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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/31205-8.txt b/31205-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8703f8d --- /dev/null +++ b/31205-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12391 @@ +Project Gutenberg's The Philosophy of Spinoza, by Baruch de Spinoza + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Philosophy of Spinoza + +Author: Baruch de Spinoza + +Editor: Joseph Ratner + +Release Date: February 7, 2010 [EBook #31205] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA *** + + + + +Produced by Alicia Williams and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + +------------------------------------------------------------+ + | Transcriber's Note | + | | + | Obvious typographical errors have been corrected in | + | this text. For a complete list, please see the bottom of | + | this document. | + +------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + +THE PHILOSOPHY + +OF + +SPINOZA + + +EDITED BY +JOSEPH RATNER + + +TUDOR PUBLISHING COMPANY + +_Printed in the United States of America_ + + + + +PREFACE + + +Selections usually need no justifications. Some justification, however, +of the treatment accorded Spinoza's _Ethics_ may be necessary in this +place. The object in taking the _Ethics_ as much as possible out of the +geometrical form, was not to improve upon the author's text; it was to +give the lay reader a text of Spinoza he would find pleasanter to read +and easier to understand. To the practice of popularization, Spinoza, +one may confidently feel, would not be averse. He himself gave a short +popular statement of his philosophy in the _Political Treatise_. + +The lay reader of philosophy is chiefly, if not wholly, interested in +grasping a philosophic point of view. He is not interested in highly +meticulous details, and still less is he interested in checking up the +author's statements to see if the author is consistent with himself. He +takes such consistency, even if unwarrantedly, for granted. A continuous +reading of the original _Ethics_, even on a single topic, is impossible. +The subject-matter is coherent, but the propositions do not hang +together. By omitting the formal statement of the propositions; by +omitting many of the demonstrations and almost all cross-references; by +grouping related sections of the _Ethics_ (with selections from the +_Letters_ and the _Improvement of the Understanding_) under sectional +headings, the text has been made more continuous. It is the only time, +probably, dismembering a treatise actually made it more unified. + +In an Appendix, the sources of the selections from the _Ethics_ are +summarily indicated. It would be a meaningless burden on the text to +make full acknowledgments in footnotes. For the same reason, there has +been almost no attempt made to show, by means of the conventional +devices, the re-arrangements and abridgements that have been made. Every +care has been taken not to distort in any way the meaning of the text. +And that is all that is important in a volume of this kind. + +Wherever possible Spinoza's own chapter headings have been retained; and +some of the sectional headings have either been taken from, or have been +based upon expressions in the text. It would have been more in keeping +with contemporary form to use the title _On Historical Method_ or _The +New History_ instead of _Of the Interpretation of Scripture_; a chapter +on _Race Superiority_ would sound more important than one on _The +Vocation of the Hebrews_; but such modernizing changes were not made +because the aim has been to give the reader a text as faithful to the +original as the character of this volume would allow. + +The selections have been taken from Elwes' translation of the _Tractatus +Theologico-Politicus_, _A Political Treatise_ and the _Improvement of +the Understanding_; and from White's translation of the _Ethics_. These +translations are no longer in copyright and hence it was not necessary +to secure permission from the publishers to use them. Nonetheless, +grateful acknowledgment is their just due. + +White, in his translation, uses, not altogether without reason, the +stilted term "affect" instead of the natural English term "emotion." +"Affect" is closer to the Latin and it more clearly indicates the +metaphysical status of the emotions as "modes" or "affectiones" of +Substance. Still, practically no one has followed White in his usage. +The reasons are not difficult to discover. Besides being a stilted term, +having no legitimate English status, "affect" very often makes the text +extremely obscure, even unintelligible to one who has no antecedent +knowledge of it, because besides having also its ordinary English +meaning, "affect" is used by White to mean "mode" or "modification" +("affection") as well. In the circumstances, therefore, I thought it +advisable to change "affect" to "emotion" and "affection" to +"modification" or "mode." I also corrected White's translation of the +Definition of Attribute by deleting the word "if." In spite of the need +for these changes, it was desirable to use White's translation because +it is the most accurate and elegant extant. + +Furthermore, in both White and Elwes I have consistently capitalized the +term Nature, in accordance with Spinoza's Latin text; White and Elwes +capitalize it only desultorily. I have made some slight changes in +Elwes' mid-Victorian punctuation and White's all-too-faithful +paragraphing. The Latin paragraphs of the _Ethics_ are extremely long. +These changes are all external and as far as I can see thoroughly +legitimate as well as justified. The very slight and very occasional +internal changes I have made--other than those already accounted for--I +have indicated by square brackets. + +I am indebted to Mr. Houston Peterson, of Columbia University, for +suggesting to me the idea of arranging a volume of selections from +Spinoza. I am alone responsible, however, for the actual selections and +arrangements, and for the idea of taking the _Ethics_ out of its +geometrical form. Professor Morris R. Cohen, of the College of the City +of New York, read this volume in manuscript; I am indebted to him for +some valuable suggestions. I am also indebted very greatly to a friend +(who prefers not to be acknowledged) for invaluable help in getting the +manuscript into shape. + +JOSEPH RATNER. + +_October, 1926._ + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE +PREFACE v +THE LIFE OF SPINOZA xi +INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA xxvii + + +FIRST PART + +ON GOD + +CHAPTER + + I. OF SUPERSTITION 3 + II. OF THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE 11 + III. OF PROPHETS AND PROPHECY 36 + IV. OF THE VOCATION OF THE HEBREWS 64 + V. OF THE DIVINE LAW 71 + VI. OF THE CEREMONIAL LAW 88 + VII. OF MIRACLES 103 + VIII. OF THE DIVINE NATURE 122 + + +SECOND PART + +ON MAN + + IX. THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN MIND 155 + X. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 173 + XI. DETERMINISM AND MORALS 191 + XII. THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 211 + XIII. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMOTIONS 236 + + +THIRD PART + +ON MAN'S WELL-BEING + + XIV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE 251 + XV. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MORAL LIFE 266 + XVI. OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE 297 + XVII. OF SUPREME AUTHORITIES 314 + XVIII. FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH 333 + XIX. OF HUMAN FREEDOM 345 + XX. OF HUMAN BLESSEDNESS AND THE ETERNITY + OF THE MIND 361 + +APPENDIX 377 + + + + +THE LIFE OF SPINOZA + + +Baruch de Spinoza was born into the Jewish community of Amsterdam on +November 24, 1632. His parents were Jews who had fled, along with many +others, from the vicious intolerance of the Inquisition to the limited +and hesitant freedom of Holland. At the time Spinoza was born, the +Jewish refugees had already established themselves to a certain extent +in their new home. They had won, for example, the important right to +build a synagogue. Still, they did not enjoy the complete freedom and +peace of mind of an independent and securely protected people. Although +one could be a Jew in Amsterdam, one had to be a Jew with considerable +circumspection. Whatever might prove in any way offensive to the +political authority had to be scrupulously eschewed. For, as is always +the case, minority groups which are simply tolerated have to suffer for +the offenses of any of their members. The Jews of Amsterdam thoroughly +understood this. They knew that any significant default on the part of +one member of their community would not, in all likelihood, be +considered by the authorities to be a default of that one person +alone--a failing quite in the order of human nature; they knew it would +be considered a manifestation of an essential vice characteristic of the +whole community. And the whole community would have to suffer, in +consequence, an exaggerated punishment which the individual delinquent +himself may well not merit. + +It was inevitable that the intellectual life of the Jews of Amsterdam +should bear the marks of their inner and outer social constraints. Their +intellectual life was cramped and ineffectual. Indiscriminate erudition, +not independent thought, was all the Jewish leaders, connected in one +way or another with the Synagogue, were able to achieve. It was far +safer to cling to the innocuous past than it was to strike out boldly +into the future. Any independence of thought that was likely to prove +socially dangerous as well as schismatic was promptly suppressed. The +humiliation and excommunication (circa 1640) of the indecisive martyr +Uriel da Costa when he ventured to entertain doctrines that were not +orthodox, were prompted as much by political as by religious +considerations. It is true, many of the faithful were attracted by +Cabbalistic wonders and the strange hope of being saved from a bitter +exile by a Messianic Sabbatai Zevi. But these wayward deviations, in +reality not so very far removed from orthodox tradition, exhibited only +the more clearly the fearsome inner insecurity which a strained +formalism in thought and habit bravely attempted to cover. + +In such social and intellectual atmosphere Spinoza grew up. Of his early +life, practically nothing is known. His parents, we know, were at least +fairly well-to-do, for Spinoza received a good education. And we know +that he was, when about fifteen years of age, one of the most brilliant +and promising of Rabbi Saul Levi Morteira's pupils. Everyone who then +knew Spinoza expected great things of him. He proved himself to be a +very acute rabbinical student; at that early age already somewhat too +critical, if anything, to suit the orthodox. But all felt reasonably +confident he would become a distinguished Rabbi, and perhaps a great +commentator of the Bible. Of course, of the orthodox sort. + +But the Rabbis were early disillusioned. Spinoza soon found the learning +of the Synagogue insufficient and unsatisfactory. He sought the wisdom +of secular philosophy and science. But in order to satisfy his +intellectual desires it was necessary to study Latin. And Latin was not +taught in the Synagogue. + +An anonymous German taught Spinoza the rudiments of the language that +was to enable him to enter into the important current of modern ideas +especially embodied in the philosophy of Descartes. Francis Van den Ende +gave him a thorough technical, not literary, mastery of it. And Van den +Ende taught Spinoza much more besides. He acquainted him with the +literature of antiquity; he gave him a sound knowledge of the +contemporary fundamentals of physiology and physics; and it was he +possibly, who introduced him to the philosophy of Descartes and the +lyrical philosophic speculation of Bruno. He did much also (we may +easily infer) to encourage the independence of mind and the freedom in +thinking Spinoza had already manifested in no inconsiderable degree. For +although this Van den Ende was a Catholic physician and Latin master by +profession, he was a free thinker in spirit and reputation. And if we +are to believe the horrified public suspicion, he taught a select few of +his Latin pupils the grounds of his heterodox belief. As one can easily +understand, to study Latin with Van den Ende was not the most innocent +thing one could do. Certainly, to become a favorite pupil and assistant +teacher of Van den Ende's was, socially, decidedly bad. But Spinoza was +not deterred by the possible social consequences of his search for +knowledge and truth. He took full advantage of his opportunities and did +not hesitate to follow wherever his master might lead. + +Van den Ende was also something of a political adventurer; he finally +paid the unsuccessful conspirator's price on the gallows in Paris. It is +not at all unlikely that Spinoza's hard-headed political and ethical +realism was, in significant measure, due to his early intimacy with his +variously gifted and interesting Latin master. We know that Spinoza was +at least strongly attracted, in later life, by the Italian political +insurgent Masaniello, for Spinoza drew a portrait of himself in the +Italian's costume. Machiavelli's influence, too, upon Spinoza was very +great--an influence that would but be a continuation of Van den Ende's. + +Spinoza may have been indebted to Van den Ende for one other thing: his +only recorded romance. There is some question about this indebtedness +because tradition does not speak very confidently, in some essentials, +about Van den Ende's daughter Clara Maria. Clara, tradition is agreed, +was intellectually and artistically well endowed, although she was not +very good looking. In her father's absence on political affairs she took +his place in the school, teaching music as well as Latin. But tradition +is somewhat disconcerting when it comes to Clara's age when Spinoza +knew her. According to some chronological researches, the fair object of +Spinoza's supposed devotion, was only twelve years old. Hardly of an age +to warrant Spinoza's love, unless he loved her as Dante loved Beatrice. +A somewhat improbable possibility. The tradition that is less sparing of +Clara's age is, however, even more sparing of her character: the success +of Spinoza's supposed rival--a fellow-student by name, Kerkrinck--is +attributed to the seductive powers of a pearl necklace. In spite of the +fact that tradition reckons this gift to have been of decisive +importance, one does not like to believe that a girl of high +intellectual and artistic ability could be so easily and fatefully +overcome by a mere trinket. Still less does one like to believe that +Spinoza fell in love with a girl whose mind was so far removed from the +joys that are eternal and spiritual. But, of course, it is conceivable +that the girl took the trinket symbolically; or else that Spinoza, who +had given all his time to rabbinical and philosophical studies was, in +the circumstances, quite justifiably deceived. + +Spinoza had not yet been graduated from his student days when the +Synagogue thought him a fit object for official censure and threat. It +seems Spinoza was betrayed into overt indiscretion by two +fellow-students from the Synagogue, who asked for his opinion regarding +the existence of angels, the corporeality of God and the immortality of +the soul. Spinoza's answers were not complete, but incomplete as they +were, they yet revealed a mind that was, to the faithful, shockingly +astray from the orthodox path. Spinoza was to have elaborated upon his +answers at a later date but the students had heard, apparently, quite +enough. Instead of returning to Spinoza they went to the authorities of +the Synagogue. The authorities were quite disposed by Spinoza's +association with Van den Ende and his perceptible neglect of ceremonial +observances, to believe him capable of any intellectual villainy. They +promptly set about to reclaim the erring soul. Report has it they sought +two means: they offered Spinoza an annuity of 1,000 florins if he would, +in all overt ways, speech and action, conform to the established +opinions and customs of the Synagogue; or, if he did not see the wisdom +and profit of compliance, they threatened to isolate him by +excommunication. Again social politics as much as established religion +demanded the action the Synagogue took. Their experience with Uriel da +Costa was still very fresh in their minds and they must have felt fairly +confident that Spinoza would be warned by the fate of his heretical +predecessor if not counseled by the wisdom of the Fathers. But Spinoza +was of a firmness they did not reckon on. He did not hearken to their +censure nor cower at their threat. The thirty days or so in which he was +given to reform passed without discovering in him any change. +Excommunication had to be pronounced. When barely twenty-four years old, +Spinoza found himself cut off from the race of Israel with all the +prescribed curses of excommunication upon his head. + +Spinoza was not present when excommunication was pronounced upon him. He +had left Amsterdam to stay with some Collegiant friends on the Ouwerkerk +road, for, so one tradition relates, an attempt had been made by one of +the over-righteous upon Spinoza's life soon after he became an object +of official displeasure. Although Spinoza was, throughout his life, +ready to suffer the consequences of his opinions and actions, he at no +time had the least aspiration to become a martyr. When Spinoza heard of +his excommunication he sent a spirited and unyielding reply. The spirit +if not the words of that reply (not yet discovered) eventually made its +way into the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_. For the rest of his life, +whenever he had occasion to refer to the Jews, Spinoza referred to them +as he did to the Gentiles--a race to which he did not belong. And +immediately, with the perfect grace and humor of a cultured mind, he +changed his name from Baruch to Benedict, quite confident one can be as +blessed in Latin as in Hebrew. + +The subsequent course of Spinoza's life was almost completely +untroubled, though it was unmitigatingly austere. He took up the trade +of polishing lenses as a means of earning his simple bread. He was +somewhat influenced in his decision by the advice in the _Ethics of the +Fathers_ that every one should do some manual work. But it was also +quite the fashion at that period for learned men, interested in science, +to polish lenses, as a hobby of course, not as a means of support. +Spinoza's choice was not altogether wise in spite of its learned +associations and the fact that he soon gained an enviable reputation as +a young scientist. The early recognition Spinoza received from men like +Henry Oldenburg, the first secretary of the Royal Society, from Robert +Boyle and Huyghens, was hardly adequate recompense for the fine dust he +ground which aggravated his inherited tuberculosis and undoubtedly +considerably hastened his death. Spinoza's accomplishment in his chosen +trade was not merely practical. Many looked forward, with warranted +confidence, to the time when Spinoza would make a distinguished +contribution to the science of optics. But the only strictly scientific +work Spinoza left behind (long considered to have been lost) was a short +treatise on the rainbow. + +All Spinoza's intellectual energy went into service of his philosophy. +His earliest philosophical work (rediscovered (1862) in translated Dutch +manuscript) was a _Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being_. It is +a fragmentary, uneven work, chiefly valuable for the insight it gives +into the workings and development of Spinoza's mind. The _Ethics_, in +the completed form in which we have it (no manuscript of it is extant) +has the incredible appearance of a system of philosophy sprung +full-grown from an unhesitating mind. Even a most cursory reading of the +_Short Treatise_ completely dispels this preposterous illusion. The +_Ethics_ was the product of prolonged and critical toil. + +But just how prolonged it is difficult to say. For already as early as +1665 almost four-fifths of the _Ethics_ seems to have been written. We +learn as much from a letter Spinoza wrote to one of his friends +promising to send him the "third part" of his philosophy up to the +eightieth proposition. From the letter it is fairly clear that at that +time the _Ethics_ was divided into three, not five, parts. Also, in +letters written that same year to William Blyenbergh one finds expressed +some of the chief conclusions published five years later in the +_Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_. And Spinoza wrote, at this early +period, not conjecturally or speculatively, but as one writes who knows +the firm and tested grounds of his belief. Why the _Ethics_, in final +form, began to circulate privately only two or three years before +Spinoza's death, and why his work on _The Improvement of the +Understanding_ and his _Political Treatise_ were left unfinished, must +remain something of an insoluble philosophico-literary mystery. + +The only book Spinoza published in his own lifetime above his own name +was his _Principles of Descartes' Philosophy Geometrically Demonstrated_ +with an appendix of _Cogitata Metaphysica_ which he had dictated to a +youth (one "Cćsarius") "to whom (he) did not wish to teach (his) own +opinions openly." Discretion, as he had already learned and later +formally stated and proved, was not inconsonant with rational valor. The +only other book Spinoza published in his lifetime--the _Tractatus +Theologico-Politicus_--bore on its title page Spinoza's initials only, +and the name of a fictitious Hamburg publisher. When Spinoza heard, some +time later, that a Dutch translation of this work was being prepared, he +earnestly beseeched his friends to forestall its publication (which they +did) because only its Latin dress saved it from being officially +proscribed. It was then an open secret who the author was. Spinoza's +personal rule to incur as little official displeasure as possible made +him abandon his final literary project entertained in 1675. When he +began negotiations for the publication of the _Ethics_ a rumor spread +that he had in press a book proving that God does not exist. Complaint +was lodged with the prince and magistrates. "The stupid Cartesians," +Spinoza wrote Oldenburg "being suspected of favoring me, endeavored to +remove the aspersion by abusing every where my opinions and writings, a +course which they still pursue." In the circumstances, Spinoza thought +it wisest to delay publication till matters would change. But, +apparently, they did not change, or change sufficiently. The _Ethics_ +was first published about a year after Spinoza's death. + +In spite of the consensus of adverse, and somewhat vicious opinion, the +author of the _Tractatus_ did find favor in the eyes of some. The +Elector Palatine, Karl Ludwig, through his secretary Fabritius, offered +Spinoza the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg (1673). But Spinoza +graciously declined it. Although a more welcome or more honorable +opportunity to teach could not be conceived, it had never been his +ambition to leave his secluded station in life for one involving public +obligations. Even in his secluded corner, he found he had aroused more +public attention and sentiment than was altogether consonant with the +peace and retirement he sought. Besides, he did not know how well he +could fulfill the desires of the Elector by teaching nothing that would +tend to discomfit established religion. + +Spinoza had, in his young days, learned what extreme dangers one must +expect to encounter in a righteous community become inimical. In his +last years, he experienced a stern and tragic reminder. Two of Spinoza's +best friends, Cornelius and Jan de Witt, who had by a change in +political fortune become the enemies of the people, were brutally +murdered (1672). Spinoza for once, when this occurred, lost his +habitual philosophic calm. He could restrain neither his tears nor his +anger. He had to be forcibly prevented from leaving his house to post a +bill, at the scene of the murder, denouncing the criminal mob. A +somewhat similar crisis recurred shortly afterwards when Spinoza +returned from a visit to the hostile French camp. The object of his +mission is not unequivocally known. Some think it was to meet the Prince +of Condé solely in his private capacity of philosopher. It is certain +Spinoza was advised the French King would acknowledge a dedicated book +by means of a pension--an advice Spinoza did not act upon. Others think +his mission was political. His reputation as a distinguished man would +have made him a very likely ambassador. This conjecture would seem more +probable, however, if the de Witts, his intimate friends, had been still +in political power, instead of in their graves. But whatever Spinoza's +mission was, when he returned to the Hague, the populace branded him a +French spy. Spinoza's landlord feared his house would be wrecked, by an +infuriated mob. This time Spinoza exerted the calming influence. He +assured Van der Spijck that if any attempt were made on the house he +would leave it and face the mob, even if they should deal with him as +they did with the unfortunate de Witts. He was a good republican as all +knew. And those in high political authority knew the purpose of his +journey. Fortunately, popular suspicion and anger dissipated this time +without a sacrifice. Still, the incident showed quite clearly that +though Spinoza did not desire to be a martyr, he was no more afraid to +die than he was to live for the principles he had at heart. + +Spinoza's character, manifested in his life, has won the high admiration +of every one not bitterly hostile to him. And even his enemies +maintained and justified their hatred only by inventing calumnious +falsehoods about him. Unfounded rumors of an evil nature began to +circulate during his lifetime, and naturally increased in virulence and +volume after his death. At that period in human history, it was +popularly recognized that nothing good could be true, and nothing vile +could be false of an atheist--which was what Spinoza, of course, was +reputed to be. Oldenburg even, for years unflaggingly profuse in +expressions of devoted friendship and humble discipleship, an eager and +fearless advocate (supposedly) of the truth, a friend who lamented the +fact that the world was being denied the invaluable products of +Spinoza's unsurpassed intellect, and who, therefore, constantly urged +Spinoza, by all the advice of friendship, to publish his work without +delay, irrespective of popular prejudice--even Oldenburg began to +conceive a far from complimentary opinion of Spinoza after the +publication of the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_! So prevalent were +the groundless rumors that the Lutheran pastor, Colerus--the source of +most of our information--felt obliged in his very quaint summary +biography to defend the life and character of Spinoza. To his +everlasting credit, Colerus did this although he himself heartily +detested Spinoza's philosophy which he understood to be abhorrently +blasphemous and atheistic. Colerus' sources of information were the +best: he spoke to all who knew Spinoza at the Hague; and he himself was +intimate with the Van der Spijcks with whom Spinoza had lived the last +five years of his life, and with whom Colerus was now living--in +Spinoza's very room. + +Spinoza's courage and strength of mind are as impressively manifested in +the constant daily life he lived as in the few severe crises he +resolutely faced. For the twenty years of his excommunication he lived +in comparative retirement, if not isolation. The frugality of his life +bordered on asceticism. All his free time and energy Spinoza dedicated +with unusual single-hearted devotion to the disinterested development of +a philosophy he knew would not be very acceptable to the general or even +special philosophic reader. His mode of life is all the more remarkable +because it was not determined by embittered misanthropy or passionate +abhorrence of the goods of the world. It was dictated solely by what he +understood to be, in his circumstances, the reasonable life for him. +Although he was an eager correspondent, and had many friends whom he +valued above all things that are external to one's own soul, his +interest in his own work kept him from carrying on, for any length of +time, an active social life. He believed, too, that it is part of the +wisdom of life to refresh oneself with pleasant food and drink, with +delicate perfumes and the soft beauty of growing things, with music and +the theater, literature and painting. But his own income was too slender +to allow him much of these temperate riches of a rational life. And +always, rather than exert himself to increase his income, he would +decrease his expenditure. Still, he no doubt enjoyed the little he had. +He found very palatable, most likely, the simple food he himself +prepared in later life; and he must have gained additional satisfaction +from the thought that he was, because of his own cooking, living more +safely within his means. The pipe he smoked occasionally (let us hope) +was fragrant; the pint of wine a month very delectable. For mental +recreation he read fairly widely in literature, observed the habits of +insects, with the microscope as well as the naked eye. He also sometimes +drew ink or charcoal sketches of his visitors and himself. A fairly +plausible rumor has it that Rembrandt was his teacher. Unfortunately, +all of Spinoza's sketches were destroyed. + +Although Spinoza wanted to be independent and self-supporting he was not +irrationally zealous about it. He did not accept all the financial help +his friends were eager to give him, but he did accept some. One of his +young friends, Simon de Vries, before his early death occurred, wanted +to bequeath all of his estate to Spinoza. But Spinoza persuaded him not +to deprive his own brother of his natural inheritance. Even the annual +500 florins de Vries finally left him, Spinoza would not altogether +accept, offering the plea that so much wealth would surely take his mind +away from his philosophy. But he would accept 300 florins, a sum he felt +would not be burdensome or dangerous to his soul. This annuity he +regularly received until his death. His friends the de Witts, pensioned +him too; the heirs to the estate contested Spinoza's claim, whereupon +Spinoza promptly withdrew it. This high-minded action corrected their +covetousness, and from the de Witts, too, he received financial help +until his death. + +Spinoza's relations with the humble folk he stayed with exhibited the +modesty and grace of character that endeared him to his intimate +friends. When he was tired working in his own room, he would frequently +come down to smoke a pipe and chat with his landlady and landlord about +the simple affairs that filled their lives. His speech was "sweet and +easy;" his manner of a gentle, noble, beauty. Except for the occasion +when the de Witts were murdered, Spinoza never showed himself either +unduly merry or unduly sad. If ever he found that his emotions were +likely to escape his wise control, he would withdraw until such danger +had passed. We find the same characteristics exhibited in Spinoza's +correspondence. Although he found some of his correspondents sometimes +very trying, he never failed to be as courteous and considerate as the +circumstances would permit. Even when one Lambert de Velthuysen provoked +his righteous indignation, Spinoza tempered his caustic reply before +sending it off. + +Spinoza lived the ethics he wrote. As is the _Ethics_, so is his life +pervaded by a simple grandeur. And as he lived, so did he die. He had +not been feeling very well, and had sent for his friend and physician +Dr. Ludwig Meyer. A chicken broth was ordered for Spinoza of which he +partook quite healthily. No one suspected that he was this time fatally +ill. He came down in the morning, and spoke for some time with his +hosts. But when they returned from a visit that same afternoon (Sunday, +Feb. 21, 1677) they learned the sad, surprising news that Spinoza had +gently passed away, the only one by his bedside, his doctor and friend. + +Spinoza sought in his lifetime neither riches, nor sensual pleasure, nor +fame. He wrote and published his books when he could and thought +advisable because part of his joy consisted in extending, as he said, a +helping hand to others, in bringing them to see and understand things as +he did. If they did not see, or obdurately refused to understand, he did +not consider it part of his task to overcome them. He was animated by no +missionary zeal. He was content to search for the truth and to explain +what he found as best he could. The truth, he devoutly believed, would +make us free. But it was truth that we understood, not truth that was +forced upon us. He was quite satisfied to leave in his desk the +manuscript of his _Ethics_. People in his lifetime did not want to +listen to him. If ever they did after his death, they were cordially +welcome to. In death as in life they would find him faithful to his +ideal. + +Spinoza has often been likened to the old Hebrew prophets. He does not, +it is true, exhort the people to follow in the path of righteousness; it +is the philosopher's task simply to show the way. But the morality +Spinoza stands for is the old prophetic morality purified and made +consistent with itself. And Spinoza was, in his own time, as the +prophets were in theirs, a heretic and a rebel, a voice calling in the +wilderness--a wilderness that was later to become the very citadel of +civilization. Excommunicated by the Jews and vilified by the Gentiles +during his lifetime, Spinoza has, since his death, been canonized by +both alike as the most saintly and exalted of philosophers. Like his +forerunners of old, Spinoza was a prophet _in_ Israel, _for_ Mankind. + + + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA + + +I + +Spinoza's philosophy has suffered not a little from the highly abstruse +and technical form in which the _Ethics_ is written. Some, who are not +inured to the hardships of philosophy, quite naturally jump to the +conclusion that its formidable geometry contains only the most +inscrutable of philosophic mysteries; and a wise humility persuades them +to forego the unexampled enlightenment a mastery of the difficulties +would yield. Others, who are devoutly wedded to what they consider the +unreservedly empirical character of modern (that is, true) philosophy, +avoid the _Ethics_ because they are convinced, on general principles, +that only a mind hopelessly lost in the dark night of medieval +speculation could conceive of philosophy in such ultra-deductive +fashion. Reason was for so long servile to idle theology, it is not at +all surprising that a work exemplifying reason to such high degree as +does the _Ethics_, should receive scant respect from intrepid +empiricists. It is so easy to confuse the rationalizations of reason +with the nature of reason itself. + +Spinoza did not, however, choose the geometrical order because he +thought his philosophy too profound for ordinary exposition; nor did he +choose it because he was enmeshed in medieval philosophic speculation. +He chose it because his fundamental philosophic aim was to establish +ethics on a thoroughly tested, scientific foundation; and geometry, an +exemplar of all mathematical science, most completely embodied, at that +time, the highest scientific ideal. Man, Spinoza held, is a part of +Nature, and Nature is governed by eternal and immutable laws. It must be +just as possible, therefore, to apply the mathematical method to man, as +it is to apply it to matter. It must be possible to determine, with the +certitude obtainable in the exact sciences, what things are good for man +and what means he has for attaining them. + +Spinoza's belief in the self-sufficing, lawful order of Nature, and the +adequacy of the natural powers of our mind to understand the mysteries +(popularly so appraised) of heaven and earth, the singular expository +style of the _Ethics_ emphasizes in unmistakable fashion. Even for our +understanding of God's own nature, Divine Revelation, as commonly +interpreted in Spinoza's day and our own, is wholly unnecessary. We need +only the revelation afforded by the natural powers of reason operative +in us. In geometry, we do not blindly accept conclusions on faith, nor +do we reject them by authority. We are guided in our discovery of the +true and the false, solely by the light of our natural understanding. +And the truths we discover are not temporary fabrications of the human +mind, but eternal truths about the nature of things. Perhaps no other +single aspect of Spinoza's philosophy distinguishes Spinoza from the +medievalists as thoroughly as does his use of the geometrical order of +exposition; and no other single aspect, perhaps, justifies as +thoroughly Spinoza's claim to rank with the moderns if not even the +contemporaries. + +The geometer's method of starting with definitions and axioms and +proceeding from proposition to proposition especially appealed to +Spinoza, apart from the fact that geometry was an ideal science, +because, for Spinoza, the essence of logical method consists in starting +out with ideas that are of utter simplicity. Then, if the ideas are +understood at all, they can only be clearly and distinctly understood. +The absolutely simple we can either know or not know. We cannot be +confused about it. And ideas which are clearly and distinctly understood +are, according to Spinoza, necessarily true. Such unambiguously simple +and therefore necessarily true ideas Spinoza believed his definitions +and axioms expressed. Furthermore, if we gradually build up the body of +our science by means of our initial simple ideas, justifying ourselves +at every step by adequate proof, our final result will necessarily be as +firmly established and as certainly true as the elementary ideas we +started with. The reliability of this whole procedure more than +compensates for its tediousness--a defect Spinoza expressly recognizes. + +Unfortunately, however, there are other defects in the geometrical +method when it is applied to philosophy, far more serious than its +tediousness,--defects, moreover, Spinoza apparently did not recognize. +Even though the geometrical method is preëminently scientific, it is +hardly a form suitable for philosophy. The Euclidean geometer can take +it for granted that the reader understands what a line or plane, a solid +or an angle is. For formality, a curt definition is sufficient. But the +philosopher's fundamental terms and ideas are precisely those in need of +most careful and elaborate elucidation--something which cannot be given +in a formal definition or axiom. Also, in the geometrical form, the +burden of the author's attention is shifted from the clarification of +the propositions to the accurate demonstration of them. Which, in a +philosophical treatise, is most unfortunate. For though it is +undoubtedly highly desirable that the philosopher should observe the +same care and precision as the scientist, admitting nothing he cannot +prove, it is nevertheless just as well for the philosopher to take +reasonable care that what he is conscientiously proving is understood. +That Spinoza did not always take such care but considerably +over-estimated the self-evidence of his definitions and axioms and the +simplicity of many of his important propositions, is an unhappy fact +conclusively established by the increasing volume of Spinozistic +literature. + + +II + +However, in spite of the difficult, and to the literary repellent form +of the _Ethics_, the catholicity of Spinoza's influence has been +extremely remarkable. In time, his influence bids fair to equal in +range, if not in gross extent, the as yet unparalleled influence of the +artist-philosopher Plato. It took about a hundred years for Spinoza to +come into something of his own. For the _Ethics_ was condemned with the +_Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_ as an atheistic and immoral work. Only +when the romantic philosophers of Germany, following the lead of +Lessing and Jacobi, found in Spinoza a man who was, as they thought, +after their own heart, did Spinoza's mundane fortune change. As a result +of their efforts, Spinoza ceased to be a philosopher to be execrated in +public (though furtively read in private), and became a philosopher to +be eulogized on all occasions in most rhapsodic, if bewildering, terms. +Many others too, besides professional philosophers, began to read +Spinoza with much sympathy and unbounded admiration. Goethe, Matthew +Arnold, Heine, George Eliot, Flaubert, Coleridge, and Shelley--to +mention only a few distinguished lay names--found in Spinoza a powerful, +stimulating and, in varying degrees, congenial thinker. To-day, after +having been one of the liberating thinkers of mankind who was read but +not honored, Spinoza is fast becoming one of the canonized of mankind +who are honored but not read. + +The reason for Spinoza's magnificent influence is not difficult to +discover: his philosophy deals in a grand, illuminating way with all +that is of profoundest importance in human life. There is no material +the universe offers for man's life but Spinoza seeks to understand and +explain its rational function and utility. For Spinoza set before +himself the hard task of laying down the principles whereby men may +guide themselves aright in all the affairs of life--the lowest as well +as the highest. His philosophy, as a result, is at once the most exalted +and the most matter of fact. There is no high sentiment or glorious +ideal to which Spinoza does not give proper attention and a proper +place. And yet he propounds nothing in his ethical theory that cannot +be clearly seen by reason and that cannot be fully substantiated by the +history of man. Spinoza's ethics is perfectly balanced, eminently sane. +And there is, pervading it all, a stately sustained resolution of mind, +a royal, often religious spirit and calm. + +And Spinoza's thought, if not all of his terminology, is refreshingly +modern and contemporary. We find in him, as in contemporaries, an utter +reliance upon the powers of the human mind. All dogmatism, in the +pristine connotation of unexamined adherence to the doctrines of +tradition, is absent from his thought. Spinoza is thoroughly critical, +for only modern philosophic arrogance, in first full bloom in Kant, can +justly monopolize the term "critical" for itself. Naturally, though, +Spinoza is unfamiliar with the whole apparatus and style of philosophic +thinking which the last two centuries of excessively disputatious and +remarkably inconclusive philosophy have created. Spinoza has his own +technical philosophic style, inherited to some extent, but to a much +larger extent transformed by him for original use. But technical as his +style may be, it is simplicity itself when compared with the horrific +styles which were, until the last few decades, alone thought adequate to +express the profound and esoteric mysteries of modern philosophy. The +philosophic jargon of the 18th. and 19th. centuries is now almost +universally discarded, and with it preternaturally recondite and +ineffectual modes of thought. Those who have achieved at least some of +the new simplicity in thought and expression are better able than any +others to enter into the heart of Spinoza's philosophy, into the open +secret of his thought. For apart from the mere stylistic difficulties +of the _Ethics_ and some detail of his metaphysical doctrine, the few +great and simple ideas which dominate his philosophy are quite easy to +understand--especially if one uses the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_ +as an introduction to them. It was an unexpressed maxim with Spinoza +that even at the risk of keeping our heads empty it is necessary we keep +our minds simple and pure. + + +III + +The central controlling idea of Spinoza's philosophy is that all things +are necessarily determined in Nature, which he conceives to be an +absolutely infinite unified and uniform order. Instead of maintaining +that God is like man magnified to infinity, who has absolute, +irresponsible control of a universe which is external to him--the rather +rude anthropomorphic account of the ultimate nature of the universe +contained in the Bible--Spinoza maintains that God is identical with the +universe and must be and act according to eternal and necessary laws. +God is Nature, if we understand by Nature not merely infinite matter and +infinite thought,--the two attributes of Nature specifically known to +us--but infinite other attributes the precise character of which we can +never, because of our finitude, comprehend. Within this Being--God, +Nature or Substance (the more technical, philosophic term)--there is no +dichotomy; and there is outside of it no regulative or coercive +intelligence such as the Biblical God is conceived to be. Whatever is, +is one. And it is, in the special Spinozistic sense, supremely perfect +because absolutely real. There is, considered in its totality, no lack +or defect in Nature. There can be, therefore, no cosmic purposes, for +such purposes would imply that Nature is yet unfinished, or unperfected, +that is, not completely real. Something that cannot possibly be true of +an absolutely infinite Being. + +Spinoza's conception of an absolutely infinite universe is a vast +improvement upon the pent-in, finite medieval universe inherited from +Aristotle. It exceeds by infinity, in breadth of vision, even our +contemporary notion of an infinite physical cosmos. And his conception +of universal necessity is as great an advance upon the view that +transformed natural occurrences into miraculous events. Miracles, +according to the Bible, most clearly exemplify God's omnipotence; for +omnipotence in the popular mind consists in nothing so much as in the +ability to satisfy any purpose or whim no matter how transitory it is, +or how incompatible with what has been antecedently desired or done. +Miracles may be extraordinary occurrences with reference to the order of +Nature, but they are, with reference to God, commonplace exhibitions of +His Almighty power. For Spinoza, however, miracles, did they actually +occur, would exhibit not God's power, but His impotence. The omnipotence +of the one absolutely infinite Being is not shown by temperamental +interruptions of the course of events; it is manifested in the immutable +and necessary laws by which all things come to pass. + +Spinoza's conception of the universe, flawlessly operating under +necessary laws, effectively disposes of miracles. And to dispose of +miracles is one of Spinoza's primary concerns. For as long as miracles +happen, organized knowledge and rational control--the bases of a +rational life--are both impossible for man. + +If events were not absolutely conditioned by the determinate nature of +things, instead of science, we should have superstition, and magic +instead of scientific control. When a god governs the universe according +to his transitory and altogether personal whims, or when chance, without +a god, reigns, man is hopelessly at the mercy of the flux of events. In +the conduct of his affairs memory is of no use to him, and forethought +is impossible. In such cases man, as we read in his history, and could +easily conclude from his nature, piteously grasps for salvation at +whatever happens his way. All things are then loaded with ominous powers +the strength of which is directly proportionate to the hope or fear that +enthralls him. If the universe were lawless, the irony of man's fate +would forever be what it was when he lived in abysmal ignorance: when in +bitterest need of sane guidance, he would be most prone to trust to the +feeblest and most irrational of aids. On the other hand, if things are +determined by necessity, nothing happening either miraculously or by +chance, science and a commensurate power of scientific control is +possible for man. No more important argument could Spinoza conceive in +favor of his doctrine. + + +IV + +But the very doctrine which Spinoza placed at the heart of his +philosophy because of the inestimable advantages man could derive from +it, people loudly objected to on the ground that it robbed man's life of +all moral and religious value. Determinism, they exclaimed, reduces man +to the rank of inanimate Nature; without "free-will" man is no better +than a slave, his life doomed by an inexorable fate. True enough, +nothing is more abhorrent or more deadly to the striving soul of man +than to be bound in a fatalistic doctrine. But the anti-determinists +wildly confuse a perverted determinism of ends with a scientific +determinism of means. And only the former determinism is truly +fatalistic. This confusion is to be found equally central in Henry +Oldenburg's inconsequential letters to Spinoza and in Bernard Shaw's +shamelessly silly Preface to _Back to Methuselah_. Fundamental +confusions remain astonishingly stable throughout the centuries. + +Spinoza, when he maintained that all things are necessarily determined +by the laws of their own being, certainly did not mean to say that, for +example, the toothbrush I shall buy to-morrow will be determined by the +stellar dust of ćons ago. He did not wish to maintain that the infinite +occurrences of the past were slowly but persistently moving to that far +from divine or distant event. No aboriginal astronomer royal could have +predicted the pending purchase merely by exhaustively analyzing the then +stellar dust. For toothbrushes and their purchase are determined by the +nature of human beings, not by the nature of embryonic stars. And +Spinoza's doctrine of necessity maintains that all events are determined +by their proper causes, not that everything is immediately caused by +some antediluvian event. And this is true even though we can start from +any event in the present, no matter how trivial, and go back to an event +causally antecedent, and from that to another, even until we recede into +the stellar dust itself. But this only amounts to saying, what is +undoubtedly true, that neither I nor the toothbrush could now exist if +the stellar dust, and the whole series of intervening events, had not +existed. But this is totally different from saying that the stellar dust +existed that I might exist to-day and buy a toothbrush to-morrow, or, +what equals the same, that I and the toothbrush exist so that the +stellar dust and the exceedingly long consequence of natural events +should have a final purpose, an ultimate end--even if not an ideal +fulfillment. Now only when causality, as in the latter case, is +perversely teleological is determinism fatalistic. Fatalism is the +result only when the ends of activity are necessarily but arbitrarily +determined. But when causality is not arbitrarily teleological, or when +only the natures of things, the instruments or means of activity are +necessarily determined, then determinism involves no fatalism at all. + +The only truly fatalistic systems which have had an important influence +in the history of mankind, have been certain religious systems--the +Christian religion among them. The energies of western men were, for +over fourteen centuries, robbed of all vitality and meaning because +Christian theology irrevocably fixed the end of life, and man could do +nothing to alter it significantly in any respect. Arbitrary teleological +determinism is, in the Christian religion, the philosophic root of other +worldliness. And it was no alleviation of the state of affairs that +miracles could happen in the realm of Nature, that is, that Nature was +not determined, but was undetermined, accidental, or "free." On the +contrary, it was a decided aggravation that there existed side by side +with a perverse teleological determinism for the other world, an +instrumental indeterminism for this world. For the latter served as +effectively to put the means of man's life, as the former did to put his +end, out of his present reach and control. + +Contrast the modern and contemporary Christian period with the medieval +and pre-medieval Christian period. What a vast difference there is! With +the introduction of the modern period man's energies were almost +instantaneously liberated. And why? Because of Chancellor Bacon's +discovery of the value of empirical investigation? Hardly. For this +discovery had been made long before Bacon. But it was only after Bacon +that the discovery had a great effect because an enormous intellectual +transformation had already partly taken place in the time between the +first medieval discovery of the empirical method and Bacon's +proclamation of it. The enormous change was that determinism had been +transferred from ends to means; and indeterminism from means to ends. +Mathematical physics had, as a system for explaining Nature, supplanted +theology. + +With scientific determinism firmly established in the realm of Nature +and arbitrary determinism thoroughly disestablished in the realm of +ends, the two-fold fatality that crushed man with its oppressive power, +automatically disappeared. On the one hand, the world ceased to be +haunted by demonic powers; it was no longer a miraculous world subject +constantly to capricious perturbations. It was no longer a world alien +to man's nature and it therefore ceased to be sheerly brutal to him. For +the world is brutal only as long as we do not understand it. As soon as +we do, it ceases to be brutal, and becomes quite human, if not humane. +Knowledge transmutes a brute existent into a rational instrumentality. +And, on the other hand, man could now espouse any end consonant with his +nature. He was no longer bound and dwarfed by an alien, superimposed end +which is just as sheerly brutal to man's soul as an alien world is +sheerly brutal to man's body. + +Of course, the ends that are consonant with man's nature are determined +by his nature, so that it may seem we have not really escaped the +fatality of "determinism." This is, however, only seemingly so. Because, +according to the teleological determinism of Christian theology the ends +were fixed independently of the natures that were to fulfill them; just +as, according to instrumental indeterminism events were caused +independently of the natures of the things that caused them. Otherwise +there would be nothing miraculous about miracles and nothing virtuous +about Calvinism. But if the ends are the ends of our natures,--that is, +if teleological determinism is not perverse and arbitrary but rational +and scientific--we are, as Spinoza constantly points out, free. Only +when we are subject to alien ends or the ends of alien natures are we +enslaved. For freedom is not opposed to necessity or determinism; it is +only opposed to an alien necessity or alien determinism. Freedom +consists not in absolute indetermination, but in absolute +self-determination. And self-determination is the very last thing that +can be called fatalistic. + +Because Spinoza knew that freedom consists in self-determination he was +saved from falling into the absurdities of Rousseau's "Back to Nature" +doctrine even though Nature is, for Spinoza, the origin of everything +and its laws, the only laws that are divine. Still, the purpose and +conduct of man's life, if they are to be rational, must be defined by +man's nature not by any other nature; if man is to be free, he must be +guided by the particular laws of his own being, not by the laws of any +other being least of all by the general laws of so totally dissimilar a +being as absolutely infinite Nature. There is as much sense and +rationality in exhorting us to go back to the Realm of Nature, as there +is in exhorting us to go on to the City of God. + +There is, in Spinoza's system, no teleological determinism (in the +perverted theological usage explained above); but neither is there, in +Spinoza's system, any "free-will" for man. And the hue and cry that is +always raised when "free-will" is denied, was raised against Spinoza. +The clamorous moralists protest that "free-will" is the necessary +(_sic!_) foundation of all morality, and hence of religion. This is the +starting point of Bernard Shaw's no less than of Henry Oldenburg's +infuriated argument. And, unfortunately, no less a thinker than William +James starts from the same misguided assumption. And yet nothing can be +more certainly clear than that if man as a matter of fact has no +"free-will" it is the very height of absurdity to maintain that man's +morality necessarily depends upon his having "free-will." Something man +does not possess cannot be made any condition, let alone _the_ +indispensable condition of his being able to live a moral life. Man's +morality must be based upon his nature; and what his nature is cannot be +antecedently determined in accordance with the demands of any special +moral theory. Moral theory must be based upon man's nature; not man's +nature upon moral theory. + +Far from "free-will" being a necessary foundation of morality +"free-will" would make all morality, of the kind we know and the +"free-will"-ists want, absolutely impossible. The central condition of +moral life is responsibility. So central is it, that it is now +acknowledged as such in all the penal codes of civilized countries. But +if man has, instead of a determinate nature, "free-will", responsibility +can in no way be fixed. Education, too, is necessarily impossible. Hence +all punishment would have to be retributive. Moral strife, as well as +legal penalties, would bear all the stigmata of unmitigated, imbecilic +cruelty. This is not the case however if man has an absolutely +determinate nature. Education is possible. And therefore although crime +loses none of its evil character, punishment can lose all of its inhuman +sting. The necessary condition of human morality is responsibility not +irresponsibility; reliability not unreliability; certainty not +uncertainty; a firm will, not a "free" will. + +"Free-will" is necessary only in theological apologetics. According to +Christian theology, if man did not have "free-will" it would follow that +God is the Author of all the evil of the world. Something which is not +quite in keeping with His perfect goodness. By a queer twist of mind, +theologians therefore gave man, and not God (as they should have done) +"free-will." But they gave man "free-will" not to enable him to live +virtuously, but to enable him to sin. If man were able to live +virtuously as well as sinfully of his own "free-will" he would then be +altogether independent of God, which can in no way be admitted or +allowed. Hence the bitter and heart-rending cries of orthodox, +especially evangelical ministers that if left to themselves they can +only sin! They can live virtuously only when they are absolutely coerced +so to live by God! Their radical inability to understand or believe the +self-reliant moral person grows from the very heart of their theology. +For "free-will"--the only freedom they know--is the necessary condition, +not of man's morality, but of God's! + +There is no fatalism in Spinoza's system. Fatalism is the moral value of +a theory of the universe. That theory is fatalistic, which makes the +activities man cherishes either futile or impossible. Any system that +puts man at the mercy of the flux of events does precisely this. This is +necessarily done by a system according to which the universe does not +faithfully observe an immutable order, does not obey certain fixed and +eternal laws. Nothing is as fatal as an accident; no universe as +fatalistic as an accidental universe. + +There is no fatalism in Spinoza's system because there are no accidents +in Spinoza's universe. All things are necessarily determined by +immutable laws, and man, who is an integral part of the universe, is +necessarily without "free-will." In Spinoza's system, ends, being +undetermined (as contrasted with their being determined in the +theological sense explained above) they can exercise no fatalistic +power; and means, although determined (in the strict scientific sense) +are similarly impotent because they are, in the life of man, subordinate +to ends. Consequently, Spinoza was able to write upon Human Freedom with +a truth and clarity and force excelling by far all theological, +teleological, "free-will," idealistic philosophers from Plato to Josiah +Royce. Spinoza was able to write thus because, not in spite of the fact +that he placed at the heart of his philosophy the doctrine of necessity; +because, not in spite of the fact that he developed the only complete +system of philosophy strictly consistent with the principles of natural +science or mathematical physics. Spinoza is, perhaps, the only +thoroughly emancipated, the only thoroughly modern and scientific +philosopher that ever lived. And he is, much more certainly, the only +thoroughly emancipated, the only thoroughly modern and scientific +ethicist that ever lived. + +To-day, in view of the extensive dominion and authority of science, the +objections against Spinoza's doctrine of necessity can hardly be as +self-righteous and as loud as they were two centuries ago. The principle +of the uniformity of Nature has become the established foundation of +natural science. And it is also acknowledged, except in the recent ranks +of superstition, that man is a part of Nature, not independent of it. + +Man's connection with Nature is, in Spinoza's system, at least as +intimate as it is in the latest system of natural science. The original +doctrine of the origin of species, Spinoza would have found entirely in +harmony with his general philosophy, although what he would have thought +of subsequent evolutionary extravaganzas, it is impossible to say. +Darwinian biology made man consubstantial with the animal kingdom; +Spinoza's metaphysics makes man's body consubstantial with the infinite +attribute of extension or matter, and his mind consubstantial with the +infinite attribute of thought which is the mind of Nature or God. Man, +as a "mode" of extension and thought, is necessarily subject to the laws +of these two attributes of which he is compounded. The fundamental +relation of man to the universe, set forth in the Bible, is radically +transformed. Man is no longer an only child of God, enjoying his +privileges and protection (occasionally tempered by inexperienced +punishments); he is a mode of two attributes of substance inexorably +determined by their universal, immutable laws. + + +V + +Of all the laws of the universe, it was Spinoza's chief object to discover +the mental laws. That there were such laws his metaphysics assured him; +and the existence to-day of a science of psychology substantiates his +belief. The most popular of recent psychologies--Freudianism--is based +upon the principle that nothing whatever happens in the mental life of +man, waking or asleep, that is not specifically determined by +ascertainable causes. Psychoanalytic therapy would be impossible +otherwise. Psychiatry, too, has conclusively demonstrated that only +metaphorically is the subject matter it deals with in the region of the +"abnormal." Actually, the insane are subject to laws of behavior which can +be scientifically studied no less than the sane. They are no more +possessed of an evil, designing spirit, as our witch-burning ancestors +consistently believed, than the ordinary human being is possessed of +"free-will." + +Spinoza's psychology is dialectical. But it is no indictment of his +psychology to point out that it is. It is true, his formal definition of +sorrow, for instance, fails supremely to touch the strings of a +sympathetic heart. But the philosophical psychologist is not a novelist. +The recent claim that "literary psychology" is the only valid +psychology, is as well founded as the claim would be that only a +"literary physics" is valid. Mathematical physics gives us no more a +picture of the actual physical universe than Spinoza's psychology gives +us a picture of the mental and emotional life of an actual human being. +But the failure of these sciences to give us a picture of the living +world in no way invalidates their truth, or deprives them of their +utility. + +Consider, as an example, Spinoza's psychological law freely expressed in +the dictum that Paul's idea of Peter tells us more about Paul than about +Peter. This conclusion follows strictly from fundamental principles of +Spinoza's abstract, dialectical psychology; but its truth or its +practical applicability is because of that not in the least impaired. +Indeed, because of its dialectical form its range of meaning is greatly +increased. Spinoza's dictum applies to what William James called the +"psychologist's fallacy." It also applies to what John Ruskin called the +"pathetic fallacy." Again, it applies to the fallacy Franz Boas exposed +and which he may justly have called the "anthropologist's fallacy." And +it applies also to what one may, with a great deal of benefit, dub the +"ethicist's fallacy." For the very same constitutional weakness of man +to identify confusedly his own nature with that of the object he is +contemplating or studying, is most flagrantly and painfully evident in +the fields of theoretical and practical ethics. The "ethicist's fallacy" +is the source of all absolutism in theory, and all intolerance in +practice. + +All four fallacies just enumerated come under Spinoza's dictum as +special cases come under a general law. And these four are by no means +the only instances of the common habit of mind. From no field of human +endeavor is the mischief-working fallacy ever absent. We find it lodged +in the judge's decision, the propagandist's program, the historian's +record, the philosopher's system. In the field of metaphysical poetry it +has recently been identified by Santayana as "normal madness." In its +milder forms, the fallacy is now known by every one as the "personal +equation"; in its pronounced, abnormal manifestations it is known by the +psychoanalysts as "transference." It is a Protean fallacy woven into the +emotional texture of the human mind. Nothing, for it, is sacred enough +to be inviolate. For Spinoza discovered it sanctimoniously enshrined +even in the Sacred Scriptures. As he brilliantly shows us in the +_Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_, the prophets' ideas about God tell us +more about the prophets than about God. + +The far-reaching significance of Spinoza's propositions is one of their +most remarkable characteristics. This is due to the fact, contemporary +philological philosophers notwithstanding, that Spinoza defined the +essence, the generating principle, not the accidental qualities, of the +human mind. + +Another example may not be out of place. Spinoza's proposition that +anything may be accidentally (in the philosophic sense of "accident") a +cause of pleasure, pain, or desire seems to explain the essence of all +the particular variations of the psychological phenomena known now by +all who have been aroused to the significance of their vagrant cryptic +slumbers, as the phenomena of symbolism, sublimation, and fetich +worship. Spinoza's proposition explains all the phenomena adequately +because among the fundamental human emotions, Spinoza like Freud--if we +discount the recent attempt to go beyond the pleasure-principle--reckons +only three: desire, pleasure and pain. And with Spinoza, as with the +Freudians, it sometimes seems that desire is more fundamental than the +other two, for desire expresses, in Spinoza's terminology, the essence +of man. Desire however may be stimulated by almost anything. It requires +the least sanity of mind, therefore, to prevent one from scandalously +over-emphasizing one particular class of objects--of desire. + +The striking similarity, if not identity, between Spinoza's +psychological doctrines and those of contemporaries, serves to give +conclusive lie to the crass contemporary contention that Truth +instinctively shuns the philosophical study, and that she only favors +the laboratory or clinic where she freely comes and frankly discloses +herself to the cold, impersonal embrace of mechanical instruments. + +It is not altogether fortuitously that Spinoza's psychology embraces so +readily contemporary psychological conceptions. Spinoza made a +psychological, if not psychoanalytical, analysis of some portions of +Scripture. And Scripture is a very rich human material. Besides having +to explain the diverse and conflicting accounts the different Scriptural +authors gave of the nature of God, Spinoza had to account for the +superstitious beliefs commonly held by men that are incorporated in the +Bible--the beliefs in omens, devils, angels, miracles, magical rites. +Spinoza had to account for all these by means of his analysis of human +nature since he would not grant the existence of supernatural beings and +powers. Spinoza's psychology adequately performs the task. His +psychology demonstrates with unsurpassed thoroughness and clarity how +human emotions, when uncontrolled in any way by intelligence, naturally +attach themselves to all sorts of bizarrely irrelevant and absurd +things, and stimulate the imagination to endow these things with all the +qualities and powers the disturbed hearts of ignorant men desire. +Ignorant and frustrated man, Spinoza showed, frantically dreams with his +eyes open. + + +VI + +Spinoza's method in psychology is dialectical, but his interest is +practical. His psychology one might almost say is a moral psychology. +Spinoza wants to explain mental phenomena through their primary causes +because a knowledge of man's nature is the radical cure for his ills. +The greatest obstacle man has to contend against is his emotional +nature. Not that it is inherently degraded or sinful--the grotesque +superstition some religious moralists have maintained; but man's +emotional nature masters, more often than not, man's rational nature, +and leads man astray. When the emotions are unrestrained and undirected +by knowledge and intelligence, they violently attach themselves to +anything that chances to excite them. Their stark immediacy vitiates +man's judgment. He is unable, while under their sway, to select and +follow the course that is best, because his mind is engulfed in the +evanescent present. In his hectic desire to gain the passing pleasure, +man loses his ultimate good. + +But man's salvation, just as much as his damnation, is within his own +control. Salvation or blessedness is something man can achieve by his +own efforts; it is not something he can achieve only by Divine Grace. +For it is no innate perversion of soul, no inherent wickedness of man, +no malicious "free-will" that causes him to follow the lure of the Devil +rather than the light of God. The very elements in man's nature which +cause him to fall are the means by which he can make himself rise. He +can pit one emotion against another and the stronger will not merely +win, but will win over, the weaker. And it is in the nature of the +emotions not to have only one satisfying object, but to be able to +derive satisfaction from almost any object whatsoever. The most +spiritual forms of human love have the same emotional foundations as the +most bestial forms of human lust. + +To learn how to become master of one's emotions, to learn how to free +oneself from their bondage, is, therefore, the primary condition of +sustained and rational happiness. The key to virtue, Spinoza +independently agreed with Socrates, is knowledge of oneself. Only when +we understand ourselves can we control our emotions. And only when we +have our emotions under control are we able consistently to direct our +activity towards a definite, rational goal. Our activity then follows +from our own nature, and not from the nature of external things which +arouse our emotions and determine their strength. And, as already +noticed, to be the necessary cause of our own activity is, according to +Spinoza, to be free. + +It is impossible, of course, for man ever to be the sole cause of his +activity. To be such, he would have to be an entirely independent +being--an absolute power--something he can never be. No matter how +eloquently misguided enthusiasts extol the powerful merits of man's +"free-will" it will always be true that man's emotions, sensations and +ideas change very significantly with the organic changes that occur in +his body. The emotions, sensations and ideas of a child differ from +those of a man, and those of a man in maturity differ from those of a +man decrepit with old age. And these and similar changes are quite +beyond the control of man. + +However, without denying man's intimate dependence upon Nature, it is +still possible to distinguish between those activities which follow, in +an important degree, from a man's individual nature--whatever it may +happen to be at the time--and those activities which follow only from +his own nature in conjunction with the nature of other things. The +movement of my pen on paper would be impossible without the general +order of Nature which allows such phenomena as motion, pen and paper, to +exist. Nevertheless, I can profitably distinguish between the movement +of my pen on paper and the movement of my body through stellar space. +The former movement follows, in an important sense, from my own peculiar +constitution; the latter, from the constitution of the stellar system. +Likewise, but more significantly for human welfare, one can distinguish +broadly between the activities and the passivities of the mind; between +man as an agent, a doer--man's intellect; and man as a patient, a +sufferer--man's passions. In this creative age such distinction should +be singularly easy to draw. In moral terminology one can distinguish +between man as free and man as enslaved. + +Since man can never be the sole cause of his activity, he can never be +wholly free. The range of human power is extremely limited, and Spinoza +is ever careful to point that out. Spinoza is no incurable optimist, no +Leibnizian Pangloss who believes this is, for man, the best of all +possible worlds. To be humanly idealistic it is by no means necessary to +be super-humanly utopian. But neither is Spinoza a shallow +Schopenhauerian pessimist. Spinoza's realistic appraisal of man's +worldly estate is entirely free from all romantic despair. This world is +no more the worst than it is the best of all possible worlds for man. +Although man cannot completely alter his evil estate, he can better it. +And the wisdom of philosophy consists in recognizing this fact and +discovering what ways and means there are for bringing such betterment +about. + +This Spinoza has in mind throughout the devious courses of his +philosophy. It is present to him when he delineates the character of +Nature or God, when he outlines the nature of the mind and its emotions, +no less than when he specifically addresses himself to the task of +describing the way to the highest blessedness of man. Indeed, so intent +is Spinoza upon reaching his ethical goal, and making all his doctrines +contributory to it, he purposely omits to treat of many philosophical +problems because they are, though interesting in themselves, of too +little value for the conduct of man's life. His philosophical system, as +a result, is in many respects merely sketched in massive outline. + + +VII + +The dominant ethics of Christian civilization has made a special point +of disregarding the intimate connection that exists between human nature +and rational conduct. Morality has been identified, not with living a +life according to a rational plan and an adequate conception of an ideal +form of human existence, but with a strained attempt to live in +accordance with an inherited system of coercive social habits. Of this +morality, the Puritan is the popular type. Only in quite recent years +has some advance been made back to the sane naturalistic conception of +morals which is found in the Greeks and also in Spinoza. + +It is a fundamental point with Spinoza that the ceremonial law, as he +puts it in the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_, can at best secure man +wealth and social position. Man's highest blessedness can be secured by +the divine law of Nature alone. Here Spinoza and Rousseau are at one. +It was relevant to Spinoza's purpose to treat only of religious +ceremonial law; but his conclusions apply with equal force and relevancy +to social and political ceremonial law as well. Spinoza's distinction +between ceremonial and divine law is peculiarly significant and +illuminating when applied to marriage. For to-day in marriage, if +anywhere, is it glaringly evident that the legal or religious or social +ceremonial law can at best secure man or woman wealth and social +position. Happiness or blessedness lie altogether beyond its powerful +reach. Marriage is sanctified and made blessed not by the ceremonial law +of priest or city clerk but by the divine law of love. Natural love, or +love free from all ceremonial coercions, is not merely not a +questionable source of marital happiness: it is the only source. The +ceremonial law, the legal or religious marriage custom, has nothing +whatsoever to do with human happiness. If by "free" love is meant love +free from all legal, social and religious ceremonial restraints, then +free love is, according to Spinoza, the only basis of rational marriage. + +No man ever treasured the joys of the spirit more than did Spinoza; but +he did not because of that nourish a savage antagonism against the body. +The very bases of his philosophy of the mind saved him from any such +disastrous folly. What Havelock Ellis says "We know at last" Spinoza +knew all the time--"that it must be among our chief ethical rules to see +that we build the lofty structure of human society on the sure and +simple foundations of man's organism." It is because Spinoza knew this +so thoroughly and remembered it so well that he devotes so much of his +attention to the nature of the human mind and the human emotions in a +treatise on ethics. + +Mind and body are not intrinsically alien or inimical to one another. +They are coöperative expressions of the one reality. The mind is the +idea of the body and "in proportion as one body is better adapted than +another to do or suffer many things, in the same proportion will the +mind, at the same time, be better adapted to perceive many things." +Purely psychologically, all that we can ever discover about the +regulating influence glands have upon personality can only go to +corroborate, not to improve this general position. And morally, the +implications are equally far-reaching and profound. + +The virtue of the mind is not to despise or reject but to understand and +transform. And it clearly must be more excellent for the mind to know +both itself and the body than it is for the mind to know itself alone. +For natural science is the result when the mind organizes into a system +what are, in their own nature, simply apprehensions of bodily +existences; and art is the result when the mind transfuses with an ideal +quality of its own what are, in their own nature, simply apprehensions +of bodily excellences of form or motion, color or sound. Matter is, in +its nature, no more hostile to spirit than body is alien to mind. +Paradise is not a non-or super-physical realm; it is a physical realm +made harmonious with the ideality of the soul. Spirit is an +appreciation, a transmutation of matter. For the lover, the physical +embrace is a spiritual revelation. + +The fundamental metaphysical law from which Spinoza's ethical system +flows is that everything endeavors to persist in its own being. This law +is the metaphysical equivalent of the first law of motion in physics +which is itself the equivalent of the law of identity in logic. By his +law Spinoza does not mean anything which anticipates the +nineteenth-century doctrine of the competitive struggle for existence. +On the contrary, nothing is so clear to Spinoza as the fact that the +most efficient way of preserving one's own being is not by competitive +but by coöperative activity. Especially is this true of human beings. By +his own efforts a solitary man cannot, even after he has been nursed to +maturity, maintain himself in a decent manner. Certainly he is unable +successfully to resist his foes. But with the aid of his fellows man can +develop a highly complex and tolerably stable civilization, all the +excellences of which he can enjoy at the comparatively small risk of +becoming a victim of its dangers. Social organization is the natural +expression of man's fundamental endeavor to preserve himself. A perfect +social organization naturally expresses the highest form of human +existence--individualism without anarchy and communism without +oppression. + +Consistent with his primary law of being, Spinoza defines virtue not in +terms of negations, inhibitions, deficiencies or restraints; virtue he +defines in terms of positive human qualities compendiously called human +power. Virtue is power, however, not in the sense of the Renaissance +ideal of "manliness" as we glimpse it, for instance, in Benvenuto +Cellini; nor is it power in the vulgar sense of dominion which seems to +be the confused ideal of some ultra-contemporaries; virtue is power in +the sense of the Greek ideal that virtue is human excellence. It was +therefore very natural for Nietzsche who consciously went back to the +Greeks to hail Spinoza as his only philosophical forerunner, the only +philosopher who dwelt with him on the highest mountain-tops, perilous +only for those who are born for the base valleys of life. And it was +equally natural for Nietzsche to fail to see the important differences +between his own violent and turbid thinking and the sure and disciplined +thinking of Spinoza--on those very points upon which Nietzsche thought +they agreed. + +Perfection and imperfection are, in Spinoza's thought, identical with +the real and the unreal. The perfect is the completed, the perfected; +the imperfect, the uncompleted, the unperfected. These terms have, in +their first intention, no specifically ethical significance. Nature is +perfect, that is, absolutely real or completed; but in no intelligible +sense is Nature ethically good. However, it is possible to convert +non-ethical into ethical terms. We can do this by designating, for +example, a certain type of character as the "perfect" type. If we reach +that type we are perfect or supremely "good"; insofar as we fall short +of it, we are imperfect, or "bad." + +Just what constitutes human excellence is determined in each case by the +specific nature and relations of the individual involved. The excellence +of a child is not that of a man; and the excellence of a free man +differs from that of a slave. For the parent, the perfect child is +docile, beautiful and full of promise; for the ruler, the perfect man +is industrious, respectful of law and order, eager to pay taxes and go +to war; for the free man, the perfect man is a rational being, living a +harmonious life in knowledge and love of himself, his neighbor and God. +Moreover, within any one class the excellences vary in harmony with the +variations in the individuals. There is no excellence in general. + +But because ethical standards are quite human and vary, they do not +lack, therefore, all validity. They are within their range of +applicability, absolute, even though they are, in a more comprehensive +universe, relative. A just appreciation of the relative nature, but +absolute value of specific ethical judgments, is above all things +vitally necessary in ethics. Such appreciation saves the ethicist from +the pernicious fallacy of erecting personal preferences into universal +laws; and it also saves him from falling into the ethical abyss where +all things are of equal value because all things are equally vain. + +Ethical tolerance is different from ethical sentimentality. Every one +has the sovereign natural right to cherish the excellence in harmony +with his character. But the equality extends no further. A comprehensive +estimate of the powers of the mind can be made and they can be arranged +in a series of increasing value. No arrangement can ever be absolutely +final and authoritative, for what one free man considers the highest +perfection of human life, another will consider to be only of secondary +importance. Still, all free men will agree that certain powers of the +mind are superior to others. But superiority is not rationally endowed +with legislative power over others. The free man is superior to the +slave, but he has, because of that, no rational right to dominate him; +neither is it his office to revile or despise him; the slave was given +his nature, he did not ask for it. + +But if it is not the office of the free man to dominate or revile the +slave still less is it the divinely appointed office of the slave to +rule and revile the free man--universal democratic prejudices +notwithstanding. And in support of the independent, and in case of +contest, superior right of the free man we have the very highest +authority for those who do not trust themselves to be guided by reason. +God Himself has pronounced upon this tremendous issue. And not in mere +words, but by unmistakable deeds. When Lucifer, the first absolute +democrat or equalitarian, the first one to maintain that no one was +better than he was, raised his impious standard, God assembled all His +faithful hosts together and hurled Lucifer out of Heaven into Hell. And +justly so. For Lucifer had, by his foul, sacrilegious doctrine and +action, revealed himself to be the Prince of Darkness not the Prince of +Light. To our untold and everlasting misery the Prince of Darkness who +failed to ensnare the majority of angels did succeed in ensnaring the +majority of mankind. So irredeemably so, even the sweetly and tenderly +lyrical Prince of Peace had to be sent to us bearing a ghastly sword. + +Reason is not, according to Spinoza, a constitutive power in man's life; +it is a regulative principle. Spinoza is, in the traditional usage of +the term, anything but a rationalist in his ethics. Only if rationalism +consists in being unflaggingly reasonable is Spinoza an avowed and +thorough-going rationalist. Reason has, for Spinoza, no transcendental +status or power, and it plays no dictatorial rôle. Reason, for him, is +essentially an organizing not a legislative power in man's life. To take +a phrase from Professor Dewey, reason, for Spinoza, is reconstructive +not constitutive. The power of the intellect is not some underived, +original, independent power which can impose or, better, superimpose its +categorical imperatives upon human conduct. The power of the intellect +is wholly derivative, dependent upon the nature of the things that it +understands. + +Reason gives man the power and insight to organize his life on the basis +of his knowledge, to chose an end harmonious with his nature, what is +for his best advantage--the basis of all virtue--and to select and +control the means by which it can be attained. For the happy governance +of our lives the object we must chiefly understand is ourselves. +Because--in Matthew Arnold's line--"the aids to noble life are all +within." When we become creatures conscious of our natural endowment we +cease to be blind instruments of our natures and become rational, +intelligent agents. For intelligence, in the fundamental sense of the +word, consists in knowing what we are and understanding what we can do. + +A man who governs his life according to the dictates of reason tries, +insofar as possible, to harmonize his conflicting interests. He +balances, impartially, future with present goods, and he bases his +decision upon the broad foundation of all his needs. He does not madly +satisfy or repress one passion at the expense of the rest of his nature. +He satisfies a maximum rather than a minimum of his desires, evaluating +them not merely by numerical strength but by quality and duration. It is +only stupid and pernicious confusion that makes man's moral problem +consist in his discovering instead of a good "relative" to his nature, +an "absolute" good, good for no nature at all. Man's real moral problem +is to secure a permanent good instead of a transitory good; a more +inclusive good instead of a more restricted good; a higher good instead +of a lower good. Morally, it matters nothing whether an intellectual +good is "absolute" or whether it is only "relative" to man's mind and +his power of comprehension. But it matters everything, morally, whether +an intellectual good is more or less permanent, more or less inclusive, +more or less valuable than a sensory good. This is the real moral +problem man is faced with. And this is the moral problem Spinoza +considers and solves. + +Everybody knows what is Spinoza's solution. One permanent intellectual +good is, according to him, of more importance and value in the life of +man than countless transitory sensory pleasures. The object most +permanent in character and greatest in value is Nature or God. The +highest virtue of the mind, therefore, the highest blessedness of man, +consists in the intellectual love of Nature or God. Thus Spinoza passes +from ethics to religion, which in his thought almost imperceptibly blend +together. + + +VIII + +The beginning and the end, as familiar wisdom has long since propounded, +are the same. The ultimate origin of man is God, and the final end, the +blessed crown of life, is to return to God in fullest knowledge and +love. The philosopher who was during his lifetime and for over a century +after his death constantly execrated for being an atheist (he +occasionally still is by some hardy fools) made God a more integral part +of his system than did any one else in the whole history of philosophy. +Spinoza did not do occasional reverence to God; he did not, in lightly +passing, perfunctorily bow to Him; God is the veritable beginning and +end of all his thought. + +The intellectual love of God does not demand as basis a knowledge of the +cosmic concatenation of things. Omniscience alone could satisfy such a +demand. The intellectual love of Nature or God depends solely upon a +knowledge of the order of Nature, upon a knowledge of the infinite and +eternal essence of God. And such knowledge is within the limits of our +reach. + +We can apprehend the eternal essence of God because the temporality of +our thought is accidental to its meaning. It is the nature of reason to +see things under the form of eternity. And we can apprehend the infinite +essence of God or Nature because every particular finite thing is a +determinate expression of the infinite. The law of causality requires +that there be an essential identity of nature between cause and effect; +otherwise it would follow that something can be produced from nothing. +Since cause and effect belong to the same realm of existence, to the +same attribute of Nature, whenever we apprehend the essence of a +particular thing, we necessarily apprehend the infinite essence of that +attribute of Nature. For the infinite, with Spinoza, is not so much an +extent as a quality of being. Thus from the comprehension of any +particular thing, we can pass to a comprehension of the infinite and +eternal. + +This is most commonly understood, curiously enough, not in religion, but +in art. The ecstatic power of beauty makes the soul lose all sense of +time and location. And in the specific object the soul sees an infinite +meaning. Indeed, one can almost say that the more specific or limited +the artistic object, the more clearly is the absolute or infinite +meaning portrayed and discerned. A sonnet is oftener than not more +expressive than a long poem; the _Red Badge of Courage_ reveals more +impressively than does the _Dynasts_ the absolute essential horror of +war. There are present, apparently, in the more pronounced mystical +visions, characteristics similar to those of significant esthetic +apprehensions. These visions are extremely rare and fleeting. But then +we can be at the highest peaks only seldom and for a short while. But in +a moment we see eternity, and in the finite, the infinite. It is for +this reason Spinoza says the more we understand particular things the +more do we understand God. + +The great religious significance of Spinoza's doctrine of the +intellectual love of God is that it establishes religion upon knowledge +and not upon ignorance. The virtue of the mind is clearly and distinctly +to understand, not ignorantly to believe. There is no conflict between +science and religion; religion is based upon science. There is a +conflict only between science and superstition. Mysteries, unknown and +unknowable powers, miracles, magical rites and prayerful incantations +are instruments not of religion but of superstition which has its +origin in ignorant and ignominious fear. + +The free man does not fear and he is not consumed by fear's boundless +conceit. He has no apprehensive conscience which unceasingly interprets +all unusual or untoward events as being deliberate signs of a god's +impending wrath. The free man knows that man is, cosmically considered, +impressively insignificant. Human loves and hatreds, human joys and +sorrows are, in the face of the eternal and infinite, the littlest of +little things. Human nature is only an infinitely small part of +absolutely infinite Nature; human life only a very tiny expression of +infinite life. Inordinate conceit alone could conceive Nature to have +been made designedly either for our pleasure or our discomfort. The +stars were not hung in the heavens so that we may steer our petty +courses across the seas; nor were the sun and moon put in their places +so that we may have the day in which to waste ourselves in futile labors +and the night to spend in ignorant sleep. Even if there were a cosmic +drama--which there is not--man is too trivial to play in it a leading +rôle. The free man knows all this; but his heart is tempered and strong. +He can contemplate his place in the universe without bitterness and +without fear. For the free man's love, as his worship, flows from his +knowledge of God. + + +IX + +Spinoza is unsparing in his criticisms of the superstitions which are +in, and which have grown up around, the Bible. All Spinoza's major +conclusions have been embodied directly or indirectly in what is now +known as "the higher criticism" of the Bible, which is the basis of the +Modernist movement. It was Spinoza who established the fact that the +Pentateuch is not, as it is reputed to be, the work of Moses. It was +Spinoza, also, who first convincingly showed that other of the +Scriptural documents were compiled by various unacknowledged scribes; +not by the authors canonized by orthodoxy, Jewish or Gentile. The wealth +of philological and historical material at the disposal of the +contemporary Biblical investigator is incomparably richer than it was at +Spinoza's time. But modern scholarship has only added more +material--only extended in breadth Spinoza's modest researches. In +depth, nothing new has been achieved. The principles of investigation +and interpretation, and the general results Spinoza arrived at have not +been improved upon in the least, nor is it at all likely that they ever +will. Spinoza founded himself upon bed-rock. + +Spinoza's aim in revealing the defectiveness of the Bible was not +theological but philosophical. Orthodox Biblical conceptions had in his +day, as they still have to a certain extent in ours, a peculiarly +sanctified power, because they were institutionalized and made the basis +of an authoritative system of conduct. The misbegotten doctrines +therefore could not be questioned with impunity, for a criticism of the +doctrines on intellectual grounds was invariably construed as an attack +upon the vested customs. The misfortunes of history made dissent from +palpable absurdities capital heresy. Social and religious bigotry burned +scientific men with political ardor. + +However, although Spinoza suffered in his own person from religious +persecution, he never for one moment held as did, for example, Voltaire, +that the Church is the wily and unregenerate instrument of vicious +priests. On the contrary, Spinoza was quite sure that many of the clergy +were among the noblest of men, and that the Church was in large measure +a very salutary institution for the masses who cannot learn to govern +themselves by force of mind. But Spinoza was unalterably opposed to any +encroachment of Church authority upon the just liberties of men. +Especially did he object to the Church extending its prohibitive power +over men's thinking. It is the business of the Church to inculcate +"obedience" in the masses; not to dictate to philosophers what is the +truth. The fundamental purpose of Spinoza's attack upon the Bible is to +free philosophy from theology; not to destroy the Church but to +disestablish it. + +Many readers of Spinoza conclude that because Spinoza tolerated Church +authority in matters of public morality he therefore either did not in +his own thought thoroughly adhere to his principles or else he was +excessively cautious, even timid, and did not fully or consistently +express his mind. No one would deny that there is some accommodation in +Spinoza's language. He certainly followed the practical wisdom of the +thinkers of his day. Even so, however, Spinoza was by no means as +cautious as was Descartes. Anyway, accommodation does not fully account +for Spinoza's attitude on this question; in fact, it does not account +for any significant feature of it. + +Spinoza never believed a sound metaphysics was, for the masses, the +indispensable basis of a good moral life. The multitude, he was firmly +convinced, are controlled by their passions and desires, not by +knowledge and reason. The coercive law of the State and Nature, not +philosophy, keep them living within the bounds necessary for social +order and human well-being. Far from it being necessary to tell the +masses only the truth Spinoza believed, as did Plato before him, that it +may even be necessary in order to rule the masses successfully in the +ways of wisdom and virtue to deceive them to a greater or lesser extent. +Such deception is, as a political expediency, morally justified, for the +rulers would be lying in the interests of virtue and truth. + +Spinoza did not suffer from the fond contemporary delusion that the +salvation of mankind will come about when philosophers become like all +other people. He knew, as Plato did, that the day of ultimate, universal +happiness will dawn rather when all other people become like +philosophers. In the meantime, it is the height of moral and political +folly to act as if that day had arrived or else could be ushered in by +morning. Spinoza had nothing but contempt for facile-tongued, +feather-brained Utopians. He loved humanity too sincerely to mislead +humanity or himself that way. And so we find in Spinoza's _Ethics_ as in +his _Tractatus_ two systems of morals--one for the many who are called, +and one for the few who are chosen. In the _Tractatus_, the religion of +the many is summarily called "obedience"; in the _Ethics_ it is more +fully shown to consist of utilitarianism in the conduct of our affairs, +high-mindedness towards our fellows, and piety towards Nature or God. To +this is added, as the rare religion of the few, what is designated in +both treatises alike as the intellectual love of Nature or God. + + +X + +Spinoza's religion is as naturalistic as his ethics. By making God and +Nature equivalent terms Spinoza was not merely resorting to equivocation +to escape the penalty of his views. The identification of God and Nature +fully embodies Spinoza's doctrine that there is no supernatural realm; +and therefore if man is to have a God at all, Nature must be that God. +To contend, as so many do, that "true religion" must be based upon the +existence of a supernatural realm, no matter whether or not such a realm +exists, is as absurd as to contend that "true morality" must be based +upon man's "free-will" no matter whether or not man has "free-will." +Spinoza's system has been called pantheistic. But it is pantheistic only +in the sense that whatever man considers Godlike must be found in +Nature, for no other realm exists, and there are no gods. + +But the question is always raised, how is it possible to love a Being +indifferent to our human miseries and blind to our hopes? How is even an +intellectual love of such a Being possible? Man, as his religions show, +wants God to be a father, a protector, One who cherishes man's desires +and cares for his wants. The least anthropomorphic of religions wants +God to be the depository of abstract human ideals. But Spinoza's God is +not even as human as this. Nature does not constitute the ideal type for +man. + +Religion is, it is true, man's search for comfort and security in an +alien and hostile world. The simple demand of the human heart is to be +recognized and to be loved. Love is the magic touch that transforms all +that is barren and cold into all that is rich and warm and fruitful. But +man is neither loved nor recognized by the immensities of the universe. +And in face of the illimitable stretches of time and space even the +stoutest heart involuntarily quakes. We cannot consider the vast power +of the universe without feeling crushed and becoming despondent. And +ignorant man cannot see in the finite things about him the full +expression of the infinite beyond. He cannot derive any moral strength +or comfort from the world about him because he conceives that world to +be an implacable instrument of a god's uncertain, inexplicable will. He +therefore cosmically projects, in a frenzy of despair, his crying human +demand. And out of the wastes of space there arises for him a personal +God. + +Anthropomorphic religions reveal man at his weakest, not at his best. +Man's true grandeur is shown when he transcends by his own power of mind +his insistent human desires. He can then stand free before the Almighty. +He may tremble, but he is not afraid. For his strength of soul is +grounded not in the external world but in his own ideal. If we are born +under a lucky star, and are fortunate and happy lovers of the ideal, the +ecstasy of the mystic's beatific vision is ours. But even if we are born +under an unlucky star, and are misfortunate and unhappy lovers of the +ideal, we still have the ideal to which we can hold fast and save +ourselves from being shattered in our despairs, from dying in spirit, +which is far more terrible than any death in the body could possibly be. +We have the ideal to give us the strength, if we are lovers of God, to +go to the cross with Jesus; or, if we are lovers of Virtue, to drink the +hemlock with Socrates. + +The intellectual love of God is a devotion purged of all fear, of all +vain regrets and even vainer hopes. The wild and angry emotions of +sorrow and pain leave the strong and noble heart of man like the tidal +waves leave the scattered rocks of the shore. As the rocks, when the +waves return to their depths, smile securely in the glistening sun in +the sky, so does the brave, free heart of man, when the passionate +deluge is spent, smile serenely in the face of God. The free man is born +neither to weep nor to laugh but to view with calm and steadfast mind +the eternal nature of things. + +To know the eternal is the immortality we enjoy. But to know the eternal +we must forget about ourselves. We must cease to be consumed by a +cancerous anxiety to endure in time and be permanent in space. In the +order of Nature our own particular lives are of no especial importance. +And unless we recognize this, we are necessarily doomed to a miserable +fate. We must recognize that our mere selves can never give us ultimate +fulfillment or blessedness of soul. Only by losing ourselves in Nature +or God can we escape the wretchedness of finitude and find the final +completion and salvation of our lives. This, the free man understands. +He knows how insignificant he is in the order of Nature. But he also +knows that if only he can lose himself in Nature or God then, in his own +insignificant particularity, the eternal and infinite order of Nature +can be displayed. For in the finite is the infinite expressed, and in +the temporal, the eternal. + +It is this knowledge that makes man free, that breaks the finite fetters +from his soul enabling him to embrace the infinite and to possess +eternity. Once man is reconciled to the petty worth of his own person, +he assumes some of the majestic worth of the universe. And the austere +sublimity of soul that inscribes on the grave of the beloved _God is +Love_, inscribes, when it is chastened and purified by understanding, on +the grave of all that is merely human _Nature is Great_. Religion is the +joy and peace and strength that is all understanding. + +JOSEPH RATNER. + + + + +FIRST PART + +ON GOD + + +_The multitude, ever prone to superstition, and caring more for the +shreds of antiquity than for eternal truths, pays homage to the Books of +the Bible, rather than to the Word of God._ + +SPINOZA. + + + + +CHAPTER I + +OF SUPERSTITION[1] + + +Men would never be superstitious, if they could govern all their +circumstances by set rules, or if they were always favored by fortune: +but being frequently driven into straits where rules are useless, and +being often kept fluctuating pitiably between hope and fear by the +uncertainty of fortune's greedily coveted favors, they are consequently, +for the most part, very prone to credulity. The human mind is readily +swayed this way or that in times of doubt, especially when hope and fear +are struggling for the mastery, though usually it is boastful, +over-confident, and vain. + +This as a general fact I suppose every one knows, though few, I believe, +know their own nature; no one can have lived in the world without +observing that most people, when in prosperity, are so over-brimming +with wisdom (however inexperienced they may be), that they take every +offer of advice as a personal insult, whereas in adversity they know not +where to turn, but beg and pray for counsel from every passer-by. No +plan is then too futile, too absurd, or too fatuous for their adoption; +the most frivolous causes will raise them to hope, or plunge them into +despair--if anything happens during their fright which reminds them of +some past good or ill, they think it portends a happy or unhappy issue, +and therefore (though it may have proved abortive a hundred times +before) style it a lucky or unlucky omen. Anything which excites their +astonishment they believe to be a portent signifying the anger of the +gods or of the Supreme Being, and, mistaking superstition for religion, +account it impious not to avert the evil with prayer and sacrifice. +Signs and wonders of this sort they conjure up perpetually, till one +might think Nature as mad as themselves, they interpret her so +fantastically. + +Thus it is brought prominently before us, that superstition's chief +victims are those persons who greedily covet temporal advantages; they +it is, who (especially when they are in danger, and cannot help +themselves) are wont with prayers and womanish tears to implore help +from God: upbraiding reason as blind, because she cannot show a sure +path to the shadows they pursue, and rejecting human wisdom as vain; but +believing the phantoms of imagination, dreams, and other childish +absurdities, to be the very oracles of Heaven. As though God has turned +away from the wise, and written His decrees, not in the mind of man but +in the entrails of beasts, or left them to be proclaimed by the +inspiration and instinct of fools, madmen, and birds. Such is the +unreason to which terror can drive mankind! + +Superstition, then, is engendered, preserved, and fostered by fear. If +any one desire an example, let him take Alexander, who only began +superstitiously to seek guidance from seers, when he first learned to +fear fortune in the passes of Sysis (Curtius v. 4); whereas after he had +conquered Darius he consulted prophets no more, till a second time +frightened by reverses. When the Scythians were provoking a battle, the +Bactrians had deserted, and he himself was lying sick of his wounds, "he +once more turned to superstition, the mockery of human wisdom, and bade +Aristander, to whom he confided his credulity, inquire the issue of +affairs with sacrificed victims." Very numerous examples of a like +nature might be cited, clearly showing the fact, that only while under +the dominion of fear do men fall a prey to superstition; that all the +portents ever invested with the reverence of misguided religion are mere +phantoms of dejected and fearful minds; and lastly that prophets have +most power among the people, and are most formidable to rulers, +precisely at those times when the state is in most peril. I think this +is sufficiently plain to all, and will therefore say no more on the +subject. + +The origin of superstition above given affords us a clear reason for the +fact, that it comes to all men naturally, though some refer its rise to +a dim notion of God, universal to mankind, and also tends to show, that +it is no less inconsistent and variable than other mental hallucinations +and emotional impulses, and further that it can only be maintained by +hope, hatred, anger, and deceit; since it springs, not from reason, but +solely from the more powerful phases of emotion. Furthermore, we may +readily understand how difficult it is to maintain in the same course +men prone to every form of credulity. For, as the mass of mankind +remains always at about the same pitch of misery, it never assents long +to any one remedy, but is always best pleased by a novelty which has yet +proved illusive. + +This element of inconsistency has been the cause of many terrible wars +and revolutions; for, as Curtius well says (lib. iv. chap. 10): "The mob +has no ruler more potent than superstition," and is easily led, on the +plea of religion, at one moment to adore its kings as gods, and anon to +execrate and abjure them as humanity's common bane. Immense pains have +therefore been taken to counteract this evil by investing religion, +whether true or false, with such pomp and ceremony, that it may rise +superior to every shock, and be always observed with studious reverence +by the whole people--a system which has been brought to great perfection +by the Turks, for they consider even controversy impious, and so clog +men's minds with dogmatic formulas, that they leave no room for sound +reason, not even enough to doubt with. + +But if, in despotic statecraft, the supreme and essential mystery be to +hoodwink the subjects, and to mask the fear, which keeps them down, with +the specious garb of religion, so that men may fight as bravely for +slavery as for safety, and count it not shame but highest honor to risk +their blood and their lives for the vainglory of a tyrant; yet in a free +state no more mischievous expedient could be planned or attempted. +Wholly repugnant to the general freedom are such devices as enthralling +men's minds with prejudices, forcing their judgment, or employing any of +the weapons of quasi-religious sedition; indeed, such seditions only +spring up, when law enters the domain of speculative thought, and +opinions are put on trial and condemned on the same footing as crimes, +while those who defend and follow them are sacrificed, not to public +safety, but to their opponents' hatred and cruelty. If deeds only could +be made the grounds of criminal charges, and words were always allowed +to pass free, such seditions would be divested of every semblance of +justification, and would be separated from mere controversies by a hard +and fast line. + +Now seeing that we have the rare happiness of living in a republic, +where every one's judgment is free and unshackled, where each may +worship God as his conscience dictates, and where freedom is esteemed +before all things dear and precious, I have believed that I should be +undertaking no ungrateful or unprofitable task, in demonstrating that +not only can such freedom be granted without prejudice to the public +peace, but also, that without such freedom, piety cannot flourish nor +the public peace be secure.... + +I have often wondered that persons who make a boast of professing the +Christian religion, namely, love, joy, peace, temperance, and charity to +all men, should quarrel with such rancorous animosity, and display daily +towards one another such bitter hatred, that this, rather than the +virtues they claim, is the readiest criterion of their faith. Matters +have long since come to such a pass that one can only pronounce a man +Christian, Turk, Jew, or Heathen, by his general appearance and attire, +by his frequenting this or that place of worship, or employing the +phraseology of a particular sect--as for manner of life, it is in all +cases the same. Inquiry into the cause of this anomaly leads me +unhesitatingly to ascribe it to the fact, that the ministries of the +Church are regarded by the masses merely as dignities, her offices as +posts of emolument--in short, popular religion may be summed up as a +respect for ecclesiastics. The spread of this misconception inflamed +every worthless fellow with an intense desire to enter holy orders, and +thus the love of diffusing God's religion degenerated into sordid +avarice and ambition. Every church became a theater, where orators, +instead of church teachers harangued, caring not to instruct the people, +but striving to attract admiration, to bring opponents to public scorn, +and to preach only novelties and paradoxes, such as would tickle the +ears of their congregation. This state of things necessarily stirred up +an amount of controversy, envy, and hatred, which no lapse of time could +appease; so that we can scarcely wonder that of the old religion nothing +survives but its outward forms (even these, in the mouth of the +multitude, seem rather adulation than adoration of the Deity), and that +faith has become a mere compound of credulity and prejudices--aye, +prejudices too, which degrade man from rational being to beast, which +completely stifle the power of judgment between true and false, which +seem, in fact, carefully fostered for the purpose of extinguishing the +last spark of reason! Piety, great God! and religion are become a tissue +of ridiculous mysteries; men, who flatly despise reason, who reject and +turn away from understanding as naturally corrupt, these, I say, these +of all men, are thought, Oh lie most horrible! to possess light from on +High. Verily, if they had but one spark of light from on High, they +would not insolently rave, but would learn to worship God more wisely, +and would be as marked among their fellows for mercy as they now are for +malice; if they were concerned for their opponents' souls, instead of +for their own reputations, they would no longer fiercely persecute, but +rather be filled with pity and compassion. + +Furthermore, if any Divine light were in them, it would appear from +their doctrine. I grant that they are never tired of professing their +wonder at the profound mysteries of Holy Writ; still I cannot discover +that they teach anything but speculation of Platonists and +Aristotelians, to which (in order to save their credit of Christianity) +they have made Holy Writ conform; not content to rave with the Greeks +themselves, they want to make the prophets rave also; showing +conclusively, that never even in sleep have they caught a glimpse of +Scripture's Divine nature. The very vehemence of their admiration for +the mysteries plainly attests, that their belief in the Bible is a +formal assent rather than a living faith: and the fact is made still +more apparent by their laying down beforehand, as a foundation for the +study and true interpretation of Scripture, the principle that it is in +every passage true and divine. Such a doctrine should be reached only +after strict scrutiny and thorough comprehension of the Sacred Books +(which would teach it much better, for they stand in need of no human +fictions), and not be set up on the threshold, as it were, of inquiry. + +As I pondered over the facts that the light of reason is not only +despised, but by many even execrated as a source of impiety, that human +commentaries are accepted as divine records, and that credulity is +extolled as faith; as I marked the fierce controversies of philosophers +raging in Church and State, the source of bitter hatred and dissension, +the ready instruments of sedition and other ills innumerable, I +determined to examine the Bible afresh in a careful, impartial, and +unfettered spirit, making no assumptions concerning it, and attributing +to it no doctrines, which I do not find clearly therein set down.... + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] From the Preface to the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +OF THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE[2] + + +When people declare, as all are ready to do, that the Bible is the Word +of God teaching men true blessedness and the way of salvation, they +evidently do not mean what they say; for the masses take no pains at all +to live according to Scripture, and we see most people endeavoring to +hawk about their own commentaries as the word of God, and giving their +best efforts, under the guise of religion, to compelling others to think +as they do: we generally see, I say, theologians anxious to learn how to +wring their inventions and sayings out of the sacred text, and to +fortify them with Divine authority. Such persons never display less +scruple and more zeal than when they are interpreting Scripture or the +mind of the Holy Ghost; if we ever see them perturbed, it is not that +they fear to attribute some error to the Holy Spirit, and to stray from +the right path, but that they are afraid to be convicted of error by +others, and thus to overthrow and bring into contempt their own +authority. But if men really believe what they verbally testify of +Scripture, they would adopt quite a different plan of life: their minds +would not be agitated by so many contentions, nor so many hatreds, and +they would cease to be excited by such a blind and rash passion for +interpreting the sacred writings, and excogitating novelties in +religion. On the contrary, they would not dare to adopt, as the teaching +of Scripture, anything which they could not plainly deduce therefrom: +lastly, these sacrilegious persons who have dared, in several passages, +to interpolate the Bible, would have shrunk from so great a crime, and +would have stayed their sacrilegious hands. + +Ambition and unscrupulousness have waxed so powerful, that religion is +thought to consist, not so much in respecting the writings of the Holy +Ghost, as in defending human commentaries, so that religion is no longer +identified with charity, but with spreading discord and propagating +insensate hatred disguised under the name of zeal for the Lord, and +eager ardor. + +To these evils we must add superstition, which teaches men to despise +reason and Nature, and only to admire and venerate that which is +repugnant to both: whence it is not wonderful that for the sake of +increasing the admiration and veneration felt for Scripture, men strive +to explain it so as to make it appear to contradict, as far as possible, +both one and the other: thus they dream that most profound mysteries lie +hid in the Bible, and weary themselves out in the investigation of these +absurdities, to the neglect of what is useful. Every result of their +diseased imagination they attribute to the Holy Ghost, and strive to +defend with the utmost zeal and passion; for it is an observed fact that +men employ their reason to defend conclusions arrived at by reason, but +conclusions arrived at by the passions are defended by the passions. + +If we would separate ourselves from the crowd and escape from +theological prejudices, instead of rashly accepting human commentaries +for Divine documents, we must consider the true method of interpreting +Scripture and dwell upon it at some length: for if we remain in +ignorance of this we cannot know, certainly, what the Bible and the Holy +Spirit wish to teach. + +I may sum up the matter by saying that the method of interpreting +Scripture does not widely differ from the method of interpreting +Nature--in fact, it is almost the same. For as the interpretation of +Nature consists in the examination of the history of Nature, and +therefrom deducing definitions of natural phenomena on certain fixed +axioms, so Scriptural interpretation proceeds by the examination of +Scripture, and inferring the intention of its authors as a legitimate +conclusion from its fundamental principles. By working in this manner +every one will always advance without danger of error--that is, if they +admit no principles for interpreting Scripture, and discussing its +contents save such as they find in Scripture itself--and will be able +with equal security to discuss what surpasses our understanding, and +what is known by the natural light of reason. + +In order to make clear that such a method is not only correct, but is +also the only one advisable, and that it agrees with that employed in +interpreting Nature, I must remark that Scripture very often treats of +matters which cannot be deduced from principles known to reason: for it +is chiefly made up of narratives and revelation: the narratives +generally contain miracles--that is, [as we shall show in a later +chapter], relations of extraordinary natural occurrences adapted to the +opinions and judgment of the historians who recorded them: the +revelations also were adapted to the opinions of the prophets and in +themselves surpassed human comprehension. Therefore the knowledge of all +these--that is, of nearly the whole contents of Scripture, must be +sought from Scripture alone, even as the knowledge of nature is sought +from nature. As for the moral doctrines which are also contained in the +Bible, they may be demonstrated from received axioms, but we cannot +prove in the same manner that Scripture intended to teach them, this can +only be learned from Scripture itself. + +If we would bear unprejudiced witness to the Divine origin of Scripture, +we must prove solely on its own authority that it teaches true moral +doctrines, for by such means alone can its Divine origin be +demonstrated: we have shown that the certitude of the prophets depended +chiefly on their having minds turned towards what is just and good, +therefore we ought to have proof of their possessing this quality before +we repose faith in them. From miracles God's divinity cannot be proved +[as I shall show], for miracles could be wrought by false prophets. +Wherefore the Divine origin of Scripture must consist solely in its +teaching true virtue. But we must come to our conclusion simply on +Scriptural grounds, for if we were unable to do so we could not, unless +strongly prejudiced, accept the Bible and bear witness to its Divine +origin. + +Our knowledge of Scripture must then be looked for in Scripture only. + +Lastly, Scripture does not give us definitions of things any more than +nature does: therefore, such definitions must be sought in the latter +case from the diverse workings of nature; in the former case, from the +various narratives about the given subject which occur in the Bible. + +The universal rule, then, in interpreting Scripture is to accept nothing +as an authoritative Scriptural statement which we do not perceive very +clearly when we examine it in the light of its history. What I mean by +its history, and what should be the chief points elucidated, I will now +explain. + +The history of a Scriptural statement comprises-- + +I. The nature and properties of the language in which the books of the +Bible were written, and in which their authors were accustomed to speak. +We shall thus be able to investigate every expression by comparison with +common conversational usages. + +Now all the writers both of the Old Testament and the New were Hebrews: +therefore, a knowledge of the Hebrew language is before all things +necessary, not only for the comprehension of the Old Testament, which +was written in that tongue, but also of the New: for although the latter +was published in other languages, yet its characteristics are Hebrew. + +II. An analysis of each book and arrangement of its contents under +heads; so that we may have at hand the various texts which treat of a +given subject. Lastly, a note of all the passages which are ambiguous or +obscure, or which seem mutually contradictory. + +I call passages clear or obscure according as their meaning is inferred +easily or with difficulty in relation to the context, not according as +their truth is perceived easily or the reverse by reason. We are at +work not on the truth of passages, but solely on their meaning. We must +take especial care, when we are in search of the meaning of a text, not +to be led away by our reason in so far as it is founded on principles of +natural knowledge (to say nothing of prejudices): in order not to +confound the meaning of a passage with its truth, we must examine it +solely by means of the signification of the words, or by a reason +acknowledging no foundation but Scripture. + +I will illustrate my meaning by an example. The words of Moses, "God is +a fire" and "God is jealous," are perfectly clear so long as we regard +merely the signification of the words, and I therefore reckon them among +the clear passages, though in relation to reason and truth they are most +obscure: still, although the literal meaning is repugnant to the natural +light of reason, nevertheless, if it cannot be clearly overruled on +grounds and principles derived from its Scriptural "history," it, that +is, the literal meaning, must be the one retained: and contrariwise if +these passages literally interpreted are found to clash with principles +derived from Scripture, though such literal interpretation were in +absolute harmony with reason, they must be interpreted in a different +manner, _i.e._, metaphorically. + +If we would know whether Moses believed God to be a fire or not, we must +on no account decide the question on grounds of the reasonableness or +the reverse of such an opinion, but must judge solely by the other +opinions of Moses which are on record. + +In the present instance, as Moses says in several other passages that +God has no likeness to any visible thing, whether in heaven or in earth, +or in the water, either all such passages must be taken metaphorically, +or else the one before us must be so explained. However, as we should +depart as little as possible from the literal sense, we must first ask +whether this text, God is a fire, admits of any but the literal +meaning--that is, whether the word fire ever means anything besides +ordinary natural fire. If no such second meaning can be found, the text +must be taken literally, however repugnant to reason it may be: and all +the other passages, though in complete accordance with reason, must be +brought into harmony with it. If the verbal expressions would not admit +of being thus harmonized, we should have to set them down as +irreconcilable, and suspend our judgment concerning them. However, as we +find the name fire applied to anger and jealousy (see Job xxxi. 12) we +can thus easily reconcile the words of Moses, and legitimately conclude +that the two propositions God is a fire, and God is jealous, are in +meaning identical. + +Further, as Moses clearly teaches that God is jealous, and nowhere +states that God is without passions or emotions, we must evidently infer +that Moses held this doctrine himself, or at any rate, that he wished to +teach it, nor must we refrain because such a belief seems contrary to +reason: for as we have shown, we cannot wrest the meaning of texts to +suit the dictates of our reason, or our preconceived opinions. The whole +knowledge of the Bible must be sought solely from itself. + +III. Lastly, such a history should relate the environment of all the +prophetic books extant; that is, the life, the conduct, and the studies +of the author of each book, who he was, what was the occasion, and the +epoch of his writing, whom did he write for, and in what language. +Further, it should inquire into the fate of each book: how it was first +received, into whose hands it fell, how many different versions there +were of it, by whose advice was it received into the Bible, and, lastly, +how all the books now universally accepted as sacred, were united into a +single whole. + +All such information should, as I have said, be contained in the +"history" of Scripture. For, in order to know what statements are set +forth as laws, and what as moral precepts, it is important to be +acquainted with the life, the conduct, and the pursuits of their author: +moreover, it becomes easier to explain a man's writings in proportion as +we have more intimate knowledge of his genius and temperament. + +Further, that we may not confound precepts which are eternal with those +which served only a temporary purpose, or were only meant for a few, we +should know what was the occasion, the time, the age, in which each book +was written, and to what nation it was addressed. + +Lastly, we should have knowledge on the other points I have mentioned, +in order to be sure, in addition to the authenticity of the work, that +it has not been tampered with by sacrilegious hands, or whether errors +can have crept in, and, if so, whether they have been corrected by men +sufficiently skilled and worthy of credence. All these things should be +known, that we may not be led away by blind impulse to accept whatever +is thrust on our notice, instead of only that which is sure and +indisputable. + +Now, when we are in possession of this history of Scripture, and have +finally decided that we assert nothing as prophetic doctrine which does +not directly follow from such history, or which is not clearly deducible +from it, then, I say, it will be time to gird ourselves for the task of +investigating the mind of the prophets and of the Holy Spirit. But in +this further arguing, also, we shall require a method very like that +employed in interpreting Nature from her history. As in the examination +of natural phenomena we try first to investigate what is most universal +and common to all Nature--such, for instance, as motion and rest, and +their laws and rules, which Nature always observes, and through which +she continually works--and then we proceed to what is less universal; +so, too, in the history of Scripture, we seek first for that which is +most universal, and serves for the basis and foundation of all +Scripture, a doctrine, in fact, that is commended by all the prophets as +eternal and most profitable to all men. For example, that God is one, +and that He is omnipotent, and He alone should be worshiped, that He has +a care for all men, and that He especially loves those who adore Him and +love their neighbor as themselves, etc. These and similar doctrines, I +repeat, Scripture everywhere so clearly and expressly teaches, that no +one was ever in doubt of its meaning concerning them. + +The nature of God, His manner of regarding and providing for things, and +similar doctrines, Scripture nowhere teaches professedly, and as eternal +doctrine; on the contrary, we have shown that the prophets themselves +did not agree on the subject; therefore, we must not lay down any +doctrine as Scriptural on such subjects, though it may appear perfectly +clear on rational grounds. + +From a proper knowledge of this universal doctrine of Scripture, we must +then proceed to other doctrines less universal, but which, nevertheless, +have regard to the general conduct of life, and flow from the universal +doctrine like rivulets from a source: such are all particular external +manifestations of true virtue, which need a given occasion for their +exercise; whatever is obscure or ambiguous on such points in Scripture +must be explained and defined by its universal doctrine; with regard to +contradictory instances, we must observe the occasion and the time in +which they were written. For instance, when Christ says, "Blessed are +they that mourn, for they shall be comforted," we do not know, from the +actual passage, what sort of mourners are meant; as, however, Christ +afterwards teaches that we should have care for nothing, save only for +the kingdom of God and His righteousness, which is commended as the +highest good (see Matt. vi. 33), it follows that by mourners He only +meant those who mourn for the kingdom of God and righteousness neglected +by man: for this would be the only cause of mourning to those who love +nothing but the Divine kingdom and justice, and who evidently despise +the gifts of fortune. So, too, when Christ says: "But if a man strike +you on the right cheek, turn to him the left also," and the words which +follow. + +If He had given such a command, as a lawgiver, to judges, He would +thereby have abrogated the law of Moses, but this He expressly says He +did not do (Matt. v. 17). Wherefore we must consider who was the +speaker, what was the occasion, and to whom were the words addressed. +Now Christ said that He did not ordain laws as a legislator, but +inculcated precepts as a teacher: inasmuch as He did not aim at +correcting outward actions so much as the frame of mind. Further, these +words were spoken to men who were oppressed, who lived in a corrupt +commonwealth on the brink of ruin, where justice was utterly neglected. +The very doctrine inculcated here by Christ just before the destruction +of the city was also taught by Jeremiah before the first destruction of +Jerusalem, that is, in similar circumstances, as we see from +Lamentations iii. 25-30. + +Now as such teaching was only set forth by the prophets in times of +oppression, and was even then never laid down as a law; and as, on the +other hand, Moses (who did not write in times of oppression, but--mark +this--strove to found a well-ordered commonwealth), while condemning +envy and hatred of one's neighbor, yet ordained that an eye should be +given for an eye, it follows most clearly from these purely Scriptural +grounds that this precept of Christ and Jeremiah concerning submission +to injuries was only valid in places where justice is neglected, and in +a time of oppression, but does not hold good in a well-ordered state. + +In a well-ordered state where justice is administered every one is +bound, if he would be accounted just, to demand penalties before the +judge (see Lev. v. 1), not for the sake of vengeance (Lev. xix. 17, 18), +but in order to defend justice and his country's laws, and to prevent +the wicked rejoicing in their wickedness. All this is plainly in +accordance with reason. I might cite many other examples in the same +manner, but I think the foregoing are sufficient to explain my meaning +and the utility of this method, and this is all my present purpose. +Hitherto we have only shown how to investigate those passages of +Scripture which treat of practical conduct, and which, therefore, are +more easily examined, for on such subjects there was never really any +controversy among the writers of the Bible. + +The purely speculative passages cannot be so easily traced to their real +meaning: the way becomes narrower, for as the prophets differed in +matters speculative among themselves, and the narratives are in great +measure adapted to the prejudices of each age, we must not, on any +account, infer the intention of one prophet from clearer passages in the +writings of another; nor must we so explain his meaning, unless it is +perfectly plain that the two prophets were at one in the matter. + +How we are to arrive at the intention of the prophets in such cases I +will briefly explain. Here, too, we must begin from the most universal +proposition, inquiring first from the most clear Scriptural statements +what is the nature of prophecy or revelation, and wherein does it +consist; then we must proceed to miracles, and so on to whatever is most +general till we come to the opinions of a particular prophet, and, at +last, to the meaning of a particular revelation, prophecy, history, or +miracle. We have already pointed out that great caution is necessary not +to confound the mind of a prophet or historian with the mind of the Holy +Spirit and the truth of the matter; therefore I need not dwell further +on the subject. I would, however, here remark concerning the meaning of +revelation, that the present method only teaches us what the prophets +really saw or heard, not what they desired to signify or represent by +symbols. The latter may be guessed at but cannot be inferred with +certainty from Scriptural premises. + +We have thus shown the plan for interpreting Scripture, and have, at the +same time, demonstrated that it is the one and surest way of +investigating its true meaning. I am willing indeed to admit that those +persons (if any such there be) would be more absolutely certainly right, +who have received either a trustworthy tradition or an assurance from +the prophets themselves, such as is claimed by the Pharisees; or who +have a pontiff gifted with infallibility in the interpretation of +Scripture, such as the Roman Catholics boast. But as we can never be +perfectly sure, either of such a tradition or of the authority of the +pontiff, we cannot found any certain conclusion on either: the one is +denied by the oldest sect of Christians, the other by the oldest sect of +Jews. Indeed, if we consider the series of years (to mention no other +point) accepted by the Pharisees from their Rabbis, during which time +they say they have handed down the tradition from Moses, we shall find +that it is not correct, as I show elsewhere. Therefore such a tradition +should be received with extreme suspicion; and although, according to +our method, we are bound to consider as uncorrupted the tradition of the +Jews, namely, the meaning of the Hebrew words which we received from +them, we may accept the latter while retaining our doubts about the +former. + +No one has ever been able to change the meaning of a word in ordinary +use, though many have changed the meaning of a particular sentence. Such +a proceeding would be most difficult; for whoever attempted to change +the meaning of a word, would be compelled, at the same time, to explain +all the authors who employed it, each according to his temperament and +intention, or else, with consummate cunning, to falsify them. + +Further, the masses and the learned alike preserve language, but it is +only the learned who preserve the meaning of particular sentences and +books: thus, we may easily imagine that the learned having a very rare +book in their power, might change or corrupt the meaning of a sentence +in it, but they could not alter the signification of the words; +moreover, if anyone wanted to change the meaning of a common word he +would not be able to keep up the change among posterity, or in common +parlance or writing. + +For these and such-like reasons we may readily conclude that it would +never enter into the mind of anyone to corrupt a language, though the +intention of a writer may often have been falsified by changing his +phrases or interpreting them amiss. As then our method (based on the +principle that the knowledge of Scripture must be sought from itself +alone) is the sole true one, we must evidently renounce any knowledge +which it cannot furnish for the complete understanding of Scripture.... + +If we read a book which contains incredible or impossible narratives, or +is written in a very obscure style, and if we know nothing of its +author, nor of the time or occasion of its being written, we shall +vainly endeavor to gain any certain knowledge of its true meaning. For +being in ignorance on these points we cannot possibly know the aim or +intended aim of the author; if we are fully informed, we so order our +thoughts as not to be in any way prejudiced either in ascribing to the +author or him for whom the author wrote either more or less than his +meaning, and we only take into consideration what the author may have +had in his mind, or what the time and occasion demanded. I think this +must be tolerably evident to all. + +It often happens that in different books we read histories in themselves +similar, but which we judge very differently, according to the opinions +we have formed of the authors. I remember once to have read in some book +that a man named Orlando Furioso used to drive a kind of winged monster +through the air, fly over any countries he liked, kill unaided vast +numbers of men and giants, and such like fancies, which from the point +of view of reason are obviously absurd. A very similar story I read in +Ovid of Perseus, and also in the books of Judges and Kings of Samson, +who alone and unarmed killed thousands of men, and of Elijah, who flew +through the air, and at last went up to heaven in a chariot of fire, +with horses of fire. All these stories are obviously alike, but we judge +them very differently. The first only sought to amuse, the second had a +political object, the third a religious object. We gather this simply +from the opinions we had previously formed of the authors. Thus it is +evidently necessary to know something of the authors of writings which +are obscure or unintelligible, if we would interpret their meaning; and +for the same reason, in order to choose the proper reading from among a +great variety, we ought to have information as to the versions in which +the differences are found, and as to the possibility of other readings +having been discovered by persons of greater authority.... + +... The difficulties in this method of interpreting Scripture from its +own history, I conceive to be so great that I do not hesitate to say +that the true meaning of Scripture is in many places inexplicable, or at +best mere subject for guess work; but I must again point out, on the +other hand, that such difficulties only arise when we endeavor to follow +the meaning of a prophet in matters which cannot be perceived, but only +imagined, not in things, whereof the understanding can give a clear and +distinct idea, and which are conceivable through themselves: matters +which by their nature are easily perceived cannot be expressed so +obscurely as to be unintelligible; as the proverb says, "a word is +enough to the wise." Euclid, who only wrote of matters very simple and +easily understood, can easily be comprehended by any one in any +language; we can follow his intention perfectly, and be certain of his +true meaning, without having a thorough knowledge of the language in +which he wrote; in fact, a quite rudimentary acquaintance is sufficient. +We need make no researches concerning the life, the pursuits, or the +habits of the author; nor need we inquire in what language, nor when he +wrote, nor the vicissitudes of his book, nor its various readings, nor +how, nor by whose advice it has been received. + +What we here say of Euclid might equally be said of any book which +treats of things by their nature perceptible: thus we conclude that we +can easily follow the intention of Scripture in moral questions, from +the history we possess of it, and we can be sure of its true meaning. + +The precepts of true piety are expressed in very ordinary language, and +are equally simple and easily understood. Further, as true salvation and +blessedness consist in a true assent of the soul--and we truly assent +only to what we clearly understand--it is most plain that we can follow +with certainty the intention of Scripture in matters relating to +salvation and necessary to blessedness; therefore, we need not be much +troubled about what remains: such matters, inasmuch as we generally +cannot grasp them with our reason and understanding, are more curious +than profitable. + +I think I have now set forth the true method of Scriptural +interpretation, and have sufficiently explained my own opinion thereon. +Besides, I do not doubt that every one will see that such a method only +requires the aid of natural reason. The nature and efficacy of the +natural reason consists in deducing and proving the unknown from the +known, or in carrying premises to their legitimate conclusions; and +these are the very processes which our method desiderates. Though we +must admit that it does not suffice to explain everything in the Bible, +such imperfection does not spring from its own nature, but from the +fact that the path which it teaches us, as the true one, has never been +tended or trodden by men, and has thus, by the lapse of time, become +very difficult, and almost impassable, as, indeed, I have shown in the +difficulties I draw attention to. + +There only remains to examine the opinions of those who differ from me. + +The first which comes under our notice is, that the light of nature has +no power to interpret Scripture, but that a supernatural faculty is +required for the task. What is meant by this supernatural faculty I will +leave to its propounders to explain. Personally, I can only suppose that +they have adopted a very obscure way of stating their complete +uncertainty about the true meaning of Scripture. If we look at their +interpretations, they contain nothing supernatural, at least nothing but +the merest conjectures. + +Let them be placed side by side with the interpretations of those who +frankly confess that they have no faculty beyond their natural ones; we +shall see that the two are just alike--both human, both long pondered +over, both laboriously invented. To say that the natural reason is +insufficient for such results is plainly untrue, firstly, for the +reasons above stated, namely, that the difficulty of interpreting +Scripture arises from no defect in human reason, but simply from the +carelessness (not to say malice) of men who neglected the history of the +Bible while there were still materials for inquiry; secondly, from the +fact (admitted, I think, by all) that the supernatural faculty is a +Divine gift granted only to the faithful. But the prophets and apostles +did not preach to the faithful only, but chiefly to the unfaithful and +wicked. Such persons, therefore, were able to understand the intention +of the prophets and apostles, otherwise the prophets and apostles would +have seemed to be preaching to little boys and infants, not to men +endowed with reason. Moses, too, would have given his laws in vain, if +they could only be comprehended by the faithful, who need no law. +Indeed, those who demand supernatural faculties for comprehending the +meaning of the prophets and apostles seem truly lacking in natural +faculties, so that we should hardly suppose such persons the possessors +of a Divine supernatural gift. + +The opinion of Maimonides was widely different. He asserted that each +passage in Scripture admits of various, nay, contrary meanings; but that +we could never be certain of any particular one till we knew that the +passage, as we interpreted it, contained nothing contrary or repugnant +to reason. If the literal meaning clashes with reason, though the +passage seems in itself perfectly clear, it must be interpreted in some +metaphorical sense. This doctrine he lays down very plainly in Chap. +xxv. part ii. of his book _More Nebuchim_ for he says: "Know that we +shrink not from affirming that the world hath existed from eternity, +because of what Scripture saith concerning the world's creation. For the +texts which teach that the world was created are not more in number than +those which teach that God hath a body; neither are the approaches in +this matter of the world's creation closed, or even made hard to us: so +that we should not be able to explain what is written, as we did when we +showed that God hath no body, nay, peradventure, we could explain and +make fast the doctrine of the world's eternity more easily than we did +away with the doctrines that God hath a beatified body. Yet two things +hinder me from doing as I have said, and believing that the world is +eternal. As it hath been clearly shown that God hath not a body, we must +perforce explain all those passages whereof the literal sense agreeth +not with the demonstration, for sure it is that they can be so +explained. But the eternity of the world hath not been so demonstrated, +therefore it is not necessary to do violence to Scripture in support of +some common opinion, whereof we might, at the bidding of reason, embrace +the contrary." + +Such are the words of Maimonides, and they are evidently sufficient to +establish our point: for if he had been convinced by reason that the +world is eternal, he would not have hesitated to twist and explain away +the words of Scripture till he made them appear to teach this doctrine. +He would have felt quite sure that Scripture, though everywhere plainly +denying the eternity of the world, really intends to teach it. So that, +however clear the meaning of Scripture may be, he would not feel certain +of having grasped it, so long as he remained doubtful of the truth of +what was written. For we are in doubt whether a thing is in conformity +with reason, or contrary thereto, so long as we are uncertain of its +truth, and, consequently, we cannot be sure whether the literal meaning +of a passage be true or false. + +If such a theory as this were sound, I would certainly grant that some +faculty beyond the natural reason is required for interpreting +Scripture. For nearly all things that we find in Scripture cannot be +inferred from known principles of the natural reason, and therefore, we +should be unable to come to any conclusion about their truth, or about +the real meaning and intention of Scripture, but should stand in need of +some further assistance. + +Further, the truth of this theory would involve that the masses, having +generally no comprehension of, nor leisure for, detailed proofs, would +be reduced to receiving all their knowledge of Scripture on the +authority and testimony of philosophers, and consequently, would be +compelled to suppose that the interpretations given by philosophers were +infallible. + +Truly this would be a new form of ecclesiastical authority, and a new +sort of priests or pontiffs, more likely to excite men's ridicule than +their veneration. Certainly our method demands a knowledge of Hebrew for +which the masses have no leisure; but no such objection as the foregoing +can be brought against us. For the ordinary Jews or Gentiles, to whom +the prophets and apostles preached and wrote, understood the language, +and consequently, the intention of the prophet or apostle addressing +them; but they did not grasp the intrinsic reason of what was preached, +which, according to Maimonides, would be necessary for an understanding +of it. + +There is nothing, then, in our method which renders it necessary that +the masses should follow the testimony of commentators, for I point to a +set of unlearned people who understood the language of the prophets and +apostles; whereas Maimonides could not point to any such who could +arrive at the prophetic or apostolic meaning through their knowledge of +the causes of things. + +As to the multitude of our own time [we shall show] that whatsoever is +necessary to salvation, though its reasons may be unknown, can easily be +understood in any language, because it is thoroughly ordinary and usual; +it is in such understanding as this that the masses acquiesce, not in +the testimony of commentators; with regard to other questions, the +ignorant and the learned fare alike. + +But let us return to the opinion of Maimonides, and examine it more +closely. In the first place, he supposes that the prophets were in +entire agreement one with another, and that they were consummate +philosophers and theologians; for he would have them to have based their +conclusions on the absolute truth. Further, he supposes that the sense +of Scripture cannot be made plain from Scripture itself, for the truth +of things is not made plain therein (in that it does not prove anything, +nor teach the matters of which it speaks through their definitions and +first causes), therefore, according to Maimonides, the true sense of +Scripture cannot be made plain from itself, and must not be there +sought. + +The falsity of such a doctrine is shown in this very chapter, for we +have shown both by reason and examples that the meaning of Scripture is +only made plain through Scripture itself, and even in questions +deducible from ordinary knowledge should be looked for from no other +source. + +Lastly, such a theory supposes that we may explain the words of +Scripture according to our preconceived opinions, twisting them about, +and reversing or completely changing the literal sense, however plain it +may be. Such license is utterly opposed to the teaching of this and the +[succeeding] chapters, and moreover, will be evident to every one as +rash and excessive. + +But if we grant all this license, what can it effect after all? +Absolutely nothing. Those things which cannot be demonstrated, and which +make up the greater part of Scripture, cannot be examined by reason, and +cannot therefore be explained or interpreted by this rule; whereas, on +the contrary, by following our own method, we can explain many questions +of this nature, and discuss them on a sure basis, as we have already +shown, by reason and example. Those matters which are by their nature +comprehensible we can easily explain, as has been pointed out, simply by +means of the context. + +Therefore, the method of Maimonides is clearly useless: to which we may +add, that it does away with all the certainty which the masses acquire +by candid reading, or which is gained by any other persons in any other +way. In conclusion, then, we dismiss Maimonides' theory as harmful, +useless, and absurd. + +As to the tradition of the Pharisees, we have already shown[3] that it +is not consistent, while the authority of the popes of Rome stands in +need of more credible evidence; the latter, indeed, I reject simply on +this ground, for if the popes could point out to us the meaning of +Scripture as surely as did the high priests of the Jews, I should not be +deterred by the fact that there have been heretic and impious Roman +pontiffs; for among the Hebrew high-priests of old there were also +heretics and impious men who gained the high-priesthood by improper +means, but who, nevertheless, had Scriptural sanction for their supreme +power of interpreting the law. (See Deut. xvii. 11, 12, and xxxviii. 10, +also Malachi ii. 8). + +However, as the popes can show no such sanction, their authority remains +open to very grave doubt, nor should any one be deceived by the example +of the Jewish high-priests and think that the Catholic religion also +stands in need of a pontiff; he should bear in mind that the laws of +Moses being also the ordinary laws of the country, necessarily required +some public authority to insure their observance; for, if everyone were +free to interpret the laws of his country as he pleased, no state could +stand, but would for that very reason be dissolved at once, and public +rights would become private rights. + +With religion the case is widely different. Inasmuch as it consists not +so much in outward actions as in simplicity and truth of character, it +stands outside the sphere of law and public authority. Simplicity and +truth of character are not produced by the constraint of laws, nor by +the authority of the state, no one the whole world over can be forced or +legislated into a state of blessedness; the means required for such a +consummation are faithful and brotherly admonition, sound education, and +above all, free use of the individual judgment. + +Therefore, as the supreme right of free thinking, even on religion, is +in every man's power, and as it is inconceivable that such power could +be alienated, it is also in every man's power to wield the supreme right +and authority of free judgment in this behalf, and to explain and +interpret religion for himself. The only reason for vesting the supreme +authority in the interpretation of law, and judgment on public affairs +in the hands of the magistrates, is that it concerns questions of public +right. Similarly the supreme authority in explaining religion, and in +passing judgment thereon, is lodged with the individual because it +concerns questions of individual right. So far, then, from the authority +of the Hebrew high-priests telling in confirmation of the authority of +the Roman pontiffs to interpret religion, it would rather tend to +establish individual freedom of judgment. Thus in this way, also, we +have shown that our method of interpreting Scripture is the best. For as +the highest power of Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man, the +rule for such interpretation should be nothing but the natural light of +reason which is common to all--not any supernatural light nor any +external authority; moreover, such a rule ought not to be so difficult +that it can only be applied by very skillful philosophers, but should be +adapted to the natural and ordinary faculties and capacity of mankind. +And such I have shown our method to be, for such difficulties as it has +arise from men's carelessness, and are no part of its nature. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[2] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. vii, same title. + +[3] The detailed discussion of this point has been omitted.--ED. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +OF PROPHETS AND PROPHECY[4] + + +I + +Prophecy, or revelation, is sure knowledge revealed by God to man. A +prophet is one who interprets the revelations of God to those who are +unable to attain to sure knowledge of the matters revealed, and +therefore can only apprehend them by simple faith. + +The Hebrew word for prophet is "_nabi_," _i.e._, speaker or interpreter, +but in Scripture its meaning is restricted to interpreter of God, as we +may learn from Exodus vii. 1, where God says to Moses, "See, I have made +thee a god to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet;" +implying that, since in interpreting Moses' words to Pharaoh, Aaron +acted the part of a prophet, Moses would be to Pharaoh as a god, or in +the attitude of a god.... + +Now it is evident, from the definition above given, that prophecy really +includes ordinary knowledge; for the knowledge which we acquire by our +natural faculties depends on our knowledge of God and His eternal laws; +but ordinary knowledge is common to all men as men, and rests on +foundations which all share, whereas the multitude always strains after +rarities and exceptions, and thinks little of the gifts of nature; so +that, when prophecy is talked of, ordinary knowledge is not supposed to +be included. Nevertheless it has as much right as any other to be called +Divine, for God's nature, in so far as we share therein, and God's laws, +dictate it to us; nor does it suffer from that to which we give the +preëminence, except in so far as the latter transcends its limits and +cannot be accounted for by natural laws taken in themselves. In respect +to the certainty it involves, and the source from which it is derived, +_i.e._, God, ordinary knowledge is no whit inferior to prophetic, unless +indeed we believe, or rather dream, that the prophets had human bodies +but superhuman minds, and therefore that their sensations and +consciousness were entirely different from our own. + +But, although ordinary knowledge is Divine, its professors cannot be +called prophets, for they teach what the rest of mankind could perceive +and apprehend, not merely by simple faith, but as surely and honorably +as themselves. + +Seeing then that our mind subjectively contains in itself and partakes +of the nature of God, and solely from this cause is enabled to form +notions explaining natural phenomena and inculcating morality, it +follows that we may rightly assert the nature of the human mind (in so +far as it is thus conceived) to be a primary cause of Divine revelation. +All that we clearly and distinctly understand is dictated to us, as I +have just pointed out, by the idea and nature of God; not indeed through +words, but in a way far more excellent and agreeing perfectly with the +nature of the mind, as all who have enjoyed intellectual certainty will +doubtless attest. Here, however, my chief purpose is to speak of +matters having reference to Scripture, so these few words on the light +of reason will suffice. + +I will now pass on to, and treat more fully, the other ways and means by +which God makes revelations to mankind, both of that which transcends +ordinary knowledge and of that within its scope; for there is no reason +why God should not employ other means to communicate what we know +already by the power of reason. + +Our conclusions on the subject must be drawn solely from Scripture; for +what can we affirm about matters transcending our knowledge except what +is told us by the words or writings of prophets? And since there are, so +far as I know, no prophets now alive, we have no alternative but to read +the books of prophets departed, taking care the while not to reason from +metaphor or to ascribe anything to our authors which they do not +themselves distinctly state. I must further premise that the Jews never +make any mention or account of secondary, or particular causes, but in a +spirit of religion, piety, and what is commonly called godliness, refer +all things directly to the Deity. For instance, if they make money by a +transaction, they say God gave it to them; if they desire anything, they +say God has disposed their hearts towards it; if they think anything, +they say God told them. Hence we must not suppose that everything is +prophecy or revelation which is described in Scripture as told by God to +any one, but only such things as are expressly announced as prophecy or +revelation, or are plainly pointed to as such by the context. + +A perusal of the sacred books will show us that all God's revelations to +the prophets were made through words or appearances, or a combination of +the two. These words and appearances were of two kinds; (1) _real_ when +external to the mind of the prophet who heard or saw them, (2) +_imaginary_ when the imagination of the prophet was in a state which led +him distinctly to suppose that he heard or saw them. + +With a real voice God revealed to Moses the laws which He wished to be +transmitted to the Hebrews, as we may see from Exodus xxv. 22, where God +says, "And there I will meet with thee and I will commune with thee from +the mercy seat which is between the Cherubim." Some sort of real voice +must necessarily have been employed, for Moses found God ready to +commune with him at any time. This is the only instance of a real voice. + +... Some of the Jews believe that the actual words of the Decalogue were +not spoken by God, but that the Israelites heard a noise only, without +any distinct words, and during its continuance apprehend the Ten +Commandments by pure intuition; to this opinion I myself once inclined, +seeing that the words of the Decalogue in Exodus are different from the +words of the Decalogue in Deuteronomy, for the discrepancy seemed to +imply (since God only spoke once) that the Ten Commandments were not +intended to convey the actual words of the Lord, but only His meaning. +However, unless we would do violence to Scripture, we must certainly +admit that the Israelites heard a real voice, for Scripture expressly +says (Deut. v. 4), "God spake with you face to face," _i.e._, as two men +ordinarily interchange ideas through the instrumentality of their two +bodies; and therefore it seems more consonant with Holy Writ to suppose +that God really did create a voice of some kind with which the Decalogue +was revealed.... + +Yet not even thus is all difficulty removed, for it seems scarcely +reasonable to affirm that a created thing, depending on God in the same +manner as other created things, would be able to express or explain the +nature of God either verbally or really by means of its individual +organism: for instance, by declaring in the first person, "I am the Lord +your God." + +Certainly when any one says his mouth, "I understand," we do not +attribute the understanding to the mouth, but to the mind of the +speaker; yet this is because the mouth is the natural organ of a man +speaking, and the hearer, knowing what understanding is, easily +comprehends, by a comparison with himself, that the speaker's mind is +meant; but if we knew nothing of God beyond the mere name and wished to +commune with Him, and be assured of His existence, I fail to see how our +wish would be satisfied by the declaration of a created thing (depending +on God neither more nor less than ourselves), "I am the Lord." If God +contorted the lips of Moses, or, I will not say Moses, but some beast, +till they pronounced the words, "I am the Lord," should we apprehend the +Lord's existence therefrom? + +Scripture seems clearly to point to the belief that God spoke Himself, +having descended from heaven to Mount Sinai for the purpose--and not +only that the Israelites heard Him speaking, but that their chief men +beheld Him (Ex. xxiv.). Further, the laws of Moses which might neither +be added to nor curtailed, and which was set up as a national standard +of right, nowhere prescribed the belief that God is without body, or +even without form or figure, but only ordained that the Jews should +believe in His existence and worship Him alone: it forbade them to +invent or fashion any likeness of the Deity, but this was to insure +purity of service; because, never having seen God, they could not by +means of images recall the likeness of God, but only the likeness of +some created thing which might thus gradually take the place of God as +the object of their adoration. Nevertheless, the Bible clearly implies +that God has a form, and that Moses when he heard God speaking was +permitted to behold it, or at least its hinder parts. + +Doubtless some mystery lurks in this question which we will discuss more +fully below. For the present I will call attention to the passages in +Scripture indicating the means by which God has revealed His laws to +man. + +Revelation may be through figures only (as in 1 Chron. xxii.), where God +displays his anger to David by means of an angel bearing a sword, and +also in the story of Balaam. + +Maimonides and others do indeed maintain that these and every other +instance of angelic apparitions (_e.g._, to Manoah and to Abraham +offering up Isaac) occurred during sleep, for that no one with his eyes +open ever could see an angel, but this is mere nonsense. The sole object +of such commentators seemed to be to extort from Scripture confirmations +of Aristotelian quibbles and their own inventions, a proceeding which I +regard as the acme of absurdity. + +In figures, not real but existing only in the prophet's imagination, God +revealed to Joseph his future lordship, and in words and figures He +revealed to Joshua that He would fight for the Hebrews, causing to +appear an angel, as it were the captain of the Lord's host, bearing a +sword, and by this means communicating verbally. The forsaking of Israel +by Providence was portrayed to Isaiah by a vision of the Lord, the +thrice Holy, sitting on a very lofty throne, and the Hebrews, stained +with the mire of their sins, sunk, as it were, in uncleanness, and thus +as far as possible distant from God. The wretchedness of the people at +the time was thus revealed, while future calamities were foretold in +words. I could cite from Holy Writ many similar examples, but I think +they are sufficiently well known already.... + +We may be able quite to comprehend that God can communicate immediately +with man, for without the intervention of bodily means He communicates +to our minds His essence; still, a man who can by pure intuition +comprehend ideas which are neither contained in nor deducible from the +foundations of our natural knowledge, must necessarily possess a mind +far superior to those of his fellow men, nor do I believe that any have +been so endowed save Christ. To Him the ordinances of God leading men to +salvation were revealed directly without words or visions, so that God +manifested Himself to the Apostles through the mind of Christ as He +formerly did to Moses through the supernatural voice. In this sense the +voice of Christ, like the voice which Moses heard, may be called the +voice of God, and it may be said that the wisdom of God (_i.e._, wisdom +more than human) took upon itself in Christ human nature, and that +Christ was the way of salvation. I must at this juncture declare that +those doctrines which certain churches put forward concerning Christ, I +neither affirm nor deny, for I freely confess that I do not understand +them. What I have just stated I gather from Scripture, where I never +read that God appeared to Christ, or spoke to Christ, but that God was +revealed to the Apostles through Christ; that Christ was the Way of +Life, and that the old law was given through an angel, and not +immediately by God; whence it follows that if Moses spoke with God face +to face as a man speaks with his friend (_i.e._, by means of their two +bodies) Christ communed with God mind to mind.[5] + +Thus we may conclude that no one except Christ received the revelations +of God without the aid of imagination, whether in words or vision. +Therefore the power of prophecy implies not a peculiarly perfect mind, +but a peculiarly vivid imagination.... + +If the Jews were at a loss to understand any phenomenon, or were +ignorant of its cause, they referred it to God. Thus a storm was termed +the chiding of God, thunder and lightning the arrows of God, for it was +thought that God kept the winds confined in caves, His treasuries; thus +differing merely in name from the Greek wind-god Eolus. In like manner +miracles were called works of God, as being especially marvelous; though +in reality, of course, all natural events are the works of God, and take +place solely by His power. The Psalmist calls the miracles in Egypt the +works of God, because the Hebrews found in them a way of safety which +they had not looked for, and therefore especially marveled at. + +As, then, unusual natural phenomena are called works of God, and trees +of unusual size are called trees of God, we cannot wonder that very +strong and tall men, though impious robbers and whoremongers, are in +Genesis called sons of God. + +This reference of things wonderful to God was not peculiar to the Jews. +Pharaoh, on hearing the interpretation of his dream, exclaimed that the +mind of the gods was in Joseph. Nebuchadnezzar told Daniel that he +possessed the mind of the holy gods; so also in Latin anything well made +is often said to be wrought with Divine hands, which is equivalent to +the Hebrew phrase, wrought with the hand of God. + +... We find that the Scriptural phrases, "The Spirit of the Lord was +upon a prophet," "The Lord breathed His Spirit into men," "Men were +filled with the Spirit of God, with the Holy Spirit," etc., are quite +clear to us, and mean that the prophets were endowed with a peculiar and +extraordinary power, and devoted themselves to piety with especial +constancy; that thus they perceived the mind or the thought of God, for +we have shown [elsewhere] that God's spirit signifies in Hebrew God's +mind or thought, and that the law which shows His mind and thought is +called His Spirit; hence that the imagination of the prophets, inasmuch +as through it were revealed the decrees of God, may equally be called +the mind of God, and the prophets be said to have possessed the mind of +God. On our minds also the mind of God and His eternal thoughts are +impressed; but this being the same for all men is less taken into +account, especially by the Hebrews, who claimed a preëminence, and +despised other men and other men's knowledge. + +[Also] the prophets were said to possess the Spirit of God because men +knew not the cause of prophetic knowledge, and in their wonder referred +it with other marvels directly to the Deity, styling it Divine +knowledge. + +We need no longer scruple to affirm that the prophets only perceived +God's revelation by the aid of imagination, that is, by words and +figures either real or imaginary. We find no other means mentioned in +Scripture, and therefore must not invent any. As to the particular law +of Nature by which the communications took place, I confess my +ignorance. I might, indeed, say as others do, that they took place by +the power of God; but this would be mere trifling, and no better than +explaining some unique specimen by a transcendental term. Everything +takes place by the power of God. Nature herself is the power of God +under another name, and our ignorance of the power of God is +co-extensive with our ignorance of Nature. It is absolutely folly, +therefore, to ascribe an event to the power of God when we know not its +natural cause, which is the power of God. + +However, we are not now inquiring into the causes of prophetic +knowledge. We are only attempting, as I have said, to examine the +Scriptural documents, and to draw our conclusions from them as from +ultimate natural facts; the causes of the documents do not concern us. + +As the prophets perceived the revelations of God by the aid of +imagination, they could indisputably perceive much that is beyond the +boundary of the intellect, for many more ideas can be constructed from +words and figures than from the principles and notions on which the +whole fabric of reasoned knowledge is reared. + +Thus we have a clue to the fact that the prophets perceived nearly +everything in parables and allegories, and clothed spiritual truths in +bodily forms, for such is the usual method of imagination. We need no +longer wonder that Scripture and the prophets speak so strangely and +obscurely of God's Spirit or Mind (cf. Numbers xi. 17, 1 Kings xxii, 21, +etc.), that the Lord was seen by Micah as sitting, by Daniel as an old +man clothed in white, by Ezekiel as a fire, that the Holy Spirit +appeared to those with Christ as a descending dove, to the apostles as +fiery tongues, to Paul on his conversion as a great light. All these +expressions are plainly in harmony with the current ideas of God and +spirits. + +Inasmuch as imagination is fleeting and inconstant, we find that the +power of prophecy did not remain with a prophet for long, nor manifest +itself frequently, but was very rare; manifesting itself only in a few +men, and in them not often. + +We must necessarily inquire how the prophets became assured of the truth +of what they perceived by imagination, and not by sure mental laws; but +our investigation must be confined to Scripture, for the subject is one +on which we cannot acquire certain knowledge, and which we cannot +explain by the immediate causes. + + +II + +... As I have said, the prophets were endowed with unusually vivid +imaginations, and not with unusually perfect minds. This conclusion is +amply sustained by Scripture, for we are told that Solomon was the +wisest of men, but had no special faculty of prophecy. Heman, Calcol, +and Dara, though men of great talent, were not prophets, whereas +uneducated countrymen, nay, even women, such as Hagar, Abraham's +handmaid, were thus gifted. Nor is this contrary to ordinary experience +and reason. Men of great imaginative power are less fitted for abstract +reasoning, whereas those who excel in intellect and its use keep their +imagination more restrained and controlled, holding it in subjection, so +to speak, lest it should usurp the place of reason. + +Thus to suppose that knowledge of natural and spiritual phenomena can be +gained from the prophetic books, is an utter mistake, which I shall +endeavor to expose, as I think philosophy, the age, and the question +itself demand. I care not for the girdings of superstition, for +superstition is the bitter enemy of all true knowledge and true +morality. Yes; it has come to this! Men who openly confess that they can +form no idea of God, and only know Him through created things, of which +they know not the causes, can unblushingly accuse philosophers of +Atheism. + +Treating the question methodically, I will show that prophecies varied, +not only according to the imagination and physical temperament of the +prophet, but also according to his particular opinions; and further that +prophecy never rendered the prophet wiser than he was before. But I will +first discuss the assurance of truth which the prophets received, for +this is akin to the subject-matter of the chapter, and will serve to +elucidate somewhat our present point. + +Imagination does not, in its own nature, involve any certainty of truth, +such as is implied in every clear and distinct idea, but requires some +extrinsic reason to assure us of its objective reality: hence prophecy +cannot afford certainty, and the prophets were assured of God's +revelation by some sign, and not by the fact of revelation, as we may +see from Abraham, who, when he had heard the promise of God, demanded a +sign, not because he did not believe in God but because he wished to be +sure that it was God Who made the promise. The fact is still more +evident in the case of Gideon: "Show me," he says to God, "show me a +sign, that I may know that it is Thou that talkest with me." God also +says to Moses: "And let this be a sign that I have sent thee." Hezekiah, +though he had long known Isaiah to be a prophet, none the less demanded +a sign of the cure which he predicted. It is thus quite evident that the +prophets always received some sign to certify them of their prophetic +imaginings; and for this reason Moses bids the Jews (Deut. xviii.) ask +of the prophets a sign, namely, the prediction of some coming event. In +this respect, prophetic knowledge is inferior to natural knowledge, +which needs no sign, and in itself implies certitude. Moreover, +Scripture warrants the statement that the certitude of the prophets was +not mathematical, but moral. Moses lays down the punishment of death for +the prophet who preaches new gods, even though he confirm his doctrine +by signs and wonders (Deut. xiii.); "For," he says, "the Lord also +worketh signs and wonders to try His people." And Jesus Christ warns His +disciples of the same thing (Matt. xxiv. 24). Furthermore, Ezekiel (xiv. +9) plainly states that God sometimes deceives men with false +revelations; and Micaiah bears like witness in the case of the prophets +of Ahab. + +Although these instances go to prove that revelation is open to doubt, +it nevertheless contains, as we have said, a considerable element of +certainty, for God never deceives the good, nor His chosen, but +(according to the ancient proverb and as appears in the history of +Abigail and her speech), God uses the good as instruments of goodness, +and the wicked as means to execute His wrath. This may be seen from the +cases of Micaiah above quoted; for although God had determined to +deceive Ahab, through prophets, He made use of lying prophets; to the +good prophet He revealed the truth, and did not forbid his proclaiming +it. + +Still the certitude of prophecy remains, as I have said, merely moral; +for no one can justify himself before God, nor boast that he is an +instrument for God's goodness. Scripture itself teaches and shows that +God led away David to number the people, though it bears ample witness +to David's piety. + +The whole question of the certitude of prophecy was based on these three +considerations:-- + +1. That the things revealed were imagined very vividly, affecting the +prophets in the same way as things seen when awake; + +2. The presence of a sign; + +3. Lastly and chiefly, that the mind of the prophet was given wholly to +what was right and good. + +Although Scripture does not always make mention of a sign, we must +nevertheless suppose that a sign was always vouchsafed; for Scripture +does not always relate every condition and circumstance (as many have +remarked), but rather takes them for granted. We may, however, admit +that no sign was needed when the prophecy declared nothing that was not +already contained in the law of Moses, because it was confirmed by that +law. For instance, Jeremiah's prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem +was confirmed by the prophecies of other prophets, and by the threats in +the law, and therefore it needed no sign; whereas Hananiah, who, +contrary to all the prophets, foretold the speedy restoration of the +state, stood in need of a sign, or he would have been in doubt as to the +truth of his prophecy, until it was confirmed by facts. "The prophet +which prophesieth of peace, when the word of the prophet shall come to +pass, then shall the prophet be known that the Lord hath truly sent +him." + +As, then, the certitude afforded to the prophet by signs was not +mathematical (_i.e._, did not necessarily follow from the perception of +the thing perceived or seen), but only moral, and as the signs were only +given to convince the prophet, it follows that such signs were given +according to the opinions and capacity of each prophet, so that a sign +which would convince one prophet would fall far short of convincing +another who was imbued with different opinions. Therefore the signs +varied according to the individual prophet. + +So also did the revelation vary, as we have stated, according to +individual disposition and temperament, and according to the opinions +previously held. + +It varied according to disposition, in this way: if a prophet was +cheerful, victories, peace, and events which make men glad, were +revealed to him; in that he was naturally more likely to imagine such +things. If, on the contrary, he was melancholy, wars, massacres, and +calamities were revealed; and so, according as a prophet was merciful, +gentle, quick to anger, or severe, he was more fitted for one kind of +revelation than another. It varied according to the temper of +imagination in this way: if a prophet was cultivated he perceived the +mind of God in a cultivated way, if he was confused he perceived it +confusedly. And so with revelations perceived through visions. If a +prophet was a countryman he saw visions of oxen, cows, and the like; if +he was a soldier, he saw generals and armies; if a courtier, a royal +throne, and so on. + +Lastly, prophecy varied according to the opinions held by the prophets; +for instance, to the Magi, who believed in the follies of astrology, the +birth of Christ was revealed through the vision of a star in the East. +To the augurs of Nebuchadnezzar the destruction of Jerusalem was +revealed through entrails, whereas the king himself inferred it from +oracles and the direction of arrows which he shot into the air. To +prophets who believed that man acts from free choice and by his own +power, God was revealed as standing apart from and ignorant of future +human actions. All of which we will illustrate from Scripture.... + +The style of the prophecy also varied according to the eloquence of the +individual prophet. The prophecies of Ezekiel and Amos are not written +in a cultivated style like those of Isaiah and Nahum, but more rudely. +Any Hebrew scholar who wishes to inquire into this point more closely, +and compares chapters of the different prophets treating of the same +subject, will find that God has no particular style in speaking, but, +according to the learning and capacity of the prophet, is cultivated, +compressed, severe, untutored, prolixed or obscure.... + +Every one has been strangely hasty in affirming that the prophets knew +everything within the scope of human intellect; and, although certain +passages of Scripture plainly affirm that the prophets were in certain +respects ignorant, such persons would rather say that they do not +understand the passages than admit that there was anything which the +prophets did not know; or else they try to wrest the Scriptural words +away from their evident meaning. + +If either of these proceedings is allowable we may as well shut our +Bibles, for vainly shall we attempt to prove anything from them if their +plainest passages may be classed among obscure and impenetrable +mysteries, or if we may put any interpretation on them which we fancy. +For instance, nothing is more clear in the Bible than that Joshua, and +perhaps also the author who wrote his history, thought that the sun +revolves round the earth, and that the earth is fixed, and further that +the sun for a certain period remained still. Many, who will not admit +any movement in the heavenly bodies, explain away the passage till it +seems to mean something quite different; others, who have learned to +philosophize more correctly, and understand that the earth moves while +the sun is still, or at any rate does not revolve round the earth, try +with all their might to wrest this meaning from Scripture, though +plainly nothing of the sort is intended. Such quibblers excite my +wonder! Are we, forsooth, bound to believe that Joshua the soldier was a +learned astronomer? or that a miracle could not be revealed to him, or +that the light of the sun could not remain longer than usual above the +horizon, without his knowing the cause? To me both alternatives appear +ridiculous, and therefore I would rather say that Joshua was ignorant of +the true cause of the lengthened day, and that he and the whole host +with him thought that the sun moved round the earth every day, and that +on that particular occasion it stood still for a time, thus causing the +light to remain longer; and I would say that they did not conjecture +that, from the amount of snow in the air (see Josh. x. 11), the +refraction may have been greater than usual, or that there may have been +some other cause which we will not now inquire into. + +So also the sign of the shadow going back was revealed to Isaiah +according to his understanding; that is, as proceeding from a going +backwards of the sun; for he, too, thought that the sun moves and that +the earth is still; of parhelia he perhaps never even dreamed. We may +arrive at this conclusion without any scruple, for the sign could really +have come to pass, and have been predicted by Isaiah to the king, +without the prophet being aware of the real cause. + +With regard to the building of the Temple by Solomon, if it was really +dictated by God we must maintain the same doctrine: namely, that all the +measurements were revealed according to the opinions and understanding +of the king; for as we are not bound to believe that Solomon was a +mathematician, we may affirm that he was ignorant of the true ratio +between the circumference and the diameter of a circle, and that, like +the generality of workmen, he thought that it was as three to one. But +if it is allowable to declare that we do not understand the passage, in +good sooth I know nothing in the Bible that we can understand; for the +process of building is there narrated simply and as a mere matter of +history. If, again, it is permitted to pretend that the passage has +another meaning, and was written as it is from some reason unknown to +us, this is no less than a complete subversal of the Bible; for every +absurd and evil invention of human perversity could thus, without +detriment to Scriptural authority, be defended and fostered. Our +conclusion is in no wise impious, for though Solomon, Isaiah, Joshua, +etc., were prophets, they were none the less men, and as such not exempt +from human shortcomings. + +According to the understanding of Noah it was revealed to him that God +was about to destroy the whole human race, for Noah thought that beyond +the limits of Palestine the world was not inhabited. + +Not only in matters of this kind, but in others more important, the +prophets could be, and in fact were, ignorant; for they taught nothing +special about the Divine attributes, but held quite ordinary notions +about God, and to these notions their revelations were adapted, as I +will demonstrate by ample Scriptural testimony; from all which one may +easily see that they were praised and commended, not so much for the +sublimity and eminence of their intellect as for their piety and +faithfulness. + +Adam, the first man to whom God was revealed, did not know that He is +omnipotent and omniscient; for he hid himself from Him, and attempted to +make excuses for his fault before God, as though he had had to do with +a man; therefore to him also was God revealed according to his +understanding--that is, as being unaware of his situation or his sin, +for Adam heard, or seemed to hear, the Lord walking in the garden, +calling him and asking him where he was; and then, on seeing his +shamefacedness, asking him whether he had eaten of the forbidden fruit. +Adam evidently only knew the Deity as the Creator of all things. To Cain +also God was revealed, according to his understanding, as ignorant of +human affairs, nor was a higher conception of the Deity required for +repentance of his sin. + +To Laban the Lord revealed Himself as the God of Abraham, because Laban +believed that each nation had its own special divinity (see Gen. xxxi. +29). Abraham also knew not that God is omnipresent, and has +foreknowledge of all things; for when he heard the sentence against the +inhabitants of Sodom, he prayed that the Lord should not execute it till +He had ascertained whether they all merited such punishment; for he said +(see Gen. xviii. 24), "Peradventure there be fifty righteous within the +city," and in accordance with this belief God was revealed to him; as +Abraham imagined, He spake thus: "I will go down now, and see whether +they have done altogether according to the cry of it which is come unto +Me; and if not I will know." Further, the Divine testimony concerning +Abraham asserts nothing but that he was obedient, and that he "commanded +his household after him that they should keep the way of the Lord" (Gen. +xviii. 19); it does not state that he held sublime conceptions of the +Deity. + +Moses, also, was not sufficiently aware that God is omniscient, and +directs human actions by His sole decree, for although God himself says +that the Israelites should hearken to Him, Moses still considered the +matter doubtful and repeated, "But if they will not believe me, nor +hearken unto my voice." To him in like manner God was revealed as taking +no part in, and as being ignorant of, future human actions: the Lord +gave him two signs and said, "And it shall come to pass that if they +will not believe thee, neither hearken to the voice of the first sign, +that they will believe the voice of the latter sign; but if not, thou +shalt take of the water of the river," etc. Indeed, if any one considers +without prejudice the recorded opinions of Moses, he will plainly see +that Moses conceived the Deity as a Being Who has always existed, does +exist, and always will exist, and for this cause he calls Him by the +name Jehovah, which in Hebrew signifies these three phases of existence: +as to His nature, Moses only taught that He is merciful, gracious, and +exceeding jealous, as appears from many passages in the Pentateuch. +Lastly, he believed and taught that this Being was so different from all +other beings, that He could not be expressed by the image of any visible +thing; also, that He could not be looked upon, and that not so much from +inherent impossibility as from human infirmity; further, that by reason +of His power He was without equal and unique. Moses admitted, indeed, +that there were beings (doubtless by the plan and command of the Lord) +who acted as God's vicegerents--that is, beings to whom God had given +the right, authority, and power to direct nations, and to provide and +care for them; but he taught that this Being Whom they were bound to +obey was the highest and Supreme God, (or to use the Hebrew phrase) God +of gods, and thus in the song (Exod. xv. 11) he exclaims, "Who is like +unto Thee, O Lord, among the gods?" and Jethro says (Exod. xviii. 11), +"Now I know that the Lord is greater than all gods." That is to say, "I +am at length compelled to admit to Moses that Jehovah is greater than +all gods, and that His power is unrivalled." We must remain in doubt +whether Moses thought that these beings who acted as God's vicegerents +were created by Him, for he has stated nothing, so far as we know, about +their creation and origin. He further taught that this Being had brought +the visible world into order from Chaos, and had given Nature her germs, +and therefore that He possesses supreme right and power over all things; +further, that by reason of this supreme right and power He had chosen +for Himself alone the Hebrew nation and a certain strip of territory, +and had handed over to the care of other gods substituted by Himself the +rest of the nations and territories, and that therefore He was called +the God of Israel and the God of Jerusalem, whereas the other gods were +called the gods of the Gentiles. For this reason the Jews believed that +the strip of territory which God had chosen for Himself, demanded a +Divine worship quite apart and different from the worship which obtained +elsewhere, and that the Lord would not suffer the worship of other gods +adapted to other countries. Thus they thought that the people whom the +king of Assyria had brought into Judća were torn in pieces by lions +because they knew not the worship of the National Divinity (2 Kings +xvii. 25).... + +If we now examine the revelations to Moses, we shall find that they were +accommodated to these opinions; as he believed that the Divine Nature +was subject to the conditions of mercy, graciousness, etc., so God was +revealed to him in accordance with his idea and under these attributes +(see Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7, and the second commandment). Further it is +related (Ex. xxxiii. 18) that Moses asked of God that he might behold +Him, but as Moses (as we have said) had formed no mental image of God, +and God (as I have shown) only revealed Himself to the prophets in +accordance with the disposition of their imagination, He did not reveal +Himself in any form. This, I repeat, was because the imagination of +Moses was unsuitable, for other prophets bear witness that they saw the +Lord; for instance, Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, etc. For this reason God +answered Moses, "Thou canst not see My face;" and inasmuch as Moses +believed that God can be looked upon--that is, that no contradiction of +the Divine nature is therein involved (for otherwise he would never have +preferred his request)--it is added, "For no one shall look on Me and +live," thus giving a reason in accordance with Moses' idea, for it is +not stated that a contradiction of the Divine nature would be involved, +as was really the case, but that the thing would not come to pass +because of human infirmity.... + +Lastly, as Moses believed that God dwelt in the heavens, God was +revealed to him as coming down from heaven on to a mountain, and in +order to talk with the Lord Moses went up the mountain, which he +certainly need not have done if he could have conceived of God as +omnipresent. + +The Israelites knew scarcely anything of God, although He was revealed +to them; and this is abundantly evident from their transferring, a few +days afterwards, the honor and worship due to Him to a calf, which they +believed to be the god who had brought them out of Egypt. In truth, it +is hardly likely that men accustomed to the superstitions of Egypt, +uncultivated and sunk in most abject slavery, should have held any sound +notions about the Deity, or that Moses should have taught them anything +beyond a rule of right living; inculcating it not like a philosopher, as +the result of freedom, but like a lawgiver compelling them to be moral +by legal authority. Thus the rule of right living, the worship and love +of God, was to them rather a bondage than the true liberty, the gift and +grace of the Deity. Moses bid them love God and keep His law, because +they had in the past received benefits from Him (such as the deliverance +from slavery in Egypt), and further terrified them with threats if they +transgressed His commands, holding out many promises of good if they +should observe them; thus treating them as parents treat irrational +children. It is, therefore, certain that they knew not the excellence of +virtue and the true happiness. + +Jonah thought that he was fleeing from the sight of God, which seems to +show that he too held that God had entrusted the care of the nations +outside Judća to other substituted powers. No one in the whole of the +Old Testament speaks more rationally of God than Solomon, who in fact +surpassed all the men of his time in natural ability. Yet he considered +himself above the law (esteeming it only to have been given for men +without reasonable and intellectual grounds for their actions), and made +small account of the laws concerning kings, which are mainly three: nay, +he openly violated them (in this he did wrong, and acted in a manner +unworthy of a philosopher, by indulging in sensual pleasure), and taught +that all Fortune's favors to mankind are vanity, that humanity has no +nobler gift than wisdom, and no greater punishment than folly. (See +Proverbs xvi. 22, 23.) + +... God adapted revelations to the understanding and opinions of the +prophets, and ... in matters of theory without bearing on charity or +morality, the prophets could be, and, in fact, were ignorant, and held +conflicting opinions. It therefore follows that we must by no means go +to the prophets for knowledge, either of natural or of spiritual +phenomena. + +We have determined, then, that we are only bound to believe in the +prophetic writings, the object and substance of the revelation; with +regard to the details, every one may believe or not, as he likes. + +For instance, the revelation to Cain only teaches us that God admonished +him to lead the true life, for such alone is the object and substance of +the revelation, not doctrines concerning free will and philosophy. +Hence, though the freedom of the will is clearly implied in the words of +the admonition, we are at liberty to hold a contrary opinion, since the +words and reasons were adapted to the understanding of Cain. + +So, too, the revelation to Micaiah would only teach that God revealed to +him the true issue of the battle between Ahab and Aram; and this is all +we are bound to believe. Whatever else is contained in the revelation +concerning the true and the false Spirit of God, the army of heaven +standing on the right hand and on the left, and all the other details, +does not affect us at all. Every one may believe as much of it as his +reason allows. + +The reasonings by which the Lord displayed His power to Job (if they +really were a revelation, and the author of the history is narrating, +and not merely, as some suppose, rhetorically adorning his own +conceptions), would come under the same category--that is, they were +adapted to Job's understanding, for the purpose of convincing him, and +are not universal, or for the convincing of all men. + +We can come to no different conclusion with respect to the reasonings of +Christ, by which He convicted the Pharisees of pride and ignorance, and +exhorted His disciples to lead the true life. He adapted them to each +man's opinions and principles. For instance, when He said to the +Pharisees (Matt. xii. 26), "And if Satan cast out devils, his house is +divided against itself, how then shall his kingdom stand?" He only +wished to convince the Pharisees according to their own principles, not +to teach that there are devils, or any kingdom of devils. So, too, when +He said to His disciples (Matt. viii. 10), "See that ye despise not one +of these little ones, for I say unto you that their angels," etc., He +merely desired to warn them against pride and despising any of their +fellows, not to insist on the actual reason given, which was simply +adopted in order to persuade them more easily. + +Lastly, we should say exactly the same of the apostolic signs and +reasonings, but there is no need to go further into the subject. If I +were to enumerate all the passages of Scripture addressed only to +individuals, or to a particular man's understanding, and which cannot, +without great danger to philosophy, be defended as Divine doctrines, I +should go far beyond the brevity at which I aim. Let it suffice then, to +have indicated a few instances of general application, and let the +curious reader consider others by himself. Although the points we have +just raised concerning prophets and prophecy are the only ones which +have any direct bearing on the end in view, namely, the separation of +Philosophy from Theology, still, as I have touched on the general +question, I may here inquire whether the gift of prophecy was peculiar +to the Hebrews, or whether it was common to all nations. I must then +come to a conclusion about the vocation of the Hebrews, all of which I +shall do in the ensuing chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] From the _Tr. Th.-P._ ch. i _Of Prophecy_; and ch. ii of _Of +Prophets_. + +[5] ... I will tell you that I do not think it necessary for salvation +to know Christ according to the flesh; but with regard to the Eternal +Son of God, that is the Eternal Wisdom of God, which has manifested +itself in all things and especially in the human mind, and above all in +Christ Jesus, the case is far otherwise. For without this no one can +come to a state of blessedness, inasmuch as it alone teaches what is +true or false, good or evil. And, inasmuch as this wisdom was made +especially manifest through Jesus Christ, as I have said, His disciples +preached it, in so far as it was revealed to them through Him, and thus +showed that they could rejoice in that spirit of Christ more than the +rest of mankind. The doctrines added by certain churches, such as that +God took upon Himself human nature, I have expressly said that I do not +understand. In fact, to speak the truth, they seem to me no less absurd +than would a statement that a circle had taken upon itself the nature of +a square. This I think will be sufficient explanation of my opinion.... +Whether it will be satisfactory to Christians you will know better than +I. Farewell. _From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Nov. 1675). + +... For the rest, I accept Christ's passion, death, and burial +literally, as you do, but His resurrection I understand allegorically. I +admit, that it is related by the Evangelists in such detail that we +cannot deny that they themselves believed Christ's body to have risen +from the dead and ascended to heaven in order to sit at the right hand +of God, or that they believed that Christ might have been seen by +unbelievers, if they had happened to be at hand, in the places where He +appeared to His disciples; but in these matters they might, without +injury to Gospel teaching, have been deceived, as was the case with +other prophets.... But Paul, to whom Christ afterwards appeared, +rejoices that he knew Christ, not after the flesh, but after the spirit. +_From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Jan. 1676). + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +OF THE VOCATION OF THE HEBREWS[6] + + +Every man's true happiness and blessedness consist solely in the +enjoyment of what is good, not in the pride that he alone is enjoying +it, to the exclusion of others. He who thinks himself the more blessed +because he is enjoying benefits which others are not, or because he is +more blessed or more fortunate than his fellows, is ignorant of true +happiness and blessedness, and the joy which he feels is either childish +or envious and malicious. For instance, a man's true happiness consists +only in wisdom, and the knowledge of the truth, not at all in the fact +that he is wiser than others, or that others lack such knowledge: such +considerations do not increase his wisdom or true happiness. + +Whoever, therefore, rejoices for such reasons, rejoices in another's +misfortune, and is, so far, malicious and bad, knowing neither true +happiness nor the peace of the true life. + +When Scripture, therefore, in exhorting the Hebrews to obey the law, +says that the Lord has chosen them for Himself before other nations +(Deut. x. 15); that He is near them, but not near others (Deut. iv. 7); +that to them alone He has given just laws (Deut. iv. 8); and, lastly, +that He has marked them out before others (Deut. iv. 32); it speaks only +according to the understanding of its hearers, who, as we have shown in +the last chapter, and as Moses also testified (Deut. ix. 6, 7), knew not +true blessedness. For in good sooth they would have been no less blessed +if God had called all men equally to salvation, nor would God have been +less present to them for being equally present to others; their laws +would have been no less just if they had been ordained for all, and they +themselves would have been no less wise. The miracles would have shown +God's power no less by being wrought for other nations also; lastly, the +Hebrews would have been just as much bound to worship God if He had +bestowed all these gifts equally on all men. + +When God tells Solomon (1 Kings iii. 12) that no one shall be as wise as +he in time to come, it seems to be only a manner of expressing +surpassing wisdom; it is little to be believed that God would have +promised Solomon, for his greater happiness, that He would never endow +any one with so much wisdom in time to come; this would in no wise have +increased Solomon's intellect, and the wise king would have given equal +thanks to the Lord if every one had been gifted with the same faculties. + +Still, though we assert that Moses, in the passages of the Pentateuch +just cited, spoke only according to the understanding of the Hebrews, we +have no wish to deny that God ordained the Mosaic law for them alone, +nor that He spoke to them alone, nor that they witnessed marvels beyond +those which happened to any other nation; but we wish to emphasize that +Moses desired to admonish the Hebrews in such a manner and with such +reasonings as would appeal most forcibly to their childish +understanding and constrain them to worship the Deity. Further, we +wished to show that the Hebrews did not surpass other nations in +knowledge, or in piety, but evidently in some attribute different from +these; or (to speak like the Scriptures, according to their +understanding), that the Hebrews were not chosen by God before others +for the sake of the true life and sublime ideas, though they were often +thereto admonished, but with some other object. What that object was I +will duly show. + +But before I begin, I wish in a few words to explain what I mean by the +guidance of God, by the help of God, external and inward, and lastly, +what I understand by fortune. + +By the help of God, I mean the fixed and unchangeable order of nature or +the chain of natural events: for I have said before and shown elsewhere +that the universal laws of nature, according to which all things exist +and are determined, are only another name for the eternal decrees of +God, which always involve eternal truth and necessity. + +So that to say that everything happens according to natural laws, and to +say that everything is ordained by the decree and ordinance of God, is +the same thing. Now since the power in Nature is identical with the +power of God, by which alone all things happen and are determined, it +follows that whatsoever man, as a part of Nature, provides himself with +to aid and preserve his existence, or whatsoever Nature affords him +without his help, is given to him solely by the Divine power, acting +either through human nature or through external circumstance. So +whatever human nature can furnish itself with by its own efforts to +preserve its existence, may be fitly called the inward aid of God, +whereas whatever else accrues to man's profit from outward causes may be +called the external aid of God. + +We can now easily understand what is meant by the election of God. For +since no one can do anything save by the predetermined order of Nature, +that is by God's eternal ordinance and decree, it follows that no one +can choose a plan of life for himself, or accomplish any work save by +God's vocation choosing him for the work or the plan of life in +question, rather than any other. Lastly, by fortune, I mean the +ordinance of God in so far as it directs human life through external and +unexpected means. With these preliminaries I return to my purpose of +discovering the reason why the Hebrews were said to be elected by God +before other nations, and with the demonstration I thus proceed. + +All objects of legitimate desire fall, generally speaking, under one of +these three categories:-- + +1. The knowledge of things through their primary causes. + +2. The government of the passions, or the acquirement of the habit of +virtue. + +3. Secure and healthy life. + +The means which most directly conduce towards the first two of these +ends, and which may be considered their proximate and efficient causes +are contained in human nature itself, so that their acquisition hinges +only on our own power, and on the laws of human nature. It may be +concluded that these gifts are not peculiar to any nation, but have +always been shared by the whole human race, unless, indeed, we would +indulge the dream that Nature formerly created men of different kinds. +But the means which conduce to security and health are chiefly in +external circumstance, and are called the gifts of fortune because they +depend chiefly on objective causes of which we are ignorant; for a fool +may be almost as liable to happiness or unhappiness as a wise man. +Nevertheless, human management and watchfulness can greatly assist +towards living in security and warding off the injuries of our fellow +men, and even of beasts. Reason and experience show no more certain +means of attaining this object than the formation of a society with +fixed laws, the occupation of a strip of territory, and the +concentration of all forces, as it were, into one body, that is the +social body. Now for forming and preserving a society, no ordinary +ability and care is required: that society will be most secure, most +stable, and least liable to reverses, which is founded and directed by +far-seeing and careful men; while, on the other hand, a society +constituted by men without trained skill, depends in a great measure on +fortune, and is less constant. If, in spite of all, such a society lasts +a long time, it is owing to some other directing influence than its own; +if it overcomes great perils and its affairs prosper, it will perforce +marvel at and adore the guiding Spirit of God (in so far, that is, as +God works through hidden means, and not through the nature and mind of +man), for everything happens to it unexpectedly and contrary to +anticipation, it may even be said and thought to be by miracle. Nations, +then, are distinguished from one another in respect to the social +organization and the laws under which they live and are governed; the +Hebrew nation was not chosen by God in respect to its wisdom nor its +tranquillity of mind, but in respect to its social organization and the +good fortune with which it obtained supremacy and kept it so many years. +This is abundantly clear from Scripture. Even a cursory perusal will +show us that the only respects in which the Hebrews surpassed other +nations, are in their successful conduct of matters relating to +government, and in their surmounting great perils solely by God's +external aid; in other ways they were on a par with their fellows, and +God was equally gracious to all. For in respect to intellect (as we have +shown in the last chapter) they held very ordinary ideas about God and +Nature, so that they cannot have been God's chosen in this respect; nor +were they so chosen in respect of virtue and the true life, for here +again they, with the exception of a very few elect, were on an equality +with other nations: therefore their choice and vocation consisted only +in the temporal happiness and advantages of independent rule. In fact, +we do not see that God promised anything beyond this to the patriarchs +or their successors; in the law no other reward is offered for obedience +than the continual happiness of an independent commonwealth and other +goods of this life; while, on the other hand, against contumacy and the +breaking of the covenant is threatened the downfall of the commonwealth +and great hardships. Nor is this to be wondered at; for the ends of +every social organization and commonwealth are (as appears from what we +have said, and as we will explain more at length hereafter) security and +comfort; a commonwealth can only exist by the laws being binding on +all. If all the members of a state wish to disregard the law, by that +very fact they dissolve the state and destroy the commonwealth. Thus, +the only reward which could be promised to the Hebrews for continued +obedience to the law was security and its attendant advantages, while no +surer punishment could be threatened for disobedience, than the ruin of +the state and the evils which generally follow therefrom, in addition to +such further consequences as might accrue to the Jews in particular from +the ruin of their especial state. But there is no need here to go into +this point at more length. I will only add that the laws of the Old +Testament were revealed and ordained to the Jews only, for as God chose +them in respect to the special constitution of their society and +government, they must, of course, have had special laws. Whether God +ordained special laws for other nations also, and revealed Himself to +their lawgivers prophetically, that is, under the attributes by which +the latter were accustomed to imagine Him, I cannot sufficiently +determine. It is evident from Scripture itself that other nations +acquired supremacy and particular laws by the external aid of God. + +If any one wishes to maintain that the Jews ... have been chosen by God +for ever, I will not gainsay him if he will admit that this choice, +whether temporary or eternal, has no regard, in so far as it is peculiar +to the Jews, to aught but dominion and physical advantages (for by such +alone can one nation be distinguished from another), whereas in regard +to intellect and true virtue, every nation is on a par with the rest, +and God has not in these respects chosen one people rather than +another. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[6] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. iii, same title. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +OF THE DIVINE LAW[7] + + +The word law, taken in the abstract means that by which an individual, +or all things, or as many things as belong to a particular species, act +in one and the same fixed and definite manner, which manner depends +either on natural necessity or on human decree. A law which depends on +natural necessity is one which necessarily follows from the nature, or +from the definition of the thing in question; a law which depends on +human decree, and which is more correctly called an ordinance, is one +which men have laid down for themselves and others in order to live more +safely or conveniently, or from some similar reason. + +For example, the law that all bodies impinging on lesser bodies, lose as +much of their own motion as they communicate to the latter is a +universal law of all bodies, and depends on natural necessity. So, too, +the law that a man in remembering one thing, straightway remembers +another either like it, or which he had perceived simultaneously with +it, is a law which necessarily follows from the nature of man. But the +law that men must yield, or be compelled to yield, somewhat of their +natural right, and that they bind themselves to live in a certain way, +depends on human decree. Now, though I freely admit that all things are +predetermined by universal natural laws to exist and operate in a given, +fixed, and definite manner, I still assert that the laws I have just +mentioned depend on human decree. + +(1.) Because man, in so far as he is a part of Nature, constitutes a +part of the power of Nature. Whatever, therefore, follows necessarily +from the necessity of human nature (that is, from Nature herself, in so +far as we conceive of her as acting through man) follows, even though it +be necessarily, from human power. Hence the sanction of such laws may +very well be said to depend on man's decree, for it principally depends +on the power of the human mind; so that the human mind in respect to its +perception of things as true and false, can readily be conceived as +without such laws, but not without necessary law as we have just defined +it. + +(2.) I have stated that these laws depend on human decree because it is +well to define and explain things by their proximate causes. The general +consideration of fate and the concatenation of causes would aid us very +little in forming and arranging our ideas concerning particular +questions. Let us add that as to the actual coördination and +concatenation of things, that is how things are ordained and linked +together, we are obviously ignorant; therefore, it is more profitable +for right living, nay, it is necessary for us to consider things as +contingent. So much about law in the abstract. + +Now the word law seems to be only applied to natural phenomena by +analogy, and is commonly taken to signify a command which men can either +obey or neglect, inasmuch as it restrains human nature within certain +originally exceeded limits, and therefore lays down no rule beyond human +strength. Thus it is expedient to define law more particularly as a plan +of life laid down by man for himself or others with a certain object. + +However, as the true object of legislation is only perceived by a few, +and most men are almost incapable of grasping it, though they live under +its conditions, legislators, with a view to exacting general obedience, +have wisely put forward another object, very different from that which +necessarily follows from the nature of law: they promise to the +observers of the law that which the masses chiefly desire, and threaten +its violators with that which they chiefly fear: thus endeavoring to +restrain the masses, as far as may be, like a horse with a curb; whence +it follows that the word law is chiefly applied to the modes of life +enjoined on men by the sway of others; hence those who obey the law are +said to live under it and to be under compulsion. In truth, a man who +renders every one their due because he fears the gallows, acts under the +sway and compulsion of others, and cannot be called just. But a man who +does the same from a knowledge of the true reason for laws and their +necessity, acts from a firm purpose and of his own accord, and is +therefore properly called just. This, I take it, is Paul's meaning when +he says, that those who live under the law cannot be justified through +the law, for justice, as commonly defined, is the constant and perpetual +will to render every man his due. Thus Solomon says (Prov. xxi. 15), +"It is a joy to the just to do judgment," but the wicked fear. + +Law, then, being a plan of living which men have for a certain object +laid down for themselves or others, may, as it seems, be divided into +human law and Divine law. + +By human law I mean a plan of living which serves only to render life +and the state secure. + +By Divine law I mean that which only regards the highest good, in other +words, the true knowledge of God and love. + +I call this law Divine because of the nature of the highest good, which +I will here shortly explain as clearly as I can. + +Inasmuch as the intellect is the best part of our being, it is evident +that we should make every effort to perfect it as far as possible if we +desire to search for what is really profitable to us. For in +intellectual perfection the highest good should consist. Now, since all +our knowledge, and the certainty which removes every doubt, depend +solely on the knowledge of God;--firstly, because without God nothing +can exist or be conceived; secondly, because so long as we have no clear +and distinct idea of God we may remain in universal doubt--it follows +that our highest good and perfection also depend solely on the knowledge +of God. Further, since without God nothing can exist or be conceived, it +is evident that all natural phenomena involve and express the conception +of God as far as their essence and perfection extend, so that we have +greater and more perfect knowledge of God in proportion to our +knowledge of natural phenomena: conversely (since the knowledge of an +effect through its cause is the same thing as the knowledge of a +particular property of a cause) the greater our knowledge of natural +phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge of the essence of God +(which is the cause of all things). So, then, our highest good not only +depends on the knowledge of God, but wholly consists therein; and it +further follows that man is perfect or the reverse in proportion to the +nature and perfection of the object of his special desire; hence the +most perfect and the chief sharer in the highest blessedness is he who +prizes above all else, and takes especial delight in the intellectual +knowledge of God, the most perfect Being. + +Hither, then, our highest good and our highest blessedness aim--namely, +to the knowledge and love of God; therefore the means demanded by this +aim of all human actions, that is, by God in so far as the idea of him +is in us, may be called the commands of God, because they proceed, as it +were, from God Himself, inasmuch as He exists in our minds, and the plan +of life which has regard to this aim may be fitly called the law of God. + +The nature of the means, and the plan of life which this aim demands, +how the foundations of the best states follow its lines, and how men's +life is conducted, are questions pertaining to general ethics. Here I +only proceed to treat of the Divine law in a particular application. + +As the love of God is man's highest happiness and blessedness, and the +ultimate end and aim of all human actions, it follows that he alone +lives by the Divine law who loves God not from fear of punishment, or +from love of any other object, such as sensual pleasure, fame, or the +like; but solely because he has knowledge of God, or is convinced that +the knowledge and love of God is the highest good. The sum and chief +precept, then, of the Divine law is to love God as the highest good, +namely, as we have said, not from fear of any pains and penalties or +from the love of any other object in which we desire to take pleasure. +The idea of God lays down the rule that God is our highest good--in +other words, that the knowledge and love of God is the ultimate aim to +which all our actions should be directed. The worldling cannot +understand these things, they appear foolishness to him, because he has +too meager a knowledge of God, and also because in this highest good he +can discover nothing which he can handle or eat, or which affects the +fleshly appetites wherein he chiefly delights, for it consists solely in +thought and the pure reason. They, on the other hand, who know that they +possess no greater gift than intellect and sound reason, will doubtless +accept what I have said without question. + +We have now explained that wherein the Divine law chiefly consists, and +what are human laws, namely, all those which have a different aim unless +they have been ratified by revelation, for in this respect also things +are referred to God (as we have shown above) and in this sense the law +of Moses, although it was not universal, but entirely adapted to the +disposition and particular preservation of a single people, may yet be +called a law of God or Divine law, inasmuch as we believe that it was +ratified by prophetic insight. If we consider the nature of natural +Divine law as we have just explained it, we shall see + +I. That it is universal or common to all men, for we have deduced it +from universal human nature. + +II. That it does not depend on the truth of any historical narrative +whatsoever, for inasmuch as this natural Divine law is comprehended +solely by the consideration of human nature, it is plain that we can +conceive it as existing as well in Adam as in any other man, as well in +a man living among his fellows as in a man who lives by himself. + +The truth of a historical narrative, however assured, cannot give us the +knowledge nor consequently the love of God, for love of God springs from +knowledge of Him, and knowledge of Him should be derived from general +ideas, in themselves certain and known, so that the truth of a +historical narrative is very far from being a necessary requisite for +our attaining our highest good. + +Still, though the truth of histories cannot give us the knowledge and +love of God, I do not deny that reading them is very useful with a view +to life in the world, for the more we have observed and known of men's +customs and circumstances, which are best revealed by their actions, the +more warily we shall be able to order our lives among them, and so far +as reason dictates to adapt our actions to their dispositions. + +III. We see that this natural Divine law does not demand the performance +of ceremonies--that is, actions in themselves indifferent, which are +called good from the fact of their institution, or actions symbolizing +something profitable for salvation, or (if one prefers this definition) +actions of which the meaning surpasses human understanding. The natural +light of reason does not demand anything which it is itself unable to +supply, but only such as it can very clearly show to be good, or a means +to our blessedness. Such things as are good simply because they have +been commanded or instituted, or as being symbols of something good, are +mere shadows which cannot be reckoned among actions that are the +offspring, as it were, or fruit of a sound mind and of intellect. There +is no need for me to go into this now in more detail. + +IV. Lastly, we see that the highest reward of the Divine law is the law +itself, namely, to know God and to love Him of our free choice, and with +an undivided and fruitful spirit; while its penalty is the absence of +these things, and being in bondage to the flesh--that is, having an +inconstant and wavering spirit. + +These points being noted, I must now inquire + +I. Whether by the natural light of reason we can conceive of God as a +lawgiver or potentate ordaining laws for men? + +II. What is the teaching of Holy Writ concerning this natural light of +reason and natural law? + +III. With what objects were ceremonies formerly instituted? + +IV. Lastly, what is the good gained by knowing the sacred histories and +believing them? + +Of the first two I will treat in this chapter, of the remaining two in +the following one. + +Our conclusion about the first is easily deduced from the nature of +God's will, which is only distinguished from His understanding in +relation to our intellect--that is, the will and the understanding of +God are in reality one and the same, and are only distinguished in +relation to our thoughts which we form concerning God's understanding. +For instance, if we are only looking to the fact that the nature of a +triangle is from eternity contained in the Divine nature as an eternal +verity, we say that God possesses the idea of a triangle, or that He +understands the nature of a triangle; but if afterwards we look to the +fact that the nature of a triangle is thus contained in the Divine +nature, solely by the necessity of the Divine nature, and not by the +necessity of the nature and essence of a triangle--in fact, that the +necessity of a triangle's essence and nature, in so far as they are +conceived of as eternal verities, depends solely on the necessity of the +Divine nature and intellect, we then style God's will or decree, that +which before we styled His intellect. Wherefore we make one and the same +affirmation concerning God when we say that He has from eternity decreed +that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, as when +we say that He has understood it. + +Hence the affirmations and the negations of God always involve necessity +or truth; so that, for example, if God said to Adam that He did not wish +him to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, it would have +involved a contradiction that Adam should have been able to eat of it, +and would therefore have been impossible that he should have so eaten, +for the Divine command would have involved an eternal necessity and +truth. But since Scripture nevertheless narrates that God did give this +command to Adam, and yet that none the less Adam ate of the tree, we +must perforce say that God revealed to Adam the evil which would surely +follow if he should eat of the tree, but did not disclose that such evil +would of necessity come to pass. Thus it was that Adam took the +revelation to be not an eternal and necessary truth, but a law--that is, +an ordinance followed by gain or loss, not depending necessarily on the +nature of the act performed, but solely on the will and absolute power +of some potentate, so that the revelation in question was solely in +relation to Adam, and solely through his lack of knowledge a law, and +God was, as it were, a lawgiver and potentate. From the same cause, +namely, from lack of knowledge, the Decalogue in relation to the Hebrews +was a law, for since they knew not the existence of God as an eternal +truth, they must have taken as a law that which was revealed to them in +the Decalogue, namely, that God exists, and that God only should be +worshiped. But if God had spoken to them without the intervention of any +bodily means, immediately they would have perceived it not as a law but +as an eternal truth. + +What we have said about the Israelites and Adam applies also to all the +prophets who wrote laws in God's name--they did not adequately conceive +God's decrees as eternal truths. For instance, we must say of Moses that +from revelation, from the basis of what was revealed to him, he +perceived the method by which the Israelitish nation could best be +united in a particular territory, and could form a body politic or +state, and further that he perceived the method by which that nation +could best be constrained to obedience; but he did not perceive, nor +was it revealed to him, that this method was absolutely the best, nor +that the obedience of the people in a certain strip of territory would +necessarily imply the end he had in view. Wherefore he perceived these +things not as eternal truths, but as precepts and ordinances, and he +ordained them as laws of God, and thus it came to be that he conceived +God as a ruler, a legislator, a king, as merciful, just, etc., whereas +such qualities are simply attributes of human nature, and utterly alien +from the nature of the Deity. Thus much we may affirm of the prophets +who wrote laws in the name of God; but we must not affirm it of Christ, +for Christ, although He too seems to have written laws in the name of +God, must be taken to have had a clear and adequate perception, for +Christ was not so much a prophet as the mouthpiece of God. For God made +revelations to mankind through Christ as He had before done through +angels--that is, a created voice, visions, etc. It would be as +unreasonable to say that God had accommodated His revelations to the +opinions of Christ as that He had before accommodated them to the +opinions of angels (that is, of a created voice or visions) as matters +to be revealed to the prophets, a wholly absurd hypothesis. Moreover, +Christ was sent to teach not only the Jews but the whole human race, and +therefore it was not enough that His mind should be accommodated to the +opinions of the Jews alone, but also to the opinion and fundamental +teaching common to the whole human race--in other words, to ideas +universal and true. Inasmuch as God revealed Himself to Christ, or to +Christ's mind immediately, and not as to the prophets through words and +symbols, we must needs suppose that Christ perceived truly what was +revealed, in other words, He understood it, for a matter is understood +when it is perceived simply by the mind without words or symbols. + +Christ, then, perceived (truly and adequately) what was revealed, and if +He ever proclaimed such revelations as laws, He did so because of the +ignorance and obstinacy of the people, acting in this respect the part +of God; inasmuch as He accommodated Himself to the comprehension of the +people, and though He spoke somewhat more clearly than the other +prophets, yet He taught what was revealed obscurely, and generally +through parables, especially when He was speaking to those to whom it +was not yet given to understand the kingdom of heaven. (See Matt. xiii. +10, etc.) To those to whom it was given to understand the mysteries of +heaven, He doubtless taught His doctrines as eternal truths and did not +lay them down as laws, thus freeing the minds of His hearers from the +bondage of that law which He further confirmed and established. Paul +apparently points to this more than once (_e.g._, Rom. vii. 6, and iii. +28), though he never himself seems to wish to speak openly, but, to +quote his own words (Rom. iii. 5, and vi. 19), "merely humanly." This he +expressly states when he calls God just, and it was doubtless in +concession to human weakness that he attributes mercy, grace, anger, and +similar qualities to God, adapting his language to the popular mind, or, +as he puts it (1 Cor. iii. 1, 2), to carnal men. In Rom. ix. 18, he +teaches undisguisedly that God's anger and mercy depend not on the +actions of men, but on God's own nature or will; further, that no one +is justified by the works of the law, but only by faith, which he seems +to identify with the full assent of the soul; lastly, that no one is +blessed unless he have in him the mind of Christ (Rom. viii. 9), whereby +he perceives the laws of God as eternal truths. We conclude, therefore, +that God is described as a lawgiver or prince, and styled just, +merciful, etc., merely in concession to popular understanding, and the +imperfection of popular knowledge; that in reality God acts and directs +all things simply by the necessity of His nature and perfection, and +that His decrees and volitions are eternal truths, and always involve +necessity. So much for the first point which I wished to explain and +demonstrate. + +Passing on to the second point, let us search the sacred pages for their +teaching concerning the light of nature and this Divine law. The first +doctrine we find in the history of the first man, where it is narrated +that God commanded Adam not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the +knowledge of good and evil; this seems to mean that God commanded Adam +to do and to seek after righteousness because it was good, not because +the contrary was evil: that is, to seek the good for its own sake, not +from fear of evil. We have seen that he who acts rightly from the true +knowledge and love of right, acts with freedom and constancy, whereas he +who acts from fear of evil, is under the constraint of evil, and acts in +bondage under external control. So that this commandment of God to Adam +comprehends the whole Divine natural law, and absolutely agrees with the +dictates of the light of nature; nay, it would be easy to explain on +this basis the whole history or allegory of the first man. But I prefer +to pass over the subject in silence, because, in the first place, I +cannot be absolutely certain that my explanation would be in accordance +with the intention of the sacred writer; and, secondly, because many do +not admit that this history is an allegory, maintaining it to be a +simple narrative of facts. It will be better, therefore, to adduce other +passages of Scripture, especially such as were written by him, who +speaks with all the strength of his natural understanding, in which he +surpassed all his contemporaries, and whose sayings are accepted by the +people as of equal right with those of the prophets. I mean Solomon, +whose prudence and wisdom are commended in Scripture rather than his +piety and gift of prophecy. He, in his proverbs, calls the human +intellect the well-spring of true life, and declares that misfortune is +made up of folly. "Understanding is a well-spring of life to him that +hath it; but the instruction of fools is folly" (Prov. xvi. 22). Life +being taken to mean the true life (as is evident from Deut. xxx. 19), +the fruit of the understanding consists only in the true life, and its +absence constitutes punishment. All this absolutely agrees with what was +set out in our fourth point concerning natural law. Moreover, our +position that it is the well-spring of life, and that the intellect +alone lays down laws for the wise, is plainly taught by the sage, for he +says (Prov. xiii. 14): "The law of the wise is a fountain of life"--that +is, as we gather from the preceding text, the understanding. In chap. +iii. 13, he expressly teaches that the understanding renders man blessed +and happy, and gives him true peace of mind. "Happy is the man that +findeth wisdom, and the man that getteth understanding," for "Wisdom +gives length of days, and riches and honour; her ways are ways of +pleasantness, and all her paths peace" (xiii. 16, 17). According to +Solomon, therefore, it is only the wise who live in peace and +equanimity, not like the wicked whose minds drift hither and thither, +and (as Isaiah says, chap. lvii. 20) "are like the troubled sea, for +them there is no peace." + +Lastly, we should especially note the passage in chap. ii. of Solomon's +proverbs which most clearly confirms our contention: "If thou criest +after knowledge, and liftest up thy voice for understanding ... then +shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of +God; for the Lord giveth wisdom; out of His mouth cometh knowledge and +understanding." These words clearly enunciate (1), that wisdom or +intellect alone teaches us to fear God wisely--that is, to worship Him +truly; (2), that wisdom and knowledge flow from God's mouth, and that +God bestows on us this gift; this we have already shown in proving that +our understanding and our knowledge depend on, spring from, and are +perfected by the idea or knowledge of God, and nothing else. Solomon +goes on to say in so many words that this knowledge contains and +involves the true principles of ethics and politics: "When wisdom +entereth into thy heart, and knowledge is pleasant to thy soul, +discretion shall preserve thee, understanding shall keep thee, then +shalt thou understand righteousness, and judgment, and equity, yea every +good path." All of which is in obvious agreement with natural knowledge: +for after we have come to the understanding of things, and have tasted +the excellence of knowledge, she teaches us ethics and true virtue. + +Thus the happiness and the peace of him who cultivates his natural +understanding lies, according to Solomon also, not so much under the +dominion of fortune (or God's external aid) as in inward personal virtue +(or God's internal aid), for the latter can to a great extent be +preserved by vigilance, right action, and thought. + +Lastly, we must by no means pass over the passage in Paul's Epistle to +the Romans (i. 20), in which he says: "For the invisible things of God +from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the +things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they +are without excuse, because, when they knew God, they glorified Him not +as God, neither were they thankful." These words clearly show that every +one can by the light of nature clearly understand the goodness and the +eternal divinity of God, and can thence know and deduce what they should +seek for and what avoid; wherefore the Apostle says that they are +without excuse and cannot plead ignorance, as they certainly might if it +were a question of supernatural light and the incarnation, passion, +resurrection of Christ. "Wherefore," he goes on to say (_ib._ 24), "God +gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts;" and +so on, through the rest of the chapter, he describes the vices of +ignorance, and sets them forth as the punishment of ignorance. This +obviously agrees with the verse of Solomon, already quoted, "The +instruction of fools is folly," so that it is easy to understand why +Paul says that the wicked are without excuse. As every man sows so shall +he reap: out of evil, evils necessarily spring, unless they be wisely +counteracted. + +Thus we see that Scripture literally approves of the light of natural +reason and the natural Divine law, and I have fulfilled the promises +made at the beginning of this chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[7] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. iv, same title. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +OF THE CEREMONIAL LAW[8] + + +In the foregoing chapter we have shown that the Divine law, which +renders men truly blessed, and teaches them the true life, is universal +to all men; nay, we have so intimately deduced it from human nature that +it must be esteemed innate, and, as it were, ingrained in the human +mind. + +But with regard to the ceremonial observances which were ordained in the +Old Testament for the Hebrews only, and were so adapted to their state +that they could for the most part only be observed by the society as a +whole and not by each individual, it is evident that they formed no part +of the Divine law, and had nothing to do with blessedness and virtue, +but had reference only to the election of the Hebrews, that is (as I +have shown in Chapter IV), to their temporal bodily happiness and the +tranquillity of their kingdom, and that therefore they were only valid +while that kingdom lasted. If in the Old Testament they are spoken of as +the law of God, it is only because they were founded on revelation, or a +basis of revelation. Still as reason, however sound, has little weight +with ordinary theologians, I will adduce the authority of Scripture for +what I here assert, and will further show, for the sake of greater +clearness, why and how these ceremonials served to establish and +preserve the Jewish kingdom. Isaiah teaches most plainly that the Divine +law in its strict sense signifies that universal law which consists in a +true manner of life, and does not signify ceremonial observances. In +chapter i., verse 10, the prophet calls on his countrymen to hearken to +the Divine law as he delivers it, and first excluding all kinds of +sacrifices and all feasts, he at length sums up the law in these few +words: "Cease to do evil, learn to do well: seek judgment, relieve the +oppressed." Not less striking testimony is given in Psalm xl. 7-9, where +the Psalmist addresses God: "Sacrifice and offering Thou didst not +desire; mine ears hast Thou opened; burnt offering and sin-offering hast +Thou not required; I delight to do Thy will, O my God; yea, Thy law is +within my heart." Here the Psalmist reckons as the law of God only that +which is inscribed in his heart, and excludes ceremonies therefrom, for +the latter are good and inscribed on the heart only from the fact of +their institution, and not because of their intrinsic value. + +Other passages of Scripture testify to the same truth, but these two +will suffice. We may also learn from the Bible that ceremonies are no +aid to blessedness, but only have reference to the temporal prosperity +of the kingdom; for the rewards promised for their observance are merely +temporal advantages and delights, blessedness being reserved for the +universal Divine law. In all the five books commonly attributed to Moses +nothing is promised, as I have said, beyond temporal benefits, such as +honors, fame, victories, riches, enjoyments, and health. Though many +moral precepts besides ceremonies are contained in these five books, +they appear not as moral doctrines universal to all men, but as commands +especially adapted to the understanding and character of the Hebrew +people, and as having reference only to the welfare of the kingdom. For +instance, Moses does not teach the Jews as a prophet not to kill or to +steal, but gives these commandments solely as a lawgiver and judge; he +does not reason out the doctrine, but affixes for its non-observance a +penalty which may and very properly does vary in different nations. So, +too, the command not to commit adultery is given merely with reference +to the welfare of the state; for if the moral doctrine had been +intended, with reference not only to the welfare of the state, but also +to the tranquillity and blessedness of the individual, Moses would have +condemned not merely the outward act, but also the mental acquiescence, +as is done by Christ, Who taught only universal moral precepts, and for +this cause promises a spiritual instead of a temporal reward. Christ, as +I have said, was sent into the world, not to preserve the state nor to +lay down laws, but solely to teach the universal moral law, so we can +easily understand that He wished in no wise to do away with the law of +Moses, inasmuch as He introduced no new laws of His own--His sole care +was to teach moral doctrines, and distinguish them from the laws of the +state; for the Pharisees, in their ignorance, thought that the +observance of the state law and the Mosaic law was the sum total of +morality; whereas such laws merely had reference to the public welfare, +and aimed not so much at instructing the Jews as at keeping them under +constraint. But let us return to our subject, and cite other passages +of Scripture which set forth temporal benefits as rewards for observing +the ceremonial law, and blessedness as reward for the universal law. + +None of the prophets puts the point more clearly than Isaiah. After +condemning hypocrisy, he commends liberty and charity towards oneself +and one's neighbors, and promises as a reward: "Then shall thy light +break forth as the morning, and thy health shall spring forth speedily, +thy righteousness shall go before thee, and the glory of the Lord shall +be thy reward" (chap. lviii. 8). Shortly afterwards he commends the +Sabbath, and for a due observance of it promises: "Then shalt thou +delight thyself in the Lord, and I will cause thee to ride upon the high +places of the earth, and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob thy +father: for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it." Thus the prophet, for +liberty bestowed and charitable works, promises a healthy mind in a +healthy body, and the glory of the Lord even after death; whereas, for +ceremonial exactitude, he only promises security of rule, prosperity, +and temporal happiness. + +... It remains to show why and how the ceremonial observances tended to +preserve and confirm the Hebrew kingdom; and this I can very briefly do +on grounds universally accepted. + +The formation of society serves not only for defensive purposes, but is +also very useful, and, indeed, absolutely necessary, as rendering +possible the division of labor. If men did not render mutual assistance +to each other, no one would have either the skill or the time to provide +for his own sustenance and preservation: for all men are not equally +apt for all work, and no one would be capable of preparing all that he +individually stood in need of. Strength and time, I repeat, would fail, +if every one had in person to plow, to sow, to reap, to grind corn, to +cook, to weave, to stitch and perform the other numerous functions +required to keep life going; to say nothing of the arts and sciences +which are also entirely necessary to the perfection and blessedness of +human nature. We see that peoples living in uncivilized barbarism lead a +wretched and almost animal life, and even they would not be able to +acquire their few rude necessaries without assisting one another to a +certain extent. + +Now if men were so constituted by nature that they desired nothing but +what is designated by true reason, society would obviously have no need +of laws: it would be sufficient to inculcate true moral doctrines; and +men would freely, without hesitation, act in accordance with their true +interests. But human nature is framed in a different fashion: every one, +indeed, seeks his own interest, but does not do so in accordance with +the dictates of sound reason, for most men's ideas of desirability and +usefulness are guided by their fleshly instincts and emotions, which +take no thought beyond the present and the immediate object. Therefore, +no society can exist without government, and force, and laws to restrain +and repress men's desires and immoderate impulses. Still human nature +will not submit to absolute repression. Violent governments, as Seneca +says, never last long; the moderate governments endure. + +So long as men act simply from fear they act contrary to their +inclinations, taking no thought for the advantages or necessity of their +actions, but simply endeavoring to escape punishment or loss of life. +They must needs rejoice in any evil which befalls their ruler, even if +it should involve themselves; and must long for and bring about such +evil by every means in their power. Again, men are especially intolerant +of serving and being ruled by their equals. Lastly, it is exceedingly +difficult to revoke liberties once granted. + +From these considerations it follows, firstly, that authority should +either be vested in the hands of the whole state in common, so that +every one should be bound to serve, and yet not be in subjection to his +equals; or else, if power be in the hands of a few, or one man, that one +man should be something above average humanity, or should strive to get +himself accepted as such. Secondly, laws should in every government be +so arranged that people should be kept in bounds by the hope of some +greatly desired good, rather than by fear, for then every one will do +his duty willingly. + +Lastly, as obedience consists in acting at the bidding of external +authority, it would have no place in a state where the government is +vested in the whole people, and where laws are made by common consent. +In such a society the people would remain free, whether the laws were +added to or diminished, inasmuch as it would not be done on external +authority, but their own free consent. The reverse happens when the +sovereign power is vested in one man, for all act at his bidding; and, +therefore, unless they had been trained from the first to depend on the +words of their ruler, the latter would find it difficult, in case of +need, to abrogate liberties once conceded, and impose new laws. + +From these universal considerations, let us pass on to the kingdom of +the Jews. The Jews when they first came out of Egypt were not bound by +any national laws, and were therefore free to ratify any laws they +liked, or to make new ones, and were at liberty to set up a government +and occupy a territory wherever they chose. However, they were entirely +unfit to frame a wise code of laws and to keep the sovereign power +vested in the community; they were all uncultivated and sunk in a +wretched slavery, therefore the sovereignty was bound to remain vested +in the hands of one man who would rule the rest and keep them under +constraint, make laws and interpret them. This sovereignty was easily +retained by Moses, because he surpassed the rest in virtue and persuaded +the people of the fact, proving it by many testimonies (see Exod. chap. +xiv., last verse, and chap. xix., verse 9). He then, by the Divine +virtue he possessed, made laws and ordained them for the people, taking +the greatest care that they should be obeyed willingly and not through +fear, being specially induced to adopt this course by the obstinate +nature of the Jews, who would not have submitted to be ruled solely by +constraint; and also by the imminence of war, for it is always better to +inspire soldiers with a thirst for glory than to terrify them with +threats; each man will then strive to distinguish himself by valor and +courage, instead of merely trying to escape punishment. Moses, +therefore, by his virtue and the Divine command, introduced a religion +so that the people might do their duty from devotion rather than fear. +Further, he bound them over by benefits, and prophesied many advantages +in the future; nor were his laws very severe, as any one may see for +himself, especially if he remarks the number of circumstances necessary +in order to procure the conviction of an accused person. + +Lastly, in order that the people which could not govern itself should be +entirely dependent on its ruler, he left nothing to the free choice of +individuals (who had hitherto been slaves); the people could do nothing +but remember the law, and follow the ordinances laid down at the good +pleasure of their ruler; they were not allowed to plow, to sow, to reap, +nor even to eat; to clothe themselves, to shave, to rejoice, or, in +fact, to do anything whatever as they liked, but were bound to follow +the directions given in the law; and not only this, but they were +obliged to have marks on their doorposts, on their hands, and between +their eyes to admonish them to perpetual obedience. + +This, then, was the object of the ceremonial law, that men should do +nothing of their own free will, but should always act under external +authority, and should continually confess by their actions and thoughts +that they were not their own masters, but were entirely under the +control of others. + +From all these considerations it is clearer than day that ceremonies +have nothing to do with a state of blessedness, and that those mentioned +in the Old Testament, _i.e._, the whole Mosaic Law, had reference merely +to the government of the Jews, and merely temporal advantages. + +As for the Christian rites, such as baptism, the Lord's Supper, +festivals, public prayers, and any other observances which are, and +always have been, common to all Christendom, if they were instituted by +Christ or His Apostles (which is open to doubt), they were instituted as +external signs of the universal church, and not as having anything to do +with blessedness, or possessing any sanctity in themselves. Therefore, +though such ceremonies were not ordained for the sake of upholding a +government, they were ordained for the preservation of a society, and +accordingly he who lives alone is not bound by them: nay, those who live +in a country where the Christian religion is forbidden, are bound to +abstain from such rites, and can none the less live in a state of +blessedness. We have an example of this in Japan, where the Christian +religion is forbidden, and the Dutch who live there are enjoined by +their East India Company not to practice any outward rites of religion. +I need not cite other examples, though it would be easy to prove my +point from the fundamental principles of the New Testament, and to +adduce many confirmatory instances; but I pass on the more willingly, as +I am anxious to proceed to my next proposition. I will now, therefore, +pass on to what I proposed to treat of in the second part of this +chapter, namely, what persons are bound to believe in the narratives +contained in Scripture, and how far they are so bound. Examining this +question by the aid of natural reason, I will proceed as follows: + +If any one wishes to persuade his fellows for or against anything which +is not self-evident, he must deduce his contention from their +admissions, and convince them either by experience or by ratiocination; +either by appealing to facts of natural experience, or to self-evident +intellectual axioms. Now unless the experience be of such a kind as to +be clearly and distinctly understood, though it may convince a man, it +will not have the same effect on his mind and disperse the clouds of his +doubt so completely as when the doctrine taught is deduced entirely from +intellectual axioms--that is, by the mere power of the understanding and +logical order, and this is especially the case in spiritual matters +which have nothing to do with the senses. + +But the deduction of conclusions from general truths _ŕ priori_, usually +requires a long chain of arguments, and, moreover, very great caution, +acuteness, and self-restraint--qualities which are not often met with; +therefore people prefer to be taught by experience rather than deduce +their conclusion from a few axioms, and set them out in logical order. +Whence it follows, that if any one wishes to teach a doctrine to a whole +nation (not to speak of the whole human race), and to be understood by +all men in every particular, he will seek to support his teaching with +experience, and will endeavor to suit his reasonings and the definitions +of his doctrines as far as possible to the understanding of the common +people, who form the majority of mankind, and he will not set them forth +in logical sequence nor adduce the definitions which serve to establish +them. Otherwise he writes only for the learned--that is, he will be +understood by only a small proportion of the human race. + +All Scripture was written primarily for an entire people, and +secondarily for the whole human race; therefore its contents must +necessarily be adapted as far as possible to the understanding of the +masses, and proved only by examples drawn from experience. We will +explain ourselves more clearly. The chief speculative doctrines taught +in Scripture are the existence of God, or a Being Who made all things, +and Who directs and sustains the world with consummate wisdom; +furthermore, that God takes the greatest thought for men, or such of +them as live piously and honorably, while He punishes, with various +penalties, those who do evil, separating them from the good. All this is +proved in Scripture entirely through experience--that is, through the +narratives there related. No definitions of doctrine are given, but all +the sayings and reasonings are adapted to the understanding of the +masses. Although experience can give no clear knowledge of these things, +nor explain the nature of God, nor how He directs and sustains all +things, it can nevertheless teach and enlighten men sufficiently to +impress obedience and devotion on their minds. + +It is not, I think, sufficiently clear what persons are bound to believe +in the Scripture narratives, and in what degree they are so bound, for +it evidently follows from what has been said that the knowledge of and +belief in them is particularly necessary to the masses whose intellect +is not capable of perceiving things clearly and distinctly. Further, he +who denies them because he does not believe that God exists or takes +thought for men and the world, may be accounted impious; but a man who +is ignorant of them, and nevertheless shows by natural reason that God +exists, as we have said, and has a true plan of life, is altogether +blessed--yes, more blessed than the common herd of believers, because +besides true opinions he possesses also a true and distinct conception. +Lastly, he who is ignorant of the Scriptures and knows nothing by the +light of reason, though he may not be impious or rebellious, is yet less +than human and almost brutal, having none of God's gifts. + +We must here remark that when we say that the knowledge of the sacred +narrative is particularly necessary to the masses, we do not mean the +knowledge of absolutely all the narratives in the Bible, but only of the +principal ones, those which, taken by themselves, plainly display the +doctrine we have just stated, and have most effect over men's minds. + +If all the narratives in Scripture were necessary for the proof of this +doctrine, and if no conclusion could be drawn without the general +consideration of every one of the histories contained in the sacred +writings, truly the conclusion and demonstration of such doctrine would +overtask the understanding and strength not only of the masses, but of +humanity; who is there who could give attention to all the narratives at +once, and to all the circumstances, and all the scraps of doctrine to be +elicited from such a host of diverse histories? I cannot believe that +the men who have left us the Bible as we have it were so abounding in +talent that they attempted setting about such a method of demonstration, +still less can I suppose that we cannot understand Scriptural doctrine +till we have given heed to the quarrels of Isaac, the advice of +Achitophel to Absalom, the civil war between Jews and Israelites, and +other similar chronicles; nor can I think that it was more difficult to +teach such doctrine by means of history to the Jews of early times, the +contemporaries of Moses, than it was to the contemporaries of Esdras. +But more will be said on this point hereafter, we may now only note that +the masses are only bound to know those histories which can most +powerfully dispose their mind to obedience and devotion. However, the +masses are not sufficiently skilled to draw conclusions from what they +read, they take more delight in the actual stories, and in the strange +and unlooked-for issues of events than in the doctrines implied; +therefore, besides reading these narratives, they are always in need of +pastors or church ministers to explain them to their feeble +intelligence. + +But not to wander from our point, let us conclude with what has been our +principal object--namely, that the truth of narratives, be they what +they may, has nothing to do with the Divine law, and serves for nothing +except in respect of doctrine, the sole element which makes one history +better than another. The narratives in the Old and New Testaments +surpass profane history, and differ among themselves in merit simply by +reason of the salutary doctrines which they inculcate. Therefore, if a +man were to read the Scripture narratives believing the whole of them, +but were to give no heed to the doctrines they contain, and make no +amendment in his life, he might employ himself just as profitably in +reading the Koran or the poetic drama, or ordinary chronicles, with the +attention usually given to such writings; on the other hand, if a man is +absolutely ignorant of the Scriptures, and none the less has right +opinions and a true plan of life, he is absolutely blessed and truly +possesses in himself the spirit of Christ. + +The Jews are of a directly contrary way of thinking, for they hold that +true opinions and a true plan of life are of no service in attaining +blessedness, if their possessors have arrived at them by the light of +reason only, and not like the documents prophetically revealed to Moses. +Maimonides ventures openly to make this assertion: "Every man who takes +to heart the seven precepts and diligently follows them, is counted with +the pious among the nations, and an heir of the world to come; that is +to say, if he takes to heart and follows them because God ordained them +in the law, and revealed them to us by Moses, because they were of +aforetime precepts to the sons of Noah: but he who follows them as lead +thereto by reason, is not counted as a dweller among the pious, nor +among the wise of the nations." Such are the words of Maimonides, to +which R. Joseph, the son of Shem Job, adds in his book, which he calls +_Kebod Elohim, or God's Glory_, that although Aristotle (whom he +considers to have written the best ethics and to be above every one +else) has not omitted anything that concerns true ethics, and which he +has adopted in his own book, carefully following the lines laid down, +yet this was not able to suffice for his salvation, inasmuch as he +embraced his doctrines in accordance with the dictates of reason and not +as Divine documents prophetically revealed.[9] + +However, that these are mere figments and are not supported by +Scriptural authority will, I think, be sufficiently evident to the +attentive reader, so that an examination of the theory will be +sufficient for its refutation. It is not my purpose here to refute the +assertions of those who assert that the natural light of reason can +teach nothing of any value concerning the true way of salvation. People +who lay no claims to reason for themselves are not able to prove by +reason this their assertion; and if they hawk about something superior +to reason, it is a mere figment, and far below reason, as their general +method of life sufficiently shows. But there is no need to dwell upon +such persons. I will merely add that we can only judge of a man by his +works. If a man abounds in the fruits of the Spirit, charity, joy, +peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faith, gentleness, chastity, +against which, as Paul says (Gal. v. 22), there is no law, such an one, +whether he be taught by reason only or by the Scripture only, has been +in very truth taught by God, and is altogether blessed. Thus have I said +all that I undertook to say concerning Divine law. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[8] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. v, same title. + +[9] The Jews were not, of course, alone in holding this point of view. +Dante consigned the ancient philosophers--including Aristotle--and even +Vergil to Limbo, agreeing thus in doctrine with Maimonides and R. +Joseph, the son of Shem Job.--ED. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +OF MIRACLES[10] + + +As men are accustomed to call Divine the knowledge which transcends +human understanding, so also do they style Divine, or the work of God, +anything of which the cause is not generally known: for the masses think +that the power and providence of God are most clearly displayed by +events that are extraordinary and contrary to the conception they have +formed of Nature, especially if such events bring them any profit or +convenience: they think that the clearest possible proof of God's +existence is afforded when Nature, as they suppose, breaks her +accustomed order, and consequently they believe that those who explain +or endeavor to understand phenomena or miracles through their natural +causes are doing away with God and His providence. They suppose, +forsooth, that God is inactive so long as Nature works in her accustomed +order, and _vice versa_, that the power of Nature and natural causes are +idle so long as God is acting: thus they imagine two powers distinct one +from the other, the power of God and the power of Nature, though the +latter is in a sense determined by God, or (as most people believe now) +created by Him. What they mean by either, and what they understand by +God and Nature they do not know, except that they imagine the power of +God to be like that of some royal potentate, and Nature's power to +consist in force and energy. + +The masses then style unusual phenomena "miracles," and partly from +piety, partly for the sake of opposing the students of science, prefer +to remain in ignorance of natural causes, and only to hear of those +things which they know least, and consequently admire most. In fact, the +common people can only adore God, and refer all things to His power by +removing natural causes, and conceiving things happening out of their +due course, and only admires the power of God when the power of Nature +is conceived of as in subjection to it. + +This idea seems to have taken its rise among the early Jews who saw the +Gentiles round them worshiping visible gods, such as the sun, the moon, +the earth, water, air, etc., and in order to inspire the conviction that +such divinities were weak and inconstant, or changeable, told how they +themselves were under the sway of an invisible God, and narrated their +miracles, trying further to show that the God whom they worshiped +arranged the whole of nature for their sole benefit. This idea was so +pleasing to humanity that men go on to this day imagining miracles, so +that they may believe themselves God's favorites and the final cause for +which God created and directs all things. + +What pretensions will not people in their folly advance! They have no +single sound idea concerning either God or Nature, they confound God's +decrees with human decrees, they conceive Nature as so limited that +they believe man to be its chief part! I have spent enough space in +setting forth these common ideas and prejudices concerning Nature and +miracles, but in order to afford a regular demonstration I will show: + +1. That Nature cannot be contravened, but that she preserves a fixed and +immutable order, and at the same time I will explain what is meant by a +miracle. + +2. That God's nature and existence, and consequently His providence, +cannot be known from miracles, but that they can all be much better +perceived from the fixed and immutable order of Nature. + +3. That by the decrees and volitions, and consequently the providence of +God, Scripture (as I will prove by Scriptural examples) means nothing +but Nature's order following necessarily from her eternal laws. + +4. Lastly, I will treat of the method of interpreting Scriptural +miracles, and the chief points to be noted concerning the narratives of +them. + +Such are the principal subjects which will be discussed in this chapter, +and which will serve, I think, not a little to further the object of +this treatise. + +Our first point is easily proved from what we showed in Chapter V about +Divine law--namely, that all that God wishes or determines involves +eternal necessity and truth, for we demonstrated that God's +understanding is identical with His will, and that it is the same thing +to say that God wills a thing, as to say that He understands it; hence, +as it follows necessarily from the Divine nature and perfection that God +understands a thing as it is, it follows no less necessarily that He +wills it as it is. Now, as nothing is necessarily true save only by +Divine decree, it is plain that the universal laws of Nature are decrees +of God following from the necessity and perfection of the Divine nature. +Hence, any event happening in nature which contravened Nature's +universal laws, would necessarily also contravene the Divine decree, +nature, and understanding; or if any one asserted that God acts in +contravention to the laws of Nature, he, _ipso facto_, would be +compelled to assert that God acted against His own nature--an evident +absurdity. One might easily show from the same premises that the power +and efficiency of Nature are in themselves the Divine power and +efficiency, and that the Divine power is the very essence of God, but +this I gladly pass over for the present. + +Nothing, then, comes to pass in Nature[11] in contravention to her +universal laws, nay, everything agrees with them and follows from them, +for whatsoever comes to pass, comes to pass by the will and eternal +decree of God; that is, as we have just pointed out, whatever comes to +pass, comes to pass according to laws and rules which involve eternal +necessity and truth; Nature, therefore, always observes laws and rules +which involve eternal necessity and truth, although they may not all be +known to us, and therefore she keeps a fixed and immutable order. Nor is +there any sound reason for limiting the power and efficacy of Nature, +and asserting that her laws are fit for certain purposes, but not for +all; for as the efficacy and power of Nature are the very efficacy and +power of God, and as the laws and rules of Nature are the decrees of +God, it is in every way to be believed that the power of Nature is +infinite, and that her laws are broad enough to embrace everything +conceived by the Divine intellect. The only alternative is to assert +that God has created Nature so weak, and has ordained for her laws so +barren, that He is repeatedly compelled to come afresh to her aid if He +wishes that she should be preserved, and that things should happen as He +desires: a conclusion, in my opinion, very far removed from reason. +Further, as nothing happens in Nature which does not follow from her +laws, and as her laws embrace everything conceived by the Divine +intellect, and, lastly, as Nature preserves a fixed and immutable order, +it most clearly follows that miracles are only intelligible as in +relation to human opinions, and merely mean events of which the natural +cause cannot be explained by a reference to any ordinary occurrence, +either by us, or at any rate by the writer and narrator of the miracle. + +We may, in fact, say that a miracle is an event of which the causes +cannot be explained by the natural reason through a reference to +ascertained workings of Nature; but since miracles were wrought +according to the understanding of the masses, who are wholly ignorant of +the workings of Nature, it is certain that the ancients took for a +miracle whatever they could not explain by the method adopted by the +unlearned in such cases, namely, an appeal to the memory, a recalling of +something similar, which is ordinarily regarded without wonder; for most +people think they sufficiently understand a thing when they have ceased +to wonder at it. The ancients, then, and indeed most men up to the +present day, had no other criterion for a miracle; hence we cannot doubt +that many things are narrated in Scripture as miracles of which the +causes could easily be explained by reference to ascertained workings of +Nature. We have hinted as much in Chapter III, in speaking of the sun +standing still in the time of Joshua, and going backwards in the time of +Ahaz; but we shall soon have more to say on the subject when we come to +treat of the interpretation of miracles later on in this chapter. + +It is now time to pass on to the second point, and show that we cannot +gain an understanding of God's essence, existence, or providence by +means of miracles, but that these truths are much better perceived +through the fixed and immutable order of Nature. + +I thus proceed with the demonstration. As God's existence is not +self-evident, it must necessarily be inferred from ideas so firmly and +incontrovertibly true that no power can be postulated or conceived +sufficient to impugn them. They ought certainly so to appear to us when +we infer from them God's existence, if we wish to place our conclusion +beyond the reach of doubt; for if we could conceive that such ideas +could be impugned by any power whatsoever, we should doubt of their +truth, we should doubt of our conclusion, namely, of God's existence, +and should never be able to be certain of anything. Further, we know +that nothing either agrees with or is contrary to Nature, unless it +agrees with or is contrary to these primary ideas; wherefore if we would +conceive that anything could be done in Nature by any power whatsoever +which would be contrary to the laws of Nature, it would also be +contrary to our primary ideas, and we should have either to reject it as +absurd, or else to cast doubt (as just shown) on our primary ideas, and +consequently on the existence of God, and on everything howsoever +perceived. Therefore miracles, in the sense of events contrary to the +laws of Nature, so far from demonstrating to us the existence of God, +would, on the contrary, lead us to doubt it, where, otherwise, we might +have been absolutely certain of it, as knowing that Nature follows a +fixed and immutable order. + +Let us take miracle as meaning that which cannot be explained through +natural causes. This may be interpreted in two senses: either as that +which has natural causes, but cannot be examined by the human intellect; +or as that which has no cause save God and God's will. But as all things +which come to pass through natural causes come to pass also solely +through the will and power of God, it comes to this: that a miracle, +whether it has natural causes or not, is a result which cannot be +explained by its cause, that is a phenomenon which surpasses human +understanding; but from such a phenomenon, and certainly from a result +surpassing our understanding, we can gain no knowledge. For whatsoever +we understand clearly and distinctly should be plain to us either in +itself or by means of something else clearly and distinctly understood; +wherefore from a miracle or a phenomenon which we cannot understand we +can gain no knowledge of God's essence, or existence, or indeed anything +about God or nature; whereas when we know that all things are ordained +and ratified by God, that the operations of Nature follow from the +essence of God, and that the laws of Nature are eternal decrees and +volitions of God, we must perforce conclude that our knowledge of God +and of God's will increases in proportion to our knowledge and clear +understanding of Nature, as we see how she depends on her primal cause, +and how she works according to eternal law. Wherefore so far as our +understanding goes, those phenomena which we clearly and distinctly +understand have much better right to be called works of God, and to be +referred to the will of God than those about which we are entirely +ignorant, although they appeal powerfully to the imagination, and compel +men's admiration. + +It is only phenomena that we clearly and distinctly understand which +heighten our knowledge of God and most clearly indicate His will and +decrees. Plainly, they are but triflers who, when they cannot explain a +thing, run back to the will of God; this is, truly, a ridiculous way of +expressing ignorance. Again, even supposing that some conclusion could +be drawn from miracles, we could not possibly infer from them the +existence of God; for a miracle being an event under limitations is the +expression of a fixed and limited power, therefore we could not possibly +infer from an effect of this kind the existence of a cause whose power +is infinite, but at the utmost only of a cause whose power is greater +than that of the said effect. I say at the utmost, for a phenomenon may +be the result of many concurrent causes, and its power may be less than +the power of the sum of such causes, but far greater than that of any +one of them taken individually. On the other hand, the laws of nature, +as we have shown, extend over infinity, and are conceived by us as, +after a fashion, eternal, and Nature works in accordance with them in a +fixed and immutable order; therefore, such laws indicate to us in a +certain degree the infinity, the eternity and the immutability of God. + +We may conclude, then, that we cannot gain knowledge of the existence +and providence of God by means of miracles, but that we can far better +infer them from the fixed and immutable order of Nature. By miracle I +here mean an event which surpasses, or is thought to surpass, human +comprehension: for in so far as it is supposed to destroy or interrupt +the order of Nature or her laws, it not only can give us no knowledge of +God, but, contrariwise, takes away that which we naturally have, and +makes us doubt of God and everything else. + +Neither do I recognize any difference between an event against the laws +of Nature and an event beyond the laws of Nature (that is, according to +some, an event which does not contravene Nature, though she is +inadequate to produce or effect it), for a miracle is wrought in, and +not beyond Nature, though it may be said in itself to be above Nature, +and, therefore, must necessarily interrupt the order of Nature, which +otherwise we conceive of as fixed and unchangeable, according to God's +decrees. If therefore anything should come to pass in Nature which does +not follow from her laws, it would also be in contravention to the order +which God has established in Nature forever through universal natural +laws. It would, therefore, be in contravention to God's nature and laws, +and, consequently belief in it would throw doubt upon everything, and +lead to Atheism. + +I think I have now sufficiently established my second point, so that we +can again conclude that a miracle, whether in contravention to, or +beyond, Nature, is a mere absurdity; and therefore that what is meant in +Scripture by a miracle can only be a work of Nature, which surpasses, or +is believed to surpass, human comprehension. Before passing on to my +third point, I will adduce Scriptural authority for my assertion that +God cannot be known from miracles. Scripture nowhere states the doctrine +openly, but it can readily be inferred from several passages. Firstly, +that in which Moses commands (Deut. xiii.) that a false prophet should +be put to death, even though he work miracles: "If there arise a prophet +among you, and giveth thee a sign or wonder, and the sign or wonder come +to pass, saying, Let us go after other gods ... thou shalt not hearken +unto the voice of that prophet; for the Lord your God proveth you, and +that prophet shall be put to death." From this it clearly follows that +miracles could be wrought even by false prophets; and that, unless men +are honestly endowed with the true knowledge and love of God, they may +be as easily led by miracles to follow false gods as to follow the true +God; for these words are added: "For the Lord your God tempts you, that +He may know whether you love Him with all your heart and with all your +mind." + +Further, the Israelites, from all their miracles, were unable to form a +sound conception of God, as their experience testified: for when they +had persuaded themselves that Moses had departed from among them they +petitioned Aaron to give them visible gods; and the idea of God they had +formed as the result of all their miracles was a calf!... + +I now go on to my _third_ point, and show from Scripture that the +decrees and mandates of God, and consequently His providence, are merely +the order of Nature--that is, when Scripture describes an event as +accomplished by God or God's will, we must understand merely that it was +in accordance with the law and order of Nature, not, as most people +believe, that Nature had for a season ceased to act, or that her order +was temporarily interrupted. But Scripture does not directly teach +matters unconnected with its doctrine, wherefore it has no care to +explain things by their natural causes, nor to expound matters merely +speculative. Wherefore our conclusion must be gathered by inference from +those Scriptural narratives which happen to be written more at length +and circumstantially than usual. Of these I will cite a few. + +In the first book of Samuel (ix. 15, 16), it is related that God +revealed to Samuel that He would send Saul to him, yet God did not send +Saul to Samuel as people are wont to send one man to another. His +"sending" was merely the ordinary course of Nature. Saul was looking for +the asses he had lost, and was meditating a return home without them, +when, at the suggestion of his servant, he went to the Prophet Samuel, +to learn from him where he might find them. From no part of the +narrative does it appear that Saul had any command from God to visit +Samuel beyond this natural motive.... + +But perhaps some one will insist that we find many things in Scripture +which seem in nowise explicable by natural causes, as, for instance, +that the sins of men and their prayers can be the cause of rain and of +the earth's fertility, or that faith can heal the blind, and so on. But +I think I have already made sufficient answer: I have shown that +Scripture does not explain things by their secondary causes, but only +narrates them in the order and the style which has most power to move +men, and especially uneducated men, to devotion; and therefore it speaks +inaccurately of God and of events, seeing that its object is not to +convince the reason, but to attract and lay hold of the imagination. If +the Bible were to describe the destruction of an empire in the style of +political historians, the masses would remain unstirred, whereas the +contrary is the case when it adopts the method of poetic description, +and refers all things immediately to God. When, therefore, the Bible +says that the earth is barren because of men's sins, or that the blind +were healed by faith, we ought to take no more notice than when it says +that God is angry at men's sins, that He is sad, that He repents of the +good He has promised and done; or that on seeing a sign He remembers +something He had promised, and other similar expressions, which are +either thrown out poetically or related according to the opinion and +prejudices of the writer. + +We may then be absolutely certain that every event which is truly +described in Scripture necessarily happened, like everything else, +according to natural laws; and if anything is there set down which can +be proved in set terms to contravene the order of Nature, or not to be +deducible therefrom, we must believe it to have been foisted into the +sacred writings by irreligious hands; for whatsoever is contrary to +Nature is also contrary to reason, and whatsoever is contrary to reason +is absurd, and, _ipso facto_, to be rejected. + +There remain some points concerning the interpretation of miracles to be +noted, or rather to be recapitulated, for most of them have been already +stated. These I proceed to discuss in the fourth division of my subject, +and I am led to do so lest any one should, by wrongly interpreting a +miracle, rashly suspect that he has found something in Scripture +contrary to human reason. + +It is very rare for men to relate an event simply as it happened, +without adding any element of their own judgment. When they hear or see +anything new, they are, unless strictly on their guard, so occupied with +their own preconceived opinions that they perceive something quite +different from the plain facts seen or heard, especially if such facts +surpass the comprehension of the beholder or hearer, and, most of all, +if he is interested in their happening in a given way. + +Thus men relate in chronicles and histories their own opinions rather +than actual events, so that one and the same event is so differently +related by two men of different opinions, that it seems like two +separate occurrences; and, further, it is very easy from historical +chronicles to gather the personal opinions of the historian. + +I could cite many instances in proof of this from the writings both of +natural philosophers and historians, but I will content myself with one +only from Scripture, and leave the reader to judge of the rest. + +In the time of Joshua the Hebrews held the ordinary opinion that the sun +moves with a daily motion, and that the earth remains at rest; to this +preconceived opinion they adapted the miracle which occurred during +their battle with the five kings. They did not simply relate that that +day was longer than usual, but asserted that the sun and moon stood +still, or ceased from their motion--a statement which would be of great +service to them at that time in convincing and proving by experience to +the Gentiles, who worshiped the sun, that the sun was under the control +of another deity who could compel it to change its daily course. Thus, +partly through religious motives, partly through preconceived opinions, +they conceived of and related the occurrence as something quite +different from what really happened. + +Thus in order to interpret the Scriptural miracles and understand from +the narration of them how they really happened, it is necessary to know +the opinions of those who first related them, and have recorded them for +us in writing, and to distinguish such opinions from the actual +impression made upon their senses, otherwise we shall confound opinions +and judgments with the actual miracle as it really occurred; nay, +further, we shall confound actual events with symbolical and imaginary +ones. For many things are narrated in Scripture as real, and were +believed to be real, which were in fact only symbolical and imaginary. +As, for instance, that God came down from heaven (Exod. xix. 28, Deut. +v. 28), and that Mount Sinai smoked because God descended upon it +surrounded with fire; or, again, that Elijah ascended into heaven in a +chariot of fire, with horses of fire; all these things were assuredly +merely symbols adapted to the opinions of those who have handed them +down to us as they were represented to them, namely, as real. All who +have any education know that God has no right hand nor left; that He is +not moved nor at rest, nor in a particular place, but that He is +absolutely infinite and contains in Himself all perfections. + +These things, I repeat, are known to whoever judges of things by the +perception of pure reason, and not according as his imagination is +affected by his outward senses,--following the example of the masses who +imagine a bodily Deity, holding a royal court with a throne on the +convexity of heaven, above the stars, which are believed to be not very +far off from the earth. + +To these and similar opinions very many narrations in Scripture are +adapted, and should not, therefore, be mistaken by philosophers for +realities. + +Lastly, in order to understand, in the case of miracles, what actually +took place, we ought to be familiar with Jewish phrases and metaphors; +any one who did not make sufficient allowance for these would be +continually seeing miracles in Scripture where nothing of the kind is +intended by the writer; he would thus miss the knowledge not only of +what actually happened, but also of the mind of the writers of the +sacred text. For instance, Zachariah, speaking of some future war, says +(chap, xiv., verse 7): "It shall be one day which shall be known to the +Lord, not day nor night; but at even time it shall be light." In these +words he seems to predict a great miracle, yet he only means that the +battle will be doubtful the whole day, that the issue will be known only +to God, but that in the evening they will gain the victory. The +prophets frequently used to predict victories and defeats of the nations +in similar phrases. Thus Isaiah, describing the destruction of Babylon, +says (chap. xiii.): "The stars of heaven, and the constellations +thereof, shall not give their light; the sun shall be darkened in his +going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine." Now I +suppose no one imagines that at the destruction of Babylon these +phenomena actually occurred any more than that which the prophet adds, +"For I will make the heavens to tremble, and remove the earth out of her +place." + +So, too, Isaiah in foretelling to the Jews that they would return from +Babylon to Jerusalem in safety, and would not suffer from thirst on +their journey, says: "And they thirsted not when He led them through the +deserts; He caused the waters to flow out of the rocks for them; He +clave the rocks, and the waters gushed out." These words merely mean +that the Jews, like other people, found springs in the desert, at which +they quenched their thirst; for when the Jews returned to Jerusalem with +the consent of Cyrus, it is admitted that no similar miracles befell +them. + +In this way many occurrences in the Bible are to be regarded merely as +Jewish expressions. There is no need for me to go through them in +detail; but I will call attention generally to the fact that the Jews +employed such phrases not only rhetorically, but also, and indeed +chiefly, from devotional motives. Such is the reason for the +substitution of "bless God" for "curse God" (in 1 Kings xxi. 10, and Job +ii. 9), and for all things being referred to God, whence it appears +that the Bible seems to relate nothing but miracles, even when speaking +of the most ordinary occurrences, as in the examples given above. + +Hence we must believe that when the Bible says that the Lord hardened +Pharaoh's heart, it only means that Pharaoh was obstinate; when it says +that God opened the windows of heaven, it only means that it rained very +hard, and so on. When we reflect on these peculiarities, and also on the +fact that most things are related very shortly, with very little detail, +and almost in abridgments, we shall see that there is hardly anything in +Scripture which can be proved contrary to natural reason, while, on the +other hand, many things which before seemed obscure, will after a little +consideration be understood and easily explained. + +I think I have now very clearly explained all that I proposed to +explain, but before I finish this chapter I would call attention to the +fact that I have adopted a different method in speaking of miracles to +that which I employed in treating of prophecy. Of prophecy I have +asserted nothing which could not be inferred from premises revealed in +Scripture, whereas in this chapter I have deduced my conclusions solely +from the principles ascertained by the natural light of reason. I have +proceeded in this way advisedly, for prophecy, in that it surpasses +human knowledge, is a purely theological question; therefore, I knew +that I could not make any assertions about it, nor learn wherein it +consists, except through deductions from premises that have been +revealed; therefore I was compelled to collate the history of prophecy, +and to draw therefrom certain conclusions which would teach me, in so +far as such teaching is possible, the nature and properties of the +gift. But in the case of miracles, as our inquiry is a question purely +philosophical (namely, whether anything can happen which contravenes, or +does not follow from the laws of Nature), I was not under any such +necessity: I therefore thought it wiser to unravel the difficulty +through premises ascertained and thoroughly known by the natural light +of reason. I say I thought it wiser, for I could also easily have solved +the problem merely from the doctrines and fundamental principles of +Scripture: in order that every one may acknowledge this, I will briefly +show how it could be done. + +Scripture makes the general assertion in several passages that nature's +course is fixed and unchangeable. (In Ps. cxlviii. 6, for instance, and +Jer. xxxi. 35.) The wise man also (in Eccles. i. 10) distinctly teaches +that "there is nothing new under the sun," and (in verses 11, 12), +illustrating the same idea, he adds that although something occasionally +happens which seems new, it is not really new, but "hath been already of +old time, which was before us, whereof there is no remembrance, neither +shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come with those +that come after." Again (in chap. iii. 11), he says, "God hath made +everything beautiful in his time," and immediately afterwards adds, "I +know that whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever; nothing can be put +to it, nor anything taken from it." + +Now all these texts teach most distinctly that Nature preserves a fixed +and unchangeable order and that God in all ages known and unknown has +been the same; further, that the laws of Nature are so perfect that +nothing can be added thereto nor taken therefrom; and, lastly, that +miracles only appear as something new because of man's ignorance. + +Such is the express teaching of Scripture. Nowhere does Scripture assert +that anything happens which contradicts, or cannot follow from the laws +of Nature; and therefore we should not attribute to it such a +doctrine.... + +The conclusion, then, that is most plainly put before us is, that +miracles were natural occurrences, and must therefore be so explained as +to appear neither new (in the words of Solomon) nor contrary to Nature, +but, as far as possible, in complete agreement with ordinary events. +This can easily be done by any one, now that I have set forth the rules +drawn from Scripture. Nevertheless, though I maintain that Scripture +teaches this doctrine, I do not assert that it teaches it as a truth +necessary to salvation, but only that the prophets were in agreement +with ourselves on the point; therefore every one is free to think on the +subject as he likes, according as he thinks it best for himself, and +most likely to conduce to the worship of God and to single-hearted +religion. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[10] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. vi, same title. + +[11] N.B. I do not mean here by "Nature," merely matter and its +modifications, but infinite other things besides matter. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +OF THE DIVINE NATURE + + +_Definitions_ + +I. By cause of itself, I understand that, whose essence involves +existence; or that, whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing. + +II. That thing is called finite in its own kind (_in suo genere_) which +can be limited by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body +is called finite, because we always conceive another which is greater. +So a thought is limited by another thought; but a body is not limited by +a thought, nor a thought by a body. + +III. By substance, I understand that which is in itself and is conceived +through itself; in other words, that, the conception of which does not +need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed. + +IV. By attribute, I understand that which the intellect perceives of +substance, as constituting its essence. + +V. By mode, I understand the affections of substance, or that which is +in another thing through which also it is conceived. + +VI. By God, I understand Being absolutely infinite, that is to say, +substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses +eternal and infinite essence. + +_Explanation._--I say absolutely infinite but not infinite in its own +kind (_in suo genere_); for of whatever is infinite only in its own kind +(_in suo genere_), we can deny infinite attributes; but to the essence +of that which is absolutely infinite pertains whatever expresses essence +and involves no negation. + +VII. That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its +own nature alone, and is determined to action by itself alone. That +thing, on the other hand, is called necessary, or rather compelled, +which by another is determined to existence and action in a fixed and +prescribed manner. + +VIII. By eternity, I understand existence itself, so far as it is +conceived necessarily to follow from the definition alone of the eternal +thing. + +_Explanation._--For such existence, like the essence of the thing, is +conceived as an eternal truth. It cannot therefore be explained by +duration of time, even if the duration be conceived without beginning or +end. + + +_Axioms_ + +I. Everything which is, is either in itself or in another. + +II. That which cannot be conceived through another must be conceived +through itself. + +III. From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows; and, +on the other hand, if no determinate cause be given, it is impossible +that an effect can follow. + +IV. The knowledge (cognitio) of an effect depends upon and involves the +knowledge of the cause. + +V. Those things which have nothing mutually in common with one another +cannot through one another be mutually understood, that is to say, the +conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other. + +VI. A true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea (_cum suo +ideato_). + +VII. The essence of that thing which can be conceived as not existing +does not involve existence. + + +_The Essence of God_ + +God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which +expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists. + +[This can be proved in the following manner]: + +For the existence or non-existence of everything there must be a reason +or cause. For example, if a triangle exists, there must be a reason or +cause why it exists; and if it does not exist, there must be a reason or +cause which hinders its existence or which negates it. But this reason +or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing or lie +outside it. For example, the nature of the thing itself shows the reason +why a square circle does not exist, the reason being that a square +circle involves a contradiction. And the reason, on the other hand, why +substance exists follows from its nature alone, which involves +existence. But the reason why a circle or triangle exists or does not +exist is not drawn from their nature, but from the order of corporeal +nature generally; for from that it must follow either that a triangle +necessarily exists, or that it is impossible for it to exist. But this +is self-evident. Therefore it follows that if there be no cause nor +reason which hinders a thing from existing, it exists necessarily. If +therefore there be no reason nor cause which hinders God from existing, +or which negates His existence, we must conclude absolutely that He +necessarily exists. But if there be such a reason or cause, it must be +either in the nature itself of God or must lie outside it, that is to +say, in another substance of another nature. For if the reason lay in a +substance of the same nature, the existence of God would be by this very +fact admitted. But substance possessing another nature could have +nothing in common with God, and therefore could not give Him existence +nor negate it. Since, therefore, the reason or cause which could negate +the divine existence cannot be outside the divine nature, it will +necessarily, supposing that the divine nature does not exist, be in His +nature itself, which would therefore involve a contradiction. But to +affirm this of the Being absolutely infinite and consummately perfect is +absurd. Therefore neither in God nor outside God is there any cause or +reason which can negate His existence, and therefore God necessarily +exists.... + + +_The Corporeality of God_ + +There are those who imagine God to be like a man, composed of body and +soul and subject to passions; but it is clear enough from what has +already been demonstrated how far off men who believe this are from the +true knowledge of God. But these I dismiss, for all men who have in any +way looked into the divine nature deny that God is corporeal. That He +cannot be so they conclusively prove by showing that by "body" we +understand a certain quantity possessing length, breadth, and depth, +limited by some fixed form; and that to attribute these to God, a being +absolutely infinite, is the greatest absurdity. But yet at the same +time, from other arguments by which they endeavor to confirm their +proof, they clearly show that they remove altogether from the divine +nature substance itself corporeal or extended, affirming that it was +created by God. By what divine power, however, it could have been +created they are altogether ignorant, so that it is clear they do not +understand what they themselves say.... + + B + / + / + / + A + \ + \ + \ + \ + C + +But I will refute my adversaries' arguments, which, taken altogether, +come to this. First, that corporeal substance, in so far as it is +substance, consists, as they suppose, of parts, and therefore they deny +that it can be infinite, and consequently that it can pertain to God. +This they illustrate by many examples, one or two of which I will +adduce. If corporeal substance, they say, be infinite, let us conceive +it to be divided into two parts; each part, therefore, will be either +finite or infinite. If each part be finite, then the infinite is +composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If each part be infinite, +there is then an infinite twice as great as another infinite, which is +also absurd. Again, if infinite quantity be measured by equal parts of a +foot each, it must contain an infinite number of such parts, and +similarly if it be measured by equal parts of an inch each; and +therefore one infinite number will be twelve times greater than another +infinite number. Lastly, if from one point of any infinite quantity it +be imagined that two lines, AB, AC, which at first are at a certain and +determinate distance from one another, be infinitely extended, it is +plain that the distance between B and C will be continually increased, +and at length from being determinate will be indeterminable. Since +therefore these absurdities follow, as they think, from supposing +quantity to be infinite, they conclude that corporeal substance must be +finite, and consequently cannot pertain to the essence of God. A second +argument is assumed from the absolute perfection of God. For God, they +say, since He is a being absolutely perfect, cannot suffer; but +corporeal substance, since it is divisible, can suffer: it follows, +therefore, that it does not pertain to God's essence. + +These are the arguments which I find in authors, by which they endeavor +to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of the divine nature, and +cannot pertain to it.... If any one will rightly consider the matter, he +will see that all these absurdities (supposing that they are all +absurdities, a point which I will now take for granted), from which +these authors attempt to draw the conclusion that substance extended is +finite, do not by any means follow from the supposition that quantity is +infinite, but from the supposition that infinite quantity is measurable, +and that it is made up of finite parts. Therefore, from the absurdities +to which this leads nothing can be concluded, excepting that infinite +quantity is not measurable, and that it cannot be composed of finite +parts. But this is what we [maintain]. + +... The shaft therefore which is aimed at us turns against those who +cast it. If, therefore, from these absurdities any one should attempt to +conclude that substance extended must be finite, he would, forsooth, be +in the position of the man who supposes a circle to have the properties +of a square, and then concludes that it has no center, such that all the +lines drawn from it to the circumference are equal. For corporeal +substance, which cannot be conceived except as infinite, one and +indivisible, is conceived by those against whom I argue to be composed +of finite parts, and to be multiplex and divisible, in order that they +may prove it finite. Just in the same way others, after they have +imagined a line to consist of points, know how to discover many +arguments, by which they show that a line cannot be divided _ad +infinitum_; and indeed it is not less absurd to suppose that corporeal +substance is composed of bodies or parts than to suppose that a body is +composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and that lines, finally, are +composed of points. Every one who knows that clear reason is infallible +ought to admit this, and especially those who deny that a vacuum can +exist. For if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts +could be really distinct, why could not one part be annihilated, the +rest remaining, as before, connected with one another? And why must all +be so fitted together that there can be no vacuum? For of things which +are really distinct the one from the other, one can be and remain in its +own position without the other. Since therefore it is supposed that +there is no vacuum in Nature (about which I will speak at another time), +but that all the parts must be united, so that no vacuum can exist, it +follows that they cannot be really separated; that is to say, that +corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, cannot be divided. + +If, nevertheless, any one should now ask why there is a natural tendency +to consider quantity as capable of division, I reply that quantity is +conceived by us in two ways: either abstractly or superficially; that is +to say, as we imagine it, or else as substance, in which way it is +conceived by the intellect alone. If, therefore, we regard quantity (as +we do very often and easily) as it exists in the imagination, we find it +to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we regard it as +it exists in the intellect, and conceive it in so far as it is +substance, which is very difficult, then, as we have already +sufficiently demonstrated, we find it to be infinite, one, and +indivisible. + +This will be plain enough to all who know how to distinguish between the +imagination and the intellect, and more especially if we remember that +matter is everywhere the same, and that, except in so far as we regard +it as affected in different ways, parts are not distinguished in it; +that is to say, they are distinguished with regard to mode, but not with +regard to reality. For example, we conceive water as being divided, in +so far as it is water, and that its parts are separated from one +another; but in so far as it is corporeal substance we cannot thus +conceive it, for as such it is neither separated nor divided. Moreover, +water, in so far as it is water, is originated and destroyed; but in so +far as it is substance, it is neither originated nor destroyed. + +By this reasoning I think that I have also answered the second argument, +since that too is based upon the assumption that matter, considered as +substance, is divisible and composed of parts. And even if what I have +urged were not true, I do not know why matter should be unworthy of the +divine nature, since outside God no substance can exist from which the +divine nature could suffer. All things, I say, are in God, and +everything which takes place by the laws alone of the infinite nature of +God, and follows (as I shall presently show) from the necessity of His +essence. Therefore in no way whatever can it be asserted that God +suffers from anything, or that substance extended, even if it be +supposed divisible, is unworthy of the divine nature, provided only it +be allowed that it is eternal and infinite.... Whatever is, is in God, +and nothing can either be or be conceived without God. + + +_The Properties of God_ + +I + +From the necessity of the divine nature infinite numbers of things in +infinite ways (that is to say, all things which can be conceived by the +infinite intellect) must follow. + +This proposition must be plain to every one who considers that from the +given definition of anything a number of properties necessarily +following from it (that is to say, following from the essence of the +thing itself) are inferred by the intellect, and just in proportion as +the definition of the thing expresses a greater reality, that is to say, +just in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves a +greater reality, will more properties be inferred. But the divine nature +possesses absolutely infinite attributes (Def. 6), each one of which +expresses infinite essence in its own kind (_in suo genere_), and +therefore, from the necessity of the divine nature, infinite numbers of +things in infinite ways (that is to say, all things which can be +conceived by the infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. Hence it +follows that God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall +under the infinite intellect. It follows, secondly, that God is cause +through Himself, and not through that which is contingent (_per +accidens_). It follows, thirdly, that God is absolutely the first cause. + + +II + +We have just shown that from the necessity, or (which is the same thing) +from the laws only of the divine nature, infinite numbers of things +absolutely follow: and we have demonstrated that nothing can be, nor can +be conceived, without God, but that all things are in God. Therefore, +outside Himself, there can be nothing by which He may be determined or +compelled to act; and therefore He acts from the laws of His own nature +only, and is compelled by no one. + +Hence it follows, firstly, that there is no cause, either external to +God or within Him, which can excite Him to act except the perfection of +His own nature. It follows, secondly, that God alone is a free cause; +for God alone exists from the necessity alone of His own nature and acts +from the necessity alone of His own nature. Therefore He alone is a free +cause. + +There are some who think that God is a free cause because He can, as +they think, bring about that those things which we have said follow from +His nature--that is to say, those things which are in His power--should +not be, or should not be produced by Him. But this is simply saying that +God could bring about that it should not follow from the nature of a +triangle that its three angles should be equal to two right angles, or +that from a given cause an effect should not follow, which is absurd. +But I shall show farther on, without the help of this proposition, that +neither intellect nor will pertain to the nature of God. + +I know indeed that there are many who think themselves able to +demonstrate that intellect of the highest order and freedom of will both +pertain to the nature of God, for they say that they know nothing more +perfect which they can attribute to Him than that which is the chief +perfection in ourselves. But although they conceive God as actually +possessing the highest intellect, they nevertheless do not believe that +He can bring about that all those things should exist which are actually +in His intellect, for they think that by such a supposition they would +destroy His power. If He had created, they say, all things which are in +His intellect, He could have created nothing more, and this, they +believe, does not accord with God's omnipotence; so then they prefer to +consider God as indifferent to all things, and creating nothing except +that which He has decreed to create by a certain absolute will. But I +think that I have shown with sufficient clearness that from the supreme +power of God, or from His infinite nature, infinite things in infinite +ways, that is to say, all things, have necessarily flowed, or +continually follow by the same necessity, in the same way as it follows +from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its +three angles are equal to two right angles. The omnipotence of God has +therefore been actual from eternity, and in the same actuality will +remain to eternity. In this way the omnipotence of God, in my opinion, +is far more firmly established. + +My adversaries, indeed (if I may be permitted to speak plainly), seem to +deny the omnipotence of God, inasmuch as they are forced to admit that +He has in His mind an infinite number of things which might be created, +but which, nevertheless, He will never be able to create, for if He were +to create all things which He has in His mind, He would, according to +them, exhaust His omnipotence and make Himself imperfect. Therefore, in +order to make a perfect God, they are compelled to make Him incapable of +doing all those things to which His power extends, and anything more +absurd than this, or more opposed to God's omnipotence, I do not think +can be imagined. + +Moreover--to say a word, too, here about the intellect and will which we +commonly attribute to God--if intellect and will pertain to His eternal +essence, these attributes cannot be understood in the sense in which men +generally use them, for the intellect and will which could constitute +His essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will, +and could resemble ours in nothing except in name. There could be no +further likeness than that between the celestial constellation of the +Dog and the animal which barks. This I will demonstrate as follows: If +intellect pertains to the divine nature, it cannot, like our intellect, +follow the things which are its object (as many suppose), nor can it be +simultaneous in its nature with them, since God is prior to all things +in causality; but, on the contrary, the truth and formal essence of +things is what it is, because as such it exists objectively in God's +intellect. Therefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived +to constitute His essence, is in truth the cause of things, both of +their essence and of their existence,--a truth which seems to have been +understood by those who have maintained that God's intellect, will, and +power are one and the same thing. + +Since, therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, both of +their essence and of their existence (as we have already shown), it must +necessarily differ from them with regard both to its essence and +existence; for an effect differs from its cause precisely in that which +it has from its cause. For example, one man is the cause of the +existence but not of the essence of another, for the essence is an +eternal truth; and therefore with regard to essence the two men may +exactly resemble one another, but with regard to existence they must +differ. Consequently if the existence of one should perish, that of the +other will not therefore perish; but if the essence of one could be +destroyed and become false, the essence of the other would be likewise +destroyed. Therefore a thing which is the cause both of the essence and +of the existence of any effect must differ from that effect both with +regard to its essence and with regard to its existence. But the +intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and existence of our +intellect; therefore the intellect of God, so far as it is conceived to +constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both with +regard to its essence and its existence, nor can it coincide with our +intellect in anything except the name, which is what we essayed to +prove. The same demonstration may be applied to the will, as any one may +easily see for himself. + + +III + +All things which are, are in God and must be conceived through Him and +therefore He is the cause of the things which are in Himself. Moreover, +outside God there can be no substance, that is to say (Def. 3), outside +Him nothing can exist which is in itself. God, therefore, is the +immanent, but not the transitive cause of all things. + + +_The Necessity of All Things_ + +In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined +from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain +manner.... That which has not been thus determined by God cannot +determine itself to action. A thing which has been determined by God to +any action cannot render itself indeterminate. + +... All things have necessarily followed from the given nature of God +and from the necessity of His nature have been determined to existence +and action in a certain manner. If therefore things could have been of +another nature, or could have been determined in another manner to +action, so that the order of nature would have been different, the +nature of God might then be different to that which it now is, and hence +that different nature would necessarily exist, and there might +consequently be two or more Gods, which is absurd. Therefore things +could be produced by God in no other manner and in no other order than +that in which they have been produced. + +Since I have thus shown, with greater clearness, than that of noonday +light, that in things there is absolutely nothing by virtue of which +they can be called contingent, I wish now to explain in a few words what +is to be understood by _contingent_, but, firstly, what is to be +understood by _necessary_ and _impossible_. + +A thing is called necessary either in reference to its essence or its +cause. For the existence of a thing necessarily follows either from the +essence and definition of the thing itself, or from a given efficient +cause. In the same way a thing is said to be impossible either because +the essence of the thing itself or its definition involves a +contradiction, or because no external cause exists determinate to the +production of such a thing. But a thing cannot be called contingent +unless with reference to a deficiency in our knowledge. For if we do not +know that the essence of a thing involves a contradiction, or if we +actually know that it involves no contradiction, and nevertheless we can +affirm nothing with certainty about its existence because the order of +causes is concealed from us, that thing can never appear to us either as +necessary or impossible, and therefore we call it either contingent or +possible. + +From what has gone before it clearly follows that things have been +produced by God in the highest degree of perfection, since they have +necessarily followed from the existence of a most perfect nature. Nor +does this doctrine accuse God of any imperfection, but, on the contrary, +His perfection has compelled us to affirm it. Indeed, from its contrary +would clearly follow, as I have shown above, that God is not absolutely +perfect, since, if things had been produced in any other fashion, +another nature would have had to be assigned to Him, different from that +which the consideration of the most perfect Being compels us to assign +to Him. I do not doubt that many will reject this opinion as ridiculous, +nor will they care to apply themselves to its consideration, and this +from no other reason than that they have been in the habit of assigning +to God another liberty widely different from that absolute will which +(Def. 7) we have taught. On the other hand, I do not doubt, if they were +willing to study the matter and properly to consider the series of our +demonstrations, that they would altogether reject this liberty which +they now assign to God, not only as of no value, but as a great obstacle +to knowledge. Neither is there any need that I should here repeat those +things which are said [above][12]. + +But for the sake of those who differ from me, I will here show that +although it be granted that will pertains to God's essence, it follows +nevertheless from His perfection that things could be created in no +other mode or order by Him. This it will be easy to show if we first +consider that which my opponents themselves admit, that it depends upon +the decree and will of God alone that each thing should be what it is, +for otherwise God would not be the cause of all things. It is also +admitted that all God's decrees were decreed by God Himself from all +eternity, for otherwise imperfection and inconstancy would be proved +against Him. But since in eternity there is no _when_ nor _before_ nor +_after_, it follows from the perfection of God alone that He neither can +decree nor could ever have decreed anything else than that which He has +decreed; that is to say, God has not existed before His decrees, and can +never exist without them. But it is said that although it be supposed +that God had made the nature of things different from that which it is, +or that from eternity He had decreed something else about Nature and her +order, it would not thence follow that any imperfection exists in God. +But if this be said, it must at the same time be allowed that God can +change His decrees. For if God had decreed something about Nature and +her order other than that which He has decreed--that is to say, if He +had willed and conceived something else about Nature--He would +necessarily have had an intellect and a will different from those which +He now has. And if it be allowed to assign to God another intellect and +another will without any change of His essence and of His perfection, +what is the reason why He cannot now change His decrees about creation +and nevertheless remain equally perfect? For His intellect and will +regarding created things and their order remain the same in relationship +to His essence and perfection in whatever manner His intellect and will +are conceived. + +Moreover, all the philosophers whom I have seen admit that there is no +such thing as an intellect existing potentially in God, but only an +intellect existing actually. But since His intellect and His will are +not distinguishable from His essence, as all admit, it follows from this +also that if God had had another intellect actually and another will, +His essence would have been necessarily different, and hence, as I +showed at the beginning, if things had been produced by God in a manner +different from that in which they now exist, God's intellect and will, +that is to say, His essence (as has been granted), must have been +different, which is absurd. + +Since, therefore, things could have been produced by God in no other +manner or order, this being a truth which follows from His absolute +perfection, there is no sound reasoning which can persuade us to believe +that God was unwilling to create all things which are in His intellect +with the same perfection as that in which they exist in His intellect. +But we shall be told that there is no perfection nor imperfection in +things, but that that which is in them by reason of which they are +perfect or imperfect and are said to be good or evil depends upon the +will of God alone, and therefore if God had willed He could have +effected that that which is now perfection should have been the extreme +of imperfection, and _vice versa_. But what else would this be than +openly to affirm that God, who necessarily understands what He wills, is +able by His will to understand things in a manner different from that in +which He understands them, which, as I have just shown, is a great +absurdity? I can therefore turn the argument on my opponents in this +way. All things depend upon the power of God. In order that things may +be differently constituted, it would be necessary that God's will should +be differently constituted; but God's will cannot be other than it is as +we have lately most clearly deduced from His perfection. Things +therefore cannot be differently constituted. + +I confess that this opinion, which subjects all things to a certain +indifferent God's will, and affirms that all things depend upon God's +good pleasure, is at a less distance from the truth than the opinion of +those who affirm that God does everything for the sake of the Good. For +these seem to place something outside of God which is independent of +Him, to which He looks while He is at work as to a model, or at which He +aims as if at a certain mark. This is indeed nothing else than to +subject God to fate, the most absurd thing which can be affirmed of Him +whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of +all things as well as of their existence. Therefore it is not worth +while that I should waste time in refuting this absurdity. + +Before I go any farther, I wish here to explain or rather to recall to +recollection, what we mean by _natura naturans_ and what by _natura +naturata_. For, from what has gone before, I think it is plain that by +_natura naturans_ we are to understand that which is in itself and is +conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance which express +eternal and infinite essence, that is to say, God in so far as He is +considered as a free cause. But by _natura naturata_ I understand +everything which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of +any one of God's attributes, that is to say, all the modes of God's +attributes in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, +and which without God can neither be nor can be conceived. + +... Individual things are nothing but affections or modes of God's +attributes, expressing those attributes in a certain and determinate +manner. + + +_General Conclusions_ + +I have now explained the nature of God and its properties. I have shown +that He necessarily exists; that He is one God; that from the necessity +alone of His own nature He is and acts; that He is, and in what way He +is, the free cause of all things; that all things are in Him, and so +depend upon Him that without Him they can neither be nor can be +conceived; and, finally, that all things have been predetermined by Him, +not indeed from freedom of will or from absolute good pleasure, but from +His absolute nature or infinite power. + +Moreover, wherever an opportunity was afforded, I have endeavored to +remove prejudices which might hinder the perception of the truth of what +I have demonstrated; but because not a few still remain which have been +and are now sufficient to prove a very great hindrance to the +comprehension of the connection of things in the manner in which I have +explained it, I have thought it worth while to call them up to be +examined by reason. But all these prejudices which I here undertake to +point out depend upon this solely: that it is commonly supposed that all +things in Nature, like men, work to some end; and indeed it is thought +to be certain that God Himself directs all things to some sure end, for +it is said that God has made all things for man, and man that he may +worship God. + +This, therefore, I will first investigate by inquiring, firstly, why so +many rest in this prejudice, and why all are so naturally inclined to +embrace it? I shall then show its falsity, and, finally, the manner in +which there have arisen from it prejudices concerning _good_ and _evil_, +_merit_ and _sin_, _praise_ and _blame_, _order_ and _disorder_, +_beauty_ and _deformity_, and so forth. This, however, is not the place +to deduce these things from the nature of the human mind. It will be +sufficient if I here take as an axiom that which no one ought to +dispute, namely, that man is born ignorant of the causes of things, and +that he has a desire, of which he is conscious, to seek that which is +profitable to him. From this it follows, firstly, that he thinks himself +free because he is conscious of his wishes and appetites, whilst at the +same time he is ignorant of the causes by which he is led to wish and +desire, not dreaming what they are; and, secondly, it follows that man +does everything for an end, namely, for that which is profitable to him, +which is what he seeks. Hence it happens that he attempts to discover +merely the final causes of that which has happened; and when he has +heard them he is satisfied, because there is no longer any cause for +further uncertainty. But if he cannot hear from another what these final +causes are, nothing remains but to turn to himself and reflect upon the +ends which usually determine him to the like actions, and thus by his +own mind he necessarily judges that of another. + +Moreover, since he discovers, both within and without himself a +multitude of means which contribute not a little to the attainment of +what is profitable to himself--for example, the eyes, which are useful +for seeing, the teeth for mastication, plants and animals for +nourishment, the sun for giving light, the sea for feeding fish, +etc.--it comes to pass that all natural objects are considered as means +for obtaining what is profitable. These too being evidently discovered +and not created by man, hence he has a cause for believing that some +other person exists, who has prepared them for man's use. For having +considered them as means it was impossible to believe that they had +created themselves, and so he was obliged to infer from the means which +he was in the habit of providing for himself that some ruler or rulers +of Nature exist, endowed with human liberty, who have taken care of all +things for him, and have made all things for his use. Since he never +heard anything about the mind of these rulers, he was compelled to judge +of it from his own, and hence he affirmed that the gods direct +everything for his advantage, in order that he may be bound to them and +hold them in the highest honor. This is the reason why each man has +devised for himself, out of his own brain, a different mode of +worshiping God, so that God might love him above others, and direct all +Nature to the service of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. + +Thus has this prejudice been turned into a superstition and has driven +deep roots into the mind--a prejudice which was the reason why every one +has so eagerly tried to discover and explain the final causes of things. +The attempt, however, to show that Nature does nothing in vain (that is +to say, nothing which is not profitable to man), seems to end in showing +that Nature, the gods, and man are alike mad. + +Do but see, I pray, to what all this has led. Amidst so much in Nature +that is beneficial, not a few things must have been observed which are +injurious, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, and it was affirmed +that these things happened either because the gods were angry because of +wrongs which had been inflicted on them by man, or because of sins +committed in the method of worshiping them; and although experience +daily contradicted this, and showed by an infinity of examples that both +the beneficial and the injurious were indiscriminately bestowed on the +pious and the impious, the inveterate prejudices on this point have not +therefore been abandoned. For it was much easier for a man to place +these things aside with others of the use of which he was ignorant, and +thus retain his present and inborn state of ignorance, than to destroy +the whole superstructure and think out a new one. Hence it was looked +upon as indisputable that the judgments of the gods far surpass our +comprehension; and this opinion alone would have been sufficient to keep +the human race in darkness to all eternity, if mathematics, which does +not deal with ends, but with the essences and properties of forms, had +not placed before us another rule of truth. In addition to mathematics, +other causes also might be assigned, which it is superfluous here to +enumerate, tending to make men reflect upon these universal prejudices, +and leading them to a true knowledge of things. + +I have thus sufficiently explained what I promised in the first place to +explain. There will now be no need of many words to show that Nature has +set no end before herself, and that all final causes are nothing but +human fictions. For I believe that this is sufficiently evident both +from the foundations and causes of this prejudice, as well as from all +those propositions in which I have shown that all things are begotten by +a certain eternal necessity of Nature and in absolute perfection. Thus +much, nevertheless, I will add, that this doctrine concerning an end +altogether overturns nature. For that which is in truth the cause it +considers as the effect, and _vice versa_. Again, that which is first in +Nature it puts last; and, finally, that which is supreme and most +perfect it makes the most imperfect. For, passing by the first two +assertions as self-evident, it is plain that that effect is the most +perfect which is immediately produced by God, and in proportion as +intermediate causes are necessary for the production of a thing is it +imperfect. But if things which are immediately produced by God were made +in order that He might obtain the end He had in view, then the last +things for the sake of which the first exist, must be the most perfect +of all. + +Again, this doctrine does away with God's perfection. For if God works +to obtain an end, He necessarily seeks something of which he stands in +need. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between +the end of want and the end of assimilation (_finem indigentić et finem +assimilationis_), they confess that God has done all things for His own +sake, and not for the sake of the things to be created, because before +the creation they can assign nothing excepting God for the sake of which +God could do anything; and therefore they are necessarily compelled to +admit that God stood in need of and desired those things for which He +determined to prepare means. This is self-evident. Nor is it here to be +overlooked that the adherents of this doctrine, who have found a +pleasure in displaying their ingenuity in assigning the ends of things, +have introduced a new species of argument, not the _reductio ad +impossible_, but the _reductio ad ignorantiam_, to prove their position, +which shows that it had no other method of defense left. + +For, by way of example, if a stone had fallen from some roof on +somebody's head and killed him, they will demonstrate in this manner +that the stone has fallen in order to kill the man. For if it did not +fall for that purpose by the will of God, how could so many +circumstances concur through chance (and a number often simultaneously +do concur)? You will answer, perhaps, that the event happened because +the wind blew and the man was passing that way. But, they will urge, why +did the wind blow at that time, and why did the man pass that way +precisely at the same moment? If you again reply that the wind rose then +because the sea on the preceding day began to be stormy, the weather +hitherto having been calm, and that the man had been invited by a +friend, they will urge again--because there is no end of +questioning--But why was the sea agitated? why was the man invited at +that time? And so they will not cease from asking the causes of causes, +until at last you fly to the will of God, the refuge for ignorance. + +So, also, when they behold the structure of the human body, they are +amazed; and because they are ignorant of the causes of such art, they +conclude that the body was made not by mechanical but by a supernatural +or divine art, and has been formed in such a way so that the one part +may not injure the other. Hence it happens that the man who endeavors to +find out the true causes of miracles, and who desires as a wise man to +understand Nature, and not to gape at it like a fool, is generally +considered and proclaimed to be a heretic and impious by those whom the +vulgar worship as the interpreters both of Nature and the gods. For +these know that if ignorance be removed, amazed stupidity, the sole +ground on which they rely in arguing or in defending their authority, is +taken away also. But these things I leave and pass on to that which I +determined to do in the third place. + +After man has persuaded himself that all things which exist are made for +him, he must in everything adjudge that to be of the greatest importance +which is most useful to him, and he must esteem that to be of surpassing +worth by which he is most beneficially affected. In this way he is +compelled to form those notions by which he explains Nature; such, for +instance, as _good_, _evil_, _order_, _confusion_, _heat_, _cold_, +_beauty_, and _deformity_, etc.; and because he supposes himself to be +free, notions like those of _praise_ and _blame_, _sin_ and _merit_, +have arisen. These latter I shall hereafter explain when I have treated +of human nature; the former I will here briefly unfold. + +It is to be observed that man has given the name _good_ to everything +which leads to health and the worship of God; on the contrary, +everything which does not lead thereto he calls _evil_. But because +those who do not understand Nature affirm nothing about things +themselves, but only imagine them, and take the imagination to be +understanding, they therefore, ignorant of things and their nature, +firmly believe an _order_ to be in things; for when things are so placed +that if they are represented to us through the senses, we can easily +imagine them, and consequently easily remember them, we call them well +arranged; but if they are not placed so that we can imagine and remember +them, we call them badly arranged or _confused_. Moreover, since those +things are more especially pleasing to us which we can easily imagine, +men therefore prefer order to confusion, as if order were something in +Nature apart from our own imagination; and they say that God has created +everything in order, and in this manner they ignorantly attribute +imagination to God, unless they mean perhaps that God, out of +consideration for the human imagination, has disposed things in the +manner in which they can most easily be imagined. No hesitation either +seems to be caused by the fact that an infinite number of things are +discovered which far surpass our imagination, and very many which +confound it through its weakness. But enough of this. + +The other notions which I have mentioned are nothing but modes in which +the imagination is affected in different ways, and nevertheless they are +regarded by the ignorant as being specially attributes of things, +because, as we have remarked, men consider all things as made for +themselves, and call the nature of a thing good, evil, sound, putrid, or +corrupt, just as they are affected by it. For example, if the motion by +which the nerves are affected by means of objects represented to the eye +conduces to well-being, the objects by which it is caused are called +_beautiful_; while those exciting a contrary motion are called +_deformed_. Those things, too, which stimulate the senses through the +nostrils are called sweet-smelling or stinking; those which act through +the taste are called sweet or bitter, full-flavored or insipid; those +which act through the touch, hard or soft, heavy or light; those, +lastly, which act through the ears are said to make a noise, sound, or +harmony, the last having caused men to lose their senses to such a +degree that they have believed that God even is delighted with it. +Indeed, philosophers may be found who have persuaded themselves that the +celestial motions beget a harmony. + +All these things sufficiently show that every one judges things by the +constitution of his brain, or rather accepts the affections of his +imagination in the place of things.[13] It is not, therefore, to be +wondered at, as we may observe in passing, that all those controversies +which we see have arisen amongst men, so that at last skepticism has +been the result. For although human bodies agree in many things, they +differ in more, and therefore that which to one person is good will +appear to another evil, that which to one is well arranged to another is +confused, that which pleases one will displease another, and so on in +other cases which I pass by both because we cannot notice them at length +here, and because they are within the experience of every one. For every +one has heard the expressions: So many heads, so many ways of thinking; +Every one is satisfied with his own way of thinking; Differences of +brains are not less common than differences of taste;--all which maxims +show that men decide upon matters according to the constitution of their +brains, and imagine rather than understand things. + +If men understood things, they would, as mathematics prove, at least be +all alike convinced if they were not all alike attracted. We see, +therefore, that all those methods by which the common people are in the +habit of explaining Nature are only different sorts of imaginations, and +do not reveal the nature of anything in itself, but only the +constitution of the imagination; and because they have names as if they +were entities existing apart from the imagination, I call them entities +not of the reason but of the imagination. All argument therefore, urged +against us based upon such notions can be easily refuted. + +Many people, for instance, are accustomed to argue thus:--If all things +have followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, how +is it that so many imperfections have arisen in Nature--corruption, for +instance, of things till they stink; deformity, exciting disgust; +confusion, evil, crime, etc.? But, as I have just observed, all this is +easily answered. For the perfection of things is to be judged by their +nature and power alone; nor are they more or less perfect because they +delight or offend the human senses, or because they are beneficial or +prejudicial to human nature. But to those who ask why God has not +created all men in such a manner that they might be controlled by the +dictates of reason alone, I give but this answer: Because to Him +material was not wanting for the creation of everything, from the +highest down to the very lowest grade of perfection; or, to speak more +properly, because the laws of His nature were so ample that they +sufficed for the production of everything which can be conceived by an +infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated. + +These are the prejudices which I undertook to notice here. If any others +of a similar character remain, they can easily be rectified with a +little thought by any one. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[12] Pp. 132-135. + +[13] Beauty, my dear Sir, is not so much a quality of the object beheld, +as an effect in him who beholds it. If our sight were longer or shorter, +or, if our constitution were different, what now appears beautiful to us +would seem misshapen and what we now think misshapen we should regard as +beautiful. The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will +appear horrible. Some things are beautiful at a distance, but ugly near; +thus things regarded in themselves, and in relation to God, are neither +ugly nor beautiful. Therefore, he who says that God has created the +world so that it might be beautiful is bound to adopt one of the two +alternatives: either that God created the world for the sake of men's +pleasure and eyesight, or else that He created men's pleasure and +eyesight for the sake of the world. _From a letter to Hugo Boxel_ +(1674). + + + + +SECOND PART + +ON MAN + + +_The more things the mind knows, the better it understands its own +powers and the order of Nature. The better it understands its own +powers, so much the more easily can it direct itself and propose rules +to itself. The better, also, it understands the order of Nature, the +more easily can it restrain itself from what is useless._ + +SPINOZA. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN MIND + + +_Introductory_ + +I pass on now to explain those things which must necessarily follow from +the essence of God or the Being eternal and infinite; not indeed to +explain all these things, for we have demonstrated that an infinitude of +things must follow in an infinite number of ways,--but to consider those +things only which may conduct us, as it were, by the hand to a knowledge +of the human mind and its highest happiness. + + +_Definitions_ + +I. By body, I understand a mode which expresses in a certain and +determinate manner the essence of God in so far as He is considered as +the thing extended. + +II. I say that to the essence of anything pertains that, which being +given, the thing itself is necessarily posited, and being taken away, +the thing is necessarily taken; or, in other words, that, without which +the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which in its turn cannot +be nor be conceived without the thing. + +III. By idea, I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms +because it is a thinking thing. + +_Explanation._--I use the word conception rather than perception because +the name perception seems to indicate that the mind is passive in its +relation to the object. But the word conception seems to express the +action of the mind. + +IV. By adequate idea, I understand an idea which, in so far as it is +considered in itself, without reference to the object, has all the +properties or internal signs (_denominationes intrinsecas_) of a true +idea. + +_Explanation._--I say internal, so as to exclude that which is external, +the agreement, namely, of the idea with its object. + +V. Duration is the indefinite continuation of existence. + +_Explanation._--I call it indefinite because it cannot be determined by +the nature itself of the existing thing nor by the efficient cause, +which necessarily posits the existence of the thing but does not take it +away. + +VI. By reality and perfection I understand the same thing. + +VII. By individual things I understand things which are finite and which +have a determinate existence; and if a number of individuals so unite in +one action that they are all simultaneously the cause of one effect, I +consider them all, so far, as one individual thing. + + +_Axioms_ + +I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence; that is to +say, the existence as well as the non-existence of this or that man may +or may not follow from the order of Nature. + +II. Man thinks. + +III. Modes of thought, such as love, desire, or the emotions of the +mind, by whatever name they may be called, do not exist, unless in the +same individual the idea exist of a thing loved, desired, etc. But the +idea may exist although no other mode of thinking exist. + +IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways. + +V. No individual things are felt or perceived by us excepting bodies and +modes of thought. + + +_The Mind of God_ + +Individual thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which express +the nature of God in a certain and determinate manner. God therefore +possesses an attribute, the conception of which is involved in all +individual thoughts, and through which they are conceived. Thought, +therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God which expresses the +eternal and infinite essence of God or, in other words, God is a +thinking thing. + +This proposition is plain from the fact that we can conceive an infinite +thinking Being. For the more things a thinking being can think, the more +reality or perfection we conceive it to possess, and therefore the being +which can think an infinitude of things in infinite ways is necessarily +infinite by his power of thinking. Since, therefore, we can conceive an +infinite Being by attending to thought alone, thought is necessarily one +of the infinite attributes of God.[14] + +God can think an infinitude of things in infinite ways, or (which is the +same thing) can form an idea of His essence and of all the things which +necessarily follow from it. But everything which is in the power of God +is necessary. Therefore in God there necessarily exists the idea of His +essence, and of all things which necessarily follow from His essence. + +The infinite intellect comprehends nothing but the attributes of God and +His modes. But God is one. Therefore the idea of God, from which +infinite numbers of things follow in infinite ways, can be one only. + +The common people understand by God's power His free will and right over +all existing things, which are therefore commonly looked upon as +contingent; for they say that God has the power of destroying everything +and reducing it to nothing. They very frequently, too, compare God's +power with the power of kings. That there is any similarity between the +two we have disproved. We have shown that God does everything with that +necessity with which He understands Himself; that is to say, as it +follows from the necessity of the divine nature that God understands +Himself (a truth admitted by all), so by the same necessity it follows +that God does an infinitude of things in infinite ways. Moreover, we +have shown that the power of God is nothing but the active essence of +God, and therefore it is as impossible for us to conceive that God does +not act as that He does not exist. If it pleased me to go farther, I +could show besides that the power which the common people ascribe to God +is not only a human power (which shows that they look upon God as a man, +or as being like a man), but that it also involves weakness. But I do +not care to talk so much upon the same subject. Again and again I ask +the reader to consider and reconsider what is said upon this subject +[above].[15] For it is not possible for any one properly to understand +the things which I wish to prove unless he takes great care not to +confound the power of God with the human power and right of kings. + + +_The Order and Dependence of Ideas in God_ + +The formal Being of ideas is a mode of thought (as is self-evident); +that is to say, a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of +God in so far as He is a thinking thing. It is a mode, therefore, that +involves the conception of no other attribute of God, and consequently +is the effect of no other attribute except that of thought; therefore +the formal Being of ideas recognizes God for its cause in so far only as +He is considered as a thinking thing, and not in so far as He is +manifested by any other attribute; that is to say, the ideas both of +God's attributes and of individual things do not recognize as their +efficient cause the objects of the ideas or the things which are +perceived, but God Himself in so far as He is a thinking thing.[16] + +God's power of thinking is equal to His actual power of acting; that is +to say, whatever follows _formally_ from the infinite nature of God, +follows from the idea of God (idea Dei), in the same order and in the +same connection _objectively_ in God. + +The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and +connection of things. + +Before we go any farther, we must here recall to our memory what we have +already demonstrated, that everything which can be perceived by the +infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance pertains +entirely to the one sole substance only, and consequently that substance +thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, which is +now comprehended under this attribute and now under that. Thus, also, a +mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing +expressed in two different ways--a truth which some of the Hebrews +appear to have seen as if through a cloud, since they say that God, the +intellect of God, and the things which are the objects of that intellect +are one and the same thing. For example, the circle existing in nature +and the idea that is in God of an existing circle are one and the same +thing, which is manifested through different attributes; and, therefore, +whether we think of Nature under the attribute of extension, or under +the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute whatever, we +shall discover one and the same order, or one and the same connection of +causes; that is to say, in every case the same sequence of things. Nor +have I had any other reason for saying that God is the cause of the +idea, for example, of the circle in so far only as He is a thinking +thing, and of the circle itself in so far as He is an extended thing, +but this, that the formal Being of the idea of a circle can only be +perceived through another mode of thought, as its proximate cause, and +this again must be perceived through another, and so on _ad infinitum_. +So that when things are considered as modes of thought, we must explain +the order of the whole of Nature or the connection of causes by the +attribute of thought alone, and when things are considered as modes of +extension, the order of the whole of Nature must be explained through +the attribute of extension alone, and so with other attributes. +Therefore God is in truth the cause of things as they are in themselves +in so far as He consists of infinite attributes, nor for the present can +I explain the matter more clearly. + + +_The Origin of the Human Mind_ + +The human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God, and +therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that thing, +we say nothing else than that God has this or that idea; not indeed in +so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is manifested through the +nature of the human mind, or in so far as He forms the essence of the +human mind; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not merely +in so far as He forms the nature of the human mind, but in so far as He +has at the same time with the human mind the idea also of another thing, +then we say that the human mind perceives the thing partially or +inadequately. + +... When you ask me my opinion on the question[17] raised concerning +our knowledge of the means, whereby each part of Nature agrees with its +whole, and the manner in which it is associated with the remaining +parts, I presume you are asking for the reasons which induce us to +believe that each part of Nature agrees with its whole, and is +associated with the remaining parts. For as to the means whereby the +parts are really associated, and each part agrees with its whole, I told +you in my former letter that I am in ignorance. To answer such a +question we should have to know the whole of Nature and its several +parts. I will therefore endeavor to show the reason which led me to make +the statement; but I will promise that I do not attribute to Nature +either beauty or deformity, order or confusion. Only in relation to our +imagination can things be called beautiful or deformed, ordered or +confused. + +By the association of parts, then, I merely mean that the laws or nature +of one part adapt themselves to the laws or nature of another part, so +as to cause the least possible inconsistency. As to the whole and the +parts, I mean that a given number of things are parts of a whole, in so +far as the nature of each of them is adapted to the nature of the rest +so that they all, as far as possible, agree together. On the other hand, +in so far as they do not agree, each of them forms, in our minds, a +separate idea, and is to that extent considered as a whole, not as a +part. For instance, when the parts of lymph, chyle, etc., combine, +according to the proportion of the figure and size of each, so as to +evidently unite, and form one fluid, the chyle, lymph, etc., considered +under this aspect, are part of the blood; but, in so far as we consider +the particles of lymph as differing in figure and size from the +particles of chyle, we shall consider each of the two as a whole, not as +a part. + +Let us imagine, with your permission, a little worm, living in the +blood, able to distinguish by sight the particles of blood, lymph, etc., +and to reflect on the manner in which each particle, on meeting with +another particle, either is repulsed, or communicates a portion of its +own motion. This little worm would live in the blood in the same way as +we live in a part of the universe, and would consider each particle of +blood, not as a part, but as a whole. He would be unable to determine +how all the parts are modified by the general nature of blood, and are +compelled by it to adapt themselves so as to stand in a fixed relation +to one another. For if we imagine that there are no causes external to +the blood, which could communicate fresh movements to it, nor any space +beyond the blood, nor any bodies whereto the particles of blood could +communicate their motion, it is certain that the blood would always +remain in the same state, and its particles would undergo no +modifications, save those which may be conceived as arising from the +relations of motion existing between the lymph, the chyle, etc. The +blood would then always have to be considered as a whole, not as a part. +But as there exist, as a matter of fact, very many causes which modify, +in a given manner, the nature of blood, and are, in turn, modified +thereby, it follows that other motions and other relations arise in the +blood, springing not from the mutual relations of its parts only, but +from the mutual relations between the blood as a whole and external +causes. Thus the blood comes to be regarded as a part, not as a whole. +So much for the whole and the part. + +All natural bodies can and ought to be considered in the same way as we +have here considered the blood, for all bodies are surrounded by others, +and are mutually determined to exist and operate in a fixed and definite +proportion, while the relations between motion and rest in the sum total +of them, that is, in the whole universe, remain unchanged. Hence it +follows that each body, in so far as it exists as modified in a +particular manner, must be considered as a part of the whole universe, +as agreeing with the whole, and associated with the remaining parts. As +the nature of the universe is not limited, like the nature of blood, but +is absolutely infinite, its parts are by this nature of infinite power +infinitely modified, and compelled to undergo infinite variations.... + +You see, therefore, how and why I think that the human body is a part of +Nature. As regards the human mind, I believe that it also is a part of +Nature; for I maintain that there exists in Nature an infinite power of +thinking, which, in so far as it is infinite, contains subjectively the +whole of Nature, and its thoughts proceed in the same manner as +Nature--that is, in the sphere of ideas. Further, I take the human mind +to be identical with this said power, not in so far as it is infinite, +and perceives the whole of Nature, but in so far as it is finite, and +perceives only the human body. In this manner, I maintain that the human +mind is part of an infinite understanding. + + +_The Nature of the Human Mind_ + +The essence of man is formed by certain modes of the attributes of God, +that is to say, modes of thought, the idea of all of them being prior by +nature to the modes of thought themselves; and if this idea exists, +other modes (which also have an idea in nature prior to them) must exist +in the same individual likewise. Therefore an idea is the first thing +which forms the Being of the human mind. But it is not the idea of a +non-existent thing, for then the idea itself could not be said to exist. +It will therefore be the idea of something actually existing. Neither +will it be the idea of an infinite thing, for an infinite thing must +always necessarily exist, and this is absurd. Therefore the first thing +which forms the actual Being of the human mind is the idea of an +individual thing actually existing. + +The knowledge of everything which happens in the object of any idea +necessarily exists in God, in so far as He is considered as modified by +the idea of that object; that is to say, in so far as He forms the mind +of any being. The knowledge, therefore, necessarily exists in God of +everything which happens in the object of the idea constituting the +human mind; that is to say, it exists in Him in so far as He forms the +nature of the human mind; or, whatever happens in the object of the idea +constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind; in +other words, an idea of that thing will necessarily exist in the human +mind. That is to say, if the object of the idea constituting the human +mind be a body, nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived +by the mind. + +If the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the +modifications of the body would not be in God, in so far as He has +formed our mind, but would be in Him in so far as He has formed the mind +of another thing; that is to say, the ideas of the modifications of the +body would not be in our mind. But we have ideas of the modifications of +a body; therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is +a body, and that, too, actually existing. Again, if there were also any +other object of the mind besides a body, since nothing exists from which +some effect does not follow, the idea of some effort produced by this +object would necessarily exist in our mind. But there is no such idea. +Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, +or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else. + +Hence it follows that man is composed of mind and body, and that the +human body exists as we perceive it. + +Hence we see not only that the human mind is united to the body, but +also what is to be understood by the union of the mind and body. But no +one can understand it adequately or distinctly without knowing +adequately beforehand the nature of our body; for those things which we +have proved hitherto are altogether general, nor do they refer more to +man than to other individuals, all of which are animate, although in +different degrees. For of everything there necessarily exists in God an +idea of which He is the cause, in the same way as the idea of the human +body exists in Him; and therefore everything that we have said of the +idea of the human body is necessarily true of the idea of any other +thing. We cannot, however, deny that ideas, like objects themselves, +differ from one another, and that one is more excellent and contains +more reality than another, just as the object of one idea is more +excellent and contains more reality than another. Therefore, in order to +determine the differences between the human mind and other things and +its superiority over them, we must first know, as we have said, the +nature of its object, that is to say, the nature of the human body. I am +not able to explain it here, nor is such an explanation necessary for +what I wish to demonstrate. + +This much, nevertheless, I will say generally, that in proportion as one +body is better adapted than another to do or suffer many things, in the +same proportion will the mind at the same time be better adapted to +perceive many things, and the more the actions of a body depend upon +itself alone, and the less other bodies coöperate with it in action, the +better adapted will the mind be for distinctly understanding. We can +thus determine the superiority of one mind to another; we can also see +the reason why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, +together with many other things which I shall deduce in what follows. + + +_The Complexity of the Human Mind_ + +The idea which constitutes the formal Being of the human mind is the +idea of a body which is composed of a number of individuals composite to +a high degree. But an idea of each individual composing the body must +necessarily exist in God; therefore the idea of the human body is +composed of these several ideas of the component parts. The idea which +constitutes the formal Being of the human mind is not simple, but is +composed of a number of ideas. + +All ways in which any body is affected follow at the same time from the +nature of the affected body, and from the nature of the affecting body; +therefore the idea of these modifications necessarily involves the +nature of each body, and therefore the idea of each way in which the +human body is affected by an external body involves the nature of the +human body and of the external body. + +Hence it follows, in the first place, that the human mind perceives the +nature of many bodies together with that of its own body. + +It follows, secondly, that the ideas we have of external bodies indicate +the constitution of our own body rather than the nature of external +bodies. + + +_Imagination_ + +If the human body be affected in a way which involves the nature of any +external body, the human mind will contemplate that external body as +actually existing or as present, until the human body be affected by a +mode which excludes the existence or presence of the external body. + +When external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body that +they often strike upon the softer parts, the fluid parts change the +plane of the soft parts, and thence it happens that the fluid parts are +reflected from the new planes in a direction different from that in +which they used to be reflected, and that also afterwards when they +strike against these new planes by their own spontaneous motion, they +are reflected in the same way as when they were impelled towards those +planes by external bodies. Consequently those fluid bodies produce a +modification in the human body while they keep up this reflex motion +similar to that produced by the presence of an external body. The mind, +therefore, will think as before, that is to say, it will again +contemplate the external body as present. This will happen as often as +the fluid parts of the human body strike against those planes by their +own spontaneous motion. Therefore, although the external bodies by which +the human body was once affected do not exist the mind will perceive +them as if they were present so often as this action is repeated in the +body. + +We see, therefore, how it is possible for us to contemplate things which +do not exist as if they were actually present. This may indeed be +produced by other causes, but I am satisfied with having here shown one +cause through which I could explain it, just as if I had explained it +through the true cause. I do not think, however, that I am far from the +truth, since no postulate which I have assumed contains anything which +is not confirmed by an experience that we cannot mistrust, after we have +proved the existence of the human body as we perceive it. + +We clearly see, moreover, what is the difference between the idea, for +example, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of the mind itself of +Peter, and the idea of Peter himself which is in another man; for +example, in Paul. For the former directly manifests the essence of the +body of Peter himself, nor does it involve existence unless so long as +Peter exists; the latter, on the other hand, indicates rather the +constitution of the body of Paul than the nature of Peter; and therefore +so long as Paul's body exists with that constitution, so long will +Paul's mind contemplate Peter as present, although he does not exist. +But in order that we may retain the customary phraseology, we will give +to those modifications of the human body, the ideas of which represent +to us external bodies as if they were present, the name of _images of +things_, although they do not actually reproduce the forms of the +things. When the mind contemplates bodies in this way, we will say that +it imagines. Here I wish it to be observed, in order that I may begin to +show what _error_ is, that these imaginations of the mind, regarded by +themselves, contain no error, and that the mind is not in error because +it imagines, but only in so far as it is considered as wanting in an +idea which excludes the existence of those things which it imagines as +present. For if the mind, when it imagines non-existent things to be +present, could at the same time know that those things did not really +exist, it would think its power of imagination to be a virtue of its +nature and not a defect, especially if this faculty of imagining +depended upon its own nature alone, that is to say, if this faculty of +the mind were free. + + +_Association of Ideas and Memory_ + +If the human body has at any time been simultaneously affected by two or +more bodies, whenever the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will +also remember the others. + +We clearly understand by this what memory is. It is nothing else than a +certain concatenation of ideas, involving the nature of things which are +outside the human body, a concatenation which corresponds in the mind to +the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human body. I +say, firstly, that it is a concatenation of those ideas only which +involve the nature of things which are outside the human body, and not +of those ideas which explain the nature of those things, for there are +in truth ideas of the modifications of the human body, which involve its +nature as well as the nature of external bodies. I say, in the second +place, that this concatenation takes place according to the order and +concatenation of the modifications of the human body, that I may +distinguish it from the concatenation of ideas which takes place +according to the order of the intellect, and enables the mind to +perceive things through their first causes, and is the same in all men. + +Hence we can clearly understand how it is that the mind from the thought +of one thing at once turns to the thought of another thing which is not +in any way like the first. For example, from the thought of the word +_pomum_ a Roman immediately turned to the thought of the fruit, which +has no resemblance to the articulate sound _pomum_, nor anything in +common with it, excepting this, that the body of that man was often +affected by the thing and the sound; that is to say, he often heard the +word _pomum_ when he saw the fruit. In this manner each person will turn +from one thought to another according to the manner in which the habit +of each has arranged the images of things in the body. The soldier, for +instance, if he sees the footsteps of a horse in the sand, will +immediately turn from the thought of a horse to the thought of a +horseman, and so to the thought of war. The countryman, on the other +hand, from the thought of a horse will turn to the thought of his plow, +his field, etc.; and thus each person will turn from one thought to this +or that thought, according to the manner in which he has been accustomed +to connect and bind together the images of things in his mind. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[14] [Similarly, it can be demonstrated that] extension is an attribute +of God, or God is an extended thing. + +[15] Chapter Eight. + +[16] The formal Being of things which are not modes of thought does not +follow from the divine nature because of His prior knowledge of these +things, but, just as ideas follow from the attribute of thought, in the +same manner and with the same necessity the objects of ideas follow and +are concluded from their attributes. + +[17] From a letter to Henry Oldenburg (1665). + + + + +CHAPTER X + +THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE + + +_Of Truth_ + +All the ideas which are in God always agree with those things of which +they are the ideas. Therefore, all ideas, in so far as they are related +to God, are true. + +A true idea[18] (for we possess a true idea) is something different from +its correlate (_ideatum_); thus a circle is different from the idea of a +circle. The idea of a circle is not something having a circumference and +a center, as a circle has; nor is the idea of a body that body itself. +Now, as it is something different from its correlate, it is capable of +being understood through itself; in other words, the idea, in so far as +its actual essence (_essentia formalis_) is concerned, may be the +subject of another subjective essence. And, again, this second +subjective essence will, regarded in itself, be something real and +capable of being understood; and so on indefinitely. For instance, the +man Peter is something real; the true idea of Peter is the reality of +Peter represented subjectively, and is in itself something real, and +quite distinct from the actual Peter. Now, as this true idea of Peter is +in itself something real, and has its own individual existence, it will +also be capable of being understood--that is, of being the subject of +another idea which will contain by representation all that the idea of +Peter contains actually. And, again, this idea of the idea of Peter has +its own individuality, which may become the subject of yet another idea; +and so on indefinitely. This every one may make trial of for himself, by +reflecting that he knows what Peter is, and also knows that he knows, +and further knows that he knows that he knows, etc. Hence, it is plain +that, in order to understand the actual Peter, it is not necessary first +to understand the idea of Peter, and still less the idea of the idea of +Peter. This is the same as saying that in order to know, there is no +need to know that we know, much less to know that we know that we know. +This is no more necessary than to know the nature of a circle before +knowing the nature of a triangle. But with these ideas the contrary is +the case; for in order to know that I know, I must first know. Hence it +is clear that certainty is nothing else than the subjective essence of a +thing: in other words, the mode in which we perceive an actual reality +is certainty. Further, it is also evident that for the certitude of +truth no further sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea; +for, as I have shown, it is not necessary to know that we know that we +know.... + +He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea, +nor can he doubt the truth of the thing. For no one who has a true idea +is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certitude; to have a +true idea signifying just this, to know a thing perfectly or as well as +possible. No one, in fact, can doubt this, unless he supposes an idea to +be something dumb, like a picture on a tablet, instead of being a mode +of thought, that is to say, intelligence itself. Moreover, I ask who can +know that he understands a thing unless he first of all understands that +thing? that is to say, who can know that he is certain of anything +unless he is first of all certain of that thing? Then, again, what can +be clearer or more certain than a true idea as the standard of truth? +Just as light reveals both itself and the darkness, so truth is the +standard of itself and of the false. + + +_Of Falsity_ + +There is nothing positive in ideas which can constitute a form of +falsity. But falsity cannot consist in absolute privation (for we say +that minds and not bodies err and are mistaken); nor can it consist in +absolute ignorance, for to be ignorant and to be in error are different. +Falsehood, therefore, consists in the privation of knowledge which is +involved by inadequate knowledge of things or by inadequate and confused +ideas. For instance, men are deceived because they think themselves +free, and the sole reason for thinking so is that they are conscious of +their own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which those actions are +determined. Their idea of liberty therefore is this--that they know no +cause for their own actions; for as to saying that their actions depend +upon their will, these are words to which no idea is attached. What the +will is, and in what manner it moves the body, every one is ignorant, +for those who pretend otherwise, and devise seats and dwelling-places of +the soul, usually excite our laughter or disgust. Just in the same +manner, when we look at the sun, we imagine its distance from us to be +about 200 feet; the error not consisting solely in the imagination, but +arising from our not knowing what the true distance is when we imagine, +and what are the causes of our imagination. For although we may +afterwards know that the sun is more than 600 diameters of the earth +distant from us, we still imagine it near us, since we imagine it to be +so near, not because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because a +modification of our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as +our body itself is affected by it. + + +_The Origin and Nature of Confused Ideas_ + +The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both +of external bodies and of the human body itself and must involve the +nature not only of the human body, but of its parts, for the +modifications are ways in which the parts of the human body, and +consequently the whole body, are affected. But an adequate knowledge of +external bodies and of the parts composing the human body does not exist +in God in so far as He is considered as affected by the human mind, but +in so far as He is affected by other ideas. These ideas of +modifications, therefore, in so far as they are related to the human +mind alone, are like conclusions without premises, that is to say, as is +self-evident, they are confused ideas. + +The idea which forms the nature of the mind is demonstrated in the same +way not to be clear and distinct when considered in itself. So also with +the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the +modifications of the human body, in so far as they are related to the +mind alone, as every one may easily see. + +All ideas are in God and in so far as they are related to God are true +and adequate. No ideas, therefore, are inadequate or confused unless in +so far as they are related to the individual mind of some person. All +ideas, therefore, both adequate and inadequate, follow by the same +necessity. + + +_The Origin and Nature of Adequate Ideas_ + +Let there be something, _A_, which is common to all bodies, and which is +equally in the part of each body and in the whole. I say that _A_ can +only be adequately conceived. For the idea of _A_ will necessarily be +adequate in God, both in so far as He has the idea of the human body and +in so far as He has the idea of its modifications, which involve the +nature of the human body, and partly also the nature of external bodies; +that is to say, this idea will necessarily be adequate in God in so far +as He constitutes the human mind, or in so far as He has ideas which are +in the human mind. The mind, therefore, necessarily perceives _A_ +adequately, both in so far as it perceives itself or its own or any +external body; nor can _A_ be conceived in any other manner. + +Hence it follows that some ideas or notions exist which are common to +all men, for all bodies agree in some things, which must be adequately, +that is to say, clearly and distinctly, perceived by all. + +Hence it follows also that the more things the body has in common with +other bodies, the more things will the mind be adapted to perceive. + +Those ideas are also adequate which follow in the mind from ideas which +are adequate in it. For when we say that an idea follows in the human +mind from ideas which are adequate in it, we do but say that in the +divine intellect itself an idea exists of which God is the cause, not in +so far as He is infinite, nor in so far as He is affected by the ideas +of a multitude of individual things, but in so far only as He +constitutes the essence of the human mind. + +I have thus explained the origin of those notions which are called +common, and which are the foundations of our reasoning; but of some +axioms or notions other causes exist which it would be advantageous to +explain by our method, for we should thus be able to distinguish those +notions which are more useful than others, and those which are scarcely +of any use; those which are common; those which are clear and distinct +only to those persons who do not suffer from prejudice; and, finally, +those which are ill-founded. Moreover, it would be manifest whence these +notions which are called _second_, and consequently the axioms founded +upon them, have taken their origin, and other things, too, would be +explained which I have thought about at different times. Since, however, +I have set apart this subject for another treatise, and because I do not +wish to create disgust with excessive prolixity, I have determined to +pass by these matters here. + +But not to omit anything which is necessary for us to know, I will +briefly give the causes from which terms called _Transcendental_, such +as _Being_, _Thing_, _Something_, have taken their origin. These terms +have arisen because the human body, inasmuch as it is limited, can form +distinctly in itself a certain number only of images at once. If this +number be exceeded, the images will become confused; and if the number +of images which the body is able to form distinctly be greatly exceeded, +they will all run one into another. Since this is so, it is clear that +in proportion to the number of images which can be formed at the same +time in the body will be the number of bodies which the human mind can +imagine at the same time. If the images in the body, therefore, are all +confused, the mind will confusedly imagine all the bodies without +distinguishing the one from the other, and will include them all, as it +were, under one attribute, that of being or thing. + +The same confusion may also be caused by lack of uniform force in the +images and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to +discuss here, the consideration of one cause being sufficient for the +purpose we have in view. For it all comes to this, that these terms +signify ideas in the highest degree confused. It is in this way that +those notions have arisen which are called _Universal_, such as, _Man_, +_Horse_, _Dog_, etc.; that is to say, so many images of men, for +instance, are formed in the human body at once, that they exceed the +power of the imagination, not entirely, but to such a degree that the +mind has no power to imagine the determinate number of men and the small +differences of each, such as color and size, etc. It will therefore +distinctly imagine that only in which all of them agree in so far as +the body is affected by them, for by that the body was chiefly affected, +that is to say, by each individual, and this it will express by the name +_man_, covering thereby an infinite number of individuals; to imagine a +determinate number of individuals being out of its power. + +But we must observe that these notions are not formed by all persons in +the same way, but that they vary in each case according to the thing by +which the body is more frequently affected, and which the mind more +easily imagines or recollects. For example, those who have more +frequently looked with admiration upon the stature of men, by the name +_man_ will understand an animal of erect stature, while those who have +been in the habit of fixing their thoughts on something else, will form +another common image of men, describing man, for instance, as an animal +capable of laughter, a biped without feathers, a rational animal, and so +on; each person forming universal images of things according to the +temperament of his own body. It is not therefore to be wondered at that +so many controversies have arisen amongst those philosophers who have +endeavored to explain natural objects by the images of things alone. + + +_The Three Kinds of Knowledge_ + +From what has been already said, it clearly appears that we perceive +many things and form universal ideas: + +1. From individual things, represented by the senses to us in a +mutilated and confused manner, and without order to the intellect. These +perceptions I have therefore been in the habit of calling knowledge +from vague experience. + +2. From signs; as, for example, when we hear or read certain words, we +recollect things and form certain ideas of them similar to them, through +which ideas we imagine things. These two ways of looking at things I +shall hereafter call knowledge of the first kind, opinion or +imagination. + +3. From our possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the +properties of things. This I shall call reason and knowledge of the +second kind. + +Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is a third, as I shall +hereafter show, which we shall call intuitive science. This kind of +knowing advances from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain +attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. +All this I will explain by one example. Let there be three numbers given +through which it is required to discover a fourth which shall be to the +third as the second is to the first. A merchant does not hesitate to +multiply the second and third together and divide the product by the +first, either because he has not yet forgotten the things which he heard +without any demonstration from his school-master, or because he has seen +the truth of the rule with the more simple numbers, or because from the +19th Prop. in the 7th book of Euclid he understands the common property +of all proportionals. + +But with the simplest numbers there is no need of all this. If the +numbers 1, 2, 3, for instance, be given, every one can see that the +fourth proportional is 6 much more clearly than by any demonstration, +because from the ratio in which we see by one intuition that the first +stands to the second we conclude the fourth. + +To knowledge of the first kind we have said that all those ideas belong +which are inadequate and confused, and, therefore, this knowledge alone +is the cause of falsity. Moreover, to knowledge of the second and third +kind we have said that those ideas belong which are adequate, and +therefore this knowledge is necessarily true. + +It is the knowledge of the second and third, and not that of the first +kind, which teaches us to distinguish the true from the false. For he +who knows how to distinguish between the true and the false must have an +adequate idea of the true and the false, that is to say, he must know +the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge. + + +_Reason and Imagination_ + +It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly, that is to say, +as they are in themselves, that is to say, not as contingent but as +necessary. + +Hence it follows that it is through the imagination alone that we look +upon things as contingent both with reference to the past and the +future. + +How this happens I will explain in a few words. We have shown above that +unless causes occur preventing the present existence of things, the mind +always imagines them present before it, even if they do not exist. +Again, we have shown that if the human body has once been simultaneously +affected by two external bodies, whenever the mind afterwards imagines +one it will immediately remember the other; that is to say, it will +look upon both as present before it, unless causes occur which prevent +the present existence of the things. No one doubts, too, that we imagine +time because we imagine some bodies to move with a velocity less, or +greater than, or equal to that of others. + +Let us therefore suppose a boy who yesterday, for the first time, in the +morning saw Peter, at midday Paul, in the evening Simeon, and to-day in +the morning again sees Peter. It is plain that as soon as he sees the +morning light he will imagine the sun passing through the same part of +the sky as on the day preceding; that is to say, he will imagine the +whole day, and at the same time Peter will be connected in his +imagination with the morning, Paul with midday, and Simeon with the +evening. In the morning, therefore, the existence of Paul and Simeon +will be imagined in relation to future time, while in the evening, if +the boy should see Simeon, he will refer Peter and Paul to the past, +since they will be connected with the past in his imagination. This +process will be constant in proportion to the regularity with which he +sees Peter, Paul, and Simeon in this order. If it should by some means +happen that on some other evening, in the place of Simeon, he should see +James, on the following morning he will connect in his imagination with +the evening at one time Simeon and at another James, but not both +together. For he is supposed to have seen one and then the other in the +evening, but not both together. His imagination will therefore +fluctuate, and he will connect with a future evening first one and then +the other; that is to say, he will consider neither as certain, but both +as a contingency in the future. + +This fluctuation of the imagination will take place in the same way if +the imagination is dealing with things which we contemplate in the same +way with reference to past or present time, and consequently we imagine +things related to time past, present, or future as contingent. + + +_Sub Specie Ćternitatis_ + +It is of the nature of reason to consider things as necessary and not as +contingent. This necessity of things it perceives truly, that is to say, +as it is in itself. But this necessity of things is the necessity itself +of the eternal nature of God. Therefore it is of the nature of reason to +consider things under this form of eternity. Moreover, the foundations +of reason are notions which explain those things which are common to +all, and these things explain the essence of no individual thing, and +must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, but under a +certain form of eternity. + + +_The Limits of Human Knowledge_ + +I + +The parts composing the human body pertain to the essence of the body +itself only in so far as they communicate their motions to one another +by some certain method, and not in so far as they can be considered as +individuals without relation to the human body. For the parts of the +human body are individuals, composite to a high degree, parts of which +can be separated from the human body and communicate their motions to +other bodies in another way, although the nature and form of the human +body itself is closely preserved. Therefore the idea or knowledge of +each part will be in God in so far as He is considered as affected by +another idea of an individual thing, which individual thing is prior to +the part itself in the order of Nature. The same thing may be said of +each part of the individual itself composing the human body, and +therefore the knowledge of each part composing the human body exists in +God in so far as He is affected by a number of ideas of things, and not +in so far as He has the idea of the human body only; that is to say, the +idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind; and therefore the +human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing +the human body. + +We have shown that the idea of a modification of the human body involves +the nature of an external body so far as the external body determines +the human body in some certain manner. But in so far as the external +body is an individual which is not related to the human body, its idea +or knowledge is in God, in so far as He is considered as affected by the +idea of another thing, which idea is prior by nature to the external +body itself. Therefore the adequate knowledge of an external body is not +in God in so far as He has the idea of the modification of the human +body, or, in other words, the idea of the modification of the human body +does not involve an adequate knowledge of an external body. + +When the human mind through the ideas of the modifications of its body +contemplates external bodies, we say that it then imagines, nor can the +mind in any other way imagine external bodies as actually existing. +Therefore in so far as the mind imagines external bodies it does not +possess an adequate knowledge of them. + + +II + +The idea of a modification of the human body does not involve an +adequate knowledge of the body itself, or, in other words, does not +adequately express its nature, that is to say, it does not correspond +adequately with the nature of the human mind, and therefore the idea of +this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind, nor +involve an adequate knowledge of it. + +From this it is evident that the human mind, when it perceives things in +the common order of Nature, has no adequate knowledge of itself nor of +its own body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused and mutilated +knowledge; for the mind does not know itself unless in so far as it +perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body. Moreover, it does +not perceive its body unless through those same ideas of the +modifications by means of which alone it perceives external bodies. +Therefore in so far as it possesses these ideas it possesses an adequate +knowledge neither of itself, nor of its body, nor of external bodies, +but merely a mutilated and confused knowledge. + +I say expressly that the mind has no adequate knowledge of itself, nor +of its body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused knowledge, as +often as it perceives things in the common order of Nature, that is to +say, as often as it is determined to the contemplation of this or that +_externally_--namely, by a chance coincidence, and not as often as it is +determined _internally_--for the reason that it contemplates several +things at once, and is determined to understand in what they differ, +agree, or oppose one another; for whenever it is internally disposed in +this or in any other way, it then contemplates things clearly and +distinctly. + + +III + +The duration of our body does not depend upon its essence, nor upon the +absolute nature of God, but the body is determined to existence and +action by causes which also are determined by others to existence and +action in a certain and determinate manner, whilst these, again, are +determined by others, and so on _ad infinitum_. The duration, therefore, +of our body depends upon the common order of Nature and the constitution +of things. But an adequate knowledge of the way in which things are +constituted, exists in God in so far as He possesses the ideas of all +things, and not in so far as He possesses only the idea of the human +body. Therefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is altogether +inadequate in God, in so far as He is only considered as constituting +the nature of the human mind, that is to say, this knowledge in our mind +is altogether inadequate. + +Each individual thing, like the human body, must be determined to +existence and action by another individual thing in a certain and +determinate manner, and this again by another, and so on _ad infinitum_. +But we have demonstrated in the preceding proposition, from this common +property of individual things, that we have but a very inadequate +knowledge of the duration of our own body; therefore the same conclusion +is to be drawn about the duration of individual things, that is to say, +that we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of it. + +Hence it follows that all individual things are contingent and +corruptible, for we can have no adequate knowledge concerning their +duration and this is what is to be understood by us as their contingency +and capability of corruption; for there is no other contingency but +this. + + +_The Mind's Knowledge of God_ + +The idea of an individual thing actually existing necessarily involves +both the essence and existence of the thing itself. But individual +things cannot be conceived without God, and since God is their cause in +so far as He is considered under that attribute of which they are modes, +their ideas must necessarily involve the conception of that attribute, +or, in other words, must involve the eternal and infinite essence of +God. + +By existence is to be understood here not duration, that is, existence +considered in the abstract, as if it were a certain kind of quantity, +but I speak of the nature itself of the existence which is assigned to +individual things, because from the eternal necessity of the nature of +God infinite numbers of things follow in infinite ways. I repeat, that I +speak of the existence itself of individual things in so far as they are +in God. For although each individual thing is determined by another +individual thing to existence in a certain way, the force nevertheless +by which each thing perseveres in its existence follows from the eternal +necessity of the nature of God. + +The demonstration of the preceding proposition is universal, and whether +a thing be considered as a part or as a whole, its idea, whether it be +of a part or whole, will involve the eternal and infinite essence of +God. Therefore that which gives a knowledge of the eternal and infinite +essence of God is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the +whole. This knowledge therefore will be adequate. + +The human mind possesses ideas by which it perceives itself and its own +body, together with external bodies, as actually existing. Therefore it +possesses an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of +God. + +Hence we see that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known +to all; and since all things are in God and are conceived through Him, +it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge many things which we +can know adequately, and that we can thus form that third sort of +knowledge. The reason why we do not possess a knowledge of God as +distinct as that which we have of common notions is, that we cannot +imagine God as we can bodies; and because we have attached the name God +to the images of things which we are in the habit of seeing, an error we +can hardly avoid, inasmuch as we are continually affected by external +bodies. + +Many errors, of a truth, consist merely in the application of the wrong +names to things. For if a man says that the lines which are drawn from +the center of the circle to the circumference are not equal, he +understands by the circle, at all events for the time, something else +than mathematicians understand by it. So when men make errors in +calculation, the numbers which are in their minds are not those which +are upon the paper. As far as their mind is concerned there is no error, +although it seems as if there were, because we think that the numbers in +their minds are those which are upon the paper. If we did not think so, +we should not believe them to be in error. For example, when I lately +heard a man complaining that his court had flown into one of his +neighbor's fowls, I understood what he meant, and therefore did not +imagine him to be in error. This is the source from which so many +controversies arise--that men either do not properly explain their own +thoughts, or do not properly interpret those of other people; for, in +truth, when they most contradict one another, they either think the same +things or something different, so that those things which they suppose +to be errors and absurdities in another person are not so. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[18] From the _Improvement of the Understanding_, §§ 33-35. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +DETERMINISM AND MORALS + + +_The Mind Is Necessarily Determined_ + +The mind is a certain and determinate mode of thought, and therefore it +cannot be the free cause of its own actions, or have an absolute faculty +of willing or not willing, but must be determined to this or that +volition by a cause which is also determined by another cause, and this +again by another, and so on _ad infinitum_. + +In the same manner it is demonstrated that in the mind there exists no +absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. These and the +like faculties, therefore, are either altogether fictitious, or else are +nothing but metaphysical or universal entities, which we are in the +habit of forming from individual cases. The intellect and will, +therefore, are related to this or that idea or volition as rockiness is +related to this or that rock, or as man is related to Peter or Paul. The +reason why men imagine themselves to be free we have already explained. + + +_Faculty Psychology Fallacious_ + +Before, however, I advance any further, I must observe that by the will +I understand a faculty of affirming or denying, but not a desire; a +faculty, I say, by which the mind affirms or denies that which is true +or false, and not a desire by which the mind seeks a thing or turns away +from it. But now that we have demonstrated that these faculties are +universal notions which are not distinguishable from the individual +notions from which they are formed, we must now inquire whether the +volitions themselves are anything more than the ideas of things. We must +inquire, I say, whether in the mind there exists any other affirmation +or negation than that which the idea involves in so far as it is an +idea. For this purpose see the following, so that thought may not fall +into pictures. For by ideas I do not understand the images which are +formed at the back of the eye, or, if you please, in the middle of the +brain, but rather the conceptions of thought. + +In the mind there exists no absolute faculty of willing or not willing. +Only individual volitions exist, that is to say, this and that +affirmation and this and that negation. Let us conceive, therefore, any +individual volition, that is, any mode of thought, by which the mind +affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right +angles. This affirmation involves the conception or idea of the +triangle, that is to say, without it the affirmation cannot be +conceived. For to say that _A_ must involve the conception _B_, is the +same as saying that _A_ cannot be conceived without _B_. Moreover, +without the idea of the triangle this affirmation cannot be, and it can +therefore neither be nor be conceived without that idea. But this idea +of the triangle must involve this same affirmation that its three angles +are equal to two right angles. Therefore also, _vice versa_, this idea +of the triangle without this affirmation can neither be nor be +conceived. Therefore this affirmation pertains to the essence of the +idea of the triangle, nor is it anything else besides this. Whatever too +we have said of this volition (since it has been taken arbitrarily) +applies to all other volitions, that is to say, they are nothing but +ideas. + +The will and the intellect are nothing but the individual volitions and +ideas themselves. But the individual volition and idea are one and the +same. Therefore the will and the intellect are one and the same. + + +_False Doctrines about Error Exposed_ + +I have thus removed what is commonly thought to be the cause of error. +It has been proved above that falsity consists solely in the privation +which mutilated and confused ideas involve. A false idea, therefore, in +so far as it is false, does not involve certitude. Consequently, when we +say that a man assents to what is false and does not doubt it, we do not +say that he is certain, but merely that he does not doubt, that is to +say, that he assents to what is false, because there are no causes +sufficient to make his imagination waver. Although, therefore, a man may +be supposed to adhere to what is false, we shall never on that account +say that he is certain. For by certitude we understand something +positive, and not the privation of doubt; but by the privation of +certitude we understand falsity. + +If the preceding proposition, however, is to be more clearly +comprehended, a word or two must be added; it yet remains also that I +should answer the objections which may be brought against our doctrine, +and finally, in order to remove all scruples, I have thought it worth +while to indicate some of its advantages. I say some, as the principal +advantages will be better understood later. + +I begin, therefore, with the first, and I warn my readers carefully to +distinguish between an idea or conception of the mind and the images of +things formed by our imagination. Secondly, it is necessary that we +should distinguish between ideas and the words by which things are +signified. For it is because these three things, images, words, and +ideas, are by many people either altogether confounded or not +distinguished with sufficient accuracy and care that such ignorance +exists about this doctrine of the will, so necessary to be known both +for the purposes of speculation and for the wise government of life. +Those who think that ideas consist of images, which are formed in us by +meeting with external bodies, persuade themselves that those ideas of +things of which we can form no similar image are not ideas, but mere +fancies constructed by the free power of the will. They look upon ideas, +therefore, as dumb pictures on a tablet, and being prepossessed with +this prejudice, they do not see that an idea, in so far as it is an +idea, involves affirmation or negation. Again, those who confound words +with the idea, or with the affirmation itself which the idea involves, +think that they can will contrary to their perception, because they +affirm or deny something in words alone contrary to their perception. It +will be easy for us, however, to divest ourselves of these prejudices if +we attend to the nature of thought, which in no way involves the +conception of extension, and by doing this we clearly see that an idea, +since it is a mode of thought, is not an image of anything, nor does it +consist of words. For the essence of words and images is formed of +bodily motions alone, which involve in no way whatever the conception of +thought. + +Let thus much suffice under this head. I pass on now to the objections +to which I have already alluded. + + +_Freedom of the Will_ + +The first is, that it is supposed to be certain that the will extends +itself more widely than the intellect, and is therefore different from +it. The reason why men suppose that the will extends itself more widely +than the intellect is because they say they have discovered that they do +not need a larger faculty of assent--that is to say, of affirmation--and +denial than that which they now have for the purpose of assenting to an +infinite number of other things which we do not perceive, but that they +do need a greater faculty for understanding them. The will, therefore, +is distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite, the former +infinite. The second objection which can be made is that there is +nothing which experience seems to teach more clearly than the +possibility of suspending our judgment, so as not to assent to the +things we perceive; and we are strengthened in this opinion because no +one is said to be deceived in so far as he perceives a thing, but only +in so far as he assents to it or dissents from it. For example, a man +who imagines a winged horse does not therefore admit the existence of a +winged horse; that is to say, he is not necessarily deceived, unless he +grants at the same time that a winged horse exists. Experience, +therefore, seems to show nothing more plainly than that the will or +faculty of assent is free, and different from the faculty of the +intellect. + +Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not seem to +contain more reality than another; that is to say, it does not appear +that we need a greater power for affirming a thing to be true which is +true than for affirming a thing to be true which is false. Nevertheless, +we observe that one idea contains more reality or perfection than +another, for as some objects are nobler than others, in the same +proportion are their ideas more perfect. It appears indisputable, +therefore, that there is a difference between the will and the +intellect. + +Fourthly, it may be objected that if a man does not act from freedom of +the will, what would he do if he were in a state of equilibrium, like +the ass of Buridanus? Would he not perish from hunger and thirst? and if +this be granted, do we not seem to conceive him as a statue of a man or +as an ass? If I deny that he would thus perish, he will consequently +determine himself and possess the power of going where he likes and +doing what he likes. + +There may be other objections besides these, but as I am not bound to +discuss what every one may dream, I shall therefore make it my business +to answer as briefly as possible those only which I have mentioned. + +In reply to the first objection, I grant that the will extends itself +more widely than the intellect, if by the intellect we understand only +clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will extends itself more +widely than the perceptions or the faculty of conception; nor, indeed, +do I see why the faculty of will should be said to be infinite any more +than the faculty of feeling; for as by the same faculty of will we can +affirm an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot +affirm an infinite number of things at once), so also by the same +faculty of feeling we can feel or perceive (one after another) an +infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there are an infinite +number of things which we cannot perceive, I reply that such things as +these we can reach by no thought, and consequently by no faculty of +will. But it is said that if God wished us to perceive those things, it +would be necessary for Him to give us a larger faculty of perception, +but not a larger faculty of will than He has already given us, which is +the same thing as saying that if God wished us to understand an infinite +number of other beings, it would be necessary for Him to give us a +greater intellect, but not a more universal idea of being (in order to +embrace that infinite number of beings), than He has given us. For we +have shown that the will is a Universal, or the idea by which we explain +all individual volitions, that is to say, that which is common to them +all. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that those who believe this +common or universal idea of all the volitions to be a faculty should say +that it extends itself infinitely beyond the limits of the intellect. +For the universal is predicated of one or of many, or of an infinite +number of individuals. + +The second objection I answer by denying that we have free power of +suspending judgment. For when we say that a person suspends judgment, we +only say in other words that he sees that he does not perceive the thing +adequately. The suspension of the judgment, therefore, is in truth a +perception and not free will. + +In order that this may be clearly understood, let us take the case of a +boy who imagines a horse and perceives nothing else. Since this +imagination involves the existence of the horse, and the boy does not +perceive anything which negates its existence, he will necessarily +contemplate it as present, nor will he be able to doubt its existence +although he may not be certain of it. This is a thing which we daily +experience in dreams, nor do I believe that there is any one who thinks +that he has the free power during dreams of suspending his judgment upon +those things which he dreams, and of causing himself not to dream those +things which he dreams that he sees; and yet in dreams it nevertheless +happens that we suspend our judgment, for we dream that we dream. + +I grant, it is true, that no man is deceived in so far as he perceives; +that is to say, I grant that mental images considered in themselves +involve no error; but I deny that a man in so far as he perceives +affirms nothing. For what else is it to perceive a winged horse than to +affirm of the horse that it has wings? For if the mind perceived nothing +else but this winged horse, it would regard it as present, nor would it +have any reason for doubting its existence, nor any power of refusing +assent to it, unless the image of the winged horse be joined to an idea +which negates its existence, or the mind perceives that the idea of the +winged horse which it has is inadequate. In either of the two latter +cases it will necessarily deny or doubt the existence of the horse. + +With regard to the third objection, what has been said will perhaps be +a sufficient answer--namely, that the will is something universal, which +is predicated of all ideas, and that it signifies that only which is +common to them all, that is to say, affirmation. Its adequate essence, +therefore, in so far as it is thus considered in the abstract, must be +in every idea, and in this sense only must it be the same in all; but +not in so far as it is considered as constituting the essence of an +idea, for so far, the individual affirmations differ just as the ideas +differ. For example, the affirmation which the idea of a circle involves +differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves, just as the +idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle. Again, I +absolutely deny that we need a power of thinking in order to affirm that +to be true which is true, equal to that which we need in order to affirm +that to be true which is false. For these two affirmations, if we look +to the mind, are related to one another as being and non-being, for +there is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes a form of falsity. + +Here therefore particularly is it to be observed how easily we are +deceived when we confuse universals with individuals, and the entities +of reason and abstractions with realities. + +With regard to the fourth objection, I say that I entirely grant that if +a man were placed in such a state of equilibrium he would perish of +hunger and thirst, supposing he perceived nothing but hunger and thirst, +and the food and drink which were equidistant from him. If you ask me +whether such a man would not be thought an ass rather than a man, I +reply that I do not know; nor do I know what ought to be thought of a +man who hangs himself, or of children, fools, and madmen. + + +_The Independence of Mind and Body_ + +All modes of thought have God for a cause in so far as He is a thinking +thing, and not in so far as He is manifested by any other attribute. +That which determines the mind to thought, therefore, is a mode of +thought and not of extension, that is to say, it is not the body. Again, +the motion and rest of the body must be derived from some other body, +which has also been determined to motion or rest by another, and, +absolutely, whatever arises in the body must arise from God, in so far +as He is considered as affected by some mode of extension, and not in so +far as He is considered as affected by any mode of thought, that is to +say, whatever arises in the body cannot arise from the mind, which is a +mode of thought. Therefore, the body cannot determine the mind to +thought, neither can the mind determine the body to motion nor rest, nor +to anything else, if there be anything else. + +This proposition will be better understood from what has been said, that +is to say, that the mind and the body are one and the same thing, +conceived at one time under the attribute of thought, and at another +under that of extension. For this reason, the order or concatenation of +things is one, whether nature be conceived under this or under that +attribute, and consequently the order of the actions and passions of our +body is coincident in Nature with the order of the actions and passions +of the mind. + +Although these things are so, and no ground for doubting remains, I +scarcely believe, nevertheless, that, without a proof derived from +experience, men will be induced calmly to weigh what has been said, so +firmly are they persuaded that, solely at the bidding of the mind, the +body moves or rests, and does a number of things which depend upon the +will of the mind alone, and upon the power of thought. For what the body +can do no one has hitherto determined, that is to say, experience has +taught no one hitherto what the body, without being determined by the +mind, can do and what it cannot do from the laws of Nature alone, in so +far as Nature is considered merely as corporeal. For no one as yet has +understood the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to +explain all its functions, not to mention the fact that many things are +observed in brutes which far surpass human sagacity, and that +sleep-walkers in their sleep do very many things which they dare not do +when awake; all this showing that the body itself can do many things +from the laws of its own nature alone at which the mind belonging to +that body is amazed. + +Again, nobody knows by what means or by what method the mind moves the +body, nor how many degrees of motion it can communicate to the body, nor +with what speed it can move the body. So that it follows that when men +say that this or that action of the body springs from the mind which has +commanded over the body, they do not know what they say, and they do +nothing but confess with pretentious words that they know nothing about +the cause of the action, and see nothing in it to wonder at. + +But they will say, that whether they know or do not know by what means +the mind moves the body, it is nevertheless in their experience that if +the mind were not fit for thinking the body would be inert. They say, +again, it is in their experience that the mind alone has power both to +speak and be silent, and to do many other things which they therefore +think to be dependent on a decree of the mind. + +But with regard to the first assertion, I ask them if experience does +not also teach that if the body be sluggish the mind at the same time is +not fit for thinking? When the body is asleep, the mind slumbers with +it, and has not the power to think, as it has when the body is awake. +Again, I believe that all have discovered that the mind is not always +equally fitted for thinking about the same subject, but in proportion to +the fitness of the body for this or that image to be excited in it will +the mind be better fitted to contemplate this or that object. But my +opponents will say, that from the laws of Nature alone, in so far as it +is considered to be corporeal merely, it cannot be that the causes of +architecture, painting, and things of this sort, which are the results +of human art alone, could be deduced, and that the human body, unless it +were determined and guided by the mind, would not be able to build a +temple. I have already shown, however, that they do not know what the +body can do, nor what can be deduced from the consideration of its +nature alone, and that they find that many things are done merely by the +laws of Nature which they would never have believed to be possible +without the direction of the mind, as, for example, those things which +sleep-walkers do in their sleep, and at which they themselves are +astonished when they wake. I adduce also here the structure itself of +the human body, which so greatly surpasses in workmanship all those +things which are constructed by human art, not to mention what I have +already proved, that an infinitude of things follows from Nature under +whatever attribute it may be considered. + +With regard to the second point, I should say that human affairs would +be much more happily conducted if it were equally in the power of men to +be silent and to speak. But experience shows over and over again that +there is nothing which men have less power over than the tongue, and +that there is nothing which they are less able to do than to govern +their appetites, so that many persons believe that we do those things +only with freedom which we seek indifferently; as the desire for such +things can easily be lessened by the recollection of another thing which +we frequently call to mind; it being impossible, on the other hand, to +do those things with freedom which we seek with such ardor that the +recollection of another thing is unable to mitigate it. + +But if, however, we had not found out that we do many things which we +afterwards repent, and that when agitated by conflicting emotions we see +that which is better and follow that which is worse, nothing would +hinder us from believing that we do everything with freedom. Thus the +infant believes that it is by free will that it seeks the breast; the +angry boy believes that by free will he wishes vengeance; the timid man +thinks it is with free will he seeks flight; the drunkard believes that +by a free command of his mind he speaks the things which when sober he +wishes he had left unsaid. Thus the madman, the chatterer, the boy, and +others of the same kind, all believe that they speak by a free command +of the mind, whilst, in truth, they have no power to restrain the +impulse which they have to speak, so that experience itself, no less +than reason, clearly teaches that men believe themselves to be free +simply because they are conscious of their own actions, knowing nothing +of the causes by which they are determined. It[19] teaches, too, that +the decrees of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which +differ, therefore, according to the different temper of the body. For +every man determines all things from his emotion; those who are agitated +by contrary emotions do not know what they want, whilst those who are +agitated by no emotion are easily driven hither and thither. + +All this plainly shows that the decree of the mind, the appetite, and +determination of the body are coincident in Nature, or rather that they +are one and the same thing, which, when it is considered under the +attribute of thought and manifested by that, is called a decree, and +when it is considered under the attribute of extension and is deduced +from the laws of motion and rest, is called a determination. + +This, however, will be better understood as we go on, for there is +another thing which I wish to be observed here--that we cannot by a +mental decree do a thing unless we recollect it. We cannot speak a word, +for instance, unless we recollect it. But it is not in the free power of +the mind either to recollect a thing or to forget it. It is believed, +therefore, that the power of the mind extends only thus far--that from a +mental decree we can speak or be silent about a thing only when we +recollect it. But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we do so +from a free decree of the mind; and yet we do not speak, or, if we do, +it is the result of a spontaneous motion of the body. We dream, again, +that we are concealing things, and that we do this by virtue of a decree +of the mind like that by which, when awake, we are silent about things +we know. We dream, again, that from a decree of the mind, we do some +things which we should not dare to do when awake. And I should like to +know, therefore, whether there are two kinds of decrees in the +mind--one belonging to dreams and the other free. If this be too great +nonsense, we must necessarily grant that this decree of the mind, which +is believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or +memory, and is nothing but the affirmation which the idea necessarily +involves in so far as it is an idea. These decrees of the mind, +therefore, arise in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of +things actually existing. Consequently, those who believe that they +speak, or are silent, or do anything else from a free decree of the +mind, dream with their eyes open. + + +_The Moral Values of Determinism_ + +I + +It remains for me now to show what service to our own lives a knowledge +of this doctrine is. This we shall easily understand from the remarks +which follow. Notice-- + +1. It is of service in so far as it teaches us that we do everything by +the will of God alone, and that we are partakers of the divine nature in +proportion as our actions become more and more perfect and we more and +more understand God. This doctrine, therefore, besides giving repose in +every way to the soul, has also this advantage, that it teaches us in +what our highest happiness or blessedness consists, namely, in the +knowledge of God alone, by which we are drawn to do those things only +which love and piety persuade. Hence we clearly see how greatly those +stray from the true estimation of virtue who expect to be distinguished +by God with the highest rewards for virtue and the noblest actions as if +for the completest servitude, just as if virtue itself and the service +of God were not happiness itself and the highest liberty. + +2. It is of service to us in so far as it teaches us how we ought to +behave with regard to the things of fortune, or those which are not in +our power, that is to say, which do not follow from our own nature; for +it teaches us with equal mind to wait for and bear each form of fortune, +because we know that all things follow from the eternal decree of God, +according to that same necessity by which it follows from the essence of +a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. + +3. This doctrine contributes to the welfare of our social existence, +since it teaches us to hate no one, to despise no one, to mock no one, +to be angry with no one, and to envy no one. It teaches every one, +moreover, to be content with his own, and to be helpful to his neighbor, +not from any womanish pity, from partiality, or superstition, but by the +guidance of reason alone, according to the demand of time and +circumstance, as I shall show. + +4. This doctrine contributes not a little to the advantage of common +society, in so far as it teaches us by what means citizens are to be +governed and led; not in order that they may be slaves, but that they +may freely do those things which are best. + + +II + +At[21] last I see, what it was that you begged me not to publish. +However, as it forms the chief foundation of everything in the +treatise[22] which I intend to bring out, I should like briefly to +explain here, in what sense I assert that a fatal necessity presides +over all things and actions. + +God I in no wise subject to fate: I conceive that all things follow with +inevitable necessity from the nature of God, in the same way as every +one conceives that it follows from God's nature that God understands +Himself. This latter consequence all admit to follow necessarily from +the divine nature, yet no one conceives that God is under the compulsion +of any fate, but that He understands Himself quite freely, though +necessarily. + +Further, this inevitable necessity in things does away neither with +divine nor human laws. The principles of morality, whether they receive +from God Himself the form of laws or institutions, or whether they do +not, are still divine and salutary; whether we receive the good, which +flows from virtue and the divine love, as from God in the capacity of a +judge, or as from the necessity of the divine nature, it will in either +case be equally desirable; on the other hand, the evils following from +wicked actions and passions are not less to be feared because they are +necessary consequences.[23] Lastly, in our actions, whether they be +necessary or contingent, we are led by hope and fear. + +Men are only without excuse before God, because they are in God's power, +as clay is in the hands of the potter, who from the same lump makes +vessels, some to honor, some to dishonor.... [24] When I said in my +former letter that we are inexcusable, because we are in the power of +God, like clay in the hands of the potter, I meant to be understood in +the sense that no one can bring a complaint against God for having given +him a weak nature, or infirm spirit. A circle might as well complain to +God for not being endowed with the properties of a sphere, or a child +who is tortured, say, with stone, for not being given a healthy body, as +a man of feeble spirit, because God has denied to him fortitude, and the +true knowledge and love of the Deity, or because he is endowed with so +weak a nature that he cannot check or moderate his desires. For the +nature of each thing is only competent to do that which follows +necessarily from its given cause. + +That every man cannot be brave, and that we can no more command for +ourselves a healthy body than a healthy mind, nobody can deny, without +giving the lie to experience, as well as to reason. "But," you urge, "if +men sin by nature, they are excusable"; but you do not state the +conclusion you draw, whether that God cannot be angry with them, or that +they are worthy of blessedness--that is, of the knowledge and love of +God. If you say the former, I fully admit that God cannot be angry, and +that all things are done in accordance with His will; but I deny that +all men ought, therefore, to be blessed--men may be excusable, and +nevertheless, be without blessedness and afflicted in many ways.[25] A +horse is excusable for being a horse and not a man; but, nevertheless, +he must needs be a horse and not a man. He who goes mad from the bite of +a dog is excusable, yet he is rightly suffocated. Lastly, he who cannot +govern his desires, and keep them in check with the fear of the laws, +though his weakness may be excusable, yet he cannot enjoy with +contentment, the knowledge and love of God, but necessarily perishes. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[19] ... I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by the +necessity of its own nature. Thus also God understands Himself and all +things freely, because it follows solely from the necessity of His +nature that He should understand all things. You see I do not place +freedom in free decision, but in free necessity. However, let us descend +to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist +and operate in a given determinate manner. In order that this may be +clearly understood, let us conceive a very simple thing. For instance, a +stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause a certain +quantity of motion, by virtue of which it continues to move after the +impulsion given by the external cause has ceased. The permanence of the +stone's motion is constrained, not necessary because it must be defined +by the impulsion of an external cause. What is true of the stone is true +of an individual, however complicated its nature, or varied its +functions, inasmuch as every individual thing is necessarily determined +by some external cause to exist and operate in a fixed and determinate +manner. + +Further conceive, I beg, that a stone, while continuing in motion, +should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is endeavoring, as +far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being conscious merely +of its own endeavor and not at all indifferent, would believe itself to +be completely free, and would think that it continued in motion solely +because of its own wish. This is that human freedom, which all boast +that they possess, and which consists solely in the fact, that men are +conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby +that desire has been determined.[20] ... + +[20] _From a letter to G. H. Schaller_ (1674). + +[21] _From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Dec., 1675). + +[22] The _Ethics_.--ED. + +[23] I received on Saturday last your very short letter dated 15th Nov. +In it you merely indicated the points in the theological treatise which +have given pain to readers, whereas I had hoped to learn from it what +were the opinions which militated against the practice of religious +virtue.... I make this chief distinction between religion and +superstition; the latter is founded on ignorance, the former on +knowledge. This, I take it, is the reason why Christians are +distinguished from the rest of the world, not by faith, nor by charity, +nor by the other fruits of the Holy Spirit, but solely by their +opinions, inasmuch as they defend their cause, like every one else, by +miracles, that is, by ignorance, which is the source of all malice. Thus +they turn a faith, which may be true, into superstition. _From a letter +to Henry Oldenburg_ (Dec., 1675). + +[24] _From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Feb. 7, 1676). + +[25] A mouse no less than an angel, and sorrow no less than joy depend +on God; yet a mouse is not a kind of angel, neither is sorrow a kind of +joy. _From a letter to Wm. Blyenbergh_ (March 13, 1665). + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS + + +_Introductory_ + +Most persons who have written about the emotions and man's conduct of +life seem to discuss, not the natural things which follow the common +laws of Nature, but things which are outside her. They seem indeed to +consider man in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe +that man disturbs rather than follows her order; that he has an absolute +power over his own actions; and that he is altogether self-determined. +They then proceed to attribute the cause of human weakness and +changeableness, not to the common power of Nature, but to some vice of +human nature, which they therefore bewail, laugh at, mock, or, as is +more generally the case, detest; whilst he who knows how to revile most +eloquently or subtilely the weakness of the mind is looked upon as +divine. + +It is true that very eminent men have not been wanting, to whose labor +and industry we confess ourselves much indebted, who have written many +excellent things about the right conduct of life, and who have given to +mortals counsels full of prudence. But no one so far as I know has +determined the nature and strength of the emotions, and what the mind is +able to do towards controlling them. I remember, indeed, that the +celebrated Descartes, although he believed that the mind is absolute +master over its own actions, tried nevertheless to explain by their +first causes human emotions, and at the same time to show the way by +which the mind could obtain absolute power over them. But in my opinion +he has shown nothing but the acuteness of his great intellect, as I +shall make evident in the proper place, for I wish to return to those +who prefer to detest and scoff at human affects and actions than +understand them. + +To such as these it will doubtless seem a marvelous thing for me to +endeavor to treat by a geometrical method the vices and follies of men, +and to desire by a sure method to demonstrate those things which these +people cry out against as being opposed to reason, or as being vanities, +absurdities, and monstrosities. The following is my reason for so doing. +Nothing happens in Nature which can be attributed to any vice of Nature, +for she is always the same and everywhere one. Her virtue is the same, +and her power of acting; that is to say, her laws and rules, according +to which all things are and are changed from form to form, are +everywhere and always the same; so that there must also be one and the +same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, that +is to say, by the universal laws and rules of Nature. The emotions, +therefore, of hatred, anger, envy, considered in themselves, follow from +the same necessity and virtue of Nature as other individual things; they +have therefore certain causes through which they are to be understood, +and certain properties which are just as worthy of being known as the +properties of any other thing in the contemplation alone of which we +delight. I shall, therefore, pursue the same method in considering the +nature and strength of the emotions and the power of the mind over them +which I pursued in our previous discussion of God and the mind, and I +shall consider human actions and appetites just as if I were considering +lines, planes or bodies. + + +_Definitions_ + +I.--I call that an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and +distinctly perceived by means of the cause. I call that an inadequate or +partial cause whose effect cannot be understood by means of the cause +alone. + +II.--I say that we act when anything is done, either within us or +without us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is to say (by the +preceding Definition), when from our nature anything follows, either +within us or without us, which by that nature alone can be clearly and +distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we suffer when +anything is done within us, or when anything follows from our nature, of +which we are not the cause excepting partially. + +III.--By emotion I understand the modifications of the body, by which +the power of acting of the body itself is increased, diminished, helped, +or hindered, together with the ideas of these modifications. + +If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of any of these +modifications, I understand the emotion to be an action, otherwise it is +a passion. + + +_Postulates_ + +1.--The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of +acting is increased or diminished, and also in other ways which make its +power of acting neither greater nor less. + +2.--The human body is capable of suffering many changes, and, +nevertheless, can retain the impressions or traces of objects, and +consequently the same images of things. + + +_The Two States of Mind: Active and Passive_ + +In every human mind some ideas are adequate, and others mutilated and +confused. But the ideas which in any mind are adequate are adequate in +God in so far as He forms the essence of that mind, while those again +which are inadequate in the mind are also adequate in God, not in so far +as He contains the essence of that mind only, but in so far as He +contains the ideas of other things at the same time in Himself. Again, +from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow, of which God is +the adequate cause, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He +is considered as affected with the given idea. But of that effect of +which God is the cause, in so far as He is affected by an idea which is +adequate in any mind, that same mind is the adequate cause. Our mind, +therefore, in so far as it has adequate ideas, necessarily at times +acts. Again, if there be anything which necessarily follows from an idea +which is adequate in God, not in so far as He contains within Himself +the mind of one man only, but also, together with this, the ideas[26] +of other things, then the mind of that man is not the adequate cause of +that thing, but is only its partial cause, and therefore, in so far as +the mind has inadequate ideas, it necessarily at times suffers. + + +_The Basic Endeavor of All Things_ + +Individual things are modes by which the attributes of God are expressed +in a certain and determinate manner; that is to say, they are things +which express in a certain and determinate manner the power of God, by +which He is and acts. A thing, too, has nothing in itself through which +it can be destroyed, or which can negate its existence,[27] but, on the +contrary, it is opposed to everything which could negate its existence. +Therefore, in so far as it can and is in itself, it endeavors to +persevere in its own being. + + +_The Three Primary Emotions_ + +I + +_Desire_ + +The essence of the mind is composed of adequate and inadequate ideas (as +we have shown), and therefore both in so far as it has the former and in +so far as it has the latter, it endeavors to persevere in its being, +and endeavors to persevere in it for an indefinite time. But since the +mind, through the ideas of the modifications of the body, is necessarily +conscious of itself, it is therefore conscious of its effort. + +This effort, when it is related to the mind alone, is called _will_, but +when it is related at the same time both to the mind and the body, is +called _appetite_, which is therefore nothing but the very essence of +man, from the nature of which necessarily follow those things which +promote his preservation, and thus he is determined to do those things. +Hence there is no difference between appetite and desire, unless in this +particular, that desire is generally related to men in so far as they +are conscious of their appetites, and it may therefore be defined as +appetite of which we are conscious. From what has been said it is plain, +therefore, that we neither strive for, wish, seek, nor desire anything +because we think it to be good, but, on the contrary, we adjudge a thing +to be good because we strive for, wish, seek, or desire it. + + +II + +_Joy and Sorrow_ + +If anything increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our body's power of +action, the idea of that thing increases, diminishes, helps, or limits +our mind's power of thought. + +We thus see that the mind can suffer great changes, and can pass now to +a greater and now to a lesser perfection; these passions explaining to +us the emotions of joy and sorrow. By _joy_, therefore, in what +follows, I shall understand the passion by which the mind passes to a +greater perfection; by _sorrow_, on the other hand, the passion by which +it passes to a less perfection. The emotion of joy, related at the same +time both to the mind and the body, I call _pleasurable excitement_ +(_titillatio_) or _cheerfulness_; that of sorrow I call _pain_ or +_melancholy_. It is, however, to be observed that pleasurable excitement +and pain are related to a man when one of his parts is affected more +than the others; cheerfulness and melancholy, on the other hand, when +all parts are equally affected. What the nature of desire is I have +explained; and besides these three--joy, sorrow, and desire--I know of +no other primary emotion, the others springing from these. + + +_Definitions of the Principal Emotions_ + +I.--_Desire_ is the essence itself of man in so far as it is conceived +as determined to any action by any one of his modifications. + +_Explanation._--We have said above, that desire is appetite which is +self-conscious, and that appetite is the essence itself of man in so far +as it is determined to such acts as contribute to his preservation. But +I have taken care to remark that in truth I cannot recognize any +difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a man be +conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite, +and so, lest I might appear to be guilty of tautology, I have not +explained desire by appetite, but have tried to give such a definition +of desire as would include all the efforts of human nature to which we +give the name of appetite, desire, will, or impulse. For I might have +said that desire is the essence itself of man in so far as it is +considered as determined to any action; but from this definition it +would not follow that the mind could be conscious of its desire or +appetite, and therefore, in order that I might include the cause of this +consciousness, it was necessary to add the words, _in so far as it is +conceived as determined to any action by any one of his modifications_. +For by a modification of the human essence we understand any +constitution of that essence, whether it be innate, whether it be +conceived through the attribute of thought alone or of extension alone, +or whether it be related to both. By the word "desire," therefore, I +understand all the efforts, impulses, appetites, and volitions of a man, +which vary according to his changing disposition, and not unfrequently +are so opposed to one another that he is drawn hither and thither, and +knows not whither he ought to turn. + +II. _Joy_ is man's passage from a less to a greater perfection. + +III. _Sorrow_ is man's passage from a greater to a less perfection. + +_Explanation._--I say passage, for joy is not perfection itself. If a +man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess +it without the emotion of joy; a truth which will appear the more +clearly from the emotion of sorrow, which is the opposite to joy. For +that sorrow consists in the passage to a less perfection, but not in the +less perfection itself, no one can deny, since in so far as a man shares +any perfection he cannot be sad. Nor can we say that sorrow consists in +the privation of a greater perfection for privation is nothing. But the +emotion of sorrow is a reality, and it therefore must be the reality of +the passage to a lesser perfection, or the reality by which man's power +of acting is diminished or limited. As for the definitions of +cheerfulness, pleasurable excitement, melancholy, and grief, I pass +these by, because they are related rather to the body than to the mind, +and are merely different kinds of joy or of sorrow. + +IV. _Astonishment_ is the imagination of an object in which the mind +remains fixed because this particular imagination has no connection with +others. + +_Explanation._--That which causes the mind from the contemplation of one +thing immediately to pass to the thought of another is that the images +of these things are connected one with the other, and are so arranged +that the one follows the other; a process which cannot be conceived when +the image of the thing is new, for the mind will be held in the +contemplation of the same object until other causes determine it to +think of other things. The imagination, therefore, considered in itself, +of a new object is of the same character as other imaginations; and for +this reason I do not class astonishment among the emotions, nor do I see +any reason why I should do it, since this abstraction of the mind arises +from no positive cause by which it is abstracted from other things, but +merely from the absence of any cause by which from the contemplation of +one thing the mind is determined to think other things. I acknowledge, +therefore, only three primitive or primary emotions, those of joy, +sorrow, and desire; and the only reason which has induced me to speak +of astonishment is, that it has been the custom to give other names to +certain emotions derived from the three primitives whenever these +emotions are related to objects at which we are astonished. This same +reason also induces me to add the definition of contempt. + +V. _Contempt_ is the imagination of an object which so little touches +the mind that the mind is moved by the presence of the object to imagine +those qualities which are not in it rather than those which are in it. + +The definitions of veneration and scorn I pass by here, because they +give a name, so far as I know, to none of the emotions. + +VI. _Love_ is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause. + +_Explanation._--This definition explains with sufficient clearness the +essence of love; that which is given by some authors, who define love to +be the will of the lover to unite himself to the beloved object, +expresses not the essence of love but one of its properties. In as much +as these authors have not seen with sufficient clearness what is the +essence of love, they could not have a distinct conception of its +properties, and consequently their definition has by everybody been +thought very obscure. I must observe, however, when I say that it is a +property in a lover to will a union with the beloved object, that I do +not understand by will a consent or deliberation or a free decree of the +mind (for that this is a fiction we have demonstrated above), nor even a +desire of the lover to unite himself with the beloved object when it is +absent, nor a desire to continue in its presence when it is present, for +love can be conceived without either one or the other of these desires; +but by will I understand the satisfaction that the beloved object +produces in the lover by its presence, by virtue of which the joy of the +lover is strengthened, or at any rate supported. + +VII. _Hatred_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of an external cause. + +_Explanation._--What is to be observed here will easily be seen from +what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition. + +VIII. _Inclination_ (_propensio_) is a joy with the accompanying idea of +some object as being accidentally the cause of joy. + +IX. _Aversion_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of some object which +is accidentally the cause of the sorrow. + +X. _Devotion_ is love towards an object which astonishes us. + +_Explanation._--Astonishment arises from the novelty of the object. If, +therefore, it should happen that we often imagine the object at which we +are astonished, we shall cease to be astonished at it, and hence we see +that the emotion of devotion easily degenerates into simple love. + +XI. _Derision_ is joy arising from the imagination that something we +despise is present in an object we hate. + +_Explanation._--In so far as we despise a thing we hate do we deny its +existence, and so far do we rejoice. But inasmuch as we suppose that a +man hates what he ridicules, it follows that this joy is not solid. + +XII. _Hope_ is a joy not constant, arising from the idea of something +future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt. + +XIII. _Fear_ is a sorrow not constant, arising from the idea of +something future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt. + +_Explanation._--From these definitions it follows that there is no hope +without fear nor fear without hope, for the person who wavers in hope +and doubts concerning the issue of anything is supposed to imagine +something which may exclude its existence, and so far, therefore, to be +sad, and consequently while he wavers in hope, to fear lest his wishes +should not be accomplished. So also the person who fears, that is to +say, who doubts whether what he hates will not come to pass, imagines +something which excludes the existence of what he hates, and therefore +is rejoiced, and consequently so far hopes that it will not happen. + +XIV. _Confidence_ is joy arising from the idea of a past or future +object from which cause for doubting is removed. + +XV. _Despair_ is sorrow arising from the idea of a past or future object +from which cause for doubting is removed. + +_Explanation._--Confidence, therefore, springs from hope and despair +from fear, whenever the reason for doubting the issue is taken away; a +case which occurs either because we imagine a thing past or future to be +present and contemplate it as present, or because we imagine other +things which exclude the existence of those which made us to doubt. + +For although we can never be sure about the issue of individual objects, +it may nevertheless happen that we do not doubt it. For elsewhere we +have shown that it is one thing not to doubt and another to possess +certitude, and so it may happen that from the image of an object either +past or future we are affected with the same emotion of joy or sorrow as +that by which we should be affected from the image of an object present. + +XVI. _Gladness_ (_gaudium_) is a joy with the accompanying idea of +something past, which, unhoped for, has happened. + +XVII. _Remorse_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of something past, +which, unhoped for, has happened. + +XVIII. _Commiseration_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of evil +which has happened to some one whom we imagine like ourselves. + +_Explanation._--Between commiseration and compassion there seems to be +no difference, excepting perhaps that commiseration refers rather to an +individual emotion and compassion to it as a habit. + +XIX. _Favor_ is love towards those who have benefited others. + +XX. _Indignation_ is hatred towards those who have injured others. + +_Explanation._--I am aware that these names in common bear a different +meaning. But my object is not to explain the meaning of words but the +nature of things, and to indicate them by words whose customary meaning +shall not be altogether opposed to the meaning which I desire to bestow +upon them. I consider it sufficient to have said this once for all. + +XXI. _Over-estimation_ consists in thinking too highly of another person +in consequence of our love for him. + +XXII. _Contempt_ consists in thinking too little of another person in +consequence of our hatred for him. + +_Explanation._--Over-estimation and contempt are therefore respectively +effects or properties of love or hatred, and so over-estimation may be +defined as love in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too much +of the beloved object; and, on the contrary, contempt may be defined as +hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too little of the +object he hates. + +XXIII. _Envy_ is hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he is sad +at the good fortune of another person and is glad when any evil happens +to him. + +_Explanation._--To envy is generally opposed compassion +(_misericordia_), which may therefore be defined as follows, +notwithstanding the usual signification of the word:-- + +XXIV. _Compassion_ is love in so far as it affects a man so that he is +glad at the prosperity of another person and is sad when any evil +happens to him. + +I pass now to consider other emotions which are attended by the idea of +something within us as the cause. + +XXV. _Self-satisfaction_ is the joy which is produced by contemplating +ourselves and our own power of action. + +XXVI. _Humility_ is the sorrow which is produced by contemplating our +impotence or helplessness. + +Self-satisfaction is opposed to humility in so far as we understand by +the former the joy which arises from contemplating our power of action, +but in so far as we understand by it joy attended with the idea of +something done, which we believe has been done by a free decree of our +mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we may thus define:-- + +XXVII. _Repentance_ is sorrow accompanied with the idea of something +done which we believe has been done by a free decree of our mind. + +It is not to be wondered at that sorrow should always follow all those +actions which are from _custom_ called wicked, and that joy should +follow those which are called good. But that this is chiefly the effect +of education will be evident from what we have before said. Parents, by +reprobating what are called bad actions, and frequently blaming their +children whenever they commit them, while they persuade them to what are +called good actions, and praise their children when they perform them, +have caused the emotions of sorrow to connect themselves with the +former, and those of joy with the latter. Experience proves this, for +custom and religion are not the same everywhere; but, on the contrary, +things which are sacred to some are profane to others, and what are +honorable with some are disgraceful with others. Education alone, +therefore, will determine whether a man will repent of any deed or boast +of it. + +XXVIII. _Pride_ is thinking too much of ourselves, through self-love. + +_Explanation._--Pride differs, therefore, from over-estimation, inasmuch +as the latter is related to an external object, but pride to the man +himself who thinks of himself too highly. As over-estimation, therefore, +is an effect or property of love, so pride is an effect or property of +self-love, and it may therefore be defined as love of ourselves or +self-satisfaction, in so far as it affects us so that we think too +highly of ourselves. + +To this emotion a contrary does not exist, for no one, through hatred of +himself, thinks too little of himself; indeed, we may say that no one +thinks too little of himself, in so far as he imagines himself unable to +do this or that thing. For whatever he imagines that he cannot do, that +thing he necessarily imagines, and by his imagination is so disposed +that he is actually incapable of doing what he imagines he cannot do. So +long, therefore, as he imagines himself unable to do this or that thing, +so long is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long it is +impossible for him to do it. If, however, we pay attention to what +depends upon opinion alone, we shall be able to conceive it possible for +a man to think too little of himself, for it may happen that while he +sorrowfully contemplates his own weakness he will imagine himself +despised by everybody, although nothing could be further from their +thoughts than to despise him. A man may also think too little of himself +if in the present he denies something of himself in relation to a future +time of which he is not sure; for example, when he denies that he can +conceive of nothing with certitude, and that he can desire and do +nothing which is not wicked and base. We may also say that a man thinks +too little of himself when we see that, from an excess of fear or shame, +he does not dare to do what others who are his equals dare to do. This +emotion, to which I will give the name of despondency, may therefore be +opposed to pride; for as self-satisfaction springs from pride, so +despondency springs from humility, and it may therefore be defined thus: + +XXIX. _Despondency_ is thinking too little of ourselves through sorrow. + +_Explanation._--We are, nevertheless, often in the habit of opposing +humility to pride, but only when we attend to their effects rather than +to their nature. For we are accustomed to call a man proud who boasts +too much, who talks about nothing but his own virtues and other people's +vices, who wishes to be preferred to everybody else, and who marches +along with that stateliness and pomp which belong to others whose +position is far above his. On the other hand, we call a man humble who +often blushes, who confesses his own faults and talks about the virtues +of others, who yields to every one, who walks with bended head, and who +neglects to adorn himself. These emotions, humility and despondency, are +very rare, for human nature, considered in itself, struggles against +them as much as it can, and hence those who have the most credit for +being abject and humble are generally the most ambitious and envious. + +XXX. Self-exaltation is joy with the accompanying idea of some action we +have done, which we imagine people praise. + +XXXI. _Shame_ is sorrow, with the accompanying idea of some action which +we imagine people blame. + +_Explanation._--A difference, however, is here to be observed between +shame and modesty. Shame is sorrow which follows a deed of which we are +ashamed. Modesty is the dread or fear of shame, which keeps a man from +committing any disgraceful act. To modesty is usually opposed impudence, +which indeed is not an emotion, as I shall show in the proper place; but +the names of emotions, as I have already said, are matters rather of +custom than indications of the nature of the emotions. I have thus +discharged the task which I set myself of explaining the emotions of +joy and sorrow. I will advance now to those which I ascribe to desire. + +XXXII. _Regret_ is the desire or longing to possess something, the +emotion being strengthened by the memory of the object itself, and at +the same time being restrained by the memory of other things which +exclude the existence of the desired object. + +_Explanation._--Whenever we recollect a thing, as we have often said, we +are thereby necessarily disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion +as if it were present before us. But this disposition or effort, while +we are awake, is generally restrained by the images of things which +exclude the existence of the thing which we recollect. Whenever, +therefore, we recollect a thing which affects us with any kind of joy, +we thereby endeavor to contemplate it with the same emotion of joy as if +it were present,--an attempt which is, however, immediately restrained +by the memory of that which excludes the existence of the thing. Regret, +therefore, is really a sorrow which is opposed to the joy which arises +from the absence of what we hate. But because the name _regret_ seems to +connect this emotion with desire, I therefore ascribe it to desire. + +XXXIII. _Emulation_ is the desire which is begotten in us of a thing +because we imagine that other persons have the same desire. + +_Explanation._--He who seeks flight because others seek it, he who fears +because he sees others fear, or even he who withdraws his hand and moves +his body as if his hand were burning because he sees that another person +has burnt his hand, such as these, I say, although they may indeed +imitate the emotion of another, are not said to emulate it; not because +we have recognized one cause for emulation and another for imitation, +but because it has been the custom to call that man only emulous who +imitates what we think noble, useful, or pleasant. + +XXXIV. _Thankfulness_ or _gratitude_ is the desire or endeavor of love +with which we strive to do good to others who, from a similar emotion of +love, have done good to us. + +XXXV. _Benevolence_ is the desire to do good to those whom we pity. + +XXXVI. _Anger_ is the desire by which we are impelled, through hatred, +to injure those whom we hate. + +XXXVII. _Vengeance_ is the desire which, springing from mutual hatred, +urges us to injure those who, from a similar emotion, have injured us. + +XXXVIII. _Cruelty_ or _ferocity_ is the desire by which a man is +impelled to injure any one whom we love or pity. + +_Explanation._--To cruelty is opposed mercy, which is not a passion, but +a power of the mind by which a man restrains anger and vengeance. + +XXXIX. _Fear_ is the desire of avoiding the greater of two dreaded evils +by the less. + +XL. _Audacity_ is the desire by which we are impelled to do something +which is accompanied with a danger which our equals fear to meet. + +XLI. A person is said to be _pusillanimous_ whose desire is restrained +by the fear of a danger which his equals dare to meet. + +_Explanation._--Pusillanimity, therefore, is nothing but the dread of +some evil which most persons do not usually fear, and therefore I do not +ascribe it to the emotions of desire. I wished, notwithstanding, to +explain it here, because in so far as we attend to desire, pusillanimity +is the true opposite of the emotion of audacity. + +XLII. _Consternation_ is affirmed of the man whose desire of avoiding +evil is restrained by astonishment at the evil which he fears. + +_Explanation._--Consternation is therefore a kind of pusillanimity. But +because consternation springs from a double fear, it may be more aptly +defined as that dread which holds a man stupefied or vacillating, so +that he cannot remove an evil. I say _stupefied_, in so far as we +understand his desire of removing the evil to be restrained by his +astonishment. I say also _vacillating_, in so far as we conceive the +same desire to be restrained by the fear of another evil which equally +tortures him, so that he does not know which of the two evils to avoid. + +XLIII. _Courtesy_ or _moderation_ is the desire of doing those things +which please men and omitting those which displease them. + +XLIV. _Ambition_ is the immoderate desire of glory. + +_Explanation._--Ambition is a desire which increases and strengthens all +the emotions, and that is the reason why it can hardly be kept under +control. For so long as a man is possessed by any desire, he is +necessarily at the same time possessed by this. _Every noble man_, says +Cicero, _is led by glory, and even the philosophers who write books +about despising glory place their names on the title-page_. + +XLV. _Luxuriousness_ is the immoderate desire or love of good living. + +XLVI. _Drunkenness_ is the immoderate desire and love of drinking. + +XLVII. _Avarice_ is the immoderate desire and love of riches. + +XLVIII. _Lust_ is the immoderate desire and love of sexual intercourse. + +_Explanation._--This desire of sexual intercourse is usually called +lust, whether it be held within bounds or not. I may add that the five +last-mentioned emotions have no contraries, for moderation is a kind of +ambition, and I have already observed that temperance, sobriety, and +chastity show a power and not a passion of the mind. Even supposing that +an avaricious, ambitious, or timid man refrains from an excess of +eating, drinking, or sexual intercourse, avarice, ambition, and fear are +not therefore the opposites of voluptuousness, drunkenness, or lust. For +the avaricious man generally desires to swallow as much meat and drink +as he can, provided only it belong to another person. The ambitious man, +too, if he hopes he can keep it a secret, will restrain himself in +nothing, and if he lives amongst drunkards and libertines, will be more +inclined to their vices just because he is ambitious. The timid man, +too, does what he does not will; and although, in order to avoid death, +he may throw his riches into the sea, he remains avaricious; nor does +the lascivious man cease to be lascivious because he is sorry that he +cannot gratify his desire. Absolutely, therefore, these emotions have +reference not so much to the acts themselves of eating and drinking as +to the appetite and love itself. Consequently nothing can be opposed to +these emotions but nobility of soul and strength of mind, as we shall +see afterwards. + +The definitions of jealousy and the other vacillations of the mind I +pass over in silence, both because they are compounded of the emotions +which we have already defined, and also because many of them have no +names,--a fact which shows that, for the purposes of life, it is +sufficient to know these combinations generally. Moreover, it follows +from the definitions of the emotions which we have explained that, they +all arise from desire, joy, or sorrow, or rather that there are none but +these three, which pass under names varying as their relations and +external signs vary. If, therefore, we attend to these primitive +emotions and to what has been said above about the nature of the mind, +we shall be able here to define the emotions in so far as they are +related to the mind alone. + +_General definition of the emotions._--Emotion, which is called _animi +pathema_, is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or +any part of it, a greater or less power of existence than before; and +this increase of power being given, the mind itself is determined to one +particular thought rather than to another. + +_Explanation._--I say, in the first place, that an emotion or passion of +the mind _is a confused idea_. For we have shown that the mind suffers +only in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. I say again, _by +which the mind affirms of its body, or any part of it, a greater or less +power of existence than before_. For all ideas which we possess of +bodies indicate the actual constitution of our body rather than the +nature of the external body; but this idea, which constitutes the form +of an emotion, must indicate or express the constitution of the body, or +of some part of it; which constitution the body or any part of it +possesses from the fact that its power of action or force of existence +is increased or diminished, helped or limited. But it is to be observed, +that when I say _a greater or less power of existence than before_, I do +not mean that the mind compares the present with the past constitution +of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the form of emotion +affirms something of the body which actually involves more or less +reality than before. Moreover, since the essence of the mind consists in +its affirmation of the actual existence of its body, and since we +understand by perfection the essence itself of the thing, it follows +that the mind passes to a greater or less perfection when it is able to +affirm of its body, or some part of it, something which involves a +greater or less reality than before. When, therefore, I have said that +the mind's power of thought is increased or diminished, I have wished to +be understood as meaning nothing else than that the mind has formed an +idea of its body, or some part of its body, which expresses more or less +reality than it had hitherto affirmed of the body. For the value of +ideas and the actual power of thought are measured by the value of the +object. Finally, I added, _which being given, the mind itself is +determined to one particular thought rather than to another_, that I +might also express the nature of desire in addition to that of joy and +sorrow, which is explained by the first part of the definition. + +I have now, I think, explained the principal emotions and vacillations +of the mind which are compounded of the three primary emotions, desire, +joy, and sorrow, and have set them forth through their first causes. +From what has been said it is plain that we are disturbed by external +causes in a number of ways, and that, like the waves of the sea agitated +by contrary winds, we fluctuate in our ignorance of our future and +destiny. I have said, however, that I have only explained the principal +mental complications, and not all which may exist. For by the same +method which we have pursued above it would be easy to show that love +unites itself to repentance, scorn, shame, etc.; but I think it has +already been made clear to all that the emotions can be combined in so +many ways, and that so many variations can arise, that no limits can be +assigned to their number. It is sufficient for my purpose to have +enumerated only those which are of consequence; the rest, of which I +have taken no notice, being more curious than important. + +There is one constantly recurring characteristic of love which I have +yet to notice, and that is, that while we are enjoying the thing which +we desired, the body acquires from that fruition a new disposition by +which it is otherwise determined, and the images of other things are +excited in it, and the mind begins to imagine and to desire other +things. For example, when we imagine anything which usually delights our +taste, we desire to enjoy it by eating it. But whilst we enjoy it the +stomach becomes full, and the constitution of the body becomes altered. +If, therefore, the body being now otherwise disposed, the image of the +food, in consequence of its being present, and therefore also the +effort or desire to eat it, become more intense, then this new +disposition of the body will oppose this effort or desire, and +consequently the presence of the food which we desired will become +hateful to us, and this hatefulness is what we call loathing or disgust. + +As for the external modifications of the body which are observed in the +emotions, such as trembling, paleness, sobbing, laughter, and the like, +I have neglected to notice them, because they belong to the body alone +without any relationship to the mind. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[26] Hence it follows that the mind is subject to passions in proportion +to the number of inadequate ideas which it has, and that it acts in +proportion to the number of adequate ideas which it has. + +[27] This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of any given +thing affirms and does not deny the existence of the thing; that is to +say, it posits the essence of the thing and does not negate it. So long, +therefore, as we attend only to the thing itself, and not to external +causes, we shall discover nothing in it which can destroy it. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMOTIONS + + +_The Association of the Emotions_ + +If the human body has at any time been simultaneously affected by two +bodies, whenever the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will +immediately remember the other. But the imaginations of the mind +indicate rather the modifications of our body than the nature of +external bodies, and therefore if the body, and consequently the mind, +has been at any time, simultaneously affected by two emotions, whenever +it is afterwards affected by one of them, it will also be affected by +the other. + +Let the mind be supposed to be affected at the same time by two +emotions, its power of action not being increased or diminished by one, +while it is increased or diminished by the other. From the preceding +proposition it is plain that when the mind is afterwards affected by the +first emotion through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) of itself +neither increases nor diminishes the mind's power of thinking, it will +at the same time be affected by the other emotion, which does increase +or diminish that power, that is to say, it will be affected with joy or +sorrow; and thus the thing itself will be the cause of joy or of sorrow, +not of itself, but accidentally. In the same way it can easily be shown +that the same thing may accidentally be the cause of desire. + +The fact that we have contemplated a thing with an emotion of joy or +sorrow, of which it is not the efficient cause, is a sufficient reason +for being able to love or hate it. + +We now understand why we love or hate certain things from no cause which +is known to us, but merely from sympathy or antipathy, as they say. To +this class, too, are to be referred those objects which affect us with +joy or sorrow solely because they are somewhat like objects which +usually affect us with those emotions. I know indeed that the writers +who first introduced the words "Sympathy" and "Antipathy" desired +thereby to signify certain hidden qualities of things, but nevertheless +I believe that we shall be permitted to understand by those names +qualities which are plain and well known. + +Anything may be accidentally the cause either of hope or fear. Things +which are accidentally the causes either of hope or fear are called good +or evil omens. In so far as the omens are the cause of hope and fear are +they the cause of joy or of sorrow, and consequently so far do we love +them or hate them, and endeavor to use them as means to obtain those +things for which we hope, or to remove them as obstacles or causes of +fear. Our natural constitution, too, is such that we easily believe the +things we hope for, and believe with difficulty those we fear, and we +think too much of the former and too little of the latter. Thus have +superstitions arisen, by which men are everywhere disquieted. I do not +consider it worth while to go any further, and to explain here all +those vacillations of mind which arise from hope and fear, since it +follows from the definition alone of these emotions that hope cannot +exist without fear, nor fear without hope. + +If we imagine a certain thing to possess something which resembles an +object which usually affects the mind with joy or sorrow, although the +quality in which the thing resembles the object is not the efficient +cause of these emotions, we shall nevertheless, by virtue of the +resemblance alone, love or hate the thing. + +If we have been affected with joy or sorrow by any one who belongs to a +class or nation different from our own, and if our joy or sorrow is +accompanied with the idea of this person as its cause, under the common +name of his class or nation, we shall not love or hate him merely, but +the whole of the class or nation to which he belongs. + + +_The Imitation and Reciprocation of the Emotions_ + +I + +The images of things are modifications of the human body, and the ideas +of these modifications represent to us external bodies as if they were +present, that is to say, these ideas involve both the nature of our own +body and at the same time the present nature of the external body. If, +therefore, the nature of the external body be like that of our body, +then the idea of the external body which we imagine will involve a +modification of our body like that of the external body. Therefore, if +we imagine any one who is like ourselves to be affected by a +modification, this imagination will express a modification of our body +like that modification, and therefore we shall be modified with a +similar modification ourselves, because we imagine something like us to +be modified with the same. If, on the other hand, we hate a thing which +is like ourselves, we shall so far be modified by a modification +contrary and not similar to that with which it is modified. + +If we imagine that a person enjoys a thing, that will be a sufficient +reason for making us love the thing and desiring to enjoy it. If we +imagine that a person enjoys a thing which only one can possess, we do +all we can to prevent his possessing it. His enjoyment of the thing is +an obstacle to our joy, and we endeavor to bring into existence +everything which we imagine conduces to joy, and to remove or destroy +everything opposed to it, or which we imagine conduces to sorrow. + +We see, therefore, that the nature of man is generally constituted so as +to pity those who are in adversity and envy those who are in prosperity, +and he envies with a hatred which is the greater in proportion as he +loves what he imagines another possesses. We see also that from the same +property of human nature from which it follows that men pity one another +it also follows that they are envious and ambitious. If we will consult +experience, we shall find that she teaches the same doctrine, especially +if we consider the first years of our life. For we find that children, +because their body is, as it were, continually in equilibrium, laugh and +cry merely because they see others do the same; whatever else they see +others do they immediately wish to imitate; everything which they think +is pleasing to other people they want. And the reason is, as we have +said, that the images of things are the modifications themselves of the +human body, or the ways in which it is modified by external causes and +disposed to this or that action. + + +II + +If we imagine that we are hated by another without having given him any +cause for it, we shall hate him in return. If we imagine that we have +given just cause for the hatred, we shall then be affected with shame. +This, however, rarely happens; we endeavor to affirm everything, both +concerning ourselves and concerning the beloved object which we imagine +will affect us or the object with joy, and, on the contrary, we endeavor +to deny everything that will affect either it or ourselves with sorrow. + +This reciprocity of hatred may also arise from the fact that hatred is +followed by an attempt to bring evil upon him who is hated. If, +therefore, we imagine that we are hated by any one else, we shall +imagine him as the cause of some evil or sorrow, and thus we shall be +affected with sorrow or apprehension accompanied with the idea of the +person who hates us as a cause; that is to say, we shall hate him in +return, as we have said above. + +If we imagine that the person we love is affected with hatred towards +us, we shall be agitated at the same time both with love and hatred. For +in so far as we imagine that we are hated are we determined to hate him +in return. But (by hypothesis) we love him notwithstanding, and +therefore we shall be agitated both by love and hatred. + +If we imagine that an evil has been brought upon us through the hatred +of some person towards whom we have hitherto been moved by no emotion, +we shall immediately endeavor to return that evil upon him. + +If we imagine that any one like ourselves is affected with hatred +towards an object like ourselves which we love, we shall hate him. If we +imagine that we are beloved by a person without having given any cause +for the love we shall love him in return. + +If we imagine that we have given just cause for love, we shall pride +ourselves upon it. This frequently occurs, and we have said that the +contrary takes place when we believe that we are hated by another +person. This reciprocal love, and consequently this attempt to do good +to the person who loves us, and who endeavors to do good to us, is +called _thankfulness_ or _gratitude_, and from this we can see how much +readier men are to revenge themselves than to return a benefit. + +If we imagine that we are loved by a person we hate, we shall at the +same time be agitated both by love and hatred. If the hatred prevail, we +shall endeavor to bring evil upon the person by whom we are loved. This +emotion is called Cruelty, especially if it is believed that the person +who loves has not given any ordinary reason for hatred. + + +_The "Herd Instinct"_ + +If we imagine men to love or hate a thing, we shall therefore love or +hate it; that is to say, we shall therefore rejoice or be sad at the +presence of the thing, and therefore we shall endeavor to do everything +which we imagine men[28] will look upon with joy, and, on the contrary, +we shall be averse to doing anything to which we imagine men are averse. + +He who imagines that he affects others with joy or sorrow will +necessarily be affected with joy or sorrow. But since man is conscious +of himself by means of the emotions by which he is determined to act; +therefore if a person has done anything which he imagines will affect +others with joy, he also will be affected with joy, accompanied with an +idea of himself as its cause; that is to say, he will look upon himself +with joy. If, on the other hand, he has done anything which he imagines +will affect others with sorrow, he will look upon himself with sorrow. + +If we imagine that a person loves, desires, or hates a thing which we +ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall on that account love, desire, +or hate the thing more steadily. If, on the other hand, we imagine that +he is averse to the thing we love or loves the thing to which we are +averse, we shall then suffer vacillation of mind. + +It follows from this proposition that every one endeavors as much as +possible to make others love what he loves, and to hate what he hates. +Hence the poet says: + + Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes; + Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat. + +This effort to make every one approve what we love or hate is in truth +ambition, and so we see that each person by nature desires that other +persons should live according to his way of thinking; but if every one +does this, then all are a hindrance to one another, and if every one +wishes to be praised or beloved by the rest, then they all hate one +another. + + +_The Varieties of Emotion_ + +Joy and sorrow, and consequently the emotions which are compounded of +these or derived from them, are passions. But we necessarily suffer in +so far as we have inadequate ideas, and only in so far as we have them; +that is to say, we necessarily suffer only in so far as we imagine, or +in so far as we are affected by a modification which involves the nature +of our body and that of an external body. The nature, therefore, of each +passion must necessarily be explained in such a manner, that the nature +of the object by which we are affected is expressed. The joy, for +example, which springs from an object _A_ involves the nature of that +object _A_, and the joy which springs from _B_ involves the nature of +that object _B_, and therefore these two emotions of joy are of a +different nature, because they arise from causes of a different nature. +In like manner the emotion of sorrow which arises from one object is of +a different kind from that which arises from another cause, and the same +thing is to be understood of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation of +mind, etc.; so that there are necessarily just as many kinds of joy, +sorrow, love, hatred, etc., as there are kinds of objects by which we +are affected. But desire is the essence itself or nature of a person in +so far as this nature is conceived from its given constitution as +determined towards any action, and therefore as a person is affected by +external causes with this or that kind of joy, sorrow, love, hatred, +etc., that is to say, as his nature is constituted in this or that way, +so must his desire vary and the nature of one desire differ from that of +another, just as the emotions from which each desire arises differ. +There are as many kinds of desires, therefore, as there are kinds of +joy, sorrow, love, etc., and, consequently (as we have just shown), as +there are kinds of objects by which we are affected. + +All emotions are related to desire, joy, or sorrow, as the definitions +show which we have given of those emotions. But desire is the very +nature or essence of a person and therefore the desire of one person +differs from the desire of another as much as the nature or essence of +the one differs from that of the other. Again, joy and sorrow are +passions by which the power of a person or his effort to persevere in +his own being is increased or diminished, helped, or limited. But by the +effort to persevere in his own being, in so far as it is related at the +same time to the mind and the body, we understand appetite and desire, +and therefore joy and sorrow are desire or appetite in so far as the +latter is increased, diminished, helped, or limited by external causes; +that is to say they are the nature itself of each person. + +The joy or sorrow of one person therefore differs from the joy or sorrow +of another as much as the nature or essence of one person differs from +that of the other, and consequently the emotion of one person differs +from the corresponding emotion of another. + +Hence it follows that the emotions of animals which are called +irrational (for after we have learned the origin of the mind we can in +no way doubt that brutes feel) differ from human emotions as much as +the nature of a brute differs from that of a man. Both the man and the +horse, for example, are swayed by the lust to propagate, but the horse +is swayed by equine lust and the man by that which is human. The lusts +and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must vary in the same way; +and so, although each individual lives contented with its own nature and +delights in it, nevertheless the life with which it is contented and its +joy are nothing but the idea or soul of that individual, and so the joy +of one differs in character from the joy of the other as much as the +essence of the one differs from the essence of the other. Finally, it +follows from the preceding proposition that the joy by which the +drunkard is enslaved is altogether different from the joy which is the +portion of the philosopher,--a thing I wished just to hint in passing. + + +_The Inconstancy of the Emotions_ + +The human body is affected by external bodies in a number of ways. Two +men, therefore, may be affected in different ways at the same time, and +therefore they can be affected by one and the same object in different +ways. Again the human body may be affected now in this and now in that +way, and consequently it may be affected by one and the same object in +different ways at different times. + +We thus see that it is possible for one man to love a thing and for +another man to hate it; for this man to fear what this man does not +fear, and for the same man to love what before he hated, and to dare to +do what before he feared. Again, since each judges according to his own +emotion what is good and what is evil, what is better and what is +worse, it follows that men may change in their judgment as they do in +their emotions, and hence it comes to pass that when we compare men, we +distinguish them solely by the difference in their emotions, calling +some brave, others timid, and others by other names. + +For example, I shall call a man _brave_ who despises an evil which I +usually fear, and if, besides this, I consider the fact that his desire +of doing evil to a person whom he hates or doing good to one whom he +loves is not restrained by that fear of evil by which I am usually +restrained, I call him _audacious_. On the other hand, the man who fears +an evil which I usually despise will appear _timid_, and if, besides +this, I consider that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil +which has no power to restrain me, I call him _pusillanimous_; and in +this way everybody will pass judgment. + +Finally, from this nature of man and the inconstancy of his judgment, in +consequence of which he often judges things from mere emotion, and the +things which he believes contribute to his joy or his sorrow, and which, +therefore, he endeavors to bring to pass or remove, are often only +imaginary--to say nothing about the uncertainty of things--it is easy to +see that a man may often be himself the cause of his sorrow or his joy, +or of being affected with sorrow or joy accompanied with the idea of +himself as its cause, so that we can easily understand what repentance +and what self-approval are. + +Love and hatred towards any object, for example, towards Peter, are +destroyed if the joy and the sorrow which they respectively involve be +joined to the idea of another cause; and they are respectively +diminished in proportion as we imagine that Peter has not been their +sole cause. + +For the same reason, love or hatred towards an object we imagine to be +free must be greater than towards an object which is under necessity. + +An object which we imagine to be free must be perceived through itself +and without others. If, therefore, we imagine it to be the cause of joy +or sorrow, we shall for that reason alone love or hate it, and that too +with the greatest love or the greatest hatred which can spring from the +given emotion. But if we imagine that the object which is the cause of +that emotion is necessary, then we shall imagine it as the cause of that +emotion, not alone, but together with other causes, and so our love or +hatred towards it will be less. + +Hence it follows that our hatred or love towards one another is greater +than towards other things, because we think we are free. + + +_The Power of Love Over Hate_ + +If we imagine that the person we hate is affected with hatred towards +us, a new hatred is thereby produced, the old hatred still remaining (by +hypothesis). If, on the other hand, we imagine him to be affected with +love towards us, in so far as we imagine it shall we look upon ourselves +with joy, and endeavor to please him; that is to say, in so far shall we +endeavor not to hate him nor to affect him with sorrow. This effort will +be greater or less as the emotion from which it arises is greater or +less, and, therefore, should it be greater than that which springs from +hatred, and by which we endeavor to affect with sorrow the object we +hate, then it will prevail and banish hatred from the mind. Hatred is +increased through return of hatred, but may be destroyed by love. + +Hatred which is altogether overcome by love passes into love, and the +love is therefore greater than if hatred had not preceded it. For if we +begin to love a thing which we hated, or upon which we were in the habit +of looking with sorrow, we shall rejoice for the very reason that we +love, and to this joy which love involves a new joy is added, which +springs from the fact that the effort to remove the sorrow which hatred +involves, is so much assisted, there being also present before us as the +cause of our joy the idea of the person whom we hated. + +Notwithstanding the truth of this proposition, no one will try to hate a +thing or will wish to be affected with sorrow in order that he may +rejoice the more; that is to say, no one will desire to inflict loss on +himself in the hope of recovering the loss, or to become ill in the hope +of getting well, inasmuch as every one will always try to preserve his +being and to remove sorrow from himself as much as possible. Moreover, +if it can be imagined that it is possible for us to desire to hate a +person in order that we may love him afterwards the more, we must always +desire to continue the hatred. For the love will be the greater as the +hatred has been greater, and therefore we shall always desire the hatred +to be more and more increased. Upon the same principle we shall desire +that our sickness may continue and increase in order that we may +afterwards enjoy the greater pleasure when we get well, and therefore we +shall always desire sickness, which is absurd. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[28] Both here and in what follows to whom we are moved by no emotion I +understand by the word _men_, men (Sp.). + + + + +THIRD PART + +ON MAN'S WELL-BEING + + +_All happiness or unhappiness solely depends upon the quality of the +object to which we are attached by love. Love for an object eternal and +infinite feeds the mind with joy alone, a joy that is free from all +sorrow_. + +SPINOZA. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +OF HUMAN BONDAGE + + +_Introductory_ + +The impotence of man to govern or restrain the emotions I call bondage, +for a man who is under their control is not his own master, but is +mastered by fortune, in whose power he is, so that he is often forced to +follow the worse, although he sees the better before him. I propose in +this part to demonstrate why this is, and also to show what of good and +evil the emotions possess. + +But before I begin I should like to say a few words about perfection and +imperfection, and about good and evil. If a man has proposed to do a +thing and has accomplished it, he calls it perfect, and not only he, but +every one else who has really known or has believed that he has known +the mind and intention of the author of that work will call it perfect +too. For example, having seen some work (which I suppose to be as yet +not finished), if we know that the intention of the author of that work +is to build a house, we shall call the house imperfect; while, on the +other hand, we shall call it perfect as soon as we see the work has been +brought to the end which the author had determined for it. But if we see +any work such as we have never seen before, and if we do not know the +mind of the workman, we shall then not be able to say whether the work +is perfect or imperfect. + +This seems to have been the first signification of these words; but +afterwards men began to form universal ideas, to think out for +themselves types of houses, buildings, castles, and to prefer some types +of things to others; and so it happened that each person called a thing +perfect which seemed to agree with the universal idea which he had +formed of that thing, and, on the other hand, he called a thing +imperfect which seemed to agree less with his typal conception, +although, according to the intention of the workman, it had been +entirely completed. This appears to be the only reason why the words +_perfect_ and _imperfect_ are commonly applied to natural objects which +are not made with human hands; for men are in the habit of forming, both +of natural as well as of artificial objects, universal ideas which they +regard as types of things, and which they think Nature has in view, +setting them before herself as types too; it being the common opinion +that she does nothing except for the sake of some end. When, therefore, +men see something done by Nature which does not altogether answer to +that typal conception which they have of the thing, they think that +Nature herself has failed or committed an error, and that she has left +the thing imperfect. + +Thus we see that the custom of applying the words _perfect_ and +_imperfect_ to natural objects has arisen rather from prejudice than +from true knowledge of them. For we have shown that Nature does nothing +for the sake of an end, for that eternal and infinite Being whom we call +God or Nature acts by the same necessity by which He exists; for we have +shown that He acts by the same necessity of nature as that by which He +exists. The reason or cause, therefore, why God or Nature acts and the +reason why He exists are one and the same. Since, therefore, He exists +for no end, He acts for no end; and since He has no principle or end of +existence, He has no principle or end of action. A final cause, as it is +called, is nothing, therefore, but human desire, in so far as this is +considered as the principle or primary cause of anything. For example, +when we say that the having a house to live in was the final cause of +this or that house, we merely mean that a man, because he imagined the +advantages of a domestic life, desired to build a house. Therefore, +having a house to live in, in so far as it is considered as a final +cause, is merely this particular desire, which is really an efficient +cause, and is considered as primary, because men are usually ignorant of +the causes of their desires; for, as I have often said, we are conscious +of our actions and desires, but ignorant of the causes by which we are +determined to desire anything. As for the vulgar opinion that Nature +sometimes fails or commits an error, or produces imperfect things, I +class it amongst those fictions mentioned above.[29] + +Perfection, therefore, and imperfection are really only modes of +thought; that is to say, notions which we are in the habit of forming +from the comparison with one another of individuals of the same species +or genus, and this is the reason why I have said that by reality and +perfection I understand the same thing; for we are in the habit of +referring all individuals in Nature to one genus, which is called the +most general; that is to say, to the notion of being, which embraces +absolutely all the individual objects in Nature. In so far, therefore, +as we refer the individual objects in Nature to this genus, and compare +them one with another, and discover that some possess more being or +reality than others, in so far do we call some more perfect than others; +and in so far as we assign to the latter anything which, like +limitation, termination, impotence, etc., involves negation, shall we +call them imperfect, because they do not affect our minds so strongly as +those we call perfect, but not because anything which really belongs to +them is wanting, or because Nature has committed an error. For nothing +belongs to the nature of anything excepting that which follows from the +necessity of the nature of the efficient cause, and whatever follows +from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause necessarily +happens. + +With regard to good and evil, these terms indicate nothing positive in +things considered in themselves, nor are they anything else than modes +of thought, or notions which we form from the comparison of one thing +with another. For one and the same thing may at the same time be both +good and evil or indifferent. Music, for example, is good to a +melancholy person, bad to one mourning, while to a deaf man it is +neither good nor bad. But although things are so, we must retain these +words. For since we desire to form for ourselves an idea of man upon +which we may look as a model of human nature, it will be of service to +us to retain these expressions in the sense I have mentioned. + +By _good_, therefore, I understand in the following pages everything +which we are certain is a means by which we may approach nearer and +nearer to the model of human nature we set before us. By _evil_, on the +contrary, I understand everything which we are certain hinders us from +reaching that model. Again, I shall call men more or less perfect or +imperfect in so far as they approach more or less nearly to this same +model. For it is to be carefully observed, that when I say that an +individual passes from a less to a greater perfection and _vice versa_, +I do not understand that from one essence or form he is changed into +another (for a horse, for instance, would be as much destroyed if it +were changed into a man as if it were changed into an insect), but +rather we conceive that his power of action, in so far as it is +understood by his own nature, is increased or diminished. Finally, by +perfection generally, I understand, as I have said, reality; that is to +say, the essence of any object in so far as it exists and acts in a +certain manner, no regard being paid to its duration. For no individual +thing can be said to be more perfect because for a longer time it has +persevered in existence; inasmuch as the duration of things cannot be +determined by their essence, the essence of things involving no fixed or +determined period of existence; any object, whether it be more or less +perfect, always being able to persevere in existence with the same force +as that with which it commenced existence. All things, therefore, are +equal in this respect. + + +_Definitions_ + +I.--By good, I understand that which we certainly know is useful to us. + +II. By evil, on the contrary, I understand that which we certainly know +hinders us from possessing anything that is good. + +With regard to these two definitions, see the close of the preceding. + +III. I call individual things contingent in so far as we discover +nothing, whilst we attend to their essence alone, which necessarily +posits their existence or which necessarily excludes it. + +IV. I call these individual things possible, in so far as we are +ignorant, whilst we attend to the cause from which they must be +produced, whether these causes are determined to the production of these +things. + +V. By contrary emotions, I understand in the following pages those +which, although they may be of the same kind, draw a man in different +directions; such as voluptuousness and avarice, which are both a species +of love, and are not contrary to one another by nature, but only by +accident. + +VI. I here call a thing past or future in so far as we have been or +shall be affected by it; for example, in so far as we have seen a thing +or are about to see it, in so far as it has strengthened us or will +strengthen us, has injured or will injure us. For in so far as we thus +imagine it do we affirm its existence; that is to say, the body is +affected by no mode which excludes the existence of the thing, and +therefore the body is affected by the image of the thing in the same way +as if the thing itself were present. But because it generally happens +that those who possess much experience hesitate when they think of a +thing as past or future, and doubt greatly concerning its issue, +therefore the emotions which spring from such images of things are not +so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things, +until men become more sure of the issue. + +However, it is to be observed that it is the same with time as it is +with place; for as beyond a certain limit we can form no distinct +imagination of distance--that is to say, as we usually imagine all +objects to be equally distant from us, and as if they were on the same +plane, if their distance from us exceeds 200 feet, or if their distance +from the position we occupy is greater than we can distinctly +imagine--so we imagine all objects to be equally distant from the +present time, and refer them as if to one moment, if the period to which +their existence belongs is separated from the present by a longer +interval than we can usually imagine distinctly. + +VII. By end for the sake of which we do anything, I understand appetite. + +VIII. By virtue and power, I understand the same thing; that is to say, +virtue, in so far as it is related to man, is the essence itself or +nature of the man in so far as it has the power of effecting certain +things which can be understood through the laws of its nature alone. + + +_Axiom_ + +There is no individual thing in Nature which is not surpassed in +strength and power by some other thing; but any individual thing being +given, another and a stronger is also given, by which the former can be +destroyed. + + +_Man's Place in Nature_ + +The power by which individual things and, consequently, man preserve +their being is the actual power of God or Nature, not in so far as it is +infinite, but in so far as it can be manifested by the actual essence of +man. The power therefore of man, in so far as it is manifested by his +actual essence is part of the infinite power of God or Nature, that is +to say, part of His essence. Again, if it were possible that man could +suffer no changes but those which can be understood through his nature +alone, it would follow that he could not perish, but that he would exist +forever necessarily; and this necessary existence must result from a +cause whose power is either finite or infinite, that is to say, either +from the power of man alone, which would be able to place at a distance +from himself all other changes which could take their origin from +external causes, or it must result from the infinite power of Nature by +which all individual things would be so directed that man could suffer +no changes but those tending to his preservation. + +But the first case is absurd. The force by which man perseveres in +existence is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external +causes. This is evident from the Axiom. Therefore if it were possible +for a man to suffer no changes but those which could be understood +through his own nature alone, and consequently (as we have shown) that +he should always necessarily exist, this must follow from the infinite +power of God; and therefore from the necessity of the divine nature, in +so far as it is considered as affected by the idea of any one man, the +whole order of Nature, in so far as it is conceived under the attributes +of thought and extension, would have to be deduced. From this it would +follow that man would be infinite, which (by the first part of this +demonstration) is an absurdity. It is impossible, therefore, that a man +can suffer no changes but those of which he is the adequate cause. + +Hence it follows that a man is necessarily always subject to passions, +and that he follows and obeys the common order of Nature, accommodating +himself to it as far as the nature of things requires. The force and +increase of any passion and its perseverance in existence are not +limited by the power by which we endeavor to persevere in existence, but +by the power of an external cause compared with our own power. + + +_The Nature of Good and Evil_ + +We call a thing good which contributes to the preservation of our being, +and we call a thing evil if it is an obstacle to the preservation of our +being; that is to say, a thing is called by us good or evil as it +increases or diminishes, helps or restrains, our power of action. In so +far, therefore, as we perceive that any object affects us with joy or +sorrow do we call it good or evil, and therefore the knowledge of good +or evil is nothing but an idea of joy or sorrow which necessarily +follows from the emotion itself of joy or sorrow. But this idea is +united to the emotion in the same way as the mind is united to the body, +or, in other words, this idea is not actually distinguished from the +emotion itself; that is to say, it is not actually distinguished from +the idea of the modification of the body, unless in conception alone. +This knowledge, therefore, of good and evil is nothing but the emotion +itself of joy and sorrow in so far as we are conscious of it. + + +_The Control of the Emotions_ + +An emotion, in so far as it is related to the mind, is an idea by which +the mind affirms a greater or less power of existence for its body than +the body possessed before. Whenever, therefore, the mind is agitated by +any emotion, the body is at the same time affected with a modification +by which its power of action is increased or diminished. Again, this +modification of the body receives from its own cause a power to +persevere in its own being, a power, therefore, which cannot be +restrained nor removed unless by a bodily cause affecting the body with +a modification contrary to the first, and stronger than it. Thus the +mind is affected by the idea of a modification stronger than the former +and contrary to it; that is to say, it will be affected with an emotion +stronger than the former and contrary to it, and this stronger emotion +will exclude the existence of the other or remove it. Thus an emotion +cannot be restrained nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger +emotion. + +An emotion, in so far as it is related to the mind, cannot be restrained +nor removed unless by the idea of a bodily modification opposed to that +which we suffer and stronger than it. For the emotion which we suffer +cannot be restrained nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger +emotion; that is to say, it cannot be removed unless by the idea of a +bodily modification stronger than that which affects us, and opposed to +it. + +The force and increase of any passion and its perseverance in existence +are limited by the power of an external cause compared with our own +power and therefore the other actions or power of a man may be so far +surpassed by force of some passion or emotion, that the emotion may +obstinately cling to him. + +An emotion is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or less power +of existence for the body than it possessed before, and therefore this +idea has nothing positive which can be removed by the presence of the +truth, and consequently the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far +as it is true, can restrain no emotion. But in so far as it is an +emotion will it restrain any other emotion, provided that the latter be +the weaker of the two. + +From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as this is an +emotion, necessarily arises desire, which is greater in proportion as +the emotion from which it springs is greater. But this desire (by +hypothesis), because it springs from our understanding, something truly +follows therefore in us in so far as we act, and therefore must be +understood through our essence alone, and consequently its strength and +increase must be limited by human power alone. But the desires which +spring from the emotions by which we are agitated are greater as the +emotions themselves are greater, and therefore their strength and +increase must be limited by the power of external causes, a power which, +if it be compared with our own, indefinitely surpasses it. The desires, +therefore, which take their origin from such emotions as these may be +much stronger than that which takes its origin from a true knowledge of +good and evil, and the former may be able to restrain and extinguish the +latter. + +Desire is the very essence of man, that is to say, the effort by which a +man strives to persevere in his being. The desire, therefore, which +springs from joy, by that very emotion of joy is assisted or increased, +while that which springs from sorrow, by that very emotion of sorrow is +lessened or restrained, and so the force of the desire which springs +from joy must be limited by human power, together with the power of an +external cause, while that which springs from sorrow must be limited by +human power alone. The latter is, therefore, weaker than the former. + + +_How the Strength of the Emotions Varies_ + +I + +The imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates an object as +present, an idea which nevertheless indicates the constitution of the +human body rather than the nature of the external object. Imagination, +therefore, is an emotion in so far as it indicates the constitution of +the body. But the imagination increases in intensity in proportion as we +imagine nothing which excludes the present existence of the external +object. If, therefore, we imagine the cause of an emotion to be actually +present with us, that emotion will be intenser or stronger than if we +imagined the cause not to be present. + +When I said that we are affected by the image of an object in the future +or the past with the same emotion with which we should be affected if +the object we imagined were actually present, I was careful to warn the +reader that this was true in so far only as we attend to the image alone +of the object itself, for the image is of the same nature whether we +have imagined the object or not; but I have not denied that the image +becomes weaker when we contemplate as present other objects which +exclude the present existence of the future object. + +The image of a past or future object, that is to say, of an object which +we contemplate in relation to the past or future to the exclusion of the +present, other things being equal, is weaker than the image of a present +object, and consequently the emotion towards a future or past object, +other things being equal, is weaker then than the emotion towards a +present object. + +The desire which springs from a knowledge of good and evil can be easily +extinguished or restrained, in so far as this knowledge is connected +with the future, by the desire of things which in the present are sweet. + + +II + +In so far as we imagine any object to be necessary do we affirm its +existence, and, on the other hand, we deny its existence in so far as we +imagine it to be not necessary and therefore the emotion towards an +object which we imagine as necessary, other things being equal, is +stronger than that towards an object that is possible, contingent, or +not necessary. + +In so far as we imagine an object as contingent, we are not affected by +the image of any other object which posits the existence of the first, +but, on the contrary (by hypothesis), we imagine some things which +exclude its present existence. But in so far as we imagine any object in +the future to be possible do we imagine some things which posit its +existence, that is to say, things which foster hope or fear, and +therefore the emotion towards an object which we know does not exist in +the present, and which we imagine as possible, other things being equal, +is stronger than the emotion towards a contingent object. + +The emotion towards an object which we imagine to exist in the present +is stronger than if we imagined it as future, and is much stronger if we +imagine the future to be at a great distance from the present time. The +emotion, therefore, towards an object which we imagine will not exist +for a long time is so much feebler than if we imagined it as present, +and nevertheless is stronger than if we imagined it as contingent; and +therefore the emotion towards a contingent object is much feebler than +if we imagined the object to be present to us. + +In so far as we imagine an object as contingent, we are affected with no +image of any other object which posits the existence of the first. On +the contrary, we imagine (by hypothesis) certain things which exclude +its present existence. But in so far as we imagine it in relationship to +past time are we supposed to imagine something which brings it back to +the memory or which excites its image and therefore so far causes us to +contemplate it as present. Therefore, the emotion towards a contingent +object which we know does not exist in the present, other things being +equal, will be weaker than the emotion towards a past object. + +In these propositions I consider that I have explained why men are more +strongly influenced by an opinion than by true reason, and why the true +knowledge of good and evil causes disturbance in the mind, and often +gives way to every kind of lust, whence the saying of the poet, "_Video +meliora proboque, deteriora sequor._" The same thought appears to have +been in the mind of the Preacher when he said, "_He that increaseth +knowledge increaseth sorrow._" I say these things not because I would be +understood to conclude, therefore, that it is better to be ignorant than +to be wise, or that the wise man in governing his passions is nothing +better than the fool, but I say them because it is necessary for us to +know both the strength and weakness of our nature, so that we may +determine what reason can do and what it cannot do in governing our +emotions. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[29] Chapter Eight _ad fin._ + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MORAL LIFE + + +_Introductory_ + +I have briefly explained the causes of human impotence and want of +stability, and why men do not obey the dictates of reason. It remains +for me now to show what it is which reason prescribes to us, which +emotions agree with the rules of human reason, and which, on the +contrary, are opposed to these rules. Before, however, I begin to +demonstrate these things by our full method, I should like briefly to +set forth here these dictates of reason, in order that what I have in my +mind about them may be easily comprehended by all. + +Since reason demands nothing which is opposed to Nature, it demands, +therefore, that every person should love himself, should seek his own +profit--what is truly profitable to him--should desire everything that +really leads man to greater perfection, and absolutely that every one +should endeavor, as far as in him lies, to preserve his own being. This +is all true as necessarily as that the whole is greater than its part. +Again, since virtue means nothing but acting according to the laws of +our own nature, and since no one endeavors to preserve his being except +in accordance with the laws of his own nature, it follows: _Firstly_, +That the foundation of virtue is that endeavor itself to preserve our +own being, and that happiness consists in this--that a man can preserve +his own being. _Secondly_, It follows that virtue is to be desired for +its own sake, nor is there anything more excellent or more useful to us +than virtue, for the sake of which virtue ought to be desired. +_Thirdly_, It follows that all persons who kill themselves are impotent +in mind, and have been thoroughly overcome by external causes opposed to +their nature. + +Again, we can never free ourselves from the need of something outside us +for the preservation of our being, and we can never live in such a +manner as to have no intercourse with objects which are outside us. +Indeed, so far as the mind is concerned, our intellect would be less +perfect if the mind were alone, and understood nothing but itself. There +are many things, therefore, outside us which are useful to us, and +which, therefore, are to be sought. Of all these, none more excellent +can be discovered than those which exactly agree with our nature. If, +for example, two individuals of exactly the same nature are joined +together, they make up a single individual, doubly stronger than each +alone. Nothing, therefore, is more useful to man than man. Men can +desire, I say, nothing more excellent for the preservation of their +being than that all should so agree at every point that the minds and +bodies of all should form, as it were, one mind and one body; that all +should together endeavor as much as possible to preserve their being, +and that all should together seek the common good of all. From this it +follows that men who are governed by reason--that is to say, men who, +under the guidance of reason, seek their own profit--desire nothing for +themselves which they do not desire for other men, and that, therefore, +they are just, faithful, and honorable. + +These are those dictates of reason which I purposed briefly to set forth +before commencing their demonstration by a fuller method, in order that, +if possible, I might win the attention of those who believe that this +principle--that every one is bound to seek his own profit--is the +foundation of impiety, and not of virtue and piety. + + +_The Essence of Virtue_ + +I + +According to the laws of his own nature each person necessarily desires +that which he considers to be good, and avoids that which he considers +to be evil. + +The more each person strives and is able to seek his own profit, that is +to say, to preserve his being, the more virtue does he possess; on the +other hand, in so far as each person neglects his own profit, that is to +say, neglects to preserve his own being, is he impotent. + +No one, therefore, unless defeated by external causes and those which +are contrary to his nature, neglects to seek his own profit or preserve +his being. No one, I say, refuses food or kills himself from a necessity +of his nature, but only when forced by external causes. The compulsion +may be exercised in many ways. A man kills himself under compulsion by +another when that other turns the right hand, with which the man had by +chance laid hold of a sword, and compels him to direct the sword against +his own heart; or the command of a tyrant may compel a man, as it did +Seneca, to open his own veins, that is to say, he may desire to avoid a +greater evil by a less. External and hidden causes also may so dispose +his imagination and may so affect his body as to cause it to put on +another nature contrary to that which it had at first, and one whose +idea cannot exist in the mind; but a very little reflection will show +that it is as impossible that a man, from the necessity of his nature, +should endeavor not to exist, or to be changed into some other form, as +it is that something should be begotten from nothing. + +The endeavor after self-preservation is the essence itself of a thing. +If, therefore, any virtue could be conceived prior to this of +self-preservation, the essence itself of the thing would be conceived as +prior to itself, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. + +The endeavor after self-preservation is the primary and only foundation +of virtue. For prior to this principle no other can be conceived, and +without it no virtue can be conceived. + +No one endeavors to preserve his own being for the sake of another +object. For if a man endeavored to preserve his being for the sake of +any other object, this object would then become the primary foundation +of virtue (as is self-evident), which is an absurdity. + +No one can desire to be happy, to act well and live well, who does not +at the same time desire to be, to act, and to live, that is to say, +actually to exist. + + +II + +To act absolutely in conformity with virtue is nothing but acting +according to the laws of our own proper nature. But only in so far as +we understand do we act. Therefore, to act in conformity with virtue is +nothing but acting, living, and preserving our being as reason directs, +and doing so from the ground of seeking our own profit.[30] + +In so far as a man is determined to action because he has inadequate +ideas he suffers, that is to say, he does something which through his +essence alone cannot be perceived, that is to say, which does not follow +from his virtue. But in so far as he is determined to any action because +he understands, he acts, that is to say he does something which is +perceived through his essence alone, or which adequately follows from +his virtue. + + +_The Highest Virtue of Reason_ + +All efforts which we make through reason are nothing but efforts to +understand, and the mind, in so far as it uses reason, adjudges nothing +as profitable to itself excepting that which conduces to understanding. + +The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing but to understand, +nor does it adjudge anything to be profitable to itself excepting what +conduces to understanding. But the mind possesses no certitude, unless +in so far as it possesses adequate ideas, or in so far as it reasons. We +do not know, therefore, that anything is certainly good, excepting that +which actually conduces to understanding, and, on the other hand, we do +not know that anything is evil excepting that which can hinder us from +understanding. + +The highest thing which the mind can understand is God, that is to say, +Being absolutely infinite, and without whom nothing can be nor can be +conceived, and therefore that which is chiefly profitable to the mind, +or which is the highest good of the mind, is the knowledge of God. +Again, the mind acts only in so far as it understands and only in so far +can it be absolutely said to act in conformity with virtue. To +understand, therefore, is the absolute virtue of the mind. But the +highest thing which the mind can understand is God (as we have already +demonstrated), and therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to +understand or know God. + + +_THE MORAL VALUE OF THE EMOTIONS_ + +I + +_General Principles_ + +That which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many +ways, or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many +ways, is profitable to man, and is more profitable in proportion as by +its means the body becomes better fitted to be affected in many ways, +and to affect other bodies; on the other hand, that thing is injurious +which renders the body less fitted to affect or be affected. + +Whatever is effective to preserve the proportion of motion and rest +which the parts of the human body bear to each other is good, and, on +the contrary, that is evil which causes the parts of the human body to +have a different proportion of motion and rest to each other. + +In what degree these things may injure or profit the mind will be +explained below. Here I observe merely that I understand the body to die +when its parts are so disposed as to acquire a different proportion of +motion and rest to each other. For I dare not deny that the human body, +though the circulation of the blood and the other things by means of +which it is thought to live be preserved, may, nevertheless, be changed +into another nature altogether different from its own. No reason compels +me to affirm that the body never dies unless it is changed into a +corpse. Experience, indeed, seems to teach the contrary. It happens +sometimes that a man undergoes such changes that he cannot very well be +said to be the same man, as was the case with a certain Spanish poet of +whom I have heard, who was seized with an illness, and although he +recovered, remained, nevertheless, so oblivious of his past life that he +did not believe the tales and tragedies he had composed were his own, +and he might, indeed, have been taken for a grown-up child if he had +also forgotten his native tongue. But if this seems incredible, what +shall we say of children? The man of mature years believes the nature of +children to be so different from his own, that it would be impossible +to persuade him he had ever been a child, if he did not conjecture +regarding himself from what he sees of others. But in order to avoid +giving to the superstitious matter for new questions, I prefer to go no +farther in the discussion of these matters. + + +II + +_Value of Joy and Sorrow_ + +Joy is an emotion by which the body's power of action is increased or +assisted. Sorrow, on the other hand, is an emotion by which the body's +power of action is lessened or restrained, and therefore joy is not +directly evil, but good; sorrow, on the other hand, is directly evil. + + +III + +_The Good Emotions_ + +Cheerfulness is joy, which, in so far as it is related to the body, +consists in this, that all the parts of the body are equally affected, +that is to say, the body's power of action is increased or assisted, so +that all the parts acquire the same proportion of motion and rest to +each other. Cheerfulness, therefore, is always good, and can never be +excessive. But melancholy is sorrow, which, in so far as it is related +to the body consists in this, that the body's power of action is +absolutely lessened or restrained, and melancholy, therefore, is always +evil. + +Pleasurable excitement is joy, which, in so far as it is related to the +body, consists in this, that one or some of the parts of the body are +affected more than others. The power of this emotion may, therefore, be +so great as to overcome the other actions of the body. It may cling +obstinately to the body; it may impede the body in such a manner as to +render it less capable of being affected in many ways, and therefore may +be evil. Again, pain, which, on the contrary, is sorrow, considered in +itself alone cannot be good. But because its power and increase is +limited by the power of an external cause compared with our own power, +we can therefore conceive infinite degrees of strength of this emotion, +and infinite kinds of it, and we can therefore conceive it to be such +that it can restrain an excess of pleasurable excitement, and so far (by +the first part of this proposition) preventing the body from becoming +less capable. So far, therefore, will pain be good. + +Love is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause. Pleasurable +excitement, therefore with the accompanying idea of an external cause, +is love, and therefore love may be excessive. Again, desire is greater +as the emotion from which it springs is greater. Inasmuch, therefore, as +an emotion may overpower the other actions of a man, so also the desire +which springs from this emotion may also overpower the other desires, +and may therefore exist in the same excess which we have shown (in the +preceding proposition) that pleasurable excitement possesses. + +Cheerfulness, which I have affirmed to be good, is more easily imagined +than observed; for the emotions by which we are daily agitated are +generally related to some part of the body which is affected more than +the others, and therefore it is that the emotions exist for the most +part in excess, and so hold the mind down to the contemplation of one +object alone, that it can think about nothing else; and although men are +subject to a number of emotions, and therefore few are found who are +always under the control of one and the same emotion, there are not +wanting those to whom one and the same emotion obstinately clings. We +see men sometimes so affected by one object, that although it is not +present, they believe it to be before them; and if this happens to a man +who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or mad. Nor are those +believed to be less mad who are inflamed by love, dreaming about nothing +but a mistress or harlot day and night, for they excite our laughter. +But the avaricious man who thinks of nothing else but gain or money, and +the ambitious man who thinks of nothing but glory, inasmuch as they do +harm, and are, therefore, thought worthy of hatred, are not believed to +be mad. In truth, however, avarice, lust, etc., are a kind of madness, +although they are not reckoned amongst diseases. + + +IV + +_The Evil Emotions_ + +The man whom we hate we endeavor to destroy, that is to say we endeavor +to do something which is evil. Therefore hatred can never be good.[31] + +Envy, mockery, contempt, anger, revenge, and the other affects which are +related to hatred or arise from it, are evil. + +Everything which we desire because we are affected by hatred is base and +unjust in the State. + +I make a great distinction between mockery (which I have said is bad) +and laughter; for laughter and merriment are nothing but joy, and +therefore, provided they are not excessive, are in themselves good. +Nothing but a gloomy and sad superstition forbids enjoyment. For why is +it more seemly to extinguish hunger and thirst than to drive away +melancholy? My reasons and my conclusions are these: No God and no human +being, except an envious one, is delighted by my impotence or my +trouble, or esteems as any virtue in us tears, sighs, fears, and other +things of this kind, which are signs of mental impotence; on the +contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater +the perfection to which we pass thereby, that is to say, the more do we +necessarily partake of the divine nature. To make use of things, +therefore, and to delight in them as much as possible (provided we do +not disgust ourselves with them, which is not delighting in them), is +the part of a wise man. It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh +and invigorate himself with moderate and pleasant eating and drinking, +with sweet scents and the beauty of green plants, with ornament, with +music, with sports, with the theater, and with all things of this kind +which one man can enjoy without hurting another. For the human body is +composed of a great number of parts of diverse nature, which constantly +need new and varied nourishment, in order that the whole of the body may +be equally fit for everything which can follow from its nature, and +consequently that the mind may be equally fit to understand many things +at once. This mode of living best of all agrees both with our +principles and with common practice; therefore this mode of living is +the best of all, and is to be universally commended. There is no need, +therefore, to enter more at length into the subject. + +All emotions of hatred are evil and therefore the man who lives +according to the guidance of reason will strive as much as possible to +keep himself from being agitated by the emotions of hatred and, +consequently, will strive to keep others from being subject to the same +emotions. But hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and, on the +other hand, can be extinguished by love, so that hatred passes into +love. Therefore he who lives according to the guidance of reason will +strive to repay the hatred of another, etc., with love, that is to say, +with generosity. He who wishes to avenge injuries by hating in return +does indeed live miserably. But he who, on the contrary, strives to +drive out hatred by love, fights joyfully and confidently, with equal +ease resisting one man or a number of men, and needing scarcely any +assistance from fortune. Those whom he conquers yield gladly, not from +defect of strength, but from an increase of it. These truths, however, +all follow so plainly from the definitions alone of love and the +intellect, that there is no need to demonstrate them singly. + + +V + +_Necessary Evils_ + +(i) + +The emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without sorrow; for fear is +sorrow, and hope cannot exist without fear. Therefore these emotions +cannot be good of themselves, but only in so far as they are able to +restrain the excesses of joy. + +We may here add that these emotions indicate want of knowledge and +impotence of mind, and, for the same reason, confidence, despair, +gladness, and remorse are signs of weakness of mind. For although +confidence and gladness are emotions of joy, they nevertheless suppose +that sorrow has preceded them, namely, hope or fear. In proportion, +therefore, as we endeavor to live according to the guidance of reason, +shall we strive as much as possible to depend less on hope, to liberate +ourselves from fear, to rule fortune, and to direct our actions by the +sure counsels of reason. + +Humility is sorrow, which springs from this, that a man contemplates his +own weakness. But in so far as a man knows himself by true reason is he +supposed to understand his essence, that is to say, his power. If, +therefore, while contemplating himself, he perceives any impotence of +his, this is not due to his understanding himself, but, as we have +shown, to the fact that his power of actions is restrained. But if we +suppose that he forms a conception of his own impotence because he +understands something to be more powerful than himself, by the knowledge +of which he limits his own power of action, in this case we simply +conceive that he understands himself distinctly, and his power of action +is increased. Humility or sorrow, therefore, which arises because a man +contemplates his own impotence, does not spring from true contemplation +or reason, and is not a virtue, but a passion. + +Repentance is not a virtue, that is to say, it does not spring from +reason; on the contrary, the man who repents of what he has done is +doubly wretched or impotent. For, in the first place, we allow ourselves +to be overcome by a depraved desire, and, in the second place, by +sorrow. + +Inasmuch as men seldom live as reason dictates, therefore these two +emotions, humility and repentance, together with hope and fear, are +productive of more profit than disadvantage, and therefore, since men +must sin, it is better that they should sin in this way. For if men +impotent in mind were all equally proud, were ashamed of nothing, and +feared nothing, by what bonds could they be united or constrained? The +multitude becomes a thing to be feared if it has nothing to fear. It is +not to be wondered at, therefore, that the prophets, thinking rather of +the good of the community than of a few, should have commended so +greatly humility, repentance and reverence. Indeed, those who are +subject to these emotions can be led much more easily than others, so +that, at last, they come to live according to the guidance of reason, +that is to say, become free men, and enjoy the life of the blessed. + + +(ii) + +Pity is sorrow, and therefore is in itself evil. The good, however, +which issues from pity, namely, that we endeavor to free from misery the +man we pity, we desire to do from the dictate of reason alone; nor can +we do anything except by the dictate of reason alone, which we are sure +is good. Pity, therefore, in a man who lives according to the guidance +of reason is in itself bad and unprofitable. + +Hence it follows that a man who lives according to the dictates of +reason endeavors as much as possible to prevent himself from being +touched by pity. + +The man who has properly understood that everything follows from the +necessity of the divine nature, and comes to pass according to the +eternal laws and rules of Nature, will in truth discover nothing which +is worthy of hatred, laughter, or contempt, nor will he pity any one, +but, so far as human virtue is able, he will endeavor to _do well_, as +we say, and to _rejoice_. We must add also, that a man who is easily +touched by the emotion of pity, and is moved by the misery or tears of +another, often does something of which he afterward repents, both +because from an emotion we do nothing which we certainly know to be +good, and also because we are so easily deceived by false tears. But +this I say expressly of the man who lives according to the guidance of +reason. For he who is moved neither by reason nor pity to be of any +service to others is properly called inhuman; for he seems to be unlike +a man. + + +VI + +_Diseased Emotions_ + +The primary foundation of virtue is the preservation of our being +according to the guidance of reason. The man, therefore, who is ignorant +of himself is ignorant of the foundation of all the virtues, and +consequently is ignorant of all the virtues. Again, to act in conformity +with virtue is nothing but acting according to the guidance of reason, +and he who acts according to the guidance of reason must necessarily +know that he acts according to the guidance of reason. He, therefore, +who is ignorant of himself, and consequently (as we have just shown) +altogether ignorant of all the virtues, cannot in any way act in +conformity with virtue, that is to say, is altogether impotent in mind. +Therefore the greatest pride or despondency indicates the greatest +impotence of mind. + +Hence follows, with the utmost clearness, that the proud and the +desponding are above all others subject to emotions. + +Despondency, nevertheless, can be corrected more easily than pride, +since the former is an emotion of sorrow, while the latter is an emotion +of joy, and is therefore stronger than the former. + +Pride is joy arising from a man's having too high an opinion of himself. +This opinion a proud man will endeavor, as much as he can, to cherish, +and therefore, will love the presence of parasites or flatterers (the +definitions of these people are omitted, because they are too well +known), and will shun that of the noble-minded who think of him as is +right. + +It would take too much time to enumerate here all the evils of pride, +for the proud are subject to all emotions, but to none are they less +subject than to those of love and pity. It is necessary, however, to +observe here that a man is also called proud if he thinks too little of +other people, and so, in this sense, pride is to be defined as joy which +arises from the false opinion that we are superior to other people, +while despondency, the contrary to this pride, would be defined as +sorrow arising from the false opinion that we are inferior to other +people. This being understood, it is easy to see that the proud man is +necessarily envious, and that he hates those above all others who are +the most praised on account of their virtues. It follows, too, that his +hatred of them is not easily overcome by love or kindness and that he is +delighted by the presence of those only who humor his weakness, and from +a fool make him a madman. + +Although despondency is contrary to pride, the despondent man is closely +akin to the proud man. For since the sorrow of the despondent man arises +from his judging his own impotence by the power of virtue of others, his +sorrow will be mitigated, that is to say, he will rejoice, if his +imagination be occupied in contemplating the vices of others. Hence the +proverb-- It is a consolation to the wretched to have bad companions in +their misfortunes. On the other hand, the more the despondent man +believes himself to be below other people, the more will he sorrow; and +this is the reason why none are more prone to envy than the despondent; +and why they, above all others, try to observe men's actions with a view +to finding fault with them rather than correcting them, so that at last +they praise nothing but despondency and glory in it; but in such a +manner, however, as always to seem despondent. + +These things follow from this emotion as necessarily as it follows from +the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right +angles. It is true, indeed, that I have said that I call these and the +like emotions evil, in so far as I attend to human profit alone; but the +laws of Nature have regard to the common order of Nature of which man +is a part--a remark I desired to make in passing, lest it should be +thought that I talk about the vices and absurdities of men rather than +attempt to demonstrate the nature and properties of things. As I said, I +consider human emotions and their properties precisely as I consider +other natural objects; and, indeed, the emotions of man, if they do not +show his power, show at least the power and workmanship of Nature, no +less than many other things which we admire and delight to contemplate. + + +VII + +_Reasonable Emotions_ + +If we live according to the guidance of reason, we shall desire for +others the good which we seek for ourselves. Therefore if we see one +person do good to another, our endeavor to do good is assisted, that is +to say, we shall rejoice, and our joy (by hypothesis) will be +accompanied with the idea of the person who does good to the other, that +is to say, we shall favor him. Favor is not opposed to reason, but +agrees with it, and may arise from it. + +Indignation, as it is defined by us, is necessarily evil; but it is to +be observed that when the supreme authority, constrained by the desire +of preserving peace, punishes a citizen who injures another, I do not +say that it is indignant with the citizen, since it is not excited by +hatred to destroy him, but punishes him from motives of piety. + +Self-satisfaction is the joy which arises from a man's contemplating +himself and his power of action. But man's true power of action or his +virtue is reason itself, which he contemplates clearly and distinctly. +Self-satisfaction therefore arises from reason. Again, man, when he +contemplates himself, perceives nothing clearly and distinctly or +adequately, excepting those things which follow from his power of +action, that is to say, those things which follow from his power of +understanding; and therefore from this contemplation alone the highest +satisfaction which can exist arises. + +Self-satisfaction is indeed the highest thing for which we can hope, for +(as we have shown), no one endeavors to preserve his being for the sake +of any end. Again, because this self-satisfaction is more and more +nourished and strengthened by praise, and, on the contrary more and more +disturbed by blame, therefore we are principally led by glory, and can +scarcely endure life with disgrace. + +Self-exaltation is not opposed to reason, but may spring from it. + +What is called vainglory is self-satisfaction, nourished by nothing but +the good opinion of the multitude, so that when that is withdrawn, the +satisfaction, that is to say, the chief good which every one loves, +ceases. For this reason those who glory in the good opinion of the +multitude anxiously and with daily care strive, labor, and struggle to +preserve their fame. For the multitude is changeable and fickle, so that +fame, if it be not preserved, soon passes away. As every one, moreover, +is desirous to catch the praises of the people, one person will readily +destroy the fame of another; and consequently, as the object of +contention is what is commonly thought to be the highest good, a great +desire arises on the part of every one to keep down his fellows by every +possible means, and he who at last comes off conqueror boasts more +because he has injured another person than because he has profited +himself. This glory of self-satisfaction, therefore, is indeed vain, for +it is really no glory. + +What is worthy of notice with regard to shame may easily be gathered +from what has been said about compassion and repentance. I will only add +that pity, like shame, although it is not a virtue, is nevertheless +good, in so far as it shows that a desire of living uprightly is present +in the man who is possessed with shame, just as pain is called good in +so far as it shows that the injured part has not yet putrefied. A man, +therefore, who is ashamed of what he has done, although he is sorrowful, +is nevertheless more perfect that the shameless man who has no desire of +living uprightly. + +These are the things which I undertook to establish with regard to the +emotions of joy and sorrow. With reference to the desires, these are +good or evil as they spring from good or evil emotions. All of them, +however, in so far as they are begotten in us of emotions which are +passions, are blind, as may easily be inferred from what has been said, +nor would they be of any use if men could be easily persuaded to live +according to the dictates of reason alone. + + +_The Life of Virtue_ + +I + +All our efforts or desires follow from the necessity of our nature in +such a manner that they can be understood either through it alone as +their proximate cause, or in so far as we are a part of Nature, which +part cannot be adequately conceived through itself and without the other +individuals. + + +II + +The desires which follow from our nature in such a manner that they can +be understood through it alone, are those which are related to the mind, +in so far as it is conceived to consist of adequate ideas. The remaining +desires are not related to the mind, unless in so far as it conceives +things inadequately, whose power and increase cannot be determined by +human power, but by the power of objects which are without us. The first +kind of desires, therefore, are properly called actions, but the latter +passions; for the first always indicate our power, and the latter, on +the contrary, indicate our impotence and imperfect knowledge. + + +III + +Our actions, that is to say, those desires which are determined by man's +power or reason, are always good; the others may be good as well as +evil. + + +IV + +It is therefore most profitable to us in life to make perfect the +intellect or reason as far as possible, and in this one thing consists +the highest happiness or blessedness of man; for blessedness is nothing +but the peace of mind which springs from the intuitive knowledge of God, +and to perfect the intellect is nothing but to understand God, together +with the attributes and actions of God, which flow from the necessity +of His nature. The final aim, therefore, of a man who is guided by +reason, that is to say, the chief desire by which he strives to govern +all his other desires, is that by which he is led adequately to conceive +himself and all things which can be conceived by his intelligence. + + +V + +There is no rational life, therefore, without intelligence and things +are good only in so far as they assist man to enjoy that life of the +mind which is determined by intelligence. Those things alone, on the +other hand, we call evil which hinder man from perfecting his reason and +enjoying a rational life. + + +VI + +But because all those things of which man is the efficient cause are +necessarily good, it follows that no evil can happen to man except from +external causes, that is to say, except in so far as he is a part of the +whole of Nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey--compelled +also to accommodate himself to this whole of Nature in almost an +infinite number of ways. + + +VII + +It is impossible that a man should not be a part of Nature and follow +her common order; but if he be placed amongst individuals who agree with +his nature, his power of action will by that very fact be assisted and +supported. But if, on the contrary, he be placed amongst individuals who +do not in the least agree with his nature, he will scarcely be able +without great change on his part to accommodate himself to them. + + +VIII + +Anything that exists in Nature which we judge to be evil or able to +hinder us from existing and enjoying a rational life, we are allowed to +remove from us in that way which seems the safest; and whatever, on the +other hand, we judge to be good or to be profitable for the preservation +of our being or the enjoyment of a rational life, we are permitted to +take for our use and use in any way we may think proper; and absolutely, +every one is allowed by the highest right of Nature to do that which he +believes contributes to his own profit. + + +IX + +Nothing, therefore, can agree better with the nature of any object than +other individuals of the same kind, and so (see § VII) there is nothing +more profitable to man for the preservation of his being and the +enjoyment of a rational life than a man who is guided by reason. Again, +since there is no single thing we know which is more excellent than a +man who is guided by reason, it follows that there is nothing by which a +person can better show how much skill and talent he possesses than by so +educating men that at last they will live under the direct authority of +reason. + + +X + +In so far as men are carried away by envy or any emotion of hatred +towards one another, so far are they contrary to one another, and +consequently so much the more are they to be feared, as they have more +power than other individuals of nature. + + +XI + +Minds, nevertheless, are not conquered by arms, but by love and +generosity. + + +XII + +Above all things is it profitable to men to form communities and to +unite themselves to one another by bonds which may make all of them as +one man; and absolutely, it is profitable for them to do whatever may +tend to strengthen their friendships. + + +XIII + +But to accomplish this skill and watchfulness are required; for men are +changeable (those being very few who live according to the laws of +reason), and nevertheless generally envious and more inclined to +vengeance than pity. To bear with each, therefore, according to his +disposition and to refrain from imitating his emotions requires a +singular power of mind. But those, on the contrary, who know how to +revile men, to denounce vices rather than teach virtues, and not to +strengthen men's minds but to weaken them, are injurious both to +themselves and others, so that many of them through an excess of +impatience and a false zeal for religion prefer living with brutes +rather than amongst men; just as boys or youths, unable to endure with +equanimity the rebukes of their parents, fly to the army, choosing the +discomforts of war and the rule of a tyrant rather than the comforts of +home and the admonitions of a father, suffering all kinds of burdens to +be imposed upon them in order that they may revenge themselves upon +their parents. + + +XIV + +Although, therefore, men generally determine everything by their +pleasure, many more advantages than disadvantages arise from their +common union. It is better, therefore, to endure with equanimity the +injuries inflicted by them, and to apply our minds to those things which +subserve concord and the establishment of friendship. + + +XV + +The things which beget concord are those which are related to justice, +integrity, and honor; for besides that which is unjust and injurious, +men take ill also anything which is esteemed base, or that any one +should despise the received customs of the State. But in order to win +love, those things are chiefly necessary which have reference to +religion and piety. + + +XVI + +Concord, moreover, is often produced by fear, but it is without good +faith. It is to be observed, too, that fear arises from impotence of +mind, and therefore is of no service to reason; nor is pity, although it +seems to present an appearance of piety. + + +XVII + +Men also are conquered by liberality, especially those who have not the +means wherewith to procure what is necessary for the support of life. +But to assist every one who is needy far surpasses the strength or +profit of a private person, for the wealth of a private person is +altogether insufficient to supply such wants. Besides, the power of any +one man is too limited for him to be able to unite every one with +himself in friendship. The care, therefore, of the poor is incumbent on +the whole of society and concerns only the general profit. + + +XVIII + +In the receipt of benefits and in returning thanks, care altogether +different must be taken. + + +XIX + +The love of a harlot, that is to say, the lust of sexual intercourse, +which arises from mere external form, and absolutely all love which +recognizes any other cause than the freedom of the mind, easily passes +into hatred, unless, which is worse, it becomes a species of delirium, +and thereby discord is cherished rather than concord. + + +XX + +With regard to marriage, it is plain that it is in accordance with +reason, if the desire of connection is engendered not merely by external +form, but by a love of begetting children and wisely educating them; and +if, in addition, the love both of the husband and wife has for its cause +not external form merely, but chiefly liberty of mind. + + +XXI + +Flattery, too, produces concord, but only by means of the disgraceful +crime of slavery or perfidy; for there are none who are more taken by +flattery than the proud, who wish to be first and are not so. + + +XXII + +There is a false appearance of piety and religion in dejection; and +although dejection is the opposite of pride, the humble dejected man is +very near akin to the proud. + + +XXIII + +Shame also contributes to concord, but only with regard to those matters +which cannot be concealed. Shame, too, inasmuch as it is a kind of +sorrow, does not belong to the service of reason. + + +XXIV + +The remaining emotions of sorrow which have man for their object are +directly opposed to justice, integrity, honor, piety, and religion; and +although indignation may seem to present an appearance of equity, yet +there is no law where it is allowed to every one to judge the deeds of +another, and to vindicate his own or another's right. + + +XXV + +Affability, that is to say, the desire of pleasing men, which is +determined by reason, is related to piety. But if affability arise from +an emotion, it is ambition or desire, by which men, generally under a +false pretense of piety, excite discords and seditions. For he who +desires to assist other people, either by advice or by deed, in order +that they may together enjoy the highest good, will strive, above all +things, to win their love, and not to draw them into admiration, so +that a doctrine may be named after him, nor absolutely to give any +occasion for envy. In common conversation, too, he will avoid referring +to the vices of men, and will take care only sparingly to speak of human +impotence, while he will talk largely of human virtue or power, and of +the way by which it may be made perfect, so that men being moved not by +fear or aversion, but solely by the emotion of joy, may endeavor as much +as they can to live under the rule of reason. + + +XXVI + +Excepting man, we know no individual thing in Nature in whose mind we +can take pleasure, nor any thing which we can unite with ourselves by +friendship or any kind of intercourse, and therefore regard to our own +profit does not demand that we should preserve anything which exists in +Nature excepting men, but teaches us to preserve it or destroy it in +accordance with its varied uses, or to adapt it to our own service in +any way whatever. + + +XXVII + +The profit which we derive from objects without us, over and above the +experience and knowledge which we obtain because we observe them and +change them from their existing forms into others, is chiefly the +preservation of the body, and for this reason those objects are the most +profitable to us which can feed and nourish the body, so that all its +parts are able properly to perform their functions. For the more capable +the body is of being affected in many ways, and affecting external +bodies in many ways, the more capable of thinking is the mind. But there +seem to be very few things in Nature of this kind, and it is +consequently necessary for the requisite nourishment of the body to use +many different kinds of food; for the human body is composed of a great +number of parts of different nature, which need constant and varied food +in order that the whole of the body may be equally adapted for all those +things which can follow from its nature, and consequently that the mind +also may be equally adapted to conceive many things. + + +XXVIII + +The strength of one man would scarcely suffice to obtain these things if +men did not mutually assist one another. As money has presented us with +an abstract of everything, it has come to pass that its image above +every other usually occupies the mind of the multitude, because they can +imagine hardly any kind of joy without the accompanying idea of money as +its cause. + + +XXIX + +This, however, is a vice only in those who seek money not from poverty +or necessity, but because they have learned the arts of gain, by which +they keep up a grand appearance. As for the body itself, they feed it in +accordance with custom, but sparingly, because they believe that they +lose so much of their goods as they spend upon the preservation of their +body. Those, however, who know the true use of money, and regulate the +measure of wealth according to their needs, live contented with few +things. + + +XXX + +Since, therefore, those things are good which help the parts of the body +to perform their functions, and since joy consists in this, that the +power of man, in so far as he is made up of mind and body, is helped or +increased, it follows that all things which bring joy are good. But +inasmuch as things do not work to this end--that they may affect us with +joy--nor is their power of action guided in accordance with our profit, +and finally, since joy is generally related chiefly to some one part of +the body, it follows that generally the emotions of joy (unless reason +and watchfulness be present), and consequently the desires which are +begotten from them, are excessive. It is to be added, that an emotion +causes us to put that thing first which is sweet to us in the present, +and that we are not able to judge the future with an equal emotion of +the mind. + + +XXXI + +Superstition, on the contrary, seems to affirm that what brings sorrow +is good, and, on the contrary, that what brings joy is evil. But, as we +have already said, no one, excepting an envious man, is delighted at my +impotence or disadvantage, for the greater the joy with which we are +affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, and consequently +the more do we participate in the divine nature; nor can joy ever be +evil which is controlled by a true consideration for our own profit. On +the other hand, the man who is led by fear, and does what is good that +he may avoid what is evil, is not guided by reason. + + +XXXII + +But human power is very limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the +power of external causes, so that we do not possess an absolute power to +adapt to our service the things which are without us. Nevertheless we +shall bear with equanimity those things which happen to us contrary to +what a consideration of our own profit demands, if we are conscious that +we have performed our duty, that the power we have could not reach so +far as to enable us to avoid those things, and that we are a part of the +whole of Nature, whose order we follow. If we clearly and distinctly +understand this, the part of us which is determined by intelligence, +that is to say, the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied +therewith, and in that satisfaction will endeavor to persevere; for, in +so far as we understand, we cannot desire anything excepting what is +necessary, nor, absolutely, can we be satisfied with anything but the +truth. Therefore in so far as we understand these things properly will +the efforts of the better part of us agree with the order of the whole +of Nature. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[30] ... If it agreed better with a man's nature that he should hang +himself, could any reasons be given for his not hanging himself? Can +such a nature possibly exist? If so, I maintain (whether I do or do not +grant free will), that such an one, if he sees that he can live more +conveniently on the gallows than sitting at his own table, would act +most foolishly, if he did not hang himself. So any one who clearly saw +that, by committing crimes, he would enjoy a really more perfect and +better life and existence, than he could attain by the practice of +virtue, would be foolish if he did not act on his convictions. For, with +such a perverse human nature as his, crime would become virtue. _From a +letter to Wm. Blyenbergh_ (March 13, 1665). + +[31] It is to be observed that here and in the following I understand by +hatred, hatred towards men only. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + +OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE[32] + + +By the right and ordinance of Nature, I merely mean those natural laws +wherewith we conceive every individual to be conditioned by Nature, so +as to live and act in a given way. For instance, fishes are naturally +conditioned for swimming, and the greater for devouring the less; +therefore fishes enjoy the water, and the greater devour the less by +sovereign natural right. For it is certain that Nature, taken in the +abstract, has sovereign right to do anything she can; in other words, +her right is co-extensive with her power. The power of Nature is the +power of God, which has sovereign right over all things; and, inasmuch +as the power of Nature is simply the aggregate of the powers of all her +individual components, it follows that every individual has sovereign +right to do all that he can, in other words, the rights of an individual +extend to the utmost limits of his power as it has been conditioned. + +Now it is the sovereign law and right of Nature that each individual +should endeavor to preserve itself as it is, without regard to anything +but itself; therefore this sovereign law and right belongs to every +individual, namely, to exist and act according to its natural +conditions. We do not here acknowledge any difference between mankind +and other individual natural entities, nor between men endowed with +reason and those to whom reason is unknown; nor between fools, madmen, +and sane men. Whatsoever an individual does by the laws of its nature it +has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as it acts as it was conditioned +by Nature, and cannot act otherwise. Wherefore among men, so long as +they are considered as living under the sway of Nature, he who does not +yet know reason, or who has not yet acquired the habit of virtue, acts +solely according to the laws of his desire with as sovereign a right as +he who orders his life entirely by the laws of reason. + +That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that reason +dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also the +ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire +dictates, or to live according to the laws of desire. This is identical +with the teaching of Paul, who acknowledges that previous to the +law--that is, so long as men are considered of as living under the sway +of Nature, there is no sin. + +The natural right of the individual man is thus determined, not by sound +reason, but by desire and power. All are not naturally conditioned so as +to act according to the laws and rules of reason; nay, on the contrary, +all men are born ignorant, and before they can learn the right way of +life and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater part of their life, +even if they have been well brought up, has passed away. Nevertheless, +they are in the meanwhile bound to live and preserve themselves as far +as they can by the unaided impulses of desire. Nature has given them no +other guide, and has denied them the present power of living according +to sound reason; so that they are no more bound to live by the dictates +of an enlightened mind than a cat is bound to live by the laws of the +nature of a lion. + +Whatsoever, therefore, an individual, considered as under the sway of +Nature, thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or +impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to seek and to +take for himself as he best can, whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or +any other means; consequently he may regard as an enemy any one who +hinders the accomplishment of his purpose. + +It follows from what we have said that the right and ordinance of +Nature, under which all men are born, and under which they mostly live, +only prohibits such things as no one desires, and no one can attain: it +does not forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, +any of the means suggested by desire. + +This we need not wonder at, for Nature is not bounded by the laws of +human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation. +Her limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the eternal order +of Nature, wherein man is but a speck. It is by the necessity of this +alone that all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a +particular way. If anything, therefore, in Nature seems to us +ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we only know in part, and are +almost entirely ignorant of the order and interdependence of Nature as a +whole, and also because we want everything to be arranged according to +the dictates of our human reason; in reality that which reason considers +evil is not evil in respect to the order and laws of Nature as a whole, +but only in respect to the laws of our reason. + +Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live +according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said, +they have men's true good for their object. Moreover, every one wishes +to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this +would be quite impossible so long as every one did everything he liked, +and reason's claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger. +There is no one who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity, hatred, +anger and deceit, and who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can. +When we reflect that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must +needs live most miserably, ... we shall plainly see that men must +necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely and well +as possible if they are to enjoy, as a whole, the rights which naturally +belong to them as individuals, and their life should be no more +conditioned by the force and desire of individuals, but by the power and +will of the whole body. This end they will be unable to attain if desire +be their only guide, for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a +different direction; they must, therefore, most firmly decree and +establish that they will be guided in everything by reason, which nobody +will dare openly to repudiate lest he should be taken for a madman, and +will restrain any desire which is injurious to a man's fellows, that +they will do to all as they would be done by, and that they will defend +their neighbor's rights as their own. + +How such a compact as this should be entered into, how ratified and +established, we will now inquire. + +Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever neglects +anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of gaining a +greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does any one +endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or +gaining a greater good. That is, every one will, of two goods, choose +that which he thinks the greatest; and, of two evils that which he +thinks the least. I say advisedly that which he thinks the greatest or +the least, for it does not necessarily follow that he judges right. This +law is so deeply implanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted +among eternal truths and axioms. + +As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated, no one can +honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all things,[33] +and in general no one will abide by his promises, unless under the fear +of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good. An example will make +the matter clearer. Suppose that a robber forces me to promise that I +will give him my goods at his will and pleasure. It is plain (inasmuch +as my natural right is, as I have shown, co-extensive with my power) +that if I can free myself from this robber by stratagem, by assenting +to his demands, I have the natural right to do so, and to pretend to +accept his conditions. Or, again, suppose I have genuinely promised some +one that for the space of twenty days I will not taste food or any +nourishment; and suppose I afterwards find that my promise was foolish, +and cannot be kept without very great injury to myself; as I am bound by +natural law and right to choose the least of two evils, I have complete +right to break any compact, and act as if my promise had never been +uttered. I say that I should have perfect natural right to do so, +whether I was actuated by true and evident reason, or whether I was +actuated by mere opinion in thinking I had promised rashly; whether my +reasons were true or false, I should be in fear of a greater evil, +which, by the ordinance of Nature, I should strive to avoid by every +means in my power. + +We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid by its +utility, without which it becomes null and void. It is therefore foolish +to ask a man to keep his faith with us forever, unless we also endeavor +that the violation of the compact we enter into shall involve for the +violator more harm than good. This consideration should have very great +weight in forming a state. However, if all men could be easily led by +reason alone, and could recognize what is best and most useful for a +state, there would be no one who would not forswear deceit, for every +one would keep most religiously to their compact in their desire for the +chief good, namely, the preservation of the state, and would cherish +good faith above all things as the shield and buckler of the +commonwealth. However, it is far from being the case that all men can +always be easily led by reason alone; every one is drawn away by his +pleasure, while avarice, ambition, envy, hatred, and the like so engross +the mind that reason has no place therein. Hence, though men make +promises with all the appearances of good faith, and agree that they +will keep to their engagement, no one can absolutely rely on another +man's promise unless there is something behind it. Every one has by +Nature a right to act deceitfully, and to break his compacts, unless he +be restrained by the hope of some greater good, or the fear of some +greater evil. + +However, as we have shown that the natural right of the individual is +only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either +willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he +in so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and, further, +that the sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign +power, wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats +of the universally feared punishment of death. Such sovereign right he +will retain only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his +will; otherwise he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger +than he will be bound unwillingly to obey him. + +In this manner a society can be formed without any violation of natural +right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept--that is, if each +individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the +latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that +is, it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and every one will be +bound to obey, under pain of the severest punishment. A body politic of +this kind is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a society which +wields all its power as a whole. The sovereign power is not restrained +by any laws, but every one is bound to obey it in all things; such is +the state of things implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed +over to it all their power of self-defense, or in other words, all their +right. For if they had wished to retain any right for themselves, they +ought to have taken precautions for its defense and preservation. As +they have not done so, and indeed could not have done so without +dividing and consequently ruining the state, they placed themselves +absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign power; and, therefore, having +acted (as we have shown) as reason and necessity demanded, they are +obliged to fulfill the commands of the sovereign power, however absurd +these may be, else they will be public enemies, and will act against +reason, which urges the preservation of the state as a primary duty. For +reason bids us choose the lesser of two evils. + +Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the dominion and +will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light heart: for we +have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of imposing their +will, so long as they have the full power to enforce it. If such power +be lost their right to command is lost also, or lapses to those who have +assumed it and can keep it. Thus it is very rare for sovereigns to +impose thoroughly irrational commands, for they are bound to consult +their own interests, and retain their power by consulting the public +good and acting according to the dictates of reason, as Seneca says, +"_violenta imperia nemo continuit diu_." No one can long retain a +tyrant's sway. + +In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared: for it +is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it be +a large one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the +basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and +to bring men as far as possible under the control of reason, so that +they may live in peace and harmony. If this basis be removed the whole +fabric falls to ruin. + +Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty of +subjects is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to recognize no +right save that which it sanctions. + +It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects into slaves, +for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like; but this idea +is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he who is led away by +his pleasures and can neither see what is good for him nor act +accordingly: he alone is free who lives with free consent under the +entire guidance of reason. + +Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a certain sense, +but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave; all depends on the +object of the action. If the object of the action be the good of the +state, and not the good of the agent, the latter is a slave and does +himself no good; but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole +people, and not that of the ruler, is the supreme law, obedience to the +sovereign power does not make a man a slave, of no use to himself, but +a subject. Therefore, that state is the freest whose laws are founded on +sound reason, so that every member of it may, if he will, be free;[34] +that is, live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason. + +Children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of their +parents, are yet not slaves; for the commands of parents look generally +to the children's benefit. + +We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between a slave, a +son, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined. A slave is one +who is bound to obey his master's orders, though they are given solely +in the master's interest; a son is one who obeys his father's orders, +given in his own interest; a subject obeys the orders of the sovereign +power, given for the common interest, wherein he is included. + +I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a democracy. +I have especially desired to do so, for I believe it to be of all forms +of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual +liberty. In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he +has no further voice in affairs; he only hands it over to the majority +of a society, whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain, as they were in +the state of Nature, equals. + +This is the only form of government which I have treated of at length, +for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the benefits of +freedom in a state. + +I may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms of government, +for we may gather from what has been said whence their right arises +without going into its origin. The possessor of sovereign power, whether +he be one, or many, or the whole body politic, has the sovereign right +of imposing any commands he pleases; and he who has either voluntarily, +or under compulsion, transferred the right to defend him to another, +has, in so doing, renounced his natural right and is therefore bound to +obey, in all things, the commands of the sovereign power; and will be +bound so to do so long as the king, or nobles, or the people preserve +the sovereign power which formed the basis of the original transfer. I +need add no more. + +The bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed, we shall readily +be able to define private civil right, wrong, justice, and injustice, +with their relations to the state; and also to determine what +constitutes an ally, or an enemy, or the crime of treason. + +By private civil right we can only mean the liberty every man possesses +to preserve his existence, a liberty limited by the edicts of the +sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority. For when a man has +transferred to another his right of living as he likes, which was only +limited by his power, that is, has transferred his liberty and power of +self-defense, he is bound to live as that other dictates, and to trust +to him entirely for his defense. Wrong takes place when a citizen, or +subject, is forced by another to undergo some loss or pain in +contradiction to the authority of the law, or the edict of the sovereign +power. + +Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community; nor can it ever +accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has the right to +do what he likes. It can only arise, therefore, between private persons, +who are bound by law and right not to injure one another. Justice +consists in the habitual rendering to every man his lawful due; +injustice consists in depriving a man, under the pretense of legality, +of what the laws, rightly interpreted, would allow him. These last are +also called equity and inequity, because those who administer the laws +are bound to show no respect of persons, but to account all men equal, +and to defend every man's right equally, neither envying the rich nor +despising the poor. + +The men of two states become allies, when for the sake of avoiding war, +or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each other no hurt, +but, on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity arises, each +retaining his independence. Such a covenant is valid so long as its +basis of danger or advantage is in force: no one enters into an +engagement, or is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope +of some accruing good, or the fear of some evil: if this basis be +removed the compact thereby becomes void: this has been abundantly shown +by experience. For although different states make treaties not to harm +one another, they always take every possible precaution against such +treaties being broken by the stronger party, and do not rely on the +compact, unless there is a sufficiently obvious object and advantage to +both parties in observing it. Otherwise they would fear a breach of +faith, nor would there be any wrong done thereby; for who in his proper +senses, and aware of the right of the sovereign power, would trust in +the promises of one who has the will and the power to do what he likes, +and who aims solely at the safety and advantage of his dominion? +Moreover, if we consult loyalty and religion, we shall see that no one +in possession of power ought to abide by his promises to the injury of +his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises without breaking the +engagement he made with his subjects, by which both he and they are most +solemnly bound. + +An enemy is one who lives apart from the state, and does not recognize +its authority either as a subject or as an ally. It is not hatred which +makes a man an enemy, but the rights of the state. The rights of the +state are the same in regard to him who does not recognize by any +compact the state authority, as they are against him who has done the +state an injury. It has the right to force him, as best it can, either +to submit, or to contract an alliance. + +Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects, who by compact, +either tacit or expressed, have transferred all their rights to the +state. A subject is said to have committed this crime when he has +attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the sovereign power, or to +place it in different hands. I say, _has attempted_, for if punishment +were not to overtake him till he had succeeded, it would often come too +late, the sovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred +already. + +I also say, _has attempted, for whatever reasons, to seize the sovereign +power_, and I recognize no difference whether such an attempt should be +followed by public loss or public gain. Whatever be his reason for +acting, the crime is treason, and he is rightly condemned. In war, every +one would admit the justice of his sentence. If a man does not keep to +his post, but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his +commander, whatever may be his motive, so long as he acts on his own +motion, even if he advances with the design of defeating the enemy, he +is rightly put to death, because he has violated his oath, and infringed +the rights of his commander. That all citizens are equally bound by +these rights in time of peace, is not so generally recognized, but the +reasons for obedience are in both cases identical. The state must be +preserved and directed by the sole authority of the sovereign, and such +authority and right have been accorded by universal consent to him +alone. If, therefore, any one else attempts, without his consent, to +execute any public enterprise, even though the state might (as we said) +reap benefit therefrom, such person has none the less infringed the +sovereign's right, and would be rightly punished for treason. + +In order that every scruple may be removed, we may now answer the +inquiry, whether our former assertion that every one who has not the +practice of reason, may, in the state of Nature, live by sovereign +natural right, according to the laws of his desires, is not in direct +opposition to the law and right of God as revealed. For as all men +absolutely (whether they be less endowed with reason or more) are +equally bound by the Divine command to love their neighbor as +themselves, it may be said that they cannot, without wrong, do injury to +any one, or live according to their desires. + +This objection, so far as the state of Nature is concerned, can be +easily answered, for the state of Nature is, both in nature and in time, +prior to religion. No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to +God,[35] nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his reason, but +solely by revelation confirmed by signs. Therefore, previous to +revelation, no one is bound by a Divine law and right of which he is +necessarily in ignorance. The state of Nature must by no means be +confounded with a state of religion, but must be conceived as without +either religion or law, and consequently without sin or wrong. This is +how we have described it, and we are confirmed by the authority of Paul. +It is not only in respect of ignorance that we conceive the state of +Nature as prior to, and lacking the Divine revealed law and right; but +in respect of freedom also, wherewith all men are born endowed.... + +It may be insisted that sovereigns are as much bound by the Divine law +as subjects; whereas we have asserted that they retain their natural +rights, and may do whatever they like. + +In order to clear up the whole difficulty, which arises rather +concerning the natural right than the natural state, I maintain that +every one is bound, in the state of Nature, to live according to Divine +law, in the same way as he is bound to live according to the dictates of +sound reason; namely, inasmuch as it is to his advantage, and necessary +for his salvation; but, if he will not so live, he may do otherwise at +his own risk. He is thus bound to live according to his own laws, not +according to any one else's, and to recognize no man as a judge, or as a +superior in religion. Such, in my opinion, is the position of a +sovereign, for he may take advice from his fellow men, but he is not +bound to recognize any as a judge, nor any one besides himself as an +arbitrator on any question of right, unless it be a prophet sent +expressly by God and attesting his mission by indisputable signs. Even +then he does not recognize a man, but God Himself as his judge. + +If a sovereign refuses to obey God as revealed in His law, he does so at +his own risk and loss, but without violating any civil or natural +right. For the civil right is dependent on his own decree; and natural +right is dependent on the laws of Nature, which latter are not adapted +to religion, whose sole aim is the good of humanity, but to the order of +Nature--that is, to God's eternal decree unknown to us. + +This truth seems to be adumbrated in a somewhat obscurer form by those +who maintain that men can sin against God's revelation, but not against +the eternal decree by which He has ordained all things.... + +FOOTNOTES: + +[32] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. xvi, same title. + +[33] In the state of social life, where general right determines what is +good or evil, stratagem is rightly distinguished as of two kinds, good +and evil. But in the state of Nature, where every man is his own judge, +possessing the absolute right to lay down laws for himself, to interpret +them as he pleases, or to abrogate them if he thinks it convenient, it +is not conceivable that stratagem should be evil. + +[34] Whatever be the social state a man finds himself in, he may be +free. For certainly a man is free, in so far as he is led by reason. Now +reason (though Hobbes thinks otherwise) is always on the side of peace, +which cannot be attained unless the general laws of the state be +respected. Therefore the more a man is led by reason--in other words, +the more he is free, the more constantly will he respect the laws of his +country, and obey the commands of the sovereign power to which he is +subject. + +[35] When Paul says that men have in themselves no refuge, he speaks as +a man: for in the ninth chapter of the same Epistle he expressly teaches +that God has mercy on whom He will, and that men are without excuse, +only because they are in God's power like clay in the hands of a potter, +who out of the same lump makes vessels, some for honor and some for +dishonor, not because they have been forewarned. As regards the Divine +natural law whereof the chief commandment is, as we have said, to love +God, I have called it a law in the same sense, as philosophers style +laws those general rules of Nature, according to which everything +happens. For the love of God is not a state of obedience: it is a virtue +which necessarily exists in a man who knows God rightly. Obedience has +regard to the will of a ruler, not to necessity and truth. Now as we are +ignorant of the nature of God's will, and on the other hand know that +everything happens solely by God's power, we cannot, except through +revelation, know whether God wishes in any way to be honored as a +sovereign. + +Again; we have shown that the Divine rights appear to us in the light of +rights or commands, only so long as we are ignorant of their cause: as +soon as their cause is known, they cease to be rights, and we embrace +them no longer as rights but as eternal truths; in other words, +obedience passes into love of God, which emanates from true knowledge as +necessarily as light emanates from the sun. Reason then leads us to love +God, but cannot lead us to obey Him; for we cannot embrace the commands +of God as Divine, while we are in ignorance of their cause, neither can +we rationally conceive God as a sovereign laying down laws as a +sovereign. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +OF SUPREME AUTHORITIES + + +I + +_Of the Right of Supreme Authorities_[36] + +Under every dominion the state is said to be Civil; but the entire body +subject to a dominion is called a Commonwealth, and the general business +of the dominion, subject to the direction of him that holds it, has the +name of Affairs of State. Next we call men Citizens, as far as they +enjoy by the civil law all the advantages of the commonwealth, and +Subjects, as far as they are bound to obey its ordinances or laws. +Lastly ... of the civil state there are three kinds--democracy, +aristocracy and monarchy. Now, before I begin to treat of each kind +separately, I will first deduce all the properties of the civil state in +general. And of these, first of all comes to be considered the supreme +right of the commonwealth, or the right of the supreme authorities. + +It is clear that the right of the supreme authorities is nothing else +than simple natural right, limited, indeed, by the power, not of every +individual, but of the multitude, which is guided, as it were, by one +mind--that is, as each individual in the state of Nature, so the body +and mind of a dominion have as much right as they have power. And thus +each single citizen or subject has the less right, the more the +commonwealth exceeds him in power, and each citizen consequently does +and has nothing but what he may by the general decree of the +commonwealth defend. + +If the commonwealth grant to any man the right, and therewith the +authority (for else it is but a gift of words) to live after his own +mind, by that very act it abandons its own right, and transfers the same +to him, to whom it has given such authority. But if it has given this +authority to two or more, I mean authority to live each after his own +mind, by that very act it has divided the dominion, and if, lastly, it +has given this same authority to every citizen, it has thereby destroyed +itself, and there remains no more a commonwealth, but everything returns +to the state of Nature; all of which is very manifest from what goes +before. And thus it follows, that it can by no means be conceived, that +every citizen should by the ordinance of the commonwealth live after his +own mind, and accordingly this natural right of being one's own judge +ceases in the civil state. I say expressly "by the ordinance of the +commonwealth," for if we weigh the matter aright, the natural right of +every man does not cease in the civil state. For man, alike in the +natural and in the civil state, acts according to the laws of his own +nature, and consults his own interest. Man, I say, in each state is led +by fear or hope to do or leave undone this or that; but the main +difference between the two states is this, that in the civil state all +fear the same things, and all have the same ground of security, and +manner of life; and this certainly does not do away with the +individual's faculty of judgment. For he that is minded to obey all the +commonwealth's orders, whether through fear of its power or through love +of quiet, certainly consults after his own heart his own safety and +interest. + +Moreover, we cannot even conceive, that every citizen should be allowed +to interpret the commonwealth's decrees or laws. For were every citizen +allowed this, he would thereby be his own judge, because each would +easily be able to give a color of right to his own deeds, which by the +last section is absurd. + +We see, then, that every citizen depends not on himself, but on the +commonwealth, all whose commands he is bound to execute, and has no +right to decide, what is equitable or iniquitous, just or unjust. But, +on the contrary, as the body of the dominion should, so to speak, be +guided by one mind, and consequently the will of the commonwealth must +be taken to be the will of all; what the state decides to be just and +good must be held to be so decided by every individual. And so, however +iniquitous the subject may think the commonwealth's decisions, he is +none the less bound to execute them. + +But, it may be objected, is it not contrary to the dictate of reason to +subject oneself wholly to the judgment of another, and, consequently, is +not the civil state repugnant to reason? Whence it would follow that the +civil state is irrational, and could only be created by men destitute of +reason, not at all by such as are led by it. But since reason teaches +nothing contrary to Nature, sound reason cannot therefore dictate that +every one should remain independent, so long as men are liable to +passions, that is, reason pronounces against such independence. Besides, +reason altogether teaches to seek peace, and peace cannot be maintained, +unless the commonwealth's general laws be kept unbroken. And so, the +more a man is guided by reason, that is, the more he is free, the more +constantly he will keep the laws of the commonwealth, and execute the +commands of the supreme authority, whose subject he is. Furthermore, the +civil state is naturally ordained to remove general fear, and prevent +general sufferings, and therefore pursue above everything the very end, +after which every one, who is led by reason, strives, but in the natural +state strives vainly. Wherefore, if a man, who is led by reason, has +sometimes to do by the commonwealth's order what he knows to be +repugnant to reason, that harm is far compensated by the good, which he +derives from the existence of a civil state. For it is reason's own law, +to choose the less of two evils; and accordingly we may conclude that no +one is acting against the dictate of his own reason, so far as he does +what by the law of the commonwealth is to be done. And this any one will +more easily grant us, after we have explained how far the power and +consequently the right of the commonwealth extends. + +For, first of all, it must be considered that, as in the state of Nature +the man who is led by reason is most powerful and most independent, so +too that commonwealth will be most powerful and most independent which +is founded and guided by reason. For the right of the commonwealth is +determined by the power of the multitude, which is led, as it were, by +one mind. But this unity of mind can in no wise be conceived, unless the +commonwealth pursues chiefly the very end which sound reason teaches is +to the interest of all men. + +In the second place it comes to be considered that subjects are so far +dependent, not on themselves but on the commonwealth, as they fear its +power or threats, or as they love the civil state. Whence it follows, +that such things, as no one can be induced to do by rewards or threats, +do not fall within the rights of the commonwealth. For instance, by +reason of his faculty of judgment, it is in no man's power to believe. +For by what rewards or threats can a man be brought to believe that the +whole is not greater than its part, or that God does not exist, or that +that is an infinite being, which he sees to be finite, or, generally, +anything contrary to his sense or thought? So, too, by what rewards or +threats can a man be brought to love one whom he hates, or to hate one +whom he loves? And to this head must likewise be referred such things as +are so abhorrent to human nature, that it regards them as actually worse +than any evil, as that a man should be witness against himself, or +torture himself, or kill his parents, or not strive to avoid death, and +the like, to which no one can be induced by rewards or threats. But if +we still choose to say that the commonwealth has the right or authority +to order such things, we can conceive of it in no other sense than that +in which one might say that a man has the right to be mad or delirious. +For what but a delirious fancy would such a right be, as could bind no +one? And here I am speaking expressly of such things as cannot be +subject to the right of a commonwealth and are abhorrent to human nature +in general. For the fact that a fool or madman can by no rewards or +threats be induced to execute orders, or that this or that person, +because he is attached to this or that religion, judges the laws of a +dominion worse than any possible evil, in no wise makes void the laws of +the commonwealth, since by them most of the citizens are restrained. And +so, as those who are without fear or hope are so far independent, they +are, therefore, enemies of the dominion, and may lawfully be coerced by +force. + +Thirdly, and lastly, it comes to be considered that those things are not +so much within the commonwealth's right, which cause indignation in the +majority. For it is certain, that by the guidance of Nature men conspire +together, either through common fear, or with the desire to avenge some +common hurt; and as the right of the commonwealth is determined by the +common power of the multitude, it is certain that the power and right of +the commonwealth are so far diminished, as it gives occasion for many to +conspire together. There are certainly some subjects of fear for a +commonwealth, and as every separate citizen or in the state of Nature +every man, so a commonwealth is the less independent, the greater reason +it has to fear. So much for the right of supreme authorities over +subjects. Now before I treat of the right of the said authorities as +against others, we had better resolve a question commonly mooted about +religion. + +For it may be objected to us, Do not the civil state, and the obedience +of subjects, such as we have shown is required in the civil state, do +away with religion, whereby we are bound to worship God? But if we +consider the matter, as it really is, we shall find nothing that can +suggest a scruple. For the mind, so far as it makes use of reason, is +dependent, not on the supreme authorities, but on itself. And so the +true knowledge and the love of God cannot be subject to the dominion of +any, nor yet can charity towards one's neighbor. And if we further +reflect that the highest exercise of charity is that which aims at +keeping peace and joining in unity, we shall not doubt that he does his +duty, who helps every one, so far as the commonwealth's laws, that is, +so far as unity and quiet allow. As for external rites, it is certain, +that they can do no good or harm at all in respect of the true knowledge +of God, and the love which necessarily results from it; and so they +ought not to be held of such importance, that it should be thought worth +while on their account to disturb public peace and quiet. Moreover, it +is certain that I am not a champion of religion by the law of Nature, +that is, by the divine decree. For I have no authority, as once the +disciples of Christ had, to cast out unclean spirits and work miracles; +which authority is yet so necessary to the propagating of religion in +places where it is forbidden, that without it one not only, as they say, +wastes one's time[37] and trouble, but causes besides very many +inconveniences, whereof all ages have seen most mournful examples. Every +one therefore, wherever he may be, can worship God with true religion, +and mind his own business, which is the duty of a private man. But the +care of propagating religion should be left to God, or the supreme +authorities, upon whom alone falls the charge of affairs of state. But I +return to my subject. + +After explaining the right of supreme authorities over citizens and the +duty of subjects, it remains to consider the right of such authorities +against the world at large, which is now easily intelligible from what +has been said. For since the right of the supreme authorities is nothing +else but simple natural right, it follows that two dominions stand +towards each other in the same relation as do two men in the state of +Nature, with this exception, that a commonwealth can provide against +being oppressed by another; which a man in the state of Nature cannot +do, seeing that he is overcome daily by sleep, often by disease or +mental infirmity, and in the end by old age, and is besides liable to +other inconveniences, from which a commonwealth can secure itself. + +A commonwealth, then, is so far independent, as it can plan and provide +against oppression by another, and so far dependent on another +commonwealth, as it fears that other's power, or is hindered by it from +executing its own wishes, or, lastly, as it needs its help for its own +preservation or increase. For we cannot at all doubt, that if two +commonwealths are willing to offer each other mutual help, both together +are more powerful, and therefore have more right, than either alone. + +But this will be more clearly intelligible if we reflect that two +commonwealths are naturally enemies. For men in the state of Nature are +enemies. Those, then, who stand outside a commonwealth, and retain +their natural rights, continue enemies. Accordingly, if one commonwealth +wishes to make war on another and employ extreme measures to make that +other dependent on itself, it may lawfully make the attempt, since it +needs but the bare will of the commonwealth for war to be waged. But +concerning peace it can decide nothing, save with the concurrence of +another commonwealth's will. When it follows that laws of war regard +every commonwealth by itself, but laws of peace regard not one, but at +the least two commonwealths, which are therefore called "contracting +parties." + +This "contract" remains so long unmoved as the motive for entering into +it, that is, fear of hurt or hope of gain, subsists. But take away from +either commonwealth this hope or fear, and it is left independent, and +the link, whereby the commonwealths were mutually bound, breaks of +itself. And therefore every commonwealth has the right to break its +contract, whenever it chooses, and cannot be said to act treacherously +or perfidiously in breaking its word, as soon as the motive of hope or +fear is removed. For every contracting party was on equal terms in this +respect, that whichever could first free itself of fear should be +independent, and make use of its independence after its own mind; and, +besides, no one makes a contract respecting the future, but on the +hypothesis of certain precedent circumstances. But when these +circumstances change, the reason of policy applicable to the whole +position changes with them; and therefore every one of the contracting +commonwealths retains the right of consulting its own interest, and +consequently endeavors, as far as possible, to be free from fear and +thereby independent, and to prevent another from coming out of the +contract with greater power. If then a commonwealth complains that it +has been deceived, it cannot properly blame the bad faith of another +contracting commonwealth, but only its own folly in having entrusted its +own welfare to another party, that was independent, and had for its +highest law the welfare of its own dominion. + +To commonwealths, which have contracted a treaty of peace, it belongs to +decide the questions which may be mooted about the terms or rules of +peace, whereby they have mutually bound themselves, inasmuch as laws of +peace regard not one commonwealth, but the commonwealths which contract +taken together. But if they cannot agree together about the conditions, +they by that very fact return to a state of war. + +The more commonwealths there are, that have contracted a joint treaty of +peace, the less each of them by itself is an object of fear to the +remainder, or the less it has the authority to make war. But it is so +much the more bound to observe the conditions of peace; that is, the +less independent, and the more bound to accommodate itself to the +general will of the contracting parties. + +But the good faith, inculcated by sound reason and religion, is not +hereby made void; for neither reason nor Scripture teaches one to keep +one's word in every case. For if I have promised a man, for instance, to +keep safe a sum of money he has secretly deposited with me, I am not +bound to keep my word, from the time that I know or believe the deposit +to have been stolen, but I shall act more rightly in endeavoring to +restore it to its owners. So likewise, if the supreme authority has +promised another to do something, which subsequently occasion or reason +shows or seems to show is contrary to the welfare of its subjects, it is +surely bound to break its word. As then Scripture only teaches us to +keep our word in general, and leaves to every individual's judgment the +special cases of exception, it teaches nothing repugnant to what we have +just proved. + +But that I may not have so often to break the thread of my discourse, +and to resolve hereafter similar objections, I would have it known that +all this demonstration of mine proceeds from the necessity of human +nature, considered in what light you will--I mean, from the universal +effort of all men after self-preservation, an effort inherent in all +men, whether learned or unlearned. And therefore, however one considers +men are led, whether by passion or by reason, it will be the same thing; +for the demonstration, as we have said, is of universal application. + + +II + +_Of the Functions of Supreme Authorities_[38] + +The right of the supreme authorities is limited by their power; the most +important part of that right is, that they are, as it were, the mind of +the dominion, whereby all ought to be guided; and accordingly, such +authorities alone have the right of deciding what is good, evil, +equitable or iniquitous, that is, what must be done or left undone by +the subjects severally or collectively. And, accordingly, they have the +sole right of laying down laws, and of interpreting the same, whenever +their meaning is disputed, and of deciding whether a given case is in +conformity with or violation of the laws; and, lastly, of waging war, +and of drawing up and offering propositions for peace, or of accepting +such when offered. + +As all these functions, and also the means required to execute them, are +matters which regard the whole body of the dominion, that is, are +affairs of state, it follows that affairs of state depend on the +direction of him only who holds supreme dominion. And hence it follows +that it is the right of the supreme authority alone to judge the deeds +of every individual, and demand of him an account of the same; to punish +criminals, and decide questions of law between citizens, or appoint +jurists acquainted with the existing laws, to administer these matters +on its behalf; and, further, to use and order all means to war and +peace, as to found and fortify cities, levy soldiers, assign military +posts, and order what it would have done, and, with a view to peace, to +send and give audience to ambassadors; and, finally, to levy the costs +of all this. + +Since, then, it is the right of the supreme authority alone to handle +public matters, or choose officials to do so, it follows that that +subject is a pretender to the dominion, who, without the supreme +council's knowledge, enters upon any public matter, although he believe +that his design will be to the best interest of the commonwealth. + +But it is often asked, whether the supreme authority is bound by laws, +and, consequently, whether it can do wrong. Now as the words "law" and +"wrong-doing" often refer not merely to the laws of a commonwealth, but +also to the general rules which concern all natural things, and +especially to the general rules of reason, we cannot, without +qualification, say that the commonwealth is bound by no laws, or can do +no wrong. For were the commonwealth bound by no laws or rules, which +removed, the commonwealth were no commonwealth, we should have to regard +it not as a natural thing, but as a chimera. A commonwealth then does +wrong, when it does, or suffers to be done, things which may be the +cause of its own ruin; and we can say that it then does wrong, in the +sense in which philosophers or doctors say that Nature does wrong; and +in this sense we can say, that a commonwealth does wrong, when it acts +against the dictate of reason. For a commonwealth is most independent +when it acts according to the dictate of reason; so far, then, as it +acts against reason, it fails itself, or does wrong. And we shall be +able more easily to understand this if we reflect that when we say, that +a man can do what he will with his own, this authority must be limited +not only by the power of the agent, but by the capacity of the object. +If, for instance, I say that I can rightfully do what I will with this +table, I do not certainly mean that I have the right to make it eat +grass. So, too, though we say, that men depend not on themselves, but on +the commonwealth, we do not mean, that men lose their human nature and +put on another; nor yet that the commonwealth has the right to make men +wish for this or that, or (what is just as impossible) regard with +honor things which excite ridicule or disgust. But it is implied that +there are certain intervening circumstances which supposed, one likewise +supposes the reverence and fear of the subjects towards the +commonwealth, and which abstracted, one makes abstraction likewise of +that fear and reverence, and therewith of the commonwealth itself. The +commonwealth, then, to maintain its independence, is bound to preserve +the causes of fear and reverence, otherwise it ceases to be a +commonwealth. For the person or persons that hold dominion can no more +combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or +naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage-player, or the +open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves, than they can +combine existence with non-existence. But to proceed to slay and rob +subjects, ravish maidens, and the like, turns fear into indignation and +the civil state into a state of enmity. + +We see, then, in what sense we may say, that a commonwealth is bound by +laws and can do wrong. But if by "law" we understand civil law, and by +"wrong" that which, by civil law, is forbidden to be done, that is, if +these words be taken in their proper sense, we cannot at all say that a +commonwealth is bound by laws or can do wrong. For the maxims and +motives of fear and reverence which a commonwealth is bound to observe +in its own interest, pertain not to civil jurisprudence, but to the law +of Nature, since they cannot be vindicated by the civil law, but by the +law of war. And a commonwealth is bound by them in no other sense than +that in which in the state of Nature a man is bound to take heed that +he preserve his independence and be not his own enemy, lest he should +destroy himself; and in this taking heed lies not the subjection, but +the liberty of human nature. But civil jurisprudence depends on the mere +decree of the commonwealth, which is not bound to please any but itself, +nor to hold anything to be good or bad, but what it judges to be such +for itself. And, accordingly, it has not merely the right to avenge +itself, or to lay down and interpret laws, but also to abolish the same, +and to pardon any guilty person out of the fullness of its power. + +Contracts or laws, whereby the multitude transfers its right to one +council or man, should without doubt be broken, when it is expedient for +the general welfare to do so. But to decide this point, whether, that +is, it be expedient for the general welfare to break them or not, is +within the right of no private person, but of him only who holds +dominion; therefore of these laws he who holds dominion remains sole +interpreter. Moreover, no private person can by right vindicate these +laws, and so they do not really bind him who holds dominion. +Notwithstanding, if they are of such a nature that they cannot be broken +without at the same time weakening the commonwealth's strength, that is, +without at the same time changing to indignation the common fear of most +of the citizens, by this very fact the commonwealth is dissolved, and +the contract comes to an end; and therefore such contract is vindicated +not by the civil law, but by the law of war. And so he who holds +dominion is not bound to observe the terms of the contract by any other +cause than that, which bids a man in the state of Nature to beware of +being his own enemy, lest he should destroy himself. + + +III + +_Of the Best State of a Dominion_[39] + +We have shown that man is then most independent when he is most led by +reason, and, in consequence, that that commonwealth is most powerful and +most independent which is founded and guided by reason. But, as the best +plan of living, so as to assure to the utmost self-preservation, is that +which is framed according to the dictate of reason, therefore it follows +that that in every kind is best done, which a man or commonwealth does, +so far as he or it is in the highest degree independent. For it is one +thing to till a field by right, and another to till it in the best way. +One thing, I say, to defend or preserve oneself, and to pass judgment by +right, and another to defend or preserve oneself in the best way, and to +pass the best judgment; and, consequently, it is one thing to have +dominion and care of affairs of state by right, and another to exercise +dominion and direct affairs of state in the best way. And so, as we have +treated of the right of every commonwealth in general, it is time to +treat of the best state of every dominion. + +Now the quality of the state of any dominion is easily perceived from +the end of the civil state, which end is nothing else but peace and +security of life. And therefore that dominion is the best, where men +pass their lives in unity, and the laws are kept unbroken. For it is +certain, that seditions, wars, and contempt or breach of the laws are +not so much to be imputed to the wickedness of the subjects, as to the +bad state of a dominion. For men are not born fit for citizenship, but +must be made so. Besides, men's natural passions are everywhere the +same; and if wickedness more prevails, and more offenses are committed +in one commonwealth than in another, it is certain that the former has +not enough pursued the end of unity, nor framed its laws with sufficient +forethought; and that, therefore, it has failed in making quite good its +right as a commonwealth. For a civil state, which has not done away with +the causes of seditions, where war is a perpetual object of fear, and +where, lastly, the laws are often broken, differs but little from the +mere state of Nature, in which every one lives after his own mind at the +great risk of his life. + +But as the vices and inordinate license and contumacy of subjects must +be imputed to the commonwealth, so, on the other hand, their virtue and +constant obedience to the laws are to be ascribed in the main to the +virtue and perfect right of the commonwealth. And so it is deservedly +reckoned to Hannibal as an extraordinary virtue, that in his army there +never arose a sedition. + +Of a commonwealth, whose subjects are but hindered by terror from taking +arms, it should rather be said, that it is free from war, than that it +has peace. For peace is not mere absence of war, but is a virtue that +springs from force of character: for obedience is the constant will to +execute what, by the general decree of the commonwealth, ought to be +done. Besides, that commonwealth whose peace depends on the +sluggishness of its subjects, that are led about like sheep to learn +but slavery, may more properly be called a desert than a commonwealth. + +When, then, we call that dominion best, where men pass their lives in +unity, I understand a human life, defined not by mere circulation of the +blood, and other qualities common to all animals, but above all by +reason, the true excellence and life of the mind. + +But be it remarked that, by the dominion which I have said is +established for this end, I intend that which has been established by a +free multitude, not that which is acquired over a multitude by right of +war. For a free multitude is guided more by hope than fear; a conquered +one, more by fear than by hope: inasmuch as the former aims at making +use of life, the latter but at escaping death. The former, I say, aims +at living for its own ends, the latter is forced to belong to the +conqueror; and so we say that this is enslaved, but that free. And, +therefore, the end of a dominion, which one gets by right of war, is to +be master, and have rather slaves than subjects. And although between +the dominion created by a free multitude, and that gained by right of +war, if we regard generally the right of each, we can make no essential +distinction; yet their ends, as we have already shown, and further the +means to the preservation of each are very different. + +But what means a prince, whose sole motive is lust of mastery, should +use to establish and maintain his dominion, the most ingenious +Machiavelli has set forth at large,[40] but with what design one can +hardly be sure. If, however, he had some good design, as one should +believe of a learned man, it seems to have been to show, with how little +foresight many attempt to remove a tyrant, though thereby the causes +which make the prince a tyrant can in no wise be removed, but, on the +contrary, are so much the more established, as the prince is given more +cause to fear, which happens when the multitude has made an example of +its prince, and glories in the parricide as in a thing well done. +Moreover, he perhaps wished to show how cautious a free multitude should +be of entrusting its welfare absolutely to one man, who, unless in his +vanity he thinks he can please everybody, must be in daily fear of +plots, and so is forced to look chiefly after his own interest, and, as +for the multitude, rather to plot against it than consult its good. And +I am the more led to this opinion concerning that most far-seeing man, +because it is known that he was favorable to liberty, for the +maintenance of which he has besides given the most wholesome advice. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[36] From _A Political Treatise_, ch. iii, same title. + +[37] Literally, "oil and trouble"--a common proverbial expression in +Latin. + +[38] From _A Political Treatise_, ch. iv, same title. + +[39] From _A Political Treatise_, ch. v, same title. + +[40] In his book called "Il Principe," or "The Prince." + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII + +FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH[41] + + +If men's minds were as easily controlled as their tongues, every king +would sit safely on his throne, and government by compulsion would +cease; for every subject would shape his life according to the +intentions of his rulers, and would esteem a thing true or false, good +or evil, just or unjust, in obedience to their dictates. However, ... no +man's mind can possibly lie wholly at the disposition of another, for no +one can willingly transfer his natural right of free reason and +judgment, or be compelled so to do. For this reason government which +attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical, and it is considered +an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of subjects to +seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true, or rejected as false, +or what opinions should actuate men in their worship of God. All these +questions fall within a man's natural right, which he cannot abdicate +even with his own consent. + +I admit that the judgment can be biased in many ways, and to an almost +incredible degree, so that while exempt from direct external control it +may be so dependent on another man's words, that it may fitly be said to +be ruled by him; but although this influence is carried to great +lengths, it has never gone so far as to invalidate the statement that +every man's understanding is his own, and that brains are as diverse as +palates. + +Moses, not by fraud, but by Divine virtue, gained such a hold over the +popular judgment that he was accounted superhuman, and believed to speak +and act through the inspiration of the Deity; nevertheless, even he +could not escape murmurs and evil interpretations. How much less then +can other monarchs avoid them! Yet such unlimited power, if it exists at +all, must belong to a monarch, and least of all to a democracy, where +the whole or a great part of the people wield authority collectively. +This is a fact which I think every one can explain for himself. + +However unlimited, therefore, the power of a sovereign may be, however +implicitly it is trusted as the exponent of law and religion, it can +never prevent men from forming judgments according to their intellect, +or being influenced by any given emotion. It is true that it has the +right to treat as enemies all men whose opinions do not, on all +subjects, entirely coincide with its own; but we are not discussing its +strict rights, but its proper course of action. I grant that it has the +right to rule in the most violent manner, and to put citizens to death +for very trivial causes, but no one supposes it can do this with the +approval of sound judgment. Nay, inasmuch as such things cannot be done +without extreme peril to itself, we may even deny that it has the +absolute power to do them, or, consequently, the absolute right; for the +rights of the sovereign are limited by his power. + +Since, therefore, no one can abdicate his freedom of judgment and +feeling; since every man is by indefeasible natural right the master of +his own thoughts, it follows that men, thinking in diverse and +contradictory fashions, cannot, without disastrous results, be compelled +to speak only according to the dictates of the supreme power. Not even +the most experienced, to say nothing of the multitude, know how to keep +silence. Men's common failing is to confide their plans to others, +though there be need for secrecy, so that a government would be most +harsh which deprived the individual of his freedom of saying and +teaching what he thought; and would be moderate if such freedom were +granted. Still we cannot deny that authority may be as much injured by +words as by actions. Hence, although the freedom we are discussing +cannot be entirely denied to subjects, its unlimited concession would be +most baneful; we must, therefore, now inquire, how far such freedom can +and ought to be conceded without danger to the peace of the state, or +the power of the rulers. + +It follows, plainly, from the explanation given above, of the +foundations of a state, that the ultimate aim of government is not to +rule, or restrain by fear, nor to exact obedience, but, contrariwise, to +free every man from fear that he may live in all possible security; in +other words, to strengthen his natural right to exist and work without +injury to himself or others. + +No, the object of government is not to change men from rational beings +into beasts or puppets, but to enable them to develop their minds and +bodies in security, and to employ their reason unshackled; neither +showing hatred, anger or deceit, nor watched with the eyes of jealousy +and injustice. In fact, the true aim of government is liberty. + +Now we have seen that in forming a state the power of making laws must +either be vested in the body of the citizens, or in a portion of them, +or in one man. For, although men's free judgments are very diverse, each +one thinking that he alone knows everything, and although complete +unanimity of feeling and speech is out of the question, it is impossible +to preserve peace unless individuals abdicate their right of acting +entirely on their own judgment. Therefore, the individual justly cedes +the right of free action, though not of free reason and judgment; no one +can act against the authorities without danger to the state, though his +feelings and judgment may be at variance therewith; he may even speak +against them, provided that he does so from rational conviction, not +from fraud, anger or hatred, and provided that he does not attempt to +introduce any change on his private authority. + +For instance, supposing a man shows that a law is repugnant to sound +reason, and should therefore be repealed; if he submits his opinion to +the judgment of the authorities (who alone have the right of making and +repealing laws), and meanwhile acts in nowise contrary to that law, he +has deserved well of the state, and has behaved as a good citizen +should; but if he accuses the authorities of injustice, and stirs up the +people against them, or if he seditiously strives to abrogate the law +without their consent, he is a mere agitator and rebel. + +Thus we see how an individual may declare and teach what he believes, +without injury to the authority of his rulers, or to the public peace; +namely, by leaving in their hands the entire power of legislation as it +affects action, and by doing nothing against their laws, though he be +compelled often to act in contradiction to what he believes, and openly +feels, to be best. + +Such a course can be taken without detriment to justice and dutifulness, +nay, it is the one which a just and dutiful man would adopt. We have +shown that justice is dependent on the laws of the authorities, so that +no one who contravenes their accepted decrees can be just, while the +highest regard for duty, as we have pointed out, is exercised in +maintaining public peace and tranquillity. These could not be preserved +if every man were to live as he pleased. Therefore it is no less than +undutiful for a man to act contrary to his country's laws, for if the +practice became universal the ruin of states would necessarily follow. + +Hence, so long as a man acts in obedience to the laws of his rulers, he +in nowise contravenes his reason, for in obedience to reason he +transferred the right of controlling his actions from his own hands to +theirs. This doctrine we can confirm from actual custom, for in a +conference of great and small powers, schemes are seldom carried +unanimously, yet all unite in carrying out what is decided on, whether +they voted for or against. But I return to my proposition. + +From the fundamental notions of a state, we have discovered how a man +may exercise free judgment without detriment to the supreme power: from +the same premises we can no less easily determine what opinions would be +seditious. Evidently those which by their very nature nullify the +compact by which the right of free action was ceded. For instance, a +man who holds that the supreme power has no rights over him, or that +promises ought not to be kept, or that every one should live as he +pleases, or other doctrines of this nature in direct opposition to the +above-mentioned contract, is seditious, not so much from his actual +opinions and judgment, as from the deeds which they involve; for he who +maintains such theories abrogates the contract which tacitly, or openly, +he made with his rulers. Other opinions which do not involve acts +violating the contract, such as revenge, anger, and the like, are not +seditious, unless it be in some corrupt state, where superstitious and +ambitious persons, unable to endure men of learning, are so popular with +the multitude that their word is more valued than the law. + +However, I do not deny that there are some doctrines which, while they +are apparently only concerned with abstract truths and falsehoods, are +yet propounded and published with unworthy motives.... Reason should +nevertheless remain unshackled. If we hold to the principle that a man's +loyalty to the state should be judged, like his loyalty to God, from his +actions only--namely, from his charity towards his neighbors; we cannot +doubt that the best government will allow freedom of philosophical +speculation no less than of religious belief. I confess that from such +freedom inconveniences may sometimes arise, but what question was ever +settled so wisely than no abuses could possibly spring therefrom? He who +seeks to regulate everything by law is more likely to arouse vices than +to reform them. It is best to grant what cannot be abolished, even +though it be in itself harmful. How many evils spring from luxury, +envy, avarice, drunkenness and the like, yet these are tolerated--vices +as they are--because they cannot be prevented by legal enactments. How +much more, then, should free thought be granted, seeing that it is in +itself a virtue and that it cannot be crushed! Besides, the evil results +can easily be checked, as I will show, by the secular authorities, not +to mention that such freedom is absolutely necessary for progress in +science and the liberal arts: for no man follows such pursuits to +advantage unless his judgment be entirely free and unhampered. + +But let it be granted that freedom may be crushed, and men be so bound +down that they do not dare to utter a whisper, save at the bidding of +their rulers; nevertheless this can never be carried to the pitch of +making them think according to authority, so that the necessary +consequences would be that men would daily be thinking one thing and +saying another, to the corruption of good faith, that mainstay of +government, and to the fostering of hateful flattery and perfidy, whence +spring stratagems, and the corruption of every good art. + +It is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech, for the more +rulers strive to curtail freedom of speech the more obstinately are they +resisted; not indeed by the avaricious, the flatterers, and other +numskulls, who think supreme salvation consists in filling their +stomachs and gloating over their money-bags, but by those whom good +education, sound morality, and virtue have rendered more free. Men, as +generally constituted, are most prone to resent the branding as criminal +of opinions which they believe to be true, and the proscription as +wicked of that which inspires them with piety towards God and man; +hence they are ready to forswear the laws and conspire against the +authorities, thinking it not shameful but honorable to stir up seditions +and perpetuate any sort of crime with this end in view. Such being the +constitution of human nature, we see that laws directed against opinions +affect the generous minded rather than the wicked, and are adapted less +for coercing criminals than for irritating the upright; so that they +cannot be maintained without great peril to the state. + +Moreover, such laws are almost always useless, for those who hold that +the opinions proscribed are sound, cannot possibly obey the law; whereas +those who already reject them as false, accept the law as a kind of +privilege, and make such boast of it, that authority is powerless to +repeal it, even if such a course be subsequently desired. + +... And, lastly, how many schisms have arisen in the Church from the +attempt of the authorities to decide by law the intricacies of +theological controversy! If men were not allured by the hope of getting +the law and the authorities on their side, of triumphing over their +adversaries in the sight of an applauding multitude, and of acquiring +honorable distinctions, they would not strive so maliciously, nor would +such fury sway their minds. This is taught not only by reason but by +daily examples, for laws of this kind prescribing what every man shall +believe and forbidding any one to speak or write to the contrary, have +often been passed as sops or concessions to the anger of those who +cannot tolerate men of enlightenment, and who, by such harsh and crooked +enactments, can easily turn the devotion of the masses into fury and +direct it against whom they will. + +How much better would it be to restrain popular anger and fury, instead +of passing useless laws, which can only be broken by those who love +virtue and the liberal arts, thus paring down the state till it is too +small to harbor men of talent. What greater misfortune for a state can +be conceived than that honorable men should be sent like criminals into +exile, because they hold diverse opinions which they cannot disguise? +What, I say, can be more hurtful than that men who have committed no +crime or wickedness should, simply because they are enlightened, be +treated as enemies and put to death, and that the scaffold, the terror +of evil-doers, should become the arena where the highest examples of +tolerance and virtue are displayed to the people with all the marks of +ignominy that authority can devise? + +He that knows himself to be upright does not fear the death of a +criminal, and shrinks from no punishment. His mind is not wrung with +remorse for any disgraceful deed. He holds that death in a good cause is +no punishment, but an honor, and that death for freedom is glory. + +What purpose, then, is served by the death of such men, what example is +proclaimed? The cause for which they die is unknown to the idle and the +foolish, hateful to the turbulent, loved by the upright. The only lesson +we can draw from such scenes is to flatter the persecutor, or else to +imitate the victim. + +If formal assent is not to be esteemed above conviction, and if +governments are to retain a firm hold of authority and not be compelled +to yield to agitators, it is imperative that freedom of judgment should +be granted, so that men may live together in harmony, however diverse, +or even openly contradictory their opinions may be. We cannot doubt that +such is the best system of government and open to the fewest objections, +since it is the one most in harmony with human nature. In a democracy +(the most natural form of government) every one submits to the control +of authority over his actions, but not over his judgment and reason; +that is, seeing that all cannot think alike, the voice of the majority +has the force of law, subject to repeal if circumstances bring about a +change of opinion. In proportion as the power of free judgment is +withheld we depart from the natural condition of mankind, and +consequently the government becomes more tyrannical. + +In order to prove that from such freedom no inconvenience arises which +cannot easily be checked by the exercise of the sovereign power, and +that men's actions can easily be kept in bounds, though their opinions +be at open variance, it will be well to cite an example. Such an one is +not very far to seek. The city of Amsterdam reaps the fruit of this +freedom in its own great prosperity and in the admiration of all other +people. For in this most flourishing state, and most splendid city, men +of every nation and religion live together in the greatest harmony, and +ask no questions before trusting their goods to a fellow-citizen, save +whether he be rich or poor, and whether he generally acts honestly, or +the reverse. His religion and sect is considered of no importance: for +it has no effect before the judges in gaining or losing a cause, and +there is no sect so despised that its followers, provided that they harm +no one, pay every man his due, and live uprightly, are deprived of the +protection of the magisterial authority. + +On the other hand, when the religious controversy between Remonstrants +and Counter-Remonstrants began to be taken up by politicians and the +States, it grew into a schism, and abundantly showed that laws dealing +with religion and seeking to settle its controversies are much more +calculated to irritate than to reform, and that they give rise to +extreme license. Further, it was seen that schisms do not originate in a +love of truth, which is a source of courtesy and gentleness, but rather +in an inordinate desire for supremacy. From all these considerations it +is clearer than the sun at noonday, that the true schismatics are those +who condemn other men's writings, and seditiously stir up the +quarrelsome masses against their authors, rather than those authors +themselves, who generally write only for the learned, and appeal solely +to reason. In fact, the real disturbers of the peace are those who, in a +free state, seek to curtail the liberty of judgment which they are +unable to tyrannize over. + +I have thus shown:--I. That it is impossible to deprive men of the +liberty of saying what they think. II. That such liberty can be conceded +to every man without injury to the rights and authority of the sovereign +power, and that every man may retain it without injury to such rights, +provided that he does not presume upon it to the extent of introducing +any new rights into the state, or acting in any way contrary to the +existing laws. III. That every man may enjoy this liberty without +detriment to the public peace, and that no inconveniences arise +therefrom which cannot easily be checked. IV. That every man may enjoy +it without injury to his allegiance. V. That laws dealing with +speculative problems are entirely useless. VI. Lastly, that not only may +such liberty be granted without prejudice to the public peace, to +loyalty, and to the rights of rulers, but that it is even necessary for +their preservation. For when people try to take it away, and bring to +trial, not only the acts which alone are capable of offending, but also +the opinions of mankind, they only succeed in surrounding their victims +with an appearance of martyrdom, and raise feelings of pity and revenge +rather than of terror. Uprightness and good faith are thus corrupted, +flatterers and traitors are encouraged, and sectarians triumph, inasmuch +as concessions have been made to their animosity, and they have gained +the state sanction for the doctrines of which they are the interpreters. +Hence they arrogate to themselves the state authority and rights, and do +not scruple to assert that they have been directly chosen by God, and +that their laws are Divine, whereas the laws of the state are human, and +should therefore yield obedience to the laws of God--in other words, to +their own laws. Every one must see that this is not a state of affairs +conducive to public welfare. Wherefore, the safest way for a state is to +lay down the rule that religion is comprised solely in the exercise of +charity and justice, and that the rights of rulers in sacred, no less +than in secular matters, should merely have to do with actions, but that +every man should think what he likes and say what he thinks. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[41] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. xx, same title. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX + +OF HUMAN FREEDOM + + +_Introductory_ + +I pass at length to the other part of ethics which concerns the method +or way which leads to liberty. In [the following], therefore, I shall +treat of the power of reason, showing how much reason itself can control +the emotions, and then what is freedom of mind or blessedness. Thence we +shall see how much stronger the wise man is than the ignorant. In what +manner and what way the intellect should be rendered perfect, and with +what art the body is to be cared for in order that it may properly +perform its functions, I have nothing to do with here; for the former +belongs to logic, the latter to medicine. I shall occupy myself here, as +I have said, solely with the power of the mind or of reason, first of +all showing the extent and nature of the authority which it has over the +emotions in restraining them and governing them; for that we have not +absolute authority over them we have already demonstrated. The Stoics +indeed thought that the emotions depend absolutely on our will, and that +we are absolutely masters over them; but they were driven, by the +contradiction of experience, though not by their own principles, to +confess that not a little practice and study are required in order to +restrain and govern the emotions. This one of them attempted to +illustrate, if I remember rightly, by the example of two dogs, one of a +domestic and the other of a hunting breed; for he was able by habit to +make the house dog hunt, and the hunting dog, on the contrary, to desist +from running after hares. + +To the Stoical opinion Descartes much inclines. He affirms that the soul +or mind is united specially to a certain part of the brain called the +pineal gland, which the mind by the mere exercise of the will is able to +move in different ways, and by whose help the mind perceives all the +movements which are excited in the body and external objects. This +gland, he affirms, is suspended in the middle of the brain in such a +manner that it can be moved by the least motion of the animal spirits. +Again, he affirms that any variation in the manner in which the animal +spirits impinge upon this gland is followed by a variation in the manner +in which it is suspended in the middle of the brain, and moreover that +the number of different impressions on the gland is the same as that of +the different external objects which propel the animal spirits toward +it. Hence it comes to pass that if the gland, by the will of the soul +moving it in different directions, be afterwards suspended in this or +that way in which it had once been suspended by the spirits agitated in +this or that way, then the gland itself will propel and determine the +animal spirits themselves in the same way as that in which they had +before been repelled by a similar suspension of the gland. Moreover, he +affirmed that each volition of the mind is united in Nature to a certain +motion of the gland. For example, if a person wishes to behold a remote +object, this volition will cause the pupil of the eye to dilate, but if +he thinks merely of the dilation of the pupil, to have that volition +will profit him nothing, because Nature has not connected a motion of +the gland which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic +nerve in a way suitable for dilation or contraction of the pupil with +the volition or dilation or contraction, but only with the volition of +beholding objects afar off or close at hand. Finally, he maintained that +although each motion of this gland appears to be connected by Nature +from the commencement of our life with an individual thought, these +motions can nevertheless be connected by habit with other thoughts, a +proposition which he attempts to demonstrate in his "Passions of the +Soul" (art. 50, pt. 1). + +From this he concludes that there is no mind so feeble that it cannot, +when properly directed, acquire absolute power over its passions; for +passions, as defined by him, are "perceptions, or sensations, or +emotions of the soul which are related to it specially, and which (N.B.) +are produced, preserved, and strengthened by some motion of the +spirits." (See the "Passions of Soul," art. 27, pt. 1.) But since it is +possible to join to a certain volition any motion of the gland, and +consequently of the spirits, and since the determination of the will +depends solely on our power, we shall be able to acquire absolute +mastery over our passions provided only we determine our will by fixed +and firm decisions by which we desire to direct our actions and bind +with these decisions the movements of the passions we wish to have. + +So far as I can gather from his own words, this is the opinion of that +distinguished man, and I could scarcely have believed it possible for +one so great to have put it forward if it had been less subtle. I can +hardly wonder enough that a philosopher who firmly resolved to make no +deduction except from self-evident principles, and to affirm nothing but +what he clearly and distinctly perceived, and who blamed all the +Schoolmen because they desired to explain obscure matters by occult +qualities, should accept a hypothesis more occult than any occult +quality. + +What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and body? What +clear and distinct conception has he of thought intimately connected +with a certain small portion of matter? I wish that he had explained +this union by its proximate cause. But he conceived the mind to be so +distinct from the body that he was able to assign no single cause of +this union, nor of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to +the cause of the whole universe, that is to say, to God. Again, I should +like to know how many degrees of motion the mind can give to that pineal +gland, and with how great a power the mind can hold it suspended. For I +do not understand whether this gland is acted on by the mind more slowly +or more quickly than by the animal spirits, and whether the movements of +the passions, which we have so closely bound with firm decisions, might +not be separated from them again by bodily causes, from which it would +follow that although the mind had firmly determined to meet danger, and +had joined to this decision the motion of boldness, the sight of the +danger might cause the gland to be suspended in such a manner that the +mind could think of nothing but flight. Indeed, since there is no +relation between the will and motion, so there is no comparison between +the power or strength of the body and that of the mind, and consequently +the strength of the body can never be determined by the strength of the +mind. It is to be remembered also that this gland is not found to be so +situated in the middle of the brain that it can be driven about so +easily and in so many ways, and that all the nerves are not extended to +the cavities of the brain. + +Lastly, I omit all that Descartes asserts concerning the will and the +freedom of the will, since I have shown over and over again that it is +false. Therefore, inasmuch as the power of the mind, as I have shown +above, is determined by intelligence alone, we shall determine by the +knowledge of the mind alone the remedies against the emotions--remedies +which every one, I believe, has experienced, although there may not have +been any accurate observation or distinct perception of them, and from +this knowledge of the mind alone shall we deduce everything which +relates to its blessedness. + + +_Axioms_ + +I. If two contrary actions be excited in the same subject, a change must +necessarily take place in both, or in one alone, until they cease to be +contrary. + +II. The power of an emotion is limited by the power of its cause, in so +far as the essence of the emotion is manifested or limited by the +essence of the cause itself. + + +_The Strength of the Emotions_ + +The emotion towards an object which we imagine to be free is greater +than towards one which is necessary, and consequently still greater +than towards one which we imagine as possible or contingent. But to +imagine an object as free can be nothing else than to imagine it simply, +while we know not the causes by which it was determined to action. An +emotion, therefore, towards an object which we simply imagine is, other +things being equal, greater than towards one which we imagine as +necessary, possible, or contingent, and consequently greatest of all. + +The mind understands all things to be necessary and determined by an +infinite chain of causes to existence and action, and therefore so far +enables itself to suffer less from the emotions which arise from these +things, and to be less affected towards them. + +The more this knowledge that things are necessary is applied to +individual things which we imagine more distinctly and more vividly, the +greater is this power of the mind over the emotions--a fact to which +experience also testifies. For we see that sorrow for the loss of +anything good is diminished if the person who has lost it considers that +it could not by any possibility have been preserved. So also we see that +nobody pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk, or +reason, and lives so many years not conscious, as it were, of itself. +But if a number of human beings were born adult, and only a few here and +there were born infants, every one would pity the infants, because we +should then consider infancy not as a thing natural and necessary, but +as a defect or fault of Nature. Many other facts of a similar kind we +might observe. + +We do not contemplate an object as absent by reason of the emotion by +which we imagine it, but by reason of the fact that the body is affected +with another modification, which excludes the existence of that object. +The emotion, therefore, which is related to an object which we +contemplate as absent, is not of such a nature as to overcome the other +actions and power of man, but, on the contrary, is of such a nature that +it can in some way be restrained by those modifications which exclude +the existence of its external cause. But the emotion which arises from +reason is necessarily related to the common properties of things, which +we always contemplate as present for nothing can exist which excludes +their present existence, and which we always imagine in the same way. +This emotion, therefore, always remains the same, and consequently the +emotions which are contrary to it, and which are not maintained by their +external cause, must more and more accommodate themselves to it until +they are no longer contrary to it. So far, therefore, the emotion which +springs from reason is the stronger. + +A number of simultaneous causes can do more than if they were fewer, and +therefore the greater the number of the simultaneous causes by which an +emotion is excited, the greater it is. + +An emotion is bad or injurious only in so far as it hinders the mind +from thinking and therefore that emotion by which the mind is determined +to the contemplation of a number of objects at the same time is less +injurious than another emotion equally great which holds the mind in the +contemplation of one object alone or of a few objects, so that it cannot +think of others. Again, since the essence of the mind, that is to say, +its power, consists in thought alone, the mind suffers less through an +emotion by which it is determined to the contemplation of a number of +objects at the same time than through an emotion equally great which +holds it occupied in the contemplation of one object alone or of a few +objects. Finally, this emotion, in so far as it is related to a number +of external causes, is therefore less towards each. + + +_The Power of the Intellect Over the Emotions_ + +I + +_General Principles_ + +The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and +connection of things, and _vice versa_, the order and connection of +things is the same as the order and connection of ideas. Therefore, as +the order and connection of ideas in the mind is according to the order +and connection of the modifications of the body it follows _vice versa_, +that the order and connection of the modifications of the body is +according to the order and connection in the mind of the thoughts and +ideas of things. + +If we detach an emotion of the mind from the thought of an external +cause and connect it with other thoughts, then the love or hatred +towards the external cause and the fluctuations of the mind which arise +from these emotions will be destroyed. + +An emotion which is a passion is a confused idea. If, therefore, we form +a clear and distinct idea of this emotion, the idea will not be +distinguished--except by reason--from this emotion, in so far as the +emotion is related to the mind alone, and therefore the emotion will +cease to be a passion. + +In proportion, then, as we know an emotion better is it more within our +control, and the less does the mind suffer from it. + +Those things which are common to all cannot be otherwise than adequately +conceived and therefore there is no modification of the body of which we +cannot form some clear and distinct conception. + +Hence it follows that there is no emotion of which we cannot form some +clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is an idea of a +modification of the body, and this idea therefore must involve some +clear and distinct conception. + +Since nothing exists from which some effect does not follow, and since +we understand clearly and distinctly everything which follows from an +idea which is adequate in us, it is a necessary consequence that every +one has the power, partly at least, if not absolutely, of understanding +clearly and distinctly himself and his emotions, and consequently of +bringing it to pass that he suffers less from them. We have therefore +mainly to strive to acquire a clear and distinct knowledge as far as +possible of each emotion, so that the mind may be led to pass from the +emotion to think those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, +and with which it is entirely satisfied, and to strive also that the +emotion may be separated from the thought of an external cause and +connected with true thoughts. Thus not only love, hatred, etc., will be +destroyed, but also the appetites or desires to which the emotion gives +rise cannot be excessive. For it is above everything to be observed +that the appetite by which a man is said to act is one and the same +appetite as that by which he is said to suffer. For example, we have +shown that human nature is so constituted that every one desires that +other people should live according to his way of thinking, a desire +which in a man who is not guided by reason is a passion which is called +ambition, and is not very different from pride; while, on the other +hand, in a man who lives according to the dictates of reason it is an +action or virtue which is called piety. In the same manner, all the +appetites or desires are passions only in so far as they arise from +inadequate ideas, and are classed among the virtues whenever they are +excited or begotten by adequate ideas; for all the desires by which we +are determined to any action may arise either from adequate or +inadequate ideas. To return, therefore, to the point from which we set +out: there is no remedy within our power which can be conceived more +excellent for the emotions than that which consists in true knowledge of +them, since the mind possesses no other power than that of thinking and +forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above. + + +II + +_The Natural Basis of Rational Control_ + +The greater the number of objects to which an image or emotion is +related, the greater is the number of causes by which it can be excited +and cherished. All these causes the mind contemplates simultaneously by +means of the emotion (by hypothesis), and therefore the more constant is +the emotion, or the more frequently does it present itself, and the +more does it occupy the mind. + +Things which we clearly and distinctly understand are either the common +properties of things or what are deduced from them, and consequently are +more frequently excited in us; and therefore it is easier for us to +contemplate other things together with these which we clearly and +distinctly understand than with any others, and consequently it is +easier to connect things with these which we clearly and distinctly +understand than with any others. + +The greater the number of other things with which any image is +connected, the more frequently does it present itself. For the greater +the number of other things with which an image is connected, the greater +is the number of causes by which it may be excited. + +There is no modification of the body of which the mind cannot form some +clear and distinct conception and therefore it can cause all the +modifications of the body to be related to the idea of God. + + +III + +_The Function of the Intellectual Order_ + +The emotions which are contrary to our nature, that is to say, which are +evil, are evil so far as they hinder the mind from understanding. So +long, therefore, as we are not agitated by emotions which are contrary +to our nature, so long the power of the mind by which it endeavors to +understand things is not hindered, and therefore so long does it possess +the power of forming clear and distinct ideas, and of deducing them the +one from the other. So long, consequently, do we possess the power of +arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to the +order of the intellect. + +Through this power of properly arranging and connecting the +modifications of the body we can prevent ourselves from being easily +affected by evil emotions. For a greater power is required to restrain +emotions which are arranged and connected according to the order of the +intellect than is required to restrain those which are uncertain and +unsettled. The best thing, therefore, we can do, so long as we lack a +perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to conceive a right rule of life, +or sure maxims (_dogmata_) of life--to commit these latter to memory, +and constantly to apply them to the particular cases which frequently +meet us in life, so that our imagination may be widely affected by them, +and they may always be ready to hand. For example, amongst the maxims of +life we have placed this, that hatred is to be conquered by love or +generosity, and is not to be met with hatred in return. But in order +that we may always have this prescript of reason in readiness whenever +it will be of service, we must think over and often meditate upon the +common injuries inflicted by men, and consider how and in what way they +may best be repelled by generosity; for thus we shall connect the image +of injury with the imagination of this maxim, and it will be at hand +whenever an injury is offered to us. If we also continually have regard +to our own true profit, and the good which follows from mutual +friendship and common fellowship, and remember that the highest peace of +mind arises from a right rule of life, and also that man, like other +things, acts according to the necessity of Nature, then the injury or +the hatred which usually arises from that necessity will occupy but the +least part of the imagination, and will be easily overcome: or supposing +that the anger which generally arises from the greatest injuries is not +so easily overcome, it will nevertheless be overcome, although not +without fluctuation of mind, in a far shorter space of time than would +have been necessary if we had not possessed those maxims on which we had +thus meditated beforehand. + +Concerning strength of mind, we must reflect in the same way for the +purpose of getting rid of fear, that is to say, we must often enumerate +and imagine the common dangers of life, and think upon the manner in +which they can best be avoided and overcome by presence of mind and +courage. It is to be observed, however, that in the ordering of our +thoughts and images we must always look to those qualities which in each +thing are good, so that we may be determined to action always by an +emotion of joy. + +For example, if a man sees that he pursues glory too eagerly, let him +think on its proper use, for what end it is to be followed, and by what +means it can be obtained; but let him not think upon its abuse and +vanity, and on the inconstancy of men, and things of this sort, about +which no one thinks unless through disease of mind. For with such +thoughts do those who are ambitious greatly torment themselves when they +despair of obtaining the honors for which they are striving; and while +they vomit forth rage, wish to be thought wise. Indeed it is certain +that those covet glory the most who are loudest in declaiming against +its abuse and the vanity of the world. Nor is this a peculiarity of the +ambitious, but is common to all to whom fortune is adverse and who are +impotent in mind; for we see that a poor and avaricious man is never +weary of speaking about the abuse of money and the vices of the rich, +thereby achieving nothing save to torment himself and show to others +that he is unable to bear with equanimity not only his own poverty but +also the wealth of others. So also a man who has not been well deceived +by his mistress thinks of nothing but the fickleness of women, their +faithlessness, and their other oft-proclaimed failing--all of which he +forgets as soon as he is taken into favor by his mistress again. He, +therefore, who desires to govern his emotions and appetites from a love +of liberty alone will strive as much as he can to know virtues and their +causes, and to fill his mind with that joy which springs from a true +knowledge of them. Least of all will he desire to contemplate the vices +of men and disparage men, or to delight in a false show of liberty. He +who will diligently observe these things (and they are not difficult), +and will continue to practice them, will assuredly in a short space of +time be able for the most part to direct his actions in accordance with +the command of reason. + + +IV + +_Summary_ + +I have, in what has preceded, included all the remedies for the +emotions, that is to say, everything which the mind, considered in +itself alone, can do against them. It appears therefrom that the power +of the mind over the emotions consists-- + +1. In the knowledge itself of the emotions. + +2. In the separation by the mind of the emotions from the thought of an +external cause, which we imagine confusedly. + +3. In duration, in which the emotions which are related to objects we +understand surpass those related to objects conceived in a mutilated or +confused manner. + +4. In the multitude of causes by which the emotions which are related to +the common properties of things or to God are nourished. + +5. In the order in which the mind can arrange its emotions and connect +them one with the other. + +But that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better +understood, it is to be carefully observed that we call the emotions +great when we compare the emotion of one man with that of another, and +see that one man is agitated more than another by the same emotion, or +when we compare the emotions of one and the same man with one another, +and discover that he is affected or moved more by one emotion than by +another. + +For the power of any emotion is limited by the power of the external +cause as compared with our own power. But the power of the mind is +limited solely by knowledge, whilst impotence or passion is estimated +solely by privation of knowledge, or, in other words, by that through +which ideas are called inadequate; and it therefore follows that that +mind suffers the most whose largest part consists of inadequate ideas, +so that it is distinguished rather by what it suffers than by what it +does, while, on the contrary, that mind acts the most whose largest part +consists of adequate ideas, so that although it may possess as many +inadequate ideas as the first, it is nevertheless distinguished rather +by those which belong to human virtue than by those which are a sign of +human impotence. Again, it is to be observed that our sorrows and +misfortunes mainly proceed from too much love towards an object which is +subject to many changes, and which we can never possess. For no one is +troubled or anxious about any object he does not love, neither do +wrongs, suspicions, hatreds, etc., arise except from love towards +objects of which no one can be truly the possessor. + +From all this we easily conceive what is the power which clear and +distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge whose +foundation is the knowledge itself of God, possesses over the emotions; +the power, namely, by which it is able, in so far as they are passions, +if not actually to destroy them, at least to make them constitute the +smallest part of the mind. Moreover, it begets a love towards an +immutable and eternal object of which we are really partakers; a love +which therefore cannot be vitiated by the defects which are in common +love, but which can always become greater and greater, occupy the +largest part of the mind, and thoroughly affect it. + +I have now concluded all that I had to say relating to this present +life. For any one who will attend to what has been urged will easily be +able to see the truth of what I said--that in these few words all the +remedies for the emotions are comprehended. It is time, therefore, that +I should now pass to the consideration of those matters which appertain +to the duration of the mind without relation to the body. + + + + +CHAPTER XX + +OF HUMAN BLESSEDNESS AND THE ETERNITY OF THE MIND + + +_Human Blessedness: The Intellectual Love of God_ + +I + +The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain +attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things; and +the more we understand things in this manner, the more we understand +God; and therefore the highest virtue of the mind, that is to say, the +power or nature of the mind, or the highest effort, is to understand +things by the third kind of knowledge. + +The better the mind is adapted to understand things by the third kind of +knowledge, the more it desires to understand them by this kind of +knowledge. + +The highest virtue of the mind is to know God, or to understand things +by the third kind of knowledge. This virtue is greater the more the mind +knows things by this kind of knowledge, and therefore he who knows +things by this kind of knowledge passes to the highest human perfection, +and consequently is affected with the highest joy, which is accompanied +with the idea of himself and his own virtue; and therefore from this +kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace of mind. + +The effort or the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge +cannot arise from the first kind, but may arise from the second kind of +knowledge. This proposition is self-evident. For everything that we +clearly and distinctly understand, we understand either through itself +or through something which is conceived through itself; or, in other +words, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are related to +the third kind of knowledge, cannot follow from mutilated and confused +ideas, which are related to the first kind of knowledge, but from +adequate ideas, that is to say, from the second and third kinds of +knowledge. + + +II + +Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as that essence involves +necessary existence. To conceive things therefore under the form of +eternity, is to conceive them in so far as they are conceived through +the essence of God as actually existing things, or in so far as through +the essence of God they involve existence. Therefore our mind, in so far +as it conceives itself and its body under the form of eternity, +necessarily has a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is +conceived through Him. + +We delight in whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, and +our delight is accompanied with the idea of God as its cause. + +From the third kind of knowledge necessarily springs the intellectual +love of God. For from this kind of knowledge arises joy attended with +the idea of God as its cause, that is to say, the love of God, not in so +far as we imagine Him as present, but in so far as we understand that +He is eternal; and that is what I call the intellectual love of God. + +He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions +rejoices, and his joy is attended with the idea of God, therefore he +loves God, and (by the same reasoning) loves Him better the better he +understands himself and his emotions. + +This intellectual love necessarily follows from the nature of the mind, +in so far as it is considered, through the nature of God, as an eternal +truth. If there were anything, therefore, contrary to this love, it +would be contrary to the truth, and consequently whatever might be able +to negate this love would be able to make the true false, which, as is +self-evident, is absurd. There exists, therefore, nothing in Nature +contrary to this intellectual love, or which can negate it. + + +III + +This love to God above everything else ought to occupy the mind, for +this love is connected with all the modifications of the body, by all of +which it is cherished. + +The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect, and therefore in +so far as we contemplate God do we act and consequently no sorrow can +exist with the accompanying idea of God; that is to say, no one can hate +God. + +Love to God cannot be turned into hatred. But some may object, that if +we understand God to be the cause of all things, we do for that very +reason consider Him to be the cause of sorrow. But I reply, that in so +far as we understand the causes of sorrow, it ceases to be a passion, +that is to say, it ceases to be sorrow; and therefore in so far as we +understand God to be the cause of sorrow do we rejoice. + +This love to God is the highest good which we can seek according to the +dictate of reason; is common to all men; and we desire that all may +enjoy it. It cannot, therefore, be sullied by the emotion of envy, nor +by that of jealousy, but, on the contrary, it must be the more +strengthened the more people we imagine to rejoice in it. + +It is possible to show in the same manner that there is no emotion +directly contrary to this love and able to destroy it, and so we may +conclude that this love to God is the most constant of all the emotions, +and that, in so far as it is related to the body, it cannot be destroyed +unless with the body itself. What its nature is, in so far as it is +related to the mind alone, we shall see hereafter. + + +IV + +All ideas, in so far as they are related to God, are true; that is to +say, are adequate, and therefore, (by the general definition of the +Emotions), God is free from passions. Again, God can neither pass to a +greater nor to a less perfection, and therefore He cannot be affected +with any emotion of joy or sorrow. + +He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return. If a +man were to strive after this, he would desire that God, whom he loves, +should not be God, and consequently he would desire to be sad, which is +absurd. + + +V + +God is absolutely infinite, that is to say, the nature of God delights +in infinite perfection accompanied with the idea of Himself, that is to +say, with the idea of Himself as cause, and this is what we have called +intellectual love. God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love. + +The intellectual love of the mind towards God is the very love with +which He loves Himself, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far +as He can be manifested through the essence of the human mind, +considered under the form of eternity; that is to say, the intellectual +love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love with which God +loves Himself. + +Hence it follows that God, in so far as He loves Himself, loves men, and +consequently that the love of God towards men and the intellectual love +of the mind towards God are one and the same thing. + +Hence it follows that God, in so far as He loves Himself, loves men, and +consequently that the love of the mind towards God are one and the same +thing. + +Hence we clearly understand that our salvation, or blessedness, or +liberty consists in a constant and eternal love towards God, or in the +love of God towards men. This love or blessedness is called Glory in the +sacred writings, and not without reason. For whether it be related to +God or to the mind, it may properly be called repose of mind, which is, +in truth, not distinguished from glory. For in so far as it is related +to God, it is joy (granting that it is allowable to use this word), +accompanied with the idea of Himself, and it is the same thing when it +is related to the mind. + +Again, since the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, whose +beginning and foundation is God, it is clear to us in what manner and by +what method our mind, with regard both to essence and existence, follows +from the divine nature, and continually depends upon God. I thought it +worth while for me to notice this here, in order that I might show, by +this example, what that knowledge of individual objects which I have +called intuitive or of the third kind is able to do, and how much more +potent it is than the universal knowledge, which I have called knowledge +of the second kind. For although I have shown generally that all things, +and consequently also the human mind, depend upon God both with regard +to existence and essence, yet that demonstration, although legitimate, +and placed beyond the possibility of a doubt, does not, nevertheless, so +affect our mind as a proof from the essence itself of any individual +object which we say depends upon God. The more we understand individual +objects, the more we understand God. + + +_The Eternity of the Mind_ + +I + +The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it +conceive as actual the modifications of the body, except while the body +exists, and consequently it conceives no body as actually existing +except while its own body exists. It can therefore imagine nothing, nor +can it recollect anything that is past, except while the body exists. + +An imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates any object as +present. This idea nevertheless indicates the present constitution of +the human body rather than the nature of the external object. An +emotion, therefore (by the general definition of the Emotions), is an +imagination in so far as it indicates the present constitution of the +body, and therefore the mind, only so long as the body exists, is +subject to emotions which are related to passions. + +Hence it follows that no love except intellectual love is eternal. + +If we look at the common opinion of men, we shall see that they are +indeed conscious of the eternity of their minds, but they confound it +with duration, and attribute it to imagination or memory, which they +believe remain after death. + +God is not only the cause of the existence of this or that human body, +but also of its essence, which therefore must necessarily be conceived +through the essence of God itself and by a certain eternal necessity. +This conception, moreover, must necessarily exist in God. In God there +necessarily exists an idea which expresses the essence of this or that +human body under the form of eternity. + +In God there necessarily exists a conception or idea which expresses the +essence of the human body. This conception or idea is therefore +necessarily something which pertains to the essence of the human mind. +But we ascribe to the human mind no duration which can be limited by +time, unless in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, +which is manifested through duration, and which can be limited by time, +that is to say, we cannot ascribe duration to the mind except while the +body exists. + +But, nevertheless, since this something is that which is conceived by a +certain eternal necessity through the essence itself of God, this +something which pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be +eternal. + +This idea which expresses the essence of the body under the form of +eternity is, as we have said, a certain mode of thought which pertains +to the essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. It is +impossible, nevertheless, that we should recollect that we existed +before the body, because there are no traces of any such existence in +the body, and also because eternity cannot be defined by time, or have +any relationship to it. Nevertheless we feel and know by experience that +we are eternal. For the mind is no less sensible of those things which +it conceives through intelligence than of those which it remembers, for +demonstrations are the eyes of the mind by which it sees and observes +things. + +Although, therefore, we do not recollect that we existed before the +body, we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the +body under the form of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence of +the mind cannot be limited by time nor manifested through duration. Only +in so far, therefore, as it involves the actual existence of the body +can the mind be said to possess duration, and its existence be limited +by a fixed time, and so far only has it the power of determining the +existence of things in time, and of conceiving them under the form of +duration. + + +II + +In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body does +it conceive duration which can be determined in time, and so far only +has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time. But eternity +cannot be manifested through duration, therefore the mind so far has not +the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity: but because +it is the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of +eternity, and because it also pertains to the nature of the mind to +conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity, and +excepting these two things nothing else pertains to the nature of the +mind, therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of +eternity does not pertain to the mind except in so far as it conceives +the essence of the body under the form of eternity. + +Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either in so far as we +conceive them to exist with relation to a fixed time and place, or in so +far as we conceive them to be contained in God, and to follow from the +necessity of the divine nature. But those things which are conceived in +this second way as true or real we conceive under the form of eternity, +and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. + +The mind conceives nothing under the form of eternity, unless in so far +as it conceives the essence of its body under the form of eternity, that +is to say, unless in so far as it is eternal. Therefore in so far as the +mind is eternal it has a knowledge of God, which is necessarily +adequate, and therefore in so far as it is eternal it is fitted to know +all those things which can follow from this knowledge of God, that is to +say, it is fitted to know things by the third kind of knowledge of +which, in so far as the mind is eternal, it is the adequate or formal +cause. + +As each person therefore becomes stronger in this kind of knowledge, the +more is he conscious of himself and of God; that is to say, the more +perfect and the happier he is, a truth which will still more clearly +appear from what follows. Here, however, it is to be observed, that +although we are now certain that the mind is eternal in so far as it +conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we +wish to prove may be more easily explained and better understood, we +shall consider the mind, as we have hitherto done, as if it had just +begun to be, and had just begun to understand things under the form of +eternity. This we can do without any risk of error, provided only we are +careful to conclude nothing except from clear premises. + +The third kind of knowledge is eternal, and therefore the love which +springs from it is necessarily eternal. + +Although this love to God has no beginning, it nevertheless has all the +perfections of love, just as if it had originated. Nor is there here any +difference, excepting that the mind has eternally possessed these same +perfections which we imagined as now accruing to it, and has possessed +them with the accompanying idea of God as the eternal cause. And if joy +consist in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must indeed +consist in this, that the mind is endowed with perfection itself. + + +III + +The essence of the mind consists in knowledge. The more things, +therefore, the mind knows by the second and third kinds of knowledge, +the greater is that part which abides and consequently the greater is +that part which is not touched by emotions which are contrary to our +nature, that is to say, which are evil. The more things, therefore, the +mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater +is that part which remains unharmed, and the less consequently does it +suffer from the emotions. + +We are thus enabled to understand that death is by so much the less +injurious to us as the clear and distinct knowledge of the mind is +greater, and consequently as the mind loves God more. Again, since from +the third kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible peace, it +follows that it is possible for the human mind to be of such a nature +that that part of it which we have shown perishes with its body, in +comparison with the part of it which remains, is of no consequence. But +more fully upon this subject presently. + +He who possesses a body fitted for doing many things is least of all +agitated by those emotions which are evil, that is to say, by emotions +which are contrary to our nature, and therefore he possesses the power +of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to +the order of the intellect, and consequently of causing all the +modifications of the body to be related to the idea of God; in +consequence of which he is affected with a love to God, which must +occupy or form the greatest part of his mind, and therefore he +possesses a mind of which the greatest part is eternal. + +Inasmuch as human bodies are fit for many things, we cannot doubt the +possibility of their possessing such a nature that they may be related +to minds which have a large knowledge of themselves and of God, and +whose greatest or principal part is eternal, so that they scarcely fear +death. To understand this more clearly, it is to be here considered that +we live in constant change, and that according as we change for the +better or the worse we are called happy or unhappy. For he who passes +from infancy or childhood to death is called unhappy, and, on the other +hand, we consider ourselves happy if we can pass through the whole +period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. Moreover, he who, like +an infant or child, possesses a body fit for very few things, and, +almost altogether dependent on external causes, has a mind which, +considered in itself alone, is almost entirely unconscious of itself, of +God, and of objects. On the other hand, he who possesses a body fit for +many things possesses a mind which, considered in itself alone, is +largely conscious of itself, of God, and of objects. In this life, +therefore, it is our chief endeavor to change the body of infancy, so +far as its nature permits and is conducive thereto, into another body +which is fitted for many things, and which is related to a mind +conscious as much as possible of itself, of God, and of objects; so that +everything which is related to its memory or imagination, in comparison +with the intellect is scarcely of any moment, as I have already said. + +The more perfect a thing is, the more reality it possesses, and +consequently the more it acts and the less it suffers. Inversely also it +may be demonstrated in the same way that the more a thing acts the more +perfect it is. Hence it follows that that part of the mind which abides, +whether great or small, is more perfect than the other part. For the +part of the mind which is eternal is the intellect, through which alone +we are said to act, but that part which, as we have shown, perishes, is +the imagination itself, through which alone we are said to suffer. +Therefore that part which abides, whether great or small, is more +perfect than the latter. + +These are the things I proposed to prove concerning the mind, in so far +as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body, and +from these, and other propositions, it is evident that our mind, in so +far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thought, which is +determined by another eternal mode of thought, and this again by +another, and so on _ad infinitum_, so that all taken together form the +eternal and infinite intellect of God. + + +_Conclusion_ + +The primary and sole foundation of virtue or of the proper conduct of +life is to seek our own profit. But in order to determine what reason +prescribes as profitable, we had no regard to the eternity of the mind. +Therefore, although we were at that time ignorant that the mind is +eternal, we considered as of primary importance those things which we +have shown are related to strength of mind and generosity; and +therefore, even if we were now ignorant of the eternity of the mind, we +should consider those commands of reason as of primary importance. + +The creed of the multitude seems to be different from this; for most +persons seem to believe that they are free in so far as it is allowed +them to obey their lusts, and that they give up a portion of their +rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the commands of +divine law. Piety, therefore, and religion,[42] and absolutely all those +things that are related to greatness of soul, they believe to be burdens +which they hope to be able to lay aside after death; hoping also to +receive some reward for their bondage, that is to say, for _their_ piety +and religion. It is not merely this hope, however, but also and chiefly +fear of dreadful punishments after death, by which they are induced to +live according to the commands of divine law, that is to say, as far as +their feebleness and impotent mind will permit; and if this hope and +fear were not present to them, but if they, on the contrary, believed +that minds perish with the body, and that there is no prolongation of +life for miserable creatures exhausted with the burden of their piety, +they would return to ways of their own liking. They would prefer to let +everything be controlled by their own passions, and to obey fortune +rather than themselves. + +This seems to me as absurd as if a man, because he does not believe that +he will be able to feed his body with good food to all eternity, should +desire to satiate himself with poisonous and deadly drugs; or as if, +because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should +therefore prefer to be mad and to live without reason--absurdities so +great that they scarcely deserve to be repeated. + +Blessedness consists in love towards God, which arises from the third +kind of knowledge, and this love, therefore, must be related to the mind +in so far as it acts. Blessedness, therefore, is virtue itself. Again, +the more the mind delights in this divine love or blessedness, the more +it understands, that is to say, the greater is the power it has over its +emotions and the less it suffers from emotions which are evil. +Therefore, it is because the mind delights in this divine love or +blessedness that it possesses the power of restraining the lusts; and +because the power of man to restrain the emotions is in the intellect +alone, no one, therefore, delights in blessedness because he has +restrained his emotions, but, on the contrary, the power of restraining +his lusts springs from blessedness itself. + +I have finished everything I wished to explain concerning the power of +the mind over the emotions and concerning its liberty. From what has +been said we see what is the strength of the wise man, and how much he +surpasses the ignorant who is driven forward by lust alone. For the +ignorant man is not only agitated by external causes in many ways, and +never enjoys true peace of soul, but lives also ignorant, as it were, +both of God and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer ceases +also to be. On the other hand, the wise man, in so far as he is +considered as such, is scarcely ever moved in his mind, but, being +conscious by a certain eternal necessity of himself, of God, and of +things, never ceases to be, and always enjoys true peace of soul. + +If the way which, as I have shown, leads hither seem very difficult, it +can nevertheless be found. It must indeed be difficult since it is so +seldom discovered; for if salvation lay ready to hand and could be +discovered without great labor, how could it be possible that it should +be neglected almost by everybody? But all noble things are as difficult +as they are rare. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[42] Everything which we desire and do, of which we are the cause in so +far as we possess an idea of God, or in so far as we know God, I refer +to _Religion_. The desire of doing well which is born in us, because we +live according to the guidance of reason, I call _Piety_. + + + + +APPENDIX + + +Spinoza's _Ethics_, demonstrated in geometrical order, consists of five +parts; from these parts the following selections have been taken: + +Part I. _Of God_ + Definitions, Axioms, and the Appendix. + Propositions: 11; 15-18; 26; 27; 29; 33. + +Part II. _Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind_ + Preface, Definitions, and Axioms. + Propositions: 1; 4-7; 11-13; 15-18; 24-26; + 28-32; 35; 36; 38-49. + +Part III. _Of the Origin and Nature of the Emotions_ + Preface, Definitions, and Postulates; Definitions + of the Emotions. + Propositions: 1; 2; 4; 6; 9; 11; 14; 16; + 18; 25; 27-32; 40; 41; 43-46; 48-51; 56; 57. + +Part IV. _Of Human Bondage or Of the Strength of the + Emotions_ + Preface, Definitions, Axioms, and the Appendix. + Propositions: 3-9; 11-27; 38; 39; 41-47; + 50-54; 56-58. + +Part V. _Of the Power of the Intellect or Of Human + Liberty_ + Preface and Axioms. + Propositions: 1-28; 30-42. + + +THE END + + +--------------------------------------------------------------+ + | Transcriber's Notes | + | | + | Page vii: "affectiones" _sic_ | + | Page xxvi: "villified" amended to "vilified" | + | Page xxvii: "chose" amended to "choose" (twice); | + | "forego" _sic_ | + | Page xxxvi: "antedeluvian" amended to "antediluvian" | + | Page lix: "goverance" amended to "governance" | + | Page 1: "oursleves" amended to "ourselves" | + | Page 6: "superstitition" amended to "superstition" | + | Page 9: "conprehension" amended to "comprehension" | + | Page 26: "chose" amended to "choose" | + | Page 28: "interpretating" amended to "interpreting" | + | Page 45: "phophet" amended to "prophet" | + | Page 51: "came" amended to "come" | + | Page 69: "patriachs" amended to "patriarchs" | + | Page 84: "refer" amended to "prefer" | + | Page 135: "appetities" amended to "appetites" | + | Page 204: "thy" amended to "they" and "thir" amended to | + | "their" | + | Page 229: "Explanations" amended to "Explanation" | + | Page 276: "others" amended to "other" | + | Page 284: "mutitude" amended to "multitude" | + | Page 362: "propositon" amended to "proposition" | + | | + | Abbreviations in footnotes and references have been | + | standardized. | + | | + | Accents and hyphenation have generally been standardised. | + +--------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Philosophy of Spinoza, by Baruch de Spinoza + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA *** + +***** This file should be named 31205-8.txt or 31205-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/1/2/0/31205/ + +Produced by Alicia Williams and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Philosophy of Spinoza + +Author: Baruch de Spinoza + +Editor: Joseph Ratner + +Release Date: February 7, 2010 [EBook #31205] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA *** + + + + +Produced by Alicia Williams and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +</pre> + + + + +<div class='transnote'> +<h3>Transcriber's Note</h3> + +<p>Obvious typographical errors have been corrected in +this text. For a complete list, please see <a href="#transnote">the bottom of +this document</a>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="figcenter" style="width: 254px;"> +<img src="images/img01.jpg" width="254" height="400" alt="" title="" /> +</div> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>THE PHILOSOPHY</h2> + + +<h3>OF</h3> + +<h1>SPINOZA</h1> + + +<h3><span class='smcap'>edited by</span><br /> +JOSEPH RATNER</h3> + + +<p class='center'>TUDOR PUBLISHING COMPANY</p> + +<p class='frontend'><i>Printed in the United States of America</i></p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[v]</a></span></p> +<h2>PREFACE</h2> + + +<p>Selections usually need no justifications. Some +justification, however, of the treatment accorded +Spinoza's <i>Ethics</i> may be necessary in this place. The +object in taking the <i>Ethics</i> as much as possible out +of the geometrical form, was not to improve upon the +author's text; it was to give the lay reader a text of +Spinoza he would find pleasanter to read and easier to +understand. To the practice of popularization, Spinoza, +one may confidently feel, would not be averse. +He himself gave a short popular statement of his +philosophy in the <i>Political Treatise</i>.</p> + +<p>The lay reader of philosophy is chiefly, if not wholly, +interested in grasping a philosophic point of view. He +is not interested in highly meticulous details, and still +less is he interested in checking up the author's statements +to see if the author is consistent with himself. +He takes such consistency, even if unwarrantedly, for +granted. A continuous reading of the original <i>Ethics</i>, +even on a single topic, is impossible. The subject-matter +is coherent, but the propositions do not hang +together. By omitting the formal statement of the +propositions; by omitting many of the demonstrations +and almost all cross-references; by grouping related +sections of the <i>Ethics</i> (with selections from the <i>Letters</i> +and the <i>Improvement of the Understanding</i>) under +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[vi]</a></span>sectional headings, the text has been made more continuous. +It is the only time, probably, dismembering +a treatise actually made it more unified.</p> + +<p>In an Appendix, the sources of the selections from +the <i>Ethics</i> are summarily indicated. It would be a +meaningless burden on the text to make full acknowledgments +in footnotes. For the same reason, there +has been almost no attempt made to show, by means +of the conventional devices, the re-arrangements and +abridgements that have been made. Every care has +been taken not to distort in any way the meaning of +the text. And that is all that is important in a volume +of this kind.</p> + +<p>Wherever possible Spinoza's own chapter headings +have been retained; and some of the sectional headings +have either been taken from, or have been based upon +expressions in the text. It would have been more in +keeping with contemporary form to use the title <i>On +Historical Method</i> or <i>The New History</i> instead of <i>Of +the Interpretation of Scripture</i>; a chapter on <i>Race +Superiority</i> would sound more important than one on +<i>The Vocation of the Hebrews</i>; but such modernizing +changes were not made because the aim has been to +give the reader a text as faithful to the original as the +character of this volume would allow.</p> + +<p>The selections have been taken from Elwes' translation +of the <i>Tractatus Theologico-Politicus</i>, <i>A Political +Treatise</i> and the <i>Improvement of the Understanding</i>; +and from White's translation of the <i>Ethics</i>. These +translations are no longer in copyright and hence it was +not necessary to secure permission from the publishers +to use them. Nonetheless, grateful acknowledgment +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[vii]</a></span>is their just due.</p> + +<p>White, in his translation, uses, not altogether without +reason, the stilted term "affect" instead of the natural +English term "emotion." "Affect" is closer to the +Latin and it more clearly indicates the metaphysical +status of the emotions as "modes" or "affectiones" of +Substance. Still, practically no one has followed White +in his usage. The reasons are not difficult to discover. +Besides being a stilted term, having no legitimate English +status, "affect" very often makes the text extremely +obscure, even unintelligible to one who has no antecedent +knowledge of it, because besides having also its +ordinary English meaning, "affect" is used by White +to mean "mode" or "modification" ("affection") as +well. In the circumstances, therefore, I thought it +advisable to change "affect" to "emotion" and "affection" +to "modification" or "mode." I also corrected +White's translation of the Definition of Attribute by +deleting the word "if." In spite of the need for these +changes, it was desirable to use White's translation +because it is the most accurate and elegant extant.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, in both White and Elwes I have consistently +capitalized the term Nature, in accordance +with Spinoza's Latin text; White and Elwes capitalize +it only desultorily. I have made some slight changes +in Elwes' mid-Victorian punctuation and White's all-too-faithful +paragraphing. The Latin paragraphs of +the <i>Ethics</i> are extremely long. These changes are all +external and as far as I can see thoroughly legitimate +as well as justified. The very slight and very occasional +internal changes I have made—other than those +already accounted for—I have indicated by square +brackets.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[viii]</a></span></p> + +<p>I am indebted to Mr. Houston Peterson, of Columbia +University, for suggesting to me the idea of arranging +a volume of selections from Spinoza. I am alone +responsible, however, for the actual selections and +arrangements, and for the idea of taking the <i>Ethics</i> +out of its geometrical form. Professor Morris R. +Cohen, of the College of the City of New York, read +this volume in manuscript; I am indebted to him for +some valuable suggestions. I am also indebted very +greatly to a friend (who prefers not to be acknowledged) +for invaluable help in getting the manuscript +into shape.</p> + +<p class='right'><span class="smcap">Joseph Ratner</span>.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>October, 1926.</i></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[ix]</a></span></p> +<h2>CONTENTS</h2> + + +<div class='center'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="toc"> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'><span class="smcap">page</span></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left' colspan='2'><span class="smcap">Preface</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_v">v</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left' colspan='2'><span class="smcap">The Life of Spinoza</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_xi">xi</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left' colspan='2'><span class="smcap">Introduction to the Philosophy of Spinoza</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_xxvii">xxvii</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='3'>FIRST PART</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='3'><span class="smcap">on god</span></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'><span class="smcap">chapter</span></td><td align='left'></td><td align='right'></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>I.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of Superstition</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_3">3</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>II.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of the Interpretation of Scripture</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_11">11</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>III.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of Prophets and Prophecy</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_36">36</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>IV.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of the Vocation of the Hebrews</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_64">64</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>V.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of the Divine Law</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_71">71</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>VI.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of the Ceremonial Law</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_88">88</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>VII.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of Miracles</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_103">103</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>VIII.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of the Divine Nature</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_122">122</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='3'>SECOND PART</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='3'><span class="smcap">on man</span></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>IX.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">The Nature and Origin of the Human Mind</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_155">155</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>X.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">The Nature and Extent of Human Knowledge</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_173">173</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>XI.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Determinism and Morals</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_191">191</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>XII.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">The Origin and Nature of the Emotions</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_211">211</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>XIII.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">The Psychology of the Emotions</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_236">236</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='3'>THIRD PART<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[x]</a></span></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='3'><span class="smcap">on man's well-being</span></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>XIV.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of Human Bondage</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_251">251</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>XV.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">The Foundations of the Moral Life</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_266">266</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>XVI.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of the Foundations of a State</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_297">297</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>XVII.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of Supreme Authorities</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_314">314</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>XVIII.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Freedom of Thought and Speech</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_333">333</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>XIX.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of Human Freedom</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_345">345</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>XX.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">Of Human Blessedness and the Eternity of the Mind</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_361">361</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left' colspan='2'><span class="smcap">Appendix</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_377">377</a></td></tr> +</table></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[xi]</a></span></p> +<h2>THE LIFE OF SPINOZA</h2> + + +<p>Baruch de Spinoza was born into the Jewish community +of Amsterdam on November 24, 1632. His +parents were Jews who had fled, along with many +others, from the vicious intolerance of the Inquisition +to the limited and hesitant freedom of Holland. At +the time Spinoza was born, the Jewish refugees had +already established themselves to a certain extent in +their new home. They had won, for example, the +important right to build a synagogue. Still, they did +not enjoy the complete freedom and peace of mind of +an independent and securely protected people. Although +one could be a Jew in Amsterdam, one had to +be a Jew with considerable circumspection. Whatever +might prove in any way offensive to the political +authority had to be scrupulously eschewed. For, as +is always the case, minority groups which are simply +tolerated have to suffer for the offenses of any of +their members. The Jews of Amsterdam thoroughly +understood this. They knew that any significant default +on the part of one member of their community +would not, in all likelihood, be considered by the authorities +to be a default of that one person alone—a +failing quite in the order of human nature; they +knew it would be considered a manifestation of an +essential vice characteristic of the whole community. +And the whole community would have to suffer, in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[xii]</a></span> +consequence, an exaggerated punishment which the +individual delinquent himself may well not merit.</p> + +<p>It was inevitable that the intellectual life of the +Jews of Amsterdam should bear the marks of their +inner and outer social constraints. Their intellectual +life was cramped and ineffectual. Indiscriminate +erudition, not independent thought, was all the Jewish +leaders, connected in one way or another with the +Synagogue, were able to achieve. It was far safer +to cling to the innocuous past than it was to strike out +boldly into the future. Any independence of thought +that was likely to prove socially dangerous as well +as schismatic was promptly suppressed. The humiliation +and excommunication (circa 1640) of the indecisive +martyr Uriel da Costa when he ventured to +entertain doctrines that were not orthodox, were +prompted as much by political as by religious considerations. +It is true, many of the faithful were attracted +by Cabbalistic wonders and the strange hope +of being saved from a bitter exile by a Messianic +Sabbatai Zevi. But these wayward deviations, in +reality not so very far removed from orthodox tradition, +exhibited only the more clearly the fearsome inner +insecurity which a strained formalism in thought +and habit bravely attempted to cover.</p> + +<p>In such social and intellectual atmosphere Spinoza +grew up. Of his early life, practically nothing is +known. His parents, we know, were at least fairly +well-to-do, for Spinoza received a good education. And +we know that he was, when about fifteen years of age, +one of the most brilliant and promising of Rabbi Saul +Levi Morteira's pupils. Everyone who then knew Spi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[xiii]</a></span>noza +expected great things of him. He proved himself +to be a very acute rabbinical student; at that early age +already somewhat too critical, if anything, to suit the +orthodox. But all felt reasonably confident he would +become a distinguished Rabbi, and perhaps a great +commentator of the Bible. Of course, of the orthodox +sort.</p> + +<p>But the Rabbis were early disillusioned. Spinoza +soon found the learning of the Synagogue insufficient +and unsatisfactory. He sought the wisdom of secular +philosophy and science. But in order to satisfy his +intellectual desires it was necessary to study Latin. +And Latin was not taught in the Synagogue.</p> + +<p>An anonymous German taught Spinoza the rudiments +of the language that was to enable him to enter +into the important current of modern ideas especially +embodied in the philosophy of Descartes. Francis +Van den Ende gave him a thorough technical, not literary, +mastery of it. And Van den Ende taught Spinoza +much more besides. He acquainted him with the +literature of antiquity; he gave him a sound knowledge +of the contemporary fundamentals of physiology and +physics; and it was he possibly, who introduced him +to the philosophy of Descartes and the lyrical philosophic +speculation of Bruno. He did much also (we +may easily infer) to encourage the independence of +mind and the freedom in thinking Spinoza had already +manifested in no inconsiderable degree. For although +this Van den Ende was a Catholic physician and Latin +master by profession, he was a free thinker in spirit +and reputation. And if we are to believe the horrified +public suspicion, he taught a select few of his Latin<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[xiv]</a></span> +pupils the grounds of his heterodox belief. As one +can easily understand, to study Latin with Van den +Ende was not the most innocent thing one could do. +Certainly, to become a favorite pupil and assistant +teacher of Van den Ende's was, socially, decidedly +bad. But Spinoza was not deterred by the possible +social consequences of his search for knowledge and +truth. He took full advantage of his opportunities and +did not hesitate to follow wherever his master might +lead.</p> + +<p>Van den Ende was also something of a political +adventurer; he finally paid the unsuccessful conspirator's +price on the gallows in Paris. It is not at all unlikely +that Spinoza's hard-headed political and ethical +realism was, in significant measure, due to his early intimacy +with his variously gifted and interesting Latin +master. We know that Spinoza was at least strongly +attracted, in later life, by the Italian political insurgent +Masaniello, for Spinoza drew a portrait of himself +in the Italian's costume. Machiavelli's influence, +too, upon Spinoza was very great—an influence that +would but be a continuation of Van den Ende's.</p> + +<p>Spinoza may have been indebted to Van den Ende +for one other thing: his only recorded romance. There +is some question about this indebtedness because tradition +does not speak very confidently, in some essentials, +about Van den Ende's daughter Clara Maria. Clara, +tradition is agreed, was intellectually and artistically +well endowed, although she was not very good looking. +In her father's absence on political affairs she took his +place in the school, teaching music as well as Latin. +But tradition is somewhat disconcerting when it comes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[xv]</a></span> +to Clara's age when Spinoza knew her. According +to some chronological researches, the fair object of +Spinoza's supposed devotion, was only twelve years +old. Hardly of an age to warrant Spinoza's love, unless +he loved her as Dante loved Beatrice. A somewhat +improbable possibility. The tradition that is less sparing +of Clara's age is, however, even more sparing of +her character: the success of Spinoza's supposed rival—a +fellow-student by name, Kerkrinck—is attributed to +the seductive powers of a pearl necklace. In spite of +the fact that tradition reckons this gift to have been +of decisive importance, one does not like to believe +that a girl of high intellectual and artistic ability could +be so easily and fatefully overcome by a mere trinket. +Still less does one like to believe that Spinoza fell in +love with a girl whose mind was so far removed from +the joys that are eternal and spiritual. But, of course, +it is conceivable that the girl took the trinket symbolically; +or else that Spinoza, who had given all his +time to rabbinical and philosophical studies was, in +the circumstances, quite justifiably deceived.</p> + +<p>Spinoza had not yet been graduated from his student +days when the Synagogue thought him a fit object for +official censure and threat. It seems Spinoza was betrayed +into overt indiscretion by two fellow-students +from the Synagogue, who asked for his opinion regarding +the existence of angels, the corporeality of God and +the immortality of the soul. Spinoza's answers were +not complete, but incomplete as they were, they yet +revealed a mind that was, to the faithful, shockingly +astray from the orthodox path. Spinoza was to have +elaborated upon his answers at a later date but the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[xvi]</a></span> +students had heard, apparently, quite enough. Instead +of returning to Spinoza they went to the authorities of +the Synagogue. The authorities were quite disposed +by Spinoza's association with Van den Ende and his +perceptible neglect of ceremonial observances, to believe +him capable of any intellectual villainy. They +promptly set about to reclaim the erring soul. Report +has it they sought two means: they offered Spinoza +an annuity of 1,000 florins if he would, in all overt +ways, speech and action, conform to the established +opinions and customs of the Synagogue; or, if he did +not see the wisdom and profit of compliance, they +threatened to isolate him by excommunication. Again +social politics as much as established religion demanded +the action the Synagogue took. Their experience with +Uriel da Costa was still very fresh in their minds and +they must have felt fairly confident that Spinoza would +be warned by the fate of his heretical predecessor if +not counseled by the wisdom of the Fathers. But +Spinoza was of a firmness they did not reckon on. He +did not hearken to their censure nor cower at their +threat. The thirty days or so in which he was given +to reform passed without discovering in him any +change. Excommunication had to be pronounced. +When barely twenty-four years old, Spinoza found +himself cut off from the race of Israel with all the +prescribed curses of excommunication upon his head.</p> + +<p>Spinoza was not present when excommunication was +pronounced upon him. He had left Amsterdam to stay +with some Collegiant friends on the Ouwerkerk road, +for, so one tradition relates, an attempt had been made +by one of the over-righteous upon Spinoza's life soon<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[xvii]</a></span> +after he became an object of official displeasure. Although +Spinoza was, throughout his life, ready to suffer +the consequences of his opinions and actions, he at no +time had the least aspiration to become a martyr. When +Spinoza heard of his excommunication he sent a spirited +and unyielding reply. The spirit if not the words of +that reply (not yet discovered) eventually made its +way into the <i>Tractatus Theologico-Politicus</i>. For the +rest of his life, whenever he had occasion to refer to +the Jews, Spinoza referred to them as he did to the +Gentiles—a race to which he did not belong. And +immediately, with the perfect grace and humor of a +cultured mind, he changed his name from Baruch to +Benedict, quite confident one can be as blessed in +Latin as in Hebrew.</p> + +<p>The subsequent course of Spinoza's life was almost +completely untroubled, though it was unmitigatingly +austere. He took up the trade of polishing lenses as a +means of earning his simple bread. He was somewhat +influenced in his decision by the advice in the +<i>Ethics of the Fathers</i> that every one should do some +manual work. But it was also quite the fashion at that +period for learned men, interested in science, to polish +lenses, as a hobby of course, not as a means of support. +Spinoza's choice was not altogether wise in spite of its +learned associations and the fact that he soon gained +an enviable reputation as a young scientist. The early +recognition Spinoza received from men like Henry +Oldenburg, the first secretary of the Royal Society, +from Robert Boyle and Huyghens, was hardly adequate +recompense for the fine dust he ground which aggravated +his inherited tuberculosis and undoubtedly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">[xviii]</a></span> +considerably hastened his death. Spinoza's accomplishment +in his chosen trade was not merely practical. +Many looked forward, with warranted confidence, to +the time when Spinoza would make a distinguished +contribution to the science of optics. But the only +strictly scientific work Spinoza left behind (long considered +to have been lost) was a short treatise on the +rainbow.</p> + +<p>All Spinoza's intellectual energy went into service of +his philosophy. His earliest philosophical work (rediscovered +(1862) in translated Dutch manuscript) +was a <i>Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being</i>. +It is a fragmentary, uneven work, chiefly valuable for +the insight it gives into the workings and development +of Spinoza's mind. The <i>Ethics</i>, in the completed form +in which we have it (no manuscript of it is extant) has +the incredible appearance of a system of philosophy +sprung full-grown from an unhesitating mind. Even +a most cursory reading of the <i>Short Treatise</i> completely +dispels this preposterous illusion. The <i>Ethics</i> was +the product of prolonged and critical toil.</p> + +<p>But just how prolonged it is difficult to say. For +already as early as 1665 almost four-fifths of the +<i>Ethics</i> seems to have been written. We learn as much +from a letter Spinoza wrote to one of his friends promising +to send him the "third part" of his philosophy up +to the eightieth proposition. From the letter it is +fairly clear that at that time the <i>Ethics</i> was divided +into three, not five, parts. Also, in letters written that +same year to William Blyenbergh one finds expressed +some of the chief conclusions published five years later +in the <i>Tractatus Theologico-Politicus</i>. And Spinoza<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">[xix]</a></span> +wrote, at this early period, not conjecturally or speculatively, +but as one writes who knows the firm and +tested grounds of his belief. Why the <i>Ethics</i>, in final +form, began to circulate privately only two or three +years before Spinoza's death, and why his work on +<i>The Improvement of the Understanding</i> and his +<i>Political Treatise</i> were left unfinished, must remain +something of an insoluble philosophico-literary mystery.</p> + +<p>The only book Spinoza published in his own lifetime +above his own name was his <i>Principles of Descartes' +Philosophy Geometrically Demonstrated</i> with +an appendix of <i>Cogitata Metaphysica</i> which he had +dictated to a youth (one "Cæsarius") "to whom (he) +did not wish to teach (his) own opinions openly." +Discretion, as he had already learned and later formally +stated and proved, was not inconsonant with rational +valor. The only other book Spinoza published +in his lifetime—the <i>Tractatus Theologico-Politicus</i>—bore +on its title page Spinoza's initials only, and the +name of a fictitious Hamburg publisher. When Spinoza +heard, some time later, that a Dutch translation +of this work was being prepared, he earnestly beseeched +his friends to forestall its publication (which +they did) because only its Latin dress saved it from +being officially proscribed. It was then an open secret +who the author was. Spinoza's personal rule to incur +as little official displeasure as possible made him abandon +his final literary project entertained in 1675. When +he began negotiations for the publication of the <i>Ethics</i> +a rumor spread that he had in press a book proving +that God does not exist. Complaint was lodged with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx">[xx]</a></span> +the prince and magistrates. "The stupid Cartesians," +Spinoza wrote Oldenburg "being suspected of favoring +me, endeavored to remove the aspersion by abusing +every where my opinions and writings, a course which +they still pursue." In the circumstances, Spinoza +thought it wisest to delay publication till matters would +change. But, apparently, they did not change, or +change sufficiently. The <i>Ethics</i> was first published +about a year after Spinoza's death.</p> + +<p>In spite of the consensus of adverse, and somewhat +vicious opinion, the author of the <i>Tractatus</i> did find +favor in the eyes of some. The Elector Palatine, Karl +Ludwig, through his secretary Fabritius, offered Spinoza +the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg (1673). But +Spinoza graciously declined it. Although a more welcome +or more honorable opportunity to teach could +not be conceived, it had never been his ambition to +leave his secluded station in life for one involving public +obligations. Even in his secluded corner, he found +he had aroused more public attention and sentiment +than was altogether consonant with the peace and retirement +he sought. Besides, he did not know how +well he could fulfill the desires of the Elector by teaching +nothing that would tend to discomfit established +religion.</p> + +<p>Spinoza had, in his young days, learned what extreme +dangers one must expect to encounter in a righteous +community become inimical. In his last years, he +experienced a stern and tragic reminder. Two of +Spinoza's best friends, Cornelius and Jan de Witt, who +had by a change in political fortune become the enemies +of the people, were brutally murdered (1672). Spinoza<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi">[xxi]</a></span> +for once, when this occurred, lost his habitual philosophic +calm. He could restrain neither his tears nor +his anger. He had to be forcibly prevented from +leaving his house to post a bill, at the scene of the +murder, denouncing the criminal mob. A somewhat +similar crisis recurred shortly afterwards when +Spinoza returned from a visit to the hostile French +camp. The object of his mission is not unequivocally +known. Some think it was to meet the Prince of +Condé solely in his private capacity of philosopher. +It is certain Spinoza was advised the French King +would acknowledge a dedicated book by means of a +pension—an advice Spinoza did not act upon. Others +think his mission was political. His reputation as a +distinguished man would have made him a very likely +ambassador. This conjecture would seem more probable, +however, if the de Witts, his intimate friends, +had been still in political power, instead of in their +graves. But whatever Spinoza's mission was, when +he returned to the Hague, the populace branded him a +French spy. Spinoza's landlord feared his house would +be wrecked, by an infuriated mob. This time Spinoza +exerted the calming influence. He assured Van der +Spijck that if any attempt were made on the house +he would leave it and face the mob, even if they should +deal with him as they did with the unfortunate de +Witts. He was a good republican as all knew. And +those in high political authority knew the purpose of +his journey. Fortunately, popular suspicion and anger +dissipated this time without a sacrifice. Still, the incident +showed quite clearly that though Spinoza did +not desire to be a martyr, he was no more afraid to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii">[xxii]</a></span> +die than he was to live for the principles he had at +heart.</p> + +<p>Spinoza's character, manifested in his life, has won +the high admiration of every one not bitterly hostile +to him. And even his enemies maintained and justified +their hatred only by inventing calumnious falsehoods +about him. Unfounded rumors of an evil nature began +to circulate during his lifetime, and naturally increased +in virulence and volume after his death. At +that period in human history, it was popularly recognized +that nothing good could be true, and nothing +vile could be false of an atheist—which was what +Spinoza, of course, was reputed to be. Oldenburg +even, for years unflaggingly profuse in expressions of +devoted friendship and humble discipleship, an eager +and fearless advocate (supposedly) of the truth, a +friend who lamented the fact that the world was being +denied the invaluable products of Spinoza's unsurpassed +intellect, and who, therefore, constantly +urged Spinoza, by all the advice of friendship, to publish +his work without delay, irrespective of popular +prejudice—even Oldenburg began to conceive a far +from complimentary opinion of Spinoza after the publication +of the <i>Tractatus Theologico-Politicus</i>! So +prevalent were the groundless rumors that the Lutheran +pastor, Colerus—the source of most of our information—felt +obliged in his very quaint summary +biography to defend the life and character of Spinoza. +To his everlasting credit, Colerus did this although +he himself heartily detested Spinoza's philosophy which +he understood to be abhorrently blasphemous and +atheistic. Colerus' sources of information were the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxiii" id="Page_xxiii">[xxiii]</a></span> +best: he spoke to all who knew Spinoza at the Hague; +and he himself was intimate with the Van der Spijcks +with whom Spinoza had lived the last five years of his +life, and with whom Colerus was now living—in +Spinoza's very room.</p> + +<p>Spinoza's courage and strength of mind are as impressively +manifested in the constant daily life he lived +as in the few severe crises he resolutely faced. For +the twenty years of his excommunication he lived in +comparative retirement, if not isolation. The frugality +of his life bordered on asceticism. All his free time +and energy Spinoza dedicated with unusual single-hearted +devotion to the disinterested development of +a philosophy he knew would not be very acceptable to +the general or even special philosophic reader. His +mode of life is all the more remarkable because it was +not determined by embittered misanthropy or passionate +abhorrence of the goods of the world. It was +dictated solely by what he understood to be, in his +circumstances, the reasonable life for him. Although +he was an eager correspondent, and had many friends +whom he valued above all things that are external to +one's own soul, his interest in his own work kept him +from carrying on, for any length of time, an active +social life. He believed, too, that it is part of the +wisdom of life to refresh oneself with pleasant food +and drink, with delicate perfumes and the soft beauty +of growing things, with music and the theater, literature +and painting. But his own income was too slender +to allow him much of these temperate riches of a +rational life. And always, rather than exert himself +to increase his income, he would decrease his ex<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxiv" id="Page_xxiv">[xxiv]</a></span>penditure. +Still, he no doubt enjoyed the little he had. +He found very palatable, most likely, the simple food +he himself prepared in later life; and he must have +gained additional satisfaction from the thought that +he was, because of his own cooking, living more safely +within his means. The pipe he smoked occasionally +(let us hope) was fragrant; the pint of wine a month +very delectable. For mental recreation he read +fairly widely in literature, observed the habits of insects, +with the microscope as well as the naked eye. +He also sometimes drew ink or charcoal sketches of +his visitors and himself. A fairly plausible rumor has +it that Rembrandt was his teacher. Unfortunately, all +of Spinoza's sketches were destroyed.</p> + +<p>Although Spinoza wanted to be independent and +self-supporting he was not irrationally zealous about +it. He did not accept all the financial help his friends +were eager to give him, but he did accept some. One +of his young friends, Simon de Vries, before his early +death occurred, wanted to bequeath all of his estate to +Spinoza. But Spinoza persuaded him not to deprive +his own brother of his natural inheritance. Even the +annual 500 florins de Vries finally left him, Spinoza +would not altogether accept, offering the plea that so +much wealth would surely take his mind away from +his philosophy. But he would accept 300 florins, a +sum he felt would not be burdensome or dangerous to +his soul. This annuity he regularly received until his +death. His friends the de Witts, pensioned him too; +the heirs to the estate contested Spinoza's claim, whereupon +Spinoza promptly withdrew it. This high-minded +action corrected their covetousness, and from the de<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxv" id="Page_xxv">[xxv]</a></span> +Witts, too, he received financial help until his death.</p> + +<p>Spinoza's relations with the humble folk he stayed +with exhibited the modesty and grace of character that +endeared him to his intimate friends. When he was +tired working in his own room, he would frequently +come down to smoke a pipe and chat with his landlady +and landlord about the simple affairs that filled their +lives. His speech was "sweet and easy;" his manner +of a gentle, noble, beauty. Except for the occasion +when the de Witts were murdered, Spinoza never +showed himself either unduly merry or unduly sad. +If ever he found that his emotions were likely to +escape his wise control, he would withdraw until such +danger had passed. We find the same characteristics +exhibited in Spinoza's correspondence. Although he +found some of his correspondents sometimes very trying, +he never failed to be as courteous and considerate +as the circumstances would permit. Even when one +Lambert de Velthuysen provoked his righteous indignation, +Spinoza tempered his caustic reply before sending +it off.</p> + +<p>Spinoza lived the ethics he wrote. As is the <i>Ethics</i>, +so is his life pervaded by a simple grandeur. And as +he lived, so did he die. He had not been feeling very +well, and had sent for his friend and physician Dr. +Ludwig Meyer. A chicken broth was ordered for +Spinoza of which he partook quite healthily. No one +suspected that he was this time fatally ill. He came +down in the morning, and spoke for some time with his +hosts. But when they returned from a visit that same +afternoon (Sunday, Feb. 21, 1677) they learned the sad, +surprising news that Spinoza had gently passed away, +the only one by his bedside, his doctor and friend.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxvi" id="Page_xxvi">[xxvi]</a></span></p> + +<p>Spinoza sought in his lifetime neither riches, nor +sensual pleasure, nor fame. He wrote and published +his books when he could and thought advisable because +part of his joy consisted in extending, as he +said, a helping hand to others, in bringing them to see +and understand things as he did. If they did not see, +or obdurately refused to understand, he did not consider +it part of his task to overcome them. He was +animated by no missionary zeal. He was content to +search for the truth and to explain what he found +as best he could. The truth, he devoutly believed, +would make us free. But it was truth that we understood, +not truth that was forced upon us. He was +quite satisfied to leave in his desk the manuscript of +his <i>Ethics</i>. People in his lifetime did not want to listen +to him. If ever they did after his death, they were +cordially welcome to. In death as in life they would +find him faithful to his ideal.</p> + +<p>Spinoza has often been likened to the old Hebrew +prophets. He does not, it is true, exhort the people +to follow in the path of righteousness; it is the philosopher's +task simply to show the way. But the +morality Spinoza stands for is the old prophetic morality +purified and made consistent with itself. And +Spinoza was, in his own time, as the prophets were +in theirs, a heretic and a rebel, a voice calling in the +wilderness—a wilderness that was later to become the +very citadel of civilization. Excommunicated by the +Jews and vilified by the Gentiles during his lifetime, +Spinoza has, since his death, been canonized by both +alike as the most saintly and exalted of philosophers. +Like his forerunners of old, Spinoza was a prophet <i>in</i> +Israel, <i>for</i> Mankind.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxvii" id="Page_xxvii">[xxvii]</a></span></p> +<h2>INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF<br /> +SPINOZA</h2> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>Spinoza's philosophy has suffered not a little from +the highly abstruse and technical form in which the +<i>Ethics</i> is written. Some, who are not inured to the hardships +of philosophy, quite naturally jump to the conclusion +that its formidable geometry contains only the +most inscrutable of philosophic mysteries; and a wise +humility persuades them to forego the unexampled enlightenment +a mastery of the difficulties would yield. +Others, who are devoutly wedded to what they consider +the unreservedly empirical character of modern (that +is, true) philosophy, avoid the <i>Ethics</i> because they are +convinced, on general principles, that only a mind +hopelessly lost in the dark night of medieval speculation +could conceive of philosophy in such ultra-deductive +fashion. Reason was for so long servile to idle +theology, it is not at all surprising that a work exemplifying +reason to such high degree as does the +<i>Ethics</i>, should receive scant respect from intrepid +empiricists. It is so easy to confuse the rationalizations +of reason with the nature of reason itself.</p> + +<p>Spinoza did not, however, choose the geometrical order +because he thought his philosophy too profound for +ordinary exposition; nor did he choose it because he +was enmeshed in medieval philosophic speculation. He<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxviii" id="Page_xxviii">[xxviii]</a></span> +chose it because his fundamental philosophic aim was +to establish ethics on a thoroughly tested, scientific +foundation; and geometry, an exemplar of all mathematical +science, most completely embodied, at that time, +the highest scientific ideal. Man, Spinoza held, is a +part of Nature, and Nature is governed by eternal and +immutable laws. It must be just as possible, therefore, +to apply the mathematical method to man, as it +is to apply it to matter. It must be possible to determine, +with the certitude obtainable in the exact sciences, +what things are good for man and what means +he has for attaining them.</p> + +<p>Spinoza's belief in the self-sufficing, lawful order of +Nature, and the adequacy of the natural powers of our +mind to understand the mysteries (popularly so appraised) +of heaven and earth, the singular expository +style of the <i>Ethics</i> emphasizes in unmistakable fashion. +Even for our understanding of God's own nature, +Divine Revelation, as commonly interpreted in Spinoza's +day and our own, is wholly unnecessary. We +need only the revelation afforded by the natural powers +of reason operative in us. In geometry, we do not +blindly accept conclusions on faith, nor do we reject +them by authority. We are guided in our discovery +of the true and the false, solely by the light of our +natural understanding. And the truths we discover +are not temporary fabrications of the human mind, but +eternal truths about the nature of things. Perhaps +no other single aspect of Spinoza's philosophy distinguishes +Spinoza from the medievalists as thoroughly +as does his use of the geometrical order of exposition; +and no other single aspect, perhaps, justifies as thor<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxix" id="Page_xxix">[xxix]</a></span>oughly +Spinoza's claim to rank with the moderns if +not even the contemporaries.</p> + +<p>The geometer's method of starting with definitions +and axioms and proceeding from proposition to proposition +especially appealed to Spinoza, apart from the +fact that geometry was an ideal science, because, for +Spinoza, the essence of logical method consists in starting +out with ideas that are of utter simplicity. Then, +if the ideas are understood at all, they can only be +clearly and distinctly understood. The absolutely +simple we can either know or not know. We cannot be +confused about it. And ideas which are clearly and +distinctly understood are, according to Spinoza, necessarily +true. Such unambiguously simple and therefore +necessarily true ideas Spinoza believed his definitions +and axioms expressed. Furthermore, if we gradually +build up the body of our science by means of our initial +simple ideas, justifying ourselves at every step +by adequate proof, our final result will necessarily be +as firmly established and as certainly true as the elementary +ideas we started with. The reliability of this +whole procedure more than compensates for its +tediousness—a defect Spinoza expressly recognizes.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately, however, there are other defects in +the geometrical method when it is applied to philosophy, +far more serious than its tediousness,—defects, +moreover, Spinoza apparently did not recognize. Even +though the geometrical method is preëminently scientific, +it is hardly a form suitable for philosophy. The +Euclidean geometer can take it for granted that the +reader understands what a line or plane, a solid or an +angle is. For formality, a curt definition is sufficient.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxx" id="Page_xxx">[xxx]</a></span> +But the philosopher's fundamental terms and ideas +are precisely those in need of most careful and elaborate +elucidation—something which cannot be given in +a formal definition or axiom. Also, in the geometrical +form, the burden of the author's attention is shifted +from the clarification of the propositions to the accurate +demonstration of them. Which, in a philosophical +treatise, is most unfortunate. For though it +is undoubtedly highly desirable that the philosopher +should observe the same care and precision as the +scientist, admitting nothing he cannot prove, it is +nevertheless just as well for the philosopher to take +reasonable care that what he is conscientiously proving +is understood. That Spinoza did not always take +such care but considerably over-estimated the self-evidence +of his definitions and axioms and the simplicity +of many of his important propositions, is an unhappy +fact conclusively established by the increasing +volume of Spinozistic literature.</p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>However, in spite of the difficult, and to the literary +repellent form of the <i>Ethics</i>, the catholicity of +Spinoza's influence has been extremely remarkable. +In time, his influence bids fair to equal in range, if +not in gross extent, the as yet unparalleled influence of +the artist-philosopher Plato. It took about a hundred +years for Spinoza to come into something of his own. +For the <i>Ethics</i> was condemned with the <i>Tractatus +Theologico-Politicus</i> as an atheistic and immoral work. +Only when the romantic philosophers of Germany,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxxi" id="Page_xxxi">[xxxi]</a></span> +following the lead of Lessing and Jacobi, found in +Spinoza a man who was, as they thought, after their +own heart, did Spinoza's mundane fortune change. +As a result of their efforts, Spinoza ceased to be a +philosopher to be execrated in public (though furtively +read in private), and became a philosopher to be +eulogized on all occasions in most rhapsodic, if bewildering, +terms. Many others too, besides professional +philosophers, began to read Spinoza with much sympathy +and unbounded admiration. Goethe, Matthew +Arnold, Heine, George Eliot, Flaubert, Coleridge, and +Shelley—to mention only a few distinguished lay +names—found in Spinoza a powerful, stimulating and, +in varying degrees, congenial thinker. To-day, after +having been one of the liberating thinkers of mankind +who was read but not honored, Spinoza is fast becoming +one of the canonized of mankind who are honored +but not read.</p> + +<p>The reason for Spinoza's magnificent influence is not +difficult to discover: his philosophy deals in a grand, +illuminating way with all that is of profoundest importance +in human life. There is no material the universe +offers for man's life but Spinoza seeks to understand +and explain its rational function and utility. +For Spinoza set before himself the hard task of laying +down the principles whereby men may guide themselves +aright in all the affairs of life—the lowest as +well as the highest. His philosophy, as a result, is at +once the most exalted and the most matter of fact. +There is no high sentiment or glorious ideal to which +Spinoza does not give proper attention and a proper +place. And yet he propounds nothing in his ethical<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxxii" id="Page_xxxii">[xxxii]</a></span> +theory that cannot be clearly seen by reason and that +cannot be fully substantiated by the history of man. +Spinoza's ethics is perfectly balanced, eminently sane. +And there is, pervading it all, a stately sustained resolution +of mind, a royal, often religious spirit and calm.</p> + +<p>And Spinoza's thought, if not all of his terminology, +is refreshingly modern and contemporary. We find +in him, as in contemporaries, an utter reliance upon +the powers of the human mind. All dogmatism, in the +pristine connotation of unexamined adherence to the +doctrines of tradition, is absent from his thought. +Spinoza is thoroughly critical, for only modern philosophic +arrogance, in first full bloom in Kant, can justly +monopolize the term "critical" for itself. Naturally, +though, Spinoza is unfamiliar with the whole apparatus +and style of philosophic thinking which the last two +centuries of excessively disputatious and remarkably +inconclusive philosophy have created. Spinoza has +his own technical philosophic style, inherited to some +extent, but to a much larger extent transformed by him +for original use. But technical as his style may be, it +is simplicity itself when compared with the horrific +styles which were, until the last few decades, alone +thought adequate to express the profound and esoteric +mysteries of modern philosophy. The philosophic +jargon of the 18th. and 19th. centuries is now almost +universally discarded, and with it preternaturally recondite +and ineffectual modes of thought. Those who +have achieved at least some of the new simplicity in +thought and expression are better able than any others +to enter into the heart of Spinoza's philosophy, into +the open secret of his thought. For apart from the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxxiii" id="Page_xxxiii">[xxxiii]</a></span> +mere stylistic difficulties of the <i>Ethics</i> and some detail +of his metaphysical doctrine, the few great and simple +ideas which dominate his philosophy are quite easy +to understand—especially if one uses the <i>Tractatus +Theologico-Politicus</i> as an introduction to them. It +was an unexpressed maxim with Spinoza that even at +the risk of keeping our heads empty it is necessary we +keep our minds simple and pure.</p> + + +<h3>III</h3> + +<p>The central controlling idea of Spinoza's philosophy +is that all things are necessarily determined in Nature, +which he conceives to be an absolutely infinite unified +and uniform order. Instead of maintaining that God +is like man magnified to infinity, who has absolute, +irresponsible control of a universe which is external to +him—the rather rude anthropomorphic account of the +ultimate nature of the universe contained in the Bible—Spinoza +maintains that God is identical with the universe +and must be and act according to eternal and +necessary laws. God is Nature, if we understand by +Nature not merely infinite matter and infinite +thought,—the two attributes of Nature specifically +known to us—but infinite other attributes the precise +character of which we can never, because of our finitude, +comprehend. Within this Being—God, Nature +or Substance (the more technical, philosophic term)—there +is no dichotomy; and there is outside of it no +regulative or coercive intelligence such as the Biblical +God is conceived to be. Whatever is, is one. And +it is, in the special Spinozistic sense, supremely per<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxxiv" id="Page_xxxiv">[xxxiv]</a></span>fect +because absolutely real. There is, considered in +its totality, no lack or defect in Nature. There can +be, therefore, no cosmic purposes, for such purposes +would imply that Nature is yet unfinished, or unperfected, +that is, not completely real. Something that +cannot possibly be true of an absolutely infinite Being.</p> + +<p>Spinoza's conception of an absolutely infinite universe +is a vast improvement upon the pent-in, finite +medieval universe inherited from Aristotle. It exceeds +by infinity, in breadth of vision, even our contemporary +notion of an infinite physical cosmos. And his +conception of universal necessity is as great an advance +upon the view that transformed natural occurrences +into miraculous events. Miracles, according to +the Bible, most clearly exemplify God's omnipotence; +for omnipotence in the popular mind consists in nothing +so much as in the ability to satisfy any purpose or +whim no matter how transitory it is, or how incompatible +with what has been antecedently desired or +done. Miracles may be extraordinary occurrences +with reference to the order of Nature, but they are, +with reference to God, commonplace exhibitions of +His Almighty power. For Spinoza, however, miracles, +did they actually occur, would exhibit not God's power, +but His impotence. The omnipotence of the one absolutely +infinite Being is not shown by temperamental +interruptions of the course of events; it is manifested +in the immutable and necessary laws by which all +things come to pass.</p> + +<p>Spinoza's conception of the universe, flawlessly operating +under necessary laws, effectively disposes of +miracles. And to dispose of miracles is one of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxxv" id="Page_xxxv">[xxxv]</a></span> +Spinoza's primary concerns. For as long as miracles +happen, organized knowledge and rational control—the +bases of a rational life—are both impossible for +man.</p> + +<p>If events were not absolutely conditioned by the determinate +nature of things, instead of science, we +should have superstition, and magic instead of scientific +control. When a god governs the universe according +to his transitory and altogether personal whims, +or when chance, without a god, reigns, man is hopelessly +at the mercy of the flux of events. In the conduct +of his affairs memory is of no use to him, and +forethought is impossible. In such cases man, as we +read in his history, and could easily conclude from his +nature, piteously grasps for salvation at whatever happens +his way. All things are then loaded with ominous +powers the strength of which is directly proportionate +to the hope or fear that enthralls him. If the +universe were lawless, the irony of man's fate would +forever be what it was when he lived in abysmal ignorance: +when in bitterest need of sane guidance, he +would be most prone to trust to the feeblest and most +irrational of aids. On the other hand, if things are +determined by necessity, nothing happening either +miraculously or by chance, science and a commensurate +power of scientific control is possible for man. +No more important argument could Spinoza conceive +in favor of his doctrine.</p> + + +<h3>IV</h3> + +<p>But the very doctrine which Spinoza placed at the +heart of his philosophy because of the inestimable ad<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxxvi" id="Page_xxxvi">[xxxvi]</a></span>vantages +man could derive from it, people loudly objected +to on the ground that it robbed man's life of all +moral and religious value. Determinism, they exclaimed, +reduces man to the rank of inanimate Nature; +without "free-will" man is no better than a slave, +his life doomed by an inexorable fate. True enough, +nothing is more abhorrent or more deadly to the striving +soul of man than to be bound in a fatalistic doctrine. +But the anti-determinists wildly confuse a perverted +determinism of ends with a scientific determinism +of means. And only the former determinism is truly +fatalistic. This confusion is to be found equally central +in Henry Oldenburg's inconsequential letters to +Spinoza and in Bernard Shaw's shamelessly silly Preface +to <i>Back to Methuselah</i>. Fundamental confusions +remain astonishingly stable throughout the centuries.</p> + +<p>Spinoza, when he maintained that all things are +necessarily determined by the laws of their own being, +certainly did not mean to say that, for example, the +toothbrush I shall buy to-morrow will be determined +by the stellar dust of æons ago. He did not wish to +maintain that the infinite occurrences of the past were +slowly but persistently moving to that far from divine +or distant event. No aboriginal astronomer royal could +have predicted the pending purchase merely by exhaustively +analyzing the then stellar dust. For toothbrushes +and their purchase are determined by the +nature of human beings, not by the nature of embryonic +stars. And Spinoza's doctrine of necessity +maintains that all events are determined by their +proper causes, not that everything is immediately +caused by some antediluvian event. And this is true<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxxvii" id="Page_xxxvii">[xxxvii]</a></span> +even though we can start from any event in the present, +no matter how trivial, and go back to an event +causally antecedent, and from that to another, even +until we recede into the stellar dust itself. But this +only amounts to saying, what is undoubtedly true, that +neither I nor the toothbrush could now exist if the +stellar dust, and the whole series of intervening events, +had not existed. But this is totally different from saying +that the stellar dust existed that I might exist to-day +and buy a toothbrush to-morrow, or, what equals +the same, that I and the toothbrush exist so that the +stellar dust and the exceedingly long consequence of +natural events should have a final purpose, an ultimate +end—even if not an ideal fulfillment. Now only when +causality, as in the latter case, is perversely teleological +is determinism fatalistic. Fatalism is the result only +when the ends of activity are necessarily but arbitrarily +determined. But when causality is not arbitrarily +teleological, or when only the natures of things, the +instruments or means of activity are necessarily +determined, then determinism involves no fatalism at +all.</p> + +<p>The only truly fatalistic systems which have had an +important influence in the history of mankind, have +been certain religious systems—the Christian religion +among them. The energies of western men were, for +over fourteen centuries, robbed of all vitality and meaning +because Christian theology irrevocably fixed the +end of life, and man could do nothing to alter it significantly +in any respect. Arbitrary teleological determinism +is, in the Christian religion, the philosophic root +of other worldliness. And it was no alleviation of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxxviii" id="Page_xxxviii">[xxxviii]</a></span> +state of affairs that miracles could happen in the realm +of Nature, that is, that Nature was not determined, but +was undetermined, accidental, or "free." On the contrary, +it was a decided aggravation that there existed +side by side with a perverse teleological determinism +for the other world, an instrumental indeterminism for +this world. For the latter served as effectively to put +the means of man's life, as the former did to put his +end, out of his present reach and control.</p> + +<p>Contrast the modern and contemporary Christian +period with the medieval and pre-medieval Christian +period. What a vast difference there is! With the +introduction of the modern period man's energies were +almost instantaneously liberated. And why? Because +of Chancellor Bacon's discovery of the value of empirical +investigation? Hardly. For this discovery +had been made long before Bacon. But it was only +after Bacon that the discovery had a great effect because +an enormous intellectual transformation had already +partly taken place in the time between the first +medieval discovery of the empirical method and +Bacon's proclamation of it. The enormous change was +that determinism had been transferred from ends to +means; and indeterminism from means to ends. +Mathematical physics had, as a system for explaining +Nature, supplanted theology.</p> + +<p>With scientific determinism firmly established in the +realm of Nature and arbitrary determinism thoroughly +disestablished in the realm of ends, the two-fold fatality +that crushed man with its oppressive power, automatically +disappeared. On the one hand, the world +ceased to be haunted by demonic powers; it was no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxxix" id="Page_xxxix">[xxxix]</a></span> +longer a miraculous world subject constantly to capricious +perturbations. It was no longer a world alien +to man's nature and it therefore ceased to be sheerly +brutal to him. For the world is brutal only as long +as we do not understand it. As soon as we do, it +ceases to be brutal, and becomes quite human, if not +humane. Knowledge transmutes a brute existent into a +rational instrumentality. And, on the other hand, man +could now espouse any end consonant with his nature. +He was no longer bound and dwarfed by an alien, superimposed +end which is just as sheerly brutal to man's +soul as an alien world is sheerly brutal to man's body.</p> + +<p>Of course, the ends that are consonant with man's +nature are determined by his nature, so that it may +seem we have not really escaped the fatality of "determinism." +This is, however, only seemingly so. Because, +according to the teleological determinism of +Christian theology the ends were fixed independently +of the natures that were to fulfill them; just as, according +to instrumental indeterminism events were +caused independently of the natures of the things that +caused them. Otherwise there would be nothing +miraculous about miracles and nothing virtuous about +Calvinism. But if the ends are the ends of our natures,—that +is, if teleological determinism is not perverse and +arbitrary but rational and scientific—we are, as Spinoza +constantly points out, free. Only when we are +subject to alien ends or the ends of alien natures are +we enslaved. For freedom is not opposed to necessity +or determinism; it is only opposed to an alien necessity +or alien determinism. Freedom consists not in +absolute indetermination, but in absolute self-deter<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xl" id="Page_xl">[xl]</a></span>mination. +And self-determination is the very last thing +that can be called fatalistic.</p> + +<p>Because Spinoza knew that freedom consists in self-determination +he was saved from falling into the +absurdities of Rousseau's "Back to Nature" doctrine +even though Nature is, for Spinoza, the origin of everything +and its laws, the only laws that are divine. Still, +the purpose and conduct of man's life, if they are to +be rational, must be defined by man's nature not by +any other nature; if man is to be free, he must be +guided by the particular laws of his own being, not +by the laws of any other being least of all by the general +laws of so totally dissimilar a being as absolutely +infinite Nature. There is as much sense and rationality +in exhorting us to go back to the Realm of Nature, +as there is in exhorting us to go on to the City of +God.</p> + +<p>There is, in Spinoza's system, no teleological determinism +(in the perverted theological usage explained +above); but neither is there, in Spinoza's system, any +"free-will" for man. And the hue and cry that is +always raised when "free-will" is denied, was raised +against Spinoza. The clamorous moralists protest that +"free-will" is the necessary (<i>sic!</i>) foundation of all +morality, and hence of religion. This is the starting +point of Bernard Shaw's no less than of Henry Oldenburg's +infuriated argument. And, unfortunately, no +less a thinker than William James starts from the same +misguided assumption. And yet nothing can be more +certainly clear than that if man as a matter of fact +has no "free-will" it is the very height of absurdity to +maintain that man's morality necessarily depends upon<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xli" id="Page_xli">[xli]</a></span> +his having "free-will." Something man does not possess +cannot be made any condition, let alone <i>the</i> indispensable +condition of his being able to live a moral life. +Man's morality must be based upon his nature; and +what his nature is cannot be antecedently determined +in accordance with the demands of any special moral +theory. Moral theory must be based upon man's nature; +not man's nature upon moral theory.</p> + +<p>Far from "free-will" being a necessary foundation +of morality "free-will" would make all morality, of +the kind we know and the "free-will"-ists want, absolutely +impossible. The central condition of moral +life is responsibility. So central is it, that it is now +acknowledged as such in all the penal codes of civilized +countries. But if man has, instead of a determinate +nature, "free-will", responsibility can in no way be +fixed. Education, too, is necessarily impossible. Hence +all punishment would have to be retributive. Moral +strife, as well as legal penalties, would bear all the +stigmata of unmitigated, imbecilic cruelty. This is +not the case however if man has an absolutely determinate +nature. Education is possible. And therefore +although crime loses none of its evil character, punishment +can lose all of its inhuman sting. The necessary +condition of human morality is responsibility not irresponsibility; +reliability not unreliability; certainty not +uncertainty; a firm will, not a "free" will.</p> + +<p>"Free-will" is necessary only in theological apologetics. +According to Christian theology, if man did +not have "free-will" it would follow that God is the +Author of all the evil of the world. Something which +is not quite in keeping with His perfect goodness. By<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xlii" id="Page_xlii">[xlii]</a></span> +a queer twist of mind, theologians therefore gave man, +and not God (as they should have done) "free-will." +But they gave man "free-will" not to enable him to +live virtuously, but to enable him to sin. If man were +able to live virtuously as well as sinfully of his own +"free-will" he would then be altogether independent +of God, which can in no way be admitted or allowed. +Hence the bitter and heart-rending cries of orthodox, +especially evangelical ministers that if left to themselves +they can only sin! They can live virtuously +only when they are absolutely coerced so to live by +God! Their radical inability to understand or believe +the self-reliant moral person grows from the very +heart of their theology. For "free-will"—the only +freedom they know—is the necessary condition, not +of man's morality, but of God's!</p> + +<p>There is no fatalism in Spinoza's system. Fatalism +is the moral value of a theory of the universe. That +theory is fatalistic, which makes the activities man +cherishes either futile or impossible. Any system that +puts man at the mercy of the flux of events does precisely +this. This is necessarily done by a system according +to which the universe does not faithfully observe +an immutable order, does not obey certain fixed and +eternal laws. Nothing is as fatal as an accident; no +universe as fatalistic as an accidental universe.</p> + +<p>There is no fatalism in Spinoza's system because +there are no accidents in Spinoza's universe. All +things are necessarily determined by immutable laws, +and man, who is an integral part of the universe, is +necessarily without "free-will." In Spinoza's system, +ends, being undetermined (as contrasted with their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xliii" id="Page_xliii">[xliii]</a></span> +being determined in the theological sense explained +above) they can exercise no fatalistic power; and +means, although determined (in the strict scientific +sense) are similarly impotent because they are, in the +life of man, subordinate to ends. Consequently, Spinoza +was able to write upon Human Freedom with a +truth and clarity and force excelling by far all theological, +teleological, "free-will," idealistic philosophers +from Plato to Josiah Royce. Spinoza was able to +write thus because, not in spite of the fact that he +placed at the heart of his philosophy the doctrine of +necessity; because, not in spite of the fact that he +developed the only complete system of philosophy +strictly consistent with the principles of natural science +or mathematical physics. Spinoza is, perhaps, +the only thoroughly emancipated, the only thoroughly +modern and scientific philosopher that ever lived. +And he is, much more certainly, the only thoroughly +emancipated, the only thoroughly modern and scientific +ethicist that ever lived.</p> + +<p>To-day, in view of the extensive dominion and authority +of science, the objections against Spinoza's +doctrine of necessity can hardly be as self-righteous +and as loud as they were two centuries ago. The principle +of the uniformity of Nature has become the +established foundation of natural science. And it is +also acknowledged, except in the recent ranks of superstition, +that man is a part of Nature, not independent +of it.</p> + +<p>Man's connection with Nature is, in Spinoza's system, +at least as intimate as it is in the latest system +of natural science. The original doctrine of the origin<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xliv" id="Page_xliv">[xliv]</a></span> +of species, Spinoza would have found entirely in +harmony with his general philosophy, although what +he would have thought of subsequent evolutionary +extravaganzas, it is impossible to say. Darwinian +biology made man consubstantial with the animal kingdom; +Spinoza's metaphysics makes man's body consubstantial +with the infinite attribute of extension or +matter, and his mind consubstantial with the infinite +attribute of thought which is the mind of Nature or +God. Man, as a "mode" of extension and thought, +is necessarily subject to the laws of these two attributes +of which he is compounded. The fundamental +relation of man to the universe, set forth in the Bible, +is radically transformed. Man is no longer an only +child of God, enjoying his privileges and protection +(occasionally tempered by inexperienced punishments); +he is a mode of two attributes of substance +inexorably determined by their universal, immutable +laws.</p> + + +<h3>V</h3> + +<p>Of all the laws of the universe, it was Spinoza's chief +object to discover the mental laws. That there were +such laws his metaphysics assured him; and the existence +to-day of a science of psychology substantiates +his belief. The most popular of recent psychologies—Freudianism—is +based upon the principle that +nothing whatever happens in the mental life of man, +waking or asleep, that is not specifically determined +by ascertainable causes. Psychoanalytic therapy +would be impossible otherwise. Psychiatry, too, has +conclusively demonstrated that only metaphorically +is the subject matter it deals with in the region of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xlv" id="Page_xlv">[xlv]</a></span> +the "abnormal." Actually, the insane are subject to +laws of behavior which can be scientifically studied no +less than the sane. They are no more possessed of an +evil, designing spirit, as our witch-burning ancestors +consistently believed, than the ordinary human being +is possessed of "free-will."</p> + +<p>Spinoza's psychology is dialectical. But it is no indictment +of his psychology to point out that it is. It +is true, his formal definition of sorrow, for instance, +fails supremely to touch the strings of a sympathetic +heart. But the philosophical psychologist is not a +novelist. The recent claim that "literary psychology" +is the only valid psychology, is as well founded as the +claim would be that only a "literary physics" is valid. +Mathematical physics gives us no more a picture of the +actual physical universe than Spinoza's psychology +gives us a picture of the mental and emotional life of an +actual human being. But the failure of these sciences +to give us a picture of the living world in no way invalidates +their truth, or deprives them of their utility.</p> + +<p>Consider, as an example, Spinoza's psychological law +freely expressed in the dictum that Paul's idea of Peter +tells us more about Paul than about Peter. This conclusion +follows strictly from fundamental principles of +Spinoza's abstract, dialectical psychology; but its truth +or its practical applicability is because of that not in +the least impaired. Indeed, because of its dialectical +form its range of meaning is greatly increased. +Spinoza's dictum applies to what William James called +the "psychologist's fallacy." It also applies to what +John Ruskin called the "pathetic fallacy." Again, it +applies to the fallacy Franz Boas exposed and which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xlvi" id="Page_xlvi">[xlvi]</a></span> +he may justly have called the "anthropologist's +fallacy." And it applies also to what one may, with a +great deal of benefit, dub the "ethicist's fallacy." For +the very same constitutional weakness of man to identify +confusedly his own nature with that of the object +he is contemplating or studying, is most flagrantly and +painfully evident in the fields of theoretical and practical +ethics. The "ethicist's fallacy" is the source of +all absolutism in theory, and all intolerance in practice.</p> + +<p>All four fallacies just enumerated come under +Spinoza's dictum as special cases come under a general +law. And these four are by no means the only instances +of the common habit of mind. From no field +of human endeavor is the mischief-working fallacy +ever absent. We find it lodged in the judge's decision, +the propagandist's program, the historian's record, the +philosopher's system. In the field of metaphysical +poetry it has recently been identified by Santayana as +"normal madness." In its milder forms, the fallacy +is now known by every one as the "personal equation"; +in its pronounced, abnormal manifestations it is known +by the psychoanalysts as "transference." It is a Protean +fallacy woven into the emotional texture of the +human mind. Nothing, for it, is sacred enough to be +inviolate. For Spinoza discovered it sanctimoniously +enshrined even in the Sacred Scriptures. As he brilliantly +shows us in the <i>Tractatus Theologico-Politicus</i>, +the prophets' ideas about God tell us more about the +prophets than about God.</p> + +<p>The far-reaching significance of Spinoza's propositions +is one of their most remarkable characteristics. +This is due to the fact, contemporary philological<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xlvii" id="Page_xlvii">[xlvii]</a></span> +philosophers notwithstanding, that Spinoza defined the +essence, the generating principle, not the accidental +qualities, of the human mind.</p> + +<p>Another example may not be out of place. Spinoza's +proposition that anything may be accidentally +(in the philosophic sense of "accident") a cause of +pleasure, pain, or desire seems to explain the essence +of all the particular variations of the psychological +phenomena known now by all who have been aroused +to the significance of their vagrant cryptic slumbers, +as the phenomena of symbolism, sublimation, and +fetich worship. Spinoza's proposition explains all the +phenomena adequately because among the fundamental +human emotions, Spinoza like Freud—if we +discount the recent attempt to go beyond the pleasure-principle—reckons +only three: desire, pleasure and +pain. And with Spinoza, as with the Freudians, it +sometimes seems that desire is more fundamental than +the other two, for desire expresses, in Spinoza's terminology, +the essence of man. Desire however may be +stimulated by almost anything. It requires the least +sanity of mind, therefore, to prevent one from scandalously +over-emphasizing one particular class of objects—of +desire.</p> + +<p>The striking similarity, if not identity, between Spinoza's +psychological doctrines and those of contemporaries, +serves to give conclusive lie to the crass contemporary +contention that Truth instinctively shuns the +philosophical study, and that she only favors the laboratory +or clinic where she freely comes and frankly +discloses herself to the cold, impersonal embrace of +mechanical instruments.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xlviii" id="Page_xlviii">[xlviii]</a></span></p> + +<p>It is not altogether fortuitously that Spinoza's psychology +embraces so readily contemporary psychological +conceptions. Spinoza made a psychological, if not +psychoanalytical, analysis of some portions of Scripture. +And Scripture is a very rich human material. +Besides having to explain the diverse and conflicting +accounts the different Scriptural authors gave of the +nature of God, Spinoza had to account for the superstitious +beliefs commonly held by men that are incorporated +in the Bible—the beliefs in omens, devils, +angels, miracles, magical rites. Spinoza had to account +for all these by means of his analysis of human nature +since he would not grant the existence of supernatural +beings and powers. Spinoza's psychology adequately +performs the task. His psychology demonstrates with +unsurpassed thoroughness and clarity how human +emotions, when uncontrolled in any way by intelligence, +naturally attach themselves to all sorts of +bizarrely irrelevant and absurd things, and stimulate +the imagination to endow these things with all the +qualities and powers the disturbed hearts of ignorant +men desire. Ignorant and frustrated man, Spinoza +showed, frantically dreams with his eyes open.</p> + + +<h3>VI</h3> + +<p>Spinoza's method in psychology is dialectical, but +his interest is practical. His psychology one might almost +say is a moral psychology. Spinoza wants to +explain mental phenomena through their primary causes +because a knowledge of man's nature is the radical +cure for his ills. The greatest obstacle man has to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xlix" id="Page_xlix">[xlix]</a></span> +contend against is his emotional nature. Not that it +is inherently degraded or sinful—the grotesque superstition +some religious moralists have maintained; but +man's emotional nature masters, more often than not, +man's rational nature, and leads man astray. When +the emotions are unrestrained and undirected by knowledge +and intelligence, they violently attach themselves +to anything that chances to excite them. Their stark +immediacy vitiates man's judgment. He is unable, +while under their sway, to select and follow the course +that is best, because his mind is engulfed in the evanescent +present. In his hectic desire to gain the passing +pleasure, man loses his ultimate good.</p> + +<p>But man's salvation, just as much as his damnation, +is within his own control. Salvation or blessedness +is something man can achieve by his own efforts; +it is not something he can achieve only by Divine +Grace. For it is no innate perversion of soul, no inherent +wickedness of man, no malicious "free-will" +that causes him to follow the lure of the Devil rather +than the light of God. The very elements in man's +nature which cause him to fall are the means by which +he can make himself rise. He can pit one emotion +against another and the stronger will not merely win, +but will win over, the weaker. And it is in the nature +of the emotions not to have only one satisfying object, +but to be able to derive satisfaction from almost any +object whatsoever. The most spiritual forms of human +love have the same emotional foundations as the most +bestial forms of human lust.</p> + +<p>To learn how to become master of one's emotions, to +learn how to free oneself from their bondage, is, there<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_l" id="Page_l">[l]</a></span>fore, +the primary condition of sustained and rational +happiness. The key to virtue, Spinoza independently +agreed with Socrates, is knowledge of oneself. Only +when we understand ourselves can we control our emotions. +And only when we have our emotions under +control are we able consistently to direct our activity +towards a definite, rational goal. Our activity then +follows from our own nature, and not from the nature +of external things which arouse our emotions and determine +their strength. And, as already noticed, to be +the necessary cause of our own activity is, according +to Spinoza, to be free.</p> + +<p>It is impossible, of course, for man ever to be the +sole cause of his activity. To be such, he would have +to be an entirely independent being—an absolute power—something +he can never be. No matter how eloquently +misguided enthusiasts extol the powerful merits +of man's "free-will" it will always be true that man's +emotions, sensations and ideas change very significantly +with the organic changes that occur in his body. +The emotions, sensations and ideas of a child differ +from those of a man, and those of a man in maturity +differ from those of a man decrepit with old age. And +these and similar changes are quite beyond the control +of man.</p> + +<p>However, without denying man's intimate dependence +upon Nature, it is still possible to distinguish +between those activities which follow, in an important +degree, from a man's individual nature—whatever it +may happen to be at the time—and those activities +which follow only from his own nature in conjunction +with the nature of other things. The movement of my<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_li" id="Page_li">[li]</a></span> +pen on paper would be impossible without the general +order of Nature which allows such phenomena as +motion, pen and paper, to exist. Nevertheless, I can +profitably distinguish between the movement of my +pen on paper and the movement of my body through +stellar space. The former movement follows, in an +important sense, from my own peculiar constitution; +the latter, from the constitution of the stellar system. +Likewise, but more significantly for human welfare, +one can distinguish broadly between the activities and +the passivities of the mind; between man as an agent, +a doer—man's intellect; and man as a patient, a sufferer—man's +passions. In this creative age such +distinction should be singularly easy to draw. In moral +terminology one can distinguish between man as free +and man as enslaved.</p> + +<p>Since man can never be the sole cause of his activity, +he can never be wholly free. The range of +human power is extremely limited, and Spinoza is ever +careful to point that out. Spinoza is no incurable +optimist, no Leibnizian Pangloss who believes this is, +for man, the best of all possible worlds. To be humanly +idealistic it is by no means necessary to be +super-humanly utopian. But neither is Spinoza a shallow +Schopenhauerian pessimist. Spinoza's realistic appraisal +of man's worldly estate is entirely free from all +romantic despair. This world is no more the worst +than it is the best of all possible worlds for man. Although +man cannot completely alter his evil estate, he +can better it. And the wisdom of philosophy consists +in recognizing this fact and discovering what ways and +means there are for bringing such betterment about.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lii" id="Page_lii">[lii]</a></span></p> + +<p>This Spinoza has in mind throughout the devious +courses of his philosophy. It is present to him when +he delineates the character of Nature or God, when he +outlines the nature of the mind and its emotions, no +less than when he specifically addresses himself to the +task of describing the way to the highest blessedness +of man. Indeed, so intent is Spinoza upon reaching +his ethical goal, and making all his doctrines contributory +to it, he purposely omits to treat of many +philosophical problems because they are, though interesting +in themselves, of too little value for the conduct +of man's life. His philosophical system, as a result, is +in many respects merely sketched in massive outline.</p> + + +<h3>VII</h3> + +<p>The dominant ethics of Christian civilization has +made a special point of disregarding the intimate connection +that exists between human nature and rational +conduct. Morality has been identified, not with living +a life according to a rational plan and an adequate +conception of an ideal form of human existence, but +with a strained attempt to live in accordance with an +inherited system of coercive social habits. Of this +morality, the Puritan is the popular type. Only in +quite recent years has some advance been made back +to the sane naturalistic conception of morals which is +found in the Greeks and also in Spinoza.</p> + +<p>It is a fundamental point with Spinoza that the +ceremonial law, as he puts it in the <i>Tractatus +Theologico-Politicus</i>, can at best secure man wealth +and social position. Man's highest blessedness can be +secured by the divine law of Nature alone. Here<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_liii" id="Page_liii">[liii]</a></span> +Spinoza and Rousseau are at one. It was relevant to +Spinoza's purpose to treat only of religious ceremonial +law; but his conclusions apply with equal force and +relevancy to social and political ceremonial law as well. +Spinoza's distinction between ceremonial and divine +law is peculiarly significant and illuminating when +applied to marriage. For to-day in marriage, if anywhere, +is it glaringly evident that the legal or religious +or social ceremonial law can at best secure man or +woman wealth and social position. Happiness or +blessedness lie altogether beyond its powerful reach. +Marriage is sanctified and made blessed not by the +ceremonial law of priest or city clerk but by the divine +law of love. Natural love, or love free from all ceremonial +coercions, is not merely not a questionable +source of marital happiness: it is the only source. The +ceremonial law, the legal or religious marriage custom, +has nothing whatsoever to do with human happiness. +If by "free" love is meant love free from all legal, +social and religious ceremonial restraints, then free love +is, according to Spinoza, the only basis of rational +marriage.</p> + +<p>No man ever treasured the joys of the spirit more +than did Spinoza; but he did not because of that +nourish a savage antagonism against the body. The +very bases of his philosophy of the mind saved him +from any such disastrous folly. What Havelock Ellis +says "We know at last" Spinoza knew all the time—"that +it must be among our chief ethical rules to see +that we build the lofty structure of human society on +the sure and simple foundations of man's organism." +It is because Spinoza knew this so thoroughly and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_liv" id="Page_liv">[liv]</a></span> +remembered it so well that he devotes so much of his +attention to the nature of the human mind and the +human emotions in a treatise on ethics.</p> + +<p>Mind and body are not intrinsically alien or inimical +to one another. They are coöperative expressions of +the one reality. The mind is the idea of the body and +"in proportion as one body is better adapted than another +to do or suffer many things, in the same proportion +will the mind, at the same time, be better adapted +to perceive many things." Purely psychologically, all +that we can ever discover about the regulating influence +glands have upon personality can only go to corroborate, +not to improve this general position. And +morally, the implications are equally far-reaching and +profound.</p> + +<p>The virtue of the mind is not to despise or reject but +to understand and transform. And it clearly must be +more excellent for the mind to know both itself and +the body than it is for the mind to know itself alone. +For natural science is the result when the mind organizes +into a system what are, in their own nature, simply +apprehensions of bodily existences; and art is the result +when the mind transfuses with an ideal quality of its +own what are, in their own nature, simply apprehensions +of bodily excellences of form or motion, color or +sound. Matter is, in its nature, no more hostile to +spirit than body is alien to mind. Paradise is not a +non-or super-physical realm; it is a physical realm +made harmonious with the ideality of the soul. Spirit +is an appreciation, a transmutation of matter. For +the lover, the physical embrace is a spiritual revelation.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lv" id="Page_lv">[lv]</a></span></p> + +<p>The fundamental metaphysical law from which +Spinoza's ethical system flows is that everything endeavors +to persist in its own being. This law is the +metaphysical equivalent of the first law of motion in +physics which is itself the equivalent of the law of +identity in logic. By his law Spinoza does not mean +anything which anticipates the nineteenth-century doctrine +of the competitive struggle for existence. On the +contrary, nothing is so clear to Spinoza as the fact +that the most efficient way of preserving one's own +being is not by competitive but by coöperative activity. +Especially is this true of human beings. By his own +efforts a solitary man cannot, even after he has been +nursed to maturity, maintain himself in a decent manner. +Certainly he is unable successfully to resist his +foes. But with the aid of his fellows man can develop +a highly complex and tolerably stable civilization, all +the excellences of which he can enjoy at the comparatively +small risk of becoming a victim of its dangers. +Social organization is the natural expression of man's +fundamental endeavor to preserve himself. A perfect +social organization naturally expresses the highest form +of human existence—individualism without anarchy +and communism without oppression.</p> + +<p>Consistent with his primary law of being, Spinoza +defines virtue not in terms of negations, inhibitions, +deficiencies or restraints; virtue he defines in terms +of positive human qualities compendiously called +human power. Virtue is power, however, not in the +sense of the Renaissance ideal of "manliness" as we +glimpse it, for instance, in Benvenuto Cellini; nor is +it power in the vulgar sense of dominion which seems<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lvi" id="Page_lvi">[lvi]</a></span> +to be the confused ideal of some ultra-contemporaries; +virtue is power in the sense of the Greek ideal that +virtue is human excellence. It was therefore very +natural for Nietzsche who consciously went back to +the Greeks to hail Spinoza as his only philosophical +forerunner, the only philosopher who dwelt with him +on the highest mountain-tops, perilous only for those +who are born for the base valleys of life. And it was +equally natural for Nietzsche to fail to see the important +differences between his own violent and turbid +thinking and the sure and disciplined thinking of Spinoza—on +those very points upon which Nietzsche +thought they agreed.</p> + +<p>Perfection and imperfection are, in Spinoza's +thought, identical with the real and the unreal. The +perfect is the completed, the perfected; the imperfect, +the uncompleted, the unperfected. These terms have, +in their first intention, no specifically ethical significance. +Nature is perfect, that is, absolutely real or +completed; but in no intelligible sense is Nature ethically +good. However, it is possible to convert non-ethical +into ethical terms. We can do this by designating, +for example, a certain type of character as the +"perfect" type. If we reach that type we are perfect +or supremely "good"; insofar as we fall short of it, we +are imperfect, or "bad."</p> + +<p>Just what constitutes human excellence is determined +in each case by the specific nature and relations +of the individual involved. The excellence of a child +is not that of a man; and the excellence of a free man +differs from that of a slave. For the parent, the perfect +child is docile, beautiful and full of promise; for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lvii" id="Page_lvii">[lvii]</a></span> +the ruler, the perfect man is industrious, respectful of +law and order, eager to pay taxes and go to war; for +the free man, the perfect man is a rational being, living +a harmonious life in knowledge and love of himself, his +neighbor and God. Moreover, within any one class +the excellences vary in harmony with the variations in +the individuals. There is no excellence in general.</p> + +<p>But because ethical standards are quite human and +vary, they do not lack, therefore, all validity. They +are within their range of applicability, absolute, even +though they are, in a more comprehensive universe, +relative. A just appreciation of the relative nature, but +absolute value of specific ethical judgments, is above +all things vitally necessary in ethics. Such appreciation +saves the ethicist from the pernicious fallacy of +erecting personal preferences into universal laws; and +it also saves him from falling into the ethical abyss +where all things are of equal value because all things +are equally vain.</p> + +<p>Ethical tolerance is different from ethical sentimentality. +Every one has the sovereign natural right to +cherish the excellence in harmony with his character. +But the equality extends no further. A comprehensive +estimate of the powers of the mind can be made and +they can be arranged in a series of increasing value. +No arrangement can ever be absolutely final and +authoritative, for what one free man considers the +highest perfection of human life, another will consider +to be only of secondary importance. Still, all free +men will agree that certain powers of the mind are +superior to others. But superiority is not rationally +endowed with legislative power over others. The free<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lviii" id="Page_lviii">[lviii]</a></span> +man is superior to the slave, but he has, because of +that, no rational right to dominate him; neither is it his +office to revile or despise him; the slave was given his +nature, he did not ask for it.</p> + +<p>But if it is not the office of the free man to dominate +or revile the slave still less is it the divinely appointed +office of the slave to rule and revile the free man—universal +democratic prejudices notwithstanding. And +in support of the independent, and in case of contest, +superior right of the free man we have the very highest +authority for those who do not trust themselves to be +guided by reason. God Himself has pronounced upon +this tremendous issue. And not in mere words, but +by unmistakable deeds. When Lucifer, the first absolute +democrat or equalitarian, the first one to maintain +that no one was better than he was, raised his impious +standard, God assembled all His faithful hosts together +and hurled Lucifer out of Heaven into Hell. And +justly so. For Lucifer had, by his foul, sacrilegious +doctrine and action, revealed himself to be the Prince +of Darkness not the Prince of Light. To our untold +and everlasting misery the Prince of Darkness who +failed to ensnare the majority of angels did succeed in +ensnaring the majority of mankind. So irredeemably +so, even the sweetly and tenderly lyrical Prince of +Peace had to be sent to us bearing a ghastly sword.</p> + +<p>Reason is not, according to Spinoza, a constitutive +power in man's life; it is a regulative principle. Spinoza +is, in the traditional usage of the term, anything +but a rationalist in his ethics. Only if rationalism consists +in being unflaggingly reasonable is Spinoza an +avowed and thorough-going rationalist. Reason has,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lix" id="Page_lix">[lix]</a></span> +for Spinoza, no transcendental status or power, and it +plays no dictatorial rôle. Reason, for him, is essentially +an organizing not a legislative power in man's +life. To take a phrase from Professor Dewey, reason, +for Spinoza, is reconstructive not constitutive. The +power of the intellect is not some underived, original, +independent power which can impose or, better, superimpose +its categorical imperatives upon human conduct. +The power of the intellect is wholly derivative, dependent +upon the nature of the things that it understands.</p> + +<p>Reason gives man the power and insight to organize +his life on the basis of his knowledge, to chose +an end harmonious with his nature, what is for his best +advantage—the basis of all virtue—and to select and +control the means by which it can be attained. For +the happy governance of our lives the object we must +chiefly understand is ourselves. Because—in Matthew +Arnold's line—"the aids to noble life are all within." +When we become creatures conscious of our natural +endowment we cease to be blind instruments of our +natures and become rational, intelligent agents. For +intelligence, in the fundamental sense of the word, consists +in knowing what we are and understanding what +we can do.</p> + +<p>A man who governs his life according to the dictates +of reason tries, insofar as possible, to harmonize his +conflicting interests. He balances, impartially, future +with present goods, and he bases his decision upon the +broad foundation of all his needs. He does not madly +satisfy or repress one passion at the expense of the rest +of his nature. He satisfies a maximum rather than a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lx" id="Page_lx">[lx]</a></span> +minimum of his desires, evaluating them not merely +by numerical strength but by quality and duration. It +is only stupid and pernicious confusion that makes +man's moral problem consist in his discovering instead +of a good "relative" to his nature, an "absolute" good, +good for no nature at all. Man's real moral problem +is to secure a permanent good instead of a transitory +good; a more inclusive good instead of a more restricted +good; a higher good instead of a lower good. Morally, +it matters nothing whether an intellectual good is +"absolute" or whether it is only "relative" to man's +mind and his power of comprehension. But it matters +everything, morally, whether an intellectual good is +more or less permanent, more or less inclusive, more or +less valuable than a sensory good. This is the real +moral problem man is faced with. And this is the +moral problem Spinoza considers and solves.</p> + +<p>Everybody knows what is Spinoza's solution. One +permanent intellectual good is, according to him, of +more importance and value in the life of man than +countless transitory sensory pleasures. The object +most permanent in character and greatest in value is +Nature or God. The highest virtue of the mind, therefore, +the highest blessedness of man, consists in the +intellectual love of Nature or God. Thus Spinoza +passes from ethics to religion, which in his thought +almost imperceptibly blend together.</p> + + +<h3>VIII</h3> + +<p>The beginning and the end, as familiar wisdom has +long since propounded, are the same. The ultimate +origin of man is God, and the final end, the blessed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lxi" id="Page_lxi">[lxi]</a></span> +crown of life, is to return to God in fullest knowledge +and love. The philosopher who was during his lifetime +and for over a century after his death constantly +execrated for being an atheist (he occasionally still is +by some hardy fools) made God a more integral part +of his system than did any one else in the whole history +of philosophy. Spinoza did not do occasional reverence +to God; he did not, in lightly passing, perfunctorily +bow to Him; God is the veritable beginning and end +of all his thought.</p> + +<p>The intellectual love of God does not demand as +basis a knowledge of the cosmic concatenation of things. +Omniscience alone could satisfy such a demand. The +intellectual love of Nature or God depends solely upon +a knowledge of the order of Nature, upon a knowledge +of the infinite and eternal essence of God. And such +knowledge is within the limits of our reach.</p> + +<p>We can apprehend the eternal essence of God because +the temporality of our thought is accidental to +its meaning. It is the nature of reason to see things +under the form of eternity. And we can apprehend +the infinite essence of God or Nature because every +particular finite thing is a determinate expression of +the infinite. The law of causality requires that there +be an essential identity of nature between cause and +effect; otherwise it would follow that something can +be produced from nothing. Since cause and effect +belong to the same realm of existence, to the same +attribute of Nature, whenever we apprehend the essence +of a particular thing, we necessarily apprehend +the infinite essence of that attribute of Nature. For +the infinite, with Spinoza, is not so much an extent as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lxii" id="Page_lxii">[lxii]</a></span> +a quality of being. Thus from the comprehension of +any particular thing, we can pass to a comprehension +of the infinite and eternal.</p> + +<p>This is most commonly understood, curiously +enough, not in religion, but in art. The ecstatic power +of beauty makes the soul lose all sense of time and +location. And in the specific object the soul sees an +infinite meaning. Indeed, one can almost say that the +more specific or limited the artistic object, the more +clearly is the absolute or infinite meaning portrayed +and discerned. A sonnet is oftener than not more expressive +than a long poem; the <i>Red Badge of Courage</i> +reveals more impressively than does the <i>Dynasts</i> the +absolute essential horror of war. There are present, +apparently, in the more pronounced mystical visions, +characteristics similar to those of significant esthetic +apprehensions. These visions are extremely rare and +fleeting. But then we can be at the highest peaks only +seldom and for a short while. But in a moment we +see eternity, and in the finite, the infinite. It is for +this reason Spinoza says the more we understand particular +things the more do we understand God.</p> + +<p>The great religious significance of Spinoza's doctrine +of the intellectual love of God is that it establishes +religion upon knowledge and not upon ignorance. The +virtue of the mind is clearly and distinctly to understand, +not ignorantly to believe. There is no conflict +between science and religion; religion is based upon +science. There is a conflict only between science and +superstition. Mysteries, unknown and unknowable +powers, miracles, magical rites and prayerful incantations +are instruments not of religion but of super<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lxiii" id="Page_lxiii">[lxiii]</a></span>stition +which has its origin in ignorant and ignominious +fear.</p> + +<p>The free man does not fear and he is not consumed +by fear's boundless conceit. He has no apprehensive +conscience which unceasingly interprets all +unusual or untoward events as being deliberate signs +of a god's impending wrath. The free man knows that +man is, cosmically considered, impressively insignificant. +Human loves and hatreds, human joys and sorrows +are, in the face of the eternal and infinite, the +littlest of little things. Human nature is only an infinitely +small part of absolutely infinite Nature; human +life only a very tiny expression of infinite life. Inordinate +conceit alone could conceive Nature to have +been made designedly either for our pleasure or our +discomfort. The stars were not hung in the heavens +so that we may steer our petty courses across the seas; +nor were the sun and moon put in their places so that +we may have the day in which to waste ourselves in +futile labors and the night to spend in ignorant sleep. +Even if there were a cosmic drama—which there is not—man +is too trivial to play in it a leading rôle. The +free man knows all this; but his heart is tempered +and strong. He can contemplate his place in the universe +without bitterness and without fear. For the +free man's love, as his worship, flows from his knowledge +of God.</p> + + +<h3>IX</h3> + +<p>Spinoza is unsparing in his criticisms of the superstitions +which are in, and which have grown up around, +the Bible. All Spinoza's major conclusions have been<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lxiv" id="Page_lxiv">[lxiv]</a></span> +embodied directly or indirectly in what is now known +as "the higher criticism" of the Bible, which is the basis +of the Modernist movement. It was Spinoza who +established the fact that the Pentateuch is not, as it is +reputed to be, the work of Moses. It was Spinoza, also, +who first convincingly showed that other of the Scriptural +documents were compiled by various unacknowledged +scribes; not by the authors canonized by orthodoxy, +Jewish or Gentile. The wealth of philological +and historical material at the disposal of the contemporary +Biblical investigator is incomparably richer than +it was at Spinoza's time. But modern scholarship has +only added more material—only extended in breadth +Spinoza's modest researches. In depth, nothing new +has been achieved. The principles of investigation and +interpretation, and the general results Spinoza arrived +at have not been improved upon in the least, nor is it +at all likely that they ever will. Spinoza founded himself +upon bed-rock.</p> + +<p>Spinoza's aim in revealing the defectiveness of the +Bible was not theological but philosophical. Orthodox +Biblical conceptions had in his day, as they still have +to a certain extent in ours, a peculiarly sanctified +power, because they were institutionalized and made +the basis of an authoritative system of conduct. The +misbegotten doctrines therefore could not be questioned +with impunity, for a criticism of the doctrines on intellectual +grounds was invariably construed as an attack +upon the vested customs. The misfortunes of history +made dissent from palpable absurdities capital +heresy. Social and religious bigotry burned scientific +men with political ardor.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lxv" id="Page_lxv">[lxv]</a></span></p> + +<p>However, although Spinoza suffered in his own person +from religious persecution, he never for one moment +held as did, for example, Voltaire, that the Church is +the wily and unregenerate instrument of vicious priests. +On the contrary, Spinoza was quite sure that many of +the clergy were among the noblest of men, and that the +Church was in large measure a very salutary institution +for the masses who cannot learn to govern themselves +by force of mind. But Spinoza was unalterably opposed +to any encroachment of Church authority upon +the just liberties of men. Especially did he object to +the Church extending its prohibitive power over men's +thinking. It is the business of the Church to inculcate +"obedience" in the masses; not to dictate to philosophers +what is the truth. The fundamental purpose of +Spinoza's attack upon the Bible is to free philosophy +from theology; not to destroy the Church but to disestablish +it.</p> + +<p>Many readers of Spinoza conclude that because +Spinoza tolerated Church authority in matters of public +morality he therefore either did not in his own thought +thoroughly adhere to his principles or else he was +excessively cautious, even timid, and did not fully or +consistently express his mind. No one would deny +that there is some accommodation in Spinoza's language. +He certainly followed the practical wisdom of +the thinkers of his day. Even so, however, Spinoza +was by no means as cautious as was Descartes. Anyway, +accommodation does not fully account for Spinoza's +attitude on this question; in fact, it does not +account for any significant feature of it.</p> + +<p>Spinoza never believed a sound metaphysics was, for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lxvi" id="Page_lxvi">[lxvi]</a></span> +the masses, the indispensable basis of a good moral +life. The multitude, he was firmly convinced, are controlled +by their passions and desires, not by knowledge +and reason. The coercive law of the State and Nature, +not philosophy, keep them living within the bounds +necessary for social order and human well-being. Far +from it being necessary to tell the masses only the +truth Spinoza believed, as did Plato before him, that it +may even be necessary in order to rule the masses successfully +in the ways of wisdom and virtue to deceive +them to a greater or lesser extent. Such deception is, +as a political expediency, morally justified, for the rulers +would be lying in the interests of virtue and truth.</p> + +<p>Spinoza did not suffer from the fond contemporary +delusion that the salvation of mankind will come about +when philosophers become like all other people. He +knew, as Plato did, that the day of ultimate, universal +happiness will dawn rather when all other people become +like philosophers. In the meantime, it is the +height of moral and political folly to act as if that +day had arrived or else could be ushered in by morning. +Spinoza had nothing but contempt for facile-tongued, +feather-brained Utopians. He loved humanity +too sincerely to mislead humanity or himself that way. +And so we find in Spinoza's <i>Ethics</i> as in his <i>Tractatus</i> +two systems of morals—one for the many who are +called, and one for the few who are chosen. In the +<i>Tractatus</i>, the religion of the many is summarily called +"obedience"; in the <i>Ethics</i> it is more fully shown to +consist of utilitarianism in the conduct of our affairs, +high-mindedness towards our fellows, and piety towards +Nature or God. To this is added, as the rare<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lxvii" id="Page_lxvii">[lxvii]</a></span> +religion of the few, what is designated in both treatises +alike as the intellectual love of Nature or God.</p> + + +<h3>X</h3> + +<p>Spinoza's religion is as naturalistic as his ethics. By +making God and Nature equivalent terms Spinoza was +not merely resorting to equivocation to escape the +penalty of his views. The identification of God and +Nature fully embodies Spinoza's doctrine that there is +no supernatural realm; and therefore if man is to +have a God at all, Nature must be that God. To contend, +as so many do, that "true religion" must be +based upon the existence of a supernatural realm, no +matter whether or not such a realm exists, is as absurd +as to contend that "true morality" must be based upon +man's "free-will" no matter whether or not man has +"free-will." Spinoza's system has been called pantheistic. +But it is pantheistic only in the sense that +whatever man considers Godlike must be found in +Nature, for no other realm exists, and there are no +gods.</p> + +<p>But the question is always raised, how is it possible +to love a Being indifferent to our human miseries and +blind to our hopes? How is even an intellectual love +of such a Being possible? Man, as his religions show, +wants God to be a father, a protector, One who cherishes +man's desires and cares for his wants. The +least anthropomorphic of religions wants God to be +the depository of abstract human ideals. But Spinoza's +God is not even as human as this. Nature does not +constitute the ideal type for man.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lxviii" id="Page_lxviii">[lxviii]</a></span></p> + +<p>Religion is, it is true, man's search for comfort and +security in an alien and hostile world. The simple +demand of the human heart is to be recognized and to +be loved. Love is the magic touch that transforms all +that is barren and cold into all that is rich and warm +and fruitful. But man is neither loved nor recognized +by the immensities of the universe. And in face of +the illimitable stretches of time and space even the +stoutest heart involuntarily quakes. We cannot consider +the vast power of the universe without feeling +crushed and becoming despondent. And ignorant man +cannot see in the finite things about him the full expression +of the infinite beyond. He cannot derive any moral +strength or comfort from the world about him because +he conceives that world to be an implacable +instrument of a god's uncertain, inexplicable will. He +therefore cosmically projects, in a frenzy of despair, +his crying human demand. And out of the wastes of +space there arises for him a personal God.</p> + +<p>Anthropomorphic religions reveal man at his weakest, +not at his best. Man's true grandeur is shown +when he transcends by his own power of mind his insistent +human desires. He can then stand free before +the Almighty. He may tremble, but he is not afraid. +For his strength of soul is grounded not in the external +world but in his own ideal. If we are born under a +lucky star, and are fortunate and happy lovers of the +ideal, the ecstasy of the mystic's beatific vision is ours. +But even if we are born under an unlucky star, and are +misfortunate and unhappy lovers of the ideal, we still +have the ideal to which we can hold fast and save ourselves +from being shattered in our despairs, from dying<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lxix" id="Page_lxix">[lxix]</a></span> +in spirit, which is far more terrible than any death +in the body could possibly be. We have the ideal to +give us the strength, if we are lovers of God, to go to +the cross with Jesus; or, if we are lovers of Virtue, +to drink the hemlock with Socrates.</p> + +<p>The intellectual love of God is a devotion purged of +all fear, of all vain regrets and even vainer hopes. The +wild and angry emotions of sorrow and pain leave the +strong and noble heart of man like the tidal waves +leave the scattered rocks of the shore. As the rocks, +when the waves return to their depths, smile securely +in the glistening sun in the sky, so does the brave, +free heart of man, when the passionate deluge is spent, +smile serenely in the face of God. The free man +is born neither to weep nor to laugh but to view with +calm and steadfast mind the eternal nature of things.</p> + +<p>To know the eternal is the immortality we enjoy. +But to know the eternal we must forget about ourselves. +We must cease to be consumed by a cancerous anxiety +to endure in time and be permanent in space. In the +order of Nature our own particular lives are of no especial +importance. And unless we recognize this, we are +necessarily doomed to a miserable fate. We must recognize +that our mere selves can never give us ultimate +fulfillment or blessedness of soul. Only by losing ourselves +in Nature or God can we escape the wretchedness +of finitude and find the final completion and salvation +of our lives. This, the free man understands. He +knows how insignificant he is in the order of Nature. +But he also knows that if only he can lose himself in +Nature or God then, in his own insignificant particularity, +the eternal and infinite order of Nature can be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_lxx" id="Page_lxx">[lxx]</a></span> +displayed. For in the finite is the infinite expressed, +and in the temporal, the eternal.</p> + +<p>It is this knowledge that makes man free, that breaks +the finite fetters from his soul enabling him to embrace +the infinite and to possess eternity. Once man is reconciled +to the petty worth of his own person, he assumes +some of the majestic worth of the universe. And the +austere sublimity of soul that inscribes on the grave of +the beloved <i>God is Love</i>, inscribes, when it is chastened +and purified by understanding, on the grave of all that +is merely human <i>Nature is Great</i>. Religion is the joy +and peace and strength that is all understanding.</p> + +<p class='right'><span class="smcap">Joseph Ratner</span>.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>FIRST PART</h2> + +<h3>ON GOD</h3> + + +<div class='blockquot'> +<p><i>The multitude, ever prone to superstition, and caring +more for the shreds of antiquity than for eternal truths, +pays homage to the Books of the Bible, rather than to +the Word of God.</i></p> + +<p class='right'><span class="smcap">Spinoza</span>.</p> +</div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1"></a></span></p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2"></a></span></p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[3]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<h3>OF SUPERSTITION<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h3> + + +<p>Men would never be superstitious, if they could +govern all their circumstances by set rules, or if they +were always favored by fortune: but being frequently +driven into straits where rules are useless, and being +often kept fluctuating pitiably between hope and fear +by the uncertainty of fortune's greedily coveted favors, +they are consequently, for the most part, very prone to +credulity. The human mind is readily swayed this way +or that in times of doubt, especially when hope and fear +are struggling for the mastery, though usually it is +boastful, over-confident, and vain.</p> + +<p>This as a general fact I suppose every one knows, +though few, I believe, know their own nature; no one +can have lived in the world without observing that +most people, when in prosperity, are so over-brimming +with wisdom (however inexperienced they may be), +that they take every offer of advice as a personal insult, +whereas in adversity they know not where to turn, but +beg and pray for counsel from every passer-by. No +plan is then too futile, too absurd, or too fatuous for +their adoption; the most frivolous causes will raise +them to hope, or plunge them into despair—if anything +happens during their fright which reminds them of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[4]</a></span> +some past good or ill, they think it portends a happy +or unhappy issue, and therefore (though it may have +proved abortive a hundred times before) style it a +lucky or unlucky omen. Anything which excites their +astonishment they believe to be a portent signifying +the anger of the gods or of the Supreme Being, and, +mistaking superstition for religion, account it impious +not to avert the evil with prayer and sacrifice. Signs +and wonders of this sort they conjure up perpetually, +till one might think Nature as mad as themselves, they +interpret her so fantastically.</p> + +<p>Thus it is brought prominently before us, that superstition's +chief victims are those persons who greedily +covet temporal advantages; they it is, who (especially +when they are in danger, and cannot help themselves) +are wont with prayers and womanish tears to implore +help from God: upbraiding reason as blind, because +she cannot show a sure path to the shadows they pursue, +and rejecting human wisdom as vain; but believing +the phantoms of imagination, dreams, and other childish +absurdities, to be the very oracles of Heaven. As +though God has turned away from the wise, and written +His decrees, not in the mind of man but in the entrails +of beasts, or left them to be proclaimed by the inspiration +and instinct of fools, madmen, and birds. Such is +the unreason to which terror can drive mankind!</p> + +<p>Superstition, then, is engendered, preserved, and +fostered by fear. If any one desire an example, let +him take Alexander, who only began superstitiously +to seek guidance from seers, when he first learned to +fear fortune in the passes of Sysis (Curtius v. 4); +whereas after he had conquered Darius he consulted<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[5]</a></span> +prophets no more, till a second time frightened by +reverses. When the Scythians were provoking a battle, +the Bactrians had deserted, and he himself was +lying sick of his wounds, "he once more turned to +superstition, the mockery of human wisdom, and bade +Aristander, to whom he confided his credulity, inquire +the issue of affairs with sacrificed victims." Very +numerous examples of a like nature might be cited, +clearly showing the fact, that only while under the +dominion of fear do men fall a prey to superstition; +that all the portents ever invested with the reverence of +misguided religion are mere phantoms of dejected and +fearful minds; and lastly that prophets have most +power among the people, and are most formidable to +rulers, precisely at those times when the state is in +most peril. I think this is sufficiently plain to all, +and will therefore say no more on the subject.</p> + +<p>The origin of superstition above given affords us a +clear reason for the fact, that it comes to all men +naturally, though some refer its rise to a dim notion +of God, universal to mankind, and also tends to show, +that it is no less inconsistent and variable than other +mental hallucinations and emotional impulses, and +further that it can only be maintained by hope, hatred, +anger, and deceit; since it springs, not from reason, +but solely from the more powerful phases of emotion. +Furthermore, we may readily understand how difficult +it is to maintain in the same course men prone +to every form of credulity. For, as the mass of mankind +remains always at about the same pitch of misery, +it never assents long to any one remedy, but is always +best pleased by a novelty which has yet proved illusive.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[6]</a></span></p> + +<p>This element of inconsistency has been the cause of +many terrible wars and revolutions; for, as Curtius +well says (lib. iv. chap. 10): "The mob has no ruler +more potent than superstition," and is easily led, on +the plea of religion, at one moment to adore its kings +as gods, and anon to execrate and abjure them as +humanity's common bane. Immense pains have therefore +been taken to counteract this evil by investing +religion, whether true or false, with such pomp and +ceremony, that it may rise superior to every shock, +and be always observed with studious reverence by the +whole people—a system which has been brought to +great perfection by the Turks, for they consider even +controversy impious, and so clog men's minds with +dogmatic formulas, that they leave no room for sound +reason, not even enough to doubt with.</p> + +<p>But if, in despotic statecraft, the supreme and essential +mystery be to hoodwink the subjects, and to +mask the fear, which keeps them down, with the specious +garb of religion, so that men may fight as bravely +for slavery as for safety, and count it not shame but +highest honor to risk their blood and their lives for the +vainglory of a tyrant; yet in a free state no more mischievous +expedient could be planned or attempted. +Wholly repugnant to the general freedom are such devices +as enthralling men's minds with prejudices, forcing +their judgment, or employing any of the weapons +of quasi-religious sedition; indeed, such seditions only +spring up, when law enters the domain of speculative +thought, and opinions are put on trial and condemned +on the same footing as crimes, while those who defend +and follow them are sacrificed, not to public safety,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[7]</a></span> +but to their opponents' hatred and cruelty. If deeds +only could be made the grounds of criminal charges, +and words were always allowed to pass free, such seditions +would be divested of every semblance of justification, +and would be separated from mere controversies +by a hard and fast line.</p> + +<p>Now seeing that we have the rare happiness of living +in a republic, where every one's judgment is free +and unshackled, where each may worship God as his +conscience dictates, and where freedom is esteemed +before all things dear and precious, I have believed +that I should be undertaking no ungrateful or unprofitable +task, in demonstrating that not only can +such freedom be granted without prejudice to the +public peace, but also, that without such freedom, piety +cannot flourish nor the public peace be secure....</p> + +<p>I have often wondered that persons who make a +boast of professing the Christian religion, namely, love, +joy, peace, temperance, and charity to all men, should +quarrel with such rancorous animosity, and display +daily towards one another such bitter hatred, that this, +rather than the virtues they claim, is the readiest +criterion of their faith. Matters have long since come +to such a pass that one can only pronounce a man +Christian, Turk, Jew, or Heathen, by his general appearance +and attire, by his frequenting this or that +place of worship, or employing the phraseology of a +particular sect—as for manner of life, it is in all cases +the same. Inquiry into the cause of this anomaly +leads me unhesitatingly to ascribe it to the fact, that +the ministries of the Church are regarded by the masses +merely as dignities, her offices as posts of emolument<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[8]</a></span>—in +short, popular religion may be summed up as a +respect for ecclesiastics. The spread of this misconception +inflamed every worthless fellow with an intense +desire to enter holy orders, and thus the love +of diffusing God's religion degenerated into sordid +avarice and ambition. Every church became a theater, +where orators, instead of church teachers harangued, +caring not to instruct the people, but striving to attract +admiration, to bring opponents to public scorn, and +to preach only novelties and paradoxes, such as would +tickle the ears of their congregation. This state of +things necessarily stirred up an amount of controversy, +envy, and hatred, which no lapse of time could appease; +so that we can scarcely wonder that of the old +religion nothing survives but its outward forms (even +these, in the mouth of the multitude, seem rather adulation +than adoration of the Deity), and that faith has +become a mere compound of credulity and prejudices—aye, +prejudices too, which degrade man from rational +being to beast, which completely stifle the power of +judgment between true and false, which seem, in fact, +carefully fostered for the purpose of extinguishing the +last spark of reason! Piety, great God! and religion +are become a tissue of ridiculous mysteries; men, who +flatly despise reason, who reject and turn away from +understanding as naturally corrupt, these, I say, these +of all men, are thought, Oh lie most horrible! to possess +light from on High. Verily, if they had but one +spark of light from on High, they would not insolently +rave, but would learn to worship God more wisely, and +would be as marked among their fellows for mercy as +they now are for malice; if they were concerned for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[9]</a></span> +their opponents' souls, instead of for their own reputations, +they would no longer fiercely persecute, but +rather be filled with pity and compassion.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, if any Divine light were in them, it +would appear from their doctrine. I grant that they +are never tired of professing their wonder at the profound +mysteries of Holy Writ; still I cannot discover +that they teach anything but speculation of Platonists +and Aristotelians, to which (in order to save their +credit of Christianity) they have made Holy Writ conform; +not content to rave with the Greeks themselves, +they want to make the prophets rave also; showing +conclusively, that never even in sleep have they caught +a glimpse of Scripture's Divine nature. The very +vehemence of their admiration for the mysteries plainly +attests, that their belief in the Bible is a formal assent +rather than a living faith: and the fact is made still +more apparent by their laying down beforehand, as a +foundation for the study and true interpretation of +Scripture, the principle that it is in every passage true +and divine. Such a doctrine should be reached only +after strict scrutiny and thorough comprehension of the +Sacred Books (which would teach it much better, for +they stand in need of no human fictions), and not be +set up on the threshold, as it were, of inquiry.</p> + +<p>As I pondered over the facts that the light of reason +is not only despised, but by many even execrated as a +source of impiety, that human commentaries are accepted +as divine records, and that credulity is extolled as faith; +as I marked the fierce controversies of +philosophers raging in Church and State, the source +of bitter hatred and dissension, the ready instruments<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[10]</a></span> +of sedition and other ills innumerable, I determined to +examine the Bible afresh in a careful, impartial, and +unfettered spirit, making no assumptions concerning +it, and attributing to it no doctrines, which I do not +find clearly therein set down....</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> From the Preface to the <i>Tractatus Theologico-Politicus</i>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[11]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<h3>OF THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></h3> + + +<p>When people declare, as all are ready to do, that +the Bible is the Word of God teaching men true blessedness +and the way of salvation, they evidently do not +mean what they say; for the masses take no pains at +all to live according to Scripture, and we see most +people endeavoring to hawk about their own commentaries +as the word of God, and giving their best +efforts, under the guise of religion, to compelling others +to think as they do: we generally see, I say, theologians +anxious to learn how to wring their inventions and sayings +out of the sacred text, and to fortify them with +Divine authority. Such persons never display less +scruple and more zeal than when they are interpreting +Scripture or the mind of the Holy Ghost; if we ever +see them perturbed, it is not that they fear to attribute +some error to the Holy Spirit, and to stray from the +right path, but that they are afraid to be convicted +of error by others, and thus to overthrow and bring +into contempt their own authority. But if men really +believe what they verbally testify of Scripture, they +would adopt quite a different plan of life: their minds +would not be agitated by so many contentions, nor so +many hatreds, and they would cease to be excited by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[12]</a></span> +such a blind and rash passion for interpreting the +sacred writings, and excogitating novelties in religion. +On the contrary, they would not dare to adopt, as the +teaching of Scripture, anything which they could not +plainly deduce therefrom: lastly, these sacrilegious +persons who have dared, in several passages, to interpolate +the Bible, would have shrunk from so great a +crime, and would have stayed their sacrilegious hands.</p> + +<p>Ambition and unscrupulousness have waxed so powerful, +that religion is thought to consist, not so much +in respecting the writings of the Holy Ghost, as in defending +human commentaries, so that religion is no +longer identified with charity, but with spreading discord +and propagating insensate hatred disguised under +the name of zeal for the Lord, and eager ardor.</p> + +<p>To these evils we must add superstition, which +teaches men to despise reason and Nature, and only to +admire and venerate that which is repugnant to both: +whence it is not wonderful that for the sake of increasing +the admiration and veneration felt for Scripture, +men strive to explain it so as to make it appear to contradict, +as far as possible, both one and the other: +thus they dream that most profound mysteries lie +hid in the Bible, and weary themselves out in the investigation +of these absurdities, to the neglect of what +is useful. Every result of their diseased imagination +they attribute to the Holy Ghost, and strive to defend +with the utmost zeal and passion; for it is an observed +fact that men employ their reason to defend conclusions +arrived at by reason, but conclusions arrived at +by the passions are defended by the passions.</p> + +<p>If we would separate ourselves from the crowd and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[13]</a></span> +escape from theological prejudices, instead of rashly +accepting human commentaries for Divine documents, +we must consider the true method of interpreting Scripture +and dwell upon it at some length: for if we remain +in ignorance of this we cannot know, certainly, +what the Bible and the Holy Spirit wish to teach.</p> + +<p>I may sum up the matter by saying that the method +of interpreting Scripture does not widely differ from +the method of interpreting Nature—in fact, it is almost +the same. For as the interpretation of Nature consists +in the examination of the history of Nature, and therefrom +deducing definitions of natural phenomena on +certain fixed axioms, so Scriptural interpretation proceeds +by the examination of Scripture, and inferring +the intention of its authors as a legitimate conclusion +from its fundamental principles. By working in this +manner every one will always advance without danger +of error—that is, if they admit no principles for interpreting +Scripture, and discussing its contents save +such as they find in Scripture itself—and will be able +with equal security to discuss what surpasses our understanding, +and what is known by the natural light +of reason.</p> + +<p>In order to make clear that such a method is +not only correct, but is also the only one advisable, +and that it agrees with that employed in interpreting +Nature, I must remark that Scripture very often treats +of matters which cannot be deduced from principles +known to reason: for it is chiefly made up of narratives +and revelation: the narratives generally contain miracles—that +is, [as we shall show in a later chapter], +relations of extraordinary natural occurrences adapted<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[14]</a></span> +to the opinions and judgment of the historians who +recorded them: the revelations also were adapted to +the opinions of the prophets and in themselves surpassed +human comprehension. Therefore the knowledge +of all these—that is, of nearly the whole contents +of Scripture, must be sought from Scripture alone, +even as the knowledge of nature is sought from nature. +As for the moral doctrines which are also contained in +the Bible, they may be demonstrated from received +axioms, but we cannot prove in the same manner that +Scripture intended to teach them, this can only be +learned from Scripture itself.</p> + +<p>If we would bear unprejudiced witness to the +Divine origin of Scripture, we must prove solely on +its own authority that it teaches true moral doctrines, +for by such means alone can its Divine origin be +demonstrated: we have shown that the certitude of the +prophets depended chiefly on their having minds +turned towards what is just and good, therefore we +ought to have proof of their possessing this quality +before we repose faith in them. From miracles God's +divinity cannot be proved [as I shall show], for +miracles could be wrought by false prophets. Wherefore +the Divine origin of Scripture must consist solely +in its teaching true virtue. But we must come to our +conclusion simply on Scriptural grounds, for if we +were unable to do so we could not, unless strongly +prejudiced, accept the Bible and bear witness to its +Divine origin.</p> + +<p>Our knowledge of Scripture must then be looked for +in Scripture only.</p> + +<p>Lastly, Scripture does not give us definitions of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[15]</a></span> +things any more than nature does: therefore, such +definitions must be sought in the latter case from the +diverse workings of nature; in the former case, from +the various narratives about the given subject which +occur in the Bible.</p> + +<p>The universal rule, then, in interpreting Scripture +is to accept nothing as an authoritative Scriptural +statement which we do not perceive very clearly when +we examine it in the light of its history. What I mean +by its history, and what should be the chief points +elucidated, I will now explain.</p> + +<p>The history of a Scriptural statement comprises—</p> + +<p>I. The nature and properties of the language in +which the books of the Bible were written, and in which +their authors were accustomed to speak. We shall +thus be able to investigate every expression by comparison +with common conversational usages.</p> + +<p>Now all the writers both of the Old Testament and +the New were Hebrews: therefore, a knowledge of the +Hebrew language is before all things necessary, not +only for the comprehension of the Old Testament, +which was written in that tongue, but also of the New: +for although the latter was published in other languages, +yet its characteristics are Hebrew.</p> + +<p>II. An analysis of each book and arrangement of +its contents under heads; so that we may have at hand +the various texts which treat of a given subject. +Lastly, a note of all the passages which are ambiguous +or obscure, or which seem mutually contradictory.</p> + +<p>I call passages clear or obscure according as their +meaning is inferred easily or with difficulty in relation +to the context, not according as their truth is perceived<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[16]</a></span> +easily or the reverse by reason. We are at work not +on the truth of passages, but solely on their meaning. +We must take especial care, when we are in search of +the meaning of a text, not to be led away by our reason +in so far as it is founded on principles of natural +knowledge (to say nothing of prejudices): in order +not to confound the meaning of a passage with its +truth, we must examine it solely by means of the signification +of the words, or by a reason acknowledging +no foundation but Scripture.</p> + +<p>I will illustrate my meaning by an example. The +words of Moses, "God is a fire" and "God is jealous," +are perfectly clear so long as we regard merely the +signification of the words, and I therefore reckon +them among the clear passages, though in relation to +reason and truth they are most obscure: still, although +the literal meaning is repugnant to the natural light of +reason, nevertheless, if it cannot be clearly overruled +on grounds and principles derived from its Scriptural +"history," it, that is, the literal meaning, must be the +one retained: and contrariwise if these passages literally +interpreted are found to clash with principles +derived from Scripture, though such literal interpretation +were in absolute harmony with reason, they +must be interpreted in a different manner, <i>i.e.</i>, metaphorically.</p> + +<p>If we would know whether Moses believed God to +be a fire or not, we must on no account decide the +question on grounds of the reasonableness or the reverse +of such an opinion, but must judge solely by the +other opinions of Moses which are on record.</p> + +<p>In the present instance, as Moses says in several<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[17]</a></span> +other passages that God has no likeness to any visible +thing, whether in heaven or in earth, or in the water, +either all such passages must be taken metaphorically, +or else the one before us must be so explained. However, +as we should depart as little as possible from the +literal sense, we must first ask whether this text, God +is a fire, admits of any but the literal meaning—that +is, whether the word fire ever means anything besides +ordinary natural fire. If no such second meaning can +be found, the text must be taken literally, however +repugnant to reason it may be: and all the other +passages, though in complete accordance with reason, +must be brought into harmony with it. If the verbal +expressions would not admit of being thus harmonized, +we should have to set them down as irreconcilable, +and suspend our judgment concerning them. However, +as we find the name fire applied to anger and jealousy +(see Job xxxi. 12) we can thus easily reconcile the +words of Moses, and legitimately conclude that the +two propositions God is a fire, and God is jealous, +are in meaning identical.</p> + +<p>Further, as Moses clearly teaches that God is +jealous, and nowhere states that God is without passions +or emotions, we must evidently infer that Moses +held this doctrine himself, or at any rate, that he +wished to teach it, nor must we refrain because such +a belief seems contrary to reason: for as we have +shown, we cannot wrest the meaning of texts to suit +the dictates of our reason, or our preconceived opinions. +The whole knowledge of the Bible must be +sought solely from itself.</p> + +<p>III. Lastly, such a history should relate the en<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[18]</a></span>vironment +of all the prophetic books extant; that is, +the life, the conduct, and the studies of the author of +each book, who he was, what was the occasion, and +the epoch of his writing, whom did he write for, and +in what language. Further, it should inquire into the +fate of each book: how it was first received, into +whose hands it fell, how many different versions there +were of it, by whose advice was it received into the +Bible, and, lastly, how all the books now universally +accepted as sacred, were united into a single whole.</p> + +<p>All such information should, as I have said, be contained +in the "history" of Scripture. For, in order to +know what statements are set forth as laws, and what +as moral precepts, it is important to be acquainted +with the life, the conduct, and the pursuits of their +author: moreover, it becomes easier to explain a man's +writings in proportion as we have more intimate +knowledge of his genius and temperament.</p> + +<p>Further, that we may not confound precepts which +are eternal with those which served only a temporary +purpose, or were only meant for a few, we should know +what was the occasion, the time, the age, in which +each book was written, and to what nation it was addressed.</p> + +<p>Lastly, we should have knowledge on the other +points I have mentioned, in order to be sure, in addition +to the authenticity of the work, that it has not +been tampered with by sacrilegious hands, or whether +errors can have crept in, and, if so, whether they have +been corrected by men sufficiently skilled and worthy +of credence. All these things should be known, that +we may not be led away by blind impulse to accept<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[19]</a></span> +whatever is thrust on our notice, instead of only that +which is sure and indisputable.</p> + +<p>Now, when we are in possession of this history of +Scripture, and have finally decided that we assert +nothing as prophetic doctrine which does not directly +follow from such history, or which is not clearly deducible +from it, then, I say, it will be time to gird +ourselves for the task of investigating the mind of the +prophets and of the Holy Spirit. But in this further +arguing, also, we shall require a method very like that +employed in interpreting Nature from her history. As +in the examination of natural phenomena we try first +to investigate what is most universal and common to +all Nature—such, for instance, as motion and rest, and +their laws and rules, which Nature always observes, +and through which she continually works—and then +we proceed to what is less universal; so, too, in the +history of Scripture, we seek first for that which is +most universal, and serves for the basis and foundation +of all Scripture, a doctrine, in fact, that is commended +by all the prophets as eternal and most profitable to +all men. For example, that God is one, and that He is +omnipotent, and He alone should be worshiped, that +He has a care for all men, and that He especially loves +those who adore Him and love their neighbor as themselves, +etc. These and similar doctrines, I repeat, +Scripture everywhere so clearly and expressly teaches, +that no one was ever in doubt of its meaning concerning +them.</p> + +<p>The nature of God, His manner of regarding and +providing for things, and similar doctrines, Scripture +nowhere teaches professedly, and as eternal doctrine;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[20]</a></span> +on the contrary, we have shown that the prophets +themselves did not agree on the subject; therefore, +we must not lay down any doctrine as Scriptural on +such subjects, though it may appear perfectly clear on +rational grounds.</p> + +<p>From a proper knowledge of this universal doctrine +of Scripture, we must then proceed to other doctrines +less universal, but which, nevertheless, have regard to +the general conduct of life, and flow from the universal +doctrine like rivulets from a source: such are +all particular external manifestations of true virtue, +which need a given occasion for their exercise; whatever +is obscure or ambiguous on such points in Scripture +must be explained and defined by its universal +doctrine; with regard to contradictory instances, we +must observe the occasion and the time in which they +were written. For instance, when Christ says, +"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted," +we do not know, from the actual passage, +what sort of mourners are meant; as, however, Christ +afterwards teaches that we should have care for nothing, +save only for the kingdom of God and His +righteousness, which is commended as the highest good +(see Matt. vi. 33), it follows that by mourners He only +meant those who mourn for the kingdom of God and +righteousness neglected by man: for this would be +the only cause of mourning to those who love nothing +but the Divine kingdom and justice, and who evidently +despise the gifts of fortune. So, too, when +Christ says: "But if a man strike you on the right +cheek, turn to him the left also," and the words which +follow.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[21]</a></span></p> + +<p>If He had given such a command, as a lawgiver, to +judges, He would thereby have abrogated the law of +Moses, but this He expressly says He did not do (Matt. +v. 17). Wherefore we must consider who was the +speaker, what was the occasion, and to whom were +the words addressed. Now Christ said that He did +not ordain laws as a legislator, but inculcated precepts +as a teacher: inasmuch as He did not aim at correcting +outward actions so much as the frame of mind. +Further, these words were spoken to men who were +oppressed, who lived in a corrupt commonwealth on +the brink of ruin, where justice was utterly neglected. +The very doctrine inculcated here by Christ just before +the destruction of the city was also taught by +Jeremiah before the first destruction of Jerusalem, +that is, in similar circumstances, as we see from +Lamentations iii. 25-30.</p> + +<p>Now as such teaching was only set forth by the +prophets in times of oppression, and was even then +never laid down as a law; and as, on the other hand, +Moses (who did not write in times of oppression, but—mark +this—strove to found a well-ordered commonwealth), +while condemning envy and hatred of one's +neighbor, yet ordained that an eye should be given for +an eye, it follows most clearly from these purely Scriptural +grounds that this precept of Christ and Jeremiah +concerning submission to injuries was only valid in +places where justice is neglected, and in a time of oppression, +but does not hold good in a well-ordered +state.</p> + +<p>In a well-ordered state where justice is administered +every one is bound, if he would be accounted just, to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[22]</a></span> +demand penalties before the judge (see Lev. v. 1), not +for the sake of vengeance (Lev. xix. 17, 18), but in +order to defend justice and his country's laws, and to +prevent the wicked rejoicing in their wickedness. All +this is plainly in accordance with reason. I might cite +many other examples in the same manner, but I think +the foregoing are sufficient to explain my meaning and +the utility of this method, and this is all my present +purpose. Hitherto we have only shown how to investigate +those passages of Scripture which treat of +practical conduct, and which, therefore, are more +easily examined, for on such subjects there was never +really any controversy among the writers of the Bible.</p> + +<p>The purely speculative passages cannot be so easily +traced to their real meaning: the way becomes narrower, +for as the prophets differed in matters speculative +among themselves, and the narratives are in great +measure adapted to the prejudices of each age, we +must not, on any account, infer the intention of one +prophet from clearer passages in the writings of another; +nor must we so explain his meaning, unless it is +perfectly plain that the two prophets were at one in +the matter.</p> + +<p>How we are to arrive at the intention of the prophets +in such cases I will briefly explain. Here, too, +we must begin from the most universal proposition, +inquiring first from the most clear Scriptural statements +what is the nature of prophecy or revelation, +and wherein does it consist; then we must proceed to +miracles, and so on to whatever is most general till we +come to the opinions of a particular prophet, and, at +last, to the meaning of a particular revelation, proph<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[23]</a></span>ecy, +history, or miracle. We have already pointed +out that great caution is necessary not to confound +the mind of a prophet or historian with the mind of +the Holy Spirit and the truth of the matter; therefore +I need not dwell further on the subject. I would, +however, here remark concerning the meaning of +revelation, that the present method only teaches us +what the prophets really saw or heard, not what they +desired to signify or represent by symbols. The latter +may be guessed at but cannot be inferred with certainty +from Scriptural premises.</p> + +<p>We have thus shown the plan for interpreting Scripture, +and have, at the same time, demonstrated that it +is the one and surest way of investigating its true +meaning. I am willing indeed to admit that those +persons (if any such there be) would be more absolutely +certainly right, who have received either a trustworthy +tradition or an assurance from the prophets +themselves, such as is claimed by the Pharisees; or +who have a pontiff gifted with infallibility in the interpretation +of Scripture, such as the Roman Catholics +boast. But as we can never be perfectly sure, either +of such a tradition or of the authority of the pontiff, +we cannot found any certain conclusion on either: the +one is denied by the oldest sect of Christians, the other +by the oldest sect of Jews. Indeed, if we consider the +series of years (to mention no other point) accepted +by the Pharisees from their Rabbis, during which time +they say they have handed down the tradition from +Moses, we shall find that it is not correct, as I show +elsewhere. Therefore such a tradition should be received +with extreme suspicion; and although, accord<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[24]</a></span>ing +to our method, we are bound to consider as uncorrupted +the tradition of the Jews, namely, the +meaning of the Hebrew words which we received from +them, we may accept the latter while retaining our +doubts about the former.</p> + +<p>No one has ever been able to change the meaning of +a word in ordinary use, though many have changed the +meaning of a particular sentence. Such a proceeding +would be most difficult; for whoever attempted to +change the meaning of a word, would be compelled, +at the same time, to explain all the authors who +employed it, each according to his temperament and +intention, or else, with consummate cunning, to falsify +them.</p> + +<p>Further, the masses and the learned alike preserve +language, but it is only the learned who preserve the +meaning of particular sentences and books: thus, we +may easily imagine that the learned having a very rare +book in their power, might change or corrupt the meaning +of a sentence in it, but they could not alter the +signification of the words; moreover, if anyone wanted +to change the meaning of a common word he would not +be able to keep up the change among posterity, or in +common parlance or writing.</p> + +<p>For these and such-like reasons we may readily conclude +that it would never enter into the mind of anyone +to corrupt a language, though the intention of a +writer may often have been falsified by changing his +phrases or interpreting them amiss. As then our +method (based on the principle that the knowledge +of Scripture must be sought from itself alone) is the +sole true one, we must evidently renounce any knowl<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[25]</a></span>edge +which it cannot furnish for the complete understanding +of Scripture....</p> + +<p>If we read a book which contains incredible or impossible +narratives, or is written in a very obscure +style, and if we know nothing of its author, nor of the +time or occasion of its being written, we shall vainly +endeavor to gain any certain knowledge of its true +meaning. For being in ignorance on these points we +cannot possibly know the aim or intended aim of the +author; if we are fully informed, we so order our +thoughts as not to be in any way prejudiced either in +ascribing to the author or him for whom the author +wrote either more or less than his meaning, and we +only take into consideration what the author may have +had in his mind, or what the time and occasion demanded. +I think this must be tolerably evident to all.</p> + +<p>It often happens that in different books we read histories +in themselves similar, but which we judge very +differently, according to the opinions we have formed +of the authors. I remember once to have read in some +book that a man named Orlando Furioso used to drive +a kind of winged monster through the air, fly over any +countries he liked, kill unaided vast numbers of men +and giants, and such like fancies, which from the point +of view of reason are obviously absurd. A very similar +story I read in Ovid of Perseus, and also in the +books of Judges and Kings of Samson, who alone and +unarmed killed thousands of men, and of Elijah, who +flew through the air, and at last went up to heaven +in a chariot of fire, with horses of fire. All these +stories are obviously alike, but we judge them very +differently. The first only sought to amuse, the second<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[26]</a></span> +had a political object, the third a religious object. We +gather this simply from the opinions we had previously +formed of the authors. Thus it is evidently necessary +to know something of the authors of writings which are +obscure or unintelligible, if we would interpret their +meaning; and for the same reason, in order to choose +the proper reading from among a great variety, we +ought to have information as to the versions in which +the differences are found, and as to the possibility of +other readings having been discovered by persons of +greater authority....</p> + +<p>... The difficulties in this method of interpreting +Scripture from its own history, I conceive to be so +great that I do not hesitate to say that the true meaning +of Scripture is in many places inexplicable, or at +best mere subject for guess work; but I must again +point out, on the other hand, that such difficulties only +arise when we endeavor to follow the meaning of a +prophet in matters which cannot be perceived, but +only imagined, not in things, whereof the understanding +can give a clear and distinct idea, and which are +conceivable through themselves: matters which by +their nature are easily perceived cannot be expressed +so obscurely as to be unintelligible; as the proverb +says, "a word is enough to the wise." Euclid, who +only wrote of matters very simple and easily understood, +can easily be comprehended by any one in any +language; we can follow his intention perfectly, and be +certain of his true meaning, without having a thorough +knowledge of the language in which he wrote; in fact, +a quite rudimentary acquaintance is sufficient. We +need make no researches concerning the life, the pur<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[27]</a></span>suits, +or the habits of the author; nor need we inquire +in what language, nor when he wrote, nor the vicissitudes +of his book, nor its various readings, nor how, +nor by whose advice it has been received.</p> + +<p>What we here say of Euclid might equally be said of +any book which treats of things by their nature perceptible: +thus we conclude that we can easily follow +the intention of Scripture in moral questions, from the +history we possess of it, and we can be sure of its true +meaning.</p> + +<p>The precepts of true piety are expressed in very +ordinary language, and are equally simple and easily +understood. Further, as true salvation and blessedness +consist in a true assent of the soul—and we truly assent +only to what we clearly understand—it is most plain +that we can follow with certainty the intention of +Scripture in matters relating to salvation and necessary +to blessedness; therefore, we need not be much +troubled about what remains: such matters, inasmuch +as we generally cannot grasp them with our reason and +understanding, are more curious than profitable.</p> + +<p>I think I have now set forth the true method of +Scriptural interpretation, and have sufficiently explained +my own opinion thereon. Besides, I do not +doubt that every one will see that such a method only +requires the aid of natural reason. The nature and +efficacy of the natural reason consists in deducing and +proving the unknown from the known, or in carrying +premises to their legitimate conclusions; and these are +the very processes which our method desiderates. +Though we must admit that it does not suffice to explain +everything in the Bible, such imperfection does<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[28]</a></span> +not spring from its own nature, but from the fact that +the path which it teaches us, as the true one, has never +been tended or trodden by men, and has thus, by the +lapse of time, become very difficult, and almost impassable, +as, indeed, I have shown in the difficulties I +draw attention to.</p> + +<p>There only remains to examine the opinions of those +who differ from me.</p> + +<p>The first which comes under our notice is, that the +light of nature has no power to interpret Scripture, but +that a supernatural faculty is required for the task. +What is meant by this supernatural faculty I will leave +to its propounders to explain. Personally, I can only +suppose that they have adopted a very obscure way of +stating their complete uncertainty about the true +meaning of Scripture. If we look at their interpretations, +they contain nothing supernatural, at least nothing +but the merest conjectures.</p> + +<p>Let them be placed side by side with the interpretations +of those who frankly confess that they have no +faculty beyond their natural ones; we shall see that +the two are just alike—both human, both long pondered +over, both laboriously invented. To say that the +natural reason is insufficient for such results is plainly +untrue, firstly, for the reasons above stated, namely, +that the difficulty of interpreting Scripture arises +from no defect in human reason, but simply from the +carelessness (not to say malice) of men who neglected +the history of the Bible while there were still materials +for inquiry; secondly, from the fact (admitted, I think, +by all) that the supernatural faculty is a Divine gift +granted only to the faithful. But the prophets and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[29]</a></span> +apostles did not preach to the faithful only, but chiefly +to the unfaithful and wicked. Such persons, therefore, +were able to understand the intention of the +prophets and apostles, otherwise the prophets and +apostles would have seemed to be preaching to little +boys and infants, not to men endowed with reason. +Moses, too, would have given his laws in vain, if they +could only be comprehended by the faithful, who need +no law. Indeed, those who demand supernatural faculties +for comprehending the meaning of the prophets +and apostles seem truly lacking in natural faculties, so +that we should hardly suppose such persons the possessors +of a Divine supernatural gift.</p> + +<p>The opinion of Maimonides was widely different. +He asserted that each passage in Scripture admits of +various, nay, contrary meanings; but that we could +never be certain of any particular one till we knew +that the passage, as we interpreted it, contained nothing +contrary or repugnant to reason. If the literal +meaning clashes with reason, though the passage seems +in itself perfectly clear, it must be interpreted in some +metaphorical sense. This doctrine he lays down very +plainly in Chap. xxv. part ii. of his book <i>More Nebuchim</i> +for he says: "Know that we shrink not from +affirming that the world hath existed from eternity, +because of what Scripture saith concerning the world's +creation. For the texts which teach that the world +was created are not more in number than those which +teach that God hath a body; neither are the approaches +in this matter of the world's creation closed, or even +made hard to us: so that we should not be able to +explain what is written, as we did when we showed that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[30]</a></span> +God hath no body, nay, peradventure, we could explain +and make fast the doctrine of the world's eternity +more easily than we did away with the doctrines +that God hath a beatified body. Yet two things +hinder me from doing as I have said, and believing +that the world is eternal. As it hath been clearly +shown that God hath not a body, we must perforce +explain all those passages whereof the literal sense +agreeth not with the demonstration, for sure it is that +they can be so explained. But the eternity of the +world hath not been so demonstrated, therefore it is +not necessary to do violence to Scripture in support +of some common opinion, whereof we might, at the +bidding of reason, embrace the contrary."</p> + +<p>Such are the words of Maimonides, and they are +evidently sufficient to establish our point: for if he had +been convinced by reason that the world is eternal, he +would not have hesitated to twist and explain away +the words of Scripture till he made them appear to +teach this doctrine. He would have felt quite sure +that Scripture, though everywhere plainly denying the +eternity of the world, really intends to teach it. So +that, however clear the meaning of Scripture may be, +he would not feel certain of having grasped it, so long +as he remained doubtful of the truth of what was +written. For we are in doubt whether a thing is in +conformity with reason, or contrary thereto, so long +as we are uncertain of its truth, and, consequently, +we cannot be sure whether the literal meaning of a +passage be true or false.</p> + +<p>If such a theory as this were sound, I would certainly +grant that some faculty beyond the natural<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[31]</a></span> +reason is required for interpreting Scripture. For +nearly all things that we find in Scripture cannot be +inferred from known principles of the natural reason, +and therefore, we should be unable to come to any +conclusion about their truth, or about the real meaning +and intention of Scripture, but should stand in need +of some further assistance.</p> + +<p>Further, the truth of this theory would involve that +the masses, having generally no comprehension of, nor +leisure for, detailed proofs, would be reduced to receiving +all their knowledge of Scripture on the authority +and testimony of philosophers, and consequently, +would be compelled to suppose that the +interpretations given by philosophers were infallible.</p> + +<p>Truly this would be a new form of ecclesiastical +authority, and a new sort of priests or pontiffs, more +likely to excite men's ridicule than their veneration. +Certainly our method demands a knowledge of Hebrew +for which the masses have no leisure; but no such objection +as the foregoing can be brought against us. +For the ordinary Jews or Gentiles, to whom the prophets +and apostles preached and wrote, understood the +language, and consequently, the intention of the +prophet or apostle addressing them; but they did not +grasp the intrinsic reason of what was preached, which, +according to Maimonides, would be necessary for an +understanding of it.</p> + +<p>There is nothing, then, in our method which renders +it necessary that the masses should follow the testimony +of commentators, for I point to a set of unlearned +people who understood the language of the +prophets and apostles; whereas Maimonides could not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[32]</a></span> +point to any such who could arrive at the prophetic or +apostolic meaning through their knowledge of the +causes of things.</p> + +<p>As to the multitude of our own time [we shall show] +that whatsoever is necessary to salvation, though its +reasons may be unknown, can easily be understood in +any language, because it is thoroughly ordinary and +usual; it is in such understanding as this that the +masses acquiesce, not in the testimony of commentators; +with regard to other questions, the ignorant and +the learned fare alike.</p> + +<p>But let us return to the opinion of Maimonides, and +examine it more closely. In the first place, he supposes +that the prophets were in entire agreement one with +another, and that they were consummate philosophers +and theologians; for he would have them to have based +their conclusions on the absolute truth. Further, he +supposes that the sense of Scripture cannot be made +plain from Scripture itself, for the truth of things is +not made plain therein (in that it does not prove anything, +nor teach the matters of which it speaks through +their definitions and first causes), therefore, according +to Maimonides, the true sense of Scripture cannot +be made plain from itself, and must not be there +sought.</p> + +<p>The falsity of such a doctrine is shown in this very +chapter, for we have shown both by reason and +examples that the meaning of Scripture is only made +plain through Scripture itself, and even in questions +deducible from ordinary knowledge should be looked +for from no other source.</p> + +<p>Lastly, such a theory supposes that we may explain<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[33]</a></span> +the words of Scripture according to our preconceived +opinions, twisting them about, and reversing or completely +changing the literal sense, however plain it +may be. Such license is utterly opposed to the teaching +of this and the [succeeding] chapters, and moreover, +will be evident to every one as rash and excessive.</p> + +<p>But if we grant all this license, what can it effect +after all? Absolutely nothing. Those things which +cannot be demonstrated, and which make up the +greater part of Scripture, cannot be examined by reason, +and cannot therefore be explained or interpreted +by this rule; whereas, on the contrary, by following +our own method, we can explain many questions of this +nature, and discuss them on a sure basis, as we have +already shown, by reason and example. Those matters +which are by their nature comprehensible we can +easily explain, as has been pointed out, simply by +means of the context.</p> + +<p>Therefore, the method of Maimonides is clearly useless: +to which we may add, that it does away with all +the certainty which the masses acquire by candid +reading, or which is gained by any other persons in +any other way. In conclusion, then, we dismiss +Maimonides' theory as harmful, useless, and absurd.</p> + +<p>As to the tradition of the Pharisees, we have already +shown<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> that it is not consistent, while the authority of +the popes of Rome stands in need of more credible +evidence; the latter, indeed, I reject simply on this +ground, for if the popes could point out to us the +meaning of Scripture as surely as did the high priests +of the Jews, I should not be deterred by the fact that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[34]</a></span> +there have been heretic and impious Roman pontiffs; +for among the Hebrew high-priests of old there were +also heretics and impious men who gained the high-priesthood +by improper means, but who, nevertheless, +had Scriptural sanction for their supreme power of +interpreting the law. (See Deut. xvii. 11, 12, and +xxxviii. 10, also Malachi ii. 8).</p> + +<p>However, as the popes can show no such sanction, +their authority remains open to very grave doubt, nor +should any one be deceived by the example of the Jewish +high-priests and think that the Catholic religion +also stands in need of a pontiff; he should bear in +mind that the laws of Moses being also the ordinary +laws of the country, necessarily required some public +authority to insure their observance; for, if everyone +were free to interpret the laws of his country as he +pleased, no state could stand, but would for that very +reason be dissolved at once, and public rights would +become private rights.</p> + +<p>With religion the case is widely different. Inasmuch +as it consists not so much in outward actions as +in simplicity and truth of character, it stands outside +the sphere of law and public authority. Simplicity and +truth of character are not produced by the constraint +of laws, nor by the authority of the state, no one the +whole world over can be forced or legislated into a +state of blessedness; the means required for such a +consummation are faithful and brotherly admonition, +sound education, and above all, free use of the individual +judgment.</p> + +<p>Therefore, as the supreme right of free thinking, +even on religion, is in every man's power, and as it is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[35]</a></span> +inconceivable that such power could be alienated, it +is also in every man's power to wield the supreme right +and authority of free judgment in this behalf, and to +explain and interpret religion for himself. The only +reason for vesting the supreme authority in the interpretation +of law, and judgment on public affairs in the +hands of the magistrates, is that it concerns questions +of public right. Similarly the supreme authority in +explaining religion, and in passing judgment thereon, +is lodged with the individual because it concerns questions +of individual right. So far, then, from the authority +of the Hebrew high-priests telling in confirmation +of the authority of the Roman pontiffs to interpret +religion, it would rather tend to establish individual +freedom of judgment. Thus in this way, also, we have +shown that our method of interpreting Scripture is the +best. For as the highest power of Scriptural interpretation +belongs to every man, the rule for such interpretation +should be nothing but the natural light of reason +which is common to all—not any supernatural light nor +any external authority; moreover, such a rule ought +not to be so difficult that it can only be applied by very +skillful philosophers, but should be adapted to the +natural and ordinary faculties and capacity of mankind. +And such I have shown our method to be, for +such difficulties as it has arise from men's carelessness, +and are no part of its nature.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> From the <i>Tr. Th.-P.</i>, ch. vii, same title.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> The detailed discussion of this point has been omitted.—<span class="smcap">Ed.</span></p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[36]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<h3>OF PROPHETS AND PROPHECY<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></h3> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<p>Prophecy, or revelation, is sure knowledge revealed +by God to man. A prophet is one who interprets the +revelations of God to those who are unable to attain +to sure knowledge of the matters revealed, and therefore +can only apprehend them by simple faith.</p> + +<p>The Hebrew word for prophet is "<i>nabi</i>," <i>i.e.</i>, speaker +or interpreter, but in Scripture its meaning is restricted +to interpreter of God, as we may learn from Exodus +vii. 1, where God says to Moses, "See, I have made +thee a god to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy brother shall +be thy prophet;" implying that, since in interpreting +Moses' words to Pharaoh, Aaron acted the part of a +prophet, Moses would be to Pharaoh as a god, or in +the attitude of a god....</p> + +<p>Now it is evident, from the definition above given, +that prophecy really includes ordinary knowledge; for +the knowledge which we acquire by our natural faculties +depends on our knowledge of God and His eternal +laws; but ordinary knowledge is common to all men as +men, and rests on foundations which all share, whereas +the multitude always strains after rarities and excep<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[37]</a></span>tions, +and thinks little of the gifts of nature; so that, +when prophecy is talked of, ordinary knowledge is not +supposed to be included. Nevertheless it has as much +right as any other to be called Divine, for God's nature, +in so far as we share therein, and God's laws, +dictate it to us; nor does it suffer from that to which +we give the preëminence, except in so far as the latter +transcends its limits and cannot be accounted for by +natural laws taken in themselves. In respect to the +certainty it involves, and the source from which it is +derived, <i>i.e.</i>, God, ordinary knowledge is no whit inferior +to prophetic, unless indeed we believe, or rather +dream, that the prophets had human bodies but superhuman +minds, and therefore that their sensations and +consciousness were entirely different from our own.</p> + +<p>But, although ordinary knowledge is Divine, its +professors cannot be called prophets, for they teach +what the rest of mankind could perceive and apprehend, +not merely by simple faith, but as surely and +honorably as themselves.</p> + +<p>Seeing then that our mind subjectively contains in +itself and partakes of the nature of God, and solely +from this cause is enabled to form notions explaining +natural phenomena and inculcating morality, it follows +that we may rightly assert the nature of the human +mind (in so far as it is thus conceived) to be a primary +cause of Divine revelation. All that we clearly and +distinctly understand is dictated to us, as I have just +pointed out, by the idea and nature of God; not indeed +through words, but in a way far more excellent and +agreeing perfectly with the nature of the mind, as all +who have enjoyed intellectual certainty will doubtless<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[38]</a></span> +attest. Here, however, my chief purpose is to speak +of matters having reference to Scripture, so these few +words on the light of reason will suffice.</p> + +<p>I will now pass on to, and treat more fully, the other +ways and means by which God makes revelations to +mankind, both of that which transcends ordinary +knowledge and of that within its scope; for there is no +reason why God should not employ other means to +communicate what we know already by the power of +reason.</p> + +<p>Our conclusions on the subject must be drawn solely +from Scripture; for what can we affirm about matters +transcending our knowledge except what is told us by +the words or writings of prophets? And since there +are, so far as I know, no prophets now alive, we have +no alternative but to read the books of prophets +departed, taking care the while not to reason from +metaphor or to ascribe anything to our authors which +they do not themselves distinctly state. I must further +premise that the Jews never make any mention or account +of secondary, or particular causes, but in a spirit +of religion, piety, and what is commonly called godliness, +refer all things directly to the Deity. For instance, +if they make money by a transaction, they say +God gave it to them; if they desire anything, they say +God has disposed their hearts towards it; if they think +anything, they say God told them. Hence we must +not suppose that everything is prophecy or revelation +which is described in Scripture as told by God to any +one, but only such things as are expressly announced +as prophecy or revelation, or are plainly pointed to as +such by the context.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[39]</a></span></p> + +<p>A perusal of the sacred books will show us that all +God's revelations to the prophets were made through +words or appearances, or a combination of the two. +These words and appearances were of two kinds; (1) +<i>real</i> when external to the mind of the prophet who heard +or saw them, (2) <i>imaginary</i> when the imagination of +the prophet was in a state which led him distinctly to +suppose that he heard or saw them.</p> + +<p>With a real voice God revealed to Moses the laws +which He wished to be transmitted to the Hebrews, as +we may see from Exodus xxv. 22, where God says, +"And there I will meet with thee and I will commune +with thee from the mercy seat which is between the +Cherubim." Some sort of real voice must necessarily +have been employed, for Moses found God ready to +commune with him at any time. This is the only instance +of a real voice.</p> + +<p>... Some of the Jews believe that the actual words +of the Decalogue were not spoken by God, but that the +Israelites heard a noise only, without any distinct +words, and during its continuance apprehend the Ten +Commandments by pure intuition; to this opinion I +myself once inclined, seeing that the words of the +Decalogue in Exodus are different from the words of +the Decalogue in Deuteronomy, for the discrepancy +seemed to imply (since God only spoke once) that the +Ten Commandments were not intended to convey the +actual words of the Lord, but only His meaning. However, +unless we would do violence to Scripture, we +must certainly admit that the Israelites heard a real +voice, for Scripture expressly says (Deut. v. 4), "God +spake with you face to face," <i>i.e.</i>, as two men ordinarily<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[40]</a></span> +interchange ideas through the instrumentality of their +two bodies; and therefore it seems more consonant +with Holy Writ to suppose that God really did create +a voice of some kind with which the Decalogue was +revealed....</p> + +<p>Yet not even thus is all difficulty removed, for it +seems scarcely reasonable to affirm that a created +thing, depending on God in the same manner as other +created things, would be able to express or explain +the nature of God either verbally or really by means +of its individual organism: for instance, by declaring +in the first person, "I am the Lord your God."</p> + +<p>Certainly when any one says his mouth, "I understand," +we do not attribute the understanding to the +mouth, but to the mind of the speaker; yet this is because +the mouth is the natural organ of a man speaking, +and the hearer, knowing what understanding is, +easily comprehends, by a comparison with himself, +that the speaker's mind is meant; but if we knew nothing +of God beyond the mere name and wished to commune +with Him, and be assured of His existence, I fail +to see how our wish would be satisfied by the declaration +of a created thing (depending on God neither +more nor less than ourselves), "I am the Lord." If +God contorted the lips of Moses, or, I will not say +Moses, but some beast, till they pronounced the words, +"I am the Lord," should we apprehend the Lord's +existence therefrom?</p> + +<p>Scripture seems clearly to point to the belief that +God spoke Himself, having descended from heaven to +Mount Sinai for the purpose—and not only that the +Israelites heard Him speaking, but that their chief<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[41]</a></span> +men beheld Him (Ex. xxiv.). Further, the laws of +Moses which might neither be added to nor curtailed, +and which was set up as a national standard of right, +nowhere prescribed the belief that God is without body, +or even without form or figure, but only ordained that +the Jews should believe in His existence and worship +Him alone: it forbade them to invent or fashion any +likeness of the Deity, but this was to insure purity of +service; because, never having seen God, they could +not by means of images recall the likeness of God, but +only the likeness of some created thing which might +thus gradually take the place of God as the object of +their adoration. Nevertheless, the Bible clearly implies +that God has a form, and that Moses when he +heard God speaking was permitted to behold it, or at +least its hinder parts.</p> + +<p>Doubtless some mystery lurks in this question which +we will discuss more fully below. For the present I +will call attention to the passages in Scripture indicating +the means by which God has revealed His laws to +man.</p> + +<p>Revelation may be through figures only (as in 1 +Chron. xxii.), where God displays his anger to David +by means of an angel bearing a sword, and also in the +story of Balaam.</p> + +<p>Maimonides and others do indeed maintain that these +and every other instance of angelic apparitions (<i>e.g.</i>, to +Manoah and to Abraham offering up Isaac) occurred +during sleep, for that no one with his eyes open ever +could see an angel, but this is mere nonsense. The +sole object of such commentators seemed to be to extort +from Scripture confirmations of Aristotelian quib<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[42]</a></span>bles +and their own inventions, a proceeding which I +regard as the acme of absurdity.</p> + +<p>In figures, not real but existing only in the prophet's +imagination, God revealed to Joseph his future lordship, +and in words and figures He revealed to Joshua +that He would fight for the Hebrews, causing to appear +an angel, as it were the captain of the Lord's host, +bearing a sword, and by this means communicating +verbally. The forsaking of Israel by Providence was +portrayed to Isaiah by a vision of the Lord, the thrice +Holy, sitting on a very lofty throne, and the Hebrews, +stained with the mire of their sins, sunk, as it were, in +uncleanness, and thus as far as possible distant from +God. The wretchedness of the people at the time was +thus revealed, while future calamities were foretold in +words. I could cite from Holy Writ many similar examples, +but I think they are sufficiently well known +already....</p> + +<p>We may be able quite to comprehend that God can +communicate immediately with man, for without the +intervention of bodily means He communicates to our +minds His essence; still, a man who can by pure intuition +comprehend ideas which are neither contained +in nor deducible from the foundations of our natural +knowledge, must necessarily possess a mind far superior +to those of his fellow men, nor do I believe that +any have been so endowed save Christ. To Him the +ordinances of God leading men to salvation were revealed +directly without words or visions, so that God +manifested Himself to the Apostles through the mind +of Christ as He formerly did to Moses through the +supernatural voice. In this sense the voice of Christ,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[43]</a></span> +like the voice which Moses heard, may be called the +voice of God, and it may be said that the wisdom of +God (<i>i.e.</i>, wisdom more than human) took upon itself +in Christ human nature, and that Christ was the way +of salvation. I must at this juncture declare that those +doctrines which certain churches put forward concerning +Christ, I neither affirm nor deny, for I freely confess +that I do not understand them. What I have just +stated I gather from Scripture, where I never read +that God appeared to Christ, or spoke to Christ, but +that God was revealed to the Apostles through Christ; +that Christ was the Way of Life, and that the old law +was given through an angel, and not immediately by +God; whence it follows that if Moses spoke with God +face to face as a man speaks with his friend (<i>i.e.</i>, by +means of their two bodies) Christ communed with God +mind to mind.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[44]</a></span></p> +<p>Thus we may conclude that no one except Christ received +the revelations of God without the aid of imagination, +whether in words or vision. Therefore the +power of prophecy implies not a peculiarly perfect +mind, but a peculiarly vivid imagination....</p> + +<p>If the Jews were at a loss to understand any phenomenon, +or were ignorant of its cause, they referred +it to God. Thus a storm was termed the chiding of +God, thunder and lightning the arrows of God, for +it was thought that God kept the winds confined in +caves, His treasuries; thus differing merely in name +from the Greek wind-god Eolus. In like manner miracles +were called works of God, as being especially +marvelous; though in reality, of course, all natural +events are the works of God, and take place solely by +His power. The Psalmist calls the miracles in Egypt +the works of God, because the Hebrews found in them +a way of safety which they had not looked for, and +therefore especially marveled at.</p> + +<p>As, then, unusual natural phenomena are called +works of God, and trees of unusual size are called trees +of God, we cannot wonder that very strong and tall +men, though impious robbers and whoremongers, are +in Genesis called sons of God.</p> + +<p>This reference of things wonderful to God was not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[45]</a></span> +peculiar to the Jews. Pharaoh, on hearing the interpretation +of his dream, exclaimed that the mind of the +gods was in Joseph. Nebuchadnezzar told Daniel that +he possessed the mind of the holy gods; so also in Latin +anything well made is often said to be wrought with +Divine hands, which is equivalent to the Hebrew +phrase, wrought with the hand of God.</p> + +<p>... We find that the Scriptural phrases, "The +Spirit of the Lord was upon a prophet," "The Lord +breathed His Spirit into men," "Men were filled with +the Spirit of God, with the Holy Spirit," etc., are quite +clear to us, and mean that the prophets were endowed +with a peculiar and extraordinary power, and devoted +themselves to piety with especial constancy; that thus +they perceived the mind or the thought of God, for +we have shown [elsewhere] that God's spirit signifies +in Hebrew God's mind or thought, and that the law +which shows His mind and thought is called His +Spirit; hence that the imagination of the prophets, inasmuch +as through it were revealed the decrees of God, +may equally be called the mind of God, and the prophets +be said to have possessed the mind of God. On +our minds also the mind of God and His eternal +thoughts are impressed; but this being the same for all +men is less taken into account, especially by the +Hebrews, who claimed a preëminence, and despised +other men and other men's knowledge.</p> + +<p>[Also] the prophets were said to possess the Spirit +of God because men knew not the cause of prophetic +knowledge, and in their wonder referred it with other +marvels directly to the Deity, styling it Divine knowledge.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[46]</a></span></p> + +<p>We need no longer scruple to affirm that the prophets +only perceived God's revelation by the aid of imagination, +that is, by words and figures either real or imaginary. +We find no other means mentioned in Scripture, +and therefore must not invent any. As to the particular +law of Nature by which the communications took place, +I confess my ignorance. I might, indeed, say as others +do, that they took place by the power of God; but this +would be mere trifling, and no better than explaining +some unique specimen by a transcendental term. +Everything takes place by the power of God. Nature +herself is the power of God under another name, and +our ignorance of the power of God is co-extensive with +our ignorance of Nature. It is absolutely folly, therefore, +to ascribe an event to the power of God when +we know not its natural cause, which is the power of +God.</p> + +<p>However, we are not now inquiring into the causes of +prophetic knowledge. We are only attempting, as I +have said, to examine the Scriptural documents, and to +draw our conclusions from them as from ultimate +natural facts; the causes of the documents do not +concern us.</p> + +<p>As the prophets perceived the revelations of God by +the aid of imagination, they could indisputably perceive +much that is beyond the boundary of the intellect, +for many more ideas can be constructed from words +and figures than from the principles and notions on +which the whole fabric of reasoned knowledge is reared.</p> + +<p>Thus we have a clue to the fact that the prophets +perceived nearly everything in parables and allegories, +and clothed spiritual truths in bodily forms, for such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[47]</a></span> +is the usual method of imagination. We need no longer +wonder that Scripture and the prophets speak so +strangely and obscurely of God's Spirit or Mind (cf. +Numbers xi. 17, 1 Kings xxii, 21, etc.), that the Lord +was seen by Micah as sitting, by Daniel as an old man +clothed in white, by Ezekiel as a fire, that the Holy +Spirit appeared to those with Christ as a descending +dove, to the apostles as fiery tongues, to Paul on his +conversion as a great light. All these expressions are +plainly in harmony with the current ideas of God and +spirits.</p> + +<p>Inasmuch as imagination is fleeting and inconstant, +we find that the power of prophecy did not remain with +a prophet for long, nor manifest itself frequently, but +was very rare; manifesting itself only in a few men, +and in them not often.</p> + +<p>We must necessarily inquire how the prophets became +assured of the truth of what they perceived by +imagination, and not by sure mental laws; but our +investigation must be confined to Scripture, for the +subject is one on which we cannot acquire certain +knowledge, and which we cannot explain by the immediate +causes.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<p>... As I have said, the prophets were endowed +with unusually vivid imaginations, and not with unusually +perfect minds. This conclusion is amply sustained +by Scripture, for we are told that Solomon +was the wisest of men, but had no special faculty of +prophecy. Heman, Calcol, and Dara, though men of +great talent, were not prophets, whereas uneducated<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[48]</a></span> +countrymen, nay, even women, such as Hagar, Abraham's +handmaid, were thus gifted. Nor is this contrary +to ordinary experience and reason. Men of +great imaginative power are less fitted for abstract +reasoning, whereas those who excel in intellect and +its use keep their imagination more restrained and +controlled, holding it in subjection, so to speak, lest it +should usurp the place of reason.</p> + +<p>Thus to suppose that knowledge of natural and +spiritual phenomena can be gained from the prophetic +books, is an utter mistake, which I shall endeavor to +expose, as I think philosophy, the age, and the question +itself demand. I care not for the girdings of +superstition, for superstition is the bitter enemy of all +true knowledge and true morality. Yes; it has come +to this! Men who openly confess that they can form +no idea of God, and only know Him through created +things, of which they know not the causes, can unblushingly +accuse philosophers of Atheism.</p> + +<p>Treating the question methodically, I will show that +prophecies varied, not only according to the imagination +and physical temperament of the prophet, but +also according to his particular opinions; and further +that prophecy never rendered the prophet wiser than +he was before. But I will first discuss the assurance +of truth which the prophets received, for this is akin +to the subject-matter of the chapter, and will serve +to elucidate somewhat our present point.</p> + +<p>Imagination does not, in its own nature, involve any +certainty of truth, such as is implied in every clear +and distinct idea, but requires some extrinsic reason +to assure us of its objective reality: hence prophecy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[49]</a></span> +cannot afford certainty, and the prophets were assured +of God's revelation by some sign, and not by the fact +of revelation, as we may see from Abraham, who, when +he had heard the promise of God, demanded a sign, +not because he did not believe in God but because he +wished to be sure that it was God Who made the +promise. The fact is still more evident in the case of +Gideon: "Show me," he says to God, "show me a +sign, that I may know that it is Thou that talkest with +me." God also says to Moses: "And let this be a +sign that I have sent thee." Hezekiah, though he had +long known Isaiah to be a prophet, none the less demanded +a sign of the cure which he predicted. It is +thus quite evident that the prophets always received +some sign to certify them of their prophetic imaginings; +and for this reason Moses bids the Jews (Deut. +xviii.) ask of the prophets a sign, namely, the prediction +of some coming event. In this respect, prophetic +knowledge is inferior to natural knowledge, which +needs no sign, and in itself implies certitude. Moreover, +Scripture warrants the statement that the certitude +of the prophets was not mathematical, but moral. +Moses lays down the punishment of death for the +prophet who preaches new gods, even though he confirm +his doctrine by signs and wonders (Deut. xiii.); +"For," he says, "the Lord also worketh signs and +wonders to try His people." And Jesus Christ warns +His disciples of the same thing (Matt. xxiv. 24). +Furthermore, Ezekiel (xiv. 9) plainly states that God +sometimes deceives men with false revelations; and +Micaiah bears like witness in the case of the prophets +of Ahab.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[50]</a></span></p> + +<p>Although these instances go to prove that revelation +is open to doubt, it nevertheless contains, as we have +said, a considerable element of certainty, for God +never deceives the good, nor His chosen, but (according +to the ancient proverb and as appears in the history +of Abigail and her speech), God uses the good as instruments +of goodness, and the wicked as means to +execute His wrath. This may be seen from the cases +of Micaiah above quoted; for although God had determined +to deceive Ahab, through prophets, He made +use of lying prophets; to the good prophet He revealed +the truth, and did not forbid his proclaiming +it.</p> + +<p>Still the certitude of prophecy remains, as I have +said, merely moral; for no one can justify himself before +God, nor boast that he is an instrument for God's +goodness. Scripture itself teaches and shows that God +led away David to number the people, though it bears +ample witness to David's piety.</p> + +<p>The whole question of the certitude of prophecy was +based on these three considerations:—</p> + +<p>1. That the things revealed were imagined very +vividly, affecting the prophets in the same way as things +seen when awake;</p> + +<p>2. The presence of a sign;</p> + +<p>3. Lastly and chiefly, that the mind of the prophet +was given wholly to what was right and good.</p> + +<p>Although Scripture does not always make mention of +a sign, we must nevertheless suppose that a sign was +always vouchsafed; for Scripture does not always relate +every condition and circumstance (as many have +remarked), but rather takes them for granted. We<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[51]</a></span> +may, however, admit that no sign was needed when +the prophecy declared nothing that was not already +contained in the law of Moses, because it was confirmed +by that law. For instance, Jeremiah's prophecy +of the destruction of Jerusalem was confirmed by the +prophecies of other prophets, and by the threats in the +law, and therefore it needed no sign; whereas Hananiah, +who, contrary to all the prophets, foretold the +speedy restoration of the state, stood in need of a sign, +or he would have been in doubt as to the truth of his +prophecy, until it was confirmed by facts. "The +prophet which prophesieth of peace, when the word of +the prophet shall come to pass, then shall the prophet +be known that the Lord hath truly sent him."</p> + +<p>As, then, the certitude afforded to the prophet by +signs was not mathematical (<i>i.e.</i>, did not necessarily +follow from the perception of the thing perceived or +seen), but only moral, and as the signs were only given +to convince the prophet, it follows that such signs +were given according to the opinions and capacity of +each prophet, so that a sign which would convince one +prophet would fall far short of convincing another who +was imbued with different opinions. Therefore the +signs varied according to the individual prophet.</p> + +<p>So also did the revelation vary, as we have stated, +according to individual disposition and temperament, +and according to the opinions previously held.</p> + +<p>It varied according to disposition, in this way: if a +prophet was cheerful, victories, peace, and events which +make men glad, were revealed to him; in that he was +naturally more likely to imagine such things. If, on +the contrary, he was melancholy, wars, massacres, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[52]</a></span> +calamities were revealed; and so, according as a +prophet was merciful, gentle, quick to anger, or severe, +he was more fitted for one kind of revelation than another. +It varied according to the temper of imagination +in this way: if a prophet was cultivated he perceived +the mind of God in a cultivated way, if he was +confused he perceived it confusedly. And so with +revelations perceived through visions. If a prophet +was a countryman he saw visions of oxen, cows, and +the like; if he was a soldier, he saw generals and +armies; if a courtier, a royal throne, and so on.</p> + +<p>Lastly, prophecy varied according to the opinions +held by the prophets; for instance, to the Magi, who +believed in the follies of astrology, the birth of Christ +was revealed through the vision of a star in the East. +To the augurs of Nebuchadnezzar the destruction of +Jerusalem was revealed through entrails, whereas the +king himself inferred it from oracles and the direction +of arrows which he shot into the air. To prophets who +believed that man acts from free choice and by his +own power, God was revealed as standing apart from +and ignorant of future human actions. All of which +we will illustrate from Scripture....</p> + +<p>The style of the prophecy also varied according to +the eloquence of the individual prophet. The prophecies +of Ezekiel and Amos are not written in a cultivated +style like those of Isaiah and Nahum, but more rudely. +Any Hebrew scholar who wishes to inquire into this +point more closely, and compares chapters of the different +prophets treating of the same subject, will find +that God has no particular style in speaking, but, according +to the learning and capacity of the prophet, is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[53]</a></span> +cultivated, compressed, severe, untutored, prolixed or +obscure....</p> + +<p>Every one has been strangely hasty in affirming that +the prophets knew everything within the scope of +human intellect; and, although certain passages of +Scripture plainly affirm that the prophets were in certain +respects ignorant, such persons would rather say +that they do not understand the passages than admit +that there was anything which the prophets did not +know; or else they try to wrest the Scriptural words +away from their evident meaning.</p> + +<p>If either of these proceedings is allowable we may +as well shut our Bibles, for vainly shall we attempt to +prove anything from them if their plainest passages +may be classed among obscure and impenetrable mysteries, +or if we may put any interpretation on them +which we fancy. For instance, nothing is more clear +in the Bible than that Joshua, and perhaps also the +author who wrote his history, thought that the sun +revolves round the earth, and that the earth is fixed, +and further that the sun for a certain period remained +still. Many, who will not admit any movement in the +heavenly bodies, explain away the passage till it seems +to mean something quite different; others, who have +learned to philosophize more correctly, and understand +that the earth moves while the sun is still, or at any +rate does not revolve round the earth, try with all +their might to wrest this meaning from Scripture, +though plainly nothing of the sort is intended. Such +quibblers excite my wonder! Are we, forsooth, bound +to believe that Joshua the soldier was a learned astronomer? +or that a miracle could not be revealed to him,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[54]</a></span> +or that the light of the sun could not remain longer +than usual above the horizon, without his knowing the +cause? To me both alternatives appear ridiculous, and +therefore I would rather say that Joshua was ignorant +of the true cause of the lengthened day, and that he +and the whole host with him thought that the sun +moved round the earth every day, and that on that +particular occasion it stood still for a time, thus causing +the light to remain longer; and I would say that +they did not conjecture that, from the amount of snow +in the air (see Josh. x. 11), the refraction may have +been greater than usual, or that there may have been +some other cause which we will not now inquire into.</p> + +<p>So also the sign of the shadow going back was revealed +to Isaiah according to his understanding; that +is, as proceeding from a going backwards of the sun; +for he, too, thought that the sun moves and that the +earth is still; of parhelia he perhaps never even +dreamed. We may arrive at this conclusion without +any scruple, for the sign could really have come to +pass, and have been predicted by Isaiah to the king, +without the prophet being aware of the real cause.</p> + +<p>With regard to the building of the Temple by Solomon, +if it was really dictated by God we must maintain +the same doctrine: namely, that all the measurements +were revealed according to the opinions and understanding +of the king; for as we are not bound to believe +that Solomon was a mathematician, we may affirm that +he was ignorant of the true ratio between the circumference +and the diameter of a circle, and that, like the +generality of workmen, he thought that it was as three +to one. But if it is allowable to declare that we do not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[55]</a></span> +understand the passage, in good sooth I know nothing +in the Bible that we can understand; for the process +of building is there narrated simply and as a mere +matter of history. If, again, it is permitted to pretend +that the passage has another meaning, and was written +as it is from some reason unknown to us, this is no less +than a complete subversal of the Bible; for every +absurd and evil invention of human perversity could +thus, without detriment to Scriptural authority, be defended +and fostered. Our conclusion is in no wise +impious, for though Solomon, Isaiah, Joshua, etc., +were prophets, they were none the less men, and as +such not exempt from human shortcomings.</p> + +<p>According to the understanding of Noah it was +revealed to him that God was about to destroy +the whole human race, for Noah thought that beyond +the limits of Palestine the world was not inhabited.</p> + +<p>Not only in matters of this kind, but in others more +important, the prophets could be, and in fact were, +ignorant; for they taught nothing special about the +Divine attributes, but held quite ordinary notions about +God, and to these notions their revelations were +adapted, as I will demonstrate by ample Scriptural +testimony; from all which one may easily see that +they were praised and commended, not so much for +the sublimity and eminence of their intellect as for +their piety and faithfulness.</p> + +<p>Adam, the first man to whom God was revealed, did +not know that He is omnipotent and omniscient; for +he hid himself from Him, and attempted to make excuses +for his fault before God, as though he had had<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[56]</a></span> +to do with a man; therefore to him also was God revealed +according to his understanding—that is, as being +unaware of his situation or his sin, for Adam heard, +or seemed to hear, the Lord walking in the garden, +calling him and asking him where he was; and then, on +seeing his shamefacedness, asking him whether he had +eaten of the forbidden fruit. Adam evidently only +knew the Deity as the Creator of all things. To Cain +also God was revealed, according to his understanding, +as ignorant of human affairs, nor was a higher conception +of the Deity required for repentance of his +sin.</p> + +<p>To Laban the Lord revealed Himself as the God of +Abraham, because Laban believed that each nation +had its own special divinity (see Gen. xxxi. 29). Abraham +also knew not that God is omnipresent, and has +foreknowledge of all things; for when he heard the +sentence against the inhabitants of Sodom, he prayed +that the Lord should not execute it till He had ascertained +whether they all merited such punishment; for +he said (see Gen. xviii. 24), "Peradventure there be +fifty righteous within the city," and in accordance with +this belief God was revealed to him; as Abraham imagined, +He spake thus: "I will go down now, and see +whether they have done altogether according to the +cry of it which is come unto Me; and if not I will +know." Further, the Divine testimony concerning +Abraham asserts nothing but that he was obedient, and +that he "commanded his household after him that they +should keep the way of the Lord" (Gen. xviii. 19); +it does not state that he held sublime conceptions of +the Deity.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[57]</a></span></p> + +<p>Moses, also, was not sufficiently aware that God is +omniscient, and directs human actions by His sole +decree, for although God himself says that the Israelites +should hearken to Him, Moses still considered the +matter doubtful and repeated, "But if they will not +believe me, nor hearken unto my voice." To him in +like manner God was revealed as taking no part in, +and as being ignorant of, future human actions: the +Lord gave him two signs and said, "And it shall come +to pass that if they will not believe thee, neither +hearken to the voice of the first sign, that they will +believe the voice of the latter sign; but if not, thou +shalt take of the water of the river," etc. Indeed, if +any one considers without prejudice the recorded +opinions of Moses, he will plainly see that Moses conceived +the Deity as a Being Who has always existed, +does exist, and always will exist, and for this cause +he calls Him by the name Jehovah, which in Hebrew +signifies these three phases of existence: as to His +nature, Moses only taught that He is merciful, gracious, +and exceeding jealous, as appears from many passages +in the Pentateuch. Lastly, he believed and taught that +this Being was so different from all other beings, that +He could not be expressed by the image of any visible +thing; also, that He could not be looked upon, and +that not so much from inherent impossibility as from +human infirmity; further, that by reason of His power +He was without equal and unique. Moses admitted, +indeed, that there were beings (doubtless by the plan +and command of the Lord) who acted as God's vicegerents—that +is, beings to whom God had given the +right, authority, and power to direct nations, and to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[58]</a></span> +provide and care for them; but he taught that this +Being Whom they were bound to obey was the highest +and Supreme God, (or to use the Hebrew phrase) God +of gods, and thus in the song (Exod. xv. 11) he exclaims, +"Who is like unto Thee, O Lord, among the +gods?" and Jethro says (Exod. xviii. 11), "Now I know +that the Lord is greater than all gods." That is to say, +"I am at length compelled to admit to Moses that Jehovah +is greater than all gods, and that His power is +unrivalled." We must remain in doubt whether Moses +thought that these beings who acted as God's vicegerents +were created by Him, for he has stated nothing, +so far as we know, about their creation and origin. +He further taught that this Being had brought the +visible world into order from Chaos, and had given +Nature her germs, and therefore that He possesses +supreme right and power over all things; further, that +by reason of this supreme right and power He had +chosen for Himself alone the Hebrew nation and a +certain strip of territory, and had handed over to the +care of other gods substituted by Himself the rest of +the nations and territories, and that therefore He was +called the God of Israel and the God of Jerusalem, +whereas the other gods were called the gods of the +Gentiles. For this reason the Jews believed that the +strip of territory which God had chosen for Himself, +demanded a Divine worship quite apart and different +from the worship which obtained elsewhere, and that +the Lord would not suffer the worship of other gods +adapted to other countries. Thus they thought that +the people whom the king of Assyria had brought into +Judæa were torn in pieces by lions because they knew<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[59]</a></span> +not the worship of the National Divinity (2 Kings +xvii. 25)....</p> + +<p>If we now examine the revelations to Moses, we shall +find that they were accommodated to these opinions; +as he believed that the Divine Nature was subject to +the conditions of mercy, graciousness, etc., so God was +revealed to him in accordance with his idea and under +these attributes (see Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7, and the second +commandment). Further it is related (Ex. xxxiii. 18) +that Moses asked of God that he might behold Him, +but as Moses (as we have said) had formed no mental +image of God, and God (as I have shown) only revealed +Himself to the prophets in accordance with the +disposition of their imagination, He did not reveal +Himself in any form. This, I repeat, was because the +imagination of Moses was unsuitable, for other prophets +bear witness that they saw the Lord; for instance, +Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, etc. For this reason +God answered Moses, "Thou canst not see My face;" +and inasmuch as Moses believed that God can be +looked upon—that is, that no contradiction of the +Divine nature is therein involved (for otherwise he +would never have preferred his request)—it is added, +"For no one shall look on Me and live," thus giving a +reason in accordance with Moses' idea, for it is not +stated that a contradiction of the Divine nature would +be involved, as was really the case, but that the thing +would not come to pass because of human infirmity....</p> + +<p>Lastly, as Moses believed that God dwelt in the +heavens, God was revealed to him as coming down +from heaven on to a mountain, and in order to talk<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[60]</a></span> +with the Lord Moses went up the mountain, which he +certainly need not have done if he could have conceived +of God as omnipresent.</p> + +<p>The Israelites knew scarcely anything of God, although +He was revealed to them; and this is abundantly +evident from their transferring, a few days afterwards, +the honor and worship due to Him to a calf, which +they believed to be the god who had brought them out +of Egypt. In truth, it is hardly likely that men accustomed +to the superstitions of Egypt, uncultivated +and sunk in most abject slavery, should have held any +sound notions about the Deity, or that Moses should +have taught them anything beyond a rule of right living; +inculcating it not like a philosopher, as the result +of freedom, but like a lawgiver compelling them to +be moral by legal authority. Thus the rule of right +living, the worship and love of God, was to them rather +a bondage than the true liberty, the gift and grace +of the Deity. Moses bid them love God and keep +His law, because they had in the past received benefits +from Him (such as the deliverance from slavery +in Egypt), and further terrified them with threats if +they transgressed His commands, holding out many +promises of good if they should observe them; thus +treating them as parents treat irrational children. It +is, therefore, certain that they knew not the excellence +of virtue and the true happiness.</p> + +<p>Jonah thought that he was fleeing from the sight of +God, which seems to show that he too held that God +had entrusted the care of the nations outside Judæa to +other substituted powers. No one in the whole of the +Old Testament speaks more rationally of God than<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[61]</a></span> +Solomon, who in fact surpassed all the men of his time +in natural ability. Yet he considered himself above the +law (esteeming it only to have been given for men +without reasonable and intellectual grounds for their +actions), and made small account of the laws concerning +kings, which are mainly three: nay, he openly +violated them (in this he did wrong, and acted in a +manner unworthy of a philosopher, by indulging in sensual +pleasure), and taught that all Fortune's favors +to mankind are vanity, that humanity has no nobler +gift than wisdom, and no greater punishment than +folly. (See Proverbs xvi. 22, 23.)</p> + +<p>... God adapted revelations to the understanding +and opinions of the prophets, and ... in matters of +theory without bearing on charity or morality, the +prophets could be, and, in fact, were ignorant, and +held conflicting opinions. It therefore follows that we +must by no means go to the prophets for knowledge, +either of natural or of spiritual phenomena.</p> + +<p>We have determined, then, that we are only bound +to believe in the prophetic writings, the object and +substance of the revelation; with regard to the details, +every one may believe or not, as he likes.</p> + +<p>For instance, the revelation to Cain only teaches us +that God admonished him to lead the true life, for +such alone is the object and substance of the revelation, +not doctrines concerning free will and philosophy. +Hence, though the freedom of the will is clearly +implied in the words of the admonition, we are at +liberty to hold a contrary opinion, since the words +and reasons were adapted to the understanding of +Cain.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[62]</a></span></p> + +<p>So, too, the revelation to Micaiah would only teach +that God revealed to him the true issue of the battle +between Ahab and Aram; and this is all we are bound +to believe. Whatever else is contained in the revelation +concerning the true and the false Spirit of God, +the army of heaven standing on the right hand and on +the left, and all the other details, does not affect us at +all. Every one may believe as much of it as his reason +allows.</p> + +<p>The reasonings by which the Lord displayed His +power to Job (if they really were a revelation, and the +author of the history is narrating, and not merely, as +some suppose, rhetorically adorning his own conceptions), +would come under the same category—that is, +they were adapted to Job's understanding, for the purpose +of convincing him, and are not universal, or for +the convincing of all men.</p> + +<p>We can come to no different conclusion with respect +to the reasonings of Christ, by which He convicted +the Pharisees of pride and ignorance, and exhorted +His disciples to lead the true life. He adapted them +to each man's opinions and principles. For instance, +when He said to the Pharisees (Matt. xii. 26), "And +if Satan cast out devils, his house is divided against +itself, how then shall his kingdom stand?" He only +wished to convince the Pharisees according to their +own principles, not to teach that there are devils, or +any kingdom of devils. So, too, when He said to +His disciples (Matt. viii. 10), "See that ye despise +not one of these little ones, for I say unto you that +their angels," etc., He merely desired to warn them +against pride and despising any of their fellows, not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[63]</a></span> +to insist on the actual reason given, which was simply +adopted in order to persuade them more easily.</p> + +<p>Lastly, we should say exactly the same of the +apostolic signs and reasonings, but there is no need +to go further into the subject. If I were to enumerate +all the passages of Scripture addressed only to individuals, +or to a particular man's understanding, and +which cannot, without great danger to philosophy, be +defended as Divine doctrines, I should go far beyond +the brevity at which I aim. Let it suffice then, to have +indicated a few instances of general application, and +let the curious reader consider others by himself. +Although the points we have just raised concerning +prophets and prophecy are the only ones which have +any direct bearing on the end in view, namely, the +separation of Philosophy from Theology, still, as I +have touched on the general question, I may here inquire +whether the gift of prophecy was peculiar to +the Hebrews, or whether it was common to all nations. +I must then come to a conclusion about the vocation +of the Hebrews, all of which I shall do in the ensuing +chapter.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> From the <i>Tr. Th.-P.</i> ch. i <i>Of Prophecy</i>; and ch. ii of <i>Of Prophets</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> ... I will tell you that I do not think it necessary for salvation +to know Christ according to the flesh; but with regard to the +Eternal Son of God, that is the Eternal Wisdom of God, which +has manifested itself in all things and especially in the human mind, +and above all in Christ Jesus, the case is far otherwise. For without +this no one can come to a state of blessedness, inasmuch as it alone +teaches what is true or false, good or evil. And, inasmuch as this +wisdom was made especially manifest through Jesus Christ, as I +have said, His disciples preached it, in so far as it was revealed +to them through Him, and thus showed that they could rejoice +in that spirit of Christ more than the rest of mankind. The doctrines +added by certain churches, such as that God took upon Himself +human nature, I have expressly said that I do not understand. +In fact, to speak the truth, they seem to me no less absurd than +would a statement that a circle had taken upon itself the nature +of a square. This I think will be sufficient explanation of my opinion.... +Whether it will be satisfactory to Christians you will know +better than I. Farewell. <i>From a letter to Henry Oldenburg</i> (Nov. +1675). +</p><p> +... For the rest, I accept Christ's passion, death, and burial literally, +as you do, but His resurrection I understand allegorically. I +admit, that it is related by the Evangelists in such detail that we +cannot deny that they themselves believed Christ's body to have risen +from the dead and ascended to heaven in order to sit at the right +hand of God, or that they believed that Christ might have been seen +by unbelievers, if they had happened to be at hand, in the places +where He appeared to His disciples; but in these matters they might, +without injury to Gospel teaching, have been deceived, as was the +case with other prophets.... But Paul, to whom Christ afterwards +appeared, rejoices that he knew Christ, not after the flesh, but after +the spirit. <i>From a letter to Henry Oldenburg</i> (Jan. 1676).</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[64]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<h3>OF THE VOCATION OF THE HEBREWS<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></h3> + + +<p>Every man's true happiness and blessedness consist +solely in the enjoyment of what is good, not in the +pride that he alone is enjoying it, to the exclusion of +others. He who thinks himself the more blessed because +he is enjoying benefits which others are not, or +because he is more blessed or more fortunate than his +fellows, is ignorant of true happiness and blessedness, +and the joy which he feels is either childish or envious +and malicious. For instance, a man's true happiness +consists only in wisdom, and the knowledge of the +truth, not at all in the fact that he is wiser than others, +or that others lack such knowledge: such considerations +do not increase his wisdom or true happiness.</p> + +<p>Whoever, therefore, rejoices for such reasons, rejoices +in another's misfortune, and is, so far, malicious +and bad, knowing neither true happiness nor the peace +of the true life.</p> + +<p>When Scripture, therefore, in exhorting the Hebrews +to obey the law, says that the Lord has chosen them +for Himself before other nations (Deut. x. 15); that +He is near them, but not near others (Deut. iv. 7); +that to them alone He has given just laws (Deut. iv. +8); and, lastly, that He has marked them out before +others (Deut. iv. 32); it speaks only according to the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[65]</a></span> +understanding of its hearers, who, as we have shown +in the last chapter, and as Moses also testified (Deut. +ix. 6, 7), knew not true blessedness. For in good +sooth they would have been no less blessed if God had +called all men equally to salvation, nor would God +have been less present to them for being equally present +to others; their laws would have been no less +just if they had been ordained for all, and they themselves +would have been no less wise. The miracles +would have shown God's power no less by being +wrought for other nations also; lastly, the Hebrews +would have been just as much bound to worship God +if He had bestowed all these gifts equally on all men.</p> + +<p>When God tells Solomon (1 Kings iii. 12) that no +one shall be as wise as he in time to come, it seems +to be only a manner of expressing surpassing wisdom; +it is little to be believed that God would have promised +Solomon, for his greater happiness, that He would +never endow any one with so much wisdom in time to +come; this would in no wise have increased Solomon's +intellect, and the wise king would have given equal +thanks to the Lord if every one had been gifted with +the same faculties.</p> + +<p>Still, though we assert that Moses, in the passages +of the Pentateuch just cited, spoke only according to +the understanding of the Hebrews, we have no wish +to deny that God ordained the Mosaic law for them +alone, nor that He spoke to them alone, nor that they +witnessed marvels beyond those which happened to +any other nation; but we wish to emphasize that Moses +desired to admonish the Hebrews in such a manner +and with such reasonings as would appeal most forcibly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[66]</a></span> +to their childish understanding and constrain them to +worship the Deity. Further, we wished to show that +the Hebrews did not surpass other nations in knowledge, +or in piety, but evidently in some attribute different +from these; or (to speak like the Scriptures, according +to their understanding), that the Hebrews were +not chosen by God before others for the sake of the +true life and sublime ideas, though they were often +thereto admonished, but with some other object. What +that object was I will duly show.</p> + +<p>But before I begin, I wish in a few words to explain +what I mean by the guidance of God, by the help of +God, external and inward, and lastly, what I understand +by fortune.</p> + +<p>By the help of God, I mean the fixed and unchangeable +order of nature or the chain of natural events: +for I have said before and shown elsewhere that the +universal laws of nature, according to which all things +exist and are determined, are only another name for +the eternal decrees of God, which always involve +eternal truth and necessity.</p> + +<p>So that to say that everything happens according +to natural laws, and to say that everything is ordained +by the decree and ordinance of God, is the same thing. +Now since the power in Nature is identical with the +power of God, by which alone all things happen and +are determined, it follows that whatsoever man, as a +part of Nature, provides himself with to aid and preserve +his existence, or whatsoever Nature affords him +without his help, is given to him solely by the Divine +power, acting either through human nature or through +external circumstance. So whatever human nature<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[67]</a></span> +can furnish itself with by its own efforts to preserve +its existence, may be fitly called the inward aid of +God, whereas whatever else accrues to man's profit +from outward causes may be called the external aid of +God.</p> + +<p>We can now easily understand what is meant by the +election of God. For since no one can do anything +save by the predetermined order of Nature, that is by +God's eternal ordinance and decree, it follows that no +one can choose a plan of life for himself, or accomplish +any work save by God's vocation choosing him for +the work or the plan of life in question, rather than +any other. Lastly, by fortune, I mean the ordinance +of God in so far as it directs human life through external +and unexpected means. With these preliminaries +I return to my purpose of discovering the reason +why the Hebrews were said to be elected by God before +other nations, and with the demonstration I thus +proceed.</p> + +<p>All objects of legitimate desire fall, generally speaking, +under one of these three categories:—</p> + +<p>1. The knowledge of things through their primary +causes.</p> + +<p>2. The government of the passions, or the acquirement +of the habit of virtue.</p> + +<p>3. Secure and healthy life.</p> + +<p>The means which most directly conduce towards the +first two of these ends, and which may be considered +their proximate and efficient causes are contained in +human nature itself, so that their acquisition hinges +only on our own power, and on the laws of human nature. +It may be concluded that these gifts are not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[68]</a></span> +peculiar to any nation, but have always been shared +by the whole human race, unless, indeed, we would +indulge the dream that Nature formerly created men +of different kinds. But the means which conduce to +security and health are chiefly in external circumstance, +and are called the gifts of fortune because they +depend chiefly on objective causes of which we are +ignorant; for a fool may be almost as liable to happiness +or unhappiness as a wise man. Nevertheless, +human management and watchfulness can greatly assist +towards living in security and warding off the injuries +of our fellow men, and even of beasts. Reason and +experience show no more certain means of attaining +this object than the formation of a society with fixed +laws, the occupation of a strip of territory, and the +concentration of all forces, as it were, into one body, +that is the social body. Now for forming and preserving +a society, no ordinary ability and care is required: +that society will be most secure, most stable, and least +liable to reverses, which is founded and directed by +far-seeing and careful men; while, on the other hand, +a society constituted by men without trained skill, depends +in a great measure on fortune, and is less constant. +If, in spite of all, such a society lasts a long +time, it is owing to some other directing influence than +its own; if it overcomes great perils and its affairs +prosper, it will perforce marvel at and adore the guiding +Spirit of God (in so far, that is, as God works +through hidden means, and not through the nature and +mind of man), for everything happens to it unexpectedly +and contrary to anticipation, it may even be +said and thought to be by miracle. Nations, then, are +distinguished from one another in respect to the social<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[69]</a></span> +organization and the laws under which they live and +are governed; the Hebrew nation was not chosen by +God in respect to its wisdom nor its tranquillity of +mind, but in respect to its social organization and the +good fortune with which it obtained supremacy and +kept it so many years. This is abundantly clear from +Scripture. Even a cursory perusal will show us that +the only respects in which the Hebrews surpassed +other nations, are in their successful conduct of matters +relating to government, and in their surmounting +great perils solely by God's external aid; in other ways +they were on a par with their fellows, and God was +equally gracious to all. For in respect to intellect (as +we have shown in the last chapter) they held very +ordinary ideas about God and Nature, so that they +cannot have been God's chosen in this respect; nor +were they so chosen in respect of virtue and the true +life, for here again they, with the exception of a very +few elect, were on an equality with other nations: +therefore their choice and vocation consisted only in +the temporal happiness and advantages of independent +rule. In fact, we do not see that God promised anything +beyond this to the patriarchs or their successors; +in the law no other reward is offered for obedience +than the continual happiness of an independent commonwealth +and other goods of this life; while, on the +other hand, against contumacy and the breaking of the +covenant is threatened the downfall of the commonwealth +and great hardships. Nor is this to be wondered +at; for the ends of every social organization and +commonwealth are (as appears from what we have +said, and as we will explain more at length hereafter) +security and comfort; a commonwealth can only exist<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[70]</a></span> +by the laws being binding on all. If all the members +of a state wish to disregard the law, by that very fact +they dissolve the state and destroy the commonwealth. +Thus, the only reward which could be promised to the +Hebrews for continued obedience to the law was security +and its attendant advantages, while no surer +punishment could be threatened for disobedience, than +the ruin of the state and the evils which generally follow +therefrom, in addition to such further consequences +as might accrue to the Jews in particular from the +ruin of their especial state. But there is no need here +to go into this point at more length. I will only add +that the laws of the Old Testament were revealed and +ordained to the Jews only, for as God chose them in +respect to the special constitution of their society and +government, they must, of course, have had special +laws. Whether God ordained special laws for other +nations also, and revealed Himself to their lawgivers +prophetically, that is, under the attributes by which +the latter were accustomed to imagine Him, I cannot +sufficiently determine. It is evident from Scripture +itself that other nations acquired supremacy and particular +laws by the external aid of God.</p> + +<p>If any one wishes to maintain that the Jews ... +have been chosen by God for ever, I will not gainsay +him if he will admit that this choice, whether temporary +or eternal, has no regard, in so far as it is peculiar to the +Jews, to aught but dominion and physical advantages +(for by such alone can one nation be distinguished +from another), whereas in regard to intellect and true +virtue, every nation is on a par with the rest, and God +has not in these respects chosen one people rather than +another.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> From the <i>Tr. Th.-P.</i>, ch. iii, same title.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[71]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<h3>OF THE DIVINE LAW<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></h3> + + +<p>The word law, taken in the abstract means that by +which an individual, or all things, or as many things +as belong to a particular species, act in one and the +same fixed and definite manner, which manner depends +either on natural necessity or on human decree. A +law which depends on natural necessity is one which +necessarily follows from the nature, or from the definition +of the thing in question; a law which depends +on human decree, and which is more correctly called +an ordinance, is one which men have laid down for +themselves and others in order to live more safely or +conveniently, or from some similar reason.</p> + +<p>For example, the law that all bodies impinging on +lesser bodies, lose as much of their own motion as they +communicate to the latter is a universal law of all +bodies, and depends on natural necessity. So, too, the +law that a man in remembering one thing, straightway +remembers another either like it, or which he had perceived +simultaneously with it, is a law which necessarily +follows from the nature of man. But the law that +men must yield, or be compelled to yield, somewhat +of their natural right, and that they bind themselves<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[72]</a></span> +to live in a certain way, depends on human decree. +Now, though I freely admit that all things are predetermined +by universal natural laws to exist and operate +in a given, fixed, and definite manner, I still assert +that the laws I have just mentioned depend on human +decree.</p> + +<p>(1.) Because man, in so far as he is a part of Nature, +constitutes a part of the power of Nature. Whatever, +therefore, follows necessarily from the necessity of +human nature (that is, from Nature herself, in so far +as we conceive of her as acting through man) follows, +even though it be necessarily, from human power. +Hence the sanction of such laws may very well be said +to depend on man's decree, for it principally depends +on the power of the human mind; so that the human +mind in respect to its perception of things as true and +false, can readily be conceived as without such laws, +but not without necessary law as we have just defined +it.</p> + +<p>(2.) I have stated that these laws depend on human +decree because it is well to define and explain things +by their proximate causes. The general consideration +of fate and the concatenation of causes would aid us +very little in forming and arranging our ideas concerning +particular questions. Let us add that as to the +actual coördination and concatenation of things, that +is how things are ordained and linked together, we +are obviously ignorant; therefore, it is more profitable +for right living, nay, it is necessary for us to consider +things as contingent. So much about law in the abstract.</p> + +<p>Now the word law seems to be only applied to natural<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[73]</a></span> +phenomena by analogy, and is commonly taken to +signify a command which men can either obey or +neglect, inasmuch as it restrains human nature within +certain originally exceeded limits, and therefore lays +down no rule beyond human strength. Thus it is expedient +to define law more particularly as a plan of +life laid down by man for himself or others with a +certain object.</p> + +<p>However, as the true object of legislation is only +perceived by a few, and most men are almost incapable +of grasping it, though they live under its conditions, +legislators, with a view to exacting general obedience, +have wisely put forward another object, very different +from that which necessarily follows from the nature +of law: they promise to the observers of the law that +which the masses chiefly desire, and threaten its violators +with that which they chiefly fear: thus endeavoring +to restrain the masses, as far as may be, like a +horse with a curb; whence it follows that the word +law is chiefly applied to the modes of life enjoined +on men by the sway of others; hence those who obey +the law are said to live under it and to be under compulsion. +In truth, a man who renders every one their +due because he fears the gallows, acts under the sway +and compulsion of others, and cannot be called just. +But a man who does the same from a knowledge of the +true reason for laws and their necessity, acts from a +firm purpose and of his own accord, and is therefore +properly called just. This, I take it, is Paul's meaning +when he says, that those who live under the law cannot +be justified through the law, for justice, as commonly +defined, is the constant and perpetual will to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[74]</a></span> +render every man his due. Thus Solomon says (Prov. +xxi. 15), "It is a joy to the just to do judgment," but +the wicked fear.</p> + +<p>Law, then, being a plan of living which men have +for a certain object laid down for themselves or others, +may, as it seems, be divided into human law and Divine +law.</p> + +<p>By human law I mean a plan of living which serves +only to render life and the state secure.</p> + +<p>By Divine law I mean that which only regards the +highest good, in other words, the true knowledge of +God and love.</p> + +<p>I call this law Divine because of the nature of the +highest good, which I will here shortly explain as +clearly as I can.</p> + +<p>Inasmuch as the intellect is the best part of our +being, it is evident that we should make every effort to +perfect it as far as possible if we desire to search for +what is really profitable to us. For in intellectual perfection +the highest good should consist. Now, since +all our knowledge, and the certainty which removes +every doubt, depend solely on the knowledge of +God;—firstly, because without God nothing can exist +or be conceived; secondly, because so long as we +have no clear and distinct idea of God we may remain +in universal doubt—it follows that our highest good +and perfection also depend solely on the knowledge of +God. Further, since without God nothing can exist +or be conceived, it is evident that all natural phenomena +involve and express the conception of God as far as +their essence and perfection extend, so that we have +greater and more perfect knowledge of God in propor<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[75]</a></span>tion +to our knowledge of natural phenomena: conversely +(since the knowledge of an effect through its +cause is the same thing as the knowledge of a particular +property of a cause) the greater our knowledge +of natural phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge +of the essence of God (which is the cause of all +things). So, then, our highest good not only depends +on the knowledge of God, but wholly consists therein; +and it further follows that man is perfect or the reverse +in proportion to the nature and perfection of the +object of his special desire; hence the most perfect +and the chief sharer in the highest blessedness is he +who prizes above all else, and takes especial delight +in the intellectual knowledge of God, the most perfect +Being.</p> + +<p>Hither, then, our highest good and our highest +blessedness aim—namely, to the knowledge and love +of God; therefore the means demanded by this aim of +all human actions, that is, by God in so far as the idea +of him is in us, may be called the commands of God, +because they proceed, as it were, from God Himself, +inasmuch as He exists in our minds, and the plan of +life which has regard to this aim may be fitly called +the law of God.</p> + +<p>The nature of the means, and the plan of life which +this aim demands, how the foundations of the best +states follow its lines, and how men's life is conducted, +are questions pertaining to general ethics. Here I +only proceed to treat of the Divine law in a particular +application.</p> + +<p>As the love of God is man's highest happiness and +blessedness, and the ultimate end and aim of all human<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[76]</a></span> +actions, it follows that he alone lives by the Divine +law who loves God not from fear of punishment, or +from love of any other object, such as sensual pleasure, +fame, or the like; but solely because he has knowledge +of God, or is convinced that the knowledge and love of +God is the highest good. The sum and chief precept, +then, of the Divine law is to love God as the highest +good, namely, as we have said, not from fear of any +pains and penalties or from the love of any other +object in which we desire to take pleasure. The idea +of God lays down the rule that God is our highest +good—in other words, that the knowledge and love of +God is the ultimate aim to which all our actions should +be directed. The worldling cannot understand these +things, they appear foolishness to him, because he has +too meager a knowledge of God, and also because in +this highest good he can discover nothing which he can +handle or eat, or which affects the fleshly appetites +wherein he chiefly delights, for it consists solely in +thought and the pure reason. They, on the other +hand, who know that they possess no greater gift than +intellect and sound reason, will doubtless accept what +I have said without question.</p> + +<p>We have now explained that wherein the Divine law +chiefly consists, and what are human laws, namely, all +those which have a different aim unless they have been +ratified by revelation, for in this respect also things +are referred to God (as we have shown above) and in +this sense the law of Moses, although it was not universal, +but entirely adapted to the disposition and particular +preservation of a single people, may yet be +called a law of God or Divine law, inasmuch as we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[77]</a></span> +believe that it was ratified by prophetic insight. If we +consider the nature of natural Divine law as we have +just explained it, we shall see</p> + +<p>I. That it is universal or common to all men, for +we have deduced it from universal human nature.</p> + +<p>II. That it does not depend on the truth of any +historical narrative whatsoever, for inasmuch as this +natural Divine law is comprehended solely by the consideration +of human nature, it is plain that we can conceive +it as existing as well in Adam as in any other +man, as well in a man living among his fellows as in +a man who lives by himself.</p> + +<p>The truth of a historical narrative, however assured, +cannot give us the knowledge nor consequently the love +of God, for love of God springs from knowledge of +Him, and knowledge of Him should be derived from +general ideas, in themselves certain and known, so that +the truth of a historical narrative is very far from +being a necessary requisite for our attaining our highest +good.</p> + +<p>Still, though the truth of histories cannot give us the +knowledge and love of God, I do not deny that reading +them is very useful with a view to life in the world, +for the more we have observed and known of men's +customs and circumstances, which are best revealed by +their actions, the more warily we shall be able to order +our lives among them, and so far as reason dictates to +adapt our actions to their dispositions.</p> + +<p>III. We see that this natural Divine law does not +demand the performance of ceremonies—that is, actions +in themselves indifferent, which are called good +from the fact of their institution, or actions symbolizing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[78]</a></span> +something profitable for salvation, or (if one prefers +this definition) actions of which the meaning surpasses +human understanding. The natural light of reason +does not demand anything which it is itself unable to +supply, but only such as it can very clearly show to be +good, or a means to our blessedness. Such things as +are good simply because they have been commanded +or instituted, or as being symbols of something good, +are mere shadows which cannot be reckoned among +actions that are the offspring, as it were, or fruit of +a sound mind and of intellect. There is no need for +me to go into this now in more detail.</p> + +<p>IV. Lastly, we see that the highest reward of the +Divine law is the law itself, namely, to know God and +to love Him of our free choice, and with an undivided +and fruitful spirit; while its penalty is the absence of +these things, and being in bondage to the flesh—that +is, having an inconstant and wavering spirit.</p> + +<p>These points being noted, I must now inquire</p> + +<p>I. Whether by the natural light of reason we can +conceive of God as a lawgiver or potentate ordaining +laws for men?</p> + +<p>II. What is the teaching of Holy Writ concerning +this natural light of reason and natural law?</p> + +<p>III. With what objects were ceremonies formerly +instituted?</p> + +<p>IV. Lastly, what is the good gained by knowing the +sacred histories and believing them?</p> + +<p>Of the first two I will treat in this chapter, of the +remaining two in the following one.</p> + +<p>Our conclusion about the first is easily deduced from +the nature of God's will, which is only distinguished<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[79]</a></span> +from His understanding in relation to our intellect—that +is, the will and the understanding of God are in +reality one and the same, and are only distinguished +in relation to our thoughts which we form concerning +God's understanding. For instance, if we are only +looking to the fact that the nature of a triangle is +from eternity contained in the Divine nature as an +eternal verity, we say that God possesses the idea of +a triangle, or that He understands the nature of a +triangle; but if afterwards we look to the fact that the +nature of a triangle is thus contained in the Divine +nature, solely by the necessity of the Divine nature, +and not by the necessity of the nature and essence of +a triangle—in fact, that the necessity of a triangle's +essence and nature, in so far as they are conceived of +as eternal verities, depends solely on the necessity of +the Divine nature and intellect, we then style God's +will or decree, that which before we styled His intellect. +Wherefore we make one and the same affirmation +concerning God when we say that He has from eternity +decreed that three angles of a triangle are equal to two +right angles, as when we say that He has understood it.</p> + +<p>Hence the affirmations and the negations of God always +involve necessity or truth; so that, for example, +if God said to Adam that He did not wish him to eat +of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, it would have +involved a contradiction that Adam should have been +able to eat of it, and would therefore have been impossible +that he should have so eaten, for the Divine command +would have involved an eternal necessity and +truth. But since Scripture nevertheless narrates that +God did give this command to Adam, and yet that none<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[80]</a></span> +the less Adam ate of the tree, we must perforce say +that God revealed to Adam the evil which would surely +follow if he should eat of the tree, but did not disclose +that such evil would of necessity come to pass. Thus +it was that Adam took the revelation to be not an +eternal and necessary truth, but a law—that is, an +ordinance followed by gain or loss, not depending +necessarily on the nature of the act performed, but +solely on the will and absolute power of some potentate, +so that the revelation in question was solely in +relation to Adam, and solely through his lack of knowledge +a law, and God was, as it were, a lawgiver and +potentate. From the same cause, namely, from lack +of knowledge, the Decalogue in relation to the Hebrews +was a law, for since they knew not the existence +of God as an eternal truth, they must have taken as a +law that which was revealed to them in the Decalogue, +namely, that God exists, and that God only should be +worshiped. But if God had spoken to them without +the intervention of any bodily means, immediately they +would have perceived it not as a law but as an eternal +truth.</p> + +<p>What we have said about the Israelites and Adam +applies also to all the prophets who wrote laws in +God's name—they did not adequately conceive God's +decrees as eternal truths. For instance, we must say +of Moses that from revelation, from the basis of what +was revealed to him, he perceived the method by which +the Israelitish nation could best be united in a particular +territory, and could form a body politic or state, +and further that he perceived the method by which +that nation could best be constrained to obedience;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[81]</a></span> +but he did not perceive, nor was it revealed to him, +that this method was absolutely the best, nor that the +obedience of the people in a certain strip of territory +would necessarily imply the end he had in view. +Wherefore he perceived these things not as eternal +truths, but as precepts and ordinances, and he ordained +them as laws of God, and thus it came to be that he +conceived God as a ruler, a legislator, a king, as merciful, +just, etc., whereas such qualities are simply attributes +of human nature, and utterly alien from the +nature of the Deity. Thus much we may affirm of the +prophets who wrote laws in the name of God; but we +must not affirm it of Christ, for Christ, although He +too seems to have written laws in the name of God, +must be taken to have had a clear and adequate perception, +for Christ was not so much a prophet as the +mouthpiece of God. For God made revelations to mankind +through Christ as He had before done through +angels—that is, a created voice, visions, etc. It would +be as unreasonable to say that God had accommodated +His revelations to the opinions of Christ as that He +had before accommodated them to the opinions of +angels (that is, of a created voice or visions) as matters +to be revealed to the prophets, a wholly absurd +hypothesis. Moreover, Christ was sent to teach not +only the Jews but the whole human race, and therefore +it was not enough that His mind should be accommodated +to the opinions of the Jews alone, but also +to the opinion and fundamental teaching common to +the whole human race—in other words, to ideas universal +and true. Inasmuch as God revealed Himself to +Christ, or to Christ's mind immediately, and not as to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[82]</a></span> +the prophets through words and symbols, we must +needs suppose that Christ perceived truly what was +revealed, in other words, He understood it, for a matter +is understood when it is perceived simply by the mind +without words or symbols.</p> + +<p>Christ, then, perceived (truly and adequately) +what was revealed, and if He ever proclaimed such +revelations as laws, He did so because of the ignorance +and obstinacy of the people, acting in this respect the +part of God; inasmuch as He accommodated Himself +to the comprehension of the people, and though He +spoke somewhat more clearly than the other prophets, +yet He taught what was revealed obscurely, and generally +through parables, especially when He was speaking +to those to whom it was not yet given to understand +the kingdom of heaven. (See Matt. xiii. 10, etc.) +To those to whom it was given to understand the mysteries +of heaven, He doubtless taught His doctrines +as eternal truths and did not lay them down as laws, +thus freeing the minds of His hearers from the bondage +of that law which He further confirmed and established. +Paul apparently points to this more than once +(<i>e.g.</i>, Rom. vii. 6, and iii. 28), though he never himself +seems to wish to speak openly, but, to quote his own +words (Rom. iii. 5, and vi. 19), "merely humanly." +This he expressly states when he calls God just, and +it was doubtless in concession to human weakness that +he attributes mercy, grace, anger, and similar qualities +to God, adapting his language to the popular mind, or, +as he puts it (1 Cor. iii. 1, 2), to carnal men. In Rom. +ix. 18, he teaches undisguisedly that God's anger and +mercy depend not on the actions of men, but on God's<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[83]</a></span> +own nature or will; further, that no one is justified by +the works of the law, but only by faith, which he seems +to identify with the full assent of the soul; lastly, that +no one is blessed unless he have in him the mind of +Christ (Rom. viii. 9), whereby he perceives the laws +of God as eternal truths. We conclude, therefore, that +God is described as a lawgiver or prince, and styled +just, merciful, etc., merely in concession to popular +understanding, and the imperfection of popular +knowledge; that in reality God acts and directs all +things simply by the necessity of His nature and perfection, +and that His decrees and volitions are eternal +truths, and always involve necessity. So much for +the first point which I wished to explain and demonstrate.</p> + +<p>Passing on to the second point, let us search the +sacred pages for their teaching concerning the light +of nature and this Divine law. The first doctrine we +find in the history of the first man, where it is narrated +that God commanded Adam not to eat of the fruit of +the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; this seems +to mean that God commanded Adam to do and to seek +after righteousness because it was good, not because +the contrary was evil: that is, to seek the good for its +own sake, not from fear of evil. We have seen that he +who acts rightly from the true knowledge and love +of right, acts with freedom and constancy, whereas he +who acts from fear of evil, is under the constraint of +evil, and acts in bondage under external control. So +that this commandment of God to Adam comprehends +the whole Divine natural law, and absolutely agrees +with the dictates of the light of nature; nay, it would<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[84]</a></span> +be easy to explain on this basis the whole history or +allegory of the first man. But I prefer to pass over the +subject in silence, because, in the first place, I cannot +be absolutely certain that my explanation would be in +accordance with the intention of the sacred writer; +and, secondly, because many do not admit that this +history is an allegory, maintaining it to be a simple +narrative of facts. It will be better, therefore, to +adduce other passages of Scripture, especially such as +were written by him, who speaks with all the strength +of his natural understanding, in which he surpassed +all his contemporaries, and whose sayings are accepted +by the people as of equal right with those of the prophets. +I mean Solomon, whose prudence and wisdom +are commended in Scripture rather than his piety and +gift of prophecy. He, in his proverbs, calls the human +intellect the well-spring of true life, and declares that +misfortune is made up of folly. "Understanding is a +well-spring of life to him that hath it; but the instruction +of fools is folly" (Prov. xvi. 22). Life being taken +to mean the true life (as is evident from Deut. xxx. 19), +the fruit of the understanding consists only in the +true life, and its absence constitutes punishment. All +this absolutely agrees with what was set out in our +fourth point concerning natural law. Moreover, our +position that it is the well-spring of life, and that the +intellect alone lays down laws for the wise, is plainly +taught by the sage, for he says (Prov. xiii. 14): "The +law of the wise is a fountain of life"—that is, as we +gather from the preceding text, the understanding. In +chap. iii. 13, he expressly teaches that the understanding +renders man blessed and happy, and gives him true<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[85]</a></span> +peace of mind. "Happy is the man that findeth wisdom, +and the man that getteth understanding," for +"Wisdom gives length of days, and riches and honour; +her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths +peace" (xiii. 16, 17). According to Solomon, therefore, +it is only the wise who live in peace and equanimity, +not like the wicked whose minds drift hither +and thither, and (as Isaiah says, chap. lvii. 20) "are +like the troubled sea, for them there is no peace."</p> + +<p>Lastly, we should especially note the passage in +chap. ii. of Solomon's proverbs which most clearly +confirms our contention: "If thou criest after knowledge, +and liftest up thy voice for understanding ... +then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and +find the knowledge of God; for the Lord giveth wisdom; +out of His mouth cometh knowledge and understanding." +These words clearly enunciate (1), that +wisdom or intellect alone teaches us to fear God wisely—that +is, to worship Him truly; (2), that wisdom and +knowledge flow from God's mouth, and that God bestows +on us this gift; this we have already shown in +proving that our understanding and our knowledge +depend on, spring from, and are perfected by the idea +or knowledge of God, and nothing else. Solomon goes +on to say in so many words that this knowledge contains +and involves the true principles of ethics and +politics: "When wisdom entereth into thy heart, and +knowledge is pleasant to thy soul, discretion shall preserve +thee, understanding shall keep thee, then shalt +thou understand righteousness, and judgment, and +equity, yea every good path." All of which is in obvious +agreement with natural knowledge: for after we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[86]</a></span> +have come to the understanding of things, and have +tasted the excellence of knowledge, she teaches us +ethics and true virtue.</p> + +<p>Thus the happiness and the peace of him who cultivates +his natural understanding lies, according to Solomon +also, not so much under the dominion of fortune +(or God's external aid) as in inward personal virtue +(or God's internal aid), for the latter can to a great +extent be preserved by vigilance, right action, and +thought.</p> + +<p>Lastly, we must by no means pass over the passage +in Paul's Epistle to the Romans (i. 20), in which he +says: "For the invisible things of God from the creation +of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the +things that are made, even His eternal power and +Godhead; so that they are without excuse, because, +when they knew God, they glorified Him not as God, +neither were they thankful." These words clearly show +that every one can by the light of nature clearly understand +the goodness and the eternal divinity of God, and +can thence know and deduce what they should seek for +and what avoid; wherefore the Apostle says that they +are without excuse and cannot plead ignorance, as they +certainly might if it were a question of supernatural +light and the incarnation, passion, resurrection of +Christ. "Wherefore," he goes on to say (<i>ib.</i> 24), +"God gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts +of their own hearts;" and so on, through the rest of +the chapter, he describes the vices of ignorance, and +sets them forth as the punishment of ignorance. This +obviously agrees with the verse of Solomon, already +quoted, "The instruction of fools is folly," so that it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[87]</a></span> +is easy to understand why Paul says that the wicked +are without excuse. As every man sows so shall he +reap: out of evil, evils necessarily spring, unless they +be wisely counteracted.</p> + +<p>Thus we see that Scripture literally approves of the +light of natural reason and the natural Divine law, +and I have fulfilled the promises made at the beginning +of this chapter.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> From the <i>Tr. Th.-P.</i>, ch. iv, same title.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[88]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<h3>OF THE CEREMONIAL LAW<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></h3> + + +<p>In the foregoing chapter we have shown that the +Divine law, which renders men truly blessed, and +teaches them the true life, is universal to all men; nay, +we have so intimately deduced it from human nature +that it must be esteemed innate, and, as it were, ingrained +in the human mind.</p> + +<p>But with regard to the ceremonial observances which +were ordained in the Old Testament for the Hebrews +only, and were so adapted to their state that they +could for the most part only be observed by the society +as a whole and not by each individual, it is evident that +they formed no part of the Divine law, and had nothing +to do with blessedness and virtue, but had reference +only to the election of the Hebrews, that is (as +I have shown in Chapter IV), to their temporal bodily +happiness and the tranquillity of their kingdom, and +that therefore they were only valid while that kingdom +lasted. If in the Old Testament they are spoken of as +the law of God, it is only because they were founded +on revelation, or a basis of revelation. Still as reason, +however sound, has little weight with ordinary theologians, +I will adduce the authority of Scripture for what +I here assert, and will further show, for the sake of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[89]</a></span> +greater clearness, why and how these ceremonials served +to establish and preserve the Jewish kingdom. Isaiah +teaches most plainly that the Divine law in its strict +sense signifies that universal law which consists in a +true manner of life, and does not signify ceremonial +observances. In chapter i., verse 10, the prophet calls +on his countrymen to hearken to the Divine law as he +delivers it, and first excluding all kinds of sacrifices +and all feasts, he at length sums up the law in these +few words: "Cease to do evil, learn to do well: seek +judgment, relieve the oppressed." Not less striking +testimony is given in Psalm xl. 7-9, where the Psalmist +addresses God: "Sacrifice and offering Thou didst not +desire; mine ears hast Thou opened; burnt offering +and sin-offering hast Thou not required; I delight to +do Thy will, O my God; yea, Thy law is within my +heart." Here the Psalmist reckons as the law of God +only that which is inscribed in his heart, and excludes +ceremonies therefrom, for the latter are good and inscribed +on the heart only from the fact of their institution, +and not because of their intrinsic value.</p> + +<p>Other passages of Scripture testify to the same truth, +but these two will suffice. We may also learn from the +Bible that ceremonies are no aid to blessedness, but +only have reference to the temporal prosperity of the +kingdom; for the rewards promised for their observance +are merely temporal advantages and delights, +blessedness being reserved for the universal Divine +law. In all the five books commonly attributed to +Moses nothing is promised, as I have said, beyond +temporal benefits, such as honors, fame, victories, +riches, enjoyments, and health. Though many moral<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[90]</a></span> +precepts besides ceremonies are contained in these +five books, they appear not as moral doctrines universal +to all men, but as commands especially adapted +to the understanding and character of the Hebrew +people, and as having reference only to the welfare of +the kingdom. For instance, Moses does not teach the +Jews as a prophet not to kill or to steal, but gives these +commandments solely as a lawgiver and judge; he does +not reason out the doctrine, but affixes for its non-observance +a penalty which may and very properly +does vary in different nations. So, too, the command +not to commit adultery is given merely with reference +to the welfare of the state; for if the moral doctrine +had been intended, with reference not only to the welfare +of the state, but also to the tranquillity and blessedness +of the individual, Moses would have condemned +not merely the outward act, but also the mental acquiescence, +as is done by Christ, Who taught only universal +moral precepts, and for this cause promises a +spiritual instead of a temporal reward. Christ, as I +have said, was sent into the world, not to preserve the +state nor to lay down laws, but solely to teach the universal +moral law, so we can easily understand that He +wished in no wise to do away with the law of Moses, +inasmuch as He introduced no new laws of His own—His +sole care was to teach moral doctrines, and distinguish +them from the laws of the state; for the +Pharisees, in their ignorance, thought that the observance +of the state law and the Mosaic law was the +sum total of morality; whereas such laws merely had +reference to the public welfare, and aimed not so much +at instructing the Jews as at keeping them under con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[91]</a></span>straint. +But let us return to our subject, and cite other +passages of Scripture which set forth temporal benefits +as rewards for observing the ceremonial law, and +blessedness as reward for the universal law.</p> + +<p>None of the prophets puts the point more clearly +than Isaiah. After condemning hypocrisy, he commends +liberty and charity towards oneself and one's +neighbors, and promises as a reward: "Then shall thy +light break forth as the morning, and thy health shall +spring forth speedily, thy righteousness shall go before +thee, and the glory of the Lord shall be thy reward" +(chap. lviii. 8). Shortly afterwards he commends the +Sabbath, and for a due observance of it promises: +"Then shalt thou delight thyself in the Lord, and I +will cause thee to ride upon the high places of the +earth, and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob thy +father: for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it." +Thus the prophet, for liberty bestowed and charitable +works, promises a healthy mind in a healthy body, and +the glory of the Lord even after death; whereas, for +ceremonial exactitude, he only promises security of +rule, prosperity, and temporal happiness.</p> + +<p>... It remains to show why and how the ceremonial +observances tended to preserve and confirm the Hebrew +kingdom; and this I can very briefly do on grounds +universally accepted.</p> + +<p>The formation of society serves not only for defensive +purposes, but is also very useful, and, indeed, +absolutely necessary, as rendering possible the division +of labor. If men did not render mutual assistance to +each other, no one would have either the skill or the +time to provide for his own sustenance and preserva<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[92]</a></span>tion: +for all men are not equally apt for all work, and +no one would be capable of preparing all that he individually +stood in need of. Strength and time, I repeat, +would fail, if every one had in person to plow, to sow, +to reap, to grind corn, to cook, to weave, to stitch and +perform the other numerous functions required to keep +life going; to say nothing of the arts and sciences which +are also entirely necessary to the perfection and +blessedness of human nature. We see that peoples +living in uncivilized barbarism lead a wretched and +almost animal life, and even they would not be able +to acquire their few rude necessaries without assisting +one another to a certain extent.</p> + +<p>Now if men were so constituted by nature that they +desired nothing but what is designated by true reason, +society would obviously have no need of laws: it would +be sufficient to inculcate true moral doctrines; and men +would freely, without hesitation, act in accordance +with their true interests. But human nature is framed +in a different fashion: every one, indeed, seeks his own +interest, but does not do so in accordance with the dictates +of sound reason, for most men's ideas of desirability +and usefulness are guided by their fleshly instincts +and emotions, which take no thought beyond +the present and the immediate object. Therefore, no +society can exist without government, and force, and +laws to restrain and repress men's desires and immoderate +impulses. Still human nature will not submit +to absolute repression. Violent governments, as +Seneca says, never last long; the moderate governments +endure.</p> + +<p>So long as men act simply from fear they act con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[93]</a></span>trary +to their inclinations, taking no thought for the +advantages or necessity of their actions, but simply +endeavoring to escape punishment or loss of life. They +must needs rejoice in any evil which befalls their ruler, +even if it should involve themselves; and must long +for and bring about such evil by every means in their +power. Again, men are especially intolerant of serving +and being ruled by their equals. Lastly, it is exceedingly +difficult to revoke liberties once granted.</p> + +<p>From these considerations it follows, firstly, that +authority should either be vested in the hands of the +whole state in common, so that every one should be +bound to serve, and yet not be in subjection to his +equals; or else, if power be in the hands of a few, or +one man, that one man should be something above +average humanity, or should strive to get himself accepted +as such. Secondly, laws should in every government +be so arranged that people should be kept in +bounds by the hope of some greatly desired good, +rather than by fear, for then every one will do his +duty willingly.</p> + +<p>Lastly, as obedience consists in acting at the bidding +of external authority, it would have no place in a state +where the government is vested in the whole people, +and where laws are made by common consent. In +such a society the people would remain free, whether +the laws were added to or diminished, inasmuch as it +would not be done on external authority, but their own +free consent. The reverse happens when the sovereign +power is vested in one man, for all act at his bidding; +and, therefore, unless they had been trained from the +first to depend on the words of their ruler, the latter<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[94]</a></span> +would find it difficult, in case of need, to abrogate liberties +once conceded, and impose new laws.</p> + +<p>From these universal considerations, let us pass on +to the kingdom of the Jews. The Jews when they +first came out of Egypt were not bound by any national +laws, and were therefore free to ratify any laws they +liked, or to make new ones, and were at liberty to set +up a government and occupy a territory wherever they +chose. However, they were entirely unfit to frame a +wise code of laws and to keep the sovereign power +vested in the community; they were all uncultivated +and sunk in a wretched slavery, therefore the sovereignty +was bound to remain vested in the hands of +one man who would rule the rest and keep them under +constraint, make laws and interpret them. This +sovereignty was easily retained by Moses, because he +surpassed the rest in virtue and persuaded the people +of the fact, proving it by many testimonies (see Exod. +chap. xiv., last verse, and chap. xix., verse 9). He +then, by the Divine virtue he possessed, made laws and +ordained them for the people, taking the greatest care +that they should be obeyed willingly and not through +fear, being specially induced to adopt this course by +the obstinate nature of the Jews, who would not have +submitted to be ruled solely by constraint; and also +by the imminence of war, for it is always better to inspire +soldiers with a thirst for glory than to terrify them +with threats; each man will then strive to distinguish +himself by valor and courage, instead of merely trying +to escape punishment. Moses, therefore, by his virtue +and the Divine command, introduced a religion so that +the people might do their duty from devotion rather<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[95]</a></span> +than fear. Further, he bound them over by benefits, +and prophesied many advantages in the future; nor +were his laws very severe, as any one may see for himself, +especially if he remarks the number of circumstances +necessary in order to procure the conviction of +an accused person.</p> + +<p>Lastly, in order that the people which could not +govern itself should be entirely dependent on its ruler, +he left nothing to the free choice of individuals (who +had hitherto been slaves); the people could do nothing +but remember the law, and follow the ordinances laid +down at the good pleasure of their ruler; they were +not allowed to plow, to sow, to reap, nor even to eat; +to clothe themselves, to shave, to rejoice, or, in fact, to +do anything whatever as they liked, but were bound +to follow the directions given in the law; and not only +this, but they were obliged to have marks on their +doorposts, on their hands, and between their eyes to +admonish them to perpetual obedience.</p> + +<p>This, then, was the object of the ceremonial law, that +men should do nothing of their own free will, but should +always act under external authority, and should continually +confess by their actions and thoughts that +they were not their own masters, but were entirely +under the control of others.</p> + +<p>From all these considerations it is clearer than day +that ceremonies have nothing to do with a state of +blessedness, and that those mentioned in the Old Testament, +<i>i.e.</i>, the whole Mosaic Law, had reference merely +to the government of the Jews, and merely temporal +advantages.</p> + +<p>As for the Christian rites, such as baptism, the Lord's<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[96]</a></span> +Supper, festivals, public prayers, and any other observances +which are, and always have been, common +to all Christendom, if they were instituted by Christ +or His Apostles (which is open to doubt), they were instituted +as external signs of the universal church, and +not as having anything to do with blessedness, or possessing +any sanctity in themselves. Therefore, though +such ceremonies were not ordained for the sake of upholding +a government, they were ordained for the +preservation of a society, and accordingly he who lives +alone is not bound by them: nay, those who live in a +country where the Christian religion is forbidden, are +bound to abstain from such rites, and can none the less +live in a state of blessedness. We have an example of +this in Japan, where the Christian religion is forbidden, +and the Dutch who live there are enjoined by their +East India Company not to practice any outward rites +of religion. I need not cite other examples, though it +would be easy to prove my point from the fundamental +principles of the New Testament, and to adduce many +confirmatory instances; but I pass on the more willingly, +as I am anxious to proceed to my next proposition. +I will now, therefore, pass on to what I proposed +to treat of in the second part of this chapter, namely, +what persons are bound to believe in the narratives contained +in Scripture, and how far they are so bound. +Examining this question by the aid of natural reason, I +will proceed as follows:</p> + +<p>If any one wishes to persuade his fellows for or +against anything which is not self-evident, he must +deduce his contention from their admissions, and convince +them either by experience or by ratiocination;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[97]</a></span> +either by appealing to facts of natural experience, or +to self-evident intellectual axioms. Now unless the +experience be of such a kind as to be clearly and distinctly +understood, though it may convince a man, it +will not have the same effect on his mind and disperse +the clouds of his doubt so completely as when the doctrine +taught is deduced entirely from intellectual axioms—that +is, by the mere power of the understanding and +logical order, and this is especially the case in spiritual +matters which have nothing to do with the senses.</p> + +<p>But the deduction of conclusions from general truths +<i>à priori</i>, usually requires a long chain of arguments, +and, moreover, very great caution, acuteness, and self-restraint—qualities +which are not often met with; +therefore people prefer to be taught by experience +rather than deduce their conclusion from a few axioms, +and set them out in logical order. Whence it follows, +that if any one wishes to teach a doctrine to a whole +nation (not to speak of the whole human race), and to +be understood by all men in every particular, he will +seek to support his teaching with experience, and will +endeavor to suit his reasonings and the definitions of +his doctrines as far as possible to the understanding of +the common people, who form the majority of mankind, +and he will not set them forth in logical sequence nor +adduce the definitions which serve to establish them. +Otherwise he writes only for the learned—that is, he +will be understood by only a small proportion of the +human race.</p> + +<p>All Scripture was written primarily for an entire +people, and secondarily for the whole human race; +therefore its contents must necessarily be adapted as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[98]</a></span> +far as possible to the understanding of the masses, and +proved only by examples drawn from experience. We +will explain ourselves more clearly. The chief speculative +doctrines taught in Scripture are the existence of +God, or a Being Who made all things, and Who directs +and sustains the world with consummate wisdom; furthermore, +that God takes the greatest thought for men, +or such of them as live piously and honorably, while +He punishes, with various penalties, those who do evil, +separating them from the good. All this is proved in +Scripture entirely through experience—that is, through +the narratives there related. No definitions of doctrine +are given, but all the sayings and reasonings are +adapted to the understanding of the masses. Although +experience can give no clear knowledge of these things, +nor explain the nature of God, nor how He directs and +sustains all things, it can nevertheless teach and enlighten +men sufficiently to impress obedience and devotion +on their minds.</p> + +<p>It is not, I think, sufficiently clear what persons are +bound to believe in the Scripture narratives, and in +what degree they are so bound, for it evidently follows +from what has been said that the knowledge of and +belief in them is particularly necessary to the masses +whose intellect is not capable of perceiving things +clearly and distinctly. Further, he who denies them +because he does not believe that God exists or takes +thought for men and the world, may be accounted impious; +but a man who is ignorant of them, and nevertheless +shows by natural reason that God exists, as +we have said, and has a true plan of life, is altogether +blessed—yes, more blessed than the common herd of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[99]</a></span> +believers, because besides true opinions he possesses +also a true and distinct conception. Lastly, he who is +ignorant of the Scriptures and knows nothing by the +light of reason, though he may not be impious or rebellious, +is yet less than human and almost brutal, having +none of God's gifts.</p> + +<p>We must here remark that when we say that the +knowledge of the sacred narrative is particularly necessary +to the masses, we do not mean the knowledge of +absolutely all the narratives in the Bible, but only of +the principal ones, those which, taken by themselves, +plainly display the doctrine we have just stated, and +have most effect over men's minds.</p> + +<p>If all the narratives in Scripture were necessary for +the proof of this doctrine, and if no conclusion could be +drawn without the general consideration of every one +of the histories contained in the sacred writings, truly +the conclusion and demonstration of such doctrine +would overtask the understanding and strength not only +of the masses, but of humanity; who is there who could +give attention to all the narratives at once, and to all +the circumstances, and all the scraps of doctrine to be +elicited from such a host of diverse histories? I cannot +believe that the men who have left us the Bible as we +have it were so abounding in talent that they attempted +setting about such a method of demonstration, still less +can I suppose that we cannot understand Scriptural +doctrine till we have given heed to the quarrels of +Isaac, the advice of Achitophel to Absalom, the civil +war between Jews and Israelites, and other similar +chronicles; nor can I think that it was more difficult +to teach such doctrine by means of history to the Jews<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[100]</a></span> +of early times, the contemporaries of Moses, than it was +to the contemporaries of Esdras. But more will be +said on this point hereafter, we may now only note +that the masses are only bound to know those histories +which can most powerfully dispose their mind to obedience +and devotion. However, the masses are not +sufficiently skilled to draw conclusions from what they +read, they take more delight in the actual stories, and +in the strange and unlooked-for issues of events than in +the doctrines implied; therefore, besides reading these +narratives, they are always in need of pastors or church +ministers to explain them to their feeble intelligence.</p> + +<p>But not to wander from our point, let us conclude +with what has been our principal object—namely, that +the truth of narratives, be they what they may, has +nothing to do with the Divine law, and serves for +nothing except in respect of doctrine, the sole element +which makes one history better than another. The +narratives in the Old and New Testaments surpass +profane history, and differ among themselves in merit +simply by reason of the salutary doctrines which they +inculcate. Therefore, if a man were to read the +Scripture narratives believing the whole of them, but +were to give no heed to the doctrines they contain, and +make no amendment in his life, he might employ himself +just as profitably in reading the Koran or the poetic +drama, or ordinary chronicles, with the attention +usually given to such writings; on the other hand, if +a man is absolutely ignorant of the Scriptures, and none +the less has right opinions and a true plan of life, he +is absolutely blessed and truly possesses in himself the +spirit of Christ.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[101]</a></span></p> + +<p>The Jews are of a directly contrary way of thinking, +for they hold that true opinions and a true plan of life +are of no service in attaining blessedness, if their possessors +have arrived at them by the light of reason +only, and not like the documents prophetically revealed +to Moses. Maimonides ventures openly to make this +assertion: "Every man who takes to heart the seven +precepts and diligently follows them, is counted with +the pious among the nations, and an heir of the world +to come; that is to say, if he takes to heart and follows +them because God ordained them in the law, and +revealed them to us by Moses, because they were of +aforetime precepts to the sons of Noah: but he who +follows them as lead thereto by reason, is not counted +as a dweller among the pious, nor among the wise of +the nations." Such are the words of Maimonides, to +which R. Joseph, the son of Shem Job, adds in his +book, which he calls <i>Kebod Elohim, or God's Glory</i>, +that although Aristotle (whom he considers to have +written the best ethics and to be above every one else) +has not omitted anything that concerns true ethics, and +which he has adopted in his own book, carefully following +the lines laid down, yet this was not able to +suffice for his salvation, inasmuch as he embraced his +doctrines in accordance with the dictates of reason and +not as Divine documents prophetically revealed.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> + +<p>However, that these are mere figments and are not +supported by Scriptural authority will, I think, be +sufficiently evident to the attentive reader, so that an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[102]</a></span> +examination of the theory will be sufficient for its +refutation. It is not my purpose here to refute the +assertions of those who assert that the natural light +of reason can teach nothing of any value concerning +the true way of salvation. People who lay no claims +to reason for themselves are not able to prove by reason +this their assertion; and if they hawk about something +superior to reason, it is a mere figment, and far below +reason, as their general method of life sufficiently +shows. But there is no need to dwell upon such persons. +I will merely add that we can only judge of a +man by his works. If a man abounds in the fruits of +the Spirit, charity, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, +goodness, faith, gentleness, chastity, against which, as +Paul says (Gal. v. 22), there is no law, such an one, +whether he be taught by reason only or by the Scripture +only, has been in very truth taught by God, and +is altogether blessed. Thus have I said all that I +undertook to say concerning Divine law.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> From the <i>Tr. Th.-P.</i>, ch. v, same title.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> The Jews were not, of course, alone in holding this point of view. +Dante consigned the ancient philosophers—including Aristotle—and +even Vergil to Limbo, agreeing thus in doctrine with Maimonides +and R. Joseph, the son of Shem Job.—<span class="smcap">Ed.</span></p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[103]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<h3>OF MIRACLES<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></h3> + + +<p>As men are accustomed to call Divine the knowledge +which transcends human understanding, so also do +they style Divine, or the work of God, anything of +which the cause is not generally known: for the +masses think that the power and providence of God +are most clearly displayed by events that are extraordinary +and contrary to the conception they have formed +of Nature, especially if such events bring them any +profit or convenience: they think that the clearest +possible proof of God's existence is afforded when +Nature, as they suppose, breaks her accustomed order, +and consequently they believe that those who explain +or endeavor to understand phenomena or miracles +through their natural causes are doing away with God +and His providence. They suppose, forsooth, that +God is inactive so long as Nature works in her accustomed +order, and <i>vice versa</i>, that the power of +Nature and natural causes are idle so long as God is +acting: thus they imagine two powers distinct one +from the other, the power of God and the power of +Nature, though the latter is in a sense determined by +God, or (as most people believe now) created by Him. +What they mean by either, and what they understand<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[104]</a></span> +by God and Nature they do not know, except that they +imagine the power of God to be like that of some royal +potentate, and Nature's power to consist in force and +energy.</p> + +<p>The masses then style unusual phenomena "miracles," +and partly from piety, partly for the sake of +opposing the students of science, prefer to remain in +ignorance of natural causes, and only to hear of those +things which they know least, and consequently admire +most. In fact, the common people can only adore +God, and refer all things to His power by removing +natural causes, and conceiving things happening out +of their due course, and only admires the power of +God when the power of Nature is conceived of as in subjection +to it.</p> + +<p>This idea seems to have taken its rise among the +early Jews who saw the Gentiles round them worshiping +visible gods, such as the sun, the moon, the earth, +water, air, etc., and in order to inspire the conviction +that such divinities were weak and inconstant, or +changeable, told how they themselves were under the +sway of an invisible God, and narrated their miracles, +trying further to show that the God whom they worshiped +arranged the whole of nature for their sole +benefit. This idea was so pleasing to humanity that +men go on to this day imagining miracles, so that they +may believe themselves God's favorites and the final +cause for which God created and directs all things.</p> + +<p>What pretensions will not people in their folly advance! +They have no single sound idea concerning +either God or Nature, they confound God's decrees with +human decrees, they conceive Nature as so limited that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[105]</a></span> +they believe man to be its chief part! I have spent +enough space in setting forth these common ideas and +prejudices concerning Nature and miracles, but in +order to afford a regular demonstration I will show:</p> + +<p>1. That Nature cannot be contravened, but that she +preserves a fixed and immutable order, and at the +same time I will explain what is meant by a miracle.</p> + +<p>2. That God's nature and existence, and consequently +His providence, cannot be known from miracles, +but that they can all be much better perceived +from the fixed and immutable order of Nature.</p> + +<p>3. That by the decrees and volitions, and consequently +the providence of God, Scripture (as I will +prove by Scriptural examples) means nothing but Nature's +order following necessarily from her eternal +laws.</p> + +<p>4. Lastly, I will treat of the method of interpreting +Scriptural miracles, and the chief points to be +noted concerning the narratives of them.</p> + +<p>Such are the principal subjects which will be discussed +in this chapter, and which will serve, I think, +not a little to further the object of this treatise.</p> + +<p>Our first point is easily proved from what we showed +in Chapter V about Divine law—namely, that all that +God wishes or determines involves eternal necessity +and truth, for we demonstrated that God's understanding +is identical with His will, and that it is the same +thing to say that God wills a thing, as to say that He +understands it; hence, as it follows necessarily from +the Divine nature and perfection that God understands +a thing as it is, it follows no less necessarily +that He wills it as it is. Now, as nothing is necessarily<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[106]</a></span> +true save only by Divine decree, it is plain that the +universal laws of Nature are decrees of God following +from the necessity and perfection of the Divine nature. +Hence, any event happening in nature which contravened +Nature's universal laws, would necessarily also +contravene the Divine decree, nature, and understanding; +or if any one asserted that God acts in contravention +to the laws of Nature, he, <i>ipso facto</i>, would be +compelled to assert that God acted against His own +nature—an evident absurdity. One might easily show +from the same premises that the power and efficiency of +Nature are in themselves the Divine power and efficiency, +and that the Divine power is the very essence +of God, but this I gladly pass over for the present.</p> + +<p>Nothing, then, comes to pass in Nature<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> in contravention +to her universal laws, nay, everything +agrees with them and follows from them, for whatsoever +comes to pass, comes to pass by the will and +eternal decree of God; that is, as we have just pointed +out, whatever comes to pass, comes to pass according +to laws and rules which involve eternal necessity and +truth; Nature, therefore, always observes laws and rules +which involve eternal necessity and truth, although they +may not all be known to us, and therefore she keeps +a fixed and immutable order. Nor is there any sound +reason for limiting the power and efficacy of Nature, +and asserting that her laws are fit for certain purposes, +but not for all; for as the efficacy and power +of Nature are the very efficacy and power of God, and +as the laws and rules of Nature are the decrees of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[107]</a></span> +God, it is in every way to be believed that the power +of Nature is infinite, and that her laws are broad +enough to embrace everything conceived by the Divine +intellect. The only alternative is to assert that +God has created Nature so weak, and has ordained +for her laws so barren, that He is repeatedly compelled +to come afresh to her aid if He wishes that +she should be preserved, and that things should happen +as He desires: a conclusion, in my opinion, very far +removed from reason. Further, as nothing happens +in Nature which does not follow from her laws, and +as her laws embrace everything conceived by the +Divine intellect, and, lastly, as Nature preserves a fixed +and immutable order, it most clearly follows that +miracles are only intelligible as in relation to human +opinions, and merely mean events of which the natural +cause cannot be explained by a reference to any +ordinary occurrence, either by us, or at any rate by +the writer and narrator of the miracle.</p> + +<p>We may, in fact, say that a miracle is an event of +which the causes cannot be explained by the natural +reason through a reference to ascertained workings +of Nature; but since miracles were wrought according +to the understanding of the masses, who are wholly +ignorant of the workings of Nature, it is certain that +the ancients took for a miracle whatever they could +not explain by the method adopted by the unlearned in +such cases, namely, an appeal to the memory, a recalling +of something similar, which is ordinarily regarded +without wonder; for most people think they sufficiently +understand a thing when they have ceased to wonder +at it. The ancients, then, and indeed most men up to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[108]</a></span> +the present day, had no other criterion for a miracle; +hence we cannot doubt that many things are narrated +in Scripture as miracles of which the causes could +easily be explained by reference to ascertained workings +of Nature. We have hinted as much in Chapter +III, in speaking of the sun standing still in the time of +Joshua, and going backwards in the time of Ahaz; but +we shall soon have more to say on the subject when +we come to treat of the interpretation of miracles later +on in this chapter.</p> + +<p>It is now time to pass on to the second point, and +show that we cannot gain an understanding of God's +essence, existence, or providence by means of miracles, +but that these truths are much better perceived through +the fixed and immutable order of Nature.</p> + +<p>I thus proceed with the demonstration. As God's existence +is not self-evident, it must necessarily be +inferred from ideas so firmly and incontrovertibly true +that no power can be postulated or conceived sufficient +to impugn them. They ought certainly so to appear +to us when we infer from them God's existence, if we +wish to place our conclusion beyond the reach of +doubt; for if we could conceive that such ideas could +be impugned by any power whatsoever, we should doubt +of their truth, we should doubt of our conclusion, +namely, of God's existence, and should never be able +to be certain of anything. Further, we know that nothing +either agrees with or is contrary to Nature, unless +it agrees with or is contrary to these primary ideas; +wherefore if we would conceive that anything could be +done in Nature by any power whatsoever which would +be contrary to the laws of Nature, it would also be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[109]</a></span> +contrary to our primary ideas, and we should have +either to reject it as absurd, or else to cast doubt (as +just shown) on our primary ideas, and consequently +on the existence of God, and on everything howsoever +perceived. Therefore miracles, in the sense of events +contrary to the laws of Nature, so far from demonstrating +to us the existence of God, would, on the contrary, +lead us to doubt it, where, otherwise, we might have +been absolutely certain of it, as knowing that Nature +follows a fixed and immutable order.</p> + +<p>Let us take miracle as meaning that which cannot be +explained through natural causes. This may be interpreted +in two senses: either as that which has natural +causes, but cannot be examined by the human intellect; +or as that which has no cause save God and God's will. +But as all things which come to pass through natural +causes come to pass also solely through the will and +power of God, it comes to this: that a miracle, whether +it has natural causes or not, is a result which cannot be +explained by its cause, that is a phenomenon which +surpasses human understanding; but from such a phenomenon, +and certainly from a result surpassing our +understanding, we can gain no knowledge. For whatsoever +we understand clearly and distinctly should be +plain to us either in itself or by means of something +else clearly and distinctly understood; wherefore from +a miracle or a phenomenon which we cannot understand +we can gain no knowledge of God's essence, or +existence, or indeed anything about God or nature; +whereas when we know that all things are ordained and +ratified by God, that the operations of Nature follow +from the essence of God, and that the laws of Nature<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[110]</a></span> +are eternal decrees and volitions of God, we must perforce +conclude that our knowledge of God and of God's +will increases in proportion to our knowledge and clear +understanding of Nature, as we see how she depends on +her primal cause, and how she works according to eternal +law. Wherefore so far as our understanding goes, +those phenomena which we clearly and distinctly +understand have much better right to be called works +of God, and to be referred to the will of God than +those about which we are entirely ignorant, although +they appeal powerfully to the imagination, and compel +men's admiration.</p> + +<p>It is only phenomena that we clearly and distinctly +understand which heighten our knowledge of God and +most clearly indicate His will and decrees. Plainly, +they are but triflers who, when they cannot explain a +thing, run back to the will of God; this is, truly, a +ridiculous way of expressing ignorance. Again, even +supposing that some conclusion could be drawn from +miracles, we could not possibly infer from them the +existence of God; for a miracle being an event under +limitations is the expression of a fixed and limited +power, therefore we could not possibly infer from an +effect of this kind the existence of a cause whose power +is infinite, but at the utmost only of a cause whose +power is greater than that of the said effect. I say +at the utmost, for a phenomenon may be the result of +many concurrent causes, and its power may be less +than the power of the sum of such causes, but far +greater than that of any one of them taken individually. +On the other hand, the laws of nature, as we have +shown, extend over infinity, and are conceived by us<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[111]</a></span> +as, after a fashion, eternal, and Nature works in accordance +with them in a fixed and immutable order; +therefore, such laws indicate to us in a certain degree +the infinity, the eternity and the immutability of God.</p> + +<p>We may conclude, then, that we cannot gain knowledge +of the existence and providence of God by means +of miracles, but that we can far better infer them from +the fixed and immutable order of Nature. By miracle +I here mean an event which surpasses, or is thought to +surpass, human comprehension: for in so far as it is +supposed to destroy or interrupt the order of Nature or +her laws, it not only can give us no knowledge of God, +but, contrariwise, takes away that which we naturally +have, and makes us doubt of God and everything else.</p> + +<p>Neither do I recognize any difference between an +event against the laws of Nature and an event beyond +the laws of Nature (that is, according to some, an +event which does not contravene Nature, though she is +inadequate to produce or effect it), for a miracle is +wrought in, and not beyond Nature, though it may be +said in itself to be above Nature, and, therefore, must +necessarily interrupt the order of Nature, which otherwise +we conceive of as fixed and unchangeable, according +to God's decrees. If therefore anything should +come to pass in Nature which does not follow from her +laws, it would also be in contravention to the order +which God has established in Nature forever through +universal natural laws. It would, therefore, be in contravention +to God's nature and laws, and, consequently +belief in it would throw doubt upon everything, and +lead to Atheism.</p> + +<p>I think I have now sufficiently established my second<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[112]</a></span> +point, so that we can again conclude that a miracle, +whether in contravention to, or beyond, Nature, is a +mere absurdity; and therefore that what is meant in +Scripture by a miracle can only be a work of Nature, +which surpasses, or is believed to surpass, human comprehension. +Before passing on to my third point, I +will adduce Scriptural authority for my assertion that +God cannot be known from miracles. Scripture nowhere +states the doctrine openly, but it can readily be +inferred from several passages. Firstly, that in which +Moses commands (Deut. xiii.) that a false prophet +should be put to death, even though he work miracles: +"If there arise a prophet among you, and giveth thee +a sign or wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass, +saying, Let us go after other gods ... thou shalt not +hearken unto the voice of that prophet; for the Lord +your God proveth you, and that prophet shall be put to +death." From this it clearly follows that miracles could +be wrought even by false prophets; and that, unless +men are honestly endowed with the true knowledge and +love of God, they may be as easily led by miracles to +follow false gods as to follow the true God; for these +words are added: "For the Lord your God tempts you, +that He may know whether you love Him with all your +heart and with all your mind."</p> + +<p>Further, the Israelites, from all their miracles, were +unable to form a sound conception of God, as their +experience testified: for when they had persuaded +themselves that Moses had departed from among them +they petitioned Aaron to give them visible gods; and +the idea of God they had formed as the result of all +their miracles was a calf!...<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[113]</a></span></p> + +<p>I now go on to my <i>third</i> point, and show from Scripture +that the decrees and mandates of God, and consequently +His providence, are merely the order of Nature—that +is, when Scripture describes an event as accomplished +by God or God's will, we must understand +merely that it was in accordance with the law and +order of Nature, not, as most people believe, that Nature +had for a season ceased to act, or that her order +was temporarily interrupted. But Scripture does not +directly teach matters unconnected with its doctrine, +wherefore it has no care to explain things by their +natural causes, nor to expound matters merely speculative. +Wherefore our conclusion must be gathered by +inference from those Scriptural narratives which happen +to be written more at length and circumstantially +than usual. Of these I will cite a few.</p> + +<p>In the first book of Samuel (ix. 15, 16), it is related +that God revealed to Samuel that He would send Saul +to him, yet God did not send Saul to Samuel as people +are wont to send one man to another. His "sending" +was merely the ordinary course of Nature. Saul was +looking for the asses he had lost, and was meditating a +return home without them, when, at the suggestion of +his servant, he went to the Prophet Samuel, to learn +from him where he might find them. From no part of +the narrative does it appear that Saul had any command +from God to visit Samuel beyond this natural +motive....</p> + +<p>But perhaps some one will insist that we find many +things in Scripture which seem in nowise explicable by +natural causes, as, for instance, that the sins of men +and their prayers can be the cause of rain and of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[114]</a></span> +earth's fertility, or that faith can heal the blind, and +so on. But I think I have already made sufficient +answer: I have shown that Scripture does not explain +things by their secondary causes, but only narrates +them in the order and the style which has most power +to move men, and especially uneducated men, to devotion; +and therefore it speaks inaccurately of God +and of events, seeing that its object is not to convince +the reason, but to attract and lay hold of the imagination. +If the Bible were to describe the destruction +of an empire in the style of political historians, the +masses would remain unstirred, whereas the contrary +is the case when it adopts the method of poetic description, +and refers all things immediately to God. +When, therefore, the Bible says that the earth is barren +because of men's sins, or that the blind were healed +by faith, we ought to take no more notice than +when it says that God is angry at men's sins, that +He is sad, that He repents of the good He has +promised and done; or that on seeing a sign He +remembers something He had promised, and other +similar expressions, which are either thrown out poetically +or related according to the opinion and prejudices +of the writer.</p> + +<p>We may then be absolutely certain that every event +which is truly described in Scripture necessarily happened, +like everything else, according to natural laws; +and if anything is there set down which can be proved +in set terms to contravene the order of Nature, or not +to be deducible therefrom, we must believe it to have +been foisted into the sacred writings by irreligious +hands; for whatsoever is contrary to Nature is also<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[115]</a></span> +contrary to reason, and whatsoever is contrary to reason +is absurd, and, <i>ipso facto</i>, to be rejected.</p> + +<p>There remain some points concerning the interpretation +of miracles to be noted, or rather to be recapitulated, +for most of them have been already stated. +These I proceed to discuss in the fourth division of my +subject, and I am led to do so lest any one should, by +wrongly interpreting a miracle, rashly suspect that he +has found something in Scripture contrary to human +reason.</p> + +<p>It is very rare for men to relate an event simply as +it happened, without adding any element of their own +judgment. When they hear or see anything new, they +are, unless strictly on their guard, so occupied with +their own preconceived opinions that they perceive +something quite different from the plain facts seen or +heard, especially if such facts surpass the comprehension +of the beholder or hearer, and, most of all, if he is +interested in their happening in a given way.</p> + +<p>Thus men relate in chronicles and histories their +own opinions rather than actual events, so that one +and the same event is so differently related by two +men of different opinions, that it seems like two separate +occurrences; and, further, it is very easy from +historical chronicles to gather the personal opinions +of the historian.</p> + +<p>I could cite many instances in proof of this from the +writings both of natural philosophers and historians, +but I will content myself with one only from Scripture, +and leave the reader to judge of the rest.</p> + +<p>In the time of Joshua the Hebrews held the ordinary +opinion that the sun moves with a daily motion, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[116]</a></span> +that the earth remains at rest; to this preconceived +opinion they adapted the miracle which occurred during +their battle with the five kings. They did not +simply relate that that day was longer than usual, but +asserted that the sun and moon stood still, or ceased +from their motion—a statement which would be of +great service to them at that time in convincing and +proving by experience to the Gentiles, who worshiped +the sun, that the sun was under the control of another +deity who could compel it to change its daily course. +Thus, partly through religious motives, partly through +preconceived opinions, they conceived of and related +the occurrence as something quite different from what +really happened.</p> + +<p>Thus in order to interpret the Scriptural miracles +and understand from the narration of them how they +really happened, it is necessary to know the opinions +of those who first related them, and have recorded them +for us in writing, and to distinguish such opinions from +the actual impression made upon their senses, otherwise +we shall confound opinions and judgments with +the actual miracle as it really occurred; nay, further, +we shall confound actual events with symbolical and +imaginary ones. For many things are narrated in +Scripture as real, and were believed to be real, which +were in fact only symbolical and imaginary. As, for +instance, that God came down from heaven (Exod. +xix. 28, Deut. v. 28), and that Mount Sinai smoked +because God descended upon it surrounded with fire; +or, again, that Elijah ascended into heaven in a chariot +of fire, with horses of fire; all these things were assuredly +merely symbols adapted to the opinions of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[117]</a></span> +those who have handed them down to us as they were +represented to them, namely, as real. All who have +any education know that God has no right hand nor +left; that He is not moved nor at rest, nor in a particular +place, but that He is absolutely infinite and +contains in Himself all perfections.</p> + +<p>These things, I repeat, are known to whoever judges +of things by the perception of pure reason, and not +according as his imagination is affected by his outward +senses,—following the example of the masses who +imagine a bodily Deity, holding a royal court with a +throne on the convexity of heaven, above the stars, +which are believed to be not very far off from the +earth.</p> + +<p>To these and similar opinions very many narrations +in Scripture are adapted, and should not, therefore, be +mistaken by philosophers for realities.</p> + +<p>Lastly, in order to understand, in the case of miracles, +what actually took place, we ought to be familiar +with Jewish phrases and metaphors; any one who did +not make sufficient allowance for these would be continually +seeing miracles in Scripture where nothing of +the kind is intended by the writer; he would thus miss +the knowledge not only of what actually happened, but +also of the mind of the writers of the sacred text. For +instance, Zachariah, speaking of some future war, says +(chap, xiv., verse 7): "It shall be one day which shall +be known to the Lord, not day nor night; but at even +time it shall be light." In these words he seems to +predict a great miracle, yet he only means that the +battle will be doubtful the whole day, that the issue +will be known only to God, but that in the evening<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[118]</a></span> +they will gain the victory. The prophets frequently +used to predict victories and defeats of the nations in +similar phrases. Thus Isaiah, describing the destruction +of Babylon, says (chap. xiii.): "The stars of +heaven, and the constellations thereof, shall not give +their light; the sun shall be darkened in his going forth, +and the moon shall not cause her light to shine." Now +I suppose no one imagines that at the destruction of +Babylon these phenomena actually occurred any more +than that which the prophet adds, "For I will make +the heavens to tremble, and remove the earth out of +her place."</p> + +<p>So, too, Isaiah in foretelling to the Jews that they +would return from Babylon to Jerusalem in safety, and +would not suffer from thirst on their journey, says: +"And they thirsted not when He led them through the +deserts; He caused the waters to flow out of the rocks +for them; He clave the rocks, and the waters gushed +out." These words merely mean that the Jews, like +other people, found springs in the desert, at which +they quenched their thirst; for when the Jews returned +to Jerusalem with the consent of Cyrus, it is admitted +that no similar miracles befell them.</p> + +<p>In this way many occurrences in the Bible are to be +regarded merely as Jewish expressions. There is no +need for me to go through them in detail; but I will +call attention generally to the fact that the Jews employed +such phrases not only rhetorically, but also, +and indeed chiefly, from devotional motives. Such is +the reason for the substitution of "bless God" for +"curse God" (in 1 Kings xxi. 10, and Job ii. 9), and +for all things being referred to God, whence it appears<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[119]</a></span> +that the Bible seems to relate nothing but miracles, +even when speaking of the most ordinary occurrences, +as in the examples given above.</p> + +<p>Hence we must believe that when the Bible says that +the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart, it only means that +Pharaoh was obstinate; when it says that God opened +the windows of heaven, it only means that it rained very +hard, and so on. When we reflect on these peculiarities, +and also on the fact that most things are related +very shortly, with very little detail, and almost in +abridgments, we shall see that there is hardly anything +in Scripture which can be proved contrary to natural +reason, while, on the other hand, many things which +before seemed obscure, will after a little consideration +be understood and easily explained.</p> + +<p>I think I have now very clearly explained all that +I proposed to explain, but before I finish this chapter +I would call attention to the fact that I have adopted +a different method in speaking of miracles to that which +I employed in treating of prophecy. Of prophecy I +have asserted nothing which could not be inferred from +premises revealed in Scripture, whereas in this chapter +I have deduced my conclusions solely from the principles +ascertained by the natural light of reason. I +have proceeded in this way advisedly, for prophecy, in +that it surpasses human knowledge, is a purely theological +question; therefore, I knew that I could not +make any assertions about it, nor learn wherein it +consists, except through deductions from premises that +have been revealed; therefore I was compelled to collate +the history of prophecy, and to draw therefrom +certain conclusions which would teach me, in so far as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[120]</a></span> +such teaching is possible, the nature and properties +of the gift. But in the case of miracles, as our inquiry +is a question purely philosophical (namely, whether +anything can happen which contravenes, or does not +follow from the laws of Nature), I was not under any +such necessity: I therefore thought it wiser to unravel +the difficulty through premises ascertained and thoroughly +known by the natural light of reason. I say I +thought it wiser, for I could also easily have solved +the problem merely from the doctrines and fundamental +principles of Scripture: in order that every one +may acknowledge this, I will briefly show how it could +be done.</p> + +<p>Scripture makes the general assertion in several +passages that nature's course is fixed and unchangeable. +(In Ps. cxlviii. 6, for instance, and Jer. xxxi. 35.) +The wise man also (in Eccles. i. 10) distinctly teaches +that "there is nothing new under the sun," and (in +verses 11, 12), illustrating the same idea, he adds that +although something occasionally happens which seems +new, it is not really new, but "hath been already of old +time, which was before us, whereof there is no remembrance, +neither shall there be any remembrance of +things that are to come with those that come after." +Again (in chap. iii. 11), he says, "God hath made +everything beautiful in his time," and immediately +afterwards adds, "I know that whatsoever God doeth, +it shall be for ever; nothing can be put to it, nor +anything taken from it."</p> + +<p>Now all these texts teach most distinctly that Nature +preserves a fixed and unchangeable order and that God +in all ages known and unknown has been the same;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[121]</a></span> +further, that the laws of Nature are so perfect that +nothing can be added thereto nor taken therefrom; and, +lastly, that miracles only appear as something new because +of man's ignorance.</p> + +<p>Such is the express teaching of Scripture. Nowhere +does Scripture assert that anything happens which +contradicts, or cannot follow from the laws of Nature; +and therefore we should not attribute to it such a +doctrine....</p> + +<p>The conclusion, then, that is most plainly put before +us is, that miracles were natural occurrences, and must +therefore be so explained as to appear neither new (in +the words of Solomon) nor contrary to Nature, but, as +far as possible, in complete agreement with ordinary +events. This can easily be done by any one, now that +I have set forth the rules drawn from Scripture. +Nevertheless, though I maintain that Scripture teaches +this doctrine, I do not assert that it teaches it as a +truth necessary to salvation, but only that the prophets +were in agreement with ourselves on the point; therefore +every one is free to think on the subject as he +likes, according as he thinks it best for himself, and +most likely to conduce to the worship of God and to +single-hearted religion.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> From the <i>Tr. Th.-P.</i>, ch. vi, same title.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> N.B. I do not mean here by "Nature," merely matter and its +modifications, but infinite other things besides matter.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[122]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<h3>OF THE DIVINE NATURE</h3> + + +<h4><i>Definitions</i></h4> + +<p>I. By cause of itself, I understand that, whose essence +involves existence; or that, whose nature cannot +be conceived unless existing.</p> + +<p>II. That thing is called finite in its own kind (<i>in +suo genere</i>) which can be limited by another thing of +the same nature. For example, a body is called finite, +because we always conceive another which is greater. +So a thought is limited by another thought; but a body +is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body.</p> + +<p>III. By substance, I understand that which is in +itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, +that, the conception of which does not need the conception +of another thing from which it must be formed.</p> + +<p>IV. By attribute, I understand that which the intellect +perceives of substance, as constituting its +essence.</p> + +<p>V. By mode, I understand the affections of substance, +or that which is in another thing through which +also it is conceived.</p> + +<p>VI. By God, I understand Being absolutely infinite, +that is to say, substance consisting of infinite attributes, +each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—I say absolutely infinite but not in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[123]</a></span>finite +in its own kind (<i>in suo genere</i>); for of whatever +is infinite only in its own kind (<i>in suo genere</i>), we can +deny infinite attributes; but to the essence of that +which is absolutely infinite pertains whatever expresses +essence and involves no negation.</p> + +<p>VII. That thing is called free which exists from +the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined +to action by itself alone. That thing, on the other +hand, is called necessary, or rather compelled, which +by another is determined to existence and action in a +fixed and prescribed manner.</p> + +<p>VIII. By eternity, I understand existence itself, so +far as it is conceived necessarily to follow from the +definition alone of the eternal thing.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—For such existence, like the essence of +the thing, is conceived as an eternal truth. It cannot +therefore be explained by duration of time, even +if the duration be conceived without beginning or +end.</p> + + +<h4><i>Axioms</i></h4> + +<p>I. Everything which is, is either in itself or in another.</p> + +<p>II. That which cannot be conceived through another +must be conceived through itself.</p> + +<p>III. From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily +follows; and, on the other hand, if no determinate +cause be given, it is impossible that an effect +can follow.</p> + +<p>IV. The knowledge (cognitio) of an effect depends +upon and involves the knowledge of the cause.</p> + +<p>V. Those things which have nothing mutually in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[124]</a></span> +common with one another cannot through one another +be mutually understood, that is to say, the conception +of the one does not involve the conception of the other.</p> + +<p>VI. A true idea must agree with that of which it is +the idea (<i>cum suo ideato</i>).</p> + +<p>VII. The essence of that thing which can be conceived +as not existing does not involve existence.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Essence of God</i></h4> + +<p>God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, +each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, +necessarily exists.</p> + +<p>[This can be proved in the following manner]:</p> + +<p>For the existence or non-existence of everything +there must be a reason or cause. For example, if a +triangle exists, there must be a reason or cause why +it exists; and if it does not exist, there must be a reason +or cause which hinders its existence or which negates +it. But this reason or cause must either be contained +in the nature of the thing or lie outside it. For example, +the nature of the thing itself shows the reason +why a square circle does not exist, the reason being +that a square circle involves a contradiction. And the +reason, on the other hand, why substance exists follows +from its nature alone, which involves existence. But +the reason why a circle or triangle exists or does not +exist is not drawn from their nature, but from the +order of corporeal nature generally; for from that it +must follow either that a triangle necessarily exists, +or that it is impossible for it to exist. But this is self-evident. +Therefore it follows that if there be no cause<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[125]</a></span> +nor reason which hinders a thing from existing, it exists +necessarily. If therefore there be no reason nor cause +which hinders God from existing, or which negates His +existence, we must conclude absolutely that He necessarily +exists. But if there be such a reason or cause, it +must be either in the nature itself of God or must lie +outside it, that is to say, in another substance of another +nature. For if the reason lay in a substance of +the same nature, the existence of God would be by +this very fact admitted. But substance possessing another +nature could have nothing in common with God, +and therefore could not give Him existence nor negate +it. Since, therefore, the reason or cause which could +negate the divine existence cannot be outside the divine +nature, it will necessarily, supposing that the divine +nature does not exist, be in His nature itself, which +would therefore involve a contradiction. But to affirm +this of the Being absolutely infinite and consummately +perfect is absurd. Therefore neither in God nor outside +God is there any cause or reason which can negate +His existence, and therefore God necessarily exists....</p> + + +<h4><i>The Corporeality of God</i></h4> + +<p>There are those who imagine God to be like a man, +composed of body and soul and subject to passions; +but it is clear enough from what has already been +demonstrated how far off men who believe this are from +the true knowledge of God. But these I dismiss, for +all men who have in any way looked into the divine +nature deny that God is corporeal. That He cannot be +so they conclusively prove by showing that by "body"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[126]</a></span> +we understand a certain quantity possessing length, +breadth, and depth, limited by some fixed form; and +that to attribute these to God, a being absolutely infinite, +is the greatest absurdity. But yet at the same +time, from other arguments by which they endeavor +to confirm their proof, they clearly show that they +remove altogether from the divine nature substance +itself corporeal or extended, affirming that it was created +by God. By what divine power, however, it +could have been created they are altogether ignorant, +so that it is clear they do not understand what they +themselves say....</p> + +<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> +<img src="images/img02.jpg" width="400" height="262" alt="" title="" /> +</div> + +<p>But I will refute my adversaries' arguments, which, +taken altogether, come to this. First, that corporeal +substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as they +suppose, of parts, and therefore they deny that it can +be infinite, and consequently that it can pertain to +God. This they illustrate by many examples, one or +two of which I will adduce. If corporeal substance, +they say, be infinite, let us conceive it to be divided +into two parts; each part, therefore, will be either finite +or infinite. If each part be finite, then the infinite is +composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If each +part be infinite, there is then an infinite twice as great +as another infinite, which is also absurd. Again, if +infinite quantity be measured by equal parts of a foot +each, it must contain an infinite number of such parts, +and similarly if it be measured by equal parts of an +inch each; and therefore one infinite number will be +twelve times greater than another infinite number. +Lastly, if from one point of any infinite quantity it be +imagined that two lines, AB, AC, which at first are at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[127]</a></span> +a certain and determinate distance from one another, +be infinitely extended, it is plain that the distance between +B and C will be continually increased, and at +length from being determinate will be indeterminable. +Since therefore these absurdities follow, as they think, +from supposing quantity to be infinite, they conclude +that corporeal substance must be finite, and consequently +cannot pertain to the essence of God. A second +argument is assumed from the absolute perfection +of God. For God, they say, since He is a being absolutely +perfect, cannot suffer; but corporeal substance, +since it is divisible, can suffer: it follows, therefore, +that it does not pertain to God's essence.</p> + +<p>These are the arguments which I find in authors, by +which they endeavor to show that corporeal substance +is unworthy of the divine nature, and cannot pertain +to it.... If any one will rightly consider the matter, +he will see that all these absurdities (supposing that +they are all absurdities, a point which I will now take +for granted), from which these authors attempt to +draw the conclusion that substance extended is finite, +do not by any means follow from the supposition that +quantity is infinite, but from the supposition that infinite +quantity is measurable, and that it is made up of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[128]</a></span> +finite parts. Therefore, from the absurdities to which +this leads nothing can be concluded, excepting that infinite +quantity is not measurable, and that it cannot +be composed of finite parts. But this is what we +[maintain].</p> + +<p>... The shaft therefore which is aimed at us turns +against those who cast it. If, therefore, from these +absurdities any one should attempt to conclude that +substance extended must be finite, he would, forsooth, +be in the position of the man who supposes a circle to +have the properties of a square, and then concludes +that it has no center, such that all the lines drawn +from it to the circumference are equal. For corporeal +substance, which cannot be conceived except as infinite, +one and indivisible, is conceived by those against +whom I argue to be composed of finite parts, and to be +multiplex and divisible, in order that they may prove +it finite. Just in the same way others, after they have +imagined a line to consist of points, know how to discover +many arguments, by which they show that a line +cannot be divided <i>ad infinitum</i>; and indeed it is not +less absurd to suppose that corporeal substance is +composed of bodies or parts than to suppose that a +body is composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and +that lines, finally, are composed of points. Every one +who knows that clear reason is infallible ought to admit +this, and especially those who deny that a vacuum +can exist. For if corporeal substance could be so +divided that its parts could be really distinct, why +could not one part be annihilated, the rest remaining, +as before, connected with one another? And why must<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[129]</a></span> +all be so fitted together that there can be no vacuum? +For of things which are really distinct the one from +the other, one can be and remain in its own position +without the other. Since therefore it is supposed +that there is no vacuum in Nature (about which I will +speak at another time), but that all the parts must be +united, so that no vacuum can exist, it follows that +they cannot be really separated; that is to say, that +corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, cannot +be divided.</p> + +<p>If, nevertheless, any one should now ask why there +is a natural tendency to consider quantity as capable +of division, I reply that quantity is conceived by us +in two ways: either abstractly or superficially; that is +to say, as we imagine it, or else as substance, in which +way it is conceived by the intellect alone. If, therefore, +we regard quantity (as we do very often and +easily) as it exists in the imagination, we find it to be +finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we +regard it as it exists in the intellect, and conceive it in +so far as it is substance, which is very difficult, then, +as we have already sufficiently demonstrated, we find +it to be infinite, one, and indivisible.</p> + +<p>This will be plain enough to all who know how to +distinguish between the imagination and the intellect, +and more especially if we remember that matter is +everywhere the same, and that, except in so far as we +regard it as affected in different ways, parts are not +distinguished in it; that is to say, they are distinguished +with regard to mode, but not with regard to reality. +For example, we conceive water as being divided, in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[130]</a></span> +so far as it is water, and that its parts are separated +from one another; but in so far as it is corporeal substance +we cannot thus conceive it, for as such it is +neither separated nor divided. Moreover, water, in +so far as it is water, is originated and destroyed; but +in so far as it is substance, it is neither originated nor +destroyed.</p> + +<p>By this reasoning I think that I have also answered +the second argument, since that too is based upon the +assumption that matter, considered as substance, is +divisible and composed of parts. And even if what +I have urged were not true, I do not know why matter +should be unworthy of the divine nature, since outside +God no substance can exist from which the divine +nature could suffer. All things, I say, are in God, and +everything which takes place by the laws alone of the +infinite nature of God, and follows (as I shall presently +show) from the necessity of His essence. Therefore +in no way whatever can it be asserted that God suffers +from anything, or that substance extended, even if it +be supposed divisible, is unworthy of the divine nature, +provided only it be allowed that it is eternal and infinite.... +Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can +either be or be conceived without God.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Properties of God</i></h4> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<p>From the necessity of the divine nature infinite numbers +of things in infinite ways (that is to say, all things<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[131]</a></span> +which can be conceived by the infinite intellect) must +follow.</p> + +<p>This proposition must be plain to every one who +considers that from the given definition of anything a +number of properties necessarily following from it +(that is to say, following from the essence of the thing +itself) are inferred by the intellect, and just in proportion +as the definition of the thing expresses a greater +reality, that is to say, just in proportion as the essence +of the thing defined involves a greater reality, will more +properties be inferred. But the divine nature possesses +absolutely infinite attributes (Def. 6), each one of +which expresses infinite essence in its own kind (<i>in suo +genere</i>), and therefore, from the necessity of the divine +nature, infinite numbers of things in infinite ways (that +is to say, all things which can be conceived by the infinite +intellect) must necessarily follow. Hence it follows +that God is the efficient cause of all things which +can fall under the infinite intellect. It follows, secondly, +that God is cause through Himself, and not +through that which is contingent (<i>per accidens</i>). It +follows, thirdly, that God is absolutely the first cause.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<p>We have just shown that from the necessity, or +(which is the same thing) from the laws only of the +divine nature, infinite numbers of things absolutely +follow: and we have demonstrated that nothing can +be, nor can be conceived, without God, but that all +things are in God. Therefore, outside Himself, there +can be nothing by which He may be determined or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[132]</a></span> +compelled to act; and therefore He acts from the laws +of His own nature only, and is compelled by no one.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows, firstly, that there is no cause, either +external to God or within Him, which can excite Him +to act except the perfection of His own nature. It +follows, secondly, that God alone is a free cause; for +God alone exists from the necessity alone of His own +nature and acts from the necessity alone of His own +nature. Therefore He alone is a free cause.</p> + +<p>There are some who think that God is a free cause +because He can, as they think, bring about that those +things which we have said follow from His nature—that +is to say, those things which are in His power—should +not be, or should not be produced by Him. But +this is simply saying that God could bring about that +it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that +its three angles should be equal to two right angles, +or that from a given cause an effect should not follow, +which is absurd. But I shall show farther on, without +the help of this proposition, that neither intellect nor +will pertain to the nature of God.</p> + +<p>I know indeed that there are many who think themselves +able to demonstrate that intellect of the highest +order and freedom of will both pertain to the nature of +God, for they say that they know nothing more perfect +which they can attribute to Him than that which is the +chief perfection in ourselves. But although they conceive +God as actually possessing the highest intellect, +they nevertheless do not believe that He can bring +about that all those things should exist which are actually +in His intellect, for they think that by such a +supposition they would destroy His power. If He had<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[133]</a></span> +created, they say, all things which are in His intellect, +He could have created nothing more, and this, they +believe, does not accord with God's omnipotence; so +then they prefer to consider God as indifferent to all +things, and creating nothing except that which He has +decreed to create by a certain absolute will. But I +think that I have shown with sufficient clearness that +from the supreme power of God, or from His infinite +nature, infinite things in infinite ways, that is to say, all +things, have necessarily flowed, or continually follow +by the same necessity, in the same way as it follows +from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to +eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right +angles. The omnipotence of God has therefore been +actual from eternity, and in the same actuality will +remain to eternity. In this way the omnipotence of +God, in my opinion, is far more firmly established.</p> + +<p>My adversaries, indeed (if I may be permitted to +speak plainly), seem to deny the omnipotence of God, +inasmuch as they are forced to admit that He has in +His mind an infinite number of things which might be +created, but which, nevertheless, He will never be able +to create, for if He were to create all things which +He has in His mind, He would, according to them, exhaust +His omnipotence and make Himself imperfect. +Therefore, in order to make a perfect God, they are +compelled to make Him incapable of doing all those +things to which His power extends, and anything more +absurd than this, or more opposed to God's omnipotence, +I do not think can be imagined.</p> + +<p>Moreover—to say a word, too, here about the intellect +and will which we commonly attribute to God<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[134]</a></span>—if +intellect and will pertain to His eternal essence, +these attributes cannot be understood in the sense in +which men generally use them, for the intellect and +will which could constitute His essence would have to +differ entirely from our intellect and will, and could +resemble ours in nothing except in name. There could +be no further likeness than that between the celestial +constellation of the Dog and the animal which barks. +This I will demonstrate as follows: If intellect pertains +to the divine nature, it cannot, like our intellect, follow +the things which are its object (as many suppose), nor +can it be simultaneous in its nature with them, since +God is prior to all things in causality; but, on the +contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is +what it is, because as such it exists objectively in God's +intellect. Therefore the intellect of God, in so far +as it is conceived to constitute His essence, is in truth +the cause of things, both of their essence and of their +existence,—a truth which seems to have been understood +by those who have maintained that God's intellect, +will, and power are one and the same thing.</p> + +<p>Since, therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of +things, both of their essence and of their existence (as +we have already shown), it must necessarily differ +from them with regard both to its essence and existence; +for an effect differs from its cause precisely in +that which it has from its cause. For example, one man +is the cause of the existence but not of the essence of +another, for the essence is an eternal truth; and therefore +with regard to essence the two men may exactly +resemble one another, but with regard to existence +they must differ. Consequently if the existence of one<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[135]</a></span> +should perish, that of the other will not therefore +perish; but if the essence of one could be destroyed +and become false, the essence of the other would be +likewise destroyed. Therefore a thing which is the +cause both of the essence and of the existence of any +effect must differ from that effect both with regard to +its essence and with regard to its existence. But the +intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and +existence of our intellect; therefore the intellect of +God, so far as it is conceived to constitute the divine +essence, differs from our intellect both with regard to +its essence and its existence, nor can it coincide with +our intellect in anything except the name, which is +what we essayed to prove. The same demonstration +may be applied to the will, as any one may easily see +for himself.</p> + + +<h4>III</h4> + +<p>All things which are, are in God and must be conceived +through Him and therefore He is the cause of +the things which are in Himself. Moreover, outside +God there can be no substance, that is to say (Def. 3), +outside Him nothing can exist which is in itself. God, +therefore, is the immanent, but not the transitive cause +of all things.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Necessity of All Things</i></h4> + +<p>In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things +are determined from the necessity of the divine nature +to exist and act in a certain manner.... That which +has not been thus determined by God cannot determine +itself to action. A thing which has been determined<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[136]</a></span> +by God to any action cannot render itself indeterminate.</p> + +<p>... All things have necessarily followed from the +given nature of God and from the necessity of His +nature have been determined to existence and action +in a certain manner. If therefore things could have +been of another nature, or could have been determined +in another manner to action, so that the order of nature +would have been different, the nature of God might +then be different to that which it now is, and hence +that different nature would necessarily exist, and there +might consequently be two or more Gods, which is +absurd. Therefore things could be produced by God +in no other manner and in no other order than that in +which they have been produced.</p> + +<p>Since I have thus shown, with greater clearness, than +that of noonday light, that in things there is absolutely +nothing by virtue of which they can be called contingent, +I wish now to explain in a few words what +is to be understood by <i>contingent</i>, but, firstly, what is +to be understood by <i>necessary</i> and <i>impossible</i>.</p> + +<p>A thing is called necessary either in reference to its +essence or its cause. For the existence of a thing +necessarily follows either from the essence and definition +of the thing itself, or from a given efficient cause. +In the same way a thing is said to be impossible either +because the essence of the thing itself or its definition +involves a contradiction, or because no external cause +exists determinate to the production of such a thing. +But a thing cannot be called contingent unless with +reference to a deficiency in our knowledge. For if we +do not know that the essence of a thing involves a con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[137]</a></span>tradiction, +or if we actually know that it involves no +contradiction, and nevertheless we can affirm nothing +with certainty about its existence because the order +of causes is concealed from us, that thing can never +appear to us either as necessary or impossible, and +therefore we call it either contingent or possible.</p> + +<p>From what has gone before it clearly follows that +things have been produced by God in the highest degree +of perfection, since they have necessarily followed +from the existence of a most perfect nature. Nor +does this doctrine accuse God of any imperfection, +but, on the contrary, His perfection has compelled us +to affirm it. Indeed, from its contrary would clearly +follow, as I have shown above, that God is not absolutely +perfect, since, if things had been produced +in any other fashion, another nature would have had +to be assigned to Him, different from that which the +consideration of the most perfect Being compels us +to assign to Him. I do not doubt that many will reject +this opinion as ridiculous, nor will they care to apply +themselves to its consideration, and this from no other +reason than that they have been in the habit of assigning +to God another liberty widely different from that +absolute will which (Def. 7) we have taught. On +the other hand, I do not doubt, if they were willing +to study the matter and properly to consider the series +of our demonstrations, that they would altogether reject +this liberty which they now assign to God, not +only as of no value, but as a great obstacle to knowledge. +Neither is there any need that I should here +repeat those things which are said [above]<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[138]</a></span></p> +<p>But for the sake of those who differ from me, I will +here show that although it be granted that will pertains +to God's essence, it follows nevertheless from His +perfection that things could be created in no other mode +or order by Him. This it will be easy to show if we +first consider that which my opponents themselves admit, +that it depends upon the decree and will of God +alone that each thing should be what it is, for otherwise +God would not be the cause of all things. It is +also admitted that all God's decrees were decreed by +God Himself from all eternity, for otherwise imperfection +and inconstancy would be proved against Him. +But since in eternity there is no <i>when</i> nor <i>before</i> nor +<i>after</i>, it follows from the perfection of God alone that +He neither can decree nor could ever have decreed anything +else than that which He has decreed; that is to +say, God has not existed before His decrees, and can +never exist without them. But it is said that although +it be supposed that God had made the nature of things +different from that which it is, or that from eternity +He had decreed something else about Nature and her +order, it would not thence follow that any imperfection +exists in God. But if this be said, it must at the +same time be allowed that God can change His decrees. +For if God had decreed something about Nature +and her order other than that which He has decreed—that +is to say, if He had willed and conceived something +else about Nature—He would necessarily have +had an intellect and a will different from those which +He now has. And if it be allowed to assign to God +another intellect and another will without any change +of His essence and of His perfection, what is the rea<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[139]</a></span>son +why He cannot now change His decrees about +creation and nevertheless remain equally perfect? For +His intellect and will regarding created things and +their order remain the same in relationship to His essence +and perfection in whatever manner His intellect +and will are conceived.</p> + +<p>Moreover, all the philosophers whom I have seen +admit that there is no such thing as an intellect existing +potentially in God, but only an intellect existing +actually. But since His intellect and His will are not +distinguishable from His essence, as all admit, it follows +from this also that if God had had another intellect +actually and another will, His essence would have been +necessarily different, and hence, as I showed at the +beginning, if things had been produced by God in a +manner different from that in which they now exist, +God's intellect and will, that is to say, His essence (as +has been granted), must have been different, which is +absurd.</p> + +<p>Since, therefore, things could have been produced +by God in no other manner or order, this being a truth +which follows from His absolute perfection, there is +no sound reasoning which can persuade us to believe +that God was unwilling to create all things which are +in His intellect with the same perfection as that in +which they exist in His intellect. But we shall be told +that there is no perfection nor imperfection in things, +but that that which is in them by reason of which they +are perfect or imperfect and are said to be good or +evil depends upon the will of God alone, and therefore +if God had willed He could have effected that +that which is now perfection should have been the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[140]</a></span> +extreme of imperfection, and <i>vice versa</i>. But what +else would this be than openly to affirm that God, who +necessarily understands what He wills, is able by His +will to understand things in a manner different from +that in which He understands them, which, as I have +just shown, is a great absurdity? I can therefore turn +the argument on my opponents in this way. All things +depend upon the power of God. In order that things +may be differently constituted, it would be necessary +that God's will should be differently constituted; but +God's will cannot be other than it is as we have lately +most clearly deduced from His perfection. Things +therefore cannot be differently constituted.</p> + +<p>I confess that this opinion, which subjects all things +to a certain indifferent God's will, and affirms that all +things depend upon God's good pleasure, is at a less +distance from the truth than the opinion of those who +affirm that God does everything for the sake of the +Good. For these seem to place something outside of +God which is independent of Him, to which He looks +while He is at work as to a model, or at which He aims +as if at a certain mark. This is indeed nothing else +than to subject God to fate, the most absurd thing +which can be affirmed of Him whom we have shown to +be the first and only free cause of the essence of all +things as well as of their existence. Therefore it is +not worth while that I should waste time in refuting +this absurdity.</p> + +<p>Before I go any farther, I wish here to explain or +rather to recall to recollection, what we mean by +<i>natura naturans</i> and what by <i>natura naturata</i>. For, +from what has gone before, I think it is plain that by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[141]</a></span> +<i>natura naturans</i> we are to understand that which is in +itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes +of substance which express eternal and infinite essence, +that is to say, God in so far as He is considered as a +free cause. But by <i>natura naturata</i> I understand +everything which follows from the necessity of the +nature of God, or of any one of God's attributes, that +is to say, all the modes of God's attributes in so far +as they are considered as things which are in God, and +which without God can neither be nor can be conceived.</p> + +<p>... Individual things are nothing but affections or +modes of God's attributes, expressing those attributes +in a certain and determinate manner.</p> + + +<h4><i>General Conclusions</i></h4> + +<p>I have now explained the nature of God and its properties. +I have shown that He necessarily exists; +that He is one God; that from the necessity alone of +His own nature He is and acts; that He is, and in what +way He is, the free cause of all things; that all things +are in Him, and so depend upon Him that without Him +they can neither be nor can be conceived; and, finally, +that all things have been predetermined by Him, not +indeed from freedom of will or from absolute good +pleasure, but from His absolute nature or infinite +power.</p> + +<p>Moreover, wherever an opportunity was afforded, +I have endeavored to remove prejudices which might +hinder the perception of the truth of what I have +demonstrated; but because not a few still remain which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[142]</a></span> +have been and are now sufficient to prove a very great +hindrance to the comprehension of the connection of +things in the manner in which I have explained it, I +have thought it worth while to call them up to be examined +by reason. But all these prejudices which I +here undertake to point out depend upon this solely: +that it is commonly supposed that all things in Nature, +like men, work to some end; and indeed it is thought to +be certain that God Himself directs all things to some +sure end, for it is said that God has made all things +for man, and man that he may worship God.</p> + +<p>This, therefore, I will first investigate by inquiring, +firstly, why so many rest in this prejudice, and why all +are so naturally inclined to embrace it? I shall then +show its falsity, and, finally, the manner in which there +have arisen from it prejudices concerning <i>good</i> and <i>evil</i>, +<i>merit</i> and <i>sin</i>, <i>praise</i> and <i>blame</i>, <i>order</i> and <i>disorder</i>, +<i>beauty</i> and <i>deformity</i>, and so forth. This, however, +is not the place to deduce these things from the nature +of the human mind. It will be sufficient if I here take +as an axiom that which no one ought to dispute, namely, +that man is born ignorant of the causes of things, and +that he has a desire, of which he is conscious, to seek +that which is profitable to him. From this it follows, +firstly, that he thinks himself free because he is conscious +of his wishes and appetites, whilst at the same +time he is ignorant of the causes by which he is led +to wish and desire, not dreaming what they are; and, +secondly, it follows that man does everything for an +end, namely, for that which is profitable to him, which +is what he seeks. Hence it happens that he attempts +to discover merely the final causes of that which has<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[143]</a></span> +happened; and when he has heard them he is satisfied, +because there is no longer any cause for further uncertainty. +But if he cannot hear from another what +these final causes are, nothing remains but to turn +to himself and reflect upon the ends which usually determine +him to the like actions, and thus by his own +mind he necessarily judges that of another.</p> + +<p>Moreover, since he discovers, both within and without +himself a multitude of means which contribute not +a little to the attainment of what is profitable to himself—for +example, the eyes, which are useful for seeing, +the teeth for mastication, plants and animals for +nourishment, the sun for giving light, the sea for feeding +fish, etc.—it comes to pass that all natural objects +are considered as means for obtaining what is profitable. +These too being evidently discovered and not +created by man, hence he has a cause for believing that +some other person exists, who has prepared them for +man's use. For having considered them as means it +was impossible to believe that they had created themselves, +and so he was obliged to infer from the means +which he was in the habit of providing for himself that +some ruler or rulers of Nature exist, endowed with +human liberty, who have taken care of all things for +him, and have made all things for his use. Since he +never heard anything about the mind of these rulers, he +was compelled to judge of it from his own, and hence he +affirmed that the gods direct everything for his advantage, +in order that he may be bound to them and hold +them in the highest honor. This is the reason why +each man has devised for himself, out of his own brain, +a different mode of worshiping God, so that God<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[144]</a></span> +might love him above others, and direct all Nature to +the service of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice.</p> + +<p>Thus has this prejudice been turned into a superstition +and has driven deep roots into the mind—a prejudice +which was the reason why every one has so +eagerly tried to discover and explain the final causes +of things. The attempt, however, to show that Nature +does nothing in vain (that is to say, nothing which is +not profitable to man), seems to end in showing that +Nature, the gods, and man are alike mad.</p> + +<p>Do but see, I pray, to what all this has led. Amidst +so much in Nature that is beneficial, not a few things +must have been observed which are injurious, such as +storms, earthquakes, diseases, and it was affirmed that +these things happened either because the gods were +angry because of wrongs which had been inflicted on +them by man, or because of sins committed in the +method of worshiping them; and although experience +daily contradicted this, and showed by an infinity of +examples that both the beneficial and the injurious +were indiscriminately bestowed on the pious and the +impious, the inveterate prejudices on this point have +not therefore been abandoned. For it was much easier +for a man to place these things aside with others of +the use of which he was ignorant, and thus retain his +present and inborn state of ignorance, than to destroy +the whole superstructure and think out a new one. +Hence it was looked upon as indisputable that the +judgments of the gods far surpass our comprehension; +and this opinion alone would have been sufficient to +keep the human race in darkness to all eternity, if +mathematics, which does not deal with ends, but with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[145]</a></span> +the essences and properties of forms, had not placed +before us another rule of truth. In addition to mathematics, +other causes also might be assigned, which it +is superfluous here to enumerate, tending to make men +reflect upon these universal prejudices, and leading +them to a true knowledge of things.</p> + +<p>I have thus sufficiently explained what I promised +in the first place to explain. There will now be no +need of many words to show that Nature has set no +end before herself, and that all final causes are nothing +but human fictions. For I believe that this is sufficiently +evident both from the foundations and causes +of this prejudice, as well as from all those propositions +in which I have shown that all things are begotten by +a certain eternal necessity of Nature and in absolute +perfection. Thus much, nevertheless, I will add, that +this doctrine concerning an end altogether overturns +nature. For that which is in truth the cause it considers +as the effect, and <i>vice versa</i>. Again, that which +is first in Nature it puts last; and, finally, that which +is supreme and most perfect it makes the most imperfect. +For, passing by the first two assertions as self-evident, +it is plain that that effect is the most perfect +which is immediately produced by God, and in +proportion as intermediate causes are necessary for +the production of a thing is it imperfect. But if things +which are immediately produced by God were made +in order that He might obtain the end He had in view, +then the last things for the sake of which the first exist, +must be the most perfect of all.</p> + +<p>Again, this doctrine does away with God's perfection. +For if God works to obtain an end, He necessarily seeks<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[146]</a></span> +something of which he stands in need. And although +theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between the +end of want and the end of assimilation (<i>finem indigentiæ +et finem assimilationis</i>), they confess that God +has done all things for His own sake, and not for the +sake of the things to be created, because before the +creation they can assign nothing excepting God for +the sake of which God could do anything; and therefore +they are necessarily compelled to admit that God +stood in need of and desired those things for which He +determined to prepare means. This is self-evident. +Nor is it here to be overlooked that the adherents of +this doctrine, who have found a pleasure in displaying +their ingenuity in assigning the ends of things, have +introduced a new species of argument, not the <i>reductio +ad impossible</i>, but the <i>reductio ad ignorantiam</i>, to prove +their position, which shows that it had no other method +of defense left.</p> + +<p>For, by way of example, if a stone had fallen from +some roof on somebody's head and killed him, they +will demonstrate in this manner that the stone has +fallen in order to kill the man. For if it did not fall +for that purpose by the will of God, how could so many +circumstances concur through chance (and a number +often simultaneously do concur)? You will answer, +perhaps, that the event happened because the wind +blew and the man was passing that way. But, they +will urge, why did the wind blow at that time, and +why did the man pass that way precisely at the same +moment? If you again reply that the wind rose then +because the sea on the preceding day began to be +stormy, the weather hitherto having been calm, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[147]</a></span> +that the man had been invited by a friend, they will +urge again—because there is no end of questioning—But +why was the sea agitated? why was the man +invited at that time? And so they will not cease from +asking the causes of causes, until at last you fly to the +will of God, the refuge for ignorance.</p> + +<p>So, also, when they behold the structure of the human +body, they are amazed; and because they are ignorant +of the causes of such art, they conclude that the body +was made not by mechanical but by a supernatural or +divine art, and has been formed in such a way so that +the one part may not injure the other. Hence it happens +that the man who endeavors to find out the true +causes of miracles, and who desires as a wise man to +understand Nature, and not to gape at it like a fool, is +generally considered and proclaimed to be a heretic +and impious by those whom the vulgar worship as +the interpreters both of Nature and the gods. For +these know that if ignorance be removed, amazed +stupidity, the sole ground on which they rely in arguing +or in defending their authority, is taken away also. +But these things I leave and pass on to that which I +determined to do in the third place.</p> + +<p>After man has persuaded himself that all things +which exist are made for him, he must in everything +adjudge that to be of the greatest importance which +is most useful to him, and he must esteem that to be +of surpassing worth by which he is most beneficially +affected. In this way he is compelled to form those +notions by which he explains Nature; such, for instance, +as <i>good</i>, <i>evil</i>, <i>order</i>, <i>confusion</i>, <i>heat</i>, <i>cold</i>, +<i>beauty</i>, and <i>deformity</i>, etc.; and because he supposes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[148]</a></span> +himself to be free, notions like those of <i>praise</i> and +<i>blame</i>, <i>sin</i> and <i>merit</i>, have arisen. These latter I +shall hereafter explain when I have treated of human +nature; the former I will here briefly unfold.</p> + +<p>It is to be observed that man has given the name +<i>good</i> to everything which leads to health and the worship +of God; on the contrary, everything which does +not lead thereto he calls <i>evil</i>. But because those who +do not understand Nature affirm nothing about things +themselves, but only imagine them, and take the imagination +to be understanding, they therefore, ignorant +of things and their nature, firmly believe an <i>order</i> to +be in things; for when things are so placed that if +they are represented to us through the senses, we can +easily imagine them, and consequently easily remember +them, we call them well arranged; but if they are +not placed so that we can imagine and remember them, +we call them badly arranged or <i>confused</i>. Moreover, +since those things are more especially pleasing to us +which we can easily imagine, men therefore prefer +order to confusion, as if order were something in Nature +apart from our own imagination; and they say +that God has created everything in order, and in this +manner they ignorantly attribute imagination to God, +unless they mean perhaps that God, out of consideration +for the human imagination, has disposed things +in the manner in which they can most easily be +imagined. No hesitation either seems to be caused by +the fact that an infinite number of things are discovered +which far surpass our imagination, and very +many which confound it through its weakness. But +enough of this.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[149]</a></span></p> + +<p>The other notions which I have mentioned are nothing +but modes in which the imagination is affected in +different ways, and nevertheless they are regarded by +the ignorant as being specially attributes of things, +because, as we have remarked, men consider all things +as made for themselves, and call the nature of a thing +good, evil, sound, putrid, or corrupt, just as they are +affected by it. For example, if the motion by which +the nerves are affected by means of objects represented +to the eye conduces to well-being, the objects by which +it is caused are called <i>beautiful</i>; while those exciting +a contrary motion are called <i>deformed</i>. Those things, +too, which stimulate the senses through the nostrils are +called sweet-smelling or stinking; those which act +through the taste are called sweet or bitter, full-flavored +or insipid; those which act through the touch, hard or +soft, heavy or light; those, lastly, which act through +the ears are said to make a noise, sound, or harmony, +the last having caused men to lose their senses to +such a degree that they have believed that God even +is delighted with it. Indeed, philosophers may be found +who have persuaded themselves that the celestial motions +beget a harmony.</p> + +<p>All these things sufficiently show that every one +judges things by the constitution of his brain, or rather +accepts the affections of his imagination in the place +of things.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[150]</a></span> +we may observe in passing, that all those controversies +which we see have arisen amongst men, so that at last +skepticism has been the result. For although human +bodies agree in many things, they differ in more, and +therefore that which to one person is good will appear +to another evil, that which to one is well arranged to +another is confused, that which pleases one will displease +another, and so on in other cases which I pass +by both because we cannot notice them at length here, +and because they are within the experience of +every one. For every one has heard the expressions: +So many heads, so many ways of thinking; Every one +is satisfied with his own way of thinking; Differences +of brains are not less common than differences of +taste;—all which maxims show that men decide upon +matters according to the constitution of their brains, +and imagine rather than understand things.</p> + +<p>If men understood things, they would, as mathematics +prove, at least be all alike convinced if they +were not all alike attracted. We see, therefore, that all +those methods by which the common people are in the +habit of explaining Nature are only different sorts of +imaginations, and do not reveal the nature of anything +in itself, but only the constitution of the imagination; +and because they have names as if they were entities +existing apart from the imagination, I call them entities +not of the reason but of the imagination. All argument<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[151]</a></span> +therefore, urged against us based upon such notions +can be easily refuted.</p> + +<p>Many people, for instance, are accustomed to argue +thus:—If all things have followed from the necessity +of the most perfect nature of God, how is it that so +many imperfections have arisen in Nature—corruption, +for instance, of things till they stink; deformity, exciting +disgust; confusion, evil, crime, etc.? But, as I have +just observed, all this is easily answered. For the perfection +of things is to be judged by their nature and +power alone; nor are they more or less perfect because +they delight or offend the human senses, or because they +are beneficial or prejudicial to human nature. But to +those who ask why God has not created all men in such +a manner that they might be controlled by the dictates +of reason alone, I give but this answer: Because to +Him material was not wanting for the creation of everything, +from the highest down to the very lowest grade +of perfection; or, to speak more properly, because +the laws of His nature were so ample that they sufficed +for the production of everything which can be conceived +by an infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated.</p> + +<p>These are the prejudices which I undertook to notice +here. If any others of a similar character remain, +they can easily be rectified with a little thought by +any one.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Pp. <a href="#Page_132">132-135.</a></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Beauty, my dear Sir, is not so much a quality of the object +beheld, as an effect in him who beholds it. If our sight were longer +or shorter, or, if our constitution were different, what now appears +beautiful to us would seem misshapen and what we now think +misshapen we should regard as beautiful. The most beautiful hand +seen through the microscope will appear horrible. Some things +are beautiful at a distance, but ugly near; thus things regarded in +themselves, and in relation to God, are neither ugly nor beautiful. +Therefore, he who says that God has created the world so that it +might be beautiful is bound to adopt one of the two alternatives: +either that God created the world for the sake of men's pleasure +and eyesight, or else that He created men's pleasure and eyesight +for the sake of the world. <i>From a letter to Hugo Boxel</i> (1674).</p></div> +</div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[152]</a></span></p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[153]</a></span></p> +<h2>SECOND PART</h2> + +<h3>ON MAN</h3> + + +<div class='blockquot'> +<p><i>The more things the mind knows, the better it understands +its own powers and the order of Nature. The +better it understands its own powers, so much the more +easily can it direct itself and propose rules to itself. +The better, also, it understands the order of Nature, the +more easily can it restrain itself from what is useless.</i></p> + +<p class='right'><span class="smcap">Spinoza.</span></p> +</div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[154]</a></span></p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[155]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER IX</h2> + +<h3>THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE +HUMAN MIND</h3> + + +<h4><i>Introductory</i></h4> + +<p>I pass on now to explain those things which must +necessarily follow from the essence of God or the Being +eternal and infinite; not indeed to explain all these +things, for we have demonstrated that an infinitude of +things must follow in an infinite number of ways,—but +to consider those things only which may conduct +us, as it were, by the hand to a knowledge of the human +mind and its highest happiness.</p> + + +<h4><i>Definitions</i></h4> + +<p>I. By body, I understand a mode which expresses +in a certain and determinate manner the essence of +God in so far as He is considered as the thing extended.</p> + +<p>II. I say that to the essence of anything pertains +that, which being given, the thing itself is necessarily +posited, and being taken away, the thing is necessarily +taken; or, in other words, that, without which the thing +can neither be nor be conceived, and which in its turn +cannot be nor be conceived without the thing.</p> + +<p>III. By idea, I understand a conception of the +mind which the mind forms because it is a thinking +thing.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[156]</a></span></p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—I use the word conception rather than +perception because the name perception seems to indicate +that the mind is passive in its relation to the +object. But the word conception seems to express +the action of the mind.</p> + +<p>IV. By adequate idea, I understand an idea which, +in so far as it is considered in itself, without reference +to the object, has all the properties or internal signs +(<i>denominationes intrinsecas</i>) of a true idea.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—I say internal, so as to exclude that +which is external, the agreement, namely, of the idea +with its object.</p> + +<p>V. Duration is the indefinite continuation of existence.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—I call it indefinite because it cannot +be determined by the nature itself of the existing thing +nor by the efficient cause, which necessarily posits the +existence of the thing but does not take it away.</p> + +<p>VI. By reality and perfection I understand the +same thing.</p> + +<p>VII. By individual things I understand things which +are finite and which have a determinate existence; and +if a number of individuals so unite in one action that +they are all simultaneously the cause of one effect, I +consider them all, so far, as one individual thing.</p> + + +<h4><i>Axioms</i></h4> + +<p>I. The essence of man does not involve necessary +existence; that is to say, the existence as well as the +non-existence of this or that man may or may not follow +from the order of Nature.</p> + +<p>II. Man thinks.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[157]</a></span></p> + +<p>III. Modes of thought, such as love, desire, or the +emotions of the mind, by whatever name they may +be called, do not exist, unless in the same individual +the idea exist of a thing loved, desired, etc. But the +idea may exist although no other mode of thinking +exist.</p> + +<p>IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in +many ways.</p> + +<p>V. No individual things are felt or perceived by +us excepting bodies and modes of thought.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Mind of God</i></h4> + +<p>Individual thoughts, or this and that thought, are +modes which express the nature of God in a certain +and determinate manner. God therefore possesses an +attribute, the conception of which is involved in all +individual thoughts, and through which they are conceived. +Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite +attributes of God which expresses the eternal and +infinite essence of God or, in other words, God is a +thinking thing.</p> + +<p>This proposition is plain from the fact that we can +conceive an infinite thinking Being. For the more +things a thinking being can think, the more reality +or perfection we conceive it to possess, and therefore +the being which can think an infinitude of things in +infinite ways is necessarily infinite by his power of +thinking. Since, therefore, we can conceive an infinite +Being by attending to thought alone, thought is necessarily +one of the infinite attributes of God.<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[158]</a></span></p> +<p>God can think an infinitude of things in infinite ways, +or (which is the same thing) can form an idea of His +essence and of all the things which necessarily follow +from it. But everything which is in the power of God +is necessary. Therefore in God there necessarily exists +the idea of His essence, and of all things which +necessarily follow from His essence.</p> + +<p>The infinite intellect comprehends nothing but the +attributes of God and His modes. But God is one. +Therefore the idea of God, from which infinite numbers +of things follow in infinite ways, can be one only.</p> + +<p>The common people understand by God's power His +free will and right over all existing things, which are +therefore commonly looked upon as contingent; for +they say that God has the power of destroying everything +and reducing it to nothing. They very frequently, +too, compare God's power with the power +of kings. That there is any similarity between the two +we have disproved. We have shown that God does +everything with that necessity with which He understands +Himself; that is to say, as it follows from the +necessity of the divine nature that God understands +Himself (a truth admitted by all), so by the same +necessity it follows that God does an infinitude of +things in infinite ways. Moreover, we have shown +that the power of God is nothing but the active essence +of God, and therefore it is as impossible for us to conceive +that God does not act as that He does not exist. +If it pleased me to go farther, I could show besides +that the power which the common people ascribe to +God is not only a human power (which shows that +they look upon God as a man, or as being like a man),<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[159]</a></span> +but that it also involves weakness. But I do not care +to talk so much upon the same subject. Again and +again I ask the reader to consider and reconsider what +is said upon this subject [above].<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> For it is not possible +for any one properly to understand the things +which I wish to prove unless he takes great care not +to confound the power of God with the human power +and right of kings.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Order and Dependence of Ideas in God</i></h4> + +<p>The formal Being of ideas is a mode of thought (as +is self-evident); that is to say, a mode which expresses +in a certain manner the nature of God in so far as He +is a thinking thing. It is a mode, therefore, that involves +the conception of no other attribute of God, +and consequently is the effect of no other attribute +except that of thought; therefore the formal Being of +ideas recognizes God for its cause in so far only as +He is considered as a thinking thing, and not in so far +as He is manifested by any other attribute; that is to +say, the ideas both of God's attributes and of individual +things do not recognize as their efficient cause +the objects of the ideas or the things which are perceived, +but God Himself in so far as He is a thinking +thing.<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p> + +<p>God's power of thinking is equal to His actual +power of acting; that is to say, whatever follows<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[160]</a></span> +<i>formally</i> from the infinite nature of God, follows from +the idea of God (idea Dei), in the same order and in +the same connection <i>objectively</i> in God.</p> + +<p>The order and connection of ideas is the same as +the order and connection of things.</p> + +<p>Before we go any farther, we must here recall to +our memory what we have already demonstrated, that +everything which can be perceived by the infinite +intellect as constituting the essence of substance pertains +entirely to the one sole substance only, and consequently +that substance thinking and substance extended +are one and the same substance, which is now +comprehended under this attribute and now under +that. Thus, also, a mode of extension and the idea of +that mode are one and the same thing expressed in +two different ways—a truth which some of the Hebrews +appear to have seen as if through a cloud, since +they say that God, the intellect of God, and the things +which are the objects of that intellect are one and +the same thing. For example, the circle existing in +nature and the idea that is in God of an existing circle +are one and the same thing, which is manifested +through different attributes; and, therefore, whether +we think of Nature under the attribute of extension, +or under the attribute of thought, or under any other +attribute whatever, we shall discover one and the same +order, or one and the same connection of causes; that +is to say, in every case the same sequence of things. +Nor have I had any other reason for saying that God +is the cause of the idea, for example, of the circle in so +far only as He is a thinking thing, and of the circle +itself in so far as He is an extended thing, but this,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[161]</a></span> +that the formal Being of the idea of a circle can only +be perceived through another mode of thought, as its +proximate cause, and this again must be perceived +through another, and so on <i>ad infinitum</i>. So that when +things are considered as modes of thought, we must +explain the order of the whole of Nature or the connection +of causes by the attribute of thought alone, and +when things are considered as modes of extension, the +order of the whole of Nature must be explained through +the attribute of extension alone, and so with other attributes. +Therefore God is in truth the cause of things +as they are in themselves in so far as He consists of +infinite attributes, nor for the present can I explain +the matter more clearly.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Origin of the Human Mind</i></h4> + +<p>The human mind is a part of the infinite intellect +of God, and therefore, when we say that the human +mind perceives this or that thing, we say nothing else +than that God has this or that idea; not indeed in so +far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is manifested +through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as +He forms the essence of the human mind; and when +we say that God has this or that idea, not merely in +so far as He forms the nature of the human mind, but +in so far as He has at the same time with the human +mind the idea also of another thing, then we say that +the human mind perceives the thing partially or inadequately.</p> + +<p>... When you ask me my opinion on the question<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[162]</a></span> +raised concerning our knowledge of the means, whereby +each part of Nature agrees with its whole, and the manner +in which it is associated with the remaining parts, +I presume you are asking for the reasons which induce +us to believe that each part of Nature agrees +with its whole, and is associated with the remaining +parts. For as to the means whereby the parts are +really associated, and each part agrees with its whole, +I told you in my former letter that I am in ignorance. +To answer such a question we should have to know the +whole of Nature and its several parts. I will therefore +endeavor to show the reason which led me to make +the statement; but I will promise that I do not attribute +to Nature either beauty or deformity, order or +confusion. Only in relation to our imagination can +things be called beautiful or deformed, ordered or confused.</p> + +<p>By the association of parts, then, I merely mean +that the laws or nature of one part adapt themselves +to the laws or nature of another part, so as to cause +the least possible inconsistency. As to the whole and +the parts, I mean that a given number of things are +parts of a whole, in so far as the nature of each of +them is adapted to the nature of the rest so that they +all, as far as possible, agree together. On the other +hand, in so far as they do not agree, each of them +forms, in our minds, a separate idea, and is to that +extent considered as a whole, not as a part. For instance, +when the parts of lymph, chyle, etc., combine, +according to the proportion of the figure and size of +each, so as to evidently unite, and form one fluid, the +chyle, lymph, etc., considered under this aspect, are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[163]</a></span> +part of the blood; but, in so far as we consider the particles +of lymph as differing in figure and size from the +particles of chyle, we shall consider each of the two +as a whole, not as a part.</p> + +<p>Let us imagine, with your permission, a little worm, +living in the blood, able to distinguish by sight the +particles of blood, lymph, etc., and to reflect on the +manner in which each particle, on meeting with another +particle, either is repulsed, or communicates a +portion of its own motion. This little worm would +live in the blood in the same way as we live in a part +of the universe, and would consider each particle of +blood, not as a part, but as a whole. He would be +unable to determine how all the parts are modified +by the general nature of blood, and are compelled by +it to adapt themselves so as to stand in a fixed relation +to one another. For if we imagine that there are +no causes external to the blood, which could communicate +fresh movements to it, nor any space beyond +the blood, nor any bodies whereto the particles of +blood could communicate their motion, it is certain +that the blood would always remain in the same state, +and its particles would undergo no modifications, save +those which may be conceived as arising from the +relations of motion existing between the lymph, the +chyle, etc. The blood would then always have to be +considered as a whole, not as a part. But as there +exist, as a matter of fact, very many causes which +modify, in a given manner, the nature of blood, and +are, in turn, modified thereby, it follows that other +motions and other relations arise in the blood, springing +not from the mutual relations of its parts only, but<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[164]</a></span> +from the mutual relations between the blood as a whole +and external causes. Thus the blood comes to be +regarded as a part, not as a whole. So much for the +whole and the part.</p> + +<p>All natural bodies can and ought to be considered +in the same way as we have here considered the blood, +for all bodies are surrounded by others, and are mutually +determined to exist and operate in a fixed and +definite proportion, while the relations between motion +and rest in the sum total of them, that is, in the whole +universe, remain unchanged. Hence it follows that +each body, in so far as it exists as modified in a particular +manner, must be considered as a part of the +whole universe, as agreeing with the whole, and associated +with the remaining parts. As the nature of the +universe is not limited, like the nature of blood, but +is absolutely infinite, its parts are by this nature of +infinite power infinitely modified, and compelled to +undergo infinite variations....</p> + +<p>You see, therefore, how and why I think that the +human body is a part of Nature. As regards the human +mind, I believe that it also is a part of Nature; for I +maintain that there exists in Nature an infinite power +of thinking, which, in so far as it is infinite, contains +subjectively the whole of Nature, and its thoughts proceed +in the same manner as Nature—that is, in the +sphere of ideas. Further, I take the human mind to +be identical with this said power, not in so far as it +is infinite, and perceives the whole of Nature, but in +so far as it is finite, and perceives only the human body. +In this manner, I maintain that the human mind is +part of an infinite understanding.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[165]</a></span></p> + + +<h4><i>The Nature of the Human Mind</i></h4> + +<p>The essence of man is formed by certain modes of +the attributes of God, that is to say, modes of thought, +the idea of all of them being prior by nature to the +modes of thought themselves; and if this idea exists, +other modes (which also have an idea in nature prior +to them) must exist in the same individual likewise. +Therefore an idea is the first thing which forms the +Being of the human mind. But it is not the idea of a +non-existent thing, for then the idea itself could not +be said to exist. It will therefore be the idea of +something actually existing. Neither will it be the +idea of an infinite thing, for an infinite thing must always +necessarily exist, and this is absurd. Therefore +the first thing which forms the actual Being of the +human mind is the idea of an individual thing actually +existing.</p> + +<p>The knowledge of everything which happens in the +object of any idea necessarily exists in God, in so far +as He is considered as modified by the idea of that +object; that is to say, in so far as He forms the mind +of any being. The knowledge, therefore, necessarily +exists in God of everything which happens in the +object of the idea constituting the human mind; that +is to say, it exists in Him in so far as He forms the +nature of the human mind; or, whatever happens in +the object of the idea constituting the human mind +must be perceived by the human mind; in other words, +an idea of that thing will necessarily exist in the human +mind. That is to say, if the object of the idea constituting +the human mind be a body, nothing can hap<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[166]</a></span>pen +in that body which is not perceived by the mind.</p> + +<p>If the body were not the object of the human mind, +the ideas of the modifications of the body would not +be in God, in so far as He has formed our mind, but +would be in Him in so far as He has formed the mind +of another thing; that is to say, the ideas of the modifications +of the body would not be in our mind. But +we have ideas of the modifications of a body; therefore +the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a +body, and that, too, actually existing. Again, if there +were also any other object of the mind besides a body, +since nothing exists from which some effect does not +follow, the idea of some effort produced by this object +would necessarily exist in our mind. But there is no +such idea. Therefore the object of the idea constituting +the human mind is a body, or a certain mode of +extension actually existing, and nothing else.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that man is composed of mind and +body, and that the human body exists as we perceive +it.</p> + +<p>Hence we see not only that the human mind is +united to the body, but also what is to be understood +by the union of the mind and body. But no one can +understand it adequately or distinctly without knowing +adequately beforehand the nature of our body; for +those things which we have proved hitherto are altogether +general, nor do they refer more to man than +to other individuals, all of which are animate, although +in different degrees. For of everything there necessarily +exists in God an idea of which He is the cause, +in the same way as the idea of the human body exists +in Him; and therefore everything that we have said<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[167]</a></span> +of the idea of the human body is necessarily true of +the idea of any other thing. We cannot, however, +deny that ideas, like objects themselves, differ from +one another, and that one is more excellent and contains +more reality than another, just as the object of +one idea is more excellent and contains more reality +than another. Therefore, in order to determine the +differences between the human mind and other things +and its superiority over them, we must first know, as +we have said, the nature of its object, that is to say, the +nature of the human body. I am not able to explain +it here, nor is such an explanation necessary for what +I wish to demonstrate.</p> + +<p>This much, nevertheless, I will say generally, that +in proportion as one body is better adapted than another +to do or suffer many things, in the same proportion +will the mind at the same time be better adapted +to perceive many things, and the more the actions of +a body depend upon itself alone, and the less other +bodies coöperate with it in action, the better adapted +will the mind be for distinctly understanding. We +can thus determine the superiority of one mind to another; +we can also see the reason why we have only a +very confused knowledge of our body, together with +many other things which I shall deduce in what follows.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Complexity of the Human Mind</i></h4> + +<p>The idea which constitutes the formal Being of the +human mind is the idea of a body which is composed +of a number of individuals composite to a high degree. +But an idea of each individual composing the body<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[168]</a></span> +must necessarily exist in God; therefore the idea of +the human body is composed of these several ideas +of the component parts. The idea which constitutes +the formal Being of the human mind is not simple, but +is composed of a number of ideas.</p> + +<p>All ways in which any body is affected follow at the +same time from the nature of the affected body, and +from the nature of the affecting body; therefore the +idea of these modifications necessarily involves the nature +of each body, and therefore the idea of each way +in which the human body is affected by an external +body involves the nature of the human body and of +the external body.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows, in the first place, that the human +mind perceives the nature of many bodies together +with that of its own body.</p> + +<p>It follows, secondly, that the ideas we have of external +bodies indicate the constitution of our own +body rather than the nature of external bodies.</p> + + +<h4><i>Imagination</i></h4> + +<p>If the human body be affected in a way which involves +the nature of any external body, the human +mind will contemplate that external body as actually +existing or as present, until the human body be affected +by a mode which excludes the existence or presence +of the external body.</p> + +<p>When external bodies so determine the fluid parts +of the human body that they often strike upon the +softer parts, the fluid parts change the plane of the +soft parts, and thence it happens that the fluid parts<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[169]</a></span> +are reflected from the new planes in a direction different +from that in which they used to be reflected, and +that also afterwards when they strike against these new +planes by their own spontaneous motion, they are reflected +in the same way as when they were impelled +towards those planes by external bodies. Consequently +those fluid bodies produce a modification in the human +body while they keep up this reflex motion similar to +that produced by the presence of an external body. +The mind, therefore, will think as before, that is to say, +it will again contemplate the external body as present. +This will happen as often as the fluid parts of the +human body strike against those planes by their own +spontaneous motion. Therefore, although the external +bodies by which the human body was once affected do +not exist the mind will perceive them as if they were +present so often as this action is repeated in the body.</p> + +<p>We see, therefore, how it is possible for us to contemplate +things which do not exist as if they were +actually present. This may indeed be produced by +other causes, but I am satisfied with having here shown +one cause through which I could explain it, just as if +I had explained it through the true cause. I do not +think, however, that I am far from the truth, since no +postulate which I have assumed contains anything +which is not confirmed by an experience that we cannot +mistrust, after we have proved the existence of the +human body as we perceive it.</p> + +<p>We clearly see, moreover, what is the difference between +the idea, for example, of Peter, which constitutes +the essence of the mind itself of Peter, and the idea of +Peter himself which is in another man; for example,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[170]</a></span> +in Paul. For the former directly manifests the essence +of the body of Peter himself, nor does it involve +existence unless so long as Peter exists; the latter, on +the other hand, indicates rather the constitution of +the body of Paul than the nature of Peter; and therefore +so long as Paul's body exists with that constitution, +so long will Paul's mind contemplate Peter as +present, although he does not exist. But in order that +we may retain the customary phraseology, we will give +to those modifications of the human body, the ideas of +which represent to us external bodies as if they were +present, the name of <i>images of things</i>, although they do +not actually reproduce the forms of the things. When +the mind contemplates bodies in this way, we will say +that it imagines. Here I wish it to be observed, in +order that I may begin to show what <i>error</i> is, that +these imaginations of the mind, regarded by themselves, +contain no error, and that the mind is not in +error because it imagines, but only in so far as it is +considered as wanting in an idea which excludes the +existence of those things which it imagines as present. +For if the mind, when it imagines non-existent things +to be present, could at the same time know that those +things did not really exist, it would think its power +of imagination to be a virtue of its nature and not a +defect, especially if this faculty of imagining depended +upon its own nature alone, that is to say, if this faculty +of the mind were free.</p> + + +<h4><i>Association of Ideas and Memory</i></h4> + +<p>If the human body has at any time been simultaneously +affected by two or more bodies, whenever<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[171]</a></span> +the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will also +remember the others.</p> + +<p>We clearly understand by this what memory is. It +is nothing else than a certain concatenation of ideas, +involving the nature of things which are outside the +human body, a concatenation which corresponds in the +mind to the order and concatenation of the modifications +of the human body. I say, firstly, that it is a +concatenation of those ideas only which involve the nature +of things which are outside the human body, and +not of those ideas which explain the nature of those +things, for there are in truth ideas of the modifications +of the human body, which involve its nature as well as +the nature of external bodies. I say, in the second +place, that this concatenation takes place according to +the order and concatenation of the modifications of the +human body, that I may distinguish it from the concatenation +of ideas which takes place according to the +order of the intellect, and enables the mind to perceive +things through their first causes, and is the same in +all men.</p> + +<p>Hence we can clearly understand how it is that the +mind from the thought of one thing at once turns to +the thought of another thing which is not in any way +like the first. For example, from the thought of the +word <i>pomum</i> a Roman immediately turned to the +thought of the fruit, which has no resemblance to the +articulate sound <i>pomum</i>, nor anything in common with +it, excepting this, that the body of that man was often +affected by the thing and the sound; that is to say, +he often heard the word <i>pomum</i> when he saw the fruit. +In this manner each person will turn from one thought<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[172]</a></span> +to another according to the manner in which the habit +of each has arranged the images of things in the body. +The soldier, for instance, if he sees the footsteps of +a horse in the sand, will immediately turn from the +thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and +so to the thought of war. The countryman, on the +other hand, from the thought of a horse will turn to +the thought of his plow, his field, etc.; and thus each +person will turn from one thought to this or that +thought, according to the manner in which he has been +accustomed to connect and bind together the images of +things in his mind.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> [Similarly, it can be demonstrated that] extension is an attribute +of God, or God is an extended thing.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <a href="#Page_122">Chapter Eight.</a></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> The formal Being of things which are not modes of thought does +not follow from the divine nature because of His prior knowledge +of these things, but, just as ideas follow from the attribute of +thought, in the same manner and with the same necessity the objects +of ideas follow and are concluded from their attributes.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> From a letter to Henry Oldenburg (1665).</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[173]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER X</h2> + +<h3>THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF HUMAN +KNOWLEDGE</h3> + + +<h4><i>Of Truth</i></h4> + +<p>All the ideas which are in God always agree with +those things of which they are the ideas. Therefore, +all ideas, in so far as they are related to God, are true.</p> + +<p>A true idea<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> (for we possess a true idea) is something +different from its correlate (<i>ideatum</i>); thus a +circle is different from the idea of a circle. The idea +of a circle is not something having a circumference +and a center, as a circle has; nor is the idea of a body +that body itself. Now, as it is something different +from its correlate, it is capable of being understood +through itself; in other words, the idea, in so far as +its actual essence (<i>essentia formalis</i>) is concerned, may +be the subject of another subjective essence. And, +again, this second subjective essence will, regarded in +itself, be something real and capable of being understood; +and so on indefinitely. For instance, the man +Peter is something real; the true idea of Peter is the +reality of Peter represented subjectively, and is in +itself something real, and quite distinct from the actual +Peter. Now, as this true idea of Peter is in itself<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[174]</a></span> +something real, and has its own individual existence, +it will also be capable of being understood—that is, of +being the subject of another idea which will contain +by representation all that the idea of Peter contains +actually. And, again, this idea of the idea of Peter +has its own individuality, which may become the subject +of yet another idea; and so on indefinitely. This +every one may make trial of for himself, by reflecting +that he knows what Peter is, and also knows that he +knows, and further knows that he knows that he knows, +etc. Hence, it is plain that, in order to understand +the actual Peter, it is not necessary first to understand +the idea of Peter, and still less the idea of the idea of +Peter. This is the same as saying that in order to +know, there is no need to know that we know, much +less to know that we know that we know. This is no +more necessary than to know the nature of a circle +before knowing the nature of a triangle. But with +these ideas the contrary is the case; for in order to +know that I know, I must first know. Hence it is +clear that certainty is nothing else than the subjective +essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in which +we perceive an actual reality is certainty. Further, it +is also evident that for the certitude of truth no further +sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea; +for, as I have shown, it is not necessary to know that +we know that we know....</p> + +<p>He who has a true idea knows at the same time +that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt the truth of +the thing. For no one who has a true idea is ignorant +that a true idea involves the highest certitude; to have +a true idea signifying just this, to know a thing per<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[175]</a></span>fectly +or as well as possible. No one, in fact, can +doubt this, unless he supposes an idea to be something +dumb, like a picture on a tablet, instead of being a +mode of thought, that is to say, intelligence itself. +Moreover, I ask who can know that he understands +a thing unless he first of all understands that thing? +that is to say, who can know that he is certain of anything +unless he is first of all certain of that thing? +Then, again, what can be clearer or more certain than +a true idea as the standard of truth? Just as light +reveals both itself and the darkness, so truth is the +standard of itself and of the false.</p> + + +<h4><i>Of Falsity</i></h4> + +<p>There is nothing positive in ideas which can constitute +a form of falsity. But falsity cannot consist in +absolute privation (for we say that minds and not +bodies err and are mistaken); nor can it consist in +absolute ignorance, for to be ignorant and to be in +error are different. Falsehood, therefore, consists in +the privation of knowledge which is involved by inadequate +knowledge of things or by inadequate and confused +ideas. For instance, men are deceived because +they think themselves free, and the sole reason for +thinking so is that they are conscious of their own +actions, and ignorant of the causes by which those +actions are determined. Their idea of liberty therefore +is this—that they know no cause for their own actions; +for as to saying that their actions depend upon their +will, these are words to which no idea is attached. +What the will is, and in what manner it moves the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[176]</a></span> +body, every one is ignorant, for those who pretend +otherwise, and devise seats and dwelling-places of the +soul, usually excite our laughter or disgust. Just in +the same manner, when we look at the sun, we imagine +its distance from us to be about 200 feet; the error +not consisting solely in the imagination, but arising +from our not knowing what the true distance is when +we imagine, and what are the causes of our imagination. +For although we may afterwards know that the sun +is more than 600 diameters of the earth distant from +us, we still imagine it near us, since we imagine it to be +so near, not because we are ignorant of its true distance, +but because a modification of our body involves +the essence of the sun, in so far as our body itself +is affected by it.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Origin and Nature of Confused Ideas</i></h4> + +<p>The ideas of the modifications of the human body +involve the nature both of external bodies and of the +human body itself and must involve the nature not only +of the human body, but of its parts, for the modifications +are ways in which the parts of the human body, +and consequently the whole body, are affected. But an +adequate knowledge of external bodies and of the parts +composing the human body does not exist in God in +so far as He is considered as affected by the human +mind, but in so far as He is affected by other ideas. +These ideas of modifications, therefore, in so far as +they are related to the human mind alone, are like conclusions +without premises, that is to say, as is self-evident, +they are confused ideas.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[177]</a></span></p> + +<p>The idea which forms the nature of the mind is +demonstrated in the same way not to be clear and distinct +when considered in itself. So also with the idea of +the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the +modifications of the human body, in so far as they are +related to the mind alone, as every one may easily see.</p> + +<p>All ideas are in God and in so far as they are related +to God are true and adequate. No ideas, therefore, +are inadequate or confused unless in so far as they are +related to the individual mind of some person. All +ideas, therefore, both adequate and inadequate, follow +by the same necessity.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Origin and Nature of Adequate Ideas</i></h4> + +<p>Let there be something, <i>A</i>, which is common to all +bodies, and which is equally in the part of each body +and in the whole. I say that <i>A</i> can only be adequately +conceived. For the idea of <i>A</i> will necessarily be adequate +in God, both in so far as He has the idea of +the human body and in so far as He has the idea of +its modifications, which involve the nature of the human +body, and partly also the nature of external bodies; +that is to say, this idea will necessarily be adequate +in God in so far as He constitutes the human mind, or +in so far as He has ideas which are in the human mind. +The mind, therefore, necessarily perceives <i>A</i> adequately, +both in so far as it perceives itself or its own +or any external body; nor can <i>A</i> be conceived in any +other manner.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that some ideas or notions exist +which are common to all men, for all bodies agree in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[178]</a></span> +some things, which must be adequately, that is to say, +clearly and distinctly, perceived by all.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows also that the more things the body +has in common with other bodies, the more things will +the mind be adapted to perceive.</p> + +<p>Those ideas are also adequate which follow in the +mind from ideas which are adequate in it. For when +we say that an idea follows in the human mind from +ideas which are adequate in it, we do but say that in +the divine intellect itself an idea exists of which God +is the cause, not in so far as He is infinite, nor in so +far as He is affected by the ideas of a multitude of +individual things, but in so far only as He constitutes +the essence of the human mind.</p> + +<p>I have thus explained the origin of those notions +which are called common, and which are the foundations +of our reasoning; but of some axioms or notions +other causes exist which it would be advantageous to +explain by our method, for we should thus be able to +distinguish those notions which are more useful than +others, and those which are scarcely of any use; those +which are common; those which are clear and distinct +only to those persons who do not suffer from prejudice; +and, finally, those which are ill-founded. Moreover, +it would be manifest whence these notions which are +called <i>second</i>, and consequently the axioms founded +upon them, have taken their origin, and other things, +too, would be explained which I have thought about +at different times. Since, however, I have set apart +this subject for another treatise, and because I do not +wish to create disgust with excessive prolixity, I have +determined to pass by these matters here.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[179]</a></span></p> + +<p>But not to omit anything which is necessary for us to +know, I will briefly give the causes from which terms +called <i>Transcendental</i>, such as <i>Being</i>, <i>Thing</i>, <i>Something</i>, +have taken their origin. These terms have arisen +because the human body, inasmuch as it is limited, can +form distinctly in itself a certain number only of +images at once. If this number be exceeded, the images +will become confused; and if the number of images +which the body is able to form distinctly be greatly +exceeded, they will all run one into another. Since +this is so, it is clear that in proportion to the number +of images which can be formed at the same time in +the body will be the number of bodies which the human +mind can imagine at the same time. If the images in +the body, therefore, are all confused, the mind will +confusedly imagine all the bodies without distinguishing +the one from the other, and will include them all, +as it were, under one attribute, that of being or thing.</p> + +<p>The same confusion may also be caused by lack of +uniform force in the images and from other analogous +causes, which there is no need to discuss here, the consideration +of one cause being sufficient for the purpose +we have in view. For it all comes to this, that these +terms signify ideas in the highest degree confused. It +is in this way that those notions have arisen which are +called <i>Universal</i>, such as, <i>Man</i>, <i>Horse</i>, <i>Dog</i>, etc.; that +is to say, so many images of men, for instance, are +formed in the human body at once, that they exceed the +power of the imagination, not entirely, but to such a +degree that the mind has no power to imagine the determinate +number of men and the small differences of +each, such as color and size, etc. It will therefore dis<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[180]</a></span>tinctly +imagine that only in which all of them agree in +so far as the body is affected by them, for by that the +body was chiefly affected, that is to say, by each individual, +and this it will express by the name <i>man</i>, +covering thereby an infinite number of individuals; to +imagine a determinate number of individuals being out +of its power.</p> + +<p>But we must observe that these notions are not +formed by all persons in the same way, but that they +vary in each case according to the thing by which the +body is more frequently affected, and which the mind +more easily imagines or recollects. For example, those +who have more frequently looked with admiration upon +the stature of men, by the name <i>man</i> will understand +an animal of erect stature, while those who have been in +the habit of fixing their thoughts on something else, will +form another common image of men, describing man, +for instance, as an animal capable of laughter, a biped +without feathers, a rational animal, and so on; each +person forming universal images of things according to +the temperament of his own body. It is not therefore to +be wondered at that so many controversies have arisen +amongst those philosophers who have endeavored to explain +natural objects by the images of things alone.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Three Kinds of Knowledge</i></h4> + +<p>From what has been already said, it clearly appears +that we perceive many things and form universal ideas:</p> + +<p>1. From individual things, represented by the senses +to us in a mutilated and confused manner, and without +order to the intellect. These perceptions I have there<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[181]</a></span>fore +been in the habit of calling knowledge from vague +experience.</p> + +<p>2. From signs; as, for example, when we hear or +read certain words, we recollect things and form certain +ideas of them similar to them, through which ideas +we imagine things. These two ways of looking at +things I shall hereafter call knowledge of the first +kind, opinion or imagination.</p> + +<p>3. From our possessing common notions and adequate +ideas of the properties of things. This I shall +call reason and knowledge of the second kind.</p> + +<p>Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is a +third, as I shall hereafter show, which we shall call +intuitive science. This kind of knowing advances from +an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes +of God to the adequate knowledge of the +essence of things. All this I will explain by one example. +Let there be three numbers given through +which it is required to discover a fourth which shall be +to the third as the second is to the first. A merchant +does not hesitate to multiply the second and third +together and divide the product by the first, either +because he has not yet forgotten the things which he +heard without any demonstration from his school-master, +or because he has seen the truth of the rule +with the more simple numbers, or because from the +19th Prop. in the 7th book of Euclid he understands +the common property of all proportionals.</p> + +<p>But with the simplest numbers there is no need of +all this. If the numbers 1, 2, 3, for instance, be given, +every one can see that the fourth proportional is 6 +much more clearly than by any demonstration, because<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[182]</a></span> +from the ratio in which we see by one intuition that the +first stands to the second we conclude the fourth.</p> + +<p>To knowledge of the first kind we have said that all +those ideas belong which are inadequate and confused, +and, therefore, this knowledge alone is the cause of falsity. +Moreover, to knowledge of the second and third +kind we have said that those ideas belong which are adequate, +and therefore this knowledge is necessarily true.</p> + +<p>It is the knowledge of the second and third, and not +that of the first kind, which teaches us to distinguish +the true from the false. For he who knows how to +distinguish between the true and the false must have +an adequate idea of the true and the false, that is to +say, he must know the true and the false by the second +or third kind of knowledge.</p> + + +<h4><i>Reason and Imagination</i></h4> + +<p>It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly, +that is to say, as they are in themselves, that is to say, +not as contingent but as necessary.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that it is through the imagination +alone that we look upon things as contingent both with +reference to the past and the future.</p> + +<p>How this happens I will explain in a few words. We +have shown above that unless causes occur preventing +the present existence of things, the mind always imagines +them present before it, even if they do not exist. +Again, we have shown that if the human body has +once been simultaneously affected by two external +bodies, whenever the mind afterwards imagines one it +will immediately remember the other; that is to say,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[183]</a></span> +it will look upon both as present before it, unless causes +occur which prevent the present existence of the things. +No one doubts, too, that we imagine time because we +imagine some bodies to move with a velocity less, or +greater than, or equal to that of others.</p> + +<p>Let us therefore suppose a boy who yesterday, for +the first time, in the morning saw Peter, at midday +Paul, in the evening Simeon, and to-day in the morning +again sees Peter. It is plain that as soon as he +sees the morning light he will imagine the sun passing +through the same part of the sky as on the day preceding; +that is to say, he will imagine the whole day, and +at the same time Peter will be connected in his imagination +with the morning, Paul with midday, and Simeon +with the evening. In the morning, therefore, the +existence of Paul and Simeon will be imagined in relation +to future time, while in the evening, if the boy +should see Simeon, he will refer Peter and Paul to the +past, since they will be connected with the past in his +imagination. This process will be constant in proportion +to the regularity with which he sees Peter, Paul, +and Simeon in this order. If it should by some means +happen that on some other evening, in the place of +Simeon, he should see James, on the following morning +he will connect in his imagination with the evening at +one time Simeon and at another James, but not both +together. For he is supposed to have seen one and +then the other in the evening, but not both together. +His imagination will therefore fluctuate, and he will +connect with a future evening first one and then the +other; that is to say, he will consider neither as certain, +but both as a contingency in the future.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[184]</a></span></p> + +<p>This fluctuation of the imagination will take place +in the same way if the imagination is dealing with +things which we contemplate in the same way with +reference to past or present time, and consequently we +imagine things related to time past, present, or future +as contingent.</p> + + +<h4><i>Sub Specie Æternitatis</i></h4> + +<p>It is of the nature of reason to consider things as +necessary and not as contingent. This necessity of +things it perceives truly, that is to say, as it is in itself. +But this necessity of things is the necessity itself of +the eternal nature of God. Therefore it is of the nature +of reason to consider things under this form of eternity. +Moreover, the foundations of reason are notions which +explain those things which are common to all, and these +things explain the essence of no individual thing, and +must therefore be conceived without any relation to +time, but under a certain form of eternity.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Limits of Human Knowledge</i></h4> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<p>The parts composing the human body pertain to the +essence of the body itself only in so far as they communicate +their motions to one another by some certain +method, and not in so far as they can be considered +as individuals without relation to the human body. +For the parts of the human body are individuals, composite +to a high degree, parts of which can be separated +from the human body and communicate their motions +to other bodies in another way, although the nature<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[185]</a></span> +and form of the human body itself is closely preserved. +Therefore the idea or knowledge of each part will be in +God in so far as He is considered as affected by another +idea of an individual thing, which individual thing is +prior to the part itself in the order of Nature. The +same thing may be said of each part of the individual +itself composing the human body, and therefore the +knowledge of each part composing the human body +exists in God in so far as He is affected by a number +of ideas of things, and not in so far as He has the +idea of the human body only; that is to say, the idea +which constitutes the nature of the human mind; and +therefore the human mind does not involve an adequate +knowledge of the parts composing the human +body.</p> + +<p>We have shown that the idea of a modification of the +human body involves the nature of an external body +so far as the external body determines the human body +in some certain manner. But in so far as the external +body is an individual which is not related to the human +body, its idea or knowledge is in God, in so far as +He is considered as affected by the idea of another +thing, which idea is prior by nature to the external +body itself. Therefore the adequate knowledge of an +external body is not in God in so far as He has the idea +of the modification of the human body, or, in other +words, the idea of the modification of the human body +does not involve an adequate knowledge of an external +body.</p> + +<p>When the human mind through the ideas of the +modifications of its body contemplates external bodies, +we say that it then imagines, nor can the mind in any<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[186]</a></span> +other way imagine external bodies as actually existing. +Therefore in so far as the mind imagines external +bodies it does not possess an adequate knowledge of +them.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<p>The idea of a modification of the human body does +not involve an adequate knowledge of the body itself, +or, in other words, does not adequately express its +nature, that is to say, it does not correspond adequately +with the nature of the human mind, and therefore +the idea of this idea does not adequately express +the nature of the human mind, nor involve an adequate +knowledge of it.</p> + +<p>From this it is evident that the human mind, when +it perceives things in the common order of Nature, +has no adequate knowledge of itself nor of its own +body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused and +mutilated knowledge; for the mind does not know +itself unless in so far as it perceives the ideas of the +modifications of the body. Moreover, it does not perceive +its body unless through those same ideas of the +modifications by means of which alone it perceives +external bodies. Therefore in so far as it possesses +these ideas it possesses an adequate knowledge neither +of itself, nor of its body, nor of external bodies, but +merely a mutilated and confused knowledge.</p> + +<p>I say expressly that the mind has no adequate knowledge +of itself, nor of its body, nor of external bodies, +but only a confused knowledge, as often as it perceives +things in the common order of Nature, that is to say, as +often as it is determined to the contemplation of this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[187]</a></span> +or that <i>externally</i>—namely, by a chance coincidence, +and not as often as it is determined <i>internally</i>—for the +reason that it contemplates several things at once, and +is determined to understand in what they differ, agree, +or oppose one another; for whenever it is internally +disposed in this or in any other way, it then contemplates +things clearly and distinctly.</p> + + +<h4>III</h4> + +<p>The duration of our body does not depend upon its +essence, nor upon the absolute nature of God, but the +body is determined to existence and action by causes +which also are determined by others to existence and +action in a certain and determinate manner, whilst +these, again, are determined by others, and so on <i>ad +infinitum</i>. The duration, therefore, of our body depends +upon the common order of Nature and the constitution +of things. But an adequate knowledge of the +way in which things are constituted, exists in God in so +far as He possesses the ideas of all things, and not in +so far as He possesses only the idea of the human +body. Therefore the knowledge of the duration of +our body is altogether inadequate in God, in so far as +He is only considered as constituting the nature of the +human mind, that is to say, this knowledge in our +mind is altogether inadequate.</p> + +<p>Each individual thing, like the human body, must +be determined to existence and action by another individual +thing in a certain and determinate manner, and +this again by another, and so on <i>ad infinitum</i>. But we +have demonstrated in the preceding proposition, from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[188]</a></span> +this common property of individual things, that we +have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration +of our own body; therefore the same conclusion is to +be drawn about the duration of individual things, that +is to say, that we can have but a very inadequate +knowledge of it.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that all individual things are contingent +and corruptible, for we can have no adequate +knowledge concerning their duration and this is what +is to be understood by us as their contingency and +capability of corruption; for there is no other contingency +but this.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Mind's Knowledge of God</i></h4> + +<p>The idea of an individual thing actually existing +necessarily involves both the essence and existence of +the thing itself. But individual things cannot be conceived +without God, and since God is their cause in so +far as He is considered under that attribute of which +they are modes, their ideas must necessarily involve the +conception of that attribute, or, in other words, must +involve the eternal and infinite essence of God.</p> + +<p>By existence is to be understood here not duration, +that is, existence considered in the abstract, as if it +were a certain kind of quantity, but I speak of the +nature itself of the existence which is assigned to individual +things, because from the eternal necessity of +the nature of God infinite numbers of things follow in +infinite ways. I repeat, that I speak of the existence +itself of individual things in so far as they are in God. +For although each individual thing is determined by +another individual thing to existence in a certain way,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[189]</a></span> +the force nevertheless by which each thing perseveres +in its existence follows from the eternal necessity of the +nature of God.</p> + +<p>The demonstration of the preceding proposition is +universal, and whether a thing be considered as a +part or as a whole, its idea, whether it be of a part or +whole, will involve the eternal and infinite essence of +God. Therefore that which gives a knowledge of the +eternal and infinite essence of God is common to all, +and is equally in the part and in the whole. This +knowledge therefore will be adequate.</p> + +<p>The human mind possesses ideas by which it perceives +itself and its own body, together with external +bodies, as actually existing. Therefore it possesses +an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence +of God.</p> + +<p>Hence we see that the infinite essence and the eternity +of God are known to all; and since all things are +in God and are conceived through Him, it follows that +we can deduce from this knowledge many things which +we can know adequately, and that we can thus form +that third sort of knowledge. The reason why we do +not possess a knowledge of God as distinct as that +which we have of common notions is, that we cannot +imagine God as we can bodies; and because we have +attached the name God to the images of things which +we are in the habit of seeing, an error we can hardly +avoid, inasmuch as we are continually affected by +external bodies.</p> + +<p>Many errors, of a truth, consist merely in the application +of the wrong names to things. For if a man +says that the lines which are drawn from the center of +the circle to the circumference are not equal, he under<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[190]</a></span>stands +by the circle, at all events for the time, something +else than mathematicians understand by it. So when +men make errors in calculation, the numbers which are +in their minds are not those which are upon the paper. +As far as their mind is concerned there is no error, although +it seems as if there were, because we think that +the numbers in their minds are those which are upon +the paper. If we did not think so, we should not +believe them to be in error. For example, when I +lately heard a man complaining that his court had +flown into one of his neighbor's fowls, I understood +what he meant, and therefore did not imagine him to +be in error. This is the source from which so many +controversies arise—that men either do not properly +explain their own thoughts, or do not properly interpret +those of other people; for, in truth, when they most +contradict one another, they either think the same +things or something different, so that those things which +they suppose to be errors and absurdities in another +person are not so.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> From the <i>Improvement of the Understanding</i>, §§ 33-35.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[191]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER XI</h2> + +<h3>DETERMINISM AND MORALS</h3> + + +<h4><i>The Mind Is Necessarily Determined</i></h4> + +<p>The mind is a certain and determinate mode of +thought, and therefore it cannot be the free cause of +its own actions, or have an absolute faculty of willing +or not willing, but must be determined to this or that +volition by a cause which is also determined by another +cause, and this again by another, and so on <i>ad +infinitum</i>.</p> + +<p>In the same manner it is demonstrated that in the +mind there exists no absolute faculty of understanding, +desiring, loving, etc. These and the like faculties, +therefore, are either altogether fictitious, or else are +nothing but metaphysical or universal entities, which +we are in the habit of forming from individual cases. +The intellect and will, therefore, are related to this or +that idea or volition as rockiness is related to this or +that rock, or as man is related to Peter or Paul. The +reason why men imagine themselves to be free we have +already explained.</p> + + +<h4><i>Faculty Psychology Fallacious</i></h4> + +<p>Before, however, I advance any further, I must observe +that by the will I understand a faculty of affirming +or denying, but not a desire; a faculty, I say, by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[192]</a></span> +which the mind affirms or denies that which is true or +false, and not a desire by which the mind seeks a thing +or turns away from it. But now that we have demonstrated +that these faculties are universal notions which +are not distinguishable from the individual notions +from which they are formed, we must now inquire +whether the volitions themselves are anything more +than the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, +whether in the mind there exists any other affirmation +or negation than that which the idea involves in so +far as it is an idea. For this purpose see the following, +so that thought may not fall into pictures. For by +ideas I do not understand the images which are formed +at the back of the eye, or, if you please, in the middle +of the brain, but rather the conceptions of thought.</p> + +<p>In the mind there exists no absolute faculty of willing +or not willing. Only individual volitions exist, that is +to say, this and that affirmation and this and that negation. +Let us conceive, therefore, any individual volition, +that is, any mode of thought, by which the mind +affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to +two right angles. This affirmation involves the conception +or idea of the triangle, that is to say, without +it the affirmation cannot be conceived. For to say that +<i>A</i> must involve the conception <i>B</i>, is the same as saying +that <i>A</i> cannot be conceived without <i>B</i>. Moreover, +without the idea of the triangle this affirmation cannot +be, and it can therefore neither be nor be conceived +without that idea. But this idea of the triangle must +involve this same affirmation that its three angles are +equal to two right angles. Therefore also, <i>vice versa</i>, +this idea of the triangle without this affirmation can<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[193]</a></span> +neither be nor be conceived. Therefore this affirmation +pertains to the essence of the idea of the triangle, +nor is it anything else besides this. Whatever too we +have said of this volition (since it has been taken +arbitrarily) applies to all other volitions, that is to say, +they are nothing but ideas.</p> + +<p>The will and the intellect are nothing but the individual +volitions and ideas themselves. But the individual +volition and idea are one and the same. Therefore +the will and the intellect are one and the same.</p> + + +<h4><i>False Doctrines about Error Exposed</i></h4> + +<p>I have thus removed what is commonly thought to be +the cause of error. It has been proved above that +falsity consists solely in the privation which mutilated +and confused ideas involve. A false idea, therefore, +in so far as it is false, does not involve certitude. Consequently, +when we say that a man assents to what is +false and does not doubt it, we do not say that he is +certain, but merely that he does not doubt, that is to +say, that he assents to what is false, because there +are no causes sufficient to make his imagination waver. +Although, therefore, a man may be supposed to adhere +to what is false, we shall never on that account say +that he is certain. For by certitude we understand +something positive, and not the privation of doubt; +but by the privation of certitude we understand falsity.</p> + +<p>If the preceding proposition, however, is to be more +clearly comprehended, a word or two must be added; +it yet remains also that I should answer the objections +which may be brought against our doctrine, and finally, +in order to remove all scruples, I have thought it worth<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[194]</a></span> +while to indicate some of its advantages. I say some, +as the principal advantages will be better understood +later.</p> + +<p>I begin, therefore, with the first, and I warn my +readers carefully to distinguish between an idea or +conception of the mind and the images of things formed +by our imagination. Secondly, it is necessary that we +should distinguish between ideas and the words by +which things are signified. For it is because these +three things, images, words, and ideas, are by many +people either altogether confounded or not distinguished +with sufficient accuracy and care that such +ignorance exists about this doctrine of the will, so +necessary to be known both for the purposes of speculation +and for the wise government of life. Those who +think that ideas consist of images, which are formed +in us by meeting with external bodies, persuade themselves +that those ideas of things of which we can form +no similar image are not ideas, but mere fancies constructed +by the free power of the will. They look upon +ideas, therefore, as dumb pictures on a tablet, and +being prepossessed with this prejudice, they do not see +that an idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves affirmation +or negation. Again, those who confound words +with the idea, or with the affirmation itself which the +idea involves, think that they can will contrary to their +perception, because they affirm or deny something in +words alone contrary to their perception. It will be +easy for us, however, to divest ourselves of these prejudices +if we attend to the nature of thought, which in +no way involves the conception of extension, and by +doing this we clearly see that an idea, since it is a mode<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[195]</a></span> +of thought, is not an image of anything, nor does it +consist of words. For the essence of words and images +is formed of bodily motions alone, which involve in no +way whatever the conception of thought.</p> + +<p>Let thus much suffice under this head. I pass on +now to the objections to which I have already alluded.</p> + + +<h4><i>Freedom of the Will</i></h4> + +<p>The first is, that it is supposed to be certain that the +will extends itself more widely than the intellect, and is +therefore different from it. The reason why men suppose +that the will extends itself more widely than the +intellect is because they say they have discovered that +they do not need a larger faculty of assent—that is to +say, of affirmation—and denial than that which they +now have for the purpose of assenting to an infinite +number of other things which we do not perceive, but +that they do need a greater faculty for understanding +them. The will, therefore, is distinguished from the +intellect, the latter being finite, the former infinite. +The second objection which can be made is that there is +nothing which experience seems to teach more clearly +than the possibility of suspending our judgment, so as +not to assent to the things we perceive; and we are +strengthened in this opinion because no one is said to +be deceived in so far as he perceives a thing, but only +in so far as he assents to it or dissents from it. For +example, a man who imagines a winged horse does not +therefore admit the existence of a winged horse; that +is to say, he is not necessarily deceived, unless he grants +at the same time that a winged horse exists. Experience, +therefore, seems to show nothing more plainly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[196]</a></span> +than that the will or faculty of assent is free, and different +from the faculty of the intellect.</p> + +<p>Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does +not seem to contain more reality than another; that is +to say, it does not appear that we need a greater power +for affirming a thing to be true which is true than for +affirming a thing to be true which is false. Nevertheless, +we observe that one idea contains more reality or +perfection than another, for as some objects are nobler +than others, in the same proportion are their ideas more +perfect. It appears indisputable, therefore, that there +is a difference between the will and the intellect.</p> + +<p>Fourthly, it may be objected that if a man does not +act from freedom of the will, what would he do if he +were in a state of equilibrium, like the ass of Buridanus? +Would he not perish from hunger and thirst? +and if this be granted, do we not seem to conceive him +as a statue of a man or as an ass? If I deny that he +would thus perish, he will consequently determine himself +and possess the power of going where he likes and +doing what he likes.</p> + +<p>There may be other objections besides these, +but as I am not bound to discuss what every one +may dream, I shall therefore make it my business to +answer as briefly as possible those only which I have +mentioned.</p> + +<p>In reply to the first objection, I grant that the will +extends itself more widely than the intellect, if by the +intellect we understand only clear and distinct ideas; +but I deny that the will extends itself more widely than +the perceptions or the faculty of conception; nor, indeed, +do I see why the faculty of will should be said<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[197]</a></span> +to be infinite any more than the faculty of feeling; for +as by the same faculty of will we can affirm an infinite +number of things (one after the other, for we cannot +affirm an infinite number of things at once), so also by +the same faculty of feeling we can feel or perceive +(one after another) an infinite number of bodies. If +it be said that there are an infinite number of things +which we cannot perceive, I reply that such things as +these we can reach by no thought, and consequently +by no faculty of will. But it is said that if God wished +us to perceive those things, it would be necessary for +Him to give us a larger faculty of perception, but not +a larger faculty of will than He has already given us, +which is the same thing as saying that if God wished +us to understand an infinite number of other beings, +it would be necessary for Him to give us a greater +intellect, but not a more universal idea of being (in +order to embrace that infinite number of beings), than +He has given us. For we have shown that the will is a +Universal, or the idea by which we explain all individual +volitions, that is to say, that which is common +to them all. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, +that those who believe this common or universal idea +of all the volitions to be a faculty should say that it +extends itself infinitely beyond the limits of the intellect. +For the universal is predicated of one or of +many, or of an infinite number of individuals.</p> + +<p>The second objection I answer by denying that we +have free power of suspending judgment. For when +we say that a person suspends judgment, we only say +in other words that he sees that he does not perceive +the thing adequately. The suspension of the judgment,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[198]</a></span> +therefore, is in truth a perception and not free will.</p> + +<p>In order that this may be clearly understood, let us +take the case of a boy who imagines a horse and perceives +nothing else. Since this imagination involves the +existence of the horse, and the boy does not perceive +anything which negates its existence, he will necessarily +contemplate it as present, nor will he be able +to doubt its existence although he may not be certain +of it. This is a thing which we daily experience in +dreams, nor do I believe that there is any one who +thinks that he has the free power during dreams of +suspending his judgment upon those things which he +dreams, and of causing himself not to dream those +things which he dreams that he sees; and yet in dreams +it nevertheless happens that we suspend our judgment, +for we dream that we dream.</p> + +<p>I grant, it is true, that no man is deceived in so far +as he perceives; that is to say, I grant that mental +images considered in themselves involve no error; but +I deny that a man in so far as he perceives affirms +nothing. For what else is it to perceive a winged horse +than to affirm of the horse that it has wings? For if +the mind perceived nothing else but this winged horse, +it would regard it as present, nor would it have any +reason for doubting its existence, nor any power of +refusing assent to it, unless the image of the winged +horse be joined to an idea which negates its existence, +or the mind perceives that the idea of the winged +horse which it has is inadequate. In either of the two +latter cases it will necessarily deny or doubt the existence +of the horse.</p> + +<p>With regard to the third objection, what has been<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[199]</a></span> +said will perhaps be a sufficient answer—namely, that +the will is something universal, which is predicated of +all ideas, and that it signifies that only which is common +to them all, that is to say, affirmation. Its adequate +essence, therefore, in so far as it is thus considered in +the abstract, must be in every idea, and in this sense +only must it be the same in all; but not in so far as it +is considered as constituting the essence of an idea, for +so far, the individual affirmations differ just as the ideas +differ. For example, the affirmation which the idea of +a circle involves differs from that which the idea of a +triangle involves, just as the idea of a circle differs +from the idea of a triangle. Again, I absolutely deny +that we need a power of thinking in order to affirm +that to be true which is true, equal to that which we +need in order to affirm that to be true which is false. +For these two affirmations, if we look to the mind, are +related to one another as being and non-being, for there +is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes a form of +falsity.</p> + +<p>Here therefore particularly is it to be observed how +easily we are deceived when we confuse universals with +individuals, and the entities of reason and abstractions +with realities.</p> + +<p>With regard to the fourth objection, I say that I +entirely grant that if a man were placed in such a state +of equilibrium he would perish of hunger and thirst, +supposing he perceived nothing but hunger and thirst, +and the food and drink which were equidistant from +him. If you ask me whether such a man would not +be thought an ass rather than a man, I reply that I do +not know; nor do I know what ought to be thought of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[200]</a></span> +a man who hangs himself, or of children, fools, and +madmen.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Independence of Mind and Body</i></h4> + +<p>All modes of thought have God for a cause in so far +as He is a thinking thing, and not in so far as He is +manifested by any other attribute. That which determines +the mind to thought, therefore, is a mode of +thought and not of extension, that is to say, it is not +the body. Again, the motion and rest of the body must +be derived from some other body, which has also been +determined to motion or rest by another, and, absolutely, +whatever arises in the body must arise from +God, in so far as He is considered as affected by some +mode of extension, and not in so far as He is considered +as affected by any mode of thought, that is to say, +whatever arises in the body cannot arise from the mind, +which is a mode of thought. Therefore, the body cannot +determine the mind to thought, neither can the +mind determine the body to motion nor rest, nor to +anything else, if there be anything else.</p> + +<p>This proposition will be better understood from what +has been said, that is to say, that the mind and the +body are one and the same thing, conceived at one time +under the attribute of thought, and at another under +that of extension. For this reason, the order or concatenation +of things is one, whether nature be conceived +under this or under that attribute, and consequently +the order of the actions and passions of our +body is coincident in Nature with the order of the actions +and passions of the mind.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[201]</a></span></p> + +<p>Although these things are so, and no ground for +doubting remains, I scarcely believe, nevertheless, that, +without a proof derived from experience, men will be +induced calmly to weigh what has been said, so firmly +are they persuaded that, solely at the bidding of the +mind, the body moves or rests, and does a number of +things which depend upon the will of the mind alone, +and upon the power of thought. For what the body +can do no one has hitherto determined, that is to say, +experience has taught no one hitherto what the body, +without being determined by the mind, can do and +what it cannot do from the laws of Nature alone, in +so far as Nature is considered merely as corporeal. +For no one as yet has understood the structure of the +body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions, +not to mention the fact that many things are +observed in brutes which far surpass human sagacity, +and that sleep-walkers in their sleep do very many +things which they dare not do when awake; all this +showing that the body itself can do many things from +the laws of its own nature alone at which the mind +belonging to that body is amazed.</p> + +<p>Again, nobody knows by what means or by what +method the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees +of motion it can communicate to the body, nor +with what speed it can move the body. So that it follows +that when men say that this or that action of the +body springs from the mind which has commanded over +the body, they do not know what they say, and they +do nothing but confess with pretentious words that they +know nothing about the cause of the action, and see +nothing in it to wonder at.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[202]</a></span></p> + +<p>But they will say, that whether they know or do +not know by what means the mind moves the body, it +is nevertheless in their experience that if the mind +were not fit for thinking the body would be inert. They +say, again, it is in their experience that the mind alone +has power both to speak and be silent, and to do many +other things which they therefore think to be dependent +on a decree of the mind.</p> + +<p>But with regard to the first assertion, I ask them if +experience does not also teach that if the body be +sluggish the mind at the same time is not fit for thinking? +When the body is asleep, the mind slumbers +with it, and has not the power to think, as it has when +the body is awake. Again, I believe that all have discovered +that the mind is not always equally fitted for +thinking about the same subject, but in proportion to +the fitness of the body for this or that image to be +excited in it will the mind be better fitted to contemplate +this or that object. But my opponents will say, +that from the laws of Nature alone, in so far as it is +considered to be corporeal merely, it cannot be that +the causes of architecture, painting, and things of this +sort, which are the results of human art alone, could +be deduced, and that the human body, unless it were +determined and guided by the mind, would not be able +to build a temple. I have already shown, however, +that they do not know what the body can do, nor +what can be deduced from the consideration of its +nature alone, and that they find that many things are +done merely by the laws of Nature which they would +never have believed to be possible without the direction +of the mind, as, for example, those things which sleep-<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[203]</a></span>walkers +do in their sleep, and at which they themselves +are astonished when they wake. I adduce also here the +structure itself of the human body, which so greatly +surpasses in workmanship all those things which are +constructed by human art, not to mention what I +have already proved, that an infinitude of things follows +from Nature under whatever attribute it may be +considered.</p> + +<p>With regard to the second point, I should say that +human affairs would be much more happily conducted +if it were equally in the power of men to be silent and +to speak. But experience shows over and over again +that there is nothing which men have less power over +than the tongue, and that there is nothing which they +are less able to do than to govern their appetites, so +that many persons believe that we do those things only +with freedom which we seek indifferently; as the desire +for such things can easily be lessened by the recollection +of another thing which we frequently call to +mind; it being impossible, on the other hand, to do +those things with freedom which we seek with such +ardor that the recollection of another thing is unable +to mitigate it.</p> + +<p>But if, however, we had not found out that we do +many things which we afterwards repent, and that +when agitated by conflicting emotions we see that which +is better and follow that which is worse, nothing would +hinder us from believing that we do everything with +freedom. Thus the infant believes that it is by free +will that it seeks the breast; the angry boy believes +that by free will he wishes vengeance; the timid man +thinks it is with free will he seeks flight; the drunkard<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[204]</a></span> +believes that by a free command of his mind he speaks +the things which when sober he wishes he had left +unsaid. Thus the madman, the chatterer, the boy, and +others of the same kind, all believe that they speak by +a free command of the mind, whilst, in truth, they +have no power to restrain the impulse which they have +to speak, so that experience itself, no less than reason, +clearly teaches that men believe themselves to be free +simply because they are conscious of their own actions, +knowing nothing of the causes by which they are determined. +It<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> teaches, too, that the decrees of the mind +are nothing but the appetites themselves, which differ, +therefore, according to the different temper of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[205]</a></span> +body. For every man determines all things from his +emotion; those who are agitated by contrary emotions +do not know what they want, whilst those who are +agitated by no emotion are easily driven hither and +thither.</p> + +<p>All this plainly shows that the decree of the mind, +the appetite, and determination of the body are coincident +in Nature, or rather that they are one and the +same thing, which, when it is considered under the +attribute of thought and manifested by that, is called +a decree, and when it is considered under the attribute +of extension and is deduced from the laws of motion +and rest, is called a determination.</p> + +<p>This, however, will be better understood as we go on, +for there is another thing which I wish to be observed +here—that we cannot by a mental decree do a thing +unless we recollect it. We cannot speak a word, for +instance, unless we recollect it. But it is not in the +free power of the mind either to recollect a thing or to +forget it. It is believed, therefore, that the power of +the mind extends only thus far—that from a mental +decree we can speak or be silent about a thing only +when we recollect it. But when we dream that we +speak, we believe that we do so from a free decree of +the mind; and yet we do not speak, or, if we do, it is +the result of a spontaneous motion of the body. We +dream, again, that we are concealing things, and that +we do this by virtue of a decree of the mind like that +by which, when awake, we are silent about things we +know. We dream, again, that from a decree of the +mind, we do some things which we should not dare +to do when awake. And I should like to know, there<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[206]</a></span>fore, +whether there are two kinds of decrees in the +mind—one belonging to dreams and the other free. +If this be too great nonsense, we must necessarily +grant that this decree of the mind, which is believed +to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination +or memory, and is nothing but the affirmation which +the idea necessarily involves in so far as it is an idea. +These decrees of the mind, therefore, arise in the mind +by the same necessity as the ideas of things actually +existing. Consequently, those who believe that they +speak, or are silent, or do anything else from a free +decree of the mind, dream with their eyes open.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Moral Values of Determinism</i></h4> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<p>It remains for me now to show what service to our +own lives a knowledge of this doctrine is. This we +shall easily understand from the remarks which follow. +Notice—</p> + +<p>1. It is of service in so far as it teaches us that we +do everything by the will of God alone, and that we +are partakers of the divine nature in proportion as our +actions become more and more perfect and we more +and more understand God. This doctrine, therefore, +besides giving repose in every way to the soul, has also +this advantage, that it teaches us in what our highest +happiness or blessedness consists, namely, in the knowledge +of God alone, by which we are drawn to do those +things only which love and piety persuade. Hence we +clearly see how greatly those stray from the true +estimation of virtue who expect to be distinguished<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[207]</a></span> +by God with the highest rewards for virtue and the +noblest actions as if for the completest servitude, just +as if virtue itself and the service of God were not +happiness itself and the highest liberty.</p> + +<p>2. It is of service to us in so far as it teaches us +how we ought to behave with regard to the things of +fortune, or those which are not in our power, that is +to say, which do not follow from our own nature; for +it teaches us with equal mind to wait for and bear +each form of fortune, because we know that all things +follow from the eternal decree of God, according to +that same necessity by which it follows from the essence +of a triangle that its three angles are equal to +two right angles.</p> + +<p>3. This doctrine contributes to the welfare of our +social existence, since it teaches us to hate no one, to +despise no one, to mock no one, to be angry with no +one, and to envy no one. It teaches every one, moreover, +to be content with his own, and to be helpful to +his neighbor, not from any womanish pity, from partiality, +or superstition, but by the guidance of reason +alone, according to the demand of time and circumstance, +as I shall show.</p> + +<p>4. This doctrine contributes not a little to the advantage +of common society, in so far as it teaches us by +what means citizens are to be governed and led; not +in order that they may be slaves, but that they may +freely do those things which are best.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<p>At<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> last I see, what it was that you begged me not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[208]</a></span> +to publish. However, as it forms the chief foundation +of everything in the treatise<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> which I intend to bring +out, I should like briefly to explain here, in what sense +I assert that a fatal necessity presides over all things +and actions.</p> + +<p>God I in no wise subject to fate: I conceive that +all things follow with inevitable necessity from the +nature of God, in the same way as every one conceives +that it follows from God's nature that God understands +Himself. This latter consequence all admit to follow +necessarily from the divine nature, yet no one conceives +that God is under the compulsion of any fate, but that +He understands Himself quite freely, though necessarily.</p> + +<p>Further, this inevitable necessity in things does +away neither with divine nor human laws. The principles +of morality, whether they receive from God +Himself the form of laws or institutions, or whether +they do not, are still divine and salutary; whether we +receive the good, which flows from virtue and the +divine love, as from God in the capacity of a judge, +or as from the necessity of the divine nature, it will +in either case be equally desirable; on the other hand, +the evils following from wicked actions and passions +are not less to be feared because they are necessary +consequences.<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> Lastly, in our actions, whether they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[209]</a></span> +be necessary or contingent, we are led by hope and +fear.</p> + +<p>Men are only without excuse before God, because +they are in God's power, as clay is in the hands of the +potter, who from the same lump makes vessels, some +to honor, some to dishonor.... +<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> +When I said in my former letter that we are inexcusable, +because we are in the power of God, like +clay in the hands of the potter, I meant to be understood +in the sense that no one can bring a complaint +against God for having given him a weak nature, or +infirm spirit. A circle might as well complain to God +for not being endowed with the properties of a sphere, +or a child who is tortured, say, with stone, for not +being given a healthy body, as a man of feeble spirit, +because God has denied to him fortitude, and the true +knowledge and love of the Deity, or because he is +endowed with so weak a nature that he cannot check +or moderate his desires. For the nature of each thing +is only competent to do that which follows necessarily +from its given cause.</p> + +<p>That every man cannot be brave, and that we can +no more command for ourselves a healthy body than a +healthy mind, nobody can deny, without giving the lie +to experience, as well as to reason. "But," you urge, +"if men sin by nature, they are excusable"; but you<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[210]</a></span> +do not state the conclusion you draw, whether that +God cannot be angry with them, or that they are +worthy of blessedness—that is, of the knowledge and +love of God. If you say the former, I fully admit that +God cannot be angry, and that all things are done in +accordance with His will; but I deny that all men +ought, therefore, to be blessed—men may be excusable, +and nevertheless, be without blessedness and afflicted +in many ways.<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> A horse is excusable for being a horse +and not a man; but, nevertheless, he must needs be +a horse and not a man. He who goes mad from the +bite of a dog is excusable, yet he is rightly suffocated. +Lastly, he who cannot govern his desires, and keep +them in check with the fear of the laws, though his +weakness may be excusable, yet he cannot enjoy with +contentment, the knowledge and love of God, but +necessarily perishes.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> ... I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by +the necessity of its own nature. Thus also God understands Himself +and all things freely, because it follows solely from the necessity of +His nature that He should understand all things. You see I do not +place freedom in free decision, but in free necessity. However, let +us descend to created things, which are all determined by external +causes to exist and operate in a given determinate manner. In +order that this may be clearly understood, let us conceive a very +simple thing. For instance, a stone receives from the impulsion of +an external cause a certain quantity of motion, by virtue of which +it continues to move after the impulsion given by the external cause +has ceased. The permanence of the stone's motion is constrained, +not necessary because it must be defined by the impulsion of an +external cause. What is true of the stone is true of an individual, +however complicated its nature, or varied its functions, inasmuch as +every individual thing is necessarily determined by some external +cause to exist and operate in a fixed and determinate manner. +</p><p> +Further conceive, I beg, that a stone, while continuing in motion, +should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is endeavoring, +as far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being conscious +merely of its own endeavor and not at all indifferent, would believe +itself to be completely free, and would think that it continued in +motion solely because of its own wish. This is that human freedom, +which all boast that they possess, and which consists solely in the +fact, that men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of +the causes whereby that desire has been determined.<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> ...</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>From a letter to G. H. Schaller</i> (1674).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>From a letter to Henry Oldenburg</i> (Dec., 1675).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> The <i>Ethics</i>.—<span class="smcap">Ed.</span></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> I received on Saturday last your very short letter dated 15th +Nov. In it you merely indicated the points in the theological +treatise which have given pain to readers, whereas I had hoped to +learn from it what were the opinions which militated against the +practice of religious virtue.... I make this chief distinction between +religion and superstition; the latter is founded on ignorance, +the former on knowledge. This, I take it, is the reason why +Christians are distinguished from the rest of the world, not by +faith, nor by charity, nor by the other fruits of the Holy Spirit, +but solely by their opinions, inasmuch as they defend their cause, +like every one else, by miracles, that is, by ignorance, which is the +source of all malice. Thus they turn a faith, which may be true, +into superstition. <i>From a letter to Henry Oldenburg</i> (Dec., 1675).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>From a letter to Henry Oldenburg</i> (Feb. 7, 1676).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> A mouse no less than an angel, and sorrow no less than joy +depend on God; yet a mouse is not a kind of angel, neither is sorrow +a kind of joy. <i>From a letter to Wm. Blyenbergh</i> (March 13, 1665).</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[211]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER XII</h2> + +<h3>THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE +EMOTIONS</h3> + + +<h4><i>Introductory</i></h4> + +<p>Most persons who have written about the emotions +and man's conduct of life seem to discuss, not the +natural things which follow the common laws of Nature, +but things which are outside her. They seem indeed +to consider man in Nature as a kingdom within a +kingdom. For they believe that man disturbs rather +than follows her order; that he has an absolute power +over his own actions; and that he is altogether self-determined. +They then proceed to attribute the cause +of human weakness and changeableness, not to the +common power of Nature, but to some vice of human +nature, which they therefore bewail, laugh at, mock, +or, as is more generally the case, detest; whilst he who +knows how to revile most eloquently or subtilely the +weakness of the mind is looked upon as divine.</p> + +<p>It is true that very eminent men have not been wanting, +to whose labor and industry we confess ourselves +much indebted, who have written many excellent things +about the right conduct of life, and who have given to +mortals counsels full of prudence. But no one so far +as I know has determined the nature and strength of +the emotions, and what the mind is able to do towards<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[212]</a></span> +controlling them. I remember, indeed, that the celebrated +Descartes, although he believed that the mind +is absolute master over its own actions, tried nevertheless +to explain by their first causes human emotions, +and at the same time to show the way by which the +mind could obtain absolute power over them. But in +my opinion he has shown nothing but the acuteness of +his great intellect, as I shall make evident in the proper +place, for I wish to return to those who prefer to detest +and scoff at human affects and actions than understand +them.</p> + +<p>To such as these it will doubtless seem a marvelous +thing for me to endeavor to treat by a geometrical +method the vices and follies of men, and to desire by +a sure method to demonstrate those things which these +people cry out against as being opposed to reason, or +as being vanities, absurdities, and monstrosities. The +following is my reason for so doing. Nothing happens +in Nature which can be attributed to any vice of Nature, +for she is always the same and everywhere one. +Her virtue is the same, and her power of acting; that is +to say, her laws and rules, according to which all things +are and are changed from form to form, are everywhere +and always the same; so that there must also be one +and the same method of understanding the nature of +all things whatsoever, that is to say, by the universal +laws and rules of Nature. The emotions, therefore, of +hatred, anger, envy, considered in themselves, follow +from the same necessity and virtue of Nature as other +individual things; they have therefore certain causes +through which they are to be understood, and certain +properties which are just as worthy of being known<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[213]</a></span> +as the properties of any other thing in the contemplation +alone of which we delight. I shall, therefore, pursue +the same method in considering the nature and +strength of the emotions and the power of the mind +over them which I pursued in our previous discussion +of God and the mind, and I shall consider human actions +and appetites just as if I were considering lines, +planes or bodies.</p> + + +<h4><i>Definitions</i></h4> + +<p>I.—I call that an adequate cause whose effect can +be clearly and distinctly perceived by means of the +cause. I call that an inadequate or partial cause whose +effect cannot be understood by means of the cause +alone.</p> + +<p>II.—I say that we act when anything is done, either +within us or without us, of which we are the adequate +cause, that is to say (by the preceding Definition), +when from our nature anything follows, either within +us or without us, which by that nature alone can be +clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, +I say that we suffer when anything is done within +us, or when anything follows from our nature, of which +we are not the cause excepting partially.</p> + +<p>III.—By emotion I understand the modifications of +the body, by which the power of acting of the body itself +is increased, diminished, helped, or hindered, +together with the ideas of these modifications.</p> + +<p>If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of any +of these modifications, I understand the emotion to be +an action, otherwise it is a passion.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[214]</a></span></p> + + +<h4><i>Postulates</i></h4> + +<p>1.—The human body can be affected in many ways +by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, +and also in other ways which make its power of acting +neither greater nor less.</p> + +<p>2.—The human body is capable of suffering many +changes, and, nevertheless, can retain the impressions +or traces of objects, and consequently the same images +of things.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Two States of Mind: Active and Passive</i></h4> + +<p>In every human mind some ideas are adequate, and +others mutilated and confused. But the ideas which +in any mind are adequate are adequate in God in so +far as He forms the essence of that mind, while those +again which are inadequate in the mind are also adequate +in God, not in so far as He contains the essence +of that mind only, but in so far as He contains the +ideas of other things at the same time in Himself. +Again, from any given idea some effect must necessarily +follow, of which God is the adequate cause, not +in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is considered +as affected with the given idea. But of that +effect of which God is the cause, in so far as He is +affected by an idea which is adequate in any mind, +that same mind is the adequate cause. Our mind, +therefore, in so far as it has adequate ideas, necessarily +at times acts. Again, if there be anything which +necessarily follows from an idea which is adequate in +God, not in so far as He contains within Himself the +mind of one man only, but also, together with this, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[215]</a></span> +ideas<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> of other things, then the mind of that man is +not the adequate cause of that thing, but is only its +partial cause, and therefore, in so far as the mind has +inadequate ideas, it necessarily at times suffers.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Basic Endeavor of All Things</i></h4> + +<p>Individual things are modes by which the attributes +of God are expressed in a certain and determinate +manner; that is to say, they are things which express +in a certain and determinate manner the power of God, +by which He is and acts. A thing, too, has nothing in +itself through which it can be destroyed, or which can +negate its existence,<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> but, on the contrary, it is opposed +to everything which could negate its existence. +Therefore, in so far as it can and is in itself, it endeavors +to persevere in its own being.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Three Primary Emotions</i></h4> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<h4><i>Desire</i></h4> + +<p>The essence of the mind is composed of adequate and +inadequate ideas (as we have shown), and therefore +both in so far as it has the former and in so far as it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[216]</a></span> +has the latter, it endeavors to persevere in its being, +and endeavors to persevere in it for an indefinite time. +But since the mind, through the ideas of the modifications +of the body, is necessarily conscious of itself, +it is therefore conscious of its effort.</p> + +<p>This effort, when it is related to the mind alone, is +called <i>will</i>, but when it is related at the same time both +to the mind and the body, is called <i>appetite</i>, which is +therefore nothing but the very essence of man, from +the nature of which necessarily follow those things +which promote his preservation, and thus he is determined +to do those things. Hence there is no difference +between appetite and desire, unless in this particular, +that desire is generally related to men in so +far as they are conscious of their appetites, and it +may therefore be defined as appetite of which we are +conscious. From what has been said it is plain, therefore, +that we neither strive for, wish, seek, nor desire +anything because we think it to be good, but, on the +contrary, we adjudge a thing to be good because we +strive for, wish, seek, or desire it.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<h4><i>Joy and Sorrow</i></h4> + +<p>If anything increases, diminishes, helps, or limits +our body's power of action, the idea of that thing increases, +diminishes, helps, or limits our mind's power +of thought.</p> + +<p>We thus see that the mind can suffer great changes, +and can pass now to a greater and now to a lesser perfection; +these passions explaining to us the emotions of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[217]</a></span> +joy and sorrow. By <i>joy</i>, therefore, in what follows, +I shall understand the passion by which the mind +passes to a greater perfection; by <i>sorrow</i>, on the other +hand, the passion by which it passes to a less perfection. +The emotion of joy, related at the same time both +to the mind and the body, I call <i>pleasurable excitement</i> +(<i>titillatio</i>) or <i>cheerfulness</i>; that of sorrow I call <i>pain</i> +or <i>melancholy</i>. It is, however, to be observed that +pleasurable excitement and pain are related to a man +when one of his parts is affected more than the others; +cheerfulness and melancholy, on the other hand, when +all parts are equally affected. What the nature of desire +is I have explained; and besides these three—joy, +sorrow, and desire—I know of no other primary emotion, +the others springing from these.</p> + + +<h4><i>Definitions of the Principal Emotions</i></h4> + +<p>I.—<i>Desire</i> is the essence itself of man in so far as it +is conceived as determined to any action by any one +of his modifications.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—We have said above, that desire is +appetite which is self-conscious, and that appetite is +the essence itself of man in so far as it is determined +to such acts as contribute to his preservation. But I +have taken care to remark that in truth I cannot recognize +any difference between human appetite and desire. +For whether a man be conscious of his appetite +or not, it remains one and the same appetite, and +so, lest I might appear to be guilty of tautology, I have +not explained desire by appetite, but have tried to give +such a definition of desire as would include all the +efforts of human nature to which we give the name of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[218]</a></span> +appetite, desire, will, or impulse. For I might have +said that desire is the essence itself of man in so far +as it is considered as determined to any action; but +from this definition it would not follow that the mind +could be conscious of its desire or appetite, and therefore, +in order that I might include the cause of this +consciousness, it was necessary to add the words, <i>in so +far as it is conceived as determined to any action by +any one of his modifications</i>. For by a modification of +the human essence we understand any constitution of +that essence, whether it be innate, whether it be conceived +through the attribute of thought alone or of +extension alone, or whether it be related to both. By +the word "desire," therefore, I understand all the +efforts, impulses, appetites, and volitions of a man, +which vary according to his changing disposition, and +not unfrequently are so opposed to one another that +he is drawn hither and thither, and knows not whither +he ought to turn.</p> + +<p>II. <i>Joy</i> is man's passage from a less to a greater +perfection.</p> + +<p>III. <i>Sorrow</i> is man's passage from a greater to a +less perfection.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—I say passage, for joy is not perfection +itself. If a man were born with the perfection to +which he passes, he would possess it without the emotion +of joy; a truth which will appear the more clearly +from the emotion of sorrow, which is the opposite to +joy. For that sorrow consists in the passage to a less +perfection, but not in the less perfection itself, no one +can deny, since in so far as a man shares any perfection +he cannot be sad. Nor can we say that sorrow<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[219]</a></span> +consists in the privation of a greater perfection for +privation is nothing. But the emotion of sorrow is a +reality, and it therefore must be the reality of the +passage to a lesser perfection, or the reality by which +man's power of acting is diminished or limited. As +for the definitions of cheerfulness, pleasurable excitement, +melancholy, and grief, I pass these by, because +they are related rather to the body than to the mind, +and are merely different kinds of joy or of sorrow.</p> + +<p>IV. <i>Astonishment</i> is the imagination of an object +in which the mind remains fixed because this particular +imagination has no connection with others.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—That which causes the mind from the +contemplation of one thing immediately to pass to the +thought of another is that the images of these things +are connected one with the other, and are so arranged +that the one follows the other; a process which cannot +be conceived when the image of the thing is new, +for the mind will be held in the contemplation of the +same object until other causes determine it to think of +other things. The imagination, therefore, considered +in itself, of a new object is of the same character as +other imaginations; and for this reason I do not class +astonishment among the emotions, nor do I see any reason +why I should do it, since this abstraction of the +mind arises from no positive cause by which it is abstracted +from other things, but merely from the absence +of any cause by which from the contemplation +of one thing the mind is determined to think other +things. I acknowledge, therefore, only three primitive +or primary emotions, those of joy, sorrow, and desire; +and the only reason which has induced me to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[220]</a></span> +speak of astonishment is, that it has been the custom to +give other names to certain emotions derived from the +three primitives whenever these emotions are related to +objects at which we are astonished. This same reason +also induces me to add the definition of contempt.</p> + +<p>V. <i>Contempt</i> is the imagination of an object which +so little touches the mind that the mind is moved by +the presence of the object to imagine those qualities +which are not in it rather than those which are in it.</p> + +<p>The definitions of veneration and scorn I pass by +here, because they give a name, so far as I know, to +none of the emotions.</p> + +<p>VI. <i>Love</i> is joy with the accompanying idea of an +external cause.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—This definition explains with sufficient +clearness the essence of love; that which is given by +some authors, who define love to be the will of the +lover to unite himself to the beloved object, expresses +not the essence of love but one of its properties. In +as much as these authors have not seen with sufficient +clearness what is the essence of love, they could not +have a distinct conception of its properties, and consequently +their definition has by everybody been +thought very obscure. I must observe, however, when +I say that it is a property in a lover to will a union +with the beloved object, that I do not understand by +will a consent or deliberation or a free decree of the +mind (for that this is a fiction we have demonstrated +above), nor even a desire of the lover to unite himself +with the beloved object when it is absent, nor a desire +to continue in its presence when it is present, for love +can be conceived without either one or the other of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[221]</a></span> +these desires; but by will I understand the satisfaction +that the beloved object produces in the lover by +its presence, by virtue of which the joy of the lover is +strengthened, or at any rate supported.</p> + +<p>VII. <i>Hatred</i> is sorrow with the accompanying idea +of an external cause.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—What is to be observed here will easily +be seen from what has been said in the explanation of +the preceding definition.</p> + +<p>VIII. <i>Inclination</i> (<i>propensio</i>) is a joy with the accompanying +idea of some object as being accidentally +the cause of joy.</p> + +<p>IX. <i>Aversion</i> is sorrow with the accompanying idea +of some object which is accidentally the cause of the +sorrow.</p> + +<p>X. <i>Devotion</i> is love towards an object which astonishes +us.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—Astonishment arises from the novelty +of the object. If, therefore, it should happen that we +often imagine the object at which we are astonished, +we shall cease to be astonished at it, and hence we see +that the emotion of devotion easily degenerates into +simple love.</p> + +<p>XI. <i>Derision</i> is joy arising from the imagination that +something we despise is present in an object we hate.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—In so far as we despise a thing we hate +do we deny its existence, and so far do we rejoice. But +inasmuch as we suppose that a man hates what he ridicules, +it follows that this joy is not solid.</p> + +<p>XII. <i>Hope</i> is a joy not constant, arising from the +idea of something future or past, about the issue of +which we sometimes doubt.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[222]</a></span></p> + +<p>XIII. <i>Fear</i> is a sorrow not constant, arising from the +idea of something future or past, about the issue of +which we sometimes doubt.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—From these definitions it follows that +there is no hope without fear nor fear without hope, +for the person who wavers in hope and doubts concerning +the issue of anything is supposed to imagine something +which may exclude its existence, and so far, +therefore, to be sad, and consequently while he wavers +in hope, to fear lest his wishes should not be accomplished. +So also the person who fears, that is to say, +who doubts whether what he hates will not come to +pass, imagines something which excludes the existence +of what he hates, and therefore is rejoiced, and consequently +so far hopes that it will not happen.</p> + +<p>XIV. <i>Confidence</i> is joy arising from the idea of a +past or future object from which cause for doubting is +removed.</p> + +<p>XV. <i>Despair</i> is sorrow arising from the idea of a +past or future object from which cause for doubting is +removed.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—Confidence, therefore, springs from +hope and despair from fear, whenever the reason for +doubting the issue is taken away; a case which occurs +either because we imagine a thing past or future to be +present and contemplate it as present, or because we +imagine other things which exclude the existence of +those which made us to doubt.</p> + +<p>For although we can never be sure about the issue of +individual objects, it may nevertheless happen that we +do not doubt it. For elsewhere we have shown that it +is one thing not to doubt and another to possess certi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[223]</a></span>tude, +and so it may happen that from the image of an +object either past or future we are affected with the +same emotion of joy or sorrow as that by which we +should be affected from the image of an object present.</p> + +<p>XVI. <i>Gladness</i> (<i>gaudium</i>) is a joy with the accompanying +idea of something past, which, unhoped for, +has happened.</p> + +<p>XVII. <i>Remorse</i> is sorrow with the accompanying +idea of something past, which, unhoped for, has happened.</p> + +<p>XVIII. <i>Commiseration</i> is sorrow with the accompanying +idea of evil which has happened to some one +whom we imagine like ourselves.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—Between commiseration and compassion +there seems to be no difference, excepting perhaps +that commiseration refers rather to an individual emotion +and compassion to it as a habit.</p> + +<p>XIX. <i>Favor</i> is love towards those who have benefited +others.</p> + +<p>XX. <i>Indignation</i> is hatred towards those who have +injured others.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—I am aware that these names in common +bear a different meaning. But my object is not +to explain the meaning of words but the nature of +things, and to indicate them by words whose customary +meaning shall not be altogether opposed to the meaning +which I desire to bestow upon them. I consider +it sufficient to have said this once for all.</p> + +<p>XXI. <i>Over-estimation</i> consists in thinking too highly +of another person in consequence of our love for him.</p> + +<p>XXII. <i>Contempt</i> consists in thinking too little of +another person in consequence of our hatred for him.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[224]</a></span></p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—Over-estimation and contempt are +therefore respectively effects or properties of love or +hatred, and so over-estimation may be defined as love +in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too much +of the beloved object; and, on the contrary, contempt +may be defined as hatred in so far as it affects a man +so that he thinks too little of the object he hates.</p> + +<p>XXIII. <i>Envy</i> is hatred in so far as it affects a man +so that he is sad at the good fortune of another person +and is glad when any evil happens to him.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—To envy is generally opposed compassion +(<i>misericordia</i>), which may therefore be defined +as follows, notwithstanding the usual signification of the +word:—</p> + +<p>XXIV. <i>Compassion</i> is love in so far as it affects a +man so that he is glad at the prosperity of another person +and is sad when any evil happens to him.</p> + +<p>I pass now to consider other emotions which are attended +by the idea of something within us as the cause.</p> + +<p>XXV. <i>Self-satisfaction</i> is the joy which is produced +by contemplating ourselves and our own power of +action.</p> + +<p>XXVI. <i>Humility</i> is the sorrow which is produced by +contemplating our impotence or helplessness.</p> + +<p>Self-satisfaction is opposed to humility in so far as +we understand by the former the joy which arises from +contemplating our power of action, but in so far as we +understand by it joy attended with the idea of something +done, which we believe has been done by a free +decree of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which +we may thus define:—</p> + +<p>XXVII. <i>Repentance</i> is sorrow accompanied with the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[225]</a></span> +idea of something done which we believe has been done +by a free decree of our mind.</p> + +<p>It is not to be wondered at that sorrow should always +follow all those actions which are from <i>custom</i> +called wicked, and that joy should follow those which +are called good. But that this is chiefly the effect of +education will be evident from what we have before +said. Parents, by reprobating what are called bad +actions, and frequently blaming their children whenever +they commit them, while they persuade them to what +are called good actions, and praise their children when +they perform them, have caused the emotions of sorrow +to connect themselves with the former, and those +of joy with the latter. Experience proves this, for +custom and religion are not the same everywhere; but, +on the contrary, things which are sacred to some are +profane to others, and what are honorable with some +are disgraceful with others. Education alone, therefore, +will determine whether a man will repent of any +deed or boast of it.</p> + +<p>XXVIII. <i>Pride</i> is thinking too much of ourselves, +through self-love.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—Pride differs, therefore, from over-estimation, +inasmuch as the latter is related to an external +object, but pride to the man himself who thinks +of himself too highly. As over-estimation, therefore, +is an effect or property of love, so pride is an effect or +property of self-love, and it may therefore be defined as +love of ourselves or self-satisfaction, in so far as it +affects us so that we think too highly of ourselves.</p> + +<p>To this emotion a contrary does not exist, for no one, +through hatred of himself, thinks too little of himself;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[226]</a></span> +indeed, we may say that no one thinks too little of himself, +in so far as he imagines himself unable to do this +or that thing. For whatever he imagines that he cannot +do, that thing he necessarily imagines, and by his imagination +is so disposed that he is actually incapable of +doing what he imagines he cannot do. So long, therefore, +as he imagines himself unable to do this or that +thing, so long is he not determined to do it, and consequently +so long it is impossible for him to do it. If, +however, we pay attention to what depends upon opinion +alone, we shall be able to conceive it possible for +a man to think too little of himself, for it may happen +that while he sorrowfully contemplates his own weakness +he will imagine himself despised by everybody, +although nothing could be further from their thoughts +than to despise him. A man may also think too little +of himself if in the present he denies something of +himself in relation to a future time of which he is not +sure; for example, when he denies that he can conceive +of nothing with certitude, and that he can desire and +do nothing which is not wicked and base. We may +also say that a man thinks too little of himself when +we see that, from an excess of fear or shame, he does +not dare to do what others who are his equals dare to +do. This emotion, to which I will give the name of +despondency, may therefore be opposed to pride; for +as self-satisfaction springs from pride, so despondency +springs from humility, and it may therefore be defined +thus:</p> + +<p>XXIX. <i>Despondency</i> is thinking too little of ourselves +through sorrow.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—We are, nevertheless, often in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[227]</a></span> +habit of opposing humility to pride, but only when we +attend to their effects rather than to their nature. For +we are accustomed to call a man proud who boasts too +much, who talks about nothing but his own virtues and +other people's vices, who wishes to be preferred to +everybody else, and who marches along with that stateliness +and pomp which belong to others whose position +is far above his. On the other hand, we call a man +humble who often blushes, who confesses his own +faults and talks about the virtues of others, who yields +to every one, who walks with bended head, and who +neglects to adorn himself. These emotions, humility +and despondency, are very rare, for human nature, considered +in itself, struggles against them as much as it +can, and hence those who have the most credit for +being abject and humble are generally the most ambitious +and envious.</p> + +<p>XXX. Self-exaltation is joy with the accompanying +idea of some action we have done, which we imagine +people praise.</p> + +<p>XXXI. <i>Shame</i> is sorrow, with the accompanying +idea of some action which we imagine people blame.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—A difference, however, is here to be +observed between shame and modesty. Shame is sorrow +which follows a deed of which we are ashamed. +Modesty is the dread or fear of shame, which keeps +a man from committing any disgraceful act. To +modesty is usually opposed impudence, which indeed +is not an emotion, as I shall show in the proper place; +but the names of emotions, as I have already said, are +matters rather of custom than indications of the nature +of the emotions. I have thus discharged the task<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[228]</a></span> +which I set myself of explaining the emotions of joy +and sorrow. I will advance now to those which I +ascribe to desire.</p> + +<p>XXXII. <i>Regret</i> is the desire or longing to possess +something, the emotion being strengthened by the memory +of the object itself, and at the same time being restrained +by the memory of other things which exclude +the existence of the desired object.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—Whenever we recollect a thing, as we +have often said, we are thereby necessarily disposed to +contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were +present before us. But this disposition or effort, while +we are awake, is generally restrained by the images of +things which exclude the existence of the thing which +we recollect. Whenever, therefore, we recollect a thing +which affects us with any kind of joy, we thereby endeavor +to contemplate it with the same emotion of joy +as if it were present,—an attempt which is, however, +immediately restrained by the memory of that which +excludes the existence of the thing. Regret, therefore, +is really a sorrow which is opposed to the joy which +arises from the absence of what we hate. But because +the name <i>regret</i> seems to connect this emotion with +desire, I therefore ascribe it to desire.</p> + +<p>XXXIII. <i>Emulation</i> is the desire which is begotten +in us of a thing because we imagine that other persons +have the same desire.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—He who seeks flight because others +seek it, he who fears because he sees others fear, or +even he who withdraws his hand and moves his body +as if his hand were burning because he sees that another +person has burnt his hand, such as these, I say,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[229]</a></span> +although they may indeed imitate the emotion of another, +are not said to emulate it; not because we have +recognized one cause for emulation and another for +imitation, but because it has been the custom to call +that man only emulous who imitates what we think +noble, useful, or pleasant.</p> + +<p>XXXIV. <i>Thankfulness</i> or <i>gratitude</i> is the desire or +endeavor of love with which we strive to do good to +others who, from a similar emotion of love, have done +good to us.</p> + +<p>XXXV. <i>Benevolence</i> is the desire to do good to +those whom we pity.</p> + +<p>XXXVI. <i>Anger</i> is the desire by which we are impelled, +through hatred, to injure those whom we hate.</p> + +<p>XXXVII. <i>Vengeance</i> is the desire which, springing +from mutual hatred, urges us to injure those who, from +a similar emotion, have injured us.</p> + +<p>XXXVIII. <i>Cruelty</i> or <i>ferocity</i> is the desire by +which a man is impelled to injure any one whom we +love or pity.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—To cruelty is opposed mercy, which is +not a passion, but a power of the mind by which a man +restrains anger and vengeance.</p> + +<p>XXXIX. <i>Fear</i> is the desire of avoiding the greater +of two dreaded evils by the less.</p> + +<p>XL. <i>Audacity</i> is the desire by which we are impelled +to do something which is accompanied with a danger +which our equals fear to meet.</p> + +<p>XLI. A person is said to be <i>pusillanimous</i> whose +desire is restrained by the fear of a danger which his +equals dare to meet.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—Pusillanimity, therefore, is nothing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[230]</a></span> +but the dread of some evil which most persons do not +usually fear, and therefore I do not ascribe it to the +emotions of desire. I wished, notwithstanding, to explain +it here, because in so far as we attend to desire, +pusillanimity is the true opposite of the emotion of +audacity.</p> + +<p>XLII. <i>Consternation</i> is affirmed of the man whose +desire of avoiding evil is restrained by astonishment at +the evil which he fears.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—Consternation is therefore a kind of +pusillanimity. But because consternation springs from +a double fear, it may be more aptly defined as that +dread which holds a man stupefied or vacillating, so +that he cannot remove an evil. I say <i>stupefied</i>, in so +far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to +be restrained by his astonishment. I say also <i>vacillating</i>, +in so far as we conceive the same desire to be restrained +by the fear of another evil which equally tortures +him, so that he does not know which of the two +evils to avoid.</p> + +<p>XLIII. <i>Courtesy</i> or <i>moderation</i> is the desire of +doing those things which please men and omitting +those which displease them.</p> + +<p>XLIV. <i>Ambition</i> is the immoderate desire of glory.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—Ambition is a desire which increases +and strengthens all the emotions, and that is the reason +why it can hardly be kept under control. For so long +as a man is possessed by any desire, he is necessarily +at the same time possessed by this. <i>Every noble man</i>, +says Cicero, <i>is led by glory, and even the philosophers +who write books about despising glory place their +names on the title-page</i>.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[231]</a></span></p> + +<p>XLV. <i>Luxuriousness</i> is the immoderate desire or +love of good living.</p> + +<p>XLVI. <i>Drunkenness</i> is the immoderate desire and +love of drinking.</p> + +<p>XLVII. <i>Avarice</i> is the immoderate desire and love +of riches.</p> + +<p>XLVIII. <i>Lust</i> is the immoderate desire and love of +sexual intercourse.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—This desire of sexual intercourse is +usually called lust, whether it be held within bounds or +not. I may add that the five last-mentioned emotions +have no contraries, for moderation is a kind of ambition, +and I have already observed that temperance, +sobriety, and chastity show a power and not a passion +of the mind. Even supposing that an avaricious, ambitious, +or timid man refrains from an excess of eating, +drinking, or sexual intercourse, avarice, ambition, +and fear are not therefore the opposites of voluptuousness, +drunkenness, or lust. For the avaricious man +generally desires to swallow as much meat and drink as +he can, provided only it belong to another person. +The ambitious man, too, if he hopes he can keep it a +secret, will restrain himself in nothing, and if he lives +amongst drunkards and libertines, will be more inclined +to their vices just because he is ambitious. The +timid man, too, does what he does not will; and although, +in order to avoid death, he may throw his +riches into the sea, he remains avaricious; nor does +the lascivious man cease to be lascivious because he is +sorry that he cannot gratify his desire. Absolutely, +therefore, these emotions have reference not so much +to the acts themselves of eating and drinking as to the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[232]</a></span> +appetite and love itself. Consequently nothing can be +opposed to these emotions but nobility of soul and +strength of mind, as we shall see afterwards.</p> + +<p>The definitions of jealousy and the other vacillations +of the mind I pass over in silence, both because they +are compounded of the emotions which we have already +defined, and also because many of them have no names,—a +fact which shows that, for the purposes of life, it +is sufficient to know these combinations generally. +Moreover, it follows from the definitions of the emotions +which we have explained that, they all arise from +desire, joy, or sorrow, or rather that there are none but +these three, which pass under names varying as their +relations and external signs vary. If, therefore, we +attend to these primitive emotions and to what has +been said above about the nature of the mind, we shall +be able here to define the emotions in so far as they +are related to the mind alone.</p> + +<p><i>General definition of the emotions.</i>—Emotion, which +is called <i>animi pathema</i>, is a confused idea by which the +mind affirms of its body, or any part of it, a greater +or less power of existence than before; and this increase +of power being given, the mind itself is determined +to one particular thought rather than to another.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation.</i>—I say, in the first place, that an emotion +or passion of the mind <i>is a confused idea</i>. For we +have shown that the mind suffers only in so far as it has +inadequate or confused ideas. I say again, <i>by which +the mind affirms of its body, or any part of it, a greater +or less power of existence than before</i>. For all ideas +which we possess of bodies indicate the actual consti<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[233]</a></span>tution +of our body rather than the nature of the external +body; but this idea, which constitutes the form +of an emotion, must indicate or express the constitution +of the body, or of some part of it; which constitution +the body or any part of it possesses from the fact that +its power of action or force of existence is increased +or diminished, helped or limited. But it is to be observed, +that when I say <i>a greater or less power of existence +than before</i>, I do not mean that the mind compares +the present with the past constitution of the body, +but that the idea which constitutes the form of emotion +affirms something of the body which actually involves +more or less reality than before. Moreover, +since the essence of the mind consists in its affirmation +of the actual existence of its body, and since we understand +by perfection the essence itself of the thing, it +follows that the mind passes to a greater or less perfection +when it is able to affirm of its body, or some part of +it, something which involves a greater or less reality +than before. When, therefore, I have said that the +mind's power of thought is increased or diminished, I +have wished to be understood as meaning nothing else +than that the mind has formed an idea of its body, or +some part of its body, which expresses more or less +reality than it had hitherto affirmed of the body. For +the value of ideas and the actual power of thought are +measured by the value of the object. Finally, I added, +<i>which being given, the mind itself is determined to one +particular thought rather than to another</i>, that I might +also express the nature of desire in addition to that of +joy and sorrow, which is explained by the first part of +the definition.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[234]</a></span></p> + +<p>I have now, I think, explained the principal emotions +and vacillations of the mind which are compounded of +the three primary emotions, desire, joy, and sorrow, +and have set them forth through their first causes. +From what has been said it is plain that we are disturbed +by external causes in a number of ways, and +that, like the waves of the sea agitated by contrary +winds, we fluctuate in our ignorance of our future and +destiny. I have said, however, that I have only explained +the principal mental complications, and not all +which may exist. For by the same method which we +have pursued above it would be easy to show that love +unites itself to repentance, scorn, shame, etc.; but I +think it has already been made clear to all that the +emotions can be combined in so many ways, and that so +many variations can arise, that no limits can be assigned +to their number. It is sufficient for my purpose +to have enumerated only those which are of consequence; +the rest, of which I have taken no notice, +being more curious than important.</p> + +<p>There is one constantly recurring characteristic of +love which I have yet to notice, and that is, that while +we are enjoying the thing which we desired, the body +acquires from that fruition a new disposition by which +it is otherwise determined, and the images of other +things are excited in it, and the mind begins to imagine +and to desire other things. For example, when we +imagine anything which usually delights our taste, we +desire to enjoy it by eating it. But whilst we enjoy it +the stomach becomes full, and the constitution of the +body becomes altered. If, therefore, the body being +now otherwise disposed, the image of the food, in con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[235]</a></span>sequence +of its being present, and therefore also the +effort or desire to eat it, become more intense, then this +new disposition of the body will oppose this effort or +desire, and consequently the presence of the food which +we desired will become hateful to us, and this hatefulness +is what we call loathing or disgust.</p> + +<p>As for the external modifications of the body which +are observed in the emotions, such as trembling, +paleness, sobbing, laughter, and the like, I have neglected +to notice them, because they belong to the body +alone without any relationship to the mind.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Hence it follows that the mind is subject to passions in proportion +to the number of inadequate ideas which it has, and that it +acts in proportion to the number of adequate ideas which it has.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of any given +thing affirms and does not deny the existence of the thing; that is +to say, it posits the essence of the thing and does not negate it. So +long, therefore, as we attend only to the thing itself, and not to external +causes, we shall discover nothing in it which can destroy it.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[236]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER XIII</h2> + +<h3>THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMOTIONS</h3> + + +<h4><i>The Association of the Emotions</i></h4> + +<p>If the human body has at any time been simultaneously +affected by two bodies, whenever the mind +afterwards imagines one of them, it will immediately +remember the other. But the imaginations of the +mind indicate rather the modifications of our body than +the nature of external bodies, and therefore if the body, +and consequently the mind, has been at any time, +simultaneously affected by two emotions, whenever it +is afterwards affected by one of them, it will also be +affected by the other.</p> + +<p>Let the mind be supposed to be affected at the same +time by two emotions, its power of action not being increased +or diminished by one, while it is increased or +diminished by the other. From the preceding proposition +it is plain that when the mind is afterwards affected +by the first emotion through its true cause, which +(by hypothesis) of itself neither increases nor diminishes +the mind's power of thinking, it will at the same +time be affected by the other emotion, which does increase +or diminish that power, that is to say, it will be +affected with joy or sorrow; and thus the thing itself +will be the cause of joy or of sorrow, not of itself, but +accidentally. In the same way it can easily be shown<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[237]</a></span> +that the same thing may accidentally be the cause of +desire.</p> + +<p>The fact that we have contemplated a thing with an +emotion of joy or sorrow, of which it is not the efficient +cause, is a sufficient reason for being able to love or +hate it.</p> + +<p>We now understand why we love or hate certain +things from no cause which is known to us, but merely +from sympathy or antipathy, as they say. To this +class, too, are to be referred those objects which affect +us with joy or sorrow solely because they are somewhat +like objects which usually affect us with those +emotions. I know indeed that the writers who first +introduced the words "Sympathy" and "Antipathy" +desired thereby to signify certain hidden qualities of +things, but nevertheless I believe that we shall be permitted +to understand by those names qualities which +are plain and well known.</p> + +<p>Anything may be accidentally the cause either of +hope or fear. Things which are accidentally the +causes either of hope or fear are called good or evil +omens. In so far as the omens are the cause of hope +and fear are they the cause of joy or of sorrow, and +consequently so far do we love them or hate them, and +endeavor to use them as means to obtain those things +for which we hope, or to remove them as obstacles or +causes of fear. Our natural constitution, too, is such +that we easily believe the things we hope for, and believe +with difficulty those we fear, and we think too +much of the former and too little of the latter. Thus +have superstitions arisen, by which men are everywhere +disquieted. I do not consider it worth while to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[238]</a></span> +go any further, and to explain here all those vacillations +of mind which arise from hope and fear, since it +follows from the definition alone of these emotions that +hope cannot exist without fear, nor fear without hope.</p> + +<p>If we imagine a certain thing to possess something +which resembles an object which usually affects the +mind with joy or sorrow, although the quality in which +the thing resembles the object is not the efficient cause +of these emotions, we shall nevertheless, by virtue of +the resemblance alone, love or hate the thing.</p> + +<p>If we have been affected with joy or sorrow by any +one who belongs to a class or nation different from our +own, and if our joy or sorrow is accompanied with the +idea of this person as its cause, under the common name +of his class or nation, we shall not love or hate him +merely, but the whole of the class or nation to which he +belongs.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Imitation and Reciprocation of the Emotions</i></h4> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<p>The images of things are modifications of the human +body, and the ideas of these modifications represent to +us external bodies as if they were present, that is to +say, these ideas involve both the nature of our own +body and at the same time the present nature of the external +body. If, therefore, the nature of the external +body be like that of our body, then the idea of the +external body which we imagine will involve a modification +of our body like that of the external body. +Therefore, if we imagine any one who is like ourselves +to be affected by a modification, this imagination will +express a modification of our body like that modifica<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[239]</a></span>tion, +and therefore we shall be modified with a similar +modification ourselves, because we imagine something +like us to be modified with the same. If, on the other +hand, we hate a thing which is like ourselves, we shall +so far be modified by a modification contrary and not +similar to that with which it is modified.</p> + +<p>If we imagine that a person enjoys a thing, that +will be a sufficient reason for making us love the thing +and desiring to enjoy it. If we imagine that a person +enjoys a thing which only one can possess, we do all +we can to prevent his possessing it. His enjoyment +of the thing is an obstacle to our joy, and we endeavor +to bring into existence everything which we imagine +conduces to joy, and to remove or destroy everything +opposed to it, or which we imagine conduces to sorrow.</p> + +<p>We see, therefore, that the nature of man is generally +constituted so as to pity those who are in adversity +and envy those who are in prosperity, and he envies +with a hatred which is the greater in proportion as he +loves what he imagines another possesses. We see also +that from the same property of human nature from +which it follows that men pity one another it also follows +that they are envious and ambitious. If we will +consult experience, we shall find that she teaches the +same doctrine, especially if we consider the first years +of our life. For we find that children, because their +body is, as it were, continually in equilibrium, laugh +and cry merely because they see others do the same; +whatever else they see others do they immediately wish +to imitate; everything which they think is pleasing to +other people they want. And the reason is, as we have +said, that the images of things are the modifications<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[240]</a></span> +themselves of the human body, or the ways in which it +is modified by external causes and disposed to this or +that action.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<p>If we imagine that we are hated by another without +having given him any cause for it, we shall hate him in +return. If we imagine that we have given just cause +for the hatred, we shall then be affected with shame. +This, however, rarely happens; we endeavor to affirm +everything, both concerning ourselves and concerning +the beloved object which we imagine will affect us or +the object with joy, and, on the contrary, we endeavor +to deny everything that will affect either it or ourselves +with sorrow.</p> + +<p>This reciprocity of hatred may also arise from the +fact that hatred is followed by an attempt to bring +evil upon him who is hated. If, therefore, we imagine +that we are hated by any one else, we shall imagine +him as the cause of some evil or sorrow, and thus we +shall be affected with sorrow or apprehension accompanied +with the idea of the person who hates us +as a cause; that is to say, we shall hate him in return, +as we have said above.</p> + +<p>If we imagine that the person we love is affected +with hatred towards us, we shall be agitated at the same +time both with love and hatred. For in so far as we +imagine that we are hated are we determined to hate +him in return. But (by hypothesis) we love him notwithstanding, +and therefore we shall be agitated both +by love and hatred.</p> + +<p>If we imagine that an evil has been brought upon<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[241]</a></span> +us through the hatred of some person towards whom we +have hitherto been moved by no emotion, we shall immediately +endeavor to return that evil upon him.</p> + +<p>If we imagine that any one like ourselves is affected +with hatred towards an object like ourselves which we +love, we shall hate him. If we imagine that we are +beloved by a person without having given any cause +for the love we shall love him in return.</p> + +<p>If we imagine that we have given just cause for love, +we shall pride ourselves upon it. This frequently occurs, +and we have said that the contrary takes place +when we believe that we are hated by another person. +This reciprocal love, and consequently this attempt to +do good to the person who loves us, and who endeavors +to do good to us, is called <i>thankfulness</i> or <i>gratitude</i>, +and from this we can see how much readier men are to +revenge themselves than to return a benefit.</p> + +<p>If we imagine that we are loved by a person we +hate, we shall at the same time be agitated both by +love and hatred. If the hatred prevail, we shall endeavor +to bring evil upon the person by whom we are +loved. This emotion is called Cruelty, especially if it +is believed that the person who loves has not given +any ordinary reason for hatred.</p> + + +<h4><i>The "Herd Instinct"</i></h4> + +<p>If we imagine men to love or hate a thing, we shall +therefore love or hate it; that is to say, we shall therefore +rejoice or be sad at the presence of the thing, and +therefore we shall endeavor to do everything which +we imagine men<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> will look upon with joy, and, on the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[242]</a></span> +contrary, we shall be averse to doing anything to which +we imagine men are averse.</p> + +<p>He who imagines that he affects others with joy or +sorrow will necessarily be affected with joy or sorrow. +But since man is conscious of himself by means of the +emotions by which he is determined to act; therefore +if a person has done anything which he imagines will +affect others with joy, he also will be affected with joy, +accompanied with an idea of himself as its cause; that +is to say, he will look upon himself with joy. If, on +the other hand, he has done anything which he imagines +will affect others with sorrow, he will look upon himself +with sorrow.</p> + +<p>If we imagine that a person loves, desires, or hates +a thing which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we +shall on that account love, desire, or hate the thing +more steadily. If, on the other hand, we imagine that +he is averse to the thing we love or loves the thing to +which we are averse, we shall then suffer vacillation +of mind.</p> + +<p>It follows from this proposition that every one endeavors +as much as possible to make others love what +he loves, and to hate what he hates. Hence the poet +says:</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>This effort to make every one approve what we love +or hate is in truth ambition, and so we see that each +person by nature desires that other persons should live +according to his way of thinking; but if every one does +this, then all are a hindrance to one another, and if<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[243]</a></span> +every one wishes to be praised or beloved by the rest, +then they all hate one another.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Varieties of Emotion</i></h4> + +<p>Joy and sorrow, and consequently the emotions which +are compounded of these or derived from them, are +passions. But we necessarily suffer in so far as we have +inadequate ideas, and only in so far as we have them; +that is to say, we necessarily suffer only in so far as +we imagine, or in so far as we are affected by a +modification which involves the nature of our body and +that of an external body. The nature, therefore, of +each passion must necessarily be explained in such a +manner, that the nature of the object by which we are +affected is expressed. The joy, for example, which +springs from an object <i>A</i> involves the nature of that +object <i>A</i>, and the joy which springs from <i>B</i> involves +the nature of that object <i>B</i>, and therefore these two +emotions of joy are of a different nature, because they +arise from causes of a different nature. In like manner +the emotion of sorrow which arises from one object +is of a different kind from that which arises from another +cause, and the same thing is to be understood of +love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation of mind, etc.; so +that there are necessarily just as many kinds of joy, +sorrow, love, hatred, etc., as there are kinds of objects +by which we are affected. But desire is the essence +itself or nature of a person in so far as this nature is +conceived from its given constitution as determined +towards any action, and therefore as a person is affected +by external causes with this or that kind of joy, +sorrow, love, hatred, etc., that is to say, as his nature<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[244]</a></span> +is constituted in this or that way, so must his desire +vary and the nature of one desire differ from that of +another, just as the emotions from which each desire +arises differ. There are as many kinds of desires, +therefore, as there are kinds of joy, sorrow, love, etc., +and, consequently (as we have just shown), as there +are kinds of objects by which we are affected.</p> + +<p>All emotions are related to desire, joy, or sorrow, as +the definitions show which we have given of those +emotions. But desire is the very nature or essence of a +person and therefore the desire of one person differs +from the desire of another as much as the nature or +essence of the one differs from that of the other. +Again, joy and sorrow are passions by which the power +of a person or his effort to persevere in his own being +is increased or diminished, helped, or limited. But by +the effort to persevere in his own being, in so far as it +is related at the same time to the mind and the body, +we understand appetite and desire, and therefore joy +and sorrow are desire or appetite in so far as the latter +is increased, diminished, helped, or limited by external +causes; that is to say they are the nature itself of each +person.</p> + +<p>The joy or sorrow of one person therefore differs +from the joy or sorrow of another as much as the nature +or essence of one person differs from that of the +other, and consequently the emotion of one person differs +from the corresponding emotion of another.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that the emotions of animals which +are called irrational (for after we have learned the +origin of the mind we can in no way doubt that brutes +feel) differ from human emotions as much as the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[245]</a></span> +nature of a brute differs from that of a man. Both +the man and the horse, for example, are swayed by +the lust to propagate, but the horse is swayed by equine +lust and the man by that which is human. The lusts +and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must vary in +the same way; and so, although each individual lives +contented with its own nature and delights in it, nevertheless +the life with which it is contented and its joy +are nothing but the idea or soul of that individual, and +so the joy of one differs in character from the joy of +the other as much as the essence of the one differs +from the essence of the other. Finally, it follows from +the preceding proposition that the joy by which the +drunkard is enslaved is altogether different from the joy +which is the portion of the philosopher,—a thing I +wished just to hint in passing.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Inconstancy of the Emotions</i></h4> + +<p>The human body is affected by external bodies in a +number of ways. Two men, therefore, may be affected +in different ways at the same time, and therefore they +can be affected by one and the same object in different +ways. Again the human body may be affected now in +this and now in that way, and consequently it may be +affected by one and the same object in different ways at +different times.</p> + +<p>We thus see that it is possible for one man to love a +thing and for another man to hate it; for this man to +fear what this man does not fear, and for the same man +to love what before he hated, and to dare to do what +before he feared. Again, since each judges according +to his own emotion what is good and what is evil, what<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[246]</a></span> +is better and what is worse, it follows that men may +change in their judgment as they do in their emotions, +and hence it comes to pass that when we compare men, +we distinguish them solely by the difference in their +emotions, calling some brave, others timid, and others +by other names.</p> + +<p>For example, I shall call a man <i>brave</i> who despises +an evil which I usually fear, and if, besides this, I consider +the fact that his desire of doing evil to a person +whom he hates or doing good to one whom he loves is +not restrained by that fear of evil by which I am +usually restrained, I call him <i>audacious</i>. On the other +hand, the man who fears an evil which I usually despise +will appear <i>timid</i>, and if, besides this, I consider that +his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil which +has no power to restrain me, I call him <i>pusillanimous</i>; +and in this way everybody will pass judgment.</p> + +<p>Finally, from this nature of man and the inconstancy +of his judgment, in consequence of which he often +judges things from mere emotion, and the things which +he believes contribute to his joy or his sorrow, and +which, therefore, he endeavors to bring to pass or +remove, are often only imaginary—to say nothing +about the uncertainty of things—it is easy to see that a +man may often be himself the cause of his sorrow or +his joy, or of being affected with sorrow or joy accompanied +with the idea of himself as its cause, so that +we can easily understand what repentance and what +self-approval are.</p> + +<p>Love and hatred towards any object, for example, +towards Peter, are destroyed if the joy and the sorrow +which they respectively involve be joined to the idea<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[247]</a></span> +of another cause; and they are respectively diminished +in proportion as we imagine that Peter has not been +their sole cause.</p> + +<p>For the same reason, love or hatred towards an object +we imagine to be free must be greater than towards +an object which is under necessity.</p> + +<p>An object which we imagine to be free must be perceived +through itself and without others. If, therefore, +we imagine it to be the cause of joy or sorrow, +we shall for that reason alone love or hate it, and that +too with the greatest love or the greatest hatred which +can spring from the given emotion. But if we imagine +that the object which is the cause of that emotion is +necessary, then we shall imagine it as the cause of that +emotion, not alone, but together with other causes, and +so our love or hatred towards it will be less.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that our hatred or love towards +one another is greater than towards other things, because +we think we are free.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Power of Love Over Hate</i></h4> + +<p>If we imagine that the person we hate is affected with +hatred towards us, a new hatred is thereby produced, +the old hatred still remaining (by hypothesis). If, on +the other hand, we imagine him to be affected with love +towards us, in so far as we imagine it shall we look upon +ourselves with joy, and endeavor to please him; that +is to say, in so far shall we endeavor not to hate him +nor to affect him with sorrow. This effort will be +greater or less as the emotion from which it arises is +greater or less, and, therefore, should it be greater +than that which springs from hatred, and by which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[248]</a></span> +we endeavor to affect with sorrow the object we hate, +then it will prevail and banish hatred from the mind. +Hatred is increased through return of hatred, but may +be destroyed by love.</p> + +<p>Hatred which is altogether overcome by love passes +into love, and the love is therefore greater than if hatred +had not preceded it. For if we begin to love a thing +which we hated, or upon which we were in the habit of +looking with sorrow, we shall rejoice for the very reason +that we love, and to this joy which love involves a +new joy is added, which springs from the fact that the +effort to remove the sorrow which hatred involves, is so +much assisted, there being also present before us as the +cause of our joy the idea of the person whom we hated.</p> + +<p>Notwithstanding the truth of this proposition, no one +will try to hate a thing or will wish to be affected with +sorrow in order that he may rejoice the more; that is +to say, no one will desire to inflict loss on himself in +the hope of recovering the loss, or to become ill in the +hope of getting well, inasmuch as every one will always +try to preserve his being and to remove sorrow from +himself as much as possible. Moreover, if it can be +imagined that it is possible for us to desire to hate a +person in order that we may love him afterwards the +more, we must always desire to continue the hatred. +For the love will be the greater as the hatred has been +greater, and therefore we shall always desire the hatred +to be more and more increased. Upon the same principle +we shall desire that our sickness may continue and +increase in order that we may afterwards enjoy the +greater pleasure when we get well, and therefore we +shall always desire sickness, which is absurd.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Both here and in what follows to whom we are moved by no +emotion I understand by the word <i>men</i>, men (Sp.).</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[249]</a></span></p> +<h2>THIRD PART</h2> + +<h3>ON MAN'S WELL-BEING</h3> + + +<div class='blockquot'> +<p><i>All happiness or unhappiness solely depends upon the +quality of the object to which we are attached by love. +Love for an object eternal and infinite feeds the mind +with joy alone, a joy that is free from all sorrow</i>.</p> + +<p class='right'><span class="smcap">Spinoza</span>.</p> +</div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[250]</a></span></p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[251]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER XIV</h2> + +<h3>OF HUMAN BONDAGE</h3> + + +<h4><i>Introductory</i></h4> + +<p>The impotence of man to govern or restrain the +emotions I call bondage, for a man who is under their +control is not his own master, but is mastered by fortune, +in whose power he is, so that he is often forced to +follow the worse, although he sees the better before +him. I propose in this part to demonstrate why this +is, and also to show what of good and evil the emotions +possess.</p> + +<p>But before I begin I should like to say a few words +about perfection and imperfection, and about good and +evil. If a man has proposed to do a thing and has +accomplished it, he calls it perfect, and not only he, but +every one else who has really known or has believed +that he has known the mind and intention of the author +of that work will call it perfect too. For example, +having seen some work (which I suppose to be as yet +not finished), if we know that the intention of the +author of that work is to build a house, we shall call +the house imperfect; while, on the other hand, we +shall call it perfect as soon as we see the work has been +brought to the end which the author had determined for +it. But if we see any work such as we have never +seen before, and if we do not know the mind of the +workman, we shall then not be able to say whether the +work is perfect or imperfect.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[252]</a></span></p> + +<p>This seems to have been the first signification of +these words; but afterwards men began to form universal +ideas, to think out for themselves types of houses, +buildings, castles, and to prefer some types of things to +others; and so it happened that each person called a +thing perfect which seemed to agree with the universal +idea which he had formed of that thing, and, on the +other hand, he called a thing imperfect which seemed +to agree less with his typal conception, although, according +to the intention of the workman, it had been +entirely completed. This appears to be the only reason +why the words <i>perfect</i> and <i>imperfect</i> are commonly +applied to natural objects which are not made with +human hands; for men are in the habit of forming, +both of natural as well as of artificial objects, universal +ideas which they regard as types of things, +and which they think Nature has in view, setting +them before herself as types too; it being the common +opinion that she does nothing except for the sake of +some end. When, therefore, men see something done +by Nature which does not altogether answer to that +typal conception which they have of the thing, +they think that Nature herself has failed or committed +an error, and that she has left the thing +imperfect.</p> + +<p>Thus we see that the custom of applying the words +<i>perfect</i> and <i>imperfect</i> to natural objects has arisen +rather from prejudice than from true knowledge of +them. For we have shown that Nature does nothing +for the sake of an end, for that eternal and infinite +Being whom we call God or Nature acts by the same +necessity by which He exists; for we have shown that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[253]</a></span> +He acts by the same necessity of nature as that by +which He exists. The reason or cause, therefore, why +God or Nature acts and the reason why He exists are +one and the same. Since, therefore, He exists for no +end, He acts for no end; and since He has no principle +or end of existence, He has no principle or end +of action. A final cause, as it is called, is nothing, +therefore, but human desire, in so far as this is considered +as the principle or primary cause of anything. +For example, when we say that the having a house to +live in was the final cause of this or that house, we +merely mean that a man, because he imagined the advantages +of a domestic life, desired to build a house. +Therefore, having a house to live in, in so far as it is +considered as a final cause, is merely this particular +desire, which is really an efficient cause, and is considered +as primary, because men are usually ignorant of +the causes of their desires; for, as I have often said, +we are conscious of our actions and desires, but ignorant +of the causes by which we are determined to desire +anything. As for the vulgar opinion that Nature sometimes +fails or commits an error, or produces imperfect +things, I class it amongst those fictions mentioned +above.<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p> + +<p>Perfection, therefore, and imperfection are really +only modes of thought; that is to say, notions which +we are in the habit of forming from the comparison +with one another of individuals of the same species or +genus, and this is the reason why I have said that by +reality and perfection I understand the same thing; +for we are in the habit of referring all individuals in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[254]</a></span> +Nature to one genus, which is called the most general; +that is to say, to the notion of being, which embraces +absolutely all the individual objects in Nature. In so +far, therefore, as we refer the individual objects in +Nature to this genus, and compare them one with another, +and discover that some possess more being or +reality than others, in so far do we call some more perfect +than others; and in so far as we assign to the +latter anything which, like limitation, termination, impotence, +etc., involves negation, shall we call them imperfect, +because they do not affect our minds so +strongly as those we call perfect, but not because anything +which really belongs to them is wanting, or because +Nature has committed an error. For nothing belongs +to the nature of anything excepting that which +follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient +cause, and whatever follows from the necessity of the +nature of the efficient cause necessarily happens.</p> + +<p>With regard to good and evil, these terms indicate +nothing positive in things considered in themselves, nor +are they anything else than modes of thought, or notions +which we form from the comparison of one thing +with another. For one and the same thing may at the +same time be both good and evil or indifferent. Music, +for example, is good to a melancholy person, bad to one +mourning, while to a deaf man it is neither good nor +bad. But although things are so, we must retain these +words. For since we desire to form for ourselves an +idea of man upon which we may look as a model of +human nature, it will be of service to us to retain these +expressions in the sense I have mentioned.</p> + +<p>By <i>good</i>, therefore, I understand in the following<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[255]</a></span> +pages everything which we are certain is a means by +which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model +of human nature we set before us. By <i>evil</i>, on the +contrary, I understand everything which we are certain +hinders us from reaching that model. Again, I shall +call men more or less perfect or imperfect in so far as +they approach more or less nearly to this same model. +For it is to be carefully observed, that when I say that +an individual passes from a less to a greater perfection +and <i>vice versa</i>, I do not understand that from one +essence or form he is changed into another (for a horse, +for instance, would be as much destroyed if it were +changed into a man as if it were changed into an insect), +but rather we conceive that his power of action, +in so far as it is understood by his own nature, is increased +or diminished. Finally, by perfection generally, +I understand, as I have said, reality; that is to +say, the essence of any object in so far as it exists +and acts in a certain manner, no regard being paid to +its duration. For no individual thing can be said to +be more perfect because for a longer time it has persevered +in existence; inasmuch as the duration of +things cannot be determined by their essence, the essence +of things involving no fixed or determined period +of existence; any object, whether it be more or less +perfect, always being able to persevere in existence +with the same force as that with which it commenced +existence. All things, therefore, are equal in this +respect.</p> + + +<h4><i>Definitions</i></h4> + +<p>I.—By good, I understand that which we certainly +know is useful to us.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[256]</a></span></p> + +<p>II. By evil, on the contrary, I understand that which +we certainly know hinders us from possessing anything +that is good.</p> + +<p>With regard to these two definitions, see the close of +the preceding.</p> + +<p>III. I call individual things contingent in so far as +we discover nothing, whilst we attend to their essence +alone, which necessarily posits their existence or which +necessarily excludes it.</p> + +<p>IV. I call these individual things possible, in so far +as we are ignorant, whilst we attend to the cause from +which they must be produced, whether these causes are +determined to the production of these things.</p> + +<p>V. By contrary emotions, I understand in the following +pages those which, although they may be of the +same kind, draw a man in different directions; such as +voluptuousness and avarice, which are both a species +of love, and are not contrary to one another by nature, +but only by accident.</p> + +<p>VI. I here call a thing past or future in so far as we +have been or shall be affected by it; for example, in +so far as we have seen a thing or are about to see it, in +so far as it has strengthened us or will strengthen us, +has injured or will injure us. For in so far as we thus +imagine it do we affirm its existence; that is to say, +the body is affected by no mode which excludes the +existence of the thing, and therefore the body is affected +by the image of the thing in the same way as if +the thing itself were present. But because it generally +happens that those who possess much experience hesitate +when they think of a thing as past or future, and +doubt greatly concerning its issue, therefore the emo<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[257]</a></span>tions +which spring from such images of things are not +so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images +of other things, until men become more sure of the +issue.</p> + +<p>However, it is to be observed that it is the same +with time as it is with place; for as beyond a certain +limit we can form no distinct imagination of distance—that +is to say, as we usually imagine all objects to be +equally distant from us, and as if they were on the same +plane, if their distance from us exceeds 200 feet, or +if their distance from the position we occupy is greater +than we can distinctly imagine—so we imagine all objects +to be equally distant from the present time, and +refer them as if to one moment, if the period to which +their existence belongs is separated from the present +by a longer interval than we can usually imagine distinctly.</p> + +<p>VII. By end for the sake of which we do anything, +I understand appetite.</p> + +<p>VIII. By virtue and power, I understand the same +thing; that is to say, virtue, in so far as it is related +to man, is the essence itself or nature of the man in so +far as it has the power of effecting certain things which +can be understood through the laws of its nature +alone.</p> + + +<h4><i>Axiom</i></h4> + +<p>There is no individual thing in Nature which is not +surpassed in strength and power by some other thing; +but any individual thing being given, another and a +stronger is also given, by which the former can be +destroyed.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[258]</a></span></p> + + +<h4><i>Man's Place in Nature</i></h4> + +<p>The power by which individual things and, consequently, +man preserve their being is the actual power of +God or Nature, not in so far as it is infinite, but in so +far as it can be manifested by the actual essence of +man. The power therefore of man, in so far as it is +manifested by his actual essence is part of the infinite +power of God or Nature, that is to say, part of His +essence. Again, if it were possible that man could +suffer no changes but those which can be understood +through his nature alone, it would follow that he could +not perish, but that he would exist forever necessarily; +and this necessary existence must result from a cause +whose power is either finite or infinite, that is to say, +either from the power of man alone, which would be +able to place at a distance from himself all other changes +which could take their origin from external causes, or +it must result from the infinite power of Nature by +which all individual things would be so directed that +man could suffer no changes but those tending to his +preservation.</p> + +<p>But the first case is absurd. The force by which man +perseveres in existence is limited, and infinitely surpassed +by the power of external causes. This is evident +from the Axiom. Therefore if it were possible +for a man to suffer no changes but those which could +be understood through his own nature alone, and consequently +(as we have shown) that he should always +necessarily exist, this must follow from the infinite +power of God; and therefore from the necessity of the +divine nature, in so far as it is considered as affected<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[259]</a></span> +by the idea of any one man, the whole order of Nature, +in so far as it is conceived under the attributes of +thought and extension, would have to be deduced. +From this it would follow that man would be infinite, +which (by the first part of this demonstration) is an +absurdity. It is impossible, therefore, that a man can +suffer no changes but those of which he is the adequate +cause.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that a man is necessarily always +subject to passions, and that he follows and obeys the +common order of Nature, accommodating himself to it +as far as the nature of things requires. The force and +increase of any passion and its perseverance in existence +are not limited by the power by which we endeavor +to persevere in existence, but by the power of +an external cause compared with our own power.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Nature of Good and Evil</i></h4> + +<p>We call a thing good which contributes to the preservation +of our being, and we call a thing evil if it is an +obstacle to the preservation of our being; that is to +say, a thing is called by us good or evil as it increases +or diminishes, helps or restrains, our power of action. +In so far, therefore, as we perceive that any object +affects us with joy or sorrow do we call it good or evil, +and therefore the knowledge of good or evil is nothing +but an idea of joy or sorrow which necessarily follows +from the emotion itself of joy or sorrow. But this idea +is united to the emotion in the same way as the mind is +united to the body, or, in other words, this idea is not +actually distinguished from the emotion itself; that is to +say, it is not actually distinguished from the idea of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[260]</a></span> +the modification of the body, unless in conception alone. +This knowledge, therefore, of good and evil is nothing +but the emotion itself of joy and sorrow in so far as we +are conscious of it.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Control of the Emotions</i></h4> + +<p>An emotion, in so far as it is related to the mind, is +an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or less +power of existence for its body than the body possessed +before. Whenever, therefore, the mind is +agitated by any emotion, the body is at the same time +affected with a modification by which its power of +action is increased or diminished. Again, this modification +of the body receives from its own cause a power +to persevere in its own being, a power, therefore, which +cannot be restrained nor removed unless by a bodily +cause affecting the body with a modification contrary +to the first, and stronger than it. Thus the mind is +affected by the idea of a modification stronger than +the former and contrary to it; that is to say, it will +be affected with an emotion stronger than the former +and contrary to it, and this stronger emotion will exclude +the existence of the other or remove it. Thus +an emotion cannot be restrained nor removed unless +by an opposed and stronger emotion.</p> + +<p>An emotion, in so far as it is related to the mind, cannot +be restrained nor removed unless by the idea of a +bodily modification opposed to that which we suffer and +stronger than it. For the emotion which we suffer cannot +be restrained nor removed unless by an opposed +and stronger emotion; that is to say, it cannot be +removed unless by the idea of a bodily modification<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[261]</a></span> +stronger than that which affects us, and opposed to it.</p> + +<p>The force and increase of any passion and its perseverance +in existence are limited by the power of an +external cause compared with our own power and +therefore the other actions or power of a man may be +so far surpassed by force of some passion or emotion, +that the emotion may obstinately cling to him.</p> + +<p>An emotion is an idea by which the mind affirms a +greater or less power of existence for the body than it +possessed before, and therefore this idea has nothing +positive which can be removed by the presence of the +truth, and consequently the true knowledge of good +and evil, in so far as it is true, can restrain no emotion. +But in so far as it is an emotion will it restrain any other +emotion, provided that the latter be the weaker of the +two.</p> + +<p>From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far +as this is an emotion, necessarily arises desire, which is +greater in proportion as the emotion from which it +springs is greater. But this desire (by hypothesis), +because it springs from our understanding, something +truly follows therefore in us in so far as we act, and +therefore must be understood through our essence +alone, and consequently its strength and increase must +be limited by human power alone. But the desires +which spring from the emotions by which we are +agitated are greater as the emotions themselves are +greater, and therefore their strength and increase must +be limited by the power of external causes, a power +which, if it be compared with our own, indefinitely surpasses +it. The desires, therefore, which take their +origin from such emotions as these may be much<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[262]</a></span> +stronger than that which takes its origin from a true +knowledge of good and evil, and the former may be +able to restrain and extinguish the latter.</p> + +<p>Desire is the very essence of man, that is to say, +the effort by which a man strives to persevere in his +being. The desire, therefore, which springs from joy, +by that very emotion of joy is assisted or increased, +while that which springs from sorrow, by that very +emotion of sorrow is lessened or restrained, and so the +force of the desire which springs from joy must be limited +by human power, together with the power of an +external cause, while that which springs from sorrow +must be limited by human power alone. The latter is, +therefore, weaker than the former.</p> + + +<h4><i>How the Strength of the Emotions Varies</i></h4> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<p>The imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates +an object as present, an idea which nevertheless +indicates the constitution of the human body +rather than the nature of the external object. Imagination, +therefore, is an emotion in so far as it indicates the +constitution of the body. But the imagination increases +in intensity in proportion as we imagine nothing +which excludes the present existence of the external +object. If, therefore, we imagine the cause of an emotion +to be actually present with us, that emotion will be +intenser or stronger than if we imagined the cause not +to be present.</p> + +<p>When I said that we are affected by the image of an +object in the future or the past with the same emotion<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[263]</a></span> +with which we should be affected if the object we +imagined were actually present, I was careful to warn +the reader that this was true in so far only as we attend +to the image alone of the object itself, for the image +is of the same nature whether we have imagined the +object or not; but I have not denied that the image +becomes weaker when we contemplate as present other +objects which exclude the present existence of the +future object.</p> + +<p>The image of a past or future object, that is to say, +of an object which we contemplate in relation to the +past or future to the exclusion of the present, other +things being equal, is weaker than the image of a +present object, and consequently the emotion towards +a future or past object, other things being equal, is +weaker then than the emotion towards a present object.</p> + +<p>The desire which springs from a knowledge of good +and evil can be easily extinguished or restrained, in so +far as this knowledge is connected with the future, by +the desire of things which in the present are sweet.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<p>In so far as we imagine any object to be necessary +do we affirm its existence, and, on the other hand, we +deny its existence in so far as we imagine it to be not +necessary and therefore the emotion towards an object +which we imagine as necessary, other things being +equal, is stronger than that towards an object that is +possible, contingent, or not necessary.</p> + +<p>In so far as we imagine an object as contingent, we +are not affected by the image of any other object which +posits the existence of the first, but, on the contrary<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[264]</a></span> +(by hypothesis), we imagine some things which exclude +its present existence. But in so far as we imagine any +object in the future to be possible do we imagine some +things which posit its existence, that is to say, things +which foster hope or fear, and therefore the emotion +towards an object which we know does not exist in +the present, and which we imagine as possible, other +things being equal, is stronger than the emotion towards +a contingent object.</p> + +<p>The emotion towards an object which we imagine to +exist in the present is stronger than if we imagined it +as future, and is much stronger if we imagine the +future to be at a great distance from the present time. +The emotion, therefore, towards an object which we +imagine will not exist for a long time is so much feebler +than if we imagined it as present, and nevertheless is +stronger than if we imagined it as contingent; and +therefore the emotion towards a contingent object is +much feebler than if we imagined the object to be +present to us.</p> + +<p>In so far as we imagine an object as contingent, we +are affected with no image of any other object which +posits the existence of the first. On the contrary, we +imagine (by hypothesis) certain things which exclude +its present existence. But in so far as we imagine it in +relationship to past time are we supposed to imagine +something which brings it back to the memory or which +excites its image and therefore so far causes us to contemplate +it as present. Therefore, the emotion towards +a contingent object which we know does not exist in +the present, other things being equal, will be weaker +than the emotion towards a past object.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[265]</a></span></p> + +<p>In these propositions I consider that I have explained +why men are more strongly influenced by an opinion +than by true reason, and why the true knowledge of +good and evil causes disturbance in the mind, and +often gives way to every kind of lust, whence the saying +of the poet, "<i>Video meliora proboque, deteriora +sequor.</i>" The same thought appears to have been in +the mind of the Preacher when he said, "<i>He that increaseth +knowledge increaseth sorrow.</i>" I say these +things not because I would be understood to conclude, +therefore, that it is better to be ignorant than to be +wise, or that the wise man in governing his passions is +nothing better than the fool, but I say them because it +is necessary for us to know both the strength and weakness +of our nature, so that we may determine what reason +can do and what it cannot do in governing our +emotions.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <a href="#Page_122">Chapter Eight</a> <i>ad fin.</i></p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[266]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER XV</h2> + +<h3>THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MORAL LIFE</h3> + + +<h4><i>Introductory</i></h4> + +<p>I have briefly explained the causes of human impotence +and want of stability, and why men do not obey +the dictates of reason. It remains for me now to show +what it is which reason prescribes to us, which emotions +agree with the rules of human reason, and which, on +the contrary, are opposed to these rules. Before, however, +I begin to demonstrate these things by our full +method, I should like briefly to set forth here these +dictates of reason, in order that what I have in my +mind about them may be easily comprehended by all.</p> + +<p>Since reason demands nothing which is opposed to +Nature, it demands, therefore, that every person should +love himself, should seek his own profit—what is truly +profitable to him—should desire everything that really +leads man to greater perfection, and absolutely that +every one should endeavor, as far as in him lies, to +preserve his own being. This is all true as necessarily +as that the whole is greater than its part. Again, since +virtue means nothing but acting according to the laws +of our own nature, and since no one endeavors to +preserve his being except in accordance with the laws +of his own nature, it follows: <i>Firstly</i>, That the foundation +of virtue is that endeavor itself to preserve our<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[267]</a></span> +own being, and that happiness consists in this—that a +man can preserve his own being. <i>Secondly</i>, It follows +that virtue is to be desired for its own sake, nor is +there anything more excellent or more useful to us than +virtue, for the sake of which virtue ought to be desired. +<i>Thirdly</i>, It follows that all persons who kill themselves +are impotent in mind, and have been thoroughly overcome +by external causes opposed to their nature.</p> + +<p>Again, we can never free ourselves from the need of +something outside us for the preservation of our being, +and we can never live in such a manner as to have no +intercourse with objects which are outside us. Indeed, +so far as the mind is concerned, our intellect would be +less perfect if the mind were alone, and understood +nothing but itself. There are many things, therefore, +outside us which are useful to us, and which, therefore, +are to be sought. Of all these, none more excellent can +be discovered than those which exactly agree with our +nature. If, for example, two individuals of exactly the +same nature are joined together, they make up a single +individual, doubly stronger than each alone. Nothing, +therefore, is more useful to man than man. Men can +desire, I say, nothing more excellent for the preservation +of their being than that all should so agree at +every point that the minds and bodies of all should +form, as it were, one mind and one body; that all +should together endeavor as much as possible to preserve +their being, and that all should together seek the +common good of all. From this it follows that men +who are governed by reason—that is to say, men who, +under the guidance of reason, seek their own profit—desire +nothing for themselves which they do not desire<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[268]</a></span> +for other men, and that, therefore, they are just, faithful, +and honorable.</p> + +<p>These are those dictates of reason which I purposed +briefly to set forth before commencing their demonstration +by a fuller method, in order that, if possible, I +might win the attention of those who believe that this +principle—that every one is bound to seek his own +profit—is the foundation of impiety, and not of virtue +and piety.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Essence of Virtue</i></h4> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<p>According to the laws of his own nature each person +necessarily desires that which he considers to be good, +and avoids that which he considers to be evil.</p> + +<p>The more each person strives and is able to seek +his own profit, that is to say, to preserve his being, +the more virtue does he possess; on the other hand, +in so far as each person neglects his own profit, that is +to say, neglects to preserve his own being, is he impotent.</p> + +<p>No one, therefore, unless defeated by external +causes and those which are contrary to his nature, neglects +to seek his own profit or preserve his being. No +one, I say, refuses food or kills himself from a necessity +of his nature, but only when forced by external +causes. The compulsion may be exercised in many +ways. A man kills himself under compulsion by another +when that other turns the right hand, with which +the man had by chance laid hold of a sword, and compels +him to direct the sword against his own heart; or +the command of a tyrant may compel a man, as it did<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[269]</a></span> +Seneca, to open his own veins, that is to say, he may +desire to avoid a greater evil by a less. External +and hidden causes also may so dispose his imagination +and may so affect his body as to cause it to put on +another nature contrary to that which it had at first, +and one whose idea cannot exist in the mind; but a +very little reflection will show that it is as impossible +that a man, from the necessity of his nature, should endeavor +not to exist, or to be changed into some other +form, as it is that something should be begotten from +nothing.</p> + +<p>The endeavor after self-preservation is the essence +itself of a thing. If, therefore, any virtue could be conceived +prior to this of self-preservation, the essence +itself of the thing would be conceived as prior to itself, +which (as is self-evident) is absurd.</p> + +<p>The endeavor after self-preservation is the primary +and only foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle +no other can be conceived, and without it no +virtue can be conceived.</p> + +<p>No one endeavors to preserve his own being for the +sake of another object. For if a man endeavored to +preserve his being for the sake of any other object, +this object would then become the primary foundation +of virtue (as is self-evident), which is an absurdity.</p> + +<p>No one can desire to be happy, to act well and live +well, who does not at the same time desire to be, to +act, and to live, that is to say, actually to exist.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<p>To act absolutely in conformity with virtue is nothing +but acting according to the laws of our own proper<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[270]</a></span> +nature. But only in so far as we understand do we +act. Therefore, to act in conformity with virtue is +nothing but acting, living, and preserving our being as +reason directs, and doing so from the ground of seeking +our own profit.<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p> + +<p>In so far as a man is determined to action because +he has inadequate ideas he suffers, that is to say, he +does something which through his essence alone cannot +be perceived, that is to say, which does not follow +from his virtue. But in so far as he is determined to +any action because he understands, he acts, that is to +say he does something which is perceived through his +essence alone, or which adequately follows from his +virtue.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Highest Virtue of Reason</i></h4> + +<p>All efforts which we make through reason are nothing +but efforts to understand, and the mind, in so far +as it uses reason, adjudges nothing as profitable to +itself excepting that which conduces to understanding.</p> + +<p>The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing +but to understand, nor does it adjudge anything to be +profitable to itself excepting what conduces to under<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[271]</a></span>standing. +But the mind possesses no certitude, unless +in so far as it possesses adequate ideas, or in so far as +it reasons. We do not know, therefore, that anything +is certainly good, excepting that which actually conduces +to understanding, and, on the other hand, we do +not know that anything is evil excepting that which +can hinder us from understanding.</p> + +<p>The highest thing which the mind can understand +is God, that is to say, Being absolutely infinite, and +without whom nothing can be nor can be conceived, +and therefore that which is chiefly profitable to the +mind, or which is the highest good of the mind, is the +knowledge of God. Again, the mind acts only in so +far as it understands and only in so far can it be absolutely +said to act in conformity with virtue. To understand, +therefore, is the absolute virtue of the mind. +But the highest thing which the mind can understand +is God (as we have already demonstrated), and therefore +the highest virtue of the mind is to understand or +know God.</p> + + +<h4><i>THE MORAL VALUE OF THE EMOTIONS</i></h4> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<h4><i>General Principles</i></h4> + +<p>That which so disposes the human body that it can +be affected in many ways, or which renders it capable +of affecting external bodies in many ways, is profitable +to man, and is more profitable in proportion as by its +means the body becomes better fitted to be affected +in many ways, and to affect other bodies; on the other<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[272]</a></span> +hand, that thing is injurious which renders the body +less fitted to affect or be affected.</p> + +<p>Whatever is effective to preserve the proportion of +motion and rest which the parts of the human body +bear to each other is good, and, on the contrary, that +is evil which causes the parts of the human body to +have a different proportion of motion and rest to each +other.</p> + +<p>In what degree these things may injure or profit the +mind will be explained below. Here I observe merely +that I understand the body to die when its parts are +so disposed as to acquire a different proportion of +motion and rest to each other. For I dare not deny +that the human body, though the circulation of the +blood and the other things by means of which it is +thought to live be preserved, may, nevertheless, be +changed into another nature altogether different from +its own. No reason compels me to affirm that the +body never dies unless it is changed into a corpse. +Experience, indeed, seems to teach the contrary. It +happens sometimes that a man undergoes such changes +that he cannot very well be said to be the same man, as +was the case with a certain Spanish poet of whom I +have heard, who was seized with an illness, and although +he recovered, remained, nevertheless, so oblivious +of his past life that he did not believe the tales +and tragedies he had composed were his own, and he +might, indeed, have been taken for a grown-up child +if he had also forgotten his native tongue. But if this +seems incredible, what shall we say of children? The +man of mature years believes the nature of children +to be so different from his own, that it would be im<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[273]</a></span>possible +to persuade him he had ever been a child, if +he did not conjecture regarding himself from what he +sees of others. But in order to avoid giving to the +superstitious matter for new questions, I prefer to go +no farther in the discussion of these matters.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<h4><i>Value of Joy and Sorrow</i></h4> + +<p>Joy is an emotion by which the body's power of action +is increased or assisted. Sorrow, on the other +hand, is an emotion by which the body's power of action +is lessened or restrained, and therefore joy is not +directly evil, but good; sorrow, on the other hand, is +directly evil.</p> + + +<h4>III</h4> + +<h4><i>The Good Emotions</i></h4> + +<p>Cheerfulness is joy, which, in so far as it is related +to the body, consists in this, that all the parts of the +body are equally affected, that is to say, the body's +power of action is increased or assisted, so that all the +parts acquire the same proportion of motion and rest +to each other. Cheerfulness, therefore, is always good, +and can never be excessive. But melancholy is sorrow, +which, in so far as it is related to the body consists +in this, that the body's power of action is absolutely +lessened or restrained, and melancholy, therefore, +is always evil.</p> + +<p>Pleasurable excitement is joy, which, in so far as +it is related to the body, consists in this, that one or +some of the parts of the body are affected more than<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[274]</a></span> +others. The power of this emotion may, therefore, be +so great as to overcome the other actions of the body. +It may cling obstinately to the body; it may impede +the body in such a manner as to render it less capable +of being affected in many ways, and therefore may be +evil. Again, pain, which, on the contrary, is sorrow, +considered in itself alone cannot be good. But because +its power and increase is limited by the power of an +external cause compared with our own power, we can +therefore conceive infinite degrees of strength of this +emotion, and infinite kinds of it, and we can therefore +conceive it to be such that it can restrain an excess +of pleasurable excitement, and so far (by the first +part of this proposition) preventing the body from becoming +less capable. So far, therefore, will pain be good.</p> + +<p>Love is joy with the accompanying idea of an external +cause. Pleasurable excitement, therefore with +the accompanying idea of an external cause, is love, +and therefore love may be excessive. Again, desire is +greater as the emotion from which it springs is greater. +Inasmuch, therefore, as an emotion may overpower the +other actions of a man, so also the desire which springs +from this emotion may also overpower the other desires, +and may therefore exist in the same excess which we +have shown (in the preceding proposition) that pleasurable +excitement possesses.</p> + +<p>Cheerfulness, which I have affirmed to be good, is +more easily imagined than observed; for the emotions +by which we are daily agitated are generally related +to some part of the body which is affected more than +the others, and therefore it is that the emotions exist +for the most part in excess, and so hold the mind down<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[275]</a></span> +to the contemplation of one object alone, that it can +think about nothing else; and although men are subject +to a number of emotions, and therefore few are +found who are always under the control of one and the +same emotion, there are not wanting those to whom one +and the same emotion obstinately clings. We see men +sometimes so affected by one object, that although +it is not present, they believe it to be before them; +and if this happens to a man who is not asleep, we say +that he is delirious or mad. Nor are those believed +to be less mad who are inflamed by love, dreaming +about nothing but a mistress or harlot day and night, +for they excite our laughter. But the avaricious man +who thinks of nothing else but gain or money, and the +ambitious man who thinks of nothing but glory, inasmuch +as they do harm, and are, therefore, thought +worthy of hatred, are not believed to be mad. In +truth, however, avarice, lust, etc., are a kind of madness, +although they are not reckoned amongst diseases.</p> + + +<h4>IV</h4> + +<h4><i>The Evil Emotions</i></h4> + +<p>The man whom we hate we endeavor to destroy, +that is to say we endeavor to do something which is +evil. Therefore hatred can never be good.<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p> + +<p>Envy, mockery, contempt, anger, revenge, and the +other affects which are related to hatred or arise from +it, are evil.</p> + +<p>Everything which we desire because we are affected +by hatred is base and unjust in the State.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[276]</a></span></p> +<p>I make a great distinction between mockery (which +I have said is bad) and laughter; for laughter and +merriment are nothing but joy, and therefore, provided +they are not excessive, are in themselves good. +Nothing but a gloomy and sad superstition forbids enjoyment. +For why is it more seemly to extinguish +hunger and thirst than to drive away melancholy? +My reasons and my conclusions are these: No God +and no human being, except an envious one, is delighted +by my impotence or my trouble, or esteems as any +virtue in us tears, sighs, fears, and other things of +this kind, which are signs of mental impotence; on +the contrary, the greater the joy with which we are +affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass +thereby, that is to say, the more do we necessarily +partake of the divine nature. To make use of things, +therefore, and to delight in them as much as possible +(provided we do not disgust ourselves with them, which +is not delighting in them), is the part of a wise man. +It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and +invigorate himself with moderate and pleasant eating +and drinking, with sweet scents and the beauty of +green plants, with ornament, with music, with sports, +with the theater, and with all things of this kind which +one man can enjoy without hurting another. For the +human body is composed of a great number of parts +of diverse nature, which constantly need new and +varied nourishment, in order that the whole of the +body may be equally fit for everything which can +follow from its nature, and consequently that the mind +may be equally fit to understand many things at once. +This mode of living best of all agrees both with our<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[277]</a></span> +principles and with common practice; therefore this +mode of living is the best of all, and is to be universally +commended. There is no need, therefore, to enter +more at length into the subject.</p> + +<p>All emotions of hatred are evil and therefore the man +who lives according to the guidance of reason will +strive as much as possible to keep himself from being +agitated by the emotions of hatred and, consequently, +will strive to keep others from being subject to the +same emotions. But hatred is increased by reciprocal +hatred, and, on the other hand, can be extinguished +by love, so that hatred passes into love. Therefore he +who lives according to the guidance of reason will +strive to repay the hatred of another, etc., with love, +that is to say, with generosity. He who wishes to +avenge injuries by hating in return does indeed live +miserably. But he who, on the contrary, strives to +drive out hatred by love, fights joyfully and confidently, +with equal ease resisting one man or a number of +men, and needing scarcely any assistance from fortune. +Those whom he conquers yield gladly, not from +defect of strength, but from an increase of it. These +truths, however, all follow so plainly from the definitions +alone of love and the intellect, that there is no +need to demonstrate them singly.</p> + + +<h4>V</h4> + +<h4><i>Necessary Evils</i></h4> + + +<h4>(i)</h4> + +<p>The emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without +sorrow; for fear is sorrow, and hope cannot exist with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[278]</a></span>out +fear. Therefore these emotions cannot be good of +themselves, but only in so far as they are able to +restrain the excesses of joy.</p> + +<p>We may here add that these emotions indicate want +of knowledge and impotence of mind, and, for the same +reason, confidence, despair, gladness, and remorse are +signs of weakness of mind. For although confidence +and gladness are emotions of joy, they nevertheless +suppose that sorrow has preceded them, namely, hope +or fear. In proportion, therefore, as we endeavor to +live according to the guidance of reason, shall we +strive as much as possible to depend less on hope, to +liberate ourselves from fear, to rule fortune, and +to direct our actions by the sure counsels of reason.</p> + +<p>Humility is sorrow, which springs from this, that +a man contemplates his own weakness. But in so far +as a man knows himself by true reason is he supposed +to understand his essence, that is to say, his power. +If, therefore, while contemplating himself, he perceives +any impotence of his, this is not due to his +understanding himself, but, as we have shown, to the +fact that his power of actions is restrained. But if +we suppose that he forms a conception of his own impotence +because he understands something to be more +powerful than himself, by the knowledge of which he +limits his own power of action, in this case we simply +conceive that he understands himself distinctly, and +his power of action is increased. Humility or sorrow, +therefore, which arises because a man contemplates +his own impotence, does not spring from true contemplation +or reason, and is not a virtue, but a passion.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[279]</a></span></p> + +<p>Repentance is not a virtue, that is to say, it does +not spring from reason; on the contrary, the man who +repents of what he has done is doubly wretched or +impotent. For, in the first place, we allow ourselves to +be overcome by a depraved desire, and, in the second +place, by sorrow.</p> + +<p>Inasmuch as men seldom live as reason dictates, +therefore these two emotions, humility and repentance, +together with hope and fear, are productive of more +profit than disadvantage, and therefore, since men must +sin, it is better that they should sin in this way. For +if men impotent in mind were all equally proud, were +ashamed of nothing, and feared nothing, by what +bonds could they be united or constrained? The multitude +becomes a thing to be feared if it has nothing +to fear. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that +the prophets, thinking rather of the good of the community +than of a few, should have commended so +greatly humility, repentance and reverence. Indeed, +those who are subject to these emotions can be led much +more easily than others, so that, at last, they come to +live according to the guidance of reason, that is to say, +become free men, and enjoy the life of the blessed.</p> + + +<h4>(ii)</h4> + +<p>Pity is sorrow, and therefore is in itself evil. The +good, however, which issues from pity, namely, that +we endeavor to free from misery the man we pity, we +desire to do from the dictate of reason alone; nor can +we do anything except by the dictate of reason alone, +which we are sure is good. Pity, therefore, in a man<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[280]</a></span> +who lives according to the guidance of reason is in +itself bad and unprofitable.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that a man who lives according +to the dictates of reason endeavors as much as possible +to prevent himself from being touched by pity.</p> + +<p>The man who has properly understood that everything +follows from the necessity of the divine nature, +and comes to pass according to the eternal laws and +rules of Nature, will in truth discover nothing which +is worthy of hatred, laughter, or contempt, nor will +he pity any one, but, so far as human virtue is able, +he will endeavor to <i>do well</i>, as we say, and to <i>rejoice</i>. +We must add also, that a man who is easily touched by +the emotion of pity, and is moved by the misery or tears +of another, often does something of which he afterward +repents, both because from an emotion we do +nothing which we certainly know to be good, and also +because we are so easily deceived by false tears. But +this I say expressly of the man who lives according to +the guidance of reason. For he who is moved neither +by reason nor pity to be of any service to others is +properly called inhuman; for he seems to be unlike +a man.</p> + + +<h4>VI</h4> + +<h4><i>Diseased Emotions</i></h4> + +<p>The primary foundation of virtue is the preservation +of our being according to the guidance of reason. +The man, therefore, who is ignorant of himself is ignorant +of the foundation of all the virtues, and consequently +is ignorant of all the virtues. Again, to act +in conformity with virtue is nothing but acting ac<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[281]</a></span>cording +to the guidance of reason, and he who acts according +to the guidance of reason must necessarily +know that he acts according to the guidance of reason. +He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, and consequently +(as we have just shown) altogether ignorant +of all the virtues, cannot in any way act in conformity +with virtue, that is to say, is altogether impotent in +mind. Therefore the greatest pride or despondency +indicates the greatest impotence of mind.</p> + +<p>Hence follows, with the utmost clearness, that the +proud and the desponding are above all others subject +to emotions.</p> + +<p>Despondency, nevertheless, can be corrected more +easily than pride, since the former is an emotion of +sorrow, while the latter is an emotion of joy, and is +therefore stronger than the former.</p> + +<p>Pride is joy arising from a man's having too high +an opinion of himself. This opinion a proud man will +endeavor, as much as he can, to cherish, and therefore, +will love the presence of parasites or flatterers (the +definitions of these people are omitted, because they +are too well known), and will shun that of the noble-minded +who think of him as is right.</p> + +<p>It would take too much time to enumerate here all +the evils of pride, for the proud are subject to all +emotions, but to none are they less subject than to those +of love and pity. It is necessary, however, to observe +here that a man is also called proud if he thinks too +little of other people, and so, in this sense, pride is to +be defined as joy which arises from the false opinion +that we are superior to other people, while despondency, +the contrary to this pride, would be defined as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[282]</a></span> +sorrow arising from the false opinion that we are inferior +to other people. This being understood, it is +easy to see that the proud man is necessarily envious, +and that he hates those above all others who are the +most praised on account of their virtues. It follows, +too, that his hatred of them is not easily overcome +by love or kindness and that he is delighted by the +presence of those only who humor his weakness, and +from a fool make him a madman.</p> + +<p>Although despondency is contrary to pride, the +despondent man is closely akin to the proud man. For +since the sorrow of the despondent man arises from his +judging his own impotence by the power of virtue of +others, his sorrow will be mitigated, that is to say, he +will rejoice, if his imagination be occupied in contemplating +the vices of others. Hence the proverb— It +is a consolation to the wretched to have bad companions +in their misfortunes. On the other hand, the more +the despondent man believes himself to be below other +people, the more will he sorrow; and this is the reason +why none are more prone to envy than the despondent; +and why they, above all others, try to observe men's +actions with a view to finding fault with them rather +than correcting them, so that at last they praise nothing +but despondency and glory in it; but in such a +manner, however, as always to seem despondent.</p> + +<p>These things follow from this emotion as necessarily +as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its +three angles are equal to two right angles. It is true, +indeed, that I have said that I call these and the like +emotions evil, in so far as I attend to human profit +alone; but the laws of Nature have regard to the com<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[283]</a></span>mon +order of Nature of which man is a part—a remark +I desired to make in passing, lest it should be thought +that I talk about the vices and absurdities of men rather +than attempt to demonstrate the nature and properties +of things. As I said, I consider human emotions and +their properties precisely as I consider other natural +objects; and, indeed, the emotions of man, if they do +not show his power, show at least the power and workmanship +of Nature, no less than many other things +which we admire and delight to contemplate.</p> + + +<h4>VII</h4> + +<h4><i>Reasonable Emotions</i></h4> + +<p>If we live according to the guidance of reason, we +shall desire for others the good which we seek for ourselves. +Therefore if we see one person do good to another, +our endeavor to do good is assisted, that is to +say, we shall rejoice, and our joy (by hypothesis) will +be accompanied with the idea of the person who does +good to the other, that is to say, we shall favor him. +Favor is not opposed to reason, but agrees with it, +and may arise from it.</p> + +<p>Indignation, as it is defined by us, is necessarily evil; +but it is to be observed that when the supreme authority, +constrained by the desire of preserving peace, +punishes a citizen who injures another, I do not say +that it is indignant with the citizen, since it is not +excited by hatred to destroy him, but punishes him +from motives of piety.</p> + +<p>Self-satisfaction is the joy which arises from a man's +contemplating himself and his power of action. But<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[284]</a></span> +man's true power of action or his virtue is reason itself, +which he contemplates clearly and distinctly. Self-satisfaction +therefore arises from reason. Again, man, +when he contemplates himself, perceives nothing clearly +and distinctly or adequately, excepting those things +which follow from his power of action, that is to say, +those things which follow from his power of understanding; +and therefore from this contemplation alone +the highest satisfaction which can exist arises.</p> + +<p>Self-satisfaction is indeed the highest thing for +which we can hope, for (as we have shown), no one +endeavors to preserve his being for the sake of any +end. Again, because this self-satisfaction is more and +more nourished and strengthened by praise, and, on +the contrary more and more disturbed by blame, therefore +we are principally led by glory, and can scarcely +endure life with disgrace.</p> + +<p>Self-exaltation is not opposed to reason, but may +spring from it.</p> + +<p>What is called vainglory is self-satisfaction, nourished +by nothing but the good opinion of the multitude, +so that when that is withdrawn, the satisfaction, +that is to say, the chief good which every one loves, +ceases. For this reason those who glory in the good +opinion of the multitude anxiously and with daily care +strive, labor, and struggle to preserve their fame. For +the multitude is changeable and fickle, so that fame, if +it be not preserved, soon passes away. As every one, +moreover, is desirous to catch the praises of the people, +one person will readily destroy the fame of another; +and consequently, as the object of contention is what +is commonly thought to be the highest good, a great<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[285]</a></span> +desire arises on the part of every one to keep down +his fellows by every possible means, and he who at +last comes off conqueror boasts more because he has +injured another person than because he has profited +himself. This glory of self-satisfaction, therefore, is +indeed vain, for it is really no glory.</p> + +<p>What is worthy of notice with regard to shame may +easily be gathered from what has been said about compassion +and repentance. I will only add that pity, like +shame, although it is not a virtue, is nevertheless good, +in so far as it shows that a desire of living uprightly +is present in the man who is possessed with shame, just +as pain is called good in so far as it shows that the +injured part has not yet putrefied. A man, therefore, +who is ashamed of what he has done, although he is +sorrowful, is nevertheless more perfect that the shameless +man who has no desire of living uprightly.</p> + +<p>These are the things which I undertook to establish +with regard to the emotions of joy and sorrow. With +reference to the desires, these are good or evil as they +spring from good or evil emotions. All of them, however, +in so far as they are begotten in us of emotions +which are passions, are blind, as may easily be inferred +from what has been said, nor would they be of any +use if men could be easily persuaded to live according +to the dictates of reason alone.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Life of Virtue</i></h4> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<p>All our efforts or desires follow from the necessity +of our nature in such a manner that they can be under<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[286]</a></span>stood +either through it alone as their proximate cause, +or in so far as we are a part of Nature, which part +cannot be adequately conceived through itself and without +the other individuals.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<p>The desires which follow from our nature in such a +manner that they can be understood through it alone, +are those which are related to the mind, in so far as it +is conceived to consist of adequate ideas. The remaining +desires are not related to the mind, unless in so far +as it conceives things inadequately, whose power and +increase cannot be determined by human power, but +by the power of objects which are without us. The +first kind of desires, therefore, are properly called +actions, but the latter passions; for the first always +indicate our power, and the latter, on the contrary, +indicate our impotence and imperfect knowledge.</p> + + +<h4>III</h4> + +<p>Our actions, that is to say, those desires which are +determined by man's power or reason, are always good; +the others may be good as well as evil.</p> + + +<h4>IV</h4> + +<p>It is therefore most profitable to us in life to make +perfect the intellect or reason as far as possible, and +in this one thing consists the highest happiness or +blessedness of man; for blessedness is nothing but the +peace of mind which springs from the intuitive knowledge +of God, and to perfect the intellect is nothing but +to understand God, together with the attributes and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[287]</a></span> +actions of God, which flow from the necessity of His +nature. The final aim, therefore, of a man who is +guided by reason, that is to say, the chief desire by +which he strives to govern all his other desires, is +that by which he is led adequately to conceive himself +and all things which can be conceived by his intelligence.</p> + + +<h4>V</h4> + +<p>There is no rational life, therefore, without intelligence +and things are good only in so far as they assist +man to enjoy that life of the mind which is determined +by intelligence. Those things alone, on the other +hand, we call evil which hinder man from perfecting +his reason and enjoying a rational life.</p> + + +<h4>VI</h4> + +<p>But because all those things of which man is the +efficient cause are necessarily good, it follows that no +evil can happen to man except from external causes, +that is to say, except in so far as he is a part of the +whole of Nature, whose laws human nature is compelled +to obey—compelled also to accommodate himself +to this whole of Nature in almost an infinite +number of ways.</p> + + +<h4>VII</h4> + +<p>It is impossible that a man should not be a part of +Nature and follow her common order; but if he be +placed amongst individuals who agree with his nature, +his power of action will by that very fact be assisted +and supported. But if, on the contrary, he be placed +amongst individuals who do not in the least agree with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[288]</a></span> +his nature, he will scarcely be able without great change +on his part to accommodate himself to them.</p> + + +<h4>VIII</h4> + +<p>Anything that exists in Nature which we judge to +be evil or able to hinder us from existing and enjoying +a rational life, we are allowed to remove from us +in that way which seems the safest; and whatever, on +the other hand, we judge to be good or to be profitable +for the preservation of our being or the enjoyment of +a rational life, we are permitted to take for our use +and use in any way we may think proper; and absolutely, +every one is allowed by the highest right of +Nature to do that which he believes contributes to his +own profit.</p> + + +<h4>IX</h4> + +<p>Nothing, therefore, can agree better with the nature +of any object than other individuals of the same kind, +and so (see § VII) there is nothing more profitable to +man for the preservation of his being and the enjoyment +of a rational life than a man who is guided by +reason. Again, since there is no single thing we know +which is more excellent than a man who is guided by +reason, it follows that there is nothing by which a +person can better show how much skill and talent he +possesses than by so educating men that at last they +will live under the direct authority of reason.</p> + + +<h4>X</h4> + +<p>In so far as men are carried away by envy or any +emotion of hatred towards one another, so far are they +contrary to one another, and consequently so much the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[289]</a></span> +more are they to be feared, as they have more power +than other individuals of nature.</p> + + +<h4>XI</h4> + +<p>Minds, nevertheless, are not conquered by arms, +but by love and generosity.</p> + + +<h4>XII</h4> + +<p>Above all things is it profitable to men to form communities +and to unite themselves to one another by +bonds which may make all of them as one man; and +absolutely, it is profitable for them to do whatever +may tend to strengthen their friendships.</p> + + +<h4>XIII</h4> + +<p>But to accomplish this skill and watchfulness are +required; for men are changeable (those being very +few who live according to the laws of reason), and +nevertheless generally envious and more inclined to +vengeance than pity. To bear with each, therefore, +according to his disposition and to refrain from imitating +his emotions requires a singular power of mind. +But those, on the contrary, who know how to revile +men, to denounce vices rather than teach virtues, and +not to strengthen men's minds but to weaken them, are +injurious both to themselves and others, so that many +of them through an excess of impatience and a false +zeal for religion prefer living with brutes rather than +amongst men; just as boys or youths, unable to endure +with equanimity the rebukes of their parents, fly to the +army, choosing the discomforts of war and the rule of +a tyrant rather than the comforts of home and the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[290]</a></span> +admonitions of a father, suffering all kinds of burdens +to be imposed upon them in order that they may +revenge themselves upon their parents.</p> + + +<h4>XIV</h4> + +<p>Although, therefore, men generally determine everything +by their pleasure, many more advantages than +disadvantages arise from their common union. It +is better, therefore, to endure with equanimity the +injuries inflicted by them, and to apply our minds to +those things which subserve concord and the establishment +of friendship.</p> + + +<h4>XV</h4> + +<p>The things which beget concord are those which +are related to justice, integrity, and honor; for besides +that which is unjust and injurious, men take ill also +anything which is esteemed base, or that any one +should despise the received customs of the State. But +in order to win love, those things are chiefly necessary +which have reference to religion and piety.</p> + + +<h4>XVI</h4> + +<p>Concord, moreover, is often produced by fear, but +it is without good faith. It is to be observed, too, that +fear arises from impotence of mind, and therefore is +of no service to reason; nor is pity, although it seems +to present an appearance of piety.</p> + + +<h4>XVII</h4> + +<p>Men also are conquered by liberality, especially +those who have not the means wherewith to procure +what is necessary for the support of life. But to assist<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[291]</a></span> +every one who is needy far surpasses the strength or +profit of a private person, for the wealth of a private +person is altogether insufficient to supply such wants. +Besides, the power of any one man is too limited for +him to be able to unite every one with himself in friendship. +The care, therefore, of the poor is incumbent +on the whole of society and concerns only the general +profit.</p> + + +<h4>XVIII</h4> + +<p>In the receipt of benefits and in returning thanks, +care altogether different must be taken.</p> + + +<h4>XIX</h4> + +<p>The love of a harlot, that is to say, the lust of sexual +intercourse, which arises from mere external form, +and absolutely all love which recognizes any other +cause than the freedom of the mind, easily passes into +hatred, unless, which is worse, it becomes a species of +delirium, and thereby discord is cherished rather than +concord.</p> + + +<h4>XX</h4> + +<p>With regard to marriage, it is plain that it is in accordance +with reason, if the desire of connection is +engendered not merely by external form, but by a love +of begetting children and wisely educating them; and +if, in addition, the love both of the husband and wife +has for its cause not external form merely, but chiefly +liberty of mind.</p> + + +<h4>XXI</h4> + +<p>Flattery, too, produces concord, but only by means +of the disgraceful crime of slavery or perfidy; for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[292]</a></span> +there are none who are more taken by flattery than +the proud, who wish to be first and are not so.</p> + + +<h4>XXII</h4> + +<p>There is a false appearance of piety and religion in +dejection; and although dejection is the opposite of +pride, the humble dejected man is very near akin to +the proud.</p> + + +<h4>XXIII</h4> + +<p>Shame also contributes to concord, but only with regard +to those matters which cannot be concealed. +Shame, too, inasmuch as it is a kind of sorrow, does +not belong to the service of reason.</p> + + +<h4>XXIV</h4> + +<p>The remaining emotions of sorrow which have man +for their object are directly opposed to justice, integrity, +honor, piety, and religion; and although indignation +may seem to present an appearance of +equity, yet there is no law where it is allowed to every +one to judge the deeds of another, and to vindicate +his own or another's right.</p> + + +<h4>XXV</h4> + +<p>Affability, that is to say, the desire of pleasing men, +which is determined by reason, is related to piety. +But if affability arise from an emotion, it is ambition or +desire, by which men, generally under a false pretense +of piety, excite discords and seditions. For he who +desires to assist other people, either by advice or by +deed, in order that they may together enjoy the highest +good, will strive, above all things, to win their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[293]</a></span> +love, and not to draw them into admiration, so that a +doctrine may be named after him, nor absolutely to +give any occasion for envy. In common conversation, +too, he will avoid referring to the vices of men, and +will take care only sparingly to speak of human impotence, +while he will talk largely of human virtue or +power, and of the way by which it may be made perfect, +so that men being moved not by fear or aversion, +but solely by the emotion of joy, may endeavor as much +as they can to live under the rule of reason.</p> + + +<h4>XXVI</h4> + +<p>Excepting man, we know no individual thing in +Nature in whose mind we can take pleasure, nor any +thing which we can unite with ourselves by friendship +or any kind of intercourse, and therefore regard to +our own profit does not demand that we should preserve +anything which exists in Nature excepting men, but +teaches us to preserve it or destroy it in accordance +with its varied uses, or to adapt it to our own service +in any way whatever.</p> + + +<h4>XXVII</h4> + +<p>The profit which we derive from objects without us, +over and above the experience and knowledge which we +obtain because we observe them and change them from +their existing forms into others, is chiefly the preservation +of the body, and for this reason those objects are +the most profitable to us which can feed and nourish the +body, so that all its parts are able properly to perform +their functions. For the more capable the body is of +being affected in many ways, and affecting external<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[294]</a></span> +bodies in many ways, the more capable of thinking is +the mind. But there seem to be very few things in Nature +of this kind, and it is consequently necessary for +the requisite nourishment of the body to use many +different kinds of food; for the human body is composed +of a great number of parts of different nature, +which need constant and varied food in order that the +whole of the body may be equally adapted for all +those things which can follow from its nature, and consequently +that the mind also may be equally adapted +to conceive many things.</p> + + +<h4>XXVIII</h4> + +<p>The strength of one man would scarcely suffice to +obtain these things if men did not mutually assist one +another. As money has presented us with an abstract +of everything, it has come to pass that its image above +every other usually occupies the mind of the multitude, +because they can imagine hardly any kind of joy without +the accompanying idea of money as its cause.</p> + + +<h4>XXIX</h4> + +<p>This, however, is a vice only in those who seek +money not from poverty or necessity, but because they +have learned the arts of gain, by which they keep up a +grand appearance. As for the body itself, they feed +it in accordance with custom, but sparingly, because +they believe that they lose so much of their goods +as they spend upon the preservation of their body. +Those, however, who know the true use of money, and +regulate the measure of wealth according to their +needs, live contented with few things.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[295]</a></span></p> + + +<h4>XXX</h4> + +<p>Since, therefore, those things are good which help +the parts of the body to perform their functions, and +since joy consists in this, that the power of man, in +so far as he is made up of mind and body, is helped +or increased, it follows that all things which bring +joy are good. But inasmuch as things do not work to +this end—that they may affect us with joy—nor is +their power of action guided in accordance with our +profit, and finally, since joy is generally related chiefly +to some one part of the body, it follows that generally +the emotions of joy (unless reason and watchfulness be +present), and consequently the desires which are begotten +from them, are excessive. It is to be added, +that an emotion causes us to put that thing first which +is sweet to us in the present, and that we are not able +to judge the future with an equal emotion of the mind.</p> + + +<h4>XXXI</h4> + +<p>Superstition, on the contrary, seems to affirm that +what brings sorrow is good, and, on the contrary, that +what brings joy is evil. But, as we have already said, +no one, excepting an envious man, is delighted at my +impotence or disadvantage, for the greater the joy +with which we are affected, the greater the perfection +to which we pass, and consequently the more do we +participate in the divine nature; nor can joy ever be +evil which is controlled by a true consideration for our +own profit. On the other hand, the man who is led +by fear, and does what is good that he may avoid +what is evil, is not guided by reason.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[296]</a></span></p> + + +<h4>XXXII</h4> + +<p>But human power is very limited, and is infinitely +surpassed by the power of external causes, so that we +do not possess an absolute power to adapt to our service +the things which are without us. Nevertheless we +shall bear with equanimity those things which happen +to us contrary to what a consideration of our own +profit demands, if we are conscious that we have performed +our duty, that the power we have could not +reach so far as to enable us to avoid those things, and +that we are a part of the whole of Nature, whose order +we follow. If we clearly and distinctly understand this, +the part of us which is determined by intelligence, that +is to say, the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied +therewith, and in that satisfaction will endeavor to +persevere; for, in so far as we understand, we cannot +desire anything excepting what is necessary, nor, +absolutely, can we be satisfied with anything but the +truth. Therefore in so far as we understand these +things properly will the efforts of the better part of +us agree with the order of the whole of Nature.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> ... If it agreed better with a man's nature that he should +hang himself, could any reasons be given for his not hanging himself? +Can such a nature possibly exist? If so, I maintain (whether +I do or do not grant free will), that such an one, if he sees that he +can live more conveniently on the gallows than sitting at his own +table, would act most foolishly, if he did not hang himself. So +any one who clearly saw that, by committing crimes, he would +enjoy a really more perfect and better life and existence, than he +could attain by the practice of virtue, would be foolish if he did +not act on his convictions. For, with such a perverse human nature +as his, crime would become virtue. <i>From a letter to Wm. Blyenbergh</i> +(March 13, 1665).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> It is to be observed that here and in the following I understand +by hatred, hatred towards men only.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[297]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER XVI</h2> + +<h3>OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></h3> + + +<p>By the right and ordinance of Nature, I merely +mean those natural laws wherewith we conceive every +individual to be conditioned by Nature, so as to live +and act in a given way. For instance, fishes are naturally +conditioned for swimming, and the greater for +devouring the less; therefore fishes enjoy the water, +and the greater devour the less by sovereign natural +right. For it is certain that Nature, taken in the abstract, +has sovereign right to do anything she can; +in other words, her right is co-extensive with her power. +The power of Nature is the power of God, which has +sovereign right over all things; and, inasmuch as the +power of Nature is simply the aggregate of the powers +of all her individual components, it follows that every +individual has sovereign right to do all that he can, +in other words, the rights of an individual extend to +the utmost limits of his power as it has been conditioned.</p> + +<p>Now it is the sovereign law and right of Nature that +each individual should endeavor to preserve itself as it +is, without regard to anything but itself; therefore this +sovereign law and right belongs to every individual, +namely, to exist and act according to its natural condi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[298]</a></span>tions. +We do not here acknowledge any difference between +mankind and other individual natural entities, nor +between men endowed with reason and those to whom +reason is unknown; nor between fools, madmen, and +sane men. Whatsoever an individual does by the laws +of its nature it has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as +it acts as it was conditioned by Nature, and cannot act +otherwise. Wherefore among men, so long as they are +considered as living under the sway of Nature, he who +does not yet know reason, or who has not yet acquired +the habit of virtue, acts solely according to the laws of +his desire with as sovereign a right as he who orders +his life entirely by the laws of reason.</p> + +<p>That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do +all that reason dictates, or to live according to the +laws of reason, so also the ignorant and foolish man +has sovereign right to do all that desire dictates, or to +live according to the laws of desire. This is identical +with the teaching of Paul, who acknowledges that +previous to the law—that is, so long as men are considered +of as living under the sway of Nature, there +is no sin.</p> + +<p>The natural right of the individual man is thus determined, +not by sound reason, but by desire and power. +All are not naturally conditioned so as to act according +to the laws and rules of reason; nay, on the contrary, +all men are born ignorant, and before they can +learn the right way of life and acquire the habit of +virtue, the greater part of their life, even if they have +been well brought up, has passed away. Nevertheless, +they are in the meanwhile bound to live and preserve +themselves as far as they can by the unaided<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[299]</a></span> +impulses of desire. Nature has given them no other +guide, and has denied them the present power of +living according to sound reason; so that they are no +more bound to live by the dictates of an enlightened +mind than a cat is bound to live by the laws of the +nature of a lion.</p> + +<p>Whatsoever, therefore, an individual, considered as +under the sway of Nature, thinks useful for himself, +whether led by sound reason or impelled by the passions, +that he has a sovereign right to seek and to +take for himself as he best can, whether by force, cunning, +entreaty, or any other means; consequently he +may regard as an enemy any one who hinders the +accomplishment of his purpose.</p> + +<p>It follows from what we have said that the right +and ordinance of Nature, under which all men are +born, and under which they mostly live, only prohibits +such things as no one desires, and no one can attain: +it does not forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor +deceit, nor, indeed, any of the means suggested by +desire.</p> + +<p>This we need not wonder at, for Nature is not +bounded by the laws of human reason, which aims only +at man's true benefit and preservation. Her limits are +infinitely wider, and have reference to the eternal +order of Nature, wherein man is but a speck. It is by +the necessity of this alone that all individuals are +conditioned for living and acting in a particular way. +If anything, therefore, in Nature seems to us ridiculous, +absurd, or evil, it is because we only know in part, and +are almost entirely ignorant of the order and interdependence +of Nature as a whole, and also because<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[300]</a></span> +we want everything to be arranged according to the +dictates of our human reason; in reality that which +reason considers evil is not evil in respect to the order +and laws of Nature as a whole, but only in respect to the +laws of our reason.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much +better for us to live according to the laws and assured +dictates of reason, for, as we said, they have men's +true good for their object. Moreover, every one +wishes to live as far as possible securely beyond the +reach of fear, and this would be quite impossible so +long as every one did everything he liked, and reason's +claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and +anger. There is no one who is not ill at ease in the +midst of enmity, hatred, anger and deceit, and who +does not seek to avoid them as much as he can. When +we reflect that men without mutual help, or the aid +of reason, must needs live most miserably, ... we +shall plainly see that men must necessarily come to an +agreement to live together as securely and well as +possible if they are to enjoy, as a whole, the rights +which naturally belong to them as individuals, and +their life should be no more conditioned by the force +and desire of individuals, but by the power and will +of the whole body. This end they will be unable to +attain if desire be their only guide, for by the laws +of desire each man is drawn in a different direction; +they must, therefore, most firmly decree and establish +that they will be guided in everything by reason, which +nobody will dare openly to repudiate lest he should +be taken for a madman, and will restrain any desire +which is injurious to a man's fellows, that they will<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[301]</a></span> +do to all as they would be done by, and that they will +defend their neighbor's rights as their own.</p> + +<p>How such a compact as this should be entered into, +how ratified and established, we will now inquire.</p> + +<p>Now it is a universal law of human nature that no +one ever neglects anything which he judges to be good, +except with the hope of gaining a greater good, or +from the fear of a greater evil; nor does any one endure +an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater +evil, or gaining a greater good. That is, every one +will, of two goods, choose that which he thinks the +greatest; and, of two evils that which he thinks the +least. I say advisedly that which he thinks the greatest +or the least, for it does not necessarily follow that he +judges right. This law is so deeply implanted in the +human mind that it ought to be counted among eternal +truths and axioms.</p> + +<p>As a necessary consequence of the principle just +enunciated, no one can honestly promise to forego the +right which he has over all things,<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> and in general no +one will abide by his promises, unless under the fear +of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good. An +example will make the matter clearer. Suppose that a +robber forces me to promise that I will give him my +goods at his will and pleasure. It is plain (inasmuch +as my natural right is, as I have shown, co-extensive +with my power) that if I can free myself from this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[302]</a></span> +robber by stratagem, by assenting to his demands, I +have the natural right to do so, and to pretend to +accept his conditions. Or, again, suppose I have genuinely +promised some one that for the space of twenty +days I will not taste food or any nourishment; and +suppose I afterwards find that my promise was foolish, +and cannot be kept without very great injury to myself; +as I am bound by natural law and right to choose +the least of two evils, I have complete right to break +any compact, and act as if my promise had never been +uttered. I say that I should have perfect natural right +to do so, whether I was actuated by true and evident +reason, or whether I was actuated by mere opinion in +thinking I had promised rashly; whether my reasons +were true or false, I should be in fear of a greater evil, +which, by the ordinance of Nature, I should strive to +avoid by every means in my power.</p> + +<p>We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only +made valid by its utility, without which it becomes +null and void. It is therefore foolish to ask a man +to keep his faith with us forever, unless we also endeavor +that the violation of the compact we enter +into shall involve for the violator more harm than +good. This consideration should have very great +weight in forming a state. However, if all men could +be easily led by reason alone, and could recognize what +is best and most useful for a state, there would be no +one who would not forswear deceit, for every one +would keep most religiously to their compact in their +desire for the chief good, namely, the preservation of +the state, and would cherish good faith above all things +as the shield and buckler of the commonwealth. How<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[303]</a></span>ever, +it is far from being the case that all men can +always be easily led by reason alone; every one is +drawn away by his pleasure, while avarice, ambition, +envy, hatred, and the like so engross the mind that +reason has no place therein. Hence, though men make +promises with all the appearances of good faith, and +agree that they will keep to their engagement, no one +can absolutely rely on another man's promise unless +there is something behind it. Every one has by Nature +a right to act deceitfully, and to break his compacts, +unless he be restrained by the hope of some greater +good, or the fear of some greater evil.</p> + +<p>However, as we have shown that the natural right +of the individual is only limited by his power, it is +clear that by transferring, either willingly or under +compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he +in so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; +and, further, that the sovereign right over all men +belongs to him who has sovereign power, wherewith +he can compel men by force, or restrain them by +threats of the universally feared punishment of death. +Such sovereign right he will retain only so long as he +can maintain his power of enforcing his will; otherwise +he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger +than he will be bound unwillingly to obey him.</p> + +<p>In this manner a society can be formed without +any violation of natural right, and the covenant can +always be strictly kept—that is, if each individual +hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, +the latter will then possess sovereign natural right over +all things; that is, it will have sole and unquestioned +dominion, and every one will be bound to obey, under<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[304]</a></span> +pain of the severest punishment. A body politic of +this kind is called a Democracy, which may be defined +as a society which wields all its power as a whole. +The sovereign power is not restrained by any laws, but +every one is bound to obey it in all things; such is the +state of things implied when men either tacitly or +expressly handed over to it all their power of self-defense, +or in other words, all their right. For if they +had wished to retain any right for themselves, they +ought to have taken precautions for its defense and +preservation. As they have not done so, and indeed +could not have done so without dividing and consequently +ruining the state, they placed themselves absolutely +at the mercy of the sovereign power; and, therefore, +having acted (as we have shown) as reason and +necessity demanded, they are obliged to fulfill the commands +of the sovereign power, however absurd these +may be, else they will be public enemies, and will act +against reason, which urges the preservation of the +state as a primary duty. For reason bids us choose +the lesser of two evils.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely +to the dominion and will of another, is one which may +be incurred with a light heart: for we have shown that +sovereigns only possess this right of imposing their +will, so long as they have the full power to enforce it. +If such power be lost their right to command is lost +also, or lapses to those who have assumed it and can +keep it. Thus it is very rare for sovereigns to impose +thoroughly irrational commands, for they are bound +to consult their own interests, and retain their power +by consulting the public good and acting according to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[305]</a></span> +the dictates of reason, as Seneca says, "<i>violenta imperia +nemo continuit diu</i>." No one can long retain a +tyrant's sway.</p> + +<p>In a democracy, irrational commands are still less +to be feared: for it is almost impossible that the majority +of a people, especially if it be a large one, should +agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the basis +and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, +and to bring men as far as possible under the +control of reason, so that they may live in peace and +harmony. If this basis be removed the whole fabric +falls to ruin.</p> + +<p>Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, +the duty of subjects is, as I have said, to obey its +commands, and to recognize no right save that which +it sanctions.</p> + +<p>It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning +subjects into slaves, for slaves obey commands and +free men live as they like; but this idea is based on a +misconception, for the true slave is he who is led away +by his pleasures and can neither see what is good +for him nor act accordingly: he alone is free who lives +with free consent under the entire guidance of +reason.</p> + +<p>Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom +in a certain sense, but it does not, therefore, make +a man a slave; all depends on the object of the action. +If the object of the action be the good of the state, and +not the good of the agent, the latter is a slave and +does himself no good; but in a state or kingdom where +the weal of the whole people, and not that of the ruler, +is the supreme law, obedience to the sovereign power<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[306]</a></span> +does not make a man a slave, of no use to himself, but +a subject. Therefore, that state is the freest whose +laws are founded on sound reason, so that every member +of it may, if he will, be free;<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> that is, live with +full consent under the entire guidance of reason.</p> + +<p>Children, though they are bound to obey all the +commands of their parents, are yet not slaves; for the +commands of parents look generally to the children's +benefit.</p> + +<p>We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference +between a slave, a son, and a subject; their positions +may be thus defined. A slave is one who is bound +to obey his master's orders, though they are given +solely in the master's interest; a son is one who obeys +his father's orders, given in his own interest; a subject +obeys the orders of the sovereign power, given for the +common interest, wherein he is included.</p> + +<p>I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the +basis of a democracy. I have especially desired to do +so, for I believe it to be of all forms of government +the most natural, and the most consonant with individual +liberty. In it no one transfers his natural right +so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs; +he only hands it over to the majority of a society, +whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain, as they +were in the state of Nature, equals.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[307]</a></span></p> +<p>This is the only form of government which I have +treated of at length, for it is the one most akin to my +purpose of showing the benefits of freedom in a state.</p> + +<p>I may pass over the fundamental principles of other +forms of government, for we may gather from what +has been said whence their right arises without going +into its origin. The possessor of sovereign power, +whether he be one, or many, or the whole body politic, +has the sovereign right of imposing any commands he +pleases; and he who has either voluntarily, or under +compulsion, transferred the right to defend him to +another, has, in so doing, renounced his natural right +and is therefore bound to obey, in all things, the +commands of the sovereign power; and will be bound +so to do so long as the king, or nobles, or the people +preserve the sovereign power which formed the basis +of the original transfer. I need add no more.</p> + +<p>The bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed, +we shall readily be able to define private civil +right, wrong, justice, and injustice, with their relations +to the state; and also to determine what constitutes an +ally, or an enemy, or the crime of treason.</p> + +<p>By private civil right we can only mean the liberty +every man possesses to preserve his existence, a liberty +limited by the edicts of the sovereign power, and preserved +only by its authority. For when a man has +transferred to another his right of living as he likes, +which was only limited by his power, that is, has transferred +his liberty and power of self-defense, he is +bound to live as that other dictates, and to trust to +him entirely for his defense. Wrong takes place when +a citizen, or subject, is forced by another to undergo<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[308]</a></span> +some loss or pain in contradiction to the authority of +the law, or the edict of the sovereign power.</p> + +<p>Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community; +nor can it ever accrue to subjects from any +act of the sovereign, who has the right to do what +he likes. It can only arise, therefore, between private +persons, who are bound by law and right not to injure +one another. Justice consists in the habitual rendering +to every man his lawful due; injustice consists in depriving +a man, under the pretense of legality, of what +the laws, rightly interpreted, would allow him. These +last are also called equity and inequity, because those +who administer the laws are bound to show no respect +of persons, but to account all men equal, and to defend +every man's right equally, neither envying the +rich nor despising the poor.</p> + +<p>The men of two states become allies, when for the +sake of avoiding war, or for some other advantage, +they covenant to do each other no hurt, but, on the +contrary, to assist each other if necessity arises, each +retaining his independence. Such a covenant is valid +so long as its basis of danger or advantage is in force: +no one enters into an engagement, or is bound to stand +by his compacts unless there be a hope of some accruing +good, or the fear of some evil: if this basis be +removed the compact thereby becomes void: this has +been abundantly shown by experience. For although +different states make treaties not to harm one another, +they always take every possible precaution against +such treaties being broken by the stronger party, and +do not rely on the compact, unless there is a sufficiently +obvious object and advantage to both parties in ob<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[309]</a></span>serving +it. Otherwise they would fear a breach of +faith, nor would there be any wrong done thereby; +for who in his proper senses, and aware of the right +of the sovereign power, would trust in the promises +of one who has the will and the power to do what he +likes, and who aims solely at the safety and advantage +of his dominion? Moreover, if we consult loyalty +and religion, we shall see that no one in possession of +power ought to abide by his promises to the injury of +his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises without +breaking the engagement he made with his subjects, +by which both he and they are most solemnly +bound.</p> + +<p>An enemy is one who lives apart from the state, and +does not recognize its authority either as a subject or as +an ally. It is not hatred which makes a man an +enemy, but the rights of the state. The rights of the +state are the same in regard to him who does not recognize +by any compact the state authority, as they are +against him who has done the state an injury. It has +the right to force him, as best it can, either to submit, +or to contract an alliance.</p> + +<p>Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects, +who by compact, either tacit or expressed, have transferred +all their rights to the state. A subject is said +to have committed this crime when he has attempted, +for whatever reason, to seize the sovereign power, or +to place it in different hands. I say, <i>has attempted</i>, +for if punishment were not to overtake him till he +had succeeded, it would often come too late, the sovereign +rights would have been acquired or transferred +already.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[310]</a></span></p> + +<p>I also say, <i>has attempted, for whatever reasons, to +seize the sovereign power</i>, and I recognize no difference +whether such an attempt should be followed by +public loss or public gain. Whatever be his reason for +acting, the crime is treason, and he is rightly condemned. +In war, every one would admit the justice of +his sentence. If a man does not keep to his post, but +approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his +commander, whatever may be his motive, so long as +he acts on his own motion, even if he advances with +the design of defeating the enemy, he is rightly put +to death, because he has violated his oath, and infringed +the rights of his commander. That all citizens +are equally bound by these rights in time of peace, is +not so generally recognized, but the reasons for obedience +are in both cases identical. The state must be +preserved and directed by the sole authority of the +sovereign, and such authority and right have been +accorded by universal consent to him alone. If, therefore, +any one else attempts, without his consent, to +execute any public enterprise, even though the state +might (as we said) reap benefit therefrom, such person +has none the less infringed the sovereign's right, and +would be rightly punished for treason.</p> + +<p>In order that every scruple may be removed, we may +now answer the inquiry, whether our former assertion +that every one who has not the practice of reason, may, +in the state of Nature, live by sovereign natural right, +according to the laws of his desires, is not in direct +opposition to the law and right of God as revealed. +For as all men absolutely (whether they be less endowed +with reason or more) are equally bound by the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[311]</a></span> +Divine command to love their neighbor as themselves, +it may be said that they cannot, without wrong, do +injury to any one, or live according to their desires.</p> + +<p>This objection, so far as the state of Nature is concerned, +can be easily answered, for the state of Nature +is, both in nature and in time, prior to religion. No +one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to +God,<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his +reason, but solely by revelation confirmed by signs. +Therefore, previous to revelation, no one is bound by a +Divine law and right of which he is necessarily in +ignorance. The state of Nature must by no means be +confounded with a state of religion, but must be con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[312]</a></span>ceived +as without either religion or law, and consequently +without sin or wrong. This is how we have described +it, and we are confirmed by the authority of +Paul. It is not only in respect of ignorance that we +conceive the state of Nature as prior to, and lacking +the Divine revealed law and right; but in respect of +freedom also, wherewith all men are born endowed....</p> + +<p>It may be insisted that sovereigns are as much +bound by the Divine law as subjects; whereas we have +asserted that they retain their natural rights, and +may do whatever they like.</p> + +<p>In order to clear up the whole difficulty, which arises +rather concerning the natural right than the natural +state, I maintain that every one is bound, in the state +of Nature, to live according to Divine law, in the same +way as he is bound to live according to the dictates of +sound reason; namely, inasmuch as it is to his advantage, +and necessary for his salvation; but, if he +will not so live, he may do otherwise at his own risk. +He is thus bound to live according to his own laws, +not according to any one else's, and to recognize no +man as a judge, or as a superior in religion. Such, in +my opinion, is the position of a sovereign, for he may +take advice from his fellow men, but he is not bound +to recognize any as a judge, nor any one besides himself +as an arbitrator on any question of right, unless +it be a prophet sent expressly by God and attesting his +mission by indisputable signs. Even then he does not +recognize a man, but God Himself as his judge.</p> + +<p>If a sovereign refuses to obey God as revealed in +His law, he does so at his own risk and loss, but with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[313]</a></span>out +violating any civil or natural right. For the civil +right is dependent on his own decree; and natural +right is dependent on the laws of Nature, which latter +are not adapted to religion, whose sole aim is the +good of humanity, but to the order of Nature—that +is, to God's eternal decree unknown to us.</p> + +<p>This truth seems to be adumbrated in a somewhat +obscurer form by those who maintain that men can +sin against God's revelation, but not against the eternal +decree by which He has ordained all things....</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> From the <i>Tr. Th.-P.</i>, ch. xvi, same title.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> In the state of social life, where general right determines what +is good or evil, stratagem is rightly distinguished as of two kinds, +good and evil. But in the state of Nature, where every man is his +own judge, possessing the absolute right to lay down laws for +himself, to interpret them as he pleases, or to abrogate them if +he thinks it convenient, it is not conceivable that stratagem should +be evil.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Whatever be the social state a man finds himself in, he may be +free. For certainly a man is free, in so far as he is led by reason. +Now reason (though Hobbes thinks otherwise) is always on the +side of peace, which cannot be attained unless the general laws of +the state be respected. Therefore the more a man is led by reason—in +other words, the more he is free, the more constantly will he +respect the laws of his country, and obey the commands of the +sovereign power to which he is subject.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> When Paul says that men have in themselves no refuge, he +speaks as a man: for in the ninth chapter of the same Epistle he +expressly teaches that God has mercy on whom He will, and that +men are without excuse, only because they are in God's power like +clay in the hands of a potter, who out of the same lump makes +vessels, some for honor and some for dishonor, not because they +have been forewarned. As regards the Divine natural law whereof +the chief commandment is, as we have said, to love God, I have +called it a law in the same sense, as philosophers style laws those +general rules of Nature, according to which everything happens. +For the love of God is not a state of obedience: it is a virtue +which necessarily exists in a man who knows God rightly. Obedience +has regard to the will of a ruler, not to necessity and truth. Now +as we are ignorant of the nature of God's will, and on the other +hand know that everything happens solely by God's power, we +cannot, except through revelation, know whether God wishes in any +way to be honored as a sovereign. +</p><p> +Again; we have shown that the Divine rights appear to us in the +light of rights or commands, only so long as we are ignorant of their +cause: as soon as their cause is known, they cease to be rights, and +we embrace them no longer as rights but as eternal truths; in other +words, obedience passes into love of God, which emanates from +true knowledge as necessarily as light emanates from the sun. Reason +then leads us to love God, but cannot lead us to obey Him; for we +cannot embrace the commands of God as Divine, while we are in +ignorance of their cause, neither can we rationally conceive God +as a sovereign laying down laws as a sovereign.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[314]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER XVII</h2> + +<h3>OF SUPREME AUTHORITIES</h3> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<h4><i>Of the Right of Supreme Authorities</i><a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a></h4> + +<p>Under every dominion the state is said to be Civil; +but the entire body subject to a dominion is called a +Commonwealth, and the general business of the dominion, +subject to the direction of him that holds it, +has the name of Affairs of State. Next we call men +Citizens, as far as they enjoy by the civil law all the +advantages of the commonwealth, and Subjects, as far +as they are bound to obey its ordinances or laws. +Lastly ... of the civil state there are three kinds—democracy, +aristocracy and monarchy. Now, before +I begin to treat of each kind separately, I will first +deduce all the properties of the civil state in general. +And of these, first of all comes to be considered the +supreme right of the commonwealth, or the right of +the supreme authorities.</p> + +<p>It is clear that the right of the supreme authorities +is nothing else than simple natural right, limited, indeed, +by the power, not of every individual, but of +the multitude, which is guided, as it were, by one mind—that +is, as each individual in the state of Nature, so<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[315]</a></span> +the body and mind of a dominion have as much right +as they have power. And thus each single citizen or +subject has the less right, the more the commonwealth +exceeds him in power, and each citizen consequently +does and has nothing but what he may by the general +decree of the commonwealth defend.</p> + +<p>If the commonwealth grant to any man the right, +and therewith the authority (for else it is but a gift of +words) to live after his own mind, by that very act it +abandons its own right, and transfers the same to him, +to whom it has given such authority. But if it has +given this authority to two or more, I mean authority +to live each after his own mind, by that very act it +has divided the dominion, and if, lastly, it has given +this same authority to every citizen, it has thereby +destroyed itself, and there remains no more a commonwealth, +but everything returns to the state of Nature; +all of which is very manifest from what goes before. +And thus it follows, that it can by no means be conceived, +that every citizen should by the ordinance of +the commonwealth live after his own mind, and accordingly +this natural right of being one's own judge ceases +in the civil state. I say expressly "by the ordinance +of the commonwealth," for if we weigh the matter +aright, the natural right of every man does not cease +in the civil state. For man, alike in the natural and +in the civil state, acts according to the laws of his +own nature, and consults his own interest. Man, I say, +in each state is led by fear or hope to do or leave +undone this or that; but the main difference between +the two states is this, that in the civil state all fear +the same things, and all have the same ground of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[316]</a></span> +security, and manner of life; and this certainly does +not do away with the individual's faculty of judgment. +For he that is minded to obey all the commonwealth's +orders, whether through fear of its power or through +love of quiet, certainly consults after his own heart +his own safety and interest.</p> + +<p>Moreover, we cannot even conceive, that every citizen +should be allowed to interpret the commonwealth's +decrees or laws. For were every citizen allowed this, +he would thereby be his own judge, because each would +easily be able to give a color of right to his own deeds, +which by the last section is absurd.</p> + +<p>We see, then, that every citizen depends not on himself, +but on the commonwealth, all whose commands +he is bound to execute, and has no right to decide, +what is equitable or iniquitous, just or unjust. But, +on the contrary, as the body of the dominion should, +so to speak, be guided by one mind, and consequently +the will of the commonwealth must be taken to be the +will of all; what the state decides to be just and good +must be held to be so decided by every individual. +And so, however iniquitous the subject may think +the commonwealth's decisions, he is none the less +bound to execute them.</p> + +<p>But, it may be objected, is it not contrary to the +dictate of reason to subject oneself wholly to the +judgment of another, and, consequently, is not the civil +state repugnant to reason? Whence it would follow +that the civil state is irrational, and could only be +created by men destitute of reason, not at all by such +as are led by it. But since reason teaches nothing +contrary to Nature, sound reason cannot therefore<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[317]</a></span> +dictate that every one should remain independent, so +long as men are liable to passions, that is, reason pronounces +against such independence. Besides, reason +altogether teaches to seek peace, and peace cannot +be maintained, unless the commonwealth's general +laws be kept unbroken. And so, the more a man is +guided by reason, that is, the more he is free, the more +constantly he will keep the laws of the commonwealth, +and execute the commands of the supreme authority, +whose subject he is. Furthermore, the civil state is +naturally ordained to remove general fear, and prevent +general sufferings, and therefore pursue above everything +the very end, after which every one, who is led +by reason, strives, but in the natural state strives +vainly. Wherefore, if a man, who is led by reason, +has sometimes to do by the commonwealth's order +what he knows to be repugnant to reason, that harm +is far compensated by the good, which he derives from +the existence of a civil state. For it is reason's own +law, to choose the less of two evils; and accordingly +we may conclude that no one is acting against the +dictate of his own reason, so far as he does what by +the law of the commonwealth is to be done. And this +any one will more easily grant us, after we have explained +how far the power and consequently the right +of the commonwealth extends.</p> + +<p>For, first of all, it must be considered that, as in +the state of Nature the man who is led by reason is +most powerful and most independent, so too that commonwealth +will be most powerful and most independent +which is founded and guided by reason. For +the right of the commonwealth is determined by the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[318]</a></span> +power of the multitude, which is led, as it were, by +one mind. But this unity of mind can in no wise be +conceived, unless the commonwealth pursues chiefly +the very end which sound reason teaches is to the +interest of all men.</p> + +<p>In the second place it comes to be considered that +subjects are so far dependent, not on themselves but +on the commonwealth, as they fear its power or threats, +or as they love the civil state. Whence it follows, +that such things, as no one can be induced to do by +rewards or threats, do not fall within the rights of +the commonwealth. For instance, by reason of his +faculty of judgment, it is in no man's power to believe. +For by what rewards or threats can a man be brought +to believe that the whole is not greater than its part, +or that God does not exist, or that that is an infinite +being, which he sees to be finite, or, generally, anything +contrary to his sense or thought? So, too, by what +rewards or threats can a man be brought to love one +whom he hates, or to hate one whom he loves? And +to this head must likewise be referred such things as +are so abhorrent to human nature, that it regards them +as actually worse than any evil, as that a man should +be witness against himself, or torture himself, or kill his +parents, or not strive to avoid death, and the like, to +which no one can be induced by rewards or threats. +But if we still choose to say that the commonwealth +has the right or authority to order such things, we can +conceive of it in no other sense than that in which +one might say that a man has the right to be mad or +delirious. For what but a delirious fancy would such +a right be, as could bind no one? And here I am<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[319]</a></span> +speaking expressly of such things as cannot be subject +to the right of a commonwealth and are abhorrent to +human nature in general. For the fact that a fool or +madman can by no rewards or threats be induced to +execute orders, or that this or that person, because he +is attached to this or that religion, judges the laws +of a dominion worse than any possible evil, in no wise +makes void the laws of the commonwealth, since by +them most of the citizens are restrained. And so, as +those who are without fear or hope are so far independent, +they are, therefore, enemies of the dominion, +and may lawfully be coerced by force.</p> + +<p>Thirdly, and lastly, it comes to be considered that +those things are not so much within the commonwealth's +right, which cause indignation in the majority. +For it is certain, that by the guidance of Nature men +conspire together, either through common fear, or with +the desire to avenge some common hurt; and as the +right of the commonwealth is determined by the common +power of the multitude, it is certain that the +power and right of the commonwealth are so far diminished, +as it gives occasion for many to conspire +together. There are certainly some subjects of fear +for a commonwealth, and as every separate citizen or +in the state of Nature every man, so a commonwealth +is the less independent, the greater reason it has to +fear. So much for the right of supreme authorities +over subjects. Now before I treat of the right of the +said authorities as against others, we had better resolve +a question commonly mooted about religion.</p> + +<p>For it may be objected to us, Do not the civil state, +and the obedience of subjects, such as we have shown<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[320]</a></span> +is required in the civil state, do away with religion, +whereby we are bound to worship God? But if we +consider the matter, as it really is, we shall find nothing +that can suggest a scruple. For the mind, so far +as it makes use of reason, is dependent, not on the +supreme authorities, but on itself. And so the true +knowledge and the love of God cannot be subject to +the dominion of any, nor yet can charity towards one's +neighbor. And if we further reflect that the highest +exercise of charity is that which aims at keeping peace +and joining in unity, we shall not doubt that he does +his duty, who helps every one, so far as the commonwealth's +laws, that is, so far as unity and quiet allow. +As for external rites, it is certain, that they can do no +good or harm at all in respect of the true knowledge of +God, and the love which necessarily results from it; +and so they ought not to be held of such importance, +that it should be thought worth while on their account +to disturb public peace and quiet. Moreover, it is +certain that I am not a champion of religion by the +law of Nature, that is, by the divine decree. For I +have no authority, as once the disciples of Christ had, +to cast out unclean spirits and work miracles; which +authority is yet so necessary to the propagating of religion +in places where it is forbidden, that without it +one not only, as they say, wastes one's time<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> and +trouble, but causes besides very many inconveniences, +whereof all ages have seen most mournful examples. +Every one therefore, wherever he may be, can worship +God with true religion, and mind his own business,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[321]</a></span> +which is the duty of a private man. But the care of +propagating religion should be left to God, or the +supreme authorities, upon whom alone falls the charge +of affairs of state. But I return to my subject.</p> + +<p>After explaining the right of supreme authorities +over citizens and the duty of subjects, it remains to +consider the right of such authorities against the world +at large, which is now easily intelligible from what +has been said. For since the right of the supreme +authorities is nothing else but simple natural right, +it follows that two dominions stand towards each other +in the same relation as do two men in the state of +Nature, with this exception, that a commonwealth can +provide against being oppressed by another; which a +man in the state of Nature cannot do, seeing that he +is overcome daily by sleep, often by disease or mental +infirmity, and in the end by old age, and is besides +liable to other inconveniences, from which a commonwealth +can secure itself.</p> + +<p>A commonwealth, then, is so far independent, as it +can plan and provide against oppression by another, +and so far dependent on another commonwealth, as it +fears that other's power, or is hindered by it from +executing its own wishes, or, lastly, as it needs its help +for its own preservation or increase. For we cannot +at all doubt, that if two commonwealths are willing to +offer each other mutual help, both together are more +powerful, and therefore have more right, than either +alone.</p> + +<p>But this will be more clearly intelligible if we reflect +that two commonwealths are naturally enemies. +For men in the state of Nature are enemies. Those,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[322]</a></span> +then, who stand outside a commonwealth, and retain +their natural rights, continue enemies. Accordingly, +if one commonwealth wishes to make war on another +and employ extreme measures to make that other dependent +on itself, it may lawfully make the attempt, +since it needs but the bare will of the commonwealth +for war to be waged. But concerning peace it can +decide nothing, save with the concurrence of another +commonwealth's will. When it follows that laws +of war regard every commonwealth by itself, but laws +of peace regard not one, but at the least two commonwealths, +which are therefore called "contracting +parties."</p> + +<p>This "contract" remains so long unmoved as the +motive for entering into it, that is, fear of hurt or +hope of gain, subsists. But take away from either +commonwealth this hope or fear, and it is left independent, +and the link, whereby the commonwealths +were mutually bound, breaks of itself. And therefore +every commonwealth has the right to break its contract, +whenever it chooses, and cannot be said to act +treacherously or perfidiously in breaking its word, as +soon as the motive of hope or fear is removed. For +every contracting party was on equal terms in this +respect, that whichever could first free itself of fear +should be independent, and make use of its independence +after its own mind; and, besides, no one makes +a contract respecting the future, but on the hypothesis +of certain precedent circumstances. But when these +circumstances change, the reason of policy applicable +to the whole position changes with them; and therefore +every one of the contracting commonwealths re<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[323]</a></span>tains +the right of consulting its own interest, and consequently +endeavors, as far as possible, to be free +from fear and thereby independent, and to prevent +another from coming out of the contract with greater +power. If then a commonwealth complains that it +has been deceived, it cannot properly blame the bad +faith of another contracting commonwealth, but only +its own folly in having entrusted its own welfare to +another party, that was independent, and had for its +highest law the welfare of its own dominion.</p> + +<p>To commonwealths, which have contracted a treaty +of peace, it belongs to decide the questions which may +be mooted about the terms or rules of peace, whereby +they have mutually bound themselves, inasmuch as +laws of peace regard not one commonwealth, but the +commonwealths which contract taken together. But +if they cannot agree together about the conditions, +they by that very fact return to a state of war.</p> + +<p>The more commonwealths there are, that have contracted +a joint treaty of peace, the less each of them +by itself is an object of fear to the remainder, or the +less it has the authority to make war. But it is so +much the more bound to observe the conditions of +peace; that is, the less independent, and the more +bound to accommodate itself to the general will of the +contracting parties.</p> + +<p>But the good faith, inculcated by sound reason and +religion, is not hereby made void; for neither reason +nor Scripture teaches one to keep one's word in every +case. For if I have promised a man, for instance, to +keep safe a sum of money he has secretly deposited +with me, I am not bound to keep my word, from the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[324]</a></span> +time that I know or believe the deposit to have been +stolen, but I shall act more rightly in endeavoring to +restore it to its owners. So likewise, if the supreme +authority has promised another to do something, which +subsequently occasion or reason shows or seems to +show is contrary to the welfare of its subjects, it is +surely bound to break its word. As then Scripture +only teaches us to keep our word in general, and leaves +to every individual's judgment the special cases of +exception, it teaches nothing repugnant to what we +have just proved.</p> + +<p>But that I may not have so often to break the +thread of my discourse, and to resolve hereafter similar +objections, I would have it known that all this demonstration +of mine proceeds from the necessity of human +nature, considered in what light you will—I mean, from +the universal effort of all men after self-preservation, +an effort inherent in all men, whether learned or unlearned. +And therefore, however one considers men +are led, whether by passion or by reason, it will be +the same thing; for the demonstration, as we have +said, is of universal application.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<h4><i>Of the Functions of Supreme Authorities</i><a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a></h4> + +<p>The right of the supreme authorities is limited by +their power; the most important part of that right is, +that they are, as it were, the mind of the dominion, +whereby all ought to be guided; and accordingly, such +authorities alone have the right of deciding what is +good, evil, equitable or iniquitous, that is, what must<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[325]</a></span> +be done or left undone by the subjects severally or +collectively. And, accordingly, they have the sole +right of laying down laws, and of interpreting the +same, whenever their meaning is disputed, and of +deciding whether a given case is in conformity with +or violation of the laws; and, lastly, of waging war, +and of drawing up and offering propositions for peace, +or of accepting such when offered.</p> + +<p>As all these functions, and also the means required +to execute them, are matters which regard the whole +body of the dominion, that is, are affairs of state, it +follows that affairs of state depend on the direction +of him only who holds supreme dominion. And hence +it follows that it is the right of the supreme authority +alone to judge the deeds of every individual, and demand +of him an account of the same; to punish criminals, +and decide questions of law between citizens, or +appoint jurists acquainted with the existing laws, to +administer these matters on its behalf; and, further, +to use and order all means to war and peace, as to +found and fortify cities, levy soldiers, assign military +posts, and order what it would have done, and, with +a view to peace, to send and give audience to ambassadors; +and, finally, to levy the costs of all this.</p> + +<p>Since, then, it is the right of the supreme authority +alone to handle public matters, or choose officials to do +so, it follows that that subject is a pretender to the +dominion, who, without the supreme council's knowledge, +enters upon any public matter, although he believe +that his design will be to the best interest of the +commonwealth.</p> + +<p>But it is often asked, whether the supreme authority<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[326]</a></span> +is bound by laws, and, consequently, whether it can +do wrong. Now as the words "law" and "wrong-doing" +often refer not merely to the laws of a commonwealth, +but also to the general rules which concern all +natural things, and especially to the general rules of +reason, we cannot, without qualification, say that the +commonwealth is bound by no laws, or can do no +wrong. For were the commonwealth bound by no laws +or rules, which removed, the commonwealth were no +commonwealth, we should have to regard it not as a +natural thing, but as a chimera. A commonwealth +then does wrong, when it does, or suffers to be done, +things which may be the cause of its own ruin; and we +can say that it then does wrong, in the sense in which +philosophers or doctors say that Nature does wrong; +and in this sense we can say, that a commonwealth +does wrong, when it acts against the dictate of reason. +For a commonwealth is most independent when it acts +according to the dictate of reason; so far, then, as it +acts against reason, it fails itself, or does wrong. And +we shall be able more easily to understand this if we +reflect that when we say, that a man can do what he +will with his own, this authority must be limited not +only by the power of the agent, but by the capacity +of the object. If, for instance, I say that I can rightfully +do what I will with this table, I do not certainly +mean that I have the right to make it eat grass. So, +too, though we say, that men depend not on themselves, +but on the commonwealth, we do not mean, that men +lose their human nature and put on another; nor yet +that the commonwealth has the right to make men +wish for this or that, or (what is just as impossible)<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[327]</a></span> +regard with honor things which excite ridicule or disgust. +But it is implied that there are certain intervening +circumstances which supposed, one likewise +supposes the reverence and fear of the subjects towards +the commonwealth, and which abstracted, one makes +abstraction likewise of that fear and reverence, and +therewith of the commonwealth itself. The commonwealth, +then, to maintain its independence, is bound +to preserve the causes of fear and reverence, otherwise +it ceases to be a commonwealth. For the person or +persons that hold dominion can no more combine with +the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots +drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances +of a stage-player, or the open violation or contempt +of laws passed by themselves, than they can combine +existence with non-existence. But to proceed to slay +and rob subjects, ravish maidens, and the like, turns +fear into indignation and the civil state into a state of +enmity.</p> + +<p>We see, then, in what sense we may say, that a +commonwealth is bound by laws and can do wrong. +But if by "law" we understand civil law, and by +"wrong" that which, by civil law, is forbidden to be +done, that is, if these words be taken in their proper +sense, we cannot at all say that a commonwealth is +bound by laws or can do wrong. For the maxims +and motives of fear and reverence which a commonwealth +is bound to observe in its own interest, pertain +not to civil jurisprudence, but to the law of Nature, +since they cannot be vindicated by the civil law, but +by the law of war. And a commonwealth is bound +by them in no other sense than that in which in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[328]</a></span> +state of Nature a man is bound to take heed that he +preserve his independence and be not his own enemy, +lest he should destroy himself; and in this taking +heed lies not the subjection, but the liberty of human +nature. But civil jurisprudence depends on the mere +decree of the commonwealth, which is not bound to +please any but itself, nor to hold anything to be good +or bad, but what it judges to be such for itself. And, +accordingly, it has not merely the right to avenge itself, +or to lay down and interpret laws, but also to abolish +the same, and to pardon any guilty person out of the +fullness of its power.</p> + +<p>Contracts or laws, whereby the multitude transfers +its right to one council or man, should without doubt +be broken, when it is expedient for the general welfare +to do so. But to decide this point, whether, that is, it +be expedient for the general welfare to break them or +not, is within the right of no private person, but of +him only who holds dominion; therefore of these laws +he who holds dominion remains sole interpreter. +Moreover, no private person can by right vindicate +these laws, and so they do not really bind him who +holds dominion. Notwithstanding, if they are of such +a nature that they cannot be broken without at the +same time weakening the commonwealth's strength, +that is, without at the same time changing to indignation +the common fear of most of the citizens, by this +very fact the commonwealth is dissolved, and the contract +comes to an end; and therefore such contract is +vindicated not by the civil law, but by the law of war. +And so he who holds dominion is not bound to observe +the terms of the contract by any other cause than that,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[329]</a></span> +which bids a man in the state of Nature to beware of +being his own enemy, lest he should destroy himself.</p> + + +<h4>III</h4> + +<h4><i>Of the Best State of a Dominion</i><a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></h4> + +<p>We have shown that man is then most independent +when he is most led by reason, and, in consequence, +that that commonwealth is most powerful and most independent +which is founded and guided by reason. +But, as the best plan of living, so as to assure to the +utmost self-preservation, is that which is framed according +to the dictate of reason, therefore it follows +that that in every kind is best done, which a man or +commonwealth does, so far as he or it is in the highest +degree independent. For it is one thing to till a field +by right, and another to till it in the best way. One +thing, I say, to defend or preserve oneself, and to +pass judgment by right, and another to defend or +preserve oneself in the best way, and to pass the +best judgment; and, consequently, it is one thing to +have dominion and care of affairs of state by right, +and another to exercise dominion and direct affairs of +state in the best way. And so, as we have treated of +the right of every commonwealth in general, it is time +to treat of the best state of every dominion.</p> + +<p>Now the quality of the state of any dominion is easily +perceived from the end of the civil state, which end is +nothing else but peace and security of life. And therefore +that dominion is the best, where men pass their +lives in unity, and the laws are kept unbroken. For +it is certain, that seditions, wars, and contempt or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[330]</a></span> +breach of the laws are not so much to be imputed to +the wickedness of the subjects, as to the bad state of a +dominion. For men are not born fit for citizenship, +but must be made so. Besides, men's natural passions +are everywhere the same; and if wickedness more prevails, +and more offenses are committed in one commonwealth +than in another, it is certain that the former +has not enough pursued the end of unity, nor framed +its laws with sufficient forethought; and that, therefore, +it has failed in making quite good its right as a +commonwealth. For a civil state, which has not done +away with the causes of seditions, where war is a perpetual +object of fear, and where, lastly, the laws are +often broken, differs but little from the mere state of +Nature, in which every one lives after his own mind +at the great risk of his life.</p> + +<p>But as the vices and inordinate license and contumacy +of subjects must be imputed to the commonwealth, +so, on the other hand, their virtue and constant +obedience to the laws are to be ascribed in the main +to the virtue and perfect right of the commonwealth. +And so it is deservedly reckoned to Hannibal as an +extraordinary virtue, that in his army there never +arose a sedition.</p> + +<p>Of a commonwealth, whose subjects are but hindered +by terror from taking arms, it should rather be said, +that it is free from war, than that it has peace. For +peace is not mere absence of war, but is a virtue that +springs from force of character: for obedience is the +constant will to execute what, by the general decree +of the commonwealth, ought to be done. Besides, that +commonwealth whose peace depends on the sluggish<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[331]</a></span>ness +of its subjects, that are led about like sheep to +learn but slavery, may more properly be called a desert +than a commonwealth.</p> + +<p>When, then, we call that dominion best, where men +pass their lives in unity, I understand a human life, +defined not by mere circulation of the blood, and other +qualities common to all animals, but above all by +reason, the true excellence and life of the mind.</p> + +<p>But be it remarked that, by the dominion which I +have said is established for this end, I intend that +which has been established by a free multitude, not +that which is acquired over a multitude by right of +war. For a free multitude is guided more by hope +than fear; a conquered one, more by fear than by +hope: inasmuch as the former aims at making use of +life, the latter but at escaping death. The former, I +say, aims at living for its own ends, the latter is forced +to belong to the conqueror; and so we say that this +is enslaved, but that free. And, therefore, the end +of a dominion, which one gets by right of war, is to be +master, and have rather slaves than subjects. And +although between the dominion created by a free multitude, +and that gained by right of war, if we regard +generally the right of each, we can make no essential +distinction; yet their ends, as we have already shown, +and further the means to the preservation of each are +very different.</p> + +<p>But what means a prince, whose sole motive is lust +of mastery, should use to establish and maintain his +dominion, the most ingenious Machiavelli has set forth +at large,<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> but with what design one can hardly be sure.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[332]</a></span> +If, however, he had some good design, as one should +believe of a learned man, it seems to have been to +show, with how little foresight many attempt to remove +a tyrant, though thereby the causes which make the +prince a tyrant can in no wise be removed, but, on +the contrary, are so much the more established, as +the prince is given more cause to fear, which happens +when the multitude has made an example of its prince, +and glories in the parricide as in a thing well done. +Moreover, he perhaps wished to show how cautious a +free multitude should be of entrusting its welfare absolutely +to one man, who, unless in his vanity he thinks +he can please everybody, must be in daily fear of +plots, and so is forced to look chiefly after his own +interest, and, as for the multitude, rather to plot against +it than consult its good. And I am the more led to this +opinion concerning that most far-seeing man, because +it is known that he was favorable to liberty, for the +maintenance of which he has besides given the most +wholesome advice.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> From <i>A Political Treatise</i>, ch. iii, same title.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> Literally, "oil and trouble"—a common proverbial expression in +Latin.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> From <i>A Political Treatise</i>, ch. iv, same title.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> From <i>A Political Treatise</i>, ch. v, same title.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> In his book called "Il Principe," or "The Prince."</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[333]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER XVIII</h2> + +<h3>FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a></h3> + + +<p>If men's minds were as easily controlled as their +tongues, every king would sit safely on his throne, +and government by compulsion would cease; for every +subject would shape his life according to the intentions +of his rulers, and would esteem a thing true or false, +good or evil, just or unjust, in obedience to their dictates. +However, ... no man's mind can possibly +lie wholly at the disposition of another, for no one +can willingly transfer his natural right of free reason +and judgment, or be compelled so to do. For this +reason government which attempts to control minds is +accounted tyrannical, and it is considered an abuse of +sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of subjects +to seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true, or +rejected as false, or what opinions should actuate men +in their worship of God. All these questions fall +within a man's natural right, which he cannot abdicate +even with his own consent.</p> + +<p>I admit that the judgment can be biased in many +ways, and to an almost incredible degree, so that while +exempt from direct external control it may be so dependent +on another man's words, that it may fitly be +said to be ruled by him; but although this influence +is carried to great lengths, it has never gone so far<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[334]</a></span> +as to invalidate the statement that every man's understanding +is his own, and that brains are as diverse as +palates.</p> + +<p>Moses, not by fraud, but by Divine virtue, gained +such a hold over the popular judgment that he was +accounted superhuman, and believed to speak and act +through the inspiration of the Deity; nevertheless, +even he could not escape murmurs and evil interpretations. +How much less then can other monarchs avoid +them! Yet such unlimited power, if it exists at all, +must belong to a monarch, and least of all to a democracy, +where the whole or a great part of the people +wield authority collectively. This is a fact which I +think every one can explain for himself.</p> + +<p>However unlimited, therefore, the power of a sovereign +may be, however implicitly it is trusted as the +exponent of law and religion, it can never prevent men +from forming judgments according to their intellect, +or being influenced by any given emotion. It is true +that it has the right to treat as enemies all men whose +opinions do not, on all subjects, entirely coincide with +its own; but we are not discussing its strict rights, but +its proper course of action. I grant that it has the +right to rule in the most violent manner, and to put +citizens to death for very trivial causes, but no one +supposes it can do this with the approval of sound +judgment. Nay, inasmuch as such things cannot be +done without extreme peril to itself, we may even deny +that it has the absolute power to do them, or, consequently, +the absolute right; for the rights of the sovereign +are limited by his power.</p> + +<p>Since, therefore, no one can abdicate his freedom<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[335]</a></span> +of judgment and feeling; since every man is by indefeasible +natural right the master of his own thoughts, +it follows that men, thinking in diverse and contradictory +fashions, cannot, without disastrous results, be +compelled to speak only according to the dictates of +the supreme power. Not even the most experienced, +to say nothing of the multitude, know how to keep +silence. Men's common failing is to confide their +plans to others, though there be need for secrecy, so +that a government would be most harsh which deprived +the individual of his freedom of saying and +teaching what he thought; and would be moderate if +such freedom were granted. Still we cannot deny that +authority may be as much injured by words as by +actions. Hence, although the freedom we are discussing +cannot be entirely denied to subjects, its unlimited +concession would be most baneful; we must, therefore, +now inquire, how far such freedom can and ought to +be conceded without danger to the peace of the state, +or the power of the rulers.</p> + +<p>It follows, plainly, from the explanation given above, +of the foundations of a state, that the ultimate aim of +government is not to rule, or restrain by fear, nor to +exact obedience, but, contrariwise, to free every man +from fear that he may live in all possible security; +in other words, to strengthen his natural right to exist +and work without injury to himself or others.</p> + +<p>No, the object of government is not to change men +from rational beings into beasts or puppets, but to +enable them to develop their minds and bodies in security, +and to employ their reason unshackled; neither +showing hatred, anger or deceit, nor watched with the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[336]</a></span> +eyes of jealousy and injustice. In fact, the true aim +of government is liberty.</p> + +<p>Now we have seen that in forming a state the power +of making laws must either be vested in the body of +the citizens, or in a portion of them, or in one man. +For, although men's free judgments are very diverse, +each one thinking that he alone knows everything, +and although complete unanimity of feeling and speech +is out of the question, it is impossible to preserve peace +unless individuals abdicate their right of acting entirely +on their own judgment. Therefore, the individual +justly cedes the right of free action, though not of free +reason and judgment; no one can act against the authorities +without danger to the state, though his feelings +and judgment may be at variance therewith; he +may even speak against them, provided that he does +so from rational conviction, not from fraud, anger or +hatred, and provided that he does not attempt to introduce +any change on his private authority.</p> + +<p>For instance, supposing a man shows that a law is +repugnant to sound reason, and should therefore be +repealed; if he submits his opinion to the judgment +of the authorities (who alone have the right of making +and repealing laws), and meanwhile acts in nowise +contrary to that law, he has deserved well of the state, +and has behaved as a good citizen should; but if he +accuses the authorities of injustice, and stirs up the +people against them, or if he seditiously strives to +abrogate the law without their consent, he is a mere +agitator and rebel.</p> + +<p>Thus we see how an individual may declare and teach +what he believes, without injury to the authority of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[337]</a></span> +his rulers, or to the public peace; namely, by leaving +in their hands the entire power of legislation as it +affects action, and by doing nothing against their laws, +though he be compelled often to act in contradiction +to what he believes, and openly feels, to be best.</p> + +<p>Such a course can be taken without detriment to +justice and dutifulness, nay, it is the one which a just +and dutiful man would adopt. We have shown that +justice is dependent on the laws of the authorities, so +that no one who contravenes their accepted decrees can +be just, while the highest regard for duty, as we have +pointed out, is exercised in maintaining public peace +and tranquillity. These could not be preserved if every +man were to live as he pleased. Therefore it is no less +than undutiful for a man to act contrary to his country's +laws, for if the practice became universal the ruin +of states would necessarily follow.</p> + +<p>Hence, so long as a man acts in obedience to the +laws of his rulers, he in nowise contravenes his reason, +for in obedience to reason he transferred the right of +controlling his actions from his own hands to theirs. +This doctrine we can confirm from actual custom, +for in a conference of great and small powers, schemes +are seldom carried unanimously, yet all unite in carrying +out what is decided on, whether they voted for or +against. But I return to my proposition.</p> + +<p>From the fundamental notions of a state, we have +discovered how a man may exercise free judgment +without detriment to the supreme power: from the +same premises we can no less easily determine what +opinions would be seditious. Evidently those which +by their very nature nullify the compact by which the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[338]</a></span> +right of free action was ceded. For instance, a man +who holds that the supreme power has no rights over +him, or that promises ought not to be kept, or that +every one should live as he pleases, or other doctrines +of this nature in direct opposition to the above-mentioned +contract, is seditious, not so much from his +actual opinions and judgment, as from the deeds which +they involve; for he who maintains such theories abrogates +the contract which tacitly, or openly, he made +with his rulers. Other opinions which do not involve acts +violating the contract, such as revenge, anger, and the +like, are not seditious, unless it be in some corrupt state, +where superstitious and ambitious persons, unable to +endure men of learning, are so popular with the multitude +that their word is more valued than the law.</p> + +<p>However, I do not deny that there are some doctrines +which, while they are apparently only concerned with +abstract truths and falsehoods, are yet propounded +and published with unworthy motives.... Reason +should nevertheless remain unshackled. If we hold +to the principle that a man's loyalty to the state should +be judged, like his loyalty to God, from his actions +only—namely, from his charity towards his neighbors; +we cannot doubt that the best government will allow +freedom of philosophical speculation no less than of +religious belief. I confess that from such freedom +inconveniences may sometimes arise, but what question +was ever settled so wisely than no abuses could possibly +spring therefrom? He who seeks to regulate +everything by law is more likely to arouse vices than +to reform them. It is best to grant what cannot be +abolished, even though it be in itself harmful. How<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[339]</a></span> +many evils spring from luxury, envy, avarice, drunkenness +and the like, yet these are tolerated—vices as they +are—because they cannot be prevented by legal enactments. +How much more, then, should free thought be +granted, seeing that it is in itself a virtue and that it +cannot be crushed! Besides, the evil results can easily +be checked, as I will show, by the secular authorities, +not to mention that such freedom is absolutely necessary +for progress in science and the liberal arts: for no +man follows such pursuits to advantage unless his judgment +be entirely free and unhampered.</p> + +<p>But let it be granted that freedom may be crushed, +and men be so bound down that they do not dare to +utter a whisper, save at the bidding of their rulers; +nevertheless this can never be carried to the pitch of +making them think according to authority, so that the +necessary consequences would be that men would daily +be thinking one thing and saying another, to the corruption +of good faith, that mainstay of government, and to +the fostering of hateful flattery and perfidy, whence +spring stratagems, and the corruption of every good art.</p> + +<p>It is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech, +for the more rulers strive to curtail freedom of speech +the more obstinately are they resisted; not indeed by +the avaricious, the flatterers, and other numskulls, who +think supreme salvation consists in filling their stomachs +and gloating over their money-bags, but by those +whom good education, sound morality, and virtue have +rendered more free. Men, as generally constituted, +are most prone to resent the branding as criminal of +opinions which they believe to be true, and the proscription +as wicked of that which inspires them with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[340]</a></span> +piety towards God and man; hence they are ready +to forswear the laws and conspire against the authorities, +thinking it not shameful but honorable to stir up +seditions and perpetuate any sort of crime with this +end in view. Such being the constitution of human +nature, we see that laws directed against opinions +affect the generous minded rather than the wicked, +and are adapted less for coercing criminals than for +irritating the upright; so that they cannot be maintained +without great peril to the state.</p> + +<p>Moreover, such laws are almost always useless, for +those who hold that the opinions proscribed are sound, +cannot possibly obey the law; whereas those who already +reject them as false, accept the law as a kind +of privilege, and make such boast of it, that authority +is powerless to repeal it, even if such a course be subsequently +desired.</p> + +<p>... And, lastly, how many schisms have arisen in +the Church from the attempt of the authorities to +decide by law the intricacies of theological controversy! +If men were not allured by the hope of getting +the law and the authorities on their side, of triumphing +over their adversaries in the sight of an applauding +multitude, and of acquiring honorable distinctions, +they would not strive so maliciously, nor would such +fury sway their minds. This is taught not only by +reason but by daily examples, for laws of this kind +prescribing what every man shall believe and forbidding +any one to speak or write to the contrary, have +often been passed as sops or concessions to the anger +of those who cannot tolerate men of enlightenment, +and who, by such harsh and crooked enactments, can<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[341]</a></span> +easily turn the devotion of the masses into fury and +direct it against whom they will.</p> + +<p>How much better would it be to restrain popular +anger and fury, instead of passing useless laws, which +can only be broken by those who love virtue and the +liberal arts, thus paring down the state till it is too +small to harbor men of talent. What greater misfortune +for a state can be conceived than that honorable +men should be sent like criminals into exile, because +they hold diverse opinions which they cannot +disguise? What, I say, can be more hurtful than +that men who have committed no crime or wickedness +should, simply because they are enlightened, be treated +as enemies and put to death, and that the scaffold, the +terror of evil-doers, should become the arena where +the highest examples of tolerance and virtue are displayed +to the people with all the marks of ignominy +that authority can devise?</p> + +<p>He that knows himself to be upright does not fear +the death of a criminal, and shrinks from no punishment. +His mind is not wrung with remorse for any +disgraceful deed. He holds that death in a good cause +is no punishment, but an honor, and that death for +freedom is glory.</p> + +<p>What purpose, then, is served by the death of such +men, what example is proclaimed? The cause for +which they die is unknown to the idle and the foolish, +hateful to the turbulent, loved by the upright. The +only lesson we can draw from such scenes is to flatter +the persecutor, or else to imitate the victim.</p> + +<p>If formal assent is not to be esteemed above conviction, +and if governments are to retain a firm hold<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[342]</a></span> +of authority and not be compelled to yield to agitators, +it is imperative that freedom of judgment should be +granted, so that men may live together in harmony, +however diverse, or even openly contradictory their +opinions may be. We cannot doubt that such is the +best system of government and open to the fewest objections, +since it is the one most in harmony with +human nature. In a democracy (the most natural +form of government) every one submits to the control +of authority over his actions, but not over his judgment +and reason; that is, seeing that all cannot think alike, +the voice of the majority has the force of law, subject +to repeal if circumstances bring about a change of +opinion. In proportion as the power of free judgment +is withheld we depart from the natural condition of +mankind, and consequently the government becomes +more tyrannical.</p> + +<p>In order to prove that from such freedom no inconvenience +arises which cannot easily be checked by the +exercise of the sovereign power, and that men's actions +can easily be kept in bounds, though their opinions be +at open variance, it will be well to cite an example. +Such an one is not very far to seek. The city of Amsterdam +reaps the fruit of this freedom in its own great +prosperity and in the admiration of all other people. +For in this most flourishing state, and most splendid +city, men of every nation and religion live together in +the greatest harmony, and ask no questions before +trusting their goods to a fellow-citizen, save whether he +be rich or poor, and whether he generally acts honestly, +or the reverse. His religion and sect is considered of +no importance: for it has no effect before the judges<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[343]</a></span> +in gaining or losing a cause, and there is no sect so despised +that its followers, provided that they harm no +one, pay every man his due, and live uprightly, are deprived +of the protection of the magisterial authority.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, when the religious controversy +between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants +began to be taken up by politicians and the States, it +grew into a schism, and abundantly showed that laws +dealing with religion and seeking to settle its controversies +are much more calculated to irritate than to +reform, and that they give rise to extreme license. +Further, it was seen that schisms do not originate in a +love of truth, which is a source of courtesy and gentleness, +but rather in an inordinate desire for supremacy. +From all these considerations it is clearer than the sun +at noonday, that the true schismatics are those who +condemn other men's writings, and seditiously stir up +the quarrelsome masses against their authors, rather +than those authors themselves, who generally write +only for the learned, and appeal solely to reason. In +fact, the real disturbers of the peace are those who, +in a free state, seek to curtail the liberty of judgment +which they are unable to tyrannize over.</p> + +<p>I have thus shown:—I. That it is impossible to deprive +men of the liberty of saying what they think. +II. That such liberty can be conceded to every man +without injury to the rights and authority of the sovereign +power, and that every man may retain it without +injury to such rights, provided that he does not presume +upon it to the extent of introducing any new +rights into the state, or acting in any way contrary to +the existing laws. III. That every man may enjoy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[344]</a></span> +this liberty without detriment to the public peace, and +that no inconveniences arise therefrom which cannot +easily be checked. IV. That every man may enjoy it +without injury to his allegiance. V. That laws dealing +with speculative problems are entirely useless. VI. +Lastly, that not only may such liberty be granted +without prejudice to the public peace, to loyalty, and +to the rights of rulers, but that it is even necessary +for their preservation. For when people try to take it +away, and bring to trial, not only the acts which alone +are capable of offending, but also the opinions of mankind, +they only succeed in surrounding their victims +with an appearance of martyrdom, and raise feelings +of pity and revenge rather than of terror. Uprightness +and good faith are thus corrupted, flatterers and +traitors are encouraged, and sectarians triumph, inasmuch +as concessions have been made to their animosity, +and they have gained the state sanction for the doctrines +of which they are the interpreters. Hence they +arrogate to themselves the state authority and rights, +and do not scruple to assert that they have been directly +chosen by God, and that their laws are Divine, +whereas the laws of the state are human, and should +therefore yield obedience to the laws of God—in other +words, to their own laws. Every one must see that this +is not a state of affairs conducive to public welfare. +Wherefore, the safest way for a state is to lay down +the rule that religion is comprised solely in the exercise +of charity and justice, and that the rights of rulers +in sacred, no less than in secular matters, should merely +have to do with actions, but that every man should +think what he likes and say what he thinks.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> From the <i>Tr. Th.-P.</i>, ch. xx, same title.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[345]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER XIX</h2> + +<h3>OF HUMAN FREEDOM</h3> + + +<h4><i>Introductory</i></h4> + +<p>I pass at length to the other part of ethics which +concerns the method or way which leads to liberty. +In [the following], therefore, I shall treat of the power +of reason, showing how much reason itself can control +the emotions, and then what is freedom of mind or +blessedness. Thence we shall see how much stronger +the wise man is than the ignorant. In what manner +and what way the intellect should be rendered perfect, +and with what art the body is to be cared for in +order that it may properly perform its functions, I +have nothing to do with here; for the former belongs +to logic, the latter to medicine. I shall occupy myself +here, as I have said, solely with the power of the mind +or of reason, first of all showing the extent and nature +of the authority which it has over the emotions in restraining +them and governing them; for that we have +not absolute authority over them we have already +demonstrated. The Stoics indeed thought that the +emotions depend absolutely on our will, and that we are +absolutely masters over them; but they were driven, +by the contradiction of experience, though not by their +own principles, to confess that not a little practice and +study are required in order to restrain and govern the +emotions. This one of them attempted to illustrate, if I<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[346]</a></span> +remember rightly, by the example of two dogs, one +of a domestic and the other of a hunting breed; for +he was able by habit to make the house dog hunt, and +the hunting dog, on the contrary, to desist from running +after hares.</p> + +<p>To the Stoical opinion Descartes much inclines. He +affirms that the soul or mind is united specially to a +certain part of the brain called the pineal gland, which +the mind by the mere exercise of the will is able to +move in different ways, and by whose help the mind +perceives all the movements which are excited in the +body and external objects. This gland, he affirms, is +suspended in the middle of the brain in such a manner +that it can be moved by the least motion of the animal +spirits. Again, he affirms that any variation in the +manner in which the animal spirits impinge upon this +gland is followed by a variation in the manner in which +it is suspended in the middle of the brain, and moreover +that the number of different impressions on the gland +is the same as that of the different external objects +which propel the animal spirits toward it. Hence +it comes to pass that if the gland, by the will of the +soul moving it in different directions, be afterwards +suspended in this or that way in which it had once been +suspended by the spirits agitated in this or that way, +then the gland itself will propel and determine the animal +spirits themselves in the same way as that in which +they had before been repelled by a similar suspension +of the gland. Moreover, he affirmed that each volition +of the mind is united in Nature to a certain motion of +the gland. For example, if a person wishes to behold a +remote object, this volition will cause the pupil of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[347]</a></span> +eye to dilate, but if he thinks merely of the dilation of +the pupil, to have that volition will profit him nothing, +because Nature has not connected a motion of the +gland which serves to impel the animal spirits towards +the optic nerve in a way suitable for dilation or contraction +of the pupil with the volition or dilation or +contraction, but only with the volition of beholding +objects afar off or close at hand. Finally, he maintained +that although each motion of this gland appears to be +connected by Nature from the commencement of our +life with an individual thought, these motions can +nevertheless be connected by habit with other thoughts, +a proposition which he attempts to demonstrate in his +"Passions of the Soul" (art. 50, pt. 1).</p> + +<p>From this he concludes that there is no mind so +feeble that it cannot, when properly directed, acquire +absolute power over its passions; for passions, as defined +by him, are "perceptions, or sensations, or emotions +of the soul which are related to it specially, and +which (N.B.) are produced, preserved, and strengthened +by some motion of the spirits." (See the "Passions +of Soul," art. 27, pt. 1.) But since it is possible +to join to a certain volition any motion of the gland, +and consequently of the spirits, and since the determination +of the will depends solely on our power, we shall +be able to acquire absolute mastery over our passions +provided only we determine our will by fixed and firm +decisions by which we desire to direct our actions and +bind with these decisions the movements of the passions +we wish to have.</p> + +<p>So far as I can gather from his own words, this is +the opinion of that distinguished man, and I could<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[348]</a></span> +scarcely have believed it possible for one so great to +have put it forward if it had been less subtle. I can +hardly wonder enough that a philosopher who firmly +resolved to make no deduction except from self-evident +principles, and to affirm nothing but what he clearly +and distinctly perceived, and who blamed all the Schoolmen +because they desired to explain obscure matters +by occult qualities, should accept a hypothesis more +occult than any occult quality.</p> + +<p>What does he understand, I ask, by the union of +the mind and body? What clear and distinct conception +has he of thought intimately connected with +a certain small portion of matter? I wish that he had +explained this union by its proximate cause. But he +conceived the mind to be so distinct from the body +that he was able to assign no single cause of this union, +nor of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse +to the cause of the whole universe, that is to +say, to God. Again, I should like to know how many +degrees of motion the mind can give to that pineal +gland, and with how great a power the mind can hold +it suspended. For I do not understand whether this +gland is acted on by the mind more slowly or more +quickly than by the animal spirits, and whether the +movements of the passions, which we have so closely +bound with firm decisions, might not be separated +from them again by bodily causes, from which it would +follow that although the mind had firmly determined +to meet danger, and had joined to this decision the +motion of boldness, the sight of the danger might +cause the gland to be suspended in such a manner that +the mind could think of nothing but flight. Indeed,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[349]</a></span> +since there is no relation between the will and motion, +so there is no comparison between the power or +strength of the body and that of the mind, and consequently +the strength of the body can never be determined +by the strength of the mind. It is to be +remembered also that this gland is not found to be so +situated in the middle of the brain that it can be driven +about so easily and in so many ways, and that all the +nerves are not extended to the cavities of the brain.</p> + +<p>Lastly, I omit all that Descartes asserts concerning +the will and the freedom of the will, since I have shown +over and over again that it is false. Therefore, inasmuch +as the power of the mind, as I have shown above, +is determined by intelligence alone, we shall determine +by the knowledge of the mind alone the remedies +against the emotions—remedies which every one, I believe, +has experienced, although there may not have +been any accurate observation or distinct perception of +them, and from this knowledge of the mind alone shall +we deduce everything which relates to its blessedness.</p> + + +<h4><i>Axioms</i></h4> + +<p>I. If two contrary actions be excited in the same +subject, a change must necessarily take place in both, +or in one alone, until they cease to be contrary.</p> + +<p>II. The power of an emotion is limited by the power +of its cause, in so far as the essence of the emotion is +manifested or limited by the essence of the cause itself.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Strength of the Emotions</i></h4> + +<p>The emotion towards an object which we imagine to +be free is greater than towards one which is necessary,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[350]</a></span> +and consequently still greater than towards one which +we imagine as possible or contingent. But to imagine +an object as free can be nothing else than to imagine +it simply, while we know not the causes by which it +was determined to action. An emotion, therefore, towards +an object which we simply imagine is, other +things being equal, greater than towards one which +we imagine as necessary, possible, or contingent, and +consequently greatest of all.</p> + +<p>The mind understands all things to be necessary +and determined by an infinite chain of causes to existence +and action, and therefore so far enables itself to +suffer less from the emotions which arise from these +things, and to be less affected towards them.</p> + +<p>The more this knowledge that things are necessary +is applied to individual things which we imagine more +distinctly and more vividly, the greater is this power +of the mind over the emotions—a fact to which experience +also testifies. For we see that sorrow for the +loss of anything good is diminished if the person who +has lost it considers that it could not by any possibility +have been preserved. So also we see that nobody +pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, +walk, or reason, and lives so many years not conscious, +as it were, of itself. But if a number of human beings +were born adult, and only a few here and there were +born infants, every one would pity the infants, because +we should then consider infancy not as a thing +natural and necessary, but as a defect or fault of Nature. +Many other facts of a similar kind we might +observe.</p> + +<p>We do not contemplate an object as absent by reason<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[351]</a></span> +of the emotion by which we imagine it, but by reason of +the fact that the body is affected with another modification, +which excludes the existence of that object. The +emotion, therefore, which is related to an object which +we contemplate as absent, is not of such a nature as +to overcome the other actions and power of man, but, +on the contrary, is of such a nature that it can in some +way be restrained by those modifications which exclude +the existence of its external cause. But the emotion +which arises from reason is necessarily related to the +common properties of things, which we always contemplate +as present for nothing can exist which excludes +their present existence, and which we always +imagine in the same way. This emotion, therefore, always +remains the same, and consequently the emotions +which are contrary to it, and which are not maintained +by their external cause, must more and more accommodate +themselves to it until they are no longer contrary +to it. So far, therefore, the emotion which springs +from reason is the stronger.</p> + +<p>A number of simultaneous causes can do more than +if they were fewer, and therefore the greater the number +of the simultaneous causes by which an emotion is +excited, the greater it is.</p> + +<p>An emotion is bad or injurious only in so far as it +hinders the mind from thinking and therefore that +emotion by which the mind is determined to the contemplation +of a number of objects at the same time +is less injurious than another emotion equally great +which holds the mind in the contemplation of one object +alone or of a few objects, so that it cannot think of +others. Again, since the essence of the mind, that is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[352]</a></span> +to say, its power, consists in thought alone, the mind +suffers less through an emotion by which it is determined +to the contemplation of a number of objects at +the same time than through an emotion equally great +which holds it occupied in the contemplation of one +object alone or of a few objects. Finally, this emotion, +in so far as it is related to a number of external causes, +is therefore less towards each.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Power of the Intellect Over the Emotions</i></h4> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<h4><i>General Principles</i></h4> + +<p>The order and connection of ideas is the same as the +order and connection of things, and <i>vice versa</i>, the +order and connection of things is the same as the order +and connection of ideas. Therefore, as the order and +connection of ideas in the mind is according to the order +and connection of the modifications of the body it follows +<i>vice versa</i>, that the order and connection of the +modifications of the body is according to the order and +connection in the mind of the thoughts and ideas of +things.</p> + +<p>If we detach an emotion of the mind from the thought +of an external cause and connect it with other thoughts, +then the love or hatred towards the external cause and +the fluctuations of the mind which arise from these +emotions will be destroyed.</p> + +<p>An emotion which is a passion is a confused idea. If, +therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of this +emotion, the idea will not be distinguished—except by +reason—from this emotion, in so far as the emotion<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[353]</a></span> +is related to the mind alone, and therefore the emotion +will cease to be a passion.</p> + +<p>In proportion, then, as we know an emotion better +is it more within our control, and the less does the mind +suffer from it.</p> + +<p>Those things which are common to all cannot be +otherwise than adequately conceived and therefore +there is no modification of the body of which we cannot +form some clear and distinct conception.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that there is no emotion of which +we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. +For an emotion is an idea of a modification of the body, +and this idea therefore must involve some clear and +distinct conception.</p> + +<p>Since nothing exists from which some effect does +not follow, and since we understand clearly and distinctly +everything which follows from an idea which +is adequate in us, it is a necessary consequence that +every one has the power, partly at least, if not absolutely, +of understanding clearly and distinctly himself +and his emotions, and consequently of bringing it to +pass that he suffers less from them. We have therefore +mainly to strive to acquire a clear and distinct knowledge +as far as possible of each emotion, so that the mind +may be led to pass from the emotion to think those +things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, and with +which it is entirely satisfied, and to strive also that +the emotion may be separated from the thought of an +external cause and connected with true thoughts. Thus +not only love, hatred, etc., will be destroyed, but also +the appetites or desires to which the emotion gives rise +cannot be excessive. For it is above everything to be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[354]</a></span> +observed that the appetite by which a man is said to +act is one and the same appetite as that by which he +is said to suffer. For example, we have shown that +human nature is so constituted that every one desires +that other people should live according to his way of +thinking, a desire which in a man who is not guided by +reason is a passion which is called ambition, and is not +very different from pride; while, on the other hand, +in a man who lives according to the dictates of reason +it is an action or virtue which is called piety. In the +same manner, all the appetites or desires are passions +only in so far as they arise from inadequate ideas, and +are classed among the virtues whenever they are excited +or begotten by adequate ideas; for all the desires +by which we are determined to any action may arise +either from adequate or inadequate ideas. To return, +therefore, to the point from which we set out: there +is no remedy within our power which can be conceived +more excellent for the emotions than that which consists +in true knowledge of them, since the mind possesses +no other power than that of thinking and forming +adequate ideas, as we have shown above.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<h4><i>The Natural Basis of Rational Control</i></h4> + +<p>The greater the number of objects to which an +image or emotion is related, the greater is the number +of causes by which it can be excited and cherished. +All these causes the mind contemplates simultaneously +by means of the emotion (by hypothesis), and therefore +the more constant is the emotion, or the more fre<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[355]</a></span>quently +does it present itself, and the more does it +occupy the mind.</p> + +<p>Things which we clearly and distinctly understand +are either the common properties of things or what +are deduced from them, and consequently are more +frequently excited in us; and therefore it is easier for +us to contemplate other things together with these +which we clearly and distinctly understand than with +any others, and consequently it is easier to connect +things with these which we clearly and distinctly understand +than with any others.</p> + +<p>The greater the number of other things with which +any image is connected, the more frequently does it +present itself. For the greater the number of other +things with which an image is connected, the greater +is the number of causes by which it may be excited.</p> + +<p>There is no modification of the body of which the +mind cannot form some clear and distinct conception +and therefore it can cause all the modifications of the +body to be related to the idea of God.</p> + + +<h4>III</h4> + +<h4><i>The Function of the Intellectual Order</i></h4> + +<p>The emotions which are contrary to our nature, that +is to say, which are evil, are evil so far as they hinder +the mind from understanding. So long, therefore, as +we are not agitated by emotions which are contrary to +our nature, so long the power of the mind by which it +endeavors to understand things is not hindered, and +therefore so long does it possess the power of forming +clear and distinct ideas, and of deducing them the one +from the other. So long, consequently, do we possess<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[356]</a></span> +the power of arranging and connecting the modifications +of the body according to the order of the intellect.</p> + +<p>Through this power of properly arranging and connecting +the modifications of the body we can prevent +ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions. +For a greater power is required to restrain emotions +which are arranged and connected according to the +order of the intellect than is required to restrain those +which are uncertain and unsettled. The best thing, +therefore, we can do, so long as we lack a perfect +knowledge of our emotions, is to conceive a right rule +of life, or sure maxims (<i>dogmata</i>) of life—to commit +these latter to memory, and constantly to apply them to +the particular cases which frequently meet us in life, +so that our imagination may be widely affected by them, +and they may always be ready to hand. For example, +amongst the maxims of life we have placed this, that +hatred is to be conquered by love or generosity, and is +not to be met with hatred in return. But in order that +we may always have this prescript of reason in readiness +whenever it will be of service, we must think +over and often meditate upon the common injuries inflicted +by men, and consider how and in what way +they may best be repelled by generosity; for thus we +shall connect the image of injury with the imagination +of this maxim, and it will be at hand whenever an +injury is offered to us. If we also continually have +regard to our own true profit, and the good which +follows from mutual friendship and common fellowship, +and remember that the highest peace of mind arises +from a right rule of life, and also that man, like other +things, acts according to the necessity of Nature, then<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[357]</a></span> +the injury or the hatred which usually arises from that +necessity will occupy but the least part of the imagination, +and will be easily overcome: or supposing that +the anger which generally arises from the greatest injuries +is not so easily overcome, it will nevertheless be +overcome, although not without fluctuation of mind, +in a far shorter space of time than would have been +necessary if we had not possessed those maxims on +which we had thus meditated beforehand.</p> + +<p>Concerning strength of mind, we must reflect in the +same way for the purpose of getting rid of fear, that +is to say, we must often enumerate and imagine the +common dangers of life, and think upon the manner in +which they can best be avoided and overcome by presence +of mind and courage. It is to be observed, however, +that in the ordering of our thoughts and images +we must always look to those qualities which in each +thing are good, so that we may be determined to action +always by an emotion of joy.</p> + +<p>For example, if a man sees that he pursues glory +too eagerly, let him think on its proper use, for what +end it is to be followed, and by what means it can be +obtained; but let him not think upon its abuse and +vanity, and on the inconstancy of men, and things of +this sort, about which no one thinks unless through +disease of mind. For with such thoughts do those who +are ambitious greatly torment themselves when they +despair of obtaining the honors for which they are +striving; and while they vomit forth rage, wish to be +thought wise. Indeed it is certain that those covet +glory the most who are loudest in declaiming against +its abuse and the vanity of the world. Nor is this a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[358]</a></span> +peculiarity of the ambitious, but is common to all to +whom fortune is adverse and who are impotent in +mind; for we see that a poor and avaricious man is +never weary of speaking about the abuse of money +and the vices of the rich, thereby achieving nothing +save to torment himself and show to others that he +is unable to bear with equanimity not only his own +poverty but also the wealth of others. So also a man +who has not been well deceived by his mistress thinks +of nothing but the fickleness of women, their faithlessness, +and their other oft-proclaimed failing—all +of which he forgets as soon as he is taken into favor by +his mistress again. He, therefore, who desires to +govern his emotions and appetites from a love of liberty +alone will strive as much as he can to know virtues +and their causes, and to fill his mind with that joy +which springs from a true knowledge of them. Least +of all will he desire to contemplate the vices of men +and disparage men, or to delight in a false show of +liberty. He who will diligently observe these things +(and they are not difficult), and will continue to practice +them, will assuredly in a short space of time be +able for the most part to direct his actions in accordance +with the command of reason.</p> + + +<h4>IV</h4> + +<h4><i>Summary</i></h4> + +<p>I have, in what has preceded, included all the remedies +for the emotions, that is to say, everything which +the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against +them. It appears therefrom that the power of the mind +over the emotions consists<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[359]</a></span>—</p> + +<p>1. In the knowledge itself of the emotions.</p> + +<p>2. In the separation by the mind of the emotions +from the thought of an external cause, which we imagine +confusedly.</p> + +<p>3. In duration, in which the emotions which are +related to objects we understand surpass those related +to objects conceived in a mutilated or confused manner.</p> + +<p>4. In the multitude of causes by which the emotions +which are related to the common properties of things +or to God are nourished.</p> + +<p>5. In the order in which the mind can arrange its +emotions and connect them one with the other.</p> + +<p>But that this power of the mind over the emotions +may be better understood, it is to be carefully observed +that we call the emotions great when we compare the +emotion of one man with that of another, and see that +one man is agitated more than another by the same +emotion, or when we compare the emotions of one and +the same man with one another, and discover that he is +affected or moved more by one emotion than by another.</p> + +<p>For the power of any emotion is limited by the power +of the external cause as compared with our own power. +But the power of the mind is limited solely by knowledge, +whilst impotence or passion is estimated solely +by privation of knowledge, or, in other words, by +that through which ideas are called inadequate; and +it therefore follows that that mind suffers the most +whose largest part consists of inadequate ideas, so that +it is distinguished rather by what it suffers than by +what it does, while, on the contrary, that mind acts +the most whose largest part consists of adequate ideas,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[360]</a></span> +so that although it may possess as many inadequate +ideas as the first, it is nevertheless distinguished rather +by those which belong to human virtue than by those +which are a sign of human impotence. Again, it is to +be observed that our sorrows and misfortunes mainly +proceed from too much love towards an object which +is subject to many changes, and which we can never +possess. For no one is troubled or anxious about any +object he does not love, neither do wrongs, suspicions, +hatreds, etc., arise except from love towards objects +of which no one can be truly the possessor.</p> + +<p>From all this we easily conceive what is the power +which clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that +third kind of knowledge whose foundation is the knowledge +itself of God, possesses over the emotions; the +power, namely, by which it is able, in so far as they +are passions, if not actually to destroy them, at least +to make them constitute the smallest part of the mind. +Moreover, it begets a love towards an immutable and +eternal object of which we are really partakers; a love +which therefore cannot be vitiated by the defects which +are in common love, but which can always become +greater and greater, occupy the largest part of the +mind, and thoroughly affect it.</p> + +<p>I have now concluded all that I had to say relating +to this present life. For any one who will attend to +what has been urged will easily be able to see the truth +of what I said—that in these few words all the remedies +for the emotions are comprehended. It is time, therefore, +that I should now pass to the consideration of +those matters which appertain to the duration of the +mind without relation to the body.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[361]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER XX</h2> + +<h3>OF HUMAN BLESSEDNESS AND THE +ETERNITY OF THE MIND</h3> + + +<h4><i>Human Blessedness: The Intellectual Love of God</i></h4> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<p>The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an +adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate +knowledge of the essence of things; and the more +we understand things in this manner, the more we +understand God; and therefore the highest virtue of the +mind, that is to say, the power or nature of the mind, +or the highest effort, is to understand things by the +third kind of knowledge.</p> + +<p>The better the mind is adapted to understand things +by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires +to understand them by this kind of knowledge.</p> + +<p>The highest virtue of the mind is to know God, or +to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. +This virtue is greater the more the mind knows things +by this kind of knowledge, and therefore he who knows +things by this kind of knowledge passes to the highest +human perfection, and consequently is affected with +the highest joy, which is accompanied with the idea +of himself and his own virtue; and therefore from +this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace +of mind.</p> + +<p>The effort or the desire to know things by the third<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[362]</a></span> +kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind, +but may arise from the second kind of knowledge. +This proposition is self-evident. For everything that +we clearly and distinctly understand, we understand +either through itself or through something which is +conceived through itself; or, in other words, ideas +which are clear and distinct in us, or which are related +to the third kind of knowledge, cannot follow from +mutilated and confused ideas, which are related to +the first kind of knowledge, but from adequate ideas, +that is to say, from the second and third kinds of +knowledge.</p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<p>Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as that +essence involves necessary existence. To conceive +things therefore under the form of eternity, is to conceive +them in so far as they are conceived through +the essence of God as actually existing things, or in so +far as through the essence of God they involve existence. +Therefore our mind, in so far as it conceives +itself and its body under the form of eternity, necessarily +has a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in +God and is conceived through Him.</p> + +<p>We delight in whatever we understand by the third +kind of knowledge, and our delight is accompanied +with the idea of God as its cause.</p> + +<p>From the third kind of knowledge necessarily springs +the intellectual love of God. For from this kind of +knowledge arises joy attended with the idea of God +as its cause, that is to say, the love of God, not in so +far as we imagine Him as present, but in so far as we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[363]</a></span> +understand that He is eternal; and that is what I call +the intellectual love of God.</p> + +<p>He who clearly and distinctly understands himself +and his emotions rejoices, and his joy is attended with +the idea of God, therefore he loves God, and (by the +same reasoning) loves Him better the better he understands +himself and his emotions.</p> + +<p>This intellectual love necessarily follows from the +nature of the mind, in so far as it is considered, through +the nature of God, as an eternal truth. If there were +anything, therefore, contrary to this love, it would be +contrary to the truth, and consequently whatever +might be able to negate this love would be able to +make the true false, which, as is self-evident, is absurd. +There exists, therefore, nothing in Nature contrary +to this intellectual love, or which can negate it.</p> + + +<h4>III</h4> + +<p>This love to God above everything else ought to +occupy the mind, for this love is connected with all +the modifications of the body, by all of which it is +cherished.</p> + +<p>The idea of God which is in us is adequate and +perfect, and therefore in so far as we contemplate God +do we act and consequently no sorrow can exist with +the accompanying idea of God; that is to say, no one +can hate God.</p> + +<p>Love to God cannot be turned into hatred. But +some may object, that if we understand God to be the +cause of all things, we do for that very reason consider +Him to be the cause of sorrow. But I reply, that in +so far as we understand the causes of sorrow, it ceases<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[364]</a></span> +to be a passion, that is to say, it ceases to be sorrow; +and therefore in so far as we understand God to be +the cause of sorrow do we rejoice.</p> + +<p>This love to God is the highest good which we can +seek according to the dictate of reason; is common to +all men; and we desire that all may enjoy it. It cannot, +therefore, be sullied by the emotion of envy, nor by +that of jealousy, but, on the contrary, it must be the +more strengthened the more people we imagine to +rejoice in it.</p> + +<p>It is possible to show in the same manner that there +is no emotion directly contrary to this love and able to +destroy it, and so we may conclude that this love to +God is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, +in so far as it is related to the body, it cannot be destroyed +unless with the body itself. What its nature +is, in so far as it is related to the mind alone, we shall +see hereafter.</p> + + +<h4>IV</h4> + +<p>All ideas, in so far as they are related to God, are +true; that is to say, are adequate, and therefore, (by +the general definition of the Emotions), God is free from +passions. Again, God can neither pass to a greater +nor to a less perfection, and therefore He cannot be +affected with any emotion of joy or sorrow.</p> + +<p>He who loves God cannot strive that God should +love him in return. If a man were to strive after this, +he would desire that God, whom he loves, should not +be God, and consequently he would desire to be sad, +which is absurd.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[365]</a></span></p> + + +<h4>V</h4> + +<p>God is absolutely infinite, that is to say, the nature +of God delights in infinite perfection accompanied with +the idea of Himself, that is to say, with the idea of +Himself as cause, and this is what we have called intellectual +love. God loves Himself with an infinite +intellectual love.</p> + +<p>The intellectual love of the mind towards God is the +very love with which He loves Himself, not in so far +as He is infinite, but in so far as He can be manifested +through the essence of the human mind, considered +under the form of eternity; that is to say, the +intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of +the infinite love with which God loves Himself.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that God, in so far as He loves +Himself, loves men, and consequently that the love +of God towards men and the intellectual love of the +mind towards God are one and the same thing.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that God, in so far as He loves +Himself, loves men, and consequently that the love of +the mind towards God are one and the same thing.</p> + +<p>Hence we clearly understand that our salvation, or +blessedness, or liberty consists in a constant and eternal +love towards God, or in the love of God towards men. +This love or blessedness is called Glory in the sacred +writings, and not without reason. For whether it be +related to God or to the mind, it may properly be called +repose of mind, which is, in truth, not distinguished +from glory. For in so far as it is related to God, it is +joy (granting that it is allowable to use this word), +accompanied with the idea of Himself, and it is the +same thing when it is related to the mind.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[366]</a></span></p> + +<p>Again, since the essence of our mind consists in +knowledge alone, whose beginning and foundation is +God, it is clear to us in what manner and by what +method our mind, with regard both to essence and +existence, follows from the divine nature, and continually +depends upon God. I thought it worth while +for me to notice this here, in order that I might show, +by this example, what that knowledge of individual +objects which I have called intuitive or of the third +kind is able to do, and how much more potent it is +than the universal knowledge, which I have called +knowledge of the second kind. For although I have +shown generally that all things, and consequently also +the human mind, depend upon God both with regard +to existence and essence, yet that demonstration, although +legitimate, and placed beyond the possibility +of a doubt, does not, nevertheless, so affect our mind +as a proof from the essence itself of any individual +object which we say depends upon God. The more +we understand individual objects, the more we understand +God.</p> + + +<h4><i>The Eternity of the Mind</i></h4> + + +<h4>I</h4> + +<p>The mind does not express the actual existence of its +body, nor does it conceive as actual the modifications of +the body, except while the body exists, and consequently +it conceives no body as actually existing except +while its own body exists. It can therefore imagine +nothing, nor can it recollect anything that is past, except +while the body exists.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[367]</a></span></p> + +<p>An imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates +any object as present. This idea nevertheless +indicates the present constitution of the human +body rather than the nature of the external object. +An emotion, therefore (by the general definition of the +Emotions), is an imagination in so far as it indicates the +present constitution of the body, and therefore the +mind, only so long as the body exists, is subject to +emotions which are related to passions.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that no love except intellectual love +is eternal.</p> + +<p>If we look at the common opinion of men, we shall +see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of +their minds, but they confound it with duration, and +attribute it to imagination or memory, which they believe +remain after death.</p> + +<p>God is not only the cause of the existence of this or +that human body, but also of its essence, which therefore +must necessarily be conceived through the essence +of God itself and by a certain eternal necessity. This +conception, moreover, must necessarily exist in God. +In God there necessarily exists an idea which expresses +the essence of this or that human body under the form +of eternity.</p> + +<p>In God there necessarily exists a conception or idea +which expresses the essence of the human body. This +conception or idea is therefore necessarily something +which pertains to the essence of the human mind. But +we ascribe to the human mind no duration which can +be limited by time, unless in so far as it expresses the +actual existence of the body, which is manifested +through duration, and which can be limited by time,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[368]</a></span> +that is to say, we cannot ascribe duration to the mind +except while the body exists.</p> + +<p>But, nevertheless, since this something is that +which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity +through the essence itself of God, this something which +pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be +eternal.</p> + +<p>This idea which expresses the essence of the body +under the form of eternity is, as we have said, a certain +mode of thought which pertains to the essence of +the mind, and is necessarily eternal. It is impossible, +nevertheless, that we should recollect that we existed +before the body, because there are no traces of any +such existence in the body, and also because eternity +cannot be defined by time, or have any relationship +to it. Nevertheless we feel and know by experience +that we are eternal. For the mind is no less sensible +of those things which it conceives through intelligence +than of those which it remembers, for demonstrations +are the eyes of the mind by which it sees and observes +things.</p> + +<p>Although, therefore, we do not recollect that we +existed before the body, we feel that our mind, in so +far as it involves the essence of the body under the +form of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence of +the mind cannot be limited by time nor manifested +through duration. Only in so far, therefore, as it involves +the actual existence of the body can the mind +be said to possess duration, and its existence be limited +by a fixed time, and so far only has it the power of +determining the existence of things in time, and of +conceiving them under the form of duration.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[369]</a></span></p> + + +<h4>II</h4> + +<p>In so far as the mind conceives the present existence +of its body does it conceive duration which can +be determined in time, and so far only has it the power +of conceiving things in relation to time. But eternity +cannot be manifested through duration, therefore the +mind so far has not the power of conceiving things +under the form of eternity: but because it is the nature +of reason to conceive things under the form of +eternity, and because it also pertains to the nature of +the mind to conceive the essence of the body under +the form of eternity, and excepting these two things +nothing else pertains to the nature of the mind, therefore +this power of conceiving things under the form +of eternity does not pertain to the mind except in so +far as it conceives the essence of the body under the +form of eternity.</p> + +<p>Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; +either in so far as we conceive them to exist with +relation to a fixed time and place, or in so far as we +conceive them to be contained in God, and to follow +from the necessity of the divine nature. But those +things which are conceived in this second way as true +or real we conceive under the form of eternity, and +their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of +God.</p> + +<p>The mind conceives nothing under the form of +eternity, unless in so far as it conceives the essence of +its body under the form of eternity, that is to say, +unless in so far as it is eternal. Therefore in so far +as the mind is eternal it has a knowledge of God, which +is necessarily adequate, and therefore in so far as it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[370]</a></span> +is eternal it is fitted to know all those things which can +follow from this knowledge of God, that is to say, it is +fitted to know things by the third kind of knowledge +of which, in so far as the mind is eternal, it is the adequate +or formal cause.</p> + +<p>As each person therefore becomes stronger in this +kind of knowledge, the more is he conscious of himself +and of God; that is to say, the more perfect and +the happier he is, a truth which will still more clearly +appear from what follows. Here, however, it is to be +observed, that although we are now certain that the +mind is eternal in so far as it conceives things under +the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish +to prove may be more easily explained and better understood, +we shall consider the mind, as we have +hitherto done, as if it had just begun to be, and had +just begun to understand things under the form of +eternity. This we can do without any risk of error, +provided only we are careful to conclude nothing except +from clear premises.</p> + +<p>The third kind of knowledge is eternal, and therefore +the love which springs from it is necessarily +eternal.</p> + +<p>Although this love to God has no beginning, it +nevertheless has all the perfections of love, just as if +it had originated. Nor is there here any difference, +excepting that the mind has eternally possessed these +same perfections which we imagined as now accruing +to it, and has possessed them with the accompanying +idea of God as the eternal cause. And if joy consist +in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must +indeed consist in this, that the mind is endowed with +perfection itself.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[371]</a></span></p> + + +<h4>III</h4> + +<p>The essence of the mind consists in knowledge. +The more things, therefore, the mind knows by the +second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater is +that part which abides and consequently the greater +is that part which is not touched by emotions which +are contrary to our nature, that is to say, which +are evil. The more things, therefore, the mind understands +by the second and third kinds of knowledge, +the greater is that part which remains unharmed, and +the less consequently does it suffer from the emotions.</p> + +<p>We are thus enabled to understand that death is +by so much the less injurious to us as the clear and +distinct knowledge of the mind is greater, and consequently +as the mind loves God more. Again, since +from the third kind of knowledge there arises the +highest possible peace, it follows that it is possible for +the human mind to be of such a nature that that part +of it which we have shown perishes with its body, in +comparison with the part of it which remains, is of no +consequence. But more fully upon this subject +presently.</p> + +<p>He who possesses a body fitted for doing many things +is least of all agitated by those emotions which are evil, +that is to say, by emotions which are contrary to our +nature, and therefore he possesses the power of arranging +and connecting the modifications of the body +according to the order of the intellect, and consequently +of causing all the modifications of the body to be related +to the idea of God; in consequence of which he is +affected with a love to God, which must occupy or form<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[372]</a></span> +the greatest part of his mind, and therefore he possesses +a mind of which the greatest part is eternal.</p> + +<p>Inasmuch as human bodies are fit for many things, +we cannot doubt the possibility of their possessing such +a nature that they may be related to minds which have +a large knowledge of themselves and of God, and whose +greatest or principal part is eternal, so that they +scarcely fear death. To understand this more clearly, +it is to be here considered that we live in constant +change, and that according as we change for the better +or the worse we are called happy or unhappy. For he +who passes from infancy or childhood to death is +called unhappy, and, on the other hand, we consider +ourselves happy if we can pass through the whole +period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. +Moreover, he who, like an infant or child, possesses +a body fit for very few things, and, almost altogether +dependent on external causes, has a mind which, considered +in itself alone, is almost entirely unconscious +of itself, of God, and of objects. On the other hand, +he who possesses a body fit for many things possesses +a mind which, considered in itself alone, is largely conscious +of itself, of God, and of objects. In this life, +therefore, it is our chief endeavor to change the body +of infancy, so far as its nature permits and is conducive +thereto, into another body which is fitted for many +things, and which is related to a mind conscious as +much as possible of itself, of God, and of objects; so +that everything which is related to its memory or +imagination, in comparison with the intellect is scarcely +of any moment, as I have already said.</p> + +<p>The more perfect a thing is, the more reality it pos<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[373]</a></span>sesses, +and consequently the more it acts and the less +it suffers. Inversely also it may be demonstrated in +the same way that the more a thing acts the more perfect +it is. Hence it follows that that part of the mind +which abides, whether great or small, is more perfect +than the other part. For the part of the mind which is +eternal is the intellect, through which alone we are said +to act, but that part which, as we have shown, perishes, +is the imagination itself, through which alone we are +said to suffer. Therefore that part which abides, +whether great or small, is more perfect than the +latter.</p> + +<p>These are the things I proposed to prove concerning +the mind, in so far as it is considered without +relation to the existence of the body, and from these, +and other propositions, it is evident that our mind, in +so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thought, +which is determined by another eternal mode of +thought, and this again by another, and so on <i>ad infinitum</i>, +so that all taken together form the eternal and +infinite intellect of God.</p> + + +<h4><i>Conclusion</i></h4> + +<p>The primary and sole foundation of virtue or of the +proper conduct of life is to seek our own profit. But +in order to determine what reason prescribes as +profitable, we had no regard to the eternity of the +mind. Therefore, although we were at that time ignorant +that the mind is eternal, we considered as of +primary importance those things which we have shown +are related to strength of mind and generosity; and +therefore, even if we were now ignorant of the eternity<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[374]</a></span> +of the mind, we should consider those commands of +reason as of primary importance.</p> + +<p>The creed of the multitude seems to be different +from this; for most persons seem to believe that they +are free in so far as it is allowed them to obey their +lusts, and that they give up a portion of their rights, +in so far as they are bound to live according to the +commands of divine law. Piety, therefore, and religion,<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> +and absolutely all those things that are related +to greatness of soul, they believe to be burdens which +they hope to be able to lay aside after death; hoping +also to receive some reward for their bondage, that is +to say, for <i>their</i> piety and religion. It is not merely +this hope, however, but also and chiefly fear of dreadful +punishments after death, by which they are induced +to live according to the commands of divine law, +that is to say, as far as their feebleness and impotent +mind will permit; and if this hope and fear were not +present to them, but if they, on the contrary, believed +that minds perish with the body, and that there is no +prolongation of life for miserable creatures exhausted +with the burden of their piety, they would return to +ways of their own liking. They would prefer to let +everything be controlled by their own passions, and to +obey fortune rather than themselves.</p> + +<p>This seems to me as absurd as if a man, because he +does not believe that he will be able to feed his body +with good food to all eternity, should desire to satiate +himself with poisonous and deadly drugs; or as if, be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[375]</a></span>cause +he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, +he should therefore prefer to be mad and to live without +reason—absurdities so great that they scarcely +deserve to be repeated.</p> + +<p>Blessedness consists in love towards God, which +arises from the third kind of knowledge, and this love, +therefore, must be related to the mind in so far as it +acts. Blessedness, therefore, is virtue itself. Again, +the more the mind delights in this divine love or +blessedness, the more it understands, that is to say, the +greater is the power it has over its emotions and the +less it suffers from emotions which are evil. Therefore, +it is because the mind delights in this divine love or +blessedness that it possesses the power of restraining +the lusts; and because the power of man to restrain the +emotions is in the intellect alone, no one, therefore, delights +in blessedness because he has restrained his +emotions, but, on the contrary, the power of restraining +his lusts springs from blessedness itself.</p> + +<p>I have finished everything I wished to explain concerning +the power of the mind over the emotions and +concerning its liberty. From what has been said we +see what is the strength of the wise man, and how +much he surpasses the ignorant who is driven forward +by lust alone. For the ignorant man is not only agitated +by external causes in many ways, and never enjoys +true peace of soul, but lives also ignorant, as it +were, both of God and of things, and as soon as he +ceases to suffer ceases also to be. On the other hand, +the wise man, in so far as he is considered as such, is +scarcely ever moved in his mind, but, being conscious +by a certain eternal necessity of himself, of God, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[376]</a></span> +of things, never ceases to be, and always enjoys true +peace of soul.</p> + +<p>If the way which, as I have shown, leads hither +seem very difficult, it can nevertheless be found. It +must indeed be difficult since it is so seldom discovered; +for if salvation lay ready to hand and could be discovered +without great labor, how could it be possible +that it should be neglected almost by everybody? But +all noble things are as difficult as they are rare.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> Everything which we desire and do, of which we are the cause +in so far as we possess an idea of God, or in so far as we know God, I +refer to <i>Religion</i>. The desire of doing well which is born in us, +because we live according to the guidance of reason, I call <i>Piety</i>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[377]</a></span></p> +<h2>APPENDIX</h2> + + +<p>Spinoza's <i>Ethics</i>, demonstrated in geometrical order, +consists of five parts; from these parts the following +selections have been taken:</p> + +<div class='center'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="appendix"> + +<tr><td align='right'>Part I.</td><td align='left'><i>Of God</i></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'></td><td align='left'>Definitions, Axioms, and the Appendix.</td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'></td><td align='left'>Propositions: 11; 15-18; 26; 27; 29; 33.</td></tr> + +<tr><td align='right'>Part II.</td><td align='left'><i>Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind</i></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'></td><td align='left'>Preface, Definitions, and Axioms.</td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'></td><td align='left'>Propositions: 1; 4-7; 11-13; 15-18; 24-26; 28-32; 35; 36; 38-49.</td></tr> + +<tr><td align='right'>Part III.</td><td align='left'><i>Of the Origin and Nature of the Emotions</i></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'></td><td align='left'>Preface, Definitions, and Postulates; Definitions of the Emotions.</td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'></td><td align='left'>Propositions: 1; 2; 4; 6; 9; 11; 14; 16; +18; 25; 27-32; 40; 41; 43-46; 48-51; 56; 57.</td></tr> + +<tr><td align='right'>Part IV.</td><td align='left'><i>Of Human Bondage or Of the Strength of the Emotions</i></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'></td><td align='left'>Preface, Definitions, Axioms, and the Appendix.</td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'></td><td align='left'>Propositions: 3-9; 11-27; 38; 39; 41-47; 50-54; 56-58.</td></tr> + +<tr><td align='right'>Part V.</td><td align='left'><i>Of the Power of the Intellect or Of Human Liberty</i></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'></td><td align='left'>Preface and Axioms.</td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'></td><td align='left'>Propositions: 1-28; 30-42.</td></tr> +</table></div> + + +<p class='center'><span class="smcap">the end</span></p> + + +<div class='transnote'> +<h3><a name="transnote" id="transnote"></a>Transcriber's Notes</h3> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_vii">vii</a>: "affectiones" <i>sic</i></p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_xxvi">xxvi</a>: "villified" amended to "vilified"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_xxviii">xxvii</a>: "chose" amended to "choose" (twice); "forego" <i>sic</i></p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_xxxvi">xxxvi</a>: "antedeluvian" amended to "antediluvian"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_lix">lix</a>: "goverance" amended to "governance"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_1">1</a>: "oursleves" amended to "ourselves"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_6">6</a>: "superstitition" amended to "superstition"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_9">9</a>: "conprehension" amended to "comprehension"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_26">26</a>: "chose" amended to "choose"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_28">28</a>: "interpretating" amended to "interpreting"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_45">45</a>: "phophet" amended to "prophet"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_51">51</a>: "came" amended to "come"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_69">69</a>: "patriachs" amended to "patriarchs"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_84">84</a>: "refer" amended to "prefer"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_135">135</a>: "appetities" amended to "appetites"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_204">204</a>: "thy" amended to "they" and "thir" amended to "their"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_229">229</a>: "Explanations" amended to "Explanation"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_276">276</a>: "others" amended to "other"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_284">284</a>: "mutitude" amended to "multitude"</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_362">362</a>: "propositon" amended to "proposition"</p> + +<p>Abbreviations in footnotes and references have been standardized.</p> + +<p>Accents and hyphenation have generally been standardised.</p> +</div> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Philosophy of Spinoza, by Baruch de Spinoza + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA *** + +***** This file should be named 31205-h.htm or 31205-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/1/2/0/31205/ + +Produced by Alicia Williams and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Philosophy of Spinoza + +Author: Baruch de Spinoza + +Editor: Joseph Ratner + +Release Date: February 7, 2010 [EBook #31205] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA *** + + + + +Produced by Alicia Williams and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + +------------------------------------------------------------+ + | Transcriber's Note | + | | + | Obvious typographical errors have been corrected in | + | this text. For a complete list, please see the bottom of | + | this document. | + +------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + +THE PHILOSOPHY + +OF + +SPINOZA + + +EDITED BY +JOSEPH RATNER + + +TUDOR PUBLISHING COMPANY + +_Printed in the United States of America_ + + + + +PREFACE + + +Selections usually need no justifications. Some justification, however, +of the treatment accorded Spinoza's _Ethics_ may be necessary in this +place. The object in taking the _Ethics_ as much as possible out of the +geometrical form, was not to improve upon the author's text; it was to +give the lay reader a text of Spinoza he would find pleasanter to read +and easier to understand. To the practice of popularization, Spinoza, +one may confidently feel, would not be averse. He himself gave a short +popular statement of his philosophy in the _Political Treatise_. + +The lay reader of philosophy is chiefly, if not wholly, interested in +grasping a philosophic point of view. He is not interested in highly +meticulous details, and still less is he interested in checking up the +author's statements to see if the author is consistent with himself. He +takes such consistency, even if unwarrantedly, for granted. A continuous +reading of the original _Ethics_, even on a single topic, is impossible. +The subject-matter is coherent, but the propositions do not hang +together. By omitting the formal statement of the propositions; by +omitting many of the demonstrations and almost all cross-references; by +grouping related sections of the _Ethics_ (with selections from the +_Letters_ and the _Improvement of the Understanding_) under sectional +headings, the text has been made more continuous. It is the only time, +probably, dismembering a treatise actually made it more unified. + +In an Appendix, the sources of the selections from the _Ethics_ are +summarily indicated. It would be a meaningless burden on the text to +make full acknowledgments in footnotes. For the same reason, there has +been almost no attempt made to show, by means of the conventional +devices, the re-arrangements and abridgements that have been made. Every +care has been taken not to distort in any way the meaning of the text. +And that is all that is important in a volume of this kind. + +Wherever possible Spinoza's own chapter headings have been retained; and +some of the sectional headings have either been taken from, or have been +based upon expressions in the text. It would have been more in keeping +with contemporary form to use the title _On Historical Method_ or _The +New History_ instead of _Of the Interpretation of Scripture_; a chapter +on _Race Superiority_ would sound more important than one on _The +Vocation of the Hebrews_; but such modernizing changes were not made +because the aim has been to give the reader a text as faithful to the +original as the character of this volume would allow. + +The selections have been taken from Elwes' translation of the _Tractatus +Theologico-Politicus_, _A Political Treatise_ and the _Improvement of +the Understanding_; and from White's translation of the _Ethics_. These +translations are no longer in copyright and hence it was not necessary +to secure permission from the publishers to use them. Nonetheless, +grateful acknowledgment is their just due. + +White, in his translation, uses, not altogether without reason, the +stilted term "affect" instead of the natural English term "emotion." +"Affect" is closer to the Latin and it more clearly indicates the +metaphysical status of the emotions as "modes" or "affectiones" of +Substance. Still, practically no one has followed White in his usage. +The reasons are not difficult to discover. Besides being a stilted term, +having no legitimate English status, "affect" very often makes the text +extremely obscure, even unintelligible to one who has no antecedent +knowledge of it, because besides having also its ordinary English +meaning, "affect" is used by White to mean "mode" or "modification" +("affection") as well. In the circumstances, therefore, I thought it +advisable to change "affect" to "emotion" and "affection" to +"modification" or "mode." I also corrected White's translation of the +Definition of Attribute by deleting the word "if." In spite of the need +for these changes, it was desirable to use White's translation because +it is the most accurate and elegant extant. + +Furthermore, in both White and Elwes I have consistently capitalized the +term Nature, in accordance with Spinoza's Latin text; White and Elwes +capitalize it only desultorily. I have made some slight changes in +Elwes' mid-Victorian punctuation and White's all-too-faithful +paragraphing. The Latin paragraphs of the _Ethics_ are extremely long. +These changes are all external and as far as I can see thoroughly +legitimate as well as justified. The very slight and very occasional +internal changes I have made--other than those already accounted for--I +have indicated by square brackets. + +I am indebted to Mr. Houston Peterson, of Columbia University, for +suggesting to me the idea of arranging a volume of selections from +Spinoza. I am alone responsible, however, for the actual selections and +arrangements, and for the idea of taking the _Ethics_ out of its +geometrical form. Professor Morris R. Cohen, of the College of the City +of New York, read this volume in manuscript; I am indebted to him for +some valuable suggestions. I am also indebted very greatly to a friend +(who prefers not to be acknowledged) for invaluable help in getting the +manuscript into shape. + +JOSEPH RATNER. + +_October, 1926._ + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE +PREFACE v +THE LIFE OF SPINOZA xi +INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA xxvii + + +FIRST PART + +ON GOD + +CHAPTER + + I. OF SUPERSTITION 3 + II. OF THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE 11 + III. OF PROPHETS AND PROPHECY 36 + IV. OF THE VOCATION OF THE HEBREWS 64 + V. OF THE DIVINE LAW 71 + VI. OF THE CEREMONIAL LAW 88 + VII. OF MIRACLES 103 + VIII. OF THE DIVINE NATURE 122 + + +SECOND PART + +ON MAN + + IX. THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN MIND 155 + X. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 173 + XI. DETERMINISM AND MORALS 191 + XII. THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 211 + XIII. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMOTIONS 236 + + +THIRD PART + +ON MAN'S WELL-BEING + + XIV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE 251 + XV. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MORAL LIFE 266 + XVI. OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE 297 + XVII. OF SUPREME AUTHORITIES 314 + XVIII. FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH 333 + XIX. OF HUMAN FREEDOM 345 + XX. OF HUMAN BLESSEDNESS AND THE ETERNITY + OF THE MIND 361 + +APPENDIX 377 + + + + +THE LIFE OF SPINOZA + + +Baruch de Spinoza was born into the Jewish community of Amsterdam on +November 24, 1632. His parents were Jews who had fled, along with many +others, from the vicious intolerance of the Inquisition to the limited +and hesitant freedom of Holland. At the time Spinoza was born, the +Jewish refugees had already established themselves to a certain extent +in their new home. They had won, for example, the important right to +build a synagogue. Still, they did not enjoy the complete freedom and +peace of mind of an independent and securely protected people. Although +one could be a Jew in Amsterdam, one had to be a Jew with considerable +circumspection. Whatever might prove in any way offensive to the +political authority had to be scrupulously eschewed. For, as is always +the case, minority groups which are simply tolerated have to suffer for +the offenses of any of their members. The Jews of Amsterdam thoroughly +understood this. They knew that any significant default on the part of +one member of their community would not, in all likelihood, be +considered by the authorities to be a default of that one person +alone--a failing quite in the order of human nature; they knew it would +be considered a manifestation of an essential vice characteristic of the +whole community. And the whole community would have to suffer, in +consequence, an exaggerated punishment which the individual delinquent +himself may well not merit. + +It was inevitable that the intellectual life of the Jews of Amsterdam +should bear the marks of their inner and outer social constraints. Their +intellectual life was cramped and ineffectual. Indiscriminate erudition, +not independent thought, was all the Jewish leaders, connected in one +way or another with the Synagogue, were able to achieve. It was far +safer to cling to the innocuous past than it was to strike out boldly +into the future. Any independence of thought that was likely to prove +socially dangerous as well as schismatic was promptly suppressed. The +humiliation and excommunication (circa 1640) of the indecisive martyr +Uriel da Costa when he ventured to entertain doctrines that were not +orthodox, were prompted as much by political as by religious +considerations. It is true, many of the faithful were attracted by +Cabbalistic wonders and the strange hope of being saved from a bitter +exile by a Messianic Sabbatai Zevi. But these wayward deviations, in +reality not so very far removed from orthodox tradition, exhibited only +the more clearly the fearsome inner insecurity which a strained +formalism in thought and habit bravely attempted to cover. + +In such social and intellectual atmosphere Spinoza grew up. Of his early +life, practically nothing is known. His parents, we know, were at least +fairly well-to-do, for Spinoza received a good education. And we know +that he was, when about fifteen years of age, one of the most brilliant +and promising of Rabbi Saul Levi Morteira's pupils. Everyone who then +knew Spinoza expected great things of him. He proved himself to be a +very acute rabbinical student; at that early age already somewhat too +critical, if anything, to suit the orthodox. But all felt reasonably +confident he would become a distinguished Rabbi, and perhaps a great +commentator of the Bible. Of course, of the orthodox sort. + +But the Rabbis were early disillusioned. Spinoza soon found the learning +of the Synagogue insufficient and unsatisfactory. He sought the wisdom +of secular philosophy and science. But in order to satisfy his +intellectual desires it was necessary to study Latin. And Latin was not +taught in the Synagogue. + +An anonymous German taught Spinoza the rudiments of the language that +was to enable him to enter into the important current of modern ideas +especially embodied in the philosophy of Descartes. Francis Van den Ende +gave him a thorough technical, not literary, mastery of it. And Van den +Ende taught Spinoza much more besides. He acquainted him with the +literature of antiquity; he gave him a sound knowledge of the +contemporary fundamentals of physiology and physics; and it was he +possibly, who introduced him to the philosophy of Descartes and the +lyrical philosophic speculation of Bruno. He did much also (we may +easily infer) to encourage the independence of mind and the freedom in +thinking Spinoza had already manifested in no inconsiderable degree. For +although this Van den Ende was a Catholic physician and Latin master by +profession, he was a free thinker in spirit and reputation. And if we +are to believe the horrified public suspicion, he taught a select few of +his Latin pupils the grounds of his heterodox belief. As one can easily +understand, to study Latin with Van den Ende was not the most innocent +thing one could do. Certainly, to become a favorite pupil and assistant +teacher of Van den Ende's was, socially, decidedly bad. But Spinoza was +not deterred by the possible social consequences of his search for +knowledge and truth. He took full advantage of his opportunities and did +not hesitate to follow wherever his master might lead. + +Van den Ende was also something of a political adventurer; he finally +paid the unsuccessful conspirator's price on the gallows in Paris. It is +not at all unlikely that Spinoza's hard-headed political and ethical +realism was, in significant measure, due to his early intimacy with his +variously gifted and interesting Latin master. We know that Spinoza was +at least strongly attracted, in later life, by the Italian political +insurgent Masaniello, for Spinoza drew a portrait of himself in the +Italian's costume. Machiavelli's influence, too, upon Spinoza was very +great--an influence that would but be a continuation of Van den Ende's. + +Spinoza may have been indebted to Van den Ende for one other thing: his +only recorded romance. There is some question about this indebtedness +because tradition does not speak very confidently, in some essentials, +about Van den Ende's daughter Clara Maria. Clara, tradition is agreed, +was intellectually and artistically well endowed, although she was not +very good looking. In her father's absence on political affairs she took +his place in the school, teaching music as well as Latin. But tradition +is somewhat disconcerting when it comes to Clara's age when Spinoza +knew her. According to some chronological researches, the fair object of +Spinoza's supposed devotion, was only twelve years old. Hardly of an age +to warrant Spinoza's love, unless he loved her as Dante loved Beatrice. +A somewhat improbable possibility. The tradition that is less sparing of +Clara's age is, however, even more sparing of her character: the success +of Spinoza's supposed rival--a fellow-student by name, Kerkrinck--is +attributed to the seductive powers of a pearl necklace. In spite of the +fact that tradition reckons this gift to have been of decisive +importance, one does not like to believe that a girl of high +intellectual and artistic ability could be so easily and fatefully +overcome by a mere trinket. Still less does one like to believe that +Spinoza fell in love with a girl whose mind was so far removed from the +joys that are eternal and spiritual. But, of course, it is conceivable +that the girl took the trinket symbolically; or else that Spinoza, who +had given all his time to rabbinical and philosophical studies was, in +the circumstances, quite justifiably deceived. + +Spinoza had not yet been graduated from his student days when the +Synagogue thought him a fit object for official censure and threat. It +seems Spinoza was betrayed into overt indiscretion by two +fellow-students from the Synagogue, who asked for his opinion regarding +the existence of angels, the corporeality of God and the immortality of +the soul. Spinoza's answers were not complete, but incomplete as they +were, they yet revealed a mind that was, to the faithful, shockingly +astray from the orthodox path. Spinoza was to have elaborated upon his +answers at a later date but the students had heard, apparently, quite +enough. Instead of returning to Spinoza they went to the authorities of +the Synagogue. The authorities were quite disposed by Spinoza's +association with Van den Ende and his perceptible neglect of ceremonial +observances, to believe him capable of any intellectual villainy. They +promptly set about to reclaim the erring soul. Report has it they sought +two means: they offered Spinoza an annuity of 1,000 florins if he would, +in all overt ways, speech and action, conform to the established +opinions and customs of the Synagogue; or, if he did not see the wisdom +and profit of compliance, they threatened to isolate him by +excommunication. Again social politics as much as established religion +demanded the action the Synagogue took. Their experience with Uriel da +Costa was still very fresh in their minds and they must have felt fairly +confident that Spinoza would be warned by the fate of his heretical +predecessor if not counseled by the wisdom of the Fathers. But Spinoza +was of a firmness they did not reckon on. He did not hearken to their +censure nor cower at their threat. The thirty days or so in which he was +given to reform passed without discovering in him any change. +Excommunication had to be pronounced. When barely twenty-four years old, +Spinoza found himself cut off from the race of Israel with all the +prescribed curses of excommunication upon his head. + +Spinoza was not present when excommunication was pronounced upon him. He +had left Amsterdam to stay with some Collegiant friends on the Ouwerkerk +road, for, so one tradition relates, an attempt had been made by one of +the over-righteous upon Spinoza's life soon after he became an object +of official displeasure. Although Spinoza was, throughout his life, +ready to suffer the consequences of his opinions and actions, he at no +time had the least aspiration to become a martyr. When Spinoza heard of +his excommunication he sent a spirited and unyielding reply. The spirit +if not the words of that reply (not yet discovered) eventually made its +way into the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_. For the rest of his life, +whenever he had occasion to refer to the Jews, Spinoza referred to them +as he did to the Gentiles--a race to which he did not belong. And +immediately, with the perfect grace and humor of a cultured mind, he +changed his name from Baruch to Benedict, quite confident one can be as +blessed in Latin as in Hebrew. + +The subsequent course of Spinoza's life was almost completely +untroubled, though it was unmitigatingly austere. He took up the trade +of polishing lenses as a means of earning his simple bread. He was +somewhat influenced in his decision by the advice in the _Ethics of the +Fathers_ that every one should do some manual work. But it was also +quite the fashion at that period for learned men, interested in science, +to polish lenses, as a hobby of course, not as a means of support. +Spinoza's choice was not altogether wise in spite of its learned +associations and the fact that he soon gained an enviable reputation as +a young scientist. The early recognition Spinoza received from men like +Henry Oldenburg, the first secretary of the Royal Society, from Robert +Boyle and Huyghens, was hardly adequate recompense for the fine dust he +ground which aggravated his inherited tuberculosis and undoubtedly +considerably hastened his death. Spinoza's accomplishment in his chosen +trade was not merely practical. Many looked forward, with warranted +confidence, to the time when Spinoza would make a distinguished +contribution to the science of optics. But the only strictly scientific +work Spinoza left behind (long considered to have been lost) was a short +treatise on the rainbow. + +All Spinoza's intellectual energy went into service of his philosophy. +His earliest philosophical work (rediscovered (1862) in translated Dutch +manuscript) was a _Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being_. It is +a fragmentary, uneven work, chiefly valuable for the insight it gives +into the workings and development of Spinoza's mind. The _Ethics_, in +the completed form in which we have it (no manuscript of it is extant) +has the incredible appearance of a system of philosophy sprung +full-grown from an unhesitating mind. Even a most cursory reading of the +_Short Treatise_ completely dispels this preposterous illusion. The +_Ethics_ was the product of prolonged and critical toil. + +But just how prolonged it is difficult to say. For already as early as +1665 almost four-fifths of the _Ethics_ seems to have been written. We +learn as much from a letter Spinoza wrote to one of his friends +promising to send him the "third part" of his philosophy up to the +eightieth proposition. From the letter it is fairly clear that at that +time the _Ethics_ was divided into three, not five, parts. Also, in +letters written that same year to William Blyenbergh one finds expressed +some of the chief conclusions published five years later in the +_Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_. And Spinoza wrote, at this early +period, not conjecturally or speculatively, but as one writes who knows +the firm and tested grounds of his belief. Why the _Ethics_, in final +form, began to circulate privately only two or three years before +Spinoza's death, and why his work on _The Improvement of the +Understanding_ and his _Political Treatise_ were left unfinished, must +remain something of an insoluble philosophico-literary mystery. + +The only book Spinoza published in his own lifetime above his own name +was his _Principles of Descartes' Philosophy Geometrically Demonstrated_ +with an appendix of _Cogitata Metaphysica_ which he had dictated to a +youth (one "Caesarius") "to whom (he) did not wish to teach (his) own +opinions openly." Discretion, as he had already learned and later +formally stated and proved, was not inconsonant with rational valor. The +only other book Spinoza published in his lifetime--the _Tractatus +Theologico-Politicus_--bore on its title page Spinoza's initials only, +and the name of a fictitious Hamburg publisher. When Spinoza heard, some +time later, that a Dutch translation of this work was being prepared, he +earnestly beseeched his friends to forestall its publication (which they +did) because only its Latin dress saved it from being officially +proscribed. It was then an open secret who the author was. Spinoza's +personal rule to incur as little official displeasure as possible made +him abandon his final literary project entertained in 1675. When he +began negotiations for the publication of the _Ethics_ a rumor spread +that he had in press a book proving that God does not exist. Complaint +was lodged with the prince and magistrates. "The stupid Cartesians," +Spinoza wrote Oldenburg "being suspected of favoring me, endeavored to +remove the aspersion by abusing every where my opinions and writings, a +course which they still pursue." In the circumstances, Spinoza thought +it wisest to delay publication till matters would change. But, +apparently, they did not change, or change sufficiently. The _Ethics_ +was first published about a year after Spinoza's death. + +In spite of the consensus of adverse, and somewhat vicious opinion, the +author of the _Tractatus_ did find favor in the eyes of some. The +Elector Palatine, Karl Ludwig, through his secretary Fabritius, offered +Spinoza the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg (1673). But Spinoza +graciously declined it. Although a more welcome or more honorable +opportunity to teach could not be conceived, it had never been his +ambition to leave his secluded station in life for one involving public +obligations. Even in his secluded corner, he found he had aroused more +public attention and sentiment than was altogether consonant with the +peace and retirement he sought. Besides, he did not know how well he +could fulfill the desires of the Elector by teaching nothing that would +tend to discomfit established religion. + +Spinoza had, in his young days, learned what extreme dangers one must +expect to encounter in a righteous community become inimical. In his +last years, he experienced a stern and tragic reminder. Two of Spinoza's +best friends, Cornelius and Jan de Witt, who had by a change in +political fortune become the enemies of the people, were brutally +murdered (1672). Spinoza for once, when this occurred, lost his +habitual philosophic calm. He could restrain neither his tears nor his +anger. He had to be forcibly prevented from leaving his house to post a +bill, at the scene of the murder, denouncing the criminal mob. A +somewhat similar crisis recurred shortly afterwards when Spinoza +returned from a visit to the hostile French camp. The object of his +mission is not unequivocally known. Some think it was to meet the Prince +of Conde solely in his private capacity of philosopher. It is certain +Spinoza was advised the French King would acknowledge a dedicated book +by means of a pension--an advice Spinoza did not act upon. Others think +his mission was political. His reputation as a distinguished man would +have made him a very likely ambassador. This conjecture would seem more +probable, however, if the de Witts, his intimate friends, had been still +in political power, instead of in their graves. But whatever Spinoza's +mission was, when he returned to the Hague, the populace branded him a +French spy. Spinoza's landlord feared his house would be wrecked, by an +infuriated mob. This time Spinoza exerted the calming influence. He +assured Van der Spijck that if any attempt were made on the house he +would leave it and face the mob, even if they should deal with him as +they did with the unfortunate de Witts. He was a good republican as all +knew. And those in high political authority knew the purpose of his +journey. Fortunately, popular suspicion and anger dissipated this time +without a sacrifice. Still, the incident showed quite clearly that +though Spinoza did not desire to be a martyr, he was no more afraid to +die than he was to live for the principles he had at heart. + +Spinoza's character, manifested in his life, has won the high admiration +of every one not bitterly hostile to him. And even his enemies +maintained and justified their hatred only by inventing calumnious +falsehoods about him. Unfounded rumors of an evil nature began to +circulate during his lifetime, and naturally increased in virulence and +volume after his death. At that period in human history, it was +popularly recognized that nothing good could be true, and nothing vile +could be false of an atheist--which was what Spinoza, of course, was +reputed to be. Oldenburg even, for years unflaggingly profuse in +expressions of devoted friendship and humble discipleship, an eager and +fearless advocate (supposedly) of the truth, a friend who lamented the +fact that the world was being denied the invaluable products of +Spinoza's unsurpassed intellect, and who, therefore, constantly urged +Spinoza, by all the advice of friendship, to publish his work without +delay, irrespective of popular prejudice--even Oldenburg began to +conceive a far from complimentary opinion of Spinoza after the +publication of the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_! So prevalent were +the groundless rumors that the Lutheran pastor, Colerus--the source of +most of our information--felt obliged in his very quaint summary +biography to defend the life and character of Spinoza. To his +everlasting credit, Colerus did this although he himself heartily +detested Spinoza's philosophy which he understood to be abhorrently +blasphemous and atheistic. Colerus' sources of information were the +best: he spoke to all who knew Spinoza at the Hague; and he himself was +intimate with the Van der Spijcks with whom Spinoza had lived the last +five years of his life, and with whom Colerus was now living--in +Spinoza's very room. + +Spinoza's courage and strength of mind are as impressively manifested in +the constant daily life he lived as in the few severe crises he +resolutely faced. For the twenty years of his excommunication he lived +in comparative retirement, if not isolation. The frugality of his life +bordered on asceticism. All his free time and energy Spinoza dedicated +with unusual single-hearted devotion to the disinterested development of +a philosophy he knew would not be very acceptable to the general or even +special philosophic reader. His mode of life is all the more remarkable +because it was not determined by embittered misanthropy or passionate +abhorrence of the goods of the world. It was dictated solely by what he +understood to be, in his circumstances, the reasonable life for him. +Although he was an eager correspondent, and had many friends whom he +valued above all things that are external to one's own soul, his +interest in his own work kept him from carrying on, for any length of +time, an active social life. He believed, too, that it is part of the +wisdom of life to refresh oneself with pleasant food and drink, with +delicate perfumes and the soft beauty of growing things, with music and +the theater, literature and painting. But his own income was too slender +to allow him much of these temperate riches of a rational life. And +always, rather than exert himself to increase his income, he would +decrease his expenditure. Still, he no doubt enjoyed the little he had. +He found very palatable, most likely, the simple food he himself +prepared in later life; and he must have gained additional satisfaction +from the thought that he was, because of his own cooking, living more +safely within his means. The pipe he smoked occasionally (let us hope) +was fragrant; the pint of wine a month very delectable. For mental +recreation he read fairly widely in literature, observed the habits of +insects, with the microscope as well as the naked eye. He also sometimes +drew ink or charcoal sketches of his visitors and himself. A fairly +plausible rumor has it that Rembrandt was his teacher. Unfortunately, +all of Spinoza's sketches were destroyed. + +Although Spinoza wanted to be independent and self-supporting he was not +irrationally zealous about it. He did not accept all the financial help +his friends were eager to give him, but he did accept some. One of his +young friends, Simon de Vries, before his early death occurred, wanted +to bequeath all of his estate to Spinoza. But Spinoza persuaded him not +to deprive his own brother of his natural inheritance. Even the annual +500 florins de Vries finally left him, Spinoza would not altogether +accept, offering the plea that so much wealth would surely take his mind +away from his philosophy. But he would accept 300 florins, a sum he felt +would not be burdensome or dangerous to his soul. This annuity he +regularly received until his death. His friends the de Witts, pensioned +him too; the heirs to the estate contested Spinoza's claim, whereupon +Spinoza promptly withdrew it. This high-minded action corrected their +covetousness, and from the de Witts, too, he received financial help +until his death. + +Spinoza's relations with the humble folk he stayed with exhibited the +modesty and grace of character that endeared him to his intimate +friends. When he was tired working in his own room, he would frequently +come down to smoke a pipe and chat with his landlady and landlord about +the simple affairs that filled their lives. His speech was "sweet and +easy;" his manner of a gentle, noble, beauty. Except for the occasion +when the de Witts were murdered, Spinoza never showed himself either +unduly merry or unduly sad. If ever he found that his emotions were +likely to escape his wise control, he would withdraw until such danger +had passed. We find the same characteristics exhibited in Spinoza's +correspondence. Although he found some of his correspondents sometimes +very trying, he never failed to be as courteous and considerate as the +circumstances would permit. Even when one Lambert de Velthuysen provoked +his righteous indignation, Spinoza tempered his caustic reply before +sending it off. + +Spinoza lived the ethics he wrote. As is the _Ethics_, so is his life +pervaded by a simple grandeur. And as he lived, so did he die. He had +not been feeling very well, and had sent for his friend and physician +Dr. Ludwig Meyer. A chicken broth was ordered for Spinoza of which he +partook quite healthily. No one suspected that he was this time fatally +ill. He came down in the morning, and spoke for some time with his +hosts. But when they returned from a visit that same afternoon (Sunday, +Feb. 21, 1677) they learned the sad, surprising news that Spinoza had +gently passed away, the only one by his bedside, his doctor and friend. + +Spinoza sought in his lifetime neither riches, nor sensual pleasure, nor +fame. He wrote and published his books when he could and thought +advisable because part of his joy consisted in extending, as he said, a +helping hand to others, in bringing them to see and understand things as +he did. If they did not see, or obdurately refused to understand, he did +not consider it part of his task to overcome them. He was animated by no +missionary zeal. He was content to search for the truth and to explain +what he found as best he could. The truth, he devoutly believed, would +make us free. But it was truth that we understood, not truth that was +forced upon us. He was quite satisfied to leave in his desk the +manuscript of his _Ethics_. People in his lifetime did not want to +listen to him. If ever they did after his death, they were cordially +welcome to. In death as in life they would find him faithful to his +ideal. + +Spinoza has often been likened to the old Hebrew prophets. He does not, +it is true, exhort the people to follow in the path of righteousness; it +is the philosopher's task simply to show the way. But the morality +Spinoza stands for is the old prophetic morality purified and made +consistent with itself. And Spinoza was, in his own time, as the +prophets were in theirs, a heretic and a rebel, a voice calling in the +wilderness--a wilderness that was later to become the very citadel of +civilization. Excommunicated by the Jews and vilified by the Gentiles +during his lifetime, Spinoza has, since his death, been canonized by +both alike as the most saintly and exalted of philosophers. Like his +forerunners of old, Spinoza was a prophet _in_ Israel, _for_ Mankind. + + + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA + + +I + +Spinoza's philosophy has suffered not a little from the highly abstruse +and technical form in which the _Ethics_ is written. Some, who are not +inured to the hardships of philosophy, quite naturally jump to the +conclusion that its formidable geometry contains only the most +inscrutable of philosophic mysteries; and a wise humility persuades them +to forego the unexampled enlightenment a mastery of the difficulties +would yield. Others, who are devoutly wedded to what they consider the +unreservedly empirical character of modern (that is, true) philosophy, +avoid the _Ethics_ because they are convinced, on general principles, +that only a mind hopelessly lost in the dark night of medieval +speculation could conceive of philosophy in such ultra-deductive +fashion. Reason was for so long servile to idle theology, it is not at +all surprising that a work exemplifying reason to such high degree as +does the _Ethics_, should receive scant respect from intrepid +empiricists. It is so easy to confuse the rationalizations of reason +with the nature of reason itself. + +Spinoza did not, however, choose the geometrical order because he +thought his philosophy too profound for ordinary exposition; nor did he +choose it because he was enmeshed in medieval philosophic speculation. +He chose it because his fundamental philosophic aim was to establish +ethics on a thoroughly tested, scientific foundation; and geometry, an +exemplar of all mathematical science, most completely embodied, at that +time, the highest scientific ideal. Man, Spinoza held, is a part of +Nature, and Nature is governed by eternal and immutable laws. It must be +just as possible, therefore, to apply the mathematical method to man, as +it is to apply it to matter. It must be possible to determine, with the +certitude obtainable in the exact sciences, what things are good for man +and what means he has for attaining them. + +Spinoza's belief in the self-sufficing, lawful order of Nature, and the +adequacy of the natural powers of our mind to understand the mysteries +(popularly so appraised) of heaven and earth, the singular expository +style of the _Ethics_ emphasizes in unmistakable fashion. Even for our +understanding of God's own nature, Divine Revelation, as commonly +interpreted in Spinoza's day and our own, is wholly unnecessary. We need +only the revelation afforded by the natural powers of reason operative +in us. In geometry, we do not blindly accept conclusions on faith, nor +do we reject them by authority. We are guided in our discovery of the +true and the false, solely by the light of our natural understanding. +And the truths we discover are not temporary fabrications of the human +mind, but eternal truths about the nature of things. Perhaps no other +single aspect of Spinoza's philosophy distinguishes Spinoza from the +medievalists as thoroughly as does his use of the geometrical order of +exposition; and no other single aspect, perhaps, justifies as +thoroughly Spinoza's claim to rank with the moderns if not even the +contemporaries. + +The geometer's method of starting with definitions and axioms and +proceeding from proposition to proposition especially appealed to +Spinoza, apart from the fact that geometry was an ideal science, +because, for Spinoza, the essence of logical method consists in starting +out with ideas that are of utter simplicity. Then, if the ideas are +understood at all, they can only be clearly and distinctly understood. +The absolutely simple we can either know or not know. We cannot be +confused about it. And ideas which are clearly and distinctly understood +are, according to Spinoza, necessarily true. Such unambiguously simple +and therefore necessarily true ideas Spinoza believed his definitions +and axioms expressed. Furthermore, if we gradually build up the body of +our science by means of our initial simple ideas, justifying ourselves +at every step by adequate proof, our final result will necessarily be as +firmly established and as certainly true as the elementary ideas we +started with. The reliability of this whole procedure more than +compensates for its tediousness--a defect Spinoza expressly recognizes. + +Unfortunately, however, there are other defects in the geometrical +method when it is applied to philosophy, far more serious than its +tediousness,--defects, moreover, Spinoza apparently did not recognize. +Even though the geometrical method is preeminently scientific, it is +hardly a form suitable for philosophy. The Euclidean geometer can take +it for granted that the reader understands what a line or plane, a solid +or an angle is. For formality, a curt definition is sufficient. But the +philosopher's fundamental terms and ideas are precisely those in need of +most careful and elaborate elucidation--something which cannot be given +in a formal definition or axiom. Also, in the geometrical form, the +burden of the author's attention is shifted from the clarification of +the propositions to the accurate demonstration of them. Which, in a +philosophical treatise, is most unfortunate. For though it is +undoubtedly highly desirable that the philosopher should observe the +same care and precision as the scientist, admitting nothing he cannot +prove, it is nevertheless just as well for the philosopher to take +reasonable care that what he is conscientiously proving is understood. +That Spinoza did not always take such care but considerably +over-estimated the self-evidence of his definitions and axioms and the +simplicity of many of his important propositions, is an unhappy fact +conclusively established by the increasing volume of Spinozistic +literature. + + +II + +However, in spite of the difficult, and to the literary repellent form +of the _Ethics_, the catholicity of Spinoza's influence has been +extremely remarkable. In time, his influence bids fair to equal in +range, if not in gross extent, the as yet unparalleled influence of the +artist-philosopher Plato. It took about a hundred years for Spinoza to +come into something of his own. For the _Ethics_ was condemned with the +_Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_ as an atheistic and immoral work. Only +when the romantic philosophers of Germany, following the lead of +Lessing and Jacobi, found in Spinoza a man who was, as they thought, +after their own heart, did Spinoza's mundane fortune change. As a result +of their efforts, Spinoza ceased to be a philosopher to be execrated in +public (though furtively read in private), and became a philosopher to +be eulogized on all occasions in most rhapsodic, if bewildering, terms. +Many others too, besides professional philosophers, began to read +Spinoza with much sympathy and unbounded admiration. Goethe, Matthew +Arnold, Heine, George Eliot, Flaubert, Coleridge, and Shelley--to +mention only a few distinguished lay names--found in Spinoza a powerful, +stimulating and, in varying degrees, congenial thinker. To-day, after +having been one of the liberating thinkers of mankind who was read but +not honored, Spinoza is fast becoming one of the canonized of mankind +who are honored but not read. + +The reason for Spinoza's magnificent influence is not difficult to +discover: his philosophy deals in a grand, illuminating way with all +that is of profoundest importance in human life. There is no material +the universe offers for man's life but Spinoza seeks to understand and +explain its rational function and utility. For Spinoza set before +himself the hard task of laying down the principles whereby men may +guide themselves aright in all the affairs of life--the lowest as well +as the highest. His philosophy, as a result, is at once the most exalted +and the most matter of fact. There is no high sentiment or glorious +ideal to which Spinoza does not give proper attention and a proper +place. And yet he propounds nothing in his ethical theory that cannot +be clearly seen by reason and that cannot be fully substantiated by the +history of man. Spinoza's ethics is perfectly balanced, eminently sane. +And there is, pervading it all, a stately sustained resolution of mind, +a royal, often religious spirit and calm. + +And Spinoza's thought, if not all of his terminology, is refreshingly +modern and contemporary. We find in him, as in contemporaries, an utter +reliance upon the powers of the human mind. All dogmatism, in the +pristine connotation of unexamined adherence to the doctrines of +tradition, is absent from his thought. Spinoza is thoroughly critical, +for only modern philosophic arrogance, in first full bloom in Kant, can +justly monopolize the term "critical" for itself. Naturally, though, +Spinoza is unfamiliar with the whole apparatus and style of philosophic +thinking which the last two centuries of excessively disputatious and +remarkably inconclusive philosophy have created. Spinoza has his own +technical philosophic style, inherited to some extent, but to a much +larger extent transformed by him for original use. But technical as his +style may be, it is simplicity itself when compared with the horrific +styles which were, until the last few decades, alone thought adequate to +express the profound and esoteric mysteries of modern philosophy. The +philosophic jargon of the 18th. and 19th. centuries is now almost +universally discarded, and with it preternaturally recondite and +ineffectual modes of thought. Those who have achieved at least some of +the new simplicity in thought and expression are better able than any +others to enter into the heart of Spinoza's philosophy, into the open +secret of his thought. For apart from the mere stylistic difficulties +of the _Ethics_ and some detail of his metaphysical doctrine, the few +great and simple ideas which dominate his philosophy are quite easy to +understand--especially if one uses the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_ +as an introduction to them. It was an unexpressed maxim with Spinoza +that even at the risk of keeping our heads empty it is necessary we keep +our minds simple and pure. + + +III + +The central controlling idea of Spinoza's philosophy is that all things +are necessarily determined in Nature, which he conceives to be an +absolutely infinite unified and uniform order. Instead of maintaining +that God is like man magnified to infinity, who has absolute, +irresponsible control of a universe which is external to him--the rather +rude anthropomorphic account of the ultimate nature of the universe +contained in the Bible--Spinoza maintains that God is identical with the +universe and must be and act according to eternal and necessary laws. +God is Nature, if we understand by Nature not merely infinite matter and +infinite thought,--the two attributes of Nature specifically known to +us--but infinite other attributes the precise character of which we can +never, because of our finitude, comprehend. Within this Being--God, +Nature or Substance (the more technical, philosophic term)--there is no +dichotomy; and there is outside of it no regulative or coercive +intelligence such as the Biblical God is conceived to be. Whatever is, +is one. And it is, in the special Spinozistic sense, supremely perfect +because absolutely real. There is, considered in its totality, no lack +or defect in Nature. There can be, therefore, no cosmic purposes, for +such purposes would imply that Nature is yet unfinished, or unperfected, +that is, not completely real. Something that cannot possibly be true of +an absolutely infinite Being. + +Spinoza's conception of an absolutely infinite universe is a vast +improvement upon the pent-in, finite medieval universe inherited from +Aristotle. It exceeds by infinity, in breadth of vision, even our +contemporary notion of an infinite physical cosmos. And his conception +of universal necessity is as great an advance upon the view that +transformed natural occurrences into miraculous events. Miracles, +according to the Bible, most clearly exemplify God's omnipotence; for +omnipotence in the popular mind consists in nothing so much as in the +ability to satisfy any purpose or whim no matter how transitory it is, +or how incompatible with what has been antecedently desired or done. +Miracles may be extraordinary occurrences with reference to the order of +Nature, but they are, with reference to God, commonplace exhibitions of +His Almighty power. For Spinoza, however, miracles, did they actually +occur, would exhibit not God's power, but His impotence. The omnipotence +of the one absolutely infinite Being is not shown by temperamental +interruptions of the course of events; it is manifested in the immutable +and necessary laws by which all things come to pass. + +Spinoza's conception of the universe, flawlessly operating under +necessary laws, effectively disposes of miracles. And to dispose of +miracles is one of Spinoza's primary concerns. For as long as miracles +happen, organized knowledge and rational control--the bases of a +rational life--are both impossible for man. + +If events were not absolutely conditioned by the determinate nature of +things, instead of science, we should have superstition, and magic +instead of scientific control. When a god governs the universe according +to his transitory and altogether personal whims, or when chance, without +a god, reigns, man is hopelessly at the mercy of the flux of events. In +the conduct of his affairs memory is of no use to him, and forethought +is impossible. In such cases man, as we read in his history, and could +easily conclude from his nature, piteously grasps for salvation at +whatever happens his way. All things are then loaded with ominous powers +the strength of which is directly proportionate to the hope or fear that +enthralls him. If the universe were lawless, the irony of man's fate +would forever be what it was when he lived in abysmal ignorance: when in +bitterest need of sane guidance, he would be most prone to trust to the +feeblest and most irrational of aids. On the other hand, if things are +determined by necessity, nothing happening either miraculously or by +chance, science and a commensurate power of scientific control is +possible for man. No more important argument could Spinoza conceive in +favor of his doctrine. + + +IV + +But the very doctrine which Spinoza placed at the heart of his +philosophy because of the inestimable advantages man could derive from +it, people loudly objected to on the ground that it robbed man's life of +all moral and religious value. Determinism, they exclaimed, reduces man +to the rank of inanimate Nature; without "free-will" man is no better +than a slave, his life doomed by an inexorable fate. True enough, +nothing is more abhorrent or more deadly to the striving soul of man +than to be bound in a fatalistic doctrine. But the anti-determinists +wildly confuse a perverted determinism of ends with a scientific +determinism of means. And only the former determinism is truly +fatalistic. This confusion is to be found equally central in Henry +Oldenburg's inconsequential letters to Spinoza and in Bernard Shaw's +shamelessly silly Preface to _Back to Methuselah_. Fundamental +confusions remain astonishingly stable throughout the centuries. + +Spinoza, when he maintained that all things are necessarily determined +by the laws of their own being, certainly did not mean to say that, for +example, the toothbrush I shall buy to-morrow will be determined by the +stellar dust of aeons ago. He did not wish to maintain that the infinite +occurrences of the past were slowly but persistently moving to that far +from divine or distant event. No aboriginal astronomer royal could have +predicted the pending purchase merely by exhaustively analyzing the then +stellar dust. For toothbrushes and their purchase are determined by the +nature of human beings, not by the nature of embryonic stars. And +Spinoza's doctrine of necessity maintains that all events are determined +by their proper causes, not that everything is immediately caused by +some antediluvian event. And this is true even though we can start from +any event in the present, no matter how trivial, and go back to an event +causally antecedent, and from that to another, even until we recede into +the stellar dust itself. But this only amounts to saying, what is +undoubtedly true, that neither I nor the toothbrush could now exist if +the stellar dust, and the whole series of intervening events, had not +existed. But this is totally different from saying that the stellar dust +existed that I might exist to-day and buy a toothbrush to-morrow, or, +what equals the same, that I and the toothbrush exist so that the +stellar dust and the exceedingly long consequence of natural events +should have a final purpose, an ultimate end--even if not an ideal +fulfillment. Now only when causality, as in the latter case, is +perversely teleological is determinism fatalistic. Fatalism is the +result only when the ends of activity are necessarily but arbitrarily +determined. But when causality is not arbitrarily teleological, or when +only the natures of things, the instruments or means of activity are +necessarily determined, then determinism involves no fatalism at all. + +The only truly fatalistic systems which have had an important influence +in the history of mankind, have been certain religious systems--the +Christian religion among them. The energies of western men were, for +over fourteen centuries, robbed of all vitality and meaning because +Christian theology irrevocably fixed the end of life, and man could do +nothing to alter it significantly in any respect. Arbitrary teleological +determinism is, in the Christian religion, the philosophic root of other +worldliness. And it was no alleviation of the state of affairs that +miracles could happen in the realm of Nature, that is, that Nature was +not determined, but was undetermined, accidental, or "free." On the +contrary, it was a decided aggravation that there existed side by side +with a perverse teleological determinism for the other world, an +instrumental indeterminism for this world. For the latter served as +effectively to put the means of man's life, as the former did to put his +end, out of his present reach and control. + +Contrast the modern and contemporary Christian period with the medieval +and pre-medieval Christian period. What a vast difference there is! With +the introduction of the modern period man's energies were almost +instantaneously liberated. And why? Because of Chancellor Bacon's +discovery of the value of empirical investigation? Hardly. For this +discovery had been made long before Bacon. But it was only after Bacon +that the discovery had a great effect because an enormous intellectual +transformation had already partly taken place in the time between the +first medieval discovery of the empirical method and Bacon's +proclamation of it. The enormous change was that determinism had been +transferred from ends to means; and indeterminism from means to ends. +Mathematical physics had, as a system for explaining Nature, supplanted +theology. + +With scientific determinism firmly established in the realm of Nature +and arbitrary determinism thoroughly disestablished in the realm of +ends, the two-fold fatality that crushed man with its oppressive power, +automatically disappeared. On the one hand, the world ceased to be +haunted by demonic powers; it was no longer a miraculous world subject +constantly to capricious perturbations. It was no longer a world alien +to man's nature and it therefore ceased to be sheerly brutal to him. For +the world is brutal only as long as we do not understand it. As soon as +we do, it ceases to be brutal, and becomes quite human, if not humane. +Knowledge transmutes a brute existent into a rational instrumentality. +And, on the other hand, man could now espouse any end consonant with his +nature. He was no longer bound and dwarfed by an alien, superimposed end +which is just as sheerly brutal to man's soul as an alien world is +sheerly brutal to man's body. + +Of course, the ends that are consonant with man's nature are determined +by his nature, so that it may seem we have not really escaped the +fatality of "determinism." This is, however, only seemingly so. Because, +according to the teleological determinism of Christian theology the ends +were fixed independently of the natures that were to fulfill them; just +as, according to instrumental indeterminism events were caused +independently of the natures of the things that caused them. Otherwise +there would be nothing miraculous about miracles and nothing virtuous +about Calvinism. But if the ends are the ends of our natures,--that is, +if teleological determinism is not perverse and arbitrary but rational +and scientific--we are, as Spinoza constantly points out, free. Only +when we are subject to alien ends or the ends of alien natures are we +enslaved. For freedom is not opposed to necessity or determinism; it is +only opposed to an alien necessity or alien determinism. Freedom +consists not in absolute indetermination, but in absolute +self-determination. And self-determination is the very last thing that +can be called fatalistic. + +Because Spinoza knew that freedom consists in self-determination he was +saved from falling into the absurdities of Rousseau's "Back to Nature" +doctrine even though Nature is, for Spinoza, the origin of everything +and its laws, the only laws that are divine. Still, the purpose and +conduct of man's life, if they are to be rational, must be defined by +man's nature not by any other nature; if man is to be free, he must be +guided by the particular laws of his own being, not by the laws of any +other being least of all by the general laws of so totally dissimilar a +being as absolutely infinite Nature. There is as much sense and +rationality in exhorting us to go back to the Realm of Nature, as there +is in exhorting us to go on to the City of God. + +There is, in Spinoza's system, no teleological determinism (in the +perverted theological usage explained above); but neither is there, in +Spinoza's system, any "free-will" for man. And the hue and cry that is +always raised when "free-will" is denied, was raised against Spinoza. +The clamorous moralists protest that "free-will" is the necessary +(_sic!_) foundation of all morality, and hence of religion. This is the +starting point of Bernard Shaw's no less than of Henry Oldenburg's +infuriated argument. And, unfortunately, no less a thinker than William +James starts from the same misguided assumption. And yet nothing can be +more certainly clear than that if man as a matter of fact has no +"free-will" it is the very height of absurdity to maintain that man's +morality necessarily depends upon his having "free-will." Something man +does not possess cannot be made any condition, let alone _the_ +indispensable condition of his being able to live a moral life. Man's +morality must be based upon his nature; and what his nature is cannot be +antecedently determined in accordance with the demands of any special +moral theory. Moral theory must be based upon man's nature; not man's +nature upon moral theory. + +Far from "free-will" being a necessary foundation of morality +"free-will" would make all morality, of the kind we know and the +"free-will"-ists want, absolutely impossible. The central condition of +moral life is responsibility. So central is it, that it is now +acknowledged as such in all the penal codes of civilized countries. But +if man has, instead of a determinate nature, "free-will", responsibility +can in no way be fixed. Education, too, is necessarily impossible. Hence +all punishment would have to be retributive. Moral strife, as well as +legal penalties, would bear all the stigmata of unmitigated, imbecilic +cruelty. This is not the case however if man has an absolutely +determinate nature. Education is possible. And therefore although crime +loses none of its evil character, punishment can lose all of its inhuman +sting. The necessary condition of human morality is responsibility not +irresponsibility; reliability not unreliability; certainty not +uncertainty; a firm will, not a "free" will. + +"Free-will" is necessary only in theological apologetics. According to +Christian theology, if man did not have "free-will" it would follow that +God is the Author of all the evil of the world. Something which is not +quite in keeping with His perfect goodness. By a queer twist of mind, +theologians therefore gave man, and not God (as they should have done) +"free-will." But they gave man "free-will" not to enable him to live +virtuously, but to enable him to sin. If man were able to live +virtuously as well as sinfully of his own "free-will" he would then be +altogether independent of God, which can in no way be admitted or +allowed. Hence the bitter and heart-rending cries of orthodox, +especially evangelical ministers that if left to themselves they can +only sin! They can live virtuously only when they are absolutely coerced +so to live by God! Their radical inability to understand or believe the +self-reliant moral person grows from the very heart of their theology. +For "free-will"--the only freedom they know--is the necessary condition, +not of man's morality, but of God's! + +There is no fatalism in Spinoza's system. Fatalism is the moral value of +a theory of the universe. That theory is fatalistic, which makes the +activities man cherishes either futile or impossible. Any system that +puts man at the mercy of the flux of events does precisely this. This is +necessarily done by a system according to which the universe does not +faithfully observe an immutable order, does not obey certain fixed and +eternal laws. Nothing is as fatal as an accident; no universe as +fatalistic as an accidental universe. + +There is no fatalism in Spinoza's system because there are no accidents +in Spinoza's universe. All things are necessarily determined by +immutable laws, and man, who is an integral part of the universe, is +necessarily without "free-will." In Spinoza's system, ends, being +undetermined (as contrasted with their being determined in the +theological sense explained above) they can exercise no fatalistic +power; and means, although determined (in the strict scientific sense) +are similarly impotent because they are, in the life of man, subordinate +to ends. Consequently, Spinoza was able to write upon Human Freedom with +a truth and clarity and force excelling by far all theological, +teleological, "free-will," idealistic philosophers from Plato to Josiah +Royce. Spinoza was able to write thus because, not in spite of the fact +that he placed at the heart of his philosophy the doctrine of necessity; +because, not in spite of the fact that he developed the only complete +system of philosophy strictly consistent with the principles of natural +science or mathematical physics. Spinoza is, perhaps, the only +thoroughly emancipated, the only thoroughly modern and scientific +philosopher that ever lived. And he is, much more certainly, the only +thoroughly emancipated, the only thoroughly modern and scientific +ethicist that ever lived. + +To-day, in view of the extensive dominion and authority of science, the +objections against Spinoza's doctrine of necessity can hardly be as +self-righteous and as loud as they were two centuries ago. The principle +of the uniformity of Nature has become the established foundation of +natural science. And it is also acknowledged, except in the recent ranks +of superstition, that man is a part of Nature, not independent of it. + +Man's connection with Nature is, in Spinoza's system, at least as +intimate as it is in the latest system of natural science. The original +doctrine of the origin of species, Spinoza would have found entirely in +harmony with his general philosophy, although what he would have thought +of subsequent evolutionary extravaganzas, it is impossible to say. +Darwinian biology made man consubstantial with the animal kingdom; +Spinoza's metaphysics makes man's body consubstantial with the infinite +attribute of extension or matter, and his mind consubstantial with the +infinite attribute of thought which is the mind of Nature or God. Man, +as a "mode" of extension and thought, is necessarily subject to the laws +of these two attributes of which he is compounded. The fundamental +relation of man to the universe, set forth in the Bible, is radically +transformed. Man is no longer an only child of God, enjoying his +privileges and protection (occasionally tempered by inexperienced +punishments); he is a mode of two attributes of substance inexorably +determined by their universal, immutable laws. + + +V + +Of all the laws of the universe, it was Spinoza's chief object to discover +the mental laws. That there were such laws his metaphysics assured him; +and the existence to-day of a science of psychology substantiates his +belief. The most popular of recent psychologies--Freudianism--is based +upon the principle that nothing whatever happens in the mental life of +man, waking or asleep, that is not specifically determined by +ascertainable causes. Psychoanalytic therapy would be impossible +otherwise. Psychiatry, too, has conclusively demonstrated that only +metaphorically is the subject matter it deals with in the region of the +"abnormal." Actually, the insane are subject to laws of behavior which can +be scientifically studied no less than the sane. They are no more +possessed of an evil, designing spirit, as our witch-burning ancestors +consistently believed, than the ordinary human being is possessed of +"free-will." + +Spinoza's psychology is dialectical. But it is no indictment of his +psychology to point out that it is. It is true, his formal definition of +sorrow, for instance, fails supremely to touch the strings of a +sympathetic heart. But the philosophical psychologist is not a novelist. +The recent claim that "literary psychology" is the only valid +psychology, is as well founded as the claim would be that only a +"literary physics" is valid. Mathematical physics gives us no more a +picture of the actual physical universe than Spinoza's psychology gives +us a picture of the mental and emotional life of an actual human being. +But the failure of these sciences to give us a picture of the living +world in no way invalidates their truth, or deprives them of their +utility. + +Consider, as an example, Spinoza's psychological law freely expressed in +the dictum that Paul's idea of Peter tells us more about Paul than about +Peter. This conclusion follows strictly from fundamental principles of +Spinoza's abstract, dialectical psychology; but its truth or its +practical applicability is because of that not in the least impaired. +Indeed, because of its dialectical form its range of meaning is greatly +increased. Spinoza's dictum applies to what William James called the +"psychologist's fallacy." It also applies to what John Ruskin called the +"pathetic fallacy." Again, it applies to the fallacy Franz Boas exposed +and which he may justly have called the "anthropologist's fallacy." And +it applies also to what one may, with a great deal of benefit, dub the +"ethicist's fallacy." For the very same constitutional weakness of man +to identify confusedly his own nature with that of the object he is +contemplating or studying, is most flagrantly and painfully evident in +the fields of theoretical and practical ethics. The "ethicist's fallacy" +is the source of all absolutism in theory, and all intolerance in +practice. + +All four fallacies just enumerated come under Spinoza's dictum as +special cases come under a general law. And these four are by no means +the only instances of the common habit of mind. From no field of human +endeavor is the mischief-working fallacy ever absent. We find it lodged +in the judge's decision, the propagandist's program, the historian's +record, the philosopher's system. In the field of metaphysical poetry it +has recently been identified by Santayana as "normal madness." In its +milder forms, the fallacy is now known by every one as the "personal +equation"; in its pronounced, abnormal manifestations it is known by the +psychoanalysts as "transference." It is a Protean fallacy woven into the +emotional texture of the human mind. Nothing, for it, is sacred enough +to be inviolate. For Spinoza discovered it sanctimoniously enshrined +even in the Sacred Scriptures. As he brilliantly shows us in the +_Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_, the prophets' ideas about God tell us +more about the prophets than about God. + +The far-reaching significance of Spinoza's propositions is one of their +most remarkable characteristics. This is due to the fact, contemporary +philological philosophers notwithstanding, that Spinoza defined the +essence, the generating principle, not the accidental qualities, of the +human mind. + +Another example may not be out of place. Spinoza's proposition that +anything may be accidentally (in the philosophic sense of "accident") a +cause of pleasure, pain, or desire seems to explain the essence of all +the particular variations of the psychological phenomena known now by +all who have been aroused to the significance of their vagrant cryptic +slumbers, as the phenomena of symbolism, sublimation, and fetich +worship. Spinoza's proposition explains all the phenomena adequately +because among the fundamental human emotions, Spinoza like Freud--if we +discount the recent attempt to go beyond the pleasure-principle--reckons +only three: desire, pleasure and pain. And with Spinoza, as with the +Freudians, it sometimes seems that desire is more fundamental than the +other two, for desire expresses, in Spinoza's terminology, the essence +of man. Desire however may be stimulated by almost anything. It requires +the least sanity of mind, therefore, to prevent one from scandalously +over-emphasizing one particular class of objects--of desire. + +The striking similarity, if not identity, between Spinoza's +psychological doctrines and those of contemporaries, serves to give +conclusive lie to the crass contemporary contention that Truth +instinctively shuns the philosophical study, and that she only favors +the laboratory or clinic where she freely comes and frankly discloses +herself to the cold, impersonal embrace of mechanical instruments. + +It is not altogether fortuitously that Spinoza's psychology embraces so +readily contemporary psychological conceptions. Spinoza made a +psychological, if not psychoanalytical, analysis of some portions of +Scripture. And Scripture is a very rich human material. Besides having +to explain the diverse and conflicting accounts the different Scriptural +authors gave of the nature of God, Spinoza had to account for the +superstitious beliefs commonly held by men that are incorporated in the +Bible--the beliefs in omens, devils, angels, miracles, magical rites. +Spinoza had to account for all these by means of his analysis of human +nature since he would not grant the existence of supernatural beings and +powers. Spinoza's psychology adequately performs the task. His +psychology demonstrates with unsurpassed thoroughness and clarity how +human emotions, when uncontrolled in any way by intelligence, naturally +attach themselves to all sorts of bizarrely irrelevant and absurd +things, and stimulate the imagination to endow these things with all the +qualities and powers the disturbed hearts of ignorant men desire. +Ignorant and frustrated man, Spinoza showed, frantically dreams with his +eyes open. + + +VI + +Spinoza's method in psychology is dialectical, but his interest is +practical. His psychology one might almost say is a moral psychology. +Spinoza wants to explain mental phenomena through their primary causes +because a knowledge of man's nature is the radical cure for his ills. +The greatest obstacle man has to contend against is his emotional +nature. Not that it is inherently degraded or sinful--the grotesque +superstition some religious moralists have maintained; but man's +emotional nature masters, more often than not, man's rational nature, +and leads man astray. When the emotions are unrestrained and undirected +by knowledge and intelligence, they violently attach themselves to +anything that chances to excite them. Their stark immediacy vitiates +man's judgment. He is unable, while under their sway, to select and +follow the course that is best, because his mind is engulfed in the +evanescent present. In his hectic desire to gain the passing pleasure, +man loses his ultimate good. + +But man's salvation, just as much as his damnation, is within his own +control. Salvation or blessedness is something man can achieve by his +own efforts; it is not something he can achieve only by Divine Grace. +For it is no innate perversion of soul, no inherent wickedness of man, +no malicious "free-will" that causes him to follow the lure of the Devil +rather than the light of God. The very elements in man's nature which +cause him to fall are the means by which he can make himself rise. He +can pit one emotion against another and the stronger will not merely +win, but will win over, the weaker. And it is in the nature of the +emotions not to have only one satisfying object, but to be able to +derive satisfaction from almost any object whatsoever. The most +spiritual forms of human love have the same emotional foundations as the +most bestial forms of human lust. + +To learn how to become master of one's emotions, to learn how to free +oneself from their bondage, is, therefore, the primary condition of +sustained and rational happiness. The key to virtue, Spinoza +independently agreed with Socrates, is knowledge of oneself. Only when +we understand ourselves can we control our emotions. And only when we +have our emotions under control are we able consistently to direct our +activity towards a definite, rational goal. Our activity then follows +from our own nature, and not from the nature of external things which +arouse our emotions and determine their strength. And, as already +noticed, to be the necessary cause of our own activity is, according to +Spinoza, to be free. + +It is impossible, of course, for man ever to be the sole cause of his +activity. To be such, he would have to be an entirely independent +being--an absolute power--something he can never be. No matter how +eloquently misguided enthusiasts extol the powerful merits of man's +"free-will" it will always be true that man's emotions, sensations and +ideas change very significantly with the organic changes that occur in +his body. The emotions, sensations and ideas of a child differ from +those of a man, and those of a man in maturity differ from those of a +man decrepit with old age. And these and similar changes are quite +beyond the control of man. + +However, without denying man's intimate dependence upon Nature, it is +still possible to distinguish between those activities which follow, in +an important degree, from a man's individual nature--whatever it may +happen to be at the time--and those activities which follow only from +his own nature in conjunction with the nature of other things. The +movement of my pen on paper would be impossible without the general +order of Nature which allows such phenomena as motion, pen and paper, to +exist. Nevertheless, I can profitably distinguish between the movement +of my pen on paper and the movement of my body through stellar space. +The former movement follows, in an important sense, from my own peculiar +constitution; the latter, from the constitution of the stellar system. +Likewise, but more significantly for human welfare, one can distinguish +broadly between the activities and the passivities of the mind; between +man as an agent, a doer--man's intellect; and man as a patient, a +sufferer--man's passions. In this creative age such distinction should +be singularly easy to draw. In moral terminology one can distinguish +between man as free and man as enslaved. + +Since man can never be the sole cause of his activity, he can never be +wholly free. The range of human power is extremely limited, and Spinoza +is ever careful to point that out. Spinoza is no incurable optimist, no +Leibnizian Pangloss who believes this is, for man, the best of all +possible worlds. To be humanly idealistic it is by no means necessary to +be super-humanly utopian. But neither is Spinoza a shallow +Schopenhauerian pessimist. Spinoza's realistic appraisal of man's +worldly estate is entirely free from all romantic despair. This world is +no more the worst than it is the best of all possible worlds for man. +Although man cannot completely alter his evil estate, he can better it. +And the wisdom of philosophy consists in recognizing this fact and +discovering what ways and means there are for bringing such betterment +about. + +This Spinoza has in mind throughout the devious courses of his +philosophy. It is present to him when he delineates the character of +Nature or God, when he outlines the nature of the mind and its emotions, +no less than when he specifically addresses himself to the task of +describing the way to the highest blessedness of man. Indeed, so intent +is Spinoza upon reaching his ethical goal, and making all his doctrines +contributory to it, he purposely omits to treat of many philosophical +problems because they are, though interesting in themselves, of too +little value for the conduct of man's life. His philosophical system, as +a result, is in many respects merely sketched in massive outline. + + +VII + +The dominant ethics of Christian civilization has made a special point +of disregarding the intimate connection that exists between human nature +and rational conduct. Morality has been identified, not with living a +life according to a rational plan and an adequate conception of an ideal +form of human existence, but with a strained attempt to live in +accordance with an inherited system of coercive social habits. Of this +morality, the Puritan is the popular type. Only in quite recent years +has some advance been made back to the sane naturalistic conception of +morals which is found in the Greeks and also in Spinoza. + +It is a fundamental point with Spinoza that the ceremonial law, as he +puts it in the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_, can at best secure man +wealth and social position. Man's highest blessedness can be secured by +the divine law of Nature alone. Here Spinoza and Rousseau are at one. +It was relevant to Spinoza's purpose to treat only of religious +ceremonial law; but his conclusions apply with equal force and relevancy +to social and political ceremonial law as well. Spinoza's distinction +between ceremonial and divine law is peculiarly significant and +illuminating when applied to marriage. For to-day in marriage, if +anywhere, is it glaringly evident that the legal or religious or social +ceremonial law can at best secure man or woman wealth and social +position. Happiness or blessedness lie altogether beyond its powerful +reach. Marriage is sanctified and made blessed not by the ceremonial law +of priest or city clerk but by the divine law of love. Natural love, or +love free from all ceremonial coercions, is not merely not a +questionable source of marital happiness: it is the only source. The +ceremonial law, the legal or religious marriage custom, has nothing +whatsoever to do with human happiness. If by "free" love is meant love +free from all legal, social and religious ceremonial restraints, then +free love is, according to Spinoza, the only basis of rational marriage. + +No man ever treasured the joys of the spirit more than did Spinoza; but +he did not because of that nourish a savage antagonism against the body. +The very bases of his philosophy of the mind saved him from any such +disastrous folly. What Havelock Ellis says "We know at last" Spinoza +knew all the time--"that it must be among our chief ethical rules to see +that we build the lofty structure of human society on the sure and +simple foundations of man's organism." It is because Spinoza knew this +so thoroughly and remembered it so well that he devotes so much of his +attention to the nature of the human mind and the human emotions in a +treatise on ethics. + +Mind and body are not intrinsically alien or inimical to one another. +They are cooeperative expressions of the one reality. The mind is the +idea of the body and "in proportion as one body is better adapted than +another to do or suffer many things, in the same proportion will the +mind, at the same time, be better adapted to perceive many things." +Purely psychologically, all that we can ever discover about the +regulating influence glands have upon personality can only go to +corroborate, not to improve this general position. And morally, the +implications are equally far-reaching and profound. + +The virtue of the mind is not to despise or reject but to understand and +transform. And it clearly must be more excellent for the mind to know +both itself and the body than it is for the mind to know itself alone. +For natural science is the result when the mind organizes into a system +what are, in their own nature, simply apprehensions of bodily +existences; and art is the result when the mind transfuses with an ideal +quality of its own what are, in their own nature, simply apprehensions +of bodily excellences of form or motion, color or sound. Matter is, in +its nature, no more hostile to spirit than body is alien to mind. +Paradise is not a non-or super-physical realm; it is a physical realm +made harmonious with the ideality of the soul. Spirit is an +appreciation, a transmutation of matter. For the lover, the physical +embrace is a spiritual revelation. + +The fundamental metaphysical law from which Spinoza's ethical system +flows is that everything endeavors to persist in its own being. This law +is the metaphysical equivalent of the first law of motion in physics +which is itself the equivalent of the law of identity in logic. By his +law Spinoza does not mean anything which anticipates the +nineteenth-century doctrine of the competitive struggle for existence. +On the contrary, nothing is so clear to Spinoza as the fact that the +most efficient way of preserving one's own being is not by competitive +but by cooeperative activity. Especially is this true of human beings. By +his own efforts a solitary man cannot, even after he has been nursed to +maturity, maintain himself in a decent manner. Certainly he is unable +successfully to resist his foes. But with the aid of his fellows man can +develop a highly complex and tolerably stable civilization, all the +excellences of which he can enjoy at the comparatively small risk of +becoming a victim of its dangers. Social organization is the natural +expression of man's fundamental endeavor to preserve himself. A perfect +social organization naturally expresses the highest form of human +existence--individualism without anarchy and communism without +oppression. + +Consistent with his primary law of being, Spinoza defines virtue not in +terms of negations, inhibitions, deficiencies or restraints; virtue he +defines in terms of positive human qualities compendiously called human +power. Virtue is power, however, not in the sense of the Renaissance +ideal of "manliness" as we glimpse it, for instance, in Benvenuto +Cellini; nor is it power in the vulgar sense of dominion which seems to +be the confused ideal of some ultra-contemporaries; virtue is power in +the sense of the Greek ideal that virtue is human excellence. It was +therefore very natural for Nietzsche who consciously went back to the +Greeks to hail Spinoza as his only philosophical forerunner, the only +philosopher who dwelt with him on the highest mountain-tops, perilous +only for those who are born for the base valleys of life. And it was +equally natural for Nietzsche to fail to see the important differences +between his own violent and turbid thinking and the sure and disciplined +thinking of Spinoza--on those very points upon which Nietzsche thought +they agreed. + +Perfection and imperfection are, in Spinoza's thought, identical with +the real and the unreal. The perfect is the completed, the perfected; +the imperfect, the uncompleted, the unperfected. These terms have, in +their first intention, no specifically ethical significance. Nature is +perfect, that is, absolutely real or completed; but in no intelligible +sense is Nature ethically good. However, it is possible to convert +non-ethical into ethical terms. We can do this by designating, for +example, a certain type of character as the "perfect" type. If we reach +that type we are perfect or supremely "good"; insofar as we fall short +of it, we are imperfect, or "bad." + +Just what constitutes human excellence is determined in each case by the +specific nature and relations of the individual involved. The excellence +of a child is not that of a man; and the excellence of a free man +differs from that of a slave. For the parent, the perfect child is +docile, beautiful and full of promise; for the ruler, the perfect man +is industrious, respectful of law and order, eager to pay taxes and go +to war; for the free man, the perfect man is a rational being, living a +harmonious life in knowledge and love of himself, his neighbor and God. +Moreover, within any one class the excellences vary in harmony with the +variations in the individuals. There is no excellence in general. + +But because ethical standards are quite human and vary, they do not +lack, therefore, all validity. They are within their range of +applicability, absolute, even though they are, in a more comprehensive +universe, relative. A just appreciation of the relative nature, but +absolute value of specific ethical judgments, is above all things +vitally necessary in ethics. Such appreciation saves the ethicist from +the pernicious fallacy of erecting personal preferences into universal +laws; and it also saves him from falling into the ethical abyss where +all things are of equal value because all things are equally vain. + +Ethical tolerance is different from ethical sentimentality. Every one +has the sovereign natural right to cherish the excellence in harmony +with his character. But the equality extends no further. A comprehensive +estimate of the powers of the mind can be made and they can be arranged +in a series of increasing value. No arrangement can ever be absolutely +final and authoritative, for what one free man considers the highest +perfection of human life, another will consider to be only of secondary +importance. Still, all free men will agree that certain powers of the +mind are superior to others. But superiority is not rationally endowed +with legislative power over others. The free man is superior to the +slave, but he has, because of that, no rational right to dominate him; +neither is it his office to revile or despise him; the slave was given +his nature, he did not ask for it. + +But if it is not the office of the free man to dominate or revile the +slave still less is it the divinely appointed office of the slave to +rule and revile the free man--universal democratic prejudices +notwithstanding. And in support of the independent, and in case of +contest, superior right of the free man we have the very highest +authority for those who do not trust themselves to be guided by reason. +God Himself has pronounced upon this tremendous issue. And not in mere +words, but by unmistakable deeds. When Lucifer, the first absolute +democrat or equalitarian, the first one to maintain that no one was +better than he was, raised his impious standard, God assembled all His +faithful hosts together and hurled Lucifer out of Heaven into Hell. And +justly so. For Lucifer had, by his foul, sacrilegious doctrine and +action, revealed himself to be the Prince of Darkness not the Prince of +Light. To our untold and everlasting misery the Prince of Darkness who +failed to ensnare the majority of angels did succeed in ensnaring the +majority of mankind. So irredeemably so, even the sweetly and tenderly +lyrical Prince of Peace had to be sent to us bearing a ghastly sword. + +Reason is not, according to Spinoza, a constitutive power in man's life; +it is a regulative principle. Spinoza is, in the traditional usage of +the term, anything but a rationalist in his ethics. Only if rationalism +consists in being unflaggingly reasonable is Spinoza an avowed and +thorough-going rationalist. Reason has, for Spinoza, no transcendental +status or power, and it plays no dictatorial role. Reason, for him, is +essentially an organizing not a legislative power in man's life. To take +a phrase from Professor Dewey, reason, for Spinoza, is reconstructive +not constitutive. The power of the intellect is not some underived, +original, independent power which can impose or, better, superimpose its +categorical imperatives upon human conduct. The power of the intellect +is wholly derivative, dependent upon the nature of the things that it +understands. + +Reason gives man the power and insight to organize his life on the basis +of his knowledge, to chose an end harmonious with his nature, what is +for his best advantage--the basis of all virtue--and to select and +control the means by which it can be attained. For the happy governance +of our lives the object we must chiefly understand is ourselves. +Because--in Matthew Arnold's line--"the aids to noble life are all +within." When we become creatures conscious of our natural endowment we +cease to be blind instruments of our natures and become rational, +intelligent agents. For intelligence, in the fundamental sense of the +word, consists in knowing what we are and understanding what we can do. + +A man who governs his life according to the dictates of reason tries, +insofar as possible, to harmonize his conflicting interests. He +balances, impartially, future with present goods, and he bases his +decision upon the broad foundation of all his needs. He does not madly +satisfy or repress one passion at the expense of the rest of his nature. +He satisfies a maximum rather than a minimum of his desires, evaluating +them not merely by numerical strength but by quality and duration. It is +only stupid and pernicious confusion that makes man's moral problem +consist in his discovering instead of a good "relative" to his nature, +an "absolute" good, good for no nature at all. Man's real moral problem +is to secure a permanent good instead of a transitory good; a more +inclusive good instead of a more restricted good; a higher good instead +of a lower good. Morally, it matters nothing whether an intellectual +good is "absolute" or whether it is only "relative" to man's mind and +his power of comprehension. But it matters everything, morally, whether +an intellectual good is more or less permanent, more or less inclusive, +more or less valuable than a sensory good. This is the real moral +problem man is faced with. And this is the moral problem Spinoza +considers and solves. + +Everybody knows what is Spinoza's solution. One permanent intellectual +good is, according to him, of more importance and value in the life of +man than countless transitory sensory pleasures. The object most +permanent in character and greatest in value is Nature or God. The +highest virtue of the mind, therefore, the highest blessedness of man, +consists in the intellectual love of Nature or God. Thus Spinoza passes +from ethics to religion, which in his thought almost imperceptibly blend +together. + + +VIII + +The beginning and the end, as familiar wisdom has long since propounded, +are the same. The ultimate origin of man is God, and the final end, the +blessed crown of life, is to return to God in fullest knowledge and +love. The philosopher who was during his lifetime and for over a century +after his death constantly execrated for being an atheist (he +occasionally still is by some hardy fools) made God a more integral part +of his system than did any one else in the whole history of philosophy. +Spinoza did not do occasional reverence to God; he did not, in lightly +passing, perfunctorily bow to Him; God is the veritable beginning and +end of all his thought. + +The intellectual love of God does not demand as basis a knowledge of the +cosmic concatenation of things. Omniscience alone could satisfy such a +demand. The intellectual love of Nature or God depends solely upon a +knowledge of the order of Nature, upon a knowledge of the infinite and +eternal essence of God. And such knowledge is within the limits of our +reach. + +We can apprehend the eternal essence of God because the temporality of +our thought is accidental to its meaning. It is the nature of reason to +see things under the form of eternity. And we can apprehend the infinite +essence of God or Nature because every particular finite thing is a +determinate expression of the infinite. The law of causality requires +that there be an essential identity of nature between cause and effect; +otherwise it would follow that something can be produced from nothing. +Since cause and effect belong to the same realm of existence, to the +same attribute of Nature, whenever we apprehend the essence of a +particular thing, we necessarily apprehend the infinite essence of that +attribute of Nature. For the infinite, with Spinoza, is not so much an +extent as a quality of being. Thus from the comprehension of any +particular thing, we can pass to a comprehension of the infinite and +eternal. + +This is most commonly understood, curiously enough, not in religion, but +in art. The ecstatic power of beauty makes the soul lose all sense of +time and location. And in the specific object the soul sees an infinite +meaning. Indeed, one can almost say that the more specific or limited +the artistic object, the more clearly is the absolute or infinite +meaning portrayed and discerned. A sonnet is oftener than not more +expressive than a long poem; the _Red Badge of Courage_ reveals more +impressively than does the _Dynasts_ the absolute essential horror of +war. There are present, apparently, in the more pronounced mystical +visions, characteristics similar to those of significant esthetic +apprehensions. These visions are extremely rare and fleeting. But then +we can be at the highest peaks only seldom and for a short while. But in +a moment we see eternity, and in the finite, the infinite. It is for +this reason Spinoza says the more we understand particular things the +more do we understand God. + +The great religious significance of Spinoza's doctrine of the +intellectual love of God is that it establishes religion upon knowledge +and not upon ignorance. The virtue of the mind is clearly and distinctly +to understand, not ignorantly to believe. There is no conflict between +science and religion; religion is based upon science. There is a +conflict only between science and superstition. Mysteries, unknown and +unknowable powers, miracles, magical rites and prayerful incantations +are instruments not of religion but of superstition which has its +origin in ignorant and ignominious fear. + +The free man does not fear and he is not consumed by fear's boundless +conceit. He has no apprehensive conscience which unceasingly interprets +all unusual or untoward events as being deliberate signs of a god's +impending wrath. The free man knows that man is, cosmically considered, +impressively insignificant. Human loves and hatreds, human joys and +sorrows are, in the face of the eternal and infinite, the littlest of +little things. Human nature is only an infinitely small part of +absolutely infinite Nature; human life only a very tiny expression of +infinite life. Inordinate conceit alone could conceive Nature to have +been made designedly either for our pleasure or our discomfort. The +stars were not hung in the heavens so that we may steer our petty +courses across the seas; nor were the sun and moon put in their places +so that we may have the day in which to waste ourselves in futile labors +and the night to spend in ignorant sleep. Even if there were a cosmic +drama--which there is not--man is too trivial to play in it a leading +role. The free man knows all this; but his heart is tempered and strong. +He can contemplate his place in the universe without bitterness and +without fear. For the free man's love, as his worship, flows from his +knowledge of God. + + +IX + +Spinoza is unsparing in his criticisms of the superstitions which are +in, and which have grown up around, the Bible. All Spinoza's major +conclusions have been embodied directly or indirectly in what is now +known as "the higher criticism" of the Bible, which is the basis of the +Modernist movement. It was Spinoza who established the fact that the +Pentateuch is not, as it is reputed to be, the work of Moses. It was +Spinoza, also, who first convincingly showed that other of the +Scriptural documents were compiled by various unacknowledged scribes; +not by the authors canonized by orthodoxy, Jewish or Gentile. The wealth +of philological and historical material at the disposal of the +contemporary Biblical investigator is incomparably richer than it was at +Spinoza's time. But modern scholarship has only added more +material--only extended in breadth Spinoza's modest researches. In +depth, nothing new has been achieved. The principles of investigation +and interpretation, and the general results Spinoza arrived at have not +been improved upon in the least, nor is it at all likely that they ever +will. Spinoza founded himself upon bed-rock. + +Spinoza's aim in revealing the defectiveness of the Bible was not +theological but philosophical. Orthodox Biblical conceptions had in his +day, as they still have to a certain extent in ours, a peculiarly +sanctified power, because they were institutionalized and made the basis +of an authoritative system of conduct. The misbegotten doctrines +therefore could not be questioned with impunity, for a criticism of the +doctrines on intellectual grounds was invariably construed as an attack +upon the vested customs. The misfortunes of history made dissent from +palpable absurdities capital heresy. Social and religious bigotry burned +scientific men with political ardor. + +However, although Spinoza suffered in his own person from religious +persecution, he never for one moment held as did, for example, Voltaire, +that the Church is the wily and unregenerate instrument of vicious +priests. On the contrary, Spinoza was quite sure that many of the clergy +were among the noblest of men, and that the Church was in large measure +a very salutary institution for the masses who cannot learn to govern +themselves by force of mind. But Spinoza was unalterably opposed to any +encroachment of Church authority upon the just liberties of men. +Especially did he object to the Church extending its prohibitive power +over men's thinking. It is the business of the Church to inculcate +"obedience" in the masses; not to dictate to philosophers what is the +truth. The fundamental purpose of Spinoza's attack upon the Bible is to +free philosophy from theology; not to destroy the Church but to +disestablish it. + +Many readers of Spinoza conclude that because Spinoza tolerated Church +authority in matters of public morality he therefore either did not in +his own thought thoroughly adhere to his principles or else he was +excessively cautious, even timid, and did not fully or consistently +express his mind. No one would deny that there is some accommodation in +Spinoza's language. He certainly followed the practical wisdom of the +thinkers of his day. Even so, however, Spinoza was by no means as +cautious as was Descartes. Anyway, accommodation does not fully account +for Spinoza's attitude on this question; in fact, it does not account +for any significant feature of it. + +Spinoza never believed a sound metaphysics was, for the masses, the +indispensable basis of a good moral life. The multitude, he was firmly +convinced, are controlled by their passions and desires, not by +knowledge and reason. The coercive law of the State and Nature, not +philosophy, keep them living within the bounds necessary for social +order and human well-being. Far from it being necessary to tell the +masses only the truth Spinoza believed, as did Plato before him, that it +may even be necessary in order to rule the masses successfully in the +ways of wisdom and virtue to deceive them to a greater or lesser extent. +Such deception is, as a political expediency, morally justified, for the +rulers would be lying in the interests of virtue and truth. + +Spinoza did not suffer from the fond contemporary delusion that the +salvation of mankind will come about when philosophers become like all +other people. He knew, as Plato did, that the day of ultimate, universal +happiness will dawn rather when all other people become like +philosophers. In the meantime, it is the height of moral and political +folly to act as if that day had arrived or else could be ushered in by +morning. Spinoza had nothing but contempt for facile-tongued, +feather-brained Utopians. He loved humanity too sincerely to mislead +humanity or himself that way. And so we find in Spinoza's _Ethics_ as in +his _Tractatus_ two systems of morals--one for the many who are called, +and one for the few who are chosen. In the _Tractatus_, the religion of +the many is summarily called "obedience"; in the _Ethics_ it is more +fully shown to consist of utilitarianism in the conduct of our affairs, +high-mindedness towards our fellows, and piety towards Nature or God. To +this is added, as the rare religion of the few, what is designated in +both treatises alike as the intellectual love of Nature or God. + + +X + +Spinoza's religion is as naturalistic as his ethics. By making God and +Nature equivalent terms Spinoza was not merely resorting to equivocation +to escape the penalty of his views. The identification of God and Nature +fully embodies Spinoza's doctrine that there is no supernatural realm; +and therefore if man is to have a God at all, Nature must be that God. +To contend, as so many do, that "true religion" must be based upon the +existence of a supernatural realm, no matter whether or not such a realm +exists, is as absurd as to contend that "true morality" must be based +upon man's "free-will" no matter whether or not man has "free-will." +Spinoza's system has been called pantheistic. But it is pantheistic only +in the sense that whatever man considers Godlike must be found in +Nature, for no other realm exists, and there are no gods. + +But the question is always raised, how is it possible to love a Being +indifferent to our human miseries and blind to our hopes? How is even an +intellectual love of such a Being possible? Man, as his religions show, +wants God to be a father, a protector, One who cherishes man's desires +and cares for his wants. The least anthropomorphic of religions wants +God to be the depository of abstract human ideals. But Spinoza's God is +not even as human as this. Nature does not constitute the ideal type for +man. + +Religion is, it is true, man's search for comfort and security in an +alien and hostile world. The simple demand of the human heart is to be +recognized and to be loved. Love is the magic touch that transforms all +that is barren and cold into all that is rich and warm and fruitful. But +man is neither loved nor recognized by the immensities of the universe. +And in face of the illimitable stretches of time and space even the +stoutest heart involuntarily quakes. We cannot consider the vast power +of the universe without feeling crushed and becoming despondent. And +ignorant man cannot see in the finite things about him the full +expression of the infinite beyond. He cannot derive any moral strength +or comfort from the world about him because he conceives that world to +be an implacable instrument of a god's uncertain, inexplicable will. He +therefore cosmically projects, in a frenzy of despair, his crying human +demand. And out of the wastes of space there arises for him a personal +God. + +Anthropomorphic religions reveal man at his weakest, not at his best. +Man's true grandeur is shown when he transcends by his own power of mind +his insistent human desires. He can then stand free before the Almighty. +He may tremble, but he is not afraid. For his strength of soul is +grounded not in the external world but in his own ideal. If we are born +under a lucky star, and are fortunate and happy lovers of the ideal, the +ecstasy of the mystic's beatific vision is ours. But even if we are born +under an unlucky star, and are misfortunate and unhappy lovers of the +ideal, we still have the ideal to which we can hold fast and save +ourselves from being shattered in our despairs, from dying in spirit, +which is far more terrible than any death in the body could possibly be. +We have the ideal to give us the strength, if we are lovers of God, to +go to the cross with Jesus; or, if we are lovers of Virtue, to drink the +hemlock with Socrates. + +The intellectual love of God is a devotion purged of all fear, of all +vain regrets and even vainer hopes. The wild and angry emotions of +sorrow and pain leave the strong and noble heart of man like the tidal +waves leave the scattered rocks of the shore. As the rocks, when the +waves return to their depths, smile securely in the glistening sun in +the sky, so does the brave, free heart of man, when the passionate +deluge is spent, smile serenely in the face of God. The free man is born +neither to weep nor to laugh but to view with calm and steadfast mind +the eternal nature of things. + +To know the eternal is the immortality we enjoy. But to know the eternal +we must forget about ourselves. We must cease to be consumed by a +cancerous anxiety to endure in time and be permanent in space. In the +order of Nature our own particular lives are of no especial importance. +And unless we recognize this, we are necessarily doomed to a miserable +fate. We must recognize that our mere selves can never give us ultimate +fulfillment or blessedness of soul. Only by losing ourselves in Nature +or God can we escape the wretchedness of finitude and find the final +completion and salvation of our lives. This, the free man understands. +He knows how insignificant he is in the order of Nature. But he also +knows that if only he can lose himself in Nature or God then, in his own +insignificant particularity, the eternal and infinite order of Nature +can be displayed. For in the finite is the infinite expressed, and in +the temporal, the eternal. + +It is this knowledge that makes man free, that breaks the finite fetters +from his soul enabling him to embrace the infinite and to possess +eternity. Once man is reconciled to the petty worth of his own person, +he assumes some of the majestic worth of the universe. And the austere +sublimity of soul that inscribes on the grave of the beloved _God is +Love_, inscribes, when it is chastened and purified by understanding, on +the grave of all that is merely human _Nature is Great_. Religion is the +joy and peace and strength that is all understanding. + +JOSEPH RATNER. + + + + +FIRST PART + +ON GOD + + +_The multitude, ever prone to superstition, and caring more for the +shreds of antiquity than for eternal truths, pays homage to the Books of +the Bible, rather than to the Word of God._ + +SPINOZA. + + + + +CHAPTER I + +OF SUPERSTITION[1] + + +Men would never be superstitious, if they could govern all their +circumstances by set rules, or if they were always favored by fortune: +but being frequently driven into straits where rules are useless, and +being often kept fluctuating pitiably between hope and fear by the +uncertainty of fortune's greedily coveted favors, they are consequently, +for the most part, very prone to credulity. The human mind is readily +swayed this way or that in times of doubt, especially when hope and fear +are struggling for the mastery, though usually it is boastful, +over-confident, and vain. + +This as a general fact I suppose every one knows, though few, I believe, +know their own nature; no one can have lived in the world without +observing that most people, when in prosperity, are so over-brimming +with wisdom (however inexperienced they may be), that they take every +offer of advice as a personal insult, whereas in adversity they know not +where to turn, but beg and pray for counsel from every passer-by. No +plan is then too futile, too absurd, or too fatuous for their adoption; +the most frivolous causes will raise them to hope, or plunge them into +despair--if anything happens during their fright which reminds them of +some past good or ill, they think it portends a happy or unhappy issue, +and therefore (though it may have proved abortive a hundred times +before) style it a lucky or unlucky omen. Anything which excites their +astonishment they believe to be a portent signifying the anger of the +gods or of the Supreme Being, and, mistaking superstition for religion, +account it impious not to avert the evil with prayer and sacrifice. +Signs and wonders of this sort they conjure up perpetually, till one +might think Nature as mad as themselves, they interpret her so +fantastically. + +Thus it is brought prominently before us, that superstition's chief +victims are those persons who greedily covet temporal advantages; they +it is, who (especially when they are in danger, and cannot help +themselves) are wont with prayers and womanish tears to implore help +from God: upbraiding reason as blind, because she cannot show a sure +path to the shadows they pursue, and rejecting human wisdom as vain; but +believing the phantoms of imagination, dreams, and other childish +absurdities, to be the very oracles of Heaven. As though God has turned +away from the wise, and written His decrees, not in the mind of man but +in the entrails of beasts, or left them to be proclaimed by the +inspiration and instinct of fools, madmen, and birds. Such is the +unreason to which terror can drive mankind! + +Superstition, then, is engendered, preserved, and fostered by fear. If +any one desire an example, let him take Alexander, who only began +superstitiously to seek guidance from seers, when he first learned to +fear fortune in the passes of Sysis (Curtius v. 4); whereas after he had +conquered Darius he consulted prophets no more, till a second time +frightened by reverses. When the Scythians were provoking a battle, the +Bactrians had deserted, and he himself was lying sick of his wounds, "he +once more turned to superstition, the mockery of human wisdom, and bade +Aristander, to whom he confided his credulity, inquire the issue of +affairs with sacrificed victims." Very numerous examples of a like +nature might be cited, clearly showing the fact, that only while under +the dominion of fear do men fall a prey to superstition; that all the +portents ever invested with the reverence of misguided religion are mere +phantoms of dejected and fearful minds; and lastly that prophets have +most power among the people, and are most formidable to rulers, +precisely at those times when the state is in most peril. I think this +is sufficiently plain to all, and will therefore say no more on the +subject. + +The origin of superstition above given affords us a clear reason for the +fact, that it comes to all men naturally, though some refer its rise to +a dim notion of God, universal to mankind, and also tends to show, that +it is no less inconsistent and variable than other mental hallucinations +and emotional impulses, and further that it can only be maintained by +hope, hatred, anger, and deceit; since it springs, not from reason, but +solely from the more powerful phases of emotion. Furthermore, we may +readily understand how difficult it is to maintain in the same course +men prone to every form of credulity. For, as the mass of mankind +remains always at about the same pitch of misery, it never assents long +to any one remedy, but is always best pleased by a novelty which has yet +proved illusive. + +This element of inconsistency has been the cause of many terrible wars +and revolutions; for, as Curtius well says (lib. iv. chap. 10): "The mob +has no ruler more potent than superstition," and is easily led, on the +plea of religion, at one moment to adore its kings as gods, and anon to +execrate and abjure them as humanity's common bane. Immense pains have +therefore been taken to counteract this evil by investing religion, +whether true or false, with such pomp and ceremony, that it may rise +superior to every shock, and be always observed with studious reverence +by the whole people--a system which has been brought to great perfection +by the Turks, for they consider even controversy impious, and so clog +men's minds with dogmatic formulas, that they leave no room for sound +reason, not even enough to doubt with. + +But if, in despotic statecraft, the supreme and essential mystery be to +hoodwink the subjects, and to mask the fear, which keeps them down, with +the specious garb of religion, so that men may fight as bravely for +slavery as for safety, and count it not shame but highest honor to risk +their blood and their lives for the vainglory of a tyrant; yet in a free +state no more mischievous expedient could be planned or attempted. +Wholly repugnant to the general freedom are such devices as enthralling +men's minds with prejudices, forcing their judgment, or employing any of +the weapons of quasi-religious sedition; indeed, such seditions only +spring up, when law enters the domain of speculative thought, and +opinions are put on trial and condemned on the same footing as crimes, +while those who defend and follow them are sacrificed, not to public +safety, but to their opponents' hatred and cruelty. If deeds only could +be made the grounds of criminal charges, and words were always allowed +to pass free, such seditions would be divested of every semblance of +justification, and would be separated from mere controversies by a hard +and fast line. + +Now seeing that we have the rare happiness of living in a republic, +where every one's judgment is free and unshackled, where each may +worship God as his conscience dictates, and where freedom is esteemed +before all things dear and precious, I have believed that I should be +undertaking no ungrateful or unprofitable task, in demonstrating that +not only can such freedom be granted without prejudice to the public +peace, but also, that without such freedom, piety cannot flourish nor +the public peace be secure.... + +I have often wondered that persons who make a boast of professing the +Christian religion, namely, love, joy, peace, temperance, and charity to +all men, should quarrel with such rancorous animosity, and display daily +towards one another such bitter hatred, that this, rather than the +virtues they claim, is the readiest criterion of their faith. Matters +have long since come to such a pass that one can only pronounce a man +Christian, Turk, Jew, or Heathen, by his general appearance and attire, +by his frequenting this or that place of worship, or employing the +phraseology of a particular sect--as for manner of life, it is in all +cases the same. Inquiry into the cause of this anomaly leads me +unhesitatingly to ascribe it to the fact, that the ministries of the +Church are regarded by the masses merely as dignities, her offices as +posts of emolument--in short, popular religion may be summed up as a +respect for ecclesiastics. The spread of this misconception inflamed +every worthless fellow with an intense desire to enter holy orders, and +thus the love of diffusing God's religion degenerated into sordid +avarice and ambition. Every church became a theater, where orators, +instead of church teachers harangued, caring not to instruct the people, +but striving to attract admiration, to bring opponents to public scorn, +and to preach only novelties and paradoxes, such as would tickle the +ears of their congregation. This state of things necessarily stirred up +an amount of controversy, envy, and hatred, which no lapse of time could +appease; so that we can scarcely wonder that of the old religion nothing +survives but its outward forms (even these, in the mouth of the +multitude, seem rather adulation than adoration of the Deity), and that +faith has become a mere compound of credulity and prejudices--aye, +prejudices too, which degrade man from rational being to beast, which +completely stifle the power of judgment between true and false, which +seem, in fact, carefully fostered for the purpose of extinguishing the +last spark of reason! Piety, great God! and religion are become a tissue +of ridiculous mysteries; men, who flatly despise reason, who reject and +turn away from understanding as naturally corrupt, these, I say, these +of all men, are thought, Oh lie most horrible! to possess light from on +High. Verily, if they had but one spark of light from on High, they +would not insolently rave, but would learn to worship God more wisely, +and would be as marked among their fellows for mercy as they now are for +malice; if they were concerned for their opponents' souls, instead of +for their own reputations, they would no longer fiercely persecute, but +rather be filled with pity and compassion. + +Furthermore, if any Divine light were in them, it would appear from +their doctrine. I grant that they are never tired of professing their +wonder at the profound mysteries of Holy Writ; still I cannot discover +that they teach anything but speculation of Platonists and +Aristotelians, to which (in order to save their credit of Christianity) +they have made Holy Writ conform; not content to rave with the Greeks +themselves, they want to make the prophets rave also; showing +conclusively, that never even in sleep have they caught a glimpse of +Scripture's Divine nature. The very vehemence of their admiration for +the mysteries plainly attests, that their belief in the Bible is a +formal assent rather than a living faith: and the fact is made still +more apparent by their laying down beforehand, as a foundation for the +study and true interpretation of Scripture, the principle that it is in +every passage true and divine. Such a doctrine should be reached only +after strict scrutiny and thorough comprehension of the Sacred Books +(which would teach it much better, for they stand in need of no human +fictions), and not be set up on the threshold, as it were, of inquiry. + +As I pondered over the facts that the light of reason is not only +despised, but by many even execrated as a source of impiety, that human +commentaries are accepted as divine records, and that credulity is +extolled as faith; as I marked the fierce controversies of philosophers +raging in Church and State, the source of bitter hatred and dissension, +the ready instruments of sedition and other ills innumerable, I +determined to examine the Bible afresh in a careful, impartial, and +unfettered spirit, making no assumptions concerning it, and attributing +to it no doctrines, which I do not find clearly therein set down.... + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] From the Preface to the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +OF THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE[2] + + +When people declare, as all are ready to do, that the Bible is the Word +of God teaching men true blessedness and the way of salvation, they +evidently do not mean what they say; for the masses take no pains at all +to live according to Scripture, and we see most people endeavoring to +hawk about their own commentaries as the word of God, and giving their +best efforts, under the guise of religion, to compelling others to think +as they do: we generally see, I say, theologians anxious to learn how to +wring their inventions and sayings out of the sacred text, and to +fortify them with Divine authority. Such persons never display less +scruple and more zeal than when they are interpreting Scripture or the +mind of the Holy Ghost; if we ever see them perturbed, it is not that +they fear to attribute some error to the Holy Spirit, and to stray from +the right path, but that they are afraid to be convicted of error by +others, and thus to overthrow and bring into contempt their own +authority. But if men really believe what they verbally testify of +Scripture, they would adopt quite a different plan of life: their minds +would not be agitated by so many contentions, nor so many hatreds, and +they would cease to be excited by such a blind and rash passion for +interpreting the sacred writings, and excogitating novelties in +religion. On the contrary, they would not dare to adopt, as the teaching +of Scripture, anything which they could not plainly deduce therefrom: +lastly, these sacrilegious persons who have dared, in several passages, +to interpolate the Bible, would have shrunk from so great a crime, and +would have stayed their sacrilegious hands. + +Ambition and unscrupulousness have waxed so powerful, that religion is +thought to consist, not so much in respecting the writings of the Holy +Ghost, as in defending human commentaries, so that religion is no longer +identified with charity, but with spreading discord and propagating +insensate hatred disguised under the name of zeal for the Lord, and +eager ardor. + +To these evils we must add superstition, which teaches men to despise +reason and Nature, and only to admire and venerate that which is +repugnant to both: whence it is not wonderful that for the sake of +increasing the admiration and veneration felt for Scripture, men strive +to explain it so as to make it appear to contradict, as far as possible, +both one and the other: thus they dream that most profound mysteries lie +hid in the Bible, and weary themselves out in the investigation of these +absurdities, to the neglect of what is useful. Every result of their +diseased imagination they attribute to the Holy Ghost, and strive to +defend with the utmost zeal and passion; for it is an observed fact that +men employ their reason to defend conclusions arrived at by reason, but +conclusions arrived at by the passions are defended by the passions. + +If we would separate ourselves from the crowd and escape from +theological prejudices, instead of rashly accepting human commentaries +for Divine documents, we must consider the true method of interpreting +Scripture and dwell upon it at some length: for if we remain in +ignorance of this we cannot know, certainly, what the Bible and the Holy +Spirit wish to teach. + +I may sum up the matter by saying that the method of interpreting +Scripture does not widely differ from the method of interpreting +Nature--in fact, it is almost the same. For as the interpretation of +Nature consists in the examination of the history of Nature, and +therefrom deducing definitions of natural phenomena on certain fixed +axioms, so Scriptural interpretation proceeds by the examination of +Scripture, and inferring the intention of its authors as a legitimate +conclusion from its fundamental principles. By working in this manner +every one will always advance without danger of error--that is, if they +admit no principles for interpreting Scripture, and discussing its +contents save such as they find in Scripture itself--and will be able +with equal security to discuss what surpasses our understanding, and +what is known by the natural light of reason. + +In order to make clear that such a method is not only correct, but is +also the only one advisable, and that it agrees with that employed in +interpreting Nature, I must remark that Scripture very often treats of +matters which cannot be deduced from principles known to reason: for it +is chiefly made up of narratives and revelation: the narratives +generally contain miracles--that is, [as we shall show in a later +chapter], relations of extraordinary natural occurrences adapted to the +opinions and judgment of the historians who recorded them: the +revelations also were adapted to the opinions of the prophets and in +themselves surpassed human comprehension. Therefore the knowledge of all +these--that is, of nearly the whole contents of Scripture, must be +sought from Scripture alone, even as the knowledge of nature is sought +from nature. As for the moral doctrines which are also contained in the +Bible, they may be demonstrated from received axioms, but we cannot +prove in the same manner that Scripture intended to teach them, this can +only be learned from Scripture itself. + +If we would bear unprejudiced witness to the Divine origin of Scripture, +we must prove solely on its own authority that it teaches true moral +doctrines, for by such means alone can its Divine origin be +demonstrated: we have shown that the certitude of the prophets depended +chiefly on their having minds turned towards what is just and good, +therefore we ought to have proof of their possessing this quality before +we repose faith in them. From miracles God's divinity cannot be proved +[as I shall show], for miracles could be wrought by false prophets. +Wherefore the Divine origin of Scripture must consist solely in its +teaching true virtue. But we must come to our conclusion simply on +Scriptural grounds, for if we were unable to do so we could not, unless +strongly prejudiced, accept the Bible and bear witness to its Divine +origin. + +Our knowledge of Scripture must then be looked for in Scripture only. + +Lastly, Scripture does not give us definitions of things any more than +nature does: therefore, such definitions must be sought in the latter +case from the diverse workings of nature; in the former case, from the +various narratives about the given subject which occur in the Bible. + +The universal rule, then, in interpreting Scripture is to accept nothing +as an authoritative Scriptural statement which we do not perceive very +clearly when we examine it in the light of its history. What I mean by +its history, and what should be the chief points elucidated, I will now +explain. + +The history of a Scriptural statement comprises-- + +I. The nature and properties of the language in which the books of the +Bible were written, and in which their authors were accustomed to speak. +We shall thus be able to investigate every expression by comparison with +common conversational usages. + +Now all the writers both of the Old Testament and the New were Hebrews: +therefore, a knowledge of the Hebrew language is before all things +necessary, not only for the comprehension of the Old Testament, which +was written in that tongue, but also of the New: for although the latter +was published in other languages, yet its characteristics are Hebrew. + +II. An analysis of each book and arrangement of its contents under +heads; so that we may have at hand the various texts which treat of a +given subject. Lastly, a note of all the passages which are ambiguous or +obscure, or which seem mutually contradictory. + +I call passages clear or obscure according as their meaning is inferred +easily or with difficulty in relation to the context, not according as +their truth is perceived easily or the reverse by reason. We are at +work not on the truth of passages, but solely on their meaning. We must +take especial care, when we are in search of the meaning of a text, not +to be led away by our reason in so far as it is founded on principles of +natural knowledge (to say nothing of prejudices): in order not to +confound the meaning of a passage with its truth, we must examine it +solely by means of the signification of the words, or by a reason +acknowledging no foundation but Scripture. + +I will illustrate my meaning by an example. The words of Moses, "God is +a fire" and "God is jealous," are perfectly clear so long as we regard +merely the signification of the words, and I therefore reckon them among +the clear passages, though in relation to reason and truth they are most +obscure: still, although the literal meaning is repugnant to the natural +light of reason, nevertheless, if it cannot be clearly overruled on +grounds and principles derived from its Scriptural "history," it, that +is, the literal meaning, must be the one retained: and contrariwise if +these passages literally interpreted are found to clash with principles +derived from Scripture, though such literal interpretation were in +absolute harmony with reason, they must be interpreted in a different +manner, _i.e._, metaphorically. + +If we would know whether Moses believed God to be a fire or not, we must +on no account decide the question on grounds of the reasonableness or +the reverse of such an opinion, but must judge solely by the other +opinions of Moses which are on record. + +In the present instance, as Moses says in several other passages that +God has no likeness to any visible thing, whether in heaven or in earth, +or in the water, either all such passages must be taken metaphorically, +or else the one before us must be so explained. However, as we should +depart as little as possible from the literal sense, we must first ask +whether this text, God is a fire, admits of any but the literal +meaning--that is, whether the word fire ever means anything besides +ordinary natural fire. If no such second meaning can be found, the text +must be taken literally, however repugnant to reason it may be: and all +the other passages, though in complete accordance with reason, must be +brought into harmony with it. If the verbal expressions would not admit +of being thus harmonized, we should have to set them down as +irreconcilable, and suspend our judgment concerning them. However, as we +find the name fire applied to anger and jealousy (see Job xxxi. 12) we +can thus easily reconcile the words of Moses, and legitimately conclude +that the two propositions God is a fire, and God is jealous, are in +meaning identical. + +Further, as Moses clearly teaches that God is jealous, and nowhere +states that God is without passions or emotions, we must evidently infer +that Moses held this doctrine himself, or at any rate, that he wished to +teach it, nor must we refrain because such a belief seems contrary to +reason: for as we have shown, we cannot wrest the meaning of texts to +suit the dictates of our reason, or our preconceived opinions. The whole +knowledge of the Bible must be sought solely from itself. + +III. Lastly, such a history should relate the environment of all the +prophetic books extant; that is, the life, the conduct, and the studies +of the author of each book, who he was, what was the occasion, and the +epoch of his writing, whom did he write for, and in what language. +Further, it should inquire into the fate of each book: how it was first +received, into whose hands it fell, how many different versions there +were of it, by whose advice was it received into the Bible, and, lastly, +how all the books now universally accepted as sacred, were united into a +single whole. + +All such information should, as I have said, be contained in the +"history" of Scripture. For, in order to know what statements are set +forth as laws, and what as moral precepts, it is important to be +acquainted with the life, the conduct, and the pursuits of their author: +moreover, it becomes easier to explain a man's writings in proportion as +we have more intimate knowledge of his genius and temperament. + +Further, that we may not confound precepts which are eternal with those +which served only a temporary purpose, or were only meant for a few, we +should know what was the occasion, the time, the age, in which each book +was written, and to what nation it was addressed. + +Lastly, we should have knowledge on the other points I have mentioned, +in order to be sure, in addition to the authenticity of the work, that +it has not been tampered with by sacrilegious hands, or whether errors +can have crept in, and, if so, whether they have been corrected by men +sufficiently skilled and worthy of credence. All these things should be +known, that we may not be led away by blind impulse to accept whatever +is thrust on our notice, instead of only that which is sure and +indisputable. + +Now, when we are in possession of this history of Scripture, and have +finally decided that we assert nothing as prophetic doctrine which does +not directly follow from such history, or which is not clearly deducible +from it, then, I say, it will be time to gird ourselves for the task of +investigating the mind of the prophets and of the Holy Spirit. But in +this further arguing, also, we shall require a method very like that +employed in interpreting Nature from her history. As in the examination +of natural phenomena we try first to investigate what is most universal +and common to all Nature--such, for instance, as motion and rest, and +their laws and rules, which Nature always observes, and through which +she continually works--and then we proceed to what is less universal; +so, too, in the history of Scripture, we seek first for that which is +most universal, and serves for the basis and foundation of all +Scripture, a doctrine, in fact, that is commended by all the prophets as +eternal and most profitable to all men. For example, that God is one, +and that He is omnipotent, and He alone should be worshiped, that He has +a care for all men, and that He especially loves those who adore Him and +love their neighbor as themselves, etc. These and similar doctrines, I +repeat, Scripture everywhere so clearly and expressly teaches, that no +one was ever in doubt of its meaning concerning them. + +The nature of God, His manner of regarding and providing for things, and +similar doctrines, Scripture nowhere teaches professedly, and as eternal +doctrine; on the contrary, we have shown that the prophets themselves +did not agree on the subject; therefore, we must not lay down any +doctrine as Scriptural on such subjects, though it may appear perfectly +clear on rational grounds. + +From a proper knowledge of this universal doctrine of Scripture, we must +then proceed to other doctrines less universal, but which, nevertheless, +have regard to the general conduct of life, and flow from the universal +doctrine like rivulets from a source: such are all particular external +manifestations of true virtue, which need a given occasion for their +exercise; whatever is obscure or ambiguous on such points in Scripture +must be explained and defined by its universal doctrine; with regard to +contradictory instances, we must observe the occasion and the time in +which they were written. For instance, when Christ says, "Blessed are +they that mourn, for they shall be comforted," we do not know, from the +actual passage, what sort of mourners are meant; as, however, Christ +afterwards teaches that we should have care for nothing, save only for +the kingdom of God and His righteousness, which is commended as the +highest good (see Matt. vi. 33), it follows that by mourners He only +meant those who mourn for the kingdom of God and righteousness neglected +by man: for this would be the only cause of mourning to those who love +nothing but the Divine kingdom and justice, and who evidently despise +the gifts of fortune. So, too, when Christ says: "But if a man strike +you on the right cheek, turn to him the left also," and the words which +follow. + +If He had given such a command, as a lawgiver, to judges, He would +thereby have abrogated the law of Moses, but this He expressly says He +did not do (Matt. v. 17). Wherefore we must consider who was the +speaker, what was the occasion, and to whom were the words addressed. +Now Christ said that He did not ordain laws as a legislator, but +inculcated precepts as a teacher: inasmuch as He did not aim at +correcting outward actions so much as the frame of mind. Further, these +words were spoken to men who were oppressed, who lived in a corrupt +commonwealth on the brink of ruin, where justice was utterly neglected. +The very doctrine inculcated here by Christ just before the destruction +of the city was also taught by Jeremiah before the first destruction of +Jerusalem, that is, in similar circumstances, as we see from +Lamentations iii. 25-30. + +Now as such teaching was only set forth by the prophets in times of +oppression, and was even then never laid down as a law; and as, on the +other hand, Moses (who did not write in times of oppression, but--mark +this--strove to found a well-ordered commonwealth), while condemning +envy and hatred of one's neighbor, yet ordained that an eye should be +given for an eye, it follows most clearly from these purely Scriptural +grounds that this precept of Christ and Jeremiah concerning submission +to injuries was only valid in places where justice is neglected, and in +a time of oppression, but does not hold good in a well-ordered state. + +In a well-ordered state where justice is administered every one is +bound, if he would be accounted just, to demand penalties before the +judge (see Lev. v. 1), not for the sake of vengeance (Lev. xix. 17, 18), +but in order to defend justice and his country's laws, and to prevent +the wicked rejoicing in their wickedness. All this is plainly in +accordance with reason. I might cite many other examples in the same +manner, but I think the foregoing are sufficient to explain my meaning +and the utility of this method, and this is all my present purpose. +Hitherto we have only shown how to investigate those passages of +Scripture which treat of practical conduct, and which, therefore, are +more easily examined, for on such subjects there was never really any +controversy among the writers of the Bible. + +The purely speculative passages cannot be so easily traced to their real +meaning: the way becomes narrower, for as the prophets differed in +matters speculative among themselves, and the narratives are in great +measure adapted to the prejudices of each age, we must not, on any +account, infer the intention of one prophet from clearer passages in the +writings of another; nor must we so explain his meaning, unless it is +perfectly plain that the two prophets were at one in the matter. + +How we are to arrive at the intention of the prophets in such cases I +will briefly explain. Here, too, we must begin from the most universal +proposition, inquiring first from the most clear Scriptural statements +what is the nature of prophecy or revelation, and wherein does it +consist; then we must proceed to miracles, and so on to whatever is most +general till we come to the opinions of a particular prophet, and, at +last, to the meaning of a particular revelation, prophecy, history, or +miracle. We have already pointed out that great caution is necessary not +to confound the mind of a prophet or historian with the mind of the Holy +Spirit and the truth of the matter; therefore I need not dwell further +on the subject. I would, however, here remark concerning the meaning of +revelation, that the present method only teaches us what the prophets +really saw or heard, not what they desired to signify or represent by +symbols. The latter may be guessed at but cannot be inferred with +certainty from Scriptural premises. + +We have thus shown the plan for interpreting Scripture, and have, at the +same time, demonstrated that it is the one and surest way of +investigating its true meaning. I am willing indeed to admit that those +persons (if any such there be) would be more absolutely certainly right, +who have received either a trustworthy tradition or an assurance from +the prophets themselves, such as is claimed by the Pharisees; or who +have a pontiff gifted with infallibility in the interpretation of +Scripture, such as the Roman Catholics boast. But as we can never be +perfectly sure, either of such a tradition or of the authority of the +pontiff, we cannot found any certain conclusion on either: the one is +denied by the oldest sect of Christians, the other by the oldest sect of +Jews. Indeed, if we consider the series of years (to mention no other +point) accepted by the Pharisees from their Rabbis, during which time +they say they have handed down the tradition from Moses, we shall find +that it is not correct, as I show elsewhere. Therefore such a tradition +should be received with extreme suspicion; and although, according to +our method, we are bound to consider as uncorrupted the tradition of the +Jews, namely, the meaning of the Hebrew words which we received from +them, we may accept the latter while retaining our doubts about the +former. + +No one has ever been able to change the meaning of a word in ordinary +use, though many have changed the meaning of a particular sentence. Such +a proceeding would be most difficult; for whoever attempted to change +the meaning of a word, would be compelled, at the same time, to explain +all the authors who employed it, each according to his temperament and +intention, or else, with consummate cunning, to falsify them. + +Further, the masses and the learned alike preserve language, but it is +only the learned who preserve the meaning of particular sentences and +books: thus, we may easily imagine that the learned having a very rare +book in their power, might change or corrupt the meaning of a sentence +in it, but they could not alter the signification of the words; +moreover, if anyone wanted to change the meaning of a common word he +would not be able to keep up the change among posterity, or in common +parlance or writing. + +For these and such-like reasons we may readily conclude that it would +never enter into the mind of anyone to corrupt a language, though the +intention of a writer may often have been falsified by changing his +phrases or interpreting them amiss. As then our method (based on the +principle that the knowledge of Scripture must be sought from itself +alone) is the sole true one, we must evidently renounce any knowledge +which it cannot furnish for the complete understanding of Scripture.... + +If we read a book which contains incredible or impossible narratives, or +is written in a very obscure style, and if we know nothing of its +author, nor of the time or occasion of its being written, we shall +vainly endeavor to gain any certain knowledge of its true meaning. For +being in ignorance on these points we cannot possibly know the aim or +intended aim of the author; if we are fully informed, we so order our +thoughts as not to be in any way prejudiced either in ascribing to the +author or him for whom the author wrote either more or less than his +meaning, and we only take into consideration what the author may have +had in his mind, or what the time and occasion demanded. I think this +must be tolerably evident to all. + +It often happens that in different books we read histories in themselves +similar, but which we judge very differently, according to the opinions +we have formed of the authors. I remember once to have read in some book +that a man named Orlando Furioso used to drive a kind of winged monster +through the air, fly over any countries he liked, kill unaided vast +numbers of men and giants, and such like fancies, which from the point +of view of reason are obviously absurd. A very similar story I read in +Ovid of Perseus, and also in the books of Judges and Kings of Samson, +who alone and unarmed killed thousands of men, and of Elijah, who flew +through the air, and at last went up to heaven in a chariot of fire, +with horses of fire. All these stories are obviously alike, but we judge +them very differently. The first only sought to amuse, the second had a +political object, the third a religious object. We gather this simply +from the opinions we had previously formed of the authors. Thus it is +evidently necessary to know something of the authors of writings which +are obscure or unintelligible, if we would interpret their meaning; and +for the same reason, in order to choose the proper reading from among a +great variety, we ought to have information as to the versions in which +the differences are found, and as to the possibility of other readings +having been discovered by persons of greater authority.... + +... The difficulties in this method of interpreting Scripture from its +own history, I conceive to be so great that I do not hesitate to say +that the true meaning of Scripture is in many places inexplicable, or at +best mere subject for guess work; but I must again point out, on the +other hand, that such difficulties only arise when we endeavor to follow +the meaning of a prophet in matters which cannot be perceived, but only +imagined, not in things, whereof the understanding can give a clear and +distinct idea, and which are conceivable through themselves: matters +which by their nature are easily perceived cannot be expressed so +obscurely as to be unintelligible; as the proverb says, "a word is +enough to the wise." Euclid, who only wrote of matters very simple and +easily understood, can easily be comprehended by any one in any +language; we can follow his intention perfectly, and be certain of his +true meaning, without having a thorough knowledge of the language in +which he wrote; in fact, a quite rudimentary acquaintance is sufficient. +We need make no researches concerning the life, the pursuits, or the +habits of the author; nor need we inquire in what language, nor when he +wrote, nor the vicissitudes of his book, nor its various readings, nor +how, nor by whose advice it has been received. + +What we here say of Euclid might equally be said of any book which +treats of things by their nature perceptible: thus we conclude that we +can easily follow the intention of Scripture in moral questions, from +the history we possess of it, and we can be sure of its true meaning. + +The precepts of true piety are expressed in very ordinary language, and +are equally simple and easily understood. Further, as true salvation and +blessedness consist in a true assent of the soul--and we truly assent +only to what we clearly understand--it is most plain that we can follow +with certainty the intention of Scripture in matters relating to +salvation and necessary to blessedness; therefore, we need not be much +troubled about what remains: such matters, inasmuch as we generally +cannot grasp them with our reason and understanding, are more curious +than profitable. + +I think I have now set forth the true method of Scriptural +interpretation, and have sufficiently explained my own opinion thereon. +Besides, I do not doubt that every one will see that such a method only +requires the aid of natural reason. The nature and efficacy of the +natural reason consists in deducing and proving the unknown from the +known, or in carrying premises to their legitimate conclusions; and +these are the very processes which our method desiderates. Though we +must admit that it does not suffice to explain everything in the Bible, +such imperfection does not spring from its own nature, but from the +fact that the path which it teaches us, as the true one, has never been +tended or trodden by men, and has thus, by the lapse of time, become +very difficult, and almost impassable, as, indeed, I have shown in the +difficulties I draw attention to. + +There only remains to examine the opinions of those who differ from me. + +The first which comes under our notice is, that the light of nature has +no power to interpret Scripture, but that a supernatural faculty is +required for the task. What is meant by this supernatural faculty I will +leave to its propounders to explain. Personally, I can only suppose that +they have adopted a very obscure way of stating their complete +uncertainty about the true meaning of Scripture. If we look at their +interpretations, they contain nothing supernatural, at least nothing but +the merest conjectures. + +Let them be placed side by side with the interpretations of those who +frankly confess that they have no faculty beyond their natural ones; we +shall see that the two are just alike--both human, both long pondered +over, both laboriously invented. To say that the natural reason is +insufficient for such results is plainly untrue, firstly, for the +reasons above stated, namely, that the difficulty of interpreting +Scripture arises from no defect in human reason, but simply from the +carelessness (not to say malice) of men who neglected the history of the +Bible while there were still materials for inquiry; secondly, from the +fact (admitted, I think, by all) that the supernatural faculty is a +Divine gift granted only to the faithful. But the prophets and apostles +did not preach to the faithful only, but chiefly to the unfaithful and +wicked. Such persons, therefore, were able to understand the intention +of the prophets and apostles, otherwise the prophets and apostles would +have seemed to be preaching to little boys and infants, not to men +endowed with reason. Moses, too, would have given his laws in vain, if +they could only be comprehended by the faithful, who need no law. +Indeed, those who demand supernatural faculties for comprehending the +meaning of the prophets and apostles seem truly lacking in natural +faculties, so that we should hardly suppose such persons the possessors +of a Divine supernatural gift. + +The opinion of Maimonides was widely different. He asserted that each +passage in Scripture admits of various, nay, contrary meanings; but that +we could never be certain of any particular one till we knew that the +passage, as we interpreted it, contained nothing contrary or repugnant +to reason. If the literal meaning clashes with reason, though the +passage seems in itself perfectly clear, it must be interpreted in some +metaphorical sense. This doctrine he lays down very plainly in Chap. +xxv. part ii. of his book _More Nebuchim_ for he says: "Know that we +shrink not from affirming that the world hath existed from eternity, +because of what Scripture saith concerning the world's creation. For the +texts which teach that the world was created are not more in number than +those which teach that God hath a body; neither are the approaches in +this matter of the world's creation closed, or even made hard to us: so +that we should not be able to explain what is written, as we did when we +showed that God hath no body, nay, peradventure, we could explain and +make fast the doctrine of the world's eternity more easily than we did +away with the doctrines that God hath a beatified body. Yet two things +hinder me from doing as I have said, and believing that the world is +eternal. As it hath been clearly shown that God hath not a body, we must +perforce explain all those passages whereof the literal sense agreeth +not with the demonstration, for sure it is that they can be so +explained. But the eternity of the world hath not been so demonstrated, +therefore it is not necessary to do violence to Scripture in support of +some common opinion, whereof we might, at the bidding of reason, embrace +the contrary." + +Such are the words of Maimonides, and they are evidently sufficient to +establish our point: for if he had been convinced by reason that the +world is eternal, he would not have hesitated to twist and explain away +the words of Scripture till he made them appear to teach this doctrine. +He would have felt quite sure that Scripture, though everywhere plainly +denying the eternity of the world, really intends to teach it. So that, +however clear the meaning of Scripture may be, he would not feel certain +of having grasped it, so long as he remained doubtful of the truth of +what was written. For we are in doubt whether a thing is in conformity +with reason, or contrary thereto, so long as we are uncertain of its +truth, and, consequently, we cannot be sure whether the literal meaning +of a passage be true or false. + +If such a theory as this were sound, I would certainly grant that some +faculty beyond the natural reason is required for interpreting +Scripture. For nearly all things that we find in Scripture cannot be +inferred from known principles of the natural reason, and therefore, we +should be unable to come to any conclusion about their truth, or about +the real meaning and intention of Scripture, but should stand in need of +some further assistance. + +Further, the truth of this theory would involve that the masses, having +generally no comprehension of, nor leisure for, detailed proofs, would +be reduced to receiving all their knowledge of Scripture on the +authority and testimony of philosophers, and consequently, would be +compelled to suppose that the interpretations given by philosophers were +infallible. + +Truly this would be a new form of ecclesiastical authority, and a new +sort of priests or pontiffs, more likely to excite men's ridicule than +their veneration. Certainly our method demands a knowledge of Hebrew for +which the masses have no leisure; but no such objection as the foregoing +can be brought against us. For the ordinary Jews or Gentiles, to whom +the prophets and apostles preached and wrote, understood the language, +and consequently, the intention of the prophet or apostle addressing +them; but they did not grasp the intrinsic reason of what was preached, +which, according to Maimonides, would be necessary for an understanding +of it. + +There is nothing, then, in our method which renders it necessary that +the masses should follow the testimony of commentators, for I point to a +set of unlearned people who understood the language of the prophets and +apostles; whereas Maimonides could not point to any such who could +arrive at the prophetic or apostolic meaning through their knowledge of +the causes of things. + +As to the multitude of our own time [we shall show] that whatsoever is +necessary to salvation, though its reasons may be unknown, can easily be +understood in any language, because it is thoroughly ordinary and usual; +it is in such understanding as this that the masses acquiesce, not in +the testimony of commentators; with regard to other questions, the +ignorant and the learned fare alike. + +But let us return to the opinion of Maimonides, and examine it more +closely. In the first place, he supposes that the prophets were in +entire agreement one with another, and that they were consummate +philosophers and theologians; for he would have them to have based their +conclusions on the absolute truth. Further, he supposes that the sense +of Scripture cannot be made plain from Scripture itself, for the truth +of things is not made plain therein (in that it does not prove anything, +nor teach the matters of which it speaks through their definitions and +first causes), therefore, according to Maimonides, the true sense of +Scripture cannot be made plain from itself, and must not be there +sought. + +The falsity of such a doctrine is shown in this very chapter, for we +have shown both by reason and examples that the meaning of Scripture is +only made plain through Scripture itself, and even in questions +deducible from ordinary knowledge should be looked for from no other +source. + +Lastly, such a theory supposes that we may explain the words of +Scripture according to our preconceived opinions, twisting them about, +and reversing or completely changing the literal sense, however plain it +may be. Such license is utterly opposed to the teaching of this and the +[succeeding] chapters, and moreover, will be evident to every one as +rash and excessive. + +But if we grant all this license, what can it effect after all? +Absolutely nothing. Those things which cannot be demonstrated, and which +make up the greater part of Scripture, cannot be examined by reason, and +cannot therefore be explained or interpreted by this rule; whereas, on +the contrary, by following our own method, we can explain many questions +of this nature, and discuss them on a sure basis, as we have already +shown, by reason and example. Those matters which are by their nature +comprehensible we can easily explain, as has been pointed out, simply by +means of the context. + +Therefore, the method of Maimonides is clearly useless: to which we may +add, that it does away with all the certainty which the masses acquire +by candid reading, or which is gained by any other persons in any other +way. In conclusion, then, we dismiss Maimonides' theory as harmful, +useless, and absurd. + +As to the tradition of the Pharisees, we have already shown[3] that it +is not consistent, while the authority of the popes of Rome stands in +need of more credible evidence; the latter, indeed, I reject simply on +this ground, for if the popes could point out to us the meaning of +Scripture as surely as did the high priests of the Jews, I should not be +deterred by the fact that there have been heretic and impious Roman +pontiffs; for among the Hebrew high-priests of old there were also +heretics and impious men who gained the high-priesthood by improper +means, but who, nevertheless, had Scriptural sanction for their supreme +power of interpreting the law. (See Deut. xvii. 11, 12, and xxxviii. 10, +also Malachi ii. 8). + +However, as the popes can show no such sanction, their authority remains +open to very grave doubt, nor should any one be deceived by the example +of the Jewish high-priests and think that the Catholic religion also +stands in need of a pontiff; he should bear in mind that the laws of +Moses being also the ordinary laws of the country, necessarily required +some public authority to insure their observance; for, if everyone were +free to interpret the laws of his country as he pleased, no state could +stand, but would for that very reason be dissolved at once, and public +rights would become private rights. + +With religion the case is widely different. Inasmuch as it consists not +so much in outward actions as in simplicity and truth of character, it +stands outside the sphere of law and public authority. Simplicity and +truth of character are not produced by the constraint of laws, nor by +the authority of the state, no one the whole world over can be forced or +legislated into a state of blessedness; the means required for such a +consummation are faithful and brotherly admonition, sound education, and +above all, free use of the individual judgment. + +Therefore, as the supreme right of free thinking, even on religion, is +in every man's power, and as it is inconceivable that such power could +be alienated, it is also in every man's power to wield the supreme right +and authority of free judgment in this behalf, and to explain and +interpret religion for himself. The only reason for vesting the supreme +authority in the interpretation of law, and judgment on public affairs +in the hands of the magistrates, is that it concerns questions of public +right. Similarly the supreme authority in explaining religion, and in +passing judgment thereon, is lodged with the individual because it +concerns questions of individual right. So far, then, from the authority +of the Hebrew high-priests telling in confirmation of the authority of +the Roman pontiffs to interpret religion, it would rather tend to +establish individual freedom of judgment. Thus in this way, also, we +have shown that our method of interpreting Scripture is the best. For as +the highest power of Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man, the +rule for such interpretation should be nothing but the natural light of +reason which is common to all--not any supernatural light nor any +external authority; moreover, such a rule ought not to be so difficult +that it can only be applied by very skillful philosophers, but should be +adapted to the natural and ordinary faculties and capacity of mankind. +And such I have shown our method to be, for such difficulties as it has +arise from men's carelessness, and are no part of its nature. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[2] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. vii, same title. + +[3] The detailed discussion of this point has been omitted.--ED. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +OF PROPHETS AND PROPHECY[4] + + +I + +Prophecy, or revelation, is sure knowledge revealed by God to man. A +prophet is one who interprets the revelations of God to those who are +unable to attain to sure knowledge of the matters revealed, and +therefore can only apprehend them by simple faith. + +The Hebrew word for prophet is "_nabi_," _i.e._, speaker or interpreter, +but in Scripture its meaning is restricted to interpreter of God, as we +may learn from Exodus vii. 1, where God says to Moses, "See, I have made +thee a god to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet;" +implying that, since in interpreting Moses' words to Pharaoh, Aaron +acted the part of a prophet, Moses would be to Pharaoh as a god, or in +the attitude of a god.... + +Now it is evident, from the definition above given, that prophecy really +includes ordinary knowledge; for the knowledge which we acquire by our +natural faculties depends on our knowledge of God and His eternal laws; +but ordinary knowledge is common to all men as men, and rests on +foundations which all share, whereas the multitude always strains after +rarities and exceptions, and thinks little of the gifts of nature; so +that, when prophecy is talked of, ordinary knowledge is not supposed to +be included. Nevertheless it has as much right as any other to be called +Divine, for God's nature, in so far as we share therein, and God's laws, +dictate it to us; nor does it suffer from that to which we give the +preeminence, except in so far as the latter transcends its limits and +cannot be accounted for by natural laws taken in themselves. In respect +to the certainty it involves, and the source from which it is derived, +_i.e._, God, ordinary knowledge is no whit inferior to prophetic, unless +indeed we believe, or rather dream, that the prophets had human bodies +but superhuman minds, and therefore that their sensations and +consciousness were entirely different from our own. + +But, although ordinary knowledge is Divine, its professors cannot be +called prophets, for they teach what the rest of mankind could perceive +and apprehend, not merely by simple faith, but as surely and honorably +as themselves. + +Seeing then that our mind subjectively contains in itself and partakes +of the nature of God, and solely from this cause is enabled to form +notions explaining natural phenomena and inculcating morality, it +follows that we may rightly assert the nature of the human mind (in so +far as it is thus conceived) to be a primary cause of Divine revelation. +All that we clearly and distinctly understand is dictated to us, as I +have just pointed out, by the idea and nature of God; not indeed through +words, but in a way far more excellent and agreeing perfectly with the +nature of the mind, as all who have enjoyed intellectual certainty will +doubtless attest. Here, however, my chief purpose is to speak of +matters having reference to Scripture, so these few words on the light +of reason will suffice. + +I will now pass on to, and treat more fully, the other ways and means by +which God makes revelations to mankind, both of that which transcends +ordinary knowledge and of that within its scope; for there is no reason +why God should not employ other means to communicate what we know +already by the power of reason. + +Our conclusions on the subject must be drawn solely from Scripture; for +what can we affirm about matters transcending our knowledge except what +is told us by the words or writings of prophets? And since there are, so +far as I know, no prophets now alive, we have no alternative but to read +the books of prophets departed, taking care the while not to reason from +metaphor or to ascribe anything to our authors which they do not +themselves distinctly state. I must further premise that the Jews never +make any mention or account of secondary, or particular causes, but in a +spirit of religion, piety, and what is commonly called godliness, refer +all things directly to the Deity. For instance, if they make money by a +transaction, they say God gave it to them; if they desire anything, they +say God has disposed their hearts towards it; if they think anything, +they say God told them. Hence we must not suppose that everything is +prophecy or revelation which is described in Scripture as told by God to +any one, but only such things as are expressly announced as prophecy or +revelation, or are plainly pointed to as such by the context. + +A perusal of the sacred books will show us that all God's revelations to +the prophets were made through words or appearances, or a combination of +the two. These words and appearances were of two kinds; (1) _real_ when +external to the mind of the prophet who heard or saw them, (2) +_imaginary_ when the imagination of the prophet was in a state which led +him distinctly to suppose that he heard or saw them. + +With a real voice God revealed to Moses the laws which He wished to be +transmitted to the Hebrews, as we may see from Exodus xxv. 22, where God +says, "And there I will meet with thee and I will commune with thee from +the mercy seat which is between the Cherubim." Some sort of real voice +must necessarily have been employed, for Moses found God ready to +commune with him at any time. This is the only instance of a real voice. + +... Some of the Jews believe that the actual words of the Decalogue were +not spoken by God, but that the Israelites heard a noise only, without +any distinct words, and during its continuance apprehend the Ten +Commandments by pure intuition; to this opinion I myself once inclined, +seeing that the words of the Decalogue in Exodus are different from the +words of the Decalogue in Deuteronomy, for the discrepancy seemed to +imply (since God only spoke once) that the Ten Commandments were not +intended to convey the actual words of the Lord, but only His meaning. +However, unless we would do violence to Scripture, we must certainly +admit that the Israelites heard a real voice, for Scripture expressly +says (Deut. v. 4), "God spake with you face to face," _i.e._, as two men +ordinarily interchange ideas through the instrumentality of their two +bodies; and therefore it seems more consonant with Holy Writ to suppose +that God really did create a voice of some kind with which the Decalogue +was revealed.... + +Yet not even thus is all difficulty removed, for it seems scarcely +reasonable to affirm that a created thing, depending on God in the same +manner as other created things, would be able to express or explain the +nature of God either verbally or really by means of its individual +organism: for instance, by declaring in the first person, "I am the Lord +your God." + +Certainly when any one says his mouth, "I understand," we do not +attribute the understanding to the mouth, but to the mind of the +speaker; yet this is because the mouth is the natural organ of a man +speaking, and the hearer, knowing what understanding is, easily +comprehends, by a comparison with himself, that the speaker's mind is +meant; but if we knew nothing of God beyond the mere name and wished to +commune with Him, and be assured of His existence, I fail to see how our +wish would be satisfied by the declaration of a created thing (depending +on God neither more nor less than ourselves), "I am the Lord." If God +contorted the lips of Moses, or, I will not say Moses, but some beast, +till they pronounced the words, "I am the Lord," should we apprehend the +Lord's existence therefrom? + +Scripture seems clearly to point to the belief that God spoke Himself, +having descended from heaven to Mount Sinai for the purpose--and not +only that the Israelites heard Him speaking, but that their chief men +beheld Him (Ex. xxiv.). Further, the laws of Moses which might neither +be added to nor curtailed, and which was set up as a national standard +of right, nowhere prescribed the belief that God is without body, or +even without form or figure, but only ordained that the Jews should +believe in His existence and worship Him alone: it forbade them to +invent or fashion any likeness of the Deity, but this was to insure +purity of service; because, never having seen God, they could not by +means of images recall the likeness of God, but only the likeness of +some created thing which might thus gradually take the place of God as +the object of their adoration. Nevertheless, the Bible clearly implies +that God has a form, and that Moses when he heard God speaking was +permitted to behold it, or at least its hinder parts. + +Doubtless some mystery lurks in this question which we will discuss more +fully below. For the present I will call attention to the passages in +Scripture indicating the means by which God has revealed His laws to +man. + +Revelation may be through figures only (as in 1 Chron. xxii.), where God +displays his anger to David by means of an angel bearing a sword, and +also in the story of Balaam. + +Maimonides and others do indeed maintain that these and every other +instance of angelic apparitions (_e.g._, to Manoah and to Abraham +offering up Isaac) occurred during sleep, for that no one with his eyes +open ever could see an angel, but this is mere nonsense. The sole object +of such commentators seemed to be to extort from Scripture confirmations +of Aristotelian quibbles and their own inventions, a proceeding which I +regard as the acme of absurdity. + +In figures, not real but existing only in the prophet's imagination, God +revealed to Joseph his future lordship, and in words and figures He +revealed to Joshua that He would fight for the Hebrews, causing to +appear an angel, as it were the captain of the Lord's host, bearing a +sword, and by this means communicating verbally. The forsaking of Israel +by Providence was portrayed to Isaiah by a vision of the Lord, the +thrice Holy, sitting on a very lofty throne, and the Hebrews, stained +with the mire of their sins, sunk, as it were, in uncleanness, and thus +as far as possible distant from God. The wretchedness of the people at +the time was thus revealed, while future calamities were foretold in +words. I could cite from Holy Writ many similar examples, but I think +they are sufficiently well known already.... + +We may be able quite to comprehend that God can communicate immediately +with man, for without the intervention of bodily means He communicates +to our minds His essence; still, a man who can by pure intuition +comprehend ideas which are neither contained in nor deducible from the +foundations of our natural knowledge, must necessarily possess a mind +far superior to those of his fellow men, nor do I believe that any have +been so endowed save Christ. To Him the ordinances of God leading men to +salvation were revealed directly without words or visions, so that God +manifested Himself to the Apostles through the mind of Christ as He +formerly did to Moses through the supernatural voice. In this sense the +voice of Christ, like the voice which Moses heard, may be called the +voice of God, and it may be said that the wisdom of God (_i.e._, wisdom +more than human) took upon itself in Christ human nature, and that +Christ was the way of salvation. I must at this juncture declare that +those doctrines which certain churches put forward concerning Christ, I +neither affirm nor deny, for I freely confess that I do not understand +them. What I have just stated I gather from Scripture, where I never +read that God appeared to Christ, or spoke to Christ, but that God was +revealed to the Apostles through Christ; that Christ was the Way of +Life, and that the old law was given through an angel, and not +immediately by God; whence it follows that if Moses spoke with God face +to face as a man speaks with his friend (_i.e._, by means of their two +bodies) Christ communed with God mind to mind.[5] + +Thus we may conclude that no one except Christ received the revelations +of God without the aid of imagination, whether in words or vision. +Therefore the power of prophecy implies not a peculiarly perfect mind, +but a peculiarly vivid imagination.... + +If the Jews were at a loss to understand any phenomenon, or were +ignorant of its cause, they referred it to God. Thus a storm was termed +the chiding of God, thunder and lightning the arrows of God, for it was +thought that God kept the winds confined in caves, His treasuries; thus +differing merely in name from the Greek wind-god Eolus. In like manner +miracles were called works of God, as being especially marvelous; though +in reality, of course, all natural events are the works of God, and take +place solely by His power. The Psalmist calls the miracles in Egypt the +works of God, because the Hebrews found in them a way of safety which +they had not looked for, and therefore especially marveled at. + +As, then, unusual natural phenomena are called works of God, and trees +of unusual size are called trees of God, we cannot wonder that very +strong and tall men, though impious robbers and whoremongers, are in +Genesis called sons of God. + +This reference of things wonderful to God was not peculiar to the Jews. +Pharaoh, on hearing the interpretation of his dream, exclaimed that the +mind of the gods was in Joseph. Nebuchadnezzar told Daniel that he +possessed the mind of the holy gods; so also in Latin anything well made +is often said to be wrought with Divine hands, which is equivalent to +the Hebrew phrase, wrought with the hand of God. + +... We find that the Scriptural phrases, "The Spirit of the Lord was +upon a prophet," "The Lord breathed His Spirit into men," "Men were +filled with the Spirit of God, with the Holy Spirit," etc., are quite +clear to us, and mean that the prophets were endowed with a peculiar and +extraordinary power, and devoted themselves to piety with especial +constancy; that thus they perceived the mind or the thought of God, for +we have shown [elsewhere] that God's spirit signifies in Hebrew God's +mind or thought, and that the law which shows His mind and thought is +called His Spirit; hence that the imagination of the prophets, inasmuch +as through it were revealed the decrees of God, may equally be called +the mind of God, and the prophets be said to have possessed the mind of +God. On our minds also the mind of God and His eternal thoughts are +impressed; but this being the same for all men is less taken into +account, especially by the Hebrews, who claimed a preeminence, and +despised other men and other men's knowledge. + +[Also] the prophets were said to possess the Spirit of God because men +knew not the cause of prophetic knowledge, and in their wonder referred +it with other marvels directly to the Deity, styling it Divine +knowledge. + +We need no longer scruple to affirm that the prophets only perceived +God's revelation by the aid of imagination, that is, by words and +figures either real or imaginary. We find no other means mentioned in +Scripture, and therefore must not invent any. As to the particular law +of Nature by which the communications took place, I confess my +ignorance. I might, indeed, say as others do, that they took place by +the power of God; but this would be mere trifling, and no better than +explaining some unique specimen by a transcendental term. Everything +takes place by the power of God. Nature herself is the power of God +under another name, and our ignorance of the power of God is +co-extensive with our ignorance of Nature. It is absolutely folly, +therefore, to ascribe an event to the power of God when we know not its +natural cause, which is the power of God. + +However, we are not now inquiring into the causes of prophetic +knowledge. We are only attempting, as I have said, to examine the +Scriptural documents, and to draw our conclusions from them as from +ultimate natural facts; the causes of the documents do not concern us. + +As the prophets perceived the revelations of God by the aid of +imagination, they could indisputably perceive much that is beyond the +boundary of the intellect, for many more ideas can be constructed from +words and figures than from the principles and notions on which the +whole fabric of reasoned knowledge is reared. + +Thus we have a clue to the fact that the prophets perceived nearly +everything in parables and allegories, and clothed spiritual truths in +bodily forms, for such is the usual method of imagination. We need no +longer wonder that Scripture and the prophets speak so strangely and +obscurely of God's Spirit or Mind (cf. Numbers xi. 17, 1 Kings xxii, 21, +etc.), that the Lord was seen by Micah as sitting, by Daniel as an old +man clothed in white, by Ezekiel as a fire, that the Holy Spirit +appeared to those with Christ as a descending dove, to the apostles as +fiery tongues, to Paul on his conversion as a great light. All these +expressions are plainly in harmony with the current ideas of God and +spirits. + +Inasmuch as imagination is fleeting and inconstant, we find that the +power of prophecy did not remain with a prophet for long, nor manifest +itself frequently, but was very rare; manifesting itself only in a few +men, and in them not often. + +We must necessarily inquire how the prophets became assured of the truth +of what they perceived by imagination, and not by sure mental laws; but +our investigation must be confined to Scripture, for the subject is one +on which we cannot acquire certain knowledge, and which we cannot +explain by the immediate causes. + + +II + +... As I have said, the prophets were endowed with unusually vivid +imaginations, and not with unusually perfect minds. This conclusion is +amply sustained by Scripture, for we are told that Solomon was the +wisest of men, but had no special faculty of prophecy. Heman, Calcol, +and Dara, though men of great talent, were not prophets, whereas +uneducated countrymen, nay, even women, such as Hagar, Abraham's +handmaid, were thus gifted. Nor is this contrary to ordinary experience +and reason. Men of great imaginative power are less fitted for abstract +reasoning, whereas those who excel in intellect and its use keep their +imagination more restrained and controlled, holding it in subjection, so +to speak, lest it should usurp the place of reason. + +Thus to suppose that knowledge of natural and spiritual phenomena can be +gained from the prophetic books, is an utter mistake, which I shall +endeavor to expose, as I think philosophy, the age, and the question +itself demand. I care not for the girdings of superstition, for +superstition is the bitter enemy of all true knowledge and true +morality. Yes; it has come to this! Men who openly confess that they can +form no idea of God, and only know Him through created things, of which +they know not the causes, can unblushingly accuse philosophers of +Atheism. + +Treating the question methodically, I will show that prophecies varied, +not only according to the imagination and physical temperament of the +prophet, but also according to his particular opinions; and further that +prophecy never rendered the prophet wiser than he was before. But I will +first discuss the assurance of truth which the prophets received, for +this is akin to the subject-matter of the chapter, and will serve to +elucidate somewhat our present point. + +Imagination does not, in its own nature, involve any certainty of truth, +such as is implied in every clear and distinct idea, but requires some +extrinsic reason to assure us of its objective reality: hence prophecy +cannot afford certainty, and the prophets were assured of God's +revelation by some sign, and not by the fact of revelation, as we may +see from Abraham, who, when he had heard the promise of God, demanded a +sign, not because he did not believe in God but because he wished to be +sure that it was God Who made the promise. The fact is still more +evident in the case of Gideon: "Show me," he says to God, "show me a +sign, that I may know that it is Thou that talkest with me." God also +says to Moses: "And let this be a sign that I have sent thee." Hezekiah, +though he had long known Isaiah to be a prophet, none the less demanded +a sign of the cure which he predicted. It is thus quite evident that the +prophets always received some sign to certify them of their prophetic +imaginings; and for this reason Moses bids the Jews (Deut. xviii.) ask +of the prophets a sign, namely, the prediction of some coming event. In +this respect, prophetic knowledge is inferior to natural knowledge, +which needs no sign, and in itself implies certitude. Moreover, +Scripture warrants the statement that the certitude of the prophets was +not mathematical, but moral. Moses lays down the punishment of death for +the prophet who preaches new gods, even though he confirm his doctrine +by signs and wonders (Deut. xiii.); "For," he says, "the Lord also +worketh signs and wonders to try His people." And Jesus Christ warns His +disciples of the same thing (Matt. xxiv. 24). Furthermore, Ezekiel (xiv. +9) plainly states that God sometimes deceives men with false +revelations; and Micaiah bears like witness in the case of the prophets +of Ahab. + +Although these instances go to prove that revelation is open to doubt, +it nevertheless contains, as we have said, a considerable element of +certainty, for God never deceives the good, nor His chosen, but +(according to the ancient proverb and as appears in the history of +Abigail and her speech), God uses the good as instruments of goodness, +and the wicked as means to execute His wrath. This may be seen from the +cases of Micaiah above quoted; for although God had determined to +deceive Ahab, through prophets, He made use of lying prophets; to the +good prophet He revealed the truth, and did not forbid his proclaiming +it. + +Still the certitude of prophecy remains, as I have said, merely moral; +for no one can justify himself before God, nor boast that he is an +instrument for God's goodness. Scripture itself teaches and shows that +God led away David to number the people, though it bears ample witness +to David's piety. + +The whole question of the certitude of prophecy was based on these three +considerations:-- + +1. That the things revealed were imagined very vividly, affecting the +prophets in the same way as things seen when awake; + +2. The presence of a sign; + +3. Lastly and chiefly, that the mind of the prophet was given wholly to +what was right and good. + +Although Scripture does not always make mention of a sign, we must +nevertheless suppose that a sign was always vouchsafed; for Scripture +does not always relate every condition and circumstance (as many have +remarked), but rather takes them for granted. We may, however, admit +that no sign was needed when the prophecy declared nothing that was not +already contained in the law of Moses, because it was confirmed by that +law. For instance, Jeremiah's prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem +was confirmed by the prophecies of other prophets, and by the threats in +the law, and therefore it needed no sign; whereas Hananiah, who, +contrary to all the prophets, foretold the speedy restoration of the +state, stood in need of a sign, or he would have been in doubt as to the +truth of his prophecy, until it was confirmed by facts. "The prophet +which prophesieth of peace, when the word of the prophet shall come to +pass, then shall the prophet be known that the Lord hath truly sent +him." + +As, then, the certitude afforded to the prophet by signs was not +mathematical (_i.e._, did not necessarily follow from the perception of +the thing perceived or seen), but only moral, and as the signs were only +given to convince the prophet, it follows that such signs were given +according to the opinions and capacity of each prophet, so that a sign +which would convince one prophet would fall far short of convincing +another who was imbued with different opinions. Therefore the signs +varied according to the individual prophet. + +So also did the revelation vary, as we have stated, according to +individual disposition and temperament, and according to the opinions +previously held. + +It varied according to disposition, in this way: if a prophet was +cheerful, victories, peace, and events which make men glad, were +revealed to him; in that he was naturally more likely to imagine such +things. If, on the contrary, he was melancholy, wars, massacres, and +calamities were revealed; and so, according as a prophet was merciful, +gentle, quick to anger, or severe, he was more fitted for one kind of +revelation than another. It varied according to the temper of +imagination in this way: if a prophet was cultivated he perceived the +mind of God in a cultivated way, if he was confused he perceived it +confusedly. And so with revelations perceived through visions. If a +prophet was a countryman he saw visions of oxen, cows, and the like; if +he was a soldier, he saw generals and armies; if a courtier, a royal +throne, and so on. + +Lastly, prophecy varied according to the opinions held by the prophets; +for instance, to the Magi, who believed in the follies of astrology, the +birth of Christ was revealed through the vision of a star in the East. +To the augurs of Nebuchadnezzar the destruction of Jerusalem was +revealed through entrails, whereas the king himself inferred it from +oracles and the direction of arrows which he shot into the air. To +prophets who believed that man acts from free choice and by his own +power, God was revealed as standing apart from and ignorant of future +human actions. All of which we will illustrate from Scripture.... + +The style of the prophecy also varied according to the eloquence of the +individual prophet. The prophecies of Ezekiel and Amos are not written +in a cultivated style like those of Isaiah and Nahum, but more rudely. +Any Hebrew scholar who wishes to inquire into this point more closely, +and compares chapters of the different prophets treating of the same +subject, will find that God has no particular style in speaking, but, +according to the learning and capacity of the prophet, is cultivated, +compressed, severe, untutored, prolixed or obscure.... + +Every one has been strangely hasty in affirming that the prophets knew +everything within the scope of human intellect; and, although certain +passages of Scripture plainly affirm that the prophets were in certain +respects ignorant, such persons would rather say that they do not +understand the passages than admit that there was anything which the +prophets did not know; or else they try to wrest the Scriptural words +away from their evident meaning. + +If either of these proceedings is allowable we may as well shut our +Bibles, for vainly shall we attempt to prove anything from them if their +plainest passages may be classed among obscure and impenetrable +mysteries, or if we may put any interpretation on them which we fancy. +For instance, nothing is more clear in the Bible than that Joshua, and +perhaps also the author who wrote his history, thought that the sun +revolves round the earth, and that the earth is fixed, and further that +the sun for a certain period remained still. Many, who will not admit +any movement in the heavenly bodies, explain away the passage till it +seems to mean something quite different; others, who have learned to +philosophize more correctly, and understand that the earth moves while +the sun is still, or at any rate does not revolve round the earth, try +with all their might to wrest this meaning from Scripture, though +plainly nothing of the sort is intended. Such quibblers excite my +wonder! Are we, forsooth, bound to believe that Joshua the soldier was a +learned astronomer? or that a miracle could not be revealed to him, or +that the light of the sun could not remain longer than usual above the +horizon, without his knowing the cause? To me both alternatives appear +ridiculous, and therefore I would rather say that Joshua was ignorant of +the true cause of the lengthened day, and that he and the whole host +with him thought that the sun moved round the earth every day, and that +on that particular occasion it stood still for a time, thus causing the +light to remain longer; and I would say that they did not conjecture +that, from the amount of snow in the air (see Josh. x. 11), the +refraction may have been greater than usual, or that there may have been +some other cause which we will not now inquire into. + +So also the sign of the shadow going back was revealed to Isaiah +according to his understanding; that is, as proceeding from a going +backwards of the sun; for he, too, thought that the sun moves and that +the earth is still; of parhelia he perhaps never even dreamed. We may +arrive at this conclusion without any scruple, for the sign could really +have come to pass, and have been predicted by Isaiah to the king, +without the prophet being aware of the real cause. + +With regard to the building of the Temple by Solomon, if it was really +dictated by God we must maintain the same doctrine: namely, that all the +measurements were revealed according to the opinions and understanding +of the king; for as we are not bound to believe that Solomon was a +mathematician, we may affirm that he was ignorant of the true ratio +between the circumference and the diameter of a circle, and that, like +the generality of workmen, he thought that it was as three to one. But +if it is allowable to declare that we do not understand the passage, in +good sooth I know nothing in the Bible that we can understand; for the +process of building is there narrated simply and as a mere matter of +history. If, again, it is permitted to pretend that the passage has +another meaning, and was written as it is from some reason unknown to +us, this is no less than a complete subversal of the Bible; for every +absurd and evil invention of human perversity could thus, without +detriment to Scriptural authority, be defended and fostered. Our +conclusion is in no wise impious, for though Solomon, Isaiah, Joshua, +etc., were prophets, they were none the less men, and as such not exempt +from human shortcomings. + +According to the understanding of Noah it was revealed to him that God +was about to destroy the whole human race, for Noah thought that beyond +the limits of Palestine the world was not inhabited. + +Not only in matters of this kind, but in others more important, the +prophets could be, and in fact were, ignorant; for they taught nothing +special about the Divine attributes, but held quite ordinary notions +about God, and to these notions their revelations were adapted, as I +will demonstrate by ample Scriptural testimony; from all which one may +easily see that they were praised and commended, not so much for the +sublimity and eminence of their intellect as for their piety and +faithfulness. + +Adam, the first man to whom God was revealed, did not know that He is +omnipotent and omniscient; for he hid himself from Him, and attempted to +make excuses for his fault before God, as though he had had to do with +a man; therefore to him also was God revealed according to his +understanding--that is, as being unaware of his situation or his sin, +for Adam heard, or seemed to hear, the Lord walking in the garden, +calling him and asking him where he was; and then, on seeing his +shamefacedness, asking him whether he had eaten of the forbidden fruit. +Adam evidently only knew the Deity as the Creator of all things. To Cain +also God was revealed, according to his understanding, as ignorant of +human affairs, nor was a higher conception of the Deity required for +repentance of his sin. + +To Laban the Lord revealed Himself as the God of Abraham, because Laban +believed that each nation had its own special divinity (see Gen. xxxi. +29). Abraham also knew not that God is omnipresent, and has +foreknowledge of all things; for when he heard the sentence against the +inhabitants of Sodom, he prayed that the Lord should not execute it till +He had ascertained whether they all merited such punishment; for he said +(see Gen. xviii. 24), "Peradventure there be fifty righteous within the +city," and in accordance with this belief God was revealed to him; as +Abraham imagined, He spake thus: "I will go down now, and see whether +they have done altogether according to the cry of it which is come unto +Me; and if not I will know." Further, the Divine testimony concerning +Abraham asserts nothing but that he was obedient, and that he "commanded +his household after him that they should keep the way of the Lord" (Gen. +xviii. 19); it does not state that he held sublime conceptions of the +Deity. + +Moses, also, was not sufficiently aware that God is omniscient, and +directs human actions by His sole decree, for although God himself says +that the Israelites should hearken to Him, Moses still considered the +matter doubtful and repeated, "But if they will not believe me, nor +hearken unto my voice." To him in like manner God was revealed as taking +no part in, and as being ignorant of, future human actions: the Lord +gave him two signs and said, "And it shall come to pass that if they +will not believe thee, neither hearken to the voice of the first sign, +that they will believe the voice of the latter sign; but if not, thou +shalt take of the water of the river," etc. Indeed, if any one considers +without prejudice the recorded opinions of Moses, he will plainly see +that Moses conceived the Deity as a Being Who has always existed, does +exist, and always will exist, and for this cause he calls Him by the +name Jehovah, which in Hebrew signifies these three phases of existence: +as to His nature, Moses only taught that He is merciful, gracious, and +exceeding jealous, as appears from many passages in the Pentateuch. +Lastly, he believed and taught that this Being was so different from all +other beings, that He could not be expressed by the image of any visible +thing; also, that He could not be looked upon, and that not so much from +inherent impossibility as from human infirmity; further, that by reason +of His power He was without equal and unique. Moses admitted, indeed, +that there were beings (doubtless by the plan and command of the Lord) +who acted as God's vicegerents--that is, beings to whom God had given +the right, authority, and power to direct nations, and to provide and +care for them; but he taught that this Being Whom they were bound to +obey was the highest and Supreme God, (or to use the Hebrew phrase) God +of gods, and thus in the song (Exod. xv. 11) he exclaims, "Who is like +unto Thee, O Lord, among the gods?" and Jethro says (Exod. xviii. 11), +"Now I know that the Lord is greater than all gods." That is to say, "I +am at length compelled to admit to Moses that Jehovah is greater than +all gods, and that His power is unrivalled." We must remain in doubt +whether Moses thought that these beings who acted as God's vicegerents +were created by Him, for he has stated nothing, so far as we know, about +their creation and origin. He further taught that this Being had brought +the visible world into order from Chaos, and had given Nature her germs, +and therefore that He possesses supreme right and power over all things; +further, that by reason of this supreme right and power He had chosen +for Himself alone the Hebrew nation and a certain strip of territory, +and had handed over to the care of other gods substituted by Himself the +rest of the nations and territories, and that therefore He was called +the God of Israel and the God of Jerusalem, whereas the other gods were +called the gods of the Gentiles. For this reason the Jews believed that +the strip of territory which God had chosen for Himself, demanded a +Divine worship quite apart and different from the worship which obtained +elsewhere, and that the Lord would not suffer the worship of other gods +adapted to other countries. Thus they thought that the people whom the +king of Assyria had brought into Judaea were torn in pieces by lions +because they knew not the worship of the National Divinity (2 Kings +xvii. 25).... + +If we now examine the revelations to Moses, we shall find that they were +accommodated to these opinions; as he believed that the Divine Nature +was subject to the conditions of mercy, graciousness, etc., so God was +revealed to him in accordance with his idea and under these attributes +(see Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7, and the second commandment). Further it is +related (Ex. xxxiii. 18) that Moses asked of God that he might behold +Him, but as Moses (as we have said) had formed no mental image of God, +and God (as I have shown) only revealed Himself to the prophets in +accordance with the disposition of their imagination, He did not reveal +Himself in any form. This, I repeat, was because the imagination of +Moses was unsuitable, for other prophets bear witness that they saw the +Lord; for instance, Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, etc. For this reason God +answered Moses, "Thou canst not see My face;" and inasmuch as Moses +believed that God can be looked upon--that is, that no contradiction of +the Divine nature is therein involved (for otherwise he would never have +preferred his request)--it is added, "For no one shall look on Me and +live," thus giving a reason in accordance with Moses' idea, for it is +not stated that a contradiction of the Divine nature would be involved, +as was really the case, but that the thing would not come to pass +because of human infirmity.... + +Lastly, as Moses believed that God dwelt in the heavens, God was +revealed to him as coming down from heaven on to a mountain, and in +order to talk with the Lord Moses went up the mountain, which he +certainly need not have done if he could have conceived of God as +omnipresent. + +The Israelites knew scarcely anything of God, although He was revealed +to them; and this is abundantly evident from their transferring, a few +days afterwards, the honor and worship due to Him to a calf, which they +believed to be the god who had brought them out of Egypt. In truth, it +is hardly likely that men accustomed to the superstitions of Egypt, +uncultivated and sunk in most abject slavery, should have held any sound +notions about the Deity, or that Moses should have taught them anything +beyond a rule of right living; inculcating it not like a philosopher, as +the result of freedom, but like a lawgiver compelling them to be moral +by legal authority. Thus the rule of right living, the worship and love +of God, was to them rather a bondage than the true liberty, the gift and +grace of the Deity. Moses bid them love God and keep His law, because +they had in the past received benefits from Him (such as the deliverance +from slavery in Egypt), and further terrified them with threats if they +transgressed His commands, holding out many promises of good if they +should observe them; thus treating them as parents treat irrational +children. It is, therefore, certain that they knew not the excellence of +virtue and the true happiness. + +Jonah thought that he was fleeing from the sight of God, which seems to +show that he too held that God had entrusted the care of the nations +outside Judaea to other substituted powers. No one in the whole of the +Old Testament speaks more rationally of God than Solomon, who in fact +surpassed all the men of his time in natural ability. Yet he considered +himself above the law (esteeming it only to have been given for men +without reasonable and intellectual grounds for their actions), and made +small account of the laws concerning kings, which are mainly three: nay, +he openly violated them (in this he did wrong, and acted in a manner +unworthy of a philosopher, by indulging in sensual pleasure), and taught +that all Fortune's favors to mankind are vanity, that humanity has no +nobler gift than wisdom, and no greater punishment than folly. (See +Proverbs xvi. 22, 23.) + +... God adapted revelations to the understanding and opinions of the +prophets, and ... in matters of theory without bearing on charity or +morality, the prophets could be, and, in fact, were ignorant, and held +conflicting opinions. It therefore follows that we must by no means go +to the prophets for knowledge, either of natural or of spiritual +phenomena. + +We have determined, then, that we are only bound to believe in the +prophetic writings, the object and substance of the revelation; with +regard to the details, every one may believe or not, as he likes. + +For instance, the revelation to Cain only teaches us that God admonished +him to lead the true life, for such alone is the object and substance of +the revelation, not doctrines concerning free will and philosophy. +Hence, though the freedom of the will is clearly implied in the words of +the admonition, we are at liberty to hold a contrary opinion, since the +words and reasons were adapted to the understanding of Cain. + +So, too, the revelation to Micaiah would only teach that God revealed to +him the true issue of the battle between Ahab and Aram; and this is all +we are bound to believe. Whatever else is contained in the revelation +concerning the true and the false Spirit of God, the army of heaven +standing on the right hand and on the left, and all the other details, +does not affect us at all. Every one may believe as much of it as his +reason allows. + +The reasonings by which the Lord displayed His power to Job (if they +really were a revelation, and the author of the history is narrating, +and not merely, as some suppose, rhetorically adorning his own +conceptions), would come under the same category--that is, they were +adapted to Job's understanding, for the purpose of convincing him, and +are not universal, or for the convincing of all men. + +We can come to no different conclusion with respect to the reasonings of +Christ, by which He convicted the Pharisees of pride and ignorance, and +exhorted His disciples to lead the true life. He adapted them to each +man's opinions and principles. For instance, when He said to the +Pharisees (Matt. xii. 26), "And if Satan cast out devils, his house is +divided against itself, how then shall his kingdom stand?" He only +wished to convince the Pharisees according to their own principles, not +to teach that there are devils, or any kingdom of devils. So, too, when +He said to His disciples (Matt. viii. 10), "See that ye despise not one +of these little ones, for I say unto you that their angels," etc., He +merely desired to warn them against pride and despising any of their +fellows, not to insist on the actual reason given, which was simply +adopted in order to persuade them more easily. + +Lastly, we should say exactly the same of the apostolic signs and +reasonings, but there is no need to go further into the subject. If I +were to enumerate all the passages of Scripture addressed only to +individuals, or to a particular man's understanding, and which cannot, +without great danger to philosophy, be defended as Divine doctrines, I +should go far beyond the brevity at which I aim. Let it suffice then, to +have indicated a few instances of general application, and let the +curious reader consider others by himself. Although the points we have +just raised concerning prophets and prophecy are the only ones which +have any direct bearing on the end in view, namely, the separation of +Philosophy from Theology, still, as I have touched on the general +question, I may here inquire whether the gift of prophecy was peculiar +to the Hebrews, or whether it was common to all nations. I must then +come to a conclusion about the vocation of the Hebrews, all of which I +shall do in the ensuing chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] From the _Tr. Th.-P._ ch. i _Of Prophecy_; and ch. ii of _Of +Prophets_. + +[5] ... I will tell you that I do not think it necessary for salvation +to know Christ according to the flesh; but with regard to the Eternal +Son of God, that is the Eternal Wisdom of God, which has manifested +itself in all things and especially in the human mind, and above all in +Christ Jesus, the case is far otherwise. For without this no one can +come to a state of blessedness, inasmuch as it alone teaches what is +true or false, good or evil. And, inasmuch as this wisdom was made +especially manifest through Jesus Christ, as I have said, His disciples +preached it, in so far as it was revealed to them through Him, and thus +showed that they could rejoice in that spirit of Christ more than the +rest of mankind. The doctrines added by certain churches, such as that +God took upon Himself human nature, I have expressly said that I do not +understand. In fact, to speak the truth, they seem to me no less absurd +than would a statement that a circle had taken upon itself the nature of +a square. This I think will be sufficient explanation of my opinion.... +Whether it will be satisfactory to Christians you will know better than +I. Farewell. _From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Nov. 1675). + +... For the rest, I accept Christ's passion, death, and burial +literally, as you do, but His resurrection I understand allegorically. I +admit, that it is related by the Evangelists in such detail that we +cannot deny that they themselves believed Christ's body to have risen +from the dead and ascended to heaven in order to sit at the right hand +of God, or that they believed that Christ might have been seen by +unbelievers, if they had happened to be at hand, in the places where He +appeared to His disciples; but in these matters they might, without +injury to Gospel teaching, have been deceived, as was the case with +other prophets.... But Paul, to whom Christ afterwards appeared, +rejoices that he knew Christ, not after the flesh, but after the spirit. +_From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Jan. 1676). + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +OF THE VOCATION OF THE HEBREWS[6] + + +Every man's true happiness and blessedness consist solely in the +enjoyment of what is good, not in the pride that he alone is enjoying +it, to the exclusion of others. He who thinks himself the more blessed +because he is enjoying benefits which others are not, or because he is +more blessed or more fortunate than his fellows, is ignorant of true +happiness and blessedness, and the joy which he feels is either childish +or envious and malicious. For instance, a man's true happiness consists +only in wisdom, and the knowledge of the truth, not at all in the fact +that he is wiser than others, or that others lack such knowledge: such +considerations do not increase his wisdom or true happiness. + +Whoever, therefore, rejoices for such reasons, rejoices in another's +misfortune, and is, so far, malicious and bad, knowing neither true +happiness nor the peace of the true life. + +When Scripture, therefore, in exhorting the Hebrews to obey the law, +says that the Lord has chosen them for Himself before other nations +(Deut. x. 15); that He is near them, but not near others (Deut. iv. 7); +that to them alone He has given just laws (Deut. iv. 8); and, lastly, +that He has marked them out before others (Deut. iv. 32); it speaks only +according to the understanding of its hearers, who, as we have shown in +the last chapter, and as Moses also testified (Deut. ix. 6, 7), knew not +true blessedness. For in good sooth they would have been no less blessed +if God had called all men equally to salvation, nor would God have been +less present to them for being equally present to others; their laws +would have been no less just if they had been ordained for all, and they +themselves would have been no less wise. The miracles would have shown +God's power no less by being wrought for other nations also; lastly, the +Hebrews would have been just as much bound to worship God if He had +bestowed all these gifts equally on all men. + +When God tells Solomon (1 Kings iii. 12) that no one shall be as wise as +he in time to come, it seems to be only a manner of expressing +surpassing wisdom; it is little to be believed that God would have +promised Solomon, for his greater happiness, that He would never endow +any one with so much wisdom in time to come; this would in no wise have +increased Solomon's intellect, and the wise king would have given equal +thanks to the Lord if every one had been gifted with the same faculties. + +Still, though we assert that Moses, in the passages of the Pentateuch +just cited, spoke only according to the understanding of the Hebrews, we +have no wish to deny that God ordained the Mosaic law for them alone, +nor that He spoke to them alone, nor that they witnessed marvels beyond +those which happened to any other nation; but we wish to emphasize that +Moses desired to admonish the Hebrews in such a manner and with such +reasonings as would appeal most forcibly to their childish +understanding and constrain them to worship the Deity. Further, we +wished to show that the Hebrews did not surpass other nations in +knowledge, or in piety, but evidently in some attribute different from +these; or (to speak like the Scriptures, according to their +understanding), that the Hebrews were not chosen by God before others +for the sake of the true life and sublime ideas, though they were often +thereto admonished, but with some other object. What that object was I +will duly show. + +But before I begin, I wish in a few words to explain what I mean by the +guidance of God, by the help of God, external and inward, and lastly, +what I understand by fortune. + +By the help of God, I mean the fixed and unchangeable order of nature or +the chain of natural events: for I have said before and shown elsewhere +that the universal laws of nature, according to which all things exist +and are determined, are only another name for the eternal decrees of +God, which always involve eternal truth and necessity. + +So that to say that everything happens according to natural laws, and to +say that everything is ordained by the decree and ordinance of God, is +the same thing. Now since the power in Nature is identical with the +power of God, by which alone all things happen and are determined, it +follows that whatsoever man, as a part of Nature, provides himself with +to aid and preserve his existence, or whatsoever Nature affords him +without his help, is given to him solely by the Divine power, acting +either through human nature or through external circumstance. So +whatever human nature can furnish itself with by its own efforts to +preserve its existence, may be fitly called the inward aid of God, +whereas whatever else accrues to man's profit from outward causes may be +called the external aid of God. + +We can now easily understand what is meant by the election of God. For +since no one can do anything save by the predetermined order of Nature, +that is by God's eternal ordinance and decree, it follows that no one +can choose a plan of life for himself, or accomplish any work save by +God's vocation choosing him for the work or the plan of life in +question, rather than any other. Lastly, by fortune, I mean the +ordinance of God in so far as it directs human life through external and +unexpected means. With these preliminaries I return to my purpose of +discovering the reason why the Hebrews were said to be elected by God +before other nations, and with the demonstration I thus proceed. + +All objects of legitimate desire fall, generally speaking, under one of +these three categories:-- + +1. The knowledge of things through their primary causes. + +2. The government of the passions, or the acquirement of the habit of +virtue. + +3. Secure and healthy life. + +The means which most directly conduce towards the first two of these +ends, and which may be considered their proximate and efficient causes +are contained in human nature itself, so that their acquisition hinges +only on our own power, and on the laws of human nature. It may be +concluded that these gifts are not peculiar to any nation, but have +always been shared by the whole human race, unless, indeed, we would +indulge the dream that Nature formerly created men of different kinds. +But the means which conduce to security and health are chiefly in +external circumstance, and are called the gifts of fortune because they +depend chiefly on objective causes of which we are ignorant; for a fool +may be almost as liable to happiness or unhappiness as a wise man. +Nevertheless, human management and watchfulness can greatly assist +towards living in security and warding off the injuries of our fellow +men, and even of beasts. Reason and experience show no more certain +means of attaining this object than the formation of a society with +fixed laws, the occupation of a strip of territory, and the +concentration of all forces, as it were, into one body, that is the +social body. Now for forming and preserving a society, no ordinary +ability and care is required: that society will be most secure, most +stable, and least liable to reverses, which is founded and directed by +far-seeing and careful men; while, on the other hand, a society +constituted by men without trained skill, depends in a great measure on +fortune, and is less constant. If, in spite of all, such a society lasts +a long time, it is owing to some other directing influence than its own; +if it overcomes great perils and its affairs prosper, it will perforce +marvel at and adore the guiding Spirit of God (in so far, that is, as +God works through hidden means, and not through the nature and mind of +man), for everything happens to it unexpectedly and contrary to +anticipation, it may even be said and thought to be by miracle. Nations, +then, are distinguished from one another in respect to the social +organization and the laws under which they live and are governed; the +Hebrew nation was not chosen by God in respect to its wisdom nor its +tranquillity of mind, but in respect to its social organization and the +good fortune with which it obtained supremacy and kept it so many years. +This is abundantly clear from Scripture. Even a cursory perusal will +show us that the only respects in which the Hebrews surpassed other +nations, are in their successful conduct of matters relating to +government, and in their surmounting great perils solely by God's +external aid; in other ways they were on a par with their fellows, and +God was equally gracious to all. For in respect to intellect (as we have +shown in the last chapter) they held very ordinary ideas about God and +Nature, so that they cannot have been God's chosen in this respect; nor +were they so chosen in respect of virtue and the true life, for here +again they, with the exception of a very few elect, were on an equality +with other nations: therefore their choice and vocation consisted only +in the temporal happiness and advantages of independent rule. In fact, +we do not see that God promised anything beyond this to the patriarchs +or their successors; in the law no other reward is offered for obedience +than the continual happiness of an independent commonwealth and other +goods of this life; while, on the other hand, against contumacy and the +breaking of the covenant is threatened the downfall of the commonwealth +and great hardships. Nor is this to be wondered at; for the ends of +every social organization and commonwealth are (as appears from what we +have said, and as we will explain more at length hereafter) security and +comfort; a commonwealth can only exist by the laws being binding on +all. If all the members of a state wish to disregard the law, by that +very fact they dissolve the state and destroy the commonwealth. Thus, +the only reward which could be promised to the Hebrews for continued +obedience to the law was security and its attendant advantages, while no +surer punishment could be threatened for disobedience, than the ruin of +the state and the evils which generally follow therefrom, in addition to +such further consequences as might accrue to the Jews in particular from +the ruin of their especial state. But there is no need here to go into +this point at more length. I will only add that the laws of the Old +Testament were revealed and ordained to the Jews only, for as God chose +them in respect to the special constitution of their society and +government, they must, of course, have had special laws. Whether God +ordained special laws for other nations also, and revealed Himself to +their lawgivers prophetically, that is, under the attributes by which +the latter were accustomed to imagine Him, I cannot sufficiently +determine. It is evident from Scripture itself that other nations +acquired supremacy and particular laws by the external aid of God. + +If any one wishes to maintain that the Jews ... have been chosen by God +for ever, I will not gainsay him if he will admit that this choice, +whether temporary or eternal, has no regard, in so far as it is peculiar +to the Jews, to aught but dominion and physical advantages (for by such +alone can one nation be distinguished from another), whereas in regard +to intellect and true virtue, every nation is on a par with the rest, +and God has not in these respects chosen one people rather than +another. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[6] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. iii, same title. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +OF THE DIVINE LAW[7] + + +The word law, taken in the abstract means that by which an individual, +or all things, or as many things as belong to a particular species, act +in one and the same fixed and definite manner, which manner depends +either on natural necessity or on human decree. A law which depends on +natural necessity is one which necessarily follows from the nature, or +from the definition of the thing in question; a law which depends on +human decree, and which is more correctly called an ordinance, is one +which men have laid down for themselves and others in order to live more +safely or conveniently, or from some similar reason. + +For example, the law that all bodies impinging on lesser bodies, lose as +much of their own motion as they communicate to the latter is a +universal law of all bodies, and depends on natural necessity. So, too, +the law that a man in remembering one thing, straightway remembers +another either like it, or which he had perceived simultaneously with +it, is a law which necessarily follows from the nature of man. But the +law that men must yield, or be compelled to yield, somewhat of their +natural right, and that they bind themselves to live in a certain way, +depends on human decree. Now, though I freely admit that all things are +predetermined by universal natural laws to exist and operate in a given, +fixed, and definite manner, I still assert that the laws I have just +mentioned depend on human decree. + +(1.) Because man, in so far as he is a part of Nature, constitutes a +part of the power of Nature. Whatever, therefore, follows necessarily +from the necessity of human nature (that is, from Nature herself, in so +far as we conceive of her as acting through man) follows, even though it +be necessarily, from human power. Hence the sanction of such laws may +very well be said to depend on man's decree, for it principally depends +on the power of the human mind; so that the human mind in respect to its +perception of things as true and false, can readily be conceived as +without such laws, but not without necessary law as we have just defined +it. + +(2.) I have stated that these laws depend on human decree because it is +well to define and explain things by their proximate causes. The general +consideration of fate and the concatenation of causes would aid us very +little in forming and arranging our ideas concerning particular +questions. Let us add that as to the actual cooerdination and +concatenation of things, that is how things are ordained and linked +together, we are obviously ignorant; therefore, it is more profitable +for right living, nay, it is necessary for us to consider things as +contingent. So much about law in the abstract. + +Now the word law seems to be only applied to natural phenomena by +analogy, and is commonly taken to signify a command which men can either +obey or neglect, inasmuch as it restrains human nature within certain +originally exceeded limits, and therefore lays down no rule beyond human +strength. Thus it is expedient to define law more particularly as a plan +of life laid down by man for himself or others with a certain object. + +However, as the true object of legislation is only perceived by a few, +and most men are almost incapable of grasping it, though they live under +its conditions, legislators, with a view to exacting general obedience, +have wisely put forward another object, very different from that which +necessarily follows from the nature of law: they promise to the +observers of the law that which the masses chiefly desire, and threaten +its violators with that which they chiefly fear: thus endeavoring to +restrain the masses, as far as may be, like a horse with a curb; whence +it follows that the word law is chiefly applied to the modes of life +enjoined on men by the sway of others; hence those who obey the law are +said to live under it and to be under compulsion. In truth, a man who +renders every one their due because he fears the gallows, acts under the +sway and compulsion of others, and cannot be called just. But a man who +does the same from a knowledge of the true reason for laws and their +necessity, acts from a firm purpose and of his own accord, and is +therefore properly called just. This, I take it, is Paul's meaning when +he says, that those who live under the law cannot be justified through +the law, for justice, as commonly defined, is the constant and perpetual +will to render every man his due. Thus Solomon says (Prov. xxi. 15), +"It is a joy to the just to do judgment," but the wicked fear. + +Law, then, being a plan of living which men have for a certain object +laid down for themselves or others, may, as it seems, be divided into +human law and Divine law. + +By human law I mean a plan of living which serves only to render life +and the state secure. + +By Divine law I mean that which only regards the highest good, in other +words, the true knowledge of God and love. + +I call this law Divine because of the nature of the highest good, which +I will here shortly explain as clearly as I can. + +Inasmuch as the intellect is the best part of our being, it is evident +that we should make every effort to perfect it as far as possible if we +desire to search for what is really profitable to us. For in +intellectual perfection the highest good should consist. Now, since all +our knowledge, and the certainty which removes every doubt, depend +solely on the knowledge of God;--firstly, because without God nothing +can exist or be conceived; secondly, because so long as we have no clear +and distinct idea of God we may remain in universal doubt--it follows +that our highest good and perfection also depend solely on the knowledge +of God. Further, since without God nothing can exist or be conceived, it +is evident that all natural phenomena involve and express the conception +of God as far as their essence and perfection extend, so that we have +greater and more perfect knowledge of God in proportion to our +knowledge of natural phenomena: conversely (since the knowledge of an +effect through its cause is the same thing as the knowledge of a +particular property of a cause) the greater our knowledge of natural +phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge of the essence of God +(which is the cause of all things). So, then, our highest good not only +depends on the knowledge of God, but wholly consists therein; and it +further follows that man is perfect or the reverse in proportion to the +nature and perfection of the object of his special desire; hence the +most perfect and the chief sharer in the highest blessedness is he who +prizes above all else, and takes especial delight in the intellectual +knowledge of God, the most perfect Being. + +Hither, then, our highest good and our highest blessedness aim--namely, +to the knowledge and love of God; therefore the means demanded by this +aim of all human actions, that is, by God in so far as the idea of him +is in us, may be called the commands of God, because they proceed, as it +were, from God Himself, inasmuch as He exists in our minds, and the plan +of life which has regard to this aim may be fitly called the law of God. + +The nature of the means, and the plan of life which this aim demands, +how the foundations of the best states follow its lines, and how men's +life is conducted, are questions pertaining to general ethics. Here I +only proceed to treat of the Divine law in a particular application. + +As the love of God is man's highest happiness and blessedness, and the +ultimate end and aim of all human actions, it follows that he alone +lives by the Divine law who loves God not from fear of punishment, or +from love of any other object, such as sensual pleasure, fame, or the +like; but solely because he has knowledge of God, or is convinced that +the knowledge and love of God is the highest good. The sum and chief +precept, then, of the Divine law is to love God as the highest good, +namely, as we have said, not from fear of any pains and penalties or +from the love of any other object in which we desire to take pleasure. +The idea of God lays down the rule that God is our highest good--in +other words, that the knowledge and love of God is the ultimate aim to +which all our actions should be directed. The worldling cannot +understand these things, they appear foolishness to him, because he has +too meager a knowledge of God, and also because in this highest good he +can discover nothing which he can handle or eat, or which affects the +fleshly appetites wherein he chiefly delights, for it consists solely in +thought and the pure reason. They, on the other hand, who know that they +possess no greater gift than intellect and sound reason, will doubtless +accept what I have said without question. + +We have now explained that wherein the Divine law chiefly consists, and +what are human laws, namely, all those which have a different aim unless +they have been ratified by revelation, for in this respect also things +are referred to God (as we have shown above) and in this sense the law +of Moses, although it was not universal, but entirely adapted to the +disposition and particular preservation of a single people, may yet be +called a law of God or Divine law, inasmuch as we believe that it was +ratified by prophetic insight. If we consider the nature of natural +Divine law as we have just explained it, we shall see + +I. That it is universal or common to all men, for we have deduced it +from universal human nature. + +II. That it does not depend on the truth of any historical narrative +whatsoever, for inasmuch as this natural Divine law is comprehended +solely by the consideration of human nature, it is plain that we can +conceive it as existing as well in Adam as in any other man, as well in +a man living among his fellows as in a man who lives by himself. + +The truth of a historical narrative, however assured, cannot give us the +knowledge nor consequently the love of God, for love of God springs from +knowledge of Him, and knowledge of Him should be derived from general +ideas, in themselves certain and known, so that the truth of a +historical narrative is very far from being a necessary requisite for +our attaining our highest good. + +Still, though the truth of histories cannot give us the knowledge and +love of God, I do not deny that reading them is very useful with a view +to life in the world, for the more we have observed and known of men's +customs and circumstances, which are best revealed by their actions, the +more warily we shall be able to order our lives among them, and so far +as reason dictates to adapt our actions to their dispositions. + +III. We see that this natural Divine law does not demand the performance +of ceremonies--that is, actions in themselves indifferent, which are +called good from the fact of their institution, or actions symbolizing +something profitable for salvation, or (if one prefers this definition) +actions of which the meaning surpasses human understanding. The natural +light of reason does not demand anything which it is itself unable to +supply, but only such as it can very clearly show to be good, or a means +to our blessedness. Such things as are good simply because they have +been commanded or instituted, or as being symbols of something good, are +mere shadows which cannot be reckoned among actions that are the +offspring, as it were, or fruit of a sound mind and of intellect. There +is no need for me to go into this now in more detail. + +IV. Lastly, we see that the highest reward of the Divine law is the law +itself, namely, to know God and to love Him of our free choice, and with +an undivided and fruitful spirit; while its penalty is the absence of +these things, and being in bondage to the flesh--that is, having an +inconstant and wavering spirit. + +These points being noted, I must now inquire + +I. Whether by the natural light of reason we can conceive of God as a +lawgiver or potentate ordaining laws for men? + +II. What is the teaching of Holy Writ concerning this natural light of +reason and natural law? + +III. With what objects were ceremonies formerly instituted? + +IV. Lastly, what is the good gained by knowing the sacred histories and +believing them? + +Of the first two I will treat in this chapter, of the remaining two in +the following one. + +Our conclusion about the first is easily deduced from the nature of +God's will, which is only distinguished from His understanding in +relation to our intellect--that is, the will and the understanding of +God are in reality one and the same, and are only distinguished in +relation to our thoughts which we form concerning God's understanding. +For instance, if we are only looking to the fact that the nature of a +triangle is from eternity contained in the Divine nature as an eternal +verity, we say that God possesses the idea of a triangle, or that He +understands the nature of a triangle; but if afterwards we look to the +fact that the nature of a triangle is thus contained in the Divine +nature, solely by the necessity of the Divine nature, and not by the +necessity of the nature and essence of a triangle--in fact, that the +necessity of a triangle's essence and nature, in so far as they are +conceived of as eternal verities, depends solely on the necessity of the +Divine nature and intellect, we then style God's will or decree, that +which before we styled His intellect. Wherefore we make one and the same +affirmation concerning God when we say that He has from eternity decreed +that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, as when +we say that He has understood it. + +Hence the affirmations and the negations of God always involve necessity +or truth; so that, for example, if God said to Adam that He did not wish +him to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, it would have +involved a contradiction that Adam should have been able to eat of it, +and would therefore have been impossible that he should have so eaten, +for the Divine command would have involved an eternal necessity and +truth. But since Scripture nevertheless narrates that God did give this +command to Adam, and yet that none the less Adam ate of the tree, we +must perforce say that God revealed to Adam the evil which would surely +follow if he should eat of the tree, but did not disclose that such evil +would of necessity come to pass. Thus it was that Adam took the +revelation to be not an eternal and necessary truth, but a law--that is, +an ordinance followed by gain or loss, not depending necessarily on the +nature of the act performed, but solely on the will and absolute power +of some potentate, so that the revelation in question was solely in +relation to Adam, and solely through his lack of knowledge a law, and +God was, as it were, a lawgiver and potentate. From the same cause, +namely, from lack of knowledge, the Decalogue in relation to the Hebrews +was a law, for since they knew not the existence of God as an eternal +truth, they must have taken as a law that which was revealed to them in +the Decalogue, namely, that God exists, and that God only should be +worshiped. But if God had spoken to them without the intervention of any +bodily means, immediately they would have perceived it not as a law but +as an eternal truth. + +What we have said about the Israelites and Adam applies also to all the +prophets who wrote laws in God's name--they did not adequately conceive +God's decrees as eternal truths. For instance, we must say of Moses that +from revelation, from the basis of what was revealed to him, he +perceived the method by which the Israelitish nation could best be +united in a particular territory, and could form a body politic or +state, and further that he perceived the method by which that nation +could best be constrained to obedience; but he did not perceive, nor +was it revealed to him, that this method was absolutely the best, nor +that the obedience of the people in a certain strip of territory would +necessarily imply the end he had in view. Wherefore he perceived these +things not as eternal truths, but as precepts and ordinances, and he +ordained them as laws of God, and thus it came to be that he conceived +God as a ruler, a legislator, a king, as merciful, just, etc., whereas +such qualities are simply attributes of human nature, and utterly alien +from the nature of the Deity. Thus much we may affirm of the prophets +who wrote laws in the name of God; but we must not affirm it of Christ, +for Christ, although He too seems to have written laws in the name of +God, must be taken to have had a clear and adequate perception, for +Christ was not so much a prophet as the mouthpiece of God. For God made +revelations to mankind through Christ as He had before done through +angels--that is, a created voice, visions, etc. It would be as +unreasonable to say that God had accommodated His revelations to the +opinions of Christ as that He had before accommodated them to the +opinions of angels (that is, of a created voice or visions) as matters +to be revealed to the prophets, a wholly absurd hypothesis. Moreover, +Christ was sent to teach not only the Jews but the whole human race, and +therefore it was not enough that His mind should be accommodated to the +opinions of the Jews alone, but also to the opinion and fundamental +teaching common to the whole human race--in other words, to ideas +universal and true. Inasmuch as God revealed Himself to Christ, or to +Christ's mind immediately, and not as to the prophets through words and +symbols, we must needs suppose that Christ perceived truly what was +revealed, in other words, He understood it, for a matter is understood +when it is perceived simply by the mind without words or symbols. + +Christ, then, perceived (truly and adequately) what was revealed, and if +He ever proclaimed such revelations as laws, He did so because of the +ignorance and obstinacy of the people, acting in this respect the part +of God; inasmuch as He accommodated Himself to the comprehension of the +people, and though He spoke somewhat more clearly than the other +prophets, yet He taught what was revealed obscurely, and generally +through parables, especially when He was speaking to those to whom it +was not yet given to understand the kingdom of heaven. (See Matt. xiii. +10, etc.) To those to whom it was given to understand the mysteries of +heaven, He doubtless taught His doctrines as eternal truths and did not +lay them down as laws, thus freeing the minds of His hearers from the +bondage of that law which He further confirmed and established. Paul +apparently points to this more than once (_e.g._, Rom. vii. 6, and iii. +28), though he never himself seems to wish to speak openly, but, to +quote his own words (Rom. iii. 5, and vi. 19), "merely humanly." This he +expressly states when he calls God just, and it was doubtless in +concession to human weakness that he attributes mercy, grace, anger, and +similar qualities to God, adapting his language to the popular mind, or, +as he puts it (1 Cor. iii. 1, 2), to carnal men. In Rom. ix. 18, he +teaches undisguisedly that God's anger and mercy depend not on the +actions of men, but on God's own nature or will; further, that no one +is justified by the works of the law, but only by faith, which he seems +to identify with the full assent of the soul; lastly, that no one is +blessed unless he have in him the mind of Christ (Rom. viii. 9), whereby +he perceives the laws of God as eternal truths. We conclude, therefore, +that God is described as a lawgiver or prince, and styled just, +merciful, etc., merely in concession to popular understanding, and the +imperfection of popular knowledge; that in reality God acts and directs +all things simply by the necessity of His nature and perfection, and +that His decrees and volitions are eternal truths, and always involve +necessity. So much for the first point which I wished to explain and +demonstrate. + +Passing on to the second point, let us search the sacred pages for their +teaching concerning the light of nature and this Divine law. The first +doctrine we find in the history of the first man, where it is narrated +that God commanded Adam not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the +knowledge of good and evil; this seems to mean that God commanded Adam +to do and to seek after righteousness because it was good, not because +the contrary was evil: that is, to seek the good for its own sake, not +from fear of evil. We have seen that he who acts rightly from the true +knowledge and love of right, acts with freedom and constancy, whereas he +who acts from fear of evil, is under the constraint of evil, and acts in +bondage under external control. So that this commandment of God to Adam +comprehends the whole Divine natural law, and absolutely agrees with the +dictates of the light of nature; nay, it would be easy to explain on +this basis the whole history or allegory of the first man. But I prefer +to pass over the subject in silence, because, in the first place, I +cannot be absolutely certain that my explanation would be in accordance +with the intention of the sacred writer; and, secondly, because many do +not admit that this history is an allegory, maintaining it to be a +simple narrative of facts. It will be better, therefore, to adduce other +passages of Scripture, especially such as were written by him, who +speaks with all the strength of his natural understanding, in which he +surpassed all his contemporaries, and whose sayings are accepted by the +people as of equal right with those of the prophets. I mean Solomon, +whose prudence and wisdom are commended in Scripture rather than his +piety and gift of prophecy. He, in his proverbs, calls the human +intellect the well-spring of true life, and declares that misfortune is +made up of folly. "Understanding is a well-spring of life to him that +hath it; but the instruction of fools is folly" (Prov. xvi. 22). Life +being taken to mean the true life (as is evident from Deut. xxx. 19), +the fruit of the understanding consists only in the true life, and its +absence constitutes punishment. All this absolutely agrees with what was +set out in our fourth point concerning natural law. Moreover, our +position that it is the well-spring of life, and that the intellect +alone lays down laws for the wise, is plainly taught by the sage, for he +says (Prov. xiii. 14): "The law of the wise is a fountain of life"--that +is, as we gather from the preceding text, the understanding. In chap. +iii. 13, he expressly teaches that the understanding renders man blessed +and happy, and gives him true peace of mind. "Happy is the man that +findeth wisdom, and the man that getteth understanding," for "Wisdom +gives length of days, and riches and honour; her ways are ways of +pleasantness, and all her paths peace" (xiii. 16, 17). According to +Solomon, therefore, it is only the wise who live in peace and +equanimity, not like the wicked whose minds drift hither and thither, +and (as Isaiah says, chap. lvii. 20) "are like the troubled sea, for +them there is no peace." + +Lastly, we should especially note the passage in chap. ii. of Solomon's +proverbs which most clearly confirms our contention: "If thou criest +after knowledge, and liftest up thy voice for understanding ... then +shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of +God; for the Lord giveth wisdom; out of His mouth cometh knowledge and +understanding." These words clearly enunciate (1), that wisdom or +intellect alone teaches us to fear God wisely--that is, to worship Him +truly; (2), that wisdom and knowledge flow from God's mouth, and that +God bestows on us this gift; this we have already shown in proving that +our understanding and our knowledge depend on, spring from, and are +perfected by the idea or knowledge of God, and nothing else. Solomon +goes on to say in so many words that this knowledge contains and +involves the true principles of ethics and politics: "When wisdom +entereth into thy heart, and knowledge is pleasant to thy soul, +discretion shall preserve thee, understanding shall keep thee, then +shalt thou understand righteousness, and judgment, and equity, yea every +good path." All of which is in obvious agreement with natural knowledge: +for after we have come to the understanding of things, and have tasted +the excellence of knowledge, she teaches us ethics and true virtue. + +Thus the happiness and the peace of him who cultivates his natural +understanding lies, according to Solomon also, not so much under the +dominion of fortune (or God's external aid) as in inward personal virtue +(or God's internal aid), for the latter can to a great extent be +preserved by vigilance, right action, and thought. + +Lastly, we must by no means pass over the passage in Paul's Epistle to +the Romans (i. 20), in which he says: "For the invisible things of God +from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the +things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they +are without excuse, because, when they knew God, they glorified Him not +as God, neither were they thankful." These words clearly show that every +one can by the light of nature clearly understand the goodness and the +eternal divinity of God, and can thence know and deduce what they should +seek for and what avoid; wherefore the Apostle says that they are +without excuse and cannot plead ignorance, as they certainly might if it +were a question of supernatural light and the incarnation, passion, +resurrection of Christ. "Wherefore," he goes on to say (_ib._ 24), "God +gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts;" and +so on, through the rest of the chapter, he describes the vices of +ignorance, and sets them forth as the punishment of ignorance. This +obviously agrees with the verse of Solomon, already quoted, "The +instruction of fools is folly," so that it is easy to understand why +Paul says that the wicked are without excuse. As every man sows so shall +he reap: out of evil, evils necessarily spring, unless they be wisely +counteracted. + +Thus we see that Scripture literally approves of the light of natural +reason and the natural Divine law, and I have fulfilled the promises +made at the beginning of this chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[7] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. iv, same title. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +OF THE CEREMONIAL LAW[8] + + +In the foregoing chapter we have shown that the Divine law, which +renders men truly blessed, and teaches them the true life, is universal +to all men; nay, we have so intimately deduced it from human nature that +it must be esteemed innate, and, as it were, ingrained in the human +mind. + +But with regard to the ceremonial observances which were ordained in the +Old Testament for the Hebrews only, and were so adapted to their state +that they could for the most part only be observed by the society as a +whole and not by each individual, it is evident that they formed no part +of the Divine law, and had nothing to do with blessedness and virtue, +but had reference only to the election of the Hebrews, that is (as I +have shown in Chapter IV), to their temporal bodily happiness and the +tranquillity of their kingdom, and that therefore they were only valid +while that kingdom lasted. If in the Old Testament they are spoken of as +the law of God, it is only because they were founded on revelation, or a +basis of revelation. Still as reason, however sound, has little weight +with ordinary theologians, I will adduce the authority of Scripture for +what I here assert, and will further show, for the sake of greater +clearness, why and how these ceremonials served to establish and +preserve the Jewish kingdom. Isaiah teaches most plainly that the Divine +law in its strict sense signifies that universal law which consists in a +true manner of life, and does not signify ceremonial observances. In +chapter i., verse 10, the prophet calls on his countrymen to hearken to +the Divine law as he delivers it, and first excluding all kinds of +sacrifices and all feasts, he at length sums up the law in these few +words: "Cease to do evil, learn to do well: seek judgment, relieve the +oppressed." Not less striking testimony is given in Psalm xl. 7-9, where +the Psalmist addresses God: "Sacrifice and offering Thou didst not +desire; mine ears hast Thou opened; burnt offering and sin-offering hast +Thou not required; I delight to do Thy will, O my God; yea, Thy law is +within my heart." Here the Psalmist reckons as the law of God only that +which is inscribed in his heart, and excludes ceremonies therefrom, for +the latter are good and inscribed on the heart only from the fact of +their institution, and not because of their intrinsic value. + +Other passages of Scripture testify to the same truth, but these two +will suffice. We may also learn from the Bible that ceremonies are no +aid to blessedness, but only have reference to the temporal prosperity +of the kingdom; for the rewards promised for their observance are merely +temporal advantages and delights, blessedness being reserved for the +universal Divine law. In all the five books commonly attributed to Moses +nothing is promised, as I have said, beyond temporal benefits, such as +honors, fame, victories, riches, enjoyments, and health. Though many +moral precepts besides ceremonies are contained in these five books, +they appear not as moral doctrines universal to all men, but as commands +especially adapted to the understanding and character of the Hebrew +people, and as having reference only to the welfare of the kingdom. For +instance, Moses does not teach the Jews as a prophet not to kill or to +steal, but gives these commandments solely as a lawgiver and judge; he +does not reason out the doctrine, but affixes for its non-observance a +penalty which may and very properly does vary in different nations. So, +too, the command not to commit adultery is given merely with reference +to the welfare of the state; for if the moral doctrine had been +intended, with reference not only to the welfare of the state, but also +to the tranquillity and blessedness of the individual, Moses would have +condemned not merely the outward act, but also the mental acquiescence, +as is done by Christ, Who taught only universal moral precepts, and for +this cause promises a spiritual instead of a temporal reward. Christ, as +I have said, was sent into the world, not to preserve the state nor to +lay down laws, but solely to teach the universal moral law, so we can +easily understand that He wished in no wise to do away with the law of +Moses, inasmuch as He introduced no new laws of His own--His sole care +was to teach moral doctrines, and distinguish them from the laws of the +state; for the Pharisees, in their ignorance, thought that the +observance of the state law and the Mosaic law was the sum total of +morality; whereas such laws merely had reference to the public welfare, +and aimed not so much at instructing the Jews as at keeping them under +constraint. But let us return to our subject, and cite other passages +of Scripture which set forth temporal benefits as rewards for observing +the ceremonial law, and blessedness as reward for the universal law. + +None of the prophets puts the point more clearly than Isaiah. After +condemning hypocrisy, he commends liberty and charity towards oneself +and one's neighbors, and promises as a reward: "Then shall thy light +break forth as the morning, and thy health shall spring forth speedily, +thy righteousness shall go before thee, and the glory of the Lord shall +be thy reward" (chap. lviii. 8). Shortly afterwards he commends the +Sabbath, and for a due observance of it promises: "Then shalt thou +delight thyself in the Lord, and I will cause thee to ride upon the high +places of the earth, and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob thy +father: for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it." Thus the prophet, for +liberty bestowed and charitable works, promises a healthy mind in a +healthy body, and the glory of the Lord even after death; whereas, for +ceremonial exactitude, he only promises security of rule, prosperity, +and temporal happiness. + +... It remains to show why and how the ceremonial observances tended to +preserve and confirm the Hebrew kingdom; and this I can very briefly do +on grounds universally accepted. + +The formation of society serves not only for defensive purposes, but is +also very useful, and, indeed, absolutely necessary, as rendering +possible the division of labor. If men did not render mutual assistance +to each other, no one would have either the skill or the time to provide +for his own sustenance and preservation: for all men are not equally +apt for all work, and no one would be capable of preparing all that he +individually stood in need of. Strength and time, I repeat, would fail, +if every one had in person to plow, to sow, to reap, to grind corn, to +cook, to weave, to stitch and perform the other numerous functions +required to keep life going; to say nothing of the arts and sciences +which are also entirely necessary to the perfection and blessedness of +human nature. We see that peoples living in uncivilized barbarism lead a +wretched and almost animal life, and even they would not be able to +acquire their few rude necessaries without assisting one another to a +certain extent. + +Now if men were so constituted by nature that they desired nothing but +what is designated by true reason, society would obviously have no need +of laws: it would be sufficient to inculcate true moral doctrines; and +men would freely, without hesitation, act in accordance with their true +interests. But human nature is framed in a different fashion: every one, +indeed, seeks his own interest, but does not do so in accordance with +the dictates of sound reason, for most men's ideas of desirability and +usefulness are guided by their fleshly instincts and emotions, which +take no thought beyond the present and the immediate object. Therefore, +no society can exist without government, and force, and laws to restrain +and repress men's desires and immoderate impulses. Still human nature +will not submit to absolute repression. Violent governments, as Seneca +says, never last long; the moderate governments endure. + +So long as men act simply from fear they act contrary to their +inclinations, taking no thought for the advantages or necessity of their +actions, but simply endeavoring to escape punishment or loss of life. +They must needs rejoice in any evil which befalls their ruler, even if +it should involve themselves; and must long for and bring about such +evil by every means in their power. Again, men are especially intolerant +of serving and being ruled by their equals. Lastly, it is exceedingly +difficult to revoke liberties once granted. + +From these considerations it follows, firstly, that authority should +either be vested in the hands of the whole state in common, so that +every one should be bound to serve, and yet not be in subjection to his +equals; or else, if power be in the hands of a few, or one man, that one +man should be something above average humanity, or should strive to get +himself accepted as such. Secondly, laws should in every government be +so arranged that people should be kept in bounds by the hope of some +greatly desired good, rather than by fear, for then every one will do +his duty willingly. + +Lastly, as obedience consists in acting at the bidding of external +authority, it would have no place in a state where the government is +vested in the whole people, and where laws are made by common consent. +In such a society the people would remain free, whether the laws were +added to or diminished, inasmuch as it would not be done on external +authority, but their own free consent. The reverse happens when the +sovereign power is vested in one man, for all act at his bidding; and, +therefore, unless they had been trained from the first to depend on the +words of their ruler, the latter would find it difficult, in case of +need, to abrogate liberties once conceded, and impose new laws. + +From these universal considerations, let us pass on to the kingdom of +the Jews. The Jews when they first came out of Egypt were not bound by +any national laws, and were therefore free to ratify any laws they +liked, or to make new ones, and were at liberty to set up a government +and occupy a territory wherever they chose. However, they were entirely +unfit to frame a wise code of laws and to keep the sovereign power +vested in the community; they were all uncultivated and sunk in a +wretched slavery, therefore the sovereignty was bound to remain vested +in the hands of one man who would rule the rest and keep them under +constraint, make laws and interpret them. This sovereignty was easily +retained by Moses, because he surpassed the rest in virtue and persuaded +the people of the fact, proving it by many testimonies (see Exod. chap. +xiv., last verse, and chap. xix., verse 9). He then, by the Divine +virtue he possessed, made laws and ordained them for the people, taking +the greatest care that they should be obeyed willingly and not through +fear, being specially induced to adopt this course by the obstinate +nature of the Jews, who would not have submitted to be ruled solely by +constraint; and also by the imminence of war, for it is always better to +inspire soldiers with a thirst for glory than to terrify them with +threats; each man will then strive to distinguish himself by valor and +courage, instead of merely trying to escape punishment. Moses, +therefore, by his virtue and the Divine command, introduced a religion +so that the people might do their duty from devotion rather than fear. +Further, he bound them over by benefits, and prophesied many advantages +in the future; nor were his laws very severe, as any one may see for +himself, especially if he remarks the number of circumstances necessary +in order to procure the conviction of an accused person. + +Lastly, in order that the people which could not govern itself should be +entirely dependent on its ruler, he left nothing to the free choice of +individuals (who had hitherto been slaves); the people could do nothing +but remember the law, and follow the ordinances laid down at the good +pleasure of their ruler; they were not allowed to plow, to sow, to reap, +nor even to eat; to clothe themselves, to shave, to rejoice, or, in +fact, to do anything whatever as they liked, but were bound to follow +the directions given in the law; and not only this, but they were +obliged to have marks on their doorposts, on their hands, and between +their eyes to admonish them to perpetual obedience. + +This, then, was the object of the ceremonial law, that men should do +nothing of their own free will, but should always act under external +authority, and should continually confess by their actions and thoughts +that they were not their own masters, but were entirely under the +control of others. + +From all these considerations it is clearer than day that ceremonies +have nothing to do with a state of blessedness, and that those mentioned +in the Old Testament, _i.e._, the whole Mosaic Law, had reference merely +to the government of the Jews, and merely temporal advantages. + +As for the Christian rites, such as baptism, the Lord's Supper, +festivals, public prayers, and any other observances which are, and +always have been, common to all Christendom, if they were instituted by +Christ or His Apostles (which is open to doubt), they were instituted as +external signs of the universal church, and not as having anything to do +with blessedness, or possessing any sanctity in themselves. Therefore, +though such ceremonies were not ordained for the sake of upholding a +government, they were ordained for the preservation of a society, and +accordingly he who lives alone is not bound by them: nay, those who live +in a country where the Christian religion is forbidden, are bound to +abstain from such rites, and can none the less live in a state of +blessedness. We have an example of this in Japan, where the Christian +religion is forbidden, and the Dutch who live there are enjoined by +their East India Company not to practice any outward rites of religion. +I need not cite other examples, though it would be easy to prove my +point from the fundamental principles of the New Testament, and to +adduce many confirmatory instances; but I pass on the more willingly, as +I am anxious to proceed to my next proposition. I will now, therefore, +pass on to what I proposed to treat of in the second part of this +chapter, namely, what persons are bound to believe in the narratives +contained in Scripture, and how far they are so bound. Examining this +question by the aid of natural reason, I will proceed as follows: + +If any one wishes to persuade his fellows for or against anything which +is not self-evident, he must deduce his contention from their +admissions, and convince them either by experience or by ratiocination; +either by appealing to facts of natural experience, or to self-evident +intellectual axioms. Now unless the experience be of such a kind as to +be clearly and distinctly understood, though it may convince a man, it +will not have the same effect on his mind and disperse the clouds of his +doubt so completely as when the doctrine taught is deduced entirely from +intellectual axioms--that is, by the mere power of the understanding and +logical order, and this is especially the case in spiritual matters +which have nothing to do with the senses. + +But the deduction of conclusions from general truths _a priori_, usually +requires a long chain of arguments, and, moreover, very great caution, +acuteness, and self-restraint--qualities which are not often met with; +therefore people prefer to be taught by experience rather than deduce +their conclusion from a few axioms, and set them out in logical order. +Whence it follows, that if any one wishes to teach a doctrine to a whole +nation (not to speak of the whole human race), and to be understood by +all men in every particular, he will seek to support his teaching with +experience, and will endeavor to suit his reasonings and the definitions +of his doctrines as far as possible to the understanding of the common +people, who form the majority of mankind, and he will not set them forth +in logical sequence nor adduce the definitions which serve to establish +them. Otherwise he writes only for the learned--that is, he will be +understood by only a small proportion of the human race. + +All Scripture was written primarily for an entire people, and +secondarily for the whole human race; therefore its contents must +necessarily be adapted as far as possible to the understanding of the +masses, and proved only by examples drawn from experience. We will +explain ourselves more clearly. The chief speculative doctrines taught +in Scripture are the existence of God, or a Being Who made all things, +and Who directs and sustains the world with consummate wisdom; +furthermore, that God takes the greatest thought for men, or such of +them as live piously and honorably, while He punishes, with various +penalties, those who do evil, separating them from the good. All this is +proved in Scripture entirely through experience--that is, through the +narratives there related. No definitions of doctrine are given, but all +the sayings and reasonings are adapted to the understanding of the +masses. Although experience can give no clear knowledge of these things, +nor explain the nature of God, nor how He directs and sustains all +things, it can nevertheless teach and enlighten men sufficiently to +impress obedience and devotion on their minds. + +It is not, I think, sufficiently clear what persons are bound to believe +in the Scripture narratives, and in what degree they are so bound, for +it evidently follows from what has been said that the knowledge of and +belief in them is particularly necessary to the masses whose intellect +is not capable of perceiving things clearly and distinctly. Further, he +who denies them because he does not believe that God exists or takes +thought for men and the world, may be accounted impious; but a man who +is ignorant of them, and nevertheless shows by natural reason that God +exists, as we have said, and has a true plan of life, is altogether +blessed--yes, more blessed than the common herd of believers, because +besides true opinions he possesses also a true and distinct conception. +Lastly, he who is ignorant of the Scriptures and knows nothing by the +light of reason, though he may not be impious or rebellious, is yet less +than human and almost brutal, having none of God's gifts. + +We must here remark that when we say that the knowledge of the sacred +narrative is particularly necessary to the masses, we do not mean the +knowledge of absolutely all the narratives in the Bible, but only of the +principal ones, those which, taken by themselves, plainly display the +doctrine we have just stated, and have most effect over men's minds. + +If all the narratives in Scripture were necessary for the proof of this +doctrine, and if no conclusion could be drawn without the general +consideration of every one of the histories contained in the sacred +writings, truly the conclusion and demonstration of such doctrine would +overtask the understanding and strength not only of the masses, but of +humanity; who is there who could give attention to all the narratives at +once, and to all the circumstances, and all the scraps of doctrine to be +elicited from such a host of diverse histories? I cannot believe that +the men who have left us the Bible as we have it were so abounding in +talent that they attempted setting about such a method of demonstration, +still less can I suppose that we cannot understand Scriptural doctrine +till we have given heed to the quarrels of Isaac, the advice of +Achitophel to Absalom, the civil war between Jews and Israelites, and +other similar chronicles; nor can I think that it was more difficult to +teach such doctrine by means of history to the Jews of early times, the +contemporaries of Moses, than it was to the contemporaries of Esdras. +But more will be said on this point hereafter, we may now only note that +the masses are only bound to know those histories which can most +powerfully dispose their mind to obedience and devotion. However, the +masses are not sufficiently skilled to draw conclusions from what they +read, they take more delight in the actual stories, and in the strange +and unlooked-for issues of events than in the doctrines implied; +therefore, besides reading these narratives, they are always in need of +pastors or church ministers to explain them to their feeble +intelligence. + +But not to wander from our point, let us conclude with what has been our +principal object--namely, that the truth of narratives, be they what +they may, has nothing to do with the Divine law, and serves for nothing +except in respect of doctrine, the sole element which makes one history +better than another. The narratives in the Old and New Testaments +surpass profane history, and differ among themselves in merit simply by +reason of the salutary doctrines which they inculcate. Therefore, if a +man were to read the Scripture narratives believing the whole of them, +but were to give no heed to the doctrines they contain, and make no +amendment in his life, he might employ himself just as profitably in +reading the Koran or the poetic drama, or ordinary chronicles, with the +attention usually given to such writings; on the other hand, if a man is +absolutely ignorant of the Scriptures, and none the less has right +opinions and a true plan of life, he is absolutely blessed and truly +possesses in himself the spirit of Christ. + +The Jews are of a directly contrary way of thinking, for they hold that +true opinions and a true plan of life are of no service in attaining +blessedness, if their possessors have arrived at them by the light of +reason only, and not like the documents prophetically revealed to Moses. +Maimonides ventures openly to make this assertion: "Every man who takes +to heart the seven precepts and diligently follows them, is counted with +the pious among the nations, and an heir of the world to come; that is +to say, if he takes to heart and follows them because God ordained them +in the law, and revealed them to us by Moses, because they were of +aforetime precepts to the sons of Noah: but he who follows them as lead +thereto by reason, is not counted as a dweller among the pious, nor +among the wise of the nations." Such are the words of Maimonides, to +which R. Joseph, the son of Shem Job, adds in his book, which he calls +_Kebod Elohim, or God's Glory_, that although Aristotle (whom he +considers to have written the best ethics and to be above every one +else) has not omitted anything that concerns true ethics, and which he +has adopted in his own book, carefully following the lines laid down, +yet this was not able to suffice for his salvation, inasmuch as he +embraced his doctrines in accordance with the dictates of reason and not +as Divine documents prophetically revealed.[9] + +However, that these are mere figments and are not supported by +Scriptural authority will, I think, be sufficiently evident to the +attentive reader, so that an examination of the theory will be +sufficient for its refutation. It is not my purpose here to refute the +assertions of those who assert that the natural light of reason can +teach nothing of any value concerning the true way of salvation. People +who lay no claims to reason for themselves are not able to prove by +reason this their assertion; and if they hawk about something superior +to reason, it is a mere figment, and far below reason, as their general +method of life sufficiently shows. But there is no need to dwell upon +such persons. I will merely add that we can only judge of a man by his +works. If a man abounds in the fruits of the Spirit, charity, joy, +peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faith, gentleness, chastity, +against which, as Paul says (Gal. v. 22), there is no law, such an one, +whether he be taught by reason only or by the Scripture only, has been +in very truth taught by God, and is altogether blessed. Thus have I said +all that I undertook to say concerning Divine law. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[8] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. v, same title. + +[9] The Jews were not, of course, alone in holding this point of view. +Dante consigned the ancient philosophers--including Aristotle--and even +Vergil to Limbo, agreeing thus in doctrine with Maimonides and R. +Joseph, the son of Shem Job.--ED. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +OF MIRACLES[10] + + +As men are accustomed to call Divine the knowledge which transcends +human understanding, so also do they style Divine, or the work of God, +anything of which the cause is not generally known: for the masses think +that the power and providence of God are most clearly displayed by +events that are extraordinary and contrary to the conception they have +formed of Nature, especially if such events bring them any profit or +convenience: they think that the clearest possible proof of God's +existence is afforded when Nature, as they suppose, breaks her +accustomed order, and consequently they believe that those who explain +or endeavor to understand phenomena or miracles through their natural +causes are doing away with God and His providence. They suppose, +forsooth, that God is inactive so long as Nature works in her accustomed +order, and _vice versa_, that the power of Nature and natural causes are +idle so long as God is acting: thus they imagine two powers distinct one +from the other, the power of God and the power of Nature, though the +latter is in a sense determined by God, or (as most people believe now) +created by Him. What they mean by either, and what they understand by +God and Nature they do not know, except that they imagine the power of +God to be like that of some royal potentate, and Nature's power to +consist in force and energy. + +The masses then style unusual phenomena "miracles," and partly from +piety, partly for the sake of opposing the students of science, prefer +to remain in ignorance of natural causes, and only to hear of those +things which they know least, and consequently admire most. In fact, the +common people can only adore God, and refer all things to His power by +removing natural causes, and conceiving things happening out of their +due course, and only admires the power of God when the power of Nature +is conceived of as in subjection to it. + +This idea seems to have taken its rise among the early Jews who saw the +Gentiles round them worshiping visible gods, such as the sun, the moon, +the earth, water, air, etc., and in order to inspire the conviction that +such divinities were weak and inconstant, or changeable, told how they +themselves were under the sway of an invisible God, and narrated their +miracles, trying further to show that the God whom they worshiped +arranged the whole of nature for their sole benefit. This idea was so +pleasing to humanity that men go on to this day imagining miracles, so +that they may believe themselves God's favorites and the final cause for +which God created and directs all things. + +What pretensions will not people in their folly advance! They have no +single sound idea concerning either God or Nature, they confound God's +decrees with human decrees, they conceive Nature as so limited that +they believe man to be its chief part! I have spent enough space in +setting forth these common ideas and prejudices concerning Nature and +miracles, but in order to afford a regular demonstration I will show: + +1. That Nature cannot be contravened, but that she preserves a fixed and +immutable order, and at the same time I will explain what is meant by a +miracle. + +2. That God's nature and existence, and consequently His providence, +cannot be known from miracles, but that they can all be much better +perceived from the fixed and immutable order of Nature. + +3. That by the decrees and volitions, and consequently the providence of +God, Scripture (as I will prove by Scriptural examples) means nothing +but Nature's order following necessarily from her eternal laws. + +4. Lastly, I will treat of the method of interpreting Scriptural +miracles, and the chief points to be noted concerning the narratives of +them. + +Such are the principal subjects which will be discussed in this chapter, +and which will serve, I think, not a little to further the object of +this treatise. + +Our first point is easily proved from what we showed in Chapter V about +Divine law--namely, that all that God wishes or determines involves +eternal necessity and truth, for we demonstrated that God's +understanding is identical with His will, and that it is the same thing +to say that God wills a thing, as to say that He understands it; hence, +as it follows necessarily from the Divine nature and perfection that God +understands a thing as it is, it follows no less necessarily that He +wills it as it is. Now, as nothing is necessarily true save only by +Divine decree, it is plain that the universal laws of Nature are decrees +of God following from the necessity and perfection of the Divine nature. +Hence, any event happening in nature which contravened Nature's +universal laws, would necessarily also contravene the Divine decree, +nature, and understanding; or if any one asserted that God acts in +contravention to the laws of Nature, he, _ipso facto_, would be +compelled to assert that God acted against His own nature--an evident +absurdity. One might easily show from the same premises that the power +and efficiency of Nature are in themselves the Divine power and +efficiency, and that the Divine power is the very essence of God, but +this I gladly pass over for the present. + +Nothing, then, comes to pass in Nature[11] in contravention to her +universal laws, nay, everything agrees with them and follows from them, +for whatsoever comes to pass, comes to pass by the will and eternal +decree of God; that is, as we have just pointed out, whatever comes to +pass, comes to pass according to laws and rules which involve eternal +necessity and truth; Nature, therefore, always observes laws and rules +which involve eternal necessity and truth, although they may not all be +known to us, and therefore she keeps a fixed and immutable order. Nor is +there any sound reason for limiting the power and efficacy of Nature, +and asserting that her laws are fit for certain purposes, but not for +all; for as the efficacy and power of Nature are the very efficacy and +power of God, and as the laws and rules of Nature are the decrees of +God, it is in every way to be believed that the power of Nature is +infinite, and that her laws are broad enough to embrace everything +conceived by the Divine intellect. The only alternative is to assert +that God has created Nature so weak, and has ordained for her laws so +barren, that He is repeatedly compelled to come afresh to her aid if He +wishes that she should be preserved, and that things should happen as He +desires: a conclusion, in my opinion, very far removed from reason. +Further, as nothing happens in Nature which does not follow from her +laws, and as her laws embrace everything conceived by the Divine +intellect, and, lastly, as Nature preserves a fixed and immutable order, +it most clearly follows that miracles are only intelligible as in +relation to human opinions, and merely mean events of which the natural +cause cannot be explained by a reference to any ordinary occurrence, +either by us, or at any rate by the writer and narrator of the miracle. + +We may, in fact, say that a miracle is an event of which the causes +cannot be explained by the natural reason through a reference to +ascertained workings of Nature; but since miracles were wrought +according to the understanding of the masses, who are wholly ignorant of +the workings of Nature, it is certain that the ancients took for a +miracle whatever they could not explain by the method adopted by the +unlearned in such cases, namely, an appeal to the memory, a recalling of +something similar, which is ordinarily regarded without wonder; for most +people think they sufficiently understand a thing when they have ceased +to wonder at it. The ancients, then, and indeed most men up to the +present day, had no other criterion for a miracle; hence we cannot doubt +that many things are narrated in Scripture as miracles of which the +causes could easily be explained by reference to ascertained workings of +Nature. We have hinted as much in Chapter III, in speaking of the sun +standing still in the time of Joshua, and going backwards in the time of +Ahaz; but we shall soon have more to say on the subject when we come to +treat of the interpretation of miracles later on in this chapter. + +It is now time to pass on to the second point, and show that we cannot +gain an understanding of God's essence, existence, or providence by +means of miracles, but that these truths are much better perceived +through the fixed and immutable order of Nature. + +I thus proceed with the demonstration. As God's existence is not +self-evident, it must necessarily be inferred from ideas so firmly and +incontrovertibly true that no power can be postulated or conceived +sufficient to impugn them. They ought certainly so to appear to us when +we infer from them God's existence, if we wish to place our conclusion +beyond the reach of doubt; for if we could conceive that such ideas +could be impugned by any power whatsoever, we should doubt of their +truth, we should doubt of our conclusion, namely, of God's existence, +and should never be able to be certain of anything. Further, we know +that nothing either agrees with or is contrary to Nature, unless it +agrees with or is contrary to these primary ideas; wherefore if we would +conceive that anything could be done in Nature by any power whatsoever +which would be contrary to the laws of Nature, it would also be +contrary to our primary ideas, and we should have either to reject it as +absurd, or else to cast doubt (as just shown) on our primary ideas, and +consequently on the existence of God, and on everything howsoever +perceived. Therefore miracles, in the sense of events contrary to the +laws of Nature, so far from demonstrating to us the existence of God, +would, on the contrary, lead us to doubt it, where, otherwise, we might +have been absolutely certain of it, as knowing that Nature follows a +fixed and immutable order. + +Let us take miracle as meaning that which cannot be explained through +natural causes. This may be interpreted in two senses: either as that +which has natural causes, but cannot be examined by the human intellect; +or as that which has no cause save God and God's will. But as all things +which come to pass through natural causes come to pass also solely +through the will and power of God, it comes to this: that a miracle, +whether it has natural causes or not, is a result which cannot be +explained by its cause, that is a phenomenon which surpasses human +understanding; but from such a phenomenon, and certainly from a result +surpassing our understanding, we can gain no knowledge. For whatsoever +we understand clearly and distinctly should be plain to us either in +itself or by means of something else clearly and distinctly understood; +wherefore from a miracle or a phenomenon which we cannot understand we +can gain no knowledge of God's essence, or existence, or indeed anything +about God or nature; whereas when we know that all things are ordained +and ratified by God, that the operations of Nature follow from the +essence of God, and that the laws of Nature are eternal decrees and +volitions of God, we must perforce conclude that our knowledge of God +and of God's will increases in proportion to our knowledge and clear +understanding of Nature, as we see how she depends on her primal cause, +and how she works according to eternal law. Wherefore so far as our +understanding goes, those phenomena which we clearly and distinctly +understand have much better right to be called works of God, and to be +referred to the will of God than those about which we are entirely +ignorant, although they appeal powerfully to the imagination, and compel +men's admiration. + +It is only phenomena that we clearly and distinctly understand which +heighten our knowledge of God and most clearly indicate His will and +decrees. Plainly, they are but triflers who, when they cannot explain a +thing, run back to the will of God; this is, truly, a ridiculous way of +expressing ignorance. Again, even supposing that some conclusion could +be drawn from miracles, we could not possibly infer from them the +existence of God; for a miracle being an event under limitations is the +expression of a fixed and limited power, therefore we could not possibly +infer from an effect of this kind the existence of a cause whose power +is infinite, but at the utmost only of a cause whose power is greater +than that of the said effect. I say at the utmost, for a phenomenon may +be the result of many concurrent causes, and its power may be less than +the power of the sum of such causes, but far greater than that of any +one of them taken individually. On the other hand, the laws of nature, +as we have shown, extend over infinity, and are conceived by us as, +after a fashion, eternal, and Nature works in accordance with them in a +fixed and immutable order; therefore, such laws indicate to us in a +certain degree the infinity, the eternity and the immutability of God. + +We may conclude, then, that we cannot gain knowledge of the existence +and providence of God by means of miracles, but that we can far better +infer them from the fixed and immutable order of Nature. By miracle I +here mean an event which surpasses, or is thought to surpass, human +comprehension: for in so far as it is supposed to destroy or interrupt +the order of Nature or her laws, it not only can give us no knowledge of +God, but, contrariwise, takes away that which we naturally have, and +makes us doubt of God and everything else. + +Neither do I recognize any difference between an event against the laws +of Nature and an event beyond the laws of Nature (that is, according to +some, an event which does not contravene Nature, though she is +inadequate to produce or effect it), for a miracle is wrought in, and +not beyond Nature, though it may be said in itself to be above Nature, +and, therefore, must necessarily interrupt the order of Nature, which +otherwise we conceive of as fixed and unchangeable, according to God's +decrees. If therefore anything should come to pass in Nature which does +not follow from her laws, it would also be in contravention to the order +which God has established in Nature forever through universal natural +laws. It would, therefore, be in contravention to God's nature and laws, +and, consequently belief in it would throw doubt upon everything, and +lead to Atheism. + +I think I have now sufficiently established my second point, so that we +can again conclude that a miracle, whether in contravention to, or +beyond, Nature, is a mere absurdity; and therefore that what is meant in +Scripture by a miracle can only be a work of Nature, which surpasses, or +is believed to surpass, human comprehension. Before passing on to my +third point, I will adduce Scriptural authority for my assertion that +God cannot be known from miracles. Scripture nowhere states the doctrine +openly, but it can readily be inferred from several passages. Firstly, +that in which Moses commands (Deut. xiii.) that a false prophet should +be put to death, even though he work miracles: "If there arise a prophet +among you, and giveth thee a sign or wonder, and the sign or wonder come +to pass, saying, Let us go after other gods ... thou shalt not hearken +unto the voice of that prophet; for the Lord your God proveth you, and +that prophet shall be put to death." From this it clearly follows that +miracles could be wrought even by false prophets; and that, unless men +are honestly endowed with the true knowledge and love of God, they may +be as easily led by miracles to follow false gods as to follow the true +God; for these words are added: "For the Lord your God tempts you, that +He may know whether you love Him with all your heart and with all your +mind." + +Further, the Israelites, from all their miracles, were unable to form a +sound conception of God, as their experience testified: for when they +had persuaded themselves that Moses had departed from among them they +petitioned Aaron to give them visible gods; and the idea of God they had +formed as the result of all their miracles was a calf!... + +I now go on to my _third_ point, and show from Scripture that the +decrees and mandates of God, and consequently His providence, are merely +the order of Nature--that is, when Scripture describes an event as +accomplished by God or God's will, we must understand merely that it was +in accordance with the law and order of Nature, not, as most people +believe, that Nature had for a season ceased to act, or that her order +was temporarily interrupted. But Scripture does not directly teach +matters unconnected with its doctrine, wherefore it has no care to +explain things by their natural causes, nor to expound matters merely +speculative. Wherefore our conclusion must be gathered by inference from +those Scriptural narratives which happen to be written more at length +and circumstantially than usual. Of these I will cite a few. + +In the first book of Samuel (ix. 15, 16), it is related that God +revealed to Samuel that He would send Saul to him, yet God did not send +Saul to Samuel as people are wont to send one man to another. His +"sending" was merely the ordinary course of Nature. Saul was looking for +the asses he had lost, and was meditating a return home without them, +when, at the suggestion of his servant, he went to the Prophet Samuel, +to learn from him where he might find them. From no part of the +narrative does it appear that Saul had any command from God to visit +Samuel beyond this natural motive.... + +But perhaps some one will insist that we find many things in Scripture +which seem in nowise explicable by natural causes, as, for instance, +that the sins of men and their prayers can be the cause of rain and of +the earth's fertility, or that faith can heal the blind, and so on. But +I think I have already made sufficient answer: I have shown that +Scripture does not explain things by their secondary causes, but only +narrates them in the order and the style which has most power to move +men, and especially uneducated men, to devotion; and therefore it speaks +inaccurately of God and of events, seeing that its object is not to +convince the reason, but to attract and lay hold of the imagination. If +the Bible were to describe the destruction of an empire in the style of +political historians, the masses would remain unstirred, whereas the +contrary is the case when it adopts the method of poetic description, +and refers all things immediately to God. When, therefore, the Bible +says that the earth is barren because of men's sins, or that the blind +were healed by faith, we ought to take no more notice than when it says +that God is angry at men's sins, that He is sad, that He repents of the +good He has promised and done; or that on seeing a sign He remembers +something He had promised, and other similar expressions, which are +either thrown out poetically or related according to the opinion and +prejudices of the writer. + +We may then be absolutely certain that every event which is truly +described in Scripture necessarily happened, like everything else, +according to natural laws; and if anything is there set down which can +be proved in set terms to contravene the order of Nature, or not to be +deducible therefrom, we must believe it to have been foisted into the +sacred writings by irreligious hands; for whatsoever is contrary to +Nature is also contrary to reason, and whatsoever is contrary to reason +is absurd, and, _ipso facto_, to be rejected. + +There remain some points concerning the interpretation of miracles to be +noted, or rather to be recapitulated, for most of them have been already +stated. These I proceed to discuss in the fourth division of my subject, +and I am led to do so lest any one should, by wrongly interpreting a +miracle, rashly suspect that he has found something in Scripture +contrary to human reason. + +It is very rare for men to relate an event simply as it happened, +without adding any element of their own judgment. When they hear or see +anything new, they are, unless strictly on their guard, so occupied with +their own preconceived opinions that they perceive something quite +different from the plain facts seen or heard, especially if such facts +surpass the comprehension of the beholder or hearer, and, most of all, +if he is interested in their happening in a given way. + +Thus men relate in chronicles and histories their own opinions rather +than actual events, so that one and the same event is so differently +related by two men of different opinions, that it seems like two +separate occurrences; and, further, it is very easy from historical +chronicles to gather the personal opinions of the historian. + +I could cite many instances in proof of this from the writings both of +natural philosophers and historians, but I will content myself with one +only from Scripture, and leave the reader to judge of the rest. + +In the time of Joshua the Hebrews held the ordinary opinion that the sun +moves with a daily motion, and that the earth remains at rest; to this +preconceived opinion they adapted the miracle which occurred during +their battle with the five kings. They did not simply relate that that +day was longer than usual, but asserted that the sun and moon stood +still, or ceased from their motion--a statement which would be of great +service to them at that time in convincing and proving by experience to +the Gentiles, who worshiped the sun, that the sun was under the control +of another deity who could compel it to change its daily course. Thus, +partly through religious motives, partly through preconceived opinions, +they conceived of and related the occurrence as something quite +different from what really happened. + +Thus in order to interpret the Scriptural miracles and understand from +the narration of them how they really happened, it is necessary to know +the opinions of those who first related them, and have recorded them for +us in writing, and to distinguish such opinions from the actual +impression made upon their senses, otherwise we shall confound opinions +and judgments with the actual miracle as it really occurred; nay, +further, we shall confound actual events with symbolical and imaginary +ones. For many things are narrated in Scripture as real, and were +believed to be real, which were in fact only symbolical and imaginary. +As, for instance, that God came down from heaven (Exod. xix. 28, Deut. +v. 28), and that Mount Sinai smoked because God descended upon it +surrounded with fire; or, again, that Elijah ascended into heaven in a +chariot of fire, with horses of fire; all these things were assuredly +merely symbols adapted to the opinions of those who have handed them +down to us as they were represented to them, namely, as real. All who +have any education know that God has no right hand nor left; that He is +not moved nor at rest, nor in a particular place, but that He is +absolutely infinite and contains in Himself all perfections. + +These things, I repeat, are known to whoever judges of things by the +perception of pure reason, and not according as his imagination is +affected by his outward senses,--following the example of the masses who +imagine a bodily Deity, holding a royal court with a throne on the +convexity of heaven, above the stars, which are believed to be not very +far off from the earth. + +To these and similar opinions very many narrations in Scripture are +adapted, and should not, therefore, be mistaken by philosophers for +realities. + +Lastly, in order to understand, in the case of miracles, what actually +took place, we ought to be familiar with Jewish phrases and metaphors; +any one who did not make sufficient allowance for these would be +continually seeing miracles in Scripture where nothing of the kind is +intended by the writer; he would thus miss the knowledge not only of +what actually happened, but also of the mind of the writers of the +sacred text. For instance, Zachariah, speaking of some future war, says +(chap, xiv., verse 7): "It shall be one day which shall be known to the +Lord, not day nor night; but at even time it shall be light." In these +words he seems to predict a great miracle, yet he only means that the +battle will be doubtful the whole day, that the issue will be known only +to God, but that in the evening they will gain the victory. The +prophets frequently used to predict victories and defeats of the nations +in similar phrases. Thus Isaiah, describing the destruction of Babylon, +says (chap. xiii.): "The stars of heaven, and the constellations +thereof, shall not give their light; the sun shall be darkened in his +going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine." Now I +suppose no one imagines that at the destruction of Babylon these +phenomena actually occurred any more than that which the prophet adds, +"For I will make the heavens to tremble, and remove the earth out of her +place." + +So, too, Isaiah in foretelling to the Jews that they would return from +Babylon to Jerusalem in safety, and would not suffer from thirst on +their journey, says: "And they thirsted not when He led them through the +deserts; He caused the waters to flow out of the rocks for them; He +clave the rocks, and the waters gushed out." These words merely mean +that the Jews, like other people, found springs in the desert, at which +they quenched their thirst; for when the Jews returned to Jerusalem with +the consent of Cyrus, it is admitted that no similar miracles befell +them. + +In this way many occurrences in the Bible are to be regarded merely as +Jewish expressions. There is no need for me to go through them in +detail; but I will call attention generally to the fact that the Jews +employed such phrases not only rhetorically, but also, and indeed +chiefly, from devotional motives. Such is the reason for the +substitution of "bless God" for "curse God" (in 1 Kings xxi. 10, and Job +ii. 9), and for all things being referred to God, whence it appears +that the Bible seems to relate nothing but miracles, even when speaking +of the most ordinary occurrences, as in the examples given above. + +Hence we must believe that when the Bible says that the Lord hardened +Pharaoh's heart, it only means that Pharaoh was obstinate; when it says +that God opened the windows of heaven, it only means that it rained very +hard, and so on. When we reflect on these peculiarities, and also on the +fact that most things are related very shortly, with very little detail, +and almost in abridgments, we shall see that there is hardly anything in +Scripture which can be proved contrary to natural reason, while, on the +other hand, many things which before seemed obscure, will after a little +consideration be understood and easily explained. + +I think I have now very clearly explained all that I proposed to +explain, but before I finish this chapter I would call attention to the +fact that I have adopted a different method in speaking of miracles to +that which I employed in treating of prophecy. Of prophecy I have +asserted nothing which could not be inferred from premises revealed in +Scripture, whereas in this chapter I have deduced my conclusions solely +from the principles ascertained by the natural light of reason. I have +proceeded in this way advisedly, for prophecy, in that it surpasses +human knowledge, is a purely theological question; therefore, I knew +that I could not make any assertions about it, nor learn wherein it +consists, except through deductions from premises that have been +revealed; therefore I was compelled to collate the history of prophecy, +and to draw therefrom certain conclusions which would teach me, in so +far as such teaching is possible, the nature and properties of the +gift. But in the case of miracles, as our inquiry is a question purely +philosophical (namely, whether anything can happen which contravenes, or +does not follow from the laws of Nature), I was not under any such +necessity: I therefore thought it wiser to unravel the difficulty +through premises ascertained and thoroughly known by the natural light +of reason. I say I thought it wiser, for I could also easily have solved +the problem merely from the doctrines and fundamental principles of +Scripture: in order that every one may acknowledge this, I will briefly +show how it could be done. + +Scripture makes the general assertion in several passages that nature's +course is fixed and unchangeable. (In Ps. cxlviii. 6, for instance, and +Jer. xxxi. 35.) The wise man also (in Eccles. i. 10) distinctly teaches +that "there is nothing new under the sun," and (in verses 11, 12), +illustrating the same idea, he adds that although something occasionally +happens which seems new, it is not really new, but "hath been already of +old time, which was before us, whereof there is no remembrance, neither +shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come with those +that come after." Again (in chap. iii. 11), he says, "God hath made +everything beautiful in his time," and immediately afterwards adds, "I +know that whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever; nothing can be put +to it, nor anything taken from it." + +Now all these texts teach most distinctly that Nature preserves a fixed +and unchangeable order and that God in all ages known and unknown has +been the same; further, that the laws of Nature are so perfect that +nothing can be added thereto nor taken therefrom; and, lastly, that +miracles only appear as something new because of man's ignorance. + +Such is the express teaching of Scripture. Nowhere does Scripture assert +that anything happens which contradicts, or cannot follow from the laws +of Nature; and therefore we should not attribute to it such a +doctrine.... + +The conclusion, then, that is most plainly put before us is, that +miracles were natural occurrences, and must therefore be so explained as +to appear neither new (in the words of Solomon) nor contrary to Nature, +but, as far as possible, in complete agreement with ordinary events. +This can easily be done by any one, now that I have set forth the rules +drawn from Scripture. Nevertheless, though I maintain that Scripture +teaches this doctrine, I do not assert that it teaches it as a truth +necessary to salvation, but only that the prophets were in agreement +with ourselves on the point; therefore every one is free to think on the +subject as he likes, according as he thinks it best for himself, and +most likely to conduce to the worship of God and to single-hearted +religion. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[10] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. vi, same title. + +[11] N.B. I do not mean here by "Nature," merely matter and its +modifications, but infinite other things besides matter. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +OF THE DIVINE NATURE + + +_Definitions_ + +I. By cause of itself, I understand that, whose essence involves +existence; or that, whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing. + +II. That thing is called finite in its own kind (_in suo genere_) which +can be limited by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body +is called finite, because we always conceive another which is greater. +So a thought is limited by another thought; but a body is not limited by +a thought, nor a thought by a body. + +III. By substance, I understand that which is in itself and is conceived +through itself; in other words, that, the conception of which does not +need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed. + +IV. By attribute, I understand that which the intellect perceives of +substance, as constituting its essence. + +V. By mode, I understand the affections of substance, or that which is +in another thing through which also it is conceived. + +VI. By God, I understand Being absolutely infinite, that is to say, +substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses +eternal and infinite essence. + +_Explanation._--I say absolutely infinite but not infinite in its own +kind (_in suo genere_); for of whatever is infinite only in its own kind +(_in suo genere_), we can deny infinite attributes; but to the essence +of that which is absolutely infinite pertains whatever expresses essence +and involves no negation. + +VII. That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its +own nature alone, and is determined to action by itself alone. That +thing, on the other hand, is called necessary, or rather compelled, +which by another is determined to existence and action in a fixed and +prescribed manner. + +VIII. By eternity, I understand existence itself, so far as it is +conceived necessarily to follow from the definition alone of the eternal +thing. + +_Explanation._--For such existence, like the essence of the thing, is +conceived as an eternal truth. It cannot therefore be explained by +duration of time, even if the duration be conceived without beginning or +end. + + +_Axioms_ + +I. Everything which is, is either in itself or in another. + +II. That which cannot be conceived through another must be conceived +through itself. + +III. From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows; and, +on the other hand, if no determinate cause be given, it is impossible +that an effect can follow. + +IV. The knowledge (cognitio) of an effect depends upon and involves the +knowledge of the cause. + +V. Those things which have nothing mutually in common with one another +cannot through one another be mutually understood, that is to say, the +conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other. + +VI. A true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea (_cum suo +ideato_). + +VII. The essence of that thing which can be conceived as not existing +does not involve existence. + + +_The Essence of God_ + +God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which +expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists. + +[This can be proved in the following manner]: + +For the existence or non-existence of everything there must be a reason +or cause. For example, if a triangle exists, there must be a reason or +cause why it exists; and if it does not exist, there must be a reason or +cause which hinders its existence or which negates it. But this reason +or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing or lie +outside it. For example, the nature of the thing itself shows the reason +why a square circle does not exist, the reason being that a square +circle involves a contradiction. And the reason, on the other hand, why +substance exists follows from its nature alone, which involves +existence. But the reason why a circle or triangle exists or does not +exist is not drawn from their nature, but from the order of corporeal +nature generally; for from that it must follow either that a triangle +necessarily exists, or that it is impossible for it to exist. But this +is self-evident. Therefore it follows that if there be no cause nor +reason which hinders a thing from existing, it exists necessarily. If +therefore there be no reason nor cause which hinders God from existing, +or which negates His existence, we must conclude absolutely that He +necessarily exists. But if there be such a reason or cause, it must be +either in the nature itself of God or must lie outside it, that is to +say, in another substance of another nature. For if the reason lay in a +substance of the same nature, the existence of God would be by this very +fact admitted. But substance possessing another nature could have +nothing in common with God, and therefore could not give Him existence +nor negate it. Since, therefore, the reason or cause which could negate +the divine existence cannot be outside the divine nature, it will +necessarily, supposing that the divine nature does not exist, be in His +nature itself, which would therefore involve a contradiction. But to +affirm this of the Being absolutely infinite and consummately perfect is +absurd. Therefore neither in God nor outside God is there any cause or +reason which can negate His existence, and therefore God necessarily +exists.... + + +_The Corporeality of God_ + +There are those who imagine God to be like a man, composed of body and +soul and subject to passions; but it is clear enough from what has +already been demonstrated how far off men who believe this are from the +true knowledge of God. But these I dismiss, for all men who have in any +way looked into the divine nature deny that God is corporeal. That He +cannot be so they conclusively prove by showing that by "body" we +understand a certain quantity possessing length, breadth, and depth, +limited by some fixed form; and that to attribute these to God, a being +absolutely infinite, is the greatest absurdity. But yet at the same +time, from other arguments by which they endeavor to confirm their +proof, they clearly show that they remove altogether from the divine +nature substance itself corporeal or extended, affirming that it was +created by God. By what divine power, however, it could have been +created they are altogether ignorant, so that it is clear they do not +understand what they themselves say.... + + B + / + / + / + A + \ + \ + \ + \ + C + +But I will refute my adversaries' arguments, which, taken altogether, +come to this. First, that corporeal substance, in so far as it is +substance, consists, as they suppose, of parts, and therefore they deny +that it can be infinite, and consequently that it can pertain to God. +This they illustrate by many examples, one or two of which I will +adduce. If corporeal substance, they say, be infinite, let us conceive +it to be divided into two parts; each part, therefore, will be either +finite or infinite. If each part be finite, then the infinite is +composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If each part be infinite, +there is then an infinite twice as great as another infinite, which is +also absurd. Again, if infinite quantity be measured by equal parts of a +foot each, it must contain an infinite number of such parts, and +similarly if it be measured by equal parts of an inch each; and +therefore one infinite number will be twelve times greater than another +infinite number. Lastly, if from one point of any infinite quantity it +be imagined that two lines, AB, AC, which at first are at a certain and +determinate distance from one another, be infinitely extended, it is +plain that the distance between B and C will be continually increased, +and at length from being determinate will be indeterminable. Since +therefore these absurdities follow, as they think, from supposing +quantity to be infinite, they conclude that corporeal substance must be +finite, and consequently cannot pertain to the essence of God. A second +argument is assumed from the absolute perfection of God. For God, they +say, since He is a being absolutely perfect, cannot suffer; but +corporeal substance, since it is divisible, can suffer: it follows, +therefore, that it does not pertain to God's essence. + +These are the arguments which I find in authors, by which they endeavor +to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of the divine nature, and +cannot pertain to it.... If any one will rightly consider the matter, he +will see that all these absurdities (supposing that they are all +absurdities, a point which I will now take for granted), from which +these authors attempt to draw the conclusion that substance extended is +finite, do not by any means follow from the supposition that quantity is +infinite, but from the supposition that infinite quantity is measurable, +and that it is made up of finite parts. Therefore, from the absurdities +to which this leads nothing can be concluded, excepting that infinite +quantity is not measurable, and that it cannot be composed of finite +parts. But this is what we [maintain]. + +... The shaft therefore which is aimed at us turns against those who +cast it. If, therefore, from these absurdities any one should attempt to +conclude that substance extended must be finite, he would, forsooth, be +in the position of the man who supposes a circle to have the properties +of a square, and then concludes that it has no center, such that all the +lines drawn from it to the circumference are equal. For corporeal +substance, which cannot be conceived except as infinite, one and +indivisible, is conceived by those against whom I argue to be composed +of finite parts, and to be multiplex and divisible, in order that they +may prove it finite. Just in the same way others, after they have +imagined a line to consist of points, know how to discover many +arguments, by which they show that a line cannot be divided _ad +infinitum_; and indeed it is not less absurd to suppose that corporeal +substance is composed of bodies or parts than to suppose that a body is +composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and that lines, finally, are +composed of points. Every one who knows that clear reason is infallible +ought to admit this, and especially those who deny that a vacuum can +exist. For if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts +could be really distinct, why could not one part be annihilated, the +rest remaining, as before, connected with one another? And why must all +be so fitted together that there can be no vacuum? For of things which +are really distinct the one from the other, one can be and remain in its +own position without the other. Since therefore it is supposed that +there is no vacuum in Nature (about which I will speak at another time), +but that all the parts must be united, so that no vacuum can exist, it +follows that they cannot be really separated; that is to say, that +corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, cannot be divided. + +If, nevertheless, any one should now ask why there is a natural tendency +to consider quantity as capable of division, I reply that quantity is +conceived by us in two ways: either abstractly or superficially; that is +to say, as we imagine it, or else as substance, in which way it is +conceived by the intellect alone. If, therefore, we regard quantity (as +we do very often and easily) as it exists in the imagination, we find it +to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we regard it as +it exists in the intellect, and conceive it in so far as it is +substance, which is very difficult, then, as we have already +sufficiently demonstrated, we find it to be infinite, one, and +indivisible. + +This will be plain enough to all who know how to distinguish between the +imagination and the intellect, and more especially if we remember that +matter is everywhere the same, and that, except in so far as we regard +it as affected in different ways, parts are not distinguished in it; +that is to say, they are distinguished with regard to mode, but not with +regard to reality. For example, we conceive water as being divided, in +so far as it is water, and that its parts are separated from one +another; but in so far as it is corporeal substance we cannot thus +conceive it, for as such it is neither separated nor divided. Moreover, +water, in so far as it is water, is originated and destroyed; but in so +far as it is substance, it is neither originated nor destroyed. + +By this reasoning I think that I have also answered the second argument, +since that too is based upon the assumption that matter, considered as +substance, is divisible and composed of parts. And even if what I have +urged were not true, I do not know why matter should be unworthy of the +divine nature, since outside God no substance can exist from which the +divine nature could suffer. All things, I say, are in God, and +everything which takes place by the laws alone of the infinite nature of +God, and follows (as I shall presently show) from the necessity of His +essence. Therefore in no way whatever can it be asserted that God +suffers from anything, or that substance extended, even if it be +supposed divisible, is unworthy of the divine nature, provided only it +be allowed that it is eternal and infinite.... Whatever is, is in God, +and nothing can either be or be conceived without God. + + +_The Properties of God_ + +I + +From the necessity of the divine nature infinite numbers of things in +infinite ways (that is to say, all things which can be conceived by the +infinite intellect) must follow. + +This proposition must be plain to every one who considers that from the +given definition of anything a number of properties necessarily +following from it (that is to say, following from the essence of the +thing itself) are inferred by the intellect, and just in proportion as +the definition of the thing expresses a greater reality, that is to say, +just in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves a +greater reality, will more properties be inferred. But the divine nature +possesses absolutely infinite attributes (Def. 6), each one of which +expresses infinite essence in its own kind (_in suo genere_), and +therefore, from the necessity of the divine nature, infinite numbers of +things in infinite ways (that is to say, all things which can be +conceived by the infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. Hence it +follows that God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall +under the infinite intellect. It follows, secondly, that God is cause +through Himself, and not through that which is contingent (_per +accidens_). It follows, thirdly, that God is absolutely the first cause. + + +II + +We have just shown that from the necessity, or (which is the same thing) +from the laws only of the divine nature, infinite numbers of things +absolutely follow: and we have demonstrated that nothing can be, nor can +be conceived, without God, but that all things are in God. Therefore, +outside Himself, there can be nothing by which He may be determined or +compelled to act; and therefore He acts from the laws of His own nature +only, and is compelled by no one. + +Hence it follows, firstly, that there is no cause, either external to +God or within Him, which can excite Him to act except the perfection of +His own nature. It follows, secondly, that God alone is a free cause; +for God alone exists from the necessity alone of His own nature and acts +from the necessity alone of His own nature. Therefore He alone is a free +cause. + +There are some who think that God is a free cause because He can, as +they think, bring about that those things which we have said follow from +His nature--that is to say, those things which are in His power--should +not be, or should not be produced by Him. But this is simply saying that +God could bring about that it should not follow from the nature of a +triangle that its three angles should be equal to two right angles, or +that from a given cause an effect should not follow, which is absurd. +But I shall show farther on, without the help of this proposition, that +neither intellect nor will pertain to the nature of God. + +I know indeed that there are many who think themselves able to +demonstrate that intellect of the highest order and freedom of will both +pertain to the nature of God, for they say that they know nothing more +perfect which they can attribute to Him than that which is the chief +perfection in ourselves. But although they conceive God as actually +possessing the highest intellect, they nevertheless do not believe that +He can bring about that all those things should exist which are actually +in His intellect, for they think that by such a supposition they would +destroy His power. If He had created, they say, all things which are in +His intellect, He could have created nothing more, and this, they +believe, does not accord with God's omnipotence; so then they prefer to +consider God as indifferent to all things, and creating nothing except +that which He has decreed to create by a certain absolute will. But I +think that I have shown with sufficient clearness that from the supreme +power of God, or from His infinite nature, infinite things in infinite +ways, that is to say, all things, have necessarily flowed, or +continually follow by the same necessity, in the same way as it follows +from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its +three angles are equal to two right angles. The omnipotence of God has +therefore been actual from eternity, and in the same actuality will +remain to eternity. In this way the omnipotence of God, in my opinion, +is far more firmly established. + +My adversaries, indeed (if I may be permitted to speak plainly), seem to +deny the omnipotence of God, inasmuch as they are forced to admit that +He has in His mind an infinite number of things which might be created, +but which, nevertheless, He will never be able to create, for if He were +to create all things which He has in His mind, He would, according to +them, exhaust His omnipotence and make Himself imperfect. Therefore, in +order to make a perfect God, they are compelled to make Him incapable of +doing all those things to which His power extends, and anything more +absurd than this, or more opposed to God's omnipotence, I do not think +can be imagined. + +Moreover--to say a word, too, here about the intellect and will which we +commonly attribute to God--if intellect and will pertain to His eternal +essence, these attributes cannot be understood in the sense in which men +generally use them, for the intellect and will which could constitute +His essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will, +and could resemble ours in nothing except in name. There could be no +further likeness than that between the celestial constellation of the +Dog and the animal which barks. This I will demonstrate as follows: If +intellect pertains to the divine nature, it cannot, like our intellect, +follow the things which are its object (as many suppose), nor can it be +simultaneous in its nature with them, since God is prior to all things +in causality; but, on the contrary, the truth and formal essence of +things is what it is, because as such it exists objectively in God's +intellect. Therefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived +to constitute His essence, is in truth the cause of things, both of +their essence and of their existence,--a truth which seems to have been +understood by those who have maintained that God's intellect, will, and +power are one and the same thing. + +Since, therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, both of +their essence and of their existence (as we have already shown), it must +necessarily differ from them with regard both to its essence and +existence; for an effect differs from its cause precisely in that which +it has from its cause. For example, one man is the cause of the +existence but not of the essence of another, for the essence is an +eternal truth; and therefore with regard to essence the two men may +exactly resemble one another, but with regard to existence they must +differ. Consequently if the existence of one should perish, that of the +other will not therefore perish; but if the essence of one could be +destroyed and become false, the essence of the other would be likewise +destroyed. Therefore a thing which is the cause both of the essence and +of the existence of any effect must differ from that effect both with +regard to its essence and with regard to its existence. But the +intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and existence of our +intellect; therefore the intellect of God, so far as it is conceived to +constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both with +regard to its essence and its existence, nor can it coincide with our +intellect in anything except the name, which is what we essayed to +prove. The same demonstration may be applied to the will, as any one may +easily see for himself. + + +III + +All things which are, are in God and must be conceived through Him and +therefore He is the cause of the things which are in Himself. Moreover, +outside God there can be no substance, that is to say (Def. 3), outside +Him nothing can exist which is in itself. God, therefore, is the +immanent, but not the transitive cause of all things. + + +_The Necessity of All Things_ + +In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined +from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain +manner.... That which has not been thus determined by God cannot +determine itself to action. A thing which has been determined by God to +any action cannot render itself indeterminate. + +... All things have necessarily followed from the given nature of God +and from the necessity of His nature have been determined to existence +and action in a certain manner. If therefore things could have been of +another nature, or could have been determined in another manner to +action, so that the order of nature would have been different, the +nature of God might then be different to that which it now is, and hence +that different nature would necessarily exist, and there might +consequently be two or more Gods, which is absurd. Therefore things +could be produced by God in no other manner and in no other order than +that in which they have been produced. + +Since I have thus shown, with greater clearness, than that of noonday +light, that in things there is absolutely nothing by virtue of which +they can be called contingent, I wish now to explain in a few words what +is to be understood by _contingent_, but, firstly, what is to be +understood by _necessary_ and _impossible_. + +A thing is called necessary either in reference to its essence or its +cause. For the existence of a thing necessarily follows either from the +essence and definition of the thing itself, or from a given efficient +cause. In the same way a thing is said to be impossible either because +the essence of the thing itself or its definition involves a +contradiction, or because no external cause exists determinate to the +production of such a thing. But a thing cannot be called contingent +unless with reference to a deficiency in our knowledge. For if we do not +know that the essence of a thing involves a contradiction, or if we +actually know that it involves no contradiction, and nevertheless we can +affirm nothing with certainty about its existence because the order of +causes is concealed from us, that thing can never appear to us either as +necessary or impossible, and therefore we call it either contingent or +possible. + +From what has gone before it clearly follows that things have been +produced by God in the highest degree of perfection, since they have +necessarily followed from the existence of a most perfect nature. Nor +does this doctrine accuse God of any imperfection, but, on the contrary, +His perfection has compelled us to affirm it. Indeed, from its contrary +would clearly follow, as I have shown above, that God is not absolutely +perfect, since, if things had been produced in any other fashion, +another nature would have had to be assigned to Him, different from that +which the consideration of the most perfect Being compels us to assign +to Him. I do not doubt that many will reject this opinion as ridiculous, +nor will they care to apply themselves to its consideration, and this +from no other reason than that they have been in the habit of assigning +to God another liberty widely different from that absolute will which +(Def. 7) we have taught. On the other hand, I do not doubt, if they were +willing to study the matter and properly to consider the series of our +demonstrations, that they would altogether reject this liberty which +they now assign to God, not only as of no value, but as a great obstacle +to knowledge. Neither is there any need that I should here repeat those +things which are said [above][12]. + +But for the sake of those who differ from me, I will here show that +although it be granted that will pertains to God's essence, it follows +nevertheless from His perfection that things could be created in no +other mode or order by Him. This it will be easy to show if we first +consider that which my opponents themselves admit, that it depends upon +the decree and will of God alone that each thing should be what it is, +for otherwise God would not be the cause of all things. It is also +admitted that all God's decrees were decreed by God Himself from all +eternity, for otherwise imperfection and inconstancy would be proved +against Him. But since in eternity there is no _when_ nor _before_ nor +_after_, it follows from the perfection of God alone that He neither can +decree nor could ever have decreed anything else than that which He has +decreed; that is to say, God has not existed before His decrees, and can +never exist without them. But it is said that although it be supposed +that God had made the nature of things different from that which it is, +or that from eternity He had decreed something else about Nature and her +order, it would not thence follow that any imperfection exists in God. +But if this be said, it must at the same time be allowed that God can +change His decrees. For if God had decreed something about Nature and +her order other than that which He has decreed--that is to say, if He +had willed and conceived something else about Nature--He would +necessarily have had an intellect and a will different from those which +He now has. And if it be allowed to assign to God another intellect and +another will without any change of His essence and of His perfection, +what is the reason why He cannot now change His decrees about creation +and nevertheless remain equally perfect? For His intellect and will +regarding created things and their order remain the same in relationship +to His essence and perfection in whatever manner His intellect and will +are conceived. + +Moreover, all the philosophers whom I have seen admit that there is no +such thing as an intellect existing potentially in God, but only an +intellect existing actually. But since His intellect and His will are +not distinguishable from His essence, as all admit, it follows from this +also that if God had had another intellect actually and another will, +His essence would have been necessarily different, and hence, as I +showed at the beginning, if things had been produced by God in a manner +different from that in which they now exist, God's intellect and will, +that is to say, His essence (as has been granted), must have been +different, which is absurd. + +Since, therefore, things could have been produced by God in no other +manner or order, this being a truth which follows from His absolute +perfection, there is no sound reasoning which can persuade us to believe +that God was unwilling to create all things which are in His intellect +with the same perfection as that in which they exist in His intellect. +But we shall be told that there is no perfection nor imperfection in +things, but that that which is in them by reason of which they are +perfect or imperfect and are said to be good or evil depends upon the +will of God alone, and therefore if God had willed He could have +effected that that which is now perfection should have been the extreme +of imperfection, and _vice versa_. But what else would this be than +openly to affirm that God, who necessarily understands what He wills, is +able by His will to understand things in a manner different from that in +which He understands them, which, as I have just shown, is a great +absurdity? I can therefore turn the argument on my opponents in this +way. All things depend upon the power of God. In order that things may +be differently constituted, it would be necessary that God's will should +be differently constituted; but God's will cannot be other than it is as +we have lately most clearly deduced from His perfection. Things +therefore cannot be differently constituted. + +I confess that this opinion, which subjects all things to a certain +indifferent God's will, and affirms that all things depend upon God's +good pleasure, is at a less distance from the truth than the opinion of +those who affirm that God does everything for the sake of the Good. For +these seem to place something outside of God which is independent of +Him, to which He looks while He is at work as to a model, or at which He +aims as if at a certain mark. This is indeed nothing else than to +subject God to fate, the most absurd thing which can be affirmed of Him +whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of +all things as well as of their existence. Therefore it is not worth +while that I should waste time in refuting this absurdity. + +Before I go any farther, I wish here to explain or rather to recall to +recollection, what we mean by _natura naturans_ and what by _natura +naturata_. For, from what has gone before, I think it is plain that by +_natura naturans_ we are to understand that which is in itself and is +conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance which express +eternal and infinite essence, that is to say, God in so far as He is +considered as a free cause. But by _natura naturata_ I understand +everything which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of +any one of God's attributes, that is to say, all the modes of God's +attributes in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, +and which without God can neither be nor can be conceived. + +... Individual things are nothing but affections or modes of God's +attributes, expressing those attributes in a certain and determinate +manner. + + +_General Conclusions_ + +I have now explained the nature of God and its properties. I have shown +that He necessarily exists; that He is one God; that from the necessity +alone of His own nature He is and acts; that He is, and in what way He +is, the free cause of all things; that all things are in Him, and so +depend upon Him that without Him they can neither be nor can be +conceived; and, finally, that all things have been predetermined by Him, +not indeed from freedom of will or from absolute good pleasure, but from +His absolute nature or infinite power. + +Moreover, wherever an opportunity was afforded, I have endeavored to +remove prejudices which might hinder the perception of the truth of what +I have demonstrated; but because not a few still remain which have been +and are now sufficient to prove a very great hindrance to the +comprehension of the connection of things in the manner in which I have +explained it, I have thought it worth while to call them up to be +examined by reason. But all these prejudices which I here undertake to +point out depend upon this solely: that it is commonly supposed that all +things in Nature, like men, work to some end; and indeed it is thought +to be certain that God Himself directs all things to some sure end, for +it is said that God has made all things for man, and man that he may +worship God. + +This, therefore, I will first investigate by inquiring, firstly, why so +many rest in this prejudice, and why all are so naturally inclined to +embrace it? I shall then show its falsity, and, finally, the manner in +which there have arisen from it prejudices concerning _good_ and _evil_, +_merit_ and _sin_, _praise_ and _blame_, _order_ and _disorder_, +_beauty_ and _deformity_, and so forth. This, however, is not the place +to deduce these things from the nature of the human mind. It will be +sufficient if I here take as an axiom that which no one ought to +dispute, namely, that man is born ignorant of the causes of things, and +that he has a desire, of which he is conscious, to seek that which is +profitable to him. From this it follows, firstly, that he thinks himself +free because he is conscious of his wishes and appetites, whilst at the +same time he is ignorant of the causes by which he is led to wish and +desire, not dreaming what they are; and, secondly, it follows that man +does everything for an end, namely, for that which is profitable to him, +which is what he seeks. Hence it happens that he attempts to discover +merely the final causes of that which has happened; and when he has +heard them he is satisfied, because there is no longer any cause for +further uncertainty. But if he cannot hear from another what these final +causes are, nothing remains but to turn to himself and reflect upon the +ends which usually determine him to the like actions, and thus by his +own mind he necessarily judges that of another. + +Moreover, since he discovers, both within and without himself a +multitude of means which contribute not a little to the attainment of +what is profitable to himself--for example, the eyes, which are useful +for seeing, the teeth for mastication, plants and animals for +nourishment, the sun for giving light, the sea for feeding fish, +etc.--it comes to pass that all natural objects are considered as means +for obtaining what is profitable. These too being evidently discovered +and not created by man, hence he has a cause for believing that some +other person exists, who has prepared them for man's use. For having +considered them as means it was impossible to believe that they had +created themselves, and so he was obliged to infer from the means which +he was in the habit of providing for himself that some ruler or rulers +of Nature exist, endowed with human liberty, who have taken care of all +things for him, and have made all things for his use. Since he never +heard anything about the mind of these rulers, he was compelled to judge +of it from his own, and hence he affirmed that the gods direct +everything for his advantage, in order that he may be bound to them and +hold them in the highest honor. This is the reason why each man has +devised for himself, out of his own brain, a different mode of +worshiping God, so that God might love him above others, and direct all +Nature to the service of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. + +Thus has this prejudice been turned into a superstition and has driven +deep roots into the mind--a prejudice which was the reason why every one +has so eagerly tried to discover and explain the final causes of things. +The attempt, however, to show that Nature does nothing in vain (that is +to say, nothing which is not profitable to man), seems to end in showing +that Nature, the gods, and man are alike mad. + +Do but see, I pray, to what all this has led. Amidst so much in Nature +that is beneficial, not a few things must have been observed which are +injurious, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, and it was affirmed +that these things happened either because the gods were angry because of +wrongs which had been inflicted on them by man, or because of sins +committed in the method of worshiping them; and although experience +daily contradicted this, and showed by an infinity of examples that both +the beneficial and the injurious were indiscriminately bestowed on the +pious and the impious, the inveterate prejudices on this point have not +therefore been abandoned. For it was much easier for a man to place +these things aside with others of the use of which he was ignorant, and +thus retain his present and inborn state of ignorance, than to destroy +the whole superstructure and think out a new one. Hence it was looked +upon as indisputable that the judgments of the gods far surpass our +comprehension; and this opinion alone would have been sufficient to keep +the human race in darkness to all eternity, if mathematics, which does +not deal with ends, but with the essences and properties of forms, had +not placed before us another rule of truth. In addition to mathematics, +other causes also might be assigned, which it is superfluous here to +enumerate, tending to make men reflect upon these universal prejudices, +and leading them to a true knowledge of things. + +I have thus sufficiently explained what I promised in the first place to +explain. There will now be no need of many words to show that Nature has +set no end before herself, and that all final causes are nothing but +human fictions. For I believe that this is sufficiently evident both +from the foundations and causes of this prejudice, as well as from all +those propositions in which I have shown that all things are begotten by +a certain eternal necessity of Nature and in absolute perfection. Thus +much, nevertheless, I will add, that this doctrine concerning an end +altogether overturns nature. For that which is in truth the cause it +considers as the effect, and _vice versa_. Again, that which is first in +Nature it puts last; and, finally, that which is supreme and most +perfect it makes the most imperfect. For, passing by the first two +assertions as self-evident, it is plain that that effect is the most +perfect which is immediately produced by God, and in proportion as +intermediate causes are necessary for the production of a thing is it +imperfect. But if things which are immediately produced by God were made +in order that He might obtain the end He had in view, then the last +things for the sake of which the first exist, must be the most perfect +of all. + +Again, this doctrine does away with God's perfection. For if God works +to obtain an end, He necessarily seeks something of which he stands in +need. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between +the end of want and the end of assimilation (_finem indigentiae et finem +assimilationis_), they confess that God has done all things for His own +sake, and not for the sake of the things to be created, because before +the creation they can assign nothing excepting God for the sake of which +God could do anything; and therefore they are necessarily compelled to +admit that God stood in need of and desired those things for which He +determined to prepare means. This is self-evident. Nor is it here to be +overlooked that the adherents of this doctrine, who have found a +pleasure in displaying their ingenuity in assigning the ends of things, +have introduced a new species of argument, not the _reductio ad +impossible_, but the _reductio ad ignorantiam_, to prove their position, +which shows that it had no other method of defense left. + +For, by way of example, if a stone had fallen from some roof on +somebody's head and killed him, they will demonstrate in this manner +that the stone has fallen in order to kill the man. For if it did not +fall for that purpose by the will of God, how could so many +circumstances concur through chance (and a number often simultaneously +do concur)? You will answer, perhaps, that the event happened because +the wind blew and the man was passing that way. But, they will urge, why +did the wind blow at that time, and why did the man pass that way +precisely at the same moment? If you again reply that the wind rose then +because the sea on the preceding day began to be stormy, the weather +hitherto having been calm, and that the man had been invited by a +friend, they will urge again--because there is no end of +questioning--But why was the sea agitated? why was the man invited at +that time? And so they will not cease from asking the causes of causes, +until at last you fly to the will of God, the refuge for ignorance. + +So, also, when they behold the structure of the human body, they are +amazed; and because they are ignorant of the causes of such art, they +conclude that the body was made not by mechanical but by a supernatural +or divine art, and has been formed in such a way so that the one part +may not injure the other. Hence it happens that the man who endeavors to +find out the true causes of miracles, and who desires as a wise man to +understand Nature, and not to gape at it like a fool, is generally +considered and proclaimed to be a heretic and impious by those whom the +vulgar worship as the interpreters both of Nature and the gods. For +these know that if ignorance be removed, amazed stupidity, the sole +ground on which they rely in arguing or in defending their authority, is +taken away also. But these things I leave and pass on to that which I +determined to do in the third place. + +After man has persuaded himself that all things which exist are made for +him, he must in everything adjudge that to be of the greatest importance +which is most useful to him, and he must esteem that to be of surpassing +worth by which he is most beneficially affected. In this way he is +compelled to form those notions by which he explains Nature; such, for +instance, as _good_, _evil_, _order_, _confusion_, _heat_, _cold_, +_beauty_, and _deformity_, etc.; and because he supposes himself to be +free, notions like those of _praise_ and _blame_, _sin_ and _merit_, +have arisen. These latter I shall hereafter explain when I have treated +of human nature; the former I will here briefly unfold. + +It is to be observed that man has given the name _good_ to everything +which leads to health and the worship of God; on the contrary, +everything which does not lead thereto he calls _evil_. But because +those who do not understand Nature affirm nothing about things +themselves, but only imagine them, and take the imagination to be +understanding, they therefore, ignorant of things and their nature, +firmly believe an _order_ to be in things; for when things are so placed +that if they are represented to us through the senses, we can easily +imagine them, and consequently easily remember them, we call them well +arranged; but if they are not placed so that we can imagine and remember +them, we call them badly arranged or _confused_. Moreover, since those +things are more especially pleasing to us which we can easily imagine, +men therefore prefer order to confusion, as if order were something in +Nature apart from our own imagination; and they say that God has created +everything in order, and in this manner they ignorantly attribute +imagination to God, unless they mean perhaps that God, out of +consideration for the human imagination, has disposed things in the +manner in which they can most easily be imagined. No hesitation either +seems to be caused by the fact that an infinite number of things are +discovered which far surpass our imagination, and very many which +confound it through its weakness. But enough of this. + +The other notions which I have mentioned are nothing but modes in which +the imagination is affected in different ways, and nevertheless they are +regarded by the ignorant as being specially attributes of things, +because, as we have remarked, men consider all things as made for +themselves, and call the nature of a thing good, evil, sound, putrid, or +corrupt, just as they are affected by it. For example, if the motion by +which the nerves are affected by means of objects represented to the eye +conduces to well-being, the objects by which it is caused are called +_beautiful_; while those exciting a contrary motion are called +_deformed_. Those things, too, which stimulate the senses through the +nostrils are called sweet-smelling or stinking; those which act through +the taste are called sweet or bitter, full-flavored or insipid; those +which act through the touch, hard or soft, heavy or light; those, +lastly, which act through the ears are said to make a noise, sound, or +harmony, the last having caused men to lose their senses to such a +degree that they have believed that God even is delighted with it. +Indeed, philosophers may be found who have persuaded themselves that the +celestial motions beget a harmony. + +All these things sufficiently show that every one judges things by the +constitution of his brain, or rather accepts the affections of his +imagination in the place of things.[13] It is not, therefore, to be +wondered at, as we may observe in passing, that all those controversies +which we see have arisen amongst men, so that at last skepticism has +been the result. For although human bodies agree in many things, they +differ in more, and therefore that which to one person is good will +appear to another evil, that which to one is well arranged to another is +confused, that which pleases one will displease another, and so on in +other cases which I pass by both because we cannot notice them at length +here, and because they are within the experience of every one. For every +one has heard the expressions: So many heads, so many ways of thinking; +Every one is satisfied with his own way of thinking; Differences of +brains are not less common than differences of taste;--all which maxims +show that men decide upon matters according to the constitution of their +brains, and imagine rather than understand things. + +If men understood things, they would, as mathematics prove, at least be +all alike convinced if they were not all alike attracted. We see, +therefore, that all those methods by which the common people are in the +habit of explaining Nature are only different sorts of imaginations, and +do not reveal the nature of anything in itself, but only the +constitution of the imagination; and because they have names as if they +were entities existing apart from the imagination, I call them entities +not of the reason but of the imagination. All argument therefore, urged +against us based upon such notions can be easily refuted. + +Many people, for instance, are accustomed to argue thus:--If all things +have followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, how +is it that so many imperfections have arisen in Nature--corruption, for +instance, of things till they stink; deformity, exciting disgust; +confusion, evil, crime, etc.? But, as I have just observed, all this is +easily answered. For the perfection of things is to be judged by their +nature and power alone; nor are they more or less perfect because they +delight or offend the human senses, or because they are beneficial or +prejudicial to human nature. But to those who ask why God has not +created all men in such a manner that they might be controlled by the +dictates of reason alone, I give but this answer: Because to Him +material was not wanting for the creation of everything, from the +highest down to the very lowest grade of perfection; or, to speak more +properly, because the laws of His nature were so ample that they +sufficed for the production of everything which can be conceived by an +infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated. + +These are the prejudices which I undertook to notice here. If any others +of a similar character remain, they can easily be rectified with a +little thought by any one. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[12] Pp. 132-135. + +[13] Beauty, my dear Sir, is not so much a quality of the object beheld, +as an effect in him who beholds it. If our sight were longer or shorter, +or, if our constitution were different, what now appears beautiful to us +would seem misshapen and what we now think misshapen we should regard as +beautiful. The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will +appear horrible. Some things are beautiful at a distance, but ugly near; +thus things regarded in themselves, and in relation to God, are neither +ugly nor beautiful. Therefore, he who says that God has created the +world so that it might be beautiful is bound to adopt one of the two +alternatives: either that God created the world for the sake of men's +pleasure and eyesight, or else that He created men's pleasure and +eyesight for the sake of the world. _From a letter to Hugo Boxel_ +(1674). + + + + +SECOND PART + +ON MAN + + +_The more things the mind knows, the better it understands its own +powers and the order of Nature. The better it understands its own +powers, so much the more easily can it direct itself and propose rules +to itself. The better, also, it understands the order of Nature, the +more easily can it restrain itself from what is useless._ + +SPINOZA. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN MIND + + +_Introductory_ + +I pass on now to explain those things which must necessarily follow from +the essence of God or the Being eternal and infinite; not indeed to +explain all these things, for we have demonstrated that an infinitude of +things must follow in an infinite number of ways,--but to consider those +things only which may conduct us, as it were, by the hand to a knowledge +of the human mind and its highest happiness. + + +_Definitions_ + +I. By body, I understand a mode which expresses in a certain and +determinate manner the essence of God in so far as He is considered as +the thing extended. + +II. I say that to the essence of anything pertains that, which being +given, the thing itself is necessarily posited, and being taken away, +the thing is necessarily taken; or, in other words, that, without which +the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which in its turn cannot +be nor be conceived without the thing. + +III. By idea, I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms +because it is a thinking thing. + +_Explanation._--I use the word conception rather than perception because +the name perception seems to indicate that the mind is passive in its +relation to the object. But the word conception seems to express the +action of the mind. + +IV. By adequate idea, I understand an idea which, in so far as it is +considered in itself, without reference to the object, has all the +properties or internal signs (_denominationes intrinsecas_) of a true +idea. + +_Explanation._--I say internal, so as to exclude that which is external, +the agreement, namely, of the idea with its object. + +V. Duration is the indefinite continuation of existence. + +_Explanation._--I call it indefinite because it cannot be determined by +the nature itself of the existing thing nor by the efficient cause, +which necessarily posits the existence of the thing but does not take it +away. + +VI. By reality and perfection I understand the same thing. + +VII. By individual things I understand things which are finite and which +have a determinate existence; and if a number of individuals so unite in +one action that they are all simultaneously the cause of one effect, I +consider them all, so far, as one individual thing. + + +_Axioms_ + +I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence; that is to +say, the existence as well as the non-existence of this or that man may +or may not follow from the order of Nature. + +II. Man thinks. + +III. Modes of thought, such as love, desire, or the emotions of the +mind, by whatever name they may be called, do not exist, unless in the +same individual the idea exist of a thing loved, desired, etc. But the +idea may exist although no other mode of thinking exist. + +IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways. + +V. No individual things are felt or perceived by us excepting bodies and +modes of thought. + + +_The Mind of God_ + +Individual thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which express +the nature of God in a certain and determinate manner. God therefore +possesses an attribute, the conception of which is involved in all +individual thoughts, and through which they are conceived. Thought, +therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God which expresses the +eternal and infinite essence of God or, in other words, God is a +thinking thing. + +This proposition is plain from the fact that we can conceive an infinite +thinking Being. For the more things a thinking being can think, the more +reality or perfection we conceive it to possess, and therefore the being +which can think an infinitude of things in infinite ways is necessarily +infinite by his power of thinking. Since, therefore, we can conceive an +infinite Being by attending to thought alone, thought is necessarily one +of the infinite attributes of God.[14] + +God can think an infinitude of things in infinite ways, or (which is the +same thing) can form an idea of His essence and of all the things which +necessarily follow from it. But everything which is in the power of God +is necessary. Therefore in God there necessarily exists the idea of His +essence, and of all things which necessarily follow from His essence. + +The infinite intellect comprehends nothing but the attributes of God and +His modes. But God is one. Therefore the idea of God, from which +infinite numbers of things follow in infinite ways, can be one only. + +The common people understand by God's power His free will and right over +all existing things, which are therefore commonly looked upon as +contingent; for they say that God has the power of destroying everything +and reducing it to nothing. They very frequently, too, compare God's +power with the power of kings. That there is any similarity between the +two we have disproved. We have shown that God does everything with that +necessity with which He understands Himself; that is to say, as it +follows from the necessity of the divine nature that God understands +Himself (a truth admitted by all), so by the same necessity it follows +that God does an infinitude of things in infinite ways. Moreover, we +have shown that the power of God is nothing but the active essence of +God, and therefore it is as impossible for us to conceive that God does +not act as that He does not exist. If it pleased me to go farther, I +could show besides that the power which the common people ascribe to God +is not only a human power (which shows that they look upon God as a man, +or as being like a man), but that it also involves weakness. But I do +not care to talk so much upon the same subject. Again and again I ask +the reader to consider and reconsider what is said upon this subject +[above].[15] For it is not possible for any one properly to understand +the things which I wish to prove unless he takes great care not to +confound the power of God with the human power and right of kings. + + +_The Order and Dependence of Ideas in God_ + +The formal Being of ideas is a mode of thought (as is self-evident); +that is to say, a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of +God in so far as He is a thinking thing. It is a mode, therefore, that +involves the conception of no other attribute of God, and consequently +is the effect of no other attribute except that of thought; therefore +the formal Being of ideas recognizes God for its cause in so far only as +He is considered as a thinking thing, and not in so far as He is +manifested by any other attribute; that is to say, the ideas both of +God's attributes and of individual things do not recognize as their +efficient cause the objects of the ideas or the things which are +perceived, but God Himself in so far as He is a thinking thing.[16] + +God's power of thinking is equal to His actual power of acting; that is +to say, whatever follows _formally_ from the infinite nature of God, +follows from the idea of God (idea Dei), in the same order and in the +same connection _objectively_ in God. + +The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and +connection of things. + +Before we go any farther, we must here recall to our memory what we have +already demonstrated, that everything which can be perceived by the +infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance pertains +entirely to the one sole substance only, and consequently that substance +thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, which is +now comprehended under this attribute and now under that. Thus, also, a +mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing +expressed in two different ways--a truth which some of the Hebrews +appear to have seen as if through a cloud, since they say that God, the +intellect of God, and the things which are the objects of that intellect +are one and the same thing. For example, the circle existing in nature +and the idea that is in God of an existing circle are one and the same +thing, which is manifested through different attributes; and, therefore, +whether we think of Nature under the attribute of extension, or under +the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute whatever, we +shall discover one and the same order, or one and the same connection of +causes; that is to say, in every case the same sequence of things. Nor +have I had any other reason for saying that God is the cause of the +idea, for example, of the circle in so far only as He is a thinking +thing, and of the circle itself in so far as He is an extended thing, +but this, that the formal Being of the idea of a circle can only be +perceived through another mode of thought, as its proximate cause, and +this again must be perceived through another, and so on _ad infinitum_. +So that when things are considered as modes of thought, we must explain +the order of the whole of Nature or the connection of causes by the +attribute of thought alone, and when things are considered as modes of +extension, the order of the whole of Nature must be explained through +the attribute of extension alone, and so with other attributes. +Therefore God is in truth the cause of things as they are in themselves +in so far as He consists of infinite attributes, nor for the present can +I explain the matter more clearly. + + +_The Origin of the Human Mind_ + +The human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God, and +therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that thing, +we say nothing else than that God has this or that idea; not indeed in +so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is manifested through the +nature of the human mind, or in so far as He forms the essence of the +human mind; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not merely +in so far as He forms the nature of the human mind, but in so far as He +has at the same time with the human mind the idea also of another thing, +then we say that the human mind perceives the thing partially or +inadequately. + +... When you ask me my opinion on the question[17] raised concerning +our knowledge of the means, whereby each part of Nature agrees with its +whole, and the manner in which it is associated with the remaining +parts, I presume you are asking for the reasons which induce us to +believe that each part of Nature agrees with its whole, and is +associated with the remaining parts. For as to the means whereby the +parts are really associated, and each part agrees with its whole, I told +you in my former letter that I am in ignorance. To answer such a +question we should have to know the whole of Nature and its several +parts. I will therefore endeavor to show the reason which led me to make +the statement; but I will promise that I do not attribute to Nature +either beauty or deformity, order or confusion. Only in relation to our +imagination can things be called beautiful or deformed, ordered or +confused. + +By the association of parts, then, I merely mean that the laws or nature +of one part adapt themselves to the laws or nature of another part, so +as to cause the least possible inconsistency. As to the whole and the +parts, I mean that a given number of things are parts of a whole, in so +far as the nature of each of them is adapted to the nature of the rest +so that they all, as far as possible, agree together. On the other hand, +in so far as they do not agree, each of them forms, in our minds, a +separate idea, and is to that extent considered as a whole, not as a +part. For instance, when the parts of lymph, chyle, etc., combine, +according to the proportion of the figure and size of each, so as to +evidently unite, and form one fluid, the chyle, lymph, etc., considered +under this aspect, are part of the blood; but, in so far as we consider +the particles of lymph as differing in figure and size from the +particles of chyle, we shall consider each of the two as a whole, not as +a part. + +Let us imagine, with your permission, a little worm, living in the +blood, able to distinguish by sight the particles of blood, lymph, etc., +and to reflect on the manner in which each particle, on meeting with +another particle, either is repulsed, or communicates a portion of its +own motion. This little worm would live in the blood in the same way as +we live in a part of the universe, and would consider each particle of +blood, not as a part, but as a whole. He would be unable to determine +how all the parts are modified by the general nature of blood, and are +compelled by it to adapt themselves so as to stand in a fixed relation +to one another. For if we imagine that there are no causes external to +the blood, which could communicate fresh movements to it, nor any space +beyond the blood, nor any bodies whereto the particles of blood could +communicate their motion, it is certain that the blood would always +remain in the same state, and its particles would undergo no +modifications, save those which may be conceived as arising from the +relations of motion existing between the lymph, the chyle, etc. The +blood would then always have to be considered as a whole, not as a part. +But as there exist, as a matter of fact, very many causes which modify, +in a given manner, the nature of blood, and are, in turn, modified +thereby, it follows that other motions and other relations arise in the +blood, springing not from the mutual relations of its parts only, but +from the mutual relations between the blood as a whole and external +causes. Thus the blood comes to be regarded as a part, not as a whole. +So much for the whole and the part. + +All natural bodies can and ought to be considered in the same way as we +have here considered the blood, for all bodies are surrounded by others, +and are mutually determined to exist and operate in a fixed and definite +proportion, while the relations between motion and rest in the sum total +of them, that is, in the whole universe, remain unchanged. Hence it +follows that each body, in so far as it exists as modified in a +particular manner, must be considered as a part of the whole universe, +as agreeing with the whole, and associated with the remaining parts. As +the nature of the universe is not limited, like the nature of blood, but +is absolutely infinite, its parts are by this nature of infinite power +infinitely modified, and compelled to undergo infinite variations.... + +You see, therefore, how and why I think that the human body is a part of +Nature. As regards the human mind, I believe that it also is a part of +Nature; for I maintain that there exists in Nature an infinite power of +thinking, which, in so far as it is infinite, contains subjectively the +whole of Nature, and its thoughts proceed in the same manner as +Nature--that is, in the sphere of ideas. Further, I take the human mind +to be identical with this said power, not in so far as it is infinite, +and perceives the whole of Nature, but in so far as it is finite, and +perceives only the human body. In this manner, I maintain that the human +mind is part of an infinite understanding. + + +_The Nature of the Human Mind_ + +The essence of man is formed by certain modes of the attributes of God, +that is to say, modes of thought, the idea of all of them being prior by +nature to the modes of thought themselves; and if this idea exists, +other modes (which also have an idea in nature prior to them) must exist +in the same individual likewise. Therefore an idea is the first thing +which forms the Being of the human mind. But it is not the idea of a +non-existent thing, for then the idea itself could not be said to exist. +It will therefore be the idea of something actually existing. Neither +will it be the idea of an infinite thing, for an infinite thing must +always necessarily exist, and this is absurd. Therefore the first thing +which forms the actual Being of the human mind is the idea of an +individual thing actually existing. + +The knowledge of everything which happens in the object of any idea +necessarily exists in God, in so far as He is considered as modified by +the idea of that object; that is to say, in so far as He forms the mind +of any being. The knowledge, therefore, necessarily exists in God of +everything which happens in the object of the idea constituting the +human mind; that is to say, it exists in Him in so far as He forms the +nature of the human mind; or, whatever happens in the object of the idea +constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind; in +other words, an idea of that thing will necessarily exist in the human +mind. That is to say, if the object of the idea constituting the human +mind be a body, nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived +by the mind. + +If the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the +modifications of the body would not be in God, in so far as He has +formed our mind, but would be in Him in so far as He has formed the mind +of another thing; that is to say, the ideas of the modifications of the +body would not be in our mind. But we have ideas of the modifications of +a body; therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is +a body, and that, too, actually existing. Again, if there were also any +other object of the mind besides a body, since nothing exists from which +some effect does not follow, the idea of some effort produced by this +object would necessarily exist in our mind. But there is no such idea. +Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, +or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else. + +Hence it follows that man is composed of mind and body, and that the +human body exists as we perceive it. + +Hence we see not only that the human mind is united to the body, but +also what is to be understood by the union of the mind and body. But no +one can understand it adequately or distinctly without knowing +adequately beforehand the nature of our body; for those things which we +have proved hitherto are altogether general, nor do they refer more to +man than to other individuals, all of which are animate, although in +different degrees. For of everything there necessarily exists in God an +idea of which He is the cause, in the same way as the idea of the human +body exists in Him; and therefore everything that we have said of the +idea of the human body is necessarily true of the idea of any other +thing. We cannot, however, deny that ideas, like objects themselves, +differ from one another, and that one is more excellent and contains +more reality than another, just as the object of one idea is more +excellent and contains more reality than another. Therefore, in order to +determine the differences between the human mind and other things and +its superiority over them, we must first know, as we have said, the +nature of its object, that is to say, the nature of the human body. I am +not able to explain it here, nor is such an explanation necessary for +what I wish to demonstrate. + +This much, nevertheless, I will say generally, that in proportion as one +body is better adapted than another to do or suffer many things, in the +same proportion will the mind at the same time be better adapted to +perceive many things, and the more the actions of a body depend upon +itself alone, and the less other bodies cooeperate with it in action, the +better adapted will the mind be for distinctly understanding. We can +thus determine the superiority of one mind to another; we can also see +the reason why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, +together with many other things which I shall deduce in what follows. + + +_The Complexity of the Human Mind_ + +The idea which constitutes the formal Being of the human mind is the +idea of a body which is composed of a number of individuals composite to +a high degree. But an idea of each individual composing the body must +necessarily exist in God; therefore the idea of the human body is +composed of these several ideas of the component parts. The idea which +constitutes the formal Being of the human mind is not simple, but is +composed of a number of ideas. + +All ways in which any body is affected follow at the same time from the +nature of the affected body, and from the nature of the affecting body; +therefore the idea of these modifications necessarily involves the +nature of each body, and therefore the idea of each way in which the +human body is affected by an external body involves the nature of the +human body and of the external body. + +Hence it follows, in the first place, that the human mind perceives the +nature of many bodies together with that of its own body. + +It follows, secondly, that the ideas we have of external bodies indicate +the constitution of our own body rather than the nature of external +bodies. + + +_Imagination_ + +If the human body be affected in a way which involves the nature of any +external body, the human mind will contemplate that external body as +actually existing or as present, until the human body be affected by a +mode which excludes the existence or presence of the external body. + +When external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body that +they often strike upon the softer parts, the fluid parts change the +plane of the soft parts, and thence it happens that the fluid parts are +reflected from the new planes in a direction different from that in +which they used to be reflected, and that also afterwards when they +strike against these new planes by their own spontaneous motion, they +are reflected in the same way as when they were impelled towards those +planes by external bodies. Consequently those fluid bodies produce a +modification in the human body while they keep up this reflex motion +similar to that produced by the presence of an external body. The mind, +therefore, will think as before, that is to say, it will again +contemplate the external body as present. This will happen as often as +the fluid parts of the human body strike against those planes by their +own spontaneous motion. Therefore, although the external bodies by which +the human body was once affected do not exist the mind will perceive +them as if they were present so often as this action is repeated in the +body. + +We see, therefore, how it is possible for us to contemplate things which +do not exist as if they were actually present. This may indeed be +produced by other causes, but I am satisfied with having here shown one +cause through which I could explain it, just as if I had explained it +through the true cause. I do not think, however, that I am far from the +truth, since no postulate which I have assumed contains anything which +is not confirmed by an experience that we cannot mistrust, after we have +proved the existence of the human body as we perceive it. + +We clearly see, moreover, what is the difference between the idea, for +example, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of the mind itself of +Peter, and the idea of Peter himself which is in another man; for +example, in Paul. For the former directly manifests the essence of the +body of Peter himself, nor does it involve existence unless so long as +Peter exists; the latter, on the other hand, indicates rather the +constitution of the body of Paul than the nature of Peter; and therefore +so long as Paul's body exists with that constitution, so long will +Paul's mind contemplate Peter as present, although he does not exist. +But in order that we may retain the customary phraseology, we will give +to those modifications of the human body, the ideas of which represent +to us external bodies as if they were present, the name of _images of +things_, although they do not actually reproduce the forms of the +things. When the mind contemplates bodies in this way, we will say that +it imagines. Here I wish it to be observed, in order that I may begin to +show what _error_ is, that these imaginations of the mind, regarded by +themselves, contain no error, and that the mind is not in error because +it imagines, but only in so far as it is considered as wanting in an +idea which excludes the existence of those things which it imagines as +present. For if the mind, when it imagines non-existent things to be +present, could at the same time know that those things did not really +exist, it would think its power of imagination to be a virtue of its +nature and not a defect, especially if this faculty of imagining +depended upon its own nature alone, that is to say, if this faculty of +the mind were free. + + +_Association of Ideas and Memory_ + +If the human body has at any time been simultaneously affected by two or +more bodies, whenever the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will +also remember the others. + +We clearly understand by this what memory is. It is nothing else than a +certain concatenation of ideas, involving the nature of things which are +outside the human body, a concatenation which corresponds in the mind to +the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human body. I +say, firstly, that it is a concatenation of those ideas only which +involve the nature of things which are outside the human body, and not +of those ideas which explain the nature of those things, for there are +in truth ideas of the modifications of the human body, which involve its +nature as well as the nature of external bodies. I say, in the second +place, that this concatenation takes place according to the order and +concatenation of the modifications of the human body, that I may +distinguish it from the concatenation of ideas which takes place +according to the order of the intellect, and enables the mind to +perceive things through their first causes, and is the same in all men. + +Hence we can clearly understand how it is that the mind from the thought +of one thing at once turns to the thought of another thing which is not +in any way like the first. For example, from the thought of the word +_pomum_ a Roman immediately turned to the thought of the fruit, which +has no resemblance to the articulate sound _pomum_, nor anything in +common with it, excepting this, that the body of that man was often +affected by the thing and the sound; that is to say, he often heard the +word _pomum_ when he saw the fruit. In this manner each person will turn +from one thought to another according to the manner in which the habit +of each has arranged the images of things in the body. The soldier, for +instance, if he sees the footsteps of a horse in the sand, will +immediately turn from the thought of a horse to the thought of a +horseman, and so to the thought of war. The countryman, on the other +hand, from the thought of a horse will turn to the thought of his plow, +his field, etc.; and thus each person will turn from one thought to this +or that thought, according to the manner in which he has been accustomed +to connect and bind together the images of things in his mind. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[14] [Similarly, it can be demonstrated that] extension is an attribute +of God, or God is an extended thing. + +[15] Chapter Eight. + +[16] The formal Being of things which are not modes of thought does not +follow from the divine nature because of His prior knowledge of these +things, but, just as ideas follow from the attribute of thought, in the +same manner and with the same necessity the objects of ideas follow and +are concluded from their attributes. + +[17] From a letter to Henry Oldenburg (1665). + + + + +CHAPTER X + +THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE + + +_Of Truth_ + +All the ideas which are in God always agree with those things of which +they are the ideas. Therefore, all ideas, in so far as they are related +to God, are true. + +A true idea[18] (for we possess a true idea) is something different from +its correlate (_ideatum_); thus a circle is different from the idea of a +circle. The idea of a circle is not something having a circumference and +a center, as a circle has; nor is the idea of a body that body itself. +Now, as it is something different from its correlate, it is capable of +being understood through itself; in other words, the idea, in so far as +its actual essence (_essentia formalis_) is concerned, may be the +subject of another subjective essence. And, again, this second +subjective essence will, regarded in itself, be something real and +capable of being understood; and so on indefinitely. For instance, the +man Peter is something real; the true idea of Peter is the reality of +Peter represented subjectively, and is in itself something real, and +quite distinct from the actual Peter. Now, as this true idea of Peter is +in itself something real, and has its own individual existence, it will +also be capable of being understood--that is, of being the subject of +another idea which will contain by representation all that the idea of +Peter contains actually. And, again, this idea of the idea of Peter has +its own individuality, which may become the subject of yet another idea; +and so on indefinitely. This every one may make trial of for himself, by +reflecting that he knows what Peter is, and also knows that he knows, +and further knows that he knows that he knows, etc. Hence, it is plain +that, in order to understand the actual Peter, it is not necessary first +to understand the idea of Peter, and still less the idea of the idea of +Peter. This is the same as saying that in order to know, there is no +need to know that we know, much less to know that we know that we know. +This is no more necessary than to know the nature of a circle before +knowing the nature of a triangle. But with these ideas the contrary is +the case; for in order to know that I know, I must first know. Hence it +is clear that certainty is nothing else than the subjective essence of a +thing: in other words, the mode in which we perceive an actual reality +is certainty. Further, it is also evident that for the certitude of +truth no further sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea; +for, as I have shown, it is not necessary to know that we know that we +know.... + +He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea, +nor can he doubt the truth of the thing. For no one who has a true idea +is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certitude; to have a +true idea signifying just this, to know a thing perfectly or as well as +possible. No one, in fact, can doubt this, unless he supposes an idea to +be something dumb, like a picture on a tablet, instead of being a mode +of thought, that is to say, intelligence itself. Moreover, I ask who can +know that he understands a thing unless he first of all understands that +thing? that is to say, who can know that he is certain of anything +unless he is first of all certain of that thing? Then, again, what can +be clearer or more certain than a true idea as the standard of truth? +Just as light reveals both itself and the darkness, so truth is the +standard of itself and of the false. + + +_Of Falsity_ + +There is nothing positive in ideas which can constitute a form of +falsity. But falsity cannot consist in absolute privation (for we say +that minds and not bodies err and are mistaken); nor can it consist in +absolute ignorance, for to be ignorant and to be in error are different. +Falsehood, therefore, consists in the privation of knowledge which is +involved by inadequate knowledge of things or by inadequate and confused +ideas. For instance, men are deceived because they think themselves +free, and the sole reason for thinking so is that they are conscious of +their own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which those actions are +determined. Their idea of liberty therefore is this--that they know no +cause for their own actions; for as to saying that their actions depend +upon their will, these are words to which no idea is attached. What the +will is, and in what manner it moves the body, every one is ignorant, +for those who pretend otherwise, and devise seats and dwelling-places of +the soul, usually excite our laughter or disgust. Just in the same +manner, when we look at the sun, we imagine its distance from us to be +about 200 feet; the error not consisting solely in the imagination, but +arising from our not knowing what the true distance is when we imagine, +and what are the causes of our imagination. For although we may +afterwards know that the sun is more than 600 diameters of the earth +distant from us, we still imagine it near us, since we imagine it to be +so near, not because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because a +modification of our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as +our body itself is affected by it. + + +_The Origin and Nature of Confused Ideas_ + +The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both +of external bodies and of the human body itself and must involve the +nature not only of the human body, but of its parts, for the +modifications are ways in which the parts of the human body, and +consequently the whole body, are affected. But an adequate knowledge of +external bodies and of the parts composing the human body does not exist +in God in so far as He is considered as affected by the human mind, but +in so far as He is affected by other ideas. These ideas of +modifications, therefore, in so far as they are related to the human +mind alone, are like conclusions without premises, that is to say, as is +self-evident, they are confused ideas. + +The idea which forms the nature of the mind is demonstrated in the same +way not to be clear and distinct when considered in itself. So also with +the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the +modifications of the human body, in so far as they are related to the +mind alone, as every one may easily see. + +All ideas are in God and in so far as they are related to God are true +and adequate. No ideas, therefore, are inadequate or confused unless in +so far as they are related to the individual mind of some person. All +ideas, therefore, both adequate and inadequate, follow by the same +necessity. + + +_The Origin and Nature of Adequate Ideas_ + +Let there be something, _A_, which is common to all bodies, and which is +equally in the part of each body and in the whole. I say that _A_ can +only be adequately conceived. For the idea of _A_ will necessarily be +adequate in God, both in so far as He has the idea of the human body and +in so far as He has the idea of its modifications, which involve the +nature of the human body, and partly also the nature of external bodies; +that is to say, this idea will necessarily be adequate in God in so far +as He constitutes the human mind, or in so far as He has ideas which are +in the human mind. The mind, therefore, necessarily perceives _A_ +adequately, both in so far as it perceives itself or its own or any +external body; nor can _A_ be conceived in any other manner. + +Hence it follows that some ideas or notions exist which are common to +all men, for all bodies agree in some things, which must be adequately, +that is to say, clearly and distinctly, perceived by all. + +Hence it follows also that the more things the body has in common with +other bodies, the more things will the mind be adapted to perceive. + +Those ideas are also adequate which follow in the mind from ideas which +are adequate in it. For when we say that an idea follows in the human +mind from ideas which are adequate in it, we do but say that in the +divine intellect itself an idea exists of which God is the cause, not in +so far as He is infinite, nor in so far as He is affected by the ideas +of a multitude of individual things, but in so far only as He +constitutes the essence of the human mind. + +I have thus explained the origin of those notions which are called +common, and which are the foundations of our reasoning; but of some +axioms or notions other causes exist which it would be advantageous to +explain by our method, for we should thus be able to distinguish those +notions which are more useful than others, and those which are scarcely +of any use; those which are common; those which are clear and distinct +only to those persons who do not suffer from prejudice; and, finally, +those which are ill-founded. Moreover, it would be manifest whence these +notions which are called _second_, and consequently the axioms founded +upon them, have taken their origin, and other things, too, would be +explained which I have thought about at different times. Since, however, +I have set apart this subject for another treatise, and because I do not +wish to create disgust with excessive prolixity, I have determined to +pass by these matters here. + +But not to omit anything which is necessary for us to know, I will +briefly give the causes from which terms called _Transcendental_, such +as _Being_, _Thing_, _Something_, have taken their origin. These terms +have arisen because the human body, inasmuch as it is limited, can form +distinctly in itself a certain number only of images at once. If this +number be exceeded, the images will become confused; and if the number +of images which the body is able to form distinctly be greatly exceeded, +they will all run one into another. Since this is so, it is clear that +in proportion to the number of images which can be formed at the same +time in the body will be the number of bodies which the human mind can +imagine at the same time. If the images in the body, therefore, are all +confused, the mind will confusedly imagine all the bodies without +distinguishing the one from the other, and will include them all, as it +were, under one attribute, that of being or thing. + +The same confusion may also be caused by lack of uniform force in the +images and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to +discuss here, the consideration of one cause being sufficient for the +purpose we have in view. For it all comes to this, that these terms +signify ideas in the highest degree confused. It is in this way that +those notions have arisen which are called _Universal_, such as, _Man_, +_Horse_, _Dog_, etc.; that is to say, so many images of men, for +instance, are formed in the human body at once, that they exceed the +power of the imagination, not entirely, but to such a degree that the +mind has no power to imagine the determinate number of men and the small +differences of each, such as color and size, etc. It will therefore +distinctly imagine that only in which all of them agree in so far as +the body is affected by them, for by that the body was chiefly affected, +that is to say, by each individual, and this it will express by the name +_man_, covering thereby an infinite number of individuals; to imagine a +determinate number of individuals being out of its power. + +But we must observe that these notions are not formed by all persons in +the same way, but that they vary in each case according to the thing by +which the body is more frequently affected, and which the mind more +easily imagines or recollects. For example, those who have more +frequently looked with admiration upon the stature of men, by the name +_man_ will understand an animal of erect stature, while those who have +been in the habit of fixing their thoughts on something else, will form +another common image of men, describing man, for instance, as an animal +capable of laughter, a biped without feathers, a rational animal, and so +on; each person forming universal images of things according to the +temperament of his own body. It is not therefore to be wondered at that +so many controversies have arisen amongst those philosophers who have +endeavored to explain natural objects by the images of things alone. + + +_The Three Kinds of Knowledge_ + +From what has been already said, it clearly appears that we perceive +many things and form universal ideas: + +1. From individual things, represented by the senses to us in a +mutilated and confused manner, and without order to the intellect. These +perceptions I have therefore been in the habit of calling knowledge +from vague experience. + +2. From signs; as, for example, when we hear or read certain words, we +recollect things and form certain ideas of them similar to them, through +which ideas we imagine things. These two ways of looking at things I +shall hereafter call knowledge of the first kind, opinion or +imagination. + +3. From our possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the +properties of things. This I shall call reason and knowledge of the +second kind. + +Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is a third, as I shall +hereafter show, which we shall call intuitive science. This kind of +knowing advances from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain +attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. +All this I will explain by one example. Let there be three numbers given +through which it is required to discover a fourth which shall be to the +third as the second is to the first. A merchant does not hesitate to +multiply the second and third together and divide the product by the +first, either because he has not yet forgotten the things which he heard +without any demonstration from his school-master, or because he has seen +the truth of the rule with the more simple numbers, or because from the +19th Prop. in the 7th book of Euclid he understands the common property +of all proportionals. + +But with the simplest numbers there is no need of all this. If the +numbers 1, 2, 3, for instance, be given, every one can see that the +fourth proportional is 6 much more clearly than by any demonstration, +because from the ratio in which we see by one intuition that the first +stands to the second we conclude the fourth. + +To knowledge of the first kind we have said that all those ideas belong +which are inadequate and confused, and, therefore, this knowledge alone +is the cause of falsity. Moreover, to knowledge of the second and third +kind we have said that those ideas belong which are adequate, and +therefore this knowledge is necessarily true. + +It is the knowledge of the second and third, and not that of the first +kind, which teaches us to distinguish the true from the false. For he +who knows how to distinguish between the true and the false must have an +adequate idea of the true and the false, that is to say, he must know +the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge. + + +_Reason and Imagination_ + +It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly, that is to say, +as they are in themselves, that is to say, not as contingent but as +necessary. + +Hence it follows that it is through the imagination alone that we look +upon things as contingent both with reference to the past and the +future. + +How this happens I will explain in a few words. We have shown above that +unless causes occur preventing the present existence of things, the mind +always imagines them present before it, even if they do not exist. +Again, we have shown that if the human body has once been simultaneously +affected by two external bodies, whenever the mind afterwards imagines +one it will immediately remember the other; that is to say, it will +look upon both as present before it, unless causes occur which prevent +the present existence of the things. No one doubts, too, that we imagine +time because we imagine some bodies to move with a velocity less, or +greater than, or equal to that of others. + +Let us therefore suppose a boy who yesterday, for the first time, in the +morning saw Peter, at midday Paul, in the evening Simeon, and to-day in +the morning again sees Peter. It is plain that as soon as he sees the +morning light he will imagine the sun passing through the same part of +the sky as on the day preceding; that is to say, he will imagine the +whole day, and at the same time Peter will be connected in his +imagination with the morning, Paul with midday, and Simeon with the +evening. In the morning, therefore, the existence of Paul and Simeon +will be imagined in relation to future time, while in the evening, if +the boy should see Simeon, he will refer Peter and Paul to the past, +since they will be connected with the past in his imagination. This +process will be constant in proportion to the regularity with which he +sees Peter, Paul, and Simeon in this order. If it should by some means +happen that on some other evening, in the place of Simeon, he should see +James, on the following morning he will connect in his imagination with +the evening at one time Simeon and at another James, but not both +together. For he is supposed to have seen one and then the other in the +evening, but not both together. His imagination will therefore +fluctuate, and he will connect with a future evening first one and then +the other; that is to say, he will consider neither as certain, but both +as a contingency in the future. + +This fluctuation of the imagination will take place in the same way if +the imagination is dealing with things which we contemplate in the same +way with reference to past or present time, and consequently we imagine +things related to time past, present, or future as contingent. + + +_Sub Specie AEternitatis_ + +It is of the nature of reason to consider things as necessary and not as +contingent. This necessity of things it perceives truly, that is to say, +as it is in itself. But this necessity of things is the necessity itself +of the eternal nature of God. Therefore it is of the nature of reason to +consider things under this form of eternity. Moreover, the foundations +of reason are notions which explain those things which are common to +all, and these things explain the essence of no individual thing, and +must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, but under a +certain form of eternity. + + +_The Limits of Human Knowledge_ + +I + +The parts composing the human body pertain to the essence of the body +itself only in so far as they communicate their motions to one another +by some certain method, and not in so far as they can be considered as +individuals without relation to the human body. For the parts of the +human body are individuals, composite to a high degree, parts of which +can be separated from the human body and communicate their motions to +other bodies in another way, although the nature and form of the human +body itself is closely preserved. Therefore the idea or knowledge of +each part will be in God in so far as He is considered as affected by +another idea of an individual thing, which individual thing is prior to +the part itself in the order of Nature. The same thing may be said of +each part of the individual itself composing the human body, and +therefore the knowledge of each part composing the human body exists in +God in so far as He is affected by a number of ideas of things, and not +in so far as He has the idea of the human body only; that is to say, the +idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind; and therefore the +human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing +the human body. + +We have shown that the idea of a modification of the human body involves +the nature of an external body so far as the external body determines +the human body in some certain manner. But in so far as the external +body is an individual which is not related to the human body, its idea +or knowledge is in God, in so far as He is considered as affected by the +idea of another thing, which idea is prior by nature to the external +body itself. Therefore the adequate knowledge of an external body is not +in God in so far as He has the idea of the modification of the human +body, or, in other words, the idea of the modification of the human body +does not involve an adequate knowledge of an external body. + +When the human mind through the ideas of the modifications of its body +contemplates external bodies, we say that it then imagines, nor can the +mind in any other way imagine external bodies as actually existing. +Therefore in so far as the mind imagines external bodies it does not +possess an adequate knowledge of them. + + +II + +The idea of a modification of the human body does not involve an +adequate knowledge of the body itself, or, in other words, does not +adequately express its nature, that is to say, it does not correspond +adequately with the nature of the human mind, and therefore the idea of +this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind, nor +involve an adequate knowledge of it. + +From this it is evident that the human mind, when it perceives things in +the common order of Nature, has no adequate knowledge of itself nor of +its own body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused and mutilated +knowledge; for the mind does not know itself unless in so far as it +perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body. Moreover, it does +not perceive its body unless through those same ideas of the +modifications by means of which alone it perceives external bodies. +Therefore in so far as it possesses these ideas it possesses an adequate +knowledge neither of itself, nor of its body, nor of external bodies, +but merely a mutilated and confused knowledge. + +I say expressly that the mind has no adequate knowledge of itself, nor +of its body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused knowledge, as +often as it perceives things in the common order of Nature, that is to +say, as often as it is determined to the contemplation of this or that +_externally_--namely, by a chance coincidence, and not as often as it is +determined _internally_--for the reason that it contemplates several +things at once, and is determined to understand in what they differ, +agree, or oppose one another; for whenever it is internally disposed in +this or in any other way, it then contemplates things clearly and +distinctly. + + +III + +The duration of our body does not depend upon its essence, nor upon the +absolute nature of God, but the body is determined to existence and +action by causes which also are determined by others to existence and +action in a certain and determinate manner, whilst these, again, are +determined by others, and so on _ad infinitum_. The duration, therefore, +of our body depends upon the common order of Nature and the constitution +of things. But an adequate knowledge of the way in which things are +constituted, exists in God in so far as He possesses the ideas of all +things, and not in so far as He possesses only the idea of the human +body. Therefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is altogether +inadequate in God, in so far as He is only considered as constituting +the nature of the human mind, that is to say, this knowledge in our mind +is altogether inadequate. + +Each individual thing, like the human body, must be determined to +existence and action by another individual thing in a certain and +determinate manner, and this again by another, and so on _ad infinitum_. +But we have demonstrated in the preceding proposition, from this common +property of individual things, that we have but a very inadequate +knowledge of the duration of our own body; therefore the same conclusion +is to be drawn about the duration of individual things, that is to say, +that we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of it. + +Hence it follows that all individual things are contingent and +corruptible, for we can have no adequate knowledge concerning their +duration and this is what is to be understood by us as their contingency +and capability of corruption; for there is no other contingency but +this. + + +_The Mind's Knowledge of God_ + +The idea of an individual thing actually existing necessarily involves +both the essence and existence of the thing itself. But individual +things cannot be conceived without God, and since God is their cause in +so far as He is considered under that attribute of which they are modes, +their ideas must necessarily involve the conception of that attribute, +or, in other words, must involve the eternal and infinite essence of +God. + +By existence is to be understood here not duration, that is, existence +considered in the abstract, as if it were a certain kind of quantity, +but I speak of the nature itself of the existence which is assigned to +individual things, because from the eternal necessity of the nature of +God infinite numbers of things follow in infinite ways. I repeat, that I +speak of the existence itself of individual things in so far as they are +in God. For although each individual thing is determined by another +individual thing to existence in a certain way, the force nevertheless +by which each thing perseveres in its existence follows from the eternal +necessity of the nature of God. + +The demonstration of the preceding proposition is universal, and whether +a thing be considered as a part or as a whole, its idea, whether it be +of a part or whole, will involve the eternal and infinite essence of +God. Therefore that which gives a knowledge of the eternal and infinite +essence of God is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the +whole. This knowledge therefore will be adequate. + +The human mind possesses ideas by which it perceives itself and its own +body, together with external bodies, as actually existing. Therefore it +possesses an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of +God. + +Hence we see that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known +to all; and since all things are in God and are conceived through Him, +it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge many things which we +can know adequately, and that we can thus form that third sort of +knowledge. The reason why we do not possess a knowledge of God as +distinct as that which we have of common notions is, that we cannot +imagine God as we can bodies; and because we have attached the name God +to the images of things which we are in the habit of seeing, an error we +can hardly avoid, inasmuch as we are continually affected by external +bodies. + +Many errors, of a truth, consist merely in the application of the wrong +names to things. For if a man says that the lines which are drawn from +the center of the circle to the circumference are not equal, he +understands by the circle, at all events for the time, something else +than mathematicians understand by it. So when men make errors in +calculation, the numbers which are in their minds are not those which +are upon the paper. As far as their mind is concerned there is no error, +although it seems as if there were, because we think that the numbers in +their minds are those which are upon the paper. If we did not think so, +we should not believe them to be in error. For example, when I lately +heard a man complaining that his court had flown into one of his +neighbor's fowls, I understood what he meant, and therefore did not +imagine him to be in error. This is the source from which so many +controversies arise--that men either do not properly explain their own +thoughts, or do not properly interpret those of other people; for, in +truth, when they most contradict one another, they either think the same +things or something different, so that those things which they suppose +to be errors and absurdities in another person are not so. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[18] From the _Improvement of the Understanding_, Sec.Sec. 33-35. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +DETERMINISM AND MORALS + + +_The Mind Is Necessarily Determined_ + +The mind is a certain and determinate mode of thought, and therefore it +cannot be the free cause of its own actions, or have an absolute faculty +of willing or not willing, but must be determined to this or that +volition by a cause which is also determined by another cause, and this +again by another, and so on _ad infinitum_. + +In the same manner it is demonstrated that in the mind there exists no +absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. These and the +like faculties, therefore, are either altogether fictitious, or else are +nothing but metaphysical or universal entities, which we are in the +habit of forming from individual cases. The intellect and will, +therefore, are related to this or that idea or volition as rockiness is +related to this or that rock, or as man is related to Peter or Paul. The +reason why men imagine themselves to be free we have already explained. + + +_Faculty Psychology Fallacious_ + +Before, however, I advance any further, I must observe that by the will +I understand a faculty of affirming or denying, but not a desire; a +faculty, I say, by which the mind affirms or denies that which is true +or false, and not a desire by which the mind seeks a thing or turns away +from it. But now that we have demonstrated that these faculties are +universal notions which are not distinguishable from the individual +notions from which they are formed, we must now inquire whether the +volitions themselves are anything more than the ideas of things. We must +inquire, I say, whether in the mind there exists any other affirmation +or negation than that which the idea involves in so far as it is an +idea. For this purpose see the following, so that thought may not fall +into pictures. For by ideas I do not understand the images which are +formed at the back of the eye, or, if you please, in the middle of the +brain, but rather the conceptions of thought. + +In the mind there exists no absolute faculty of willing or not willing. +Only individual volitions exist, that is to say, this and that +affirmation and this and that negation. Let us conceive, therefore, any +individual volition, that is, any mode of thought, by which the mind +affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right +angles. This affirmation involves the conception or idea of the +triangle, that is to say, without it the affirmation cannot be +conceived. For to say that _A_ must involve the conception _B_, is the +same as saying that _A_ cannot be conceived without _B_. Moreover, +without the idea of the triangle this affirmation cannot be, and it can +therefore neither be nor be conceived without that idea. But this idea +of the triangle must involve this same affirmation that its three angles +are equal to two right angles. Therefore also, _vice versa_, this idea +of the triangle without this affirmation can neither be nor be +conceived. Therefore this affirmation pertains to the essence of the +idea of the triangle, nor is it anything else besides this. Whatever too +we have said of this volition (since it has been taken arbitrarily) +applies to all other volitions, that is to say, they are nothing but +ideas. + +The will and the intellect are nothing but the individual volitions and +ideas themselves. But the individual volition and idea are one and the +same. Therefore the will and the intellect are one and the same. + + +_False Doctrines about Error Exposed_ + +I have thus removed what is commonly thought to be the cause of error. +It has been proved above that falsity consists solely in the privation +which mutilated and confused ideas involve. A false idea, therefore, in +so far as it is false, does not involve certitude. Consequently, when we +say that a man assents to what is false and does not doubt it, we do not +say that he is certain, but merely that he does not doubt, that is to +say, that he assents to what is false, because there are no causes +sufficient to make his imagination waver. Although, therefore, a man may +be supposed to adhere to what is false, we shall never on that account +say that he is certain. For by certitude we understand something +positive, and not the privation of doubt; but by the privation of +certitude we understand falsity. + +If the preceding proposition, however, is to be more clearly +comprehended, a word or two must be added; it yet remains also that I +should answer the objections which may be brought against our doctrine, +and finally, in order to remove all scruples, I have thought it worth +while to indicate some of its advantages. I say some, as the principal +advantages will be better understood later. + +I begin, therefore, with the first, and I warn my readers carefully to +distinguish between an idea or conception of the mind and the images of +things formed by our imagination. Secondly, it is necessary that we +should distinguish between ideas and the words by which things are +signified. For it is because these three things, images, words, and +ideas, are by many people either altogether confounded or not +distinguished with sufficient accuracy and care that such ignorance +exists about this doctrine of the will, so necessary to be known both +for the purposes of speculation and for the wise government of life. +Those who think that ideas consist of images, which are formed in us by +meeting with external bodies, persuade themselves that those ideas of +things of which we can form no similar image are not ideas, but mere +fancies constructed by the free power of the will. They look upon ideas, +therefore, as dumb pictures on a tablet, and being prepossessed with +this prejudice, they do not see that an idea, in so far as it is an +idea, involves affirmation or negation. Again, those who confound words +with the idea, or with the affirmation itself which the idea involves, +think that they can will contrary to their perception, because they +affirm or deny something in words alone contrary to their perception. It +will be easy for us, however, to divest ourselves of these prejudices if +we attend to the nature of thought, which in no way involves the +conception of extension, and by doing this we clearly see that an idea, +since it is a mode of thought, is not an image of anything, nor does it +consist of words. For the essence of words and images is formed of +bodily motions alone, which involve in no way whatever the conception of +thought. + +Let thus much suffice under this head. I pass on now to the objections +to which I have already alluded. + + +_Freedom of the Will_ + +The first is, that it is supposed to be certain that the will extends +itself more widely than the intellect, and is therefore different from +it. The reason why men suppose that the will extends itself more widely +than the intellect is because they say they have discovered that they do +not need a larger faculty of assent--that is to say, of affirmation--and +denial than that which they now have for the purpose of assenting to an +infinite number of other things which we do not perceive, but that they +do need a greater faculty for understanding them. The will, therefore, +is distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite, the former +infinite. The second objection which can be made is that there is +nothing which experience seems to teach more clearly than the +possibility of suspending our judgment, so as not to assent to the +things we perceive; and we are strengthened in this opinion because no +one is said to be deceived in so far as he perceives a thing, but only +in so far as he assents to it or dissents from it. For example, a man +who imagines a winged horse does not therefore admit the existence of a +winged horse; that is to say, he is not necessarily deceived, unless he +grants at the same time that a winged horse exists. Experience, +therefore, seems to show nothing more plainly than that the will or +faculty of assent is free, and different from the faculty of the +intellect. + +Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not seem to +contain more reality than another; that is to say, it does not appear +that we need a greater power for affirming a thing to be true which is +true than for affirming a thing to be true which is false. Nevertheless, +we observe that one idea contains more reality or perfection than +another, for as some objects are nobler than others, in the same +proportion are their ideas more perfect. It appears indisputable, +therefore, that there is a difference between the will and the +intellect. + +Fourthly, it may be objected that if a man does not act from freedom of +the will, what would he do if he were in a state of equilibrium, like +the ass of Buridanus? Would he not perish from hunger and thirst? and if +this be granted, do we not seem to conceive him as a statue of a man or +as an ass? If I deny that he would thus perish, he will consequently +determine himself and possess the power of going where he likes and +doing what he likes. + +There may be other objections besides these, but as I am not bound to +discuss what every one may dream, I shall therefore make it my business +to answer as briefly as possible those only which I have mentioned. + +In reply to the first objection, I grant that the will extends itself +more widely than the intellect, if by the intellect we understand only +clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will extends itself more +widely than the perceptions or the faculty of conception; nor, indeed, +do I see why the faculty of will should be said to be infinite any more +than the faculty of feeling; for as by the same faculty of will we can +affirm an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot +affirm an infinite number of things at once), so also by the same +faculty of feeling we can feel or perceive (one after another) an +infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there are an infinite +number of things which we cannot perceive, I reply that such things as +these we can reach by no thought, and consequently by no faculty of +will. But it is said that if God wished us to perceive those things, it +would be necessary for Him to give us a larger faculty of perception, +but not a larger faculty of will than He has already given us, which is +the same thing as saying that if God wished us to understand an infinite +number of other beings, it would be necessary for Him to give us a +greater intellect, but not a more universal idea of being (in order to +embrace that infinite number of beings), than He has given us. For we +have shown that the will is a Universal, or the idea by which we explain +all individual volitions, that is to say, that which is common to them +all. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that those who believe this +common or universal idea of all the volitions to be a faculty should say +that it extends itself infinitely beyond the limits of the intellect. +For the universal is predicated of one or of many, or of an infinite +number of individuals. + +The second objection I answer by denying that we have free power of +suspending judgment. For when we say that a person suspends judgment, we +only say in other words that he sees that he does not perceive the thing +adequately. The suspension of the judgment, therefore, is in truth a +perception and not free will. + +In order that this may be clearly understood, let us take the case of a +boy who imagines a horse and perceives nothing else. Since this +imagination involves the existence of the horse, and the boy does not +perceive anything which negates its existence, he will necessarily +contemplate it as present, nor will he be able to doubt its existence +although he may not be certain of it. This is a thing which we daily +experience in dreams, nor do I believe that there is any one who thinks +that he has the free power during dreams of suspending his judgment upon +those things which he dreams, and of causing himself not to dream those +things which he dreams that he sees; and yet in dreams it nevertheless +happens that we suspend our judgment, for we dream that we dream. + +I grant, it is true, that no man is deceived in so far as he perceives; +that is to say, I grant that mental images considered in themselves +involve no error; but I deny that a man in so far as he perceives +affirms nothing. For what else is it to perceive a winged horse than to +affirm of the horse that it has wings? For if the mind perceived nothing +else but this winged horse, it would regard it as present, nor would it +have any reason for doubting its existence, nor any power of refusing +assent to it, unless the image of the winged horse be joined to an idea +which negates its existence, or the mind perceives that the idea of the +winged horse which it has is inadequate. In either of the two latter +cases it will necessarily deny or doubt the existence of the horse. + +With regard to the third objection, what has been said will perhaps be +a sufficient answer--namely, that the will is something universal, which +is predicated of all ideas, and that it signifies that only which is +common to them all, that is to say, affirmation. Its adequate essence, +therefore, in so far as it is thus considered in the abstract, must be +in every idea, and in this sense only must it be the same in all; but +not in so far as it is considered as constituting the essence of an +idea, for so far, the individual affirmations differ just as the ideas +differ. For example, the affirmation which the idea of a circle involves +differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves, just as the +idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle. Again, I +absolutely deny that we need a power of thinking in order to affirm that +to be true which is true, equal to that which we need in order to affirm +that to be true which is false. For these two affirmations, if we look +to the mind, are related to one another as being and non-being, for +there is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes a form of falsity. + +Here therefore particularly is it to be observed how easily we are +deceived when we confuse universals with individuals, and the entities +of reason and abstractions with realities. + +With regard to the fourth objection, I say that I entirely grant that if +a man were placed in such a state of equilibrium he would perish of +hunger and thirst, supposing he perceived nothing but hunger and thirst, +and the food and drink which were equidistant from him. If you ask me +whether such a man would not be thought an ass rather than a man, I +reply that I do not know; nor do I know what ought to be thought of a +man who hangs himself, or of children, fools, and madmen. + + +_The Independence of Mind and Body_ + +All modes of thought have God for a cause in so far as He is a thinking +thing, and not in so far as He is manifested by any other attribute. +That which determines the mind to thought, therefore, is a mode of +thought and not of extension, that is to say, it is not the body. Again, +the motion and rest of the body must be derived from some other body, +which has also been determined to motion or rest by another, and, +absolutely, whatever arises in the body must arise from God, in so far +as He is considered as affected by some mode of extension, and not in so +far as He is considered as affected by any mode of thought, that is to +say, whatever arises in the body cannot arise from the mind, which is a +mode of thought. Therefore, the body cannot determine the mind to +thought, neither can the mind determine the body to motion nor rest, nor +to anything else, if there be anything else. + +This proposition will be better understood from what has been said, that +is to say, that the mind and the body are one and the same thing, +conceived at one time under the attribute of thought, and at another +under that of extension. For this reason, the order or concatenation of +things is one, whether nature be conceived under this or under that +attribute, and consequently the order of the actions and passions of our +body is coincident in Nature with the order of the actions and passions +of the mind. + +Although these things are so, and no ground for doubting remains, I +scarcely believe, nevertheless, that, without a proof derived from +experience, men will be induced calmly to weigh what has been said, so +firmly are they persuaded that, solely at the bidding of the mind, the +body moves or rests, and does a number of things which depend upon the +will of the mind alone, and upon the power of thought. For what the body +can do no one has hitherto determined, that is to say, experience has +taught no one hitherto what the body, without being determined by the +mind, can do and what it cannot do from the laws of Nature alone, in so +far as Nature is considered merely as corporeal. For no one as yet has +understood the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to +explain all its functions, not to mention the fact that many things are +observed in brutes which far surpass human sagacity, and that +sleep-walkers in their sleep do very many things which they dare not do +when awake; all this showing that the body itself can do many things +from the laws of its own nature alone at which the mind belonging to +that body is amazed. + +Again, nobody knows by what means or by what method the mind moves the +body, nor how many degrees of motion it can communicate to the body, nor +with what speed it can move the body. So that it follows that when men +say that this or that action of the body springs from the mind which has +commanded over the body, they do not know what they say, and they do +nothing but confess with pretentious words that they know nothing about +the cause of the action, and see nothing in it to wonder at. + +But they will say, that whether they know or do not know by what means +the mind moves the body, it is nevertheless in their experience that if +the mind were not fit for thinking the body would be inert. They say, +again, it is in their experience that the mind alone has power both to +speak and be silent, and to do many other things which they therefore +think to be dependent on a decree of the mind. + +But with regard to the first assertion, I ask them if experience does +not also teach that if the body be sluggish the mind at the same time is +not fit for thinking? When the body is asleep, the mind slumbers with +it, and has not the power to think, as it has when the body is awake. +Again, I believe that all have discovered that the mind is not always +equally fitted for thinking about the same subject, but in proportion to +the fitness of the body for this or that image to be excited in it will +the mind be better fitted to contemplate this or that object. But my +opponents will say, that from the laws of Nature alone, in so far as it +is considered to be corporeal merely, it cannot be that the causes of +architecture, painting, and things of this sort, which are the results +of human art alone, could be deduced, and that the human body, unless it +were determined and guided by the mind, would not be able to build a +temple. I have already shown, however, that they do not know what the +body can do, nor what can be deduced from the consideration of its +nature alone, and that they find that many things are done merely by the +laws of Nature which they would never have believed to be possible +without the direction of the mind, as, for example, those things which +sleep-walkers do in their sleep, and at which they themselves are +astonished when they wake. I adduce also here the structure itself of +the human body, which so greatly surpasses in workmanship all those +things which are constructed by human art, not to mention what I have +already proved, that an infinitude of things follows from Nature under +whatever attribute it may be considered. + +With regard to the second point, I should say that human affairs would +be much more happily conducted if it were equally in the power of men to +be silent and to speak. But experience shows over and over again that +there is nothing which men have less power over than the tongue, and +that there is nothing which they are less able to do than to govern +their appetites, so that many persons believe that we do those things +only with freedom which we seek indifferently; as the desire for such +things can easily be lessened by the recollection of another thing which +we frequently call to mind; it being impossible, on the other hand, to +do those things with freedom which we seek with such ardor that the +recollection of another thing is unable to mitigate it. + +But if, however, we had not found out that we do many things which we +afterwards repent, and that when agitated by conflicting emotions we see +that which is better and follow that which is worse, nothing would +hinder us from believing that we do everything with freedom. Thus the +infant believes that it is by free will that it seeks the breast; the +angry boy believes that by free will he wishes vengeance; the timid man +thinks it is with free will he seeks flight; the drunkard believes that +by a free command of his mind he speaks the things which when sober he +wishes he had left unsaid. Thus the madman, the chatterer, the boy, and +others of the same kind, all believe that they speak by a free command +of the mind, whilst, in truth, they have no power to restrain the +impulse which they have to speak, so that experience itself, no less +than reason, clearly teaches that men believe themselves to be free +simply because they are conscious of their own actions, knowing nothing +of the causes by which they are determined. It[19] teaches, too, that +the decrees of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which +differ, therefore, according to the different temper of the body. For +every man determines all things from his emotion; those who are agitated +by contrary emotions do not know what they want, whilst those who are +agitated by no emotion are easily driven hither and thither. + +All this plainly shows that the decree of the mind, the appetite, and +determination of the body are coincident in Nature, or rather that they +are one and the same thing, which, when it is considered under the +attribute of thought and manifested by that, is called a decree, and +when it is considered under the attribute of extension and is deduced +from the laws of motion and rest, is called a determination. + +This, however, will be better understood as we go on, for there is +another thing which I wish to be observed here--that we cannot by a +mental decree do a thing unless we recollect it. We cannot speak a word, +for instance, unless we recollect it. But it is not in the free power of +the mind either to recollect a thing or to forget it. It is believed, +therefore, that the power of the mind extends only thus far--that from a +mental decree we can speak or be silent about a thing only when we +recollect it. But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we do so +from a free decree of the mind; and yet we do not speak, or, if we do, +it is the result of a spontaneous motion of the body. We dream, again, +that we are concealing things, and that we do this by virtue of a decree +of the mind like that by which, when awake, we are silent about things +we know. We dream, again, that from a decree of the mind, we do some +things which we should not dare to do when awake. And I should like to +know, therefore, whether there are two kinds of decrees in the +mind--one belonging to dreams and the other free. If this be too great +nonsense, we must necessarily grant that this decree of the mind, which +is believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or +memory, and is nothing but the affirmation which the idea necessarily +involves in so far as it is an idea. These decrees of the mind, +therefore, arise in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of +things actually existing. Consequently, those who believe that they +speak, or are silent, or do anything else from a free decree of the +mind, dream with their eyes open. + + +_The Moral Values of Determinism_ + +I + +It remains for me now to show what service to our own lives a knowledge +of this doctrine is. This we shall easily understand from the remarks +which follow. Notice-- + +1. It is of service in so far as it teaches us that we do everything by +the will of God alone, and that we are partakers of the divine nature in +proportion as our actions become more and more perfect and we more and +more understand God. This doctrine, therefore, besides giving repose in +every way to the soul, has also this advantage, that it teaches us in +what our highest happiness or blessedness consists, namely, in the +knowledge of God alone, by which we are drawn to do those things only +which love and piety persuade. Hence we clearly see how greatly those +stray from the true estimation of virtue who expect to be distinguished +by God with the highest rewards for virtue and the noblest actions as if +for the completest servitude, just as if virtue itself and the service +of God were not happiness itself and the highest liberty. + +2. It is of service to us in so far as it teaches us how we ought to +behave with regard to the things of fortune, or those which are not in +our power, that is to say, which do not follow from our own nature; for +it teaches us with equal mind to wait for and bear each form of fortune, +because we know that all things follow from the eternal decree of God, +according to that same necessity by which it follows from the essence of +a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. + +3. This doctrine contributes to the welfare of our social existence, +since it teaches us to hate no one, to despise no one, to mock no one, +to be angry with no one, and to envy no one. It teaches every one, +moreover, to be content with his own, and to be helpful to his neighbor, +not from any womanish pity, from partiality, or superstition, but by the +guidance of reason alone, according to the demand of time and +circumstance, as I shall show. + +4. This doctrine contributes not a little to the advantage of common +society, in so far as it teaches us by what means citizens are to be +governed and led; not in order that they may be slaves, but that they +may freely do those things which are best. + + +II + +At[21] last I see, what it was that you begged me not to publish. +However, as it forms the chief foundation of everything in the +treatise[22] which I intend to bring out, I should like briefly to +explain here, in what sense I assert that a fatal necessity presides +over all things and actions. + +God I in no wise subject to fate: I conceive that all things follow with +inevitable necessity from the nature of God, in the same way as every +one conceives that it follows from God's nature that God understands +Himself. This latter consequence all admit to follow necessarily from +the divine nature, yet no one conceives that God is under the compulsion +of any fate, but that He understands Himself quite freely, though +necessarily. + +Further, this inevitable necessity in things does away neither with +divine nor human laws. The principles of morality, whether they receive +from God Himself the form of laws or institutions, or whether they do +not, are still divine and salutary; whether we receive the good, which +flows from virtue and the divine love, as from God in the capacity of a +judge, or as from the necessity of the divine nature, it will in either +case be equally desirable; on the other hand, the evils following from +wicked actions and passions are not less to be feared because they are +necessary consequences.[23] Lastly, in our actions, whether they be +necessary or contingent, we are led by hope and fear. + +Men are only without excuse before God, because they are in God's power, +as clay is in the hands of the potter, who from the same lump makes +vessels, some to honor, some to dishonor.... [24] When I said in my +former letter that we are inexcusable, because we are in the power of +God, like clay in the hands of the potter, I meant to be understood in +the sense that no one can bring a complaint against God for having given +him a weak nature, or infirm spirit. A circle might as well complain to +God for not being endowed with the properties of a sphere, or a child +who is tortured, say, with stone, for not being given a healthy body, as +a man of feeble spirit, because God has denied to him fortitude, and the +true knowledge and love of the Deity, or because he is endowed with so +weak a nature that he cannot check or moderate his desires. For the +nature of each thing is only competent to do that which follows +necessarily from its given cause. + +That every man cannot be brave, and that we can no more command for +ourselves a healthy body than a healthy mind, nobody can deny, without +giving the lie to experience, as well as to reason. "But," you urge, "if +men sin by nature, they are excusable"; but you do not state the +conclusion you draw, whether that God cannot be angry with them, or that +they are worthy of blessedness--that is, of the knowledge and love of +God. If you say the former, I fully admit that God cannot be angry, and +that all things are done in accordance with His will; but I deny that +all men ought, therefore, to be blessed--men may be excusable, and +nevertheless, be without blessedness and afflicted in many ways.[25] A +horse is excusable for being a horse and not a man; but, nevertheless, +he must needs be a horse and not a man. He who goes mad from the bite of +a dog is excusable, yet he is rightly suffocated. Lastly, he who cannot +govern his desires, and keep them in check with the fear of the laws, +though his weakness may be excusable, yet he cannot enjoy with +contentment, the knowledge and love of God, but necessarily perishes. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[19] ... I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by the +necessity of its own nature. Thus also God understands Himself and all +things freely, because it follows solely from the necessity of His +nature that He should understand all things. You see I do not place +freedom in free decision, but in free necessity. However, let us descend +to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist +and operate in a given determinate manner. In order that this may be +clearly understood, let us conceive a very simple thing. For instance, a +stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause a certain +quantity of motion, by virtue of which it continues to move after the +impulsion given by the external cause has ceased. The permanence of the +stone's motion is constrained, not necessary because it must be defined +by the impulsion of an external cause. What is true of the stone is true +of an individual, however complicated its nature, or varied its +functions, inasmuch as every individual thing is necessarily determined +by some external cause to exist and operate in a fixed and determinate +manner. + +Further conceive, I beg, that a stone, while continuing in motion, +should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is endeavoring, as +far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being conscious merely +of its own endeavor and not at all indifferent, would believe itself to +be completely free, and would think that it continued in motion solely +because of its own wish. This is that human freedom, which all boast +that they possess, and which consists solely in the fact, that men are +conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby +that desire has been determined.[20] ... + +[20] _From a letter to G. H. Schaller_ (1674). + +[21] _From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Dec., 1675). + +[22] The _Ethics_.--ED. + +[23] I received on Saturday last your very short letter dated 15th Nov. +In it you merely indicated the points in the theological treatise which +have given pain to readers, whereas I had hoped to learn from it what +were the opinions which militated against the practice of religious +virtue.... I make this chief distinction between religion and +superstition; the latter is founded on ignorance, the former on +knowledge. This, I take it, is the reason why Christians are +distinguished from the rest of the world, not by faith, nor by charity, +nor by the other fruits of the Holy Spirit, but solely by their +opinions, inasmuch as they defend their cause, like every one else, by +miracles, that is, by ignorance, which is the source of all malice. Thus +they turn a faith, which may be true, into superstition. _From a letter +to Henry Oldenburg_ (Dec., 1675). + +[24] _From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Feb. 7, 1676). + +[25] A mouse no less than an angel, and sorrow no less than joy depend +on God; yet a mouse is not a kind of angel, neither is sorrow a kind of +joy. _From a letter to Wm. Blyenbergh_ (March 13, 1665). + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS + + +_Introductory_ + +Most persons who have written about the emotions and man's conduct of +life seem to discuss, not the natural things which follow the common +laws of Nature, but things which are outside her. They seem indeed to +consider man in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe +that man disturbs rather than follows her order; that he has an absolute +power over his own actions; and that he is altogether self-determined. +They then proceed to attribute the cause of human weakness and +changeableness, not to the common power of Nature, but to some vice of +human nature, which they therefore bewail, laugh at, mock, or, as is +more generally the case, detest; whilst he who knows how to revile most +eloquently or subtilely the weakness of the mind is looked upon as +divine. + +It is true that very eminent men have not been wanting, to whose labor +and industry we confess ourselves much indebted, who have written many +excellent things about the right conduct of life, and who have given to +mortals counsels full of prudence. But no one so far as I know has +determined the nature and strength of the emotions, and what the mind is +able to do towards controlling them. I remember, indeed, that the +celebrated Descartes, although he believed that the mind is absolute +master over its own actions, tried nevertheless to explain by their +first causes human emotions, and at the same time to show the way by +which the mind could obtain absolute power over them. But in my opinion +he has shown nothing but the acuteness of his great intellect, as I +shall make evident in the proper place, for I wish to return to those +who prefer to detest and scoff at human affects and actions than +understand them. + +To such as these it will doubtless seem a marvelous thing for me to +endeavor to treat by a geometrical method the vices and follies of men, +and to desire by a sure method to demonstrate those things which these +people cry out against as being opposed to reason, or as being vanities, +absurdities, and monstrosities. The following is my reason for so doing. +Nothing happens in Nature which can be attributed to any vice of Nature, +for she is always the same and everywhere one. Her virtue is the same, +and her power of acting; that is to say, her laws and rules, according +to which all things are and are changed from form to form, are +everywhere and always the same; so that there must also be one and the +same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, that +is to say, by the universal laws and rules of Nature. The emotions, +therefore, of hatred, anger, envy, considered in themselves, follow from +the same necessity and virtue of Nature as other individual things; they +have therefore certain causes through which they are to be understood, +and certain properties which are just as worthy of being known as the +properties of any other thing in the contemplation alone of which we +delight. I shall, therefore, pursue the same method in considering the +nature and strength of the emotions and the power of the mind over them +which I pursued in our previous discussion of God and the mind, and I +shall consider human actions and appetites just as if I were considering +lines, planes or bodies. + + +_Definitions_ + +I.--I call that an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and +distinctly perceived by means of the cause. I call that an inadequate or +partial cause whose effect cannot be understood by means of the cause +alone. + +II.--I say that we act when anything is done, either within us or +without us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is to say (by the +preceding Definition), when from our nature anything follows, either +within us or without us, which by that nature alone can be clearly and +distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we suffer when +anything is done within us, or when anything follows from our nature, of +which we are not the cause excepting partially. + +III.--By emotion I understand the modifications of the body, by which +the power of acting of the body itself is increased, diminished, helped, +or hindered, together with the ideas of these modifications. + +If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of any of these +modifications, I understand the emotion to be an action, otherwise it is +a passion. + + +_Postulates_ + +1.--The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of +acting is increased or diminished, and also in other ways which make its +power of acting neither greater nor less. + +2.--The human body is capable of suffering many changes, and, +nevertheless, can retain the impressions or traces of objects, and +consequently the same images of things. + + +_The Two States of Mind: Active and Passive_ + +In every human mind some ideas are adequate, and others mutilated and +confused. But the ideas which in any mind are adequate are adequate in +God in so far as He forms the essence of that mind, while those again +which are inadequate in the mind are also adequate in God, not in so far +as He contains the essence of that mind only, but in so far as He +contains the ideas of other things at the same time in Himself. Again, +from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow, of which God is +the adequate cause, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He +is considered as affected with the given idea. But of that effect of +which God is the cause, in so far as He is affected by an idea which is +adequate in any mind, that same mind is the adequate cause. Our mind, +therefore, in so far as it has adequate ideas, necessarily at times +acts. Again, if there be anything which necessarily follows from an idea +which is adequate in God, not in so far as He contains within Himself +the mind of one man only, but also, together with this, the ideas[26] +of other things, then the mind of that man is not the adequate cause of +that thing, but is only its partial cause, and therefore, in so far as +the mind has inadequate ideas, it necessarily at times suffers. + + +_The Basic Endeavor of All Things_ + +Individual things are modes by which the attributes of God are expressed +in a certain and determinate manner; that is to say, they are things +which express in a certain and determinate manner the power of God, by +which He is and acts. A thing, too, has nothing in itself through which +it can be destroyed, or which can negate its existence,[27] but, on the +contrary, it is opposed to everything which could negate its existence. +Therefore, in so far as it can and is in itself, it endeavors to +persevere in its own being. + + +_The Three Primary Emotions_ + +I + +_Desire_ + +The essence of the mind is composed of adequate and inadequate ideas (as +we have shown), and therefore both in so far as it has the former and in +so far as it has the latter, it endeavors to persevere in its being, +and endeavors to persevere in it for an indefinite time. But since the +mind, through the ideas of the modifications of the body, is necessarily +conscious of itself, it is therefore conscious of its effort. + +This effort, when it is related to the mind alone, is called _will_, but +when it is related at the same time both to the mind and the body, is +called _appetite_, which is therefore nothing but the very essence of +man, from the nature of which necessarily follow those things which +promote his preservation, and thus he is determined to do those things. +Hence there is no difference between appetite and desire, unless in this +particular, that desire is generally related to men in so far as they +are conscious of their appetites, and it may therefore be defined as +appetite of which we are conscious. From what has been said it is plain, +therefore, that we neither strive for, wish, seek, nor desire anything +because we think it to be good, but, on the contrary, we adjudge a thing +to be good because we strive for, wish, seek, or desire it. + + +II + +_Joy and Sorrow_ + +If anything increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our body's power of +action, the idea of that thing increases, diminishes, helps, or limits +our mind's power of thought. + +We thus see that the mind can suffer great changes, and can pass now to +a greater and now to a lesser perfection; these passions explaining to +us the emotions of joy and sorrow. By _joy_, therefore, in what +follows, I shall understand the passion by which the mind passes to a +greater perfection; by _sorrow_, on the other hand, the passion by which +it passes to a less perfection. The emotion of joy, related at the same +time both to the mind and the body, I call _pleasurable excitement_ +(_titillatio_) or _cheerfulness_; that of sorrow I call _pain_ or +_melancholy_. It is, however, to be observed that pleasurable excitement +and pain are related to a man when one of his parts is affected more +than the others; cheerfulness and melancholy, on the other hand, when +all parts are equally affected. What the nature of desire is I have +explained; and besides these three--joy, sorrow, and desire--I know of +no other primary emotion, the others springing from these. + + +_Definitions of the Principal Emotions_ + +I.--_Desire_ is the essence itself of man in so far as it is conceived +as determined to any action by any one of his modifications. + +_Explanation._--We have said above, that desire is appetite which is +self-conscious, and that appetite is the essence itself of man in so far +as it is determined to such acts as contribute to his preservation. But +I have taken care to remark that in truth I cannot recognize any +difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a man be +conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite, +and so, lest I might appear to be guilty of tautology, I have not +explained desire by appetite, but have tried to give such a definition +of desire as would include all the efforts of human nature to which we +give the name of appetite, desire, will, or impulse. For I might have +said that desire is the essence itself of man in so far as it is +considered as determined to any action; but from this definition it +would not follow that the mind could be conscious of its desire or +appetite, and therefore, in order that I might include the cause of this +consciousness, it was necessary to add the words, _in so far as it is +conceived as determined to any action by any one of his modifications_. +For by a modification of the human essence we understand any +constitution of that essence, whether it be innate, whether it be +conceived through the attribute of thought alone or of extension alone, +or whether it be related to both. By the word "desire," therefore, I +understand all the efforts, impulses, appetites, and volitions of a man, +which vary according to his changing disposition, and not unfrequently +are so opposed to one another that he is drawn hither and thither, and +knows not whither he ought to turn. + +II. _Joy_ is man's passage from a less to a greater perfection. + +III. _Sorrow_ is man's passage from a greater to a less perfection. + +_Explanation._--I say passage, for joy is not perfection itself. If a +man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess +it without the emotion of joy; a truth which will appear the more +clearly from the emotion of sorrow, which is the opposite to joy. For +that sorrow consists in the passage to a less perfection, but not in the +less perfection itself, no one can deny, since in so far as a man shares +any perfection he cannot be sad. Nor can we say that sorrow consists in +the privation of a greater perfection for privation is nothing. But the +emotion of sorrow is a reality, and it therefore must be the reality of +the passage to a lesser perfection, or the reality by which man's power +of acting is diminished or limited. As for the definitions of +cheerfulness, pleasurable excitement, melancholy, and grief, I pass +these by, because they are related rather to the body than to the mind, +and are merely different kinds of joy or of sorrow. + +IV. _Astonishment_ is the imagination of an object in which the mind +remains fixed because this particular imagination has no connection with +others. + +_Explanation._--That which causes the mind from the contemplation of one +thing immediately to pass to the thought of another is that the images +of these things are connected one with the other, and are so arranged +that the one follows the other; a process which cannot be conceived when +the image of the thing is new, for the mind will be held in the +contemplation of the same object until other causes determine it to +think of other things. The imagination, therefore, considered in itself, +of a new object is of the same character as other imaginations; and for +this reason I do not class astonishment among the emotions, nor do I see +any reason why I should do it, since this abstraction of the mind arises +from no positive cause by which it is abstracted from other things, but +merely from the absence of any cause by which from the contemplation of +one thing the mind is determined to think other things. I acknowledge, +therefore, only three primitive or primary emotions, those of joy, +sorrow, and desire; and the only reason which has induced me to speak +of astonishment is, that it has been the custom to give other names to +certain emotions derived from the three primitives whenever these +emotions are related to objects at which we are astonished. This same +reason also induces me to add the definition of contempt. + +V. _Contempt_ is the imagination of an object which so little touches +the mind that the mind is moved by the presence of the object to imagine +those qualities which are not in it rather than those which are in it. + +The definitions of veneration and scorn I pass by here, because they +give a name, so far as I know, to none of the emotions. + +VI. _Love_ is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause. + +_Explanation._--This definition explains with sufficient clearness the +essence of love; that which is given by some authors, who define love to +be the will of the lover to unite himself to the beloved object, +expresses not the essence of love but one of its properties. In as much +as these authors have not seen with sufficient clearness what is the +essence of love, they could not have a distinct conception of its +properties, and consequently their definition has by everybody been +thought very obscure. I must observe, however, when I say that it is a +property in a lover to will a union with the beloved object, that I do +not understand by will a consent or deliberation or a free decree of the +mind (for that this is a fiction we have demonstrated above), nor even a +desire of the lover to unite himself with the beloved object when it is +absent, nor a desire to continue in its presence when it is present, for +love can be conceived without either one or the other of these desires; +but by will I understand the satisfaction that the beloved object +produces in the lover by its presence, by virtue of which the joy of the +lover is strengthened, or at any rate supported. + +VII. _Hatred_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of an external cause. + +_Explanation._--What is to be observed here will easily be seen from +what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition. + +VIII. _Inclination_ (_propensio_) is a joy with the accompanying idea of +some object as being accidentally the cause of joy. + +IX. _Aversion_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of some object which +is accidentally the cause of the sorrow. + +X. _Devotion_ is love towards an object which astonishes us. + +_Explanation._--Astonishment arises from the novelty of the object. If, +therefore, it should happen that we often imagine the object at which we +are astonished, we shall cease to be astonished at it, and hence we see +that the emotion of devotion easily degenerates into simple love. + +XI. _Derision_ is joy arising from the imagination that something we +despise is present in an object we hate. + +_Explanation._--In so far as we despise a thing we hate do we deny its +existence, and so far do we rejoice. But inasmuch as we suppose that a +man hates what he ridicules, it follows that this joy is not solid. + +XII. _Hope_ is a joy not constant, arising from the idea of something +future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt. + +XIII. _Fear_ is a sorrow not constant, arising from the idea of +something future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt. + +_Explanation._--From these definitions it follows that there is no hope +without fear nor fear without hope, for the person who wavers in hope +and doubts concerning the issue of anything is supposed to imagine +something which may exclude its existence, and so far, therefore, to be +sad, and consequently while he wavers in hope, to fear lest his wishes +should not be accomplished. So also the person who fears, that is to +say, who doubts whether what he hates will not come to pass, imagines +something which excludes the existence of what he hates, and therefore +is rejoiced, and consequently so far hopes that it will not happen. + +XIV. _Confidence_ is joy arising from the idea of a past or future +object from which cause for doubting is removed. + +XV. _Despair_ is sorrow arising from the idea of a past or future object +from which cause for doubting is removed. + +_Explanation._--Confidence, therefore, springs from hope and despair +from fear, whenever the reason for doubting the issue is taken away; a +case which occurs either because we imagine a thing past or future to be +present and contemplate it as present, or because we imagine other +things which exclude the existence of those which made us to doubt. + +For although we can never be sure about the issue of individual objects, +it may nevertheless happen that we do not doubt it. For elsewhere we +have shown that it is one thing not to doubt and another to possess +certitude, and so it may happen that from the image of an object either +past or future we are affected with the same emotion of joy or sorrow as +that by which we should be affected from the image of an object present. + +XVI. _Gladness_ (_gaudium_) is a joy with the accompanying idea of +something past, which, unhoped for, has happened. + +XVII. _Remorse_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of something past, +which, unhoped for, has happened. + +XVIII. _Commiseration_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of evil +which has happened to some one whom we imagine like ourselves. + +_Explanation._--Between commiseration and compassion there seems to be +no difference, excepting perhaps that commiseration refers rather to an +individual emotion and compassion to it as a habit. + +XIX. _Favor_ is love towards those who have benefited others. + +XX. _Indignation_ is hatred towards those who have injured others. + +_Explanation._--I am aware that these names in common bear a different +meaning. But my object is not to explain the meaning of words but the +nature of things, and to indicate them by words whose customary meaning +shall not be altogether opposed to the meaning which I desire to bestow +upon them. I consider it sufficient to have said this once for all. + +XXI. _Over-estimation_ consists in thinking too highly of another person +in consequence of our love for him. + +XXII. _Contempt_ consists in thinking too little of another person in +consequence of our hatred for him. + +_Explanation._--Over-estimation and contempt are therefore respectively +effects or properties of love or hatred, and so over-estimation may be +defined as love in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too much +of the beloved object; and, on the contrary, contempt may be defined as +hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too little of the +object he hates. + +XXIII. _Envy_ is hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he is sad +at the good fortune of another person and is glad when any evil happens +to him. + +_Explanation._--To envy is generally opposed compassion +(_misericordia_), which may therefore be defined as follows, +notwithstanding the usual signification of the word:-- + +XXIV. _Compassion_ is love in so far as it affects a man so that he is +glad at the prosperity of another person and is sad when any evil +happens to him. + +I pass now to consider other emotions which are attended by the idea of +something within us as the cause. + +XXV. _Self-satisfaction_ is the joy which is produced by contemplating +ourselves and our own power of action. + +XXVI. _Humility_ is the sorrow which is produced by contemplating our +impotence or helplessness. + +Self-satisfaction is opposed to humility in so far as we understand by +the former the joy which arises from contemplating our power of action, +but in so far as we understand by it joy attended with the idea of +something done, which we believe has been done by a free decree of our +mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we may thus define:-- + +XXVII. _Repentance_ is sorrow accompanied with the idea of something +done which we believe has been done by a free decree of our mind. + +It is not to be wondered at that sorrow should always follow all those +actions which are from _custom_ called wicked, and that joy should +follow those which are called good. But that this is chiefly the effect +of education will be evident from what we have before said. Parents, by +reprobating what are called bad actions, and frequently blaming their +children whenever they commit them, while they persuade them to what are +called good actions, and praise their children when they perform them, +have caused the emotions of sorrow to connect themselves with the +former, and those of joy with the latter. Experience proves this, for +custom and religion are not the same everywhere; but, on the contrary, +things which are sacred to some are profane to others, and what are +honorable with some are disgraceful with others. Education alone, +therefore, will determine whether a man will repent of any deed or boast +of it. + +XXVIII. _Pride_ is thinking too much of ourselves, through self-love. + +_Explanation._--Pride differs, therefore, from over-estimation, inasmuch +as the latter is related to an external object, but pride to the man +himself who thinks of himself too highly. As over-estimation, therefore, +is an effect or property of love, so pride is an effect or property of +self-love, and it may therefore be defined as love of ourselves or +self-satisfaction, in so far as it affects us so that we think too +highly of ourselves. + +To this emotion a contrary does not exist, for no one, through hatred of +himself, thinks too little of himself; indeed, we may say that no one +thinks too little of himself, in so far as he imagines himself unable to +do this or that thing. For whatever he imagines that he cannot do, that +thing he necessarily imagines, and by his imagination is so disposed +that he is actually incapable of doing what he imagines he cannot do. So +long, therefore, as he imagines himself unable to do this or that thing, +so long is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long it is +impossible for him to do it. If, however, we pay attention to what +depends upon opinion alone, we shall be able to conceive it possible for +a man to think too little of himself, for it may happen that while he +sorrowfully contemplates his own weakness he will imagine himself +despised by everybody, although nothing could be further from their +thoughts than to despise him. A man may also think too little of himself +if in the present he denies something of himself in relation to a future +time of which he is not sure; for example, when he denies that he can +conceive of nothing with certitude, and that he can desire and do +nothing which is not wicked and base. We may also say that a man thinks +too little of himself when we see that, from an excess of fear or shame, +he does not dare to do what others who are his equals dare to do. This +emotion, to which I will give the name of despondency, may therefore be +opposed to pride; for as self-satisfaction springs from pride, so +despondency springs from humility, and it may therefore be defined thus: + +XXIX. _Despondency_ is thinking too little of ourselves through sorrow. + +_Explanation._--We are, nevertheless, often in the habit of opposing +humility to pride, but only when we attend to their effects rather than +to their nature. For we are accustomed to call a man proud who boasts +too much, who talks about nothing but his own virtues and other people's +vices, who wishes to be preferred to everybody else, and who marches +along with that stateliness and pomp which belong to others whose +position is far above his. On the other hand, we call a man humble who +often blushes, who confesses his own faults and talks about the virtues +of others, who yields to every one, who walks with bended head, and who +neglects to adorn himself. These emotions, humility and despondency, are +very rare, for human nature, considered in itself, struggles against +them as much as it can, and hence those who have the most credit for +being abject and humble are generally the most ambitious and envious. + +XXX. Self-exaltation is joy with the accompanying idea of some action we +have done, which we imagine people praise. + +XXXI. _Shame_ is sorrow, with the accompanying idea of some action which +we imagine people blame. + +_Explanation._--A difference, however, is here to be observed between +shame and modesty. Shame is sorrow which follows a deed of which we are +ashamed. Modesty is the dread or fear of shame, which keeps a man from +committing any disgraceful act. To modesty is usually opposed impudence, +which indeed is not an emotion, as I shall show in the proper place; but +the names of emotions, as I have already said, are matters rather of +custom than indications of the nature of the emotions. I have thus +discharged the task which I set myself of explaining the emotions of +joy and sorrow. I will advance now to those which I ascribe to desire. + +XXXII. _Regret_ is the desire or longing to possess something, the +emotion being strengthened by the memory of the object itself, and at +the same time being restrained by the memory of other things which +exclude the existence of the desired object. + +_Explanation._--Whenever we recollect a thing, as we have often said, we +are thereby necessarily disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion +as if it were present before us. But this disposition or effort, while +we are awake, is generally restrained by the images of things which +exclude the existence of the thing which we recollect. Whenever, +therefore, we recollect a thing which affects us with any kind of joy, +we thereby endeavor to contemplate it with the same emotion of joy as if +it were present,--an attempt which is, however, immediately restrained +by the memory of that which excludes the existence of the thing. Regret, +therefore, is really a sorrow which is opposed to the joy which arises +from the absence of what we hate. But because the name _regret_ seems to +connect this emotion with desire, I therefore ascribe it to desire. + +XXXIII. _Emulation_ is the desire which is begotten in us of a thing +because we imagine that other persons have the same desire. + +_Explanation._--He who seeks flight because others seek it, he who fears +because he sees others fear, or even he who withdraws his hand and moves +his body as if his hand were burning because he sees that another person +has burnt his hand, such as these, I say, although they may indeed +imitate the emotion of another, are not said to emulate it; not because +we have recognized one cause for emulation and another for imitation, +but because it has been the custom to call that man only emulous who +imitates what we think noble, useful, or pleasant. + +XXXIV. _Thankfulness_ or _gratitude_ is the desire or endeavor of love +with which we strive to do good to others who, from a similar emotion of +love, have done good to us. + +XXXV. _Benevolence_ is the desire to do good to those whom we pity. + +XXXVI. _Anger_ is the desire by which we are impelled, through hatred, +to injure those whom we hate. + +XXXVII. _Vengeance_ is the desire which, springing from mutual hatred, +urges us to injure those who, from a similar emotion, have injured us. + +XXXVIII. _Cruelty_ or _ferocity_ is the desire by which a man is +impelled to injure any one whom we love or pity. + +_Explanation._--To cruelty is opposed mercy, which is not a passion, but +a power of the mind by which a man restrains anger and vengeance. + +XXXIX. _Fear_ is the desire of avoiding the greater of two dreaded evils +by the less. + +XL. _Audacity_ is the desire by which we are impelled to do something +which is accompanied with a danger which our equals fear to meet. + +XLI. A person is said to be _pusillanimous_ whose desire is restrained +by the fear of a danger which his equals dare to meet. + +_Explanation._--Pusillanimity, therefore, is nothing but the dread of +some evil which most persons do not usually fear, and therefore I do not +ascribe it to the emotions of desire. I wished, notwithstanding, to +explain it here, because in so far as we attend to desire, pusillanimity +is the true opposite of the emotion of audacity. + +XLII. _Consternation_ is affirmed of the man whose desire of avoiding +evil is restrained by astonishment at the evil which he fears. + +_Explanation._--Consternation is therefore a kind of pusillanimity. But +because consternation springs from a double fear, it may be more aptly +defined as that dread which holds a man stupefied or vacillating, so +that he cannot remove an evil. I say _stupefied_, in so far as we +understand his desire of removing the evil to be restrained by his +astonishment. I say also _vacillating_, in so far as we conceive the +same desire to be restrained by the fear of another evil which equally +tortures him, so that he does not know which of the two evils to avoid. + +XLIII. _Courtesy_ or _moderation_ is the desire of doing those things +which please men and omitting those which displease them. + +XLIV. _Ambition_ is the immoderate desire of glory. + +_Explanation._--Ambition is a desire which increases and strengthens all +the emotions, and that is the reason why it can hardly be kept under +control. For so long as a man is possessed by any desire, he is +necessarily at the same time possessed by this. _Every noble man_, says +Cicero, _is led by glory, and even the philosophers who write books +about despising glory place their names on the title-page_. + +XLV. _Luxuriousness_ is the immoderate desire or love of good living. + +XLVI. _Drunkenness_ is the immoderate desire and love of drinking. + +XLVII. _Avarice_ is the immoderate desire and love of riches. + +XLVIII. _Lust_ is the immoderate desire and love of sexual intercourse. + +_Explanation._--This desire of sexual intercourse is usually called +lust, whether it be held within bounds or not. I may add that the five +last-mentioned emotions have no contraries, for moderation is a kind of +ambition, and I have already observed that temperance, sobriety, and +chastity show a power and not a passion of the mind. Even supposing that +an avaricious, ambitious, or timid man refrains from an excess of +eating, drinking, or sexual intercourse, avarice, ambition, and fear are +not therefore the opposites of voluptuousness, drunkenness, or lust. For +the avaricious man generally desires to swallow as much meat and drink +as he can, provided only it belong to another person. The ambitious man, +too, if he hopes he can keep it a secret, will restrain himself in +nothing, and if he lives amongst drunkards and libertines, will be more +inclined to their vices just because he is ambitious. The timid man, +too, does what he does not will; and although, in order to avoid death, +he may throw his riches into the sea, he remains avaricious; nor does +the lascivious man cease to be lascivious because he is sorry that he +cannot gratify his desire. Absolutely, therefore, these emotions have +reference not so much to the acts themselves of eating and drinking as +to the appetite and love itself. Consequently nothing can be opposed to +these emotions but nobility of soul and strength of mind, as we shall +see afterwards. + +The definitions of jealousy and the other vacillations of the mind I +pass over in silence, both because they are compounded of the emotions +which we have already defined, and also because many of them have no +names,--a fact which shows that, for the purposes of life, it is +sufficient to know these combinations generally. Moreover, it follows +from the definitions of the emotions which we have explained that, they +all arise from desire, joy, or sorrow, or rather that there are none but +these three, which pass under names varying as their relations and +external signs vary. If, therefore, we attend to these primitive +emotions and to what has been said above about the nature of the mind, +we shall be able here to define the emotions in so far as they are +related to the mind alone. + +_General definition of the emotions._--Emotion, which is called _animi +pathema_, is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or +any part of it, a greater or less power of existence than before; and +this increase of power being given, the mind itself is determined to one +particular thought rather than to another. + +_Explanation._--I say, in the first place, that an emotion or passion of +the mind _is a confused idea_. For we have shown that the mind suffers +only in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. I say again, _by +which the mind affirms of its body, or any part of it, a greater or less +power of existence than before_. For all ideas which we possess of +bodies indicate the actual constitution of our body rather than the +nature of the external body; but this idea, which constitutes the form +of an emotion, must indicate or express the constitution of the body, or +of some part of it; which constitution the body or any part of it +possesses from the fact that its power of action or force of existence +is increased or diminished, helped or limited. But it is to be observed, +that when I say _a greater or less power of existence than before_, I do +not mean that the mind compares the present with the past constitution +of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the form of emotion +affirms something of the body which actually involves more or less +reality than before. Moreover, since the essence of the mind consists in +its affirmation of the actual existence of its body, and since we +understand by perfection the essence itself of the thing, it follows +that the mind passes to a greater or less perfection when it is able to +affirm of its body, or some part of it, something which involves a +greater or less reality than before. When, therefore, I have said that +the mind's power of thought is increased or diminished, I have wished to +be understood as meaning nothing else than that the mind has formed an +idea of its body, or some part of its body, which expresses more or less +reality than it had hitherto affirmed of the body. For the value of +ideas and the actual power of thought are measured by the value of the +object. Finally, I added, _which being given, the mind itself is +determined to one particular thought rather than to another_, that I +might also express the nature of desire in addition to that of joy and +sorrow, which is explained by the first part of the definition. + +I have now, I think, explained the principal emotions and vacillations +of the mind which are compounded of the three primary emotions, desire, +joy, and sorrow, and have set them forth through their first causes. +From what has been said it is plain that we are disturbed by external +causes in a number of ways, and that, like the waves of the sea agitated +by contrary winds, we fluctuate in our ignorance of our future and +destiny. I have said, however, that I have only explained the principal +mental complications, and not all which may exist. For by the same +method which we have pursued above it would be easy to show that love +unites itself to repentance, scorn, shame, etc.; but I think it has +already been made clear to all that the emotions can be combined in so +many ways, and that so many variations can arise, that no limits can be +assigned to their number. It is sufficient for my purpose to have +enumerated only those which are of consequence; the rest, of which I +have taken no notice, being more curious than important. + +There is one constantly recurring characteristic of love which I have +yet to notice, and that is, that while we are enjoying the thing which +we desired, the body acquires from that fruition a new disposition by +which it is otherwise determined, and the images of other things are +excited in it, and the mind begins to imagine and to desire other +things. For example, when we imagine anything which usually delights our +taste, we desire to enjoy it by eating it. But whilst we enjoy it the +stomach becomes full, and the constitution of the body becomes altered. +If, therefore, the body being now otherwise disposed, the image of the +food, in consequence of its being present, and therefore also the +effort or desire to eat it, become more intense, then this new +disposition of the body will oppose this effort or desire, and +consequently the presence of the food which we desired will become +hateful to us, and this hatefulness is what we call loathing or disgust. + +As for the external modifications of the body which are observed in the +emotions, such as trembling, paleness, sobbing, laughter, and the like, +I have neglected to notice them, because they belong to the body alone +without any relationship to the mind. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[26] Hence it follows that the mind is subject to passions in proportion +to the number of inadequate ideas which it has, and that it acts in +proportion to the number of adequate ideas which it has. + +[27] This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of any given +thing affirms and does not deny the existence of the thing; that is to +say, it posits the essence of the thing and does not negate it. So long, +therefore, as we attend only to the thing itself, and not to external +causes, we shall discover nothing in it which can destroy it. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMOTIONS + + +_The Association of the Emotions_ + +If the human body has at any time been simultaneously affected by two +bodies, whenever the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will +immediately remember the other. But the imaginations of the mind +indicate rather the modifications of our body than the nature of +external bodies, and therefore if the body, and consequently the mind, +has been at any time, simultaneously affected by two emotions, whenever +it is afterwards affected by one of them, it will also be affected by +the other. + +Let the mind be supposed to be affected at the same time by two +emotions, its power of action not being increased or diminished by one, +while it is increased or diminished by the other. From the preceding +proposition it is plain that when the mind is afterwards affected by the +first emotion through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) of itself +neither increases nor diminishes the mind's power of thinking, it will +at the same time be affected by the other emotion, which does increase +or diminish that power, that is to say, it will be affected with joy or +sorrow; and thus the thing itself will be the cause of joy or of sorrow, +not of itself, but accidentally. In the same way it can easily be shown +that the same thing may accidentally be the cause of desire. + +The fact that we have contemplated a thing with an emotion of joy or +sorrow, of which it is not the efficient cause, is a sufficient reason +for being able to love or hate it. + +We now understand why we love or hate certain things from no cause which +is known to us, but merely from sympathy or antipathy, as they say. To +this class, too, are to be referred those objects which affect us with +joy or sorrow solely because they are somewhat like objects which +usually affect us with those emotions. I know indeed that the writers +who first introduced the words "Sympathy" and "Antipathy" desired +thereby to signify certain hidden qualities of things, but nevertheless +I believe that we shall be permitted to understand by those names +qualities which are plain and well known. + +Anything may be accidentally the cause either of hope or fear. Things +which are accidentally the causes either of hope or fear are called good +or evil omens. In so far as the omens are the cause of hope and fear are +they the cause of joy or of sorrow, and consequently so far do we love +them or hate them, and endeavor to use them as means to obtain those +things for which we hope, or to remove them as obstacles or causes of +fear. Our natural constitution, too, is such that we easily believe the +things we hope for, and believe with difficulty those we fear, and we +think too much of the former and too little of the latter. Thus have +superstitions arisen, by which men are everywhere disquieted. I do not +consider it worth while to go any further, and to explain here all +those vacillations of mind which arise from hope and fear, since it +follows from the definition alone of these emotions that hope cannot +exist without fear, nor fear without hope. + +If we imagine a certain thing to possess something which resembles an +object which usually affects the mind with joy or sorrow, although the +quality in which the thing resembles the object is not the efficient +cause of these emotions, we shall nevertheless, by virtue of the +resemblance alone, love or hate the thing. + +If we have been affected with joy or sorrow by any one who belongs to a +class or nation different from our own, and if our joy or sorrow is +accompanied with the idea of this person as its cause, under the common +name of his class or nation, we shall not love or hate him merely, but +the whole of the class or nation to which he belongs. + + +_The Imitation and Reciprocation of the Emotions_ + +I + +The images of things are modifications of the human body, and the ideas +of these modifications represent to us external bodies as if they were +present, that is to say, these ideas involve both the nature of our own +body and at the same time the present nature of the external body. If, +therefore, the nature of the external body be like that of our body, +then the idea of the external body which we imagine will involve a +modification of our body like that of the external body. Therefore, if +we imagine any one who is like ourselves to be affected by a +modification, this imagination will express a modification of our body +like that modification, and therefore we shall be modified with a +similar modification ourselves, because we imagine something like us to +be modified with the same. If, on the other hand, we hate a thing which +is like ourselves, we shall so far be modified by a modification +contrary and not similar to that with which it is modified. + +If we imagine that a person enjoys a thing, that will be a sufficient +reason for making us love the thing and desiring to enjoy it. If we +imagine that a person enjoys a thing which only one can possess, we do +all we can to prevent his possessing it. His enjoyment of the thing is +an obstacle to our joy, and we endeavor to bring into existence +everything which we imagine conduces to joy, and to remove or destroy +everything opposed to it, or which we imagine conduces to sorrow. + +We see, therefore, that the nature of man is generally constituted so as +to pity those who are in adversity and envy those who are in prosperity, +and he envies with a hatred which is the greater in proportion as he +loves what he imagines another possesses. We see also that from the same +property of human nature from which it follows that men pity one another +it also follows that they are envious and ambitious. If we will consult +experience, we shall find that she teaches the same doctrine, especially +if we consider the first years of our life. For we find that children, +because their body is, as it were, continually in equilibrium, laugh and +cry merely because they see others do the same; whatever else they see +others do they immediately wish to imitate; everything which they think +is pleasing to other people they want. And the reason is, as we have +said, that the images of things are the modifications themselves of the +human body, or the ways in which it is modified by external causes and +disposed to this or that action. + + +II + +If we imagine that we are hated by another without having given him any +cause for it, we shall hate him in return. If we imagine that we have +given just cause for the hatred, we shall then be affected with shame. +This, however, rarely happens; we endeavor to affirm everything, both +concerning ourselves and concerning the beloved object which we imagine +will affect us or the object with joy, and, on the contrary, we endeavor +to deny everything that will affect either it or ourselves with sorrow. + +This reciprocity of hatred may also arise from the fact that hatred is +followed by an attempt to bring evil upon him who is hated. If, +therefore, we imagine that we are hated by any one else, we shall +imagine him as the cause of some evil or sorrow, and thus we shall be +affected with sorrow or apprehension accompanied with the idea of the +person who hates us as a cause; that is to say, we shall hate him in +return, as we have said above. + +If we imagine that the person we love is affected with hatred towards +us, we shall be agitated at the same time both with love and hatred. For +in so far as we imagine that we are hated are we determined to hate him +in return. But (by hypothesis) we love him notwithstanding, and +therefore we shall be agitated both by love and hatred. + +If we imagine that an evil has been brought upon us through the hatred +of some person towards whom we have hitherto been moved by no emotion, +we shall immediately endeavor to return that evil upon him. + +If we imagine that any one like ourselves is affected with hatred +towards an object like ourselves which we love, we shall hate him. If we +imagine that we are beloved by a person without having given any cause +for the love we shall love him in return. + +If we imagine that we have given just cause for love, we shall pride +ourselves upon it. This frequently occurs, and we have said that the +contrary takes place when we believe that we are hated by another +person. This reciprocal love, and consequently this attempt to do good +to the person who loves us, and who endeavors to do good to us, is +called _thankfulness_ or _gratitude_, and from this we can see how much +readier men are to revenge themselves than to return a benefit. + +If we imagine that we are loved by a person we hate, we shall at the +same time be agitated both by love and hatred. If the hatred prevail, we +shall endeavor to bring evil upon the person by whom we are loved. This +emotion is called Cruelty, especially if it is believed that the person +who loves has not given any ordinary reason for hatred. + + +_The "Herd Instinct"_ + +If we imagine men to love or hate a thing, we shall therefore love or +hate it; that is to say, we shall therefore rejoice or be sad at the +presence of the thing, and therefore we shall endeavor to do everything +which we imagine men[28] will look upon with joy, and, on the contrary, +we shall be averse to doing anything to which we imagine men are averse. + +He who imagines that he affects others with joy or sorrow will +necessarily be affected with joy or sorrow. But since man is conscious +of himself by means of the emotions by which he is determined to act; +therefore if a person has done anything which he imagines will affect +others with joy, he also will be affected with joy, accompanied with an +idea of himself as its cause; that is to say, he will look upon himself +with joy. If, on the other hand, he has done anything which he imagines +will affect others with sorrow, he will look upon himself with sorrow. + +If we imagine that a person loves, desires, or hates a thing which we +ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall on that account love, desire, +or hate the thing more steadily. If, on the other hand, we imagine that +he is averse to the thing we love or loves the thing to which we are +averse, we shall then suffer vacillation of mind. + +It follows from this proposition that every one endeavors as much as +possible to make others love what he loves, and to hate what he hates. +Hence the poet says: + + Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes; + Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat. + +This effort to make every one approve what we love or hate is in truth +ambition, and so we see that each person by nature desires that other +persons should live according to his way of thinking; but if every one +does this, then all are a hindrance to one another, and if every one +wishes to be praised or beloved by the rest, then they all hate one +another. + + +_The Varieties of Emotion_ + +Joy and sorrow, and consequently the emotions which are compounded of +these or derived from them, are passions. But we necessarily suffer in +so far as we have inadequate ideas, and only in so far as we have them; +that is to say, we necessarily suffer only in so far as we imagine, or +in so far as we are affected by a modification which involves the nature +of our body and that of an external body. The nature, therefore, of each +passion must necessarily be explained in such a manner, that the nature +of the object by which we are affected is expressed. The joy, for +example, which springs from an object _A_ involves the nature of that +object _A_, and the joy which springs from _B_ involves the nature of +that object _B_, and therefore these two emotions of joy are of a +different nature, because they arise from causes of a different nature. +In like manner the emotion of sorrow which arises from one object is of +a different kind from that which arises from another cause, and the same +thing is to be understood of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation of +mind, etc.; so that there are necessarily just as many kinds of joy, +sorrow, love, hatred, etc., as there are kinds of objects by which we +are affected. But desire is the essence itself or nature of a person in +so far as this nature is conceived from its given constitution as +determined towards any action, and therefore as a person is affected by +external causes with this or that kind of joy, sorrow, love, hatred, +etc., that is to say, as his nature is constituted in this or that way, +so must his desire vary and the nature of one desire differ from that of +another, just as the emotions from which each desire arises differ. +There are as many kinds of desires, therefore, as there are kinds of +joy, sorrow, love, etc., and, consequently (as we have just shown), as +there are kinds of objects by which we are affected. + +All emotions are related to desire, joy, or sorrow, as the definitions +show which we have given of those emotions. But desire is the very +nature or essence of a person and therefore the desire of one person +differs from the desire of another as much as the nature or essence of +the one differs from that of the other. Again, joy and sorrow are +passions by which the power of a person or his effort to persevere in +his own being is increased or diminished, helped, or limited. But by the +effort to persevere in his own being, in so far as it is related at the +same time to the mind and the body, we understand appetite and desire, +and therefore joy and sorrow are desire or appetite in so far as the +latter is increased, diminished, helped, or limited by external causes; +that is to say they are the nature itself of each person. + +The joy or sorrow of one person therefore differs from the joy or sorrow +of another as much as the nature or essence of one person differs from +that of the other, and consequently the emotion of one person differs +from the corresponding emotion of another. + +Hence it follows that the emotions of animals which are called +irrational (for after we have learned the origin of the mind we can in +no way doubt that brutes feel) differ from human emotions as much as +the nature of a brute differs from that of a man. Both the man and the +horse, for example, are swayed by the lust to propagate, but the horse +is swayed by equine lust and the man by that which is human. The lusts +and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must vary in the same way; +and so, although each individual lives contented with its own nature and +delights in it, nevertheless the life with which it is contented and its +joy are nothing but the idea or soul of that individual, and so the joy +of one differs in character from the joy of the other as much as the +essence of the one differs from the essence of the other. Finally, it +follows from the preceding proposition that the joy by which the +drunkard is enslaved is altogether different from the joy which is the +portion of the philosopher,--a thing I wished just to hint in passing. + + +_The Inconstancy of the Emotions_ + +The human body is affected by external bodies in a number of ways. Two +men, therefore, may be affected in different ways at the same time, and +therefore they can be affected by one and the same object in different +ways. Again the human body may be affected now in this and now in that +way, and consequently it may be affected by one and the same object in +different ways at different times. + +We thus see that it is possible for one man to love a thing and for +another man to hate it; for this man to fear what this man does not +fear, and for the same man to love what before he hated, and to dare to +do what before he feared. Again, since each judges according to his own +emotion what is good and what is evil, what is better and what is +worse, it follows that men may change in their judgment as they do in +their emotions, and hence it comes to pass that when we compare men, we +distinguish them solely by the difference in their emotions, calling +some brave, others timid, and others by other names. + +For example, I shall call a man _brave_ who despises an evil which I +usually fear, and if, besides this, I consider the fact that his desire +of doing evil to a person whom he hates or doing good to one whom he +loves is not restrained by that fear of evil by which I am usually +restrained, I call him _audacious_. On the other hand, the man who fears +an evil which I usually despise will appear _timid_, and if, besides +this, I consider that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil +which has no power to restrain me, I call him _pusillanimous_; and in +this way everybody will pass judgment. + +Finally, from this nature of man and the inconstancy of his judgment, in +consequence of which he often judges things from mere emotion, and the +things which he believes contribute to his joy or his sorrow, and which, +therefore, he endeavors to bring to pass or remove, are often only +imaginary--to say nothing about the uncertainty of things--it is easy to +see that a man may often be himself the cause of his sorrow or his joy, +or of being affected with sorrow or joy accompanied with the idea of +himself as its cause, so that we can easily understand what repentance +and what self-approval are. + +Love and hatred towards any object, for example, towards Peter, are +destroyed if the joy and the sorrow which they respectively involve be +joined to the idea of another cause; and they are respectively +diminished in proportion as we imagine that Peter has not been their +sole cause. + +For the same reason, love or hatred towards an object we imagine to be +free must be greater than towards an object which is under necessity. + +An object which we imagine to be free must be perceived through itself +and without others. If, therefore, we imagine it to be the cause of joy +or sorrow, we shall for that reason alone love or hate it, and that too +with the greatest love or the greatest hatred which can spring from the +given emotion. But if we imagine that the object which is the cause of +that emotion is necessary, then we shall imagine it as the cause of that +emotion, not alone, but together with other causes, and so our love or +hatred towards it will be less. + +Hence it follows that our hatred or love towards one another is greater +than towards other things, because we think we are free. + + +_The Power of Love Over Hate_ + +If we imagine that the person we hate is affected with hatred towards +us, a new hatred is thereby produced, the old hatred still remaining (by +hypothesis). If, on the other hand, we imagine him to be affected with +love towards us, in so far as we imagine it shall we look upon ourselves +with joy, and endeavor to please him; that is to say, in so far shall we +endeavor not to hate him nor to affect him with sorrow. This effort will +be greater or less as the emotion from which it arises is greater or +less, and, therefore, should it be greater than that which springs from +hatred, and by which we endeavor to affect with sorrow the object we +hate, then it will prevail and banish hatred from the mind. Hatred is +increased through return of hatred, but may be destroyed by love. + +Hatred which is altogether overcome by love passes into love, and the +love is therefore greater than if hatred had not preceded it. For if we +begin to love a thing which we hated, or upon which we were in the habit +of looking with sorrow, we shall rejoice for the very reason that we +love, and to this joy which love involves a new joy is added, which +springs from the fact that the effort to remove the sorrow which hatred +involves, is so much assisted, there being also present before us as the +cause of our joy the idea of the person whom we hated. + +Notwithstanding the truth of this proposition, no one will try to hate a +thing or will wish to be affected with sorrow in order that he may +rejoice the more; that is to say, no one will desire to inflict loss on +himself in the hope of recovering the loss, or to become ill in the hope +of getting well, inasmuch as every one will always try to preserve his +being and to remove sorrow from himself as much as possible. Moreover, +if it can be imagined that it is possible for us to desire to hate a +person in order that we may love him afterwards the more, we must always +desire to continue the hatred. For the love will be the greater as the +hatred has been greater, and therefore we shall always desire the hatred +to be more and more increased. Upon the same principle we shall desire +that our sickness may continue and increase in order that we may +afterwards enjoy the greater pleasure when we get well, and therefore we +shall always desire sickness, which is absurd. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[28] Both here and in what follows to whom we are moved by no emotion I +understand by the word _men_, men (Sp.). + + + + +THIRD PART + +ON MAN'S WELL-BEING + + +_All happiness or unhappiness solely depends upon the quality of the +object to which we are attached by love. Love for an object eternal and +infinite feeds the mind with joy alone, a joy that is free from all +sorrow_. + +SPINOZA. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +OF HUMAN BONDAGE + + +_Introductory_ + +The impotence of man to govern or restrain the emotions I call bondage, +for a man who is under their control is not his own master, but is +mastered by fortune, in whose power he is, so that he is often forced to +follow the worse, although he sees the better before him. I propose in +this part to demonstrate why this is, and also to show what of good and +evil the emotions possess. + +But before I begin I should like to say a few words about perfection and +imperfection, and about good and evil. If a man has proposed to do a +thing and has accomplished it, he calls it perfect, and not only he, but +every one else who has really known or has believed that he has known +the mind and intention of the author of that work will call it perfect +too. For example, having seen some work (which I suppose to be as yet +not finished), if we know that the intention of the author of that work +is to build a house, we shall call the house imperfect; while, on the +other hand, we shall call it perfect as soon as we see the work has been +brought to the end which the author had determined for it. But if we see +any work such as we have never seen before, and if we do not know the +mind of the workman, we shall then not be able to say whether the work +is perfect or imperfect. + +This seems to have been the first signification of these words; but +afterwards men began to form universal ideas, to think out for +themselves types of houses, buildings, castles, and to prefer some types +of things to others; and so it happened that each person called a thing +perfect which seemed to agree with the universal idea which he had +formed of that thing, and, on the other hand, he called a thing +imperfect which seemed to agree less with his typal conception, +although, according to the intention of the workman, it had been +entirely completed. This appears to be the only reason why the words +_perfect_ and _imperfect_ are commonly applied to natural objects which +are not made with human hands; for men are in the habit of forming, both +of natural as well as of artificial objects, universal ideas which they +regard as types of things, and which they think Nature has in view, +setting them before herself as types too; it being the common opinion +that she does nothing except for the sake of some end. When, therefore, +men see something done by Nature which does not altogether answer to +that typal conception which they have of the thing, they think that +Nature herself has failed or committed an error, and that she has left +the thing imperfect. + +Thus we see that the custom of applying the words _perfect_ and +_imperfect_ to natural objects has arisen rather from prejudice than +from true knowledge of them. For we have shown that Nature does nothing +for the sake of an end, for that eternal and infinite Being whom we call +God or Nature acts by the same necessity by which He exists; for we have +shown that He acts by the same necessity of nature as that by which He +exists. The reason or cause, therefore, why God or Nature acts and the +reason why He exists are one and the same. Since, therefore, He exists +for no end, He acts for no end; and since He has no principle or end of +existence, He has no principle or end of action. A final cause, as it is +called, is nothing, therefore, but human desire, in so far as this is +considered as the principle or primary cause of anything. For example, +when we say that the having a house to live in was the final cause of +this or that house, we merely mean that a man, because he imagined the +advantages of a domestic life, desired to build a house. Therefore, +having a house to live in, in so far as it is considered as a final +cause, is merely this particular desire, which is really an efficient +cause, and is considered as primary, because men are usually ignorant of +the causes of their desires; for, as I have often said, we are conscious +of our actions and desires, but ignorant of the causes by which we are +determined to desire anything. As for the vulgar opinion that Nature +sometimes fails or commits an error, or produces imperfect things, I +class it amongst those fictions mentioned above.[29] + +Perfection, therefore, and imperfection are really only modes of +thought; that is to say, notions which we are in the habit of forming +from the comparison with one another of individuals of the same species +or genus, and this is the reason why I have said that by reality and +perfection I understand the same thing; for we are in the habit of +referring all individuals in Nature to one genus, which is called the +most general; that is to say, to the notion of being, which embraces +absolutely all the individual objects in Nature. In so far, therefore, +as we refer the individual objects in Nature to this genus, and compare +them one with another, and discover that some possess more being or +reality than others, in so far do we call some more perfect than others; +and in so far as we assign to the latter anything which, like +limitation, termination, impotence, etc., involves negation, shall we +call them imperfect, because they do not affect our minds so strongly as +those we call perfect, but not because anything which really belongs to +them is wanting, or because Nature has committed an error. For nothing +belongs to the nature of anything excepting that which follows from the +necessity of the nature of the efficient cause, and whatever follows +from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause necessarily +happens. + +With regard to good and evil, these terms indicate nothing positive in +things considered in themselves, nor are they anything else than modes +of thought, or notions which we form from the comparison of one thing +with another. For one and the same thing may at the same time be both +good and evil or indifferent. Music, for example, is good to a +melancholy person, bad to one mourning, while to a deaf man it is +neither good nor bad. But although things are so, we must retain these +words. For since we desire to form for ourselves an idea of man upon +which we may look as a model of human nature, it will be of service to +us to retain these expressions in the sense I have mentioned. + +By _good_, therefore, I understand in the following pages everything +which we are certain is a means by which we may approach nearer and +nearer to the model of human nature we set before us. By _evil_, on the +contrary, I understand everything which we are certain hinders us from +reaching that model. Again, I shall call men more or less perfect or +imperfect in so far as they approach more or less nearly to this same +model. For it is to be carefully observed, that when I say that an +individual passes from a less to a greater perfection and _vice versa_, +I do not understand that from one essence or form he is changed into +another (for a horse, for instance, would be as much destroyed if it +were changed into a man as if it were changed into an insect), but +rather we conceive that his power of action, in so far as it is +understood by his own nature, is increased or diminished. Finally, by +perfection generally, I understand, as I have said, reality; that is to +say, the essence of any object in so far as it exists and acts in a +certain manner, no regard being paid to its duration. For no individual +thing can be said to be more perfect because for a longer time it has +persevered in existence; inasmuch as the duration of things cannot be +determined by their essence, the essence of things involving no fixed or +determined period of existence; any object, whether it be more or less +perfect, always being able to persevere in existence with the same force +as that with which it commenced existence. All things, therefore, are +equal in this respect. + + +_Definitions_ + +I.--By good, I understand that which we certainly know is useful to us. + +II. By evil, on the contrary, I understand that which we certainly know +hinders us from possessing anything that is good. + +With regard to these two definitions, see the close of the preceding. + +III. I call individual things contingent in so far as we discover +nothing, whilst we attend to their essence alone, which necessarily +posits their existence or which necessarily excludes it. + +IV. I call these individual things possible, in so far as we are +ignorant, whilst we attend to the cause from which they must be +produced, whether these causes are determined to the production of these +things. + +V. By contrary emotions, I understand in the following pages those +which, although they may be of the same kind, draw a man in different +directions; such as voluptuousness and avarice, which are both a species +of love, and are not contrary to one another by nature, but only by +accident. + +VI. I here call a thing past or future in so far as we have been or +shall be affected by it; for example, in so far as we have seen a thing +or are about to see it, in so far as it has strengthened us or will +strengthen us, has injured or will injure us. For in so far as we thus +imagine it do we affirm its existence; that is to say, the body is +affected by no mode which excludes the existence of the thing, and +therefore the body is affected by the image of the thing in the same way +as if the thing itself were present. But because it generally happens +that those who possess much experience hesitate when they think of a +thing as past or future, and doubt greatly concerning its issue, +therefore the emotions which spring from such images of things are not +so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things, +until men become more sure of the issue. + +However, it is to be observed that it is the same with time as it is +with place; for as beyond a certain limit we can form no distinct +imagination of distance--that is to say, as we usually imagine all +objects to be equally distant from us, and as if they were on the same +plane, if their distance from us exceeds 200 feet, or if their distance +from the position we occupy is greater than we can distinctly +imagine--so we imagine all objects to be equally distant from the +present time, and refer them as if to one moment, if the period to which +their existence belongs is separated from the present by a longer +interval than we can usually imagine distinctly. + +VII. By end for the sake of which we do anything, I understand appetite. + +VIII. By virtue and power, I understand the same thing; that is to say, +virtue, in so far as it is related to man, is the essence itself or +nature of the man in so far as it has the power of effecting certain +things which can be understood through the laws of its nature alone. + + +_Axiom_ + +There is no individual thing in Nature which is not surpassed in +strength and power by some other thing; but any individual thing being +given, another and a stronger is also given, by which the former can be +destroyed. + + +_Man's Place in Nature_ + +The power by which individual things and, consequently, man preserve +their being is the actual power of God or Nature, not in so far as it is +infinite, but in so far as it can be manifested by the actual essence of +man. The power therefore of man, in so far as it is manifested by his +actual essence is part of the infinite power of God or Nature, that is +to say, part of His essence. Again, if it were possible that man could +suffer no changes but those which can be understood through his nature +alone, it would follow that he could not perish, but that he would exist +forever necessarily; and this necessary existence must result from a +cause whose power is either finite or infinite, that is to say, either +from the power of man alone, which would be able to place at a distance +from himself all other changes which could take their origin from +external causes, or it must result from the infinite power of Nature by +which all individual things would be so directed that man could suffer +no changes but those tending to his preservation. + +But the first case is absurd. The force by which man perseveres in +existence is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external +causes. This is evident from the Axiom. Therefore if it were possible +for a man to suffer no changes but those which could be understood +through his own nature alone, and consequently (as we have shown) that +he should always necessarily exist, this must follow from the infinite +power of God; and therefore from the necessity of the divine nature, in +so far as it is considered as affected by the idea of any one man, the +whole order of Nature, in so far as it is conceived under the attributes +of thought and extension, would have to be deduced. From this it would +follow that man would be infinite, which (by the first part of this +demonstration) is an absurdity. It is impossible, therefore, that a man +can suffer no changes but those of which he is the adequate cause. + +Hence it follows that a man is necessarily always subject to passions, +and that he follows and obeys the common order of Nature, accommodating +himself to it as far as the nature of things requires. The force and +increase of any passion and its perseverance in existence are not +limited by the power by which we endeavor to persevere in existence, but +by the power of an external cause compared with our own power. + + +_The Nature of Good and Evil_ + +We call a thing good which contributes to the preservation of our being, +and we call a thing evil if it is an obstacle to the preservation of our +being; that is to say, a thing is called by us good or evil as it +increases or diminishes, helps or restrains, our power of action. In so +far, therefore, as we perceive that any object affects us with joy or +sorrow do we call it good or evil, and therefore the knowledge of good +or evil is nothing but an idea of joy or sorrow which necessarily +follows from the emotion itself of joy or sorrow. But this idea is +united to the emotion in the same way as the mind is united to the body, +or, in other words, this idea is not actually distinguished from the +emotion itself; that is to say, it is not actually distinguished from +the idea of the modification of the body, unless in conception alone. +This knowledge, therefore, of good and evil is nothing but the emotion +itself of joy and sorrow in so far as we are conscious of it. + + +_The Control of the Emotions_ + +An emotion, in so far as it is related to the mind, is an idea by which +the mind affirms a greater or less power of existence for its body than +the body possessed before. Whenever, therefore, the mind is agitated by +any emotion, the body is at the same time affected with a modification +by which its power of action is increased or diminished. Again, this +modification of the body receives from its own cause a power to +persevere in its own being, a power, therefore, which cannot be +restrained nor removed unless by a bodily cause affecting the body with +a modification contrary to the first, and stronger than it. Thus the +mind is affected by the idea of a modification stronger than the former +and contrary to it; that is to say, it will be affected with an emotion +stronger than the former and contrary to it, and this stronger emotion +will exclude the existence of the other or remove it. Thus an emotion +cannot be restrained nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger +emotion. + +An emotion, in so far as it is related to the mind, cannot be restrained +nor removed unless by the idea of a bodily modification opposed to that +which we suffer and stronger than it. For the emotion which we suffer +cannot be restrained nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger +emotion; that is to say, it cannot be removed unless by the idea of a +bodily modification stronger than that which affects us, and opposed to +it. + +The force and increase of any passion and its perseverance in existence +are limited by the power of an external cause compared with our own +power and therefore the other actions or power of a man may be so far +surpassed by force of some passion or emotion, that the emotion may +obstinately cling to him. + +An emotion is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or less power +of existence for the body than it possessed before, and therefore this +idea has nothing positive which can be removed by the presence of the +truth, and consequently the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far +as it is true, can restrain no emotion. But in so far as it is an +emotion will it restrain any other emotion, provided that the latter be +the weaker of the two. + +From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as this is an +emotion, necessarily arises desire, which is greater in proportion as +the emotion from which it springs is greater. But this desire (by +hypothesis), because it springs from our understanding, something truly +follows therefore in us in so far as we act, and therefore must be +understood through our essence alone, and consequently its strength and +increase must be limited by human power alone. But the desires which +spring from the emotions by which we are agitated are greater as the +emotions themselves are greater, and therefore their strength and +increase must be limited by the power of external causes, a power which, +if it be compared with our own, indefinitely surpasses it. The desires, +therefore, which take their origin from such emotions as these may be +much stronger than that which takes its origin from a true knowledge of +good and evil, and the former may be able to restrain and extinguish the +latter. + +Desire is the very essence of man, that is to say, the effort by which a +man strives to persevere in his being. The desire, therefore, which +springs from joy, by that very emotion of joy is assisted or increased, +while that which springs from sorrow, by that very emotion of sorrow is +lessened or restrained, and so the force of the desire which springs +from joy must be limited by human power, together with the power of an +external cause, while that which springs from sorrow must be limited by +human power alone. The latter is, therefore, weaker than the former. + + +_How the Strength of the Emotions Varies_ + +I + +The imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates an object as +present, an idea which nevertheless indicates the constitution of the +human body rather than the nature of the external object. Imagination, +therefore, is an emotion in so far as it indicates the constitution of +the body. But the imagination increases in intensity in proportion as we +imagine nothing which excludes the present existence of the external +object. If, therefore, we imagine the cause of an emotion to be actually +present with us, that emotion will be intenser or stronger than if we +imagined the cause not to be present. + +When I said that we are affected by the image of an object in the future +or the past with the same emotion with which we should be affected if +the object we imagined were actually present, I was careful to warn the +reader that this was true in so far only as we attend to the image alone +of the object itself, for the image is of the same nature whether we +have imagined the object or not; but I have not denied that the image +becomes weaker when we contemplate as present other objects which +exclude the present existence of the future object. + +The image of a past or future object, that is to say, of an object which +we contemplate in relation to the past or future to the exclusion of the +present, other things being equal, is weaker than the image of a present +object, and consequently the emotion towards a future or past object, +other things being equal, is weaker then than the emotion towards a +present object. + +The desire which springs from a knowledge of good and evil can be easily +extinguished or restrained, in so far as this knowledge is connected +with the future, by the desire of things which in the present are sweet. + + +II + +In so far as we imagine any object to be necessary do we affirm its +existence, and, on the other hand, we deny its existence in so far as we +imagine it to be not necessary and therefore the emotion towards an +object which we imagine as necessary, other things being equal, is +stronger than that towards an object that is possible, contingent, or +not necessary. + +In so far as we imagine an object as contingent, we are not affected by +the image of any other object which posits the existence of the first, +but, on the contrary (by hypothesis), we imagine some things which +exclude its present existence. But in so far as we imagine any object in +the future to be possible do we imagine some things which posit its +existence, that is to say, things which foster hope or fear, and +therefore the emotion towards an object which we know does not exist in +the present, and which we imagine as possible, other things being equal, +is stronger than the emotion towards a contingent object. + +The emotion towards an object which we imagine to exist in the present +is stronger than if we imagined it as future, and is much stronger if we +imagine the future to be at a great distance from the present time. The +emotion, therefore, towards an object which we imagine will not exist +for a long time is so much feebler than if we imagined it as present, +and nevertheless is stronger than if we imagined it as contingent; and +therefore the emotion towards a contingent object is much feebler than +if we imagined the object to be present to us. + +In so far as we imagine an object as contingent, we are affected with no +image of any other object which posits the existence of the first. On +the contrary, we imagine (by hypothesis) certain things which exclude +its present existence. But in so far as we imagine it in relationship to +past time are we supposed to imagine something which brings it back to +the memory or which excites its image and therefore so far causes us to +contemplate it as present. Therefore, the emotion towards a contingent +object which we know does not exist in the present, other things being +equal, will be weaker than the emotion towards a past object. + +In these propositions I consider that I have explained why men are more +strongly influenced by an opinion than by true reason, and why the true +knowledge of good and evil causes disturbance in the mind, and often +gives way to every kind of lust, whence the saying of the poet, "_Video +meliora proboque, deteriora sequor._" The same thought appears to have +been in the mind of the Preacher when he said, "_He that increaseth +knowledge increaseth sorrow._" I say these things not because I would be +understood to conclude, therefore, that it is better to be ignorant than +to be wise, or that the wise man in governing his passions is nothing +better than the fool, but I say them because it is necessary for us to +know both the strength and weakness of our nature, so that we may +determine what reason can do and what it cannot do in governing our +emotions. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[29] Chapter Eight _ad fin._ + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MORAL LIFE + + +_Introductory_ + +I have briefly explained the causes of human impotence and want of +stability, and why men do not obey the dictates of reason. It remains +for me now to show what it is which reason prescribes to us, which +emotions agree with the rules of human reason, and which, on the +contrary, are opposed to these rules. Before, however, I begin to +demonstrate these things by our full method, I should like briefly to +set forth here these dictates of reason, in order that what I have in my +mind about them may be easily comprehended by all. + +Since reason demands nothing which is opposed to Nature, it demands, +therefore, that every person should love himself, should seek his own +profit--what is truly profitable to him--should desire everything that +really leads man to greater perfection, and absolutely that every one +should endeavor, as far as in him lies, to preserve his own being. This +is all true as necessarily as that the whole is greater than its part. +Again, since virtue means nothing but acting according to the laws of +our own nature, and since no one endeavors to preserve his being except +in accordance with the laws of his own nature, it follows: _Firstly_, +That the foundation of virtue is that endeavor itself to preserve our +own being, and that happiness consists in this--that a man can preserve +his own being. _Secondly_, It follows that virtue is to be desired for +its own sake, nor is there anything more excellent or more useful to us +than virtue, for the sake of which virtue ought to be desired. +_Thirdly_, It follows that all persons who kill themselves are impotent +in mind, and have been thoroughly overcome by external causes opposed to +their nature. + +Again, we can never free ourselves from the need of something outside us +for the preservation of our being, and we can never live in such a +manner as to have no intercourse with objects which are outside us. +Indeed, so far as the mind is concerned, our intellect would be less +perfect if the mind were alone, and understood nothing but itself. There +are many things, therefore, outside us which are useful to us, and +which, therefore, are to be sought. Of all these, none more excellent +can be discovered than those which exactly agree with our nature. If, +for example, two individuals of exactly the same nature are joined +together, they make up a single individual, doubly stronger than each +alone. Nothing, therefore, is more useful to man than man. Men can +desire, I say, nothing more excellent for the preservation of their +being than that all should so agree at every point that the minds and +bodies of all should form, as it were, one mind and one body; that all +should together endeavor as much as possible to preserve their being, +and that all should together seek the common good of all. From this it +follows that men who are governed by reason--that is to say, men who, +under the guidance of reason, seek their own profit--desire nothing for +themselves which they do not desire for other men, and that, therefore, +they are just, faithful, and honorable. + +These are those dictates of reason which I purposed briefly to set forth +before commencing their demonstration by a fuller method, in order that, +if possible, I might win the attention of those who believe that this +principle--that every one is bound to seek his own profit--is the +foundation of impiety, and not of virtue and piety. + + +_The Essence of Virtue_ + +I + +According to the laws of his own nature each person necessarily desires +that which he considers to be good, and avoids that which he considers +to be evil. + +The more each person strives and is able to seek his own profit, that is +to say, to preserve his being, the more virtue does he possess; on the +other hand, in so far as each person neglects his own profit, that is to +say, neglects to preserve his own being, is he impotent. + +No one, therefore, unless defeated by external causes and those which +are contrary to his nature, neglects to seek his own profit or preserve +his being. No one, I say, refuses food or kills himself from a necessity +of his nature, but only when forced by external causes. The compulsion +may be exercised in many ways. A man kills himself under compulsion by +another when that other turns the right hand, with which the man had by +chance laid hold of a sword, and compels him to direct the sword against +his own heart; or the command of a tyrant may compel a man, as it did +Seneca, to open his own veins, that is to say, he may desire to avoid a +greater evil by a less. External and hidden causes also may so dispose +his imagination and may so affect his body as to cause it to put on +another nature contrary to that which it had at first, and one whose +idea cannot exist in the mind; but a very little reflection will show +that it is as impossible that a man, from the necessity of his nature, +should endeavor not to exist, or to be changed into some other form, as +it is that something should be begotten from nothing. + +The endeavor after self-preservation is the essence itself of a thing. +If, therefore, any virtue could be conceived prior to this of +self-preservation, the essence itself of the thing would be conceived as +prior to itself, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. + +The endeavor after self-preservation is the primary and only foundation +of virtue. For prior to this principle no other can be conceived, and +without it no virtue can be conceived. + +No one endeavors to preserve his own being for the sake of another +object. For if a man endeavored to preserve his being for the sake of +any other object, this object would then become the primary foundation +of virtue (as is self-evident), which is an absurdity. + +No one can desire to be happy, to act well and live well, who does not +at the same time desire to be, to act, and to live, that is to say, +actually to exist. + + +II + +To act absolutely in conformity with virtue is nothing but acting +according to the laws of our own proper nature. But only in so far as +we understand do we act. Therefore, to act in conformity with virtue is +nothing but acting, living, and preserving our being as reason directs, +and doing so from the ground of seeking our own profit.[30] + +In so far as a man is determined to action because he has inadequate +ideas he suffers, that is to say, he does something which through his +essence alone cannot be perceived, that is to say, which does not follow +from his virtue. But in so far as he is determined to any action because +he understands, he acts, that is to say he does something which is +perceived through his essence alone, or which adequately follows from +his virtue. + + +_The Highest Virtue of Reason_ + +All efforts which we make through reason are nothing but efforts to +understand, and the mind, in so far as it uses reason, adjudges nothing +as profitable to itself excepting that which conduces to understanding. + +The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing but to understand, +nor does it adjudge anything to be profitable to itself excepting what +conduces to understanding. But the mind possesses no certitude, unless +in so far as it possesses adequate ideas, or in so far as it reasons. We +do not know, therefore, that anything is certainly good, excepting that +which actually conduces to understanding, and, on the other hand, we do +not know that anything is evil excepting that which can hinder us from +understanding. + +The highest thing which the mind can understand is God, that is to say, +Being absolutely infinite, and without whom nothing can be nor can be +conceived, and therefore that which is chiefly profitable to the mind, +or which is the highest good of the mind, is the knowledge of God. +Again, the mind acts only in so far as it understands and only in so far +can it be absolutely said to act in conformity with virtue. To +understand, therefore, is the absolute virtue of the mind. But the +highest thing which the mind can understand is God (as we have already +demonstrated), and therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to +understand or know God. + + +_THE MORAL VALUE OF THE EMOTIONS_ + +I + +_General Principles_ + +That which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many +ways, or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many +ways, is profitable to man, and is more profitable in proportion as by +its means the body becomes better fitted to be affected in many ways, +and to affect other bodies; on the other hand, that thing is injurious +which renders the body less fitted to affect or be affected. + +Whatever is effective to preserve the proportion of motion and rest +which the parts of the human body bear to each other is good, and, on +the contrary, that is evil which causes the parts of the human body to +have a different proportion of motion and rest to each other. + +In what degree these things may injure or profit the mind will be +explained below. Here I observe merely that I understand the body to die +when its parts are so disposed as to acquire a different proportion of +motion and rest to each other. For I dare not deny that the human body, +though the circulation of the blood and the other things by means of +which it is thought to live be preserved, may, nevertheless, be changed +into another nature altogether different from its own. No reason compels +me to affirm that the body never dies unless it is changed into a +corpse. Experience, indeed, seems to teach the contrary. It happens +sometimes that a man undergoes such changes that he cannot very well be +said to be the same man, as was the case with a certain Spanish poet of +whom I have heard, who was seized with an illness, and although he +recovered, remained, nevertheless, so oblivious of his past life that he +did not believe the tales and tragedies he had composed were his own, +and he might, indeed, have been taken for a grown-up child if he had +also forgotten his native tongue. But if this seems incredible, what +shall we say of children? The man of mature years believes the nature of +children to be so different from his own, that it would be impossible +to persuade him he had ever been a child, if he did not conjecture +regarding himself from what he sees of others. But in order to avoid +giving to the superstitious matter for new questions, I prefer to go no +farther in the discussion of these matters. + + +II + +_Value of Joy and Sorrow_ + +Joy is an emotion by which the body's power of action is increased or +assisted. Sorrow, on the other hand, is an emotion by which the body's +power of action is lessened or restrained, and therefore joy is not +directly evil, but good; sorrow, on the other hand, is directly evil. + + +III + +_The Good Emotions_ + +Cheerfulness is joy, which, in so far as it is related to the body, +consists in this, that all the parts of the body are equally affected, +that is to say, the body's power of action is increased or assisted, so +that all the parts acquire the same proportion of motion and rest to +each other. Cheerfulness, therefore, is always good, and can never be +excessive. But melancholy is sorrow, which, in so far as it is related +to the body consists in this, that the body's power of action is +absolutely lessened or restrained, and melancholy, therefore, is always +evil. + +Pleasurable excitement is joy, which, in so far as it is related to the +body, consists in this, that one or some of the parts of the body are +affected more than others. The power of this emotion may, therefore, be +so great as to overcome the other actions of the body. It may cling +obstinately to the body; it may impede the body in such a manner as to +render it less capable of being affected in many ways, and therefore may +be evil. Again, pain, which, on the contrary, is sorrow, considered in +itself alone cannot be good. But because its power and increase is +limited by the power of an external cause compared with our own power, +we can therefore conceive infinite degrees of strength of this emotion, +and infinite kinds of it, and we can therefore conceive it to be such +that it can restrain an excess of pleasurable excitement, and so far (by +the first part of this proposition) preventing the body from becoming +less capable. So far, therefore, will pain be good. + +Love is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause. Pleasurable +excitement, therefore with the accompanying idea of an external cause, +is love, and therefore love may be excessive. Again, desire is greater +as the emotion from which it springs is greater. Inasmuch, therefore, as +an emotion may overpower the other actions of a man, so also the desire +which springs from this emotion may also overpower the other desires, +and may therefore exist in the same excess which we have shown (in the +preceding proposition) that pleasurable excitement possesses. + +Cheerfulness, which I have affirmed to be good, is more easily imagined +than observed; for the emotions by which we are daily agitated are +generally related to some part of the body which is affected more than +the others, and therefore it is that the emotions exist for the most +part in excess, and so hold the mind down to the contemplation of one +object alone, that it can think about nothing else; and although men are +subject to a number of emotions, and therefore few are found who are +always under the control of one and the same emotion, there are not +wanting those to whom one and the same emotion obstinately clings. We +see men sometimes so affected by one object, that although it is not +present, they believe it to be before them; and if this happens to a man +who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or mad. Nor are those +believed to be less mad who are inflamed by love, dreaming about nothing +but a mistress or harlot day and night, for they excite our laughter. +But the avaricious man who thinks of nothing else but gain or money, and +the ambitious man who thinks of nothing but glory, inasmuch as they do +harm, and are, therefore, thought worthy of hatred, are not believed to +be mad. In truth, however, avarice, lust, etc., are a kind of madness, +although they are not reckoned amongst diseases. + + +IV + +_The Evil Emotions_ + +The man whom we hate we endeavor to destroy, that is to say we endeavor +to do something which is evil. Therefore hatred can never be good.[31] + +Envy, mockery, contempt, anger, revenge, and the other affects which are +related to hatred or arise from it, are evil. + +Everything which we desire because we are affected by hatred is base and +unjust in the State. + +I make a great distinction between mockery (which I have said is bad) +and laughter; for laughter and merriment are nothing but joy, and +therefore, provided they are not excessive, are in themselves good. +Nothing but a gloomy and sad superstition forbids enjoyment. For why is +it more seemly to extinguish hunger and thirst than to drive away +melancholy? My reasons and my conclusions are these: No God and no human +being, except an envious one, is delighted by my impotence or my +trouble, or esteems as any virtue in us tears, sighs, fears, and other +things of this kind, which are signs of mental impotence; on the +contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater +the perfection to which we pass thereby, that is to say, the more do we +necessarily partake of the divine nature. To make use of things, +therefore, and to delight in them as much as possible (provided we do +not disgust ourselves with them, which is not delighting in them), is +the part of a wise man. It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh +and invigorate himself with moderate and pleasant eating and drinking, +with sweet scents and the beauty of green plants, with ornament, with +music, with sports, with the theater, and with all things of this kind +which one man can enjoy without hurting another. For the human body is +composed of a great number of parts of diverse nature, which constantly +need new and varied nourishment, in order that the whole of the body may +be equally fit for everything which can follow from its nature, and +consequently that the mind may be equally fit to understand many things +at once. This mode of living best of all agrees both with our +principles and with common practice; therefore this mode of living is +the best of all, and is to be universally commended. There is no need, +therefore, to enter more at length into the subject. + +All emotions of hatred are evil and therefore the man who lives +according to the guidance of reason will strive as much as possible to +keep himself from being agitated by the emotions of hatred and, +consequently, will strive to keep others from being subject to the same +emotions. But hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and, on the +other hand, can be extinguished by love, so that hatred passes into +love. Therefore he who lives according to the guidance of reason will +strive to repay the hatred of another, etc., with love, that is to say, +with generosity. He who wishes to avenge injuries by hating in return +does indeed live miserably. But he who, on the contrary, strives to +drive out hatred by love, fights joyfully and confidently, with equal +ease resisting one man or a number of men, and needing scarcely any +assistance from fortune. Those whom he conquers yield gladly, not from +defect of strength, but from an increase of it. These truths, however, +all follow so plainly from the definitions alone of love and the +intellect, that there is no need to demonstrate them singly. + + +V + +_Necessary Evils_ + +(i) + +The emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without sorrow; for fear is +sorrow, and hope cannot exist without fear. Therefore these emotions +cannot be good of themselves, but only in so far as they are able to +restrain the excesses of joy. + +We may here add that these emotions indicate want of knowledge and +impotence of mind, and, for the same reason, confidence, despair, +gladness, and remorse are signs of weakness of mind. For although +confidence and gladness are emotions of joy, they nevertheless suppose +that sorrow has preceded them, namely, hope or fear. In proportion, +therefore, as we endeavor to live according to the guidance of reason, +shall we strive as much as possible to depend less on hope, to liberate +ourselves from fear, to rule fortune, and to direct our actions by the +sure counsels of reason. + +Humility is sorrow, which springs from this, that a man contemplates his +own weakness. But in so far as a man knows himself by true reason is he +supposed to understand his essence, that is to say, his power. If, +therefore, while contemplating himself, he perceives any impotence of +his, this is not due to his understanding himself, but, as we have +shown, to the fact that his power of actions is restrained. But if we +suppose that he forms a conception of his own impotence because he +understands something to be more powerful than himself, by the knowledge +of which he limits his own power of action, in this case we simply +conceive that he understands himself distinctly, and his power of action +is increased. Humility or sorrow, therefore, which arises because a man +contemplates his own impotence, does not spring from true contemplation +or reason, and is not a virtue, but a passion. + +Repentance is not a virtue, that is to say, it does not spring from +reason; on the contrary, the man who repents of what he has done is +doubly wretched or impotent. For, in the first place, we allow ourselves +to be overcome by a depraved desire, and, in the second place, by +sorrow. + +Inasmuch as men seldom live as reason dictates, therefore these two +emotions, humility and repentance, together with hope and fear, are +productive of more profit than disadvantage, and therefore, since men +must sin, it is better that they should sin in this way. For if men +impotent in mind were all equally proud, were ashamed of nothing, and +feared nothing, by what bonds could they be united or constrained? The +multitude becomes a thing to be feared if it has nothing to fear. It is +not to be wondered at, therefore, that the prophets, thinking rather of +the good of the community than of a few, should have commended so +greatly humility, repentance and reverence. Indeed, those who are +subject to these emotions can be led much more easily than others, so +that, at last, they come to live according to the guidance of reason, +that is to say, become free men, and enjoy the life of the blessed. + + +(ii) + +Pity is sorrow, and therefore is in itself evil. The good, however, +which issues from pity, namely, that we endeavor to free from misery the +man we pity, we desire to do from the dictate of reason alone; nor can +we do anything except by the dictate of reason alone, which we are sure +is good. Pity, therefore, in a man who lives according to the guidance +of reason is in itself bad and unprofitable. + +Hence it follows that a man who lives according to the dictates of +reason endeavors as much as possible to prevent himself from being +touched by pity. + +The man who has properly understood that everything follows from the +necessity of the divine nature, and comes to pass according to the +eternal laws and rules of Nature, will in truth discover nothing which +is worthy of hatred, laughter, or contempt, nor will he pity any one, +but, so far as human virtue is able, he will endeavor to _do well_, as +we say, and to _rejoice_. We must add also, that a man who is easily +touched by the emotion of pity, and is moved by the misery or tears of +another, often does something of which he afterward repents, both +because from an emotion we do nothing which we certainly know to be +good, and also because we are so easily deceived by false tears. But +this I say expressly of the man who lives according to the guidance of +reason. For he who is moved neither by reason nor pity to be of any +service to others is properly called inhuman; for he seems to be unlike +a man. + + +VI + +_Diseased Emotions_ + +The primary foundation of virtue is the preservation of our being +according to the guidance of reason. The man, therefore, who is ignorant +of himself is ignorant of the foundation of all the virtues, and +consequently is ignorant of all the virtues. Again, to act in conformity +with virtue is nothing but acting according to the guidance of reason, +and he who acts according to the guidance of reason must necessarily +know that he acts according to the guidance of reason. He, therefore, +who is ignorant of himself, and consequently (as we have just shown) +altogether ignorant of all the virtues, cannot in any way act in +conformity with virtue, that is to say, is altogether impotent in mind. +Therefore the greatest pride or despondency indicates the greatest +impotence of mind. + +Hence follows, with the utmost clearness, that the proud and the +desponding are above all others subject to emotions. + +Despondency, nevertheless, can be corrected more easily than pride, +since the former is an emotion of sorrow, while the latter is an emotion +of joy, and is therefore stronger than the former. + +Pride is joy arising from a man's having too high an opinion of himself. +This opinion a proud man will endeavor, as much as he can, to cherish, +and therefore, will love the presence of parasites or flatterers (the +definitions of these people are omitted, because they are too well +known), and will shun that of the noble-minded who think of him as is +right. + +It would take too much time to enumerate here all the evils of pride, +for the proud are subject to all emotions, but to none are they less +subject than to those of love and pity. It is necessary, however, to +observe here that a man is also called proud if he thinks too little of +other people, and so, in this sense, pride is to be defined as joy which +arises from the false opinion that we are superior to other people, +while despondency, the contrary to this pride, would be defined as +sorrow arising from the false opinion that we are inferior to other +people. This being understood, it is easy to see that the proud man is +necessarily envious, and that he hates those above all others who are +the most praised on account of their virtues. It follows, too, that his +hatred of them is not easily overcome by love or kindness and that he is +delighted by the presence of those only who humor his weakness, and from +a fool make him a madman. + +Although despondency is contrary to pride, the despondent man is closely +akin to the proud man. For since the sorrow of the despondent man arises +from his judging his own impotence by the power of virtue of others, his +sorrow will be mitigated, that is to say, he will rejoice, if his +imagination be occupied in contemplating the vices of others. Hence the +proverb-- It is a consolation to the wretched to have bad companions in +their misfortunes. On the other hand, the more the despondent man +believes himself to be below other people, the more will he sorrow; and +this is the reason why none are more prone to envy than the despondent; +and why they, above all others, try to observe men's actions with a view +to finding fault with them rather than correcting them, so that at last +they praise nothing but despondency and glory in it; but in such a +manner, however, as always to seem despondent. + +These things follow from this emotion as necessarily as it follows from +the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right +angles. It is true, indeed, that I have said that I call these and the +like emotions evil, in so far as I attend to human profit alone; but the +laws of Nature have regard to the common order of Nature of which man +is a part--a remark I desired to make in passing, lest it should be +thought that I talk about the vices and absurdities of men rather than +attempt to demonstrate the nature and properties of things. As I said, I +consider human emotions and their properties precisely as I consider +other natural objects; and, indeed, the emotions of man, if they do not +show his power, show at least the power and workmanship of Nature, no +less than many other things which we admire and delight to contemplate. + + +VII + +_Reasonable Emotions_ + +If we live according to the guidance of reason, we shall desire for +others the good which we seek for ourselves. Therefore if we see one +person do good to another, our endeavor to do good is assisted, that is +to say, we shall rejoice, and our joy (by hypothesis) will be +accompanied with the idea of the person who does good to the other, that +is to say, we shall favor him. Favor is not opposed to reason, but +agrees with it, and may arise from it. + +Indignation, as it is defined by us, is necessarily evil; but it is to +be observed that when the supreme authority, constrained by the desire +of preserving peace, punishes a citizen who injures another, I do not +say that it is indignant with the citizen, since it is not excited by +hatred to destroy him, but punishes him from motives of piety. + +Self-satisfaction is the joy which arises from a man's contemplating +himself and his power of action. But man's true power of action or his +virtue is reason itself, which he contemplates clearly and distinctly. +Self-satisfaction therefore arises from reason. Again, man, when he +contemplates himself, perceives nothing clearly and distinctly or +adequately, excepting those things which follow from his power of +action, that is to say, those things which follow from his power of +understanding; and therefore from this contemplation alone the highest +satisfaction which can exist arises. + +Self-satisfaction is indeed the highest thing for which we can hope, for +(as we have shown), no one endeavors to preserve his being for the sake +of any end. Again, because this self-satisfaction is more and more +nourished and strengthened by praise, and, on the contrary more and more +disturbed by blame, therefore we are principally led by glory, and can +scarcely endure life with disgrace. + +Self-exaltation is not opposed to reason, but may spring from it. + +What is called vainglory is self-satisfaction, nourished by nothing but +the good opinion of the multitude, so that when that is withdrawn, the +satisfaction, that is to say, the chief good which every one loves, +ceases. For this reason those who glory in the good opinion of the +multitude anxiously and with daily care strive, labor, and struggle to +preserve their fame. For the multitude is changeable and fickle, so that +fame, if it be not preserved, soon passes away. As every one, moreover, +is desirous to catch the praises of the people, one person will readily +destroy the fame of another; and consequently, as the object of +contention is what is commonly thought to be the highest good, a great +desire arises on the part of every one to keep down his fellows by every +possible means, and he who at last comes off conqueror boasts more +because he has injured another person than because he has profited +himself. This glory of self-satisfaction, therefore, is indeed vain, for +it is really no glory. + +What is worthy of notice with regard to shame may easily be gathered +from what has been said about compassion and repentance. I will only add +that pity, like shame, although it is not a virtue, is nevertheless +good, in so far as it shows that a desire of living uprightly is present +in the man who is possessed with shame, just as pain is called good in +so far as it shows that the injured part has not yet putrefied. A man, +therefore, who is ashamed of what he has done, although he is sorrowful, +is nevertheless more perfect that the shameless man who has no desire of +living uprightly. + +These are the things which I undertook to establish with regard to the +emotions of joy and sorrow. With reference to the desires, these are +good or evil as they spring from good or evil emotions. All of them, +however, in so far as they are begotten in us of emotions which are +passions, are blind, as may easily be inferred from what has been said, +nor would they be of any use if men could be easily persuaded to live +according to the dictates of reason alone. + + +_The Life of Virtue_ + +I + +All our efforts or desires follow from the necessity of our nature in +such a manner that they can be understood either through it alone as +their proximate cause, or in so far as we are a part of Nature, which +part cannot be adequately conceived through itself and without the other +individuals. + + +II + +The desires which follow from our nature in such a manner that they can +be understood through it alone, are those which are related to the mind, +in so far as it is conceived to consist of adequate ideas. The remaining +desires are not related to the mind, unless in so far as it conceives +things inadequately, whose power and increase cannot be determined by +human power, but by the power of objects which are without us. The first +kind of desires, therefore, are properly called actions, but the latter +passions; for the first always indicate our power, and the latter, on +the contrary, indicate our impotence and imperfect knowledge. + + +III + +Our actions, that is to say, those desires which are determined by man's +power or reason, are always good; the others may be good as well as +evil. + + +IV + +It is therefore most profitable to us in life to make perfect the +intellect or reason as far as possible, and in this one thing consists +the highest happiness or blessedness of man; for blessedness is nothing +but the peace of mind which springs from the intuitive knowledge of God, +and to perfect the intellect is nothing but to understand God, together +with the attributes and actions of God, which flow from the necessity +of His nature. The final aim, therefore, of a man who is guided by +reason, that is to say, the chief desire by which he strives to govern +all his other desires, is that by which he is led adequately to conceive +himself and all things which can be conceived by his intelligence. + + +V + +There is no rational life, therefore, without intelligence and things +are good only in so far as they assist man to enjoy that life of the +mind which is determined by intelligence. Those things alone, on the +other hand, we call evil which hinder man from perfecting his reason and +enjoying a rational life. + + +VI + +But because all those things of which man is the efficient cause are +necessarily good, it follows that no evil can happen to man except from +external causes, that is to say, except in so far as he is a part of the +whole of Nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey--compelled +also to accommodate himself to this whole of Nature in almost an +infinite number of ways. + + +VII + +It is impossible that a man should not be a part of Nature and follow +her common order; but if he be placed amongst individuals who agree with +his nature, his power of action will by that very fact be assisted and +supported. But if, on the contrary, he be placed amongst individuals who +do not in the least agree with his nature, he will scarcely be able +without great change on his part to accommodate himself to them. + + +VIII + +Anything that exists in Nature which we judge to be evil or able to +hinder us from existing and enjoying a rational life, we are allowed to +remove from us in that way which seems the safest; and whatever, on the +other hand, we judge to be good or to be profitable for the preservation +of our being or the enjoyment of a rational life, we are permitted to +take for our use and use in any way we may think proper; and absolutely, +every one is allowed by the highest right of Nature to do that which he +believes contributes to his own profit. + + +IX + +Nothing, therefore, can agree better with the nature of any object than +other individuals of the same kind, and so (see Sec. VII) there is nothing +more profitable to man for the preservation of his being and the +enjoyment of a rational life than a man who is guided by reason. Again, +since there is no single thing we know which is more excellent than a +man who is guided by reason, it follows that there is nothing by which a +person can better show how much skill and talent he possesses than by so +educating men that at last they will live under the direct authority of +reason. + + +X + +In so far as men are carried away by envy or any emotion of hatred +towards one another, so far are they contrary to one another, and +consequently so much the more are they to be feared, as they have more +power than other individuals of nature. + + +XI + +Minds, nevertheless, are not conquered by arms, but by love and +generosity. + + +XII + +Above all things is it profitable to men to form communities and to +unite themselves to one another by bonds which may make all of them as +one man; and absolutely, it is profitable for them to do whatever may +tend to strengthen their friendships. + + +XIII + +But to accomplish this skill and watchfulness are required; for men are +changeable (those being very few who live according to the laws of +reason), and nevertheless generally envious and more inclined to +vengeance than pity. To bear with each, therefore, according to his +disposition and to refrain from imitating his emotions requires a +singular power of mind. But those, on the contrary, who know how to +revile men, to denounce vices rather than teach virtues, and not to +strengthen men's minds but to weaken them, are injurious both to +themselves and others, so that many of them through an excess of +impatience and a false zeal for religion prefer living with brutes +rather than amongst men; just as boys or youths, unable to endure with +equanimity the rebukes of their parents, fly to the army, choosing the +discomforts of war and the rule of a tyrant rather than the comforts of +home and the admonitions of a father, suffering all kinds of burdens to +be imposed upon them in order that they may revenge themselves upon +their parents. + + +XIV + +Although, therefore, men generally determine everything by their +pleasure, many more advantages than disadvantages arise from their +common union. It is better, therefore, to endure with equanimity the +injuries inflicted by them, and to apply our minds to those things which +subserve concord and the establishment of friendship. + + +XV + +The things which beget concord are those which are related to justice, +integrity, and honor; for besides that which is unjust and injurious, +men take ill also anything which is esteemed base, or that any one +should despise the received customs of the State. But in order to win +love, those things are chiefly necessary which have reference to +religion and piety. + + +XVI + +Concord, moreover, is often produced by fear, but it is without good +faith. It is to be observed, too, that fear arises from impotence of +mind, and therefore is of no service to reason; nor is pity, although it +seems to present an appearance of piety. + + +XVII + +Men also are conquered by liberality, especially those who have not the +means wherewith to procure what is necessary for the support of life. +But to assist every one who is needy far surpasses the strength or +profit of a private person, for the wealth of a private person is +altogether insufficient to supply such wants. Besides, the power of any +one man is too limited for him to be able to unite every one with +himself in friendship. The care, therefore, of the poor is incumbent on +the whole of society and concerns only the general profit. + + +XVIII + +In the receipt of benefits and in returning thanks, care altogether +different must be taken. + + +XIX + +The love of a harlot, that is to say, the lust of sexual intercourse, +which arises from mere external form, and absolutely all love which +recognizes any other cause than the freedom of the mind, easily passes +into hatred, unless, which is worse, it becomes a species of delirium, +and thereby discord is cherished rather than concord. + + +XX + +With regard to marriage, it is plain that it is in accordance with +reason, if the desire of connection is engendered not merely by external +form, but by a love of begetting children and wisely educating them; and +if, in addition, the love both of the husband and wife has for its cause +not external form merely, but chiefly liberty of mind. + + +XXI + +Flattery, too, produces concord, but only by means of the disgraceful +crime of slavery or perfidy; for there are none who are more taken by +flattery than the proud, who wish to be first and are not so. + + +XXII + +There is a false appearance of piety and religion in dejection; and +although dejection is the opposite of pride, the humble dejected man is +very near akin to the proud. + + +XXIII + +Shame also contributes to concord, but only with regard to those matters +which cannot be concealed. Shame, too, inasmuch as it is a kind of +sorrow, does not belong to the service of reason. + + +XXIV + +The remaining emotions of sorrow which have man for their object are +directly opposed to justice, integrity, honor, piety, and religion; and +although indignation may seem to present an appearance of equity, yet +there is no law where it is allowed to every one to judge the deeds of +another, and to vindicate his own or another's right. + + +XXV + +Affability, that is to say, the desire of pleasing men, which is +determined by reason, is related to piety. But if affability arise from +an emotion, it is ambition or desire, by which men, generally under a +false pretense of piety, excite discords and seditions. For he who +desires to assist other people, either by advice or by deed, in order +that they may together enjoy the highest good, will strive, above all +things, to win their love, and not to draw them into admiration, so +that a doctrine may be named after him, nor absolutely to give any +occasion for envy. In common conversation, too, he will avoid referring +to the vices of men, and will take care only sparingly to speak of human +impotence, while he will talk largely of human virtue or power, and of +the way by which it may be made perfect, so that men being moved not by +fear or aversion, but solely by the emotion of joy, may endeavor as much +as they can to live under the rule of reason. + + +XXVI + +Excepting man, we know no individual thing in Nature in whose mind we +can take pleasure, nor any thing which we can unite with ourselves by +friendship or any kind of intercourse, and therefore regard to our own +profit does not demand that we should preserve anything which exists in +Nature excepting men, but teaches us to preserve it or destroy it in +accordance with its varied uses, or to adapt it to our own service in +any way whatever. + + +XXVII + +The profit which we derive from objects without us, over and above the +experience and knowledge which we obtain because we observe them and +change them from their existing forms into others, is chiefly the +preservation of the body, and for this reason those objects are the most +profitable to us which can feed and nourish the body, so that all its +parts are able properly to perform their functions. For the more capable +the body is of being affected in many ways, and affecting external +bodies in many ways, the more capable of thinking is the mind. But there +seem to be very few things in Nature of this kind, and it is +consequently necessary for the requisite nourishment of the body to use +many different kinds of food; for the human body is composed of a great +number of parts of different nature, which need constant and varied food +in order that the whole of the body may be equally adapted for all those +things which can follow from its nature, and consequently that the mind +also may be equally adapted to conceive many things. + + +XXVIII + +The strength of one man would scarcely suffice to obtain these things if +men did not mutually assist one another. As money has presented us with +an abstract of everything, it has come to pass that its image above +every other usually occupies the mind of the multitude, because they can +imagine hardly any kind of joy without the accompanying idea of money as +its cause. + + +XXIX + +This, however, is a vice only in those who seek money not from poverty +or necessity, but because they have learned the arts of gain, by which +they keep up a grand appearance. As for the body itself, they feed it in +accordance with custom, but sparingly, because they believe that they +lose so much of their goods as they spend upon the preservation of their +body. Those, however, who know the true use of money, and regulate the +measure of wealth according to their needs, live contented with few +things. + + +XXX + +Since, therefore, those things are good which help the parts of the body +to perform their functions, and since joy consists in this, that the +power of man, in so far as he is made up of mind and body, is helped or +increased, it follows that all things which bring joy are good. But +inasmuch as things do not work to this end--that they may affect us with +joy--nor is their power of action guided in accordance with our profit, +and finally, since joy is generally related chiefly to some one part of +the body, it follows that generally the emotions of joy (unless reason +and watchfulness be present), and consequently the desires which are +begotten from them, are excessive. It is to be added, that an emotion +causes us to put that thing first which is sweet to us in the present, +and that we are not able to judge the future with an equal emotion of +the mind. + + +XXXI + +Superstition, on the contrary, seems to affirm that what brings sorrow +is good, and, on the contrary, that what brings joy is evil. But, as we +have already said, no one, excepting an envious man, is delighted at my +impotence or disadvantage, for the greater the joy with which we are +affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, and consequently +the more do we participate in the divine nature; nor can joy ever be +evil which is controlled by a true consideration for our own profit. On +the other hand, the man who is led by fear, and does what is good that +he may avoid what is evil, is not guided by reason. + + +XXXII + +But human power is very limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the +power of external causes, so that we do not possess an absolute power to +adapt to our service the things which are without us. Nevertheless we +shall bear with equanimity those things which happen to us contrary to +what a consideration of our own profit demands, if we are conscious that +we have performed our duty, that the power we have could not reach so +far as to enable us to avoid those things, and that we are a part of the +whole of Nature, whose order we follow. If we clearly and distinctly +understand this, the part of us which is determined by intelligence, +that is to say, the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied +therewith, and in that satisfaction will endeavor to persevere; for, in +so far as we understand, we cannot desire anything excepting what is +necessary, nor, absolutely, can we be satisfied with anything but the +truth. Therefore in so far as we understand these things properly will +the efforts of the better part of us agree with the order of the whole +of Nature. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[30] ... If it agreed better with a man's nature that he should hang +himself, could any reasons be given for his not hanging himself? Can +such a nature possibly exist? If so, I maintain (whether I do or do not +grant free will), that such an one, if he sees that he can live more +conveniently on the gallows than sitting at his own table, would act +most foolishly, if he did not hang himself. So any one who clearly saw +that, by committing crimes, he would enjoy a really more perfect and +better life and existence, than he could attain by the practice of +virtue, would be foolish if he did not act on his convictions. For, with +such a perverse human nature as his, crime would become virtue. _From a +letter to Wm. Blyenbergh_ (March 13, 1665). + +[31] It is to be observed that here and in the following I understand by +hatred, hatred towards men only. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + +OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE[32] + + +By the right and ordinance of Nature, I merely mean those natural laws +wherewith we conceive every individual to be conditioned by Nature, so +as to live and act in a given way. For instance, fishes are naturally +conditioned for swimming, and the greater for devouring the less; +therefore fishes enjoy the water, and the greater devour the less by +sovereign natural right. For it is certain that Nature, taken in the +abstract, has sovereign right to do anything she can; in other words, +her right is co-extensive with her power. The power of Nature is the +power of God, which has sovereign right over all things; and, inasmuch +as the power of Nature is simply the aggregate of the powers of all her +individual components, it follows that every individual has sovereign +right to do all that he can, in other words, the rights of an individual +extend to the utmost limits of his power as it has been conditioned. + +Now it is the sovereign law and right of Nature that each individual +should endeavor to preserve itself as it is, without regard to anything +but itself; therefore this sovereign law and right belongs to every +individual, namely, to exist and act according to its natural +conditions. We do not here acknowledge any difference between mankind +and other individual natural entities, nor between men endowed with +reason and those to whom reason is unknown; nor between fools, madmen, +and sane men. Whatsoever an individual does by the laws of its nature it +has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as it acts as it was conditioned +by Nature, and cannot act otherwise. Wherefore among men, so long as +they are considered as living under the sway of Nature, he who does not +yet know reason, or who has not yet acquired the habit of virtue, acts +solely according to the laws of his desire with as sovereign a right as +he who orders his life entirely by the laws of reason. + +That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that reason +dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also the +ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire +dictates, or to live according to the laws of desire. This is identical +with the teaching of Paul, who acknowledges that previous to the +law--that is, so long as men are considered of as living under the sway +of Nature, there is no sin. + +The natural right of the individual man is thus determined, not by sound +reason, but by desire and power. All are not naturally conditioned so as +to act according to the laws and rules of reason; nay, on the contrary, +all men are born ignorant, and before they can learn the right way of +life and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater part of their life, +even if they have been well brought up, has passed away. Nevertheless, +they are in the meanwhile bound to live and preserve themselves as far +as they can by the unaided impulses of desire. Nature has given them no +other guide, and has denied them the present power of living according +to sound reason; so that they are no more bound to live by the dictates +of an enlightened mind than a cat is bound to live by the laws of the +nature of a lion. + +Whatsoever, therefore, an individual, considered as under the sway of +Nature, thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or +impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to seek and to +take for himself as he best can, whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or +any other means; consequently he may regard as an enemy any one who +hinders the accomplishment of his purpose. + +It follows from what we have said that the right and ordinance of +Nature, under which all men are born, and under which they mostly live, +only prohibits such things as no one desires, and no one can attain: it +does not forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, +any of the means suggested by desire. + +This we need not wonder at, for Nature is not bounded by the laws of +human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation. +Her limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the eternal order +of Nature, wherein man is but a speck. It is by the necessity of this +alone that all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a +particular way. If anything, therefore, in Nature seems to us +ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we only know in part, and are +almost entirely ignorant of the order and interdependence of Nature as a +whole, and also because we want everything to be arranged according to +the dictates of our human reason; in reality that which reason considers +evil is not evil in respect to the order and laws of Nature as a whole, +but only in respect to the laws of our reason. + +Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live +according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said, +they have men's true good for their object. Moreover, every one wishes +to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this +would be quite impossible so long as every one did everything he liked, +and reason's claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger. +There is no one who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity, hatred, +anger and deceit, and who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can. +When we reflect that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must +needs live most miserably, ... we shall plainly see that men must +necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely and well +as possible if they are to enjoy, as a whole, the rights which naturally +belong to them as individuals, and their life should be no more +conditioned by the force and desire of individuals, but by the power and +will of the whole body. This end they will be unable to attain if desire +be their only guide, for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a +different direction; they must, therefore, most firmly decree and +establish that they will be guided in everything by reason, which nobody +will dare openly to repudiate lest he should be taken for a madman, and +will restrain any desire which is injurious to a man's fellows, that +they will do to all as they would be done by, and that they will defend +their neighbor's rights as their own. + +How such a compact as this should be entered into, how ratified and +established, we will now inquire. + +Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever neglects +anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of gaining a +greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does any one +endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or +gaining a greater good. That is, every one will, of two goods, choose +that which he thinks the greatest; and, of two evils that which he +thinks the least. I say advisedly that which he thinks the greatest or +the least, for it does not necessarily follow that he judges right. This +law is so deeply implanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted +among eternal truths and axioms. + +As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated, no one can +honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all things,[33] +and in general no one will abide by his promises, unless under the fear +of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good. An example will make +the matter clearer. Suppose that a robber forces me to promise that I +will give him my goods at his will and pleasure. It is plain (inasmuch +as my natural right is, as I have shown, co-extensive with my power) +that if I can free myself from this robber by stratagem, by assenting +to his demands, I have the natural right to do so, and to pretend to +accept his conditions. Or, again, suppose I have genuinely promised some +one that for the space of twenty days I will not taste food or any +nourishment; and suppose I afterwards find that my promise was foolish, +and cannot be kept without very great injury to myself; as I am bound by +natural law and right to choose the least of two evils, I have complete +right to break any compact, and act as if my promise had never been +uttered. I say that I should have perfect natural right to do so, +whether I was actuated by true and evident reason, or whether I was +actuated by mere opinion in thinking I had promised rashly; whether my +reasons were true or false, I should be in fear of a greater evil, +which, by the ordinance of Nature, I should strive to avoid by every +means in my power. + +We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid by its +utility, without which it becomes null and void. It is therefore foolish +to ask a man to keep his faith with us forever, unless we also endeavor +that the violation of the compact we enter into shall involve for the +violator more harm than good. This consideration should have very great +weight in forming a state. However, if all men could be easily led by +reason alone, and could recognize what is best and most useful for a +state, there would be no one who would not forswear deceit, for every +one would keep most religiously to their compact in their desire for the +chief good, namely, the preservation of the state, and would cherish +good faith above all things as the shield and buckler of the +commonwealth. However, it is far from being the case that all men can +always be easily led by reason alone; every one is drawn away by his +pleasure, while avarice, ambition, envy, hatred, and the like so engross +the mind that reason has no place therein. Hence, though men make +promises with all the appearances of good faith, and agree that they +will keep to their engagement, no one can absolutely rely on another +man's promise unless there is something behind it. Every one has by +Nature a right to act deceitfully, and to break his compacts, unless he +be restrained by the hope of some greater good, or the fear of some +greater evil. + +However, as we have shown that the natural right of the individual is +only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either +willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he +in so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and, further, +that the sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign +power, wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats +of the universally feared punishment of death. Such sovereign right he +will retain only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his +will; otherwise he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger +than he will be bound unwillingly to obey him. + +In this manner a society can be formed without any violation of natural +right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept--that is, if each +individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the +latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that +is, it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and every one will be +bound to obey, under pain of the severest punishment. A body politic of +this kind is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a society which +wields all its power as a whole. The sovereign power is not restrained +by any laws, but every one is bound to obey it in all things; such is +the state of things implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed +over to it all their power of self-defense, or in other words, all their +right. For if they had wished to retain any right for themselves, they +ought to have taken precautions for its defense and preservation. As +they have not done so, and indeed could not have done so without +dividing and consequently ruining the state, they placed themselves +absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign power; and, therefore, having +acted (as we have shown) as reason and necessity demanded, they are +obliged to fulfill the commands of the sovereign power, however absurd +these may be, else they will be public enemies, and will act against +reason, which urges the preservation of the state as a primary duty. For +reason bids us choose the lesser of two evils. + +Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the dominion and +will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light heart: for we +have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of imposing their +will, so long as they have the full power to enforce it. If such power +be lost their right to command is lost also, or lapses to those who have +assumed it and can keep it. Thus it is very rare for sovereigns to +impose thoroughly irrational commands, for they are bound to consult +their own interests, and retain their power by consulting the public +good and acting according to the dictates of reason, as Seneca says, +"_violenta imperia nemo continuit diu_." No one can long retain a +tyrant's sway. + +In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared: for it +is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it be +a large one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the +basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and +to bring men as far as possible under the control of reason, so that +they may live in peace and harmony. If this basis be removed the whole +fabric falls to ruin. + +Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty of +subjects is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to recognize no +right save that which it sanctions. + +It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects into slaves, +for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like; but this idea +is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he who is led away by +his pleasures and can neither see what is good for him nor act +accordingly: he alone is free who lives with free consent under the +entire guidance of reason. + +Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a certain sense, +but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave; all depends on the +object of the action. If the object of the action be the good of the +state, and not the good of the agent, the latter is a slave and does +himself no good; but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole +people, and not that of the ruler, is the supreme law, obedience to the +sovereign power does not make a man a slave, of no use to himself, but +a subject. Therefore, that state is the freest whose laws are founded on +sound reason, so that every member of it may, if he will, be free;[34] +that is, live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason. + +Children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of their +parents, are yet not slaves; for the commands of parents look generally +to the children's benefit. + +We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between a slave, a +son, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined. A slave is one +who is bound to obey his master's orders, though they are given solely +in the master's interest; a son is one who obeys his father's orders, +given in his own interest; a subject obeys the orders of the sovereign +power, given for the common interest, wherein he is included. + +I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a democracy. +I have especially desired to do so, for I believe it to be of all forms +of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual +liberty. In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he +has no further voice in affairs; he only hands it over to the majority +of a society, whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain, as they were in +the state of Nature, equals. + +This is the only form of government which I have treated of at length, +for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the benefits of +freedom in a state. + +I may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms of government, +for we may gather from what has been said whence their right arises +without going into its origin. The possessor of sovereign power, whether +he be one, or many, or the whole body politic, has the sovereign right +of imposing any commands he pleases; and he who has either voluntarily, +or under compulsion, transferred the right to defend him to another, +has, in so doing, renounced his natural right and is therefore bound to +obey, in all things, the commands of the sovereign power; and will be +bound so to do so long as the king, or nobles, or the people preserve +the sovereign power which formed the basis of the original transfer. I +need add no more. + +The bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed, we shall readily +be able to define private civil right, wrong, justice, and injustice, +with their relations to the state; and also to determine what +constitutes an ally, or an enemy, or the crime of treason. + +By private civil right we can only mean the liberty every man possesses +to preserve his existence, a liberty limited by the edicts of the +sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority. For when a man has +transferred to another his right of living as he likes, which was only +limited by his power, that is, has transferred his liberty and power of +self-defense, he is bound to live as that other dictates, and to trust +to him entirely for his defense. Wrong takes place when a citizen, or +subject, is forced by another to undergo some loss or pain in +contradiction to the authority of the law, or the edict of the sovereign +power. + +Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community; nor can it ever +accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has the right to +do what he likes. It can only arise, therefore, between private persons, +who are bound by law and right not to injure one another. Justice +consists in the habitual rendering to every man his lawful due; +injustice consists in depriving a man, under the pretense of legality, +of what the laws, rightly interpreted, would allow him. These last are +also called equity and inequity, because those who administer the laws +are bound to show no respect of persons, but to account all men equal, +and to defend every man's right equally, neither envying the rich nor +despising the poor. + +The men of two states become allies, when for the sake of avoiding war, +or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each other no hurt, +but, on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity arises, each +retaining his independence. Such a covenant is valid so long as its +basis of danger or advantage is in force: no one enters into an +engagement, or is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope +of some accruing good, or the fear of some evil: if this basis be +removed the compact thereby becomes void: this has been abundantly shown +by experience. For although different states make treaties not to harm +one another, they always take every possible precaution against such +treaties being broken by the stronger party, and do not rely on the +compact, unless there is a sufficiently obvious object and advantage to +both parties in observing it. Otherwise they would fear a breach of +faith, nor would there be any wrong done thereby; for who in his proper +senses, and aware of the right of the sovereign power, would trust in +the promises of one who has the will and the power to do what he likes, +and who aims solely at the safety and advantage of his dominion? +Moreover, if we consult loyalty and religion, we shall see that no one +in possession of power ought to abide by his promises to the injury of +his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises without breaking the +engagement he made with his subjects, by which both he and they are most +solemnly bound. + +An enemy is one who lives apart from the state, and does not recognize +its authority either as a subject or as an ally. It is not hatred which +makes a man an enemy, but the rights of the state. The rights of the +state are the same in regard to him who does not recognize by any +compact the state authority, as they are against him who has done the +state an injury. It has the right to force him, as best it can, either +to submit, or to contract an alliance. + +Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects, who by compact, +either tacit or expressed, have transferred all their rights to the +state. A subject is said to have committed this crime when he has +attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the sovereign power, or to +place it in different hands. I say, _has attempted_, for if punishment +were not to overtake him till he had succeeded, it would often come too +late, the sovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred +already. + +I also say, _has attempted, for whatever reasons, to seize the sovereign +power_, and I recognize no difference whether such an attempt should be +followed by public loss or public gain. Whatever be his reason for +acting, the crime is treason, and he is rightly condemned. In war, every +one would admit the justice of his sentence. If a man does not keep to +his post, but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his +commander, whatever may be his motive, so long as he acts on his own +motion, even if he advances with the design of defeating the enemy, he +is rightly put to death, because he has violated his oath, and infringed +the rights of his commander. That all citizens are equally bound by +these rights in time of peace, is not so generally recognized, but the +reasons for obedience are in both cases identical. The state must be +preserved and directed by the sole authority of the sovereign, and such +authority and right have been accorded by universal consent to him +alone. If, therefore, any one else attempts, without his consent, to +execute any public enterprise, even though the state might (as we said) +reap benefit therefrom, such person has none the less infringed the +sovereign's right, and would be rightly punished for treason. + +In order that every scruple may be removed, we may now answer the +inquiry, whether our former assertion that every one who has not the +practice of reason, may, in the state of Nature, live by sovereign +natural right, according to the laws of his desires, is not in direct +opposition to the law and right of God as revealed. For as all men +absolutely (whether they be less endowed with reason or more) are +equally bound by the Divine command to love their neighbor as +themselves, it may be said that they cannot, without wrong, do injury to +any one, or live according to their desires. + +This objection, so far as the state of Nature is concerned, can be +easily answered, for the state of Nature is, both in nature and in time, +prior to religion. No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to +God,[35] nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his reason, but +solely by revelation confirmed by signs. Therefore, previous to +revelation, no one is bound by a Divine law and right of which he is +necessarily in ignorance. The state of Nature must by no means be +confounded with a state of religion, but must be conceived as without +either religion or law, and consequently without sin or wrong. This is +how we have described it, and we are confirmed by the authority of Paul. +It is not only in respect of ignorance that we conceive the state of +Nature as prior to, and lacking the Divine revealed law and right; but +in respect of freedom also, wherewith all men are born endowed.... + +It may be insisted that sovereigns are as much bound by the Divine law +as subjects; whereas we have asserted that they retain their natural +rights, and may do whatever they like. + +In order to clear up the whole difficulty, which arises rather +concerning the natural right than the natural state, I maintain that +every one is bound, in the state of Nature, to live according to Divine +law, in the same way as he is bound to live according to the dictates of +sound reason; namely, inasmuch as it is to his advantage, and necessary +for his salvation; but, if he will not so live, he may do otherwise at +his own risk. He is thus bound to live according to his own laws, not +according to any one else's, and to recognize no man as a judge, or as a +superior in religion. Such, in my opinion, is the position of a +sovereign, for he may take advice from his fellow men, but he is not +bound to recognize any as a judge, nor any one besides himself as an +arbitrator on any question of right, unless it be a prophet sent +expressly by God and attesting his mission by indisputable signs. Even +then he does not recognize a man, but God Himself as his judge. + +If a sovereign refuses to obey God as revealed in His law, he does so at +his own risk and loss, but without violating any civil or natural +right. For the civil right is dependent on his own decree; and natural +right is dependent on the laws of Nature, which latter are not adapted +to religion, whose sole aim is the good of humanity, but to the order of +Nature--that is, to God's eternal decree unknown to us. + +This truth seems to be adumbrated in a somewhat obscurer form by those +who maintain that men can sin against God's revelation, but not against +the eternal decree by which He has ordained all things.... + +FOOTNOTES: + +[32] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. xvi, same title. + +[33] In the state of social life, where general right determines what is +good or evil, stratagem is rightly distinguished as of two kinds, good +and evil. But in the state of Nature, where every man is his own judge, +possessing the absolute right to lay down laws for himself, to interpret +them as he pleases, or to abrogate them if he thinks it convenient, it +is not conceivable that stratagem should be evil. + +[34] Whatever be the social state a man finds himself in, he may be +free. For certainly a man is free, in so far as he is led by reason. Now +reason (though Hobbes thinks otherwise) is always on the side of peace, +which cannot be attained unless the general laws of the state be +respected. Therefore the more a man is led by reason--in other words, +the more he is free, the more constantly will he respect the laws of his +country, and obey the commands of the sovereign power to which he is +subject. + +[35] When Paul says that men have in themselves no refuge, he speaks as +a man: for in the ninth chapter of the same Epistle he expressly teaches +that God has mercy on whom He will, and that men are without excuse, +only because they are in God's power like clay in the hands of a potter, +who out of the same lump makes vessels, some for honor and some for +dishonor, not because they have been forewarned. As regards the Divine +natural law whereof the chief commandment is, as we have said, to love +God, I have called it a law in the same sense, as philosophers style +laws those general rules of Nature, according to which everything +happens. For the love of God is not a state of obedience: it is a virtue +which necessarily exists in a man who knows God rightly. Obedience has +regard to the will of a ruler, not to necessity and truth. Now as we are +ignorant of the nature of God's will, and on the other hand know that +everything happens solely by God's power, we cannot, except through +revelation, know whether God wishes in any way to be honored as a +sovereign. + +Again; we have shown that the Divine rights appear to us in the light of +rights or commands, only so long as we are ignorant of their cause: as +soon as their cause is known, they cease to be rights, and we embrace +them no longer as rights but as eternal truths; in other words, +obedience passes into love of God, which emanates from true knowledge as +necessarily as light emanates from the sun. Reason then leads us to love +God, but cannot lead us to obey Him; for we cannot embrace the commands +of God as Divine, while we are in ignorance of their cause, neither can +we rationally conceive God as a sovereign laying down laws as a +sovereign. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +OF SUPREME AUTHORITIES + + +I + +_Of the Right of Supreme Authorities_[36] + +Under every dominion the state is said to be Civil; but the entire body +subject to a dominion is called a Commonwealth, and the general business +of the dominion, subject to the direction of him that holds it, has the +name of Affairs of State. Next we call men Citizens, as far as they +enjoy by the civil law all the advantages of the commonwealth, and +Subjects, as far as they are bound to obey its ordinances or laws. +Lastly ... of the civil state there are three kinds--democracy, +aristocracy and monarchy. Now, before I begin to treat of each kind +separately, I will first deduce all the properties of the civil state in +general. And of these, first of all comes to be considered the supreme +right of the commonwealth, or the right of the supreme authorities. + +It is clear that the right of the supreme authorities is nothing else +than simple natural right, limited, indeed, by the power, not of every +individual, but of the multitude, which is guided, as it were, by one +mind--that is, as each individual in the state of Nature, so the body +and mind of a dominion have as much right as they have power. And thus +each single citizen or subject has the less right, the more the +commonwealth exceeds him in power, and each citizen consequently does +and has nothing but what he may by the general decree of the +commonwealth defend. + +If the commonwealth grant to any man the right, and therewith the +authority (for else it is but a gift of words) to live after his own +mind, by that very act it abandons its own right, and transfers the same +to him, to whom it has given such authority. But if it has given this +authority to two or more, I mean authority to live each after his own +mind, by that very act it has divided the dominion, and if, lastly, it +has given this same authority to every citizen, it has thereby destroyed +itself, and there remains no more a commonwealth, but everything returns +to the state of Nature; all of which is very manifest from what goes +before. And thus it follows, that it can by no means be conceived, that +every citizen should by the ordinance of the commonwealth live after his +own mind, and accordingly this natural right of being one's own judge +ceases in the civil state. I say expressly "by the ordinance of the +commonwealth," for if we weigh the matter aright, the natural right of +every man does not cease in the civil state. For man, alike in the +natural and in the civil state, acts according to the laws of his own +nature, and consults his own interest. Man, I say, in each state is led +by fear or hope to do or leave undone this or that; but the main +difference between the two states is this, that in the civil state all +fear the same things, and all have the same ground of security, and +manner of life; and this certainly does not do away with the +individual's faculty of judgment. For he that is minded to obey all the +commonwealth's orders, whether through fear of its power or through love +of quiet, certainly consults after his own heart his own safety and +interest. + +Moreover, we cannot even conceive, that every citizen should be allowed +to interpret the commonwealth's decrees or laws. For were every citizen +allowed this, he would thereby be his own judge, because each would +easily be able to give a color of right to his own deeds, which by the +last section is absurd. + +We see, then, that every citizen depends not on himself, but on the +commonwealth, all whose commands he is bound to execute, and has no +right to decide, what is equitable or iniquitous, just or unjust. But, +on the contrary, as the body of the dominion should, so to speak, be +guided by one mind, and consequently the will of the commonwealth must +be taken to be the will of all; what the state decides to be just and +good must be held to be so decided by every individual. And so, however +iniquitous the subject may think the commonwealth's decisions, he is +none the less bound to execute them. + +But, it may be objected, is it not contrary to the dictate of reason to +subject oneself wholly to the judgment of another, and, consequently, is +not the civil state repugnant to reason? Whence it would follow that the +civil state is irrational, and could only be created by men destitute of +reason, not at all by such as are led by it. But since reason teaches +nothing contrary to Nature, sound reason cannot therefore dictate that +every one should remain independent, so long as men are liable to +passions, that is, reason pronounces against such independence. Besides, +reason altogether teaches to seek peace, and peace cannot be maintained, +unless the commonwealth's general laws be kept unbroken. And so, the +more a man is guided by reason, that is, the more he is free, the more +constantly he will keep the laws of the commonwealth, and execute the +commands of the supreme authority, whose subject he is. Furthermore, the +civil state is naturally ordained to remove general fear, and prevent +general sufferings, and therefore pursue above everything the very end, +after which every one, who is led by reason, strives, but in the natural +state strives vainly. Wherefore, if a man, who is led by reason, has +sometimes to do by the commonwealth's order what he knows to be +repugnant to reason, that harm is far compensated by the good, which he +derives from the existence of a civil state. For it is reason's own law, +to choose the less of two evils; and accordingly we may conclude that no +one is acting against the dictate of his own reason, so far as he does +what by the law of the commonwealth is to be done. And this any one will +more easily grant us, after we have explained how far the power and +consequently the right of the commonwealth extends. + +For, first of all, it must be considered that, as in the state of Nature +the man who is led by reason is most powerful and most independent, so +too that commonwealth will be most powerful and most independent which +is founded and guided by reason. For the right of the commonwealth is +determined by the power of the multitude, which is led, as it were, by +one mind. But this unity of mind can in no wise be conceived, unless the +commonwealth pursues chiefly the very end which sound reason teaches is +to the interest of all men. + +In the second place it comes to be considered that subjects are so far +dependent, not on themselves but on the commonwealth, as they fear its +power or threats, or as they love the civil state. Whence it follows, +that such things, as no one can be induced to do by rewards or threats, +do not fall within the rights of the commonwealth. For instance, by +reason of his faculty of judgment, it is in no man's power to believe. +For by what rewards or threats can a man be brought to believe that the +whole is not greater than its part, or that God does not exist, or that +that is an infinite being, which he sees to be finite, or, generally, +anything contrary to his sense or thought? So, too, by what rewards or +threats can a man be brought to love one whom he hates, or to hate one +whom he loves? And to this head must likewise be referred such things as +are so abhorrent to human nature, that it regards them as actually worse +than any evil, as that a man should be witness against himself, or +torture himself, or kill his parents, or not strive to avoid death, and +the like, to which no one can be induced by rewards or threats. But if +we still choose to say that the commonwealth has the right or authority +to order such things, we can conceive of it in no other sense than that +in which one might say that a man has the right to be mad or delirious. +For what but a delirious fancy would such a right be, as could bind no +one? And here I am speaking expressly of such things as cannot be +subject to the right of a commonwealth and are abhorrent to human nature +in general. For the fact that a fool or madman can by no rewards or +threats be induced to execute orders, or that this or that person, +because he is attached to this or that religion, judges the laws of a +dominion worse than any possible evil, in no wise makes void the laws of +the commonwealth, since by them most of the citizens are restrained. And +so, as those who are without fear or hope are so far independent, they +are, therefore, enemies of the dominion, and may lawfully be coerced by +force. + +Thirdly, and lastly, it comes to be considered that those things are not +so much within the commonwealth's right, which cause indignation in the +majority. For it is certain, that by the guidance of Nature men conspire +together, either through common fear, or with the desire to avenge some +common hurt; and as the right of the commonwealth is determined by the +common power of the multitude, it is certain that the power and right of +the commonwealth are so far diminished, as it gives occasion for many to +conspire together. There are certainly some subjects of fear for a +commonwealth, and as every separate citizen or in the state of Nature +every man, so a commonwealth is the less independent, the greater reason +it has to fear. So much for the right of supreme authorities over +subjects. Now before I treat of the right of the said authorities as +against others, we had better resolve a question commonly mooted about +religion. + +For it may be objected to us, Do not the civil state, and the obedience +of subjects, such as we have shown is required in the civil state, do +away with religion, whereby we are bound to worship God? But if we +consider the matter, as it really is, we shall find nothing that can +suggest a scruple. For the mind, so far as it makes use of reason, is +dependent, not on the supreme authorities, but on itself. And so the +true knowledge and the love of God cannot be subject to the dominion of +any, nor yet can charity towards one's neighbor. And if we further +reflect that the highest exercise of charity is that which aims at +keeping peace and joining in unity, we shall not doubt that he does his +duty, who helps every one, so far as the commonwealth's laws, that is, +so far as unity and quiet allow. As for external rites, it is certain, +that they can do no good or harm at all in respect of the true knowledge +of God, and the love which necessarily results from it; and so they +ought not to be held of such importance, that it should be thought worth +while on their account to disturb public peace and quiet. Moreover, it +is certain that I am not a champion of religion by the law of Nature, +that is, by the divine decree. For I have no authority, as once the +disciples of Christ had, to cast out unclean spirits and work miracles; +which authority is yet so necessary to the propagating of religion in +places where it is forbidden, that without it one not only, as they say, +wastes one's time[37] and trouble, but causes besides very many +inconveniences, whereof all ages have seen most mournful examples. Every +one therefore, wherever he may be, can worship God with true religion, +and mind his own business, which is the duty of a private man. But the +care of propagating religion should be left to God, or the supreme +authorities, upon whom alone falls the charge of affairs of state. But I +return to my subject. + +After explaining the right of supreme authorities over citizens and the +duty of subjects, it remains to consider the right of such authorities +against the world at large, which is now easily intelligible from what +has been said. For since the right of the supreme authorities is nothing +else but simple natural right, it follows that two dominions stand +towards each other in the same relation as do two men in the state of +Nature, with this exception, that a commonwealth can provide against +being oppressed by another; which a man in the state of Nature cannot +do, seeing that he is overcome daily by sleep, often by disease or +mental infirmity, and in the end by old age, and is besides liable to +other inconveniences, from which a commonwealth can secure itself. + +A commonwealth, then, is so far independent, as it can plan and provide +against oppression by another, and so far dependent on another +commonwealth, as it fears that other's power, or is hindered by it from +executing its own wishes, or, lastly, as it needs its help for its own +preservation or increase. For we cannot at all doubt, that if two +commonwealths are willing to offer each other mutual help, both together +are more powerful, and therefore have more right, than either alone. + +But this will be more clearly intelligible if we reflect that two +commonwealths are naturally enemies. For men in the state of Nature are +enemies. Those, then, who stand outside a commonwealth, and retain +their natural rights, continue enemies. Accordingly, if one commonwealth +wishes to make war on another and employ extreme measures to make that +other dependent on itself, it may lawfully make the attempt, since it +needs but the bare will of the commonwealth for war to be waged. But +concerning peace it can decide nothing, save with the concurrence of +another commonwealth's will. When it follows that laws of war regard +every commonwealth by itself, but laws of peace regard not one, but at +the least two commonwealths, which are therefore called "contracting +parties." + +This "contract" remains so long unmoved as the motive for entering into +it, that is, fear of hurt or hope of gain, subsists. But take away from +either commonwealth this hope or fear, and it is left independent, and +the link, whereby the commonwealths were mutually bound, breaks of +itself. And therefore every commonwealth has the right to break its +contract, whenever it chooses, and cannot be said to act treacherously +or perfidiously in breaking its word, as soon as the motive of hope or +fear is removed. For every contracting party was on equal terms in this +respect, that whichever could first free itself of fear should be +independent, and make use of its independence after its own mind; and, +besides, no one makes a contract respecting the future, but on the +hypothesis of certain precedent circumstances. But when these +circumstances change, the reason of policy applicable to the whole +position changes with them; and therefore every one of the contracting +commonwealths retains the right of consulting its own interest, and +consequently endeavors, as far as possible, to be free from fear and +thereby independent, and to prevent another from coming out of the +contract with greater power. If then a commonwealth complains that it +has been deceived, it cannot properly blame the bad faith of another +contracting commonwealth, but only its own folly in having entrusted its +own welfare to another party, that was independent, and had for its +highest law the welfare of its own dominion. + +To commonwealths, which have contracted a treaty of peace, it belongs to +decide the questions which may be mooted about the terms or rules of +peace, whereby they have mutually bound themselves, inasmuch as laws of +peace regard not one commonwealth, but the commonwealths which contract +taken together. But if they cannot agree together about the conditions, +they by that very fact return to a state of war. + +The more commonwealths there are, that have contracted a joint treaty of +peace, the less each of them by itself is an object of fear to the +remainder, or the less it has the authority to make war. But it is so +much the more bound to observe the conditions of peace; that is, the +less independent, and the more bound to accommodate itself to the +general will of the contracting parties. + +But the good faith, inculcated by sound reason and religion, is not +hereby made void; for neither reason nor Scripture teaches one to keep +one's word in every case. For if I have promised a man, for instance, to +keep safe a sum of money he has secretly deposited with me, I am not +bound to keep my word, from the time that I know or believe the deposit +to have been stolen, but I shall act more rightly in endeavoring to +restore it to its owners. So likewise, if the supreme authority has +promised another to do something, which subsequently occasion or reason +shows or seems to show is contrary to the welfare of its subjects, it is +surely bound to break its word. As then Scripture only teaches us to +keep our word in general, and leaves to every individual's judgment the +special cases of exception, it teaches nothing repugnant to what we have +just proved. + +But that I may not have so often to break the thread of my discourse, +and to resolve hereafter similar objections, I would have it known that +all this demonstration of mine proceeds from the necessity of human +nature, considered in what light you will--I mean, from the universal +effort of all men after self-preservation, an effort inherent in all +men, whether learned or unlearned. And therefore, however one considers +men are led, whether by passion or by reason, it will be the same thing; +for the demonstration, as we have said, is of universal application. + + +II + +_Of the Functions of Supreme Authorities_[38] + +The right of the supreme authorities is limited by their power; the most +important part of that right is, that they are, as it were, the mind of +the dominion, whereby all ought to be guided; and accordingly, such +authorities alone have the right of deciding what is good, evil, +equitable or iniquitous, that is, what must be done or left undone by +the subjects severally or collectively. And, accordingly, they have the +sole right of laying down laws, and of interpreting the same, whenever +their meaning is disputed, and of deciding whether a given case is in +conformity with or violation of the laws; and, lastly, of waging war, +and of drawing up and offering propositions for peace, or of accepting +such when offered. + +As all these functions, and also the means required to execute them, are +matters which regard the whole body of the dominion, that is, are +affairs of state, it follows that affairs of state depend on the +direction of him only who holds supreme dominion. And hence it follows +that it is the right of the supreme authority alone to judge the deeds +of every individual, and demand of him an account of the same; to punish +criminals, and decide questions of law between citizens, or appoint +jurists acquainted with the existing laws, to administer these matters +on its behalf; and, further, to use and order all means to war and +peace, as to found and fortify cities, levy soldiers, assign military +posts, and order what it would have done, and, with a view to peace, to +send and give audience to ambassadors; and, finally, to levy the costs +of all this. + +Since, then, it is the right of the supreme authority alone to handle +public matters, or choose officials to do so, it follows that that +subject is a pretender to the dominion, who, without the supreme +council's knowledge, enters upon any public matter, although he believe +that his design will be to the best interest of the commonwealth. + +But it is often asked, whether the supreme authority is bound by laws, +and, consequently, whether it can do wrong. Now as the words "law" and +"wrong-doing" often refer not merely to the laws of a commonwealth, but +also to the general rules which concern all natural things, and +especially to the general rules of reason, we cannot, without +qualification, say that the commonwealth is bound by no laws, or can do +no wrong. For were the commonwealth bound by no laws or rules, which +removed, the commonwealth were no commonwealth, we should have to regard +it not as a natural thing, but as a chimera. A commonwealth then does +wrong, when it does, or suffers to be done, things which may be the +cause of its own ruin; and we can say that it then does wrong, in the +sense in which philosophers or doctors say that Nature does wrong; and +in this sense we can say, that a commonwealth does wrong, when it acts +against the dictate of reason. For a commonwealth is most independent +when it acts according to the dictate of reason; so far, then, as it +acts against reason, it fails itself, or does wrong. And we shall be +able more easily to understand this if we reflect that when we say, that +a man can do what he will with his own, this authority must be limited +not only by the power of the agent, but by the capacity of the object. +If, for instance, I say that I can rightfully do what I will with this +table, I do not certainly mean that I have the right to make it eat +grass. So, too, though we say, that men depend not on themselves, but on +the commonwealth, we do not mean, that men lose their human nature and +put on another; nor yet that the commonwealth has the right to make men +wish for this or that, or (what is just as impossible) regard with +honor things which excite ridicule or disgust. But it is implied that +there are certain intervening circumstances which supposed, one likewise +supposes the reverence and fear of the subjects towards the +commonwealth, and which abstracted, one makes abstraction likewise of +that fear and reverence, and therewith of the commonwealth itself. The +commonwealth, then, to maintain its independence, is bound to preserve +the causes of fear and reverence, otherwise it ceases to be a +commonwealth. For the person or persons that hold dominion can no more +combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or +naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage-player, or the +open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves, than they can +combine existence with non-existence. But to proceed to slay and rob +subjects, ravish maidens, and the like, turns fear into indignation and +the civil state into a state of enmity. + +We see, then, in what sense we may say, that a commonwealth is bound by +laws and can do wrong. But if by "law" we understand civil law, and by +"wrong" that which, by civil law, is forbidden to be done, that is, if +these words be taken in their proper sense, we cannot at all say that a +commonwealth is bound by laws or can do wrong. For the maxims and +motives of fear and reverence which a commonwealth is bound to observe +in its own interest, pertain not to civil jurisprudence, but to the law +of Nature, since they cannot be vindicated by the civil law, but by the +law of war. And a commonwealth is bound by them in no other sense than +that in which in the state of Nature a man is bound to take heed that +he preserve his independence and be not his own enemy, lest he should +destroy himself; and in this taking heed lies not the subjection, but +the liberty of human nature. But civil jurisprudence depends on the mere +decree of the commonwealth, which is not bound to please any but itself, +nor to hold anything to be good or bad, but what it judges to be such +for itself. And, accordingly, it has not merely the right to avenge +itself, or to lay down and interpret laws, but also to abolish the same, +and to pardon any guilty person out of the fullness of its power. + +Contracts or laws, whereby the multitude transfers its right to one +council or man, should without doubt be broken, when it is expedient for +the general welfare to do so. But to decide this point, whether, that +is, it be expedient for the general welfare to break them or not, is +within the right of no private person, but of him only who holds +dominion; therefore of these laws he who holds dominion remains sole +interpreter. Moreover, no private person can by right vindicate these +laws, and so they do not really bind him who holds dominion. +Notwithstanding, if they are of such a nature that they cannot be broken +without at the same time weakening the commonwealth's strength, that is, +without at the same time changing to indignation the common fear of most +of the citizens, by this very fact the commonwealth is dissolved, and +the contract comes to an end; and therefore such contract is vindicated +not by the civil law, but by the law of war. And so he who holds +dominion is not bound to observe the terms of the contract by any other +cause than that, which bids a man in the state of Nature to beware of +being his own enemy, lest he should destroy himself. + + +III + +_Of the Best State of a Dominion_[39] + +We have shown that man is then most independent when he is most led by +reason, and, in consequence, that that commonwealth is most powerful and +most independent which is founded and guided by reason. But, as the best +plan of living, so as to assure to the utmost self-preservation, is that +which is framed according to the dictate of reason, therefore it follows +that that in every kind is best done, which a man or commonwealth does, +so far as he or it is in the highest degree independent. For it is one +thing to till a field by right, and another to till it in the best way. +One thing, I say, to defend or preserve oneself, and to pass judgment by +right, and another to defend or preserve oneself in the best way, and to +pass the best judgment; and, consequently, it is one thing to have +dominion and care of affairs of state by right, and another to exercise +dominion and direct affairs of state in the best way. And so, as we have +treated of the right of every commonwealth in general, it is time to +treat of the best state of every dominion. + +Now the quality of the state of any dominion is easily perceived from +the end of the civil state, which end is nothing else but peace and +security of life. And therefore that dominion is the best, where men +pass their lives in unity, and the laws are kept unbroken. For it is +certain, that seditions, wars, and contempt or breach of the laws are +not so much to be imputed to the wickedness of the subjects, as to the +bad state of a dominion. For men are not born fit for citizenship, but +must be made so. Besides, men's natural passions are everywhere the +same; and if wickedness more prevails, and more offenses are committed +in one commonwealth than in another, it is certain that the former has +not enough pursued the end of unity, nor framed its laws with sufficient +forethought; and that, therefore, it has failed in making quite good its +right as a commonwealth. For a civil state, which has not done away with +the causes of seditions, where war is a perpetual object of fear, and +where, lastly, the laws are often broken, differs but little from the +mere state of Nature, in which every one lives after his own mind at the +great risk of his life. + +But as the vices and inordinate license and contumacy of subjects must +be imputed to the commonwealth, so, on the other hand, their virtue and +constant obedience to the laws are to be ascribed in the main to the +virtue and perfect right of the commonwealth. And so it is deservedly +reckoned to Hannibal as an extraordinary virtue, that in his army there +never arose a sedition. + +Of a commonwealth, whose subjects are but hindered by terror from taking +arms, it should rather be said, that it is free from war, than that it +has peace. For peace is not mere absence of war, but is a virtue that +springs from force of character: for obedience is the constant will to +execute what, by the general decree of the commonwealth, ought to be +done. Besides, that commonwealth whose peace depends on the +sluggishness of its subjects, that are led about like sheep to learn +but slavery, may more properly be called a desert than a commonwealth. + +When, then, we call that dominion best, where men pass their lives in +unity, I understand a human life, defined not by mere circulation of the +blood, and other qualities common to all animals, but above all by +reason, the true excellence and life of the mind. + +But be it remarked that, by the dominion which I have said is +established for this end, I intend that which has been established by a +free multitude, not that which is acquired over a multitude by right of +war. For a free multitude is guided more by hope than fear; a conquered +one, more by fear than by hope: inasmuch as the former aims at making +use of life, the latter but at escaping death. The former, I say, aims +at living for its own ends, the latter is forced to belong to the +conqueror; and so we say that this is enslaved, but that free. And, +therefore, the end of a dominion, which one gets by right of war, is to +be master, and have rather slaves than subjects. And although between +the dominion created by a free multitude, and that gained by right of +war, if we regard generally the right of each, we can make no essential +distinction; yet their ends, as we have already shown, and further the +means to the preservation of each are very different. + +But what means a prince, whose sole motive is lust of mastery, should +use to establish and maintain his dominion, the most ingenious +Machiavelli has set forth at large,[40] but with what design one can +hardly be sure. If, however, he had some good design, as one should +believe of a learned man, it seems to have been to show, with how little +foresight many attempt to remove a tyrant, though thereby the causes +which make the prince a tyrant can in no wise be removed, but, on the +contrary, are so much the more established, as the prince is given more +cause to fear, which happens when the multitude has made an example of +its prince, and glories in the parricide as in a thing well done. +Moreover, he perhaps wished to show how cautious a free multitude should +be of entrusting its welfare absolutely to one man, who, unless in his +vanity he thinks he can please everybody, must be in daily fear of +plots, and so is forced to look chiefly after his own interest, and, as +for the multitude, rather to plot against it than consult its good. And +I am the more led to this opinion concerning that most far-seeing man, +because it is known that he was favorable to liberty, for the +maintenance of which he has besides given the most wholesome advice. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[36] From _A Political Treatise_, ch. iii, same title. + +[37] Literally, "oil and trouble"--a common proverbial expression in +Latin. + +[38] From _A Political Treatise_, ch. iv, same title. + +[39] From _A Political Treatise_, ch. v, same title. + +[40] In his book called "Il Principe," or "The Prince." + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII + +FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH[41] + + +If men's minds were as easily controlled as their tongues, every king +would sit safely on his throne, and government by compulsion would +cease; for every subject would shape his life according to the +intentions of his rulers, and would esteem a thing true or false, good +or evil, just or unjust, in obedience to their dictates. However, ... no +man's mind can possibly lie wholly at the disposition of another, for no +one can willingly transfer his natural right of free reason and +judgment, or be compelled so to do. For this reason government which +attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical, and it is considered +an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of subjects to +seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true, or rejected as false, +or what opinions should actuate men in their worship of God. All these +questions fall within a man's natural right, which he cannot abdicate +even with his own consent. + +I admit that the judgment can be biased in many ways, and to an almost +incredible degree, so that while exempt from direct external control it +may be so dependent on another man's words, that it may fitly be said to +be ruled by him; but although this influence is carried to great +lengths, it has never gone so far as to invalidate the statement that +every man's understanding is his own, and that brains are as diverse as +palates. + +Moses, not by fraud, but by Divine virtue, gained such a hold over the +popular judgment that he was accounted superhuman, and believed to speak +and act through the inspiration of the Deity; nevertheless, even he +could not escape murmurs and evil interpretations. How much less then +can other monarchs avoid them! Yet such unlimited power, if it exists at +all, must belong to a monarch, and least of all to a democracy, where +the whole or a great part of the people wield authority collectively. +This is a fact which I think every one can explain for himself. + +However unlimited, therefore, the power of a sovereign may be, however +implicitly it is trusted as the exponent of law and religion, it can +never prevent men from forming judgments according to their intellect, +or being influenced by any given emotion. It is true that it has the +right to treat as enemies all men whose opinions do not, on all +subjects, entirely coincide with its own; but we are not discussing its +strict rights, but its proper course of action. I grant that it has the +right to rule in the most violent manner, and to put citizens to death +for very trivial causes, but no one supposes it can do this with the +approval of sound judgment. Nay, inasmuch as such things cannot be done +without extreme peril to itself, we may even deny that it has the +absolute power to do them, or, consequently, the absolute right; for the +rights of the sovereign are limited by his power. + +Since, therefore, no one can abdicate his freedom of judgment and +feeling; since every man is by indefeasible natural right the master of +his own thoughts, it follows that men, thinking in diverse and +contradictory fashions, cannot, without disastrous results, be compelled +to speak only according to the dictates of the supreme power. Not even +the most experienced, to say nothing of the multitude, know how to keep +silence. Men's common failing is to confide their plans to others, +though there be need for secrecy, so that a government would be most +harsh which deprived the individual of his freedom of saying and +teaching what he thought; and would be moderate if such freedom were +granted. Still we cannot deny that authority may be as much injured by +words as by actions. Hence, although the freedom we are discussing +cannot be entirely denied to subjects, its unlimited concession would be +most baneful; we must, therefore, now inquire, how far such freedom can +and ought to be conceded without danger to the peace of the state, or +the power of the rulers. + +It follows, plainly, from the explanation given above, of the +foundations of a state, that the ultimate aim of government is not to +rule, or restrain by fear, nor to exact obedience, but, contrariwise, to +free every man from fear that he may live in all possible security; in +other words, to strengthen his natural right to exist and work without +injury to himself or others. + +No, the object of government is not to change men from rational beings +into beasts or puppets, but to enable them to develop their minds and +bodies in security, and to employ their reason unshackled; neither +showing hatred, anger or deceit, nor watched with the eyes of jealousy +and injustice. In fact, the true aim of government is liberty. + +Now we have seen that in forming a state the power of making laws must +either be vested in the body of the citizens, or in a portion of them, +or in one man. For, although men's free judgments are very diverse, each +one thinking that he alone knows everything, and although complete +unanimity of feeling and speech is out of the question, it is impossible +to preserve peace unless individuals abdicate their right of acting +entirely on their own judgment. Therefore, the individual justly cedes +the right of free action, though not of free reason and judgment; no one +can act against the authorities without danger to the state, though his +feelings and judgment may be at variance therewith; he may even speak +against them, provided that he does so from rational conviction, not +from fraud, anger or hatred, and provided that he does not attempt to +introduce any change on his private authority. + +For instance, supposing a man shows that a law is repugnant to sound +reason, and should therefore be repealed; if he submits his opinion to +the judgment of the authorities (who alone have the right of making and +repealing laws), and meanwhile acts in nowise contrary to that law, he +has deserved well of the state, and has behaved as a good citizen +should; but if he accuses the authorities of injustice, and stirs up the +people against them, or if he seditiously strives to abrogate the law +without their consent, he is a mere agitator and rebel. + +Thus we see how an individual may declare and teach what he believes, +without injury to the authority of his rulers, or to the public peace; +namely, by leaving in their hands the entire power of legislation as it +affects action, and by doing nothing against their laws, though he be +compelled often to act in contradiction to what he believes, and openly +feels, to be best. + +Such a course can be taken without detriment to justice and dutifulness, +nay, it is the one which a just and dutiful man would adopt. We have +shown that justice is dependent on the laws of the authorities, so that +no one who contravenes their accepted decrees can be just, while the +highest regard for duty, as we have pointed out, is exercised in +maintaining public peace and tranquillity. These could not be preserved +if every man were to live as he pleased. Therefore it is no less than +undutiful for a man to act contrary to his country's laws, for if the +practice became universal the ruin of states would necessarily follow. + +Hence, so long as a man acts in obedience to the laws of his rulers, he +in nowise contravenes his reason, for in obedience to reason he +transferred the right of controlling his actions from his own hands to +theirs. This doctrine we can confirm from actual custom, for in a +conference of great and small powers, schemes are seldom carried +unanimously, yet all unite in carrying out what is decided on, whether +they voted for or against. But I return to my proposition. + +From the fundamental notions of a state, we have discovered how a man +may exercise free judgment without detriment to the supreme power: from +the same premises we can no less easily determine what opinions would be +seditious. Evidently those which by their very nature nullify the +compact by which the right of free action was ceded. For instance, a +man who holds that the supreme power has no rights over him, or that +promises ought not to be kept, or that every one should live as he +pleases, or other doctrines of this nature in direct opposition to the +above-mentioned contract, is seditious, not so much from his actual +opinions and judgment, as from the deeds which they involve; for he who +maintains such theories abrogates the contract which tacitly, or openly, +he made with his rulers. Other opinions which do not involve acts +violating the contract, such as revenge, anger, and the like, are not +seditious, unless it be in some corrupt state, where superstitious and +ambitious persons, unable to endure men of learning, are so popular with +the multitude that their word is more valued than the law. + +However, I do not deny that there are some doctrines which, while they +are apparently only concerned with abstract truths and falsehoods, are +yet propounded and published with unworthy motives.... Reason should +nevertheless remain unshackled. If we hold to the principle that a man's +loyalty to the state should be judged, like his loyalty to God, from his +actions only--namely, from his charity towards his neighbors; we cannot +doubt that the best government will allow freedom of philosophical +speculation no less than of religious belief. I confess that from such +freedom inconveniences may sometimes arise, but what question was ever +settled so wisely than no abuses could possibly spring therefrom? He who +seeks to regulate everything by law is more likely to arouse vices than +to reform them. It is best to grant what cannot be abolished, even +though it be in itself harmful. How many evils spring from luxury, +envy, avarice, drunkenness and the like, yet these are tolerated--vices +as they are--because they cannot be prevented by legal enactments. How +much more, then, should free thought be granted, seeing that it is in +itself a virtue and that it cannot be crushed! Besides, the evil results +can easily be checked, as I will show, by the secular authorities, not +to mention that such freedom is absolutely necessary for progress in +science and the liberal arts: for no man follows such pursuits to +advantage unless his judgment be entirely free and unhampered. + +But let it be granted that freedom may be crushed, and men be so bound +down that they do not dare to utter a whisper, save at the bidding of +their rulers; nevertheless this can never be carried to the pitch of +making them think according to authority, so that the necessary +consequences would be that men would daily be thinking one thing and +saying another, to the corruption of good faith, that mainstay of +government, and to the fostering of hateful flattery and perfidy, whence +spring stratagems, and the corruption of every good art. + +It is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech, for the more +rulers strive to curtail freedom of speech the more obstinately are they +resisted; not indeed by the avaricious, the flatterers, and other +numskulls, who think supreme salvation consists in filling their +stomachs and gloating over their money-bags, but by those whom good +education, sound morality, and virtue have rendered more free. Men, as +generally constituted, are most prone to resent the branding as criminal +of opinions which they believe to be true, and the proscription as +wicked of that which inspires them with piety towards God and man; +hence they are ready to forswear the laws and conspire against the +authorities, thinking it not shameful but honorable to stir up seditions +and perpetuate any sort of crime with this end in view. Such being the +constitution of human nature, we see that laws directed against opinions +affect the generous minded rather than the wicked, and are adapted less +for coercing criminals than for irritating the upright; so that they +cannot be maintained without great peril to the state. + +Moreover, such laws are almost always useless, for those who hold that +the opinions proscribed are sound, cannot possibly obey the law; whereas +those who already reject them as false, accept the law as a kind of +privilege, and make such boast of it, that authority is powerless to +repeal it, even if such a course be subsequently desired. + +... And, lastly, how many schisms have arisen in the Church from the +attempt of the authorities to decide by law the intricacies of +theological controversy! If men were not allured by the hope of getting +the law and the authorities on their side, of triumphing over their +adversaries in the sight of an applauding multitude, and of acquiring +honorable distinctions, they would not strive so maliciously, nor would +such fury sway their minds. This is taught not only by reason but by +daily examples, for laws of this kind prescribing what every man shall +believe and forbidding any one to speak or write to the contrary, have +often been passed as sops or concessions to the anger of those who +cannot tolerate men of enlightenment, and who, by such harsh and crooked +enactments, can easily turn the devotion of the masses into fury and +direct it against whom they will. + +How much better would it be to restrain popular anger and fury, instead +of passing useless laws, which can only be broken by those who love +virtue and the liberal arts, thus paring down the state till it is too +small to harbor men of talent. What greater misfortune for a state can +be conceived than that honorable men should be sent like criminals into +exile, because they hold diverse opinions which they cannot disguise? +What, I say, can be more hurtful than that men who have committed no +crime or wickedness should, simply because they are enlightened, be +treated as enemies and put to death, and that the scaffold, the terror +of evil-doers, should become the arena where the highest examples of +tolerance and virtue are displayed to the people with all the marks of +ignominy that authority can devise? + +He that knows himself to be upright does not fear the death of a +criminal, and shrinks from no punishment. His mind is not wrung with +remorse for any disgraceful deed. He holds that death in a good cause is +no punishment, but an honor, and that death for freedom is glory. + +What purpose, then, is served by the death of such men, what example is +proclaimed? The cause for which they die is unknown to the idle and the +foolish, hateful to the turbulent, loved by the upright. The only lesson +we can draw from such scenes is to flatter the persecutor, or else to +imitate the victim. + +If formal assent is not to be esteemed above conviction, and if +governments are to retain a firm hold of authority and not be compelled +to yield to agitators, it is imperative that freedom of judgment should +be granted, so that men may live together in harmony, however diverse, +or even openly contradictory their opinions may be. We cannot doubt that +such is the best system of government and open to the fewest objections, +since it is the one most in harmony with human nature. In a democracy +(the most natural form of government) every one submits to the control +of authority over his actions, but not over his judgment and reason; +that is, seeing that all cannot think alike, the voice of the majority +has the force of law, subject to repeal if circumstances bring about a +change of opinion. In proportion as the power of free judgment is +withheld we depart from the natural condition of mankind, and +consequently the government becomes more tyrannical. + +In order to prove that from such freedom no inconvenience arises which +cannot easily be checked by the exercise of the sovereign power, and +that men's actions can easily be kept in bounds, though their opinions +be at open variance, it will be well to cite an example. Such an one is +not very far to seek. The city of Amsterdam reaps the fruit of this +freedom in its own great prosperity and in the admiration of all other +people. For in this most flourishing state, and most splendid city, men +of every nation and religion live together in the greatest harmony, and +ask no questions before trusting their goods to a fellow-citizen, save +whether he be rich or poor, and whether he generally acts honestly, or +the reverse. His religion and sect is considered of no importance: for +it has no effect before the judges in gaining or losing a cause, and +there is no sect so despised that its followers, provided that they harm +no one, pay every man his due, and live uprightly, are deprived of the +protection of the magisterial authority. + +On the other hand, when the religious controversy between Remonstrants +and Counter-Remonstrants began to be taken up by politicians and the +States, it grew into a schism, and abundantly showed that laws dealing +with religion and seeking to settle its controversies are much more +calculated to irritate than to reform, and that they give rise to +extreme license. Further, it was seen that schisms do not originate in a +love of truth, which is a source of courtesy and gentleness, but rather +in an inordinate desire for supremacy. From all these considerations it +is clearer than the sun at noonday, that the true schismatics are those +who condemn other men's writings, and seditiously stir up the +quarrelsome masses against their authors, rather than those authors +themselves, who generally write only for the learned, and appeal solely +to reason. In fact, the real disturbers of the peace are those who, in a +free state, seek to curtail the liberty of judgment which they are +unable to tyrannize over. + +I have thus shown:--I. That it is impossible to deprive men of the +liberty of saying what they think. II. That such liberty can be conceded +to every man without injury to the rights and authority of the sovereign +power, and that every man may retain it without injury to such rights, +provided that he does not presume upon it to the extent of introducing +any new rights into the state, or acting in any way contrary to the +existing laws. III. That every man may enjoy this liberty without +detriment to the public peace, and that no inconveniences arise +therefrom which cannot easily be checked. IV. That every man may enjoy +it without injury to his allegiance. V. That laws dealing with +speculative problems are entirely useless. VI. Lastly, that not only may +such liberty be granted without prejudice to the public peace, to +loyalty, and to the rights of rulers, but that it is even necessary for +their preservation. For when people try to take it away, and bring to +trial, not only the acts which alone are capable of offending, but also +the opinions of mankind, they only succeed in surrounding their victims +with an appearance of martyrdom, and raise feelings of pity and revenge +rather than of terror. Uprightness and good faith are thus corrupted, +flatterers and traitors are encouraged, and sectarians triumph, inasmuch +as concessions have been made to their animosity, and they have gained +the state sanction for the doctrines of which they are the interpreters. +Hence they arrogate to themselves the state authority and rights, and do +not scruple to assert that they have been directly chosen by God, and +that their laws are Divine, whereas the laws of the state are human, and +should therefore yield obedience to the laws of God--in other words, to +their own laws. Every one must see that this is not a state of affairs +conducive to public welfare. Wherefore, the safest way for a state is to +lay down the rule that religion is comprised solely in the exercise of +charity and justice, and that the rights of rulers in sacred, no less +than in secular matters, should merely have to do with actions, but that +every man should think what he likes and say what he thinks. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[41] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. xx, same title. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX + +OF HUMAN FREEDOM + + +_Introductory_ + +I pass at length to the other part of ethics which concerns the method +or way which leads to liberty. In [the following], therefore, I shall +treat of the power of reason, showing how much reason itself can control +the emotions, and then what is freedom of mind or blessedness. Thence we +shall see how much stronger the wise man is than the ignorant. In what +manner and what way the intellect should be rendered perfect, and with +what art the body is to be cared for in order that it may properly +perform its functions, I have nothing to do with here; for the former +belongs to logic, the latter to medicine. I shall occupy myself here, as +I have said, solely with the power of the mind or of reason, first of +all showing the extent and nature of the authority which it has over the +emotions in restraining them and governing them; for that we have not +absolute authority over them we have already demonstrated. The Stoics +indeed thought that the emotions depend absolutely on our will, and that +we are absolutely masters over them; but they were driven, by the +contradiction of experience, though not by their own principles, to +confess that not a little practice and study are required in order to +restrain and govern the emotions. This one of them attempted to +illustrate, if I remember rightly, by the example of two dogs, one of a +domestic and the other of a hunting breed; for he was able by habit to +make the house dog hunt, and the hunting dog, on the contrary, to desist +from running after hares. + +To the Stoical opinion Descartes much inclines. He affirms that the soul +or mind is united specially to a certain part of the brain called the +pineal gland, which the mind by the mere exercise of the will is able to +move in different ways, and by whose help the mind perceives all the +movements which are excited in the body and external objects. This +gland, he affirms, is suspended in the middle of the brain in such a +manner that it can be moved by the least motion of the animal spirits. +Again, he affirms that any variation in the manner in which the animal +spirits impinge upon this gland is followed by a variation in the manner +in which it is suspended in the middle of the brain, and moreover that +the number of different impressions on the gland is the same as that of +the different external objects which propel the animal spirits toward +it. Hence it comes to pass that if the gland, by the will of the soul +moving it in different directions, be afterwards suspended in this or +that way in which it had once been suspended by the spirits agitated in +this or that way, then the gland itself will propel and determine the +animal spirits themselves in the same way as that in which they had +before been repelled by a similar suspension of the gland. Moreover, he +affirmed that each volition of the mind is united in Nature to a certain +motion of the gland. For example, if a person wishes to behold a remote +object, this volition will cause the pupil of the eye to dilate, but if +he thinks merely of the dilation of the pupil, to have that volition +will profit him nothing, because Nature has not connected a motion of +the gland which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic +nerve in a way suitable for dilation or contraction of the pupil with +the volition or dilation or contraction, but only with the volition of +beholding objects afar off or close at hand. Finally, he maintained that +although each motion of this gland appears to be connected by Nature +from the commencement of our life with an individual thought, these +motions can nevertheless be connected by habit with other thoughts, a +proposition which he attempts to demonstrate in his "Passions of the +Soul" (art. 50, pt. 1). + +From this he concludes that there is no mind so feeble that it cannot, +when properly directed, acquire absolute power over its passions; for +passions, as defined by him, are "perceptions, or sensations, or +emotions of the soul which are related to it specially, and which (N.B.) +are produced, preserved, and strengthened by some motion of the +spirits." (See the "Passions of Soul," art. 27, pt. 1.) But since it is +possible to join to a certain volition any motion of the gland, and +consequently of the spirits, and since the determination of the will +depends solely on our power, we shall be able to acquire absolute +mastery over our passions provided only we determine our will by fixed +and firm decisions by which we desire to direct our actions and bind +with these decisions the movements of the passions we wish to have. + +So far as I can gather from his own words, this is the opinion of that +distinguished man, and I could scarcely have believed it possible for +one so great to have put it forward if it had been less subtle. I can +hardly wonder enough that a philosopher who firmly resolved to make no +deduction except from self-evident principles, and to affirm nothing but +what he clearly and distinctly perceived, and who blamed all the +Schoolmen because they desired to explain obscure matters by occult +qualities, should accept a hypothesis more occult than any occult +quality. + +What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and body? What +clear and distinct conception has he of thought intimately connected +with a certain small portion of matter? I wish that he had explained +this union by its proximate cause. But he conceived the mind to be so +distinct from the body that he was able to assign no single cause of +this union, nor of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to +the cause of the whole universe, that is to say, to God. Again, I should +like to know how many degrees of motion the mind can give to that pineal +gland, and with how great a power the mind can hold it suspended. For I +do not understand whether this gland is acted on by the mind more slowly +or more quickly than by the animal spirits, and whether the movements of +the passions, which we have so closely bound with firm decisions, might +not be separated from them again by bodily causes, from which it would +follow that although the mind had firmly determined to meet danger, and +had joined to this decision the motion of boldness, the sight of the +danger might cause the gland to be suspended in such a manner that the +mind could think of nothing but flight. Indeed, since there is no +relation between the will and motion, so there is no comparison between +the power or strength of the body and that of the mind, and consequently +the strength of the body can never be determined by the strength of the +mind. It is to be remembered also that this gland is not found to be so +situated in the middle of the brain that it can be driven about so +easily and in so many ways, and that all the nerves are not extended to +the cavities of the brain. + +Lastly, I omit all that Descartes asserts concerning the will and the +freedom of the will, since I have shown over and over again that it is +false. Therefore, inasmuch as the power of the mind, as I have shown +above, is determined by intelligence alone, we shall determine by the +knowledge of the mind alone the remedies against the emotions--remedies +which every one, I believe, has experienced, although there may not have +been any accurate observation or distinct perception of them, and from +this knowledge of the mind alone shall we deduce everything which +relates to its blessedness. + + +_Axioms_ + +I. If two contrary actions be excited in the same subject, a change must +necessarily take place in both, or in one alone, until they cease to be +contrary. + +II. The power of an emotion is limited by the power of its cause, in so +far as the essence of the emotion is manifested or limited by the +essence of the cause itself. + + +_The Strength of the Emotions_ + +The emotion towards an object which we imagine to be free is greater +than towards one which is necessary, and consequently still greater +than towards one which we imagine as possible or contingent. But to +imagine an object as free can be nothing else than to imagine it simply, +while we know not the causes by which it was determined to action. An +emotion, therefore, towards an object which we simply imagine is, other +things being equal, greater than towards one which we imagine as +necessary, possible, or contingent, and consequently greatest of all. + +The mind understands all things to be necessary and determined by an +infinite chain of causes to existence and action, and therefore so far +enables itself to suffer less from the emotions which arise from these +things, and to be less affected towards them. + +The more this knowledge that things are necessary is applied to +individual things which we imagine more distinctly and more vividly, the +greater is this power of the mind over the emotions--a fact to which +experience also testifies. For we see that sorrow for the loss of +anything good is diminished if the person who has lost it considers that +it could not by any possibility have been preserved. So also we see that +nobody pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk, or +reason, and lives so many years not conscious, as it were, of itself. +But if a number of human beings were born adult, and only a few here and +there were born infants, every one would pity the infants, because we +should then consider infancy not as a thing natural and necessary, but +as a defect or fault of Nature. Many other facts of a similar kind we +might observe. + +We do not contemplate an object as absent by reason of the emotion by +which we imagine it, but by reason of the fact that the body is affected +with another modification, which excludes the existence of that object. +The emotion, therefore, which is related to an object which we +contemplate as absent, is not of such a nature as to overcome the other +actions and power of man, but, on the contrary, is of such a nature that +it can in some way be restrained by those modifications which exclude +the existence of its external cause. But the emotion which arises from +reason is necessarily related to the common properties of things, which +we always contemplate as present for nothing can exist which excludes +their present existence, and which we always imagine in the same way. +This emotion, therefore, always remains the same, and consequently the +emotions which are contrary to it, and which are not maintained by their +external cause, must more and more accommodate themselves to it until +they are no longer contrary to it. So far, therefore, the emotion which +springs from reason is the stronger. + +A number of simultaneous causes can do more than if they were fewer, and +therefore the greater the number of the simultaneous causes by which an +emotion is excited, the greater it is. + +An emotion is bad or injurious only in so far as it hinders the mind +from thinking and therefore that emotion by which the mind is determined +to the contemplation of a number of objects at the same time is less +injurious than another emotion equally great which holds the mind in the +contemplation of one object alone or of a few objects, so that it cannot +think of others. Again, since the essence of the mind, that is to say, +its power, consists in thought alone, the mind suffers less through an +emotion by which it is determined to the contemplation of a number of +objects at the same time than through an emotion equally great which +holds it occupied in the contemplation of one object alone or of a few +objects. Finally, this emotion, in so far as it is related to a number +of external causes, is therefore less towards each. + + +_The Power of the Intellect Over the Emotions_ + +I + +_General Principles_ + +The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and +connection of things, and _vice versa_, the order and connection of +things is the same as the order and connection of ideas. Therefore, as +the order and connection of ideas in the mind is according to the order +and connection of the modifications of the body it follows _vice versa_, +that the order and connection of the modifications of the body is +according to the order and connection in the mind of the thoughts and +ideas of things. + +If we detach an emotion of the mind from the thought of an external +cause and connect it with other thoughts, then the love or hatred +towards the external cause and the fluctuations of the mind which arise +from these emotions will be destroyed. + +An emotion which is a passion is a confused idea. If, therefore, we form +a clear and distinct idea of this emotion, the idea will not be +distinguished--except by reason--from this emotion, in so far as the +emotion is related to the mind alone, and therefore the emotion will +cease to be a passion. + +In proportion, then, as we know an emotion better is it more within our +control, and the less does the mind suffer from it. + +Those things which are common to all cannot be otherwise than adequately +conceived and therefore there is no modification of the body of which we +cannot form some clear and distinct conception. + +Hence it follows that there is no emotion of which we cannot form some +clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is an idea of a +modification of the body, and this idea therefore must involve some +clear and distinct conception. + +Since nothing exists from which some effect does not follow, and since +we understand clearly and distinctly everything which follows from an +idea which is adequate in us, it is a necessary consequence that every +one has the power, partly at least, if not absolutely, of understanding +clearly and distinctly himself and his emotions, and consequently of +bringing it to pass that he suffers less from them. We have therefore +mainly to strive to acquire a clear and distinct knowledge as far as +possible of each emotion, so that the mind may be led to pass from the +emotion to think those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, +and with which it is entirely satisfied, and to strive also that the +emotion may be separated from the thought of an external cause and +connected with true thoughts. Thus not only love, hatred, etc., will be +destroyed, but also the appetites or desires to which the emotion gives +rise cannot be excessive. For it is above everything to be observed +that the appetite by which a man is said to act is one and the same +appetite as that by which he is said to suffer. For example, we have +shown that human nature is so constituted that every one desires that +other people should live according to his way of thinking, a desire +which in a man who is not guided by reason is a passion which is called +ambition, and is not very different from pride; while, on the other +hand, in a man who lives according to the dictates of reason it is an +action or virtue which is called piety. In the same manner, all the +appetites or desires are passions only in so far as they arise from +inadequate ideas, and are classed among the virtues whenever they are +excited or begotten by adequate ideas; for all the desires by which we +are determined to any action may arise either from adequate or +inadequate ideas. To return, therefore, to the point from which we set +out: there is no remedy within our power which can be conceived more +excellent for the emotions than that which consists in true knowledge of +them, since the mind possesses no other power than that of thinking and +forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above. + + +II + +_The Natural Basis of Rational Control_ + +The greater the number of objects to which an image or emotion is +related, the greater is the number of causes by which it can be excited +and cherished. All these causes the mind contemplates simultaneously by +means of the emotion (by hypothesis), and therefore the more constant is +the emotion, or the more frequently does it present itself, and the +more does it occupy the mind. + +Things which we clearly and distinctly understand are either the common +properties of things or what are deduced from them, and consequently are +more frequently excited in us; and therefore it is easier for us to +contemplate other things together with these which we clearly and +distinctly understand than with any others, and consequently it is +easier to connect things with these which we clearly and distinctly +understand than with any others. + +The greater the number of other things with which any image is +connected, the more frequently does it present itself. For the greater +the number of other things with which an image is connected, the greater +is the number of causes by which it may be excited. + +There is no modification of the body of which the mind cannot form some +clear and distinct conception and therefore it can cause all the +modifications of the body to be related to the idea of God. + + +III + +_The Function of the Intellectual Order_ + +The emotions which are contrary to our nature, that is to say, which are +evil, are evil so far as they hinder the mind from understanding. So +long, therefore, as we are not agitated by emotions which are contrary +to our nature, so long the power of the mind by which it endeavors to +understand things is not hindered, and therefore so long does it possess +the power of forming clear and distinct ideas, and of deducing them the +one from the other. So long, consequently, do we possess the power of +arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to the +order of the intellect. + +Through this power of properly arranging and connecting the +modifications of the body we can prevent ourselves from being easily +affected by evil emotions. For a greater power is required to restrain +emotions which are arranged and connected according to the order of the +intellect than is required to restrain those which are uncertain and +unsettled. The best thing, therefore, we can do, so long as we lack a +perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to conceive a right rule of life, +or sure maxims (_dogmata_) of life--to commit these latter to memory, +and constantly to apply them to the particular cases which frequently +meet us in life, so that our imagination may be widely affected by them, +and they may always be ready to hand. For example, amongst the maxims of +life we have placed this, that hatred is to be conquered by love or +generosity, and is not to be met with hatred in return. But in order +that we may always have this prescript of reason in readiness whenever +it will be of service, we must think over and often meditate upon the +common injuries inflicted by men, and consider how and in what way they +may best be repelled by generosity; for thus we shall connect the image +of injury with the imagination of this maxim, and it will be at hand +whenever an injury is offered to us. If we also continually have regard +to our own true profit, and the good which follows from mutual +friendship and common fellowship, and remember that the highest peace of +mind arises from a right rule of life, and also that man, like other +things, acts according to the necessity of Nature, then the injury or +the hatred which usually arises from that necessity will occupy but the +least part of the imagination, and will be easily overcome: or supposing +that the anger which generally arises from the greatest injuries is not +so easily overcome, it will nevertheless be overcome, although not +without fluctuation of mind, in a far shorter space of time than would +have been necessary if we had not possessed those maxims on which we had +thus meditated beforehand. + +Concerning strength of mind, we must reflect in the same way for the +purpose of getting rid of fear, that is to say, we must often enumerate +and imagine the common dangers of life, and think upon the manner in +which they can best be avoided and overcome by presence of mind and +courage. It is to be observed, however, that in the ordering of our +thoughts and images we must always look to those qualities which in each +thing are good, so that we may be determined to action always by an +emotion of joy. + +For example, if a man sees that he pursues glory too eagerly, let him +think on its proper use, for what end it is to be followed, and by what +means it can be obtained; but let him not think upon its abuse and +vanity, and on the inconstancy of men, and things of this sort, about +which no one thinks unless through disease of mind. For with such +thoughts do those who are ambitious greatly torment themselves when they +despair of obtaining the honors for which they are striving; and while +they vomit forth rage, wish to be thought wise. Indeed it is certain +that those covet glory the most who are loudest in declaiming against +its abuse and the vanity of the world. Nor is this a peculiarity of the +ambitious, but is common to all to whom fortune is adverse and who are +impotent in mind; for we see that a poor and avaricious man is never +weary of speaking about the abuse of money and the vices of the rich, +thereby achieving nothing save to torment himself and show to others +that he is unable to bear with equanimity not only his own poverty but +also the wealth of others. So also a man who has not been well deceived +by his mistress thinks of nothing but the fickleness of women, their +faithlessness, and their other oft-proclaimed failing--all of which he +forgets as soon as he is taken into favor by his mistress again. He, +therefore, who desires to govern his emotions and appetites from a love +of liberty alone will strive as much as he can to know virtues and their +causes, and to fill his mind with that joy which springs from a true +knowledge of them. Least of all will he desire to contemplate the vices +of men and disparage men, or to delight in a false show of liberty. He +who will diligently observe these things (and they are not difficult), +and will continue to practice them, will assuredly in a short space of +time be able for the most part to direct his actions in accordance with +the command of reason. + + +IV + +_Summary_ + +I have, in what has preceded, included all the remedies for the +emotions, that is to say, everything which the mind, considered in +itself alone, can do against them. It appears therefrom that the power +of the mind over the emotions consists-- + +1. In the knowledge itself of the emotions. + +2. In the separation by the mind of the emotions from the thought of an +external cause, which we imagine confusedly. + +3. In duration, in which the emotions which are related to objects we +understand surpass those related to objects conceived in a mutilated or +confused manner. + +4. In the multitude of causes by which the emotions which are related to +the common properties of things or to God are nourished. + +5. In the order in which the mind can arrange its emotions and connect +them one with the other. + +But that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better +understood, it is to be carefully observed that we call the emotions +great when we compare the emotion of one man with that of another, and +see that one man is agitated more than another by the same emotion, or +when we compare the emotions of one and the same man with one another, +and discover that he is affected or moved more by one emotion than by +another. + +For the power of any emotion is limited by the power of the external +cause as compared with our own power. But the power of the mind is +limited solely by knowledge, whilst impotence or passion is estimated +solely by privation of knowledge, or, in other words, by that through +which ideas are called inadequate; and it therefore follows that that +mind suffers the most whose largest part consists of inadequate ideas, +so that it is distinguished rather by what it suffers than by what it +does, while, on the contrary, that mind acts the most whose largest part +consists of adequate ideas, so that although it may possess as many +inadequate ideas as the first, it is nevertheless distinguished rather +by those which belong to human virtue than by those which are a sign of +human impotence. Again, it is to be observed that our sorrows and +misfortunes mainly proceed from too much love towards an object which is +subject to many changes, and which we can never possess. For no one is +troubled or anxious about any object he does not love, neither do +wrongs, suspicions, hatreds, etc., arise except from love towards +objects of which no one can be truly the possessor. + +From all this we easily conceive what is the power which clear and +distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge whose +foundation is the knowledge itself of God, possesses over the emotions; +the power, namely, by which it is able, in so far as they are passions, +if not actually to destroy them, at least to make them constitute the +smallest part of the mind. Moreover, it begets a love towards an +immutable and eternal object of which we are really partakers; a love +which therefore cannot be vitiated by the defects which are in common +love, but which can always become greater and greater, occupy the +largest part of the mind, and thoroughly affect it. + +I have now concluded all that I had to say relating to this present +life. For any one who will attend to what has been urged will easily be +able to see the truth of what I said--that in these few words all the +remedies for the emotions are comprehended. It is time, therefore, that +I should now pass to the consideration of those matters which appertain +to the duration of the mind without relation to the body. + + + + +CHAPTER XX + +OF HUMAN BLESSEDNESS AND THE ETERNITY OF THE MIND + + +_Human Blessedness: The Intellectual Love of God_ + +I + +The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain +attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things; and +the more we understand things in this manner, the more we understand +God; and therefore the highest virtue of the mind, that is to say, the +power or nature of the mind, or the highest effort, is to understand +things by the third kind of knowledge. + +The better the mind is adapted to understand things by the third kind of +knowledge, the more it desires to understand them by this kind of +knowledge. + +The highest virtue of the mind is to know God, or to understand things +by the third kind of knowledge. This virtue is greater the more the mind +knows things by this kind of knowledge, and therefore he who knows +things by this kind of knowledge passes to the highest human perfection, +and consequently is affected with the highest joy, which is accompanied +with the idea of himself and his own virtue; and therefore from this +kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace of mind. + +The effort or the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge +cannot arise from the first kind, but may arise from the second kind of +knowledge. This proposition is self-evident. For everything that we +clearly and distinctly understand, we understand either through itself +or through something which is conceived through itself; or, in other +words, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are related to +the third kind of knowledge, cannot follow from mutilated and confused +ideas, which are related to the first kind of knowledge, but from +adequate ideas, that is to say, from the second and third kinds of +knowledge. + + +II + +Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as that essence involves +necessary existence. To conceive things therefore under the form of +eternity, is to conceive them in so far as they are conceived through +the essence of God as actually existing things, or in so far as through +the essence of God they involve existence. Therefore our mind, in so far +as it conceives itself and its body under the form of eternity, +necessarily has a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is +conceived through Him. + +We delight in whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, and +our delight is accompanied with the idea of God as its cause. + +From the third kind of knowledge necessarily springs the intellectual +love of God. For from this kind of knowledge arises joy attended with +the idea of God as its cause, that is to say, the love of God, not in so +far as we imagine Him as present, but in so far as we understand that +He is eternal; and that is what I call the intellectual love of God. + +He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions +rejoices, and his joy is attended with the idea of God, therefore he +loves God, and (by the same reasoning) loves Him better the better he +understands himself and his emotions. + +This intellectual love necessarily follows from the nature of the mind, +in so far as it is considered, through the nature of God, as an eternal +truth. If there were anything, therefore, contrary to this love, it +would be contrary to the truth, and consequently whatever might be able +to negate this love would be able to make the true false, which, as is +self-evident, is absurd. There exists, therefore, nothing in Nature +contrary to this intellectual love, or which can negate it. + + +III + +This love to God above everything else ought to occupy the mind, for +this love is connected with all the modifications of the body, by all of +which it is cherished. + +The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect, and therefore in +so far as we contemplate God do we act and consequently no sorrow can +exist with the accompanying idea of God; that is to say, no one can hate +God. + +Love to God cannot be turned into hatred. But some may object, that if +we understand God to be the cause of all things, we do for that very +reason consider Him to be the cause of sorrow. But I reply, that in so +far as we understand the causes of sorrow, it ceases to be a passion, +that is to say, it ceases to be sorrow; and therefore in so far as we +understand God to be the cause of sorrow do we rejoice. + +This love to God is the highest good which we can seek according to the +dictate of reason; is common to all men; and we desire that all may +enjoy it. It cannot, therefore, be sullied by the emotion of envy, nor +by that of jealousy, but, on the contrary, it must be the more +strengthened the more people we imagine to rejoice in it. + +It is possible to show in the same manner that there is no emotion +directly contrary to this love and able to destroy it, and so we may +conclude that this love to God is the most constant of all the emotions, +and that, in so far as it is related to the body, it cannot be destroyed +unless with the body itself. What its nature is, in so far as it is +related to the mind alone, we shall see hereafter. + + +IV + +All ideas, in so far as they are related to God, are true; that is to +say, are adequate, and therefore, (by the general definition of the +Emotions), God is free from passions. Again, God can neither pass to a +greater nor to a less perfection, and therefore He cannot be affected +with any emotion of joy or sorrow. + +He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return. If a +man were to strive after this, he would desire that God, whom he loves, +should not be God, and consequently he would desire to be sad, which is +absurd. + + +V + +God is absolutely infinite, that is to say, the nature of God delights +in infinite perfection accompanied with the idea of Himself, that is to +say, with the idea of Himself as cause, and this is what we have called +intellectual love. God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love. + +The intellectual love of the mind towards God is the very love with +which He loves Himself, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far +as He can be manifested through the essence of the human mind, +considered under the form of eternity; that is to say, the intellectual +love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love with which God +loves Himself. + +Hence it follows that God, in so far as He loves Himself, loves men, and +consequently that the love of God towards men and the intellectual love +of the mind towards God are one and the same thing. + +Hence it follows that God, in so far as He loves Himself, loves men, and +consequently that the love of the mind towards God are one and the same +thing. + +Hence we clearly understand that our salvation, or blessedness, or +liberty consists in a constant and eternal love towards God, or in the +love of God towards men. This love or blessedness is called Glory in the +sacred writings, and not without reason. For whether it be related to +God or to the mind, it may properly be called repose of mind, which is, +in truth, not distinguished from glory. For in so far as it is related +to God, it is joy (granting that it is allowable to use this word), +accompanied with the idea of Himself, and it is the same thing when it +is related to the mind. + +Again, since the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, whose +beginning and foundation is God, it is clear to us in what manner and by +what method our mind, with regard both to essence and existence, follows +from the divine nature, and continually depends upon God. I thought it +worth while for me to notice this here, in order that I might show, by +this example, what that knowledge of individual objects which I have +called intuitive or of the third kind is able to do, and how much more +potent it is than the universal knowledge, which I have called knowledge +of the second kind. For although I have shown generally that all things, +and consequently also the human mind, depend upon God both with regard +to existence and essence, yet that demonstration, although legitimate, +and placed beyond the possibility of a doubt, does not, nevertheless, so +affect our mind as a proof from the essence itself of any individual +object which we say depends upon God. The more we understand individual +objects, the more we understand God. + + +_The Eternity of the Mind_ + +I + +The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it +conceive as actual the modifications of the body, except while the body +exists, and consequently it conceives no body as actually existing +except while its own body exists. It can therefore imagine nothing, nor +can it recollect anything that is past, except while the body exists. + +An imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates any object as +present. This idea nevertheless indicates the present constitution of +the human body rather than the nature of the external object. An +emotion, therefore (by the general definition of the Emotions), is an +imagination in so far as it indicates the present constitution of the +body, and therefore the mind, only so long as the body exists, is +subject to emotions which are related to passions. + +Hence it follows that no love except intellectual love is eternal. + +If we look at the common opinion of men, we shall see that they are +indeed conscious of the eternity of their minds, but they confound it +with duration, and attribute it to imagination or memory, which they +believe remain after death. + +God is not only the cause of the existence of this or that human body, +but also of its essence, which therefore must necessarily be conceived +through the essence of God itself and by a certain eternal necessity. +This conception, moreover, must necessarily exist in God. In God there +necessarily exists an idea which expresses the essence of this or that +human body under the form of eternity. + +In God there necessarily exists a conception or idea which expresses the +essence of the human body. This conception or idea is therefore +necessarily something which pertains to the essence of the human mind. +But we ascribe to the human mind no duration which can be limited by +time, unless in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, +which is manifested through duration, and which can be limited by time, +that is to say, we cannot ascribe duration to the mind except while the +body exists. + +But, nevertheless, since this something is that which is conceived by a +certain eternal necessity through the essence itself of God, this +something which pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be +eternal. + +This idea which expresses the essence of the body under the form of +eternity is, as we have said, a certain mode of thought which pertains +to the essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. It is +impossible, nevertheless, that we should recollect that we existed +before the body, because there are no traces of any such existence in +the body, and also because eternity cannot be defined by time, or have +any relationship to it. Nevertheless we feel and know by experience that +we are eternal. For the mind is no less sensible of those things which +it conceives through intelligence than of those which it remembers, for +demonstrations are the eyes of the mind by which it sees and observes +things. + +Although, therefore, we do not recollect that we existed before the +body, we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the +body under the form of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence of +the mind cannot be limited by time nor manifested through duration. Only +in so far, therefore, as it involves the actual existence of the body +can the mind be said to possess duration, and its existence be limited +by a fixed time, and so far only has it the power of determining the +existence of things in time, and of conceiving them under the form of +duration. + + +II + +In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body does +it conceive duration which can be determined in time, and so far only +has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time. But eternity +cannot be manifested through duration, therefore the mind so far has not +the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity: but because +it is the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of +eternity, and because it also pertains to the nature of the mind to +conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity, and +excepting these two things nothing else pertains to the nature of the +mind, therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of +eternity does not pertain to the mind except in so far as it conceives +the essence of the body under the form of eternity. + +Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either in so far as we +conceive them to exist with relation to a fixed time and place, or in so +far as we conceive them to be contained in God, and to follow from the +necessity of the divine nature. But those things which are conceived in +this second way as true or real we conceive under the form of eternity, +and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. + +The mind conceives nothing under the form of eternity, unless in so far +as it conceives the essence of its body under the form of eternity, that +is to say, unless in so far as it is eternal. Therefore in so far as the +mind is eternal it has a knowledge of God, which is necessarily +adequate, and therefore in so far as it is eternal it is fitted to know +all those things which can follow from this knowledge of God, that is to +say, it is fitted to know things by the third kind of knowledge of +which, in so far as the mind is eternal, it is the adequate or formal +cause. + +As each person therefore becomes stronger in this kind of knowledge, the +more is he conscious of himself and of God; that is to say, the more +perfect and the happier he is, a truth which will still more clearly +appear from what follows. Here, however, it is to be observed, that +although we are now certain that the mind is eternal in so far as it +conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we +wish to prove may be more easily explained and better understood, we +shall consider the mind, as we have hitherto done, as if it had just +begun to be, and had just begun to understand things under the form of +eternity. This we can do without any risk of error, provided only we are +careful to conclude nothing except from clear premises. + +The third kind of knowledge is eternal, and therefore the love which +springs from it is necessarily eternal. + +Although this love to God has no beginning, it nevertheless has all the +perfections of love, just as if it had originated. Nor is there here any +difference, excepting that the mind has eternally possessed these same +perfections which we imagined as now accruing to it, and has possessed +them with the accompanying idea of God as the eternal cause. And if joy +consist in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must indeed +consist in this, that the mind is endowed with perfection itself. + + +III + +The essence of the mind consists in knowledge. The more things, +therefore, the mind knows by the second and third kinds of knowledge, +the greater is that part which abides and consequently the greater is +that part which is not touched by emotions which are contrary to our +nature, that is to say, which are evil. The more things, therefore, the +mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater +is that part which remains unharmed, and the less consequently does it +suffer from the emotions. + +We are thus enabled to understand that death is by so much the less +injurious to us as the clear and distinct knowledge of the mind is +greater, and consequently as the mind loves God more. Again, since from +the third kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible peace, it +follows that it is possible for the human mind to be of such a nature +that that part of it which we have shown perishes with its body, in +comparison with the part of it which remains, is of no consequence. But +more fully upon this subject presently. + +He who possesses a body fitted for doing many things is least of all +agitated by those emotions which are evil, that is to say, by emotions +which are contrary to our nature, and therefore he possesses the power +of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to +the order of the intellect, and consequently of causing all the +modifications of the body to be related to the idea of God; in +consequence of which he is affected with a love to God, which must +occupy or form the greatest part of his mind, and therefore he +possesses a mind of which the greatest part is eternal. + +Inasmuch as human bodies are fit for many things, we cannot doubt the +possibility of their possessing such a nature that they may be related +to minds which have a large knowledge of themselves and of God, and +whose greatest or principal part is eternal, so that they scarcely fear +death. To understand this more clearly, it is to be here considered that +we live in constant change, and that according as we change for the +better or the worse we are called happy or unhappy. For he who passes +from infancy or childhood to death is called unhappy, and, on the other +hand, we consider ourselves happy if we can pass through the whole +period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. Moreover, he who, like +an infant or child, possesses a body fit for very few things, and, +almost altogether dependent on external causes, has a mind which, +considered in itself alone, is almost entirely unconscious of itself, of +God, and of objects. On the other hand, he who possesses a body fit for +many things possesses a mind which, considered in itself alone, is +largely conscious of itself, of God, and of objects. In this life, +therefore, it is our chief endeavor to change the body of infancy, so +far as its nature permits and is conducive thereto, into another body +which is fitted for many things, and which is related to a mind +conscious as much as possible of itself, of God, and of objects; so that +everything which is related to its memory or imagination, in comparison +with the intellect is scarcely of any moment, as I have already said. + +The more perfect a thing is, the more reality it possesses, and +consequently the more it acts and the less it suffers. Inversely also it +may be demonstrated in the same way that the more a thing acts the more +perfect it is. Hence it follows that that part of the mind which abides, +whether great or small, is more perfect than the other part. For the +part of the mind which is eternal is the intellect, through which alone +we are said to act, but that part which, as we have shown, perishes, is +the imagination itself, through which alone we are said to suffer. +Therefore that part which abides, whether great or small, is more +perfect than the latter. + +These are the things I proposed to prove concerning the mind, in so far +as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body, and +from these, and other propositions, it is evident that our mind, in so +far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thought, which is +determined by another eternal mode of thought, and this again by +another, and so on _ad infinitum_, so that all taken together form the +eternal and infinite intellect of God. + + +_Conclusion_ + +The primary and sole foundation of virtue or of the proper conduct of +life is to seek our own profit. But in order to determine what reason +prescribes as profitable, we had no regard to the eternity of the mind. +Therefore, although we were at that time ignorant that the mind is +eternal, we considered as of primary importance those things which we +have shown are related to strength of mind and generosity; and +therefore, even if we were now ignorant of the eternity of the mind, we +should consider those commands of reason as of primary importance. + +The creed of the multitude seems to be different from this; for most +persons seem to believe that they are free in so far as it is allowed +them to obey their lusts, and that they give up a portion of their +rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the commands of +divine law. Piety, therefore, and religion,[42] and absolutely all those +things that are related to greatness of soul, they believe to be burdens +which they hope to be able to lay aside after death; hoping also to +receive some reward for their bondage, that is to say, for _their_ piety +and religion. It is not merely this hope, however, but also and chiefly +fear of dreadful punishments after death, by which they are induced to +live according to the commands of divine law, that is to say, as far as +their feebleness and impotent mind will permit; and if this hope and +fear were not present to them, but if they, on the contrary, believed +that minds perish with the body, and that there is no prolongation of +life for miserable creatures exhausted with the burden of their piety, +they would return to ways of their own liking. They would prefer to let +everything be controlled by their own passions, and to obey fortune +rather than themselves. + +This seems to me as absurd as if a man, because he does not believe that +he will be able to feed his body with good food to all eternity, should +desire to satiate himself with poisonous and deadly drugs; or as if, +because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should +therefore prefer to be mad and to live without reason--absurdities so +great that they scarcely deserve to be repeated. + +Blessedness consists in love towards God, which arises from the third +kind of knowledge, and this love, therefore, must be related to the mind +in so far as it acts. Blessedness, therefore, is virtue itself. Again, +the more the mind delights in this divine love or blessedness, the more +it understands, that is to say, the greater is the power it has over its +emotions and the less it suffers from emotions which are evil. +Therefore, it is because the mind delights in this divine love or +blessedness that it possesses the power of restraining the lusts; and +because the power of man to restrain the emotions is in the intellect +alone, no one, therefore, delights in blessedness because he has +restrained his emotions, but, on the contrary, the power of restraining +his lusts springs from blessedness itself. + +I have finished everything I wished to explain concerning the power of +the mind over the emotions and concerning its liberty. From what has +been said we see what is the strength of the wise man, and how much he +surpasses the ignorant who is driven forward by lust alone. For the +ignorant man is not only agitated by external causes in many ways, and +never enjoys true peace of soul, but lives also ignorant, as it were, +both of God and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer ceases +also to be. On the other hand, the wise man, in so far as he is +considered as such, is scarcely ever moved in his mind, but, being +conscious by a certain eternal necessity of himself, of God, and of +things, never ceases to be, and always enjoys true peace of soul. + +If the way which, as I have shown, leads hither seem very difficult, it +can nevertheless be found. It must indeed be difficult since it is so +seldom discovered; for if salvation lay ready to hand and could be +discovered without great labor, how could it be possible that it should +be neglected almost by everybody? But all noble things are as difficult +as they are rare. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[42] Everything which we desire and do, of which we are the cause in so +far as we possess an idea of God, or in so far as we know God, I refer +to _Religion_. The desire of doing well which is born in us, because we +live according to the guidance of reason, I call _Piety_. + + + + +APPENDIX + + +Spinoza's _Ethics_, demonstrated in geometrical order, consists of five +parts; from these parts the following selections have been taken: + +Part I. _Of God_ + Definitions, Axioms, and the Appendix. + Propositions: 11; 15-18; 26; 27; 29; 33. + +Part II. _Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind_ + Preface, Definitions, and Axioms. + Propositions: 1; 4-7; 11-13; 15-18; 24-26; + 28-32; 35; 36; 38-49. + +Part III. _Of the Origin and Nature of the Emotions_ + Preface, Definitions, and Postulates; Definitions + of the Emotions. + Propositions: 1; 2; 4; 6; 9; 11; 14; 16; + 18; 25; 27-32; 40; 41; 43-46; 48-51; 56; 57. + +Part IV. _Of Human Bondage or Of the Strength of the + Emotions_ + Preface, Definitions, Axioms, and the Appendix. + Propositions: 3-9; 11-27; 38; 39; 41-47; + 50-54; 56-58. + +Part V. _Of the Power of the Intellect or Of Human + Liberty_ + Preface and Axioms. + Propositions: 1-28; 30-42. + + +THE END + + +--------------------------------------------------------------+ + | Transcriber's Notes | + | | + | Page vii: "affectiones" _sic_ | + | Page xxvi: "villified" amended to "vilified" | + | Page xxvii: "chose" amended to "choose" (twice); | + | "forego" _sic_ | + | Page xxxvi: "antedeluvian" amended to "antediluvian" | + | Page lix: "goverance" amended to "governance" | + | Page 1: "oursleves" amended to "ourselves" | + | Page 6: "superstitition" amended to "superstition" | + | Page 9: "conprehension" amended to "comprehension" | + | Page 26: "chose" amended to "choose" | + | Page 28: "interpretating" amended to "interpreting" | + | Page 45: "phophet" amended to "prophet" | + | Page 51: "came" amended to "come" | + | Page 69: "patriachs" amended to "patriarchs" | + | Page 84: "refer" amended to "prefer" | + | Page 135: "appetities" amended to "appetites" | + | Page 204: "thy" amended to "they" and "thir" amended to | + | "their" | + | Page 229: "Explanations" amended to "Explanation" | + | Page 276: "others" amended to "other" | + | Page 284: "mutitude" amended to "multitude" | + | Page 362: "propositon" amended to "proposition" | + | | + | Abbreviations in footnotes and references have been | + | standardized. | + | | + | Accents and hyphenation have generally been standardised. | + +--------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Philosophy of Spinoza, by Baruch de Spinoza + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA *** + +***** This file should be named 31205.txt or 31205.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/1/2/0/31205/ + +Produced by Alicia Williams and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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