when they reached Tyre, they began to grieve and +lament over him. Therefore, as fear with them prevailed over grief, cannot +reason and true philosophy have the same effect with a wise man? + +XXVIII. But what is there more effectual to dispel grief than the +discovery that it answers no purpose, and has been undergone to no +account? Therefore, if we can get rid of it, we need never have been +subject to it. It must be acknowledged, then, that men take up grief +wilfully and knowingly; and this appears from the patience of those who, +after they have been exercised in afflictions and are better able to bear +whatever befals them, suppose themselves hardened against fortune; as that +person in Euripides-- + + + Had this the first essay of fortune been, + And I no storms thro' all my life had seen, + Wild as a colt I'd broke from reason's sway; + But frequent griefs have taught me to obey.(95) + + +As, then, the frequent bearing of misery makes grief the lighter, we must +necessarily perceive that the cause and original of it does not lie in the +calamity itself. Your principal philosophers, or lovers of wisdom, though +they have not yet arrived at perfect wisdom, are not they sensible that +they are in the greatest evil? For they are foolish, and foolishness is +the greatest of all evils, and yet they lament not. How shall we account +for this? Because opinion is not fixed upon that kind of evil; it is not +our opinion that it is right, meet, and our duty to be uneasy because we +are not all wise men. Whereas this opinion is strongly affixed to that +uneasiness where mourning is concerned, which is the greatest of all +grief. Therefore Aristotle, when he blames some ancient philosophers for +imagining that by their genius they had brought philosophy to the highest +perfection, says, they must be either extremely foolish or extremely vain; +but that he himself could see that great improvements had been made +therein in a few years, and that philosophy would in a little time arrive +at perfection. And Theophrastus is reported to have reproached nature at +his death for giving to stags and crows so long a life, which was of no +use to them, but allowing only so short a span to men, to whom length of +days would have been of the greatest use; for if the life of man could +have been lengthened, it would have been able to provide itself with all +kinds of learning, and with arts in the greatest perfection. He lamented, +therefore, that he was dying just when he had begun to discover these. +What? does not every grave and distinguished philosopher acknowledge +himself ignorant of many things, and confess that there are many things +which he must learn over and over again? and yet, though these men are +sensible that they are standing still in the very midway of folly, than +which nothing can be worse, they are under no great affliction, because no +opinion that it is their duty to lament is ever mingled with this +knowledge. What shall we say of those who think it unbecoming in a man to +grieve? amongst whom we may reckon Q. Maximus, when he buried his son that +had been consul, and L. Paulus, who lost two sons within a few days of one +another. Of the same opinion was M. Cato, who lost his son just after he +had been elected praetor, and many others, whose names I have collected in +my book on Consolation. Now what made these men so easy, but their +persuasion that grief and lamentation was not becoming in a man? +Therefore, as some give themselves up to grief from an opinion that it is +right so to do, they refrained themselves, from an opinion that it was +discreditable; from which we may infer that grief is owing more to opinion +than nature. + +XXIX. It may be said, on the other side, Who is so mad as to grieve of his +own accord? Pain proceeds from nature; which you must submit to, say they, +agreeably to what even your own Crantor teaches, for it presses and gains +upon you unavoidably, and cannot possibly be resisted. So that the very +same Oileus, in Sophocles, who had before comforted Telamon on the death +of Ajax, on hearing of the death of his own son is broken-hearted. On this +alteration of his mind we have these lines:-- + + + Show me the man so well by wisdom taught + That what he charges to another's fault, + When like affliction doth himself betide, + True to his own wise counsel will abide.(96) + + +Now when they urge these things, their endeavour is to prove that nature +is absolutely and wholly irresistible; and yet the same people allow that +we take greater grief on ourselves than nature requires. What madness is +it then in us to require the same from others? But there are many reasons +for our taking grief on us. The first is from the opinion of some evil, on +the discovery and certainty of which grief comes of course. Besides, many +people are persuaded that they are doing something very acceptable to the +dead when they lament bitterly over them. To these may be added a kind of +womanish superstition, in imagining that when they have been stricken by +the afflictions sent by the gods, to acknowledge themselves afflicted and +humbled by them is the readiest way of appeasing them. But most men appear +to be unaware what contradictions these things are full of. They commend +those who die calmly, but they blame those who can bear the loss of +another with the same calmness, as if it were possible that it should be +true, as is occasionally said in love speeches, that any one can love +another more than himself. There is, indeed, something excellent in this, +and, if you examine it, something no less just than true, that we love +those who ought to be most dear to us as well as we love ourselves; but to +love them more than ourselves is absolutely impossible; nor is it +desirable in friendship that I should love my friend more than myself, or +that he should love me so; for this would occasion much confusion in life, +and break in upon all the duties of it. + +XXX. But we will speak of this another time: at present it is sufficient +not to attribute our misery to the loss of our friends, nor to love them +more than, if they themselves could be sensible of our conduct, they would +approve of, or at least not more than we do ourselves. Now as to what they +say, that some are not at all appeased by our consolations; and moreover +as to what they add, that the comforters themselves acknowledge they are +miserable when fortune varies the attack and falls on them,--in both these +cases the solution is easy: for the fault here is not in nature, but in +our own folly; and much may be said against folly. But men who do not +admit of consolation seem to bespeak misery for themselves; and they who +cannot bear their misfortunes with that temper which they recommend to +others, are not more faulty in this particular than most other persons; +for we see that covetous men find fault with others who are covetous; as +do the vain-glorious with those who appear too wholly devoted to the +pursuit of glory. For it is the peculiar characteristic of folly to +perceive the vices of others, but to forget its own. But since we find +that grief is removed by length of time, we have the greatest proof that +the strength of it depends not merely on time, but on the daily +consideration of it. For if the cause continues the same, and the man be +the same, how can there be any alteration in the grief, if there is no +change in what occasioned the grief, nor in him who grieves? Therefore it +is from daily reflecting that there is no real evil in the circumstance +for which you grieve, and not from the length of time, that you procure a +remedy for your grief. + +XXXI. Here some people talk of moderate grief; but if such be natural, +what occasion is there for consolation? for nature herself will determine +the measure of it; but if it depends on and is caused by opinion, the +whole opinion should be destroyed. I think that it has been sufficiently +said, that grief arises from an opinion of some present evil, which +includes this belief, that it is incumbent on us to grieve. To this +definition Zeno has added very justly, that the opinion of this present +evil should be recent. Now this word recent they explain thus;--those are +not the only recent things which happened a little while ago, but as long +as there shall be any force or vigour or freshness in that imagined evil, +so long it is entitled to the name of recent. Take the case of Artemisia, +the wife of Mausolus king of Caria, who made that noble sepulchre at +Halicarnassus; whilst she lived she lived in grief, and died of it, being +worn out by it, for that opinion was always recent with her: but you +cannot call that recent, which has already begun to decay through time. +Now the duty of a comforter is, to remove grief entirely, to quiet it, or +draw it off as much as you can, or else to keep it under, and prevent its +spreading any further, and to divert one's attention to other matters. +There are some who think with Cleanthes, that the only duty of a comforter +is to prove, that what one is lamenting is by no means an evil. Others, as +the Peripatetics, prefer urging that the evil is not great. Others, with +Epicurus, seek to divert your attention from the evil to good: some think +it sufficient to show, that nothing has happened but what you had reason +to expect, and this is the practice of the Cyrenaics. But Chrysippus +thinks that the main thing in comforting is, to remove the opinion from +the person who is grieving, that to grieve is his bounden duty. There are +others who bring together all these various kinds of consolations, for +people are differently affected; as I have done myself in my book on +Consolation: for as my own mind was much disordered, I have attempted in +that book to discover every method of cure. But the proper season is as +much to be attended to in the cure of the mind, as of the body; as +Prometheus in AEschylus, on its being said to him, + + + I think, Prometheus, you this tenet hold, + That all men's reason should their rage control; + + +answers, + + + Yes, when one reason properly applies; + Ill-timed advice will make the storm but rise.(97) + + +XXXII. But the principal medicine to be applied in consolation, is to +maintain either that it is no evil at all, or a very inconsiderable one: +the next best to that is, to speak of the common condition of life, having +a view, if possible, to the state of the person whom you comfort +particularly. The third is, that it is folly to wear oneself out with +grief which can avail nothing. For the comfort of Cleanthes is suitable +only for a wise man, who is in no need of any comfort at all; for could +you persuade one in grief, that nothing is an evil but what is base, you +would not only cure him of grief, but folly. But the time for such +precepts is not well chosen. Besides, Cleanthes does not seem to me +sufficiently aware that affliction may very often proceed from that very +thing which he himself allows to be the greatest misfortune. For what +shall we say? When Socrates had convinced Alcibiades, as we are told, that +he had no distinctive qualifications as a man different from other people, +and that in fact there was no difference betwixt him, though a man of the +highest rank, and a porter; and when Alcibiades became uneasy at this, and +entreated Socrates, with tears in his eyes, to make him a man of virtue, +and to cure him of that mean position; what shall we say to this, +Cleanthes? Was there no evil in what afflicted Alcibiades thus? What +strange things does Lycon say? who, making light of grief, says that it +arises from trifles, from things that affect our fortune or bodies, not +from the evils of the mind. What, then--did not the grief of Alcibiades +proceed from the defects and evils of the mind? I have already said enough +of Epicurus's consolation. + +XXXIII. Nor is that consolation much to be relied on, though it is +frequently practised, and sometimes has some effect, namely, "That you are +not alone in this."--It has its effect, as I said, but not always, nor with +every person; for some reject it, but much depends on the application of +it; for you ought rather to show, not how men in general have been +affected with such evils, but how men of sense have borne them. As to +Chrysippus's method, it is certainly founded in truth; but it is difficult +to apply it in time of distress. It is a work of no small difficulty to +persuade a person in affliction that he grieves, merely because he thinks +it right so to do. Certainly then, as in pleadings we do not state all +cases alike, (if I may adopt the language of lawyers for a moment,) but +adapt what we have to say to the time, to the nature of the subject under +debate, and to the person; so too in alleviating grief, regard should be +had to what kind of cure the party to be comforted can admit of. But, +somehow or other, we have rambled from what you originally proposed. For +your question was concerning a wise man, with whom nothing can have the +appearance of evil, that is not dishonourable: or at least, anything else +would seem so small an evil, that by his wisdom he would so over-match it, +as to make it wholly disappear; and such a man makes no addition to his +grief through opinion, and never conceives it right to torment himself +above measure, nor to wear himself out with grief, which is the meanest +thing imaginable. Reason, however, it seems, has demonstrated, (though it +was not directly our object at the moment to inquire whether anything can +be called an evil except what is base,) that it is in our power to +discern, that all the evil which there is in affliction has nothing +natural in it, but is contracted by our own voluntary judgment of it, and +the error of opinion. + +XXXIV. But the kind of affliction of which I have treated is that which is +the greatest; in order that when we have once got rid of that, it may +appear a business of less consequence to look after remedies for the +others. For there are certain things which are usually said about poverty; +and also certain statements ordinarily applied to retired and +undistinguished life. There are particular treatises on banishment, on the +ruin of one's country, on slavery, on weakness, on blindness, and on every +incident that can come under the name of an evil. The Greeks divide these +into different treatises and distinct books: but they do it for the sake +of employment: not but that all such discussions are full of +entertainment; and yet, as physicians, in curing the whole body, attend to +even the most insignificant part of the body which is at all disordered, +so does philosophy act, after it has removed grief in general, (still if +any other deficiency exists, should poverty bite, should ignominy sting, +should banishment bring a dark cloud over us, or should any of those +things which I have just mentioned appear,)--there is for each its +appropriate consolation: which you shall hear whenever you please. But we +must have recourse again to the same original principle, that a wise man +is free from all sorrow, because it is vain, because it answers no +purpose, because it is not founded in nature, but on opinion and +prejudice, and is engendered by a kind of invitation to grieve, when once +men have imagined that it is their duty to do so. When then we have +subtracted what is altogether voluntary, that mournful uneasiness will be +removed; yet some little anxiety, some slight pricking will still remain. +They may indeed call this natural, provided they give it not that horrid, +solemn, melancholy name of grief, which can by no means consist with +wisdom. But how various, and how bitter, are the roots of grief! Whatever +they are, I propose, after having felled the trunk, to destroy them all; +even if it should be necessary, by allotting a separate dissertation to +each, for I have leisure enough to do so, whatever time it may take up. +But the principle of every uneasiness is the same, though they may appear +under different names. For envy is an uneasiness; so are emulation, +detraction, anguish, sorrow, sadness, tribulation, lamentation, vexation, +grief, trouble, affliction, and despair. The Stoics define all these +different feelings, and all those words which I have mentioned belong to +different things, and do not, as they seem, express the same ideas; but +they are to a certain extent distinct, as I shall make appear perhaps in +another place. These are those fibres of the roots, which, as I said at +first, must be traced back and cut off, and destroyed, so that not one +shall remain. You say it is a great and difficult undertaking:--who denies +it? But what is there of any excellency which has not its difficulty?--Yet +philosophy undertakes to effect it, provided we admit its superintendence. +But enough of this: the other books, whenever you please, shall be ready +for you here, or any where else. + + + + +Book IV. On Other Perturbations Of The Mind. + + +I. I have often wondered, Brutus, on many occasions, at the ingenuity and +virtues of our countrymen; but nothing has surprised me more than their +development in those studies, which, though they came somewhat late to us, +have been transported into this city from Greece. For the system of +auspices, and religious ceremonies, and courts of justice, and appeals to +the people, the senate, the establishment of an army of cavalry and +infantry, and the whole military discipline, were instituted as early as +the foundation of the city by royal authority, partly too by laws, not +without the assistance of the Gods. Then with what a surprising and +incredible progress did our ancestors advance towards all kind of +excellence, when once the republic was freed from the regal power! Not +that this is a proper occasion to treat of the manners and customs of our +ancestors, or of the discipline and constitution of the city; for I have +elsewhere, particularly in the six books I wrote on the Republic, given a +sufficiently accurate account of them. But whilst I am on this subject, +and considering the study of philosophy, I meet with many reasons to +imagine that those studies were brought to us from abroad, and not merely +imported, but preserved and improved; for they had Pythagoras, a man of +consummate wisdom and nobleness of character, in a manner, before their +eyes; who was in Italy at the time that Lucius Brutus, the illustrious +founder of your nobility, delivered his country from tyranny. As the +doctrine of Pythagoras spread itself on all sides, it seems probable to +me, that it reached this city; and this is not only probable of itself, +but it does really appear to have been the case from many remains of it. +For who can imagine that, when it flourished so much in that part of Italy +which was called Magna Graecia, and in some of the largest and most +powerful cities, in which, first the name of Pythagoras, and then that of +those men who were afterwards his followers, was in so high esteem; who +can imagine, I say, that our people could shut their ears to what was said +by such learned men? Besides, it is even my opinion, that it was the great +esteem in which the Pythagoreans were held, that gave rise to that opinion +amongst those who came after him, that king Numa was a Pythagorean. For, +being acquainted with the doctrine and principles of Pythagoras, and +having heard from their ancestors that this king was a very wise and just +man, and not being able to distinguish accurately between times and +periods that were so remote, they inferred from his being so eminent for +his wisdom, that he had been a pupil of Pythagoras. + +II. So far we proceed on conjecture. As to the vestiges of the +Pythagoreans, though I might collect many, I shall use but a few; because +they have no connexion, with our present purpose. For, as it is reported +to have been a custom with them to deliver certain precepts in a more +abstruse manner in verse, and to bring their minds from severe thought to +a more composed state by songs and musical instruments; so Cato, a writer +of the very highest authority, says in his Origins, that it was customary +with our ancestors for the guests at their entertainments, every one in +his turn, to celebrate the praises and virtues of illustrious men in song +to the sound of the flute; from whence it is clear that poems and songs +were then composed for the voice. And, indeed, it is also clear that +poetry was in fashion from the laws of the Twelve Tables, wherein it is +provided, that no song should be made to the injury of another. Another +argument of the erudition of those times is, that they played on +instruments before the shrines of their Gods, and at the entertainments of +their magistrates; but that custom was peculiar to the sect I am speaking +of. To me, indeed, that poem of Appius Caecus, which Panaetius commends so +much in a certain letter of his which is addressed to Quintus Tubero, has +all the marks of a Pythagorean author. We have many things derived from +the Pythagoreans in our customs; which I pass over, that we may not seem +to have learned that elsewhere which we look upon ourselves as the +inventors of. But to return to our purpose. How many great poets as well +as orators have sprung up among us! and in what a short time! so that it +is evident that our people could arrive at any learning as soon as they +had an inclination for it. But of other studies I shall speak elsewhere if +there is occasion, as I have already often done. + +III. The study of philosophy is certainly of long standing with us; but +yet I do not find that I can give you the names of any philosopher before +the age of Laelius and Scipio: in whose younger days we find that Diogenes +the Stoic, and Carneades the Academic, were sent as ambassadors by the +Athenians to our senate. And as these had never been concerned in public +affairs, and one of them was a Cyrenean, the other a Babylonian, they +certainly would never have been forced from their studies, nor chosen for +that employment, unless the study of philosophy had been in vogue with +some of the great men at that time; who, though they might employ their +pens on other subjects, some on civil law, others on oratory, others on +the history of former times, yet promoted this most extensive of all arts, +the principle of living well, even more by their life than by their +writings. So that of that true and elegant philosophy, (which was derived +from Socrates, and is still preserved by the Peripatetics, and by the +Stoics, though they express themselves differently in their disputes with +the Academics,) there are few or no Latin records; whether this proceeds +from the importance of the thing itself, or from men's being otherwise +employed, or from their concluding that the capacity of the people was not +equal to the apprehension of them. But, during this silence, C. Amafinius +arose and took upon himself to speak; on the publishing of whose writings +the people were moved, and enlisted themselves chiefly under this sect, +either because the doctrine was more easily understood, or because they +were invited thereto by the pleasing thoughts of amusement, or that, +because there was nothing better, they laid hold of what was offered them. +And after Amafinius, when many of the same sentiments had written much +about them, the Pythagoreans spread over all Italy: but that these +doctrines should be so easily understood and approved of by the unlearned, +is a great proof that they were not written with any great subtlety, and +they think their establishment to be owing to this. + +IV. But let every one defend his own opinion, for every one is at liberty +to choose what he likes; I shall keep to my old custom; and being under no +restraint from the laws of any particular school, which in philosophy +every one must necessarily confine himself to, I shall always inquire what +has the most probability in every question, and this system, which I have +often practised on other occasions, I have adhered closely to in my +Tusculan Disputations. Therefore, as I have acquainted you with the +disputations of the three former days, this book shall conclude the +discussion of the fourth day. When we had come down into the Academy, as +we had done the former days, the business was carried on thus. + +_M._ Let any one say, who pleases, what he would wish to have discussed. + +_A._ I do not think a wise man can possibly be free from every +perturbation of mind. + +_M._ He seemed by yesterday's discourse to be free from grief; unless you +agreed with us only to avoid taking up time. + +_A._ Not at all on that account, for I was extremely satisfied with your +discourse. + +_M._ You do not think, then, that a wise man is subject to grief? + +_A._ No, by no means. + +_M._ But if that cannot disorder the mind of a wise man, nothing else can. +For what? can such a man be disturbed by fear? Fear proceeds from the same +things when absent, which occasion grief when present. Take away grief +then, and you remove fear. + +The two remaining perturbations are, a joy elate above measure, and lust; +and, if a wise man is not subject to these, his mind will be always at +rest. + +_A._ I am entirely of that opinion. + +_M._ Which, then, shall we do? shall I immediately crowd all my sails? or +shall I make use of my oars, as if I were just endeavouring to get clear +of the harbour? + +_A._ What is it that you mean; for I do not exactly comprehend you? + +V. _M._ Because, Chrysippus and the Stoics, when they discuss the +perturbations of the mind, make great part of their debate to consist in +definitions and distinctions; while they employ but few words on the +subject of curing the mind, and preventing it from being disordered. +Whereas the Peripatetics bring a great many things to promote the cure of +it, but have no regard to their thorny partitions and definitions.--My +question, then, was, whether I should instantly unfold the sails of my +eloquence, or be content for a while to make less way with the oars of +logic? + +_A._ Let it be so; for by the employment of both these means the subject +of our inquiry will be more thoroughly discussed. + +_M._ It is certainly the better way; and should anything be too obscure, +you may examine that afterwards. + +_A._ I will do so; but those very obscure points, you will, as usual, +deliver with more clearness than the Greeks. + +_M._ I will indeed endeavour to do so; but it well requires great +attention, lest, by losing one word, the whole should escape you. What the +Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}, we choose to name perturbations (or disorders) rather +than diseases; in explaining which, I shall follow, first, that very old +description of Pythagoras, and afterwards that of Plato; for they both +divide the mind into two parts, and make one of these partake of reason, +and the other they represent without it. In that which partakes of reason +they place tranquillity, that is to say, a placid and undisturbed +constancy; to the other they assign the turbid motions of anger and +desire, which are contrary and opposite to reason. Let this, then, be our +principle, the spring of all our reasonings. But notwithstanding, I shall +use the partitions and definitions of the Stoics in describing these +perturbations; who seem to me to have shown very great acuteness on this +question. + +VI. Zeno's definition, then, is this: "a perturbation" (which he calls a +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}) "is a commotion of the mind repugnant to reason, and against +nature." Some of them define it even more briefly, saying that a +perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; but by too vehement they +mean an appetite that recedes further from the constancy of nature. But +they would have the divisions of perturbations to arise from two imagined +goods, and from two imagined evils; and thus they become four: from the +good proceed lust and joy--joy having reference to some present good, and +lust to some future one. They suppose fear and grief to proceed from +evils: fear from something future,--grief from something present; for +whatever things are dreaded as approaching, always occasion grief when +present. But joy and lust depend on the opinion of good; as lust, being +inflamed and provoked, is carried on eagerly towards what has the +appearance of good; and joy is transported and exults on obtaining what +was desired: for we naturally pursue those things that have the appearance +of good, and avoid the contrary. Wherefore, as soon as anything that has +the appearance of good presents itself, nature incites us to endeavour to +obtain it. Now, where this strong desire is consistent and founded on +prudence, it is by the Stoics called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, and the name which we give +it is volition; and this they allow to none but their wise man, and define +it thus: Volition is a reasonable desire; but whatever is incited too +violently in opposition to reason, that is a lust, or an unbridled desire, +which is discoverable in all fools.--And, therefore, when we are affected +so as to be placed in any good condition, we are moved in two ways; for +when the mind is moved in a placid and calm motion, consistent with +reason, that is called joy; but when it exults with a vain, wanton +exultation, or immoderate joy, then that feeling may be called immoderate +ecstasy or transport, which they define to be an elation of the mind +without reason.--And as we naturally desire good things, so in like manner +we naturally seek to avoid what is evil; and this avoidance of which, if +conducted in accordance with reason, is called caution; and this the wise +man alone is supposed to have: but that caution which is not under the +guidance of reason, but is attended with a base and low dejection, is +called fear.--Fear is, therefore, caution destitute of reason. But a wise +man is not affected by any present evil; while the grief of a fool +proceeds from being affected with an imaginary evil, by which his mind is +contracted and sunk, since it is not under the dominion of reason. This, +then, is the first definition, which makes grief to consist in a shrinking +of the mind, contrary to the dictates of reason. Thus, there are four +perturbations, and but three calm rational emotions; for grief has no +exact opposite. + +VII. But they insist upon it that all perturbations depend on opinion and +judgment; therefore they define them more strictly, in order not only the +better to show how blameable they are, but to discover how much they are +in our power. Grief, then is a recent opinion of some present evil, in +which it seems to be right that the mind should shrink and be dejected. +Joy is a recent opinion of a present good, in which it seems to be right +that the mind should be elated. Fear is an opinion of an impending evil, +which we apprehend will be intolerable. Lust is an opinion of a good to +come, which would be of advantage were it already come, and present with +us. But however I have named the judgments and opinions of perturbations, +their meaning is, not that merely the perturbations consist in them, but +that the effects likewise of these perturbations do so; as grief occasions +a kind of painful pricking, and fear engenders a recoil or sudden +abandonment of the mind; joy gives rise to a profuse mirth, while lust is +the parent of an unbridled habit of coveting. But that imagination, which +I have included in all the above definitions, they would have to consist +in assenting without warrantable grounds. Now, every perturbation has many +subordinate parts annexed to it of the same kind. Grief is attended with +enviousness (_invidentia_)--I use that word for instruction sake, though it +is not so common; because envy (_invidia_) takes in not only the person +who envies, but the person too who is envied;--emulation, detraction, pity, +vexation, mourning, sadness, tribulation, sorrow, lamentation, solicitude, +disquiet of mind, pain, despair, and many other similar feelings, are so +too. Under fear are comprehended sloth, shame, terror, cowardice, +fainting, confusion, astonishment.--In pleasure they comprehend +malevolence, that is pleased at another's misfortune, delight, +boastfulness, and the like. To lust they associate anger, fury, hatred, +enmity, discord, wants, desire, and other feelings of that kind. + +But they define these in this manner: + +VIII. Enviousness (_invidentia_), they say, is a grief arising from the +prosperous circumstances of another, which are in no degree injurious to +the person who envies: for where any one grieves at the prosperity of +another, by which he is injured, such a one is not properly said to +envy,--as when Agamemnon grieves at Hector's success; but where any one, +who is in no way hurt by the prosperity of another, is in pain at his +success, such an one envies indeed. Now the name "emulation" is taken in a +double sense, so that the same word may stand for praise and dispraise: +for the imitation of virtue is called emulation--(however, that sense of it +I shall have no occasion for here, for that carries praise with it);--but +emulation is also a term applied to grief at another's enjoying what I +desired to have, and am without. Detraction (and I mean by that, jealousy) +is a grief even at another's enjoying what I had a great inclination for. +Pity is a grief at the misery of another who suffers wrongfully; for no +one is moved by pity at the punishment of a parricide, or of a betrayer of +his country. Vexation is a pressing grief. Mourning is a grief at the +bitter death of one who was dear to you. Sadness is a grief attended with +tears. Tribulation is a painful grief. Sorrow, an excruciating grief. +Lamentation, a grief where we loudly bewail ourselves. Solicitude, a +pensive grief. Trouble, a continued grief. Affliction, a grief that +harasses the body. Despair, a grief that excludes all hope of better +things to come. But those feelings which are included under fear, they +define thus:--There is sloth, which is a dread of some ensuing labour: +shame and terror, which affect the body; hence blushing attends shame; a +paleness, and tremor, and chattering of the teeth, attend terror: +cowardice, which is an apprehension of some approaching evil: dread, a +fear that unhinges the mind; whence comes that line of Ennius,-- + + + Then dread discharged all wisdom from my mind: + + +fainting is the associate and constant attendant on dread: confusion, a +fear that drives away all thought: alarm, a continued fear. + +IX. The different species into which they divide pleasure come under this +description; so that malevolence is a pleasure in the misfortunes of +another, without any advantage to yourself: delight, a pleasure that +soothes the mind by agreeable impressions on the ear. What is said of the +ear, may be applied to the sight, to the touch, smell, and taste. All +feelings of this kind are a sort of melting pleasure that dissolves the +mind. Boastfulness is a pleasure that consists in making an appearance, +and setting off yourself with insolence.--The subordinate species of lust +they define in this manner. Anger is a lust of punishing any one who, as +we imagine, has injured us without cause. Heat is anger just forming and +beginning to exist, which the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. Hatred is a settled +anger. Enmity is anger waiting for an opportunity of revenge. Discord is a +sharper anger conceived deeply in the mind and heart. Want, an insatiable +lust. Regret is when one eagerly wishes to see a person who is absent. Now +here they have a distinction; so that with them regret is a lust conceived +on hearing of certain things reported of some one, or of many, which the +Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, or predicaments; as that they are in possession +of riches and honours: but want is a lust for those very honours and +riches.--But these definers make intemperance the fountain of all these +perturbations; which is an absolute revolt from the mind and right reason: +a state so averse to all rules of reason, that the appetites of the mind +can by no means be governed and restrained. As, therefore, temperance +appeases these desires, making them obey right reason, and maintains the +well-weighed judgments of the mind; so intemperance, which is in +opposition to this, inflames, confounds, and puts every state of the mind +into a violent motion. Thus, grief and fear, and every other perturbation +of the mind, have their rise from intemperance. + +X. Just as distempers and sickness are bred in the body from the +corruption of the blood, and the too great abundance of phlegm and bile; +so the mind is deprived of its health, and disordered with sickness, from +a confusion of depraved opinions, that are in opposition to one another. +From these perturbations arise, first, diseases, which they call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}; +and also those feelings which are in opposition to these diseases, and +which admit certain faulty distastes or loathings; then come sicknesses, +which are called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} by the Stoics; and these two have their +opposite aversions. Here the Stoics, especially Chrysippus, give +themselves unnecessary trouble to show the analogy which the diseases of +the mind have to those of the body: but, overlooking all that they say as +of little consequence, I shall treat only of the thing itself. Let us then +understand perturbation to imply a restlessness from the variety and +confusion of contradictory opinions; and that when this heat and +disturbance of the mind is of any standing, and has taken up its +residence, as it were, in the veins and marrow, then commence diseases and +sickness, and those aversions which are in opposition to these diseases +and sicknesses. + +XI. What I say here may be distinguished in thought, though they are in +fact the same; inasmuch as they both have their rise from lust and joy. +For should money be the object of our desire, and should we not instantly +apply to reason, as if it were a kind of Socratic medicine to heal this +desire, the evil glides into our veins, and cleaves to our bowels, and +from thence proceeds a distemper or sickness, which, when it is of any +continuance, is incurable, and the name of this disease is covetousness. +It is the same with other diseases; as the desire of glory, a passion for +women, to which the Greeks give the name of {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}; and thus all other +diseases and sicknesses are generated. But those feelings, which are the +contrary of these, are supposed to have fear for their foundation, as a +hatred of women, such as is displayed in the Woman-hater of Atilius: or +the hatred of the whole human species, as Timon is reported to have done, +whom they called the Misanthrope. Of the same kind is inhospitality; and +all these diseases proceed from a certain dread of such things as they +hate and avoid. But they define sickness of mind to be an overweening +opinion, and that fixed and deeply implanted in the heart, of something as +very desirable, which is by no means so. What proceeds from aversion, they +define thus: a vehement idea of something to be avoided, deeply implanted, +and inherent in our minds, when there is no reason for avoiding it; and +this kind of opinion is a deliberate belief that one understands things of +which one is wholly ignorant. Now, sickness of the mind has all these +subordinate divisions, avarice, ambition, fondness for women, obstinacy, +gluttony, drunkenness, covetousness, and other similar vices. But avarice +is a violent opinion about money, as if it were vehemently to be desired +and sought after, which opinion is deeply implanted and inherent in our +minds; and the definition of all the other similar feelings resembles +these. But the definitions of aversions are of this sort; inhospitality is +a vehement opinion, deeply implanted and inherent in your mind, that you +should avoid a stranger. Thus too the hatred of women, like that felt by +Hippolytus, is defined, and the hatred of the human species like that +displayed by Timon. + +XII. But to come to the analogy of the state of body and mind, which I +shall sometimes make use of, though more sparingly than the Stoics: some +men are more inclined to particular disorders than others. And, therefore, +we say, that some people are rheumatic, others dropsical, not because they +are so at present, but because they are often so: some are inclined to +fear, others to some other perturbation. Thus in some there is a continual +anxiety, owing to which they are anxious; in some a hastiness of temper, +which differs from anger, as anxiety differs from anguish: for all are not +anxious who are sometimes vexed; nor are they who are anxious always +uneasy in that manner: as there is a difference betwixt being drunk, and +drunkenness; and it is one thing to be a lover, another to be given to +women. And this disposition of particular people to particular disorders +is very common: for it relates to all perturbations; it appears in many +vices, though it has no name: some are therefore said to be envious, +malevolent, spiteful, fearful, pitiful, from a propensity to those +perturbations, not from their being always carried away by them. Now this +propensity to these particular disorders may be called a sickness, from +analogy with the body; meaning, that is to say, nothing more than a +propensity towards sickness. But with regard to whatever is good, as some +are more inclined to different good qualities than others, we may call +this a facility or tendency: this tendency to evil is a proclivity or +inclination to falling: but where anything is neither good nor bad, it may +have the former name. + +XIII. Even as there may be, with respect to the body, a disease, a +sickness, and a defect; so it is with the mind. They call that a disease +where the whole body is corrupted: they call that sickness, where a +disease is attended with a weakness: and that a defect, where the parts of +the body are not well compacted together; from whence it follows, that the +members are mis-shapen, crooked, and deformed. So that these two, a +disease and sickness, proceed from a violent concussion and perturbation +of the health of the whole body; but a defect discovers itself, even when +the body is in perfect health. But a disease of the mind is +distinguishable only in thought from a sickness. But a viciousness is a +habit or affection discordant and inconsistent with itself through life. +Thus it happens, that in the one case a disease and sickness may arise +from a corruption of opinions; in the other case the consequence may be +inconstancy and inconsistency. For every vice of the mind does not imply a +disunion of parts; as is the case with those who are not far from being +wise men: with them there is that affection which is inconsistent with +itself whilst it is foolish, but it is not distorted, nor depraved. But +diseases and sicknesses are parts of viciousness: but it is a question +whether perturbations are parts of the same: for vices are permanent +affections: perturbations are such as are restless; so that they cannot be +parts of permanent ones. As there is some analogy between the nature of +the body and mind in evil, so is there in good: for the distinctions of +the body are beauty, strength, health, firmness, quickness of motion; the +same may be said of the mind. The body is said to be in a good state, when +all those things on which health depends are consistent: the same may be +said of the mind, when its judgments and opinions are not at variance with +one another. And this union is the virtue of the mind: which, according to +some people, is temperance itself; others make it consist in an obedience +to the precepts of temperance, and a compliance with them, not allowing it +to be any distinct species of itself: but be it one or the other, it is to +be found only in a wise man. But there is a certain soundness of mind, +which even a fool may have, when the perturbation of his mind is removed +by the care and management of his physicians. And, as what is called +beauty arises from an exact proportion of the limbs, together with a +certain sweetness of complexion, so the beauty of the mind consists in an +equality and constancy of opinions and judgments, joined to a certain +firmness and stability, pursuing virtue, or containing within itself the +very essence of virtue. Besides, we give the very same names to the +faculties of the mind, as we do to the powers of the body, the nerves, and +other powers of action. Thus the velocity of the body is called swiftness: +a praise which we ascribe to the mind, from its running over in its +thoughts so many things in so short a time. + +XIV. Herein indeed the mind and body are unlike: that though the mind when +in perfect health may be visited by sickness, as the body may, yet the +body may be disordered without our fault, the mind cannot. For all the +disorders and perturbations of the mind proceed from a neglect of reason; +these disorders, therefore, are confined to men; the beasts are not +subject to such perturbations, though they act sometimes as if they had +reason. There is a difference, too, betwixt ingenious and dull men; the +ingenious, like the Corinthian brass, which is long before it receives +rust, are longer before they fall into these perturbations, and are +recovered sooner: the case is different with the dull. Nor does the mind +of an ingenious man fall into every kind of perturbation, for it never +yields to any that are brutish and savage: and some of their perturbations +have at first even the appearance of humanity, as mercy, grief, and fear. +But the sicknesses and diseases of the mind are thought to be harder to +eradicate, than those leading vices which are in opposition to virtues: +for vices may be removed, though the diseases of the mind should continue, +which diseases are not cured with that expedition with which vices are +removed. I have now acquainted you with the arguments which the Stoics put +forth with such exactness: which they call logic, from their close +arguing; and since my discourse has got clear of these rocks, I will +proceed with the remainder of it, provided I have been sufficiently clear +in what I have already said, considering the obscurity of the subject I +have treated. + +_A._ Clear enough; but should there be occasion for a more exact inquiry, +I shall take another opportunity of asking you: I expect you now to hoist +your sails as you just now called them, and proceed on your course. + +XV. _M._ Since I have spoken before of virtue in other places, and shall +often have occasion to speak again (for a great many questions that relate +to life and manners arise from the spring of virtue); and since, as I say, +virtue consists in a settled and uniform affection of mind, making those +persons praiseworthy who are possessed of her; she herself also, +independent of anything else, without regard to any advantage, must be +praiseworthy; for from her proceed good inclinations, opinions, actions, +and the whole of right reason; though virtue may be defined in few words +to be right reason itself. The opposite to this is viciousness (for so I +choose to translate what the Greeks call {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, rather than by +perverseness; for perverseness is the name of a particular vice; but +viciousness includes all), from whence arise those perturbations, which, +as I just now said, are turbid and violent motions of the mind, repugnant +to reason, and enemies in a high degree to the peace of the mind, and a +tranquil life: for they introduce piercing and anxious cares, and afflict +and debilitate the mind through fear; they violently inflame our hearts +with exaggerated appetite; which is in reality an impotence of mind, +utterly irreconcilable with temperance and moderation, which we sometimes +call desire, and sometimes lust; and which, should it even attain the +object of its wishes, immediately becomes so elated, that it loses all its +resolution, and knows not what to pursue; so that he was in the right who +said, "that exaggerated pleasure was the very greatest of mistakes." +Virtue then alone can effect the cure of these evils. + +XVI. For what is not only more miserable, but more base and sordid, than a +man afflicted, weakened, and oppressed with grief? And little short of +this misery is one who dreads some approaching evil, and who, through +faintheartedness, is under continual suspense. The poets, to express the +greatness of this evil, imagine a stone to hang over the head of Tantalus, +as a punishment for his wickedness, his pride, and his boasting. And this +is the common punishment of folly; for there hangs over the head of every +one whose mind revolts from reason some similar fear. And as these +perturbations of the mind, grief and fear, are of a most wasting nature; +so those two others, though of a more merry cast, (I mean lust, which is +always coveting something with eagerness, and empty mirth, which is an +exulting joy,) differ very little from madness. Hence you may understand +what sort of person he is whom we call at one time moderate, at another +modest or temperate, at another constant and virtuous; while sometimes we +include all these names in the word frugality, as the crown of all. For if +that word did not include all virtues, it would never have been proverbial +to say, that a frugal man does everything rightly; but when the Stoics +apply this saying to their wise man, they seem to exalt him too much, and +to speak of him with too much admiration. + +XVII. Whoever, then, through moderation and constancy, is at rest in his +mind, and in calm possession of himself, so as neither to pine with care, +nor be dejected with fear, nor to be inflamed with desire, coveting +something greedily, nor relaxed by extravagant mirth,--such a man is that +identical wise man whom we are inquiring for, he is the happy man: to whom +nothing in this life seems intolerable enough to depress him; nothing +exquisite enough to transport him unduly. For what is there in this life +that can appear great to him, who has acquainted himself with eternity, +and the utmost extent of the universe? For what is there in human +knowledge, or the short span of this life, that can appear great to a wise +man? whose mind is always so upon its guard, that nothing can befal him +which is unforeseen, nothing which is unexpected, nothing, in short, which +is new. Such a man takes so exact a survey on all sides of him, that he +always knows the proper place and spot to live in free from all the +troubles and annoyances of life, and encounters every accident that +fortune can bring upon him with a becoming calmness. Whoever conducts +himself in this manner, will be free from grief, and from every other +perturbation: and a mind free from these feelings renders men completely +happy: whereas a mind disordered and drawn off from right and unerring +reason, loses at once, not only its resolution, but its health.--Therefore +the thoughts and declarations of the Peripatetics are soft and effeminate, +for they say that the mind must necessarily be agitated, but at the same +time they lay down certain bounds beyond which that agitation is not to +proceed. And do you set bounds to vice? or is it novice to disobey reason? +does not reason sufficiently declare, that there is no real good which you +should desire too ardently, or the possession of which you should allow to +transport you: and that there is no evil that should be able to overwhelm +you, or the suspicion of which should distract you? and that all these +things assume too melancholy or too cheerful an appearance through our own +error? But if fools find this error lessened by time, so that, though the +cause remains the same, they are not affected in the same manner, after +some time, as they were at first; why surely a wise man ought not to be +influenced at all by it. But what are those degrees by which we are to +limit it? Let us fix these degrees in grief, a difficult subject, and one +much canvassed.--Fannius writes that P. Rutilius took it much to heart, +that his brother was refused the consulship: but he seems to have been too +much affected by this disappointment; for it was the occasion of his +death: he ought, therefore, to have borne it with more moderation. But let +us suppose, that whilst he was bearing this with moderation, the death of +his children had intervened; here would have started a fresh grief, which, +admitting it to be moderate in itself, yet still must have been a great +addition to the other. Now to these let us add some acute pains of body, +the loss of his fortune, blindness, banishment; supposing, then, each +separate misfortune to occasion a separate additional grief, the whole +would be too great to be supportable. + +XVIII. The man who attempts to set bounds to vice, acts like one who +should throw himself headlong from Leucate, persuaded that he could stop +himself whenever he pleased. Now, as that is impossible, so a perturbed +and disordered mind cannot restrain itself, and stop where it pleases. +Certainly whatever is bad in its increase, is bad in its birth: now grief, +and all other perturbations, are doubtless baneful in their progress, and +have therefore no small share of evil at the beginning; for they go on of +themselves when once they depart from reason, for every weakness is +self-indulgent, and indiscreetly launches out, and does not know where to +stop. So that it makes no difference whether you approve of moderate +perturbations of mind, or of moderate injustice, moderate cowardice, and +moderate intemperance. For whoever prescribes bounds to vice, admits a +part of it, which, as it is odious of itself, becomes the more so as it +stands on slippery ground, and being once set forward, glides on headlong, +and cannot by any means be stopped. + +XIX. Why should I say more? Why should I add that the Peripatetics say +that these perturbations, which we insist upon it should be extirpated, +are not only natural, but were given to men by nature for a good purpose? +They usually talk in this manner. In the first place, they say much in +praise of anger; they call it the whetstone of courage, and they say that +angry men exert themselves most against an enemy or against a bad citizen: +that those reasons are of little weight which are the motives of men who +think thus, as,--It is a just war, it becomes us to fight for our laws, our +liberties, our country; they will allow no force to these arguments unless +our courage is warmed by anger.--Nor do they confine their argument to +warriors: but their opinion is, that no one can issue any rigid commands +without some bitterness and anger. In short, they have no notion of an +orator either accusing or even defending a client, without he is spurred +on by anger. And though this anger should not be real, still they think +his words and gestures ought to wear the appearance of it, so that the +action of the orator may excite the anger of his hearer. And they deny +that any man has ever been seen, who does not know what it is to be angry: +and they name what we call lenity, by the bad appellation of indolence: +nor do they commend only this lust, (for anger is, as I defined it above, +the lust of revenge,) but they maintain that kind of lust or desire to be +given us by nature for very good purposes: saying that no one can execute +anything well but what he is in earnest about. Themistocles used to walk +in the public places in the night, because he could not sleep: and when +asked the reason, his answer was, that Miltiades' trophies kept him awake. +Who has not heard how Demosthenes used to watch; who said that it gave him +pain, if any mechanic was up in a morning at his work before him? Lastly, +they urge that some of the greatest philosophers would never have made +that progress in their studies, without some ardent desire spurring them +on.--We are informed that Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato, visited the +remotest parts of the world; for they thought that they ought to go +whereever anything was to be learned. Now it is not conceivable that these +things could be effected by anything but by the greatest ardour of mind. + +XX. They say that even grief, which we have already said ought to be +avoided as a monstrous and fierce beast, was appointed by nature, not +without some good purpose: in order that men should lament when they had +committed a fault, well knowing they had exposed themselves to correction, +rebuke, and ignominy. For they think that those who can bear ignominy and +infamy without pain, have acquired a complete impunity for all sorts of +crimes: for with them, reproach is a stronger check than conscience. From +whence we have that scene in Afranius, borrowed from common life; for when +the abandoned son saith, Wretched that I am! the severe father replies, + + + Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause. + + +And they say the other divisions of sorrow have their use; that pity +incites us to hasten to the assistance of others, and to alleviate the +calamities of men who have undeservedly fallen into them: that even envy +and detraction are not without their use; as when a man sees that another +person has attained what he cannot, or observes another to be equally +successful with himself: that he who should take away fear, would take +away all industry in life; which those men exert in the greatest degree +who are afraid of the laws and of the magistrates, who dread poverty, +ignominy, death, and pain. But while they argue thus, they allow indeed of +these feelings being retrenched, though they deny that they either can, or +should be plucked up by the roots: so that their opinion is that +mediocrity is best in everything. When they reason in this manner, what +think you? is what they say worth attending to or not? + +_A._ I think it is; I wait, therefore, to hear what you will say in reply +to them. + +XXI. _M._ Perhaps I may find something to say,--but I will make this +observation first: do you take notice with what modesty the Academics +behave themselves? for they speak plainly to the purpose. The Peripatetics +are answered by the Stoics; they have my leave to fight it out; who think +myself no otherwise concerned than to inquire for what may seem to be most +probable. Our present business is, then, to see if we can meet with +anything in this question which is the probable, for beyond such +approximation to truth as that human nature cannot proceed. The definition +of a perturbation, as Zeno, I think, has rightly determined it, is thus: +That a perturbation is a commotion of the mind against nature, in +opposition to right reason; or more briefly thus, that a perturbation is a +somewhat too vehement appetite; and when he says somewhat too vehement, he +means such as is at a greater distance from the constant course of nature. +What can I say to these definitions? the greater part of them we have from +those who dispute with sagacity and acuteness: some of them expressions, +indeed, such as the "ardours of the mind," and "the whetstones of virtue," +savouring of the pomp of rhetoricians. As to the question, if a brave man +can maintain his courage without becoming angry; it may be questioned with +regard to the gladiators: though we often observe much resolution even in +them; they meet, converse, they make objections and demands, they agree +about terms, so that they seem calm rather than angry. But let us admit a +man of the name of Placideianus, who was one of that trade, to be in such +a mind, as Lucilius relates of him, + + + If for his blood you thirst, the task be mine; + His laurels at my feet he shall resign; + Not but I know, before I reach his heart, + First on myself a wound he will impart. + I hate the man; enraged I fight, and straight + In action we had been, but that I wait + Till each his sword had fitted to his hand, + My rage I scarce can keep within command. + + +XXII. But we see Ajax in Homer advancing to meet Hector in battle +cheerfully, without any of this boisterous wrath. For he had no sooner +taken up his arms, than the first step which he made inspired his +associates with joy, his enemies with fear: so that even Hector, as he is +represented by Homer,(98) trembling condemned himself for having +challenged him to fight. Yet these heroes conversed together, calmly and +quietly, before they engaged; nor did they show any anger or outrageous +behaviour during the combat. Nor do I imagine that Torquatus, the first +who obtained this surname, was in a rage when he plundered the Gaul of his +collar: or that Marcellus' courage at Clastidium was only owing to his +anger. I could almost swear, that Africanus, with whom we are better +acquainted, from our recollection of him being more recent, was no ways +inflamed by anger, when he covered Alienus Pelignus with his shield, and +drove his sword into the enemy's breast. There may be some doubt of L. +Brutus, whether he was not influenced by extraordinary hatred of the +tyrant, so as to attack Aruns with more than usual rashness; for I observe +that they mutually killed each other in close fight. Why, then, do you +call in the assistance of anger? would courage, unless it began to get +furious, lose its energy? What? do you imagine that Hercules, whom the +very courage which you would try to represent as anger raised to heaven, +was angry when he engaged the Erymanthian boar, or the Nemean lion? or was +Theseus in a passion when he seized on the horns of the Marathonian bull? +Take care how you make courage to depend in the least on rage. For anger +is altogether irrational, and that is not courage which is void of reason. + +XXIII. We ought to hold all things here in contempt; death is to be looked +on with indifference; pains and labours must be considered as easily +supportable. And when these sentiments are established on judgment and +conviction, then will that stout and firm courage take place: unless you +attribute to anger whatever is done with vehemence, alacrity, and spirit. +To me, indeed, that very Scipio(99) who was chief priest, that favourer of +the saying of the Stoics, "that no private man could be a wise man," does +not seem to be angry with Tiberius Gracchus, even when he left the consul +in a hesitating frame of mind, and, though a private man himself, +commanded, with the authority of a consul, that all who meant well to the +republic should follow him. I do not know whether I have done anything in +the republic that has the appearance of courage; but if I have, I +certainly did not do it in wrath. Doth anything come nearer madness than +anger? And indeed Ennius has well defined it as the beginning of madness. +The changing colour, the alteration of our voice, the look of our eyes, +our manner of fetching our breath, the little command we have over our +words and actions, how little do all these things indicate a sound mind! +What can make a worse appearance than Homer's Achilles, or Agamemnon, +during the quarrel. And as to Ajax, anger drove him into downright +madness, and was the occasion of his death. Courage, therefore, does not +want the assistance of anger; it is sufficiently provided, armed, and +prepared of itself. We may as well say that drunkenness, or madness, are +of service to courage, because those who are mad or drunk often do a great +many things with unusual vehemence. Ajax was always brave, but still he +was most brave when he was in that state of frenzy: + + + The greatest feat that Ajax e'er achieved + Was, when his single arm the Greeks relieved. + Quitting the field; urged on by rising rage, + Forced the declining troops again t'engage. + + +Shall we say, then, that madness has its use? + +XXIV. Examine the definitions of courage: you will find it does not +require the assistance of passion. Courage is, then, an affection of mind, +that endures all things, being itself in proper subjection to the highest +of all laws; or, it may be called a firm maintenance of judgment in +supporting or repelling everything that has a formidable appearance, or a +knowledge of what is formidable or otherwise, and maintaining invariably a +stable judgment of all such things, so as to bear them, or despise them; +or, in fewer words according to Chrysippus: (for the above definitions are +Sphaerus's, a man of the first ability as a layer down of definitions, as +the Stoics think: but they are all pretty much alike, they give us only +common notions, some one way, and some another.) But what is Chrysippus's +definition? Fortitude, says he, is the knowledge of all things that are +bearable: or an affection of the mind, which bears and supports everything +in obedience to the chief law of reason, without fear. Now, though we +should attack these men in the same manner as Carneades used to do, I fear +they are the only real philosophers: for which of these definitions is +there which does not explain that obscure and intricate notion of courage +which every man conceives within himself? And when it is thus explained, +what can a warrior, a commander, or an orator, want more? and no one can +think that they will be unable to behave themselves courageously without +anger. What? do not even the Stoics, who maintain that all fools are mad, +make the same inferences? for, take away perturbations, especially a +hastiness of temper, and they will appear to talk very absurdly. But what +they assert is this: they say that all fools are mad, as all dunghills +stink; not that they always do so, but stir them, and you will perceive +it. And in like manner, a warm-tempered man is not always in a passion; +but provoke him, and you will see him run mad. Now, that very warlike +anger, which is of such service in war, what is the use of it to him when +he is at home with his wife, children, and family? Is there, then, +anything that a disturbed mind can do better than one which is calm and +steady? or can any one be angry without a perturbation of mind? Our +people, then, were in the right, who, as all vices depend on our manners, +and nothing is worse than a passionate disposition, called angry men the +only morose men.(100) + +XXV. Anger is in no wise becoming in an orator, though it is not amiss to +affect it. Do you imagine that I am angry when in pleading I use any +extraordinary vehemence and sharpness? What? when I write out my speeches +after all is over and past, am I then angry while writing? or do you think +AEsopus was ever angry when he acted, or Accius was so when he wrote? Those +men, indeed, act very well, but the orator acts better than the player, +provided he be really an orator; but then they carry it on without +passion, and with a composed mind. But what wantonness is it to commend +lust? You produce Themistocles and Demosthenes; to these you add +Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato. What, do you then call studies lust? +But these studies of the most excellent and admirable things, such as +those were which you bring forward on all occasions, ought to be composed +and tranquil; and what kind of philosophers are they who commend grief, +than which nothing is more detestable? Afranius has said much to this +purpose-- + + + Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause. + + +But he spoke this of a debauched and dissolute youth; but we are inquiring +into the conduct of a constant and wise man. We may even allow a +centurion, or standard-bearer, to be angry, or any others, whom, not to +explain too far the mysteries of the rhetoricians, I shall not mention +here; for to touch the passions, where reason cannot be come at, may have +its use; but my inquiry, as I often repeat, is about a wise man. + +XXVI. But even envy, detraction, pity, have their use. Why should you pity +rather than assist, if it is in your power to do so? Is it because you +cannot be liberal without pity? We should not take sorrows on ourselves +upon another's account; but we ought to relieve others of their grief if +we can. But to detract from another's reputation, or to rival him with +that vicious emulation, which resembles an enmity, of what use can that +conduct be? Now envy implies being uneasy at another's good because one +does not enjoy it oneself; but detraction is the being uneasy at another's +good, merely because he enjoys it. How can it be right that you should +voluntarily grieve, rather than take the trouble of acquiring what you +want to have; for it is madness in the highest degree to desire to be the +only one that has any particular happiness. But who can with correctness +speak in praise of a mediocrity of evils? Can any one in whom there is +lust or desire, be otherwise than libidinous or desirous? or can a man who +is occupied by anger avoid being angry? or can one who is exposed to any +vexation escape being vexed? or if he is under the influence of fear, must +he not be fearful? Do we look, then, on the libidinous, the angry, the +anxious, and the timid man, as persons of wisdom, of excellence? of which +I could speak very copiously and diffusely, but I wish to be as concise as +possible. And so I will merely say that wisdom is an acquaintance with all +divine and human affairs, and a knowledge of the cause of everything. +Hence it is, that it imitates what is divine, and looks upon all human +concerns as inferior to virtue. Did you, then, say that it was your +opinion that such a man was as naturally liable to perturbation as the sea +is exposed to winds? What is there that can discompose such gravity and +constancy? Anything sudden or unforeseen? How can anything of this kind +befal one, to whom nothing is sudden and unforeseen that can happen to +man? Now, as to their saying that redundancies should be pared off, and +only what is natural remain; what, I pray you, can be natural, which may +be too exuberant? + +XXVII. All these assertions proceed from the roots of errors, which must +be entirely plucked up and destroyed, not pared and amputated. But as I +suspect that your inquiry is not so much respecting the wise man as +concerning yourself, (for you allow that he is free from all +perturbations, and you would willingly be so too yourself,) let us see +what remedies there are which may be applied by philosophy to the diseases +of the mind. There is certainly some remedy; nor has nature been so unkind +to the human race, as to have discovered so many things salutary to the +body, and none which are medicinal to the mind. She has even been kinder +to the mind than to the body; inasmuch as you must seek abroad for the +assistance which the body requires; while the mind has all that it +requires within itself. But in proportion as the excellency of the mind is +of a higher and more divine nature, the more diligence does it require; +and therefore reason, when it is well applied, discovers what is best, but +when it is neglected it becomes involved in many errors. I shall apply, +then, all my discourse to you; for though you pretend to be inquiring +about the wise man, your inquiry may possibly be about yourself. Various, +then, are the cures of those perturbations which I have expounded, for +every disorder is not to be appeased the same way;--one medicine must be +applied to the man who mourns, another to the pitiful, another to the +person who envies, for there is this difference to be maintained in all +the four perturbations; we are to consider whether our discourse had +better be directed to perturbations in general, which are a contempt of +reason, or a somewhat too vehement appetite; or whether it would be better +applied to particular descriptions, as, for instance, to fear, lust, and +the rest, and whether it appears preferable to endeavour to remove that +which has occasioned the grief, or rather to attempt wholly to eradicate +every kind of grief. As, should any one grieve that he is poor, the +question is, would you maintain poverty to be no evil, or would you +contend that a man ought not to grieve at anything? Certainly this last is +the best course; for should you not convince him with regard to poverty, +you must allow him to grieve; but if you remove grief by particular +arguments, such as I used yesterday, the evil of poverty is in some manner +removed. + +XXVIII. But any perturbation of the mind of this sort may be, as it were, +wiped away by this method of appeasing the mind, if you succeed in showing +that there is no good in that which has given rise to joy and lust, nor +any evil in that which has occasioned fear or grief. But certainly the +most effectual cure is to be achieved by showing that all perturbations +are of themselves vicious, and have nothing natural or necessary in them. +As we see grief itself is easily softened when we charge those who grieve +with weakness and an effeminate mind; or when we commend the gravity and +constancy of those who bear calmly whatever befals them here, as accidents +to which all men are liable; and, indeed, this is generally the feeling of +those who look on these as real evils, but yet think they should be borne +with resignation. One imagines pleasure to be a good, another money; and +yet the one may be called off from intemperance, the other from +covetousness. The other method and address, which, at the same time that +it removes the false opinion, withdraws the disorder, has more subtilty in +it; but it seldom succeeds, and is not applicable to vulgar minds, for +there are some diseases which that medicine can by no means remove. For, +should any one be uneasy because he is without virtue, without courage, +destitute of a sense of duty, or honesty; his anxiety proceeds from a real +evil, and yet we must apply another method of cure to him; and such a one +as all the philosophers, however they may differ about other things, agree +in. For they must necessarily agree in this, that commotions of the mind +in opposition to right reason are vicious; and that even admitting those +things to be evils, which occasion fear or grief, and those to be goods +which provoke desire or joy, yet that very commotion itself is vicious; +for we mean by the expressions magnanimous and brave, one who is resolute, +sedate, grave, and superior to everything in this life: but one who either +grieves, or fears, or covets, or is transported with passion, cannot come +under that denomination; for these things are consistent only with those +who look on the things of this world as things with which their minds are +unequal to contend. + +XXIX. Wherefore, as I before said, the philosophers have all one method of +cure, so that we need say nothing about what sort of thing that is which +disturbs the mind, but we must speak only concerning the perturbation +itself. Thus, first, with regard to desire itself, when the business is +only to remove that the inquiry is not to be, whether that thing be good +or evil which provokes lust, but the lust itself is to be removed; so that +whether whatever is honest is the chief good, or whether it consists in +pleasure, or in both these things together, or in the other three kinds of +goods, yet should there be in any one too vehement an appetite for even +virtue itself, the whole discourse should be directed to the deterring him +from that vehemence. But human nature, when placed in a conspicuous point +of view, gives us every argument for appeasing the mind, and to make this +the more distinct, the laws and conditions of life should be explained in +our discourse. Therefore, it was not without reason that Socrates is +reported, when Euripides was exhibiting his play called Orestes, to have +repeated the first three verses of that tragedy-- + + + What tragic story men can mournful tell, + Whate'er from fate or from the gods befel, + That human nature can support----(101) + + +But, in order to persuade those to whom any misfortune has happened, that +they can and ought to bear it, it is very useful to set before them an +enumeration of other persons who have borne similar calamities. Indeed, +the method of appeasing grief was explained in my dispute of yesterday, +and in my book on Consolation, which I wrote in the midst of my own grief; +for I was not myself so wise a man as to be insensible to grief, and I +used this, notwithstanding Chrysippus's advice to the contrary, who is +against applying a medicine to the agitations of the mind while they are +fresh; but I did it, and committed a violence on nature, that the +greatness of my grief might give way to the greatness of the medicine. + +XXX. But fear borders upon grief, of which I have already said enough; but +I must say a little more on that. Now, as grief proceeds from what is +present, so does fear from future evil; so that some have said that fear +is a certain part of grief: others have called fear the harbinger of +trouble, which, as it were, introduces the ensuing evil. Now, the reasons +that make what is present supportable, make what is to come very +contemptible; for, with regard to both, we should take care to do nothing +low or grovelling, soft or effeminate, mean or abject. But, +notwithstanding we should speak of the inconstancy, imbecility, and levity +of fear itself, yet it is of very great service to speak contemptuously of +those very things of which we are afraid. So that it fell out very well, +whether it was by accident or design, that I disputed the first and second +day on death and pain,--the two things that are the most dreaded: now, if +what I then said was approved of, we are in a great degree freed from +fear. And this is sufficient, as far as regards the opinion of evils. + +XXXI. Proceed we now to what are goods--that is to say, to joy and desire. +To me, indeed, one thing alone seems to embrace the question of all that +relates to the perturbations of the mind--the fact, namely, that all +perturbations are in our own power; that they are taken up upon opinion, +and are voluntary. This error, then, must be got rid of; this opinion must +be removed: and, as with regard to imagined evils, we are to make them +more supportable, so with respect to goods, we are to lessen the violent +effects of those things which are called great and joyous. But one thing +is to be observed, that equally relates both to good and evil: that, +should it be difficult to persuade any one that none of those things which +disturb the mind are to be looked on as good or evil, yet a different cure +is to be applied to different feelings; and the malevolent person is to be +corrected by one way of reasoning, the lover by another, the anxious man +by another, and the fearful by another: and it would be easy for any one +who pursues the best approved method of reasoning, with regard to good and +evil, to maintain that no fool can be affected with joy, as he never can +have anything good. But, at present, my discourse proceeds upon the common +received notions. Let, then, honours, riches, pleasures, and the rest, be +the very good things which they are imagined to be; yet a too elevated and +exulting joy on the possession of them is unbecoming; just as though it +might be allowable to laugh, to giggle would be indecent. Thus, a mind +enlarged by joy is as blameable as a contraction of it by grief; and eager +longing is a sign of as much levity in desiring as immoderate joy is in +possessing; and, as those who are too dejected are said to be effeminate, +so they who are too elated with joy are properly called volatile; and as +feeling envy is a part of grief, and the being pleased with another's +misfortune is a kind of joy both these feelings are usually corrected by +showing the wildness and insensibility of them: and as it becomes a man to +be cautious, but it is unbecoming in him to be fearful; so to be pleased +is proper, but to be joyful improper. I have, in order that I might be the +better understood, distinguished pleasure from joy. I have already said +above, that a contraction of the mind can never be right, but that an +elation of it may; for the joy of Hector in Naevius is one thing,-- + + + 'Tis joy indeed to hear my praises sung + By you, who are the theme of honour's tongue: + + +but that of the character in Trabea another:--"The kind procuress, allured +by my money, will observe my nod, will watch my desires, and study my +will. If I but move the door with my little finger, instantly it flies +open; and if Chrysis should unexpectedly discover me, she will run with +joy to meet me, and throw herself into my arms." + +Now he will tell you how excellent he thinks this:-- + + + Not even fortune herself is so fortunate. + + +XXXII. Any one who attends the least to the subject will be convinced how +unbecoming this joy is. And as they are very shameful who are immoderately +delighted with the enjoyment of venereal pleasures, so are they very +scandalous who lust vehemently after them. And all that which is commonly +called love (and, believe me, I can find out no other name to call it by) +is of such a trivial nature that nothing, I think, is to be compared to +it: of which Caecilius says-- + + + I hold the man of every sense bereaved, + Who grants not Love to be of Gods the chief: + Whose mighty power whate'er is good effects, + Who gives to each his beauty and defects: + Hence, health and sickness; wit and folly, hence, + The God that love and hatred doth dispense! + + +An excellent corrector of life this same poetry, which thinks that love, +the promoter of debauchery and vanity, should have a place in the council +of the Gods! I am speaking of comedy, which could not subsist at all +without our approving of these debaucheries. But what said that chief of +the Argonauts in tragedy?-- + + + My life I owe to honour less than love + + +What, then, are we to say of this love of Medea?--what a train of miseries +did it occasion! and yet the same woman has the assurance to say to her +father, in another poet, that she had a husband-- + + + Dearer by love than ever fathers were. + + +XXXIII. However, we may allow the poets to trifle, in whose fables we see +Jupiter himself engaged in these debaucheries: but let us apply to the +masters of virtue,--the philosophers who deny love to be anything carnal; +and in this they differ from Epicurus, who, I think, is not much mistaken. +For what is that lore of friendship? How comes it that no one is in love +with a deformed young man, or a handsome old one? I am of opinion that +this love of men had its rise from the Gymnastics of the Greeks, where +these kinds of loves are admissible and permitted; therefore Ennius spoke +well:-- + + + The censure of this crime to those is due, + Who naked bodies first exposed to view. + + +Now, supposing them chaste, which I think is hardly possible, they are +uneasy and distressed, and the more so because they contain and refrain +themselves. But, to pass over the love of women, where nature has allowed +more liberty, who can misunderstand the poets in their rape of Ganymede, +or not apprehend what Laius says, and what he desires, in Euripides? +Lastly, what have the principal poets and the most learned men published +of themselves in their poems and songs? What doth Alcaeus, who was +distinguished in his own republic for his bravery, write on the love of +young men? and as for Anacreon's poetry, it is wholly on love. But Ibycus +of Rhegium appears, from his writings, to have had this love stronger on +him than all the rest. + +XXXIV. Now we see that the loves of all these writers were entirely +libidinous. There have arisen also some amongst us philosophers (and Plato +is at the head of them, whom Dicaearchus blames not without reason), who +have countenanced love. The Stoics in truth say, not only that their wise +man may be a lover, but they even define love itself as an endeavour to +originate friendship out of the appearance of beauty. Now, provided there +is any one in the nature of things without desire, without care, without a +sigh,--such a one may be a lover; for he is free from all lust: but I have +nothing to say to him, as it is lust of which I am now speaking. But +should there be any love,--as there certainly is,--which, is but little, or +perhaps not at all, short of madness, such as his is in the Leucadia,-- + + + Should there be any God whose care I am: + + +it is incumbent on all the Gods to see that he enjoys his amorous +pleasure. + + + Wretch that I am! + + +Nothing is more true, and he says very appropriately-- + + + What, are you sane, who at this rate lament? + + +He seems even to his friends to be out of his senses: then how tragical he +becomes! + + + Thy aid, divine Apollo, I implore, + And thine, dread ruler of the wat'ry store! + Oh! all ye winds, assist me! + + +He thinks that the whole world ought to apply itself to help his love: he +excludes Venus alone as unkind to him. + + + Thy aid, O Venus, why should I invoke? + + +He thinks Venus too much employed in her own lust, to have regard to +anything else, as if he himself had not said and committed these shameful +things from lust. + +XXXV. Now the cure for one who is affected in this manner, is to show, how +light, how contemptible, how very trifling he is in what he desires; how +he may turn his affections to another object, or accomplish his desires by +some other means; or else to persuade him that he may entirely disregard +it; sometimes he is to be led away to objects of another kind, to study, +business, or other different engagements and concerns: very often the cure +is effected by change of place, as sick people, that have not recovered +their strength, are benefited by change of air. Some people think an old +love may be driven out by a new one, as one nail drives out another: but +above all things the man thus afflicted should be advised what madness +love is: for of all the perturbations of the mind, there is not one which +is more vehement; for, (without charging it with rapes, debaucheries, +adultery, or even incest, the baseness of any of these being very +blameable; not, I say, to mention these,) the very perturbation of the +mind in love is base of itself, for, to pass over all its acts of +downright madness, what weakness do not those very things which are looked +upon as indifferent argue? + + + Affronts and jealousies, jars, squabbles, wars, + Then peace again.--The man who seeks to fix + These restless feelings, and to subjugate + Them to some regular law, is just as wise + As one who'd try to lay down rules by which + Men should go mad.(102) + + +Now is not this inconstancy and mutability of mind enough to deter any one +by its own deformity? We are to demonstrate, as was said of every +perturbation, that there are no such feelings which do not consist +entirely of opinion and judgment, and are not owing to ourselves. For if +love were natural, all would be in love, and always so, and all love the +same object; nor would one be deterred by shame, another by reflection, +another by satiety. + +XXXVI. Anger, too, when it disturbs the mind any time, leaves no room to +doubt its being madness: by the instigation of which, we see such +contention as this between brothers: + + + Where was there ever impudence like thine? + Who on thy malice ever could refine?(103) + + +You know what follows: for abuses are thrown out by these brothers, with +great bitterness, in every other verse: so that you may easily know them +for the sons of Atreus, of that Atreus who invented a new punishment for +his brother: + + + I who his cruel heart to gall am bent, + Some new, unheard-of torment must invent. + + +Now what were these inventions? Hear Thyestes. + + + My impious brother fain would have me eat + My children, and thus serves them up for meat. + + +To what length now will not anger go? even as far as madness. Therefore we +say properly enough, that angry men have given up their power, that is, +they are out of the power of advice, reason, and understanding: for these +ought to have power over the whole mind. Now you should put those out of +the way, whom they endeavour to attack, till they have recollected +themselves; but what does recollection here imply, but getting together +again the dispersed parts of their mind into their proper place? or else +you must beg and entreat them, if they have the means of revenge, to defer +it to another opportunity, till their anger cools. But the expression of +cooling implies, certainly, that there was a heat raised in their minds in +opposition to reason: from which consideration that saying of Archytas is +commended: who being somewhat provoked at his steward, "How would I have +treated you," said he, "if I had not been in a passion?" + +XXXVII. Where, then, are they who say that anger has its use? Can madness +be of any use? But still it is natural. Can anything be natural that is +against reason? or how is it, if anger is natural, that one person is more +inclined to anger than another? or that the lust of revenge should cease +before it has revenged itself? or that any one should repent of what he +had done in a passion? as we see that Alexander the king did, who could +scarcely keep his hands from himself, when he had killed his favourite +Clytus: so great was his compunction! Now who, that is acquainted with +these instances, can doubt that this motion of the mind is altogether in +opinion and voluntary? for who can doubt that disorders of the mind, such +as covetousness, and a desire of glory, arise from a great estimation of +those things, by which the mind is disordered? from whence we may +understand, that every perturbation of the mind is founded in opinion. + +And if boldness, that is to say, a firm assurance of mind, is a kind of +knowledge and serious opinion, not hastily taken up: then diffidence is a +fear of an expected and impending evil: and if hope is an expectation of +good, fear must of course be an expectation of evil. Thus fear and other +perturbations are evils. Therefore as constancy proceeds from knowledge, +so does perturbation from error. Now they who are said to be naturally +inclined to anger, or to pity, or to envy, or to any feeling of this kind; +their minds are constitutionally, as it were, in bad health, yet they are +curable, as the disposition of Socrates is said to have been; for when +Zopyrus, who professed to know the character of every one from his person, +had heaped a great many vices on him in a public assembly, he was laughed +at by others, who could perceive no such vices in Socrates; but Socrates +kept him in countenance, by declaring that such vices were natural to him, +but that he had got the better of them by his reason. Therefore, as any +one who has the appearance of the best constitution, may yet appear to be +naturally rather inclined to some particular disorder, so different minds +may be more particularly inclined to different diseases. But as to those +men who are said to be vicious, not by nature, but their own fault; their +vices proceed from wrong opinions of good and bad things, so that one is +more prone than another to different motions and perturbations. But, just +as it is in the case of the body, an inveterate disease is harder to be +got rid of than a sudden disorder; and it is more easy to cure a fresh +tumour in the eyes, than to remove a defluxion of any continuance. + +XXXVIII. But as the cause of perturbations is now discovered, for all of +them arise from the judgment or opinion, or volition, I shall put an end +to this discourse. But we ought to be assured, since the boundaries of +good and evil are now discovered, as far as they are discoverable by man, +that nothing can be desired of philosophy greater, or more useful, than +the discussions which we have held these four days. For besides instilling +a contempt of death, and relieving pain so as to enable men to bear it; we +have added the appeasing of grief, than which there is no greater evil to +man. For though every perturbation of mind is grievous, and differs but +little from madness: yet we are used to say of others, when they are under +any perturbation, as of fear, joy, or desire, that they are agitated and +disturbed; but of those who give themselves up to grief, that they are +miserable, afflicted, wretched, unhappy. So that it doth not seem to be by +accident, but with reason proposed by you, that I should discuss grief, +and the other perturbations separately; for there lies the spring and head +of all our miseries: but the cure of grief, and of other disorders, is one +and the same, in that they are all voluntary, and founded on opinion; we +take them on ourselves because it seems right so to do. Philosophy +undertakes to eradicate this error, as the root of all our evils: let us +therefore surrender ourselves to be instructed by it, and suffer ourselves +to be cured; for whilst these evils have possession of us, we not only +cannot be happy, but cannot be right in our minds. We must either deny +that reason can effect anything, while, on the other hand, nothing can be +done right without reason; or else, since philosophy depends on the +deductions of reason, we must seek from her, if we would be good or happy, +every help and assistance for living well and happily. + + + + +Book V. Whether Virtue Alone Be Sufficient For A Happy Life. + + +I. This fifth day, Brutus, shall put an end to our Tusculan Disputations: +on which day we discussed your favourite subject. For I perceive from that +book which you wrote for me, with the greatest accuracy, as well as from +your frequent conversation, that you are clearly of this opinion, that +virtue is of itself sufficient for a happy life: and though it may be +difficult to prove this, on account of the many various strokes of +fortune, yet it is a truth of such a nature, that we should endeavour to +facilitate the proof of it. For among all the topics of philosophy, there +is not one of more dignity or importance. For as the first philosophers +must have had some inducement, to neglect everything for the search of the +best state of life: surely, the inducement must have been the hope of +living happily, which impelled them to devote so much care and pains to +that study. Now, if virtue was discovered and carried to perfection by +them; and if virtue is a sufficient security for a happy life: who can +avoid thinking the work of philosophising excellently recommended by them, +and undertaken by me? But if virtue, as being subject to such various and +uncertain accidents, were but the slave of fortune, and were not of +sufficient ability to support herself; I am afraid that it would seem +desirable rather to offer up prayers than to rely on our own confidence in +virtue, as the foundation for our hope of a happy life. And, indeed, when +I reflect on those troubles, with which I have been so severely exercised +by fortune, I begin to distrust this opinion; and sometimes even to dread +the weakness and frailty of human nature, for I am afraid lest, when +nature had given us infirm bodies, and had joined to them incurable +diseases, and intolerable pains, she perhaps also gave us minds +participating in these bodily pains, and harassed also with troubles and +uneasinesses, peculiarly their own. But here I correct myself, for forming +my judgment of the power of virtue more from the weakness of others, or of +myself perhaps, than from virtue itself: for she herself (provided there +is such a thing as virtue, and your uncle Brutus has removed all doubt of +it) has everything that can befal mankind in subjection to her; and by +disregarding such things, she is far removed from being at all concerned +at human accidents; and, being free from every imperfection, she thinks +that nothing which is external to herself can concern her. But we, who +increase every approaching evil by our fear, and every present one by our +grief, choose rather to condemn the nature of things, than our own errors. + +II. But the amendment of this fault, and of all our other vices and +offences, is to be sought for in philosophy: and as my own inclination and +desire led me, from my earliest youth upwards, to seek her protection; so, +under my present misfortunes, I have had recourse to the same port from +whence I set out, after having been tossed by a violent tempest. O +Philosophy, thou guide of life! thou discoverer of virtue, and expeller of +vices! what had not only I myself, but the whole life of man been without +you? To you it is that we owe the origin of cities; you it was who called +together the dispersed race of men into social life; you united them +together, first, by placing them near one another, then by marriages, and +lastly, by the communication of speech and languages. You have been the +inventress of laws; you have been our instructress in morals and +discipline: to you we fly for refuge; from you we implore assistance; and +as I formerly submitted to you in a great degree, so now I surrender up +myself entirely to you. For one day spent well, and agreeably to your +precepts, is preferable to an eternity of error. Whose assistance, then, +can be of more service to me than yours, when you have bestowed on us +tranquillity of life, and removed the fear of death? But Philosophy is so +far from being praised as much as she has deserved by mankind, that she is +wholly neglected by most men, and actually evil spoken of by many. Can any +person speak ill of the parent of life, and dare to pollute himself thus +with parricide! and be so impiously ungrateful as to accuse her, whom he +ought to reverence, even were he less able to appreciate the advantages +which he might derive from her? But this error, I imagine, and this +darkness, has spread itself over the minds of ignorant men, from their not +being able to look so far back, and from their not imagining that those +men by whom human life was first improved, were philosophers: for though +we see philosophy to have been of long standing, yet the name must be +acknowledged to be but modern. + +III. But indeed, who can dispute the antiquity of philosophy, either in +fact or name? for it acquired this excellent name from the ancients, by +the knowledge of the origin and causes of everything, both divine and +human. Thus those seven {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, as they were considered and called by the +Greeks, have always been esteemed and called wise men by us: and thus +Lycurgus many ages before, in whose time, before the building of this +city, Homer is said to have lived, as well as Ulysses and Nestor in the +heroic ages, are all handed down to us by tradition as having really been +what they were called, wise men; nor would it have been said that Atlas +supported the heavens, or that Prometheus was bound to Caucasus, nor would +Cepheus, with his wife, his son-in-law, and his daughter, have been +enrolled among the constellations, but that their more than human +knowledge of the heavenly bodies had transferred their names into an +erroneous fable. From whence, all who occupied themselves in the +contemplation of nature, were both considered and called, wise men: and +that name of theirs continued to the age of Pythagoras, who is reported to +have gone to Phlius, as we find it stated by Heraclides Ponticus, a very +learned man, and a pupil of Plato, and to have discoursed very learnedly +and copiously on certain subjects, with Leon, prince of the Phliasii--and +when Leon, admiring his ingenuity and eloquence, asked him what art he +particularly professed; his answer was, that he was acquainted with no +art, but that he was a philosopher. Leon, surprised at the novelty of the +name, inquired what he meant by the name of philosopher, and in what +philosophers differed from other men: on which Pythagoras replied, "That +the life of man seemed to him to resemble those games, which were +celebrated with the greatest possible variety of sports, and the general +concourse of all Greece. For as in those games there were some persons +whose object was glory, and the honour of a crown, to be attained by the +performance of bodily exercises: so others were led thither by the gain of +buying and selling, and mere views of profit: but there was likewise one +class of persons, and they were by far the best, whose aim was neither +applause nor profit, but who came merely as spectators through curiosity, +to observe what was done, and to see in what manner things were carried on +there. And thus, said he, we come from another life and nature unto this +one, just as men come out of some other city, to some much frequented +mart; some being slaves to glory, others to money; and there are some few +who, taking no account of anything else, earnestly look into the nature of +things: and these men call themselves studious of wisdom, that is, +philosophers; and as there it is the most reputable occupation of all to +be a looker-on, without making any acquisition, so in life, the +contemplating things, and acquainting oneself with them, greatly exceeds +every other pursuit of life." + +IV. Nor was Pythagoras the inventor only of the name, but he enlarged also +the thing itself, and, when he came into Italy after this conversation at +Phlius, he adorned that Greece, which is called Great Greece, both +privately and publicly, with the most excellent institutions and arts; but +of his school and system, I shall, perhaps, find another opportunity to +speak. But numbers and motions, and the beginning and end of all things, +were the subjects of the ancient philosophy down to Socrates, who was a +pupil of Archelaus, who had been the disciple of Anaxagoras. These made +diligent inquiry into the magnitude of the stars, their distances, +courses, and all that relates to the heavens. But Socrates was the first +who brought down philosophy from the heavens, placed it in cities, +introduced it into families, and obliged it to examine into life and +morals, and good and evil. And his different methods of discussing +questions, together with the variety of his topics, and the greatness of +his abilities, being immortalized by the memory and writings of Plato, +gave rise to many sects of philosophers of different sentiments: of all +which I have principally adhered to that one which, in my opinion, +Socrates himself followed; and argue so as to conceal my own opinion, +while I deliver others from their errors, and so discover what has the +greatest appearance of probability in every question. And the custom +Carneades adopted with great copiousness and acuteness, and I myself have +often given in to it on many occasions elsewhere, and in this manner, too, +I disputed lately, in my Tusculan villa; indeed I have sent you a book of +the four former days' discussions; but the fifth day, when we had seated +ourselves as before, what we were to dispute on was proposed thus:-- + +V. _A._ I do not think virtue can possibly be sufficient for a happy life. + +_M._ But my friend Brutus thinks so, whose judgment, with submission, I +greatly prefer to yours. + +_A._ I make no doubt of it; but your regard for him is not the business +now; the question is now what is the real character of that quality of +which I have declared my opinion. I wish you to dispute on that. + +_M._ What! do you deny that virtue can possibly be sufficient for a happy +life? + +_A._ It is what I entirely deny. + +_M._ What! is not virtue sufficient to enable us to live as we ought, +honestly, commendably, or, in fine, to live well? + +_A._ Certainly sufficient. + +_M._ Can you, then, help calling any one miserable, who lives ill? or will +you deny that any one who you allow lives well, must inevitably live +happily? + +_A._ Why may I not? for a man may be upright in his life, honest, +praiseworthy, even in the midst of torments, and therefore live well. +Provided you understand what I mean by well; for when I say well, I mean +with constancy, and dignity, and wisdom, and courage; for a man may +display all these qualities on the rack; but yet the rack is inconsistent +with a happy life. + +_M._ What then? is your happy life left on the outside of the prison, +whilst constancy, dignity, wisdom, and the other virtues, are surrendered +up to the executioner, and bear punishment and pain without reluctance? + +_A._ You must look out for something new, if you would do any good. These +things have very little effect on me, not merely from their being common, +but principally because, like certain light wines, that will not bear +water, these arguments of the Stoics are pleasanter to taste than to +swallow. As when that assemblage of virtues is committed to the rack, it +raises so reverend a spectacle before our eyes, that happiness seems to +hasten on towards them, and not to suffer them to be deserted by her. But +when you take your attention off from this picture and these images of the +virtues, to the truth and the reality, what remains without disguise is, +the question whether any one can be happy in torment? Wherefore let us now +examine that point, and not be under any apprehensions, lest the virtues +should expostulate and complain, that they are forsaken by happiness. For +if prudence is connected with every virtue, then prudence itself discovers +this, that all good men are not therefore happy; and she recollects many +things of Marcus Atilius,(104) Quintus Caepio,(105) Marcus Aquilius;(106) +and prudence herself, if these representations are more agreeable to you +than the things themselves, restrains happiness, when it is endeavouring +to throw itself into torments, and denies that it has any connexion with +pain and torture. + +VI. _M._ I can easily bear with your behaving in this manner, though it is +not fair in you to prescribe to me, how you would have me carry on this +discussion; but I ask you if I have effected anything or nothing in the +preceding days? + +_A._ Yes, something was done, some little matter indeed. + +_M._ But if that is the case, this question is settled, and almost put an +end to. + +_A._ How so? + +_M._ Because turbulent motions and violent agitations of the mind, when it +is raised and elated by a rash impulse, getting the better of reason, +leave no room for a happy life. For who that fears either pain or death, +the one of which is always present, the other always impending, can be +otherwise than miserable? Now supposing the same person, which is often +the case, to be afraid of poverty, ignominy, infamy, or weakness, or +blindness; or lastly, slavery, which doth not only befal individual men, +but often even the most powerful nations; now can any one under the +apprehension of these evils be happy? What shall we say of him who not +only dreads these evils as impending, but actually feels and bears them at +present? Let us unite in the same person, banishment, mourning, the loss +of children; now how can any one who is broken down and rendered sick in +body and mind by such affliction be otherwise than very miserable indeed? +What reason again can there be, why a man should not rightly enough be +called miserable, whom we see inflamed and raging with lust, coveting +everything with an insatiable desire, and in proportion as he derives more +pleasure from anything, thirsting the more violently after them? And as to +a man vainly elated, exulting with an empty joy, and boasting of himself +without reason, is not he so much the more miserable in proportion as he +thinks himself happier? Therefore, as these men are miserable, so on the +other hand those are happy, who are alarmed by no fears, wasted by no +griefs, provoked by no lusts, melted by no languid pleasures that arise +from vain and exulting joys. We look on the sea as calm when not the least +breath of air disturbs its waves; and in like manner the placid and quiet +state of the mind is discovered when unmoved by any perturbation. Now if +there be any one who holds the power of fortune, and everything human, +everything that can possibly befal any man, as supportable, so as to be +out of the reach of fear or anxiety; and if such a man covets nothing, and +is lifted up by no vain joy of mind, what can prevent his being happy? and +if these are the effects of virtue, why cannot virtue itself make men +happy? + +VII. _A._ But the other of these two propositions is undeniable, that they +who are under no apprehensions, who are no ways uneasy, who covet nothing, +who are lifted up by no vain joy, are happy: and therefore I grant you +that; but as for the other, that is not now in a fit state for discussion; +for it has been proved by your former arguments that a wise man is free +from every perturbation of mind. + +_M._ Doubtless, then, the dispute is over; for the question appears to +have been entirely exhausted. + +_A._ I think indeed that that is almost the case. + +_M._ But yet, that is more usually the case with the mathematicians than +philosophers. For when the geometricians teach anything, if what they have +before taught relates to their present subject, they take that for granted +which has been already proved; and explain only what they had not written +on before. But the philosophers, whatever subject they have in hand, get +together everything that relates to it; notwithstanding they may have +dilated on it somewhere else. Were not that the case, why should the +Stoics say so much on that question, whether virtue was abundantly +sufficient to a happy life? when it would have been answer enough, that +they had before taught, that nothing was good but what was honourable; for +as this had been proved, the consequence must be, that virtue was +sufficient to a happy life: and each premise may be made to follow from +the admission of the other, so that if it be admitted that virtue is +sufficient to secure a happy life, it may also be inferred that nothing is +good except what is honourable. They however do not proceed in this +manner; for they would separate books about what is honourable, and what +is the chief good: and when they have demonstrated from the one that +virtue has power enough to make life happy, yet they treat this point +separately; for everything, and especially a subject of such great +consequence, should be supported by arguments and exhortations which +belong to that alone. For you should have a care how you imagine +philosophy to have uttered anything more noble, or that she has promised +anything more fruitful or of greater consequence: for, good Gods! doth she +not engage, that she will render him who submits to her laws so +accomplished as to be always armed against fortune, and to have every +assurance within himself of living well and happily; that he shall, in +short, be for ever happy. But let us see what she will perform? In the +meanwhile I look upon it as a great thing, that she has even made such a +promise. For Xerxes, who was loaded with all the rewards and gifts of +fortune, not satisfied with his armies of horse and foot, nor the +multitude of his ships, nor his infinite treasure of gold, offered a +reward to any one who could find out a new pleasure: and yet, when it was +discovered, he was not satisfied with it, nor can there ever be an end to +lust. I wish we could engage any one by a reward, to produce something the +better to establish us in this belief. + +VIII. _A._ I wish that indeed myself; but I want a little information. For +I allow, that in what you have stated, the one proposition is the +consequence of the other; that as, if what is honourable be the only good, +it must follow, that a happy life is the effect of virtue: so that if a +happy life consists in virtue, nothing can be good but virtue. But your +friend Brutus, on the authority of Aristo and Antiochus, does not see +this: for he thinks the case would be the same, even if there were +anything good besides virtue. + +_M._ What then? do you imagine that I am going to argue against Brutus? + +_A._ You may do what you please: for it is not for me to prescribe what +you shall do. + +_M._ How these things agree together shall be examined somewhere else: for +I frequently discussed that point with Antiochus, and lately with Aristo, +when, during the period of my command as general, I was lodging with him +at Athens. For to me it seemed that no one could possibly be happy under +any evil: but a wise man might be afflicted with evil, if there are any +things arising from body or fortune, deserving the name of evils. These +things were said, which Antiochus has inserted in his books in many +places: that virtue itself was sufficient to make life happy, but yet not +perfectly happy: and that many things derive their names from the +predominant portion of them, though they do not include everything, as +strength, health, riches, honour, and glory: which qualities are +determined by their kind, not their number: thus a happy life is so called +from its being so in a great degree, even though it should fall short in +some point. To clear this up, is not absolutely necessary at present, +though it seems to be said without any great consistency: for I cannot +imagine what is wanting to one that is happy, to make him happier, for if +anything be wanting to him he cannot be so much as happy; and as to what +they say, that everything is named and estimated from its predominant +portion, that may be admitted in some things. But when they allow three +kinds of evils; when any one is oppressed with every imaginable evil of +two kinds, being afflicted with adverse fortune, and having at the same +time his body worn out and harassed with all sorts of pains, shall we say +that such a one is but little short of a happy life, to say nothing about +the happiest possible life? + +IX. This is the point which Theophrastus was unable to maintain: for after +he had once laid down the position, that stripes, torments, tortures, the +ruin of one's country, banishment, the loss of children, had great +influence on men's living miserably and unhappily, he durst not any longer +use any high and lofty expressions, when he was so low and abject in his +opinion. How right he was is not the question; he certainly was +consistent. Therefore I am not for objecting to consequences where the +premises are admitted. But this most elegant and learned of all the +philosophers, is not taken to task very severely when he asserts his three +kinds of good; but he is attacked by every one for that book which he +wrote on a happy life, in which book he has many arguments, why one who is +tortured and racked cannot be happy. For in that book he is supposed to +say, that a man who is placed on the wheel, (that is a kind of torture in +use among the Greeks,) cannot attain to a completely happy life. He +nowhere, indeed, says so absolutely, but what he says amounts to the same +thing. Can I, then, find fault with him; after having allowed, that pains +of the body are evils, that the ruin of a man's fortunes is an evil, if he +should say that every good man is not happy, when all those things which +he reckons as evils may befal a good man? The same Theophrastus is found +fault with by all the books and schools of the philosophers, for +commending that sentence in his Callisthenes: + + + Fortune, not wisdom, rules the life of man. + + +They say, never did philosopher assert anything so languid. They are +right, indeed, in that: but I do not apprehend anything could be more +consistent: for if there are so many good things that depend on the body, +and so many foreign to it that depend on chance and fortune, is it +inconsistent to say that fortune, which governs everything, both what is +foreign and what belongs to the body, has greater power than counsel. Or +would we rather imitate Epicurus? who is often excellent in many things +which he speaks, but quite indifferent how consistent he may be, or how +much to the purpose he is speaking. He commends spare diet, and in that he +speaks as a philosopher; but it is for Socrates or Antisthenes to say so, +and not for one who confines all good to pleasure. He denies that any one +can live pleasantly unless he lives honestly, wisely, and justly. Nothing +is more dignified than this assertion, nothing more becoming a +philosopher, had he not measured this very expression of living honestly, +justly, and wisely, by pleasure. What could be better than to assert that +fortune interferes but little with a wise man? But does he talk thus, who +after he has said that pain is the greatest evil, or the only evil, might +himself be afflicted with the sharpest pains all over his body, even at +the time he is vaunting himself the most against fortune? And this very +thing, too, Metrodorus has said, but in better language: "I have +anticipated you, Fortune; I have caught you, and cut off every access, so +that you cannot possibly reach me." This would be excellent in the mouth +of Aristo the Chian, or Zeno the Stoic, who held nothing to be an evil but +what was base; but for you, Metrodorus, to anticipate the approaches of +fortune, who confine all that is good to your bowels and marrow,--for you +to say so, who define the chief good by a strong constitution of body, and +a well assured hope of its continuance,--for you to cut off every access of +fortune? Why, you may instantly be deprived of that good. Yet the simple +are taken with these propositions, and a vast crowd is led away by such +sentences to become their followers. + +X. But it is the duty of one who would argue accurately, to consider not +what is said, but what is said consistently. As in that very opinion which +we have adopted in this discussion, namely, that every good man is always +happy; it is clear what I mean by good men: I call those both wise and +good men, who are provided and adorned with every virtue. Let us see, +then, who are to be called happy. I imagine, indeed, that those men are to +be called so, who are possessed of good without any alloy of evil: nor is +there any other notion connected with the word that expresses happiness, +but an absolute enjoyment of good without any evil. Virtue cannot attain +this, if there is anything good besides itself: for a crowd of evils would +present themselves, if we were to allow poverty, obscurity, humility, +solitude, the loss of friends, acute pains of the body, the loss of +health, weakness, blindness, the ruin of one's country, banishment, +slavery, to be evils: for a wise man may be afflicted by all these evils, +numerous and important as they are, and many others also may be added; for +they are brought on by chance, which may attack a wise man: but if these +things are evils, who can maintain that a wise man is always happy, when +all these evils may light on him at the same time? I therefore do not +easily agree with my friend Brutus, nor with our common masters, nor those +ancient ones, Aristotle, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, who reckon all +that I have mentioned above as evils, and yet they say that a wise man is +always happy; nor can I allow them, because they are charmed with this +beautiful and illustrious title, which would very well become Pythagoras, +Socrates, and Plato, to persuade my mind, that strength, health, beauty, +riches, honours, power, with the beauty of which they are ravished, are +contemptible, and that all those things which are the opposites of these +are not to be regarded. Then might they declare openly, with a loud voice, +that neither the attacks of fortune, nor the opinion of the multitude, nor +pain, nor poverty, occasion them any apprehensions; and that they have +everything within themselves, and that there is nothing whatever which +they consider as good but what is within their own power. Nor can I by any +means allow the same person, who falls into the vulgar opinion of good and +evil, to make use of these expressions, which can only become a great and +exalted man. Struck with which glory, up starts Epicurus, who, with +submission to the Gods, thinks a wise man always happy. He is much charmed +with the dignity of this opinion, but he never would have owned that, had +he attended to himself: for what is there more inconsistent, than for one +who could say that pain was the greatest or the only evil, to think also +that a wise man can possibly say in the midst of his torture, How sweet is +this! We are not, therefore, to form our judgment of philosophers from +detached sentences, but from their consistency with themselves, and their +ordinary manner of talking. + +XI. _A._ You compel me to be of your opinion; but have a care that you are +not inconsistent yourself. + +_M._ In what respect? + +_A._ Because I have lately read your fourth book on Good and Evil: and in +that you appeared to me, while disputing against Cato, to be endeavouring +to show, which in my opinion means to prove, that Zeno and the +Peripatetics differ only about some new words; but if we allow that, what +reason can there be, if it follows from the arguments of Zeno, that virtue +contains all that is necessary to a happy life, that the Peripatetics +should not be at liberty to say the same? For, in my opinion, regard +should be had to the thing, not to words. + +_M._ What? you would convict me from my own words, and bring against me +what I had said or written elsewhere. You may act in that manner with +those who dispute by established rules: we live from hand to mouth, and +say anything that strikes our mind with probability, so that we are the +only people who are really at liberty. But, since I just now spoke of +consistency, I do not think the inquiry in this place is, if the opinion +of Zeno and his pupil Aristo be true, that nothing is good but what is +honourable; but, admitting that, then, whether the whole of a happy life +can be rested on virtue alone. Wherefore, if we certainly grant Brutus +this, that a wise man is always happy, how consistent he is, is his own +business: for who indeed is more worthy than himself of the glory of that +opinion? Still we may maintain that such a man is more happy than any one +else. + +XII. Though Zeno the Cittiaean, a stranger and an inconsiderable coiner of +words, appears to have insinuated himself into the old philosophy; still +the prevalence of this opinion is due to the authority of Plato, who often +makes use of this expression, "that nothing but virtue can be entitled to +the name of good," agreeably to what Socrates says in Plato's Gorgias; for +it is there related that when some one asked him if he did not think +Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, who was then looked upon as a most +fortunate person, a very happy man: "I do not know," replied he, "for I +never conversed with him." "What, is there no other way you can know it +by?" "None at all." "You cannot, then, pronounce of the great king of the +Persians, whether he is happy or not?" "How can I, when I do not know how +learned or how good a man he is?" "What! do you imagine that a happy life +depends on that?" "My opinion entirely is, that good men are happy, and +the wicked miserable." "Is Archelaus, then, miserable?" "Certainly, if +unjust." Now does it not appear to you, that he is here placing the whole +of a happy life in virtue alone? But what does the same man say in his +funeral oration? "For," saith he, "whoever has everything that relates to +a happy life so entirely dependent on himself as not to be connected with +the good or bad fortune of another, and not to be affected by, or made in +any degree uncertain by, what befals another; and whoever is such a one +has acquired the best rule of living; he is that moderate, that brave, +that wise man, who submits to the gain and loss of everything, and +especially of his children, and obeys that old precept; for he will never +be too joyful or too sad, because he depends entirely upon himself." + +XIII. From Plato, therefore, all my discourse shall be deduced, as if from +some sacred and hallowed fountain. Whence can I, then, more properly begin +than from nature, the parent of all? For whatsoever she produces (I am not +speaking only of animals, but even of those things which have sprung from +the earth in such a manner as to rest on their own roots) she designed it +to be perfect in its respective kind. So that among trees and vines, and +those lower plants and trees which cannot advance themselves high above +the earth, some are evergreen, others are stripped of their leaves in +winter, and, warmed by the spring season, put them out afresh, and there +are none of them but what are so quickened by a certain interior motion, +and their own seeds enclosed in every one, so as to yield flowers, fruit, +or berries, that all may have every perfection that belongs to it, +provided no violence prevents it. But the force of nature itself may be +more easily discovered in animals, as she has bestowed sense on them. For +some animals she has taught to swim, and designed to be inhabitants of the +water; others she has enabled to fly, and has willed that they should +enjoy the boundless air; some others she has made to creep, others to +walk. Again, of these very animals, some are solitary, some gregarious, +some wild, others tame, some hidden and buried beneath the earth, and +every one of these maintains the law of nature, confining itself to what +was bestowed on it, and unable to change its manner of life. And as every +animal has from nature something that distinguishes it, which every one +maintains and never quits; so man has something far more excellent, though +everything is said to be excellent by comparison. But the human mind, +being derived from the divine reason, can be compared with nothing but +with the Deity itself, if I may be allowed the expression. This, then, if +it is improved, and when its perception is so preserved as not to be +blinded by errors, becomes a perfect understanding, that is to say, +absolute reason, which is the very same as virtue. And if everything is +happy which wants nothing, and is complete and perfect in its kind, and +that is the peculiar lot of virtue; certainly all who are possessed of +virtue are happy. And in this I agree with Brutus, and also with +Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemon. + +XIV. To me such are the only men who appear completely happy; for what can +he want to a complete happy life who relies on his own good qualities, or +how can he be happy who does not rely on them? But he who makes a +threefold division of goods must necessarily be diffident, for how can he +depend on having a sound body, or that his fortune shall continue? but no +one can be happy without an immovable, fixed, and permanent good. What, +then, is this opinion of theirs? So that I think that saying of the +Spartan may be applied to them, who, on some merchant's boasting before +him, that he had despatched ships to every maritime coast, replied, that a +fortune which depended on ropes was not very desirable. Can there be any +doubt that whatever may be lost, cannot be properly classed in the number +of those things which complete a happy life? for of all that constitutes a +happy life, nothing will admit of withering, or growing old, or wearing +out, or decaying; for whoever is apprehensive of any loss of these things +cannot be happy; the happy man should be safe, well fenced, well +fortified, out of the reach of all annoyance, not like a man under +trifling apprehensions, but free from all such. As he is not called +innocent who but slightly offends, but he who offends not at all; so it is +he alone who is to be considered without fear who is free from all fear, +not he who is but in little fear. For what else is courage but an +affection of mind, that is ready to undergo perils, and patient in the +endurance of pain and labour without any alloy of fear? Now this certainly +could not be the case, if there were anything else good but what depended +on honesty alone. But how can any one be in possession of that desirable +and much-coveted security (for I now call a freedom from anxiety a +security, on which freedom a happy life depends) who has, or may have, a +multitude of evils attending him? How can he be brave and undaunted, and +hold everything as trifles which can befal a man, for so a wise man should +do, unless he be one who thinks that everything depends on himself? Could +the Lacedaemonians without this, when Philip threatened to prevent all +their attempts, have asked him, if he could prevent their killing +themselves? Is it not easier, then, to find one man of such a spirit as we +are inquiring after, than to meet with a whole city of such men? Now, if +to this courage I am speaking of we add temperance, that it may govern all +our feelings and agitations, what can be wanting to complete his happiness +who is secured by his courage from uneasiness and fear; and is prevented +from immoderate desires and immoderate insolence of joy, by temperance? I +could easily show that virtue is able to produce these effects, but that I +have explained on the foregoing days. + +XV. But as the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and +tranquillity renders it happy; and as these perturbations are of two +sorts, grief and fear, proceeding from imagined evils, and as immoderate +joy and lust arise from a mistake about what is good, and as all these +feelings are in opposition to reason and counsel; when you see a man at +ease, quite free and disengaged from such troublesome commotions, which +are so much at variance with one another can you hesitate to pronounce +such an one a happy man? Now the wise man is always in such a disposition, +therefore the wise man is always happy. Besides, every good is pleasant; +whatever is pleasant may he boasted and talked of; whatever may he boasted +of, is glorious, but whatever is glorious is certainly laudable, and +whatever is laudable doubtless, also, honourable; whatever, then, is good +is honourable; (but the things which they reckon as goods, they themselves +do not call honourable;) therefore what is honourable alone is good. Hence +it follows that a happy life is comprised in honesty alone. Such things, +then, are not to be called or considered goods, when a man may enjoy an +abundance of them, and yet be most miserable. Is there any doubt but that +a man who enjoys the best health, and who has strength and beauty, and his +senses flourishing in their utmost quickness and perfection; suppose him +likewise, if you please, nimble and active, nay, give him riches, honours, +authority, power, glory; now, I say, should this person, who is in +possession of all these, be unjust, intemperate, timid, stupid, or an +idiot, could you hesitate to call such an one miserable? What, then, are +those goods, in the possession of which you may be very miserable? Let us +see if a happy life is not made up of parts of the same nature, as a heap +implies a quantity of grain of the same kind. And if this be once +admitted, happiness must be compounded of different good things which +alone are honourable; if there is any mixture of things of another sort +with these, nothing honourable can proceed from such a composition; now, +take away honesty, and how can you imagine anything happy? For whatever is +good is desirable on that account; whatever is desirable must certainly be +approved of; whatever you approve of must be looked on as acceptable and +welcome. You must consequently impute dignity to this; and if so, it must +necessarily be laudable; therefore, everything that is laudable is good. +Hence it follows, that what is honourable is the only good. And should we +not look upon it in this light, there will be a great many things which we +must call good. + +XVI. I forbear to mention riches, which, as any one, let him be ever so +unworthy, may have them, I do not reckon amongst goods; for what is good +is not attainable by all. I pass over notoriety, and popular fame, raised +by the united voice of knaves and fools. Even things which are absolute +nothings may be called goods; such as white teeth, handsome eyes, a good +complexion, and what was commended by Euryclea, when she was washing +Ulysses's feet, the softness of his skin and the mildness of his +discourse. If you look on these as goods, what greater encomiums can the +gravity of a philosopher be entitled to than the wild opinion of the +vulgar and the thoughtless crowd? The Stoics give the name of excellent +and choice to what the others call good: they call them so, indeed; but +they do not allow them to complete a happy life. But these others think +that there is no life happy without them; or, admitting it to be happy, +they deny it to be the most happy. But our opinion is, that it is the most +happy; and we prove it from that conclusion of Socrates. For thus that +author of philosophy argued: that as the disposition of a man's mind is, +so is the man: such as the man is, such will be his discourse: his actions +will correspond with his discourse, and his life with his actions. But the +disposition of a good man's mind is laudable; the life, therefore, of a +good man is laudable: it is honourable, therefore, because laudable: the +unavoidable conclusion from which is, that the life of good men is happy. +For, good Gods! did I not make it appear, by my former arguments,--or was I +only amusing myself and killing time in what I then said,--that the mind of +a wise man was always free from every hasty motion which I call a +perturbation, and that the most undisturbed peace always reigned in his +breast? A man, then, who is temperate and consistent, free from fear or +grief, and uninfluenced by any immoderate joy or desire, cannot be +otherwise than happy: but a wise man is always so, therefore he is always +happy. Moreover, how can a good man avoid referring all his actions and +all his feelings to the one standard of whether or not it is laudable? But +he does refer everything to the object of living happily: it follows, +then, that a happy life is laudable; but nothing is laudable without +virtue: a happy life, then, is the consequence of virtue.--And this is the +unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from these arguments. + +XVII. A wicked life has nothing which we ought to speak of or glory in: +nor has that life which is neither happy nor miserable. But there is a +kind of life that admits of being spoken of, and gloried in, and boasted +of; as Epaminondas saith,-- + + + The wings of Sparta's pride my counsels clipt. + + +And Africanus boasts,-- + + + Who, from beyond Maeotis to the place + Where the sun rises, deeds like mine can trace? + + +If, then, there is such a thing as a happy life, it is to be gloried in, +spoken of, and commended by the person who enjoys it: for there is nothing +excepting that which can be spoken of, or gloried in; and when that is +once admitted, you know what follows. Now, unless an honourable life is a +happy life, there must of course be something preferable to a happy life: +for that which is honourable, all men will certainly grant to be +preferable to anything else. And thus there will be something better than +a happy life; but what can be more absurd than such an assertion? What! +when they grant vice to be effectual to the rendering life miserable, must +they not admit that there is a corresponding power in virtue to make life +happy? For contraries follow from contraries. And here I ask, what weight +they think there is in the balance of Critolaus, who, having put the goods +of the mind into one scale, and the goods of the body and other external +advantages into the other, thought the goods of the mind outweighed the +others so far, that they would require the whole earth and sea to equalise +the scale. + +XVIII. What hinders Critolaus, then, or that gravest of philosophers, +Xenocrates (who raises virtue so high, and who lessens and depreciates +everything else), from not only placing a happy life, but the happiest +possible life, in virtue? and, indeed, if this were not the case, virtue +would be absolutely lost. For whoever is subject to grief, must +necessarily be subject to fear too; for fear is an uneasy apprehension of +future grief: and whoever is subject to fear is liable to dread, timidity, +consternation, cowardice. Therefore, such a person may, some time or +other, be defeated, and not think himself concerned with that precept of +Atreus,-- + + + And let men so conduct themselves in life, + As to be always strangers to defeat. + + +But such a man, as I have said, will be defeated; and not only defeated, +but made a slave of. But we would have virtue always free, always +invincible; and were it not so, there would be an end of virtue. But if +virtue has in herself all that is necessary for a good life, she is +certainly sufficient for happiness: virtue is certainly sufficient, too, +for our living with courage; if with courage, then with a magnanimous +spirit, and indeed so as never to be under any fear, and thus to be always +invincible.--Hence it follows, that there can be nothing to be repented of, +no wants, no lets or hindrances. Thus all things will be prosperous, +perfect, and as you would have them; and consequently happy: but virtue is +sufficient for living with courage, and therefore virtue is able by +herself to make life happy. For as folly, even when possessed of what it +desires, never thinks it has acquired enough: so wisdom is always +satisfied with the present, and never repents on her own account. + +XIX. Look but on the single consulship of Laelius,--and that, too, after +having been set aside (though when a wise and good man, like him, is +outvoted, the people are disappointed of a good consul, rather than he +disappointed by a vain people); but the point is, would you prefer, were +it in your power, to be once such a consul as Laelius, or be elected four +times, like Cinna? I have no doubt in the world what answer you will make, +and it is on that account I put the question to you. + +I would not ask every one this question; for some one perhaps might answer +that he would not only prefer four consulates to one, but even one day of +Cinna's life to whole ages of many famous men. Laelius would have suffered +had he but touched any one with his finger; but Cinna ordered the head of +his colleague consul, Cn. Octavius, to be struck off; and put to death P. +Crassus(107) and L. Caesar,(108) those excellent men, so renowned both at +home and abroad; and even M. Antonius,(109) the greatest orator whom I +ever heard; and C. Caesar, who seems to me to have been the pattern of +humanity, politeness, sweetness of temper, and wit. Could he, then, be +happy who occasioned the death of these men? So far from it, that he seems +to be miserable, not only for having performed these actions, but also for +acting in such a manner, that it was lawful for him to do it, though it is +unlawful for any one to do wicked actions; but this proceeds from +inaccuracy of speech, for we call whatever a man is allowed to do, +lawful.--Was not Marius happier, I pray you, when he shared the glory of +the victory gained over the Cimbrians with his colleague Catulus (who was +almost another Laelius, for I look upon the two men as very like one +another,) than when, conqueror in the civil war, he in a passion answered +the friends of Catulus, who were interceding for him, "Let him die"? And +this answer he gave, not once only, but often. But in such a case, he was +happier who submitted to that barbarous decree than he who issued it. And +it is better to receive an injury than to do one; and so it was better to +advance a little to meet that death that was making its approaches, as +Catulus did, than, like Marius, to sully the glory of six consulships, and +disgrace his latter days, by the death of such a man. + +XX. Dionysius exercised his tyranny over the Syracusans thirty-eight +years, being but twenty-five years old when he seized on the government. +How beautiful and how wealthy a city did he oppress with slavery! And yet +we have it from good authority, that he was remarkably temperate in his +manner of living, that he was very active and energetic in carrying on +business, but naturally mischievous and unjust; from which description, +every one who diligently inquires into truth must inevitably see that he +was very miserable. Neither did he attain what he so greatly desired, even +when he was persuaded that he had unlimited power; for, notwithstanding he +was of a good family and reputable parents (though that is contested by +some authors), and had a very large acquaintance of intimate friends and +relations, and also some youths attached to him by ties of love after the +fashion of the Greeks, he could not trust any one of them, but committed +the guard of his person to slaves, whom he had selected from rich men's +families and made free, and to strangers and barbarians. And thus, through +an unjust desire of governing, he in a manner shut himself up in a prison. +Besides, he would not trust his throat to a barber, but had his daughters +taught to shave; so that these royal virgins were forced to descend to the +base and slavish employment of shaving the head and beard of their father. +Nor would he trust even them, when they were grown up, with a razor; but +contrived how they might burn off the hair of his head and beard with +red-hot nut-shells. And as to his two wives, Aristomache his countrywoman, +and Doris of Locris, he never visited them at night before everything had +been well searched and examined. And as he had surrounded the place where +his bed was with a broad ditch, and made a way over it with a wooden +bridge, he drew that bridge over after shutting his bedchamber door. And +as he did not dare to stand on the ordinary pulpits from which they +usually harangued the people, he generally addressed them from a high +tower. And it is said, that when he was disposed to play at ball,--for he +delighted much in it,--and had pulled off his clothes, he used to give his +sword into the keeping of a young man whom he was very fond of. On this, +one of his intimates said pleasantly, "You certainly trust your life with +him;" and as the young man happened to smile at this, he ordered them both +to be slain, the one for showing how he might be taken off, the other for +approving of what had been said by smiling. But he was so concerned at +what he had done, that nothing affected him more during his whole life; +for he had slain one to whom he was extremely partial. Thus do weak men's +desires pull them different ways, and whilst they indulge one, they act +counter to another. + +XXI. This tyrant, however, showed himself how happy he really was: for +once, when Damocles, one of his flatterers, was dilating in conversation +on his forces, his wealth, the greatness of his power, the plenty he +enjoyed, the grandeur of his royal palaces, and maintaining that no one +was ever happier,--"Have you an inclination," said he, "Damocles, as this +kind of life pleases you, to have a taste of it yourself, and to make a +trial of the good fortune that attends me?" And when he said that he +should like it extremely, Dionysius ordered him to be laid on a bed of +gold with the most beautiful covering, embroidered and wrought with the +most exquisite work, and he dressed out a great many sideboards with +silver and embossed gold. He then ordered some youths, distinguished for +their handsome persons, to wait at his table, and to observe his nod, in +order to serve him with what he wanted. There were ointments and garlands; +perfumes were burned; tables provided with the most exquisite meats. +Damocles thought himself very happy. In the midst of this apparatus, +Dionysius ordered a bright sword to be let down from the ceiling, +suspended by a single horsehair, so as to hang over the head of that happy +man. After which he neither cast his eye on those handsome waiters, nor on +the well wrought plate; nor touched any of the provisions: presently the +garlands fell to pieces. At last he entreated the tyrant to give him leave +to go, for that now he had no desire to be happy.(110) Does not Dionysius, +then, seem to have declared there can be no happiness for one who is under +constant apprehensions? But it was not now in his power to return to +justice, and restore his citizens their rights and privileges; for, by the +indiscretion of youth, he had engaged in so many wrong steps, and +committed such extravagances, that had he attempted to have returned to a +right way of thinking he must have endangered his life. + +XXII. Yet, how desirous he was of friendship, though at the same time he +dreaded the treachery of friends, appears from the story of those two +Pythagoreans: one of these had been security for his friend, who was +condemned to die; the other, to release his security, presented himself at +the time appointed for his dying: "I wish," said Dionysius, "you would +admit me as the third in your friendship." What misery was it for him to +be deprived of acquaintance, of company at his table, and of the freedom +of conversation; especially for one who was a man of learning, and from +his childhood acquainted with liberal arts, very fond of music, and +himself a tragic poet,--how good a one is not to the purpose, for I know +not how it is, but in this way, more than any other, every one thinks his +own performances excellent. I never as yet knew any poet (and I was very +intimate with Aquinius), who did not appear to himself to be very +admirable. The case is this; you are pleased with your own works, I like +mine. But to return to Dionysius: he debarred himself from all civil and +polite conversation, and spent his life among fugitives, bondmen, and +barbarians; for he was persuaded that no one could be his friend who was +worthy of liberty or had the least desire of being free. + +XXIII. Shall I not, then, prefer the life of Plato and Archytas, +manifestly wise and learned men, to his, than which nothing can possibly +be more horrid, or miserable, or detestable? + +I will present you with an humble and obscure mathematician of the same +city, called Archimedes, who lived many years after; whose tomb, overgrown +with shrubs and briars, I in my quaestorship discovered, when the +Syracusans knew nothing of it, and even denied that there was any such +thing remaining: for I remembered some verses, which I had been informed +were engraved on his monument, and these set forth that on the top of the +tomb there was placed a sphere with a cylinder. When I had carefully +examined all the monuments (for there are a great many tombs at the gate +Achradinae), I observed a small column standing out a little above the +briars, with the figure of a sphere and a cylinder upon it; whereupon I +immediately said to the Syracusans, for there were some of their principal +men with me there, that I imagined that was what I was inquiring for. +Several men being sent in with scythes, cleared the way, and made an +opening for us. When we could get at it, and were come near to the front +of the pedestal, I found the inscription, though the latter parts of all +the verses were effaced almost half away. Thus one of the noblest cities +of Greece, and one which at one time likewise had been very celebrated for +learning, had known nothing of the monument of its greatest genius, if it +had not been discovered to them by a native of Arpinum. But to return to +the subject from which I have been digressing. Who is there in the least +degree acquainted with the Muses, that is, with liberal knowledge, or that +deals at all in learning, who would not choose to be this mathematician +rather than that tyrant? If we look into their methods of living and their +employments, we shall find the mind of the one strengthened and improved +with tracing the deductions of reason, amused with his own ingenuity, +which is the one most delicious food of the mind; the thoughts of the +other engaged in continual murders and injuries, in constant fears by +night and by day. Now imagine a Democritus, a Pythagoras, and an +Anaxagoras; what kingdom, what riches would you prefer to their studies +and amusements? for you must necessarily look for that excellence which we +are seeking for in that which is the most perfect part of man; but what is +there better in man than a sagacious and good mind? The enjoyment, +therefore, of that good which proceeds from that sagacious mind, can alone +make us happy: but virtue is the good of the mind; it follows, therefore, +that a happy life depends on virtue. Hence proceed all things that are +beautiful, honourable, and excellent, as I said above (but this point +must, I think, be treated of more at large), and they are well stored with +joys. For, as it is clear that a happy life consists in perpetual and +unexhausted pleasures, it follows too, that a happy life must arise from +honesty. + +XXIV. But that what I propose to demonstrate to you may not rest on mere +words only, I must set before you the picture of something, as it were, +living and moving in the world, that may dispose us more for the +improvement of the understanding and real knowledge. Let us, then, pitch +upon some man perfectly acquainted with the most excellent arts; let us +present him for a while to our own thoughts, and figure him to our own +imaginations. In the first place, he must necessarily be of an +extraordinary capacity; for virtue is not easily connected with dull +minds. Secondly, he must have a great desire of discovering truth, from +whence will arise that threefold production of the mind; one of which +depends on knowing things, and explaining nature: the other in defining +what we ought to desire, and what to avoid: the third in judging of +consequences and impossibilities: in which consists both subtilty in +disputing, and also clearness of judgment. Now with what pleasure must the +mind of a wise man be affected, which continually dwells in the midst of +such cares and occupations as these, when he views the revolutions and +motions of the whole world, and sees those innumerable stars in the +heavens, which, though fixed in their places, have yet one motion in +common with the whole universe, and observes the seven other stars, some +higher, some lower, each maintaining their own course, while their +motions, though wandering, have certain defined and appointed spaces to +run through, the sight of which doubtless urged and encouraged those +ancient philosophers to exercise their investigating spirit on many other +things. Hence arose an inquiry after the beginnings, and, as it were, +seeds from which all things were produced and composed; what was the +origin of every kind of thing, whether animate or inanimate, articulately +speaking or mute; what occasioned their beginning and end, and by what +alteration and change one thing was converted into another: whence the +earth originated, and by what weights it was balanced: by what caverns the +seas were supplied: by what gravity all things being carried down tend +always to the middle of the world, which in any round body is the lowest +place. + +XXV. A mind employed on such subjects, and which night and day +contemplates them, contains in itself that precept of the Delphic God, so +as to "know itself," and to perceive its connexion with the divine reason, +from whence it is filled with an insatiable joy. For reflections on the +power and nature of the Gods raise in us a desire of imitating their +eternity. Nor does the mind, that sees the necessary dependences and +connexions that one cause has with another, think it possible that it +should be itself confined to the shortness of this life. Those causes, +though they proceed from eternity to eternity, are governed by reason and +understanding. And he who beholds them and examines them, or rather he +whose view takes in all the parts and boundaries of things, with what +tranquillity of mind does he look on all human affairs, and on all that is +nearer him! Hence proceeds the knowledge of virtue; hence arise the kinds +and species of virtues; hence are discovered those things which nature +regards as the bounds and extremities of good and evil; by this it is +discovered to what all duties ought to be referred, and which is the most +eligible manner of life. And when these and similar points have been +investigated, the principal consequence which is deduced from them, and +that which is our main object in this discussion, is the establishment of +the point--that virtue is of itself sufficient to a happy life. + +The third qualification of our wise man is the next to be considered, +which goes through and spreads itself over every part of wisdom; it is +that whereby we define each particular thing, distinguish the genus from +its species, connect consequences, draw just conclusions, and distinguish +truth from falsehood, which is the very art and science of disputing; +which is not only of the greatest use in the examination of what passes in +the world, but is likewise the most rational entertainment, and that which +is most becoming to true wisdom. Such are its effects in retirement. Now +let our wise man be considered as protecting the republic; what can be +more excellent than such a character? By his prudence he will discover the +true interests of his fellow-citizens, by his justice he will be prevented +from applying what belongs to the public to his own use; and in short, he +will be ever governed by all the virtues which are many and various? To +these let us add the advantage of his friendships; in which the learned +reckon not only a natural harmony and agreement of sentiments throughout +the conduct of life, but the utmost pleasure and satisfaction in +conversing and passing our time constantly with one another. What can be +wanting to such a life as this, to make it more happy than it is? Fortune +herself must yield to a life stored with such joys. Now if it be a +happiness to rejoice in such goods of the mind, that is to say, in such +virtues, and if all wise men enjoy thoroughly these pleasures, it must +necessarily be granted that all such are happy. + +XXVI. _A._ What, when in torments and on the rack? + +_M._ Do you imagine I am speaking of him as laid on roses and violets? Is +it allowable even for Epicurus (who only puts on the appearance of being a +philosopher, and who himself assumed that name for himself,) to say, +(though as matters stand, I commend him for his saying,) that a wise man +might at all times cry out, though he be burned, tortured, cut to pieces, +"How little I regard it!" Shall this be said by one who defines all evil +as pain, and measures every good by pleasure; who could ridicule whatever +we call either honourable or base, and could declare of us that we were +employed about words, and uttering mere empty sounds; and that nothing is +to be regarded by us, but as it is perceived to be smooth or rough by the +body? What, shall such a man as this, as I said, whose understanding is +little superior to the beasts, be at liberty to forget himself; and not +only to despise fortune, when the whole of his good and evil is in the +power of fortune, but to say, that he is happy in the most racking +torture, when he had actually declared pain to be not only the greatest +evil, but the only one? Nor did he take any trouble to provide himself +with those remedies which might have enabled him to bear pain; such as +firmness of mind, a shame of doing anything base, exercise, and the habit +of patience, precepts of courage, and a manly hardiness: but he says that +he supports himself on the single recollection of past pleasures, as if +any one, when the weather was so hot as that he was scarcely able to bear +it, should comfort himself by recollecting that he was once in my country +Arpinum, where he was surrounded on every side by cooling streams: for I +do not apprehend how past pleasures can allay present evils. But when he +says that a wise man is always happy, who would have no right to say so if +he were consistent with himself, what may they not do, who allow nothing +to be desirable, nothing to be looked on as good but what is honourable? +Let, then, the Peripatetics and old Academics follow my example, and at +length leave off muttering to themselves; and openly and with a clear +voice let them be bold to say, that a happy life may not be inconsistent +with the agonies of Phalaris's bull. + +XXVII. But to dismiss the subtleties of the Stoics, which I am sensible I +have employed more than was necessary, let us admit of three kinds of +goods: and let them really be kinds of goods, provided no regard is had to +the body, and to external circumstances, as entitled to the appellation of +good in any other sense than because we are obliged to use them: but let +those other divine goods spread themselves far in every direction, and +reach the very heavens. Why, then, may I not call him happy, nay, the +happiest of men, who has attained them? Shall a wise man be afraid of +pain? which is, indeed, the greatest enemy to our opinion. For I am +persuaded that we are prepared and fortified sufficiently, by the +disputations of the foregoing days, against our own death, or that of our +friends, against grief and the other perturbations of the mind. But pain +seems to be the sharpest adversary of virtue: that it is which menaces us +with burning torches; that it is which threatens to crush our fortitude, +and greatness of mind, and patience. Shall virtue then yield to this? +Shall the happy life of a wise and consistent man succumb to this? Good +Gods! how base would this be! Spartan boys will bear to have their bodies +torn by rods without uttering a groan. I myself have seen at Lacedaemon, +troops of young men, with incredible earnestness contending together with +their hands and feet, with their teeth and nails, nay even ready to +expire, rather than own themselves conquered. Is any country of barbarians +more uncivilized or desolate than India? Yet they have amongst them some +that are held for wise men, who never wear any clothes all their life +long, and who bear the snow of Caucasus, and the piercing cold of winter, +without any pain: and who if they come in contact with fire endure being +burned without a groan. The women too, in India, on the death of their +husbands have a regular contest, and apply to the judge to have it +determined which of them was best beloved by him; for it is customary +there for one man to have many wives. She in whose favour it is determined +exults greatly, and being attended by her relations is laid on the funeral +pile with her husband: the others, who are postponed, walk away very much +dejected. Custom can never be superior to nature: for nature is never to +be got the better of. But our minds are infected by sloth and idleness, +and luxury, and languor, and indolence: we have enervated them by +opinions, and bad customs. Who is there who is unacquainted with the +customs of the Egyptians? Their minds being tainted by pernicious +opinions, they are ready to bear any torture, rather than hurt an ibis, a +snake, a cat, a dog, or a crocodile: and should any one inadvertently have +hurt any of these animals, he will submit to any punishment. I am speaking +of men only. As to the beasts, do they not bear cold and hunger, running +about in woods, and on mountains and deserts? will they not fight for +their young ones till they are wounded? Are they afraid of any attacks or +blows? I mention not what the ambitious will suffer for honour's sake, or +those who are desirous of praise on account of glory, or lovers to gratify +their lust. Life is full of such instances. + +XXVIII. But let us not dwell too much on these questions, but rather let +us return to our subject. I say, and say again, that happiness will submit +even to be tormented; and that in pursuit of justice, and temperance, and +still more especially and principally fortitude, and greatness of soul, +and patience, it will not stop short at sight of the executioner; and when +all other virtues proceed calmly to the torture, that one will never halt, +as I said, on the outside and threshold of the prison: for what can be +baser, what can carry a worse appearance, than to be left alone, separated +from those beautiful attendants? not however that this is by any means +possible: for neither can the virtues hold together without happiness, nor +happiness without the virtues: so that they will not suffer her to desert +them, but will carry her along with them, to whatever torments, to +whatever pain they are led. For it is the peculiar quality of a wise man +to do nothing that he may repent of, nothing against his inclination: but +always to act nobly, with constancy, gravity, and honesty: to depend on +nothing as certainty: to wonder at nothing, when it falls out, as if it +appeared strange and unexpected to him: to be independent of every one, +and abide by his own opinion. For my part, I cannot form an idea of +anything happier than this. The conclusion of the Stoics is indeed easy; +for since they are persuaded that the end of good is to live agreeably to +nature, and to be consistent with that,--as a wise man should do so, not +only because it is his duty, but because it is in his power, it must of +course follow, that whoever has the chief good in his power, has his +happiness so too. And thus the life of a wise man is always happy. You +have here what I think may be confidently said of a happy life, and as +things now stand, very truly also, unless you can advance something +better. + +XXIX. _A._ Indeed I cannot; but I should be glad to prevail on you, unless +it is troublesome (as you are under no confinement from obligations to any +particular sect, but gather from all of them whatever strikes you most as +having the appearance of probability), as you just now seemed to advise +the Peripatetics and the Old Academy, boldly to speak out without reserve, +"that wise men are always the happiest,"--I should be glad to hear how you +think it consistent for them to say so, when you have said so much against +that opinion, and the conclusions of the Stoics. + +_M._ I will make use, then, of that liberty which no one has the privilege +of using in philosophy but those of our school, whose discourses determine +nothing, but take in everything, leaving them, unsupported by the +authority of any particular person, to be judged of by others, according +to their weight. And as you seem desirous of knowing how it is that, +notwithstanding the different opinions of philosophers with regard to the +ends of goods, virtue has still sufficient security for the effecting of a +happy life,--which security, as we are informed, Carneades used indeed to +dispute against; but he disputed as against the Stoics, whose opinions he +combated with great zeal and vehemence,--I however shall handle the +question with more temper; for if the Stoics have rightly settled the +_ends_ of goods, the affair is at an end; for a wise man must necessarily +be always happy. But let us examine, if we can, the particular opinions of +the others, that so this excellent decision, if I may so call it, in +favour of a happy life, may be agreeable to the opinions and discipline of +all. + +XXX. These then are the opinions, as I think, that are held and defended: +the first four are simple ones; "that nothing is good but what is honest," +according to the Stoics: "nothing good but pleasure," as Epicurus +maintains: "nothing good but a freedom from pain," as Hieronymus(111) +asserts: "nothing good but an enjoyment of the principal, or all, or the +greatest goods of nature," as Carneades maintained against the +Stoics:--these are simple, the others are mixed propositions. Then there +are three kinds of goods; the greatest being those of the mind, the next +best those of the body, the third are external goods, as the Peripatetics +call them, and the old Academics differ very little from them. +Dinomachus(112) and Callipho(113) have coupled pleasure with honesty: but +Diodorus,(114) the Peripatetic, has joined indolence to honesty. These are +the opinions that have some footing; for those of Aristo,(115) +Pyrrho,(116) Herillus,(117) and of some others, are quite out of date. Now +let us see what weight these men have in them, excepting the Stoics, whose +opinion I think I have sufficiently defended; and indeed I have explained +what the Peripatetics have to say; excepting that Theophrastus, and those +who followed him, dread and abhor pain in too weak a manner. The others +may go on to exaggerate the gravity and dignity of virtue, as usual; and +then, after they have extolled it to the skies, with the usual +extravagance of good orators, it is easy to reduce the other topics to +nothing by comparison, and to hold them up to contempt. They who think +that praise deserves to be sought after, even at the expense of pain, are +not at liberty to deny those men to be happy, who have obtained it. Though +they may be under some evils, yet this name of happy has a very wide +application. + +XXXI. For even as trading is said to be lucrative, and farming +advantageous, not because the one never meets with any loss, nor the other +with any damage from the inclemency of the weather, but because they +succeed in general: so life may be properly called happy, not from its +being entirely made up of good things, but because it abounds with these +to a great and considerable degree. By this way of reasoning, then, a +happy life may attend virtue even to the moment of execution; nay, may +descend with her into Phalaris's bull, according to Aristotle, Xenocrates, +Speusippus, Polemon; and will not be gained over by any allurements to +forsake her. Of the same opinion will Calliphon and Diodorus be: for they +are both of them such friends to virtue, as to think that all things +should be discarded and far removed that are incompatible with it. The +rest seem to be more hampered with these doctrines, but yet they get clear +of them; such as Epicurus, Hieronymus, and whoever else thinks it worth +while to defend the deserted Carneades: for there is not one of them who +does not think the mind to be judge of those goods, and able sufficiently +to instruct him how to despise what has the appearance only of good or +evil. For what seems to you to be the case with Epicurus, is the case also +with Hieronymus and Carneades, and indeed with all the rest of them: for +who is there who is not sufficiently prepared against death and pain? I +will begin, with your leave, with him whom we call soft and voluptuous. +What! does he seem to you to be afraid of death or pain, when he calls the +day of his death happy; and who, when he is afflicted by the greatest +pains, silences them all by recollecting arguments of his own discovering? +And this is not done in such a manner as to give room for imagining that +he talks thus wildly from some sudden impulse: but his opinion of death +is, that on the dissolution of the animal, all sense is lost; and what is +deprived of sense is, as he thinks, what we have no concern at all with. +And as to pain too, he has certain rules to follow then: if it be great, +the comfort is, that it must be short; if it be of long continuance, then +it must be supportable. What then? Do those grandiloquent gentlemen state +anything better than Epicurus, in opposition to these two things which +distress us the most? And as to other things, do not Epicurus and the rest +of the philosophers seem sufficiently prepared? Who is there who does not +dread poverty? And yet no true philosopher ever can dread it. + +XXXII. But with how little is this man himself satisfied? No one has said +more on frugality. For when a man is far removed from those things which +occasion a desire of money, from love, ambition, or other daily +extravagance, why should he be fond of money, or concern himself at all +about it? Could the Scythian Anacharsis(118) disregard money, and shall +not our philosophers be able to do so? We are informed of an epistle of +his, in these words: "Anacharsis to Hanno, greeting. My clothing is the +same as that with which the Scythians cover themselves; the hardness of my +feet supplies the want of shoes; the ground is my bed, hunger my sauce, my +food milk, cheese, and flesh. So you may come to me as to a man in want of +nothing. But as to those presents you take so much pleasure in, you may +dispose of them to your own citizens, or to the immortal gods." And almost +all philosophers, of all schools, excepting those who are warped from +right reason by a vicious disposition, might have been of this same +opinion. Socrates, when on one occasion he saw a great quantity of gold +and silver carried in a procession, cried out, "How many things are there +which I do not want!" + +Xenocrates, when some ambassadors from Alexander had brought him fifty +talents, which was a very large sum of money in those times, especially at +Athens, carried the ambassadors to sup in the Academy; and placed just a +sufficiency before them, without any apparatus. When they asked him, the +next day, to whom he wished the money which they had for him to be paid: +"What?" said he, "did you not perceive by our slight repast of yesterday, +that I had no occasion for money?" But when he perceived that they were +somewhat dejected, he accepted of thirty minae, that he might not seem to +treat with disrespect the king's generosity. But Diogenes took a greater +liberty, like a Cynic, when Alexander asked him if he wanted anything: +"Just at present," said he, "I wish that you would stand a little out of +the line between me and the sun," for Alexander was hindering him from +sunning himself. And indeed this very man used to maintain how much he +surpassed the Persian king, in his manner of life and fortune; for that he +himself was in want of nothing, while the other never had enough; and that +he had no inclination for those pleasures of which the other could never +get enough to satisfy himself: and that the other could never obtain his. + +XXXIII. You see, I imagine, how Epicurus has divided his kinds of desires, +not very acutely perhaps, but yet usefully: saying, that they are "partly +natural and necessary; partly natural, but not necessary; partly neither. +That those which are necessary may be supplied almost for nothing; for +that the things which nature requires are easily obtained." As to the +second kind of desires, his opinion is, that any one may easily either +enjoy or go without them. And with regard to the third, since they are +utterly frivolous, being neither allied to necessity nor nature, he thinks +that they should be entirely rooted out. On this topic a great many +arguments are adduced by the Epicureans; and those pleasures which they do +not despise in a body, they disparage one by one, and seem rather for +lessening the number of them: for as to wanton pleasures, on which subject +they say a great deal, these, say they, are easy, common, and within any +one's reach; and they think that if nature requires them, they are not to +be estimated by birth, condition, or rank, but by shape, age, and person: +and that it is by no means difficult to refrain from them, should health, +duty, or reputation require it; but that pleasures of this kind may be +desirable, where they are attended with no inconvenience, but can never be +of any use. And the assertions which Epicurus makes with respect to the +whole of pleasure, are such as show his opinion to be that pleasure is +always desirable, and to be pursued merely because it is pleasure; and for +the same reason pain is to be avoided, because it is pain. So that a wise +man will always adopt such a system of counterbalancing as to do himself +the justice to avoid pleasure, should pain ensue from it in too great a +proportion; and will submit to pain, provided the effects of it are to +produce a greater pleasure: so that all pleasurable things, though the +corporeal senses are the judges of them, are still to be referred to the +mind, on which account the body rejoices, whilst it perceives a present +pleasure; but that the mind not only perceives the present as well as the +body, but foresees it, while it is coming, and even when it is past will +not let it quite slip away. So that a wise man enjoys a continual series +of pleasures, uniting the expectation of future pleasure to the +recollection of what he has already tasted. The like notions are applied +by them to high living; and the magnificence and expensiveness of +entertainments are deprecated, because nature is satisfied at a small +expense. + +XXXIV. For who does not see this, that an appetite is the best sauce? When +Darius, in his flight from the enemy, had drunk some water which was muddy +and tainted with dead bodies, he declared that he had never drunk anything +more pleasant; the fact was, that he had never drunk before when he was +thirsty. Nor had Ptolemy ever eaten when he was hungry: for as he was +travelling over Egypt, his company not keeping up with him, he had some +coarse bread presented him in a cottage: upon which he said, "Nothing ever +seemed to him pleasanter than that bread." They relate too of Socrates, +that, once when he was walking very fast till the evening, on his being +asked why he did so, his reply was that he was purchasing an appetite by +walking, that he might sup the better. And do we not see what the +Lacedaemonians provide in their Phiditia? where the tyrant Dionysius +supped, but told them he did not at all like that black broth, which was +their principal dish; on which he who dressed it said, "It was no wonder, +for it wanted seasoning." Dionysius asked what that seasoning was; to +which it was replied, "Fatigue in hunting, sweating, a race on the banks +of Eurotas, hunger, and thirst:" for these are the seasonings to the +Lacedaemonian banquets. And this may not only be conceived from the custom +of men, but from the beasts, who are satisfied with anything that is +thrown before them, provided it is not unnatural, and they seek no +farther. Some entire cities, taught by custom, delight in parsimony, as I +said but just now of the Lacedaemonians. Xenophon has given an account of +the Persian diet; who never, as he saith, use anything but cresses with +their bread, not but that, should nature require anything more agreeable, +many things might be easily supplied by the ground, and plants in great +abundance, and of incomparable sweetness. Add to this, strength and +health, as the consequence of this abstemious way of living. Now compare +with this, those who sweat and belch, being crammed with eating, like +fatted oxen: then will you perceive that they who pursue pleasure most, +attain it least: and that the pleasure of eating lies not in satiety, but +appetite. + +XXXV. They report of Timotheus, a famous man at Athens, and the head of +the city, that having supped with Plato, and being extremely delighted +with his entertainment, on seeing him the next day, he said, "Your suppers +are not only agreeable whilst I partake of them, but the next day also." +Besides, the understanding is impaired when we are full with over-eating +and drinking. There is an excellent epistle of Plato to Dion's relations, +in which there occurs as nearly as possible these words: "When I came +there, that happy life so much talked of, devoted to Italian and Syracusan +entertainments, was no ways agreeable to me; to be crammed twice a day, +and never to have the night to yourself, and the other things which are +the accompaniments of this kind of life, by which a man will never be made +the wiser, but will be rendered much less temperate; for it must be an +extraordinary disposition that can be temperate in such circumstances." +How, then, can a life be pleasant without prudence and temperance? Hence +you discover the mistake of Sardanapalus, the wealthiest king of the +Assyrians, who ordered it to be engraved on his tomb, + + + I still have what in food I did exhaust, + But what I left, though excellent, is lost. + + +"What less than this," says Aristotle, "could be inscribed on the tomb, +not of a king but an ox?" He said that he possessed those things when +dead, which, in his lifetime, he could have no longer than whilst he was +enjoying them. Why, then, are riches desired? And wherein doth poverty +prevent us from being happy? In the want, I imagine, of statues, pictures, +and diversions. But if any one is delighted with these things, have not +the poor people the enjoyment of them more than they who are the owners of +them in the greatest abundance? For we have great numbers of them +displayed publicly in our city. And whatever store of them private people +have, they cannot have a great number, and they but seldom see them, only +when they go to their country seats; and some of them must be stung to the +heart when they consider how they came by them. The day would fail me, +should I be inclined to defend the cause of poverty: the thing is +manifest, and nature daily informs us how few things there are, and how +trifling they are, of which she really stands in need. + +XXXVI. Let us inquire, then, if obscurity, the want of power, or even the +being unpopular, can prevent a wise man from being happy. Observe if +popular favour, and this glory which they are so fond of, be not attended +with more uneasiness than pleasure. Our friend Demosthenes was certainly +very weak in declaring himself pleased with the whisper of a woman who was +carrying water, as is the custom in Greece, and who whispered to another, +"That is he--that is Demosthenes." What could be weaker than this? and yet +what an orator he was! But although he had learned to speak to others, he +had conversed but little with himself. We may perceive, therefore, that +popular glory is not desirable of itself; nor is obscurity to be dreaded. +"I came to Athens," saith Democritus, "and there was no one there that +knew me:" this was a moderate and grave man who could glory in his +obscurity. Shall musicians compose their tunes to their own tastes; and +shall a philosopher, master of a much better art, seek to ascertain, not +what is most true, but what will please the people? Can anything be more +absurd than to despise the vulgar as mere unpolished mechanics, taken +singly, and to think them of consequence when collected into a body? These +wise men would contemn our ambitious pursuits, and our vanities, and would +reject all the honours which the people could voluntarily offer to them: +but we know not how to despise them till we begin to repent of having +accepted them. There is an anecdote related by Heraclitus the natural +philosopher, of Hermodorus the chief of the Ephesians, that he said, "that +all the Ephesians ought to be punished with death, for saying, when they +had expelled Hermodorus out of their city, that they would have no one +amongst them better than another; but that if there were any such, he +might go elsewhere to some other people." Is not this the case with the +people everywhere? do they not hate every virtue that distinguishes +itself? What! was not Aristides (I had rather instance in the Greeks than +ourselves) banished his country for being eminently just? What troubles, +then, are they free from who have no connexion whatever with the people! +What is more agreeable than a learned retirement? I speak of that learning +which makes us acquainted with the boundless extent of nature, and the +universe, and which even while we remain in this world discovers to us +both heaven, earth, and sea. + +XXXVII. If, then, honour and riches have no value, what is there else to +be afraid of? Banishment, I suppose; which is looked on as the greatest +evil. Now, if the evil of banishment proceeds not from ourselves, but from +the froward disposition of the people, I have just now declared how +contemptible it is. But if to leave one's country be miserable, the +provinces are full of miserable men; very few of the settlers in which +ever return to their country again. But exiles are deprived of their +property! What, then! has there not been enough said on bearing poverty? +But with regard to banishment, if we examine the nature of things, not the +ignominy of the name, how little does it differ from constant travelling? +in which some of the most famous philosophers have spent their whole life: +as Xenocrates, Crantor, Arcesilas, Lacydes, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Zeno, +Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, Carneades, Panaetius, Clitomachus, Philo, +Antiochus, Posidonius, and innumerable others; who from their first +setting out never returned home again. Now what ignominy can a wise man be +affected with (for it is of such a one that I am speaking) who can be +guilty of nothing which deserves it; for there is no occasion to comfort +one who is banished for his deserts. Lastly, they can easily reconcile +themselves to every accident who measure all their objects and pursuits in +life by the standard of pleasure; so that in whatever place that is +supplied, there they may live happily. Thus what Teucer said may be +applied to every case: + + + Wherever I am happy, is my country. + + +Socrates, indeed, when he was asked where he belonged to, replied, "The +world;" for he looked upon himself as a citizen and inhabitant of the +whole world. How was it with T. Altibutius? Did he not follow his +philosophical studies with the greatest satisfaction at Athens, although +he was banished? which, however, would not have happened to him, if he had +obeyed the laws of Epicurus, and lived peaceably in the republic. In what +was Epicurus happier, living in his own country, than Metrodorus who lived +at Athens? Or did Plato's happiness exceed that of Xenocrates, or Polemo, +or Arcesilas? Or is that city to be valued much, that banishes all her +good and wise men? Demaratus, the father of our king Tarquin, not being +able to bear the tyrant Cypselus, fled from Corinth to Tarquinii, settled +there, and had children. Was it, then, an unwise act in him to prefer the +liberty of banishment to slavery at home? + +XXXVIII. Besides the emotions of the mind, all griefs and anxieties are +assuaged by forgetting them, and turning our thoughts to pleasure. +Therefore, it was not without reason that Epicurus presumed to say that a +wise man abounds with good things, because he may always have his +pleasures: from whence it follows, as he thinks, that that point is +gained, which is the subject of our present inquiry, that a wise man is +always happy. What! though he should be deprived of the senses of seeing +and hearing? Yes; for he holds those things very cheap. For, in the first +place, what are the pleasures of which we are deprived by that dreadful +thing, blindness? For though they allow other pleasures to be confined to +the senses, yet the things which are perceived by the sight do not depend +wholly on the pleasure the eyes receive; as is the case when we taste, +smell, touch, or hear; for, in respect of all these senses, the organs +themselves are the seat of pleasure; but it is not so with the eyes. For +it is the mind which is entertained by what we see; but the mind may be +entertained in many ways, even though we could not see at all. I am +speaking of a learned and a wise man, with whom to think is to live. But +thinking in the case of a wise man does not altogether require the use of +his eyes in his investigations; for if night does not strip him of his +happiness, why should blindness, which resembles night, have that effect? +For the reply of Antipater the Cyrenaic, to some women who bewailed his +being blind, though it is a little too obscene, is not without its +significance. "What do you mean?" saith he; "do you think the night can +furnish no pleasure?" And we find by his magistracies and his actions, +that old Appius(119) too, who was blind for many years, was not prevented +from doing whatever was required of him, with respect either to the +republic or his own affairs. It is said, that C. Drusus's house was +crowded with clients. When they, whose business it was, could not see how +to conduct themselves, they applied to a blind guide. + +XXXIX. When I was a boy, Cn. Aufidius, a blind man, who had served the +office of praetor, not only gave his opinion in the senate, and was ready +to assist his friends, but wrote a Greek history, and had a considerable +acquaintance with literature. Diodorus the Stoic was blind, and lived many +years at my house. He, indeed, which is scarcely credible, besides +applying himself more than usual to philosophy, and playing on the flute, +agreeably to the custom of the Pythagoreans, and having books read to him +night and day, in all which he did not want eyes, contrived to teach +geometry, which, one would think, could hardly be done without the +assistance of eyes, telling his scholars how and where to draw every line. +They relate of Asclepiades, a native of Eretria, and no obscure +philosopher, when some one asked him what inconvenience he suffered from +his blindness, that his reply was, "He was at the expense of another +servant." So that, as the most extreme poverty may be borne, if you +please, as is daily the case with some in Greece; so blindness may easily +be borne, provided you have the support of good health in other respects. +Democritus was so blind he could not distinguish white from black: but he +knew the difference betwixt good and evil, just and unjust, honourable and +base, the useful and useless, great and small. Thus one may live happily +without distinguishing colours; but without acquainting yourself with +things, you cannot; and this man was of opinion, that the intense +application of the mind was taken off by the objects that presented +themselves to the eye, and while others often could not see what was +before their feet, he travelled through all infinity. It is reported also +that Homer(120) was blind, but we observe his painting, as well as his +poetry. What country, what coast, what part of Greece, what military +attacks, what dispositions of battle, what army, what ship, what motions +of men and animals can be mentioned which he has not described in such a +manner as to enable us to see what he could not see himself? What, then! +can we imagine that Homer, or any other learned man, has ever been in want +of pleasure and entertainment for his mind? Were it not so, would +Anaxagoras, or this very Democritus, have left their estates and +patrimonies, and given themselves up to the pursuit of acquiring this +divine pleasure? It is thus that the poets who have represented Tiresias +the Augur as a wise man and blind, never exhibit him as bewailing his +blindness. And Homer, too, after he had described Polyphemus as a monster +and a wild man, represents him talking with his ram, and speaking of his +good fortune, inasmuch as he could go wherever he pleased and touch what +he would. And so far he was right, for that Cyclops was a being of not +much more understanding than his ram. + +XL. Now, as to the evil of being deaf: M. Crassus was a little thick of +hearing; but it was more uneasiness to him that he heard himself ill +spoken of, though, in my opinion, he did not deserve it. Our Epicureans +cannot understand Greek, nor the Greeks Latin: now, they are deaf +reciprocally as to each other's language, and we are all truly deaf with +regard to those innumerable languages which we do not understand. They do +not hear the voice of the harper; but then they do not hear the grating of +a saw when it is setting, or the grunting of a hog when his throat is +being cut, nor the roaring of the sea when they are desirous of rest. And +if they should chance to be fond of singing, they ought in the first place +to consider that many wise men lived happily before music was discovered; +besides, they may have more pleasure in reading verses than in hearing +them sung. Then, as I before referred the blind to the pleasures of +hearing, so I may the deaf to the pleasures of sight: moreover, whoever +can converse with himself doth not need the conversation of another. But +suppose all these misfortunes to meet in one person: suppose him blind and +deaf,--let him be afflicted with the sharpest pains of body, which, in the +first place, generally of themselves make an end of him; still, should +they continue so long, and the pain be so exquisite, that we should be +unable to assign any reason for our being so afflicted,--still, why, good +Gods! should we be under any difficulty? For there is a retreat at hand: +death is that retreat--a shelter where we shall for ever be insensible. +Theodoras said to Lysimachus, who threatened him with death, "It is a +great matter, indeed, for you to have acquired the power of a Spanish +fly!" When Perses entreated Paulus not to lead him in triumph, "That is a +matter which you have in your own power," said Paulus. I said many things +about death in our first day's disputation, when death was the subject; +and not a little the next day, when I treated of pain; which things if you +recollect, there can be no danger of your looking upon death as +undesirable, or at least it will not be dreadful. + +That custom which is common among the Grecians at their banquets should, +in my opinion, be observed in life:--Drink, say they, or leave the company: +and rightly enough; for a guest should either enjoy the pleasure of +drinking with others, or else not stay till he meets with affronts from +those that are in liquor. Thus, those injuries of fortune which you cannot +bear, you should flee from. + +XLI. This is the very same which is said by Epicurus and Hieronymus. Now, +if those philosophers, whose opinion it is that virtue has no power of +itself, and who say that the conduct which we denominate honourable and +laudable is really nothing, and is only an empty circumstance set off with +an unmeaning sound, can nevertheless maintain that a wise man is always +happy, what, think you, may be done by the Socratic and Platonic +philosophers. Some of these allow such superiority to the goods of the +mind, as quite to eclipse what concerns the body and all external +circumstances. But others do not admit these to be goods; they make +everything depend on the mind: whose disputes Carneades used, as a sort of +honorary arbitrator, to determine. For, as what seemed goods to the +Peripatetics were allowed to be advantages by the Stoics, and as the +Peripatetics allowed no more to riches, good health, and other things of +that sort, than the Stoics, when these things were considered according to +their reality, and not by mere names, his opinion was that there was no +ground for disagreeing. Therefore, let the philosophers of other schools +see how they can establish this point also. It is very agreeable to me +that they make some professions worthy of being uttered by the mouth of a +philosopher, with regard to a wise man's having always the means of living +happily. + +XLII. But as we are to depart in the morning, let us remember these five +days' discussions; though, indeed, I think I shall commit them to writing: +for how can I better employ the leisure which I have, of whatever kind it +is, and whatever it be owing to? and I will send these five books also to +my friend Brutus, by whom I was not only incited to write on philosophy, +but, I may say, provoked. And by so doing, it is not easy to say what +service I may be of to others; at all events, in my own various and acute +afflictions, which surround me on all sides, I cannot find any better +comfort for myself. + +THE END + + + + + + +FOOTNOTES + + + 1 The following are the most important of the passages referred + to:--"Since I entered upon these philosophical inquiries, Varro has + given me notice of a valuable and honourable dedication of a work of + his to me.... In the mean time I have been preparing myself as he + desired to make him a return. + + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}. + + "I may as well, therefore, remove from my Academical Disputations + the present speakers, who are distinguished characters indeed, but + by no means philosophical, and who discourse with too much subtlety, + and substitute Varro in their place. For these are the opinions of + Antiochus, to which he is much attached. I can find a place for + Catulus and Lucullus elsewhere."--Ep. 12. + + "The Catulus and Lucullus I imagine you have had before; but I have + made new introductions to these books which I wish you to have, + containing an eulogium upon each of these persons, and there are + some other additions."--Ep. 32. + + "In consequence of the letter which you wrote to me about Varro, I + have taken the Academy entirely out of the hands of those + distinguished persons, and transferred it to our friend. And from + two books I have made it into four. These are longer than the others + were, though there are several parts left out.... In truth, if my + self-love does not deceive me, these books have come out in such a + manner that there is nothing of the same kind like them even in + Greek."--Ep. 13. + + "I have transferred the whole of that Academical Treatise to Varro. + It had at first been divided among Catulus, Lucullus, and + Hortensius. Afterwards, as this appeared unsuitable, owing to those + persons being, not indeed unlearned, but notoriously unversed in + such subjects, as soon as I got home I transferred those dialogues + to Cato and Brutus. Your letter about Varro has just reached me, and + there is no one by whom the opinions of Antiochus could be more + fitly supported."--Ep. 16. + + "I had determined to include no living persons in my dialogues; but + since you inform me that Varro is desirous of it, and sets a great + value upon it, I have composed this work, and completed the whole + Academical Discussion in four books; I know not how well, but with + such care that nothing can exceed it. In these, what had been + excellently collected by Antiochus against the doctrine of + incomprehensibility, I have attributed to Varro; to this I reply in + my own person, and you are the third in our conversation. If I had + made Cotta and Varro disputing with one another, as you suggest in + your last letter, my own would have been a mute character.... + + "The Academics, as you know, I had discussed in the persons of + Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius; but in truth the subject did not + suit their characters, being more logical than what they could be + supposed ever to have dreamt of. Therefore, when I read your letter + to Varro, I seized on it as a sort of inspiration. Nothing could be + more adapted to that species of philosophy in which he seems to take + particular delight; or to the support of such a part that I could + manage to avoid making my own sentiments predominant. For the + opinions of Antiochus are extremely persuasive, and are so carefully + expressed as to retain the acuteness of Antiochus with my own + brilliancy of language, if indeed I possess any."--Ep. 19. + + The Antiochus mentioned above was a native of Ascalon, and the + founder of the fifth Academy; he had been the teacher of Cicero + while he studied at Athens; and he had also a school in Syria and + another in Alexandria. Cicero constantly speaks of him with great + regard and esteem. The leaders of the Academy since the time of + Plato, (and Cicero ranks even him among those philosophers who + denied the certainty of any kind of knowledge,) had gradually fallen + into a degree of scepticism that seemed to strike at the root of all + truth, theoretical and practical. But Antiochus professed to revive + the doctrines of the old Academy, maintaining, in opposition to + Carneades and Philo, that the intellect had in itself a test by + which it could distinguish between what was real and what existed + only in the imagination. He himself appears to have held doctrines + very nearly coinciding with those of Aristotle; agreeing however so + far with the Stoics as to insist that all emotions ought to be + suppressed. So that Cicero almost inclines to class him among the + Stoics; though it appears that he considered himself as an Eclectic + philosopher, uniting the doctrines of the Stoics and Academics so as + to revive the old Academy. + + 2 Titus Pomponius Atticus was three years older than Cicero, with whom + he had been educated, and with whom he always continued on terms of + the greatest intimacy; his daughter was married to Agrippa. He was + of the Epicurean school in philosophy. He died B.C. 32. + + 3 Marcus Terentius Varro was ten years older than Cicero, and a man of + the most extensive and profound learning. He had held a naval + command against the pirates, and against Mithridates, and served as + lieutenant to Pompey in Spain, at the beginning of the civil war, + adhering to his party till after the battle of Pharsalia, when he + was pardoned, and taken into favour by Caesar. He was proscribed by + the second triumvirate, but escaped, and died B.C. 28. He was a very + voluminous author, and according to his own account composed four + hundred and ninety books; but only one, the three books De Re + Rustica, have come down to us, and a portion of a large treatise De + Lingua Latina. + + In philosophy he had been a pupil of Antiochus, and attached himself + to the Academy with something of a leaning to the Stoics. + + 4 Amafanius was one of the earliest Roman writers of the Epicurean + school. He is mentioned by no one but Cicero. + + 5 We do not know who this Rabirius was. + + 6 Lucius AElius Praeconinus Stilo was a Roman knight, and one of the + earliest grammarians of Rome. Cicero in the Brutus describes him as + a very learned man in both Greek and Roman literature; and + especially in old Latin works. He had been a teacher of Varro in + grammar, and of Cicero himself in rhetoric. He received the name of + Stilo from his compositions; and of Praeconinus because his father + had been a herald. + + 7 Menippus was originally a slave, a native of Gadara in Coele Syria, + and a pupil of Diogenes the Cynic. He became very rich by usury, + afterwards he lost his money and committed suicide. He wrote nothing + serious, but his books were entirely full of jests. We have some + fragments of Varro's Satyrae Menippeae, which were written, as we are + here told, in imitation of Menippus. + + 8 Cicero ranges these poets here in chronological order. + + Ennius was born at Rudiae in Calabria, B.C. 239, of a very noble + family. He was brought to Rome by M. Porcius Cato at the end of the + second Punic war. His plays were all translations or adaptations + from the Greek; but he also wrote a poetical history of Rome called + Annales, in eighteen books, and a poem on his friend Scipio + Africanus; some Satires, Epigrams, and one or two philosophical + poems. Only a few lines of his works remain to us. He died at the + age of seventy. + + Pacuvius was a native of Brundusium, and a relation, probably a + nephew, of Ennius. He was born about B.C. 220, and lived to about + the year B.C. 130. His works were nearly entirely tragedies + translated from the Greek. Horace, distinguishing between him and + Accius, says-- + + "Aufert + Pacuvius docti famam senis; Accius alti."--Epist. II. i. 55. + + 9 From {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}, to walk. + + 10 This Lucius Lucullus was the son of Lucius Licinius Lucullus, who + was praetor B.C. 103, and was appointed by the senate to take the + command in Sicily, where there was a formidable insurrection of the + slaves under Athenion and Tryphon. He was not however successful, + and was recalled; and subsequently prosecuted by Servilius for + bribery and malversation, convicted and banished. The exact time of + the birth of this Lucullus his son is not known, but was probably + about B.C. 109. His first appearance in public life was prosecuting + Servilius, who had now become an augur, on a criminal charge, (which + is what Cicero alludes to here.) And though the trial terminated in + the acquittal of Servilius, yet the part Lucullus took in it appears + to have added greatly to his credit among his contemporaries. The + special law in his favour mentioned a few lines lower down, was + passed by Sylla with whom Lucullus was in high favour; so much so + that Sylla at his death confided to him the charge of revising and + correcting his Commentaries. Cicero's statement of his perfect + inexperience in military affairs before the war against Mithridates + is not quite correct, as he had served with distinction in the + Marsic war. The time of his death is not certainly known, but Cicero + speaks of him as dead in the Oration concerning the consular + provinces, delivered B.C. 56, while he was certainly alive B.C. 59, + in which year he was charged by L. Vettius with an imaginary plot + against the life of Pompey. His second wife was Servilia, + half-sister to Cato Uticensis. + + 11 From {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, a heap. + + 12 From {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~} an ant. + + 13 It is not even known to what work Cicero is referring here. + + 14 In the Heautontimorumenos. Act i. Sc. 1. + + 15 Caecilius Statius was the predecessor of Terence; by birth an + Insubrian Gaul and a native of Milan. He died B.C. 165, two years + before the representation of the Andria of Terence. He was + considered by the Romans as a great master of the art of exciting + the feelings. And Cicero (de Opt. Gen. Dic. 1.) speaks of him as the + chief of the Roman Comic writers. Horace says-- + + Vincere Caecilius gravitate, Terentius arte. + + 16 Marcus Atilius, (though Cicero speaks of him here as a tragedian,) + was chiefly celebrated as a comic poet. He was one of the earliest + writers of that class; but nothing of his has come down to us. In + another place Cicero calls him "duris simusscriptor." (Epist. ad + Att. xiv. 20.) + + 17 Diogenes was a pupil of Chrysippus, and succeeded Zeno of Tarsus as + the head of the Stoic school at Athens. He was one of the embassy + sent to Rome by the Athenians, B.C. 155, and is supposed to have + died almost immediately afterwards. + + 18 Antipater was a native of Tarsus, and the pupil and successor of + Diogenes. Cicero speaks in very high terms of his genius. (De Off. + iii. 12.) + + 19 Mnesarchus was a pupil of Panaetius and the teacher of Antiochus of + Ascalon. + + 20 Panaetius was a Rhodian, a pupil of Diogenes and Antipater, which + last he succeeded as head of the Stoic school. He was a friend of P. + Scipio AEmilianus, and accompanied him on his embassy to the kings of + Egypt and Asia in alliance with Rome. He died before B.C. 111. + + 21 Posidonius was a native of Apamea, in Egypt, a pupil of Panaetius, + and a contemporary of Cicero. He came to Rome B.C. 51, having been + sent there as ambassador from Rhodes in the time of Marius. + + 22 Lucius Afranius lived about 100 B.C. His comedies were chiefly + _togatae_, depicting Roman life; he borrowed largely from Menander, + to whom the Romans compared him. Horace says-- + + Dicitur Afrani toga convenisse Menandro. + + Cicero praises his language highly (Brut. 45). + + 23 Caius Lucilius was the earliest of the Roman satirists, born at + Suessa Aurunca, B.C. 148; he died at Naples, B.C. 103. He served + under Scipio in the Numantine war. He was a very vehement and bold + satirist. Cicero alludes here to a saying of his, which he mentions + more expressly (De Orat. ii.), that he did not wish the ignorant to + read his works because they could not understand them: nor the + learned because they would be able to criticise them. + + Persium non curo legere: Laelium Decimum volo. + + This Persius being a very learned man; in comparison with whom + Laelius was an ignoramus. + + 24 Polyaenus, the son of Athenodorus was a native of Lampsacus: he was a + friend of Epicurus, and though he had previously obtained a high + reputation as a mathematician, he was persuaded by him at last to + agree with him as to the worthlessness of geometry. + + 25 Hieronymus was a disciple of Aristotle and a contemporary of + Arcesilaus. He lived down to the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus. + + 26 Trabea was a Roman comic poet, who flourished about 130 B.C. + + 27 Dark, obscure. + + 28 We know nothing more of Callipho than what we derive from this and + one or two other notices of him by Cicero. + + 29 The Hymnis was a comedy of Menander, translated by Caecilius. + + 30 It is hardly possible to translate this so as to give the force of + the original. Cicero says, If _cupiditas_ is in a man he must be + _cupidus_, and we have no English word which will at all answer to + this adjective in this sense. + + 31 The Latin is "quicum in tenebris,"--the proverb at full length being, + "Dignus quicum in tenebris mices." Micare was a game played, (much + the same as that now called _La Mora_ in Italy,) by extending the + fingers and making the antagonist guess how many fingers were + extended by the two together. + + 32 This was Quintus Pompeius, the first man who raised his family to + importance at Rome. He was consul B.C. 141. Being commander in + Spain, he laid siege to Numantia; and having lost great numbers of + his troops through cold and disease, he proposed to the Numantines + to come to terms. Publicly he required of them an unconditional + surrender, but in private he only demanded the restoration of the + prisoners and deserters, that they should give hostages and pay + thirty talents. The Numantines agreed to this, and paid part of the + money, but when Popilius Laenas arrived in Spain as his successor, he + denied the treaty, though it had been witnessed by his own officers. + The matter was referred to the senate, who on the evidence of + Pompeius declared the treaty invalid, and the war was renewed. + + 33 The Voconia lex was passed on the proposal of Quintus Voconius Saxa, + one of the tribunes, B.C. 169. One of its provisions was, that a + woman could not be left the heiress of any person who was rated in + the census at 100,000 sesterces; though she could take the + inheritance _per fidei commissum_. But as the law applied only to + wills, a daughter could inherit from a father dying intestate, + whatever the amount of his property might be. A person who was not + _census_ could make a woman his heir. There is, however, a good deal + of obscurity and uncertainty as to some of the provisions of this + law. + + 34 There appears to be some corruption in the text here. + + 35 Spurius Lucretius Tricipitinus, the father of Lucretia, was made + consul as the colleague of Valerius Publicola, in the place of + Brutus, who had been slain in battle by Aruns, one of the sons of + Tarquin. + + 36 Themista was a female philosopher, wife of a man named Leonteus, or + Leon, and a friend and correspondent of Epicurus. + + 37 He means when he was banished, and when Torquatus joined in + promoting the measures for his recal. + + 38 Cicero alludes here to the story of Damon, who, when his friend + Pythias was condemned to death by Dionysius of Syracuse, pledged his + life for his return in time to be put to death, if the tyrant would + give him leave to go home for the purpose of arranging his affairs, + and Pythias did return in time.--See Cic. de Off. iii. 10; Just. Div. + v. 22. + + 39 B.C. 363. + + 40 B.C. 480. + + 41 The Greek line occurs in the Orestes, 207. + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}. + + Virgil has the same idea-- + + Vos et Scyllaeam rabiem, penitusque sonantes + Accetis scopulos, vos et Cyclopia saxa + Experti; revocate animos, moestumque timorem + Pellite: forsan et haec olim meminisse juvabit.--AEn. i. 200. + + Which Dryden translates-- + + With me the rocks of Scylla have you tried, + Th' inhuman Cyclops and his den defied: + What greater ills hereafter can you bear? + Resume your courage and dismiss your care; + An hour will come with pleasure to relate + Your sorrows past as benefits of fate. + + 42 That is, of the past, the present, and the future. + + 43 This seems to refer to the Greek epigram-- + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}. + + Which may be translated-- + + Him who the paths of land and sea disturb'd, + Sail'd o'er the earth, walk'd o'er the humbled waves, + Three hundred spears of dauntless Sparta curb'd. + Shame on you, land and sea, ye willing slaves! + + 44 The Latin is _aerumnae_: perhaps it is in allusion to this passage + that Juvenal says-- + + Et potiores + Herculis _aerumnas_ credat, saevosque labores + Et Venere et coenis, et pluma Sardanapali. + + Sat. x. 361. + + 45 The great Lucullus, father of this young Lucullus, was married to + Servilia, half-sister to Cato, and daughter of Quintus Servilius + Caepio, who was killed in the Social war, having been decoyed into an + ambush by Pompaedius, B.C. 90. The young Lucullus was afterwards + killed in the battle of Philippi. + + 46 "Malitia, badness of quality ... especially malice, ill-will, spite, + malevolence, artfulness, cunning, craft."--Riddle and Arnold, Lat. + Dict. + + 47 The Greek proverb was, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}. + + 48 The Curia Hostilia was built by Tullus Hostilius, and was originally + the only place where a Senatus Consultum could be passed, though the + senate met at times in other places. But, under Caesar, the Curia + Julia, an immense edifice, had been built as the senate-house. + + 49 Pope's Homer, Odys. xii. 231. + + 50 Archilochus was a native of Paros, and flourished about 714-676, + B.C. His poems were chiefly Iambics of bitter satire. Horace speaks + of him as the inventor of Iambics, and calls himself his pupil. + + Parios ego primus Iambos + Ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus + Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben. + + Epist. I. xix. 25. + + And in another place he says-- + + Archilochum proprio rabies armavit Iambo.--A. P. 74. + + 51 This was Livius Andronicus: he is supposed to have been a native of + Tarentum, and he was made prisoner by the Romans, during their wars + in Southern Italy; owing to which he became the slave of M. Livius + Salinator. He wrote both comedies and tragedies, of which Cicero + (Brutus 18) speaks very contemptuously, as "Livianae fabulae non satis + dignae quae iterum legantur,"--not worth reading a second time. He also + wrote a Latin Odyssey, and some hymns, and died probably about B.C. + 221. + + 52 C. Fabius, surnamed Pictor, painted the temple of Salus, which the + dictator C. Junius Brutus Bubulus dedicated B.C. 302. The temple was + destroyed by fire in the reign of Claudius. The painting is highly + praised by Dionysius, xvi. 6. + + 53 For an account of the ancient Greek philosophers, see the sketch at + the end of the volume. + + 54 Isocrates was born at Athens, B.C. 436. He was a pupil of Gorgias, + Prodicus and Socrates. He opened a school of rhetoric, at Athens, + with great success. He died by his own hand at the age of 98. + + 55 So Horace joins these two classes as inventors of all kinds of + improbable fictions-- + + Pictoribus atque poetis + Quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas.--A. P. 9. + + Which Roscommon translates-- + + Painters and poets have been still allow'd + Their pencil and their fancies unconfined. + + 56 Epicharmus was a native of Cos, but lived at Megara, in Sicily, and + when Megara was destroyed, removed to Syracuse, and lived at the + court of Hiero, where he became the first writer of comedies, so + that Horace ascribes the invention of comedy to him, and so does + Theocritus. He lived to a great age. + + 57 Pherecydes was a native of Scyros, one of the Cyclades; and is said + to have obtained his knowledge from the secret books of the + Phoenicians. He is said also to have been a pupil of Pittacus, the + rival of Thales, and the master of Pythagoras. His doctrine was that + there were three principles, {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, or AEther, {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, or Chaos, and + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, or Time; and four elements, Fire, Earth, Air, and Water, + from which everything that exists was formed.--Vide Smith's Dict. + Gr., and Rom. Biog. + + 58 Archytas was a native of Tarentum, and is said to have saved the + life of Plato by his influence with the tyrant Dionysius. He was + especially great as a mathematician and geometrician, so that Horace + calls him + + Maris et terrae numeroque carentis arenae + Mensorem--Od. i. 28. 1. + + Plato is supposed to have learnt some of his views from him, and + Aristotle to nave borrowed from him every idea of the Categories. + + 59 This was not Timaeus the historian, but a native of Locri, who is + said also in the De Finibus (c. 29) to have been a teacher of Plato. + There is a treatise extant bearing his name, which is, however, + probably spurious, and only an abridgment of Plato's dialogue + Timaeus. + + 60 Dicaearchus was a native of Messana, in Sicily, though he lived + chiefly in Greece; he was one of the later disciples of Aristotle. + He was a great geographer, politician, historian, and philosopher, + and died about B.C. 285. + + 61 Aristoxenus was a native of Tarentum, and also a pupil of Aristotle. + We know nothing of his opinions except that he held the soul to be a + _harmony_ of the body; a doctrine which had been already discussed + by Plato in the Phaedo, and combated by Aristotle. He was a great + musician, and the chief portions of his works which have come down + to us are fragments of some musical treatises.--Smith's Dict. Gr. and + Rom. Biog., to which source I must acknowledge my obligation for + nearly the whole of these biographical notes. + + 62 The Simonides here meant, is the celebrated poet of Ceos, the + perfecter of Elegiac poetry among the Greeks. He flourished about + the time of the Persian war. Besides his poetry, he is said to have + been the inventor of some method of aiding the memory. He died at + the court of Hiero, B.C. 467. + + 63 Theodectes was a native of Phaselis, in Pamphylia, a distinguished + rhetorician and tragic poet, and flourished in the time of Philip of + Macedon. He was a pupil of Isocrates, and lived at Athens, and died + there at the age of 41. + + 64 Cineas was a Thessalian, and (as is said in the text) came to Rome + as ambassador from Pyrrhus after the battle of Heraclea, B.C. 280, + and his memory is said to have been so great that on the day after + his arrival he was able to address all the senators and knights by + name. He probably died before Pyrrhus returned to Italy, B.C. 276. + + 65 Charmadas, called also Charmides, was a fellow pupil with Philo, the + Larissaean of Clitomachus, the Carthaginian. He is said by some + authors to have founded a fourth academy. + + 66 Metrodorus was a minister of Mithridates the Great; and employed by + him as supreme judge in Pontus, and afterwards as an ambassador. + Cicero speaks of him in other places (De Orat. ii. 88) as a man of + wonderful memory. + + 67 Quintus Hortensius was eight years older than Cicero; and, till + Cicero's fame surpassed his, he was accounted the most eloquent of + all the Romans. He was Verres's counsel in the prosecution conducted + against him by Cicero. Seneca relates that his memory was so great + that he could come out of an auction and repeat the catalogue + backwards. He died B.C. 50. + + 68 This treatise is one which has not come down to us, but which had + been lately composed by Cicero in order to comfort himself for the + loss of his daughter. + + 69 The epigram is-- + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}, {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. + + Which may be translated, perhaps-- + + Farewell, O sun, Cleombrotus exclaim'd, + Then plung'd from off a height beneath the sea; + Stung by pain, of no disgrace ashamed, + But mov'd by Plato's high philosophy. + + 70 This is alluded to by Juvenal-- + + Provida Pompeio dederat Campania febres + Optandas: sed multae urbes et publica vota + Vicerunt. Igitur Fortuna ipsius et Urbis, + Servatum victo caput abstulit.--Sat. x. 283. + + 71 Pompey's second wife was Julia, the daughter of Julius Caesar; she + died the year before the death of Crassus, in Parthia. Virgil speaks + of Caesar and Pompey as relations, using the same expression (socer) + as Cicero-- + + Aggeribus socer Alpinis atque arce Monoeci + Descendens, gener adversis instructus Eois.--AEn. vi. 830. + + 72 This idea is beautifully expanded by Byron:-- + + Yet if, as holiest men have deem'd, there be + A land of souls beyond that sable shore + To shame the doctrine of the Sadducee + And sophist, madly vain of dubious lore, + How sweet it were in concert to adore + With those who made our mortal labours light, + To hear each voice we fear'd to hear no more, + Behold each mighty shade reveal'd to sight, + The Bactrian, Samian sage, and all who taught the right. + + _Childe Harold_, ii. 8. + + 73 The epitaph in the original is,-- + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND OXIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. + + 74 This was expressed in the Greek verses-- + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}; + + which by some authors are attributed to Homer. + + 75 This is the first fragment of the Cresphontes.--Ed. Var. vii. p. 594 + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}. + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. + + 76 The Greek verses are quoted by Plutarch-- + + ... {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}. + + 77 This refers to the story that when Eumolpus, the son of Neptune, + whose assistance the Eleusinians had called in against the + Athenians, had been slain by the Athenians, an oracle demanded the + sacrifice of one of the daughters of Erechtheus, the King of Athens. + And when one was drawn by lot, the others voluntarily accompanied + her to death. + + 78 Menoeceus was son of Creon, and in the war of the Argives against + Thebes, Teresias declared that the Thebans should conquer if + Menoeceus would sacrifice himself for his country; and accordingly he + killed himself outside the gates of Thebes. + + 79 The Greek is, + + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. + + 80 Soph. Trach. 1047. + + 81 The lines quoted by Cicero here, appear to have come from the Latin + play of Prometheus by Accius; the ideas are borrowed rather than + translated from the Prometheus of AEschylus. + + 82 From Exerceo. + + 83 Each soldier carried a stake, to help form a palisade in front of + the camp. + + 84 Insania--from _in_, a particle of negative force in composition, and + _sanus_, healthy, sound. + + 85 The man who first received this surname was L. Calpurnius Piso, who + was consul, B.C. 133, in the Servile War. + + 86 The Greek is-- + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}.--Il. ix. 642. + + I have given Pope's translation in the text. + + 87 This is from the Theseus-- + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}. + + 88 Ter. Phorm. II. i. 11. + + 89 This refers to the speech of Agamemnon in Euripides, in the + Iphigenia in Aulis-- + + ... {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}.--v. 15. + + 90 This is a fragment from the Hypsipyle-- + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}; + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}, + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}. {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. + + 91 {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}.--Il. x. 15. + + 92 {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}.--Il. vi. 201. + + 93 This is a translation from Euripides-- + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}.--Med. 57. + + 94 {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}? + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}.--Hom. Il. xix. 226. + + 95 This is one of the fragments of Euripides which we are unable to + assign to any play in particular; it occurs Var. Ed. Tr. Inc. 167. + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}; + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. + + 96 This is only a fragment preserved by Stobaeus-- + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}, + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}; + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}. + + 97 {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}. + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}. {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}. + + AEsch. Prom. v. 378. + + 98 Cicero alludes here to Il. vii. 211, which is thus translated by + Pope-- + + His massy javelin quivering in his hand, + He stood the bulwark of the Grecian band; + Through every Argive heart new transport ran, + All Troy stood trembling at the mighty man: + E'en Hector paused, and with new doubt oppress'd, + Felt his great heart suspended in his breast; + 'Twas vain to seek retreat, and vain to fear, + Himself had challenged, and the foe drew near. + + But Melmoth (Note on the Familiar Letters of Cicero, book ii. Let. + 23) rightly accuses Cicero of having misunderstood Homer, who "by no + means represents Hector as being thus totally dismayed at the + approach of his adversary; and indeed it would have been + inconsistent with the general character of that hero to have + described him under such circumstances of terror." + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. + + But there is a great difference, as Dr. Clarke remarks, between + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} and {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, or + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}.--_The Trojans_, says Homer, _trembled_ at + the sight of Ajax, and even Hector himself felt some emotion in his + breast. + + 99 Cicero means Scipio Nasica, who in the riots consequent on the + re-election of Tiberius Gracchus to the tribunate, B.C. 133, having + called in vain on the consul, Mucius Scaevola, to save the republic, + attacked Gracchus himself, who was slain in the tumult. + + 100 Morosus is evidently derived from mores--"Morosus, mos, stubbornness, + selfwill, etc."--Riddle and Arnold, Lat. Diet. + + 101 In the original they run thus:-- + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. + + 102 This passage is from the Eunuch of Terence, Act i. sc. 1, 14. + + 103 These verses are from the Atreus of Accius. + + 104 This was Marcus Atilius Regulus, the story of whose treatment by the + Carthaginians in the first Punic War is well known to everybody. + + 105 This was Quintus Servilius Caepio, who, B.C. 105, was destroyed, with + his army, by the Cimbri,--it was believed as a judgment for the + covetousness which he had displayed in the plunder of Tolosa. + + 106 This was Marcus Aquilius, who, in the year B.C. 88, was sent against + Mithridates as one of the consular legates: and being defeated, was + delivered up to the king by the inhabitants of Mitylene. Mithridates + put him to death by pouring molten gold down his throat. + + 107 This was the elder brother of the triumvir Marcus Crassus, B.C. 87. + He was put to death by Fimbria, who was in command of some of the + troops of Marius. + + 108 Lucius Caesar and Caius Caesar were relations (it is uncertain in what + degree) of the great Caesar, and were killed by Fimbria on the same + occasion as Octavius. + + 109 M. Antonius was the grandfather of the triumvir; he was murdered the + same year, B.C. 87, by Annius, when Marius and Cinna took Rome. + + 110 This story is alluded to by Horace-- + + Districtus ensis cui super impia + Cervice pendet non Siculae dapes + Dulcem elaborabunt saporem, + Non avium citharaeve cantus + Somnum reducent.--iii. 1. 17. + + 111 Hieronymus was a Rhodian, and a pupil of Aristotle, flourishing + about 300 B.C. He is frequently mentioned by Cicero. + + 112 We know very little of Dinomachus. Some MSS. have Clitomachus. + + 113 Callipho was in all probability a pupil of Epicurus, but we have no + certain information about him. + + 114 Diodorus was a Syrian, and succeeded Critolaus as the head of the + Peripatetic School at Athens. + + 115 Aristo was a native of Ceos, and a pupil of Lycon, who succeeded + Stratton as the head of the Peripatetic School, B.C. 270. He + afterwards himself succeeded Lycon. + + 116 Pyrrho was a native of Elis, and the originator of the sceptical + theories of some of the ancient philosophers. He was a contemporary + of Alexander. + + 117 Herillus was a disciple of Zeno of Cittium, and therefore a Stoic. + He did not, however, follow all the opinions of his master: he held + that knowledge was the chief good. Some of the treatises of + Cleanthes were written expressly to confute him. + + 118 Anacharsis was (Herod, iv. 76) son of Gnurus and brother of Saulius, + king of Thrace. He came to Athens while Solon was occupied in + framing laws for his people; and by the simplicity of his way of + living, and his acute observations on the manners of the Greeks, he + excited such general admiration, that he was reckoned by some + writers among the seven wise men of Greece. + + 119 This was Appius Claudius Caecus, who was censor B.C. 310, and who, + according to Livy, was afflicted with blindness by the gods for + persuading the Potitii to instruct the public servants in the way of + sacrificing to Hercules. He it was who made the Via Appia. + + 120 The fact of Homer's blindness rests on a passage in the Hymn to + Apollo, quoted by Thucydides as a genuine work of Homer, and which + is thus spoken of by one of the most accomplished scholars that this + country or this age has ever produced:--"They are indeed beautiful + verses, and if none worse had ever been attributed to Homer, the + Prince of Poets would have had little reason to complain. + + "He has been describing the Delian festival in honour of Apollo and + Diana, and concludes this part of the poem with an address to the + women of that island, to whom it is to be supposed that he had + become familiarly known by his frequent recitations: + + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}? + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, + {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}, + {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}. + + Virgins, farewell,--and oh! remember me + Hereafter, when some stranger from the sea, + A hapless wanderer, may your isle explore, + And ask you, "Maids, of all the bards you boast, + Who sings the sweetest, and delights you most?" + Oh! answer all,--"A blind old man, and poor, + Sweetest he sings, and dwells on Chios' rocky shore." + + --_Coleridge's Introduction to the Study of the Greek Classic Poets._ + + + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ACADEMIC QUESTIONS*** + + + +CREDITS + + +June 26, 2009 + + Project Gutenberg TEI edition 1 + Produced by Ted Garvin, David King, and the Online Distributed + Proofreading Team at <http://www.pgdp.net/>. + + + +A WORD FROM PROJECT GUTENBERG + + +This file should be named 29247.txt or 29247.zip. + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + + + http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/9/2/4/29247/ + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one -- the old editions will be +renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no one +owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and +you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission +and without paying copyright royalties. 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