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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/3150-h.zip b/3150-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..7448519 --- /dev/null +++ b/3150-h.zip diff --git a/3150-h/3150-h.htm b/3150-h/3150-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce9f53e --- /dev/null +++ b/3150-h/3150-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,5139 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=US-ASCII" /> +<title>Human Nature</title> + <style type="text/css"> +/*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ +<!-- + P { margin-top: .75em; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + H1, H2 { + text-align: center; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + } + H3, H4 { + text-align: left; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + } + BODY{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + TD { vertical-align: top; } + .blkquot {margin-left: 4em; margin-right: 4em;} /* block indent */ + + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + + .pagenum {position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: right; + color: gray;} + + .citation {vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: none;} + // --> + /* XML end ]]>*/ + </style> +</head> +<body> +<h2> +<a href="#startoftext">Human Nature, by Joseph Butler</a> +</h2> +<pre> +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Human Nature, by Joseph Butler, Edited by +Henry Morley + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Human Nature + and Other Sermons + + +Author: Joseph Butler + +Editor: Henry Morley + +Release Date: May 1, 2007 [eBook #3150] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HUMAN NATURE*** +</pre> +<p><a name="startoftext"></a></p> +<p>Transcribed from the 1887 Cassell & Co. edition by David +Price, email ccx074@pglaf.org</p> +<h1>HUMAN NATURE<br /> +<span class="smcap">and</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">other sermons</span></h1> +<p style="text-align: center"><span class="smcap">by</span><br /> +JOSEPH BUTLER<br /> +<span class="smcap">bishop of durham</span>.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">CASSELL & COMPANY, <span +class="smcap">Limited</span>:<br /> +<span class="smcap"><i>london</i></span>, <span +class="smcap"><i>paris</i></span>, <span class="smcap"><i>new +york & melbourne</i></span>.<br /> +1887</p> +<h2>INTRODUCTION.</h2> +<p>Joseph Butler was born in 1692, youngest of eight children of +a linendraper at Wantage, in Berkshire. His father was a +Presbyterian, and after education at the Wantage Free Grammar +School Joseph Butler was sent to be educated for the Presbyterian +ministry in a training academy at Gloucester, which was +afterwards removed to Tewkesbury. There he had a friend and +comrade, Secker, who afterwards became Archbishop of +Canterbury. Butler and Secker inquired actively, and there +was foreshadowing of his future in the fact that in 1713, at the +age of twenty-one, Butler was engaged in anonymous discussion +with Samuel Clarke upon his book on the <i>à priori</i> +demonstration of the Divine Existence and Attributes.</p> +<p>When the time drew near for call to the ministry, Butler, like +his friend Secker, had reasoned himself into accordance with the +teaching of the Church of England. Butler’s father +did not oppose his strong desire to enter the Church, and he was +entered in 1714 at Oriel College, Oxford. At college a +strong friendship was established between Butler and a +fellow-student, Edward Talbot, whose father was a Bishop, +formerly of Oxford and Salisbury, then of Durham. Through +Talbot’s influence Butler obtained in 1718 the office of +Preacher in the Rolls Chapel, which he held for the next eight +years. In 1722 Talbot died, and on his death-bed urged his +father on behalf of his friend Butler. The Bishop +accordingly presented Joseph Butler to the living of +Houghton-le-Spring. But it was found that costs of +dilapidations were beyond his means at Houghton, and Butler had a +dangerous regard for building works. He was preferred two +years afterwards to the living of Stanhope, which then became +vacant, and which yielded a substantial income. Butler +sought nothing for himself, his simplicity of character, real +worth, and rare intellectual power, secured him friends, and the +love of two of them—Talbot first, and afterwards Secker, +who made his own way in the Church, and became strong enough to +put his friend as well as himself in the way of worldly +advancement, secured for Butler all the patronage he had, until +the Queen also became his active friend.</p> +<p>Joseph Butler was seven years at Stanhope, quietly devoted to +his parish duties, preaching, studying, and writing his +“Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the +Constitution and Course of Nature.” In 1727, while +still at Stanhope, he was appointed to a stall in Durham +Cathedral. Secker, having become chaplain to the Queen, +encouraged her in admiration of Butler’s sermons. He +told her that the author was not dead, but buried, and secured +her active interest in his behalf. From Talbot, who had +become Lord Chancellor, Secker had no difficulty in obtaining for +Butler a chaplaincy which exempted him from the necessity of +residence at Stanhope. Butler, in accepting it, stipulated +for permission to live and work in his parish for six months in +every year. Next he was made chaplain to the King, and +Rector of St. James’s, upon which he gave up +Stanhope. In 1736 Queen Caroline appointed him her Clerk of +the Closet, an office which gave Butler the duty of attendance +upon her for two hours every evening. In that year he +published his “Analogy,” of which the purpose was to +meet, on its own ground, the scepticism of his day. The +Queen died in 1737, and, in accordance with the strong desire +expressed in her last days, in 1738 Butler was made a +Bishop. But his Bishopric was Bristol, worth only +£300 or £400 a year. The King added the Deanery +of St. Paul’s, when that became vacant in 1740, and in +1750, towards the close of his life, Joseph Butler was translated +to the Bishopric of Durham. He died in 1752.</p> +<p>No man could be less self-seeking. He owed his rise in +the Church wholly to the intellectual power and substantial worth +of character that inspired strong friendship. Seeing how +little he sought worldly advancement for himself, while others +were pressing and scrambling, Butler’s friends used their +opportunities of winning for him the advancement he +deserved. He was happiest in doing his work, of which a +chief part was in his study, where he employed his philosophic +mind in strengthening the foundations of religious faith. +Faith in God was attacked by men who claimed especially to be +philosophers, and they were best met by the man who had, beyond +all other divines of his day—some might not be afraid to +add, of any day—the philosophic mind.</p> +<p style="text-align: right">H. M.</p> +<h2>SERMON I. UPON HUMAN NATURE.</h2> +<blockquote><p><span class="smcap">Romans</span> xii. 4, 5.</p> +<p><i>For as we have many members in one body</i>, <i>and all +members have not the same office</i>: <i>so we</i>, <i>being +many</i>, <i>are one body in Christ</i>, <i>and every one members +one of another</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>The Epistles in the New Testament have all of them a +particular reference to the condition and usages of the Christian +world at the time they were written. Therefore as they +cannot be thoroughly understood unless that condition and those +usages are known and attended to, so, further, though they be +known, yet if they be discontinued or changed, exhortations, +precepts, and illustrations of things, which refer to such +circumstances now ceased or altered, cannot at this time be urged +in that manner and with that force which they were to the +primitive Christians. Thus the text now before us, in its +first intent and design, relates to the decent management of +those extraordinary gifts which were then in the Church, <a +name="citation1"></a><a href="#footnote1" +class="citation">[1]</a> but which are now totally ceased. +And even as to the allusion that “we are one body in +Christ,” though what the apostle here intends is equally +true of Christians in all circumstances, and the consideration of +it is plainly still an additional motive, over and above moral +considerations, to the discharge of the several duties and +offices of a Christian, yet it is manifest this allusion must +have appeared with much greater force to those who, by the many +difficulties they went through for the sake of their religion, +were led to keep always in view the relation they stood in to +their Saviour, who had undergone the same: to those, who, from +the idolatries of all around them, and their ill-treatment, were +taught to consider themselves as not of the world in which they +lived, but as a distinct society of themselves; with laws and +ends, and principles of life and action, quite contrary to those +which the world professed themselves at that time influenced +by. Hence the relation of a Christian was by them +considered as nearer than that of affinity and blood; and they +almost literally esteemed themselves as members one of +another.</p> +<p>It cannot, indeed, possibly be denied, that our being +God’s creatures, and virtue being the natural law we are +born under, and the whole constitution of man being plainly +adapted to it, are prior obligations to piety and virtue than the +consideration that God sent his Son into the world to save it, +and the motives which arise from the peculiar relation of +Christians as members one of another under Christ our head. +However, though all this be allowed, as it expressly is by the +inspired writers, yet it is manifest that Christians at the time +of the Revelation, and immediately after, could not but insist +mostly upon considerations of this latter kind.</p> +<p>These observations show the original particular reference to +the text, and the peculiar force with which the thing intended by +the allusion in it must have been felt by the primitive Christian +world. They likewise afford a reason for treating it at +this time in a more general way.</p> +<p>The relation which the several parts or members of the natural +body have to each other and to the whole body is here compared to +the relation which each particular person in society has to other +particular persons and to the whole society; and the latter is +intended to be illustrated by the former. And if there be a +likeness between these two relations, the consequence is obvious: +that the latter shows us we were intended to do good to others, +as the former shows us that the several members of the natural +body were intended to be instruments of good to each other and to +the whole body. But as there is scarce any ground for a +comparison between society and the mere material body, this +without the mind being a dead unactive thing, much less can the +comparison be carried to any length. And since the apostle +speaks of the several members as having distinct offices, which +implies the mind, it cannot be thought an allowable liberty, +instead of the <i>body</i> and <i>its members</i>, to substitute +the <i>whole nature</i> of <i>man</i>, and <i>all the variety of +internal principles which belong to it</i>. And then the +comparison will be between the nature of man as respecting self, +and tending to private good, his own preservation and happiness; +and the nature of man as having respect to society, and tending +to promote public good, the happiness of that society. +These ends do indeed perfectly coincide; and to aim at public and +private good are so far from being inconsistent that they +mutually promote each other: yet in the following discourse they +must be considered as entirely distinct; otherwise the nature of +man as tending to one, or as tending to the other, cannot be +compared. There can no comparison be made, without +considering the things compared as distinct and different.</p> +<p>From this review and comparison of the nature of man as +respecting self and as respecting society, it will plainly appear +that <i>there are as real and the same kind of indications in +human nature</i>, <i>that we were made for society and to do good +to our fellow-creatures</i>, <i>as that we were intended to take +care of our own life and health and private good</i>: <i>and that +the same objections lie against one of these assertions as +against the other</i>. For,</p> +<p>First, there is a natural principle of <i>benevolence</i> <a +name="citation2"></a><a href="#footnote2" +class="citation">[2]</a> in man, which is in some degree to +<i>society</i> what <i>self-love</i> is to the +<i>individual</i>. And if there be in mankind any +disposition to friendship; if there be any such thing as +compassion—for compassion is momentary love—if there +be any such thing as the paternal or filial affections; if there +be any affection in human nature, the object and end of which is +the good of another, this is itself benevolence, or the love of +another. Be it ever so short, be it in ever so low a +degree, or ever so unhappily confined, it proves the assertion, +and points out what we were designed for, as really as though it +were in a higher degree and more extensive. I must, +however, remind you that though benevolence and self-love are +different, though the former tends most directly to public good, +and the latter to private, yet they are so perfectly coincident +that the greatest satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our +having benevolence in a due degree; and that self-love is one +chief security of our right behaviour towards society. It +may be added that their mutual coinciding, so that we can scarce +promote one without the other, is equally a proof that we were +made for both.</p> +<p>Secondly, this will further appear, from observing that the +<i>several passions</i> and <i>affections</i>, which are distinct +<a name="citation3"></a><a href="#footnote3" +class="citation">[3]</a> both from benevolence and self-love, do +in general contribute and lead us to <i>public good</i> as really +as to <i>private</i>. It might be thought too minute and +particular, and would carry us too great a length, to distinguish +between and compare together the several passions or appetites +distinct from benevolence, whose primary use and intention is the +security and good of society, and the passions distinct from +self-love, whose primary intention and design is the security and +good of the individual. <a name="citation4"></a><a +href="#footnote4" class="citation">[4]</a> It is enough to +the present argument that desire of esteem from others, contempt +and esteem of them, love of society as distinct from affection to +the good of it, indignation against successful vice—that +these are public affections or passions, have an immediate +respect to others, naturally lead us to regulate our behaviour in +such a manner as will be of service to our +fellow-creatures. If any or all of these may be considered +likewise as private affections, as tending to private good, this +does not hinder them from being public affections too, or destroy +the good influence of them upon society, and their tendency to +public good. It may be added that as persons without any +conviction from reason of the desirableness of life would yet of +course preserve it merely from the appetite of hunger, so, by +acting merely from regard (suppose) to reputation, without any +consideration of the good of others, men often contribute to +public good. In both these instances they are plainly +instruments in the hands of another, in the hands of Providence, +to carry on ends—the preservation of the individual and +good of society—which they themselves have not in their +view or intention. The sum is, men have various appetites, +passions, and particular affections, quite distinct both from +self-love and from benevolence: all of these have a tendency to +promote both public and private good, and may be considered as +respecting others and ourselves equally and in common; but some +of them seem most immediately to respect others, or tend to +public good; others of them most immediately to respect self, or +tend to private good: as the former are not benevolence, so the +latter are not self-love: neither sort are instances of our love +either to ourselves or others, but only instances of our +Maker’s care and love both of the individual and the +species, and proofs that He intended we should be instruments of +good to each other, as well as that we should be so to +ourselves.</p> +<p>Thirdly, there is a principle of reflection in men, by which +they distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own +actions. We are plainly constituted such sort of creatures +as to reflect upon our own nature. The mind can take a view +of what passes within itself, its propensions, aversions, +passions, affections as respecting such objects, and in such +degrees; and of the several actions consequent thereupon. +In this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another, and +towards a third is affected in neither of these ways, but is +quite indifferent. This principle in man, by which he +approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is +conscience; for this is the strict sense of the word, though +sometimes it is used so as to take in more. And that this +faculty tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other, +and leads them to do good, is too manifest to need being insisted +upon. Thus a parent has the affection of love to his +children: this leads him to take care of, to educate, to make due +provision for them—the natural affection leads to this: but +the reflection that it is his proper business, what belongs to +him, that it is right and commendable so to do—this, added +to the affection, becomes a much more settled principle, and +carries him on through more labour and difficulties for the sake +of his children than he would undergo from that affection alone, +if he thought it, and the cause of action it led to, either +indifferent or criminal. This indeed is impossible, to do +that which is good and not to approve of it; for which reason +they are frequently not considered as distinct, though they +really are: for men often approve of the action of others which +they will not imitate, and likewise do that which they approve +not. It cannot possibly be denied that there is this +principle of reflection or conscience in human nature. +Suppose a man to relieve an innocent person in great distress; +suppose the same man afterwards, in the fury of anger, to do the +greatest mischief to a person who had given no just cause of +offence. To aggravate the injury, add the circumstances of +former friendship and obligation from the injured person; let the +man who is supposed to have done these two different actions +coolly reflect upon them afterwards, without regard to their +consequences to himself: to assert that any common man would be +affected in the same way towards these different actions, that he +would make no distinction between them, but approve or disapprove +them equally, is too glaring a falsity to need being +confuted. There is therefore this principle of reflection +or conscience in mankind. It is needless to compare the +respect it has to private good with the respect it has to public; +since it plainly tends as much to the latter as to the former, +and is commonly thought to tend chiefly to the latter. This +faculty is now mentioned merely as another part in the inward +frame of man, pointing out to us in some degree what we are +intended for, and as what will naturally and of course have some +influence. The particular place assigned to it by nature, +what authority it has, and how great influence it ought to have, +shall be hereafter considered.</p> +<p>From this comparison of benevolence and self-love, of our +public and private affections, of the courses of life they lead +to, and of the principle of reflection or conscience as +respecting each of them, it is as manifest that <i>we were made +for society</i>, <i>and to promote the happiness of it</i>, <i>as +that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and +private good</i>.</p> +<p>And from this whole review must be given a different draught +of human nature from what we are often presented with. +Mankind are by nature so closely united, there is such a +correspondence between the inward sensations of one man and those +of another, that disgrace is as much avoided as bodily pain, and +to be the object of esteem and love as much desired as any +external goods; and in many particular cases persons are carried +on to do good to others, as the end their affection tends to and +rests in; and manifest that they find real satisfaction and +enjoyment in this course of behaviour. There is such a +natural principle of attraction in man towards man that having +trod the same tract of land, having breathed in the same climate, +barely having been born in the same artificial district or +division, becomes the occasion of contracting acquaintances and +familiarities many years after; for anything may serve the +purpose. Thus relations merely nominal are sought and +invented, not by governors, but by the lowest of the people, +which are found sufficient to hold mankind together in little +fraternities and copartnerships: weak ties indeed, and what may +afford fund enough for ridicule, if they are absurdly considered +as the real principles of that union: but they are in truth +merely the occasions, as anything may be of anything, upon which +our nature carries us on according to its own previous bent and +bias; which occasions therefore would be nothing at all were +there not this prior disposition and bias of nature. Men +are so much one body that in a peculiar manner they feel for each +other shame, sudden danger, resentment, honour, prosperity, +distress; one or another, or all of these, from the social nature +in general, from benevolence, upon the occasion of natural +relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence; each of these +being distinct cements of society. And therefore to have no +restraint from, no regard to, others in our behaviour, is the +speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and +independent, as having nothing in our nature which has respect to +our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice. And +this is the same absurdity as to suppose a hand, or any part, to +have no natural respect to any other, or to the whole body.</p> +<p>But, allowing all this, it may be asked, “Has not man +dispositions and principles within which lead him to do evil to +others, as well as to do good? Whence come the many +miseries else which men are the authors and instruments of to +each other?” These questions, so far as they relate +to the foregoing discourse, may be answered by asking, Has not +man also dispositions and principles within which lead him to do +evil to himself, as well as good? Whence come the many +miseries else—sickness, pain, and death—which men are +instruments and authors of to themselves?</p> +<p>It may be thought more easy to answer one of these questions +than the other, but the answer to both is really the same: that +mankind have ungoverned passions which they will gratify at any +rate, as well to the injury of others as in contradiction to +known private interest: but that as there is no such thing as +self-hatred, so neither is there any such thing as ill-will in +one man towards another, emulation and resentment being away; +whereas there is plainly benevolence or good-will: there is no +such thing as love of injustice, oppression, treachery, +ingratitude, but only eager desires after such and such external +goods; which, according to a very ancient observation, the most +abandoned would choose to obtain by innocent means, if they were +as easy and as effectual to their end: that even emulation and +resentment, by any one who will consider what these passions +really are in nature, <a name="citation5"></a><a +href="#footnote5" class="citation">[5]</a> will be found nothing +to the purpose of this objection; and that the principles and +passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from +self-love and benevolence, primarily and most directly lead to +right behaviour with regard to others as well as himself, and +only secondarily and accidentally to what is evil. Thus, +though men, to avoid the shame of one villainy, are sometimes +guilty of a greater, yet it is easy to see that the original +tendency of shame is to prevent the doing of shameful actions; +and its leading men to conceal such actions when done is only in +consequence of their being done; <i>i.e.</i>, of the +passion’s not having answered its first end.</p> +<p>If it be said that there are persons in the world who are in +great measure without the natural affections towards their +fellow-creatures, there are likewise instances of persons without +the common natural affections to themselves. But the nature +of man is not to be judged of by either of these, but by what +appears in the common world, in the bulk of mankind.</p> +<p>I am afraid it would be thought very strange, if to confirm +the truth of this account of human nature, and make out the +justness of the foregoing comparison, it should be added that +from what appears, men in fact as much and as often contradict +that <i>part</i> of their nature which respects <i>self</i>, and +which leads them to their <i>own private</i> good and happiness, +as they contradict that <i>part</i> of it which respects +<i>society</i>, and tends to <i>public</i> good: that there are +as few persons who attain the greatest satisfaction and enjoyment +which they might attain in the present world, as who do the +greatest good to others which they might do; nay, that there are +as few who can be said really and in earnest to aim at one as at +the other. Take a survey of mankind: the world in general, +the good and bad, almost without exception, equally are agreed +that were religion out of the case, the happiness of the present +life would consist in a manner wholly in riches, honours, sensual +gratifications; insomuch that one scarce hears a reflection made +upon prudence, life, conduct, but upon this supposition. +Yet, on the contrary, that persons in the greatest affluence of +fortune are no happier than such as have only a competency; that +the cares and disappointments of ambition for the most part far +exceed the satisfactions of it; as also the miserable intervals +of intemperance and excess, and the many untimely deaths +occasioned by a dissolute course of life: these things are all +seen, acknowledged, by every one acknowledged; but are thought no +objections against, though they expressly contradict, this +universal principle—that the happiness of the present life +consists in one or other of them. Whence is all this +absurdity and contradiction? Is not the middle way +obvious? Can anything be more manifest than that the +happiness of life consists in these possessed and enjoyed only to +a certain degree; that to pursue them beyond this degree is +always attended with more inconvenience than advantage to a +man’s self, and often with extreme misery and +unhappiness? Whence, then, I say, is all this absurdity and +contradiction? Is it really the result of consideration in +mankind, how they may become most easy to themselves, most free +from care, and enjoy the chief happiness attainable in this +world? Or is it not manifestly owing either to this, that +they have not cool and reasonable concern enough for themselves +to consider wherein their chief happiness in the present life +consists; or else, if they do consider it, that they will not act +conformably to what is the result of that +consideration—<i>i.e.</i>, reasonable concern for +themselves, or cool self-love, is prevailed over by passions and +appetite? So that from what appears there is no ground to +assert that those principles in the nature of man, which most +directly lead to promote the good of our fellow-creatures, are +more generally or in a greater degree violated than those which +most directly lead us to promote our own private good and +happiness.</p> +<p>The sum of the whole is plainly this: The nature of man +considered in his single capacity, and with respect only to the +present world, is adapted and leads him to attain the greatest +happiness he can for himself in the present world. The +nature of man considered in his public or social capacity leads +him to right behaviour in society, to that course of life which +we call virtue. Men follow or obey their nature in both +these capacities and respects to a certain degree, but not +entirely: their actions do not come up to the whole of what their +nature leads them to in either of these capacities or respects: +and they often violate their nature in both; <i>i.e.</i>, as they +neglect the duties they owe to their fellow-creatures, to which +their nature leads them, and are injurious, to which their nature +is abhorrent, so there is a manifest negligence in men of their +real happiness or interest in the present world, when that +interest is inconsistent with a present gratification; for the +sake of which they negligently, nay, even knowingly, are the +authors and instruments of their own misery and ruin. Thus +they are as often unjust to themselves as to others, and for the +most part are equally so to both by the same actions.</p> +<h2>SERMON II., III. UPON HUMAN NATURE.</h2> +<blockquote><p><span class="smcap">Romans</span> ii. 14.</p> +<p><i>For when the Gentiles</i>, <i>which have not the law</i>, +<i>do by nature the things contained in the law</i>, +<i>these</i>, <i>having not the law</i>, <i>are a law unto +themselves</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>As speculative truth admits of different kinds of proof, so +likewise moral obligations may be shown by different +methods. If the real nature of any creature leads him and +is adapted to such and such purposes only, or more than to any +other, this is a reason to believe the Author of that nature +intended it for those purposes. Thus there is no doubt the +eye was intended for us to see with. And the more complex +any constitution is, and the greater variety of parts there are +which thus tend to some one end, the stronger is the proof that +such end was designed. However, when the inward frame of +man is considered as any guide in morals, the utmost caution must +be used that none make peculiarities in their own temper, or +anything which is the effect of particular customs, though +observable in several, the standard of what is common to the +species; and above all, that the highest principle be not forgot +or excluded, that to which belongs the adjustment and correction +of all other inward movements and affections; which principle +will of course have some influence, but which being in nature +supreme, as shall now be shown, ought to preside over and govern +all the rest. The difficulty of rightly observing the two +former cautions; the appearance there is of some small diversity +amongst mankind with respect to this faculty, with respect to +their natural sense of moral good and evil; and the attention +necessary to survey with any exactness what passes within, have +occasioned that it is not so much agreed what is the standard of +the internal nature of man as of his external form. Neither +is this last exactly settled. Yet we understand one another +when we speak of the shape of a human body: so likewise we do +when we speak of the heart and inward principles, how far soever +the standard is from being exact or precisely fixed. There +is therefore ground for an attempt of showing men to themselves, +of showing them what course of life and behaviour their real +nature points out and would lead them to. Now obligations +of virtue shown, and motives to the practice of it enforced, from +a review of the nature of man, are to be considered as an appeal +to each particular person’s heart and natural conscience: +as the external senses are appealed to for the proof of things +cognisable by them. Since, then, our inward feelings, and +the perceptions we receive from our external senses, are equally +real, to argue from the former to life and conduct is as little +liable to exception as to argue from the latter to absolute +speculative truth. A man can as little doubt whether his +eyes were given him to see with as he can doubt of the truth of +the science of <i>optics</i>, deduced from ocular +experiments. And allowing the inward feeling, shame, a man +can as little doubt whether it was given him to prevent his doing +shameful actions as he can doubt whether his eyes were given him +to guide his steps. And as to these inward feelings +themselves, that they are real, that man has in his nature +passions and affections, can no more be questioned than that he +has external senses. Neither can the former be wholly +mistaken, though to a certain degree liable to greater mistakes +than the latter.</p> +<p>There can be no doubt but that several propensions or +instincts, several principles in the heart of man, carry him to +society, and to contribute to the happiness of it, in a sense and +a manner in which no inward principle leads him to evil. +These principles, propensions, or instincts which lead him to do +good are approved of by a certain faculty within, quite distinct +from these propensions themselves. All this hath been fully +made out in the foregoing discourse.</p> +<p>But it may be said, “What is all this, though true, to +the purpose of virtue and religion? these require, not only that +we do good to others when we are led this way, by benevolence or +reflection happening to be stronger than other principles, +passions, or appetites, but likewise that the <i>whole</i> +character be formed upon thought and reflection; that +<i>every</i> action be directed by some determinate rule, some +other rule than the strength and prevalency of any principle or +passion. What sign is there in our nature (for the inquiry +is only about what is to be collected from thence) that this was +intended by its Author? Or how does so various and fickle a +temper as that of man appear adapted thereto? It may indeed +be absurd and unnatural for men to act without any reflection; +nay, without regard to that particular kind of reflection which +you call conscience, because this does belong to our +nature. For as there never was a man but who approved one +place, prospect, building, before another, so it does not appear +that there ever was a man who would not have approved an action +of humanity rather than of cruelty; interest and passion being +quite out of the case. But interest and passion do come in, +and are often too strong for and prevail over reflection and +conscience. Now as brutes have various instincts, by which +they are carried on to the end the Author of their nature +intended them for, is not man in the same condition—with +this difference only, that to his instincts (<i>i.e.</i>, +appetites and passion) is added the principle of reflection or +conscience? And as brutes act agreeably to their nature, in +following that principle or particular instinct which for the +present is strongest in them, does not man likewise act agreeably +to his nature, or obey the law of his creation, by following that +principle, be it passion or conscience, which for the present +happens to be strongest in him? Thus different men are by +their particular nature hurried on to pursue honour or riches or +pleasure; there are also persons whose temper leads them in an +uncommon degree to kindness, compassion, doing good to their +fellow-creatures, as there are others who are given to suspend +their judgment, to weigh and consider things, and to act upon +thought and reflection. Let every one, then, quietly follow +his nature, as passion, reflection, appetite, the several parts +of it, happen to be strongest; but let not the man of virtue take +upon him to blame the ambitious, the covetous, the dissolute, +since these equally with him obey and follow their nature. +Thus, as in some cases we follow our nature in doing the works +<i>contained in the law</i>, so in other cases we follow nature +in doing contrary.”</p> +<p>Now all this licentious talk entirely goes upon a supposition +that men follow their nature in the same sense, in violating the +known rules of justice and honesty for the sake of a present +gratification, as they do in following those rules when they have +no temptation to the contrary. And if this were true, that +could not be so which St. Paul asserts, that men are <i>by nature +a law to themselves</i>. If by following nature were meant +only acting as we please, it would indeed be ridiculous to speak +of nature as any guide in morals; nay, the very mention of +deviating from nature would be absurd; and the mention of +following it, when spoken by way of distinction, would absolutely +have no meaning. For did ever any one act otherwise than as +he pleased? And yet the ancients speak of deviating from +nature as vice, and of following nature so much as a distinction, +that according to them the perfection of virtue consists +therein. So that language itself should teach people +another sense to the words <i>following nature</i> than barely +acting as we please. Let it, however, be observed that +though the words <i>human nature</i> are to be explained, yet the +real question of this discourse is not concerning the meaning of +words, any other than as the explanation of them may be needful +to make out and explain the assertion, that <i>every man is +naturally a law to himself</i>, that <i>every one may find within +himself the rule of right</i>, <i>and obligations to follow +it</i>. This St. Paul affirms in the words of the text, and +this the foregoing objection really denies by seeming to allow +it. And the objection will be fully answered, and the text +before us explained, by observing that <i>nature</i> is +considered in different views, and the word used in different +senses; and by showing in what view it is considered, and in what +sense the word is used, when intended to express and signify that +which is the guide of life, that by which men are a law to +themselves. I say, the explanation of the term will be +sufficient, because from thence it will appear that in some +senses of the word <i>nature</i> cannot be, but that in another +sense it manifestly is, a law to us.</p> +<p>I. By nature is often meant no more than some principle +in man, without regard either to the kind or degree of it. +Thus the passion of anger, and the affection of parents to their +children, would be called equally <i>natural</i>. And as +the same person hath often contrary principles, which at the same +time draw contrary ways, he may by the same action both follow +and contradict his nature in this sense of the word; he may +follow one passion and contradict another.</p> +<p>II. <i>Nature</i> is frequently spoken of as consisting +in those passions which are strongest, and most influence the +actions; which being vicious ones, mankind is in this sense +naturally vicious, or vicious by nature. Thus St. Paul says +of the Gentiles, <i>who were dead in trespasses and sins</i>, +<i>and walked according to the spirit of disobedience</i>, +<i>that they were by nature the children of wrath</i>. <a +name="citation6"></a><a href="#footnote6" +class="citation">[6]</a> They could be no otherwise +<i>children of wrath</i> by nature than they were vicious by +nature.</p> +<p>Here, then, are two different senses of the word +<i>nature</i>, in neither of which men can at all be said to be a +law to themselves. They are mentioned only to be excluded, +to prevent their being confounded, as the latter is in the +objection, with another sense of it, which is now to be inquired +after and explained.</p> +<p>III. The apostle asserts that the Gentiles <i>do by +NATURE the things contained in the law</i>. Nature is +indeed here put by way of distinction from revelation, but yet it +is not a mere negative. He intends to express more than +that by which they <i>did not</i>, that by which they <i>did</i>, +the works of the law; namely, by <i>nature</i>. It is plain +the meaning of the word is not the same in this passage as in the +former, where it is spoken of as evil; for in this latter it is +spoken of as good—as that by which they acted, or might +have acted, virtuously. What that is in man by which he is +<i>naturally a law to himself</i> is explained in the following +words: <i>Which show the work of the law written in their +hearts</i>, <i>their consciences also bearing witness</i>, <i>and +their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one +another</i>. If there be a distinction to be made between +the <i>works written in their hearts</i>, and the <i>witness of +conscience</i>, by the former must be meant the natural +disposition to kindness and compassion to do what is of good +report, to which this apostle often refers: that part of the +nature of man, treated of in the foregoing discourse, which with +very little reflection and of course leads him to society, and by +means of which he naturally acts a just and good part in it, +unless other passions or interest lead him astray. Yet +since other passions, and regards to private interest, which lead +us (though indirectly, yet they lead us) astray, are themselves +in a degree equally natural, and often most prevalent, and since +we have no method of seeing the particular degrees in which one +or the other is placed in us by nature, it is plain the former, +considered merely as natural, good and right as they are, can no +more be a law to us than the latter. But there is a +superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, +which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, +as well as his external actions; which passes judgement upon +himself and them, pronounces determinately some actions to be in +themselves just, right, good, others to be in themselves evil, +wrong, unjust: which, without being consulted, without being +advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or +condemns him the doer of them accordingly: and which, if not +forcibly stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to +anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall +hereafter second and affirm its own. But this part of the +office of conscience is beyond my present design explicitly to +consider. It is by this faculty, natural to man, that he is +a moral agent, that he is a law to himself, but this faculty, I +say, not to be considered merely as a principle in his heart, +which is to have some influence as well as others, but considered +as a faculty in kind and in nature supreme over all others, and +which bears its own authority of being so.</p> +<p>This <i>prerogative</i>, this <i>natural supremacy</i>, of the +faculty which surveys, approves, or disapproves the several +affections of our mind and actions of our lives, being that by +which men <i>are a law to themselves</i>, their conformity or +disobedience to which law of our nature renders their actions, in +the highest and most proper sense, natural or unnatural, it is +fit it be further explained to you; and I hope it will be so, if +you will attend to the following reflections.</p> +<p>Man may act according to that principle or inclination which +for the present happens to be strongest, and yet act in a way +disproportionate to, and violate his real proper nature. +Suppose a brute creature by any bait to be allured into a snare, +by which he is destroyed. He plainly followed the bent of +his nature, leading him to gratify his appetite: there is an +entire correspondence between his whole nature and such an +action: such action therefore is natural. But suppose a +man, foreseeing the same danger of certain ruin, should rush into +it for the sake of a present gratification; he in this instance +would follow his strongest desire, as did the brute creature; but +there would be as manifest a disproportion between the nature of +a man and such an action as between the meanest work of art and +the skill of the greatest master in that art; which disproportion +arises, not from considering the action singly in <i>itself</i>, +or in its <i>consequences</i>, but from <i>comparison</i> of it +with the nature of the agent. And since such an action is +utterly disproportionate to the nature of man, it is in the +strictest and most proper sense unnatural; this word expressing +that disproportion. Therefore, instead of the words +<i>disproportionate to his nature</i>, the word <i>unnatural</i> +may now be put; this being more familiar to us: but let it be +observed that it stands for the same thing precisely.</p> +<p>Now what is it which renders such a rash action +unnatural? Is it that he went against the principle of +reasonable and cool self-love, considered <i>merely</i> as a part +of his nature? No; for if he had acted the contrary way, he +would equally have gone against a principle, or part of his +nature—namely, passion or appetite. But to deny a +present appetite, from foresight that the gratification of it +would end in immediate ruin or extreme misery, is by no means an +unnatural action: whereas to contradict or go against cool +self-love for the sake of such gratification is so in the +instance before us. Such an action then being unnatural, +and its being so not arising from a man’s going against a +principle or desire barely, nor in going against that principle +or desire which happens for the present to be strongest, it +necessarily follows that there must be some other difference or +distinction to be made between these two principles, passion and +cool self-love, than what I have yet taken notice of. And +this difference, not being a difference in strength or degree, I +call a difference in <i>nature</i> and in <i>kind</i>. And +since, in the instance still before us, if passion prevails over +self-love the consequent action is unnatural, but if self-love +prevails over passion the action is natural, it is manifest that +self-love is in human nature a superior principle to +passion. This may be contradicted without violating that +nature; but the former cannot. So that, if we will act +conformably to the economy of man’s nature, reasonable +self-love must govern. Thus, without particular +consideration of conscience, we may have a clear conception of +the <i>superior nature</i> of one inward principle to another, +and see that there really is this natural superiority, quite +distinct from degrees of strength and prevalency.</p> +<p>Let us now take a view of the nature of man, as consisting +partly of various appetites, passions, affections, and partly of +the principle of reflection or conscience, leaving quite out all +consideration of the different degrees of strength in which +either of them prevails, and it will further appear that there is +this natural superiority of one inward principle to another, and +that it is even part of the idea of reflection or conscience.</p> +<p>Passion or appetite implies a direct simple tendency towards +such and such objects, without distinction of the means by which +they are to be obtained. Consequently it will often happen +there will be a desire of particular objects, in cases where they +cannot be obtained without manifest injury to others. +Reflection or conscience comes in, need disapproves the pursuit +of them in these circumstances; but the desire remains. +Which is to be obeyed, appetite or reflection? Cannot this +question be answered, from the economy and constitution of human +nature merely, without saying which is strongest? Or need +this at all come into consideration? Would not the question +be <i>intelligibly</i> and fully answered by saying that the +principle of reflection or conscience being compared with the +various appetites, passions, and affections in men, the former is +manifestly superior and chief, without regard to strength? +And how often soever the latter happens to prevail, it is mere +<i>usurpation</i>: the former remains in nature and in kind its +superior; and every instance of such prevalence of the latter is +an instance of breaking in upon and violation of the constitution +of man.</p> +<p>All this is no more than the distinction, which everybody is +acquainted with, between <i>mere power</i> and <i>authority</i>: +only instead of being intended to express the difference between +what is possible and what is lawful in civil government, here it +has been shown applicable to the several principles in the mind +of man. Thus that principle by which we survey, and either +approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and actions, is not +only to be considered as what is in its turn to have some +influence—which may be said of every passion, of the lowest +appetites—but likewise as being superior, as from its very +nature manifestly claiming superiority over all others, insomuch +that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, +without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. +This is a constituent part of the idea—that is, of the +faculty itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy +and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as +it had right; had it power, as it had manifest authority, it +would absolutely govern the world.</p> +<p>This gives us a further view of the nature of man; shows us +what course of life we were made for: not only that our real +nature leads us to be influenced in some degree by reflection and +conscience, but likewise in what degree we are to be influenced +by it, if we will fall in with, and act agreeably to, the +constitution of our nature: that this faculty was placed within +to be our proper governor, to direct and regulate all under +principles, passions, and motives of action. This is its +right and office: thus sacred is its authority. And how +often soever men violate and rebelliously refuse to submit to it, +for supposed interest which they cannot otherwise obtain, or for +the sake of passion which they cannot otherwise +gratify—this makes no alteration as to the <i>natural +right</i> and <i>office</i> of conscience.</p> +<p>Let us now turn this whole matter another way, and suppose +there was no such thing at all as this natural supremacy of +conscience—that there was no distinction to be made between +one inward principle and another, but only that of +strength—and see what would be the consequence.</p> +<p>Consider, then, what is the latitude and compass of the +actions of man with regard to himself, his fellow-creatures, and +the Supreme Being? What are their bounds, besides that of +our natural power? With respect to the two first, they are +plainly no other than these: no man seeks misery, as such, for +himself; and no one unprovoked does mischief to another for its +own sake. For in every degree within these bounds, mankind +knowingly, from passion or wantonness, bring ruin and misery upon +themselves and others. And impiety and profaneness—I +mean what every one would call so who believes the being of +God—have absolutely no bounds at all. Men blaspheme +the Author of nature, formally and in words renounce their +allegiance to their Creator. Put an instance, then, with +respect to any one of these three. Though we should suppose +profane swearing, and in general that kind of impiety now +mentioned, to mean nothing, yet it implies wanton disregard and +irreverence towards an infinite Being our Creator; and is this as +suitable to the nature of man as reverence and dutiful submission +of heart towards that Almighty Being? Or suppose a man +guilty of parricide, with all the circumstances of cruelty which +such an action can admit of. This action is done in +consequence of its principle being for the present strongest; and +if there be no difference between inward principles, but only +that of strength, the strength being given you have the whole +nature of the man given, so far as it relates to this +matter. The action plainly corresponds to the principle, +the principle being in that degree of strength it was: it +therefore corresponds to the whole nature of the man. Upon +comparing the action and the whole nature, there arises no +disproportion, there appears no unsuitableness, between +them. Thus the <i>murder of a father</i> and the <i>nature +of man</i> correspond to each other, as the same nature and an +act of filial duty. If there be no difference between +inward principles, but only that of strength, we can make no +distinction between these two actions, considered as the actions +of such a creature; but in our coolest hours must approve or +disapprove them equally: than which nothing can be reduced to a +greater absurdity.</p> +<h2>SERMON III.</h2> +<p>The natural supremacy of reflection or conscience being thus +established, we may from it form a distinct notion of what is +meant by <i>human nature</i> when virtue is said to consist in +following it, and vice in deviating from it.</p> +<p>As the idea of a civil constitution implies in it united +strength, various subordinations under one direction—that +of the supreme authority—the different strength of each +particular member of the society not coming into the +idea—whereas, if you leave out the subordination, the +union, and the one direction, you destroy and lose it—so +reason, several appetites, passions, and affections, prevailing +in different degrees of strength, is not <i>that</i> idea or +notion of <i>human nature</i>; but <i>that nature</i> consists in +these several principles considered as having a natural respect +to each other, in the several passions being naturally +subordinate to the one superior principle of reflection or +conscience. Every bias, instinct, propension within, is a +natural part of our nature, but not the whole: add to these the +superior faculty whose office it is to adjust, manage, and +preside over them, and take in this its natural superiority, and +you complete the idea of human nature. And as in civil +government the constitution is broken in upon and violated by +power and strength prevailing over authority; so the constitution +of man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties or +principles within prevailing over that which is in its nature +supreme over them all. Thus, when it is said by ancient +writers that tortures and death are not so contrary to human +nature as injustice, by this, to be sure, is not meant that the +aversion to the former in mankind is less strong and prevalent +than their aversion to the latter, but that the former is only +contrary to our nature considered in a partial view, and which +takes in only the lowest part of it, that which we have in common +with the brutes; whereas the latter is contrary to our nature, +considered in a higher sense, as a system and constitution +contrary to the whole economy of man. <a name="citation7"></a><a +href="#footnote7" class="citation">[7]</a></p> +<p>And from all these things put together, nothing can be more +evident than that, exclusive of revelation, man cannot be +considered as a creature left by his Maker to act at random, and +live at large up to the extent of his natural power, as passion, +humour, wilfulness, happen to carry him, which is the condition +brute creatures are in; but that <i>from his make</i>, +<i>constitution</i>, <i>or nature</i>, <i>he is in the strictest +and most proper sense a law to himself</i>. He hath the +rule of right within: what is wanting is only that he honestly +attend to it.</p> +<p>The inquiries which have been made by men of leisure after +some general rule, the conformity to or disagreement from which +should denominate our actions good or evil, are in many respects +of great service. Yet let any plain, honest man, before he +engages in any course of action, ask himself, Is this I am going +about right, or is it wrong? Is it good, or is it +evil? I do not in the least doubt but that this question +would be answered agreeably to truth and virtue, by almost any +fair man in almost any circumstance. Neither do there +appear any cases which look like exceptions to this, but those of +superstition, and of partiality to ourselves. Superstition +may perhaps be somewhat of an exception; but partiality to +ourselves is not, this being itself dishonesty. For a man +to judge that to be the equitable, the moderate, the right part +for him to act, which he would see to be hard, unjust, oppressive +in another, this is plain vice, and can proceed only from great +unfairness of mind.</p> +<p>But allowing that mankind hath the rule of right within +himself, yet it may be asked, “What obligations are we +under to attend to and follow it?” I answer: It has +been proved that man by his nature is a law to himself, without +the particular distinct consideration of the positive sanctions +of that law: the rewards and punishments which we feel, and those +which from the light of reason we have ground to believe, are +annexed to it. The question, then, carries its own answer +along within it. Your obligation to obey this law is its +being the law of your nature. That your conscience approves +of and attests to such a course of action is itself alone an +obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to show +us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own +authority with it, that it is our natural guide; the guide +assigned us by the Author of our nature: it therefore belongs to +our condition of being; it is our duty to walk in that path, and +follow this guide, without looking about to see whether we may +not possibly forsake them with impunity.</p> +<p>However, let us hear what is to be said against obeying this +law of our nature. And the sum is no more than this: +“Why should we be concerned about anything out of and +beyond ourselves? If we do find within ourselves regards to +others, and restraints of we know not how many different kinds, +yet these being embarrassments, and hindering us from going the +nearest way to our own good, why should we not endeavour to +suppress and get over them?”</p> +<p>Thus people go on with words, which when applied to human +nature, and the condition in which it is placed in this world, +have really no meaning. For does not all this kind of talk +go upon supposition, that our happiness in this world consists in +somewhat quite distinct from regard to others, and that it is the +privilege of vice to be without restraint or confinement? +Whereas, on the contrary, the enjoyments—in a manner all +the common enjoyments of life, even the pleasures of +vice—depend upon these regards of one kind or another to +our fellow-creatures. Throw off all regards to others, and +we should be quite indifferent to infamy and to honour; there +could be no such thing at all as ambition; and scarce any such +thing as covetousness; for we should likewise be equally +indifferent to the disgrace of poverty, the several neglects and +kinds of contempt which accompany this state, and to the +reputation of riches, the regard and respect they usually +procure. Neither is restraint by any means peculiar to one +course of life; but our very nature, exclusive of conscience and +our condition, lays us under an absolute necessity of it. +We cannot gain any end whatever without being confined to the +proper means, which is often the most painful and uneasy +confinement. And in numberless instances a present appetite +cannot be gratified without such apparent and immediate ruin and +misery that the most dissolute man in the world chooses to forego +the pleasure rather than endure the pain.</p> +<p>Is the meaning, then, to indulge those regards to our +fellow-creatures, and submit to those restraints which upon the +whole are attended with more satisfaction than uneasiness, and +get over only those which bring more uneasiness and inconvenience +than satisfaction? “Doubtless this was our +meaning.” You have changed sides then. Keep to +this; be consistent with yourselves, and you and the men of +virtue are <i>in general</i> perfectly agreed. But let us +take care and avoid mistakes. Let it not be taken for +granted that the temper of envy, rage, resentment, yields greater +delight than meekness, forgiveness, compassion, and good-will; +especially when it is acknowledged that rage, envy, resentment, +are in themselves mere misery; and that satisfaction arising from +the indulgence of them is little more than relief from that +misery; whereas the temper of compassion and benevolence is +itself delightful; and the indulgence of it, by doing good, +affords new positive delight and enjoyment. Let it not be +taken for granted that the satisfaction arising from the +reputation of riches and power, however obtained, and from the +respect paid to them, is greater than the satisfaction arising +from the reputation of justice, honesty, charity, and the esteem +which is universally acknowledged to be their due. And if +it be doubtful which of these satisfactions is the greatest, as +there are persons who think neither of them very considerable, +yet there can be no doubt concerning ambition and covetousness, +virtue and a good mind, considered in themselves, and as leading +to different courses of life; there can, I say, be no doubt, +which temper and which course is attended with most peace and +tranquillity of mind, which with most perplexity, vexation, and +inconvenience. And both the virtues and vices which have +been now mentioned, do in a manner equally imply in them regards +of one kind or another to our fellow-creatures. And with +respect to restraint and confinement, whoever will consider the +restraints from fear and shame, the dissimulation, mean arts of +concealment, servile compliances, one or other of which belong to +almost every course of vice, will soon be convinced that the man +of virtue is by no means upon a disadvantage in this +respect. How many instances are there in which men feel and +own and cry aloud under the chains of vice with which they are +enthralled, and which yet they will not shake off! How many +instances, in which persons manifestly go through more pains and +self-denial to gratify a vicious passion, than would have been +necessary to the conquest of it! To this is to be added, +that when virtue is become habitual, when the temper of it is +acquired, what was before confinement ceases to be so by becoming +choice and delight. Whatever restraint and guard upon +ourselves may be needful to unlearn any unnatural distortion or +odd gesture, yet in all propriety of speech, natural behaviour +must be the most easy and unrestrained. It is manifest +that, in the common course of life, there is seldom any +inconsistency between our duty and what is <i>called</i> +interest: it is much seldomer that there is an inconsistency +between duty and what is really our present interest; meaning by +interest, happiness and satisfaction. Self-love, then, +though confined to the interest of the present world, does in +general perfectly coincide with virtue, and leads us to one and +the same course of life. But, whatever exceptions there are +to this, which are much fewer than they are commonly thought, all +shall be set right at the final distribution of things. It +is a manifest absurdity to suppose evil prevailing finally over +good, under the conduct and administration of a perfect +mined.</p> +<p>The whole argument, which I have been now insisting upon, may +be thus summed up, and given you in one view. The nature of +man is adapted to some course of action or other. Upon +comparing some actions with this nature, they appear suitable and +correspondent to it: from comparison of other actions with the +same nature, there arises to our view some unsuitableness or +disproportion. The correspondence of actions to the nature +of the agent renders them natural; their disproportion to it, +unnatural. That an action is correspondent to the nature of +the agent does not arise from its being agreeable to the +principle which happens to be the strongest: for it may be so and +yet be quite disproportionate to the nature of the agent. +The correspondence therefore, or disproportion, arises from +somewhat else. This can be nothing but a difference in +nature and kind, altogether distinct from strength, between the +inward principles. Some then are in nature and kind +superior to others. And the correspondence arises from the +action being conformable to the higher principle; and the +unsuitableness from its being contrary to it. Reasonable +self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles in +the nature of man; because an action may be suitable to this +nature, though all other principles be violated, but becomes +unsuitable if either of those are. Conscience and +self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us +the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; +for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every +instance if we take in the future and the whole; this being +implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of +things. Thus they who have been so wise in their generation +as to regard only their own supposed interest, at the expense and +to the injury of others, shall at last find, that he who has +given up all the advantages of the present world, rather than +violate his conscience and the relations of life, has infinitely +better provided for himself, and secured his owns interest and +happiness.</p> +<h2>SERMON IV. UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TONGUE.</h2> +<blockquote><p><span class="smcap">James</span> i. 26.</p> +<p><i>If any man among you seem to be religious</i>, <i>and +bridleth not his tongue</i>, <i>but deceiveth his own heart</i>, +<i>this man’s religion is vain</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>The translation of this text would be more determinate by +being more literal, thus: <i>If any man among you seemeth to be +religious</i>, <i>not bridling his tongue</i>, <i>but deceiving +his own heart</i>, <i>this man’s religion is +vain</i>. This determines that the words, <i>but deceiveth +his own heart</i>, are not put in opposition to <i>seemeth to be +religious</i>, but to <i>bridleth not his tongue</i>. The +certain determinate meaning of the text then being, that he who +seemeth to be religious, and bridleth not his tongue, but in that +particular deceiveth his own heart, this man’s religion is +vain, we may observe somewhat very forcible and expressive in +these words of St. James. As if the apostle had said, No +man surely can make any pretences to religion, who does not at +least believe that he bridleth his tongue: if he puts on any +appearance or face of religion, and yet does not govern his +tongue, he must surely deceive himself in that particular, and +think he does; and whoever is so unhappy as to deceive himself in +this, to imagine he keeps that unruly faculty in due subjection +when indeed he does not, whatever the other part of his life be, +his religion is vain; the government of the tongue being a most +material restraint which virtue lays us under: without it no man +can be truly religious.</p> +<p>In treating upon this subject, I will consider,</p> +<p>First, what is the general vice or fault here referred to; or +what disposition in men is supposed in moral reflections and +precepts concerning <i>bridling the tongue</i>.</p> +<p>Secondly, when it may be said of any one, that he has a due +government over himself in this respect.</p> +<p>I. Now, the fault referred to, and the disposition +supposed, in precepts and reflections concerning the government +of the tongue, is not evil-speaking from malice, nor lying or +bearing false witness from indirect selfish designs. The +disposition to these, and the actual vices themselves, all come +under other subjects. The tongue may be employed about, and +made to serve all the purposes of vice, in tempting and +deceiving, in perjury and injustice. But the thing here +supposed and referred to, is talkativeness: a disposition to be +talking, abstracted from the consideration of what is to be said; +with very little or no regard to, or thought of doing, either +good or harm. And let not any imagine this to be a slight +matter, and that it deserves not to have so great weight laid +upon it, till he has considered what evil is implied in it, and +the bad effects which follow from it. It is perhaps true, +that they who are addicted to this folly would choose to confine +themselves to trifles and indifferent subjects, and so intend +only to be guilty of being impertinent: but as they cannot go on +for ever talking of nothing, as common matters will not afford a +sufficient fund for perpetual continued discourse, where subjects +of this kind are exhausted they will go on to defamation, +scandal, divulging of secrets, their own secrets as well as those +of others—anything rather than be silent. They are +plainly hurried on in the heat of their talk to say quite +different things from what they first intended, and which they +afterwards wish unsaid: or improper things, which they had no +other end in saying, but only to afford employment to their +tongue. And if these people expect to be heard and +regarded—for there are some content merely with +talking—they will invent to engage your attention: and, +when they have heard the least imperfect hint of an affair, they +will out of their own head add the circumstances of time and +place and other matters to make out their story and give the +appearance of probability to it: not that they have any concern +about being believed, otherwise than as a means of being +heard. The thing is, to engage your attention; to take you +up wholly for the present time: what reflections will be made +afterwards, is in truth the least of their thoughts. And +further, when persons who indulge themselves in these liberties +of the tongue are in any degree offended with another—as +little disgusts and misunderstandings will be—they allow +themselves to defame and revile such a one without any moderation +or bounds; though the offence is so very slight, that they +themselves would not do, nor perhaps wish him, an injury in any +other way. And in this case the scandal and revilings are +chiefly owing to talkativeness, and not bridling their tongue, +and so come under our present subject. The least occasion +in the world will make the humour break out in this particular +way or in another. It as like a torrent, which must and +will flow; but the least thing imaginable will first of all give +it either this or another direction, turn it into this or that +channel: or like a fire—the nature of which, when in a heap +of combustible matter, is to spread and lay waste all around; but +any one of a thousand little accidents will occasion it to break +out first either in this or another particular part.</p> +<p>The subject then before us, though it does run up into, and +can scarce be treated as entirely distinct from all others, yet +it needs not be so much mixed or blended with them as it often +is. Every faculty and power may be used as the instrument +of premeditated vice and wickedness, merely as the most proper +and effectual means of executing such designs. But if a +man, from deep malice and desire of revenge, should meditate a +falsehood with a settled design to ruin his neighbour’s +reputation, and should with great coolness and deliberation +spread it, nobody would choose to say of such a one that he had +no government of his tongue. A man may use the faculty of +speech as an instrument of false witness, who yet has so entire a +command over that faculty as never to speak but from forethought +and cool design. Here the crime is injustice and perjury, +and, strictly speaking, no more belongs to the present subject +than perjury and injustice in any other way. But there is +such a thing as a disposition to be talking for its own sake; +from which persons often say anything, good or bad, of others, +merely as a subject of discourse, according to the particular +temper they themselves happen to be in, and to pass away the +present time. There is likewise to be observed in persons +such a strong and eager desire of engaging attention to what they +say, that they will speak good or evil, truth or otherwise, +merely as one or the other seems to be most hearkened to: and +this though it is sometimes joined, is not the same with the +desire of being thought important and men of consequence. +There is in some such a disposition to be talking, that an +offence of the slightest kind, and such as would not raise any +other resentment, yet raises, if I may so speak, the resentment +of the tongue—puts it into a flame, into the most +ungovernable motions. This outrage, when the person it +respects is present, we distinguish in the lower rank of people +by a peculiar term: and let it be observed, that though the +decencies of behaviour are a little kept, the same outrage and +virulence, indulged when he is absent, is an offence of the same +kind. But, not to distinguish any further in this manner, +men race into faults and follies which cannot so properly be +referred to any one general head as this—that they have not +a due government over their tongue.</p> +<p>And this unrestrained volubility and wantonness of speech is +the occasion of numberless evils and vexations in life. It +begets resentment in him who is the subject of it, sows the seed +of strife and dissension amongst others, and inflames little +disgusts and offences which if let alone would wear away of +themselves: it is often of as bad effect upon the good name of +others, as deep envy or malice: and to say the least of it in +this respect, it destroys and perverts a certain equity of the +utmost importance to society to be observed—namely, that +praise and dispraise, a good or bad character, should always be +bestowed according to desert. The tongue used in such a +licentious manner is like a sword in the hand of a madman; it is +employed at random, it can scarce possibly do any good, and for +the most part does a world of mischief; and implies not only +great folly and a trifling spirit, but great viciousness of mind, +great indifference to truth and falsity, and to the reputation, +welfare, and good of others. So much reason is there for +what St. James says of the tongue, <i>It is a fire</i>, <i>a +world of iniquity</i>, <i>it defileth the whole body</i>, +<i>setteth on fire the course of nature</i>, <i>and is itself set +on fire of hell</i>. <a name="citation8"></a><a href="#footnote8" +class="citation">[8]</a> This is the faculty or disposition +which we are required to keep a guard upon: these are the vices +and follies it runs into when not kept under due restraint.</p> +<p>II. Wherein the due government of the tongue consists, +or when it may be said of any one in a moral and religious sense +that he <i>bridleth his tongue</i>, I come now to consider.</p> +<p>The due and proper use of any natural faculty or power is to +be judged of by the end and design for which it was given +us. The chief purpose for which the faculty of speech was +given to man is plainly that we might communicate our thoughts to +each other, in order to carry on the affairs of the world; for +business, and for our improvement in knowledge and +learning. But the good Author of our nature designed us not +only necessaries, but likewise enjoyment and satisfaction, in +that being He hath graciously given, and in that condition of +life He hath placed us in. There are secondary uses of our +faculties: they administer to delight, as well as to necessity; +and as they are equally-adapted to both, there is no doubt but He +intended them for our gratification as well as for the support +and continuance of our being. The secondary use of speech +is to please and be entertaining to each other in +conversation. This is in every respect allowable and right; +it unites men closer in alliances and friendships; gives us a +fellow-feeling of the prosperity and unhappiness of each other; +and is in several respects servicable to virtue, and to promote +good behaviour in the world. And provided there be not too +much time spent in it, if it were considered only in the way of +gratification and delight, men must have strange notion of God +and of religion to think that He can be offended with it, or that +it is any way inconsistent with the strictest virtue. But +the truth is, such sort of conversation, though it has no +particular good tendency, yet it has a general good one; it is +social and friendly, and tends to promote humanity, good-nature, +and civility.</p> +<p>As the end and use, so likewise the abuse of speech, relates +to the one or other of these: either to business or to +conversation. As to the former: deceit in the management of +business and affairs does not properly belong to the subject now +before us: though one may just mention that multitude, that +heedless number of words with which business is perplexed, where +a much fewer would, as it should seem, better serve the purpose; +but this must be left to those who understand the matter. +The government of the tongue, considered as a subject of itself, +relates chiefly to conversation; to that kind of discourse which +usually fills up the time spent in friendly meetings and visits +of civility. And the danger is, lest persons entertain +themselves and others at the expense of their wisdom and their +virtue, and to the injury or offence of their neighbour. If +they will observe and keep clear of these, they may be as free +and easy and unreserved as they can desire.</p> +<p>The cautions to be given for avoiding these dangers, and to +render conversation innocent and agreeable, fall under the +following particulars: silence; talking of indifferent things; +and, which makes up too great a part of conversation, giving of +characters, speaking well or evil of others.</p> +<p>The Wise Man observes that “there is a time to speak, +and a time to keep silence.” One meets with people in +the world who seem never to have made the last of these +observations. And yet these great talkers do not at all +speak from their having anything to say, as every sentence shows, +but only from their inclination to be talking. Their +conversation is merely an exercise of the tongue: no other human +faculty has any share in it. It is strange these persons +can help reflecting, that unless they have in truth a superior +capacity, and are in an extraordinary manner furnished for +conversation if they are entertaining, it is at their own +expense. Is it possible that it should never come into +people’s thoughts to suspect whether or no it be to their +advantage to show so very much of themselves? “O that +you would altogether hold your peace, and it should be your +wisdom.” <a name="citation9"></a><a href="#footnote9" +class="citation">[9]</a> Remember likewise there are +persons who love fewer words, an inoffensive sort of people, and +who deserve some regard, though of too still and composed tempers +for you. Of this number was the Son of Sirach: for he +plainly speaks from experience when he says, “As hills of +sand are to the steps of the aged, so is one of many words to a +quiet man.” But one would think it should be obvious +to every one, that when they are in company with their superiors +of any kind—in years, knowledge, and experience—when +proper and useful subjects are discoursed of, which they cannot +bear a part in, that these are times for silence, when they +should learn to hear, and be attentive, at least in their +turn. It is indeed a very unhappy way these people are in; +they in a manner cut themselves out from all advantage of +conversation, except that of being entertained with their own +talk: their business in coming into company not being at all to +be informed, to hear, to learn, but to display themselves, or +rather to exert their faculty, and talk without any design at +all. And if we consider conversation as an entertainment, +as somewhat to unbend the mind, as a diversion from the cares, +the business, and the sorrows of life, it is of the very nature +of it that the discourse be mutual. This, I say, is implied +in the very notion of what we distinguish by conversation, or +being in company. Attention to the continued discourse of +one alone grows more painful, often, than the cares and business +we come to be diverted from. He, therefore, who imposes +this upon us is guilty of a double offence—arbitrarily +enjoining silence upon all the rest, and likewise obliging them +to this painful attention.</p> +<p>I am sensible these things are apt to be passed over, as too +little to come into a serious discourse; but in reality men are +obliged, even in point of morality and virtue, to observe all the +decencies of behaviour. The greatest evils in life have had +their rise from somewhat which was thought of too little +importance to be attended to. And as to the matter we are +now upon, it is absolutely necessary to be considered. For +if people will not maintain a due government over themselves, in +regarding proper times and seasons for silence, but <i>will</i> +be talking, they certainly, whether they design it or not at +first, will go on to scandal and evil-speaking, and divulging +secrets.</p> +<p>If it were needful to say anything further to persuade men to +learn this lesson of silence, one might put them in mind how +insignificant they render themselves by this excessive +talkativeness: insomuch that, if they do chance to say anything +which deserves to be attended to and regarded, it is lost in the +variety and abundance which they utter of another sort.</p> +<p>The occasions of silence then are obvious, and one would think +should be easily distinguished by everybody: namely, when a man +has nothing to say; or nothing but what is better unsaid: better, +either in regard to the particular persons he is present with; or +from its being an interruption to conversation itself; or to +conversation of a more agreeable kind; or better, lastly, with +regard to himself. I will end this particular with two +reflections of the Wise Man; one of which, in the strongest +manner, exposes the ridiculous part of this licentiousness of the +tongue; and the other, the great danger and viciousness of +it. <i>When he that is a fool walketh by the way side</i>, +<i>his wisdom faileth him</i>, <i>and he saith to every one that +he is a fool</i>. <a name="citation10"></a><a href="#footnote10" +class="citation">[10]</a> The other is, <i>In the multitude +of words there wanteth not sin</i>. <a name="citation11"></a><a +href="#footnote11" class="citation">[11]</a></p> +<p>As to the government of the tongue in respect to talking upon +indifferent subjects: after what has been said concerning the due +government of it in respect to the occasions and times for +silence, there is little more necessary than only to caution men +to be fully satisfied that the subjects are indeed of an +indifferent nature; and not to spend too much time in +conversation of this kind. But persons must be sure to take +heed that the subject of their discourse be at least of an +indifferent nature: that it be no way offensive to virtue, +religion, or good manners: that it be not of a licentious, +dissolute sort, this leaving always ill impressions upon the +mind; that it be no way injurious or vexatious to others; and +that too much time be not spent this way, to the neglect of those +duties and offices of life which belong to their station and +condition in the world. However, though there is not any +necessity that men should aim at being important and weighty in +every sentence they speak: yet since useful subjects, at least of +some kinds, are as entertaining as others, a wise man, even when +he desires to unbend his mind from business, would choose that +the conversation might turn upon somewhat instructive.</p> +<p>The last thing is, the government of the tongue as relating to +discourse of the affairs of others, and giving of +characters. These are in a manner the same; and one can +scarce call it an indifferent subject, because discourse upon it +almost perpetually runs into somewhat criminal.</p> +<p>And, first of all, it were very much to be wished that this +did not take up so great a part of conversation; because it is +indeed a subject of a dangerous nature. Let any one +consider the various interests, competitions, and little +misunderstandings which arise amongst men; and he will soon see +that he is not unprejudiced and impartial; that he is not, as I +may speak, neutral enough to trust himself with talking of the +character and concerns of his neighbour, in a free, careless, and +unreserved manner. There is perpetually, and often it is +not attended to, a rivalship amongst people of one kind or +another in respect to wit, beauty, learning, fortune, and that +one thing will insensibly influence them to speak to the +disadvantage of others, even where there is no formed malice or +ill-design. Since therefore it is so hard to enter into +this subject without offending, the first thing to be observed is +that people should learn to decline it; to get over that strong +inclination most have to be talking of the concerns and behaviour +of their neighbour.</p> +<p>But since it is impossible that this subject should be wholly +excluded conversation; and since it is necessary that the +characters of men should be known: the next thing is that it is a +matter of importance what is said; and, therefore, that we should +be religiously scrupulous and exact to say nothing, either good +or bad, but what is true. I put it thus, because it is in +reality of as great importance to the good of society, that the +characters of bad men should be known, as that the characters of +good men should. People who are given to scandal and +detraction may indeed make an ill-use of this observation; but +truths, which are of service towards regulating our conduct, are +not to be disowned, or even concealed, because a bad use may be +made of them. This however would be effectually prevented +if these two things were attended to. First, That, though +it is equally of bad consequence to society that men should have +either good or ill characters which they do not deserve; yet, +when you say somewhat good of a man which he does not deserve, +there is no wrong done him in particular; whereas, when you say +evil of a man which he does not deserve, here is a direct formal +injury, a real piece of injustice done him. This therefore +makes a wide difference; and gives us, in point of virtue, much +greater latitude in speaking well than ill of others. +Secondly, A good man is friendly to his fellow-creatures, and a +lover of mankind; and so will, upon every occasion, and often +without any, say all the good he can of everybody; but, so far as +he is a good man, will never be disposed to speak evil of any, +unless there be some other reason for it, besides, barely that it +is true. If he be charged with having given an ill +character, he will scarce think it a sufficient justification of +himself to say it was a true one, unless he can also give some +further account how he came to do so: a just indignation against +particular instances of villainy, where they are great and +scandalous; or to prevent an innocent man from being deceived and +betrayed, when he has great trust and confidence in one who does +not deserve it. Justice must be done to every part of a +subject when we are considering it. If there be a man, who +bears a fair character in the world, whom yet we know to be +without faith or honesty, to be really an ill man; it must be +allowed in general that we shall do a piece of service to society +by letting such a one’s true character be known. This +is no more than what we have an instance of in our Saviour +himself; <a name="citation12"></a><a href="#footnote12" +class="citation">[12]</a> though He was mild and gentle beyond +example. However, no words can express too strongly the +caution which should be used in such a case as this.</p> +<p>Upon the whole matter: If people would observe the obvious +occasions of silence, if they would subdue the inclination to +tale-bearing, and that eager desire to engage attention, which is +an original disease in some minds, they would be in little danger +of offending with their tongue; and would, in a moral and +religious sense, have due government over it.</p> +<p>I will conclude with some precepts and reflections of the Son +of Sirach upon this subject. <i>Be swift to hear</i>; +<i>and</i>, <i>if thou hast understanding</i>, <i>answer thy +neighbour</i>; <i>if not</i>, <i>lay thy hand upon thy +mouth</i>. <i>Honour and shame is in talk</i>. <i>A +man of an ill tongue is dangerous in his city</i>, <i>and he that +is rash in his talk shall be hated</i>. <i>A wise man wilt +hold his tongue till he see opportunity</i>; <i>but a babbler and +a fool will regard no time</i>. <i>He that useth many words +shall be abhorred</i>; <i>and he that taketh to himself authority +therein shall be hated</i>. <i>A backbiting tongue hath +disquieted many</i>; <i>strong cities hath it pulled down</i>, +<i>and overthrown the houses of great men</i>. <i>The +tongue of a man is his fall</i>; <i>but if thou love to hear</i>, +<i>thou shall receive understanding</i>.</p> +<h2>SERMON V. UPON COMPASSION.</h2> +<blockquote><p><span class="smcap">Rom.</span> xii. 15.</p> +<p><i>Rejoice with them that do rejoice</i>, <i>and weep with +them that weep</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Every man is to be considered in two capacities, the private +and public; as designed to pursue his own interest, and likewise +to contribute to the good of others. Whoever will consider +may see that, in general, there is no contrariety between these; +but that from the original constitution of man, and the +circumstances he is placed in, they perfectly coincide, and +mutually carry on each other. But, among the great variety +of affections or principles of actions in our nature, some in +their primary intention and design seem to belong to the single +or private, others to the public or social capacity. The +affections required in the text are of the latter sort. +When we rejoice in the prosperity of others, and compassionate +their distresses, we as it were substitute them for ourselves, +their interest for our own; and have the same kind of pleasure in +their prosperity, and sorrow in their distress, as we have from +reflection upon our own. Now there is nothing strange or +unaccountable in our being thus carried out, and affected towards +the interests of others. For, if there be any appetite, or +any inward principle besides self-love; why may there not be an +affection to the good of our fellow-creatures, and delight from +that affection’s being gratified, and uneasiness from +things going contrary to it? <a name="citation13"></a><a +href="#footnote13" class="citation">[13]</a></p> +<p>Of these two, delight in the prosperity of others, and +compassion for their distresses, the last is felt much more +generally than the former. Though men do not universally +rejoice with all whom they see rejoice, yet, accidental obstacles +removed, they naturally compassionate all, in some degree, whom +they see in distress; so far as they have any real perception or +sense of that distress: insomuch that words expressing this +latter, pity, compassion, frequently occur: whereas we have +scarce any single one by which the former is distinctly +expressed. Congratulation indeed answers condolence: but +both these words are intended to signify certain forms of +civility rather than any inward sensation or feeling. This +difference or inequality is so remarkable that we plainly +consider compassion as itself an original, distinct, particular +affection in human nature; whereas to rejoice in the good of +others is only a consequence of the general affection of love and +good-will to them. The reason and account of which matter +is this: when a man has obtained any particular advantage or +felicity, his end is gained; and he does not in that particular +want the assistance of another: there was therefore no need of a +distinct affection towards that felicity of another already +obtained; neither would such affection directly carry him on to +do good to that person: whereas men in distress want assistance; +and compassion leads us directly to assist them. The object +of the former is the present felicity of another; the object of +the latter is the present misery of another. It is easy to +see that the latter wants a particular affection for its relief, +and that the former does not want one because it does not want +assistance. And upon supposition of a distinct affection in +both cases, the one must rest in the exercise of itself, having +nothing further to gain; the other does not rest in itself, but +carries us on to assist the distressed.</p> +<p>But, supposing these affections natural to the mind, +particularly the last; “Has not each man troubles enough of +his own? must he indulge an affection which appropriates to +himself those of others? which leads him to contract the least +desirable of all friendships, friendships with the +unfortunate? Must we invert the known rule of prudence, and +choose to associate ourselves with the distressed? or, allowing +that we ought, so far as it is in our power to relieve them, yet +is it not better to do this from reason and duty? Does not +passion and affection of every kind perpetually mislead us? +Nay, is not passion and affection itself a weakness, and what a +perfect being must be entirely free from?” Perhaps +so, but it is mankind I am speaking of; imperfect creatures, and +who naturally and, from the condition we are placed in, +necessarily depend upon each other. With respect to such +creatures, it would be found of as bad consequence to eradicate +all natural affections as to be entirely governed by them. +This would almost sink us to the condition of brutes; and that +would leave us without a sufficient principle of action. +Reason alone, whatever any one may wish, is not in reality a +sufficient motive of virtue in such a creature as man; but this +reason joined with those affections which God has impressed upon +his heart, and when these are allowed scope to exercise +themselves, but under strict government and direction of reason, +then it is we act suitably to our nature, and to the +circumstances God has placed us in. Neither is affection +itself at all a weakness; nor does it argue defect, any otherwise +than as our senses and appetites do; they belong to our condition +of nature, and are what we cannot be without. God Almighty +is, to be sure, unmoved by passion or appetite, unchanged by +affection; but then it is to be added that He neither sees nor +hears nor perceives things by any senses like ours; but in a +manner infinitely more perfect. Now, as it is an absurdity +almost too gross to be mentioned, for a man to endeavour to get +rid of his senses, because the Supreme Being discerns things more +perfectly without them; it is as real, though not so obvious an +absurdity, to endeavour to eradicate the passions He has given +us, because He is without them. For, since our passions are +as really a part of our constitution as our senses; since the +former as really belong to our condition of nature as the latter; +to get rid of either is equally a violation of and breaking in +upon that nature and constitution He has given us. Both our +senses and our passions are a supply to the imperfection of our +nature; thus they show that we are such sort of creatures as to +stand in need of those helps which higher orders of creatures do +not. But it is not the supply, but the deficiency; as it is +not a remedy, but a disease, which is the imperfection. +However, our appetites, passions, senses, no way imply disease: +nor indeed do they imply deficiency or imperfection of any sort; +but only this, that the constitution of nature, according to +which God has made us, is such as to require them. And it +is so far from being true, that a wise man must entirely suppress +compassion, and all fellow-feeling for others, as a weakness; and +trust to reason alone to teach and enforce upon him the practice +of the several charities we owe to our kind; that, on the +contrary, even the bare exercise of such affections would itself +be for the good and happiness of the world; and the imperfection +of the higher principles of reason and religion in man, the +little influence they have upon our practice, and the strength +and prevalency of contrary ones, plainly require these affections +to be a restraint upon these latter, and a supply to the +deficiencies of the former.</p> +<p>First, The very exercise itself of these affections in a just +and reasonable manner and degree would upon the whole increase +the satisfactions and lessen the miseries of life.</p> +<p>It is the tendency and business of virtue and religion to +procure, as much as may be, universal good-will, trust, and +friendship amongst mankind. If this could be brought to +obtain; and each man enjoyed the happiness of others, as every +one does that of a friend; and looked upon the success and +prosperity of his neighbour as every one does upon that of his +children and family; it is too manifest to be insisted upon how +much the enjoyments of life would be increased. There would +be so much happiness introduced into the world, without any +deduction or inconvenience from it, in proportion as the precept +of <i>rejoicing with those who rejoice</i> was universally +obeyed. Our Saviour has owned this good affection as +belonging to our nature in the parable of the <i>lost sheep</i>, +and does not think it to the disadvantage of a perfect state to +represent its happiness as capable of increase from reflection +upon that of others.</p> +<p>But since in such a creature as man, compassion or sorrow for +the distress of others seems so far necessarily connected with +joy in their prosperity, as that whoever rejoices in one must +unavoidably compassionate the other; there cannot be that delight +or satisfaction, which appears to be so considerable, without the +inconveniences, whatever they are, of compassion.</p> +<p>However, without considering this connection, there is no +doubt but that more good than evil, more delight than sorrow, +arises from compassion itself; there being so many things which +balance the sorrow of it. There is first the relief which +the distressed feel from this affection in others towards +them. There is likewise the additional misery which they +would feel from the reflection that no one commiserated their +case. It is indeed true that any disposition, prevailing +beyond a certain degree, becomes somewhat wrong; and we have ways +of speaking, which, though they do not directly express that +excess, yet always lead our thoughts to it, and give us the +notion of it. Thus, when mention is made of delight in +being pitied, this always conveys to our mind the notion of +somewhat which is really a weakness. The manner of +speaking, I say, implies a certain weakness and feebleness of +mind, which is and ought to be disapproved. But men of the +greatest fortitude would in distress feel uneasiness from knowing +that no person in the world had any sort of compassion or real +concern for them; and in some cases, especially when the temper +is enfeebled by sickness, or any long and great distress, +doubtless, would feel a kind of relief even from the helpless +goodwill and ineffectual assistances of those about them. +Over against the sorrow of compassion is likewise to be set a +peculiar calm kind of satisfaction, which accompanies it, unless +in cases where the distress of another is by some means so +brought home to ourselves as to become in a manner our own; or +when from weakness of mind the affection rises too high, which +ought to be corrected. This tranquillity, or calm +satisfaction, proceeds partly from consciousness of a right +affection and temper of mind, and partly from a sense of our own +freedom from the misery we compassionate. This last may +possibly appear to some at first sight faulty; but it really is +not so. It is the same with that positive enjoyment, which +sudden ease from pain for the present affords, arising from a +real sense of misery, joined with a sense of our freedom from it; +which in all cases must afford some degree of satisfaction.</p> +<p>To these things must be added the observation which respects +both the affections we are considering; that they who have got +over all fellow-feeling for others have withal contracted a +certain callousness of heart, which renders them insensible to +most other satisfactions but those of the grossest kind.</p> +<p>Secondly, Without the exercise of these affections men would +certainly be much more wanting in the offices of charity they owe +to cache other, and likewise more cruel and injurious than they +are at present.</p> +<p>The private interest of the individual would not be +sufficiently provided for by reasonable and cool self-love alone; +therefore the appetites and passions are placed within as a guard +and further security, without which it would not be taken due +care of. It is manifest our life would be neglected were it +not for the calls of hunger and thirst and weariness; +notwithstanding that without them reason would assure us that the +recruits of food and sleep are the necessary means of our +preservation. It is therefore absurd to imagine that, +without affections, the same reason alone would be more effectual +to engage us to perform the duties we owe to our +fellow-creatures. One of this make would be as defective, +as much wanting, considered with respect to society, as one of +the former make would be defective, or wanting, considered as an +individual, or in his private capacity. Is it possible any +can in earnest think that a public spirit, <i>i.e.</i>, a settled +reasonable principle of benevolence to mankind, is so prevalent +and strong in the species as that we may venture to throw off the +under affections, which are its assistants, carry it forward and +mark out particular courses for it; family, friends, +neighbourhood, the distressed, our country? The common joys +and the common sorrows, which belong to these relations and +circumstances, are as plainly useful to society as the pain and +pleasure belonging to hunger, thirst, and weariness are of +service to the individual. In defect of that higher +principle of reason, compassion is often the only way by which +the indigent can have access to us: and therefore, to eradicate +this, though it is not indeed formally to deny them that +assistance which is their due; yet it is to cut them off from +that which is too frequently their only way of obtaining +it. And as for those who have shut up this door against the +complaints of the miserable, and conquered this affection in +themselves; even these persons will be under great restraints +from the same affection in others. Thus a man who has +himself no sense of injustice, cruelty, oppression, will be kept +from running the utmost lengths of wickedness by fear of that +detestation, and even resentment of inhumanity, in many +particular instances of it, which compassion for the object +towards whom such inhumanity is exercised, excites in the bulk of +mankind. And this is frequently the chief danger and the +chief restraint which tyrants and the great oppressors of the +world feel.</p> +<p>In general, experience will show that, as want of natural +appetite to food supposes and proceeds from some bodily disease; +so the apathy the Stoics talk of as much supposes, or is +accompanied with, somewhat amiss in the moral character, in that +which is the health of the mind. Those who formerly aimed +at this upon the foot of philosophy appear to have had better +success in eradicating the affections of tenderness and +compassion than they had with the passions of envy, pride, and +resentment: these latter, at best, were but concealed, and that +imperfectly too. How far this observation may be extended +to such as endeavour to suppress the natural impulses of their +affections, in order to form themselves for business and the +world, I shall not determine. But there does not appear any +capacity or relation to be named, in which men ought to be +entirely deaf to the calls of affection, unless the judicial one +is to be excepted.</p> +<p>And as to those who are commonly called the men of pleasure, +it is manifest that the reason they set up for hardness of heart +is to avoid being interrupted in their course by the ruin and +misery they are the authors of; neither are persons of this +character always the most free from the impotencies of envy and +resentment. What may men at last bring themselves to, by +suppressing their passions and affections of one kind, and +leaving those of the other in their full strength? But +surely it might be expected that persons who make pleasure their +study and their business, if they understood what they profess, +would reflect, how many of the entertainments of life, how many +of those kind of amusements which seem peculiarly to belong to +men of leisure and education they became insensible to by this +acquired hardness of heart.</p> +<p>I shall close these reflections with barely mentioning the +behaviour of that divine Person, who was the example of all +perfection in human nature, as represented in the Gospels +mourning, and even, in a literal sense, weeping over the +distresses of His creatures.</p> +<p>The observation already made, that, of the two affections +mentioned in the text, the latter exerts itself much more than +the former; that, from the original constitution of human nature, +we much more generally and sensibly compassionate the distressed +than rejoice within the prosperous, requires to be particularly +considered. This observation, therefore, with the +reflections which arise out of it, and which it leads our +thoughts to, shall be the subject of another discourse.</p> +<p>For the conclusion of this, let me just take notice of the +danger of over-great refinements; of going beside or beyond the +plain, obvious, first appearances of things, upon the subject of +morals and religion. The least observation will show how +little the generality of men are capable of speculations. +Therefore morality and religion must be somewhat plan and easy to +be understood: it must appeal to what we call plain common sense, +as distinguished from superior capacity and improvement; because +it appeals to mankind. Persons of superior capacity and +improvement have often fallen into errors which no one of mere +common understanding could. Is it possible that one of this +latter character could even of himself have thought that there +was absolutely no such thing in mankind as affection to the good +of others? suppose of parents to their children; or that what he +felt upon seeing a friend in distress was only fear for himself; +or, upon supposition of the affections of kindness and +compassion, that it was the business of wisdom and virtue to set +him about extirpating them as fast as he could? And yet +each of these manifest contradictions to nature has been laid +down by men of speculation as a discovery in moral philosophy; +which they, it seems, have found out through all the specious +appearances to the contrary. This reflection may be +extended further. The extravagances of enthusiasm and +superstition do not at all lie in the road of common sense; and +therefore, so far as they are <i>original mistakes</i>, must be +owing to going beside or beyond it. Now, since inquiry and +examination can relate only to things so obscure and uncertain as +to stand in need of it, and to persons who are capable of it; the +proper advice to be given to plain honest men, to secure them +from the extremes both of superstition and irreligion, is that of +the Son of Sirach: <i>In every good work trust thy own soul</i>; +<i>for this is the keeping of the commandment</i>. <a +name="citation14"></a><a href="#footnote14" +class="citation">[14]</a></p> +<h2>SERMON VI. UPON COMPASSION.<br /> +PREACHED THE FIRST SUNDAY IN LENT.</h2> +<blockquote><p>Rom. xii. 15.</p> +<p><i>Rejoice with then that do rejoice</i>, <i>and weep with +them that weep</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>There is a much more exact correspondence between the natural +and moral world than we are apt to take notice of. The +inward frame of man does in a peculiar manner answer to the +external condition and circumstances of life in which he is +placed. This is a particular instance of that general +observation of the Son of Sirach: <i>All things are double one +against another</i>, <i>and God hath made nothing imperfect</i>. +<a name="citation15"></a><a href="#footnote15" +class="citation">[15]</a> The several passions and +affections in the heart of man, compared with the circumstances +of life in which he is placed, afford, to such as will attend to +them, as certain instances of final causes, as any whatever, +which are more commonly alleged for such: since those affections +lead him to a certain determinate course of action suitable to +those circumstances; as (for instance) compassion to relieve the +distressed. And as all observations of final causes, drawn +from the principles of action in the heart of man, compared with +the condition he is placed in, serve all the good uses which +instances of final causes in the material world about us do; and +both these are equally proofs of wisdom and design in the Author +of nature: so the former serve to further good purposes; they +show us what course of life we are made for, what is our duty, +and in a peculiar manner enforce upon us the practice of it.</p> +<p>Suppose we are capable of happiness and of misery in degrees +equally intense and extreme, yet, we are capable of the latter +for a much longer time, beyond all comparison. We see men +in the tortures of pain for hours, days, and, excepting the short +suspensions of sleep, for months together, without intermission, +to which no enjoyments of life do, in degree and continuance, +bear any sort of proportion. And such is our make and that +of the world about us that any thing may become the instrument of +pain and sorrow to us. Thus almost any one man is capable +of doing mischief to any other, though he may not be capable of +doing him good; and if he be capable of doing him some good, he +is capable of doing him more evil. And it is, in numberless +cases, much more in our power to lessen the miseries of others +than to promote their positive happiness, any otherwise than as +the former often includes the latter; ease from misery +occasioning for some time the greatest positive enjoyment. +This constitution of nature, namely, that it is so munch more in +our power to occasion and likewise to lessen misery than to +promote positive happiness, plainly required a particular +affection to hinder us from abusing, and to incline us to make a +right use of the former powers, <i>i.e.</i>, the powers both to +occasion and to lessen misery; over and above what was necessary +to induce us to make a right use of the latter power, that of +promoting positive happiness. The power we have over the +misery of our fellow-creatures, to occasion or lessen it, being a +more important trust than the power we have of promoting their +positive happiness; the former requires and has a further, an +additional, security and guard against its being violated, beyond +and over and above what the latter has. The social nature +of man, and general goodwill to his species, equally prevent him +from doing evil, incline him to relieve the distressed, and to +promote the positive happiness of his fellow-creatures; but +compassion only restrains from the first, and carries him to the +second; it hath nothing to do with the third.</p> +<p>The final causes, then, of compassion are to prevent and to +relieve misery.</p> +<p>As to the former: this affection may plainly be a restraint +upon resentment, envy, unreasonable self-love; that is, upon all +the principles from which men do evil to one another. Let +us instance only in resentment. It seldom happens, in +regulated societies, that men have an enemy so entirely in their +power as to be able to satiate their resentment with +safety. But if we were to put this case, it is plainly +supposable that a person might bring his enemy into such a +condition, as from being the object of anger and rage, to become +an object of compassion, even to himself, though the most +malicious man in the world; and in this case compassion would +stop him, if he could stop with safety, from pursuing his revenge +any further. But since nature has placed within us more +powerful restraints to prevent mischief, and since the final +cause of compassion is much more to relieve misery, let us go on +to the consideration of it in this view.</p> +<p>As this world was not intended to be a state of any great +satisfaction or high enjoyment, so neither was it intended to be +a mere scene of unhappiness and sorrow. Mitigations and +reliefs are provided by the merciful Author of nature for most of +the afflictions in human life. There is kind provision made +even against our frailties: as we are so constituted that time +abundantly abates our sorrows, and begets in us that resignment +of temper, which ought to have been produced by a better cause; a +due sense of the authority of God, and our state of +dependence. This holds in respect too far the greatest part +of the evils of life; I suppose, in some degree, as to pain and +sickness. Now this part of the constitution or make of man, +considered as some relief to misery, and not as provision for +positive happiness, is, if I may so speak, an instance of +nature’s compassion for us; and every natural remedy or +relief to misery may be considered in the same view.</p> +<p>But since in many cases it is very much in our power to +alleviate the miseries of each other; and benevolence, though +natural in man to man, yet is in a very low degree kept down by +interest and competitions; and men, for the most part, are so +engaged in the business and pleasures of the world, as to +overlook and turn away from objects of misery; which are plainly +considered as interruptions to them in their way, as intruders +upon their business, their gaiety, and mirth: compassion is an +advocate within us in their behalf, to gain the unhappy +admittance and access, to make their case attended to. If +it sometimes serves a contrary purpose, and makes men +industriously turn away from the miserable, these are only +instances of abuse and perversion: for the end, for which the +affection was given us, most certainly is not to make us avoid, +but to make us attend to, the objects of it. And if men +would only resolve to allow thus much to it: let it bring before +their view, the view of their mind, the miseries of their +fellow-creatures; let it gain for them that their case be +considered; I am persuaded it would not fail of gaining more, and +that very few real objects of charity would pass +unrelieved. Pain and sorrow and misery have a right to our +assistance: compassion puts us in mind of the debt, and that we +owe it to ourselves as well as to the distressed. For, to +endeavour to get rid of the sorrow of compassion by turning from +the wretched, when yet it is in our power to relieve them, is as +unnatural as to endeavour to get rid of the pain of hunger by +keeping from the sight of food. That we can do one with +greater success than we can the other is no proof that one is +less a violation of nature than the other. Compassion is a +call, a demand of nature, to relieve the unhappy as hunger is a +natural call for food. This affection plainly gives the +objects of it an additional claim to relief and mercy, over and +above what our fellow-creatures in common have to our +goodwill. Liberality and bounty are exceedingly +commendable; and a particular distinction in such a world as +this, where men set themselves to contract their heart, and close +it to all interests but their own. It is by no means to be +opposed to mercy, but always accompanies it: the distinction +between them is only that the former leads our thoughts to a more +promiscuous and undistinguished distribution of favours; to those +who are not, as well as those who are, necessitous; whereas the +object of compassion is misery. But in the comparison, and +where there is not a possibility of both, mercy is to have the +preference: the affection of compassion manifestly leads us to +this preference. Thus, to relieve the indigent and +distressed, to single out the unhappy, from whom can be expected +no returns either of present entertainment or future service, for +the objects of our favours; to esteem a man’s being +friendless as a recommendation; dejection, and incapacity of +struggling through the world, as a motive for assisting him; in a +word, to consider these circumstances of disadvantage, which are +usually thought a sufficient reason for neglect and overlooking a +person, as a motive for helping him forward: this is the course +of benevolence which compassion marks out and directs us to: this +is that humanity which is so peculiarly becoming our nature and +circumstances in this world.</p> +<p>To these considerations, drawn from the nature of man, must be +added the reason of the thing itself we are recommending, which +accords to and shows the same. For since it is so much more +in our power to lessen the misery of our fellow-creatures than to +promote their positive happiness; in cases where there is an +inconsistency, we shall be likely to do much more good by setting +ourselves to mitigate the former than by endeavouring to promote +the latter. Let the competition be between the poor and the +rich. It is easy, you will say, to see which will have the +preference. True; but the question is, which ought to have +the preference? What proportion is there between the +happiness produced by doing a favour to the indigent, and that +produced by doing the same favour to one in easy +circumstances? It is manifest that the addition of a very +large estate to one who before had an affluence, will in many +instances yield him less new enjoyment or satisfaction than an +ordinary charity would yield to a necessitous person. So +that it is not only true that our nature, <i>i.e.</i>, the voice +of God within us, carries us to the exercise of charity and +benevolence in the way of compassion or mercy, preferably to any +other way; but we also manifestly discern much more good done by +the former; or, if you will allow me the expressions, more misery +annihilated and happiness created. If charity and +benevolence, and endeavouring to do good to our fellow-creatures, +be anything, this observation deserves to be most seriously +considered by all who have to bestow. And it holds with +great exactness, when applied to the several degrees of greater +and less indigency throughout the various ranks in human life: +the happiness or good produced not being in proportion to what is +bestowed, but in proportion to this joined with the need there +was of it.</p> +<p>It may perhaps be expected that upon this subject notice +should be taken of occasions, circumstances, and characters which +seem at once to call forth affections of different sorts. +Thus vice may be thought the object both of pity and indignation: +folly, of pity and of laughter. How far this is strictly +true, I shall not inquire; but only observe upon the appearance, +how much more humane it is to yield and give scope to affections, +which are most directly in favour of, and friendly towards, our +fellow-creatures; and that there is plainly much less danger of +being led wrong by these than by the other.</p> +<p>But, notwithstanding all that has been said in recommendation +of compassion, that it is most amiable, most becoming human +nature, and most useful to the world; yet it must be owned that +every affection, as distinct from a principle of reason, may rise +too high, and be beyond its just proportion. And by means +of this one carried too far, a man throughout his life is subject +to much more uneasiness than belongs to his share; and in +particular instances, it may be in such a degree as to +incapacitate him from assisting the very person who is the object +of it. But as there are some who upon principle set up for +suppressing this affection itself as weakness, there is also I +know not what of fashion on this side; and, by some means or +other, the whole world almost is run into the extremes of +insensibility towards the distresses of their fellow-creatures: +so that general rules and exhortations must always be on the +other side.</p> +<p>And now to go on to the uses we should make of the foregoing +reflections, the further ones they lead to, and the general +temper they have a tendency to beget in us. There being +that distinct affection implanted in the nature of man, tending +to lessen the miseries of life, that particular provision made +for abating its sorrows, more than for increasing its positive +happiness, as before explained; this may suggest to us what +should be our general aim respecting ourselves, in our passage +through this world: namely, to endeavour chiefly to escape +misery, keep free from uneasiness, pain, and sorrow, or to get +relief and mitigation of them; to propose to ourselves peace and +tranquillity of mind, rather than pursue after high +enjoyments. This is what the constitution of nature before +explained marks out as the course we should follow, and the end +we should aim at. To make pleasure and mirth and jollity +our business, and be constantly hurrying about after some gay +amusement, some new gratification of sense or appetite, to those +who will consider the nature of man and our condition in this +world, will appear the most romantic scheme of life that ever +entered into thought. And yet how many are there who go on +in this course, without learning better from the daily, the +hourly disappointments, listlessness, and satiety which accompany +this fashionable method of wasting away their days!</p> +<p>The subject we have been insisting upon would lead us into the +same kind of reflections by a different connection. The +miseries of life brought home to ourselves by compassion, viewed +through this affection considered as the sense by which they are +perceived, would beget in us that moderation, humility, and +soberness of mind which has been now recommended; and which +peculiarly belongs to a season of recollection, the only purpose +of which is to bring us to a just sense of things, to recover us +out of that forgetfulness of ourselves, and our true state, which +it is manifest far the greatest part of men pass their whole life +in. Upon this account Solomon says that <i>it is better to +go to the house of mourning than to go to the house of +feasting</i>; <i>i.e.</i>, it is more to a man’s advantage +to turn his eyes towards objects of distress, to recall sometimes +to his remembrance the occasions of sorrow, than to pass all his +days in thoughtless mirth and gaiety. And he represents the +wise as choosing to frequent the former of these places; to be +sure not for his own sake, but because <i>by the sadness of the +countenance</i>, <i>the heart is made better</i>. Every one +observes how temperate and reasonable men are when humbled and +brought low by afflictions in comparison of what they are in high +prosperity. By this voluntary resort to the house of +mourning, which is here recommended, we might learn all those +useful instructions which calamities teach without undergoing +them ourselves; and grow wiser and better at a more easy rate +than men commonly do. The objects themselves, which in that +place of sorrow lie before our view, naturally give us a +seriousness and attention, check that wantonness which is the +growth of prosperity and ease, and head us to reflect upon the +deficiencies of human life itself; that <i>every man at his best +estate is altogether vanity</i>. This would correct the +florid and gaudy prospects and expectations which we are too apt +to indulge, teach us to lower our notions of happiness and +enjoyment, bring them down to the reality of things, to what is +attainable, to what the frailty of our condition will admit of, +which, for any continuance, is only tranquillity, ease, and +moderate satisfactions. Thus we might at once become proof +against the temptations with which the whole world almost is +carried away; since it is plain that not only what is called a +life of pleasure, but also vicious pursuits in general, aim at +somewhat besides and beyond these moderate satisfactions.</p> +<p>And as to that obstinacy and wilfulness, which renders men so +insensible to the motives of religion; this right sense of +ourselves and of the world about us would bend the stubborn mind, +soften the heart, and make it more apt to receive impression; and +this is the proper temper in which to call our ways to +remembrance, to review and set home upon ourselves the +miscarriages of our past life. In such a compliant state of +mind, reason and conscience will have a fair hearing; which is +the preparation for, or rather the beginning of, that repentance, +the outward show of which we all put on at this season.</p> +<p>Lastly, The various miseries of life which lie before us +wherever we turn our eyes, the frailty of this mortal state we +are passing through, may put us in mind that the present world is +not our home; that we are merely strangers and travellers in it, +as all our fathers were. It is therefore to be considered +as a foreign country; in which our poverty and wants, and the +insufficient supplies of them, were designed to turn our views to +that higher and better state we are heirs to: a state where will +be no follies to be overlooked, no miseries to be pitied, no +wants to be relieved; where the affection we have been now +treating of will happily be lost, as there will be no objects to +exercise it upon: for <i>God shall wipe away all tears from their +eyes</i>, <i>and there shall be no more death</i>, <i>neither +sorrow</i>, <i>nor crying</i>; <i>neither shall there be any more +pain</i>; <i>for the former things are passed away</i>.</p> +<h2>SERMON VII. UPON THE CHARACTER OF BALAAM.<br /> +PREACHED THE SECOND SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.</h2> +<blockquote><p><span class="smcap">Numbers</span> xxiii. 10.</p> +<p><i>Let me die the death of the righteous</i>, <i>and let my +last end be like his</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>These words, taken alone, and without respect to him who spoke +them, lead our thoughts immediately to the different ends of good +and bad men. For though the comparison is not expressed, +yet it is manifestly implied; as is also the preference of one of +these characters to the other in that last circumstance, +death. And, since dying the death of the righteous or of +the wicked necessarily implies men’s being righteous or +wicked; <i>i.e.</i>, having lived righteously or wickedly; a +comparison of them in their lives also might come into +consideration, from such a single view of the words +themselves. But my present design is to consider them with +a particular reference or respect to him who spoke them; which +reference, if you please to attend, you will see. And if +what shall be offered to your consideration at this time be +thought a discourse upon the whole history of this man, rather +than upon the particular words I have read, this is of no +consequence: it is sufficient if it afford reflection of use and +service to ourselves.</p> +<p>But, in order to avoid cavils respecting this remarkable +relation in Scripture, either that part of it which you have +heard in the first lesson for the day, or any other; let me just +observe that as this is not a place for answering them, so they +no way affect the following discourse; since the character there +given is plainly a real one in life, and such as there are +parallels to.</p> +<p>The occasion of Balaam’s coming out of his own country +into the land of Moab, where he pronounced this solemn prayer or +wish, he himself relates in the first parable or prophetic +speech, of which it is the conclusion. In which is a custom +referred to, proper to be taken notice of: that of devoting +enemies to destruction before the entrance upon a war with +them. This custom appears to have prevailed over a great +part of the world; for we find it amongst the most distant +nations. The Romans had public officers, to whom it +belonged as a stated part of their office. But there was +somewhat more particular in the case now before us: Balaam being +looked upon as an extraordinary person, whose blessing or curse +was thought to be always effectual.</p> +<p>In order to engage the reader’s attention to this +passage, the sacred historian has enumerated the preparatory +circumstances, which are these. Balaam requires the king of +Moab to build him seven altars, and to prepare him the same +number of oxen and of rams. The sacrifice being over, he +retires alone to a solitude sacred to these occasions, there to +wait the Divine inspiration or answer, for which the foregoing +rites were the preparation. <i>And God met Balaam</i>, +<i>and put a word in his mouth</i>; <a name="citation16"></a><a +href="#footnote16" class="citation">[16]</a> upon receiving +which, he returns back to the altars, where was the king, who had +all this while attended the sacrifice, as appointed; he and all +the princes of Moab standing, big with expectation of the +Prophet’s reply. <i>And he took up his parable</i>, +<i>and said</i>, <i>Balak the king of Moab hath brought me from +Aram</i>, <i>out of the mountains of the east</i>, <i>saying</i>, +<i>Come</i>, <i>curse me Jacob</i>, <i>and come</i>, <i>defy +Israel</i>. <i>How shall I curse</i>, <i>whom God hath not +cursed</i>? <i>Or how shall I defy</i>, <i>whom the Lord +hath not defied</i>? <i>For from the top of the rocks I see +him</i>, <i>and from the hills I behold him</i>: <i>lo</i>, +<i>the people shall dwell alone</i>, <i>and shall not be reckoned +among the nations</i>. <i>Who can count the dust of +Jacob</i>, <i>and the number of the fourth part of +Israel</i>? <i>Let me die the death of the righteous</i>, +<i>and let my last end be like his</i>. <a +name="citation17"></a><a href="#footnote17" +class="citation">[17]</a></p> +<p>It is necessary, as you will see in the progress of this +discourse, particularly to observe what he understood by +<i>righteous</i>. And he himself is introduced in the book +of Micah <a name="citation18"></a><a href="#footnote18" +class="citation">[18]</a> explaining it; if by <i>righteous</i> +is meant <i>good</i>, as to be sure it is. <i>O my +people</i>, <i>remember now what Balak king of Moab +consulted</i>, <i>and what Balaam the son of Beor answered him +from Shittim unto Gilgal</i>. From the mention of Shittim +it is manifest that it is this very story which is here referred +to, though another part of it, the account of which is not now +extant; as there are many quotations in Scripture out of books +which are not come down to us. <i>Remember what Balaam +answered</i>, <i>that ye may know the righteousness of the +Lord</i>; <i>i.e.</i>, the righteousness which God will +accept. Balak demands, <i>Wherewith shall I come before the +Lord</i>, <i>and bow myself before the high God</i>? +<i>Shall I come before him with burnt-offerings</i>, <i>with +calves of a year old</i>? <i>Will the Lord be pleased with +thousands of rams</i>, <i>or with ten thousands of rivers of +oil</i>? <i>Shall I give my first-born for my +transgression</i>, <i>the fruit of my body for the sin of my +soul</i>? Balaam answers him, <i>he hath showed thee</i>, +<i>O man</i>, <i>what is good</i>: <i>and what doth the Lord +require of thee</i>, <i>but to do justly</i>, <i>and to love +mercy</i>, <i>and to walk humbly with thy God</i>? Here is +a good man expressly characterised, as distinct from a dishonest +and a superstitious man. No words can more strongly exclude +dishonesty and falseness of heart than <i>doing justice and +loving mercy</i>; and both these, as well as <i>walking humbly +with God</i>, are put in opposition to those ceremonial methods +of recommendation, which Balak hoped might have served the +turn. From hence appears what he meant by the +<i>righteous</i>, whose <i>death</i> he desires to die.</p> +<p>Whether it was his own character shall now be inquired; and in +order to determine it, we must take a view of his whole behaviour +upon this occasion. When the elders of Noah came to him, +though he appears to have been much allured with the rewards +offered, yet he had such regard to the authority of God as to +keep the messengers in suspense until he had consulted His +will. <i>And God said to him</i>, <i>Thou shalt not go with +them</i>; <i>thou shalt not curse the people</i>, <i>for they are +blessed</i>. <a name="citation19"></a><a href="#footnote19" +class="citation">[19]</a> Upon this he dismisses the +ambassadors, with an absolute refusal of accompanying them back +to their king. Thus far his regards to his duty prevailed, +neither does there anything appear as yet amiss in his +conduct. His answer being reported to the king of Moab, a +more honourable embassy is immediately despatched, and greater +rewards proposed. Then the iniquity of his heart began to +disclose itself. A thorough honest man would without +hesitation have repeated his former answer, that he could not be +guilty of so infamous a prostitution of the sacred character with +which he was invested, as in the name of a prophet to curse those +whom he knew to be blessed. But instead of this, which was +the only honest part in these circumstances that lay before him, +he desires the princes of Moab to tarry that night with him also; +and for the sake of the reward deliberates, whether by some means +or other he might not be able to obtain leave to curse Israel; to +do that, which had been before revealed to him to be contrary to +the will of God, which yet he resolves not to do without that +permission. Upon which, as when this nation afterwards +rejected God from reigning over them, He gave them a king in His +anger; in the same way, as appears from other parts of the +narration, He gives Balaam the permission he desired: for this is +the most natural sense of the words. Arriving in the +territories of Moab, and being received with particular +distinction by the king, and he repeating in person the promise +of the rewards he had before made to him by his ambassadors, he +seeks, the text says, by <i>sacrifices</i> and +<i>enchantments</i> (what these were is not to our purpose), to +obtain leave of God to curse the people; keeping still his +resolution, not to do it without that permission: which not being +able to obtain, he had such regard to the command of God as to +keep this resolution to the last. The supposition of his +being under a supernatural restraint is a mere fiction of Philo: +he is plainly represented to be under no other force or restraint +than the fear of God. However, he goes on persevering in +that endeavour, after he had declared that <i>God had not beheld +iniquity in Jacob</i>, <i>neither had he seen perverseness in +Israel</i>; <a name="citation20"></a><a href="#footnote20" +class="citation">[20]</a> <i>i.e.</i>, they were a people of +virtue and piety, so far as not to have drawn down by their +iniquity that curse which he was soliciting leave to pronounce +upon them. So that the state of Balaam’s mind was +this: he wanted to do what he knew to be very wicked, and +contrary to the express command of God; he had inward checks and +restraints which he could not entirely get over; he therefore +casts about for ways to reconcile this wickedness with his +duty. How great a paradox soever this may appear, as it is +indeed a contradiction in terms, it is the very account which the +Scripture gives us of him.</p> +<p>But there is a more surprising piece of iniquity yet +behind. Not daring in his religious character, as a +prophet, to assist the king of Moab, he considers whether there +might not be found some other means of assisting him against that +very people, whom he himself by the fear of God was restrained +from cursing in words. One would not think it possible that +the weakness, even of religious self-deceit in its utmost excess, +could have so poor a distinction, so fond an evasion, to serve +itself of. But so it was; and he could think of no other +method than to betray the children of Israel to provoke His +wrath, who was their only strength and defence. The +temptation which he pitched upon was that concerning which +Solomon afterwards observed, that it had <i>cast down many +wounded</i>; <i>yea</i>, <i>many strong men had been slain by +it</i>: and of which he himself was a sad example, when <i>his +wives turned away his heart after other gods</i>. This +succeeded: the people sin against God; and thus the +Prophet’s counsel brought on that destruction which he +could by no means be prevailed upon to assist with the religious +ceremony of execration, which the king of Moab thought would +itself have affected it. Their crime and punishment are +related in Deuteronomy <a name="citation21"></a><a +href="#footnote21" class="citation">[21]</a> and Numbers. <a +name="citation22"></a><a href="#footnote22" +class="citation">[22]</a> And from the relation repeated in +Numbers, <a name="citation23"></a><a href="#footnote23" +class="citation">[23]</a> it appears, that Balaam was the +contriver of the whole matter. It is also ascribed to him +in the Revelation, <a name="citation24"></a><a href="#footnote24" +class="citation">[24]</a> where he is said to have <i>taught +Balak to cast a stumbling-block before the children of +Israel</i>.</p> +<p>This was the man, this Balaam, I say, was the man, who desired +to <i>die the death of the righteous</i>, and that his <i>last +end might be like his</i>; and this was the state of his mind +when he pronounced these words.</p> +<p>So that the object we have now before us is the most +astonishing in the world: a very wicked man, under a deep sense +of God and religion, persisting still in his wickedness, and +preferring the wages of unrighteousness, even when he had before +him a lively view of death, and that approaching period of his +days, which should deprive him of all those advantages for which +he was prostituting himself; and likewise a prospect, whether +certain or uncertain, of a future state of retribution; all this +joined with an explicit ardent wish that, when he was to leave +this world, he might be in the condition of a righteous +man. Good God! what inconsistency, what perplexity is +here! With what different views of things, with what +contradictory principles of action, must such a mind be torn and +distracted! It was not unthinking carelessness, by which he +ran on headlong in vice and folly, without ever making a stand to +ask himself what he was doing: no; he acted upon the cool motives +of interest and advantage. Neither was he totally hard and +callous to impressions of religion, what we call abandoned; for +he absolutely denied to curse Israel. When reason assumes +her place, when convinced of his duty, when he owns and feels, +and is actually under the influence of the divine authority; +whilst he is carrying on his views to the grave, the end of all +temporal greatness; under this sense of things, with the better +character and more desirable state present—full before +him—in his thoughts, in his wishes, voluntarily to choose +the worse—what fatality is here! Or how otherwise can +such a character be explained? And yet, strange as it may +appear, it is not altogether an uncommon one: nay, with some +small alterations, and put a little lower, it is applicable to a +very considerable part of the world. For if the reasonable +choice be seen and acknowledged, and yet men make the +unreasonable one, is not this the same contradiction; that very +inconsistency, which appeared so unaccountable?</p> +<p>To give some little opening to such characters and behaviour, +it is to be observed in general that there is no account to be +given in the way of reason, of men’s so strong attachments +to the present world: our hopes and fears and pursuits are in +degrees beyond all proportion to the known value of the things +they respect. This may be said without taking into +consideration religion and a future state; and when these are +considered, the disproportion is infinitely heightened. Now +when men go against their reason, and contradict a more important +interest at a distance, for one nearer, though of less +consideration; if this be the whole of the case, all that can be +said is, that strong passions, some kind of brute force within, +prevails over the principle of rationality. However, if +this be with a clear, full, and distinct view of the truth of +things, then it is doing the utmost violence to themselves, +acting in the most palpable contradiction to their very +nature. But if there be any such thing in mankind as +putting half-deceits upon themselves; which there plainly is, +either by avoiding reflection, or (if they do reflect) by +religious equivocation, subterfuges, and palliating matters to +themselves; by these means conscience may be laid asleep, and +they may go on in a course of wickedness with less +disturbance. All the various turns, doubles, and +intricacies in a dishonest heart cannot be unfolded or laid open; +but that there is somewhat of that kind is manifest, be it to be +called self-deceit, or by any other name. Balaam had before +his eyes the authority of God, absolutely forbidding him what he, +for the sake of a reward, had the strongest inclination to: he +was likewise in a state of mind sober enough to consider death +and his last end: by these considerations he was restrained, +first from going to the king of Moab, and after he did go, from +cursing Israel. But notwithstanding this, there was great +wickedness in his heart. He could not forego the rewards of +unrighteousness: he therefore first seeks for indulgences, and +when these could not be obtained, he sins against the whole +meaning, end, and design of the prohibition, which no +consideration in the world could prevail with him to go against +the letter of. And surely that impious counsel he gave to +Balak against the children of Israel was, considered in itself, a +greater piece of wickedness than if he had cursed them in +words.</p> +<p>If it be inquired what his situation, his hopes, and fears +were, in respect to this his wish; the answer must be, that +consciousness of the wickedness of his heart must necessarily +have destroyed all settled hopes of dying the death of the +righteous: he could have no calm satisfaction in this view of his +last end: yet, on the other hand, it is possible that those +partial regards to his duty, now mentioned, might keep him from +perfect despair.</p> +<p>Upon the whole it is manifest that Balaam had the most just +and true notions of God and religion; as appears, partly from the +original story itself, and more plainly from the passage in +Micah; where he explains religion to consist in real virtue and +real piety, expressly distinguished from superstition, and in +terms which most strongly exclude dishonesty and falseness of +heart. Yet you see his behaviour: he seeks indulgences for +plain wickedness, which not being able to obtain he glosses over +that same wickedness, dresses it up in a new form, in order to +make it pass off more easily with himself. That is, he +deliberately contrives to deceive and impose upon himself in a +matter which he knew to be of the utmost importance.</p> +<p>To bring these observations home to ourselves: it is too +evident that many persons allow themselves in very unjustifiable +courses who yet make great pretences to religion; not to deceive +the world, none can be so weak as to think this will pass in our +age; but from principles, hopes, and fears, respecting God and a +future state; and go on thus with a sort of tranquillity and +quiet of mind. This cannot be upon a thorough +consideration, and full resolution, that the pleasures and +advantages they propose are to be pursued at all hazards, against +reason, against the law of God, and though everlasting +destruction is to be the consequence. This would be doing +too great violence upon themselves. No, they are for making +a composition with the Almighty. These of His commands they +will obey; but as to others—why, they will make all the +atonements in their power; the ambitious, the covetous, the +dissolute man, each in a way which shall not contradict his +respective pursuit. Indulgences before, which was +Balaam’s first attempt, though he was not so successful in +it as to deceive himself, or atonements afterwards, are all the +same. And here, perhaps, come in faint hopes that they may, +and half-resolves that they will, one time or other, make a +change.</p> +<p>Besides these there are also persons, who, from a more just +way of considering things, see the infinite absurdity of this, of +substituting sacrifice instead of obedience; there are persons +far enough from superstition, and not without some real sense of +God and religion upon their minds; who yet are guilty of most +unjustifiable practices, and go on with great coolness and +command over themselves. The same dishonesty and +unsoundness of heart discovers itself in these another way. +In all common ordinary cases we see intuitively at first view +what is our duty, what is the honest part. This is the +ground of the observation, that the first thought is often the +best. In these cases doubt and deliberation is itself +dishonesty, as it was in Balaam upon the second message. +That which is called considering what is our duty in a particular +case is very often nothing but endeavouring to explain it +away. Thus those courses, which, if men would fairly attend +to the dictates of their own consciences, they would see to be +corruption, excess, oppression, uncharitableness; these are +refined upon—things were so and so +circumstantiated—great difficulties are raised about fixing +bounds and degrees, and thus every moral obligation whatever may +be evaded. Here is scope, I say, for an unfair mind to +explain away every moral obligation to itself. Whether men +reflect again upon this internal management and artifice, and how +explicit they are with themselves, is another question. +There are many operations of the mind, many things pass within, +which we never reflect upon again; which a bystander, from having +frequent opportunities of observing us and our conduct, may make +shrewd guesses at.</p> +<p>That great numbers are in this way of deceiving themselves is +certain. There is scarce a man in the world, who has +entirely got over all regards, hopes, and fears, concerning God +and a future state; and these apprehensions in the generality, +bad as we are, prevail in considerable degrees: yet men will and +can be wicked, with calmness and thought; we see they are. +There must therefore be some method of making it sit a little +easy upon their minds; which, in the superstitious, is those +indulgences and atonements before mentioned, and this self-deceit +of another kind in persons of another character. And both +these proceed from a certain unfairness of mind, a peculiar +inward dishonesty; the direct contrary to that simplicity which +our Saviour recommends, under the notion of <i>becoming little +children</i>, as a necessary qualification for our entering into +the kingdom of heaven.</p> +<p>But to conclude: How much soever men differ in the course of +life they prefer, and in their ways of palliating and excusing +their vices to themselves; yet all agree in one thing, desiring +to <i>die the death of the righteous</i>. This is surely +remarkable. The observation may be extended further, and +put thus: even without determining what that is which we call +guilt or innocence, there is no man but would choose, after +having had the pleasure or advantage of a vicious action, to be +free of the guilt of it, to be in the state of an innocent +man. This shows at least the disturbance and implicit +dissatisfaction in vice. If we inquire into the grounds of +it, we shall find it proceeds partly from an immediate sense of +having done evil, and partly from an apprehension that this +inward sense shall one time or another be seconded by a higher +judgment, upon which our whole being depends. Now to +suspend and drown this sense, and these apprehensions, be it by +the hurry of business or of pleasure, or by superstition, or +moral equivocations, this is in a manner one and the same, and +makes no alteration at all in the nature of our case. +Things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of +them will be what they will be: why, then, should we desire to be +deceived? As we are reasonable creatures, and have any +regard to ourselves, we ought to lay these things plainly and +honestly before our mind, and upon this, act as you please, as +you think most fit: make that choice, and prefer that course of +life, which you can justify to yourselves, and which sits most +easy upon your own mind. It will immediately appear that +vice cannot be the happiness, but must upon the whole be the +misery, of such a creature as man; a moral, an accountable +agent. Superstitious observances, self-deceit though of a +more refined sort, will not in reality at all mend matters with +us. And the result of the whole can be nothing else, but +that with simplicity and fairness we <i>keep innocency</i>, +<i>and take heed unto the thing that is right</i>; <i>for this +alone shall bring a man peace at the last</i>.</p> +<h2>SERMON XI. <a name="citation24a"></a><a href="#footnote24a" +class="citation">[24a]</a> UPON THE LOVE OF OUR +NEIGHBOUR.<br /> +PREACHED ON ADVENT SUNDAY.</h2> +<blockquote><p><span class="smcap">Romans</span> xiii. 9.</p> +<p><i>And if there be any other commandment</i>, <i>it is briefly +comprehended in this saying</i>, <i>namely</i>, <i>Thou shalt +love thy neighbour as thyself</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>It is commonly observed that there is a disposition in men to +complain of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which +they live as greater than that of former ones; which is usually +followed with this further observation, that mankind has been in +that respect much the same in all times. Now, not to +determine whether this last be not contradicted by the accounts +of history; thus much can scarce be doubted, that vice and folly +takes different turns, and some particular kinds of it are more +open and avowed in some ages than in others; and, I suppose, it +may be spoken of as very much the distinction of the present to +profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards to +self-interest, than appears to have been done formerly. +Upon this account it seems worth while to inquire whether private +interest is likely to be promoted in proportion to the degree in +which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over all other +principles; <i>or whether the contracted affection may not +possibly be so prevalent as to disappoint itself</i>, <i>and even +contradict its own and private good</i>.</p> +<p>And since, further, there is generally thought to be some +peculiar kind of contrariety between self-love and the love of +our neighbour, between the pursuit of public and of private good; +insomuch that when you are recommending one of these, you are +supposed to be speaking against the other; and from hence arises +a secret prejudice against, and frequently open scorn of, all +talk of public spirit and real good-will to our fellow-creatures; +it will be necessary to <i>inquire what respect benevolence hath +to self-love</i>, <i>and the pursuit of private interest to the +pursuit of public</i>: or whether there be anything of that +peculiar inconsistence and contrariety between them over and +above what there is between self-love and other passions and +particular affections, and their respective pursuits.</p> +<p>These inquiries, it is hoped, may be favourably attended to; +for there shall be all possible concessions made to the favourite +passion, which hath so much allowed to it, and whose cause is so +universally pleaded: it shall be treated with the utmost +tenderness and concern for its interests.</p> +<p>In order to do this, as well as to determine the forementioned +questions, it will be necessary to <i>consider the nature</i>, +<i>the object</i>, <i>and end of that self-love</i>, <i>as +distinguished from other principles or affections in the +mind</i>, <i>and their respective objects</i>.</p> +<p>Every man hath a general desire of his own happiness; and +likewise a variety of particular affections, passions, and +appetites to particular external objects. The former +proceeds from, or is, self-love; and seems inseparable from all +sensible creatures, who can reflect upon themselves and their own +interest or happiness so as to have that interest an object to +their minds; what is to be said of the latter is, that they +proceed from or together make up that particular nature, +according to which man is made. The object the former +pursues is somewhat internal—our own happiness, enjoyment, +satisfaction; whether we have, or have not, a distinct particular +perception what it is, or wherein it consists: the objects of the +latter are this or that particular external thing, which the +affections tend towards, and of which it hath always a particular +idea or perception. The principle we call self-love never +seeks anything external for the sake of the thing, but only as a +means of happiness or good: particular affections rest in the +external things themselves. One belongs to man as a +reasonable creature reflecting upon his own interest or +happiness. The other, though quite distinct from reason, +are as much a part of human nature.</p> +<p>That all particular appetites and passions are towards +<i>external things themselves</i>, distinct from the <i>pleasure +arising from them</i>, is manifested from hence; that there could +not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitableness +between the object and the passion: there could be no enjoyment +or delight from one thing more than another, from eating food +more than from swallowing a stone, if there were not an affection +or appetite to one thing more than another.</p> +<p>Every particular affection, even the love of our neighbour, is +as really our own affection as self-love; and the pleasure +arising from its gratification is as much my own pleasure as the +pleasure self-love would have from knowing I myself should be +happy some time hence would be my own pleasure. And if, +because every particular affection is a man’s own, and the +pleasure arising from its gratification his own pleasure, or +pleasure to himself, such particular affection must be called +self-love; according to this way of speaking, no creature +whatever can possibly act but merely from self-love; and every +action and every affection whatever is to be resolved up into +this one principle. But then this is not the language of +mankind; or if it were, we should want words to express the +difference between the principle of an action, proceeding from +cool consideration that it will be to my own advantage; and an +action, suppose of revenge or of friendship, by which a man runs +upon certain ruin, to do evil or good to another. It is +manifest the principles of these actions are totally different, +and so want different words to be distinguished by; all that they +agree in is that they both proceed from, and are done to gratify, +an inclination in a man’s self. But the principle or +inclination in one case is self-love; in the other, hatred or +love of another. There is then a distinction between the +cool principle of self-love, or general desire of our own +happiness, as one part of our nature, and one principle of +action; and the particular affections towards particular external +objects, as another part of our nature, and another principle of +action. How much soever therefore is to be allowed to +self-love, yet it cannot be allowed to be the whole of our inward +constitution; because, you see, there are other parts or +principles which come into it.</p> +<p>Further, private happiness or good is all which self-love can +make us desire, or be concerned about: in having this consists +its gratification: it is an affection to ourselves; a regard to +our own interest, happiness, and private good: and in the +proportion a man hath this, he is interested, or a lover of +himself. Let this be kept in mind; because there is +commonly, as I shall presently have occasion to observe, another +sense put upon these words. On the other hand, particular +affections tend towards particular external things: these are +their objects: having these is their end: in this consists their +gratification: no matter whether it be, or be not, upon the +whole, our interest or happiness. An action done from the +former of these principles is called an interested action. +An action proceeding from any of the latter has its denomination +of passionate, ambitious, friendly, revengeful, or any other, +from the particular appetite or affection from which it +proceeds. Thus self-love as one part of human nature, and +the several particular principles as the other part, are, +themselves, their objects and ends, stated and shown.</p> +<p>From hence it will be easy to see how far, and in what ways, +each of these can contribute and be subservient to the private +good of the individual. Happiness does not consist in +self-love. The desire of happiness is no more the thing +itself than the desire of riches is the possession or enjoyment +of them. People might love themselves with the most entire +and unbounded affection, and yet be extremely miserable. +Neither can self-love any way help them out, but by setting them +on work to get rid of the causes of their misery, to gain or make +use of those objects which are by nature adapted to afford +satisfaction. Happiness or satisfaction consists only in +the enjoyment of those objects which are by nature suited to our +several particular appetites, passions, and affections. So +that if self-love wholly engrosses us, and leaves no room for any +other principle, there can be absolutely no such thing at all as +happiness or enjoyment of any kind whatever; since happiness +consists in the gratification of particular passions, which +supposes the having of them. Self-love then does not +constitute <i>this</i> or <i>that</i> to be our interest or good; +but, our interest or good being constituted by nature and +supposed, self-love only puts us upon obtaining and securing +it. Therefore, if it be possible that self-love may prevail +and exert itself in a degree or manner which is not subservient +to this end; then it will not follow that our interest will be +promoted in proportion to the degree in which that principle +engrosses us, and prevails over others. Nay, further, the +private and contracted affection, when it is not subservient to +this end, private good may, for anything that appears, have a +direct contrary tendency and effect. And if we will +consider the matter, we shall see that it often really has. +<i>Disengagement</i> is absolutely necessary to enjoyment; and a +person may have so steady and fixed an eye upon his own interest, +whatever he places it in, as may hinder him from <i>attending</i> +to many gratifications within his reach, which others have their +minds <i>free</i> and <i>open</i> to. Over-fondness for a +child is not generally thought to be for its advantage; and, if +there be any guess to be made from appearances, surely that +character we call selfish is not the most promising for +happiness. Such a temper may plainly be, and exert itself +in a degree and manner which may give unnecessary and useless +solicitude and anxiety, in a degree and manner which may prevent +obtaining the means and materials of enjoyment, as well as the +making use of them. Immoderate self-love does very ill +consult its own interest: and, how much soever a paradox it may +appear, it is certainly true that even from self-love we should +endeavour to get over all inordinate regard to and consideration +of ourselves. Every one of our passions and affections hath +its natural stint and bound, which may easily be exceeded; +whereas our enjoyments can possibly be but in a determinate +measure and degree. Therefore such excess of the affection, +since it cannot procure any enjoyment, must in all cases be +useless; but is generally attended with inconveniences, and often +is downright pain and misery. This holds as much with +regard to self-love as to all other affections. The natural +degree of it, so far as it sets us on work to gain and make use +of the materials of satisfaction, may be to our real advantage; +but beyond or besides this, it is in several respects an +inconvenience and disadvantage. Thus it appears that +private interest is so far from being likely to be promoted in +proportion to the degree in which self-love engrosses us, and +prevails over all other principles, that <i>the contracted +affection may be so prevalent as to disappoint itself</i>, <i>and +even contradict its own and private good</i>.</p> +<p>“But who, except the most sordidly covetous, ever +thought there was any rivalship between the love of greatness, +honour, power, or between sensual appetites and self-love? +No, there is a perfect harmony between them. It is by means +of these particular appetites and affections that self-love is +gratified in enjoyment, happiness, and satisfaction. The +competition and rivalship is between self-love and the love of +our neighbour: that affection which leads us out of ourselves, +makes us regardless of our own interest, and substitute that of +another in its stead.” Whether, then, there be any +peculiar competition and contrariety in this case shall now be +considered.</p> +<p>Self-love and interestedness was stated to consist in or be an +affection to ourselves, a regard to our own private good: it is +therefore distinct from benevolence, which is an affection to the +good of our fellow-creatures. But that benevolence is +distinct from, that is, not the same thing with self-love, is no +reason for its being looked upon with any peculiar suspicion; +because every principle whatever, by means of which self-love is +gratified, is distinct from it; and all things which are distinct +from each other are equally so. A man has an affection or +aversion to another: that one of these tends to, and is gratified +by, doing good, that the other tends to, and is gratified by, +doing harm, does not in the least alter the respect which either +one or the other of these inward feelings has to self-love. +We use the word <i>property</i> so as to exclude any other +persons having an interest in that of which we say a particular +man has the property. And we often use the word +<i>selfish</i> so as to exclude in the same manner all regards to +the good of others. But the cases are not parallel: for +though that exclusion is really part of the idea of property; yet +such positive exclusion, or bringing this peculiar disregard to +the good of others into the idea of self-love, is in reality +adding to the idea, or changing it from what it was before stated +to consist in, namely, in an affection to ourselves. <a +name="citation25"></a><a href="#footnote25" +class="citation">[25]</a> This being the whole idea of +self-love, it can no otherwise exclude good-will or love of +others, than merely by not including it, no otherwise, than it +excludes love of arts or reputation, or of anything else. +Neither on the other hand does benevolence, any more than love of +arts or of reputation exclude self-love. Love of our +neighbour, then, has just the same respect to, is no more distant +from, self-love, than hatred of our neighbour, or than love or +hatred of anything else. Thus the principles, from which +men rush upon certain ruin for the destruction of an enemy, and +for the preservation of a friend, have the same respect to the +private affection, and are equally interested, or equally +disinterested; and it is of no avail whether they are said to be +one or the other. Therefore to those who are shocked to +hear virtue spoken of as disinterested, it may be allowed that it +is indeed absurd to speak thus of it; unless hatred, several +particular instances of vice, and all the common affections and +aversions in mankind, are acknowledged to be disinterested +too. Is there any less inconsistence between the love of +inanimate things, or of creatures merely sensitive, and +self-love, than between self-love and the love of our +neighbour? Is desire of and delight in the happiness of +another any more a diminution of self-love than desire of and +delight in the esteem of another? They are both equally +desire of and delight in somewhat external to ourselves; either +both or neither are so. The object of self-love is +expressed in the term self; and every appetite of sense, and +every particular affection of the heart, are equally interested +or disinterested, because the objects of them all are equally +self or somewhat else. Whatever ridicule therefore the +mention of a disinterested principle or action may be supposed to +lie open to, must, upon the matter being thus stated, relate to +ambition, and every appetite and particular affection as much as +to benevolence. And indeed all the ridicule, and all the +grave perplexity, of which this subject hath had its full share, +is merely from words. The most intelligible way of speaking +of it seems to be this: that self-love and the actions done in +consequence of it (for these will presently appear to be the same +as to this question) are interested; that particular affections +towards external objects, and the actions done in consequence of +those affections are not so. But every one is at liberty to +use words as he pleases. All that is here insisted upon is +that ambition, revenge, benevolence, all particular passions +whatever, and the actions they produce, are equally interested or +disinterested.</p> +<p>Thus it appears that there is no peculiar contrariety between +self-love and benevolence; no greater competition between these +than between any other particular affections and self-love. +This relates to the affections themselves. Let us now see +whether there be any peculiar contrariety between the respective +courses of life which these affections lead to; whether there be +any greater competition between the pursuit of private and of +public good, than between any other particular pursuits and that +of private good.</p> +<p>There seems no other reason to suspect that there is any such +peculiar contrariety, but only that the course of action which +benevolence leads to has a more direct tendency to promote the +good of others, than that course of action which love of +reputation suppose, or any other particular affection leads +to. But that any affection tends to the happiness of +another does not hinder its tending to one’s own happiness +too. That others enjoy the benefit of the air and the light +of the sun does not hinder but that these are as much one’s +own private advantage now as they would be if we had the property +of them exclusive of all others. So a pursuit which tends +to promote the good of another, yet may have as great tendency to +promote private interest, as a pursuit which does not tend to the +good of another at all, or which is mischievous to him. All +particular affections whatever, resentment, benevolence, love of +arts, equally lead to a course of action for their own +gratification; <i>i.e.</i>, the gratification of ourselves; and +the gratification of each gives delight: so far, then, it is +manifest they have all the same respect to private +interest. Now take into consideration, further, concerning +these three pursuits, that the end of the first is the harm, of +the second, the good of another, of the last, somewhat +indifferent; and is there any necessity that these additional +considerations should alter the respect, which we before saw +these three pursuits had to private interest, or render any one +of them less conducive to it, than any other? Thus one +man’s affection is to honour as his end; in order to obtain +which he thinks no pains too great. Suppose another, with +such a singularity of mind, as to have the same affection to +public good as his end, which he endeavours with the same labour +to obtain. In case of success, surely the man of +benevolence hath as great enjoyment as the man of ambition; they +both equally having the end their affections, in the same degree, +tended to; but in case of disappointment, the benevolent man has +clearly the advantage; since endeavouring to do good, considered +as a virtuous pursuit, is gratified by its own consciousness, +<i>i.e.</i>, is in a degree its own reward.</p> +<p>And as to these two, or benevolence and any other particular +passions whatever, considered in a further view, as forming a +general temper, which more or less disposes us for enjoyment of +all the common blessings of life, distinct from their own +gratification, is benevolence less the temper of tranquillity and +freedom than ambition or covetousness? Does the benevolent +man appear less easy with himself from his love to his +neighbour? Does he less relish his being? Is there +any peculiar gloom seated on his face? Is his mind less +open to entertainment, to any particular gratification? +Nothing is more manifest than that being in good humour, which is +benevolence whilst it lasts, is itself the temper of satisfaction +and enjoyment.</p> +<p>Suppose then, a man sitting down to consider how he might +become most easy to himself, and attain the greatest pleasure he +could, all that which is his real natural happiness. This +can only consist in the enjoyment of those objects which are by +nature adapted to our several faculties. These particular +enjoyments make up the sum total of our happiness, and they are +supposed to arise from riches, honours, and the gratification of +sensual appetites. Be it so; yet none profess themselves so +completely happy in these enjoyments, but that there is room left +in the mind for others, if they were presented to them: nay, +these, as much as they engage us, are not thought so high, but +that human nature is capable even of greater. Now there +have been persons in all ages who have professed that they found +satisfaction in the exercise of charity, in the love of their +neighbour, in endeavouring to promote the happiness of all they +had to do with, and in the pursuit of what is just and right and +good as the general bent of their mind and end of their life; and +that doing an action of baseness or cruelty would be as great +violence to <i>their</i> self, as much breaking in upon their +nature, as any external force. Persons of this character +would add, if they might be heard, that they consider themselves +as acting in the view of an Infinite Being, who is in a much +higher sense the object of reverence and of love, than all the +world besides; and therefore they could have no more enjoyment +from a wicked action done under His eye than the persons to whom +they are making their apology could if all mankind were the +spectators of it; and that the satisfaction of approving +themselves to his unerring judgment, to whom they thus refer all +their actions, is a more continued settled satisfaction than any +this world can afford; as also that they have, no less than +others, a mind free and open to all the common innocent +gratifications of it, such as they are. And if we go no +further, does there appear any absurdity in this? Will any +one take upon him to say that a man cannot find his account in +this general course of life as much as in the most unbounded +ambition, and the excesses of pleasure? Or that such a +person has not consulted so well for himself, for the +satisfaction and peace of his own mind, as the ambitious or +dissolute man? And though the consideration that God +himself will in the end justify their taste, and support their +cause, is not formally to be insisted upon here, yet thus much +comes in, that all enjoyments whatever are much more clear and +unmixed from the assurance that they will end well. Is it +certain, then, that there is nothing in these pretensions to +happiness? especially when there are not wanting persons who have +supported themselves with satisfactions of this kind in sickness, +poverty, disgrace, and in the very pangs of death; whereas it is +manifest all other enjoyments fail in these circumstances. +This surely looks suspicions of having somewhat in it. +Self-love, methinks, should be alarmed. May she not +possibly pass over greater pleasures than those she is so wholly +taken up with?</p> +<p>The short of the matter is no more than this. Happiness +consists in the gratification of certain affections, appetites, +passions, with objects which are by nature adapted to them. +Self-love may indeed set us on work to gratify these, but +happiness or enjoyment has no immediate connection with +self-love, but arises from such gratification alone. Love +of our neighbour is one of those affections. This, +considered as a <i>virtuous principle</i>, is gratified by a +consciousness of <i>endeavouring</i> to promote the good of +others, but considered as a natural affection, its gratification +consists in the actual accomplishment of this endeavour. +Now indulgence or gratification of this affection, whether in +that consciousness or this accomplishment, has the same respect +to interest as indulgence of any other affection; they equally +proceed from or do not proceed from self-love, they equally +include or equally exclude this principle. Thus it appears, +that <i>benevolence and the pursuit of public good hath at least +as great respect to self-love and the pursuit of private good as +any other particular passions</i>, <i>and their respective +pursuits</i>.</p> +<p>Neither is covetousness, whether as a temper or pursuit, any +exception to this. For if by covetousness is meant the +desire and pursuit of riches for their own sake, without any +regard to, or consideration of, the uses of them, this hath as +little to do with self-love as benevolence hath. But by +this word is usually meant, not such madness and total +distraction of mind, but immoderate affection to and pursuit of +riches as possessions in order to some further end, namely, +satisfaction, interest, or good. This, therefore, is not a +particular affection or particular pursuit, but it is the general +principle of self-love, and the general pursuit of our own +interest, for which reason the word <i>selfish</i> is by every +one appropriated to this temper and pursuit. Now as it is +ridiculous to assert that self-love and the love of our neighbour +are the same, so neither is it asserted that following these +different affections hath the same tendency and respect to our +own interest. The comparison is not between self-love and +the love of our neighbour, between pursuit of our own interest +and the interest of others, but between the several particular +affections in human nature towards external objects, as one part +of the comparison, and the one particular affection to the good +of our neighbour as the other part of it: and it has been shown +that all these have the same respect to self-love and private +interest.</p> +<p>There is indeed frequently an inconsistence or interfering +between self-love or private interest and the several particular +appetites, passions, affections, or the pursuits they lead +to. But this competition or interfering is merely +accidental, and happens much oftener between pride, revenge, +sensual gratifications, and private interest, than between +private interest and benevolence. For nothing is more +common than to see men give themselves up to a passion or an +affection to their known prejudice and ruin, and in direct +contradiction to manifest and real interest, and the loudest +calls of self-love: whereas the seeming competitions and +interfering, between benevolence and private interest, relate +much more to the materials or means of enjoyment than to +enjoyment itself. There is often an interfering in the +former when there is none in the latter. Thus as to riches: +so much money as a man gives away, so much less will remain in +his possession. Here is a real interfering. But +though a man cannot possibly give without lessening his fortune, +yet there are multitudes might give without lessening their own +enjoyment, because they may have more than they can turn to any +real use or advantage to themselves. Thus the more thought +and time any one employs about the interests and good of others, +he must necessarily have less to attend his own: but he may have +so ready and large a supply of his own wants, that such thought +might be really useless to himself, though of great service and +assistance to others.</p> +<p>The general mistake, that there is some greater inconsistence +between endeavouring to promote the good of another and +self-interest, than between self-interest and pursuing anything +else, seems, as hath already been hinted, to arise from our +notions of property, and to be carried on by this +property’s being supposed to be itself our happiness or +good. People are so very much taken up with this one +subject, that they seem from it to have formed a general way of +thinking, which they apply to other things that they have nothing +to do with. Hence in a confused and slight way it might +well be taken for granted that another’s having no interest +in an affection (<i>i.e.</i>, his good not being the object of +it) renders, as one may speak, the proprietor’s interest in +it greater; and that if another had an interest in it this would +render his less, or occasion that such affection could not be so +friendly to self-love, or conducive to private good, as an +affection or pursuit which has not a regard to the good of +another. This, I say, might be taken for granted, whilst it +was not attended to, that the object of every particular +affection is equally somewhat external to ourselves, and whether +it be the good of another person, or whether it be any other +external thing, makes no alteration with regard to its being +one’s own affection, and the gratification of it +one’s own private enjoyment. And so far as it is +taken for granted that barely having the means and materials of +enjoyment is what constitutes interest and happiness; that our +interest or good consists in possessions themselves, in having +the property of riches, houses, lands, gardens, not in the +enjoyment of them; so far it will even more strongly be taken for +granted, in the way already explained, that an affection’s +conducing to the good of another must even necessarily occasion +it to conduce less to private good, if not to be positively +detrimental to it. For, if property and happiness are one +and the same thing, as by increasing the property of another you +lessen your own property, so by promoting the happiness of +another you must lessen your own happiness. But whatever +occasioned the mistake, I hope it has been fully proved to be +one, as it has been proved, that there is no peculiar rivalship +or competition between self-love and benevolence: that as there +may be a competition between these two, so there many also +between any particular affection whatever and self-love; that +every particular affection, benevolence among the rest, is +subservient to self-love by being the instrument of private +enjoyment; and that in one respect benevolence contributes more +to private interest, <i>i.e.</i>, enjoyment or satisfaction, than +any other of the particular common affections, as it is in a +degree its own gratification.</p> +<p>And to all these things may be added that religion, from +whence arises our strongest obligation to benevolence, is so far +from disowning the principle of self-love, that it often +addresses itself to that very principle, and always to the mind +in that state when reason presides, and there can no access be +had to the understanding, but by convincing men that the course +of life we would persuade them to is not contrary to their +interest. It may be allowed, without any prejudice to the +cause of virtue and religion, that our ideas of happiness and +misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most important to us; +that they will, nay, if you please, that they ought to prevail +over those of order, and beauty, and harmony, and proportion, if +there should ever be, as it is impossible there ever should be, +any inconsistence between them, though these last, too, as +expressing the fitness of actions, are real as truth +itself. Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude +does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right +and good, as such, yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, we +can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till +we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least +not contrary to it.</p> +<p>Common reason and humanity will have some influence upon +mankind, whatever becomes of speculations; but, so far as the +interests of virtue depend upon the theory of it being secured +from open scorn, so far its very being in the world depends upon +its appearing to have no contrariety to private interest and +self-love. The foregoing observations, therefore, it is +hoped, may have gained a little ground in favour of the precept +before us, the particular explanation of which shall be the +subject of the next discourse.</p> +<p>I will conclude at present with observing the peculiar +obligation which we are under to virtue and religion, as enforced +in the verses following the text, in the epistle for the day, +from our Saviour’s coming into the world. <i>The +night is far spent</i>, <i>the day is at hand</i>; <i>let us +therefore cast off the works of darkness</i>, <i>and let us put +on the armour of light</i>, &c. The meaning and force +of which exhortation is, that Christianity lays us under new +obligations to a good life, as by it the will of God is more +clearly revealed, and as it affords additional motives to the +practice of it, over and above those which arise out of the +nature of virtue and vice, I might add, as our Saviour has set us +a perfect example of goodness in our own nature. Now love +and charity is plainly the thing in which He hath placed His +religion; in which, therefore, as we have any pretence to the +name of Christians, we must place ours. He hath at once +enjoined it upon us by way of command with peculiar force, and by +His example, as having undertaken the work of our salvation out +of pure love and goodwill to mankind. The endeavour to set +home this example upon our minds is a very proper employment of +this season, which is bringing on the festival of His birth, +which as it may teach us many excellent lessons of humility, +resignation, and obedience to the will of God, so there is none +it recommends with greater authority, force, and advantage than +this love and charity, since it was <i>for us men</i>, <i>and for +our salvation</i>, that <i>He came down from heaven</i>, <i>and +was incarnate</i>, <i>and was made man</i>, that He might teach +us our duty, and more especially that He might enforce the +practice of it, reform mankind, and finally bring us to that +<i>eternal salvation</i>, of which <i>He is the Author to all +those that obey Him</i>.</p> +<h2>SERMON XII. UPON THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR.</h2> +<blockquote><p><span class="smcap">Rom.</span> xiii. 9.</p> +<p><i>And if there be any other commandment</i>, <i>it is briefly +comprehended in this saying</i>, <i>namely</i>, <i>Thou shalt +love thy neighbour as thyself</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Having already removed the prejudices against public spirit, +or the love of our neighbour, on the side of private interest and +self-love, I proceed to the particular explanation of the precept +before us, by showing, <i>Who is our neighbour</i>: <i>In what +sense we are required to love him as ourselves</i>; <i>The +influence such love would have upon our behaviour in life</i>; +and lastly, <i>How this commandment comprehends in it all +others</i>.</p> +<p>I. The objects and due extent of this affection will be +understood by attending to the nature of it, and to the nature +and circumstances of mankind in this world. The love of our +neighbour is the same with charity, benevolence, or goodwill: it +is an affection to the good and happiness of our +fellow-creatures. This implies in it a disposition to +produce happiness, and this is the simple notion of goodness, +which appears so amiable wherever we meet with it. From +hence it is easy to see that the perfection of goodness consists +in love to the whole universe. This is the perfection of +Almighty God.</p> +<p>But as man is so much limited in his capacity, as so small a +part of the Creation comes under his notice and influence, and as +we are not used to consider things in so general a way, it is not +to be thought of that the universe should be the object of +benevolence to such creatures as we are. Thus in that +precept of our Saviour, <i>Be ye perfect</i>, <i>even as your +Father</i>, <i>which is in heaven</i>, <i>is perfect</i>, <a +name="citation26"></a><a href="#footnote26" +class="citation">[26]</a> the perfection of the divine goodness +is proposed to our imitation as it is promiscuous, and extends to +the evil as well as the good; not as it is absolutely universal, +imitation of it in this respect being plainly beyond us. +The object is too vast. For this reason moral writers also +have substituted a less general object for our benevolence, +mankind. But this likewise is an object too general, and +very much out of our view. Therefore persons more practical +have, instead of mankind, put our country, and made the principle +of virtue, of human virtue, to consist in the entire uniform love +of our country: and this is what we call a public spirit, which +in men of public stations is the character of a patriot. +But this is speaking to the upper part of the world. +Kingdoms and governments are large, and the sphere of action of +far the greatest part of mankind is much narrower than the +government they live under: or however, common men do not +consider their actions as affecting the whole community of which +they are members. There plainly is wanting a less general +and nearer object of benevolence for the bulk of men than that of +their country. Therefore the Scripture, not being a book of +theory and speculation, but a plain rule of life for mankind, has +with the utmost possible propriety put the principle of virtue +upon the love of our neighbour, which is that part of the +universe, that part of mankind, that part of our country, which +comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and influence, +and with which we have to do.</p> +<p>This is plainly the true account or reason why our Saviour +places the principle of virtue in the love of our +<i>neighbour</i>, and the account itself shows who are +comprehended under that relation.</p> +<p>II. Let us now consider in what sense we are commanded +to love our neighbour <i>as ourselves</i>.</p> +<p>This precept, in its first delivery by our Saviour, is thus +introduced:—<i>Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all +thine heart</i>, <i>with all thy soul</i>, <i>and with all thy +strength</i>; <i>and thy neighbour as thyself</i>. These +very different manners of expression do not lead our thoughts to +the same measure or degree of love, common to both objects, but +to one peculiar to each. Supposing, then, which is to be +supposed, a distinct meaning and propriety in the words, <i>as +thyself</i>; the precept we are considering will admit of any of +these senses: that we bear the <i>same kind</i> of affection to +our neighbour as we do to ourselves, or, that the love we bear to +our neighbour should have <i>some certain proportion or other</i> +to self-love: or, lastly, that it should bear the particular +proportion of <i>equality</i>, that <i>it be in the same +degree</i>.</p> +<p>First, The precept may be understood as requiring only that we +have the <i>same kind</i> of affection to our fellow-creatures as +to ourselves; that, as every man has the principle of self-love, +which disposes him to avoid misery, and consult his own +happiness, so we should cultivate the affection of goodwill to +our neighbour, and that it should influence us to have the same +kind of regard to him. This at least must be commanded, and +this will not only prevent our being injurious to him, but will +also put us upon promoting his good. There are blessings in +life, which we share in common with others, peace, plenty, +freedom, healthful seasons. But real benevolence to our +fellow-creatures would give us the notion of a common interest in +a stricter sense, for in the degree we love another, his +interest, his joys and sorrows, are our own. It is from +self-love that we form the notion of private good, and consider +it is our own: love of our neighbour would teach us thus to +appropriate to ourselves his good and welfare; to consider +ourselves as having a real share in his happiness. Thus the +principle of benevolence would be an advocate within our own +breasts, to take care of the interests of our fellow-creatures in +all the interfering and competitions which cannot but be, from +the imperfection of our nature, and the state we are in. It +would likewise, in some measure, lessen that interfering, and +hinder men from forming so strong a notion of private good, +exclusive of the good of others, as we commonly do. Thus, +as the private affection makes us in a peculiar manner sensible +of humanity, justice or injustice, when exercised towards +ourselves, love of our neighbour would give us the same kind of +sensibility in his behalf. This would be the greatest +security of our uniform obedience to that most equitable +rule. <i>Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto +you</i>, <i>do ye even so unto them</i>.</p> +<p>All this is indeed no more than that we should have a real +love to our neighbour; but then, which is to be observed, the +words <i>as thyself</i> express this in the most distinct manner, +and determine the precept to relate to the affection +itself. The advantage which this principle of benevolence +has over other remote considerations is, that it is itself the +temper of virtue, and likewise that it is the chief, nay, the +only effectual security of our performing the several offices of +kindness we owe to our fellow-creatures. When from distant +considerations men resolve upon any thing to which they have no +liking, or perhaps an averseness, they are perpetually finding +out evasions and excuses, which need never be wanting, if people +look for them: and they equivocate with themselves in the +plainest cases in the world. This may be in respect to +single determinate acts of virtue, but it comes in much more, +where the obligation is to a general course of behaviour, and +most of all, if it be such as cannot be reduced to fixed +determinate rules. This observation may account for the +diversity of the expression in that known passage of the prophet +Micah, <i>to do justly</i>, <i>and to love mercy</i>. A +man’s heart must be formed to humanity and benevolence, he +must <i>love mercy</i>, otherwise he will not act mercifully in +any settled course of behaviour. As consideration of the +future sanctions of religion is our only security of preserving +in our duty, in cases of great temptation: so to get our heart +and temper formed to a love and liking of what is good is +absolutely necessary in order to our behaving rightly in the +familiar and daily intercourses amongst mankind.</p> +<p>Secondly, The precept before us may be understood to require +that we love our neighbour in some certain <i>proportion</i> or +other, <i>according as</i> we love ourselves. And indeed a +man’s character cannot be determined by the love he bears +to his neighbour, considered absolutely, but the proportion which +this bears to self-love, whether it be attended to or not, is the +chief thing which forms the character and influences the +actions. For, as the form of the body is a composition of +various parts, so likewise our inward structure is not simple or +uniform, but a composition of various passions, appetites, +affections, together with rationality, including in this last +both the discernment of what is right, and a disposition to +regulate ourselves by it. There is greater variety of parts +in what we call a character than there are features in a face, +and the morality of that is no more determined by one part than +the beauty or deformity of this is by one single feature: each is +to be judged of by all the parts or features, not taken singly, +but together. In the inward frame the various passions, +appetites, affections, stand in different respects to each +other. The principles in our mind may be contradictory, or +checks and allays only, or incentives and assistants to each +other. And principles, which in their nature have no kind +of contrariety or affinity, may yet accidentally be each +other’s allays or incentives.</p> +<p>From hence it comes to pass, that though we were able to look +into the inward contexture of the heart, and see with the +greatest exactness in what degree any one principle is in a +particular man, we could not from thence determine how far that +principle would go towards forming the character, or what +influence it would have upon the actions, unless we could +likewise discern what other principles prevailed in him, and see +the proportion which that one bears to the others. Thus, +though two men should have the affection of compassion in the +same degree exactly, yet one may have the principle of resentment +or of ambition so strong in him as to prevail over that of +compassion, and prevent its having any influence upon his +actions, so that he may deserve the character of a hard or cruel +man, whereas the other having compassion in just the same degree +only, yet having resentment or ambition in a lower degree, his +compassion may prevail over them, so as to influence his actions, +and to denominate his temper compassionate. So that, how +strange soever it may appear to people who do not attend to the +thing, yet it is quite manifest that, when we say one man is more +resenting or compassionate than another, this does not +necessarily imply that one has the principle of resentment or of +compassion stronger than the other. For if the proportion +which resentment or compassion bears to other inward principles +is greater in one than in the other, this is itself sufficient to +denominate one more resenting or compassionate than the +other.</p> +<p>Further, the whole system, as I may speak, of affections +(including rationality), which constitute the heart, as this word +is used in Scripture and on moral subjects, are each and all of +them stronger in some than in others. Now the proportion +which the two general affections, benevolence and self-love, bear +to each other, according to this interpretation of the text, +demonstrates men’s character as to virtue. Suppose, +then, one man to have the principle of benevolence in a higher +degree than another; it will not follow from hence that his +general temper or character or actions will be more benevolent +than the other’s. For he may have self-love in such a +degree as quite to prevail over benevolence, so that it may have +no influence at all upon his action, whereas benevolence in the +other person, though in a lower degree, may yet be the strongest +principle in his heart, and strong enough to be the guide of his +actions, so as to denominate him a good and virtuous man. +The case is here as in scales: it is not one weight considered in +itself, which determines whether the scale shall ascend or +descend, but this depends upon the proportion which that one +weight hath to the other.</p> +<p>It being thus manifest that the influence which benevolence +has upon our actions, and how far it goes towards forming our +character, is not determined by the degree itself of this +principle in our mind, but by the proportion it has to self-love +and other principles: a comparison also being made in the text +between self-love and the love of our neighbour; these joint +considerations afforded sufficient occasion for treating here of +that proportion. It plainly is implied in the precept, +though it should be questioned, whether it be the exact meaning +of the words, as <i>thyself</i>.</p> +<p>Love of our neighbour, then, must bear some proportion to +self-love, and virtue, to be sure, consists in the due +proportion. What this due proportion is, whether as a +principle in the mind, or as exerted in actions, can be judged of +only from our nature and condition in this world. Of the +degree in which affections and the principles of action, +considered in themselves, prevail, we have no measure: let us, +then, proceed to the course of behaviour, the actions they +produce.</p> +<p>Both our nature and condition require that each particular man +should make particular provision for himself: and the inquiry, +what proportion benevolence should have to self-love, when +brought down to practice, will be, what is a competent care and +provision for ourselves? And how certain soever it be that +each man must determine this for himself, and how ridiculous +soever it would be for any to attempt to determine it for +another, yet it is to be observed that the proportion is real, +and that a competent provision has a bound, and that it cannot be +all which we can possibly get and keep within our grasp, without +legal injustice. Mankind almost universally bring in +vanity, supplies for what is called a life of pleasure, +covetousness, or imaginary notions of superiority over others, to +determine this question: but every one who desires to act a +proper part in society would do well to consider how far any of +them come in to determine it, in the way of moral +consideration. All that can be said is, supposing what, as +the world goes, is so much to be supposed that it is scarce to be +mentioned, that persons do not neglect what they really owe to +themselves; the more of their care and thought and of their +fortune they employ in doing good to their fellow-creatures the +nearer they come up to the law of perfection, <i>Thou shalt love +thy neighbour as thyself</i>.</p> +<p>Thirdly, if the words <i>as thyself</i> were to be understood +of an equality of affection, it would not be attended with those +consequences which perhaps may be thought to follow from +it. Suppose a person to have the same settled regard to +others as to himself; that in every deliberate scheme or pursuit +he took their interest into the account in the same degree as his +own, so far as an equality of affection would produce this: yet +he would, in fact, and ought to be, much more taken up and +employed about himself, and his own concerns, than about others, +and their interests. For, besides the one common affection +toward himself and his neighbour he would have several other +particular affections, passions, appetites, which he could not +possibly feel in common both for himself and others. Now +these sensations themselves very much employ us, and have perhaps +as great influence as self-love. So far indeed as +self-love, and cool reflection upon what is for our interest, +would set us on work to gain a supply of our own several wants, +so far the love of our neighbour would make us do the same for +him: but the degree in which we are put upon seeking and making +use of the means of gratification, by the feeling of those +affections, appetites, and passions, must necessarily be peculiar +to ourselves.</p> +<p>That there are particular passions (suppose shame, resentment) +which men seem to have, and feel in common, both for themselves +and others, makes no alteration in respect to those passions and +appetites which cannot possibly be thus felt in common. +From hence (and perhaps more things of the like kind might be +mentioned) it follows, that though there were an equality of +affection to both, yet regards to ourselves would be more +prevalent than attention to the concerns of others.</p> +<p>And from moral considerations it ought to be so, supposing +still the equality of affection commanded, because we are in a +peculiar manner, as I may speak, intrusted with ourselves, and +therefore care of our own interests, as well as of our conduct, +particularly belongs to us.</p> +<p>To these things must be added, that moral obligations can +extend no further than to natural possibilities. Now we +have a perception of our own interests, like consciousness of our +own existence, which we always carry about with us, and which, in +its continuation, kind, and degree, seems impossible to be felt +in respect to the interests of others.</p> +<p>From all these things it fully appears that though we were to +love our neighbour in the same degree as we love ourselves, so +far as this is possible, yet the care of ourselves, of the +individual, would not be neglected, the apprehended danger of +which seems to be the only objection against understanding the +precept in this strict sense.</p> +<p>III. The general temper of mind which the due love of +our neighbour would form us to, and the influence it would have +upon our behaviour in life, is now to be considered.</p> +<p>The temper and behaviour of charity is explained at large in +that known passage of St. Paul: <a name="citation27"></a><a +href="#footnote27" class="citation">[27]</a> <i>Charity suffereth +long</i>, <i>and is kind</i>; <i>charity envieth not</i>, <i>doth +not behave itself unseemly</i>, <i>seeketh not her own</i>, +<i>thinketh no evil</i>, <i>beareth all things</i>, <i>believeth +all things</i>, <i>hopeth all things</i>. As to the meaning +of the expressions, <i>seeketh not her own</i>, <i>thinketh no +evil</i>, <i>believeth all things</i>; however those expressions +may be explained away, this meekness, and in some degree easiness +of temper, readiness to forego our right for the sake of peace, +as well as in the way of compassion, freedom from mistrust, and +disposition to believe well of our neighbour, this general +temper, I say, accompanies, and is plainly the effect of love and +goodwill. And, though such is the world in which we live, +that experience and knowledge of it not only may, but must beget, +in as greater regard to ourselves, and doubtfulness of the +characters of others, than is natural to mankind, yet these ought +not to be carried further than the nature and course of things +make necessary. It is still true, even in the present state +of things, bad as it is, that a real good man had rather be +deceived than be suspicious; had rather forego his known right, +than run the venture of doing even a hard thing. This is +the general temper of that charity, of which the apostle asserts, +that if he had it not, giving his <i>body to be burned would +avail him nothing</i>; and which he says <i>shall never +fail</i>.</p> +<p>The happy influence of this temper extends to every different +relation and circumstance in human life. It plainly renders +a man better, more to be desired, as to all the respects and +relations we can stand in to each other. The benevolent man +is disposed to make use of all external advantages in such a +manner as shall contribute to the good of others, as well as to +his own satisfaction. His own satisfaction consists in +this. He will be easy and kind to his dependents, +compassionate to the poor and distressed, friendly to all with +whom he has to do. This includes the good neighbour, +parent, master, magistrate: and such a behaviour would plainly +make dependence, inferiority, and even servitude easy. So +that a good or charitable man of superior rank in wisdom, +fortune, authority, is a common blessing to the place he lives +in: happiness grows under his influence. This good +principle in inferiors would discover itself in paying respect, +gratitude, obedience, as due. It were therefore, methinks, +one just way of trying one’s own character to ask +ourselves, am I in reality a better master or servant, a better +friend, a better neighbour, than such and such persons, whom, +perhaps, I may think not to deserve the character of virtue and +religion so much as myself?</p> +<p>And as to the spirit of party, which unhappily prevails +amongst mankind, whatever are the distinctions which serve for a +supply to it, some or other of which have obtained in all ages +and countries, one who is thus friendly to his kind will +immediately make due allowances for it, as what cannot but be +amongst such creatures as men, in such a world as this. And +as wrath and fury and overbearing upon these occasions proceed, +as I may speak, from men’s feeling only on their own side, +so a common feeling, for others as well as for ourselves, would +render us sensible to this truth, which it is strange can have so +little influence, that we ourselves differ from others, just as +much as they do from us. I put the matter in this way, +because it can scarce be expected that the generality of men +should see that those things which are made the occasions of +dissension and fomenting the party-spirit are really nothing at +all: but it may be expected from all people, how much soever they +are in earnest about their respective peculiarities, that +humanity and common goodwill to their fellow-creatures should +moderate and restrain that wretched spirit.</p> +<p>This good temper of charity likewise would prevent strife and +enmity arising from other occasions: it would prevent our giving +just cause of offence, and our taking it without cause. And +in cases of real injury, a good man will make all the allowances +which are to be made, and, without any attempts of retaliation, +he will only consult his own and other men’s security for +the future against injustice and wrong.</p> +<p>IV. I proceed to consider, lastly, what is affirmed of +the precept now explained, that it comprehends in it all others, +<i>i.e.</i>, that to love our neighbour as ourselves includes in +it all virtues.</p> +<p>Now the way in which every maxim of conduct, or general +speculative assertion, when it is to be explained at large should +be treated, is, to show what are the particular truths which were +designed to be comprehended under such a general observation, how +far it is strictly true, and then the limitations, restrictions, +and exceptions, if there be exceptions, with which it is to be +understood. But it is only the former of these, namely, how +far the assertion in the text holds, and the ground of the +pre-eminence assigned to the precept of it, which in strictness +comes into our present consideration.</p> +<p>However, in almost everything that is said, there is somewhat +to be understood beyond what is explicitly laid down, and which +we of course supply, somewhat, I mean, which would not be +commonly called a restriction or limitation. Thus, when +benevolence is said to be the sum of virtue, it is not spoken of +as a blind propension, but a principle in reasonable creatures, +and so to be directed by their reason, for reason and reflection +comes into our notion of a moral agent. And that will lead +us to consider distant consequences, as well as the immediate +tendency of an action. It will teach us that the care of +some persons, suppose children and families, is particularly +committed to our charge by Nature and Providence, as also that +there are other circumstances, suppose friendship or former +obligations, which require that we do good to some, preferably to +others. Reason, considered merely as subservient to +benevolence, as assisting to produce the greatest good, will +teach us to have particular regard to these relations and +circumstances, because it is plainly for the good of the world +that they should be regarded. And as there are numberless +cases in which, notwithstanding appearances, we are not competent +judges, whether a particular action will upon the whole do good +or harm, reason in the same way will teach us to be cautious how +we act in these cases of uncertainty. It will suggest to +our consideration which is the safer side; how liable we are to +be led wrong by passion and private interest; and what regard is +due to laws, and the judgment of mankind. All these things +must come into consideration, were it only in order to determine +which way of acting is likely to produce the greatest good. +Thus, upon supposition that it were in the strictest sense true, +without limitation, that benevolence includes in it all virtues, +yet reason must come in as its guide and director, in order to +attain its own end, the end of benevolence, the greatest public +good. Reason, then, being thus included, let us now +consider the truth of the assertion itself.</p> +<p>First, It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to +mankind or any creature but happiness. This, then, is all +which any person can, in strictness of speaking, be said to have +a right to. We can therefore <i>owe no man anything</i>, +but only to farther and promote his happiness, according to our +abilities. And therefore a disposition and endeavour to do +good to all with whom we have to do, in the degree and manner +which the different relations we stand in to them require, is a +discharge of all the obligations we are under to them.</p> +<p>As human nature is not one simple uniform thing but a +composition of various parts, body, spirit, appetites, particular +passions, and affections, for each of which reasonable self-love +would lead men to have due regard, and make suitable provision, +so society consists of various parts to which we stand in +different respects and relations, and just benevolence would as +surely lead us to have due regard to each of these and behave as +the respective relations require. Reasonable goodwill and +right behaviour towards our fellow-creatures are in a manner the +same, only that the former expresseth the principle as it is in +the mind; the latter, the principle as it were become external, +<i>i.e.</i>, exerted in actions.</p> +<p>And so far as temperance, sobriety, and moderation in sensual +pleasures, and the contrary vices, have any respect to our +fellow-creatures, any influence upon their quiet, welfare, and +happiness, as they always have a real, and often a near influence +upon it, so far it is manifest those virtues may be produced by +the love of our neighbour, and that the contrary vices would be +prevented by it. Indeed, if men’s regard to +themselves will not restrain them from excess, it may be thought +little probable that their love to others will be sufficient: but +the reason is, that their love to others is not, any more than +their regard to themselves, just, and in its due degree. +There are, however, manifest instances of persons kept sober and +temperate from regard to their affairs, and the welfare of those +who depend upon them. And it is obvious to every one that +habitual excess, a dissolute course of life, implies a general +neglect of the duties we owe towards our friends, our families, +and our country.</p> +<p>From hence it is manifest that the common virtues and the +common vices of mankind may be traced up to benevolence, or the +want of it. And this entitles the precept, <i>Thou shalt +love thy neighbour as thyself</i>, to the pre-eminence given to +it, and is a justification of the apostle’s assertion, that +all other commandments are comprehended in it, whatever cautions +and restrictions <a name="citation28"></a><a href="#footnote28" +class="citation">[28]</a> there are, which might require to be +considered, if we were to state particularly and at length what +is virtue and right behaviour in mankind. But,</p> +<p>Secondly, It might be added, that in a higher and more general +way of consideration, leaving out the particular nature of +creatures, and the particular circumstances in which they are +placed, benevolence seems in the strictest sense to include in it +all that is good and worthy, all that is good, which we have any +distinct particular notion of. We have no clear conception +of any position moral attribute in the Supreme Being, but what +may be resolved up into goodness. And, if we consider a +reasonable creature or moral agent, without regard to the +particular relations and circumstances in which he is placed, we +cannot conceive anything else to come in towards determining +whether he is to be ranked in a higher or lower class of virtuous +beings, but the higher or lower degree in which that principle, +and what is manifestly connected with it, prevail in him.</p> +<p>That which we more strictly call piety, or the love of God, +and which is an essential part of a right temper, some may +perhaps imagine no way connected with benevolence: yet surely +they must be connected, if there be indeed in being an object +infinitely good. Human nature is so constituted that every +good affection implies the love of itself, <i>i.e.</i>, becomes +the object of a new affection in the same person. Thus, to +be righteous, implies in it the love of righteousness; to be +benevolent, the love of benevolence; to be good, the love of +goodness; whether this righteousness, benevolence, or goodness be +viewed as in our own mind or another’s, and the love of God +as a being perfectly good is the love of perfect goodness +contemplated in a being or person. Thus morality and +religion, virtue and piety, will at last necessarily coincide, +run up into one and the same point, and <i>love</i> will be in +all senses <i>the end of the commandment</i>.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">* * * * *</p> +<p><i>O Almighty God</i>, <i>inspire us with this divine +principle</i>; <i>kill in us all the seeds of envy and +ill-will</i>; <i>and help us</i>, <i>by cultivating within +ourselves the love of our neighbour</i>, <i>to improve in the +love of Thee</i>. <i>Thou hast placed us in various +kindreds</i>, <i>friendships</i>, <i>and relations</i>, <i>as the +school of discipline for our affections</i>: <i>help us</i>, +<i>by the due exercise of them</i>, <i>to improve to +perfection</i>; <i>till all partial affection be lost in that +entire universal one</i>, <i>and thou</i>, <i>O God</i>, +<i>shalt</i> be all in all.</p> +<h2>SERMON XIII., XIV. UPON THE LOVE OF GOD.</h2> +<blockquote><p><span class="smcap">Matthew</span> xxii. 37.</p> +<p><i>Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart</i>, +<i>and with all thy soul</i>, <i>and with all thy mind</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Everybody knows, you therefore need only just be put in mind, +that there is such a thing as having so great horror of one +extreme as to run insensibly and of course into the contrary; and +that a doctrine’s having been a shelter for enthusiasm, or +made to serve the purposes of superstition, is no proof of the +falsity of it: truth or right being somewhat real in itself, and +so not to be judged of by its liableness to abuse, or by its +supposed distance from or nearness to error. It may be +sufficient to have mentioned this in general, without taking +notice of the particular extravagances which have been vented +under the pretence or endeavour of explaining the love of God; or +how manifestly we are got into the contrary extreme, under the +notion of a reasonable religion; so very reasonable as to have +nothing to do with the heart and affections, if these words +signify anything but the faculty by which we discern speculative +truth.</p> +<p>By the love of God I would understand all those regards, all +those affections of mind which are due immediately to Him from +such a creature as man, and which rest in Him as their end. +As this does not include servile fear, so neither will any other +regards, how reasonable soever, which respect anything out of or +besides the perfection of the Divine nature, come into +consideration here. But all fear is not excluded, because +His displeasure is itself the natural proper object of +fear. Reverence, ambition of His love and approbation, +delight in the hope or consciousness of it, come likewise into +this definition of the love of God, because He is the natural +object of all those affections or movements of mind as really as +He is the object of the affection, which is in the strictest +sense called love; and all of them equally rest in Him as their +end. And they may all be understood to be implied in these +words of our Saviour, without putting any force upon them: for He +is speaking of the love of God and our neighbour as containing +the whole of piety and virtue.</p> +<p>It is plain that the nature of man is so constituted as to +feel certain affections upon the sight or contemplation of +certain objects. Now the very notion of affection implies +resting in its object as an end. And the particular +affection to good characters, reverence and moral love of them, +is natural to all those who have any degree of real goodness in +themselves. This will be illustrated by the description of +a perfect character in a creature; and by considering the manner +in which a good man in his presence would be affected towards +such a character. He would of course feel the affections of +love, reverence, desire of his approbation, delight in the hope +or consciousness of it. And surely all this is applicable, +and may be brought up to that Being, who is infinitely more than +an adequate object of all those affections; whom we are commanded +to <i>love with all our heart</i>, <i>with all our soul</i>, +<i>and with all our mind</i>. And of these regards towards +Almighty God some are more particularly suitable to and becoming +so imperfect a creature as man, in this mortal state we are +passing through; and some of them, and perhaps other exercises of +the mind, will be the employment and happiness of good men in a +state of perfection.</p> +<p>This is a general view of what the following discourse will +contain. And it is manifest the subject is a real one: +there is nothing in it enthusiastical or unreasonable. And +if it be indeed at all a subject, it is one of the utmost +importance.</p> +<p>As mankind have a faculty by which they discern speculative +truth, so we have various affections towards external +objects. Understanding and temper, reason and affection, +are as distinct ideas as reason and hunger, and one would think +could no more be confounded. It is by reason that we get +the ideas of several objects of our affections; but in these +cases reason and affection are no more the same than sight of a +particular object, and the pleasure or uneasiness consequent +thereupon, are the same. Now as reason tends to and rests +in the discernment of truth, the object of it, so the very nature +of affection consists in tending towards, and resting in, its +objects as an end. We do indeed often in common language +say that things are loved, desired, esteemed, not for themselves, +but for somewhat further, somewhat out of and beyond them; yet, +in these cases, whoever will attend will see that these things +are not in reality the objects of the affections, <i>i.e.</i> are +not loved, desired, esteemed, but the somewhat further and beyond +them. If we have no affections which rest in what are +called their objects, then what is called affection, love, +desire, hope, in human nature, is only an uneasiness in being at +rest; an unquiet disposition to action, progress, pursuit, +without end or meaning. But if there be any such thing as +delight in the company of one person, rather than of another; +whether in the way of friendship, or mirth and entertainment, it +is all one, if it be without respect to fortune, honour, or +increasing our stores of knowledge, or anything beyond the +present time; here is an instance of an affection absolutely +resting in its object as its end, and being gratified in the same +way as the appetite of hunger is satisfied with food. Yet +nothing is more common than to hear it asked, what advantage a +man hath in such a course, suppose of study, particular +friendships, or in any other; nothing, I say, is more common than +to hear such a question put in a way which supposes no gain, +advantage, or interest, but as a means to somewhat further: and +if so, then there is no such thing at all as real interest, gain, +or advantage. This is the same absurdity with respect to +life as an infinite series of effects without a cause is in +speculation. The gain, advantage, or interest consists in +the delight itself, arising from such a faculty’s having +its object: neither is there any such thing as happiness or +enjoyment but what arises from hence. The pleasures of hope +and of reflection are not exceptions: the former being only this +happiness anticipated; the latter the same happiness enjoyed over +again after its time. And even the general expectation of +future happiness can afford satisfaction only as it is a present +object to the principle of self-love.</p> +<p>It was doubtless intended that life should be very much a +pursuit to the gross of mankind. But this is carried so +much further than is reasonable that what gives immediate +satisfaction, <i>i.e.</i> our present interest, is scarce +considered as our interest at all. It is inventions which +have only a remote tendency towards enjoyment, perhaps but a +remote tendency towards gaining the means only of enjoyment, +which are chiefly spoken of as useful to the world. And +though this way of thinking were just with respect to the +imperfect state we are now in, where we know so little of +satisfaction without satiety, yet it must be guarded against when +we are considering the happiness of a state of perfection; which +happiness being enjoyment and not hope, must necessarily consist +in this, that our affections have their objects, and rest in +those objects as an end, <i>i.e.</i> be satisfied with +them. This will further appear in the sequel of this +discourse.</p> +<p>Of the several affections, or inward sensations, which +particular objects excite in man, there are some, the having of +which implies the love of them, when they are reflected upon. <a +name="citation29"></a><a href="#footnote29" +class="citation">[29]</a> This cannot be said of all our +affections, principles, and motives of action. It were +ridiculous to assert that a man upon reflection hath the same +kind of approbation of the appetite of hunger or the passion of +fear as he hath of goodwill to his fellow-creatures. To be +a just, a good, a righteous man, plainly carries with it a +peculiar affection to or love of justice, goodness, +righteousness, when these principles are the objects of +contemplation.</p> +<p>Now if a man approves of, or hath an affection to, any +principle in and for itself, incidental things allowed for, it +will be the same whether he views it in his own mind or in +another; in himself or in his neighbour. This is the +account of our approbation of, or moral love and affection to +good characters; which cannot but be in those who have any +degrees of real goodness in themselves, and who discern and take +notice of the same principle in others.</p> +<p>From observation of what passes within ourselves, our own +actions, and the behaviour of others, the mind may carry on its +reflections as far as it pleases; much beyond what we experience +in ourselves, or discern in our fellow creatures. It may go +on and consider goodness as become a uniform continued principle +of action, as conducted by reason, and forming a temper and +character absolutely good and perfect, which is in a higher sense +excellent, and proportionably the object of love and +approbation.</p> +<p>Let us then suppose a creature perfect according to his +created nature—let his form be human, and his capacities no +more than equal to those of the chief of men—goodness shall +be his proper character, with wisdom to direct it, and power +within some certain determined sphere of action to exert it: but +goodness must be the simple actuating principle within him; this +being the moral quality which is amiable, or the immediate object +of love as distinct from other affections of approbation. +Here then is a finite object for our mind to tend towards, to +exercise itself upon: a creature, perfect according to his +capacity, fixed, steady, equally unmoved by weak pity or more +weak fury and resentment; forming the justest scheme of conduct; +going on undisturbed in the execution of it, through the several +methods of severity and reward, towards his end, namely, the +general happiness of all with whom he hath to do, as in itself +right and valuable. This character, though uniform in +itself, in its principle, yet exerting itself in different ways, +or considered in different views, may by its appearing variety +move different affections. Thus, the severity of justice +would not affect us in the same way as an act of mercy. The +adventitious qualities of wisdom and power may be considered in +themselves; and even the strength of mind which this immovable +goodness supposes may likewise be viewed as an object of +contemplation distinct from the goodness itself. Superior +excellence of any kind, as well as superior wisdom and power, is +the object of awe and reverence to all creatures, whatever their +moral character be; but so far as creatures of the lowest rank +were good, so far the view of this character, as simply good, +must appear amiable to them, be the object of, or beget +love. Further suppose we were conscious that this superior +person so far approved of us that we had nothing servilely to +fear from him; that he was really our friend, and kind and good +to us in particular, as he had occasionally intercourse with us: +we must be other creatures than we are, or we could not but feel +the same kind of satisfaction and enjoyment (whatever would be +the degree of it) from this higher acquaintance and friendship as +we feel from common ones, the intercourse being real and the +persons equally present in both cases. We should have a +more ardent desire to be approved by his better judgment, and a +satisfaction in that approbation of the same sort with what would +be felt in respect to common persons, or be wrought in us by +their presence.</p> +<p>Let us now raise the character, and suppose this creature, for +we are still going on with the supposition of a creature, our +proper guardian and governor; that we were in a progress of being +towards somewhat further; and that his scheme of government was +too vast for our capacities to comprehend: remembering still that +he is perfectly good, and our friend as well as our +governor. Wisdom, power, goodness, accidentally viewed +anywhere, would inspire reverence, awe, love; and as these +affections would be raised in higher or lower degrees in +proportion as we had occasionally more or less intercourse with +the creature endued with those qualities, so this further +consideration and knowledge that he was our proper guardian and +governor would much more bring these objects and qualities home +to ourselves; teach us they had a greater respect to us in +particular, that we had a higher interest in that wisdom and +power and goodness. We should, with joy, gratitude, +reverence, love, trust, and dependence, appropriate the +character, as what we had a right in, and make our boast in such +our relation to it. And the conclusion of the whole would +be that we should refer ourselves implicitly to him, and cast +ourselves entirely upon him. As the whole attention of life +should be to obey his commands, so the highest enjoyment of it +must arise from the contemplation of this character, and our +relation to it, from a consciousness of his favour and +approbation, and from the exercise of those affections towards +him which could not but be raised from his presence. A +Being who hath these attributes, who stands in this relation, and +is thus sensibly present to the mind, must necessarily be the +object of these affections: there is as real a correspondence +between them as between the lowest appetite of sense and its +object.</p> +<p>That this Being is not a creature, but the Almighty God; that +He is of infinite power and wisdom and goodness, does not render +Him less the object of reverence and love than He would be if He +had those attributes only in a limited degree. The Being +who made us, and upon whom we entirely depend, is the object of +some regards. He hath given us certain affections of mind, +which correspond to wisdom, power, goodness, <i>i.e.</i> which +are raised upon view of those qualities. If then He be +really wise, powerful, good, He is the natural object of those +affections which He hath endued us with, and which correspond to +those attributes. That He is infinite in power, perfect in +wisdom and goodness, makes no alteration, but only that He is the +object of those affections raised to the highest pitch. He +is not, indeed, to be discerned by any of our senses. <i>I +go forward</i>, <i>but He is not there</i>; <i>and backward</i>, +<i>but I cannot perceive Him</i>: <i>on the left hand where He +doth work</i>, <i>but I cannot behold Him</i>: <i>He hideth +Himself on the right hand</i>, <i>that I cannot see Him</i>, +<i>Oh that I knew where I might find Him</i>! <i>that I might +come even to His seat</i>! <a name="citation30"></a><a +href="#footnote30" class="citation">[30]</a> But is He then +afar off? does He not fill heaven and earth with His +presence? The presence of our fellow-creatures affects our +senses, and our senses give us the knowledge of their presence; +which hath different kinds of influence upon us—love, joy, +sorrow, restraint, encouragement, reverence. However, this +influence is not immediately from our senses, but from that +knowledge. Thus suppose a person neither to see nor hear +another, not to know by any of his senses, but yet certainly to +know, that another was with him; this knowledge might, and in +many cases would, have one or more of the effects before +mentioned. It is therefore not only reasonable, but also +natural, to be affected with a presence, though it be not the +object of our senses; whether it be, or be not, is merely an +accidental circumstance, which needs not come into consideration: +it is the certainty that he is with us, and we with him, which +hath the influence. We consider persons then as present, +not only when they are within reach of our senses, but also when +we are assured by any other means that they are within such a +nearness; nay, if they are not, we can recall them to our mind, +and be moved towards them as present; and must He, who is so much +more intimately with us, that <i>in Him we live and move and have +our being</i>, be thought too distant to be the object of our +affections? We own and feel the force of amiable and worthy +qualities in our fellow creatures; and can we be insensible to +the contemplation of perfect goodness? Do we reverence the +shadows of greatness here below, are we solicitous about honour +and esteem and the opinion of the world, and shall we not feel +the same with respect to Him whose are wisdom and power in the +original, who <i>is the God of judgment by whom actions are +weighed</i>? Thus love, reverence, desire of esteem, every +faculty, every affection, tends towards and is employed about its +respective object in common cases: and must the exercise of them +be suspended with regard to Him alone who is an object, an +infinitely more than adequate object, to our most exalted +faculties; Him, <i>of whom</i>, <i>and through whom</i>, <i>and +to whom are all things</i>?</p> +<p>As we cannot remove from this earth, or change our general +business on it, so neither can we alter our real nature. +Therefore no exercise of the mind can be recommended, but only +the exercise of those faculties you are conscious of. +Religion does not demand new affections, but only claims the +direction of those you already have, those affections you daily +feel; though unhappily confined to objects not altogether +unsuitable but altogether unequal to them. We only +represent to you the higher, the adequate objects of those very +faculties and affections. Let the man of ambition go on +still to consider disgrace as the greatest evil, honour as his +chief good. But disgrace in whose estimation? Honour +in whose judgment? This is the only question. If +shame, and delight in esteem, be spoken of as real, as any +settled ground of pain or pleasure, both these must be in +proportion to the supposed wisdom, and worth of him by whom we +are contemned or esteemed. Must it then be thought +enthusiastical to speak of a sensibility of this sort which shall +have respect to an unerring judgment, to infinite wisdom, when we +are assured this unerring judgment, this infinite wisdom does +observe upon our actions?</p> +<p>It is the same with respect to the love of God in the +strictest and most confined sense. We only offer and +represent the highest object of an affection supposed already in +your mind. Some degree of goodness must be previously +supposed; this always implies the love of itself, an affection to +goodness: the highest, the adequate object of this affection, is +perfect goodness; which therefore we are to <i>love with all our +heart</i>, <i>with all our soul</i>, <i>and with all our +strength</i>. “Must we then, forgetting our own +interest, as it were go out of ourselves, and love God for His +own sake?” No more forget your own interest, no more +go out of yourselves, than when you prefer one place, one +prospect, the conversation of one man to that of another. +Does not every affection necessarily imply that the object of it +be itself loved? If it be not it is not the object of the +affection. You may, and ought if you can, but it is a great +mistake to think you can love or fear or hate anything, from +consideration that such love or fear or hatred may be a means of +obtaining good or avoiding evil. But the question whether +we ought to love God for His sake or for our own being a mere +mistake in language, the real question which this is mistaken for +will, I suppose, be answered by observing that the goodness of +God already exercised towards us, our present dependence upon +Him, and our expectation of future benefits, ought, and have a +natural tendency, to beget in us the affection of gratitude, and +greater love towards Him, than the same goodness exercised +towards others; were it only for this reason, that every +affection is moved in proportion to the sense we have of the +object of it; and we cannot but have a more lively sense of +goodness when exercised towards ourselves than when exercised +towards others. I added expectation of future benefits +because the ground of that expectation is present goodness.</p> +<p>Thus Almighty God is the natural object of the several +affections, love, reverence, fear, desire of approbation. +For though He is simply one, yet we cannot but consider Him in +partial and different views. He is in himself one uniform +Being, and for ever the same without <i>variableness or shadow of +turning</i>; but His infinite greatness, His goodness, His +wisdom, are different objects to our mind. To which is to +be added, that from the changes in our own characters, together +with His unchangeableness, we cannot but consider ourselves as +more or less the objects of His approbation, and really be +so. For if He approves what is good, He cannot, merely from +the unchangeableness of His nature, approve what is evil. +Hence must arise more various movements of mind, more different +kinds of affections. And this greater variety also is just +and reasonable in such creatures as we are, though it respects a +Being simply one, good and perfect. As some of these +actions are most particularly suitable to so imperfect a creature +as man in this mortal state we are passing through, so there may +be other exercises of mind, or some of these in higher degrees, +our employment and happiness in a state of perfection.</p> +<h2>SERMON XIV.</h2> +<p>Consider then our ignorance, the imperfection of our nature, +our virtue, and our condition in this world, with respect to aim +infinitely good and just Being, our Creator and Governor, and you +will see what religious affections of mind are most particularly +suitable to this mortal state we are passing through.</p> +<p>Though we are not affected with anything so strongly as what +we discern with our senses, and though our nature and condition +require that we be much taken up about sensible things, yet our +reason convinces us that God is present with us, and we see and +feel the effects of His goodness: He is therefore the object of +some regards. The imperfection of our virtue, joined with +the consideration of His absolute rectitude or holiness, will +scarce permit that perfection of love which entirely casts out +all fear: yet goodness is the object of love to all creatures who +have any degree of it themselves; and consciousness of a real +endeavour to approve ourselves to Him, joined with the +consideration of His goodness, as it quite excludes servile dread +and horror, so it is plainly a reasonable ground for hope of His +favour. Neither fear nor hope nor love then are excluded, +and one or another of these will prevail, according to the +different views we have of God, and ought to prevail, according +to the changes we find in our own character. There is a +temper of mind made up of, or which follows from all three, fear, +hope, love—namely, resignation to the Divine will, which is +the general temper belonging to this state; which ought to be the +habitual frame of our mind and heart, and to be exercised at +proper seasons more distinctly, in acts of devotion.</p> +<p>Resignation to the will of God is the whole of piety. It +includes in it all that is good, and is a source of the most +settled quiet and composure of mind. There is the general +principle of submission in our nature. Man is not so +constituted as to desire things, and be uneasy in the want of +them, in proportion to their known value: many other +considerations come in to determine the degrees of desire; +particularly whether the advantage we take a view of be within +the sphere of our rank. Whoever felt uneasiness upon +observing any of the advantages brute creatures have over +us? And yet it is plain they have several. It is the +same with respect to advantages belonging to creatures of a +superior order. Thus, though we see a thing to be highly +valuable, yet that it does not belong to our condition of being +is sufficient to suspend our desires after it, to make us rest +satisfied without such advantage. Now there is just the +same reason for quiet resignation in the want of everything +equally unattainable and out of our reach in particular, though +others of our species be possessed of it. All this may be +applied to the whole of life; to positive inconveniences as well +as wants, not indeed to the sensations of pain and sorrow, but to +all the uneasinesses of reflection, murmuring, and +discontent. Thus is human nature formed to compliance, +yielding, submission of temper. We find the principles of +it within us; and every one exercises it towards some objects or +other, <i>i.e.</i> feels it with regard to some persons and some +circumstances. Now this is an excellent foundation of a +reasonable and religious resignation. Nature teaches and +inclines as to take up with our lot; the consideration that the +course of things is unalterable hath a tendency to quiet the mind +under it, to beget a submission of temper to it. But when +we can add that this unalterable course is appointed and +continued by infinite wisdom and goodness, how absolute should be +our submission, how entire our trust and dependence!</p> +<p>This would reconcile us to our condition, prevent all the +supernumerary troubles arising from imagination, distant fears, +impatience—all uneasiness, except that which necessarily +arises from the calamities themselves we may be under. How +many of our cares should we by this means be disburdened +of! Cares not properly our own, how apt soever they may be +to intrude upon us, and we to admit them; the anxieties of +expectation, solicitude about success and disappointment, which +in truth are none of our concern. How open to every +gratification would that mind be which was clear of these +encumbrances!</p> +<p>Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be perfect +when our will is lost and resolved up into His: when we rest in +His will as our end, as being itself most just and right and +good. And where is the impossibility of such an affection +to what is just, and right, and good, such a loyalty of heart to +the Governor of the universe as shall prevail over all sinister +indirect desires of our own? Neither is this at bottom +anything more than faith and honesty and fairness of +mind—in a more enlarged sense indeed than those words are +commonly used. And as, in common cases, fear and hope and +other passions are raised in us by their respective objects, so +this submission of heart and soul and mind, this religious +resignation, would be as naturally produced by our having just +conceptions of Almighty God, and a real sense of His presence +with us. In how low a degree soever this temper usually +prevails amongst men, yet it is a temper right in itself: it is +what we owe to our Creator: it is particularly suitable to our +mortal condition, and what we should endeavour after for our own +sakes in our passage through such a world as this, where is +nothing upon which we can rest or depend, nothing but what we are +liable to be deceived and disappointed in. Thus we might +<i>acquaint ourselves with God</i>, <i>and be at peace</i>. +This is piety an religion in the strictest sense, considered as a +habit of mind: an habitual sense of God’s presence with us; +being affected towards Him, as present, in the manner His +superior nature requires from such a creature as man: this is to +<i>walk with God</i>.</p> +<p>Little more need be said of devotion or religious worship than +that it is this temper exerted into act. The nature of it +consists in the actual exercise of those affections towards God +which are supposed habitual in good men. He is always +equally present with us: but we are so much taken up with +sensible things that, <i>Lo</i>, <i>He goeth by us</i>, <i>and we +see Him not</i>: <i>He passeth on also</i>, <i>but we perceive +Him not</i>. <a name="citation31"></a><a href="#footnote31" +class="citation">[31]</a> Devotion is retirement from the +world He has made to Him alone: it is to withdraw from the +avocations of sense, to employ our attention wholly upon Him as +upon an object actually present, to yield ourselves up to the +influence of the Divine presence, and to give full scope to the +affections of gratitude, love, reverence, trust, and dependence; +of which infinite power, wisdom, and goodness is the natural and +only adequate object. We may apply to the whole of devotion +those words of the Son of Sirach, <i>When you glorify the +Lord</i>, <i>exalt Him as much as you can</i>; <i>for even yet +will He far exceed</i>: <i>and when you exalt Him</i>, <i>put +forth all your strength</i>, <i>and be not weary</i>; <i>for you +can never go far enough</i>. <a name="citation32"></a><a +href="#footnote32" class="citation">[32]</a> Our most +raised affections of every kind cannot but fall short and be +disproportionate when an infinite being is the object of +them. This is the highest exercise and employment of mind +that a creature is capable of. As this divine service and +worship is itself absolutely due to God, so also is it necessary +in order to a further end, to keep alive upon our minds a sense +of His authority, a sense that in our ordinary behaviour amongst +men we act under him as our Governor and Judge.</p> +<p>Thus you see the temper of mind respecting God which is +particularly suitable to a state of imperfection, to creatures in +a progress of being towards somewhat further.</p> +<p>Suppose now this something further attained, that we were +arrived at it, what a perception will it be to see and know and +feel that our trust was not vain, our dependence not +groundless? That the issue, event, and consummation came +out such as fully to justify and answer that resignation? +If the obscure view of the divine perfection which we have in +this world ought in just consequence to beget an entire +resignation, what will this resignation be exalted into when +<i>we shall see face to face</i>, <i>and know as we are +known</i>? If we cannot form any distinct notion of that +perfection of the love of God which <i>casts out all fear</i>, of +that enjoyment of Him which will be the happiness of good men +hereafter, the consideration of our wants and capacities of +happiness, and that He will be adequate supply to them, must +serve us instead of such distinct conception of the particular +happiness itself.</p> +<p>Let us then suppose a man entirely disengaged from business +and pleasure, sitting down alone and at leisure, to reflect upon +himself and his own condition of being. He would +immediately feel that he was by no means complete of himself, but +totally insufficient for his own happiness. One may venture +to affirm that every man hath felt this, whether he hath again +reflected upon it or not. It is feeling this deficiency, +that they are unsatisfied with themselves, which makes men look +out for assistance from abroad, and which has given rise to +various kinds of amusements, altogether needless any otherwise +than as they serve to fill up the blank spaces of time, and so +hinder their feeling this deficiency, and being uneasy with +themselves. Now, if these external things we take up with +were really an adequate supply to this deficiency of human +nature, if by their means our capacities and desires were all +satisfied and filled up, then it might be truly said that we had +found out the proper happiness of man, and so might sit down +satisfied, and be at rest in the enjoyment of it. But if it +appears that the amusements which men usually pass their time in +are so far from coming up to or answering our notions and desires +of happiness or good that they are really no more than what they +are commonly called, somewhat to pass away the time, <i>i.e.</i> +somewhat which serves to turn us aside from, and prevent our +attending to, this our internal poverty and want; if they serve +only, or chiefly, to suspend instead of satisfying our +conceptions and desires of happiness; if the want remains, and we +have found out little more than barely the means of making it +less sensible; then are we still to seek for somewhat to be an +adequate supply to it. It is plain that there is a capacity +in the nature of man which neither riches nor honours nor sensual +gratifications, nor anything in this world, can perfectly fill up +or satisfy: there is a deeper and more essential want than any of +these things can be the supply of. Yet surely there is a +possibility of somewhat which may fill up all our capacities of +happiness, somewhat in which our souls may find rest, somewhat +which may be to us that satisfactory good we are inquiring +after. But it cannot be anything which is valuable only as +it tends to some further end. Those therefore who have got +this world so much into their hearts as not to be able to +consider happiness as consisting in anything but property and +possessions—which are only valuable as the means to +somewhat else—cannot have the least glimpse of the subject +before us, which is the end, not the means; the thing itself, not +somewhat in order to it. But if you can lay aside that +general, confused, undeterminate notion of happiness, as +consisting in such possessions, and fix in your thoughts that it +really can consist in nothing but in a faculty’s having its +proper object, you will clearly see that in the coolest way of +consideration, without either the heat of fanciful enthusiasm or +the warmth of real devotion, nothing is more certain than that an +infinite Being may Himself be, if He pleases, the supply to all +the capacities of our nature. All the common enjoyments of +life are from the faculties He hath endued us with and the +objects He hath made suitable to them. He may Himself be to +us infinitely more than all these; He may be to us all that we +want. As our understanding can contemplate itself, and our +affections be exercised upon themselves by reflection, so may +each be employed in the same manner upon any other mind; and +since the Supreme Mind, the Author and Cause of all things, is +the highest possible object to Himself, He may be an adequate +supply to all the faculties of our souls, a subject to our +understanding, and an object to our affections.</p> +<p>Consider then: when we shall have put off this mortal body, +when we shall be divested of sensual appetites, and those +possessions which are now the means of gratification shall be of +no avail, when this restless scene of business and vain +pleasures, which now diverts us from ourselves, shall be all +over, we, our proper self, shall still remain: we shall still +continue the same creatures we are, with wants to be supplied and +capacities of happiness. We must have faculties of +perception, though not sensitive ones; and pleasure or uneasiness +from our perceptions, as now we have.</p> +<p>There are certain ideas which we express by the words order, +harmony, proportion, beauty, the furthest removed from anything +sensual. Now what is there in those intellectual images, +forms, or ideas, which begets that approbation, love, delight, +and even rapture, which is seen in some persons’ faces upon +having those objects present to their minds?—“Mere +enthusiasm!”—Be it what it will: there are objects, +works of nature and of art, which all mankind have delight from +quite distinct from their affording gratification to sensual +appetites, and from quite another view of them than as being for +their interest and further advantage. The faculties from +which we are capable of these pleasures, and the pleasures +themselves, are as natural, and as much to be accounted for, as +any sensual appetite whatever, and the pleasure from its +gratification. Words to be sure are wanting upon this +subject; to say that everything of grace and beauty throughout +the whole of nature, everything excellent and amiable shared in +differently lower degrees by the whole creation, meet in the +Author and Cause of all things, this is an inadequate and perhaps +improper way of speaking of the Divine nature; but it is manifest +that absolute rectitude, the perfection of being, must be in all +senses, and in every respect, the highest object to the mind.</p> +<p>In this world it is only the effects of wisdom and power and +greatness which we discern; it is not impossible that hereafter +the qualities themselves in the supreme Being may be the +immediate object of contemplation. What amazing wonders are +opened to view by late improvements! What an object is the +universe to a creature, if there be a creature who can comprehend +its system! But it must be an infinitely higher exercise of +the understanding to view the scheme of it in that mind which +projected it before its foundations were laid. And surely +we have meaning to the words when we speak of going further, and +viewing, not only this system in His mind, but the wisdom and +intelligence itself from whence it proceeded. The same may +be said of power. But since wisdom and power are not God, +He is a wise, a powerful Being; the divine nature may therefore +be a further object to the understanding. It is nothing to +observe that our senses give us but an imperfect knowledge of +things: effects themselves, if we knew them thoroughly, would +give us but imperfect notions of wisdom and power; much less of +His being in whom they reside. I am not speaking of any +fanciful notion of seeing all things in God, but only +representing to you how much a higher object to the understanding +an infinite Being Himself is than the things which He has made; +and this is no more than saying that the Creator is superior to +the works of His hands.</p> +<p>This may be illustrated by a low example. Suppose a +machine, the sight of which would raise, and discoveries in its +contrivance gratify, our curiosity: the real delight in this case +would arise from its being the effect of skill and +contrivance. This skill in the mind of the artificer would +be a higher object, if we had any senses or ways to discern +it. For, observe, the contemplation of that principle, +faculty, or power which produced any effect must be a higher +exercise of the understanding than the contemplation of the +effect itself. The cause must be a higher object to the +mind than the effect.</p> +<p>But whoever considers distinctly what the delight of knowledge +is will see reason to be satisfied that it cannot be the chief +good of man: all this, as it is applicable, so it was mentioned +with regard to the attribute of goodness. I say +goodness. Our being and all our enjoyments are the effects +of it: just men bear its resemblance; but how little do we know +of the original, of what it is in itself? Recall what was +before observed concerning the affection to moral +characters—which, in how low a degree soever, yet is +plainly natural to man, and the most excellent part of his +nature. Suppose this improved, as it may be improved, to +any degree whatever, in the <i>spirits of just men made +perfect</i>; and then suppose that they had a real view of that +<i>righteousness which is an everlasting righteousness</i>, of +the conformity of the Divine will to <i>the law of truth</i> in +which the moral attributes of God consist, of that goodness in +the sovereign Mind which gave birth to the universe. Add, +what will be true of all good men hereafter, a consciousness of +having an interest in what they are contemplating—suppose +them able to say, <i>This God is our God for ever and +ever</i>. Would they be any longer to seek for what was +their chief happiness, their final good? Could the utmost +stretch of their capacities look further? Would not +infinite perfect goodness be their very end, the last end and +object of their affections, beyond which they could neither have +nor desire, beyond which they could not form a wish or +thought?</p> +<p>Consider wherein that presence of a friend consists which has +often so strong an effect as wholly to possess the mind, and +entirely suspend all other affections and regards, and which +itself affords the highest satisfaction and enjoyment. He +is within reach of the senses. Now as our capacities of +perception improve we shall have, perhaps by some faculty +entirely new, a perception of God’s presence with us in a +nearer and stricter way, since it is certain He is more +intimately present with us than anything else can be. Proof +of the existence and presence of any being is quite different +from the immediate perception, the consciousness of it. +What then will be the joy of heart which His presence and <i>the +light of His countenance</i>, who is the life of the universe, +will inspire good men with when they shall have a sensation that +He is the sustainer of their being, that they exist in Him; when +they shall feel His influence to cheer and enliven and support +their frame, in a manner of which we have now no +conception? He will be in a literal sense <i>their strength +and their portion for ever</i>.</p> +<p>When we speak of things so much above our comprehension as the +employment and happiness of a future state, doubtless it behoves +us to speak with all modesty and distrust of ourselves. But +the Scripture represents the happiness of that state under the +notions of <i>seeing God</i>, <i>seeing Him as He is</i>, +<i>knowing as we are known</i>, <i>and seeing face to +face</i>. These words are not general or undetermined, but +express a particular determinate happiness. And I will be +bold to say that nothing can account for or come up to these +expressions but only this, that God Himself will be an object to +our faculties, that He Himself will be our happiness as +distinguished from the enjoyments of the present state, which +seem to arise not immediately from Him but from the objects He +has adapted to give us delight.</p> +<p>To conclude: Let us suppose a person tired with care and +sorrow and the repetition of vain delights which fill up the +round of life; sensible that everything here below in its best +estate is altogether vanity. Suppose him to feel that +deficiency of human nature before taken notice of, and to be +convinced that God alone was the adequate supply to it. +What could be more applicable to a good man in this state of +mind, or better express his present wants and distant hopes, his +passage through this world as a progress towards a state of +perfection, than the following passages in the devotions of the +royal prophet? They are plainly in a higher and more proper +sense applicable to this than they could be to anything +else. <i>I have seen an end of all perfection</i>. +<i>Whom have I in heaven but Thee</i>? <i>And there is none +upon earth that I desire in comparison of Thee</i>. <i>My +flesh and may heart faileth</i>: <i>but God is the strength of my +heart and my portion for ever</i>. <i>Like as the hart +desireth the water-brooks</i>, <i>so longeth my soul after +Thee</i>, <i>O God</i>. <i>My soul is athirst for God</i>, +<i>yea</i>, <i>even for the living God</i>: <i>when shall I come +to appear before Him</i>? <i>How excellent is Thy +loving-kindness</i>, <i>O God</i>! <i>and the children of men +shall put their trust under the shadow of Thy wings</i>. +<i>They shall be satisfied with the plenteousness of Thy +house</i>: <i>and Thou shalt give them drink of Thy +pleasures</i>, <i>as out of the river</i>. <i>For with Thee +is the well of life</i>: <i>and in Thy light shall we see +light</i>. <i>Blessed is the man whom Thou choosest</i>, +<i>and receivest unto Thee</i>: <i>he shall dwell in Thy +court</i>, <i>and shall be satisfied with the pleasures of Thy +house</i>, <i>even of Thy holy temple</i>. <i>Blessed is +the people</i>, <i>O Lord</i>, <i>that can rejoice in Thee</i>: +<i>they shall walk in the light of Thy countenance</i>. +<i>Their delight shall be daily in Thy name</i>, <i>and in Thy +righteousness shall they make their boast</i>. <i>For Thou +art the glory of their strength</i>: <i>and in Thy lovingkindness +they shall be exalted</i>. <i>As for me</i>, <i>I will +behold Thy presence in righteousness</i>: <i>and when I awake up +after Thy likeness</i>, <i>I shall be satisfied with +it</i>. <i>Thou shalt shew me the path of life</i>; <i>in +Thy presence is the fulness of joy</i>, <i>and at Thy right hand +there is pleasure for evermore</i>.</p> +<h2>Footnotes:</h2> +<p><a name="footnote1"></a><a href="#citation1" +class="footnote">[1]</a> 1 Cor. xii</p> +<p><a name="footnote2"></a><a href="#citation2" +class="footnote">[2]</a> Suppose a man of learning to be +writing a grave book upon <i>human nature</i>, and to show in +several parts of it that he had an insight into the subject he +was considering, amongst other things, the following one would +require to be accounted for—the appearance of benevolence +or good-will in men towards each other in the instances of +natural relation, and in others. <a name="citation2a"></a><a +href="#footnote2a" class="citation">[2a]</a> Cautions of +being deceived with outward show, he retires within himself to +see exactly what that is in the mind of man from whence this +appearance proceeds; and, upon deep reflection, asserts the +principle in the mind to be only the love of power, and delight +in the exercise of it. Would not everybody think here was a +mistake of one word for another—that the philosopher was +contemplating and accounting for some other <i>human actions</i>, +some other behaviour of man to man? And could any one be +thoroughly satisfied that what is commonly called benevolence or +good-will was really the affection meant, but only by being made +to understand that this learned person had a general hypothesis, +to which the appearance of good-will could no otherwise be +reconciled? That what has this appearance is often nothing +but ambition; that delight in superiority often (suppose always) +mixes itself with benevolence, only makes it more specious to +call it ambition than hunger, of the two: but in reality that +passion does no more account for the whole appearances of +good-will than this appetite does. Is there not often the +appearance of one man’s wishing that good to another, which +he knows himself unable to procure him; and rejoicing in it, +though bestowed by a third person? And can love of power +any way possibly come in to account for this desire or +delight? Is there not often the appearance of men’s +distinguishing between two or more persons, preferring one before +another, to do good to, in cases where love of power cannot in +the least account for the distinction and preference? For +this principle can no otherwise distinguish between objects than +as it is a greater instance and exertion of power to do good to +one rather than to another. Again, suppose good-will in the +mind of man to be nothing but delight in the exercise of power: +men might indeed be restrained by distant and accidental +consideration; but these restraints being removed, they would +have a disposition to, and delight in, mischief as an exercise +and proof of power: and this disposition and delight would arise +from, or be the same principle in the mind, as a disposition to +and delight in charity. Thus cruelty, as distinct from envy +and resentment, would be exactly the same in the mind of man as +good-will: that one tends to the happiness, the other to the +misery, of our fellow-creatures, is, it seems, merely an +accidental circumstance, which the mind has not the least regard +to. These are the absurdities which even men of capacity +run into when they have occasion to belie their nature, and will +perversely disclaim that image of God which was originally +stamped upon it, the traces of which, however faint, are plainly +discernible upon the mind of man.</p> +<p>If any person can in earnest doubt whether there be such a +thing as good-will in one man towards another (for the question +is not concerning either the degree or extensiveness of it, but +concerning the affection itself), let it be observed that +<i>whether man be thus</i>, <i>or otherwise constituted</i>, +<i>what is the inward frame in this particular</i> is a mere +question of fact of natural history not provable immediately by +reason. It is therefore to be judged of and determined in +the same way other facts or matters of natural history +are—by appealing to the external senses, or inward +perceptions respectively, as the matter under consideration is +cognisable by one or the other: by arguing from acknowledged +facts and actions for a great number of actions in the same kind, +in different circumstances, and respecting different objects, +will prove to a certainty what principles they do not, and to the +greatest probability what principles they do, proceed from: and, +lastly, by the testimony of mankind. Now that there is some +degree of benevolence amongst men may be as strongly and plainly +proved in all these ways, as it could possibly be proved, +supposing there was this affection in our nature. And +should any one think fit to assert that resentment in the mind of +man was absolutely nothing but reasonable concern for our own +safety, the falsity of this, and what is the real nature of that +passion, could be shown in no other ways than those in which it +may be shown that there is such a thing in <i>some degree</i> as +real good-will in man towards man. It is sufficient that +the seeds of it be implanted in our nature by God. There +is, it is owned, much left for us to do upon our own heart and +temper; to cultivate, to improve, to call it forth, to exercise +it in a steady, uniform manner. This is our work: this is +virtue and religion.</p> +<p><a name="footnote2a"></a><a href="#citation2a" +class="footnote">[2a]</a> Hobbes, “Of Human +Nature,” c. ix. 7.</p> +<p><a name="footnote3"></a><a href="#citation3" +class="footnote">[3]</a> Everybody makes a distinction +between self-love and the several particular passions, appetites, +and affections; and yet they are often confounded again. +That they are totally different, will be seen by any one who will +distinguish between the passions and appetites <i>themselves</i>, +and <i>endeavouring</i> after the means of their +gratification. Consider the appetite of hunger, and the +desire of esteem: these being the occasion both of pleasure and +pain, the coolest self-love, as well as the appetites and +passions themselves, may put us upon making use of the <i>proper +methods of obtaining</i> that pleasure, and avoiding that pain; +but the <i>feelings</i> themselves, the pain of hunger and shame, +and the delight from esteem, are no more self-love than they are +anything in the world. Though a man hated himself, he would +as much feel the pain of hunger as he would that of the gout; and +it is plainly supposable there may be creatures with self-love in +them to the highest degree, who may be quite insensible and +indifferent (as men in some cases are) to the contempt and esteem +of those upon whom their happiness does not in some further +respects depend. And as self-love and the several +particular passions and appetites are in themselves totally +different, so that some actions proceed from one and some from +the other will be manifest to any who will observe the two +following very supposable cases. One man rushes upon +certain ruin for the gratification of a present desire: nobody +will call the principle of this action self-love. Suppose +another man to go through some laborious work upon promise of a +great reward, without any distinct knowledge what the reward will +be: this course of action cannot be ascribed to any particular +passion. The former of these actions is plainly to be +imputed to some particular passion or affection; the latter as +plainly to the general affection or principle of self-love. +That there are some particular pursuits or actions concerning +which we cannot determine how far they are owing to one, and how +far to the other, proceeds from this, that the two principles are +frequently mixed together, and run up into each other. This +distinction is further explained in the Eleventh Sermon.</p> +<p><a name="footnote4"></a><a href="#citation4" +class="footnote">[4]</a> If any desire to see this +distinction and comparison made in a particular instance, the +appetite and passion now mentioned may serve for one. +Hunger is to be considered as a private appetite, because the end +for which it was given us is the preservation of the +individual. Desire of esteem is a public passion; because +the end for which it was given us is to regulate our behaviour +towards society. The respect which this has to private good +is as remote as the respect that has to public good; and the +appetite is no more self-love than the passion is +benevolence. The object and end of the former is merely +food; the object and end of the latter is merely esteem; but the +latter can no more be gratified without contributing to the good +of society, than the former can be gratified without contributing +to the preservation of the individual.</p> +<p><a name="footnote5"></a><a href="#citation5" +class="footnote">[5]</a> Emulation is merely the desire and +hope of equality with or superiority over others with whom we +compare ourselves. There does not appear to be any other +<i>grief</i> in the natural passion, but only <i>that want</i> +which is implied in desire. However, this may be so strong +as to be the occasion of great <i>grief</i>. To desire the +attainment of this equality or superiority by the <i>particular +means</i> of others being brought down to our own level, or below +it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence +it is easy to see that the real end, which the natural passion +emulation, and which the unlawful one envy aims at, is exactly +the same; namely, that equality or superiority: and consequently, +that to do mischief is not the end of envy, but merely the means +it makes use of to attain its end. As to resentment, see +the Eighth Sermon.</p> +<p><a name="footnote6"></a><a href="#citation6" +class="footnote">[6]</a> Ephes. ii. 3.</p> +<p><a name="footnote7"></a><a href="#citation7" +class="footnote">[7]</a> Every man in his physical nature +is one individual single agent. He has likewise properties +and principles, each of which may be considered separately, and +without regard to the respects which they have to each +other. Neither of these is the nature we are taking a view +of. But it is the inward frame of man considered as a +<i>system</i> or <i>constitution</i>: whose several parts are +united, not by a physical principle of individuation, but by the +respects they have to each other; the chief of which is the +subjection which the appetites, passions, and particular +affections have to the one supreme principle of reflection or +conscience. The system or constitution is formed by and +consists in these respects and this subjection. Thus the +body is a <i>system</i> or <i>constitution</i>: so is a tree: so +is every machine. Consider all the several parts of a tree +without the natural reselects they have to each other, and you +have not at all the idea of a tree; but add these respects, and +this gives you the idea. This body may be impaired by +sickness, a tree may decay, a machine be out of order, and yet +the system and constitution of them not totally dissolved. +There is plainly somewhat which answers to all this in the moral +constitution of man. Whoever will consider his own nature +will see that the several appetites, passions, and particular +affections have different respects amongst themselves. They +are restraints upon, and are in a proportion to, each +other. This proportion is just and perfect, when all those +under principles are perfectly coincident with conscience, so far +as their nature permits, and in all cases under its absolute and +entire direction. The least excess or defect, the least +alteration of the due proportions amongst themselves, or of their +coincidence with conscience, though not proceeding into action, +is some degree of disorder in the moral constitution. But +perfection, though plainly intelligible and unsupportable, was +never attained by any man. If the higher principle of +reflection maintains its place, and as much as it can corrects +that disorder, and hinders it from breaking out into action, this +is all that can be expected in such a creature as man. And +though the appetites and passions have not their exact due +proportion to each other, though they often strive for mastery +with judgment or reflection, yet, since the superiority of this +principle to all others is the chief respect which forms the +constitution, so far as this superiority is maintained, the +character, the man, is good, worthy, virtuous.</p> +<p><a name="footnote8"></a><a href="#citation8" +class="footnote">[8]</a> Chap. iii., ver. 6.</p> +<p><a name="footnote9"></a><a href="#citation9" +class="footnote">[9]</a> Job xiii. 5.</p> +<p><a name="footnote10"></a><a href="#citation10" +class="footnote">[10]</a> Eccles. x. 3.</p> +<p><a name="footnote11"></a><a href="#citation11" +class="footnote">[11]</a> Prov. x. 19.</p> +<p><a name="footnote12"></a><a href="#citation12" +class="footnote">[12]</a> Mark xii. 38, 40.</p> +<p><a name="footnote13"></a><a href="#citation13" +class="footnote">[13]</a> There being manifestly this +appearance of men’s substituting others for themselves, and +being carried out and affected towards them as towards +themselves; some persons, who have a system which excludes every +affection of this sort, have taken a pleasant method to solve it; +and tell you it is <i>not another</i> you are at all concerned +about, but your <i>self only</i>, when you feel the affection +called compassion, <i>i.e.</i> Here is a plain matter of fact, +which men cannot reconcile with the general account they think +fit to give of things: they therefore, instead of that manifest +fact, substitute <i>another</i>, which is reconcilable to their +own scheme. For does not everybody by compassion mean an +affection, the object of which is another in distress? instead of +this, but designing to have it mistaken for this, they speak of +an affection or passion, the object of which is ourselves, or +danger to ourselves. Hobbes defines <i>pity</i>, +<i>imagination</i>, <i>or fiction of future calamity to +ourselves</i>, <i>proceeding from the sense</i> (he means sight +or knowledge) <i>of another man’s calamity</i>. Thus +fear and compassion would be the same idea, and a fearful and a +compassionate man the same character, which every one immediately +sees are totally different. Further, to those who give any +scope to their affections, there is no perception or inward +feeling more universal than this: that one who has been merciful +and compassionate throughout the course of his behaviour should +himself be treated with kindness, if he happens to fall into +circumstances of distress. Is fear, then, or cowardice, so +great a recommendation to the favour of the bulk of +mankind? Or is it not plain that mere fearlessness (and +therefore not the contrary) is one of the most popular +qualifications? This shows that mankind are not affected +towards compassion as fear, but as somewhat totally +different.</p> +<p>Nothing would more expose such accounts as these of the +affections which are favourable and friendly to our +fellow-creatures than to substitute the definitions, which this +author, and others who follow his steps, give of such affections, +instead of the words by which they are commonly expressed. +Hobbes, after having laid down that pity or compassion is only +fear for ourselves, goes on to explain the reason why we pity our +friends in distress more than others. Now substitute the +word <i>definition</i> instead of the word <i>pity</i> in this +place, and the inquiry will be, why we fear our friends, &c., +which words (since he really does not mean why we are afraid of +them) make no question or sentence at all. So that common +language, the words <i>to compassionate</i>, <i>to pity</i>, +cannot be accommodated to his account of compassion. The +very joining of the words to <i>pity our friends</i> is a direct +contradiction to his definition of pity: because those words, so +joined, necessarily express that our friends are the objects of +the passion; whereas his definition of it asserts that ourselves +(or danger to ourselves) are the only objects of it. He +might indeed have avoided this absurdity, by plainly saying what +he is going to account for; namely, why the sight of the +innocent, or of our friends in distress, raises greater fear for +ourselves than the sight of other persons in distress. But +had he put the thing thus plainly, the fact itself would have +been doubted; that <i>the sight of our friends in distress raises +in us greater fear for ourselves than the sight of others in +distress</i>. And in the next place it would immediately +have occurred to every one that the fact now mentioned, which at +least is doubtful whether, true or false, was not the same with +this fact, which nobody ever doubted, that <i>the sight of our +friends in distress raises in us greater compassion than the +sight of others in distress</i>: every one, I say, would have +seen that these are not the same, but <i>two different</i> +inquiries; and, consequently, that fear and compassion are not +the same. Suppose a person to be in real danger, and by +some means or other to have forgot it; any trifling accident, any +sound might alarm him, recall the danger to his remembrance, and +renew his fear; but it is almost too grossly ridiculous (though +it is to show an absurdity) to speak of that sound or accident as +an object of compassion; and yet, according to Mr. Hobbes, our +greatest friend in distress is no more to us, no more the object +of compassion, or of any affection in our heart: neither the one +nor the other raises any emotion in one mind, but only the +thoughts of our liableness to calamity, and the fear of it; and +both equally do this. It is fit such sort of accounts of +human nature should be shown to be what they really are, because +there is raised upon them a general scheme, which undermines the +whole foundation of common justice and honesty. See +<i>Hobbes of Human Nature</i>, c. 9. § 10.</p> +<p>There are often three distinct perceptions or inward feelings +upon sight of persons in distress: real sorrow and concern for +the misery of our fellow-creatures; some degree of satisfaction +from a consciousness of our freedom from that misery; and as the +mind passes on from one thing to another it is not unnatural from +such an occasion to reflect upon our own liableness to the same +or other calamities. The two last frequently accompany the +first, but it is the first <i>only</i> which is properly +compassion, of which the distressed are the objects, and which +directly carries us with calmness and thought to their +assistance. Any one of these, from various and complicated +reasons, may in particular cases prevail over the other two; and +there are, I suppose, instances, where the bare <i>sight</i> of +distress, without our feeling any compassion for it, may be the +occasion of either or both of the two latter perceptions. +One might add that if there be really any such thing as the +fiction or imagination of danger to ourselves from sight of the +miseries of others, which Hobbes specks of, and which he has +absurdly mistaken for the whole of compassion; if there be +anything of this sort common to mankind, distinct from the +reflection of reason, it would be a most remarkable instance of +what was furthest from his thoughts—namely, of a mutual +sympathy between each particular of the species, a fellow-feeling +common to mankind. It would not indeed be an example of our +substituting others for ourselves, but it would be an example of +user substituting ourselves for others. And as it would not +be an instance of benevolence, so neither would it be any +instance of self-love: for this phantom of danger to ourselves, +naturally rising to view upon sight of the distresses of others, +would be no more an instance of love to ourselves than the pain +of hunger is.</p> +<p><a name="footnote14"></a><a href="#citation14" +class="footnote">[14]</a> Ecclus. xxxii. 28.</p> +<p><a name="footnote15"></a><a href="#citation15" +class="footnote">[15]</a> Ecclus. xlii. 24.</p> +<p><a name="footnote16"></a><a href="#citation16" +class="footnote">[16]</a> Ver. 4, 5.</p> +<p><a name="footnote17"></a><a href="#citation17" +class="footnote">[17]</a> Ver. 6.</p> +<p><a name="footnote18"></a><a href="#citation18" +class="footnote">[18]</a> Micah vi.</p> +<p><a name="footnote19"></a><a href="#citation19" +class="footnote">[19]</a> Chap. xxii. 12.</p> +<p><a name="footnote20"></a><a href="#citation20" +class="footnote">[20]</a> Ver. 21.</p> +<p><a name="footnote21"></a><a href="#citation21" +class="footnote">[21]</a> Chap. iv.</p> +<p><a name="footnote22"></a><a href="#citation22" +class="footnote">[22]</a> Chap. xxv.</p> +<p><a name="footnote23"></a><a href="#citation23" +class="footnote">[23]</a> Chap. xxxi.</p> +<p><a name="footnote24"></a><a href="#citation24" +class="footnote">[24]</a> Chap. ii.</p> +<p><a name="footnote24a"></a><a href="#citation24a" +class="footnote">[24a]</a> In the Cassell edition the +sermons jump from sermon VII to XI with no explanation as to +where VIII, IX and X are. I’ve left the numbering as +is in case there is a good reason for it.—DP.</p> +<p><a name="footnote25"></a><a href="#citation25" +class="footnote">[25]</a> P. 137.</p> +<p><a name="footnote26"></a><a href="#citation26" +class="footnote">[26]</a> Matt. v. 48.</p> +<p><a name="footnote27"></a><a href="#citation27" +class="footnote">[27]</a> 1 Cor. xiii.</p> +<p><a name="footnote28"></a><a href="#citation28" +class="footnote">[28]</a> For instance as we are not +competent judges, what is upon the whole for the good of the +world, there <i>may</i> be other immediate ends appointed us to +pursue, besides that one of doing good or producing +happiness. Though the good of the Creation be the only end +of the Author of it, yet he may have laid us under particular +obligations, which we may discern and feel ourselves under, quite +distinct from a perception, that the observance or violation of +them it for the happiness or misery of our +fellow-creatures. And this is in fart the ease, for there +are certain dispositions of mind, and certain actions, which are +in themselves approved or disapproved by mankind, abstracted from +the consideration of their tendency to the happiness or misery of +the world approved or disapproved by reflection, by that +principle within, whirls is the guile of life, the judge of right +and wrong. Numberless instances of this kind might be +mentioned. There are pieces of treachery, which in +themselves appear base and detestable to every one. There +are actions, which perhaps can scarce have any other general name +given them than indecencies, which yet are odious and shocking to +human nature. There is such a thing as meanness, a little +mind, which as it is quite distinct from incapacity, so it raises +a dislike and disapprobation quite different from that contempt, +which men are too apt to have, of mere folly. On the other +hand, what we call greatness of mind is the object of another +most of approbation, than superior understanding. Fidelity, +honour, strict justice, are themselves approved in the highest +degree, abstracted from the consideration of their +tendency. Now, whether it be thought that each of these are +connected with benevolence in our nature, amid so may he +considered as the same thing with it, or whether some of them he +thought an inferior kind of virtues and vices, somewhat like +natural beauties and deformities, or lastly, plain exceptions to +the general rule, thus such however is certain, that the things +now instanced in, and numberless others, are approved or +disapproved by mankind in general, in quite another view than as +conducive to the happiness or misery of the world.</p> +<p><a name="footnote29"></a><a href="#citation29" +class="footnote">[29]</a> St. Austin observes, Amor ipse +ordinate amandus est, quo bene amatur quod amandum sit, ut sit in +nobis virtue qua vivitur bene, <i>i.e.</i> <i>The affection which +we rightly have for what is lovely must ordinate justly</i>, +<i>in due manner end proportion</i>, <i>become the object of a +new affection</i>, <i>or be itself beloved</i>, <i>in order to +our being endued with that virtue which is the principle of a +good life</i>. Civ. Dei, 1. xv. c. 22.</p> +<p><a name="footnote30"></a><a href="#citation30" +class="footnote">[30]</a> Job xxii.</p> +<p><a name="footnote31"></a><a href="#citation31" +class="footnote">[31]</a> Job ix. 2.</p> +<p><a name="footnote32"></a><a href="#citation32" +class="footnote">[32]</a> Eccius. xliii. 50.</p> +<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HUMAN NATURE***</p> +<pre> + + +***** This file should be named 3150-h.htm or 3150-h.zip****** + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/3/1/5/3150 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Human Nature + and Other Sermons + + +Author: Joseph Butler + +Editor: Henry Morley + +Release Date: May 1, 2007 [eBook #3150] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HUMAN NATURE*** + + + + +Transcribed from the 1887 Cassell & Co. edition by David Price, email +ccx074@pglaf.org + + + + + +HUMAN NATURE +AND +OTHER SERMONS + + +BY +JOSEPH BUTLER +BISHOP OF DURHAM. + +CASSELL & COMPANY, LIMITED: +_LONDON_, _PARIS_, _NEW YORK & MELBOURNE_. +1887 + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + + +Joseph Butler was born in 1692, youngest of eight children of a +linendraper at Wantage, in Berkshire. His father was a Presbyterian, and +after education at the Wantage Free Grammar School Joseph Butler was sent +to be educated for the Presbyterian ministry in a training academy at +Gloucester, which was afterwards removed to Tewkesbury. There he had a +friend and comrade, Secker, who afterwards became Archbishop of +Canterbury. Butler and Secker inquired actively, and there was +foreshadowing of his future in the fact that in 1713, at the age of +twenty-one, Butler was engaged in anonymous discussion with Samuel Clarke +upon his book on the _a priori_ demonstration of the Divine Existence and +Attributes. + +When the time drew near for call to the ministry, Butler, like his friend +Secker, had reasoned himself into accordance with the teaching of the +Church of England. Butler's father did not oppose his strong desire to +enter the Church, and he was entered in 1714 at Oriel College, Oxford. At +college a strong friendship was established between Butler and a fellow- +student, Edward Talbot, whose father was a Bishop, formerly of Oxford and +Salisbury, then of Durham. Through Talbot's influence Butler obtained in +1718 the office of Preacher in the Rolls Chapel, which he held for the +next eight years. In 1722 Talbot died, and on his death-bed urged his +father on behalf of his friend Butler. The Bishop accordingly presented +Joseph Butler to the living of Houghton-le-Spring. But it was found that +costs of dilapidations were beyond his means at Houghton, and Butler had +a dangerous regard for building works. He was preferred two years +afterwards to the living of Stanhope, which then became vacant, and which +yielded a substantial income. Butler sought nothing for himself, his +simplicity of character, real worth, and rare intellectual power, secured +him friends, and the love of two of them--Talbot first, and afterwards +Secker, who made his own way in the Church, and became strong enough to +put his friend as well as himself in the way of worldly advancement, +secured for Butler all the patronage he had, until the Queen also became +his active friend. + +Joseph Butler was seven years at Stanhope, quietly devoted to his parish +duties, preaching, studying, and writing his "Analogy of Religion, +Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature." In +1727, while still at Stanhope, he was appointed to a stall in Durham +Cathedral. Secker, having become chaplain to the Queen, encouraged her +in admiration of Butler's sermons. He told her that the author was not +dead, but buried, and secured her active interest in his behalf. From +Talbot, who had become Lord Chancellor, Secker had no difficulty in +obtaining for Butler a chaplaincy which exempted him from the necessity +of residence at Stanhope. Butler, in accepting it, stipulated for +permission to live and work in his parish for six months in every year. +Next he was made chaplain to the King, and Rector of St. James's, upon +which he gave up Stanhope. In 1736 Queen Caroline appointed him her +Clerk of the Closet, an office which gave Butler the duty of attendance +upon her for two hours every evening. In that year he published his +"Analogy," of which the purpose was to meet, on its own ground, the +scepticism of his day. The Queen died in 1737, and, in accordance with +the strong desire expressed in her last days, in 1738 Butler was made a +Bishop. But his Bishopric was Bristol, worth only 300 or 400 pounds a +year. The King added the Deanery of St. Paul's, when that became vacant +in 1740, and in 1750, towards the close of his life, Joseph Butler was +translated to the Bishopric of Durham. He died in 1752. + +No man could be less self-seeking. He owed his rise in the Church wholly +to the intellectual power and substantial worth of character that +inspired strong friendship. Seeing how little he sought worldly +advancement for himself, while others were pressing and scrambling, +Butler's friends used their opportunities of winning for him the +advancement he deserved. He was happiest in doing his work, of which a +chief part was in his study, where he employed his philosophic mind in +strengthening the foundations of religious faith. Faith in God was +attacked by men who claimed especially to be philosophers, and they were +best met by the man who had, beyond all other divines of his day--some +might not be afraid to add, of any day--the philosophic mind. + +H. M. + + + + +SERMON I. UPON HUMAN NATURE. + + + ROMANS xii. 4, 5. + + _For as we have many members in one body_, _and all members have not + the same office_: _so we_, _being many_, _are one body in Christ_, + _and every one members one of another_. + +The Epistles in the New Testament have all of them a particular reference +to the condition and usages of the Christian world at the time they were +written. Therefore as they cannot be thoroughly understood unless that +condition and those usages are known and attended to, so, further, though +they be known, yet if they be discontinued or changed, exhortations, +precepts, and illustrations of things, which refer to such circumstances +now ceased or altered, cannot at this time be urged in that manner and +with that force which they were to the primitive Christians. Thus the +text now before us, in its first intent and design, relates to the decent +management of those extraordinary gifts which were then in the Church, +{1} but which are now totally ceased. And even as to the allusion that +"we are one body in Christ," though what the apostle here intends is +equally true of Christians in all circumstances, and the consideration of +it is plainly still an additional motive, over and above moral +considerations, to the discharge of the several duties and offices of a +Christian, yet it is manifest this allusion must have appeared with much +greater force to those who, by the many difficulties they went through +for the sake of their religion, were led to keep always in view the +relation they stood in to their Saviour, who had undergone the same: to +those, who, from the idolatries of all around them, and their +ill-treatment, were taught to consider themselves as not of the world in +which they lived, but as a distinct society of themselves; with laws and +ends, and principles of life and action, quite contrary to those which +the world professed themselves at that time influenced by. Hence the +relation of a Christian was by them considered as nearer than that of +affinity and blood; and they almost literally esteemed themselves as +members one of another. + +It cannot, indeed, possibly be denied, that our being God's creatures, +and virtue being the natural law we are born under, and the whole +constitution of man being plainly adapted to it, are prior obligations to +piety and virtue than the consideration that God sent his Son into the +world to save it, and the motives which arise from the peculiar relation +of Christians as members one of another under Christ our head. However, +though all this be allowed, as it expressly is by the inspired writers, +yet it is manifest that Christians at the time of the Revelation, and +immediately after, could not but insist mostly upon considerations of +this latter kind. + +These observations show the original particular reference to the text, +and the peculiar force with which the thing intended by the allusion in +it must have been felt by the primitive Christian world. They likewise +afford a reason for treating it at this time in a more general way. + +The relation which the several parts or members of the natural body have +to each other and to the whole body is here compared to the relation +which each particular person in society has to other particular persons +and to the whole society; and the latter is intended to be illustrated by +the former. And if there be a likeness between these two relations, the +consequence is obvious: that the latter shows us we were intended to do +good to others, as the former shows us that the several members of the +natural body were intended to be instruments of good to each other and to +the whole body. But as there is scarce any ground for a comparison +between society and the mere material body, this without the mind being a +dead unactive thing, much less can the comparison be carried to any +length. And since the apostle speaks of the several members as having +distinct offices, which implies the mind, it cannot be thought an +allowable liberty, instead of the _body_ and _its members_, to substitute +the _whole nature_ of _man_, and _all the variety of internal principles +which belong to it_. And then the comparison will be between the nature +of man as respecting self, and tending to private good, his own +preservation and happiness; and the nature of man as having respect to +society, and tending to promote public good, the happiness of that +society. These ends do indeed perfectly coincide; and to aim at public +and private good are so far from being inconsistent that they mutually +promote each other: yet in the following discourse they must be +considered as entirely distinct; otherwise the nature of man as tending +to one, or as tending to the other, cannot be compared. There can no +comparison be made, without considering the things compared as distinct +and different. + +From this review and comparison of the nature of man as respecting self +and as respecting society, it will plainly appear that _there are as real +and the same kind of indications in human nature_, _that we were made for +society and to do good to our fellow-creatures_, _as that we were +intended to take care of our own life and health and private good_: _and +that the same objections lie against one of these assertions as against +the other_. For, + +First, there is a natural principle of _benevolence_ {2} in man, which is +in some degree to _society_ what _self-love_ is to the _individual_. And +if there be in mankind any disposition to friendship; if there be any +such thing as compassion--for compassion is momentary love--if there be +any such thing as the paternal or filial affections; if there be any +affection in human nature, the object and end of which is the good of +another, this is itself benevolence, or the love of another. Be it ever +so short, be it in ever so low a degree, or ever so unhappily confined, +it proves the assertion, and points out what we were designed for, as +really as though it were in a higher degree and more extensive. I must, +however, remind you that though benevolence and self-love are different, +though the former tends most directly to public good, and the latter to +private, yet they are so perfectly coincident that the greatest +satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due +degree; and that self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour +towards society. It may be added that their mutual coinciding, so that +we can scarce promote one without the other, is equally a proof that we +were made for both. + +Secondly, this will further appear, from observing that the _several +passions_ and _affections_, which are distinct {3} both from benevolence +and self-love, do in general contribute and lead us to _public good_ as +really as to _private_. It might be thought too minute and particular, +and would carry us too great a length, to distinguish between and compare +together the several passions or appetites distinct from benevolence, +whose primary use and intention is the security and good of society, and +the passions distinct from self-love, whose primary intention and design +is the security and good of the individual. {4} It is enough to the +present argument that desire of esteem from others, contempt and esteem +of them, love of society as distinct from affection to the good of it, +indignation against successful vice--that these are public affections or +passions, have an immediate respect to others, naturally lead us to +regulate our behaviour in such a manner as will be of service to our +fellow-creatures. If any or all of these may be considered likewise as +private affections, as tending to private good, this does not hinder them +from being public affections too, or destroy the good influence of them +upon society, and their tendency to public good. It may be added that as +persons without any conviction from reason of the desirableness of life +would yet of course preserve it merely from the appetite of hunger, so, +by acting merely from regard (suppose) to reputation, without any +consideration of the good of others, men often contribute to public good. +In both these instances they are plainly instruments in the hands of +another, in the hands of Providence, to carry on ends--the preservation +of the individual and good of society--which they themselves have not in +their view or intention. The sum is, men have various appetites, +passions, and particular affections, quite distinct both from self-love +and from benevolence: all of these have a tendency to promote both public +and private good, and may be considered as respecting others and +ourselves equally and in common; but some of them seem most immediately +to respect others, or tend to public good; others of them most +immediately to respect self, or tend to private good: as the former are +not benevolence, so the latter are not self-love: neither sort are +instances of our love either to ourselves or others, but only instances +of our Maker's care and love both of the individual and the species, and +proofs that He intended we should be instruments of good to each other, +as well as that we should be so to ourselves. + +Thirdly, there is a principle of reflection in men, by which they +distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions. We are +plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own +nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its +propensions, aversions, passions, affections as respecting such objects, +and in such degrees; and of the several actions consequent thereupon. In +this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another, and towards a +third is affected in neither of these ways, but is quite indifferent. +This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, +temper, and actions, is conscience; for this is the strict sense of the +word, though sometimes it is used so as to take in more. And that this +faculty tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and +leads them to do good, is too manifest to need being insisted upon. Thus +a parent has the affection of love to his children: this leads him to +take care of, to educate, to make due provision for them--the natural +affection leads to this: but the reflection that it is his proper +business, what belongs to him, that it is right and commendable so to +do--this, added to the affection, becomes a much more settled principle, +and carries him on through more labour and difficulties for the sake of +his children than he would undergo from that affection alone, if he +thought it, and the cause of action it led to, either indifferent or +criminal. This indeed is impossible, to do that which is good and not to +approve of it; for which reason they are frequently not considered as +distinct, though they really are: for men often approve of the action of +others which they will not imitate, and likewise do that which they +approve not. It cannot possibly be denied that there is this principle +of reflection or conscience in human nature. Suppose a man to relieve an +innocent person in great distress; suppose the same man afterwards, in +the fury of anger, to do the greatest mischief to a person who had given +no just cause of offence. To aggravate the injury, add the circumstances +of former friendship and obligation from the injured person; let the man +who is supposed to have done these two different actions coolly reflect +upon them afterwards, without regard to their consequences to himself: to +assert that any common man would be affected in the same way towards +these different actions, that he would make no distinction between them, +but approve or disapprove them equally, is too glaring a falsity to need +being confuted. There is therefore this principle of reflection or +conscience in mankind. It is needless to compare the respect it has to +private good with the respect it has to public; since it plainly tends as +much to the latter as to the former, and is commonly thought to tend +chiefly to the latter. This faculty is now mentioned merely as another +part in the inward frame of man, pointing out to us in some degree what +we are intended for, and as what will naturally and of course have some +influence. The particular place assigned to it by nature, what authority +it has, and how great influence it ought to have, shall be hereafter +considered. + +From this comparison of benevolence and self-love, of our public and +private affections, of the courses of life they lead to, and of the +principle of reflection or conscience as respecting each of them, it is +as manifest that _we were made for society_, _and to promote the +happiness of it_, _as that we were intended to take care of our own life +and health and private good_. + +And from this whole review must be given a different draught of human +nature from what we are often presented with. Mankind are by nature so +closely united, there is such a correspondence between the inward +sensations of one man and those of another, that disgrace is as much +avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and love as much +desired as any external goods; and in many particular cases persons are +carried on to do good to others, as the end their affection tends to and +rests in; and manifest that they find real satisfaction and enjoyment in +this course of behaviour. There is such a natural principle of +attraction in man towards man that having trod the same tract of land, +having breathed in the same climate, barely having been born in the same +artificial district or division, becomes the occasion of contracting +acquaintances and familiarities many years after; for anything may serve +the purpose. Thus relations merely nominal are sought and invented, not +by governors, but by the lowest of the people, which are found sufficient +to hold mankind together in little fraternities and copartnerships: weak +ties indeed, and what may afford fund enough for ridicule, if they are +absurdly considered as the real principles of that union: but they are in +truth merely the occasions, as anything may be of anything, upon which +our nature carries us on according to its own previous bent and bias; +which occasions therefore would be nothing at all were there not this +prior disposition and bias of nature. Men are so much one body that in a +peculiar manner they feel for each other shame, sudden danger, +resentment, honour, prosperity, distress; one or another, or all of +these, from the social nature in general, from benevolence, upon the +occasion of natural relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence; each +of these being distinct cements of society. And therefore to have no +restraint from, no regard to, others in our behaviour, is the speculative +absurdity of considering ourselves as single and independent, as having +nothing in our nature which has respect to our fellow-creatures, reduced +to action and practice. And this is the same absurdity as to suppose a +hand, or any part, to have no natural respect to any other, or to the +whole body. + +But, allowing all this, it may be asked, "Has not man dispositions and +principles within which lead him to do evil to others, as well as to do +good? Whence come the many miseries else which men are the authors and +instruments of to each other?" These questions, so far as they relate to +the foregoing discourse, may be answered by asking, Has not man also +dispositions and principles within which lead him to do evil to himself, +as well as good? Whence come the many miseries else--sickness, pain, and +death--which men are instruments and authors of to themselves? + +It may be thought more easy to answer one of these questions than the +other, but the answer to both is really the same: that mankind have +ungoverned passions which they will gratify at any rate, as well to the +injury of others as in contradiction to known private interest: but that +as there is no such thing as self-hatred, so neither is there any such +thing as ill-will in one man towards another, emulation and resentment +being away; whereas there is plainly benevolence or good-will: there is +no such thing as love of injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude, +but only eager desires after such and such external goods; which, +according to a very ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose +to obtain by innocent means, if they were as easy and as effectual to +their end: that even emulation and resentment, by any one who will +consider what these passions really are in nature, {5} will be found +nothing to the purpose of this objection; and that the principles and +passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from self-love and +benevolence, primarily and most directly lead to right behaviour with +regard to others as well as himself, and only secondarily and +accidentally to what is evil. Thus, though men, to avoid the shame of +one villainy, are sometimes guilty of a greater, yet it is easy to see +that the original tendency of shame is to prevent the doing of shameful +actions; and its leading men to conceal such actions when done is only in +consequence of their being done; _i.e._, of the passion's not having +answered its first end. + +If it be said that there are persons in the world who are in great +measure without the natural affections towards their fellow-creatures, +there are likewise instances of persons without the common natural +affections to themselves. But the nature of man is not to be judged of +by either of these, but by what appears in the common world, in the bulk +of mankind. + +I am afraid it would be thought very strange, if to confirm the truth of +this account of human nature, and make out the justness of the foregoing +comparison, it should be added that from what appears, men in fact as +much and as often contradict that _part_ of their nature which respects +_self_, and which leads them to their _own private_ good and happiness, +as they contradict that _part_ of it which respects _society_, and tends +to _public_ good: that there are as few persons who attain the greatest +satisfaction and enjoyment which they might attain in the present world, +as who do the greatest good to others which they might do; nay, that +there are as few who can be said really and in earnest to aim at one as +at the other. Take a survey of mankind: the world in general, the good +and bad, almost without exception, equally are agreed that were religion +out of the case, the happiness of the present life would consist in a +manner wholly in riches, honours, sensual gratifications; insomuch that +one scarce hears a reflection made upon prudence, life, conduct, but upon +this supposition. Yet, on the contrary, that persons in the greatest +affluence of fortune are no happier than such as have only a competency; +that the cares and disappointments of ambition for the most part far +exceed the satisfactions of it; as also the miserable intervals of +intemperance and excess, and the many untimely deaths occasioned by a +dissolute course of life: these things are all seen, acknowledged, by +every one acknowledged; but are thought no objections against, though +they expressly contradict, this universal principle--that the happiness +of the present life consists in one or other of them. Whence is all this +absurdity and contradiction? Is not the middle way obvious? Can +anything be more manifest than that the happiness of life consists in +these possessed and enjoyed only to a certain degree; that to pursue them +beyond this degree is always attended with more inconvenience than +advantage to a man's self, and often with extreme misery and unhappiness? +Whence, then, I say, is all this absurdity and contradiction? Is it +really the result of consideration in mankind, how they may become most +easy to themselves, most free from care, and enjoy the chief happiness +attainable in this world? Or is it not manifestly owing either to this, +that they have not cool and reasonable concern enough for themselves to +consider wherein their chief happiness in the present life consists; or +else, if they do consider it, that they will not act conformably to what +is the result of that consideration--_i.e._, reasonable concern for +themselves, or cool self-love, is prevailed over by passions and +appetite? So that from what appears there is no ground to assert that +those principles in the nature of man, which most directly lead to +promote the good of our fellow-creatures, are more generally or in a +greater degree violated than those which most directly lead us to promote +our own private good and happiness. + +The sum of the whole is plainly this: The nature of man considered in his +single capacity, and with respect only to the present world, is adapted +and leads him to attain the greatest happiness he can for himself in the +present world. The nature of man considered in his public or social +capacity leads him to right behaviour in society, to that course of life +which we call virtue. Men follow or obey their nature in both these +capacities and respects to a certain degree, but not entirely: their +actions do not come up to the whole of what their nature leads them to in +either of these capacities or respects: and they often violate their +nature in both; _i.e._, as they neglect the duties they owe to their +fellow-creatures, to which their nature leads them, and are injurious, to +which their nature is abhorrent, so there is a manifest negligence in men +of their real happiness or interest in the present world, when that +interest is inconsistent with a present gratification; for the sake of +which they negligently, nay, even knowingly, are the authors and +instruments of their own misery and ruin. Thus they are as often unjust +to themselves as to others, and for the most part are equally so to both +by the same actions. + + + + +SERMON II., III. UPON HUMAN NATURE. + + + ROMANS ii. 14. + + _For when the Gentiles_, _which have not the law_, _do by nature the + things contained in the law_, _these_, _having not the law_, _are a + law unto themselves_. + +As speculative truth admits of different kinds of proof, so likewise +moral obligations may be shown by different methods. If the real nature +of any creature leads him and is adapted to such and such purposes only, +or more than to any other, this is a reason to believe the Author of that +nature intended it for those purposes. Thus there is no doubt the eye +was intended for us to see with. And the more complex any constitution +is, and the greater variety of parts there are which thus tend to some +one end, the stronger is the proof that such end was designed. However, +when the inward frame of man is considered as any guide in morals, the +utmost caution must be used that none make peculiarities in their own +temper, or anything which is the effect of particular customs, though +observable in several, the standard of what is common to the species; and +above all, that the highest principle be not forgot or excluded, that to +which belongs the adjustment and correction of all other inward movements +and affections; which principle will of course have some influence, but +which being in nature supreme, as shall now be shown, ought to preside +over and govern all the rest. The difficulty of rightly observing the +two former cautions; the appearance there is of some small diversity +amongst mankind with respect to this faculty, with respect to their +natural sense of moral good and evil; and the attention necessary to +survey with any exactness what passes within, have occasioned that it is +not so much agreed what is the standard of the internal nature of man as +of his external form. Neither is this last exactly settled. Yet we +understand one another when we speak of the shape of a human body: so +likewise we do when we speak of the heart and inward principles, how far +soever the standard is from being exact or precisely fixed. There is +therefore ground for an attempt of showing men to themselves, of showing +them what course of life and behaviour their real nature points out and +would lead them to. Now obligations of virtue shown, and motives to the +practice of it enforced, from a review of the nature of man, are to be +considered as an appeal to each particular person's heart and natural +conscience: as the external senses are appealed to for the proof of +things cognisable by them. Since, then, our inward feelings, and the +perceptions we receive from our external senses, are equally real, to +argue from the former to life and conduct is as little liable to +exception as to argue from the latter to absolute speculative truth. A +man can as little doubt whether his eyes were given him to see with as he +can doubt of the truth of the science of _optics_, deduced from ocular +experiments. And allowing the inward feeling, shame, a man can as little +doubt whether it was given him to prevent his doing shameful actions as +he can doubt whether his eyes were given him to guide his steps. And as +to these inward feelings themselves, that they are real, that man has in +his nature passions and affections, can no more be questioned than that +he has external senses. Neither can the former be wholly mistaken, +though to a certain degree liable to greater mistakes than the latter. + +There can be no doubt but that several propensions or instincts, several +principles in the heart of man, carry him to society, and to contribute +to the happiness of it, in a sense and a manner in which no inward +principle leads him to evil. These principles, propensions, or instincts +which lead him to do good are approved of by a certain faculty within, +quite distinct from these propensions themselves. All this hath been +fully made out in the foregoing discourse. + +But it may be said, "What is all this, though true, to the purpose of +virtue and religion? these require, not only that we do good to others +when we are led this way, by benevolence or reflection happening to be +stronger than other principles, passions, or appetites, but likewise that +the _whole_ character be formed upon thought and reflection; that _every_ +action be directed by some determinate rule, some other rule than the +strength and prevalency of any principle or passion. What sign is there +in our nature (for the inquiry is only about what is to be collected from +thence) that this was intended by its Author? Or how does so various and +fickle a temper as that of man appear adapted thereto? It may indeed be +absurd and unnatural for men to act without any reflection; nay, without +regard to that particular kind of reflection which you call conscience, +because this does belong to our nature. For as there never was a man but +who approved one place, prospect, building, before another, so it does +not appear that there ever was a man who would not have approved an +action of humanity rather than of cruelty; interest and passion being +quite out of the case. But interest and passion do come in, and are +often too strong for and prevail over reflection and conscience. Now as +brutes have various instincts, by which they are carried on to the end +the Author of their nature intended them for, is not man in the same +condition--with this difference only, that to his instincts (_i.e._, +appetites and passion) is added the principle of reflection or +conscience? And as brutes act agreeably to their nature, in following +that principle or particular instinct which for the present is strongest +in them, does not man likewise act agreeably to his nature, or obey the +law of his creation, by following that principle, be it passion or +conscience, which for the present happens to be strongest in him? Thus +different men are by their particular nature hurried on to pursue honour +or riches or pleasure; there are also persons whose temper leads them in +an uncommon degree to kindness, compassion, doing good to their fellow- +creatures, as there are others who are given to suspend their judgment, +to weigh and consider things, and to act upon thought and reflection. Let +every one, then, quietly follow his nature, as passion, reflection, +appetite, the several parts of it, happen to be strongest; but let not +the man of virtue take upon him to blame the ambitious, the covetous, the +dissolute, since these equally with him obey and follow their nature. +Thus, as in some cases we follow our nature in doing the works _contained +in the law_, so in other cases we follow nature in doing contrary." + +Now all this licentious talk entirely goes upon a supposition that men +follow their nature in the same sense, in violating the known rules of +justice and honesty for the sake of a present gratification, as they do +in following those rules when they have no temptation to the contrary. +And if this were true, that could not be so which St. Paul asserts, that +men are _by nature a law to themselves_. If by following nature were +meant only acting as we please, it would indeed be ridiculous to speak of +nature as any guide in morals; nay, the very mention of deviating from +nature would be absurd; and the mention of following it, when spoken by +way of distinction, would absolutely have no meaning. For did ever any +one act otherwise than as he pleased? And yet the ancients speak of +deviating from nature as vice, and of following nature so much as a +distinction, that according to them the perfection of virtue consists +therein. So that language itself should teach people another sense to +the words _following nature_ than barely acting as we please. Let it, +however, be observed that though the words _human nature_ are to be +explained, yet the real question of this discourse is not concerning the +meaning of words, any other than as the explanation of them may be +needful to make out and explain the assertion, that _every man is +naturally a law to himself_, that _every one may find within himself the +rule of right_, _and obligations to follow it_. This St. Paul affirms in +the words of the text, and this the foregoing objection really denies by +seeming to allow it. And the objection will be fully answered, and the +text before us explained, by observing that _nature_ is considered in +different views, and the word used in different senses; and by showing in +what view it is considered, and in what sense the word is used, when +intended to express and signify that which is the guide of life, that by +which men are a law to themselves. I say, the explanation of the term +will be sufficient, because from thence it will appear that in some +senses of the word _nature_ cannot be, but that in another sense it +manifestly is, a law to us. + +I. By nature is often meant no more than some principle in man, without +regard either to the kind or degree of it. Thus the passion of anger, +and the affection of parents to their children, would be called equally +_natural_. And as the same person hath often contrary principles, which +at the same time draw contrary ways, he may by the same action both +follow and contradict his nature in this sense of the word; he may follow +one passion and contradict another. + +II. _Nature_ is frequently spoken of as consisting in those passions +which are strongest, and most influence the actions; which being vicious +ones, mankind is in this sense naturally vicious, or vicious by nature. +Thus St. Paul says of the Gentiles, _who were dead in trespasses and +sins_, _and walked according to the spirit of disobedience_, _that they +were by nature the children of wrath_. {6} They could be no otherwise +_children of wrath_ by nature than they were vicious by nature. + +Here, then, are two different senses of the word _nature_, in neither of +which men can at all be said to be a law to themselves. They are +mentioned only to be excluded, to prevent their being confounded, as the +latter is in the objection, with another sense of it, which is now to be +inquired after and explained. + +III. The apostle asserts that the Gentiles _do by NATURE the things +contained in the law_. Nature is indeed here put by way of distinction +from revelation, but yet it is not a mere negative. He intends to +express more than that by which they _did not_, that by which they _did_, +the works of the law; namely, by _nature_. It is plain the meaning of +the word is not the same in this passage as in the former, where it is +spoken of as evil; for in this latter it is spoken of as good--as that by +which they acted, or might have acted, virtuously. What that is in man +by which he is _naturally a law to himself_ is explained in the following +words: _Which show the work of the law written in their hearts_, _their +consciences also bearing witness_, _and their thoughts the meanwhile +accusing or else excusing one another_. If there be a distinction to be +made between the _works written in their hearts_, and the _witness of +conscience_, by the former must be meant the natural disposition to +kindness and compassion to do what is of good report, to which this +apostle often refers: that part of the nature of man, treated of in the +foregoing discourse, which with very little reflection and of course +leads him to society, and by means of which he naturally acts a just and +good part in it, unless other passions or interest lead him astray. Yet +since other passions, and regards to private interest, which lead us +(though indirectly, yet they lead us) astray, are themselves in a degree +equally natural, and often most prevalent, and since we have no method of +seeing the particular degrees in which one or the other is placed in us +by nature, it is plain the former, considered merely as natural, good and +right as they are, can no more be a law to us than the latter. But there +is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which +distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as +his external actions; which passes judgement upon himself and them, +pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, +good, others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust: which, without +being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, +and approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly: and which, if +not forcibly stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to +anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter +second and affirm its own. But this part of the office of conscience is +beyond my present design explicitly to consider. It is by this faculty, +natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to himself, +but this faculty, I say, not to be considered merely as a principle in +his heart, which is to have some influence as well as others, but +considered as a faculty in kind and in nature supreme over all others, +and which bears its own authority of being so. + +This _prerogative_, this _natural supremacy_, of the faculty which +surveys, approves, or disapproves the several affections of our mind and +actions of our lives, being that by which men _are a law to themselves_, +their conformity or disobedience to which law of our nature renders their +actions, in the highest and most proper sense, natural or unnatural, it +is fit it be further explained to you; and I hope it will be so, if you +will attend to the following reflections. + +Man may act according to that principle or inclination which for the +present happens to be strongest, and yet act in a way disproportionate +to, and violate his real proper nature. Suppose a brute creature by any +bait to be allured into a snare, by which he is destroyed. He plainly +followed the bent of his nature, leading him to gratify his appetite: +there is an entire correspondence between his whole nature and such an +action: such action therefore is natural. But suppose a man, foreseeing +the same danger of certain ruin, should rush into it for the sake of a +present gratification; he in this instance would follow his strongest +desire, as did the brute creature; but there would be as manifest a +disproportion between the nature of a man and such an action as between +the meanest work of art and the skill of the greatest master in that art; +which disproportion arises, not from considering the action singly in +_itself_, or in its _consequences_, but from _comparison_ of it with the +nature of the agent. And since such an action is utterly +disproportionate to the nature of man, it is in the strictest and most +proper sense unnatural; this word expressing that disproportion. +Therefore, instead of the words _disproportionate to his nature_, the +word _unnatural_ may now be put; this being more familiar to us: but let +it be observed that it stands for the same thing precisely. + +Now what is it which renders such a rash action unnatural? Is it that he +went against the principle of reasonable and cool self-love, considered +_merely_ as a part of his nature? No; for if he had acted the contrary +way, he would equally have gone against a principle, or part of his +nature--namely, passion or appetite. But to deny a present appetite, +from foresight that the gratification of it would end in immediate ruin +or extreme misery, is by no means an unnatural action: whereas to +contradict or go against cool self-love for the sake of such +gratification is so in the instance before us. Such an action then being +unnatural, and its being so not arising from a man's going against a +principle or desire barely, nor in going against that principle or desire +which happens for the present to be strongest, it necessarily follows +that there must be some other difference or distinction to be made +between these two principles, passion and cool self-love, than what I +have yet taken notice of. And this difference, not being a difference in +strength or degree, I call a difference in _nature_ and in _kind_. And +since, in the instance still before us, if passion prevails over self- +love the consequent action is unnatural, but if self-love prevails over +passion the action is natural, it is manifest that self-love is in human +nature a superior principle to passion. This may be contradicted without +violating that nature; but the former cannot. So that, if we will act +conformably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love must +govern. Thus, without particular consideration of conscience, we may +have a clear conception of the _superior nature_ of one inward principle +to another, and see that there really is this natural superiority, quite +distinct from degrees of strength and prevalency. + +Let us now take a view of the nature of man, as consisting partly of +various appetites, passions, affections, and partly of the principle of +reflection or conscience, leaving quite out all consideration of the +different degrees of strength in which either of them prevails, and it +will further appear that there is this natural superiority of one inward +principle to another, and that it is even part of the idea of reflection +or conscience. + +Passion or appetite implies a direct simple tendency towards such and +such objects, without distinction of the means by which they are to be +obtained. Consequently it will often happen there will be a desire of +particular objects, in cases where they cannot be obtained without +manifest injury to others. Reflection or conscience comes in, need +disapproves the pursuit of them in these circumstances; but the desire +remains. Which is to be obeyed, appetite or reflection? Cannot this +question be answered, from the economy and constitution of human nature +merely, without saying which is strongest? Or need this at all come into +consideration? Would not the question be _intelligibly_ and fully +answered by saying that the principle of reflection or conscience being +compared with the various appetites, passions, and affections in men, the +former is manifestly superior and chief, without regard to strength? And +how often soever the latter happens to prevail, it is mere _usurpation_: +the former remains in nature and in kind its superior; and every instance +of such prevalence of the latter is an instance of breaking in upon and +violation of the constitution of man. + +All this is no more than the distinction, which everybody is acquainted +with, between _mere power_ and _authority_: only instead of being +intended to express the difference between what is possible and what is +lawful in civil government, here it has been shown applicable to the +several principles in the mind of man. Thus that principle by which we +survey, and either approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and +actions, is not only to be considered as what is in its turn to have some +influence--which may be said of every passion, of the lowest +appetites--but likewise as being superior, as from its very nature +manifestly claiming superiority over all others, insomuch that you cannot +form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, +direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea--that +is, of the faculty itself; and to preside and govern, from the very +economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it +had right; had it power, as it had manifest authority, it would +absolutely govern the world. + +This gives us a further view of the nature of man; shows us what course +of life we were made for: not only that our real nature leads us to be +influenced in some degree by reflection and conscience, but likewise in +what degree we are to be influenced by it, if we will fall in with, and +act agreeably to, the constitution of our nature: that this faculty was +placed within to be our proper governor, to direct and regulate all under +principles, passions, and motives of action. This is its right and +office: thus sacred is its authority. And how often soever men violate +and rebelliously refuse to submit to it, for supposed interest which they +cannot otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion which they cannot +otherwise gratify--this makes no alteration as to the _natural right_ and +_office_ of conscience. + +Let us now turn this whole matter another way, and suppose there was no +such thing at all as this natural supremacy of conscience--that there was +no distinction to be made between one inward principle and another, but +only that of strength--and see what would be the consequence. + +Consider, then, what is the latitude and compass of the actions of man +with regard to himself, his fellow-creatures, and the Supreme Being? What +are their bounds, besides that of our natural power? With respect to the +two first, they are plainly no other than these: no man seeks misery, as +such, for himself; and no one unprovoked does mischief to another for its +own sake. For in every degree within these bounds, mankind knowingly, +from passion or wantonness, bring ruin and misery upon themselves and +others. And impiety and profaneness--I mean what every one would call so +who believes the being of God--have absolutely no bounds at all. Men +blaspheme the Author of nature, formally and in words renounce their +allegiance to their Creator. Put an instance, then, with respect to any +one of these three. Though we should suppose profane swearing, and in +general that kind of impiety now mentioned, to mean nothing, yet it +implies wanton disregard and irreverence towards an infinite Being our +Creator; and is this as suitable to the nature of man as reverence and +dutiful submission of heart towards that Almighty Being? Or suppose a +man guilty of parricide, with all the circumstances of cruelty which such +an action can admit of. This action is done in consequence of its +principle being for the present strongest; and if there be no difference +between inward principles, but only that of strength, the strength being +given you have the whole nature of the man given, so far as it relates to +this matter. The action plainly corresponds to the principle, the +principle being in that degree of strength it was: it therefore +corresponds to the whole nature of the man. Upon comparing the action +and the whole nature, there arises no disproportion, there appears no +unsuitableness, between them. Thus the _murder of a father_ and the +_nature of man_ correspond to each other, as the same nature and an act +of filial duty. If there be no difference between inward principles, but +only that of strength, we can make no distinction between these two +actions, considered as the actions of such a creature; but in our coolest +hours must approve or disapprove them equally: than which nothing can be +reduced to a greater absurdity. + + + + +SERMON III. + + +The natural supremacy of reflection or conscience being thus established, +we may from it form a distinct notion of what is meant by _human nature_ +when virtue is said to consist in following it, and vice in deviating +from it. + +As the idea of a civil constitution implies in it united strength, +various subordinations under one direction--that of the supreme +authority--the different strength of each particular member of the +society not coming into the idea--whereas, if you leave out the +subordination, the union, and the one direction, you destroy and lose +it--so reason, several appetites, passions, and affections, prevailing in +different degrees of strength, is not _that_ idea or notion of _human +nature_; but _that nature_ consists in these several principles +considered as having a natural respect to each other, in the several +passions being naturally subordinate to the one superior principle of +reflection or conscience. Every bias, instinct, propension within, is a +natural part of our nature, but not the whole: add to these the superior +faculty whose office it is to adjust, manage, and preside over them, and +take in this its natural superiority, and you complete the idea of human +nature. And as in civil government the constitution is broken in upon +and violated by power and strength prevailing over authority; so the +constitution of man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties +or principles within prevailing over that which is in its nature supreme +over them all. Thus, when it is said by ancient writers that tortures +and death are not so contrary to human nature as injustice, by this, to +be sure, is not meant that the aversion to the former in mankind is less +strong and prevalent than their aversion to the latter, but that the +former is only contrary to our nature considered in a partial view, and +which takes in only the lowest part of it, that which we have in common +with the brutes; whereas the latter is contrary to our nature, considered +in a higher sense, as a system and constitution contrary to the whole +economy of man. {7} + +And from all these things put together, nothing can be more evident than +that, exclusive of revelation, man cannot be considered as a creature +left by his Maker to act at random, and live at large up to the extent of +his natural power, as passion, humour, wilfulness, happen to carry him, +which is the condition brute creatures are in; but that _from his make_, +_constitution_, _or nature_, _he is in the strictest and most proper +sense a law to himself_. He hath the rule of right within: what is +wanting is only that he honestly attend to it. + +The inquiries which have been made by men of leisure after some general +rule, the conformity to or disagreement from which should denominate our +actions good or evil, are in many respects of great service. Yet let any +plain, honest man, before he engages in any course of action, ask +himself, Is this I am going about right, or is it wrong? Is it good, or +is it evil? I do not in the least doubt but that this question would be +answered agreeably to truth and virtue, by almost any fair man in almost +any circumstance. Neither do there appear any cases which look like +exceptions to this, but those of superstition, and of partiality to +ourselves. Superstition may perhaps be somewhat of an exception; but +partiality to ourselves is not, this being itself dishonesty. For a man +to judge that to be the equitable, the moderate, the right part for him +to act, which he would see to be hard, unjust, oppressive in another, +this is plain vice, and can proceed only from great unfairness of mind. + +But allowing that mankind hath the rule of right within himself, yet it +may be asked, "What obligations are we under to attend to and follow it?" +I answer: It has been proved that man by his nature is a law to himself, +without the particular distinct consideration of the positive sanctions +of that law: the rewards and punishments which we feel, and those which +from the light of reason we have ground to believe, are annexed to it. +The question, then, carries its own answer along within it. Your +obligation to obey this law is its being the law of your nature. That +your conscience approves of and attests to such a course of action is +itself alone an obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to +show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own +authority with it, that it is our natural guide; the guide assigned us by +the Author of our nature: it therefore belongs to our condition of being; +it is our duty to walk in that path, and follow this guide, without +looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake them with +impunity. + +However, let us hear what is to be said against obeying this law of our +nature. And the sum is no more than this: "Why should we be concerned +about anything out of and beyond ourselves? If we do find within +ourselves regards to others, and restraints of we know not how many +different kinds, yet these being embarrassments, and hindering us from +going the nearest way to our own good, why should we not endeavour to +suppress and get over them?" + +Thus people go on with words, which when applied to human nature, and the +condition in which it is placed in this world, have really no meaning. +For does not all this kind of talk go upon supposition, that our +happiness in this world consists in somewhat quite distinct from regard +to others, and that it is the privilege of vice to be without restraint +or confinement? Whereas, on the contrary, the enjoyments--in a manner +all the common enjoyments of life, even the pleasures of vice--depend +upon these regards of one kind or another to our fellow-creatures. Throw +off all regards to others, and we should be quite indifferent to infamy +and to honour; there could be no such thing at all as ambition; and +scarce any such thing as covetousness; for we should likewise be equally +indifferent to the disgrace of poverty, the several neglects and kinds of +contempt which accompany this state, and to the reputation of riches, the +regard and respect they usually procure. Neither is restraint by any +means peculiar to one course of life; but our very nature, exclusive of +conscience and our condition, lays us under an absolute necessity of it. +We cannot gain any end whatever without being confined to the proper +means, which is often the most painful and uneasy confinement. And in +numberless instances a present appetite cannot be gratified without such +apparent and immediate ruin and misery that the most dissolute man in the +world chooses to forego the pleasure rather than endure the pain. + +Is the meaning, then, to indulge those regards to our fellow-creatures, +and submit to those restraints which upon the whole are attended with +more satisfaction than uneasiness, and get over only those which bring +more uneasiness and inconvenience than satisfaction? "Doubtless this was +our meaning." You have changed sides then. Keep to this; be consistent +with yourselves, and you and the men of virtue are _in general_ perfectly +agreed. But let us take care and avoid mistakes. Let it not be taken +for granted that the temper of envy, rage, resentment, yields greater +delight than meekness, forgiveness, compassion, and good-will; especially +when it is acknowledged that rage, envy, resentment, are in themselves +mere misery; and that satisfaction arising from the indulgence of them is +little more than relief from that misery; whereas the temper of +compassion and benevolence is itself delightful; and the indulgence of +it, by doing good, affords new positive delight and enjoyment. Let it +not be taken for granted that the satisfaction arising from the +reputation of riches and power, however obtained, and from the respect +paid to them, is greater than the satisfaction arising from the +reputation of justice, honesty, charity, and the esteem which is +universally acknowledged to be their due. And if it be doubtful which of +these satisfactions is the greatest, as there are persons who think +neither of them very considerable, yet there can be no doubt concerning +ambition and covetousness, virtue and a good mind, considered in +themselves, and as leading to different courses of life; there can, I +say, be no doubt, which temper and which course is attended with most +peace and tranquillity of mind, which with most perplexity, vexation, and +inconvenience. And both the virtues and vices which have been now +mentioned, do in a manner equally imply in them regards of one kind or +another to our fellow-creatures. And with respect to restraint and +confinement, whoever will consider the restraints from fear and shame, +the dissimulation, mean arts of concealment, servile compliances, one or +other of which belong to almost every course of vice, will soon be +convinced that the man of virtue is by no means upon a disadvantage in +this respect. How many instances are there in which men feel and own and +cry aloud under the chains of vice with which they are enthralled, and +which yet they will not shake off! How many instances, in which persons +manifestly go through more pains and self-denial to gratify a vicious +passion, than would have been necessary to the conquest of it! To this +is to be added, that when virtue is become habitual, when the temper of +it is acquired, what was before confinement ceases to be so by becoming +choice and delight. Whatever restraint and guard upon ourselves may be +needful to unlearn any unnatural distortion or odd gesture, yet in all +propriety of speech, natural behaviour must be the most easy and +unrestrained. It is manifest that, in the common course of life, there +is seldom any inconsistency between our duty and what is _called_ +interest: it is much seldomer that there is an inconsistency between duty +and what is really our present interest; meaning by interest, happiness +and satisfaction. Self-love, then, though confined to the interest of +the present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue, and +leads us to one and the same course of life. But, whatever exceptions +there are to this, which are much fewer than they are commonly thought, +all shall be set right at the final distribution of things. It is a +manifest absurdity to suppose evil prevailing finally over good, under +the conduct and administration of a perfect mined. + +The whole argument, which I have been now insisting upon, may be thus +summed up, and given you in one view. The nature of man is adapted to +some course of action or other. Upon comparing some actions with this +nature, they appear suitable and correspondent to it: from comparison of +other actions with the same nature, there arises to our view some +unsuitableness or disproportion. The correspondence of actions to the +nature of the agent renders them natural; their disproportion to it, +unnatural. That an action is correspondent to the nature of the agent +does not arise from its being agreeable to the principle which happens to +be the strongest: for it may be so and yet be quite disproportionate to +the nature of the agent. The correspondence therefore, or disproportion, +arises from somewhat else. This can be nothing but a difference in +nature and kind, altogether distinct from strength, between the inward +principles. Some then are in nature and kind superior to others. And +the correspondence arises from the action being conformable to the higher +principle; and the unsuitableness from its being contrary to it. +Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles +in the nature of man; because an action may be suitable to this nature, +though all other principles be violated, but becomes unsuitable if either +of those are. Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true +happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly +coincident; for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every +instance if we take in the future and the whole; this being implied in +the notion of a good and perfect administration of things. Thus they who +have been so wise in their generation as to regard only their own +supposed interest, at the expense and to the injury of others, shall at +last find, that he who has given up all the advantages of the present +world, rather than violate his conscience and the relations of life, has +infinitely better provided for himself, and secured his owns interest and +happiness. + + + + +SERMON IV. UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TONGUE. + + + JAMES i. 26. + + _If any man among you seem to be religious_, _and bridleth not his + tongue_, _but deceiveth his own heart_, _this man's religion is vain_. + +The translation of this text would be more determinate by being more +literal, thus: _If any man among you seemeth to be religious_, _not +bridling his tongue_, _but deceiving his own heart_, _this man's religion +is vain_. This determines that the words, _but deceiveth his own heart_, +are not put in opposition to _seemeth to be religious_, but to _bridleth +not his tongue_. The certain determinate meaning of the text then being, +that he who seemeth to be religious, and bridleth not his tongue, but in +that particular deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain, we +may observe somewhat very forcible and expressive in these words of St. +James. As if the apostle had said, No man surely can make any pretences +to religion, who does not at least believe that he bridleth his tongue: +if he puts on any appearance or face of religion, and yet does not govern +his tongue, he must surely deceive himself in that particular, and think +he does; and whoever is so unhappy as to deceive himself in this, to +imagine he keeps that unruly faculty in due subjection when indeed he +does not, whatever the other part of his life be, his religion is vain; +the government of the tongue being a most material restraint which virtue +lays us under: without it no man can be truly religious. + +In treating upon this subject, I will consider, + +First, what is the general vice or fault here referred to; or what +disposition in men is supposed in moral reflections and precepts +concerning _bridling the tongue_. + +Secondly, when it may be said of any one, that he has a due government +over himself in this respect. + +I. Now, the fault referred to, and the disposition supposed, in precepts +and reflections concerning the government of the tongue, is not +evil-speaking from malice, nor lying or bearing false witness from +indirect selfish designs. The disposition to these, and the actual vices +themselves, all come under other subjects. The tongue may be employed +about, and made to serve all the purposes of vice, in tempting and +deceiving, in perjury and injustice. But the thing here supposed and +referred to, is talkativeness: a disposition to be talking, abstracted +from the consideration of what is to be said; with very little or no +regard to, or thought of doing, either good or harm. And let not any +imagine this to be a slight matter, and that it deserves not to have so +great weight laid upon it, till he has considered what evil is implied in +it, and the bad effects which follow from it. It is perhaps true, that +they who are addicted to this folly would choose to confine themselves to +trifles and indifferent subjects, and so intend only to be guilty of +being impertinent: but as they cannot go on for ever talking of nothing, +as common matters will not afford a sufficient fund for perpetual +continued discourse, where subjects of this kind are exhausted they will +go on to defamation, scandal, divulging of secrets, their own secrets as +well as those of others--anything rather than be silent. They are +plainly hurried on in the heat of their talk to say quite different +things from what they first intended, and which they afterwards wish +unsaid: or improper things, which they had no other end in saying, but +only to afford employment to their tongue. And if these people expect to +be heard and regarded--for there are some content merely with +talking--they will invent to engage your attention: and, when they have +heard the least imperfect hint of an affair, they will out of their own +head add the circumstances of time and place and other matters to make +out their story and give the appearance of probability to it: not that +they have any concern about being believed, otherwise than as a means of +being heard. The thing is, to engage your attention; to take you up +wholly for the present time: what reflections will be made afterwards, is +in truth the least of their thoughts. And further, when persons who +indulge themselves in these liberties of the tongue are in any degree +offended with another--as little disgusts and misunderstandings will +be--they allow themselves to defame and revile such a one without any +moderation or bounds; though the offence is so very slight, that they +themselves would not do, nor perhaps wish him, an injury in any other +way. And in this case the scandal and revilings are chiefly owing to +talkativeness, and not bridling their tongue, and so come under our +present subject. The least occasion in the world will make the humour +break out in this particular way or in another. It as like a torrent, +which must and will flow; but the least thing imaginable will first of +all give it either this or another direction, turn it into this or that +channel: or like a fire--the nature of which, when in a heap of +combustible matter, is to spread and lay waste all around; but any one of +a thousand little accidents will occasion it to break out first either in +this or another particular part. + +The subject then before us, though it does run up into, and can scarce be +treated as entirely distinct from all others, yet it needs not be so much +mixed or blended with them as it often is. Every faculty and power may +be used as the instrument of premeditated vice and wickedness, merely as +the most proper and effectual means of executing such designs. But if a +man, from deep malice and desire of revenge, should meditate a falsehood +with a settled design to ruin his neighbour's reputation, and should with +great coolness and deliberation spread it, nobody would choose to say of +such a one that he had no government of his tongue. A man may use the +faculty of speech as an instrument of false witness, who yet has so +entire a command over that faculty as never to speak but from forethought +and cool design. Here the crime is injustice and perjury, and, strictly +speaking, no more belongs to the present subject than perjury and +injustice in any other way. But there is such a thing as a disposition +to be talking for its own sake; from which persons often say anything, +good or bad, of others, merely as a subject of discourse, according to +the particular temper they themselves happen to be in, and to pass away +the present time. There is likewise to be observed in persons such a +strong and eager desire of engaging attention to what they say, that they +will speak good or evil, truth or otherwise, merely as one or the other +seems to be most hearkened to: and this though it is sometimes joined, is +not the same with the desire of being thought important and men of +consequence. There is in some such a disposition to be talking, that an +offence of the slightest kind, and such as would not raise any other +resentment, yet raises, if I may so speak, the resentment of the +tongue--puts it into a flame, into the most ungovernable motions. This +outrage, when the person it respects is present, we distinguish in the +lower rank of people by a peculiar term: and let it be observed, that +though the decencies of behaviour are a little kept, the same outrage and +virulence, indulged when he is absent, is an offence of the same kind. +But, not to distinguish any further in this manner, men race into faults +and follies which cannot so properly be referred to any one general head +as this--that they have not a due government over their tongue. + +And this unrestrained volubility and wantonness of speech is the occasion +of numberless evils and vexations in life. It begets resentment in him +who is the subject of it, sows the seed of strife and dissension amongst +others, and inflames little disgusts and offences which if let alone +would wear away of themselves: it is often of as bad effect upon the good +name of others, as deep envy or malice: and to say the least of it in +this respect, it destroys and perverts a certain equity of the utmost +importance to society to be observed--namely, that praise and dispraise, +a good or bad character, should always be bestowed according to desert. +The tongue used in such a licentious manner is like a sword in the hand +of a madman; it is employed at random, it can scarce possibly do any +good, and for the most part does a world of mischief; and implies not +only great folly and a trifling spirit, but great viciousness of mind, +great indifference to truth and falsity, and to the reputation, welfare, +and good of others. So much reason is there for what St. James says of +the tongue, _It is a fire_, _a world of iniquity_, _it defileth the whole +body_, _setteth on fire the course of nature_, _and is itself set on fire +of hell_. {8} This is the faculty or disposition which we are required +to keep a guard upon: these are the vices and follies it runs into when +not kept under due restraint. + +II. Wherein the due government of the tongue consists, or when it may be +said of any one in a moral and religious sense that he _bridleth his +tongue_, I come now to consider. + +The due and proper use of any natural faculty or power is to be judged of +by the end and design for which it was given us. The chief purpose for +which the faculty of speech was given to man is plainly that we might +communicate our thoughts to each other, in order to carry on the affairs +of the world; for business, and for our improvement in knowledge and +learning. But the good Author of our nature designed us not only +necessaries, but likewise enjoyment and satisfaction, in that being He +hath graciously given, and in that condition of life He hath placed us +in. There are secondary uses of our faculties: they administer to +delight, as well as to necessity; and as they are equally-adapted to +both, there is no doubt but He intended them for our gratification as +well as for the support and continuance of our being. The secondary use +of speech is to please and be entertaining to each other in conversation. +This is in every respect allowable and right; it unites men closer in +alliances and friendships; gives us a fellow-feeling of the prosperity +and unhappiness of each other; and is in several respects servicable to +virtue, and to promote good behaviour in the world. And provided there +be not too much time spent in it, if it were considered only in the way +of gratification and delight, men must have strange notion of God and of +religion to think that He can be offended with it, or that it is any way +inconsistent with the strictest virtue. But the truth is, such sort of +conversation, though it has no particular good tendency, yet it has a +general good one; it is social and friendly, and tends to promote +humanity, good-nature, and civility. + +As the end and use, so likewise the abuse of speech, relates to the one +or other of these: either to business or to conversation. As to the +former: deceit in the management of business and affairs does not +properly belong to the subject now before us: though one may just mention +that multitude, that heedless number of words with which business is +perplexed, where a much fewer would, as it should seem, better serve the +purpose; but this must be left to those who understand the matter. The +government of the tongue, considered as a subject of itself, relates +chiefly to conversation; to that kind of discourse which usually fills up +the time spent in friendly meetings and visits of civility. And the +danger is, lest persons entertain themselves and others at the expense of +their wisdom and their virtue, and to the injury or offence of their +neighbour. If they will observe and keep clear of these, they may be as +free and easy and unreserved as they can desire. + +The cautions to be given for avoiding these dangers, and to render +conversation innocent and agreeable, fall under the following +particulars: silence; talking of indifferent things; and, which makes up +too great a part of conversation, giving of characters, speaking well or +evil of others. + +The Wise Man observes that "there is a time to speak, and a time to keep +silence." One meets with people in the world who seem never to have made +the last of these observations. And yet these great talkers do not at +all speak from their having anything to say, as every sentence shows, but +only from their inclination to be talking. Their conversation is merely +an exercise of the tongue: no other human faculty has any share in it. It +is strange these persons can help reflecting, that unless they have in +truth a superior capacity, and are in an extraordinary manner furnished +for conversation if they are entertaining, it is at their own expense. Is +it possible that it should never come into people's thoughts to suspect +whether or no it be to their advantage to show so very much of +themselves? "O that you would altogether hold your peace, and it should +be your wisdom." {9} Remember likewise there are persons who love fewer +words, an inoffensive sort of people, and who deserve some regard, though +of too still and composed tempers for you. Of this number was the Son of +Sirach: for he plainly speaks from experience when he says, "As hills of +sand are to the steps of the aged, so is one of many words to a quiet +man." But one would think it should be obvious to every one, that when +they are in company with their superiors of any kind--in years, +knowledge, and experience--when proper and useful subjects are discoursed +of, which they cannot bear a part in, that these are times for silence, +when they should learn to hear, and be attentive, at least in their turn. +It is indeed a very unhappy way these people are in; they in a manner cut +themselves out from all advantage of conversation, except that of being +entertained with their own talk: their business in coming into company +not being at all to be informed, to hear, to learn, but to display +themselves, or rather to exert their faculty, and talk without any design +at all. And if we consider conversation as an entertainment, as somewhat +to unbend the mind, as a diversion from the cares, the business, and the +sorrows of life, it is of the very nature of it that the discourse be +mutual. This, I say, is implied in the very notion of what we +distinguish by conversation, or being in company. Attention to the +continued discourse of one alone grows more painful, often, than the +cares and business we come to be diverted from. He, therefore, who +imposes this upon us is guilty of a double offence--arbitrarily enjoining +silence upon all the rest, and likewise obliging them to this painful +attention. + +I am sensible these things are apt to be passed over, as too little to +come into a serious discourse; but in reality men are obliged, even in +point of morality and virtue, to observe all the decencies of behaviour. +The greatest evils in life have had their rise from somewhat which was +thought of too little importance to be attended to. And as to the matter +we are now upon, it is absolutely necessary to be considered. For if +people will not maintain a due government over themselves, in regarding +proper times and seasons for silence, but _will_ be talking, they +certainly, whether they design it or not at first, will go on to scandal +and evil-speaking, and divulging secrets. + +If it were needful to say anything further to persuade men to learn this +lesson of silence, one might put them in mind how insignificant they +render themselves by this excessive talkativeness: insomuch that, if they +do chance to say anything which deserves to be attended to and regarded, +it is lost in the variety and abundance which they utter of another sort. + +The occasions of silence then are obvious, and one would think should be +easily distinguished by everybody: namely, when a man has nothing to say; +or nothing but what is better unsaid: better, either in regard to the +particular persons he is present with; or from its being an interruption +to conversation itself; or to conversation of a more agreeable kind; or +better, lastly, with regard to himself. I will end this particular with +two reflections of the Wise Man; one of which, in the strongest manner, +exposes the ridiculous part of this licentiousness of the tongue; and the +other, the great danger and viciousness of it. _When he that is a fool +walketh by the way side_, _his wisdom faileth him_, _and he saith to +every one that he is a fool_. {10} The other is, _In the multitude of +words there wanteth not sin_. {11} + +As to the government of the tongue in respect to talking upon indifferent +subjects: after what has been said concerning the due government of it in +respect to the occasions and times for silence, there is little more +necessary than only to caution men to be fully satisfied that the +subjects are indeed of an indifferent nature; and not to spend too much +time in conversation of this kind. But persons must be sure to take heed +that the subject of their discourse be at least of an indifferent nature: +that it be no way offensive to virtue, religion, or good manners: that it +be not of a licentious, dissolute sort, this leaving always ill +impressions upon the mind; that it be no way injurious or vexatious to +others; and that too much time be not spent this way, to the neglect of +those duties and offices of life which belong to their station and +condition in the world. However, though there is not any necessity that +men should aim at being important and weighty in every sentence they +speak: yet since useful subjects, at least of some kinds, are as +entertaining as others, a wise man, even when he desires to unbend his +mind from business, would choose that the conversation might turn upon +somewhat instructive. + +The last thing is, the government of the tongue as relating to discourse +of the affairs of others, and giving of characters. These are in a +manner the same; and one can scarce call it an indifferent subject, +because discourse upon it almost perpetually runs into somewhat criminal. + +And, first of all, it were very much to be wished that this did not take +up so great a part of conversation; because it is indeed a subject of a +dangerous nature. Let any one consider the various interests, +competitions, and little misunderstandings which arise amongst men; and +he will soon see that he is not unprejudiced and impartial; that he is +not, as I may speak, neutral enough to trust himself with talking of the +character and concerns of his neighbour, in a free, careless, and +unreserved manner. There is perpetually, and often it is not attended +to, a rivalship amongst people of one kind or another in respect to wit, +beauty, learning, fortune, and that one thing will insensibly influence +them to speak to the disadvantage of others, even where there is no +formed malice or ill-design. Since therefore it is so hard to enter into +this subject without offending, the first thing to be observed is that +people should learn to decline it; to get over that strong inclination +most have to be talking of the concerns and behaviour of their neighbour. + +But since it is impossible that this subject should be wholly excluded +conversation; and since it is necessary that the characters of men should +be known: the next thing is that it is a matter of importance what is +said; and, therefore, that we should be religiously scrupulous and exact +to say nothing, either good or bad, but what is true. I put it thus, +because it is in reality of as great importance to the good of society, +that the characters of bad men should be known, as that the characters of +good men should. People who are given to scandal and detraction may +indeed make an ill-use of this observation; but truths, which are of +service towards regulating our conduct, are not to be disowned, or even +concealed, because a bad use may be made of them. This however would be +effectually prevented if these two things were attended to. First, That, +though it is equally of bad consequence to society that men should have +either good or ill characters which they do not deserve; yet, when you +say somewhat good of a man which he does not deserve, there is no wrong +done him in particular; whereas, when you say evil of a man which he does +not deserve, here is a direct formal injury, a real piece of injustice +done him. This therefore makes a wide difference; and gives us, in point +of virtue, much greater latitude in speaking well than ill of others. +Secondly, A good man is friendly to his fellow-creatures, and a lover of +mankind; and so will, upon every occasion, and often without any, say all +the good he can of everybody; but, so far as he is a good man, will never +be disposed to speak evil of any, unless there be some other reason for +it, besides, barely that it is true. If he be charged with having given +an ill character, he will scarce think it a sufficient justification of +himself to say it was a true one, unless he can also give some further +account how he came to do so: a just indignation against particular +instances of villainy, where they are great and scandalous; or to prevent +an innocent man from being deceived and betrayed, when he has great trust +and confidence in one who does not deserve it. Justice must be done to +every part of a subject when we are considering it. If there be a man, +who bears a fair character in the world, whom yet we know to be without +faith or honesty, to be really an ill man; it must be allowed in general +that we shall do a piece of service to society by letting such a one's +true character be known. This is no more than what we have an instance +of in our Saviour himself; {12} though He was mild and gentle beyond +example. However, no words can express too strongly the caution which +should be used in such a case as this. + +Upon the whole matter: If people would observe the obvious occasions of +silence, if they would subdue the inclination to tale-bearing, and that +eager desire to engage attention, which is an original disease in some +minds, they would be in little danger of offending with their tongue; and +would, in a moral and religious sense, have due government over it. + +I will conclude with some precepts and reflections of the Son of Sirach +upon this subject. _Be swift to hear_; _and_, _if thou hast +understanding_, _answer thy neighbour_; _if not_, _lay thy hand upon thy +mouth_. _Honour and shame is in talk_. _A man of an ill tongue is +dangerous in his city_, _and he that is rash in his talk shall be hated_. +_A wise man wilt hold his tongue till he see opportunity_; _but a babbler +and a fool will regard no time_. _He that useth many words shall be +abhorred_; _and he that taketh to himself authority therein shall be +hated_. _A backbiting tongue hath disquieted many_; _strong cities hath +it pulled down_, _and overthrown the houses of great men_. _The tongue +of a man is his fall_; _but if thou love to hear_, _thou shall receive +understanding_. + + + + +SERMON V. UPON COMPASSION. + + + ROM. xii. 15. + + _Rejoice with them that do rejoice_, _and weep with them that weep_. + +Every man is to be considered in two capacities, the private and public; +as designed to pursue his own interest, and likewise to contribute to the +good of others. Whoever will consider may see that, in general, there is +no contrariety between these; but that from the original constitution of +man, and the circumstances he is placed in, they perfectly coincide, and +mutually carry on each other. But, among the great variety of affections +or principles of actions in our nature, some in their primary intention +and design seem to belong to the single or private, others to the public +or social capacity. The affections required in the text are of the +latter sort. When we rejoice in the prosperity of others, and +compassionate their distresses, we as it were substitute them for +ourselves, their interest for our own; and have the same kind of pleasure +in their prosperity, and sorrow in their distress, as we have from +reflection upon our own. Now there is nothing strange or unaccountable +in our being thus carried out, and affected towards the interests of +others. For, if there be any appetite, or any inward principle besides +self-love; why may there not be an affection to the good of our fellow- +creatures, and delight from that affection's being gratified, and +uneasiness from things going contrary to it? {13} + +Of these two, delight in the prosperity of others, and compassion for +their distresses, the last is felt much more generally than the former. +Though men do not universally rejoice with all whom they see rejoice, +yet, accidental obstacles removed, they naturally compassionate all, in +some degree, whom they see in distress; so far as they have any real +perception or sense of that distress: insomuch that words expressing this +latter, pity, compassion, frequently occur: whereas we have scarce any +single one by which the former is distinctly expressed. Congratulation +indeed answers condolence: but both these words are intended to signify +certain forms of civility rather than any inward sensation or feeling. +This difference or inequality is so remarkable that we plainly consider +compassion as itself an original, distinct, particular affection in human +nature; whereas to rejoice in the good of others is only a consequence of +the general affection of love and good-will to them. The reason and +account of which matter is this: when a man has obtained any particular +advantage or felicity, his end is gained; and he does not in that +particular want the assistance of another: there was therefore no need of +a distinct affection towards that felicity of another already obtained; +neither would such affection directly carry him on to do good to that +person: whereas men in distress want assistance; and compassion leads us +directly to assist them. The object of the former is the present +felicity of another; the object of the latter is the present misery of +another. It is easy to see that the latter wants a particular affection +for its relief, and that the former does not want one because it does not +want assistance. And upon supposition of a distinct affection in both +cases, the one must rest in the exercise of itself, having nothing +further to gain; the other does not rest in itself, but carries us on to +assist the distressed. + +But, supposing these affections natural to the mind, particularly the +last; "Has not each man troubles enough of his own? must he indulge an +affection which appropriates to himself those of others? which leads him +to contract the least desirable of all friendships, friendships with the +unfortunate? Must we invert the known rule of prudence, and choose to +associate ourselves with the distressed? or, allowing that we ought, so +far as it is in our power to relieve them, yet is it not better to do +this from reason and duty? Does not passion and affection of every kind +perpetually mislead us? Nay, is not passion and affection itself a +weakness, and what a perfect being must be entirely free from?" Perhaps +so, but it is mankind I am speaking of; imperfect creatures, and who +naturally and, from the condition we are placed in, necessarily depend +upon each other. With respect to such creatures, it would be found of as +bad consequence to eradicate all natural affections as to be entirely +governed by them. This would almost sink us to the condition of brutes; +and that would leave us without a sufficient principle of action. Reason +alone, whatever any one may wish, is not in reality a sufficient motive +of virtue in such a creature as man; but this reason joined with those +affections which God has impressed upon his heart, and when these are +allowed scope to exercise themselves, but under strict government and +direction of reason, then it is we act suitably to our nature, and to the +circumstances God has placed us in. Neither is affection itself at all a +weakness; nor does it argue defect, any otherwise than as our senses and +appetites do; they belong to our condition of nature, and are what we +cannot be without. God Almighty is, to be sure, unmoved by passion or +appetite, unchanged by affection; but then it is to be added that He +neither sees nor hears nor perceives things by any senses like ours; but +in a manner infinitely more perfect. Now, as it is an absurdity almost +too gross to be mentioned, for a man to endeavour to get rid of his +senses, because the Supreme Being discerns things more perfectly without +them; it is as real, though not so obvious an absurdity, to endeavour to +eradicate the passions He has given us, because He is without them. For, +since our passions are as really a part of our constitution as our +senses; since the former as really belong to our condition of nature as +the latter; to get rid of either is equally a violation of and breaking +in upon that nature and constitution He has given us. Both our senses +and our passions are a supply to the imperfection of our nature; thus +they show that we are such sort of creatures as to stand in need of those +helps which higher orders of creatures do not. But it is not the supply, +but the deficiency; as it is not a remedy, but a disease, which is the +imperfection. However, our appetites, passions, senses, no way imply +disease: nor indeed do they imply deficiency or imperfection of any sort; +but only this, that the constitution of nature, according to which God +has made us, is such as to require them. And it is so far from being +true, that a wise man must entirely suppress compassion, and all fellow- +feeling for others, as a weakness; and trust to reason alone to teach and +enforce upon him the practice of the several charities we owe to our +kind; that, on the contrary, even the bare exercise of such affections +would itself be for the good and happiness of the world; and the +imperfection of the higher principles of reason and religion in man, the +little influence they have upon our practice, and the strength and +prevalency of contrary ones, plainly require these affections to be a +restraint upon these latter, and a supply to the deficiencies of the +former. + +First, The very exercise itself of these affections in a just and +reasonable manner and degree would upon the whole increase the +satisfactions and lessen the miseries of life. + +It is the tendency and business of virtue and religion to procure, as +much as may be, universal good-will, trust, and friendship amongst +mankind. If this could be brought to obtain; and each man enjoyed the +happiness of others, as every one does that of a friend; and looked upon +the success and prosperity of his neighbour as every one does upon that +of his children and family; it is too manifest to be insisted upon how +much the enjoyments of life would be increased. There would be so much +happiness introduced into the world, without any deduction or +inconvenience from it, in proportion as the precept of _rejoicing with +those who rejoice_ was universally obeyed. Our Saviour has owned this +good affection as belonging to our nature in the parable of the _lost +sheep_, and does not think it to the disadvantage of a perfect state to +represent its happiness as capable of increase from reflection upon that +of others. + +But since in such a creature as man, compassion or sorrow for the +distress of others seems so far necessarily connected with joy in their +prosperity, as that whoever rejoices in one must unavoidably +compassionate the other; there cannot be that delight or satisfaction, +which appears to be so considerable, without the inconveniences, whatever +they are, of compassion. + +However, without considering this connection, there is no doubt but that +more good than evil, more delight than sorrow, arises from compassion +itself; there being so many things which balance the sorrow of it. There +is first the relief which the distressed feel from this affection in +others towards them. There is likewise the additional misery which they +would feel from the reflection that no one commiserated their case. It +is indeed true that any disposition, prevailing beyond a certain degree, +becomes somewhat wrong; and we have ways of speaking, which, though they +do not directly express that excess, yet always lead our thoughts to it, +and give us the notion of it. Thus, when mention is made of delight in +being pitied, this always conveys to our mind the notion of somewhat +which is really a weakness. The manner of speaking, I say, implies a +certain weakness and feebleness of mind, which is and ought to be +disapproved. But men of the greatest fortitude would in distress feel +uneasiness from knowing that no person in the world had any sort of +compassion or real concern for them; and in some cases, especially when +the temper is enfeebled by sickness, or any long and great distress, +doubtless, would feel a kind of relief even from the helpless goodwill +and ineffectual assistances of those about them. Over against the sorrow +of compassion is likewise to be set a peculiar calm kind of satisfaction, +which accompanies it, unless in cases where the distress of another is by +some means so brought home to ourselves as to become in a manner our own; +or when from weakness of mind the affection rises too high, which ought +to be corrected. This tranquillity, or calm satisfaction, proceeds +partly from consciousness of a right affection and temper of mind, and +partly from a sense of our own freedom from the misery we compassionate. +This last may possibly appear to some at first sight faulty; but it +really is not so. It is the same with that positive enjoyment, which +sudden ease from pain for the present affords, arising from a real sense +of misery, joined with a sense of our freedom from it; which in all cases +must afford some degree of satisfaction. + +To these things must be added the observation which respects both the +affections we are considering; that they who have got over all fellow- +feeling for others have withal contracted a certain callousness of heart, +which renders them insensible to most other satisfactions but those of +the grossest kind. + +Secondly, Without the exercise of these affections men would certainly be +much more wanting in the offices of charity they owe to cache other, and +likewise more cruel and injurious than they are at present. + +The private interest of the individual would not be sufficiently provided +for by reasonable and cool self-love alone; therefore the appetites and +passions are placed within as a guard and further security, without which +it would not be taken due care of. It is manifest our life would be +neglected were it not for the calls of hunger and thirst and weariness; +notwithstanding that without them reason would assure us that the +recruits of food and sleep are the necessary means of our preservation. +It is therefore absurd to imagine that, without affections, the same +reason alone would be more effectual to engage us to perform the duties +we owe to our fellow-creatures. One of this make would be as defective, +as much wanting, considered with respect to society, as one of the former +make would be defective, or wanting, considered as an individual, or in +his private capacity. Is it possible any can in earnest think that a +public spirit, _i.e._, a settled reasonable principle of benevolence to +mankind, is so prevalent and strong in the species as that we may venture +to throw off the under affections, which are its assistants, carry it +forward and mark out particular courses for it; family, friends, +neighbourhood, the distressed, our country? The common joys and the +common sorrows, which belong to these relations and circumstances, are as +plainly useful to society as the pain and pleasure belonging to hunger, +thirst, and weariness are of service to the individual. In defect of +that higher principle of reason, compassion is often the only way by +which the indigent can have access to us: and therefore, to eradicate +this, though it is not indeed formally to deny them that assistance which +is their due; yet it is to cut them off from that which is too frequently +their only way of obtaining it. And as for those who have shut up this +door against the complaints of the miserable, and conquered this +affection in themselves; even these persons will be under great +restraints from the same affection in others. Thus a man who has himself +no sense of injustice, cruelty, oppression, will be kept from running the +utmost lengths of wickedness by fear of that detestation, and even +resentment of inhumanity, in many particular instances of it, which +compassion for the object towards whom such inhumanity is exercised, +excites in the bulk of mankind. And this is frequently the chief danger +and the chief restraint which tyrants and the great oppressors of the +world feel. + +In general, experience will show that, as want of natural appetite to +food supposes and proceeds from some bodily disease; so the apathy the +Stoics talk of as much supposes, or is accompanied with, somewhat amiss +in the moral character, in that which is the health of the mind. Those +who formerly aimed at this upon the foot of philosophy appear to have had +better success in eradicating the affections of tenderness and compassion +than they had with the passions of envy, pride, and resentment: these +latter, at best, were but concealed, and that imperfectly too. How far +this observation may be extended to such as endeavour to suppress the +natural impulses of their affections, in order to form themselves for +business and the world, I shall not determine. But there does not appear +any capacity or relation to be named, in which men ought to be entirely +deaf to the calls of affection, unless the judicial one is to be +excepted. + +And as to those who are commonly called the men of pleasure, it is +manifest that the reason they set up for hardness of heart is to avoid +being interrupted in their course by the ruin and misery they are the +authors of; neither are persons of this character always the most free +from the impotencies of envy and resentment. What may men at last bring +themselves to, by suppressing their passions and affections of one kind, +and leaving those of the other in their full strength? But surely it +might be expected that persons who make pleasure their study and their +business, if they understood what they profess, would reflect, how many +of the entertainments of life, how many of those kind of amusements which +seem peculiarly to belong to men of leisure and education they became +insensible to by this acquired hardness of heart. + +I shall close these reflections with barely mentioning the behaviour of +that divine Person, who was the example of all perfection in human +nature, as represented in the Gospels mourning, and even, in a literal +sense, weeping over the distresses of His creatures. + +The observation already made, that, of the two affections mentioned in +the text, the latter exerts itself much more than the former; that, from +the original constitution of human nature, we much more generally and +sensibly compassionate the distressed than rejoice within the prosperous, +requires to be particularly considered. This observation, therefore, +with the reflections which arise out of it, and which it leads our +thoughts to, shall be the subject of another discourse. + +For the conclusion of this, let me just take notice of the danger of over- +great refinements; of going beside or beyond the plain, obvious, first +appearances of things, upon the subject of morals and religion. The +least observation will show how little the generality of men are capable +of speculations. Therefore morality and religion must be somewhat plan +and easy to be understood: it must appeal to what we call plain common +sense, as distinguished from superior capacity and improvement; because +it appeals to mankind. Persons of superior capacity and improvement have +often fallen into errors which no one of mere common understanding could. +Is it possible that one of this latter character could even of himself +have thought that there was absolutely no such thing in mankind as +affection to the good of others? suppose of parents to their children; or +that what he felt upon seeing a friend in distress was only fear for +himself; or, upon supposition of the affections of kindness and +compassion, that it was the business of wisdom and virtue to set him +about extirpating them as fast as he could? And yet each of these +manifest contradictions to nature has been laid down by men of +speculation as a discovery in moral philosophy; which they, it seems, +have found out through all the specious appearances to the contrary. This +reflection may be extended further. The extravagances of enthusiasm and +superstition do not at all lie in the road of common sense; and +therefore, so far as they are _original mistakes_, must be owing to going +beside or beyond it. Now, since inquiry and examination can relate only +to things so obscure and uncertain as to stand in need of it, and to +persons who are capable of it; the proper advice to be given to plain +honest men, to secure them from the extremes both of superstition and +irreligion, is that of the Son of Sirach: _In every good work trust thy +own soul_; _for this is the keeping of the commandment_. {14} + + + + +SERMON VI. UPON COMPASSION. +PREACHED THE FIRST SUNDAY IN LENT. + + + Rom. xii. 15. + + _Rejoice with then that do rejoice_, _and weep with them that weep_. + +There is a much more exact correspondence between the natural and moral +world than we are apt to take notice of. The inward frame of man does in +a peculiar manner answer to the external condition and circumstances of +life in which he is placed. This is a particular instance of that +general observation of the Son of Sirach: _All things are double one +against another_, _and God hath made nothing imperfect_. {15} The +several passions and affections in the heart of man, compared with the +circumstances of life in which he is placed, afford, to such as will +attend to them, as certain instances of final causes, as any whatever, +which are more commonly alleged for such: since those affections lead him +to a certain determinate course of action suitable to those +circumstances; as (for instance) compassion to relieve the distressed. +And as all observations of final causes, drawn from the principles of +action in the heart of man, compared with the condition he is placed in, +serve all the good uses which instances of final causes in the material +world about us do; and both these are equally proofs of wisdom and design +in the Author of nature: so the former serve to further good purposes; +they show us what course of life we are made for, what is our duty, and +in a peculiar manner enforce upon us the practice of it. + +Suppose we are capable of happiness and of misery in degrees equally +intense and extreme, yet, we are capable of the latter for a much longer +time, beyond all comparison. We see men in the tortures of pain for +hours, days, and, excepting the short suspensions of sleep, for months +together, without intermission, to which no enjoyments of life do, in +degree and continuance, bear any sort of proportion. And such is our +make and that of the world about us that any thing may become the +instrument of pain and sorrow to us. Thus almost any one man is capable +of doing mischief to any other, though he may not be capable of doing him +good; and if he be capable of doing him some good, he is capable of doing +him more evil. And it is, in numberless cases, much more in our power to +lessen the miseries of others than to promote their positive happiness, +any otherwise than as the former often includes the latter; ease from +misery occasioning for some time the greatest positive enjoyment. This +constitution of nature, namely, that it is so munch more in our power to +occasion and likewise to lessen misery than to promote positive +happiness, plainly required a particular affection to hinder us from +abusing, and to incline us to make a right use of the former powers, +_i.e._, the powers both to occasion and to lessen misery; over and above +what was necessary to induce us to make a right use of the latter power, +that of promoting positive happiness. The power we have over the misery +of our fellow-creatures, to occasion or lessen it, being a more important +trust than the power we have of promoting their positive happiness; the +former requires and has a further, an additional, security and guard +against its being violated, beyond and over and above what the latter +has. The social nature of man, and general goodwill to his species, +equally prevent him from doing evil, incline him to relieve the +distressed, and to promote the positive happiness of his +fellow-creatures; but compassion only restrains from the first, and +carries him to the second; it hath nothing to do with the third. + +The final causes, then, of compassion are to prevent and to relieve +misery. + +As to the former: this affection may plainly be a restraint upon +resentment, envy, unreasonable self-love; that is, upon all the +principles from which men do evil to one another. Let us instance only +in resentment. It seldom happens, in regulated societies, that men have +an enemy so entirely in their power as to be able to satiate their +resentment with safety. But if we were to put this case, it is plainly +supposable that a person might bring his enemy into such a condition, as +from being the object of anger and rage, to become an object of +compassion, even to himself, though the most malicious man in the world; +and in this case compassion would stop him, if he could stop with safety, +from pursuing his revenge any further. But since nature has placed +within us more powerful restraints to prevent mischief, and since the +final cause of compassion is much more to relieve misery, let us go on to +the consideration of it in this view. + +As this world was not intended to be a state of any great satisfaction or +high enjoyment, so neither was it intended to be a mere scene of +unhappiness and sorrow. Mitigations and reliefs are provided by the +merciful Author of nature for most of the afflictions in human life. +There is kind provision made even against our frailties: as we are so +constituted that time abundantly abates our sorrows, and begets in us +that resignment of temper, which ought to have been produced by a better +cause; a due sense of the authority of God, and our state of dependence. +This holds in respect too far the greatest part of the evils of life; I +suppose, in some degree, as to pain and sickness. Now this part of the +constitution or make of man, considered as some relief to misery, and not +as provision for positive happiness, is, if I may so speak, an instance +of nature's compassion for us; and every natural remedy or relief to +misery may be considered in the same view. + +But since in many cases it is very much in our power to alleviate the +miseries of each other; and benevolence, though natural in man to man, +yet is in a very low degree kept down by interest and competitions; and +men, for the most part, are so engaged in the business and pleasures of +the world, as to overlook and turn away from objects of misery; which are +plainly considered as interruptions to them in their way, as intruders +upon their business, their gaiety, and mirth: compassion is an advocate +within us in their behalf, to gain the unhappy admittance and access, to +make their case attended to. If it sometimes serves a contrary purpose, +and makes men industriously turn away from the miserable, these are only +instances of abuse and perversion: for the end, for which the affection +was given us, most certainly is not to make us avoid, but to make us +attend to, the objects of it. And if men would only resolve to allow +thus much to it: let it bring before their view, the view of their mind, +the miseries of their fellow-creatures; let it gain for them that their +case be considered; I am persuaded it would not fail of gaining more, and +that very few real objects of charity would pass unrelieved. Pain and +sorrow and misery have a right to our assistance: compassion puts us in +mind of the debt, and that we owe it to ourselves as well as to the +distressed. For, to endeavour to get rid of the sorrow of compassion by +turning from the wretched, when yet it is in our power to relieve them, +is as unnatural as to endeavour to get rid of the pain of hunger by +keeping from the sight of food. That we can do one with greater success +than we can the other is no proof that one is less a violation of nature +than the other. Compassion is a call, a demand of nature, to relieve the +unhappy as hunger is a natural call for food. This affection plainly +gives the objects of it an additional claim to relief and mercy, over and +above what our fellow-creatures in common have to our goodwill. +Liberality and bounty are exceedingly commendable; and a particular +distinction in such a world as this, where men set themselves to contract +their heart, and close it to all interests but their own. It is by no +means to be opposed to mercy, but always accompanies it: the distinction +between them is only that the former leads our thoughts to a more +promiscuous and undistinguished distribution of favours; to those who are +not, as well as those who are, necessitous; whereas the object of +compassion is misery. But in the comparison, and where there is not a +possibility of both, mercy is to have the preference: the affection of +compassion manifestly leads us to this preference. Thus, to relieve the +indigent and distressed, to single out the unhappy, from whom can be +expected no returns either of present entertainment or future service, +for the objects of our favours; to esteem a man's being friendless as a +recommendation; dejection, and incapacity of struggling through the +world, as a motive for assisting him; in a word, to consider these +circumstances of disadvantage, which are usually thought a sufficient +reason for neglect and overlooking a person, as a motive for helping him +forward: this is the course of benevolence which compassion marks out and +directs us to: this is that humanity which is so peculiarly becoming our +nature and circumstances in this world. + +To these considerations, drawn from the nature of man, must be added the +reason of the thing itself we are recommending, which accords to and +shows the same. For since it is so much more in our power to lessen the +misery of our fellow-creatures than to promote their positive happiness; +in cases where there is an inconsistency, we shall be likely to do much +more good by setting ourselves to mitigate the former than by +endeavouring to promote the latter. Let the competition be between the +poor and the rich. It is easy, you will say, to see which will have the +preference. True; but the question is, which ought to have the +preference? What proportion is there between the happiness produced by +doing a favour to the indigent, and that produced by doing the same +favour to one in easy circumstances? It is manifest that the addition of +a very large estate to one who before had an affluence, will in many +instances yield him less new enjoyment or satisfaction than an ordinary +charity would yield to a necessitous person. So that it is not only true +that our nature, _i.e._, the voice of God within us, carries us to the +exercise of charity and benevolence in the way of compassion or mercy, +preferably to any other way; but we also manifestly discern much more +good done by the former; or, if you will allow me the expressions, more +misery annihilated and happiness created. If charity and benevolence, +and endeavouring to do good to our fellow-creatures, be anything, this +observation deserves to be most seriously considered by all who have to +bestow. And it holds with great exactness, when applied to the several +degrees of greater and less indigency throughout the various ranks in +human life: the happiness or good produced not being in proportion to +what is bestowed, but in proportion to this joined with the need there +was of it. + +It may perhaps be expected that upon this subject notice should be taken +of occasions, circumstances, and characters which seem at once to call +forth affections of different sorts. Thus vice may be thought the object +both of pity and indignation: folly, of pity and of laughter. How far +this is strictly true, I shall not inquire; but only observe upon the +appearance, how much more humane it is to yield and give scope to +affections, which are most directly in favour of, and friendly towards, +our fellow-creatures; and that there is plainly much less danger of being +led wrong by these than by the other. + +But, notwithstanding all that has been said in recommendation of +compassion, that it is most amiable, most becoming human nature, and most +useful to the world; yet it must be owned that every affection, as +distinct from a principle of reason, may rise too high, and be beyond its +just proportion. And by means of this one carried too far, a man +throughout his life is subject to much more uneasiness than belongs to +his share; and in particular instances, it may be in such a degree as to +incapacitate him from assisting the very person who is the object of it. +But as there are some who upon principle set up for suppressing this +affection itself as weakness, there is also I know not what of fashion on +this side; and, by some means or other, the whole world almost is run +into the extremes of insensibility towards the distresses of their fellow- +creatures: so that general rules and exhortations must always be on the +other side. + +And now to go on to the uses we should make of the foregoing reflections, +the further ones they lead to, and the general temper they have a +tendency to beget in us. There being that distinct affection implanted +in the nature of man, tending to lessen the miseries of life, that +particular provision made for abating its sorrows, more than for +increasing its positive happiness, as before explained; this may suggest +to us what should be our general aim respecting ourselves, in our passage +through this world: namely, to endeavour chiefly to escape misery, keep +free from uneasiness, pain, and sorrow, or to get relief and mitigation +of them; to propose to ourselves peace and tranquillity of mind, rather +than pursue after high enjoyments. This is what the constitution of +nature before explained marks out as the course we should follow, and the +end we should aim at. To make pleasure and mirth and jollity our +business, and be constantly hurrying about after some gay amusement, some +new gratification of sense or appetite, to those who will consider the +nature of man and our condition in this world, will appear the most +romantic scheme of life that ever entered into thought. And yet how many +are there who go on in this course, without learning better from the +daily, the hourly disappointments, listlessness, and satiety which +accompany this fashionable method of wasting away their days! + +The subject we have been insisting upon would lead us into the same kind +of reflections by a different connection. The miseries of life brought +home to ourselves by compassion, viewed through this affection considered +as the sense by which they are perceived, would beget in us that +moderation, humility, and soberness of mind which has been now +recommended; and which peculiarly belongs to a season of recollection, +the only purpose of which is to bring us to a just sense of things, to +recover us out of that forgetfulness of ourselves, and our true state, +which it is manifest far the greatest part of men pass their whole life +in. Upon this account Solomon says that _it is better to go to the house +of mourning than to go to the house of feasting_; _i.e._, it is more to a +man's advantage to turn his eyes towards objects of distress, to recall +sometimes to his remembrance the occasions of sorrow, than to pass all +his days in thoughtless mirth and gaiety. And he represents the wise as +choosing to frequent the former of these places; to be sure not for his +own sake, but because _by the sadness of the countenance_, _the heart is +made better_. Every one observes how temperate and reasonable men are +when humbled and brought low by afflictions in comparison of what they +are in high prosperity. By this voluntary resort to the house of +mourning, which is here recommended, we might learn all those useful +instructions which calamities teach without undergoing them ourselves; +and grow wiser and better at a more easy rate than men commonly do. The +objects themselves, which in that place of sorrow lie before our view, +naturally give us a seriousness and attention, check that wantonness +which is the growth of prosperity and ease, and head us to reflect upon +the deficiencies of human life itself; that _every man at his best estate +is altogether vanity_. This would correct the florid and gaudy prospects +and expectations which we are too apt to indulge, teach us to lower our +notions of happiness and enjoyment, bring them down to the reality of +things, to what is attainable, to what the frailty of our condition will +admit of, which, for any continuance, is only tranquillity, ease, and +moderate satisfactions. Thus we might at once become proof against the +temptations with which the whole world almost is carried away; since it +is plain that not only what is called a life of pleasure, but also +vicious pursuits in general, aim at somewhat besides and beyond these +moderate satisfactions. + +And as to that obstinacy and wilfulness, which renders men so insensible +to the motives of religion; this right sense of ourselves and of the +world about us would bend the stubborn mind, soften the heart, and make +it more apt to receive impression; and this is the proper temper in which +to call our ways to remembrance, to review and set home upon ourselves +the miscarriages of our past life. In such a compliant state of mind, +reason and conscience will have a fair hearing; which is the preparation +for, or rather the beginning of, that repentance, the outward show of +which we all put on at this season. + +Lastly, The various miseries of life which lie before us wherever we turn +our eyes, the frailty of this mortal state we are passing through, may +put us in mind that the present world is not our home; that we are merely +strangers and travellers in it, as all our fathers were. It is therefore +to be considered as a foreign country; in which our poverty and wants, +and the insufficient supplies of them, were designed to turn our views to +that higher and better state we are heirs to: a state where will be no +follies to be overlooked, no miseries to be pitied, no wants to be +relieved; where the affection we have been now treating of will happily +be lost, as there will be no objects to exercise it upon: for _God shall +wipe away all tears from their eyes_, _and there shall be no more death_, +_neither sorrow_, _nor crying_; _neither shall there be any more pain_; +_for the former things are passed away_. + + + + +SERMON VII. UPON THE CHARACTER OF BALAAM. +PREACHED THE SECOND SUNDAY AFTER EASTER. + + + NUMBERS xxiii. 10. + + _Let me die the death of the righteous_, _and let my last end be like + his_. + +These words, taken alone, and without respect to him who spoke them, lead +our thoughts immediately to the different ends of good and bad men. For +though the comparison is not expressed, yet it is manifestly implied; as +is also the preference of one of these characters to the other in that +last circumstance, death. And, since dying the death of the righteous or +of the wicked necessarily implies men's being righteous or wicked; +_i.e._, having lived righteously or wickedly; a comparison of them in +their lives also might come into consideration, from such a single view +of the words themselves. But my present design is to consider them with +a particular reference or respect to him who spoke them; which reference, +if you please to attend, you will see. And if what shall be offered to +your consideration at this time be thought a discourse upon the whole +history of this man, rather than upon the particular words I have read, +this is of no consequence: it is sufficient if it afford reflection of +use and service to ourselves. + +But, in order to avoid cavils respecting this remarkable relation in +Scripture, either that part of it which you have heard in the first +lesson for the day, or any other; let me just observe that as this is not +a place for answering them, so they no way affect the following +discourse; since the character there given is plainly a real one in life, +and such as there are parallels to. + +The occasion of Balaam's coming out of his own country into the land of +Moab, where he pronounced this solemn prayer or wish, he himself relates +in the first parable or prophetic speech, of which it is the conclusion. +In which is a custom referred to, proper to be taken notice of: that of +devoting enemies to destruction before the entrance upon a war with them. +This custom appears to have prevailed over a great part of the world; for +we find it amongst the most distant nations. The Romans had public +officers, to whom it belonged as a stated part of their office. But +there was somewhat more particular in the case now before us: Balaam +being looked upon as an extraordinary person, whose blessing or curse was +thought to be always effectual. + +In order to engage the reader's attention to this passage, the sacred +historian has enumerated the preparatory circumstances, which are these. +Balaam requires the king of Moab to build him seven altars, and to +prepare him the same number of oxen and of rams. The sacrifice being +over, he retires alone to a solitude sacred to these occasions, there to +wait the Divine inspiration or answer, for which the foregoing rites were +the preparation. _And God met Balaam_, _and put a word in his mouth_; +{16} upon receiving which, he returns back to the altars, where was the +king, who had all this while attended the sacrifice, as appointed; he and +all the princes of Moab standing, big with expectation of the Prophet's +reply. _And he took up his parable_, _and said_, _Balak the king of Moab +hath brought me from Aram_, _out of the mountains of the east_, _saying_, +_Come_, _curse me Jacob_, _and come_, _defy Israel_. _How shall I +curse_, _whom God hath not cursed_? _Or how shall I defy_, _whom the +Lord hath not defied_? _For from the top of the rocks I see him_, _and +from the hills I behold him_: _lo_, _the people shall dwell alone_, _and +shall not be reckoned among the nations_. _Who can count the dust of +Jacob_, _and the number of the fourth part of Israel_? _Let me die the +death of the righteous_, _and let my last end be like his_. {17} + +It is necessary, as you will see in the progress of this discourse, +particularly to observe what he understood by _righteous_. And he +himself is introduced in the book of Micah {18} explaining it; if by +_righteous_ is meant _good_, as to be sure it is. _O my people_, +_remember now what Balak king of Moab consulted_, _and what Balaam the +son of Beor answered him from Shittim unto Gilgal_. From the mention of +Shittim it is manifest that it is this very story which is here referred +to, though another part of it, the account of which is not now extant; as +there are many quotations in Scripture out of books which are not come +down to us. _Remember what Balaam answered_, _that ye may know the +righteousness of the Lord_; _i.e._, the righteousness which God will +accept. Balak demands, _Wherewith shall I come before the Lord_, _and +bow myself before the high God_? _Shall I come before him with burnt- +offerings_, _with calves of a year old_? _Will the Lord be pleased with +thousands of rams_, _or with ten thousands of rivers of oil_? _Shall I +give my first-born for my transgression_, _the fruit of my body for the +sin of my soul_? Balaam answers him, _he hath showed thee_, _O man_, +_what is good_: _and what doth the Lord require of thee_, _but to do +justly_, _and to love mercy_, _and to walk humbly with thy God_? Here is +a good man expressly characterised, as distinct from a dishonest and a +superstitious man. No words can more strongly exclude dishonesty and +falseness of heart than _doing justice and loving mercy_; and both these, +as well as _walking humbly with God_, are put in opposition to those +ceremonial methods of recommendation, which Balak hoped might have served +the turn. From hence appears what he meant by the _righteous_, whose +_death_ he desires to die. + +Whether it was his own character shall now be inquired; and in order to +determine it, we must take a view of his whole behaviour upon this +occasion. When the elders of Noah came to him, though he appears to have +been much allured with the rewards offered, yet he had such regard to the +authority of God as to keep the messengers in suspense until he had +consulted His will. _And God said to him_, _Thou shalt not go with +them_; _thou shalt not curse the people_, _for they are blessed_. {19} +Upon this he dismisses the ambassadors, with an absolute refusal of +accompanying them back to their king. Thus far his regards to his duty +prevailed, neither does there anything appear as yet amiss in his +conduct. His answer being reported to the king of Moab, a more +honourable embassy is immediately despatched, and greater rewards +proposed. Then the iniquity of his heart began to disclose itself. A +thorough honest man would without hesitation have repeated his former +answer, that he could not be guilty of so infamous a prostitution of the +sacred character with which he was invested, as in the name of a prophet +to curse those whom he knew to be blessed. But instead of this, which +was the only honest part in these circumstances that lay before him, he +desires the princes of Moab to tarry that night with him also; and for +the sake of the reward deliberates, whether by some means or other he +might not be able to obtain leave to curse Israel; to do that, which had +been before revealed to him to be contrary to the will of God, which yet +he resolves not to do without that permission. Upon which, as when this +nation afterwards rejected God from reigning over them, He gave them a +king in His anger; in the same way, as appears from other parts of the +narration, He gives Balaam the permission he desired: for this is the +most natural sense of the words. Arriving in the territories of Moab, +and being received with particular distinction by the king, and he +repeating in person the promise of the rewards he had before made to him +by his ambassadors, he seeks, the text says, by _sacrifices_ and +_enchantments_ (what these were is not to our purpose), to obtain leave +of God to curse the people; keeping still his resolution, not to do it +without that permission: which not being able to obtain, he had such +regard to the command of God as to keep this resolution to the last. The +supposition of his being under a supernatural restraint is a mere fiction +of Philo: he is plainly represented to be under no other force or +restraint than the fear of God. However, he goes on persevering in that +endeavour, after he had declared that _God had not beheld iniquity in +Jacob_, _neither had he seen perverseness in Israel_; {20} _i.e._, they +were a people of virtue and piety, so far as not to have drawn down by +their iniquity that curse which he was soliciting leave to pronounce upon +them. So that the state of Balaam's mind was this: he wanted to do what +he knew to be very wicked, and contrary to the express command of God; he +had inward checks and restraints which he could not entirely get over; he +therefore casts about for ways to reconcile this wickedness with his +duty. How great a paradox soever this may appear, as it is indeed a +contradiction in terms, it is the very account which the Scripture gives +us of him. + +But there is a more surprising piece of iniquity yet behind. Not daring +in his religious character, as a prophet, to assist the king of Moab, he +considers whether there might not be found some other means of assisting +him against that very people, whom he himself by the fear of God was +restrained from cursing in words. One would not think it possible that +the weakness, even of religious self-deceit in its utmost excess, could +have so poor a distinction, so fond an evasion, to serve itself of. But +so it was; and he could think of no other method than to betray the +children of Israel to provoke His wrath, who was their only strength and +defence. The temptation which he pitched upon was that concerning which +Solomon afterwards observed, that it had _cast down many wounded_; _yea_, +_many strong men had been slain by it_: and of which he himself was a sad +example, when _his wives turned away his heart after other gods_. This +succeeded: the people sin against God; and thus the Prophet's counsel +brought on that destruction which he could by no means be prevailed upon +to assist with the religious ceremony of execration, which the king of +Moab thought would itself have affected it. Their crime and punishment +are related in Deuteronomy {21} and Numbers. {22} And from the relation +repeated in Numbers, {23} it appears, that Balaam was the contriver of +the whole matter. It is also ascribed to him in the Revelation, {24} +where he is said to have _taught Balak to cast a stumbling-block before +the children of Israel_. + +This was the man, this Balaam, I say, was the man, who desired to _die +the death of the righteous_, and that his _last end might be like his_; +and this was the state of his mind when he pronounced these words. + +So that the object we have now before us is the most astonishing in the +world: a very wicked man, under a deep sense of God and religion, +persisting still in his wickedness, and preferring the wages of +unrighteousness, even when he had before him a lively view of death, and +that approaching period of his days, which should deprive him of all +those advantages for which he was prostituting himself; and likewise a +prospect, whether certain or uncertain, of a future state of retribution; +all this joined with an explicit ardent wish that, when he was to leave +this world, he might be in the condition of a righteous man. Good God! +what inconsistency, what perplexity is here! With what different views +of things, with what contradictory principles of action, must such a mind +be torn and distracted! It was not unthinking carelessness, by which he +ran on headlong in vice and folly, without ever making a stand to ask +himself what he was doing: no; he acted upon the cool motives of interest +and advantage. Neither was he totally hard and callous to impressions of +religion, what we call abandoned; for he absolutely denied to curse +Israel. When reason assumes her place, when convinced of his duty, when +he owns and feels, and is actually under the influence of the divine +authority; whilst he is carrying on his views to the grave, the end of +all temporal greatness; under this sense of things, with the better +character and more desirable state present--full before him--in his +thoughts, in his wishes, voluntarily to choose the worse--what fatality +is here! Or how otherwise can such a character be explained? And yet, +strange as it may appear, it is not altogether an uncommon one: nay, with +some small alterations, and put a little lower, it is applicable to a +very considerable part of the world. For if the reasonable choice be +seen and acknowledged, and yet men make the unreasonable one, is not this +the same contradiction; that very inconsistency, which appeared so +unaccountable? + +To give some little opening to such characters and behaviour, it is to be +observed in general that there is no account to be given in the way of +reason, of men's so strong attachments to the present world: our hopes +and fears and pursuits are in degrees beyond all proportion to the known +value of the things they respect. This may be said without taking into +consideration religion and a future state; and when these are considered, +the disproportion is infinitely heightened. Now when men go against +their reason, and contradict a more important interest at a distance, for +one nearer, though of less consideration; if this be the whole of the +case, all that can be said is, that strong passions, some kind of brute +force within, prevails over the principle of rationality. However, if +this be with a clear, full, and distinct view of the truth of things, +then it is doing the utmost violence to themselves, acting in the most +palpable contradiction to their very nature. But if there be any such +thing in mankind as putting half-deceits upon themselves; which there +plainly is, either by avoiding reflection, or (if they do reflect) by +religious equivocation, subterfuges, and palliating matters to +themselves; by these means conscience may be laid asleep, and they may go +on in a course of wickedness with less disturbance. All the various +turns, doubles, and intricacies in a dishonest heart cannot be unfolded +or laid open; but that there is somewhat of that kind is manifest, be it +to be called self-deceit, or by any other name. Balaam had before his +eyes the authority of God, absolutely forbidding him what he, for the +sake of a reward, had the strongest inclination to: he was likewise in a +state of mind sober enough to consider death and his last end: by these +considerations he was restrained, first from going to the king of Moab, +and after he did go, from cursing Israel. But notwithstanding this, +there was great wickedness in his heart. He could not forego the rewards +of unrighteousness: he therefore first seeks for indulgences, and when +these could not be obtained, he sins against the whole meaning, end, and +design of the prohibition, which no consideration in the world could +prevail with him to go against the letter of. And surely that impious +counsel he gave to Balak against the children of Israel was, considered +in itself, a greater piece of wickedness than if he had cursed them in +words. + +If it be inquired what his situation, his hopes, and fears were, in +respect to this his wish; the answer must be, that consciousness of the +wickedness of his heart must necessarily have destroyed all settled hopes +of dying the death of the righteous: he could have no calm satisfaction +in this view of his last end: yet, on the other hand, it is possible that +those partial regards to his duty, now mentioned, might keep him from +perfect despair. + +Upon the whole it is manifest that Balaam had the most just and true +notions of God and religion; as appears, partly from the original story +itself, and more plainly from the passage in Micah; where he explains +religion to consist in real virtue and real piety, expressly +distinguished from superstition, and in terms which most strongly exclude +dishonesty and falseness of heart. Yet you see his behaviour: he seeks +indulgences for plain wickedness, which not being able to obtain he +glosses over that same wickedness, dresses it up in a new form, in order +to make it pass off more easily with himself. That is, he deliberately +contrives to deceive and impose upon himself in a matter which he knew to +be of the utmost importance. + +To bring these observations home to ourselves: it is too evident that +many persons allow themselves in very unjustifiable courses who yet make +great pretences to religion; not to deceive the world, none can be so +weak as to think this will pass in our age; but from principles, hopes, +and fears, respecting God and a future state; and go on thus with a sort +of tranquillity and quiet of mind. This cannot be upon a thorough +consideration, and full resolution, that the pleasures and advantages +they propose are to be pursued at all hazards, against reason, against +the law of God, and though everlasting destruction is to be the +consequence. This would be doing too great violence upon themselves. No, +they are for making a composition with the Almighty. These of His +commands they will obey; but as to others--why, they will make all the +atonements in their power; the ambitious, the covetous, the dissolute +man, each in a way which shall not contradict his respective pursuit. +Indulgences before, which was Balaam's first attempt, though he was not +so successful in it as to deceive himself, or atonements afterwards, are +all the same. And here, perhaps, come in faint hopes that they may, and +half-resolves that they will, one time or other, make a change. + +Besides these there are also persons, who, from a more just way of +considering things, see the infinite absurdity of this, of substituting +sacrifice instead of obedience; there are persons far enough from +superstition, and not without some real sense of God and religion upon +their minds; who yet are guilty of most unjustifiable practices, and go +on with great coolness and command over themselves. The same dishonesty +and unsoundness of heart discovers itself in these another way. In all +common ordinary cases we see intuitively at first view what is our duty, +what is the honest part. This is the ground of the observation, that the +first thought is often the best. In these cases doubt and deliberation +is itself dishonesty, as it was in Balaam upon the second message. That +which is called considering what is our duty in a particular case is very +often nothing but endeavouring to explain it away. Thus those courses, +which, if men would fairly attend to the dictates of their own +consciences, they would see to be corruption, excess, oppression, +uncharitableness; these are refined upon--things were so and so +circumstantiated--great difficulties are raised about fixing bounds and +degrees, and thus every moral obligation whatever may be evaded. Here is +scope, I say, for an unfair mind to explain away every moral obligation +to itself. Whether men reflect again upon this internal management and +artifice, and how explicit they are with themselves, is another question. +There are many operations of the mind, many things pass within, which we +never reflect upon again; which a bystander, from having frequent +opportunities of observing us and our conduct, may make shrewd guesses +at. + +That great numbers are in this way of deceiving themselves is certain. +There is scarce a man in the world, who has entirely got over all +regards, hopes, and fears, concerning God and a future state; and these +apprehensions in the generality, bad as we are, prevail in considerable +degrees: yet men will and can be wicked, with calmness and thought; we +see they are. There must therefore be some method of making it sit a +little easy upon their minds; which, in the superstitious, is those +indulgences and atonements before mentioned, and this self-deceit of +another kind in persons of another character. And both these proceed +from a certain unfairness of mind, a peculiar inward dishonesty; the +direct contrary to that simplicity which our Saviour recommends, under +the notion of _becoming little children_, as a necessary qualification +for our entering into the kingdom of heaven. + +But to conclude: How much soever men differ in the course of life they +prefer, and in their ways of palliating and excusing their vices to +themselves; yet all agree in one thing, desiring to _die the death of the +righteous_. This is surely remarkable. The observation may be extended +further, and put thus: even without determining what that is which we +call guilt or innocence, there is no man but would choose, after having +had the pleasure or advantage of a vicious action, to be free of the +guilt of it, to be in the state of an innocent man. This shows at least +the disturbance and implicit dissatisfaction in vice. If we inquire into +the grounds of it, we shall find it proceeds partly from an immediate +sense of having done evil, and partly from an apprehension that this +inward sense shall one time or another be seconded by a higher judgment, +upon which our whole being depends. Now to suspend and drown this sense, +and these apprehensions, be it by the hurry of business or of pleasure, +or by superstition, or moral equivocations, this is in a manner one and +the same, and makes no alteration at all in the nature of our case. +Things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of them will +be what they will be: why, then, should we desire to be deceived? As we +are reasonable creatures, and have any regard to ourselves, we ought to +lay these things plainly and honestly before our mind, and upon this, act +as you please, as you think most fit: make that choice, and prefer that +course of life, which you can justify to yourselves, and which sits most +easy upon your own mind. It will immediately appear that vice cannot be +the happiness, but must upon the whole be the misery, of such a creature +as man; a moral, an accountable agent. Superstitious observances, self- +deceit though of a more refined sort, will not in reality at all mend +matters with us. And the result of the whole can be nothing else, but +that with simplicity and fairness we _keep innocency_, _and take heed +unto the thing that is right_; _for this alone shall bring a man peace at +the last_. + + + + +SERMON XI. {24a} UPON THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR. +PREACHED ON ADVENT SUNDAY. + + + ROMANS xiii. 9. + + _And if there be any other commandment_, _it is briefly comprehended + in this saying_, _namely_, _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself_. + +It is commonly observed that there is a disposition in men to complain of +the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they live as greater +than that of former ones; which is usually followed with this further +observation, that mankind has been in that respect much the same in all +times. Now, not to determine whether this last be not contradicted by +the accounts of history; thus much can scarce be doubted, that vice and +folly takes different turns, and some particular kinds of it are more +open and avowed in some ages than in others; and, I suppose, it may be +spoken of as very much the distinction of the present to profess a +contracted spirit, and greater regards to self-interest, than appears to +have been done formerly. Upon this account it seems worth while to +inquire whether private interest is likely to be promoted in proportion +to the degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over all +other principles; _or whether the contracted affection may not possibly +be so prevalent as to disappoint itself_, _and even contradict its own +and private good_. + +And since, further, there is generally thought to be some peculiar kind +of contrariety between self-love and the love of our neighbour, between +the pursuit of public and of private good; insomuch that when you are +recommending one of these, you are supposed to be speaking against the +other; and from hence arises a secret prejudice against, and frequently +open scorn of, all talk of public spirit and real good-will to our fellow- +creatures; it will be necessary to _inquire what respect benevolence hath +to self-love_, _and the pursuit of private interest to the pursuit of +public_: or whether there be anything of that peculiar inconsistence and +contrariety between them over and above what there is between self-love +and other passions and particular affections, and their respective +pursuits. + +These inquiries, it is hoped, may be favourably attended to; for there +shall be all possible concessions made to the favourite passion, which +hath so much allowed to it, and whose cause is so universally pleaded: it +shall be treated with the utmost tenderness and concern for its +interests. + +In order to do this, as well as to determine the forementioned questions, +it will be necessary to _consider the nature_, _the object_, _and end of +that self-love_, _as distinguished from other principles or affections in +the mind_, _and their respective objects_. + +Every man hath a general desire of his own happiness; and likewise a +variety of particular affections, passions, and appetites to particular +external objects. The former proceeds from, or is, self-love; and seems +inseparable from all sensible creatures, who can reflect upon themselves +and their own interest or happiness so as to have that interest an object +to their minds; what is to be said of the latter is, that they proceed +from or together make up that particular nature, according to which man +is made. The object the former pursues is somewhat internal--our own +happiness, enjoyment, satisfaction; whether we have, or have not, a +distinct particular perception what it is, or wherein it consists: the +objects of the latter are this or that particular external thing, which +the affections tend towards, and of which it hath always a particular +idea or perception. The principle we call self-love never seeks anything +external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of happiness or +good: particular affections rest in the external things themselves. One +belongs to man as a reasonable creature reflecting upon his own interest +or happiness. The other, though quite distinct from reason, are as much +a part of human nature. + +That all particular appetites and passions are towards _external things +themselves_, distinct from the _pleasure arising from them_, is +manifested from hence; that there could not be this pleasure, were it not +for that prior suitableness between the object and the passion: there +could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more than another, from +eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if there were not an +affection or appetite to one thing more than another. + +Every particular affection, even the love of our neighbour, is as really +our own affection as self-love; and the pleasure arising from its +gratification is as much my own pleasure as the pleasure self-love would +have from knowing I myself should be happy some time hence would be my +own pleasure. And if, because every particular affection is a man's own, +and the pleasure arising from its gratification his own pleasure, or +pleasure to himself, such particular affection must be called self-love; +according to this way of speaking, no creature whatever can possibly act +but merely from self-love; and every action and every affection whatever +is to be resolved up into this one principle. But then this is not the +language of mankind; or if it were, we should want words to express the +difference between the principle of an action, proceeding from cool +consideration that it will be to my own advantage; and an action, suppose +of revenge or of friendship, by which a man runs upon certain ruin, to do +evil or good to another. It is manifest the principles of these actions +are totally different, and so want different words to be distinguished +by; all that they agree in is that they both proceed from, and are done +to gratify, an inclination in a man's self. But the principle or +inclination in one case is self-love; in the other, hatred or love of +another. There is then a distinction between the cool principle of self- +love, or general desire of our own happiness, as one part of our nature, +and one principle of action; and the particular affections towards +particular external objects, as another part of our nature, and another +principle of action. How much soever therefore is to be allowed to self- +love, yet it cannot be allowed to be the whole of our inward +constitution; because, you see, there are other parts or principles which +come into it. + +Further, private happiness or good is all which self-love can make us +desire, or be concerned about: in having this consists its gratification: +it is an affection to ourselves; a regard to our own interest, happiness, +and private good: and in the proportion a man hath this, he is +interested, or a lover of himself. Let this be kept in mind; because +there is commonly, as I shall presently have occasion to observe, another +sense put upon these words. On the other hand, particular affections +tend towards particular external things: these are their objects: having +these is their end: in this consists their gratification: no matter +whether it be, or be not, upon the whole, our interest or happiness. An +action done from the former of these principles is called an interested +action. An action proceeding from any of the latter has its denomination +of passionate, ambitious, friendly, revengeful, or any other, from the +particular appetite or affection from which it proceeds. Thus self-love +as one part of human nature, and the several particular principles as the +other part, are, themselves, their objects and ends, stated and shown. + +From hence it will be easy to see how far, and in what ways, each of +these can contribute and be subservient to the private good of the +individual. Happiness does not consist in self-love. The desire of +happiness is no more the thing itself than the desire of riches is the +possession or enjoyment of them. People might love themselves with the +most entire and unbounded affection, and yet be extremely miserable. +Neither can self-love any way help them out, but by setting them on work +to get rid of the causes of their misery, to gain or make use of those +objects which are by nature adapted to afford satisfaction. Happiness or +satisfaction consists only in the enjoyment of those objects which are by +nature suited to our several particular appetites, passions, and +affections. So that if self-love wholly engrosses us, and leaves no room +for any other principle, there can be absolutely no such thing at all as +happiness or enjoyment of any kind whatever; since happiness consists in +the gratification of particular passions, which supposes the having of +them. Self-love then does not constitute _this_ or _that_ to be our +interest or good; but, our interest or good being constituted by nature +and supposed, self-love only puts us upon obtaining and securing it. +Therefore, if it be possible that self-love may prevail and exert itself +in a degree or manner which is not subservient to this end; then it will +not follow that our interest will be promoted in proportion to the degree +in which that principle engrosses us, and prevails over others. Nay, +further, the private and contracted affection, when it is not subservient +to this end, private good may, for anything that appears, have a direct +contrary tendency and effect. And if we will consider the matter, we +shall see that it often really has. _Disengagement_ is absolutely +necessary to enjoyment; and a person may have so steady and fixed an eye +upon his own interest, whatever he places it in, as may hinder him from +_attending_ to many gratifications within his reach, which others have +their minds _free_ and _open_ to. Over-fondness for a child is not +generally thought to be for its advantage; and, if there be any guess to +be made from appearances, surely that character we call selfish is not +the most promising for happiness. Such a temper may plainly be, and +exert itself in a degree and manner which may give unnecessary and +useless solicitude and anxiety, in a degree and manner which may prevent +obtaining the means and materials of enjoyment, as well as the making use +of them. Immoderate self-love does very ill consult its own interest: +and, how much soever a paradox it may appear, it is certainly true that +even from self-love we should endeavour to get over all inordinate regard +to and consideration of ourselves. Every one of our passions and +affections hath its natural stint and bound, which may easily be +exceeded; whereas our enjoyments can possibly be but in a determinate +measure and degree. Therefore such excess of the affection, since it +cannot procure any enjoyment, must in all cases be useless; but is +generally attended with inconveniences, and often is downright pain and +misery. This holds as much with regard to self-love as to all other +affections. The natural degree of it, so far as it sets us on work to +gain and make use of the materials of satisfaction, may be to our real +advantage; but beyond or besides this, it is in several respects an +inconvenience and disadvantage. Thus it appears that private interest is +so far from being likely to be promoted in proportion to the degree in +which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over all other principles, +that _the contracted affection may be so prevalent as to disappoint +itself_, _and even contradict its own and private good_. + +"But who, except the most sordidly covetous, ever thought there was any +rivalship between the love of greatness, honour, power, or between +sensual appetites and self-love? No, there is a perfect harmony between +them. It is by means of these particular appetites and affections that +self-love is gratified in enjoyment, happiness, and satisfaction. The +competition and rivalship is between self-love and the love of our +neighbour: that affection which leads us out of ourselves, makes us +regardless of our own interest, and substitute that of another in its +stead." Whether, then, there be any peculiar competition and contrariety +in this case shall now be considered. + +Self-love and interestedness was stated to consist in or be an affection +to ourselves, a regard to our own private good: it is therefore distinct +from benevolence, which is an affection to the good of our +fellow-creatures. But that benevolence is distinct from, that is, not +the same thing with self-love, is no reason for its being looked upon +with any peculiar suspicion; because every principle whatever, by means +of which self-love is gratified, is distinct from it; and all things +which are distinct from each other are equally so. A man has an +affection or aversion to another: that one of these tends to, and is +gratified by, doing good, that the other tends to, and is gratified by, +doing harm, does not in the least alter the respect which either one or +the other of these inward feelings has to self-love. We use the word +_property_ so as to exclude any other persons having an interest in that +of which we say a particular man has the property. And we often use the +word _selfish_ so as to exclude in the same manner all regards to the +good of others. But the cases are not parallel: for though that +exclusion is really part of the idea of property; yet such positive +exclusion, or bringing this peculiar disregard to the good of others into +the idea of self-love, is in reality adding to the idea, or changing it +from what it was before stated to consist in, namely, in an affection to +ourselves. {25} This being the whole idea of self-love, it can no +otherwise exclude good-will or love of others, than merely by not +including it, no otherwise, than it excludes love of arts or reputation, +or of anything else. Neither on the other hand does benevolence, any +more than love of arts or of reputation exclude self-love. Love of our +neighbour, then, has just the same respect to, is no more distant from, +self-love, than hatred of our neighbour, or than love or hatred of +anything else. Thus the principles, from which men rush upon certain +ruin for the destruction of an enemy, and for the preservation of a +friend, have the same respect to the private affection, and are equally +interested, or equally disinterested; and it is of no avail whether they +are said to be one or the other. Therefore to those who are shocked to +hear virtue spoken of as disinterested, it may be allowed that it is +indeed absurd to speak thus of it; unless hatred, several particular +instances of vice, and all the common affections and aversions in +mankind, are acknowledged to be disinterested too. Is there any less +inconsistence between the love of inanimate things, or of creatures +merely sensitive, and self-love, than between self-love and the love of +our neighbour? Is desire of and delight in the happiness of another any +more a diminution of self-love than desire of and delight in the esteem +of another? They are both equally desire of and delight in somewhat +external to ourselves; either both or neither are so. The object of self- +love is expressed in the term self; and every appetite of sense, and +every particular affection of the heart, are equally interested or +disinterested, because the objects of them all are equally self or +somewhat else. Whatever ridicule therefore the mention of a +disinterested principle or action may be supposed to lie open to, must, +upon the matter being thus stated, relate to ambition, and every appetite +and particular affection as much as to benevolence. And indeed all the +ridicule, and all the grave perplexity, of which this subject hath had +its full share, is merely from words. The most intelligible way of +speaking of it seems to be this: that self-love and the actions done in +consequence of it (for these will presently appear to be the same as to +this question) are interested; that particular affections towards +external objects, and the actions done in consequence of those affections +are not so. But every one is at liberty to use words as he pleases. All +that is here insisted upon is that ambition, revenge, benevolence, all +particular passions whatever, and the actions they produce, are equally +interested or disinterested. + +Thus it appears that there is no peculiar contrariety between self-love +and benevolence; no greater competition between these than between any +other particular affections and self-love. This relates to the +affections themselves. Let us now see whether there be any peculiar +contrariety between the respective courses of life which these affections +lead to; whether there be any greater competition between the pursuit of +private and of public good, than between any other particular pursuits +and that of private good. + +There seems no other reason to suspect that there is any such peculiar +contrariety, but only that the course of action which benevolence leads +to has a more direct tendency to promote the good of others, than that +course of action which love of reputation suppose, or any other +particular affection leads to. But that any affection tends to the +happiness of another does not hinder its tending to one's own happiness +too. That others enjoy the benefit of the air and the light of the sun +does not hinder but that these are as much one's own private advantage +now as they would be if we had the property of them exclusive of all +others. So a pursuit which tends to promote the good of another, yet may +have as great tendency to promote private interest, as a pursuit which +does not tend to the good of another at all, or which is mischievous to +him. All particular affections whatever, resentment, benevolence, love +of arts, equally lead to a course of action for their own gratification; +_i.e._, the gratification of ourselves; and the gratification of each +gives delight: so far, then, it is manifest they have all the same +respect to private interest. Now take into consideration, further, +concerning these three pursuits, that the end of the first is the harm, +of the second, the good of another, of the last, somewhat indifferent; +and is there any necessity that these additional considerations should +alter the respect, which we before saw these three pursuits had to +private interest, or render any one of them less conducive to it, than +any other? Thus one man's affection is to honour as his end; in order to +obtain which he thinks no pains too great. Suppose another, with such a +singularity of mind, as to have the same affection to public good as his +end, which he endeavours with the same labour to obtain. In case of +success, surely the man of benevolence hath as great enjoyment as the man +of ambition; they both equally having the end their affections, in the +same degree, tended to; but in case of disappointment, the benevolent man +has clearly the advantage; since endeavouring to do good, considered as a +virtuous pursuit, is gratified by its own consciousness, _i.e._, is in a +degree its own reward. + +And as to these two, or benevolence and any other particular passions +whatever, considered in a further view, as forming a general temper, +which more or less disposes us for enjoyment of all the common blessings +of life, distinct from their own gratification, is benevolence less the +temper of tranquillity and freedom than ambition or covetousness? Does +the benevolent man appear less easy with himself from his love to his +neighbour? Does he less relish his being? Is there any peculiar gloom +seated on his face? Is his mind less open to entertainment, to any +particular gratification? Nothing is more manifest than that being in +good humour, which is benevolence whilst it lasts, is itself the temper +of satisfaction and enjoyment. + +Suppose then, a man sitting down to consider how he might become most +easy to himself, and attain the greatest pleasure he could, all that +which is his real natural happiness. This can only consist in the +enjoyment of those objects which are by nature adapted to our several +faculties. These particular enjoyments make up the sum total of our +happiness, and they are supposed to arise from riches, honours, and the +gratification of sensual appetites. Be it so; yet none profess +themselves so completely happy in these enjoyments, but that there is +room left in the mind for others, if they were presented to them: nay, +these, as much as they engage us, are not thought so high, but that human +nature is capable even of greater. Now there have been persons in all +ages who have professed that they found satisfaction in the exercise of +charity, in the love of their neighbour, in endeavouring to promote the +happiness of all they had to do with, and in the pursuit of what is just +and right and good as the general bent of their mind and end of their +life; and that doing an action of baseness or cruelty would be as great +violence to _their_ self, as much breaking in upon their nature, as any +external force. Persons of this character would add, if they might be +heard, that they consider themselves as acting in the view of an Infinite +Being, who is in a much higher sense the object of reverence and of love, +than all the world besides; and therefore they could have no more +enjoyment from a wicked action done under His eye than the persons to +whom they are making their apology could if all mankind were the +spectators of it; and that the satisfaction of approving themselves to +his unerring judgment, to whom they thus refer all their actions, is a +more continued settled satisfaction than any this world can afford; as +also that they have, no less than others, a mind free and open to all the +common innocent gratifications of it, such as they are. And if we go no +further, does there appear any absurdity in this? Will any one take upon +him to say that a man cannot find his account in this general course of +life as much as in the most unbounded ambition, and the excesses of +pleasure? Or that such a person has not consulted so well for himself, +for the satisfaction and peace of his own mind, as the ambitious or +dissolute man? And though the consideration that God himself will in the +end justify their taste, and support their cause, is not formally to be +insisted upon here, yet thus much comes in, that all enjoyments whatever +are much more clear and unmixed from the assurance that they will end +well. Is it certain, then, that there is nothing in these pretensions to +happiness? especially when there are not wanting persons who have +supported themselves with satisfactions of this kind in sickness, +poverty, disgrace, and in the very pangs of death; whereas it is manifest +all other enjoyments fail in these circumstances. This surely looks +suspicions of having somewhat in it. Self-love, methinks, should be +alarmed. May she not possibly pass over greater pleasures than those she +is so wholly taken up with? + +The short of the matter is no more than this. Happiness consists in the +gratification of certain affections, appetites, passions, with objects +which are by nature adapted to them. Self-love may indeed set us on work +to gratify these, but happiness or enjoyment has no immediate connection +with self-love, but arises from such gratification alone. Love of our +neighbour is one of those affections. This, considered as a _virtuous +principle_, is gratified by a consciousness of _endeavouring_ to promote +the good of others, but considered as a natural affection, its +gratification consists in the actual accomplishment of this endeavour. +Now indulgence or gratification of this affection, whether in that +consciousness or this accomplishment, has the same respect to interest as +indulgence of any other affection; they equally proceed from or do not +proceed from self-love, they equally include or equally exclude this +principle. Thus it appears, that _benevolence and the pursuit of public +good hath at least as great respect to self-love and the pursuit of +private good as any other particular passions_, _and their respective +pursuits_. + +Neither is covetousness, whether as a temper or pursuit, any exception to +this. For if by covetousness is meant the desire and pursuit of riches +for their own sake, without any regard to, or consideration of, the uses +of them, this hath as little to do with self-love as benevolence hath. +But by this word is usually meant, not such madness and total distraction +of mind, but immoderate affection to and pursuit of riches as possessions +in order to some further end, namely, satisfaction, interest, or good. +This, therefore, is not a particular affection or particular pursuit, but +it is the general principle of self-love, and the general pursuit of our +own interest, for which reason the word _selfish_ is by every one +appropriated to this temper and pursuit. Now as it is ridiculous to +assert that self-love and the love of our neighbour are the same, so +neither is it asserted that following these different affections hath the +same tendency and respect to our own interest. The comparison is not +between self-love and the love of our neighbour, between pursuit of our +own interest and the interest of others, but between the several +particular affections in human nature towards external objects, as one +part of the comparison, and the one particular affection to the good of +our neighbour as the other part of it: and it has been shown that all +these have the same respect to self-love and private interest. + +There is indeed frequently an inconsistence or interfering between self- +love or private interest and the several particular appetites, passions, +affections, or the pursuits they lead to. But this competition or +interfering is merely accidental, and happens much oftener between pride, +revenge, sensual gratifications, and private interest, than between +private interest and benevolence. For nothing is more common than to see +men give themselves up to a passion or an affection to their known +prejudice and ruin, and in direct contradiction to manifest and real +interest, and the loudest calls of self-love: whereas the seeming +competitions and interfering, between benevolence and private interest, +relate much more to the materials or means of enjoyment than to enjoyment +itself. There is often an interfering in the former when there is none +in the latter. Thus as to riches: so much money as a man gives away, so +much less will remain in his possession. Here is a real interfering. But +though a man cannot possibly give without lessening his fortune, yet +there are multitudes might give without lessening their own enjoyment, +because they may have more than they can turn to any real use or +advantage to themselves. Thus the more thought and time any one employs +about the interests and good of others, he must necessarily have less to +attend his own: but he may have so ready and large a supply of his own +wants, that such thought might be really useless to himself, though of +great service and assistance to others. + +The general mistake, that there is some greater inconsistence between +endeavouring to promote the good of another and self-interest, than +between self-interest and pursuing anything else, seems, as hath already +been hinted, to arise from our notions of property, and to be carried on +by this property's being supposed to be itself our happiness or good. +People are so very much taken up with this one subject, that they seem +from it to have formed a general way of thinking, which they apply to +other things that they have nothing to do with. Hence in a confused and +slight way it might well be taken for granted that another's having no +interest in an affection (_i.e._, his good not being the object of it) +renders, as one may speak, the proprietor's interest in it greater; and +that if another had an interest in it this would render his less, or +occasion that such affection could not be so friendly to self-love, or +conducive to private good, as an affection or pursuit which has not a +regard to the good of another. This, I say, might be taken for granted, +whilst it was not attended to, that the object of every particular +affection is equally somewhat external to ourselves, and whether it be +the good of another person, or whether it be any other external thing, +makes no alteration with regard to its being one's own affection, and the +gratification of it one's own private enjoyment. And so far as it is +taken for granted that barely having the means and materials of enjoyment +is what constitutes interest and happiness; that our interest or good +consists in possessions themselves, in having the property of riches, +houses, lands, gardens, not in the enjoyment of them; so far it will even +more strongly be taken for granted, in the way already explained, that an +affection's conducing to the good of another must even necessarily +occasion it to conduce less to private good, if not to be positively +detrimental to it. For, if property and happiness are one and the same +thing, as by increasing the property of another you lessen your own +property, so by promoting the happiness of another you must lessen your +own happiness. But whatever occasioned the mistake, I hope it has been +fully proved to be one, as it has been proved, that there is no peculiar +rivalship or competition between self-love and benevolence: that as there +may be a competition between these two, so there many also between any +particular affection whatever and self-love; that every particular +affection, benevolence among the rest, is subservient to self-love by +being the instrument of private enjoyment; and that in one respect +benevolence contributes more to private interest, _i.e._, enjoyment or +satisfaction, than any other of the particular common affections, as it +is in a degree its own gratification. + +And to all these things may be added that religion, from whence arises +our strongest obligation to benevolence, is so far from disowning the +principle of self-love, that it often addresses itself to that very +principle, and always to the mind in that state when reason presides, and +there can no access be had to the understanding, but by convincing men +that the course of life we would persuade them to is not contrary to +their interest. It may be allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of +virtue and religion, that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all +our ideas the nearest and most important to us; that they will, nay, if +you please, that they ought to prevail over those of order, and beauty, +and harmony, and proportion, if there should ever be, as it is impossible +there ever should be, any inconsistence between them, though these last, +too, as expressing the fitness of actions, are real as truth itself. Let +it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in +affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such, yet, that +when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this +or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our +happiness, or at least not contrary to it. + +Common reason and humanity will have some influence upon mankind, +whatever becomes of speculations; but, so far as the interests of virtue +depend upon the theory of it being secured from open scorn, so far its +very being in the world depends upon its appearing to have no contrariety +to private interest and self-love. The foregoing observations, +therefore, it is hoped, may have gained a little ground in favour of the +precept before us, the particular explanation of which shall be the +subject of the next discourse. + +I will conclude at present with observing the peculiar obligation which +we are under to virtue and religion, as enforced in the verses following +the text, in the epistle for the day, from our Saviour's coming into the +world. _The night is far spent_, _the day is at hand_; _let us therefore +cast off the works of darkness_, _and let us put on the armour of light_, +&c. The meaning and force of which exhortation is, that Christianity +lays us under new obligations to a good life, as by it the will of God is +more clearly revealed, and as it affords additional motives to the +practice of it, over and above those which arise out of the nature of +virtue and vice, I might add, as our Saviour has set us a perfect example +of goodness in our own nature. Now love and charity is plainly the thing +in which He hath placed His religion; in which, therefore, as we have any +pretence to the name of Christians, we must place ours. He hath at once +enjoined it upon us by way of command with peculiar force, and by His +example, as having undertaken the work of our salvation out of pure love +and goodwill to mankind. The endeavour to set home this example upon our +minds is a very proper employment of this season, which is bringing on +the festival of His birth, which as it may teach us many excellent +lessons of humility, resignation, and obedience to the will of God, so +there is none it recommends with greater authority, force, and advantage +than this love and charity, since it was _for us men_, _and for our +salvation_, that _He came down from heaven_, _and was incarnate_, _and +was made man_, that He might teach us our duty, and more especially that +He might enforce the practice of it, reform mankind, and finally bring us +to that _eternal salvation_, of which _He is the Author to all those that +obey Him_. + + + + +SERMON XII. UPON THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR. + + + ROM. xiii. 9. + + _And if there be any other commandment_, _it is briefly comprehended + in this saying_, _namely_, _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself_. + +Having already removed the prejudices against public spirit, or the love +of our neighbour, on the side of private interest and self-love, I +proceed to the particular explanation of the precept before us, by +showing, _Who is our neighbour_: _In what sense we are required to love +him as ourselves_; _The influence such love would have upon our behaviour +in life_; and lastly, _How this commandment comprehends in it all +others_. + +I. The objects and due extent of this affection will be understood by +attending to the nature of it, and to the nature and circumstances of +mankind in this world. The love of our neighbour is the same with +charity, benevolence, or goodwill: it is an affection to the good and +happiness of our fellow-creatures. This implies in it a disposition to +produce happiness, and this is the simple notion of goodness, which +appears so amiable wherever we meet with it. From hence it is easy to +see that the perfection of goodness consists in love to the whole +universe. This is the perfection of Almighty God. + +But as man is so much limited in his capacity, as so small a part of the +Creation comes under his notice and influence, and as we are not used to +consider things in so general a way, it is not to be thought of that the +universe should be the object of benevolence to such creatures as we are. +Thus in that precept of our Saviour, _Be ye perfect_, _even as your +Father_, _which is in heaven_, _is perfect_, {26} the perfection of the +divine goodness is proposed to our imitation as it is promiscuous, and +extends to the evil as well as the good; not as it is absolutely +universal, imitation of it in this respect being plainly beyond us. The +object is too vast. For this reason moral writers also have substituted +a less general object for our benevolence, mankind. But this likewise is +an object too general, and very much out of our view. Therefore persons +more practical have, instead of mankind, put our country, and made the +principle of virtue, of human virtue, to consist in the entire uniform +love of our country: and this is what we call a public spirit, which in +men of public stations is the character of a patriot. But this is +speaking to the upper part of the world. Kingdoms and governments are +large, and the sphere of action of far the greatest part of mankind is +much narrower than the government they live under: or however, common men +do not consider their actions as affecting the whole community of which +they are members. There plainly is wanting a less general and nearer +object of benevolence for the bulk of men than that of their country. +Therefore the Scripture, not being a book of theory and speculation, but +a plain rule of life for mankind, has with the utmost possible propriety +put the principle of virtue upon the love of our neighbour, which is that +part of the universe, that part of mankind, that part of our country, +which comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and influence, and +with which we have to do. + +This is plainly the true account or reason why our Saviour places the +principle of virtue in the love of our _neighbour_, and the account +itself shows who are comprehended under that relation. + +II. Let us now consider in what sense we are commanded to love our +neighbour _as ourselves_. + +This precept, in its first delivery by our Saviour, is thus +introduced:--_Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart_, +_with all thy soul_, _and with all thy strength_; _and thy neighbour as +thyself_. These very different manners of expression do not lead our +thoughts to the same measure or degree of love, common to both objects, +but to one peculiar to each. Supposing, then, which is to be supposed, a +distinct meaning and propriety in the words, _as thyself_; the precept we +are considering will admit of any of these senses: that we bear the _same +kind_ of affection to our neighbour as we do to ourselves, or, that the +love we bear to our neighbour should have _some certain proportion or +other_ to self-love: or, lastly, that it should bear the particular +proportion of _equality_, that _it be in the same degree_. + +First, The precept may be understood as requiring only that we have the +_same kind_ of affection to our fellow-creatures as to ourselves; that, +as every man has the principle of self-love, which disposes him to avoid +misery, and consult his own happiness, so we should cultivate the +affection of goodwill to our neighbour, and that it should influence us +to have the same kind of regard to him. This at least must be commanded, +and this will not only prevent our being injurious to him, but will also +put us upon promoting his good. There are blessings in life, which we +share in common with others, peace, plenty, freedom, healthful seasons. +But real benevolence to our fellow-creatures would give us the notion of +a common interest in a stricter sense, for in the degree we love another, +his interest, his joys and sorrows, are our own. It is from self-love +that we form the notion of private good, and consider it is our own: love +of our neighbour would teach us thus to appropriate to ourselves his good +and welfare; to consider ourselves as having a real share in his +happiness. Thus the principle of benevolence would be an advocate within +our own breasts, to take care of the interests of our fellow-creatures in +all the interfering and competitions which cannot but be, from the +imperfection of our nature, and the state we are in. It would likewise, +in some measure, lessen that interfering, and hinder men from forming so +strong a notion of private good, exclusive of the good of others, as we +commonly do. Thus, as the private affection makes us in a peculiar +manner sensible of humanity, justice or injustice, when exercised towards +ourselves, love of our neighbour would give us the same kind of +sensibility in his behalf. This would be the greatest security of our +uniform obedience to that most equitable rule. _Whatsoever ye would that +men should do unto you_, _do ye even so unto them_. + +All this is indeed no more than that we should have a real love to our +neighbour; but then, which is to be observed, the words _as thyself_ +express this in the most distinct manner, and determine the precept to +relate to the affection itself. The advantage which this principle of +benevolence has over other remote considerations is, that it is itself +the temper of virtue, and likewise that it is the chief, nay, the only +effectual security of our performing the several offices of kindness we +owe to our fellow-creatures. When from distant considerations men +resolve upon any thing to which they have no liking, or perhaps an +averseness, they are perpetually finding out evasions and excuses, which +need never be wanting, if people look for them: and they equivocate with +themselves in the plainest cases in the world. This may be in respect to +single determinate acts of virtue, but it comes in much more, where the +obligation is to a general course of behaviour, and most of all, if it be +such as cannot be reduced to fixed determinate rules. This observation +may account for the diversity of the expression in that known passage of +the prophet Micah, _to do justly_, _and to love mercy_. A man's heart +must be formed to humanity and benevolence, he must _love mercy_, +otherwise he will not act mercifully in any settled course of behaviour. +As consideration of the future sanctions of religion is our only security +of preserving in our duty, in cases of great temptation: so to get our +heart and temper formed to a love and liking of what is good is +absolutely necessary in order to our behaving rightly in the familiar and +daily intercourses amongst mankind. + +Secondly, The precept before us may be understood to require that we love +our neighbour in some certain _proportion_ or other, _according as_ we +love ourselves. And indeed a man's character cannot be determined by the +love he bears to his neighbour, considered absolutely, but the proportion +which this bears to self-love, whether it be attended to or not, is the +chief thing which forms the character and influences the actions. For, +as the form of the body is a composition of various parts, so likewise +our inward structure is not simple or uniform, but a composition of +various passions, appetites, affections, together with rationality, +including in this last both the discernment of what is right, and a +disposition to regulate ourselves by it. There is greater variety of +parts in what we call a character than there are features in a face, and +the morality of that is no more determined by one part than the beauty or +deformity of this is by one single feature: each is to be judged of by +all the parts or features, not taken singly, but together. In the inward +frame the various passions, appetites, affections, stand in different +respects to each other. The principles in our mind may be contradictory, +or checks and allays only, or incentives and assistants to each other. +And principles, which in their nature have no kind of contrariety or +affinity, may yet accidentally be each other's allays or incentives. + +From hence it comes to pass, that though we were able to look into the +inward contexture of the heart, and see with the greatest exactness in +what degree any one principle is in a particular man, we could not from +thence determine how far that principle would go towards forming the +character, or what influence it would have upon the actions, unless we +could likewise discern what other principles prevailed in him, and see +the proportion which that one bears to the others. Thus, though two men +should have the affection of compassion in the same degree exactly, yet +one may have the principle of resentment or of ambition so strong in him +as to prevail over that of compassion, and prevent its having any +influence upon his actions, so that he may deserve the character of a +hard or cruel man, whereas the other having compassion in just the same +degree only, yet having resentment or ambition in a lower degree, his +compassion may prevail over them, so as to influence his actions, and to +denominate his temper compassionate. So that, how strange soever it may +appear to people who do not attend to the thing, yet it is quite manifest +that, when we say one man is more resenting or compassionate than +another, this does not necessarily imply that one has the principle of +resentment or of compassion stronger than the other. For if the +proportion which resentment or compassion bears to other inward +principles is greater in one than in the other, this is itself sufficient +to denominate one more resenting or compassionate than the other. + +Further, the whole system, as I may speak, of affections (including +rationality), which constitute the heart, as this word is used in +Scripture and on moral subjects, are each and all of them stronger in +some than in others. Now the proportion which the two general +affections, benevolence and self-love, bear to each other, according to +this interpretation of the text, demonstrates men's character as to +virtue. Suppose, then, one man to have the principle of benevolence in a +higher degree than another; it will not follow from hence that his +general temper or character or actions will be more benevolent than the +other's. For he may have self-love in such a degree as quite to prevail +over benevolence, so that it may have no influence at all upon his +action, whereas benevolence in the other person, though in a lower +degree, may yet be the strongest principle in his heart, and strong +enough to be the guide of his actions, so as to denominate him a good and +virtuous man. The case is here as in scales: it is not one weight +considered in itself, which determines whether the scale shall ascend or +descend, but this depends upon the proportion which that one weight hath +to the other. + +It being thus manifest that the influence which benevolence has upon our +actions, and how far it goes towards forming our character, is not +determined by the degree itself of this principle in our mind, but by the +proportion it has to self-love and other principles: a comparison also +being made in the text between self-love and the love of our neighbour; +these joint considerations afforded sufficient occasion for treating here +of that proportion. It plainly is implied in the precept, though it +should be questioned, whether it be the exact meaning of the words, as +_thyself_. + +Love of our neighbour, then, must bear some proportion to self-love, and +virtue, to be sure, consists in the due proportion. What this due +proportion is, whether as a principle in the mind, or as exerted in +actions, can be judged of only from our nature and condition in this +world. Of the degree in which affections and the principles of action, +considered in themselves, prevail, we have no measure: let us, then, +proceed to the course of behaviour, the actions they produce. + +Both our nature and condition require that each particular man should +make particular provision for himself: and the inquiry, what proportion +benevolence should have to self-love, when brought down to practice, will +be, what is a competent care and provision for ourselves? And how +certain soever it be that each man must determine this for himself, and +how ridiculous soever it would be for any to attempt to determine it for +another, yet it is to be observed that the proportion is real, and that a +competent provision has a bound, and that it cannot be all which we can +possibly get and keep within our grasp, without legal injustice. Mankind +almost universally bring in vanity, supplies for what is called a life of +pleasure, covetousness, or imaginary notions of superiority over others, +to determine this question: but every one who desires to act a proper +part in society would do well to consider how far any of them come in to +determine it, in the way of moral consideration. All that can be said +is, supposing what, as the world goes, is so much to be supposed that it +is scarce to be mentioned, that persons do not neglect what they really +owe to themselves; the more of their care and thought and of their +fortune they employ in doing good to their fellow-creatures the nearer +they come up to the law of perfection, _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as +thyself_. + +Thirdly, if the words _as thyself_ were to be understood of an equality +of affection, it would not be attended with those consequences which +perhaps may be thought to follow from it. Suppose a person to have the +same settled regard to others as to himself; that in every deliberate +scheme or pursuit he took their interest into the account in the same +degree as his own, so far as an equality of affection would produce this: +yet he would, in fact, and ought to be, much more taken up and employed +about himself, and his own concerns, than about others, and their +interests. For, besides the one common affection toward himself and his +neighbour he would have several other particular affections, passions, +appetites, which he could not possibly feel in common both for himself +and others. Now these sensations themselves very much employ us, and +have perhaps as great influence as self-love. So far indeed as +self-love, and cool reflection upon what is for our interest, would set +us on work to gain a supply of our own several wants, so far the love of +our neighbour would make us do the same for him: but the degree in which +we are put upon seeking and making use of the means of gratification, by +the feeling of those affections, appetites, and passions, must +necessarily be peculiar to ourselves. + +That there are particular passions (suppose shame, resentment) which men +seem to have, and feel in common, both for themselves and others, makes +no alteration in respect to those passions and appetites which cannot +possibly be thus felt in common. From hence (and perhaps more things of +the like kind might be mentioned) it follows, that though there were an +equality of affection to both, yet regards to ourselves would be more +prevalent than attention to the concerns of others. + +And from moral considerations it ought to be so, supposing still the +equality of affection commanded, because we are in a peculiar manner, as +I may speak, intrusted with ourselves, and therefore care of our own +interests, as well as of our conduct, particularly belongs to us. + +To these things must be added, that moral obligations can extend no +further than to natural possibilities. Now we have a perception of our +own interests, like consciousness of our own existence, which we always +carry about with us, and which, in its continuation, kind, and degree, +seems impossible to be felt in respect to the interests of others. + +From all these things it fully appears that though we were to love our +neighbour in the same degree as we love ourselves, so far as this is +possible, yet the care of ourselves, of the individual, would not be +neglected, the apprehended danger of which seems to be the only objection +against understanding the precept in this strict sense. + +III. The general temper of mind which the due love of our neighbour +would form us to, and the influence it would have upon our behaviour in +life, is now to be considered. + +The temper and behaviour of charity is explained at large in that known +passage of St. Paul: {27} _Charity suffereth long_, _and is kind_; +_charity envieth not_, _doth not behave itself unseemly_, _seeketh not +her own_, _thinketh no evil_, _beareth all things_, _believeth all +things_, _hopeth all things_. As to the meaning of the expressions, +_seeketh not her own_, _thinketh no evil_, _believeth all things_; +however those expressions may be explained away, this meekness, and in +some degree easiness of temper, readiness to forego our right for the +sake of peace, as well as in the way of compassion, freedom from +mistrust, and disposition to believe well of our neighbour, this general +temper, I say, accompanies, and is plainly the effect of love and +goodwill. And, though such is the world in which we live, that +experience and knowledge of it not only may, but must beget, in as +greater regard to ourselves, and doubtfulness of the characters of +others, than is natural to mankind, yet these ought not to be carried +further than the nature and course of things make necessary. It is still +true, even in the present state of things, bad as it is, that a real good +man had rather be deceived than be suspicious; had rather forego his +known right, than run the venture of doing even a hard thing. This is +the general temper of that charity, of which the apostle asserts, that if +he had it not, giving his _body to be burned would avail him nothing_; +and which he says _shall never fail_. + +The happy influence of this temper extends to every different relation +and circumstance in human life. It plainly renders a man better, more to +be desired, as to all the respects and relations we can stand in to each +other. The benevolent man is disposed to make use of all external +advantages in such a manner as shall contribute to the good of others, as +well as to his own satisfaction. His own satisfaction consists in this. +He will be easy and kind to his dependents, compassionate to the poor and +distressed, friendly to all with whom he has to do. This includes the +good neighbour, parent, master, magistrate: and such a behaviour would +plainly make dependence, inferiority, and even servitude easy. So that a +good or charitable man of superior rank in wisdom, fortune, authority, is +a common blessing to the place he lives in: happiness grows under his +influence. This good principle in inferiors would discover itself in +paying respect, gratitude, obedience, as due. It were therefore, +methinks, one just way of trying one's own character to ask ourselves, am +I in reality a better master or servant, a better friend, a better +neighbour, than such and such persons, whom, perhaps, I may think not to +deserve the character of virtue and religion so much as myself? + +And as to the spirit of party, which unhappily prevails amongst mankind, +whatever are the distinctions which serve for a supply to it, some or +other of which have obtained in all ages and countries, one who is thus +friendly to his kind will immediately make due allowances for it, as what +cannot but be amongst such creatures as men, in such a world as this. And +as wrath and fury and overbearing upon these occasions proceed, as I may +speak, from men's feeling only on their own side, so a common feeling, +for others as well as for ourselves, would render us sensible to this +truth, which it is strange can have so little influence, that we +ourselves differ from others, just as much as they do from us. I put the +matter in this way, because it can scarce be expected that the generality +of men should see that those things which are made the occasions of +dissension and fomenting the party-spirit are really nothing at all: but +it may be expected from all people, how much soever they are in earnest +about their respective peculiarities, that humanity and common goodwill +to their fellow-creatures should moderate and restrain that wretched +spirit. + +This good temper of charity likewise would prevent strife and enmity +arising from other occasions: it would prevent our giving just cause of +offence, and our taking it without cause. And in cases of real injury, a +good man will make all the allowances which are to be made, and, without +any attempts of retaliation, he will only consult his own and other men's +security for the future against injustice and wrong. + +IV. I proceed to consider, lastly, what is affirmed of the precept now +explained, that it comprehends in it all others, _i.e._, that to love our +neighbour as ourselves includes in it all virtues. + +Now the way in which every maxim of conduct, or general speculative +assertion, when it is to be explained at large should be treated, is, to +show what are the particular truths which were designed to be +comprehended under such a general observation, how far it is strictly +true, and then the limitations, restrictions, and exceptions, if there be +exceptions, with which it is to be understood. But it is only the former +of these, namely, how far the assertion in the text holds, and the ground +of the pre-eminence assigned to the precept of it, which in strictness +comes into our present consideration. + +However, in almost everything that is said, there is somewhat to be +understood beyond what is explicitly laid down, and which we of course +supply, somewhat, I mean, which would not be commonly called a +restriction or limitation. Thus, when benevolence is said to be the sum +of virtue, it is not spoken of as a blind propension, but a principle in +reasonable creatures, and so to be directed by their reason, for reason +and reflection comes into our notion of a moral agent. And that will +lead us to consider distant consequences, as well as the immediate +tendency of an action. It will teach us that the care of some persons, +suppose children and families, is particularly committed to our charge by +Nature and Providence, as also that there are other circumstances, +suppose friendship or former obligations, which require that we do good +to some, preferably to others. Reason, considered merely as subservient +to benevolence, as assisting to produce the greatest good, will teach us +to have particular regard to these relations and circumstances, because +it is plainly for the good of the world that they should be regarded. And +as there are numberless cases in which, notwithstanding appearances, we +are not competent judges, whether a particular action will upon the whole +do good or harm, reason in the same way will teach us to be cautious how +we act in these cases of uncertainty. It will suggest to our +consideration which is the safer side; how liable we are to be led wrong +by passion and private interest; and what regard is due to laws, and the +judgment of mankind. All these things must come into consideration, were +it only in order to determine which way of acting is likely to produce +the greatest good. Thus, upon supposition that it were in the strictest +sense true, without limitation, that benevolence includes in it all +virtues, yet reason must come in as its guide and director, in order to +attain its own end, the end of benevolence, the greatest public good. +Reason, then, being thus included, let us now consider the truth of the +assertion itself. + +First, It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind or +any creature but happiness. This, then, is all which any person can, in +strictness of speaking, be said to have a right to. We can therefore +_owe no man anything_, but only to farther and promote his happiness, +according to our abilities. And therefore a disposition and endeavour to +do good to all with whom we have to do, in the degree and manner which +the different relations we stand in to them require, is a discharge of +all the obligations we are under to them. + +As human nature is not one simple uniform thing but a composition of +various parts, body, spirit, appetites, particular passions, and +affections, for each of which reasonable self-love would lead men to have +due regard, and make suitable provision, so society consists of various +parts to which we stand in different respects and relations, and just +benevolence would as surely lead us to have due regard to each of these +and behave as the respective relations require. Reasonable goodwill and +right behaviour towards our fellow-creatures are in a manner the same, +only that the former expresseth the principle as it is in the mind; the +latter, the principle as it were become external, _i.e._, exerted in +actions. + +And so far as temperance, sobriety, and moderation in sensual pleasures, +and the contrary vices, have any respect to our fellow-creatures, any +influence upon their quiet, welfare, and happiness, as they always have a +real, and often a near influence upon it, so far it is manifest those +virtues may be produced by the love of our neighbour, and that the +contrary vices would be prevented by it. Indeed, if men's regard to +themselves will not restrain them from excess, it may be thought little +probable that their love to others will be sufficient: but the reason is, +that their love to others is not, any more than their regard to +themselves, just, and in its due degree. There are, however, manifest +instances of persons kept sober and temperate from regard to their +affairs, and the welfare of those who depend upon them. And it is +obvious to every one that habitual excess, a dissolute course of life, +implies a general neglect of the duties we owe towards our friends, our +families, and our country. + +From hence it is manifest that the common virtues and the common vices of +mankind may be traced up to benevolence, or the want of it. And this +entitles the precept, _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself_, to the +pre-eminence given to it, and is a justification of the apostle's +assertion, that all other commandments are comprehended in it, whatever +cautions and restrictions {28} there are, which might require to be +considered, if we were to state particularly and at length what is virtue +and right behaviour in mankind. But, + +Secondly, It might be added, that in a higher and more general way of +consideration, leaving out the particular nature of creatures, and the +particular circumstances in which they are placed, benevolence seems in +the strictest sense to include in it all that is good and worthy, all +that is good, which we have any distinct particular notion of. We have +no clear conception of any position moral attribute in the Supreme Being, +but what may be resolved up into goodness. And, if we consider a +reasonable creature or moral agent, without regard to the particular +relations and circumstances in which he is placed, we cannot conceive +anything else to come in towards determining whether he is to be ranked +in a higher or lower class of virtuous beings, but the higher or lower +degree in which that principle, and what is manifestly connected with it, +prevail in him. + +That which we more strictly call piety, or the love of God, and which is +an essential part of a right temper, some may perhaps imagine no way +connected with benevolence: yet surely they must be connected, if there +be indeed in being an object infinitely good. Human nature is so +constituted that every good affection implies the love of itself, _i.e._, +becomes the object of a new affection in the same person. Thus, to be +righteous, implies in it the love of righteousness; to be benevolent, the +love of benevolence; to be good, the love of goodness; whether this +righteousness, benevolence, or goodness be viewed as in our own mind or +another's, and the love of God as a being perfectly good is the love of +perfect goodness contemplated in a being or person. Thus morality and +religion, virtue and piety, will at last necessarily coincide, run up +into one and the same point, and _love_ will be in all senses _the end of +the commandment_. + +* * * * * + +_O Almighty God_, _inspire us with this divine principle_; _kill in us +all the seeds of envy and ill-will_; _and help us_, _by cultivating +within ourselves the love of our neighbour_, _to improve in the love of +Thee_. _Thou hast placed us in various kindreds_, _friendships_, _and +relations_, _as the school of discipline for our affections_: _help us_, +_by the due exercise of them_, _to improve to perfection_; _till all +partial affection be lost in that entire universal one_, _and thou_, _O +God_, _shalt_ be all in all. + + + + +SERMON XIII., XIV. UPON THE LOVE OF GOD. + + + MATTHEW xxii. 37. + + _Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart_, _and with all + thy soul_, _and with all thy mind_. + +Everybody knows, you therefore need only just be put in mind, that there +is such a thing as having so great horror of one extreme as to run +insensibly and of course into the contrary; and that a doctrine's having +been a shelter for enthusiasm, or made to serve the purposes of +superstition, is no proof of the falsity of it: truth or right being +somewhat real in itself, and so not to be judged of by its liableness to +abuse, or by its supposed distance from or nearness to error. It may be +sufficient to have mentioned this in general, without taking notice of +the particular extravagances which have been vented under the pretence or +endeavour of explaining the love of God; or how manifestly we are got +into the contrary extreme, under the notion of a reasonable religion; so +very reasonable as to have nothing to do with the heart and affections, +if these words signify anything but the faculty by which we discern +speculative truth. + +By the love of God I would understand all those regards, all those +affections of mind which are due immediately to Him from such a creature +as man, and which rest in Him as their end. As this does not include +servile fear, so neither will any other regards, how reasonable soever, +which respect anything out of or besides the perfection of the Divine +nature, come into consideration here. But all fear is not excluded, +because His displeasure is itself the natural proper object of fear. +Reverence, ambition of His love and approbation, delight in the hope or +consciousness of it, come likewise into this definition of the love of +God, because He is the natural object of all those affections or +movements of mind as really as He is the object of the affection, which +is in the strictest sense called love; and all of them equally rest in +Him as their end. And they may all be understood to be implied in these +words of our Saviour, without putting any force upon them: for He is +speaking of the love of God and our neighbour as containing the whole of +piety and virtue. + +It is plain that the nature of man is so constituted as to feel certain +affections upon the sight or contemplation of certain objects. Now the +very notion of affection implies resting in its object as an end. And +the particular affection to good characters, reverence and moral love of +them, is natural to all those who have any degree of real goodness in +themselves. This will be illustrated by the description of a perfect +character in a creature; and by considering the manner in which a good +man in his presence would be affected towards such a character. He would +of course feel the affections of love, reverence, desire of his +approbation, delight in the hope or consciousness of it. And surely all +this is applicable, and may be brought up to that Being, who is +infinitely more than an adequate object of all those affections; whom we +are commanded to _love with all our heart_, _with all our soul_, _and +with all our mind_. And of these regards towards Almighty God some are +more particularly suitable to and becoming so imperfect a creature as +man, in this mortal state we are passing through; and some of them, and +perhaps other exercises of the mind, will be the employment and happiness +of good men in a state of perfection. + +This is a general view of what the following discourse will contain. And +it is manifest the subject is a real one: there is nothing in it +enthusiastical or unreasonable. And if it be indeed at all a subject, it +is one of the utmost importance. + +As mankind have a faculty by which they discern speculative truth, so we +have various affections towards external objects. Understanding and +temper, reason and affection, are as distinct ideas as reason and hunger, +and one would think could no more be confounded. It is by reason that we +get the ideas of several objects of our affections; but in these cases +reason and affection are no more the same than sight of a particular +object, and the pleasure or uneasiness consequent thereupon, are the +same. Now as reason tends to and rests in the discernment of truth, the +object of it, so the very nature of affection consists in tending +towards, and resting in, its objects as an end. We do indeed often in +common language say that things are loved, desired, esteemed, not for +themselves, but for somewhat further, somewhat out of and beyond them; +yet, in these cases, whoever will attend will see that these things are +not in reality the objects of the affections, _i.e._ are not loved, +desired, esteemed, but the somewhat further and beyond them. If we have +no affections which rest in what are called their objects, then what is +called affection, love, desire, hope, in human nature, is only an +uneasiness in being at rest; an unquiet disposition to action, progress, +pursuit, without end or meaning. But if there be any such thing as +delight in the company of one person, rather than of another; whether in +the way of friendship, or mirth and entertainment, it is all one, if it +be without respect to fortune, honour, or increasing our stores of +knowledge, or anything beyond the present time; here is an instance of an +affection absolutely resting in its object as its end, and being +gratified in the same way as the appetite of hunger is satisfied with +food. Yet nothing is more common than to hear it asked, what advantage a +man hath in such a course, suppose of study, particular friendships, or +in any other; nothing, I say, is more common than to hear such a question +put in a way which supposes no gain, advantage, or interest, but as a +means to somewhat further: and if so, then there is no such thing at all +as real interest, gain, or advantage. This is the same absurdity with +respect to life as an infinite series of effects without a cause is in +speculation. The gain, advantage, or interest consists in the delight +itself, arising from such a faculty's having its object: neither is there +any such thing as happiness or enjoyment but what arises from hence. The +pleasures of hope and of reflection are not exceptions: the former being +only this happiness anticipated; the latter the same happiness enjoyed +over again after its time. And even the general expectation of future +happiness can afford satisfaction only as it is a present object to the +principle of self-love. + +It was doubtless intended that life should be very much a pursuit to the +gross of mankind. But this is carried so much further than is reasonable +that what gives immediate satisfaction, _i.e._ our present interest, is +scarce considered as our interest at all. It is inventions which have +only a remote tendency towards enjoyment, perhaps but a remote tendency +towards gaining the means only of enjoyment, which are chiefly spoken of +as useful to the world. And though this way of thinking were just with +respect to the imperfect state we are now in, where we know so little of +satisfaction without satiety, yet it must be guarded against when we are +considering the happiness of a state of perfection; which happiness being +enjoyment and not hope, must necessarily consist in this, that our +affections have their objects, and rest in those objects as an end, +_i.e._ be satisfied with them. This will further appear in the sequel of +this discourse. + +Of the several affections, or inward sensations, which particular objects +excite in man, there are some, the having of which implies the love of +them, when they are reflected upon. {29} This cannot be said of all our +affections, principles, and motives of action. It were ridiculous to +assert that a man upon reflection hath the same kind of approbation of +the appetite of hunger or the passion of fear as he hath of goodwill to +his fellow-creatures. To be a just, a good, a righteous man, plainly +carries with it a peculiar affection to or love of justice, goodness, +righteousness, when these principles are the objects of contemplation. + +Now if a man approves of, or hath an affection to, any principle in and +for itself, incidental things allowed for, it will be the same whether he +views it in his own mind or in another; in himself or in his neighbour. +This is the account of our approbation of, or moral love and affection to +good characters; which cannot but be in those who have any degrees of +real goodness in themselves, and who discern and take notice of the same +principle in others. + +From observation of what passes within ourselves, our own actions, and +the behaviour of others, the mind may carry on its reflections as far as +it pleases; much beyond what we experience in ourselves, or discern in +our fellow creatures. It may go on and consider goodness as become a +uniform continued principle of action, as conducted by reason, and +forming a temper and character absolutely good and perfect, which is in a +higher sense excellent, and proportionably the object of love and +approbation. + +Let us then suppose a creature perfect according to his created +nature--let his form be human, and his capacities no more than equal to +those of the chief of men--goodness shall be his proper character, with +wisdom to direct it, and power within some certain determined sphere of +action to exert it: but goodness must be the simple actuating principle +within him; this being the moral quality which is amiable, or the +immediate object of love as distinct from other affections of +approbation. Here then is a finite object for our mind to tend towards, +to exercise itself upon: a creature, perfect according to his capacity, +fixed, steady, equally unmoved by weak pity or more weak fury and +resentment; forming the justest scheme of conduct; going on undisturbed +in the execution of it, through the several methods of severity and +reward, towards his end, namely, the general happiness of all with whom +he hath to do, as in itself right and valuable. This character, though +uniform in itself, in its principle, yet exerting itself in different +ways, or considered in different views, may by its appearing variety move +different affections. Thus, the severity of justice would not affect us +in the same way as an act of mercy. The adventitious qualities of wisdom +and power may be considered in themselves; and even the strength of mind +which this immovable goodness supposes may likewise be viewed as an +object of contemplation distinct from the goodness itself. Superior +excellence of any kind, as well as superior wisdom and power, is the +object of awe and reverence to all creatures, whatever their moral +character be; but so far as creatures of the lowest rank were good, so +far the view of this character, as simply good, must appear amiable to +them, be the object of, or beget love. Further suppose we were conscious +that this superior person so far approved of us that we had nothing +servilely to fear from him; that he was really our friend, and kind and +good to us in particular, as he had occasionally intercourse with us: we +must be other creatures than we are, or we could not but feel the same +kind of satisfaction and enjoyment (whatever would be the degree of it) +from this higher acquaintance and friendship as we feel from common ones, +the intercourse being real and the persons equally present in both cases. +We should have a more ardent desire to be approved by his better +judgment, and a satisfaction in that approbation of the same sort with +what would be felt in respect to common persons, or be wrought in us by +their presence. + +Let us now raise the character, and suppose this creature, for we are +still going on with the supposition of a creature, our proper guardian +and governor; that we were in a progress of being towards somewhat +further; and that his scheme of government was too vast for our +capacities to comprehend: remembering still that he is perfectly good, +and our friend as well as our governor. Wisdom, power, goodness, +accidentally viewed anywhere, would inspire reverence, awe, love; and as +these affections would be raised in higher or lower degrees in proportion +as we had occasionally more or less intercourse with the creature endued +with those qualities, so this further consideration and knowledge that he +was our proper guardian and governor would much more bring these objects +and qualities home to ourselves; teach us they had a greater respect to +us in particular, that we had a higher interest in that wisdom and power +and goodness. We should, with joy, gratitude, reverence, love, trust, +and dependence, appropriate the character, as what we had a right in, and +make our boast in such our relation to it. And the conclusion of the +whole would be that we should refer ourselves implicitly to him, and cast +ourselves entirely upon him. As the whole attention of life should be to +obey his commands, so the highest enjoyment of it must arise from the +contemplation of this character, and our relation to it, from a +consciousness of his favour and approbation, and from the exercise of +those affections towards him which could not but be raised from his +presence. A Being who hath these attributes, who stands in this +relation, and is thus sensibly present to the mind, must necessarily be +the object of these affections: there is as real a correspondence between +them as between the lowest appetite of sense and its object. + +That this Being is not a creature, but the Almighty God; that He is of +infinite power and wisdom and goodness, does not render Him less the +object of reverence and love than He would be if He had those attributes +only in a limited degree. The Being who made us, and upon whom we +entirely depend, is the object of some regards. He hath given us certain +affections of mind, which correspond to wisdom, power, goodness, _i.e._ +which are raised upon view of those qualities. If then He be really +wise, powerful, good, He is the natural object of those affections which +He hath endued us with, and which correspond to those attributes. That +He is infinite in power, perfect in wisdom and goodness, makes no +alteration, but only that He is the object of those affections raised to +the highest pitch. He is not, indeed, to be discerned by any of our +senses. _I go forward_, _but He is not there_; _and backward_, _but I +cannot perceive Him_: _on the left hand where He doth work_, _but I +cannot behold Him_: _He hideth Himself on the right hand_, _that I cannot +see Him_, _Oh that I knew where I might find Him_! _that I might come +even to His seat_! {30} But is He then afar off? does He not fill heaven +and earth with His presence? The presence of our fellow-creatures +affects our senses, and our senses give us the knowledge of their +presence; which hath different kinds of influence upon us--love, joy, +sorrow, restraint, encouragement, reverence. However, this influence is +not immediately from our senses, but from that knowledge. Thus suppose a +person neither to see nor hear another, not to know by any of his senses, +but yet certainly to know, that another was with him; this knowledge +might, and in many cases would, have one or more of the effects before +mentioned. It is therefore not only reasonable, but also natural, to be +affected with a presence, though it be not the object of our senses; +whether it be, or be not, is merely an accidental circumstance, which +needs not come into consideration: it is the certainty that he is with +us, and we with him, which hath the influence. We consider persons then +as present, not only when they are within reach of our senses, but also +when we are assured by any other means that they are within such a +nearness; nay, if they are not, we can recall them to our mind, and be +moved towards them as present; and must He, who is so much more +intimately with us, that _in Him we live and move and have our being_, be +thought too distant to be the object of our affections? We own and feel +the force of amiable and worthy qualities in our fellow creatures; and +can we be insensible to the contemplation of perfect goodness? Do we +reverence the shadows of greatness here below, are we solicitous about +honour and esteem and the opinion of the world, and shall we not feel the +same with respect to Him whose are wisdom and power in the original, who +_is the God of judgment by whom actions are weighed_? Thus love, +reverence, desire of esteem, every faculty, every affection, tends +towards and is employed about its respective object in common cases: and +must the exercise of them be suspended with regard to Him alone who is an +object, an infinitely more than adequate object, to our most exalted +faculties; Him, _of whom_, _and through whom_, _and to whom are all +things_? + +As we cannot remove from this earth, or change our general business on +it, so neither can we alter our real nature. Therefore no exercise of +the mind can be recommended, but only the exercise of those faculties you +are conscious of. Religion does not demand new affections, but only +claims the direction of those you already have, those affections you +daily feel; though unhappily confined to objects not altogether +unsuitable but altogether unequal to them. We only represent to you the +higher, the adequate objects of those very faculties and affections. Let +the man of ambition go on still to consider disgrace as the greatest +evil, honour as his chief good. But disgrace in whose estimation? Honour +in whose judgment? This is the only question. If shame, and delight in +esteem, be spoken of as real, as any settled ground of pain or pleasure, +both these must be in proportion to the supposed wisdom, and worth of him +by whom we are contemned or esteemed. Must it then be thought +enthusiastical to speak of a sensibility of this sort which shall have +respect to an unerring judgment, to infinite wisdom, when we are assured +this unerring judgment, this infinite wisdom does observe upon our +actions? + +It is the same with respect to the love of God in the strictest and most +confined sense. We only offer and represent the highest object of an +affection supposed already in your mind. Some degree of goodness must be +previously supposed; this always implies the love of itself, an affection +to goodness: the highest, the adequate object of this affection, is +perfect goodness; which therefore we are to _love with all our heart_, +_with all our soul_, _and with all our strength_. "Must we then, +forgetting our own interest, as it were go out of ourselves, and love God +for His own sake?" No more forget your own interest, no more go out of +yourselves, than when you prefer one place, one prospect, the +conversation of one man to that of another. Does not every affection +necessarily imply that the object of it be itself loved? If it be not it +is not the object of the affection. You may, and ought if you can, but +it is a great mistake to think you can love or fear or hate anything, +from consideration that such love or fear or hatred may be a means of +obtaining good or avoiding evil. But the question whether we ought to +love God for His sake or for our own being a mere mistake in language, +the real question which this is mistaken for will, I suppose, be answered +by observing that the goodness of God already exercised towards us, our +present dependence upon Him, and our expectation of future benefits, +ought, and have a natural tendency, to beget in us the affection of +gratitude, and greater love towards Him, than the same goodness exercised +towards others; were it only for this reason, that every affection is +moved in proportion to the sense we have of the object of it; and we +cannot but have a more lively sense of goodness when exercised towards +ourselves than when exercised towards others. I added expectation of +future benefits because the ground of that expectation is present +goodness. + +Thus Almighty God is the natural object of the several affections, love, +reverence, fear, desire of approbation. For though He is simply one, yet +we cannot but consider Him in partial and different views. He is in +himself one uniform Being, and for ever the same without _variableness or +shadow of turning_; but His infinite greatness, His goodness, His wisdom, +are different objects to our mind. To which is to be added, that from +the changes in our own characters, together with His unchangeableness, we +cannot but consider ourselves as more or less the objects of His +approbation, and really be so. For if He approves what is good, He +cannot, merely from the unchangeableness of His nature, approve what is +evil. Hence must arise more various movements of mind, more different +kinds of affections. And this greater variety also is just and +reasonable in such creatures as we are, though it respects a Being simply +one, good and perfect. As some of these actions are most particularly +suitable to so imperfect a creature as man in this mortal state we are +passing through, so there may be other exercises of mind, or some of +these in higher degrees, our employment and happiness in a state of +perfection. + + + + +SERMON XIV. + + +Consider then our ignorance, the imperfection of our nature, our virtue, +and our condition in this world, with respect to aim infinitely good and +just Being, our Creator and Governor, and you will see what religious +affections of mind are most particularly suitable to this mortal state we +are passing through. + +Though we are not affected with anything so strongly as what we discern +with our senses, and though our nature and condition require that we be +much taken up about sensible things, yet our reason convinces us that God +is present with us, and we see and feel the effects of His goodness: He +is therefore the object of some regards. The imperfection of our virtue, +joined with the consideration of His absolute rectitude or holiness, will +scarce permit that perfection of love which entirely casts out all fear: +yet goodness is the object of love to all creatures who have any degree +of it themselves; and consciousness of a real endeavour to approve +ourselves to Him, joined with the consideration of His goodness, as it +quite excludes servile dread and horror, so it is plainly a reasonable +ground for hope of His favour. Neither fear nor hope nor love then are +excluded, and one or another of these will prevail, according to the +different views we have of God, and ought to prevail, according to the +changes we find in our own character. There is a temper of mind made up +of, or which follows from all three, fear, hope, love--namely, +resignation to the Divine will, which is the general temper belonging to +this state; which ought to be the habitual frame of our mind and heart, +and to be exercised at proper seasons more distinctly, in acts of +devotion. + +Resignation to the will of God is the whole of piety. It includes in it +all that is good, and is a source of the most settled quiet and composure +of mind. There is the general principle of submission in our nature. Man +is not so constituted as to desire things, and be uneasy in the want of +them, in proportion to their known value: many other considerations come +in to determine the degrees of desire; particularly whether the advantage +we take a view of be within the sphere of our rank. Whoever felt +uneasiness upon observing any of the advantages brute creatures have over +us? And yet it is plain they have several. It is the same with respect +to advantages belonging to creatures of a superior order. Thus, though +we see a thing to be highly valuable, yet that it does not belong to our +condition of being is sufficient to suspend our desires after it, to make +us rest satisfied without such advantage. Now there is just the same +reason for quiet resignation in the want of everything equally +unattainable and out of our reach in particular, though others of our +species be possessed of it. All this may be applied to the whole of +life; to positive inconveniences as well as wants, not indeed to the +sensations of pain and sorrow, but to all the uneasinesses of reflection, +murmuring, and discontent. Thus is human nature formed to compliance, +yielding, submission of temper. We find the principles of it within us; +and every one exercises it towards some objects or other, _i.e._ feels it +with regard to some persons and some circumstances. Now this is an +excellent foundation of a reasonable and religious resignation. Nature +teaches and inclines as to take up with our lot; the consideration that +the course of things is unalterable hath a tendency to quiet the mind +under it, to beget a submission of temper to it. But when we can add +that this unalterable course is appointed and continued by infinite +wisdom and goodness, how absolute should be our submission, how entire +our trust and dependence! + +This would reconcile us to our condition, prevent all the supernumerary +troubles arising from imagination, distant fears, impatience--all +uneasiness, except that which necessarily arises from the calamities +themselves we may be under. How many of our cares should we by this +means be disburdened of! Cares not properly our own, how apt soever they +may be to intrude upon us, and we to admit them; the anxieties of +expectation, solicitude about success and disappointment, which in truth +are none of our concern. How open to every gratification would that mind +be which was clear of these encumbrances! + +Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be perfect when our +will is lost and resolved up into His: when we rest in His will as our +end, as being itself most just and right and good. And where is the +impossibility of such an affection to what is just, and right, and good, +such a loyalty of heart to the Governor of the universe as shall prevail +over all sinister indirect desires of our own? Neither is this at bottom +anything more than faith and honesty and fairness of mind--in a more +enlarged sense indeed than those words are commonly used. And as, in +common cases, fear and hope and other passions are raised in us by their +respective objects, so this submission of heart and soul and mind, this +religious resignation, would be as naturally produced by our having just +conceptions of Almighty God, and a real sense of His presence with us. In +how low a degree soever this temper usually prevails amongst men, yet it +is a temper right in itself: it is what we owe to our Creator: it is +particularly suitable to our mortal condition, and what we should +endeavour after for our own sakes in our passage through such a world as +this, where is nothing upon which we can rest or depend, nothing but what +we are liable to be deceived and disappointed in. Thus we might +_acquaint ourselves with God_, _and be at peace_. This is piety an +religion in the strictest sense, considered as a habit of mind: an +habitual sense of God's presence with us; being affected towards Him, as +present, in the manner His superior nature requires from such a creature +as man: this is to _walk with God_. + +Little more need be said of devotion or religious worship than that it is +this temper exerted into act. The nature of it consists in the actual +exercise of those affections towards God which are supposed habitual in +good men. He is always equally present with us: but we are so much taken +up with sensible things that, _Lo_, _He goeth by us_, _and we see Him +not_: _He passeth on also_, _but we perceive Him not_. {31} Devotion is +retirement from the world He has made to Him alone: it is to withdraw +from the avocations of sense, to employ our attention wholly upon Him as +upon an object actually present, to yield ourselves up to the influence +of the Divine presence, and to give full scope to the affections of +gratitude, love, reverence, trust, and dependence; of which infinite +power, wisdom, and goodness is the natural and only adequate object. We +may apply to the whole of devotion those words of the Son of Sirach, +_When you glorify the Lord_, _exalt Him as much as you can_; _for even +yet will He far exceed_: _and when you exalt Him_, _put forth all your +strength_, _and be not weary_; _for you can never go far enough_. {32} +Our most raised affections of every kind cannot but fall short and be +disproportionate when an infinite being is the object of them. This is +the highest exercise and employment of mind that a creature is capable +of. As this divine service and worship is itself absolutely due to God, +so also is it necessary in order to a further end, to keep alive upon our +minds a sense of His authority, a sense that in our ordinary behaviour +amongst men we act under him as our Governor and Judge. + +Thus you see the temper of mind respecting God which is particularly +suitable to a state of imperfection, to creatures in a progress of being +towards somewhat further. + +Suppose now this something further attained, that we were arrived at it, +what a perception will it be to see and know and feel that our trust was +not vain, our dependence not groundless? That the issue, event, and +consummation came out such as fully to justify and answer that +resignation? If the obscure view of the divine perfection which we have +in this world ought in just consequence to beget an entire resignation, +what will this resignation be exalted into when _we shall see face to +face_, _and know as we are known_? If we cannot form any distinct notion +of that perfection of the love of God which _casts out all fear_, of that +enjoyment of Him which will be the happiness of good men hereafter, the +consideration of our wants and capacities of happiness, and that He will +be adequate supply to them, must serve us instead of such distinct +conception of the particular happiness itself. + +Let us then suppose a man entirely disengaged from business and pleasure, +sitting down alone and at leisure, to reflect upon himself and his own +condition of being. He would immediately feel that he was by no means +complete of himself, but totally insufficient for his own happiness. One +may venture to affirm that every man hath felt this, whether he hath +again reflected upon it or not. It is feeling this deficiency, that they +are unsatisfied with themselves, which makes men look out for assistance +from abroad, and which has given rise to various kinds of amusements, +altogether needless any otherwise than as they serve to fill up the blank +spaces of time, and so hinder their feeling this deficiency, and being +uneasy with themselves. Now, if these external things we take up with +were really an adequate supply to this deficiency of human nature, if by +their means our capacities and desires were all satisfied and filled up, +then it might be truly said that we had found out the proper happiness of +man, and so might sit down satisfied, and be at rest in the enjoyment of +it. But if it appears that the amusements which men usually pass their +time in are so far from coming up to or answering our notions and desires +of happiness or good that they are really no more than what they are +commonly called, somewhat to pass away the time, _i.e._ somewhat which +serves to turn us aside from, and prevent our attending to, this our +internal poverty and want; if they serve only, or chiefly, to suspend +instead of satisfying our conceptions and desires of happiness; if the +want remains, and we have found out little more than barely the means of +making it less sensible; then are we still to seek for somewhat to be an +adequate supply to it. It is plain that there is a capacity in the +nature of man which neither riches nor honours nor sensual +gratifications, nor anything in this world, can perfectly fill up or +satisfy: there is a deeper and more essential want than any of these +things can be the supply of. Yet surely there is a possibility of +somewhat which may fill up all our capacities of happiness, somewhat in +which our souls may find rest, somewhat which may be to us that +satisfactory good we are inquiring after. But it cannot be anything +which is valuable only as it tends to some further end. Those therefore +who have got this world so much into their hearts as not to be able to +consider happiness as consisting in anything but property and +possessions--which are only valuable as the means to somewhat else--cannot +have the least glimpse of the subject before us, which is the end, not +the means; the thing itself, not somewhat in order to it. But if you can +lay aside that general, confused, undeterminate notion of happiness, as +consisting in such possessions, and fix in your thoughts that it really +can consist in nothing but in a faculty's having its proper object, you +will clearly see that in the coolest way of consideration, without either +the heat of fanciful enthusiasm or the warmth of real devotion, nothing +is more certain than that an infinite Being may Himself be, if He +pleases, the supply to all the capacities of our nature. All the common +enjoyments of life are from the faculties He hath endued us with and the +objects He hath made suitable to them. He may Himself be to us +infinitely more than all these; He may be to us all that we want. As our +understanding can contemplate itself, and our affections be exercised +upon themselves by reflection, so may each be employed in the same manner +upon any other mind; and since the Supreme Mind, the Author and Cause of +all things, is the highest possible object to Himself, He may be an +adequate supply to all the faculties of our souls, a subject to our +understanding, and an object to our affections. + +Consider then: when we shall have put off this mortal body, when we shall +be divested of sensual appetites, and those possessions which are now the +means of gratification shall be of no avail, when this restless scene of +business and vain pleasures, which now diverts us from ourselves, shall +be all over, we, our proper self, shall still remain: we shall still +continue the same creatures we are, with wants to be supplied and +capacities of happiness. We must have faculties of perception, though +not sensitive ones; and pleasure or uneasiness from our perceptions, as +now we have. + +There are certain ideas which we express by the words order, harmony, +proportion, beauty, the furthest removed from anything sensual. Now what +is there in those intellectual images, forms, or ideas, which begets that +approbation, love, delight, and even rapture, which is seen in some +persons' faces upon having those objects present to their minds?--"Mere +enthusiasm!"--Be it what it will: there are objects, works of nature and +of art, which all mankind have delight from quite distinct from their +affording gratification to sensual appetites, and from quite another view +of them than as being for their interest and further advantage. The +faculties from which we are capable of these pleasures, and the pleasures +themselves, are as natural, and as much to be accounted for, as any +sensual appetite whatever, and the pleasure from its gratification. Words +to be sure are wanting upon this subject; to say that everything of grace +and beauty throughout the whole of nature, everything excellent and +amiable shared in differently lower degrees by the whole creation, meet +in the Author and Cause of all things, this is an inadequate and perhaps +improper way of speaking of the Divine nature; but it is manifest that +absolute rectitude, the perfection of being, must be in all senses, and +in every respect, the highest object to the mind. + +In this world it is only the effects of wisdom and power and greatness +which we discern; it is not impossible that hereafter the qualities +themselves in the supreme Being may be the immediate object of +contemplation. What amazing wonders are opened to view by late +improvements! What an object is the universe to a creature, if there be +a creature who can comprehend its system! But it must be an infinitely +higher exercise of the understanding to view the scheme of it in that +mind which projected it before its foundations were laid. And surely we +have meaning to the words when we speak of going further, and viewing, +not only this system in His mind, but the wisdom and intelligence itself +from whence it proceeded. The same may be said of power. But since +wisdom and power are not God, He is a wise, a powerful Being; the divine +nature may therefore be a further object to the understanding. It is +nothing to observe that our senses give us but an imperfect knowledge of +things: effects themselves, if we knew them thoroughly, would give us but +imperfect notions of wisdom and power; much less of His being in whom +they reside. I am not speaking of any fanciful notion of seeing all +things in God, but only representing to you how much a higher object to +the understanding an infinite Being Himself is than the things which He +has made; and this is no more than saying that the Creator is superior to +the works of His hands. + +This may be illustrated by a low example. Suppose a machine, the sight +of which would raise, and discoveries in its contrivance gratify, our +curiosity: the real delight in this case would arise from its being the +effect of skill and contrivance. This skill in the mind of the artificer +would be a higher object, if we had any senses or ways to discern it. +For, observe, the contemplation of that principle, faculty, or power +which produced any effect must be a higher exercise of the understanding +than the contemplation of the effect itself. The cause must be a higher +object to the mind than the effect. + +But whoever considers distinctly what the delight of knowledge is will +see reason to be satisfied that it cannot be the chief good of man: all +this, as it is applicable, so it was mentioned with regard to the +attribute of goodness. I say goodness. Our being and all our enjoyments +are the effects of it: just men bear its resemblance; but how little do +we know of the original, of what it is in itself? Recall what was before +observed concerning the affection to moral characters--which, in how low +a degree soever, yet is plainly natural to man, and the most excellent +part of his nature. Suppose this improved, as it may be improved, to any +degree whatever, in the _spirits of just men made perfect_; and then +suppose that they had a real view of that _righteousness which is an +everlasting righteousness_, of the conformity of the Divine will to _the +law of truth_ in which the moral attributes of God consist, of that +goodness in the sovereign Mind which gave birth to the universe. Add, +what will be true of all good men hereafter, a consciousness of having an +interest in what they are contemplating--suppose them able to say, _This +God is our God for ever and ever_. Would they be any longer to seek for +what was their chief happiness, their final good? Could the utmost +stretch of their capacities look further? Would not infinite perfect +goodness be their very end, the last end and object of their affections, +beyond which they could neither have nor desire, beyond which they could +not form a wish or thought? + +Consider wherein that presence of a friend consists which has often so +strong an effect as wholly to possess the mind, and entirely suspend all +other affections and regards, and which itself affords the highest +satisfaction and enjoyment. He is within reach of the senses. Now as +our capacities of perception improve we shall have, perhaps by some +faculty entirely new, a perception of God's presence with us in a nearer +and stricter way, since it is certain He is more intimately present with +us than anything else can be. Proof of the existence and presence of any +being is quite different from the immediate perception, the consciousness +of it. What then will be the joy of heart which His presence and _the +light of His countenance_, who is the life of the universe, will inspire +good men with when they shall have a sensation that He is the sustainer +of their being, that they exist in Him; when they shall feel His +influence to cheer and enliven and support their frame, in a manner of +which we have now no conception? He will be in a literal sense _their +strength and their portion for ever_. + +When we speak of things so much above our comprehension as the employment +and happiness of a future state, doubtless it behoves us to speak with +all modesty and distrust of ourselves. But the Scripture represents the +happiness of that state under the notions of _seeing God_, _seeing Him as +He is_, _knowing as we are known_, _and seeing face to face_. These +words are not general or undetermined, but express a particular +determinate happiness. And I will be bold to say that nothing can +account for or come up to these expressions but only this, that God +Himself will be an object to our faculties, that He Himself will be our +happiness as distinguished from the enjoyments of the present state, +which seem to arise not immediately from Him but from the objects He has +adapted to give us delight. + +To conclude: Let us suppose a person tired with care and sorrow and the +repetition of vain delights which fill up the round of life; sensible +that everything here below in its best estate is altogether vanity. +Suppose him to feel that deficiency of human nature before taken notice +of, and to be convinced that God alone was the adequate supply to it. +What could be more applicable to a good man in this state of mind, or +better express his present wants and distant hopes, his passage through +this world as a progress towards a state of perfection, than the +following passages in the devotions of the royal prophet? They are +plainly in a higher and more proper sense applicable to this than they +could be to anything else. _I have seen an end of all perfection_. _Whom +have I in heaven but Thee_? _And there is none upon earth that I desire +in comparison of Thee_. _My flesh and may heart faileth_: _but God is +the strength of my heart and my portion for ever_. _Like as the hart +desireth the water-brooks_, _so longeth my soul after Thee_, _O God_. _My +soul is athirst for God_, _yea_, _even for the living God_: _when shall I +come to appear before Him_? _How excellent is Thy loving-kindness_, _O +God_! _and the children of men shall put their trust under the shadow of +Thy wings_. _They shall be satisfied with the plenteousness of Thy +house_: _and Thou shalt give them drink of Thy pleasures_, _as out of the +river_. _For with Thee is the well of life_: _and in Thy light shall we +see light_. _Blessed is the man whom Thou choosest_, _and receivest unto +Thee_: _he shall dwell in Thy court_, _and shall be satisfied with the +pleasures of Thy house_, _even of Thy holy temple_. _Blessed is the +people_, _O Lord_, _that can rejoice in Thee_: _they shall walk in the +light of Thy countenance_. _Their delight shall be daily in Thy name_, +_and in Thy righteousness shall they make their boast_. _For Thou art +the glory of their strength_: _and in Thy lovingkindness they shall be +exalted_. _As for me_, _I will behold Thy presence in righteousness_: +_and when I awake up after Thy likeness_, _I shall be satisfied with it_. +_Thou shalt shew me the path of life_; _in Thy presence is the fulness of +joy_, _and at Thy right hand there is pleasure for evermore_. + + + + +Footnotes: + + +{1} 1 Cor. xii + +{2} Suppose a man of learning to be writing a grave book upon _human +nature_, and to show in several parts of it that he had an insight into +the subject he was considering, amongst other things, the following one +would require to be accounted for--the appearance of benevolence or good- +will in men towards each other in the instances of natural relation, and +in others. {2a} Cautions of being deceived with outward show, he retires +within himself to see exactly what that is in the mind of man from whence +this appearance proceeds; and, upon deep reflection, asserts the +principle in the mind to be only the love of power, and delight in the +exercise of it. Would not everybody think here was a mistake of one word +for another--that the philosopher was contemplating and accounting for +some other _human actions_, some other behaviour of man to man? And +could any one be thoroughly satisfied that what is commonly called +benevolence or good-will was really the affection meant, but only by +being made to understand that this learned person had a general +hypothesis, to which the appearance of good-will could no otherwise be +reconciled? That what has this appearance is often nothing but ambition; +that delight in superiority often (suppose always) mixes itself with +benevolence, only makes it more specious to call it ambition than hunger, +of the two: but in reality that passion does no more account for the +whole appearances of good-will than this appetite does. Is there not +often the appearance of one man's wishing that good to another, which he +knows himself unable to procure him; and rejoicing in it, though bestowed +by a third person? And can love of power any way possibly come in to +account for this desire or delight? Is there not often the appearance of +men's distinguishing between two or more persons, preferring one before +another, to do good to, in cases where love of power cannot in the least +account for the distinction and preference? For this principle can no +otherwise distinguish between objects than as it is a greater instance +and exertion of power to do good to one rather than to another. Again, +suppose good-will in the mind of man to be nothing but delight in the +exercise of power: men might indeed be restrained by distant and +accidental consideration; but these restraints being removed, they would +have a disposition to, and delight in, mischief as an exercise and proof +of power: and this disposition and delight would arise from, or be the +same principle in the mind, as a disposition to and delight in charity. +Thus cruelty, as distinct from envy and resentment, would be exactly the +same in the mind of man as good-will: that one tends to the happiness, +the other to the misery, of our fellow-creatures, is, it seems, merely an +accidental circumstance, which the mind has not the least regard to. +These are the absurdities which even men of capacity run into when they +have occasion to belie their nature, and will perversely disclaim that +image of God which was originally stamped upon it, the traces of which, +however faint, are plainly discernible upon the mind of man. + +If any person can in earnest doubt whether there be such a thing as good- +will in one man towards another (for the question is not concerning +either the degree or extensiveness of it, but concerning the affection +itself), let it be observed that _whether man be thus_, _or otherwise +constituted_, _what is the inward frame in this particular_ is a mere +question of fact of natural history not provable immediately by reason. +It is therefore to be judged of and determined in the same way other +facts or matters of natural history are--by appealing to the external +senses, or inward perceptions respectively, as the matter under +consideration is cognisable by one or the other: by arguing from +acknowledged facts and actions for a great number of actions in the same +kind, in different circumstances, and respecting different objects, will +prove to a certainty what principles they do not, and to the greatest +probability what principles they do, proceed from: and, lastly, by the +testimony of mankind. Now that there is some degree of benevolence +amongst men may be as strongly and plainly proved in all these ways, as +it could possibly be proved, supposing there was this affection in our +nature. And should any one think fit to assert that resentment in the +mind of man was absolutely nothing but reasonable concern for our own +safety, the falsity of this, and what is the real nature of that passion, +could be shown in no other ways than those in which it may be shown that +there is such a thing in _some degree_ as real good-will in man towards +man. It is sufficient that the seeds of it be implanted in our nature by +God. There is, it is owned, much left for us to do upon our own heart +and temper; to cultivate, to improve, to call it forth, to exercise it in +a steady, uniform manner. This is our work: this is virtue and religion. + +{2a} Hobbes, "Of Human Nature," c. ix. 7. + +{3} Everybody makes a distinction between self-love and the several +particular passions, appetites, and affections; and yet they are often +confounded again. That they are totally different, will be seen by any +one who will distinguish between the passions and appetites _themselves_, +and _endeavouring_ after the means of their gratification. Consider the +appetite of hunger, and the desire of esteem: these being the occasion +both of pleasure and pain, the coolest self-love, as well as the +appetites and passions themselves, may put us upon making use of the +_proper methods of obtaining_ that pleasure, and avoiding that pain; but +the _feelings_ themselves, the pain of hunger and shame, and the delight +from esteem, are no more self-love than they are anything in the world. +Though a man hated himself, he would as much feel the pain of hunger as +he would that of the gout; and it is plainly supposable there may be +creatures with self-love in them to the highest degree, who may be quite +insensible and indifferent (as men in some cases are) to the contempt and +esteem of those upon whom their happiness does not in some further +respects depend. And as self-love and the several particular passions +and appetites are in themselves totally different, so that some actions +proceed from one and some from the other will be manifest to any who will +observe the two following very supposable cases. One man rushes upon +certain ruin for the gratification of a present desire: nobody will call +the principle of this action self-love. Suppose another man to go +through some laborious work upon promise of a great reward, without any +distinct knowledge what the reward will be: this course of action cannot +be ascribed to any particular passion. The former of these actions is +plainly to be imputed to some particular passion or affection; the latter +as plainly to the general affection or principle of self-love. That +there are some particular pursuits or actions concerning which we cannot +determine how far they are owing to one, and how far to the other, +proceeds from this, that the two principles are frequently mixed +together, and run up into each other. This distinction is further +explained in the Eleventh Sermon. + +{4} If any desire to see this distinction and comparison made in a +particular instance, the appetite and passion now mentioned may serve for +one. Hunger is to be considered as a private appetite, because the end +for which it was given us is the preservation of the individual. Desire +of esteem is a public passion; because the end for which it was given us +is to regulate our behaviour towards society. The respect which this has +to private good is as remote as the respect that has to public good; and +the appetite is no more self-love than the passion is benevolence. The +object and end of the former is merely food; the object and end of the +latter is merely esteem; but the latter can no more be gratified without +contributing to the good of society, than the former can be gratified +without contributing to the preservation of the individual. + +{5} Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with or +superiority over others with whom we compare ourselves. There does not +appear to be any other _grief_ in the natural passion, but only _that +want_ which is implied in desire. However, this may be so strong as to +be the occasion of great _grief_. To desire the attainment of this +equality or superiority by the _particular means_ of others being brought +down to our own level, or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of +envy. From whence it is easy to see that the real end, which the natural +passion emulation, and which the unlawful one envy aims at, is exactly +the same; namely, that equality or superiority: and consequently, that to +do mischief is not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of +to attain its end. As to resentment, see the Eighth Sermon. + +{6} Ephes. ii. 3. + +{7} Every man in his physical nature is one individual single agent. He +has likewise properties and principles, each of which may be considered +separately, and without regard to the respects which they have to each +other. Neither of these is the nature we are taking a view of. But it +is the inward frame of man considered as a _system_ or _constitution_: +whose several parts are united, not by a physical principle of +individuation, but by the respects they have to each other; the chief of +which is the subjection which the appetites, passions, and particular +affections have to the one supreme principle of reflection or conscience. +The system or constitution is formed by and consists in these respects +and this subjection. Thus the body is a _system_ or _constitution_: so +is a tree: so is every machine. Consider all the several parts of a tree +without the natural reselects they have to each other, and you have not +at all the idea of a tree; but add these respects, and this gives you the +idea. This body may be impaired by sickness, a tree may decay, a machine +be out of order, and yet the system and constitution of them not totally +dissolved. There is plainly somewhat which answers to all this in the +moral constitution of man. Whoever will consider his own nature will see +that the several appetites, passions, and particular affections have +different respects amongst themselves. They are restraints upon, and are +in a proportion to, each other. This proportion is just and perfect, +when all those under principles are perfectly coincident with conscience, +so far as their nature permits, and in all cases under its absolute and +entire direction. The least excess or defect, the least alteration of +the due proportions amongst themselves, or of their coincidence with +conscience, though not proceeding into action, is some degree of disorder +in the moral constitution. But perfection, though plainly intelligible +and unsupportable, was never attained by any man. If the higher +principle of reflection maintains its place, and as much as it can +corrects that disorder, and hinders it from breaking out into action, +this is all that can be expected in such a creature as man. And though +the appetites and passions have not their exact due proportion to each +other, though they often strive for mastery with judgment or reflection, +yet, since the superiority of this principle to all others is the chief +respect which forms the constitution, so far as this superiority is +maintained, the character, the man, is good, worthy, virtuous. + +{8} Chap. iii., ver. 6. + +{9} Job xiii. 5. + +{10} Eccles. x. 3. + +{11} Prov. x. 19. + +{12} Mark xii. 38, 40. + +{13} There being manifestly this appearance of men's substituting others +for themselves, and being carried out and affected towards them as +towards themselves; some persons, who have a system which excludes every +affection of this sort, have taken a pleasant method to solve it; and +tell you it is _not another_ you are at all concerned about, but your +_self only_, when you feel the affection called compassion, _i.e._ Here +is a plain matter of fact, which men cannot reconcile with the general +account they think fit to give of things: they therefore, instead of that +manifest fact, substitute _another_, which is reconcilable to their own +scheme. For does not everybody by compassion mean an affection, the +object of which is another in distress? instead of this, but designing to +have it mistaken for this, they speak of an affection or passion, the +object of which is ourselves, or danger to ourselves. Hobbes defines +_pity_, _imagination_, _or fiction of future calamity to ourselves_, +_proceeding from the sense_ (he means sight or knowledge) _of another +man's calamity_. Thus fear and compassion would be the same idea, and a +fearful and a compassionate man the same character, which every one +immediately sees are totally different. Further, to those who give any +scope to their affections, there is no perception or inward feeling more +universal than this: that one who has been merciful and compassionate +throughout the course of his behaviour should himself be treated with +kindness, if he happens to fall into circumstances of distress. Is fear, +then, or cowardice, so great a recommendation to the favour of the bulk +of mankind? Or is it not plain that mere fearlessness (and therefore not +the contrary) is one of the most popular qualifications? This shows that +mankind are not affected towards compassion as fear, but as somewhat +totally different. + +Nothing would more expose such accounts as these of the affections which +are favourable and friendly to our fellow-creatures than to substitute +the definitions, which this author, and others who follow his steps, give +of such affections, instead of the words by which they are commonly +expressed. Hobbes, after having laid down that pity or compassion is +only fear for ourselves, goes on to explain the reason why we pity our +friends in distress more than others. Now substitute the word +_definition_ instead of the word _pity_ in this place, and the inquiry +will be, why we fear our friends, &c., which words (since he really does +not mean why we are afraid of them) make no question or sentence at all. +So that common language, the words _to compassionate_, _to pity_, cannot +be accommodated to his account of compassion. The very joining of the +words to _pity our friends_ is a direct contradiction to his definition +of pity: because those words, so joined, necessarily express that our +friends are the objects of the passion; whereas his definition of it +asserts that ourselves (or danger to ourselves) are the only objects of +it. He might indeed have avoided this absurdity, by plainly saying what +he is going to account for; namely, why the sight of the innocent, or of +our friends in distress, raises greater fear for ourselves than the sight +of other persons in distress. But had he put the thing thus plainly, the +fact itself would have been doubted; that _the sight of our friends in +distress raises in us greater fear for ourselves than the sight of others +in distress_. And in the next place it would immediately have occurred +to every one that the fact now mentioned, which at least is doubtful +whether, true or false, was not the same with this fact, which nobody +ever doubted, that _the sight of our friends in distress raises in us +greater compassion than the sight of others in distress_: every one, I +say, would have seen that these are not the same, but _two different_ +inquiries; and, consequently, that fear and compassion are not the same. +Suppose a person to be in real danger, and by some means or other to have +forgot it; any trifling accident, any sound might alarm him, recall the +danger to his remembrance, and renew his fear; but it is almost too +grossly ridiculous (though it is to show an absurdity) to speak of that +sound or accident as an object of compassion; and yet, according to Mr. +Hobbes, our greatest friend in distress is no more to us, no more the +object of compassion, or of any affection in our heart: neither the one +nor the other raises any emotion in one mind, but only the thoughts of +our liableness to calamity, and the fear of it; and both equally do this. +It is fit such sort of accounts of human nature should be shown to be +what they really are, because there is raised upon them a general scheme, +which undermines the whole foundation of common justice and honesty. See +_Hobbes of Human Nature_, c. 9. section 10. + +There are often three distinct perceptions or inward feelings upon sight +of persons in distress: real sorrow and concern for the misery of our +fellow-creatures; some degree of satisfaction from a consciousness of our +freedom from that misery; and as the mind passes on from one thing to +another it is not unnatural from such an occasion to reflect upon our own +liableness to the same or other calamities. The two last frequently +accompany the first, but it is the first _only_ which is properly +compassion, of which the distressed are the objects, and which directly +carries us with calmness and thought to their assistance. Any one of +these, from various and complicated reasons, may in particular cases +prevail over the other two; and there are, I suppose, instances, where +the bare _sight_ of distress, without our feeling any compassion for it, +may be the occasion of either or both of the two latter perceptions. One +might add that if there be really any such thing as the fiction or +imagination of danger to ourselves from sight of the miseries of others, +which Hobbes specks of, and which he has absurdly mistaken for the whole +of compassion; if there be anything of this sort common to mankind, +distinct from the reflection of reason, it would be a most remarkable +instance of what was furthest from his thoughts--namely, of a mutual +sympathy between each particular of the species, a fellow-feeling common +to mankind. It would not indeed be an example of our substituting others +for ourselves, but it would be an example of user substituting ourselves +for others. And as it would not be an instance of benevolence, so +neither would it be any instance of self-love: for this phantom of danger +to ourselves, naturally rising to view upon sight of the distresses of +others, would be no more an instance of love to ourselves than the pain +of hunger is. + +{14} Ecclus. xxxii. 28. + +{15} Ecclus. xlii. 24. + +{16} Ver. 4, 5. + +{17} Ver. 6. + +{18} Micah vi. + +{19} Chap. xxii. 12. + +{20} Ver. 21. + +{21} Chap. iv. + +{22} Chap. xxv. + +{23} Chap. xxxi. + +{24} Chap. ii. + +{24a} In the Cassell edition the sermons jump from sermon VII to XI with +no explanation as to where VIII, IX and X are. I've left the numbering +as is in case there is a good reason for it.--DP. + +{25} P. 137. + +{26} Matt. v. 48. + +{27} 1 Cor. xiii. + +{28} For instance as we are not competent judges, what is upon the whole +for the good of the world, there _may_ be other immediate ends appointed +us to pursue, besides that one of doing good or producing happiness. +Though the good of the Creation be the only end of the Author of it, yet +he may have laid us under particular obligations, which we may discern +and feel ourselves under, quite distinct from a perception, that the +observance or violation of them it for the happiness or misery of our +fellow-creatures. And this is in fart the ease, for there are certain +dispositions of mind, and certain actions, which are in themselves +approved or disapproved by mankind, abstracted from the consideration of +their tendency to the happiness or misery of the world approved or +disapproved by reflection, by that principle within, whirls is the guile +of life, the judge of right and wrong. Numberless instances of this kind +might be mentioned. There are pieces of treachery, which in themselves +appear base and detestable to every one. There are actions, which +perhaps can scarce have any other general name given them than +indecencies, which yet are odious and shocking to human nature. There is +such a thing as meanness, a little mind, which as it is quite distinct +from incapacity, so it raises a dislike and disapprobation quite +different from that contempt, which men are too apt to have, of mere +folly. On the other hand, what we call greatness of mind is the object +of another most of approbation, than superior understanding. Fidelity, +honour, strict justice, are themselves approved in the highest degree, +abstracted from the consideration of their tendency. Now, whether it be +thought that each of these are connected with benevolence in our nature, +amid so may he considered as the same thing with it, or whether some of +them he thought an inferior kind of virtues and vices, somewhat like +natural beauties and deformities, or lastly, plain exceptions to the +general rule, thus such however is certain, that the things now instanced +in, and numberless others, are approved or disapproved by mankind in +general, in quite another view than as conducive to the happiness or +misery of the world. + +{29} St. Austin observes, Amor ipse ordinate amandus est, quo bene +amatur quod amandum sit, ut sit in nobis virtue qua vivitur bene, _i.e._ +_The affection which we rightly have for what is lovely must ordinate +justly_, _in due manner end proportion_, _become the object of a new +affection_, _or be itself beloved_, _in order to our being endued with +that virtue which is the principle of a good life_. Civ. Dei, 1. xv. c. +22. + +{30} Job xxii. + +{31} Job ix. 2. + +{32} Eccius. xliii. 50. + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HUMAN NATURE*** + + +******* This file should be named 3150.txt or 3150.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/3/1/5/3150 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.07.00*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared from the 1887 Cassell & Co. edition by +David Price, email ccx074@coventry.ac.uk. + + + + + +HUMAN NATURE AND OTHER SERMONS + +by Joseph Butler + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + + + +Joseph Butler was born in 1692, youngest of eight children of a +linendraper at Wantage, in Berkshire. His father was a +Presbyterian, and after education at the Wantage Free Grammar School +Joseph Butler was sent to be educated for the Presbyterian ministry +in a training academy at Gloucester, which was afterwards removed to +Tewkesbury. There he had a friend and comrade, Secker, who +afterwards became Archbishop of Canterbury. Butler and Secker +inquired actively, and there was foreshadowing of his future in the +fact that in 1713, at the age of twenty-one, Butler was engaged in +anonymous discussion with Samuel Clarke upon his book on the a +priori demonstration of the Divine Existence and Attributes. + +When the time drew near for call to the ministry, Butler, like his +friend Secker, had reasoned himself into accordance with the +teaching of the Church of England. Butler's father did not oppose +his strong desire to enter the Church, and he was entered in 1714 at +Oriel College, Oxford. At college a strong friendship was +established between Butler and a fellow-student, Edward Talbot, +whose father was a Bishop, formerly of Oxford and Salisbury, then of +Durham. Through Talbot's influence Butler obtained in 1718 the +office of Preacher in the Rolls Chapel, which he held for the next +eight years. In 1722 Talbot died, and on his death-bed urged his +father on behalf of his friend Butler. The Bishop accordingly +presented Joseph Butler to the living of Houghton-le-Spring. But it +was found that costs of dilapidations were beyond his means at +Houghton, and Butler had a dangerous regard for building works. He +was preferred two years afterwards to the living of Stanhope, which +then became vacant, and which yielded a substantial income. Butler +sought nothing for himself, his simplicity of character, real worth, +and rare intellectual power, secured him friends, and the love of +two of them--Talbot first, and afterwards Secker, who made his own +way in the Church, and became strong enough to put his friend as +well as himself in the way of worldly advancement, secured for +Butler all the patronage he had, until the Queen also became his +active friend. + +Joseph Butler was seven years at Stanhope, quietly devoted to his +parish duties, preaching, studying, and writing his "Analogy of +Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of +Nature." In 1727, while still at Stanhope, he was appointed to a +stall in Durham Cathedral. Secker, having become chaplain to the +Queen, encouraged her in admiration of Butler's sermons. He told +her that the author was not dead, but buried, and secured her active +interest in his behalf. From Talbot, who had become Lord +Chancellor, Secker had no difficulty in obtaining for Butler a +chaplaincy which exempted him from the necessity of residence at +Stanhope. Butler, in accepting it, stipulated for permission to +live and work in his parish for six months in every year. Next he +was made chaplain to the King, and Rector of St. James's, upon which +he gave up Stanhope. In 1736 Queen Caroline appointed him her Clerk +of the Closet, an office which gave Butler the duty of attendance +upon her for two hours every evening. In that year he published his +"Analogy," of which the purpose was to meet, on its own ground, the +scepticism of his day. The Queen died in 1737, and, in accordance +with the strong desire expressed in her last days, in 1738 Butler +was made a Bishop. But his Bishopric was Bristol, worth only 300 or +400 pounds a year. The King added the Deanery of St. Paul's, when +that became vacant in 1740, and in 1750, towards the close of his +life, Joseph Butler was translated to the Bishopric of Durham. He +died in 1752. + +No man could be less self-seeking. He owed his rise in the Church +wholly to the intellectual power and substantial worth of character +that inspired strong friendship. Seeing how little he sought +worldly advancement for himself, while others were pressing and +scrambling, Butler's friends used their opportunities of winning for +him the advancement he deserved. He was happiest in doing his work, +of which a chief part was in his study, where he employed his +philosophic mind in strengthening the foundations of religious +faith. Faith in God was attacked by men who claimed especially to +be philosophers, and they were best met by the man who had, beyond +all other divines of his day--some might not be afraid to add, of +any day--the philosophic mind. + +H.M. + + + +HUMAN NATURE, AND OTHER SERMONS. + + + +SERMON I. +UPON HUMAN NATURE. +ROMANS xii. 4, 5. + + + +For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not +the same office: so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and +every one members one of another. + +The Epistles in the New Testament have all of them a particular +reference to the condition and usages of the Christian world at the +time they were written. Therefore as they cannot be thoroughly +understood unless that condition and those usages are known and +attended to, so, further, though they be known, yet if they be +discontinued or changed, exhortations, precepts, and illustrations +of things, which refer to such circumstances now ceased or altered, +cannot at this time be urged in that manner and with that force +which they were to the primitive Christians. Thus the text now +before us, in its first intent and design, relates to the decent +management of those extraordinary gifts which were then in the +Church, {1} but which are now totally ceased. And even as to the +allusion that "we are one body in Christ," though what the apostle +here intends is equally true of Christians in all circumstances, and +the consideration of it is plainly still an additional motive, over +and above moral considerations, to the discharge of the several +duties and offices of a Christian, yet it is manifest this allusion +must have appeared with much greater force to those who, by the many +difficulties they went through for the sake of their religion, were +led to keep always in view the relation they stood in to their +Saviour, who had undergone the same: to those, who, from the +idolatries of all around them, and their ill-treatment, were taught +to consider themselves as not of the world in which they lived, but +as a distinct society of themselves; with laws and ends, and +principles of life and action, quite contrary to those which the +world professed themselves at that time influenced by. Hence the +relation of a Christian was by them considered as nearer than that +of affinity and blood; and they almost literally esteemed themselves +as members one of another. + +It cannot, indeed, possibly be denied, that our being God's +creatures, and virtue being the natural law we are born under, and +the whole constitution of man being plainly adapted to it, are prior +obligations to piety and virtue than the consideration that God sent +his Son into the world to save it, and the motives which arise from +the peculiar relation of Christians as members one of another under +Christ our head. However, though all this be allowed, as it +expressly is by the inspired writers, yet it is manifest that +Christians at the time of the Revelation, and immediately after, +could not but insist mostly upon considerations of this latter kind. + +These observations show the original particular reference to the +text, and the peculiar force with which the thing intended by the +allusion in it must have been felt by the primitive Christian world. +They likewise afford a reason for treating it at this time in a more +general way. + +The relation which the several parts or members of the natural body +have to each other and to the whole body is here compared to the +relation which each particular person in society has to other +particular persons and to the whole society; and the latter is +intended to be illustrated by the former. And if there be a +likeness between these two relations, the consequence is obvious: +that the latter shows us we were intended to do good to others, as +the former shows us that the several members of the natural body +were intended to be instruments of good to each other and to the +whole body. But as there is scarce any ground for a comparison +between society and the mere material body, this without the mind +being a dead unactive thing, much less can the comparison be carried +to any length. And since the apostle speaks of the several members +as having distinct offices, which implies the mind, it cannot be +thought an allowable liberty, instead of the BODY and ITS MEMBERS, +to substitute the WHOLE NATURE of MAN, and ALL THE VARIETY OF +INTERNAL PRINCIPLES WHICH BELONG TO IT. And then the comparison +will be between the nature of man as respecting self, and tending to +private good, his own preservation and happiness; and the nature of +man as having respect to society, and tending to promote public +good, the happiness of that society. These ends do indeed perfectly +coincide; and to aim at public and private good are so far from +being inconsistent that they mutually promote each other: yet in +the following discourse they must be considered as entirely +distinct; otherwise the nature of man as tending to one, or as +tending to the other, cannot be compared. There can no comparison +be made, without considering the things compared as distinct and +different. + +From this review and comparison of the nature of man as respecting +self and as respecting society, it will plainly appear that there +are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that +we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as +that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and +private good: and that the same objections lie against one of these +assertions as against the other. For, + +First, there is a natural principle of BENEVOLENCE {2} in man, which +is in some degree to SOCIETY what SELF-LOVE is to the INDIVIDUAL. +And if there be in mankind any disposition to friendship; if there +be any such thing as compassion--for compassion is momentary love-- +if there be any such thing as the paternal or filial affections; if +there be any affection in human nature, the object and end of which +is the good of another, this is itself benevolence, or the love of +another. Be it ever so short, be it in ever so low a degree, or +ever so unhappily confined, it proves the assertion, and points out +what we were designed for, as really as though it were in a higher +degree and more extensive. I must, however, remind you that though +benevolence and self-love are different, though the former tends +most directly to public good, and the latter to private, yet they +are so perfectly coincident that the greatest satisfactions to +ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree; and +that self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour towards +society. It may be added that their mutual coinciding, so that we +can scarce promote one without the other, is equally a proof that we +were made for both. + +Secondly, this will further appear, from observing that the SEVERAL +PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS, which are distinct {3} both from +benevolence and self-love, do in general contribute and lead us to +PUBLIC GOOD as really as to PRIVATE. It might be thought too minute +and particular, and would carry us too great a length, to +distinguish between and compare together the several passions or +appetites distinct from benevolence, whose primary use and intention +is the security and good of society, and the passions distinct from +self-love, whose primary intention and design is the security and +good of the individual. {4} It is enough to the present argument +that desire of esteem from others, contempt and esteem of them, love +of society as distinct from affection to the good of it, indignation +against successful vice--that these are public affections or +passions, have an immediate respect to others, naturally lead us to +regulate our behaviour in such a manner as will be of service to our +fellow-creatures. If any or all of these may be considered likewise +as private affections, as tending to private good, this does not +hinder them from being public affections too, or destroy the good +influence of them upon society, and their tendency to public good. +It may be added that as persons without any conviction from reason +of the desirableness of life would yet of course preserve it merely +from the appetite of hunger, so, by acting merely from regard +(suppose) to reputation, without any consideration of the good of +others, men often contribute to public good. In both these +instances they are plainly instruments in the hands of another, in +the hands of Providence, to carry on ends--the preservation of the +individual and good of society--which they themselves have not in +their view or intention. The sum is, men have various appetites, +passions, and particular affections, quite distinct both from self- +love and from benevolence: all of these have a tendency to promote +both public and private good, and may be considered as respecting +others and ourselves equally and in common; but some of them seem +most immediately to respect others, or tend to public good; others +of them most immediately to respect self, or tend to private good: +as the former are not benevolence, so the latter are not self-love: +neither sort are instances of our love either to ourselves or +others, but only instances of our Maker's care and love both of the +individual and the species, and proofs that He intended we should be +instruments of good to each other, as well as that we should be so +to ourselves. + +Thirdly, there is a principle of reflection in men, by which they +distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions. We +are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon +our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within +itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections as +respecting such objects, and in such degrees; and of the several +actions consequent thereupon. In this survey it approves of one, +disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither +of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This principle in man, by +which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is +conscience; for this is the strict sense of the word, though +sometimes it is used so as to take in more. And that this faculty +tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and leads +them to do good, is too manifest to need being insisted upon. Thus +a parent has the affection of love to his children: this leads him +to take care of, to educate, to make due provision for them--the +natural affection leads to this: but the reflection that it is his +proper business, what belongs to him, that it is right and +commendable so to do--this, added to the affection, becomes a much +more settled principle, and carries him on through more labour and +difficulties for the sake of his children than he would undergo from +that affection alone, if he thought it, and the cause of action it +led to, either indifferent or criminal. This indeed is impossible, +to do that which is good and not to approve of it; for which reason +they are frequently not considered as distinct, though they really +are: for men often approve of the action of others which they will +not imitate, and likewise do that which they approve not. It cannot +possibly be denied that there is this principle of reflection or +conscience in human nature. Suppose a man to relieve an innocent +person in great distress; suppose the same man afterwards, in the +fury of anger, to do the greatest mischief to a person who had given +no just cause of offence. To aggravate the injury, add the +circumstances of former friendship and obligation from the injured +person; let the man who is supposed to have done these two different +actions coolly reflect upon them afterwards, without regard to their +consequences to himself: to assert that any common man would be +affected in the same way towards these different actions, that he +would make no distinction between them, but approve or disapprove +them equally, is too glaring a falsity to need being confuted. +There is therefore this principle of reflection or conscience in +mankind. It is needless to compare the respect it has to private +good with the respect it has to public; since it plainly tends as +much to the latter as to the former, and is commonly thought to tend +chiefly to the latter. This faculty is now mentioned merely as +another part in the inward frame of man, pointing out to us in some +degree what we are intended for, and as what will naturally and of +course have some influence. The particular place assigned to it by +nature, what authority it has, and how great influence it ought to +have, shall be hereafter considered. + +From this comparison of benevolence and self-love, of our public and +private affections, of the courses of life they lead to, and of the +principle of reflection or conscience as respecting each of them, it +is as manifest that WE WERE MADE FOR SOCIETY, AND TO PROMOTE THE +HAPPINESS OF IT, AS THAT WE WERE INTENDED to TAKE CARE OF OUR OWN +LIFE AND HEALTH AND PRIVATE GOOD. + +And from this whole review must be given a different draught of +human nature from what we are often presented with. Mankind are by +nature so closely united, there is such a correspondence between the +inward sensations of one man and those of another, that disgrace is +as much avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and +love as much desired as any external goods; and in many particular +cases persons are carried on to do good to others, as the end their +affection tends to and rests in; and manifest that they find real +satisfaction and enjoyment in this course of behaviour. There is +such a natural principle of attraction in man towards man that +having trod the same tract of land, having breathed in the same +climate, barely having been born in the same artificial district or +division, becomes the occasion of contracting acquaintances and +familiarities many years after; for anything may serve the purpose. +Thus relations merely nominal are sought and invented, not by +governors, but by the lowest of the people, which are found +sufficient to hold mankind together in little fraternities and +copartnerships: weak ties indeed, and what may afford fund enough +for ridicule, if they are absurdly considered as the real principles +of that union: but they are in truth merely the occasions, as +anything may be of anything, upon which our nature carries us on +according to its own previous bent and bias; which occasions +therefore would be nothing at all were there not this prior +disposition and bias of nature. Men are so much one body that in a +peculiar manner they feel for each other shame, sudden danger, +resentment, honour, prosperity, distress; one or another, or all of +these, from the social nature in general, from benevolence, upon the +occasion of natural relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence; +each of these being distinct cements of society. And therefore to +have no restraint from, no regard to, others in our behaviour, is +the speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and +independent, as having nothing in our nature which has respect to +our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice. And this is +the same absurdity as to suppose a hand, or any part, to have no +natural respect to any other, or to the whole body. + +But, allowing all this, it may be asked, "Has not man dispositions +and principles within which lead him to do evil to others, as well +as to do good? Whence come the many miseries else which men are the +authors and instruments of to each other?" These questions, so far +as they relate to the foregoing discourse, may be answered by +asking, Has not man also dispositions and principles within which +lead him to do evil to himself, as well as good? Whence come the +many miseries else--sickness, pain, and death--which men are +instruments and authors of to themselves? + +It may be thought more easy to answer one of these questions than +the other, but the answer to both is really the same: that mankind +have ungoverned passions which they will gratify at any rate, as +well to the injury of others as in contradiction to known private +interest: but that as there is no such thing as self-hatred, so +neither is there any such thing as ill-will in one man towards +another, emulation and resentment being away; whereas there is +plainly benevolence or good-will: there is no such thing as love of +injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude, but only eager +desires after such and such external goods; which, according to a +very ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose to obtain +by innocent means, if they were as easy and as effectual to their +end: that even emulation and resentment, by any one who will +consider what these passions really are in nature, {5} will be found +nothing to the purpose of this objection; and that the principles +and passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from self- +love and benevolence, primarily and most directly lead to right +behaviour with regard to others as well as himself, and only +secondarily and accidentally to what is evil. Thus, though men, to +avoid the shame of one villainy, are sometimes guilty of a greater, +yet it is easy to see that the original tendency of shame is to +prevent the doing of shameful actions; and its leading men to +conceal such actions when done is only in consequence of their being +done; i.e., of the passion's not having answered its first end. + +If it be said that there are persons in the world who are in great +measure without the natural affections towards their fellow- +creatures, there are likewise instances of persons without the +common natural affections to themselves. But the nature of man is +not to be judged of by either of these, but by what appears in the +common world, in the bulk of mankind. + +I am afraid it would be thought very strange, if to confirm the +truth of this account of human nature, and make out the justness of +the foregoing comparison, it should be added that from what appears, +men in fact as much and as often contradict that PART of their +nature which respects SELF, and which leads them to their OWN +PRIVATE good and happiness, as they contradict that PART of it which +respects SOCIETY, and tends to PUBLIC good: that there are as few +persons who attain the greatest satisfaction and enjoyment which +they might attain in the present world, as who do the greatest good +to others which they might do; nay, that there are as few who can be +said really and in earnest to aim at one as at the other. Take a +survey of mankind: the world in general, the good and bad, almost +without exception, equally are agreed that were religion out of the +case, the happiness of the present life would consist in a manner +wholly in riches, honours, sensual gratifications; insomuch that one +scarce hears a reflection made upon prudence, life, conduct, but +upon this supposition. Yet, on the contrary, that persons in the +greatest affluence of fortune are no happier than such as have only +a competency; that the cares and disappointments of ambition for the +most part far exceed the satisfactions of it; as also the miserable +intervals of intemperance and excess, and the many untimely deaths +occasioned by a dissolute course of life: these things are all +seen, acknowledged, by every one acknowledged; but are thought no +objections against, though they expressly contradict, this universal +principle--that the happiness of the present life consists in one or +other of them. Whence is all this absurdity and contradiction? Is +not the middle way obvious? Can anything be more manifest than that +the happiness of life consists in these possessed and enjoyed only +to a certain degree; that to pursue them beyond this degree is +always attended with more inconvenience than advantage to a man's +self, and often with extreme misery and unhappiness? Whence, then, +I say, is all this absurdity and contradiction? Is it really the +result of consideration in mankind, how they may become most easy to +themselves, most free from care, and enjoy the chief happiness +attainable in this world? Or is it not manifestly owing either to +this, that they have not cool and reasonable concern enough for +themselves to consider wherein their chief happiness in the present +life consists; or else, if they do consider it, that they will not +act conformably to what is the result of that consideration--i.e., +reasonable concern for themselves, or cool self-love, is prevailed +over by passions and appetite? So that from what appears there is +no ground to assert that those principles in the nature of man, +which most directly lead to promote the good of our fellow- +creatures, are more generally or in a greater degree violated than +those which most directly lead us to promote our own private good +and happiness. + +The sum of the whole is plainly this: The nature of man considered +in his single capacity, and with respect only to the present world, +is adapted and leads him to attain the greatest happiness he can for +himself in the present world. The nature of man considered in his +public or social capacity leads him to right behaviour in society, +to that course of life which we call virtue. Men follow or obey +their nature in both these capacities and respects to a certain +degree, but not entirely: their actions do not come up to the whole +of what their nature leads them to in either of these capacities or +respects: and they often violate their nature in both; i.e., as +they neglect the duties they owe to their fellow-creatures, to which +their nature leads them, and are injurious, to which their nature is +abhorrent, so there is a manifest negligence in men of their real +happiness or interest in the present world, when that interest is +inconsistent with a present gratification; for the sake of which +they negligently, nay, even knowingly, are the authors and +instruments of their own misery and ruin. Thus they are as often +unjust to themselves as to others, and for the most part are equally +so to both by the same actions. + + + +SERMON II., III. +UPON HUMAN NATURE. +ROMANS ii. 14. + + + +For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the +things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law +unto themselves. + +As speculative truth admits of different kinds of proof, so likewise +moral obligations may be shown by different methods. If the real +nature of any creature leads him and is adapted to such and such +purposes only, or more than to any other, this is a reason to +believe the Author of that nature intended it for those purposes. +Thus there is no doubt the eye was intended for us to see with. And +the more complex any constitution is, and the greater variety of +parts there are which thus tend to some one end, the stronger is the +proof that such end was designed. However, when the inward frame of +man is considered as any guide in morals, the utmost caution must be +used that none make peculiarities in their own temper, or anything +which is the effect of particular customs, though observable in +several, the standard of what is common to the species; and above +all, that the highest principle be not forgot or excluded, that to +which belongs the adjustment and correction of all other inward +movements and affections; which principle will of course have some +influence, but which being in nature supreme, as shall now be shown, +ought to preside over and govern all the rest. The difficulty of +rightly observing the two former cautions; the appearance there is +of some small diversity amongst mankind with respect to this +faculty, with respect to their natural sense of moral good and evil; +and the attention necessary to survey with any exactness what passes +within, have occasioned that it is not so much agreed what is the +standard of the internal nature of man as of his external form. +Neither is this last exactly settled. Yet we understand one another +when we speak of the shape of a human body: so likewise we do when +we speak of the heart and inward principles, how far soever the +standard is from being exact or precisely fixed. There is therefore +ground for an attempt of showing men to themselves, of showing them +what course of life and behaviour their real nature points out and +would lead them to. Now obligations of virtue shown, and motives to +the practice of it enforced, from a review of the nature of man, are +to be considered as an appeal to each particular person's heart and +natural conscience: as the external senses are appealed to for the +proof of things cognisable by them. Since, then, our inward +feelings, and the perceptions we receive from our external senses, +are equally real, to argue from the former to life and conduct is as +little liable to exception as to argue from the latter to absolute +speculative truth. A man can as little doubt whether his eyes were +given him to see with as he can doubt of the truth of the science of +optics, deduced from ocular experiments. And allowing the inward +feeling, shame, a man can as little doubt whether it was given him +to prevent his doing shameful actions as he can doubt whether his +eyes were given him to guide his steps. And as to these inward +feelings themselves, that they are real, that man has in his nature +passions and affections, can no more be questioned than that he has +external senses. Neither can the former be wholly mistaken, though +to a certain degree liable to greater mistakes than the latter. + +There can be no doubt but that several propensions or instincts, +several principles in the heart of man, carry him to society, and to +contribute to the happiness of it, in a sense and a manner in which +no inward principle leads him to evil. These principles, +propensions, or instincts which lead him to do good are approved of +by a certain faculty within, quite distinct from these propensions +themselves. All this hath been fully made out in the foregoing +discourse. + +But it may be said, "What is all this, though true, to the purpose +of virtue and religion? these require, not only that we do good to +others when we are led this way, by benevolence or reflection +happening to be stronger than other principles, passions, or +appetites, but likewise that the WHOLE character be formed upon +thought and reflection; that EVERY action be directed by some +determinate rule, some other rule than the strength and prevalency +of any principle or passion. What sign is there in our nature (for +the inquiry is only about what is to be collected from thence) that +this was intended by its Author? Or how does so various and fickle +a temper as that of man appear adapted thereto? It may indeed be +absurd and unnatural for men to act without any reflection; nay, +without regard to that particular kind of reflection which you call +conscience, because this does belong to our nature. For as there +never was a man but who approved one place, prospect, building, +before another, so it does not appear that there ever was a man who +would not have approved an action of humanity rather than of +cruelty; interest and passion being quite out of the case. But +interest and passion do come in, and are often too strong for and +prevail over reflection and conscience. Now as brutes have various +instincts, by which they are carried on to the end the Author of +their nature intended them for, is not man in the same condition-- +with this difference only, that to his instincts (i.e., appetites +and passion) is added the principle of reflection or conscience? +And as brutes act agreeably to their nature, in following that +principle or particular instinct which for the present is strongest +in them, does not man likewise act agreeably to his nature, or obey +the law of his creation, by following that principle, be it passion +or conscience, which for the present happens to be strongest in him? +Thus different men are by their particular nature hurried on to +pursue honour or riches or pleasure; there are also persons whose +temper leads them in an uncommon degree to kindness, compassion, +doing good to their fellow-creatures, as there are others who are +given to suspend their judgment, to weigh and consider things, and +to act upon thought and reflection. Let every one, then, quietly +follow his nature, as passion, reflection, appetite, the several +parts of it, happen to be strongest; but let not the man of virtue +take upon him to blame the ambitious, the covetous, the dissolute, +since these equally with him obey and follow their nature. Thus, as +in some cases we follow our nature in doing the works CONTAINED IN +THE LAW, so in other cases we follow nature in doing contrary." + +Now all this licentious talk entirely goes upon a supposition that +men follow their nature in the same sense, in violating the known +rules of justice and honesty for the sake of a present +gratification, as they do in following those rules when they have no +temptation to the contrary. And if this were true, that could not +be so which St. Paul asserts, that men are BY NATURE A LAW TO +THEMSELVES. If by following nature were meant only acting as we +please, it would indeed be ridiculous to speak of nature as any +guide in morals; nay, the very mention of deviating from nature +would be absurd; and the mention of following it, when spoken by way +of distinction, would absolutely have no meaning. For did ever any +one act otherwise than as he pleased? And yet the ancients speak of +deviating from nature as vice, and of following nature so much as a +distinction, that according to them the perfection of virtue +consists therein. So that language itself should teach people +another sense to the words FOLLOWING NATURE than barely acting as we +please. Let it, however, be observed that though the words HUMAN +NATURE are to be explained, yet the real question of this discourse +is not concerning the meaning of words, any other than as the +explanation of them may be needful to make out and explain the +assertion, that EVERY MAN IS NATURALLY A LAW to HIMSELF, that EVERY +ONE MAY FIND WITHIN HIMSELF THE RULE OF RIGHT, AND OBLIGATIONS TO +FOLLOW IT. This St. Paul affirms in the words of the text, and this +the foregoing objection really denies by seeming to allow it. And +the objection will be fully answered, and the text before us +explained, by observing that NATURE is considered in different +views, and the word used in different senses; and by showing in what +view it is considered, and in what sense the word is used, when +intended to express and signify that which is the guide of life, +that by which men are a law to themselves. I say, the explanation +of the term will be sufficient, because from thence it will appear +that in some senses of the word NATURE cannot be, but that in +another sense it manifestly is, a law to us. + +I. By nature is often meant no more than some principle in man, +without regard either to the kind or degree of it. Thus the passion +of anger, and the affection of parents to their children, would be +called equally NATURAL. And as the same person hath often contrary +principles, which at the same time draw contrary ways, he may by the +same action both follow and contradict his nature in this sense of +the word; he may follow one passion and contradict another. + +II. NATURE is frequently spoken of as consisting in those passions +which are strongest, and most influence the actions; which being +vicious ones, mankind is in this sense naturally vicious, or vicious +by nature. Thus St. Paul says of the Gentiles, WHO WERE DEAD IN +TRESPASSES AND SINS, AND WALKED ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT OF +DISOBEDIENCE, THAT THEY WERE BY NATURE THE CHILDREN OF WRATH. {6} +They could be no otherwise CHILDREN OF WRATH by nature than they +were vicious by nature. + +Here, then, are two different senses of the word NATURE, in neither +of which men can at all be said to be a law to themselves. They are +mentioned only to be excluded, to prevent their being confounded, as +the latter is in the objection, with another sense of it, which is +now to be inquired after and explained. + +III. The apostle asserts that the Gentiles DO BY NATURE THE THINGS +CONTAINED IN THE LAW. Nature is indeed here put by way of +distinction from revelation, but yet it is not a mere negative. He +intends to express more than that by which they DID NOT, that by +which they DID, the works of the law; namely, by NATURE. It is +plain the meaning of the word is not the same in this passage as in +the former, where it is spoken of as evil; for in this latter it is +spoken of as good--as that by which they acted, or might have acted, +virtuously. What that is in man by which he is NATURALLY A LAW TO +HIMSELF is explained in the following words: Which show the work of +the law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing +witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing +one another. If there be a distinction to be made between the WORKS +WRITTEN IN THEIR HEARTS, and the WITNESS OF CONSCIENCE, by the +former must be meant the natural disposition to kindness and +compassion to do what is of good report, to which this apostle often +refers: that part of the nature of man, treated of in the foregoing +discourse, which with very little reflection and of course leads him +to society, and by means of which he naturally acts a just and good +part in it, unless other passions or interest lead him astray. Yet +since other passions, and regards to private interest, which lead us +(though indirectly, yet they lead us) astray, are themselves in a +degree equally natural, and often most prevalent, and since we have +no method of seeing the particular degrees in which one or the other +is placed in us by nature, it is plain the former, considered merely +as natural, good and right as they are, can no more be a law to us +than the latter. But there is a superior principle of reflection or +conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal +principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which +passes judgement upon himself and them, pronounces determinately +some actions to be in themselves just, right, good, others to be in +themselves evil, wrong, unjust: which, without being consulted, +without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and +approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly: and which, +if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to +anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall +hereafter second and affirm its own. But this part of the office of +conscience is beyond my present design explicitly to consider. It +is by this faculty, natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that +he is a law to himself, but this faculty, I say, not to be +considered merely as a principle in his heart, which is to have some +influence as well as others, but considered as a faculty in kind and +in nature supreme over all others, and which bears its own authority +of being so. + +This PREROGATIVE, this NATURAL SUPREMACY, of the faculty which +surveys, approves, or disapproves the several affections of our mind +and actions of our lives, being that by which men ARE A LAW TO +THEMSELVES, their conformity or disobedience to which law of our +nature renders their actions, in the highest and most proper sense, +natural or unnatural, it is fit it be further explained to you; and +I hope it will be so, if you will attend to the following +reflections. + +Man may act according to that principle or inclination which for the +present happens to be strongest, and yet act in a way +disproportionate to, and violate his real proper nature. Suppose a +brute creature by any bait to be allured into a snare, by which he +is destroyed. He plainly followed the bent of his nature, leading +him to gratify his appetite: there is an entire correspondence +between his whole nature and such an action: such action therefore +is natural. But suppose a man, foreseeing the same danger of +certain ruin, should rush into it for the sake of a present +gratification; he in this instance would follow his strongest +desire, as did the brute creature; but there would be as manifest a +disproportion between the nature of a man and such an action as +between the meanest work of art and the skill of the greatest master +in that art; which disproportion arises, not from considering the +action singly in ITSELF, or in its CONSEQUENCES, but from COMPARISON +of it with the nature of the agent. And since such an action is +utterly disproportionate to the nature of man, it is in the +strictest and most proper sense unnatural; this word expressing that +disproportion. Therefore, instead of the words DISPROPORTIONATE TO +HIS NATURE, the word UNNATURAL may now be put; this being more +familiar to us: but let it be observed that it stands for the same +thing precisely. + +Now what is it which renders such a rash action unnatural? Is it +that he went against the principle of reasonable and cool self-love, +considered MERELY as a part of his nature? No; for if he had acted +the contrary way, he would equally have gone against a principle, or +part of his nature--namely, passion or appetite. But to deny a +present appetite, from foresight that the gratification of it would +end in immediate ruin or extreme misery, is by no means an unnatural +action: whereas to contradict or go against cool self-love for the +sake of such gratification is so in the instance before us. Such an +action then being unnatural, and its being so not arising from a +man's going against a principle or desire barely, nor in going +against that principle or desire which happens for the present to be +strongest, it necessarily follows that there must be some other +difference or distinction to be made between these two principles, +passion and cool self-love, than what I have yet taken notice of. +And this difference, not being a difference in strength or degree, I +call a difference in NATURE and in KIND. And since, in the instance +still before us, if passion prevails over self-love the consequent +action is unnatural, but if self-love prevails over passion the +action is natural, it is manifest that self-love is in human nature +a superior principle to passion. This may be contradicted without +violating that nature; but the former cannot. So that, if we will +act conformably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love +must govern. Thus, without particular consideration of conscience, +we may have a clear conception of the SUPERIOR NATURE of one inward +principle to another, and see that there really is this natural +superiority, quite distinct from degrees of strength and prevalency. + +Let us now take a view of the nature of man, as consisting partly of +various appetites, passions, affections, and partly of the principle +of reflection or conscience, leaving quite out all consideration of +the different degrees of strength in which either of them prevails, +and it will further appear that there is this natural superiority of +one inward principle to another, and that it is even part of the +idea of reflection or conscience. + +Passion or appetite implies a direct simple tendency towards such +and such objects, without distinction of the means by which they are +to be obtained. Consequently it will often happen there will be a +desire of particular objects, in cases where they cannot be obtained +without manifest injury to others. Reflection or conscience comes +in, need disapproves the pursuit of them in these circumstances; but +the desire remains. Which is to be obeyed, appetite or reflection? +Cannot this question be answered, from the economy and constitution +of human nature merely, without saying which is strongest? Or need +this at all come into consideration? Would not the question be +INTELLIGIBLY and fully answered by saying that the principle of +reflection or conscience being compared with the various appetites, +passions, and affections in men, the former is manifestly superior +and chief, without regard to strength? And how often soever the +latter happens to prevail, it is mere USURPATION: the former +remains in nature and in kind its superior; and every instance of +such prevalence of the latter is an instance of breaking in upon and +violation of the constitution of man. + +All this is no more than the distinction, which everybody is +acquainted with, between MERE POWER and AUTHORITY: only instead of +being intended to express the difference between what is possible +and what is lawful in civil government, here it has been shown +applicable to the several principles in the mind of man. Thus that +principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our +own heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what +is in its turn to have some influence--which may be said of every +passion, of the lowest appetites--but likewise as being superior, as +from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all +others, insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, +conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. +This is a constituent part of the idea--that is, of the faculty +itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy and +constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it had +right; had it power, as it had manifest authority, it would +absolutely govern the world. + +This gives us a further view of the nature of man; shows us what +course of life we were made for: not only that our real nature +leads us to be influenced in some degree by reflection and +conscience, but likewise in what degree we are to be influenced by +it, if we will fall in with, and act agreeably to, the constitution +of our nature: that this faculty was placed within to be our proper +governor, to direct and regulate all under principles, passions, and +motives of action. This is its right and office: thus sacred is +its authority. And how often soever men violate and rebelliously +refuse to submit to it, for supposed interest which they cannot +otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion which they cannot +otherwise gratify--this makes no alteration as to the NATURAL RIGHT +and OFFICE of conscience. + +Let us now turn this whole matter another way, and suppose there was +no such thing at all as this natural supremacy of conscience--that +there was no distinction to be made between one inward principle and +another, but only that of strength--and see what would be the +consequence. + +Consider, then, what is the latitude and compass of the actions of +man with regard to himself, his fellow-creatures, and the Supreme +Being? What are their bounds, besides that of our natural power? +With respect to the two first, they are plainly no other than these: +no man seeks misery, as such, for himself; and no one unprovoked +does mischief to another for its own sake. For in every degree +within these bounds, mankind knowingly, from passion or wantonness, +bring ruin and misery upon themselves and others. And impiety and +profaneness--I mean what every one would call so who believes the +being of God--have absolutely no bounds at all. Men blaspheme the +Author of nature, formally and in words renounce their allegiance to +their Creator. Put an instance, then, with respect to any one of +these three. Though we should suppose profane swearing, and in +general that kind of impiety now mentioned, to mean nothing, yet it +implies wanton disregard and irreverence towards an infinite Being +our Creator; and is this as suitable to the nature of man as +reverence and dutiful submission of heart towards that Almighty +Being? Or suppose a man guilty of parricide, with all the +circumstances of cruelty which such an action can admit of. This +action is done in consequence of its principle being for the present +strongest; and if there be no difference between inward principles, +but only that of strength, the strength being given you have the +whole nature of the man given, so far as it relates to this matter. +The action plainly corresponds to the principle, the principle being +in that degree of strength it was: it therefore corresponds to the +whole nature of the man. Upon comparing the action and the whole +nature, there arises no disproportion, there appears no +unsuitableness, between them. Thus the MURDER OF A FATHER and the +NATURE OF MAN correspond to each other, as the same nature and an +act of filial duty. If there be no difference between inward +principles, but only that of strength, we can make no distinction +between these two actions, considered as the actions of such a +creature; but in our coolest hours must approve or disapprove them +equally: than which nothing can be reduced to a greater absurdity. + + + +SERMON III. + + + +The natural supremacy of reflection or conscience being thus +established, we may from it form a distinct notion of what is meant +by HUMAN NATURE when virtue is said to consist in following it, and +vice in deviating from it. + +As the idea of a civil constitution implies in it united strength, +various subordinations under one direction--that of the supreme +authority--the different strength of each particular member of the +society not coming into the idea--whereas, if you leave out the +subordination, the union, and the one direction, you destroy and +lose it--so reason, several appetites, passions, and affections, +prevailing in different degrees of strength, is not THAT idea or +notion of HUMAN NATURE; but THAT NATURE consists in these several +principles considered as having a natural respect to each other, in +the several passions being naturally subordinate to the one superior +principle of reflection or conscience. Every bias, instinct, +propension within, is a natural part of our nature, but not the +whole: add to these the superior faculty whose office it is to +adjust, manage, and preside over them, and take in this its natural +superiority, and you complete the idea of human nature. And as in +civil government the constitution is broken in upon and violated by +power and strength prevailing over authority; so the constitution of +man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties or +principles within prevailing over that which is in its nature +supreme over them all. Thus, when it is said by ancient writers +that tortures and death are not so contrary to human nature as +injustice, by this, to be sure, is not meant that the aversion to +the former in mankind is less strong and prevalent than their +aversion to the latter, but that the former is only contrary to our +nature considered in a partial view, and which takes in only the +lowest part of it, that which we have in common with the brutes; +whereas the latter is contrary to our nature, considered in a higher +sense, as a system and constitution contrary to the whole economy of +man. {7} + +And from all these things put together, nothing can be more evident +than that, exclusive of revelation, man cannot be considered as a +creature left by his Maker to act at random, and live at large up to +the extent of his natural power, as passion, humour, wilfulness, +happen to carry him, which is the condition brute creatures are in; +but that FROM HIS MAKE, CONSTITUTION, OR NATURE, HE IS IN THE +STRICTEST AND MOST PROPER SENSE A LAW TO HIMSELF. He hath the rule +of right within: what is wanting is only that he honestly attend to +it. + +The inquiries which have been made by men of leisure after some +general rule, the conformity to or disagreement from which should +denominate our actions good or evil, are in many respects of great +service. Yet let any plain, honest man, before he engages in any +course of action, ask himself, Is this I am going about right, or is +it wrong? Is it good, or is it evil? I do not in the least doubt +but that this question would be answered agreeably to truth and +virtue, by almost any fair man in almost any circumstance. Neither +do there appear any cases which look like exceptions to this, but +those of superstition, and of partiality to ourselves. Superstition +may perhaps be somewhat of an exception; but partiality to ourselves +is not, this being itself dishonesty. For a man to judge that to be +the equitable, the moderate, the right part for him to act, which he +would see to be hard, unjust, oppressive in another, this is plain +vice, and can proceed only from great unfairness of mind. + +But allowing that mankind hath the rule of right within himself, yet +it may be asked, "What obligations are we under to attend to and +follow it?" I answer: It has been proved that man by his nature is +a law to himself, without the particular distinct consideration of +the positive sanctions of that law: the rewards and punishments +which we feel, and those which from the light of reason we have +ground to believe, are annexed to it. The question, then, carries +its own answer along within it. Your obligation to obey this law is +its being the law of your nature. That your conscience approves of +and attests to such a course of action is itself alone an +obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the +way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority +with it, that it is our natural guide; the guide assigned us by the +Author of our nature: it therefore belongs to our condition of +being; it is our duty to walk in that path, and follow this guide, +without looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake +them with impunity. + +However, let us hear what is to be said against obeying this law of +our nature. And the sum is no more than this: "Why should we be +concerned about anything out of and beyond ourselves? If we do find +within ourselves regards to others, and restraints of we know not +how many different kinds, yet these being embarrassments, and +hindering us from going the nearest way to our own good, why should +we not endeavour to suppress and get over them?" + +Thus people go on with words, which when applied to human nature, +and the condition in which it is placed in this world, have really +no meaning. For does not all this kind of talk go upon supposition, +that our happiness in this world consists in somewhat quite distinct +from regard to others, and that it is the privilege of vice to be +without restraint or confinement? Whereas, on the contrary, the +enjoyments--in a manner all the common enjoyments of life, even the +pleasures of vice--depend upon these regards of one kind or another +to our fellow-creatures. Throw off all regards to others, and we +should be quite indifferent to infamy and to honour; there could be +no such thing at all as ambition; and scarce any such thing as +covetousness; for we should likewise be equally indifferent to the +disgrace of poverty, the several neglects and kinds of contempt +which accompany this state, and to the reputation of riches, the +regard and respect they usually procure. Neither is restraint by +any means peculiar to one course of life; but our very nature, +exclusive of conscience and our condition, lays us under an absolute +necessity of it. We cannot gain any end whatever without being +confined to the proper means, which is often the most painful and +uneasy confinement. And in numberless instances a present appetite +cannot be gratified without such apparent and immediate ruin and +misery that the most dissolute man in the world chooses to forego +the pleasure rather than endure the pain. + +Is the meaning, then, to indulge those regards to our fellow- +creatures, and submit to those restraints which upon the whole are +attended with more satisfaction than uneasiness, and get over only +those which bring more uneasiness and inconvenience than +satisfaction? "Doubtless this was our meaning." You have changed +sides then. Keep to this; be consistent with yourselves, and you +and the men of virtue are IN GENERAL perfectly agreed. But let us +take care and avoid mistakes. Let it not be taken for granted that +the temper of envy, rage, resentment, yields greater delight than +meekness, forgiveness, compassion, and good-will; especially when it +is acknowledged that rage, envy, resentment, are in themselves mere +misery; and that satisfaction arising from the indulgence of them is +little more than relief from that misery; whereas the temper of +compassion and benevolence is itself delightful; and the indulgence +of it, by doing good, affords new positive delight and enjoyment. +Let it not be taken for granted that the satisfaction arising from +the reputation of riches and power, however obtained, and from the +respect paid to them, is greater than the satisfaction arising from +the reputation of justice, honesty, charity, and the esteem which is +universally acknowledged to be their due. And if it be doubtful +which of these satisfactions is the greatest, as there are persons +who think neither of them very considerable, yet there can be no +doubt concerning ambition and covetousness, virtue and a good mind, +considered in themselves, and as leading to different courses of +life; there can, I say, be no doubt, which temper and which course +is attended with most peace and tranquillity of mind, which with +most perplexity, vexation, and inconvenience. And both the virtues +and vices which have been now mentioned, do in a manner equally +imply in them regards of one kind or another to our fellow- +creatures. And with respect to restraint and confinement, whoever +will consider the restraints from fear and shame, the dissimulation, +mean arts of concealment, servile compliances, one or other of which +belong to almost every course of vice, will soon be convinced that +the man of virtue is by no means upon a disadvantage in this +respect. How many instances are there in which men feel and own and +cry aloud under the chains of vice with which they are enthralled, +and which yet they will not shake off! How many instances, in which +persons manifestly go through more pains and self-denial to gratify +a vicious passion, than would have been necessary to the conquest of +it! To this is to be added, that when virtue is become habitual, +when the temper of it is acquired, what was before confinement +ceases to be so by becoming choice and delight. Whatever restraint +and guard upon ourselves may be needful to unlearn any unnatural +distortion or odd gesture, yet in all propriety of speech, natural +behaviour must be the most easy and unrestrained. It is manifest +that, in the common course of life, there is seldom any +inconsistency between our duty and what is CALLED interest: it is +much seldomer that there is an inconsistency between duty and what +is really our present interest; meaning by interest, happiness and +satisfaction. Self-love, then, though confined to the interest of +the present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue, +and leads us to one and the same course of life. But, whatever +exceptions there are to this, which are much fewer than they are +commonly thought, all shall be set right at the final distribution +of things. It is a manifest absurdity to suppose evil prevailing +finally over good, under the conduct and administration of a perfect +mined. + +The whole argument, which I have been now insisting upon, may be +thus summed up, and given you in one view. The nature of man is +adapted to some course of action or other. Upon comparing some +actions with this nature, they appear suitable and correspondent to +it: from comparison of other actions with the same nature, there +arises to our view some unsuitableness or disproportion. The +correspondence of actions to the nature of the agent renders them +natural; their disproportion to it, unnatural. That an action is +correspondent to the nature of the agent does not arise from its +being agreeable to the principle which happens to be the strongest: +for it may be so and yet be quite disproportionate to the nature of +the agent. The correspondence therefore, or disproportion, arises +from somewhat else. This can be nothing but a difference in nature +and kind, altogether distinct from strength, between the inward +principles. Some then are in nature and kind superior to others. +And the correspondence arises from the action being conformable to +the higher principle; and the unsuitableness from its being contrary +to it. Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or +superior principles in the nature of man; because an action may be +suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated, +but becomes unsuitable if either of those are. Conscience and self- +love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same +way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most part +in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we take in the +future and the whole; this being implied in the notion of a good and +perfect administration of things. Thus they who have been so wise +in their generation as to regard only their own supposed interest, +at the expense and to the injury of others, shall at last find, that +he who has given up all the advantages of the present world, rather +than violate his conscience and the relations of life, has +infinitely better provided for himself, and secured his owns +interest and happiness. + + + +SERMON IV. +UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TONGUE. +JAMES i. 26. + + + +If any man among you seem to be religious, and bridleth not his +tongue, but deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain. + +The translation of this text would be more determinate by being more +literal, thus: If any man among you seemeth to be religious, not +bridling his tongue, but deceiving his own heart, this man's +religion is vain. This determines that the words, BUT DECEIVETH HIS +OWN HEART, are not put in opposition to SEEMETH TO BE RELIGIOUS, but +to BRIDLETH NOT HIS TONGUE. The certain determinate meaning of the +text then being, that he who seemeth to be religious, and bridleth +not his tongue, but in that particular deceiveth his own heart, this +man's religion is vain, we may observe somewhat very forcible and +expressive in these words of St. James. As if the apostle had said, +No man surely can make any pretences to religion, who does not at +least believe that he bridleth his tongue: if he puts on any +appearance or face of religion, and yet does not govern his tongue, +he must surely deceive himself in that particular, and think he +does; and whoever is so unhappy as to deceive himself in this, to +imagine he keeps that unruly faculty in due subjection when indeed +he does not, whatever the other part of his life be, his religion is +vain; the government of the tongue being a most material restraint +which virtue lays us under: without it no man can be truly +religious. + +In treating upon this subject, I will consider, + +First, what is the general vice or fault here referred to; or what +disposition in men is supposed in moral reflections and precepts +concerning BRIDLING THE TONGUE. + +Secondly, when it may be said of any one, that he has a due +government over himself in this respect. + +I. Now, the fault referred to, and the disposition supposed, in +precepts and reflections concerning the government of the tongue, is +not evil-speaking from malice, nor lying or bearing false witness +from indirect selfish designs. The disposition to these, and the +actual vices themselves, all come under other subjects. The tongue +may be employed about, and made to serve all the purposes of vice, +in tempting and deceiving, in perjury and injustice. But the thing +here supposed and referred to, is talkativeness: a disposition to +be talking, abstracted from the consideration of what is to be said; +with very little or no regard to, or thought of doing, either good +or harm. And let not any imagine this to be a slight matter, and +that it deserves not to have so great weight laid upon it, till he +has considered what evil is implied in it, and the bad effects which +follow from it. It is perhaps true, that they who are addicted to +this folly would choose to confine themselves to trifles and +indifferent subjects, and so intend only to be guilty of being +impertinent: but as they cannot go on for ever talking of nothing, +as common matters will not afford a sufficient fund for perpetual +continued discourse, where subjects of this kind are exhausted they +will go on to defamation, scandal, divulging of secrets, their own +secrets as well as those of others--anything rather than be silent. +They are plainly hurried on in the heat of their talk to say quite +different things from what they first intended, and which they +afterwards wish unsaid: or improper things, which they had no other +end in saying, but only to afford employment to their tongue. And +if these people expect to be heard and regarded--for there are some +content merely with talking--they will invent to engage your +attention: and, when they have heard the least imperfect hint of an +affair, they will out of their own head add the circumstances of +time and place and other matters to make out their story and give +the appearance of probability to it: not that they have any concern +about being believed, otherwise than as a means of being heard. The +thing is, to engage your attention; to take you up wholly for the +present time: what reflections will be made afterwards, is in truth +the least of their thoughts. And further, when persons who indulge +themselves in these liberties of the tongue are in any degree +offended with another--as little disgusts and misunderstandings will +be--they allow themselves to defame and revile such a one without +any moderation or bounds; though the offence is so very slight, that +they themselves would not do, nor perhaps wish him, an injury in any +other way. And in this case the scandal and revilings are chiefly +owing to talkativeness, and not bridling their tongue, and so come +under our present subject. The least occasion in the world will +make the humour break out in this particular way or in another. It +as like a torrent, which must and will flow; but the least thing +imaginable will first of all give it either this or another +direction, turn it into this or that channel: or like a fire--the +nature of which, when in a heap of combustible matter, is to spread +and lay waste all around; but any one of a thousand little accidents +will occasion it to break out first either in this or another +particular part. + +The subject then before us, though it does run up into, and can +scarce be treated as entirely distinct from all others, yet it needs +not be so much mixed or blended with them as it often is. Every +faculty and power may be used as the instrument of premeditated vice +and wickedness, merely as the most proper and effectual means of +executing such designs. But if a man, from deep malice and desire +of revenge, should meditate a falsehood with a settled design to +ruin his neighbour's reputation, and should with great coolness and +deliberation spread it, nobody would choose to say of such a one +that he had no government of his tongue. A man may use the faculty +of speech as an instrument of false witness, who yet has so entire a +command over that faculty as never to speak but from forethought and +cool design. Here the crime is injustice and perjury, and, strictly +speaking, no more belongs to the present subject than perjury and +injustice in any other way. But there is such a thing as a +disposition to be talking for its own sake; from which persons often +say anything, good or bad, of others, merely as a subject of +discourse, according to the particular temper they themselves happen +to be in, and to pass away the present time. There is likewise to +be observed in persons such a strong and eager desire of engaging +attention to what they say, that they will speak good or evil, truth +or otherwise, merely as one or the other seems to be most hearkened +to: and this though it is sometimes joined, is not the same with +the desire of being thought important and men of consequence. There +is in some such a disposition to be talking, that an offence of the +slightest kind, and such as would not raise any other resentment, +yet raises, if I may so speak, the resentment of the tongue--puts it +into a flame, into the most ungovernable motions. This outrage, +when the person it respects is present, we distinguish in the lower +rank of people by a peculiar term: and let it be observed, that +though the decencies of behaviour are a little kept, the same +outrage and virulence, indulged when he is absent, is an offence of +the same kind. But, not to distinguish any further in this manner, +men race into faults and follies which cannot so properly be +referred to any one general head as this--that they have not a due +government over their tongue. + +And this unrestrained volubility and wantonness of speech is the +occasion of numberless evils and vexations in life. It begets +resentment in him who is the subject of it, sows the seed of strife +and dissension amongst others, and inflames little disgusts and +offences which if let alone would wear away of themselves: it is +often of as bad effect upon the good name of others, as deep envy or +malice: and to say the least of it in this respect, it destroys and +perverts a certain equity of the utmost importance to society to be +observed--namely, that praise and dispraise, a good or bad +character, should always be bestowed according to desert. The +tongue used in such a licentious manner is like a sword in the hand +of a madman; it is employed at random, it can scarce possibly do any +good, and for the most part does a world of mischief; and implies +not only great folly and a trifling spirit, but great viciousness of +mind, great indifference to truth and falsity, and to the +reputation, welfare, and good of others. So much reason is there +for what St. James says of the tongue, IT IS A FIRE, A WORLD OF +INIQUITY, IT DEFILETH THE WHOLE BODY, SETTETH ON FIRE THE COURSE OF +NATURE, AND IS ITSELF SET ON FIRE OF HELL. {8} This is the faculty +or disposition which we are required to keep a guard upon: these +are the vices and follies it runs into when not kept under due +restraint. + +II. Wherein the due government of the tongue consists, or when it +may be said of any one in a moral and religious sense that he +BRIDLETH HIS TONGUE, I come now to consider. + +The due and proper use of any natural faculty or power is to be +judged of by the end and design for which it was given us. The +chief purpose for which the faculty of speech was given to man is +plainly that we might communicate our thoughts to each other, in +order to carry on the affairs of the world; for business, and for +our improvement in knowledge and learning. But the good Author of +our nature designed us not only necessaries, but likewise enjoyment +and satisfaction, in that being He hath graciously given, and in +that condition of life He hath placed us in. There are secondary +uses of our faculties: they administer to delight, as well as to +necessity; and as they are equally-adapted to both, there is no +doubt but He intended them for our gratification as well as for the +support and continuance of our being. The secondary use of speech +is to please and be entertaining to each other in conversation. +This is in every respect allowable and right; it unites men closer +in alliances and friendships; gives us a fellow-feeling of the +prosperity and unhappiness of each other; and is in several respects +servicable to virtue, and to promote good behaviour in the world. +And provided there be not too much time spent in it, if it were +considered only in the way of gratification and delight, men must +have strange notion of God and of religion to think that He can be +offended with it, or that it is any way inconsistent with the +strictest virtue. But the truth is, such sort of conversation, +though it has no particular good tendency, yet it has a general good +one; it is social and friendly, and tends to promote humanity, good- +nature, and civility. + +As the end and use, so likewise the abuse of speech, relates to the +one or other of these: either to business or to conversation. As +to the former: deceit in the management of business and affairs +does not properly belong to the subject now before us: though one +may just mention that multitude, that heedless number of words with +which business is perplexed, where a much fewer would, as it should +seem, better serve the purpose; but this must be left to those who +understand the matter. The government of the tongue, considered as +a subject of itself, relates chiefly to conversation; to that kind +of discourse which usually fills up the time spent in friendly +meetings and visits of civility. And the danger is, lest persons +entertain themselves and others at the expense of their wisdom and +their virtue, and to the injury or offence of their neighbour. If +they will observe and keep clear of these, they may be as free and +easy and unreserved as they can desire. + +The cautions to be given for avoiding these dangers, and to render +conversation innocent and agreeable, fall under the following +particulars: silence; talking of indifferent things; and, which +makes up too great a part of conversation, giving of characters, +speaking well or evil of others. + +The Wise Man observes that "there is a time to speak, and a time to +keep silence." One meets with people in the world who seem never to +have made the last of these observations. And yet these great +talkers do not at all speak from their having anything to say, as +every sentence shows, but only from their inclination to be talking. +Their conversation is merely an exercise of the tongue: no other +human faculty has any share in it. It is strange these persons can +help reflecting, that unless they have in truth a superior capacity, +and are in an extraordinary manner furnished for conversation if +they are entertaining, it is at their own expense. Is it possible +that it should never come into people's thoughts to suspect whether +or no it be to their advantage to show so very much of themselves? +"O that you would altogether hold your peace, and it should be your +wisdom." {9} Remember likewise there are persons who love fewer +words, an inoffensive sort of people, and who deserve some regard, +though of too still and composed tempers for you. Of this number +was the Son of Sirach: for he plainly speaks from experience when +he says, "As hills of sand are to the steps of the aged, so is one +of many words to a quiet man." But one would think it should be +obvious to every one, that when they are in company with their +superiors of any kind--in years, knowledge, and experience--when +proper and useful subjects are discoursed of, which they cannot bear +a part in, that these are times for silence, when they should learn +to hear, and be attentive, at least in their turn. It is indeed a +very unhappy way these people are in; they in a manner cut +themselves out from all advantage of conversation, except that of +being entertained with their own talk: their business in coming +into company not being at all to be informed, to hear, to learn, but +to display themselves, or rather to exert their faculty, and talk +without any design at all. And if we consider conversation as an +entertainment, as somewhat to unbend the mind, as a diversion from +the cares, the business, and the sorrows of life, it is of the very +nature of it that the discourse be mutual. This, I say, is implied +in the very notion of what we distinguish by conversation, or being +in company. Attention to the continued discourse of one alone grows +more painful, often, than the cares and business we come to be +diverted from. He, therefore, who imposes this upon us is guilty of +a double offence--arbitrarily enjoining silence upon all the rest, +and likewise obliging them to this painful attention. + +I am sensible these things are apt to be passed over, as too little +to come into a serious discourse; but in reality men are obliged, +even in point of morality and virtue, to observe all the decencies +of behaviour. The greatest evils in life have had their rise from +somewhat which was thought of too little importance to be attended +to. And as to the matter we are now upon, it is absolutely +necessary to be considered. For if people will not maintain a due +government over themselves, in regarding proper times and seasons +for silence, but WILL be talking, they certainly, whether they +design it or not at first, will go on to scandal and evil-speaking, +and divulging secrets. + +If it were needful to say anything further to persuade men to learn +this lesson of silence, one might put them in mind how insignificant +they render themselves by this excessive talkativeness: insomuch +that, if they do chance to say anything which deserves to be +attended to and regarded, it is lost in the variety and abundance +which they utter of another sort. + +The occasions of silence then are obvious, and one would think +should be easily distinguished by everybody: namely, when a man has +nothing to say; or nothing but what is better unsaid: better, +either in regard to the particular persons he is present with; or +from its being an interruption to conversation itself; or to +conversation of a more agreeable kind; or better, lastly, with +regard to himself. I will end this particular with two reflections +of the Wise Man; one of which, in the strongest manner, exposes the +ridiculous part of this licentiousness of the tongue; and the other, +the great danger and viciousness of it. When he that is a fool +walketh by the way side, his wisdom faileth him, and he saith to +every one that he is a fool. {10} The other is, In the multitude of +words there wanteth not sin. {11} + +As to the government of the tongue in respect to talking upon +indifferent subjects: after what has been said concerning the due +government of it in respect to the occasions and times for silence, +there is little more necessary than only to caution men to be fully +satisfied that the subjects are indeed of an indifferent nature; and +not to spend too much time in conversation of this kind. But +persons must be sure to take heed that the subject of their +discourse be at least of an indifferent nature: that it be no way +offensive to virtue, religion, or good manners: that it be not of a +licentious, dissolute sort, this leaving always ill impressions upon +the mind; that it be no way injurious or vexatious to others; and +that too much time be not spent this way, to the neglect of those +duties and offices of life which belong to their station and +condition in the world. However, though there is not any necessity +that men should aim at being important and weighty in every sentence +they speak: yet since useful subjects, at least of some kinds, are +as entertaining as others, a wise man, even when he desires to +unbend his mind from business, would choose that the conversation +might turn upon somewhat instructive. + +The last thing is, the government of the tongue as relating to +discourse of the affairs of others, and giving of characters. These +are in a manner the same; and one can scarce call it an indifferent +subject, because discourse upon it almost perpetually runs into +somewhat criminal. + +And, first of all, it were very much to be wished that this did not +take up so great a part of conversation; because it is indeed a +subject of a dangerous nature. Let any one consider the various +interests, competitions, and little misunderstandings which arise +amongst men; and he will soon see that he is not unprejudiced and +impartial; that he is not, as I may speak, neutral enough to trust +himself with talking of the character and concerns of his neighbour, +in a free, careless, and unreserved manner. There is perpetually, +and often it is not attended to, a rivalship amongst people of one +kind or another in respect to wit, beauty, learning, fortune, and +that one thing will insensibly influence them to speak to the +disadvantage of others, even where there is no formed malice or ill- +design. Since therefore it is so hard to enter into this subject +without offending, the first thing to be observed is that people +should learn to decline it; to get over that strong inclination most +have to be talking of the concerns and behaviour of their neighbour. + +But since it is impossible that this subject should be wholly +excluded conversation; and since it is necessary that the characters +of men should be known: the next thing is that it is a matter of +importance what is said; and, therefore, that we should be +religiously scrupulous and exact to say nothing, either good or bad, +but what is true. I put it thus, because it is in reality of as +great importance to the good of society, that the characters of bad +men should be known, as that the characters of good men should. +People who are given to scandal and detraction may indeed make an +ill-use of this observation; but truths, which are of service +towards regulating our conduct, are not to be disowned, or even +concealed, because a bad use may be made of them. This however +would be effectually prevented if these two things were attended to. +First, That, though it is equally of bad consequence to society that +men should have either good or ill characters which they do not +deserve; yet, when you say somewhat good of a man which he does not +deserve, there is no wrong done him in particular; whereas, when you +say evil of a man which he does not deserve, here is a direct formal +injury, a real piece of injustice done him. This therefore makes a +wide difference; and gives us, in point of virtue, much greater +latitude in speaking well than ill of others. Secondly, A good man +is friendly to his fellow-creatures, and a lover of mankind; and so +will, upon every occasion, and often without any, say all the good +he can of everybody; but, so far as he is a good man, will never be +disposed to speak evil of any, unless there be some other reason for +it, besides, barely that it is true. If he be charged with having +given an ill character, he will scarce think it a sufficient +justification of himself to say it was a true one, unless he can +also give some further account how he came to do so: a just +indignation against particular instances of villainy, where they are +great and scandalous; or to prevent an innocent man from being +deceived and betrayed, when he has great trust and confidence in one +who does not deserve it. Justice must be done to every part of a +subject when we are considering it. If there be a man, who bears a +fair character in the world, whom yet we know to be without faith or +honesty, to be really an ill man; it must be allowed in general that +we shall do a piece of service to society by letting such a one's +true character be known. This is no more than what we have an +instance of in our Saviour himself; {12} though He was mild and +gentle beyond example. However, no words can express too strongly +the caution which should be used in such a case as this. + +Upon the whole matter: If people would observe the obvious +occasions of silence, if they would subdue the inclination to tale- +bearing, and that eager desire to engage attention, which is an +original disease in some minds, they would be in little danger of +offending with their tongue; and would, in a moral and religious +sense, have due government over it. + +I will conclude with some precepts and reflections of the Son of +Sirach upon this subject. Be swift to hear; and, if thou hast +understanding, answer thy neighbour; if not, lay thy hand upon thy +mouth. Honour and shame is in talk. A man of an ill tongue is +dangerous in his city, and he that is rash in his talk shall be +hated. A wise man wilt hold his tongue till he see opportunity; but +a babbler and a fool will regard no time. He that useth many words +shall be abhorred; and he that taketh to himself authority therein +shall be hated. A backbiting tongue hath disquieted many; strong +cities hath it pulled down, and overthrown the houses of great men. +The tongue of a man is his fall; but if thou love to hear, thou +shall receive understanding. + + + +SERMON V. +UPON COMPASSION. +ROM. xii. 15. + + + +Rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep. + +Every man is to be considered in two capacities, the private and +public; as designed to pursue his own interest, and likewise to +contribute to the good of others. Whoever will consider may see +that, in general, there is no contrariety between these; but that +from the original constitution of man, and the circumstances he is +placed in, they perfectly coincide, and mutually carry on each +other. But, among the great variety of affections or principles of +actions in our nature, some in their primary intention and design +seem to belong to the single or private, others to the public or +social capacity. The affections required in the text are of the +latter sort. When we rejoice in the prosperity of others, and +compassionate their distresses, we as it were substitute them for +ourselves, their interest for our own; and have the same kind of +pleasure in their prosperity, and sorrow in their distress, as we +have from reflection upon our own. Now there is nothing strange or +unaccountable in our being thus carried out, and affected towards +the interests of others. For, if there be any appetite, or any +inward principle besides self-love; why may there not be an +affection to the good of our fellow-creatures, and delight from that +affection's being gratified, and uneasiness from things going +contrary to it? {13} + +Of these two, delight in the prosperity of others, and compassion +for their distresses, the last is felt much more generally than the +former. Though men do not universally rejoice with all whom they +see rejoice, yet, accidental obstacles removed, they naturally +compassionate all, in some degree, whom they see in distress; so far +as they have any real perception or sense of that distress: +insomuch that words expressing this latter, pity, compassion, +frequently occur: whereas we have scarce any single one by which +the former is distinctly expressed. Congratulation indeed answers +condolence: but both these words are intended to signify certain +forms of civility rather than any inward sensation or feeling. This +difference or inequality is so remarkable that we plainly consider +compassion as itself an original, distinct, particular affection in +human nature; whereas to rejoice in the good of others is only a +consequence of the general affection of love and good-will to them. +The reason and account of which matter is this: when a man has +obtained any particular advantage or felicity, his end is gained; +and he does not in that particular want the assistance of another: +there was therefore no need of a distinct affection towards that +felicity of another already obtained; neither would such affection +directly carry him on to do good to that person: whereas men in +distress want assistance; and compassion leads us directly to assist +them. The object of the former is the present felicity of another; +the object of the latter is the present misery of another. It is +easy to see that the latter wants a particular affection for its +relief, and that the former does not want one because it does not +want assistance. And upon supposition of a distinct affection in +both cases, the one must rest in the exercise of itself, having +nothing further to gain; the other does not rest in itself, but +carries us on to assist the distressed. + +But, supposing these affections natural to the mind, particularly +the last; "Has not each man troubles enough of his own? must he +indulge an affection which appropriates to himself those of others? +which leads him to contract the least desirable of all friendships, +friendships with the unfortunate? Must we invert the known rule of +prudence, and choose to associate ourselves with the distressed? or, +allowing that we ought, so far as it is in our power to relieve +them, yet is it not better to do this from reason and duty? Does +not passion and affection of every kind perpetually mislead us? +Nay, is not passion and affection itself a weakness, and what a +perfect being must be entirely free from?" Perhaps so, but it is +mankind I am speaking of; imperfect creatures, and who naturally +and, from the condition we are placed in, necessarily depend upon +each other. With respect to such creatures, it would be found of as +bad consequence to eradicate all natural affections as to be +entirely governed by them. This would almost sink us to the +condition of brutes; and that would leave us without a sufficient +principle of action. Reason alone, whatever any one may wish, is +not in reality a sufficient motive of virtue in such a creature as +man; but this reason joined with those affections which God has +impressed upon his heart, and when these are allowed scope to +exercise themselves, but under strict government and direction of +reason, then it is we act suitably to our nature, and to the +circumstances God has placed us in. Neither is affection itself at +all a weakness; nor does it argue defect, any otherwise than as our +senses and appetites do; they belong to our condition of nature, and +are what we cannot be without. God Almighty is, to be sure, unmoved +by passion or appetite, unchanged by affection; but then it is to be +added that He neither sees nor hears nor perceives things by any +senses like ours; but in a manner infinitely more perfect. Now, as +it is an absurdity almost too gross to be mentioned, for a man to +endeavour to get rid of his senses, because the Supreme Being +discerns things more perfectly without them; it is as real, though +not so obvious an absurdity, to endeavour to eradicate the passions +He has given us, because He is without them. For, since our +passions are as really a part of our constitution as our senses; +since the former as really belong to our condition of nature as the +latter; to get rid of either is equally a violation of and breaking +in upon that nature and constitution He has given us. Both our +senses and our passions are a supply to the imperfection of our +nature; thus they show that we are such sort of creatures as to +stand in need of those helps which higher orders of creatures do +not. But it is not the supply, but the deficiency; as it is not a +remedy, but a disease, which is the imperfection. However, our +appetites, passions, senses, no way imply disease: nor indeed do +they imply deficiency or imperfection of any sort; but only this, +that the constitution of nature, according to which God has made us, +is such as to require them. And it is so far from being true, that +a wise man must entirely suppress compassion, and all fellow-feeling +for others, as a weakness; and trust to reason alone to teach and +enforce upon him the practice of the several charities we owe to our +kind; that, on the contrary, even the bare exercise of such +affections would itself be for the good and happiness of the world; +and the imperfection of the higher principles of reason and religion +in man, the little influence they have upon our practice, and the +strength and prevalency of contrary ones, plainly require these +affections to be a restraint upon these latter, and a supply to the +deficiencies of the former. + +First, The very exercise itself of these affections in a just and +reasonable manner and degree would upon the whole increase the +satisfactions and lessen the miseries of life. + +It is the tendency and business of virtue and religion to procure, +as much as may be, universal good-will, trust, and friendship +amongst mankind. If this could be brought to obtain; and each man +enjoyed the happiness of others, as every one does that of a friend; +and looked upon the success and prosperity of his neighbour as every +one does upon that of his children and family; it is too manifest to +be insisted upon how much the enjoyments of life would be increased. +There would be so much happiness introduced into the world, without +any deduction or inconvenience from it, in proportion as the precept +of REJOICING WITH THOSE WHO REJOICE was universally obeyed. Our +Saviour has owned this good affection as belonging to our nature in +the parable of the LOST SHEEP, and does not think it to the +disadvantage of a perfect state to represent its happiness as +capable of increase from reflection upon that of others. + +But since in such a creature as man, compassion or sorrow for the +distress of others seems so far necessarily connected with joy in +their prosperity, as that whoever rejoices in one must unavoidably +compassionate the other; there cannot be that delight or +satisfaction, which appears to be so considerable, without the +inconveniences, whatever they are, of compassion. + +However, without considering this connection, there is no doubt but +that more good than evil, more delight than sorrow, arises from +compassion itself; there being so many things which balance the +sorrow of it. There is first the relief which the distressed feel +from this affection in others towards them. There is likewise the +additional misery which they would feel from the reflection that no +one commiserated their case. It is indeed true that any +disposition, prevailing beyond a certain degree, becomes somewhat +wrong; and we have ways of speaking, which, though they do not +directly express that excess, yet always lead our thoughts to it, +and give us the notion of it. Thus, when mention is made of delight +in being pitied, this always conveys to our mind the notion of +somewhat which is really a weakness. The manner of speaking, I say, +implies a certain weakness and feebleness of mind, which is and +ought to be disapproved. But men of the greatest fortitude would in +distress feel uneasiness from knowing that no person in the world +had any sort of compassion or real concern for them; and in some +cases, especially when the temper is enfeebled by sickness, or any +long and great distress, doubtless, would feel a kind of relief even +from the helpless goodwill and ineffectual assistances of those +about them. Over against the sorrow of compassion is likewise to be +set a peculiar calm kind of satisfaction, which accompanies it, +unless in cases where the distress of another is by some means so +brought home to ourselves as to become in a manner our own; or when +from weakness of mind the affection rises too high, which ought to +be corrected. This tranquillity, or calm satisfaction, proceeds +partly from consciousness of a right affection and temper of mind, +and partly from a sense of our own freedom from the misery we +compassionate. This last may possibly appear to some at first sight +faulty; but it really is not so. It is the same with that positive +enjoyment, which sudden ease from pain for the present affords, +arising from a real sense of misery, joined with a sense of our +freedom from it; which in all cases must afford some degree of +satisfaction. + +To these things must be added the observation which respects both +the affections we are considering; that they who have got over all +fellow-feeling for others have withal contracted a certain +callousness of heart, which renders them insensible to most other +satisfactions but those of the grossest kind. + +Secondly, Without the exercise of these affections men would +certainly be much more wanting in the offices of charity they owe to +cache other, and likewise more cruel and injurious than they are at +present. + +The private interest of the individual would not be sufficiently +provided for by reasonable and cool self-love alone; therefore the +appetites and passions are placed within as a guard and further +security, without which it would not be taken due care of. It is +manifest our life would be neglected were it not for the calls of +hunger and thirst and weariness; notwithstanding that without them +reason would assure us that the recruits of food and sleep are the +necessary means of our preservation. It is therefore absurd to +imagine that, without affections, the same reason alone would be +more effectual to engage us to perform the duties we owe to our +fellow-creatures. One of this make would be as defective, as much +wanting, considered with respect to society, as one of the former +make would be defective, or wanting, considered as an individual, or +in his private capacity. Is it possible any can in earnest think +that a public spirit, i.e., a settled reasonable principle of +benevolence to mankind, is so prevalent and strong in the species as +that we may venture to throw off the under affections, which are its +assistants, carry it forward and mark out particular courses for it; +family, friends, neighbourhood, the distressed, our country? The +common joys and the common sorrows, which belong to these relations +and circumstances, are as plainly useful to society as the pain and +pleasure belonging to hunger, thirst, and weariness are of service +to the individual. In defect of that higher principle of reason, +compassion is often the only way by which the indigent can have +access to us: and therefore, to eradicate this, though it is not +indeed formally to deny them that assistance which is their due; yet +it is to cut them off from that which is too frequently their only +way of obtaining it. And as for those who have shut up this door +against the complaints of the miserable, and conquered this +affection in themselves; even these persons will be under great +restraints from the same affection in others. Thus a man who has +himself no sense of injustice, cruelty, oppression, will be kept +from running the utmost lengths of wickedness by fear of that +detestation, and even resentment of inhumanity, in many particular +instances of it, which compassion for the object towards whom such +inhumanity is exercised, excites in the bulk of mankind. And this +is frequently the chief danger and the chief restraint which tyrants +and the great oppressors of the world feel. + +In general, experience will show that, as want of natural appetite +to food supposes and proceeds from some bodily disease; so the +apathy the Stoics talk of as much supposes, or is accompanied with, +somewhat amiss in the moral character, in that which is the health +of the mind. Those who formerly aimed at this upon the foot of +philosophy appear to have had better success in eradicating the +affections of tenderness and compassion than they had with the +passions of envy, pride, and resentment: these latter, at best, +were but concealed, and that imperfectly too. How far this +observation may be extended to such as endeavour to suppress the +natural impulses of their affections, in order to form themselves +for business and the world, I shall not determine. But there does +not appear any capacity or relation to be named, in which men ought +to be entirely deaf to the calls of affection, unless the judicial +one is to be excepted. + +And as to those who are commonly called the men of pleasure, it is +manifest that the reason they set up for hardness of heart is to +avoid being interrupted in their course by the ruin and misery they +are the authors of; neither are persons of this character always the +most free from the impotencies of envy and resentment. What may men +at last bring themselves to, by suppressing their passions and +affections of one kind, and leaving those of the other in their full +strength? But surely it might be expected that persons who make +pleasure their study and their business, if they understood what +they profess, would reflect, how many of the entertainments of life, +how many of those kind of amusements which seem peculiarly to belong +to men of leisure and education they became insensible to by this +acquired hardness of heart. + +I shall close these reflections with barely mentioning the behaviour +of that divine Person, who was the example of all perfection in +human nature, as represented in the Gospels mourning, and even, in a +literal sense, weeping over the distresses of His creatures. + +The observation already made, that, of the two affections mentioned +in the text, the latter exerts itself much more than the former; +that, from the original constitution of human nature, we much more +generally and sensibly compassionate the distressed than rejoice +within the prosperous, requires to be particularly considered. This +observation, therefore, with the reflections which arise out of it, +and which it leads our thoughts to, shall be the subject of another +discourse. + +For the conclusion of this, let me just take notice of the danger of +over-great refinements; of going beside or beyond the plain, +obvious, first appearances of things, upon the subject of morals and +religion. The least observation will show how little the generality +of men are capable of speculations. Therefore morality and religion +must be somewhat plan and easy to be understood: it must appeal to +what we call plain common sense, as distinguished from superior +capacity and improvement; because it appeals to mankind. Persons of +superior capacity and improvement have often fallen into errors +which no one of mere common understanding could. Is it possible +that one of this latter character could even of himself have thought +that there was absolutely no such thing in mankind as affection to +the good of others? suppose of parents to their children; or that +what he felt upon seeing a friend in distress was only fear for +himself; or, upon supposition of the affections of kindness and +compassion, that it was the business of wisdom and virtue to set him +about extirpating them as fast as he could? And yet each of these +manifest contradictions to nature has been laid down by men of +speculation as a discovery in moral philosophy; which they, it +seems, have found out through all the specious appearances to the +contrary. This reflection may be extended further. The +extravagances of enthusiasm and superstition do not at all lie in +the road of common sense; and therefore, so far as they are ORIGINAL +MISTAKES, must be owing to going beside or beyond it. Now, since +inquiry and examination can relate only to things so obscure and +uncertain as to stand in need of it, and to persons who are capable +of it; the proper advice to be given to plain honest men, to secure +them from the extremes both of superstition and irreligion, is that +of the Son of Sirach: In every good work trust thy own soul; for +this is the keeping of the commandment. {14} + + + +SERMON VI. +UPON COMPASSION. +PREACHED THE FIRST SUNDAY IN LENT. +Rom. xii. 15. + + + +Rejoice with then that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep. + +There is a much more exact correspondence between the natural and +moral world than we are apt to take notice of. The inward frame of +man does in a peculiar manner answer to the external condition and +circumstances of life in which he is placed. This is a particular +instance of that general observation of the Son of Sirach: All +things are double one against another, and God hath made nothing +imperfect. {15} The several passions and affections in the heart of +man, compared with the circumstances of life in which he is placed, +afford, to such as will attend to them, as certain instances of +final causes, as any whatever, which are more commonly alleged for +such: since those affections lead him to a certain determinate +course of action suitable to those circumstances; as (for instance) +compassion to relieve the distressed. And as all observations of +final causes, drawn from the principles of action in the heart of +man, compared with the condition he is placed in, serve all the good +uses which instances of final causes in the material world about us +do; and both these are equally proofs of wisdom and design in the +Author of nature: so the former serve to further good purposes; +they show us what course of life we are made for, what is our duty, +and in a peculiar manner enforce upon us the practice of it. + +Suppose we are capable of happiness and of misery in degrees equally +intense and extreme, yet, we are capable of the latter for a much +longer time, beyond all comparison. We see men in the tortures of +pain for hours, days, and, excepting the short suspensions of sleep, +for months together, without intermission, to which no enjoyments of +life do, in degree and continuance, bear any sort of proportion. +And such is our make and that of the world about us that any thing +may become the instrument of pain and sorrow to us. Thus almost any +one man is capable of doing mischief to any other, though he may not +be capable of doing him good; and if he be capable of doing him some +good, he is capable of doing him more evil. And it is, in +numberless cases, much more in our power to lessen the miseries of +others than to promote their positive happiness, any otherwise than +as the former often includes the latter; ease from misery +occasioning for some time the greatest positive enjoyment. This +constitution of nature, namely, that it is so munch more in our +power to occasion and likewise to lessen misery than to promote +positive happiness, plainly required a particular affection to +hinder us from abusing, and to incline us to make a right use of the +former powers, I.E., the powers both to occasion and to lessen +misery; over and above what was necessary to induce us to make a +right use of the latter power, that of promoting positive happiness. +The power we have over the misery of our fellow-creatures, to +occasion or lessen it, being a more important trust than the power +we have of promoting their positive happiness; the former requires +and has a further, an additional, security and guard against its +being violated, beyond and over and above what the latter has. The +social nature of man, and general goodwill to his species, equally +prevent him from doing evil, incline him to relieve the distressed, +and to promote the positive happiness of his fellow-creatures; but +compassion only restrains from the first, and carries him to the +second; it hath nothing to do with the third. + +The final causes, then, of compassion are to prevent and to relieve +misery. + +As to the former: this affection may plainly be a restraint upon +resentment, envy, unreasonable self-love; that is, upon all the +principles from which men do evil to one another. Let us instance +only in resentment. It seldom happens, in regulated societies, that +men have an enemy so entirely in their power as to be able to +satiate their resentment with safety. But if we were to put this +case, it is plainly supposable that a person might bring his enemy +into such a condition, as from being the object of anger and rage, +to become an object of compassion, even to himself, though the most +malicious man in the world; and in this case compassion would stop +him, if he could stop with safety, from pursuing his revenge any +further. But since nature has placed within us more powerful +restraints to prevent mischief, and since the final cause of +compassion is much more to relieve misery, let us go on to the +consideration of it in this view. + +As this world was not intended to be a state of any great +satisfaction or high enjoyment, so neither was it intended to be a +mere scene of unhappiness and sorrow. Mitigations and reliefs are +provided by the merciful Author of nature for most of the +afflictions in human life. There is kind provision made even +against our frailties: as we are so constituted that time +abundantly abates our sorrows, and begets in us that resignment of +temper, which ought to have been produced by a better cause; a due +sense of the authority of God, and our state of dependence. This +holds in respect too far the greatest part of the evils of life; I +suppose, in some degree, as to pain and sickness. Now this part of +the constitution or make of man, considered as some relief to +misery, and not as provision for positive happiness, is, if I may so +speak, an instance of nature's compassion for us; and every natural +remedy or relief to misery may be considered in the same view. + +But since in many cases it is very much in our power to alleviate +the miseries of each other; and benevolence, though natural in man +to man, yet is in a very low degree kept down by interest and +competitions; and men, for the most part, are so engaged in the +business and pleasures of the world, as to overlook and turn away +from objects of misery; which are plainly considered as +interruptions to them in their way, as intruders upon their +business, their gaiety, and mirth: compassion is an advocate within +us in their behalf, to gain the unhappy admittance and access, to +make their case attended to. If it sometimes serves a contrary +purpose, and makes men industriously turn away from the miserable, +these are only instances of abuse and perversion: for the end, for +which the affection was given us, most certainly is not to make us +avoid, but to make us attend to, the objects of it. And if men +would only resolve to allow thus much to it: let it bring before +their view, the view of their mind, the miseries of their fellow- +creatures; let it gain for them that their case be considered; I am +persuaded it would not fail of gaining more, and that very few real +objects of charity would pass unrelieved. Pain and sorrow and +misery have a right to our assistance: compassion puts us in mind +of the debt, and that we owe it to ourselves as well as to the +distressed. For, to endeavour to get rid of the sorrow of +compassion by turning from the wretched, when yet it is in our power +to relieve them, is as unnatural as to endeavour to get rid of the +pain of hunger by keeping from the sight of food. That we can do +one with greater success than we can the other is no proof that one +is less a violation of nature than the other. Compassion is a call, +a demand of nature, to relieve the unhappy as hunger is a natural +call for food. This affection plainly gives the objects of it an +additional claim to relief and mercy, over and above what our +fellow-creatures in common have to our goodwill. Liberality and +bounty are exceedingly commendable; and a particular distinction in +such a world as this, where men set themselves to contract their +heart, and close it to all interests but their own. It is by no +means to be opposed to mercy, but always accompanies it: the +distinction between them is only that the former leads our thoughts +to a more promiscuous and undistinguished distribution of favours; +to those who are not, as well as those who are, necessitous; whereas +the object of compassion is misery. But in the comparison, and +where there is not a possibility of both, mercy is to have the +preference: the affection of compassion manifestly leads us to this +preference. Thus, to relieve the indigent and distressed, to single +out the unhappy, from whom can be expected no returns either of +present entertainment or future service, for the objects of our +favours; to esteem a man's being friendless as a recommendation; +dejection, and incapacity of struggling through the world, as a +motive for assisting him; in a word, to consider these circumstances +of disadvantage, which are usually thought a sufficient reason for +neglect and overlooking a person, as a motive for helping him +forward: this is the course of benevolence which compassion marks +out and directs us to: this is that humanity which is so peculiarly +becoming our nature and circumstances in this world. + +To these considerations, drawn from the nature of man, must be added +the reason of the thing itself we are recommending, which accords to +and shows the same. For since it is so much more in our power to +lessen the misery of our fellow-creatures than to promote their +positive happiness; in cases where there is an inconsistency, we +shall be likely to do much more good by setting ourselves to +mitigate the former than by endeavouring to promote the latter. Let +the competition be between the poor and the rich. It is easy, you +will say, to see which will have the preference. True; but the +question is, which ought to have the preference? What proportion is +there between the happiness produced by doing a favour to the +indigent, and that produced by doing the same favour to one in easy +circumstances? It is manifest that the addition of a very large +estate to one who before had an affluence, will in many instances +yield him less new enjoyment or satisfaction than an ordinary +charity would yield to a necessitous person. So that it is not only +true that our nature, i.e., the voice of God within us, carries us +to the exercise of charity and benevolence in the way of compassion +or mercy, preferably to any other way; but we also manifestly +discern much more good done by the former; or, if you will allow me +the expressions, more misery annihilated and happiness created. If +charity and benevolence, and endeavouring to do good to our fellow- +creatures, be anything, this observation deserves to be most +seriously considered by all who have to bestow. And it holds with +great exactness, when applied to the several degrees of greater and +less indigency throughout the various ranks in human life: the +happiness or good produced not being in proportion to what is +bestowed, but in proportion to this joined with the need there was +of it. + +It may perhaps be expected that upon this subject notice should be +taken of occasions, circumstances, and characters which seem at once +to call forth affections of different sorts. Thus vice may be +thought the object both of pity and indignation: folly, of pity and +of laughter. How far this is strictly true, I shall not inquire; +but only observe upon the appearance, how much more humane it is to +yield and give scope to affections, which are most directly in +favour of, and friendly towards, our fellow-creatures; and that +there is plainly much less danger of being led wrong by these than +by the other. + +But, notwithstanding all that has been said in recommendation of +compassion, that it is most amiable, most becoming human nature, and +most useful to the world; yet it must be owned that every affection, +as distinct from a principle of reason, may rise too high, and be +beyond its just proportion. And by means of this one carried too +far, a man throughout his life is subject to much more uneasiness +than belongs to his share; and in particular instances, it may be in +such a degree as to incapacitate him from assisting the very person +who is the object of it. But as there are some who upon principle +set up for suppressing this affection itself as weakness, there is +also I know not what of fashion on this side; and, by some means or +other, the whole world almost is run into the extremes of +insensibility towards the distresses of their fellow-creatures: so +that general rules and exhortations must always be on the other +side. + +And now to go on to the uses we should make of the foregoing +reflections, the further ones they lead to, and the general temper +they have a tendency to beget in us. There being that distinct +affection implanted in the nature of man, tending to lessen the +miseries of life, that particular provision made for abating its +sorrows, more than for increasing its positive happiness, as before +explained; this may suggest to us what should be our general aim +respecting ourselves, in our passage through this world: namely, to +endeavour chiefly to escape misery, keep free from uneasiness, pain, +and sorrow, or to get relief and mitigation of them; to propose to +ourselves peace and tranquillity of mind, rather than pursue after +high enjoyments. This is what the constitution of nature before +explained marks out as the course we should follow, and the end we +should aim at. To make pleasure and mirth and jollity our business, +and be constantly hurrying about after some gay amusement, some new +gratification of sense or appetite, to those who will consider the +nature of man and our condition in this world, will appear the most +romantic scheme of life that ever entered into thought. And yet how +many are there who go on in this course, without learning better +from the daily, the hourly disappointments, listlessness, and +satiety which accompany this fashionable method of wasting away +their days! + +The subject we have been insisting upon would lead us into the same +kind of reflections by a different connection. The miseries of life +brought home to ourselves by compassion, viewed through this +affection considered as the sense by which they are perceived, would +beget in us that moderation, humility, and soberness of mind which +has been now recommended; and which peculiarly belongs to a season +of recollection, the only purpose of which is to bring us to a just +sense of things, to recover us out of that forgetfulness of +ourselves, and our true state, which it is manifest far the greatest +part of men pass their whole life in. Upon this account Solomon +says that IT IS BETTER TO GO TO THE HOUSE OF MOURNING THAN TO GO TO +THE HOUSE OF FEASTING; i.e., it is more to a man's advantage to turn +his eyes towards objects of distress, to recall sometimes to his +remembrance the occasions of sorrow, than to pass all his days in +thoughtless mirth and gaiety. And he represents the wise as +choosing to frequent the former of these places; to be sure not for +his own sake, but because BY THE SADNESS OF THE COUNTENANCE, THE +HEART IS MADE BETTER. Every one observes how temperate and +reasonable men are when humbled and brought low by afflictions in +comparison of what they are in high prosperity. By this voluntary +resort to the house of mourning, which is here recommended, we might +learn all those useful instructions which calamities teach without +undergoing them ourselves; and grow wiser and better at a more easy +rate than men commonly do. The objects themselves, which in that +place of sorrow lie before our view, naturally give us a seriousness +and attention, check that wantonness which is the growth of +prosperity and ease, and head us to reflect upon the deficiencies of +human life itself; that EVERY MAN AT HIS BEST ESTATE IS ALTOGETHER +VANITY. This would correct the florid and gaudy prospects and +expectations which we are too apt to indulge, teach us to lower our +notions of happiness and enjoyment, bring them down to the reality +of things, to what is attainable, to what the frailty of our +condition will admit of, which, for any continuance, is only +tranquillity, ease, and moderate satisfactions. Thus we might at +once become proof against the temptations with which the whole world +almost is carried away; since it is plain that not only what is +called a life of pleasure, but also vicious pursuits in general, aim +at somewhat besides and beyond these moderate satisfactions. + +And as to that obstinacy and wilfulness, which renders men so +insensible to the motives of religion; this right sense of ourselves +and of the world about us would bend the stubborn mind, soften the +heart, and make it more apt to receive impression; and this is the +proper temper in which to call our ways to remembrance, to review +and set home upon ourselves the miscarriages of our past life. In +such a compliant state of mind, reason and conscience will have a +fair hearing; which is the preparation for, or rather the beginning +of, that repentance, the outward show of which we all put on at this +season. + +Lastly, The various miseries of life which lie before us wherever we +turn our eyes, the frailty of this mortal state we are passing +through, may put us in mind that the present world is not our home; +that we are merely strangers and travellers in it, as all our +fathers were. It is therefore to be considered as a foreign +country; in which our poverty and wants, and the insufficient +supplies of them, were designed to turn our views to that higher and +better state we are heirs to: a state where will be no follies to +be overlooked, no miseries to be pitied, no wants to be relieved; +where the affection we have been now treating of will happily be +lost, as there will be no objects to exercise it upon: for God +shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no +more death, neither sorrow, nor crying; neither shall there be any +more pain; for the former things are passed away. + + + +SERMON VII. +UPON THE CHARACTER OF BALAAM. +PREACHED THE SECOND SUNDAY AFTER EASTER. +NUMBERS xxiii. 10. + + + +Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like +his. + +These words, taken alone, and without respect to him who spoke them, +lead our thoughts immediately to the different ends of good and bad +men. For though the comparison is not expressed, yet it is +manifestly implied; as is also the preference of one of these +characters to the other in that last circumstance, death. And, +since dying the death of the righteous or of the wicked necessarily +implies men's being righteous or wicked; i.e., having lived +righteously or wickedly; a comparison of them in their lives also +might come into consideration, from such a single view of the words +themselves. But my present design is to consider them with a +particular reference or respect to him who spoke them; which +reference, if you please to attend, you will see. And if what shall +be offered to your consideration at this time be thought a discourse +upon the whole history of this man, rather than upon the particular +words I have read, this is of no consequence: it is sufficient if +it afford reflection of use and service to ourselves. + +But, in order to avoid cavils respecting this remarkable relation in +Scripture, either that part of it which you have heard in the first +lesson for the day, or any other; let me just observe that as this +is not a place for answering them, so they no way affect the +following discourse; since the character there given is plainly a +real one in life, and such as there are parallels to. + +The occasion of Balaam's coming out of his own country into the land +of Moab, where he pronounced this solemn prayer or wish, he himself +relates in the first parable or prophetic speech, of which it is the +conclusion. In which is a custom referred to, proper to be taken +notice of: that of devoting enemies to destruction before the +entrance upon a war with them. This custom appears to have +prevailed over a great part of the world; for we find it amongst the +most distant nations. The Romans had public officers, to whom it +belonged as a stated part of their office. But there was somewhat +more particular in the case now before us: Balaam being looked upon +as an extraordinary person, whose blessing or curse was thought to +be always effectual. + +In order to engage the reader's attention to this passage, the +sacred historian has enumerated the preparatory circumstances, which +are these. Balaam requires the king of Moab to build him seven +altars, and to prepare him the same number of oxen and of rams. The +sacrifice being over, he retires alone to a solitude sacred to these +occasions, there to wait the Divine inspiration or answer, for which +the foregoing rites were the preparation. AND GOD MET BALAAM, AND +PUT A WORD IN HIS MOUTH; {16} upon receiving which, he returns back +to the altars, where was the king, who had all this while attended +the sacrifice, as appointed; he and all the princes of Moab +standing, big with expectation of the Prophet's reply. And he took +up his parable, and said, Balak the king of Moab hath brought me +from Aram, out of the mountains of the east, saying, Come, curse me +Jacob, and come, defy Israel. How shall I curse, whom God hath not +cursed? Or how shall I defy, whom the Lord hath not defied? For +from the top of the rocks I see him, and from the hills I behold +him: lo, the people shall dwell alone, and shall not be reckoned +among the nations. Who can count the dust of Jacob, and the number +of the fourth part of Israel? Let me die the death of the +righteous, and let my last end be like his. {17} + +It is necessary, as you will see in the progress of this discourse, +particularly to observe what he understood by RIGHTEOUS. And he +himself is introduced in the book of Micah {18} explaining it; if by +RIGHTEOUS is meant good, as to be sure it is. O my people, remember +now what Balak king of Moab consulted, and what Balaam the son of +Beor answered him from Shittim unto Gilgal. From the mention of +Shittim it is manifest that it is this very story which is here +referred to, though another part of it, the account of which is not +now extant; as there are many quotations in Scripture out of books +which are not come down to us. Remember what Balaam answered, that +ye may know the righteousness of the Lord; i.e., the righteousness +which God will accept. Balak demands, Wherewith shall I come before +the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before +him with burnt-offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord +be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers +of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit +of my body for the sin of my soul? Balaam answers him, he hath +showed thee, O man, what is good: and what doth the Lord require of +thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with +thy God? Here is a good man expressly characterised, as distinct +from a dishonest and a superstitious man. No words can more +strongly exclude dishonesty and falseness of heart than doing +justice and loving mercy; and both these, as well as walking humbly +with God, are put in opposition to those ceremonial methods of +recommendation, which Balak hoped might have served the turn. From +hence appears what he meant by the righteous, whose death he desires +to die. + +Whether it was his own character shall now be inquired; and in order +to determine it, we must take a view of his whole behaviour upon +this occasion. When the elders of Noah came to him, though he +appears to have been much allured with the rewards offered, yet he +had such regard to the authority of God as to keep the messengers in +suspense until he had consulted His will. And God said to him, Thou +shalt not go with them; thou shalt not curse the people, for they +are blessed. {19} Upon this he dismisses the ambassadors, with an +absolute refusal of accompanying them back to their king. Thus far +his regards to his duty prevailed, neither does there anything +appear as yet amiss in his conduct. His answer being reported to +the king of Moab, a more honourable embassy is immediately +despatched, and greater rewards proposed. Then the iniquity of his +heart began to disclose itself. A thorough honest man would without +hesitation have repeated his former answer, that he could not be +guilty of so infamous a prostitution of the sacred character with +which he was invested, as in the name of a prophet to curse those +whom he knew to be blessed. But instead of this, which was the only +honest part in these circumstances that lay before him, he desires +the princes of Moab to tarry that night with him also; and for the +sake of the reward deliberates, whether by some means or other he +might not be able to obtain leave to curse Israel; to do that, which +had been before revealed to him to be contrary to the will of God, +which yet he resolves not to do without that permission. Upon +which, as when this nation afterwards rejected God from reigning +over them, He gave them a king in His anger; in the same way, as +appears from other parts of the narration, He gives Balaam the +permission he desired: for this is the most natural sense of the +words. Arriving in the territories of Moab, and being received with +particular distinction by the king, and he repeating in person the +promise of the rewards he had before made to him by his ambassadors, +he seeks, the text says, by SACRIFICES and ENCHANTMENTS (what these +were is not to our purpose), to obtain leave of God to curse the +people; keeping still his resolution, not to do it without that +permission: which not being able to obtain, he had such regard to +the command of God as to keep this resolution to the last. The +supposition of his being under a supernatural restraint is a mere +fiction of Philo: he is plainly represented to be under no other +force or restraint than the fear of God. However, he goes on +persevering in that endeavour, after he had declared that God had +not beheld iniquity in Jacob, neither had he seen perverseness in +Israel; {20} i.e., they were a people of virtue and piety, so far as +not to have drawn down by their iniquity that curse which he was +soliciting leave to pronounce upon them. So that the state of +Balaam's mind was this: he wanted to do what he knew to be very +wicked, and contrary to the express command of God; he had inward +checks and restraints which he could not entirely get over; he +therefore casts about for ways to reconcile this wickedness with his +duty. How great a paradox soever this may appear, as it is indeed a +contradiction in terms, it is the very account which the Scripture +gives us of him. + +But there is a more surprising piece of iniquity yet behind. Not +daring in his religious character, as a prophet, to assist the king +of Moab, he considers whether there might not be found some other +means of assisting him against that very people, whom he himself by +the fear of God was restrained from cursing in words. One would not +think it possible that the weakness, even of religious self-deceit +in its utmost excess, could have so poor a distinction, so fond an +evasion, to serve itself of. But so it was; and he could think of +no other method than to betray the children of Israel to provoke His +wrath, who was their only strength and defence. The temptation +which he pitched upon was that concerning which Solomon afterwards +observed, that it had cast down many wounded; yea, many strong men +had been slain by it: and of which he himself was a sad example, +when his wives turned away his heart after other gods. This +succeeded: the people sin against God; and thus the Prophet's +counsel brought on that destruction which he could by no means be +prevailed upon to assist with the religious ceremony of execration, +which the king of Moab thought would itself have affected it. Their +crime and punishment are related in Deuteronomy {21} and Numbers. +{22} And from the relation repeated in Numbers, {23} it appears, +that Balaam was the contriver of the whole matter. It is also +ascribed to him in the Revelation, {24} where he is said to have +taught Balak to cast a stumbling-block before the children of +Israel. + +This was the man, this Balaam, I say, was the man, who desired to +die the death of the righteous, and that his last end might be like +his; and this was the state of his mind when he pronounced these +words. + +So that the object we have now before us is the most astonishing in +the world: a very wicked man, under a deep sense of God and +religion, persisting still in his wickedness, and preferring the +wages of unrighteousness, even when he had before him a lively view +of death, and that approaching period of his days, which should +deprive him of all those advantages for which he was prostituting +himself; and likewise a prospect, whether certain or uncertain, of a +future state of retribution; all this joined with an explicit ardent +wish that, when he was to leave this world, he might be in the +condition of a righteous man. Good God! what inconsistency, what +perplexity is here! With what different views of things, with what +contradictory principles of action, must such a mind be torn and +distracted! It was not unthinking carelessness, by which he ran on +headlong in vice and folly, without ever making a stand to ask +himself what he was doing: no; he acted upon the cool motives of +interest and advantage. Neither was he totally hard and callous to +impressions of religion, what we call abandoned; for he absolutely +denied to curse Israel. When reason assumes her place, when +convinced of his duty, when he owns and feels, and is actually under +the influence of the divine authority; whilst he is carrying on his +views to the grave, the end of all temporal greatness; under this +sense of things, with the better character and more desirable state +present--full before him--in his thoughts, in his wishes, +voluntarily to choose the worse--what fatality is here! Or how +otherwise can such a character be explained? And yet, strange as it +may appear, it is not altogether an uncommon one: nay, with some +small alterations, and put a little lower, it is applicable to a +very considerable part of the world. For if the reasonable choice +be seen and acknowledged, and yet men make the unreasonable one, is +not this the same contradiction; that very inconsistency, which +appeared so unaccountable? + +To give some little opening to such characters and behaviour, it is +to be observed in general that there is no account to be given in +the way of reason, of men's so strong attachments to the present +world: our hopes and fears and pursuits are in degrees beyond all +proportion to the known value of the things they respect. This may +be said without taking into consideration religion and a future +state; and when these are considered, the disproportion is +infinitely heightened. Now when men go against their reason, and +contradict a more important interest at a distance, for one nearer, +though of less consideration; if this be the whole of the case, all +that can be said is, that strong passions, some kind of brute force +within, prevails over the principle of rationality. However, if +this be with a clear, full, and distinct view of the truth of +things, then it is doing the utmost violence to themselves, acting +in the most palpable contradiction to their very nature. But if +there be any such thing in mankind as putting half-deceits upon +themselves; which there plainly is, either by avoiding reflection, +or (if they do reflect) by religious equivocation, subterfuges, and +palliating matters to themselves; by these means conscience may be +laid asleep, and they may go on in a course of wickedness with less +disturbance. All the various turns, doubles, and intricacies in a +dishonest heart cannot be unfolded or laid open; but that there is +somewhat of that kind is manifest, be it to be called self-deceit, +or by any other name. Balaam had before his eyes the authority of +God, absolutely forbidding him what he, for the sake of a reward, +had the strongest inclination to: he was likewise in a state of +mind sober enough to consider death and his last end: by these +considerations he was restrained, first from going to the king of +Moab, and after he did go, from cursing Israel. But notwithstanding +this, there was great wickedness in his heart. He could not forego +the rewards of unrighteousness: he therefore first seeks for +indulgences, and when these could not be obtained, he sins against +the whole meaning, end, and design of the prohibition, which no +consideration in the world could prevail with him to go against the +letter of. And surely that impious counsel he gave to Balak against +the children of Israel was, considered in itself, a greater piece of +wickedness than if he had cursed them in words. + +If it be inquired what his situation, his hopes, and fears were, in +respect to this his wish; the answer must be, that consciousness of +the wickedness of his heart must necessarily have destroyed all +settled hopes of dying the death of the righteous: he could have no +calm satisfaction in this view of his last end: yet, on the other +hand, it is possible that those partial regards to his duty, now +mentioned, might keep him from perfect despair. + +Upon the whole it is manifest that Balaam had the most just and true +notions of God and religion; as appears, partly from the original +story itself, and more plainly from the passage in Micah; where he +explains religion to consist in real virtue and real piety, +expressly distinguished from superstition, and in terms which most +strongly exclude dishonesty and falseness of heart. Yet you see his +behaviour: he seeks indulgences for plain wickedness, which not +being able to obtain he glosses over that same wickedness, dresses +it up in a new form, in order to make it pass off more easily with +himself. That is, he deliberately contrives to deceive and impose +upon himself in a matter which he knew to be of the utmost +importance. + +To bring these observations home to ourselves: it is too evident +that many persons allow themselves in very unjustifiable courses who +yet make great pretences to religion; not to deceive the world, none +can be so weak as to think this will pass in our age; but from +principles, hopes, and fears, respecting God and a future state; and +go on thus with a sort of tranquillity and quiet of mind. This +cannot be upon a thorough consideration, and full resolution, that +the pleasures and advantages they propose are to be pursued at all +hazards, against reason, against the law of God, and though +everlasting destruction is to be the consequence. This would be +doing too great violence upon themselves. No, they are for making a +composition with the Almighty. These of His commands they will +obey; but as to others--why, they will make all the atonements in +their power; the ambitious, the covetous, the dissolute man, each in +a way which shall not contradict his respective pursuit. +Indulgences before, which was Balaam's first attempt, though he was +not so successful in it as to deceive himself, or atonements +afterwards, are all the same. And here, perhaps, come in faint +hopes that they may, and half-resolves that they will, one time or +other, make a change. + +Besides these there are also persons, who, from a more just way of +considering things, see the infinite absurdity of this, of +substituting sacrifice instead of obedience; there are persons far +enough from superstition, and not without some real sense of God and +religion upon their minds; who yet are guilty of most unjustifiable +practices, and go on with great coolness and command over +themselves. The same dishonesty and unsoundness of heart discovers +itself in these another way. In all common ordinary cases we see +intuitively at first view what is our duty, what is the honest part. +This is the ground of the observation, that the first thought is +often the best. In these cases doubt and deliberation is itself +dishonesty, as it was in Balaam upon the second message. That which +is called considering what is our duty in a particular case is very +often nothing but endeavouring to explain it away. Thus those +courses, which, if men would fairly attend to the dictates of their +own consciences, they would see to be corruption, excess, +oppression, uncharitableness; these are refined upon--things were so +and so circumstantiated--great difficulties are raised about fixing +bounds and degrees, and thus every moral obligation whatever may be +evaded. Here is scope, I say, for an unfair mind to explain away +every moral obligation to itself. Whether men reflect again upon +this internal management and artifice, and how explicit they are +with themselves, is another question. There are many operations of +the mind, many things pass within, which we never reflect upon +again; which a bystander, from having frequent opportunities of +observing us and our conduct, may make shrewd guesses at. + +That great numbers are in this way of deceiving themselves is +certain. There is scarce a man in the world, who has entirely got +over all regards, hopes, and fears, concerning God and a future +state; and these apprehensions in the generality, bad as we are, +prevail in considerable degrees: yet men will and can be wicked, +with calmness and thought; we see they are. There must therefore be +some method of making it sit a little easy upon their minds; which, +in the superstitious, is those indulgences and atonements before +mentioned, and this self-deceit of another kind in persons of +another character. And both these proceed from a certain unfairness +of mind, a peculiar inward dishonesty; the direct contrary to that +simplicity which our Saviour recommends, under the notion of +becoming little children, as a necessary qualification for our +entering into the kingdom of heaven. + +But to conclude: How much soever men differ in the course of life +they prefer, and in their ways of palliating and excusing their +vices to themselves; yet all agree in one thing, desiring to die the +death of the righteous. This is surely remarkable. The observation +may be extended further, and put thus: even without determining +what that is which we call guilt or innocence, there is no man but +would choose, after having had the pleasure or advantage of a +vicious action, to be free of the guilt of it, to be in the state of +an innocent man. This shows at least the disturbance and implicit +dissatisfaction in vice. If we inquire into the grounds of it, we +shall find it proceeds partly from an immediate sense of having done +evil, and partly from an apprehension that this inward sense shall +one time or another be seconded by a higher judgment, upon which our +whole being depends. Now to suspend and drown this sense, and these +apprehensions, be it by the hurry of business or of pleasure, or by +superstition, or moral equivocations, this is in a manner one and +the same, and makes no alteration at all in the nature of our case. +Things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of them +will be what they will be: why, then, should we desire to be +deceived? As we are reasonable creatures, and have any regard to +ourselves, we ought to lay these things plainly and honestly before +our mind, and upon this, act as you please, as you think most fit: +make that choice, and prefer that course of life, which you can +justify to yourselves, and which sits most easy upon your own mind. +It will immediately appear that vice cannot be the happiness, but +must upon the whole be the misery, of such a creature as man; a +moral, an accountable agent. Superstitious observances, self-deceit +though of a more refined sort, will not in reality at all mend +matters with us. And the result of the whole can be nothing else, +but that with simplicity and fairness we keep innocency, and take +heed unto the thing that is right; for this alone shall bring a man +peace at the last. + + + +SERMON XI {24a--see footnote} +UPON THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR. +PREACHED ON ADVENT SUNDAY. +ROMANS xiii. 9. + + + +And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in +this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. + +It is commonly observed that there is a disposition in men to +complain of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they +live as greater than that of former ones; which is usually followed +with this further observation, that mankind has been in that respect +much the same in all times. Now, not to determine whether this last +be not contradicted by the accounts of history; thus much can scarce +be doubted, that vice and folly takes different turns, and some +particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in some ages than in +others; and, I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much the +distinction of the present to profess a contracted spirit, and +greater regards to self-interest, than appears to have been done +formerly. Upon this account it seems worth while to inquire whether +private interest is likely to be promoted in proportion to the +degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over all other +principles; or whether the contracted affection may not possibly be +so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even contradict its own +and private good. + +And since, further, there is generally thought to be some peculiar +kind of contrariety between self-love and the love of our neighbour, +between the pursuit of public and of private good; insomuch that +when you are recommending one of these, you are supposed to be +speaking against the other; and from hence arises a secret prejudice +against, and frequently open scorn of, all talk of public spirit and +real good-will to our fellow-creatures; it will be necessary to +inquire what respect benevolence hath to self-love, and the pursuit +of private interest to the pursuit of public: or whether there be +anything of that peculiar inconsistence and contrariety between them +over and above what there is between self-love and other passions +and particular affections, and their respective pursuits. + +These inquiries, it is hoped, may be favourably attended to; for +there shall be all possible concessions made to the favourite +passion, which hath so much allowed to it, and whose cause is so +universally pleaded: it shall be treated with the utmost tenderness +and concern for its interests. + +In order to do this, as well as to determine the forementioned +questions, it will be necessary to consider the nature, the object, +and end of that self-love, as distinguished from other principles or +affections in the mind, and their respective objects. + +Every man hath a general desire of his own happiness; and likewise a +variety of particular affections, passions, and appetites to +particular external objects. The former proceeds from, or is, self- +love; and seems inseparable from all sensible creatures, who can +reflect upon themselves and their own interest or happiness so as to +have that interest an object to their minds; what is to be said of +the latter is, that they proceed from or together make up that +particular nature, according to which man is made. The object the +former pursues is somewhat internal--our own happiness, enjoyment, +satisfaction; whether we have, or have not, a distinct particular +perception what it is, or wherein it consists: the objects of the +latter are this or that particular external thing, which the +affections tend towards, and of which it hath always a particular +idea or perception. The principle we call self-love never seeks +anything external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of +happiness or good: particular affections rest in the external +things themselves. One belongs to man as a reasonable creature +reflecting upon his own interest or happiness. The other, though +quite distinct from reason, are as much a part of human nature. + +That all particular appetites and passions are towards EXTERNAL +THINGS THEMSELVES, distinct from the PLEASURE ARISING FROM THEM, is +manifested from hence; that there could not be this pleasure, were +it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the +passion: there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more +than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if +there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than +another. + +Every particular affection, even the love of our neighbour, is as +really our own affection as self-love; and the pleasure arising from +its gratification is as much my own pleasure as the pleasure self- +love would have from knowing I myself should be happy some time +hence would be my own pleasure. And if, because every particular +affection is a man's own, and the pleasure arising from its +gratification his own pleasure, or pleasure to himself, such +particular affection must be called self-love; according to this way +of speaking, no creature whatever can possibly act but merely from +self-love; and every action and every affection whatever is to be +resolved up into this one principle. But then this is not the +language of mankind; or if it were, we should want words to express +the difference between the principle of an action, proceeding from +cool consideration that it will be to my own advantage; and an +action, suppose of revenge or of friendship, by which a man runs +upon certain ruin, to do evil or good to another. It is manifest +the principles of these actions are totally different, and so want +different words to be distinguished by; all that they agree in is +that they both proceed from, and are done to gratify, an inclination +in a man's self. But the principle or inclination in one case is +self-love; in the other, hatred or love of another. There is then a +distinction between the cool principle of self-love, or general +desire of our own happiness, as one part of our nature, and one +principle of action; and the particular affections towards +particular external objects, as another part of our nature, and +another principle of action. How much soever therefore is to be +allowed to self-love, yet it cannot be allowed to be the whole of +our inward constitution; because, you see, there are other parts or +principles which come into it. + +Further, private happiness or good is all which self-love can make +us desire, or be concerned about: in having this consists its +gratification: it is an affection to ourselves; a regard to our own +interest, happiness, and private good: and in the proportion a man +hath this, he is interested, or a lover of himself. Let this be +kept in mind; because there is commonly, as I shall presently have +occasion to observe, another sense put upon these words. On the +other hand, particular affections tend towards particular external +things: these are their objects: having these is their end: in +this consists their gratification: no matter whether it be, or be +not, upon the whole, our interest or happiness. An action done from +the former of these principles is called an interested action. An +action proceeding from any of the latter has its denomination of +passionate, ambitious, friendly, revengeful, or any other, from the +particular appetite or affection from which it proceeds. Thus self- +love as one part of human nature, and the several particular +principles as the other part, are, themselves, their objects and +ends, stated and shown. + +From hence it will be easy to see how far, and in what ways, each of +these can contribute and be subservient to the private good of the +individual. Happiness does not consist in self-love. The desire of +happiness is no more the thing itself than the desire of riches is +the possession or enjoyment of them. People might love themselves +with the most entire and unbounded affection, and yet be extremely +miserable. Neither can self-love any way help them out, but by +setting them on work to get rid of the causes of their misery, to +gain or make use of those objects which are by nature adapted to +afford satisfaction. Happiness or satisfaction consists only in the +enjoyment of those objects which are by nature suited to our several +particular appetites, passions, and affections. So that if self- +love wholly engrosses us, and leaves no room for any other +principle, there can be absolutely no such thing at all as happiness +or enjoyment of any kind whatever; since happiness consists in the +gratification of particular passions, which supposes the having of +them. Self-love then does not constitute THIS or THAT to be our +interest or good; but, our interest or good being constituted by +nature and supposed, self-love only puts us upon obtaining and +securing it. Therefore, if it be possible that self-love may +prevail and exert itself in a degree or manner which is not +subservient to this end; then it will not follow that our interest +will be promoted in proportion to the degree in which that principle +engrosses us, and prevails over others. Nay, further, the private +and contracted affection, when it is not subservient to this end, +private good may, for anything that appears, have a direct contrary +tendency and effect. And if we will consider the matter, we shall +see that it often really has. DISENGAGEMENT is absolutely necessary +to enjoyment; and a person may have so steady and fixed an eye upon +his own interest, whatever he places it in, as may hinder him from +ATTENDING to many gratifications within his reach, which others have +their minds FREE and OPEN to. Over-fondness for a child is not +generally thought to be for its advantage; and, if there be any +guess to be made from appearances, surely that character we call +selfish is not the most promising for happiness. Such a temper may +plainly be, and exert itself in a degree and manner which may give +unnecessary and useless solicitude and anxiety, in a degree and +manner which may prevent obtaining the means and materials of +enjoyment, as well as the making use of them. Immoderate self-love +does very ill consult its own interest: and, how much soever a +paradox it may appear, it is certainly true that even from self-love +we should endeavour to get over all inordinate regard to and +consideration of ourselves. Every one of our passions and +affections hath its natural stint and bound, which may easily be +exceeded; whereas our enjoyments can possibly be but in a +determinate measure and degree. Therefore such excess of the +affection, since it cannot procure any enjoyment, must in all cases +be useless; but is generally attended with inconveniences, and often +is downright pain and misery. This holds as much with regard to +self-love as to all other affections. The natural degree of it, so +far as it sets us on work to gain and make use of the materials of +satisfaction, may be to our real advantage; but beyond or besides +this, it is in several respects an inconvenience and disadvantage. +Thus it appears that private interest is so far from being likely to +be promoted in proportion to the degree in which self-love engrosses +us, and prevails over all other principles, that the contracted +affection may be so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even +contradict its own and private good. + +"But who, except the most sordidly covetous, ever thought there was +any rivalship between the love of greatness, honour, power, or +between sensual appetites and self-love? No, there is a perfect +harmony between them. It is by means of these particular appetites +and affections that self-love is gratified in enjoyment, happiness, +and satisfaction. The competition and rivalship is between self- +love and the love of our neighbour: that affection which leads us +out of ourselves, makes us regardless of our own interest, and +substitute that of another in its stead." Whether, then, there be +any peculiar competition and contrariety in this case shall now be +considered. + +Self-love and interestedness was stated to consist in or be an +affection to ourselves, a regard to our own private good: it is +therefore distinct from benevolence, which is an affection to the +good of our fellow-creatures. But that benevolence is distinct +from, that is, not the same thing with self-love, is no reason for +its being looked upon with any peculiar suspicion; because every +principle whatever, by means of which self-love is gratified, is +distinct from it; and all things which are distinct from each other +are equally so. A man has an affection or aversion to another: +that one of these tends to, and is gratified by, doing good, that +the other tends to, and is gratified by, doing harm, does not in the +least alter the respect which either one or the other of these +inward feelings has to self-love. We use the word PROPERTY so as to +exclude any other persons having an interest in that of which we say +a particular man has the property. And we often use the word +SELFISH so as to exclude in the same manner all regards to the good +of others. But the cases are not parallel: for though that +exclusion is really part of the idea of property; yet such positive +exclusion, or bringing this peculiar disregard to the good of others +into the idea of self-love, is in reality adding to the idea, or +changing it from what it was before stated to consist in, namely, in +an affection to ourselves. {25} This being the whole idea of self- +love, it can no otherwise exclude good-will or love of others, than +merely by not including it, no otherwise, than it excludes love of +arts or reputation, or of anything else. Neither on the other hand +does benevolence, any more than love of arts or of reputation +exclude self-love. Love of our neighbour, then, has just the same +respect to, is no more distant from, self-love, than hatred of our +neighbour, or than love or hatred of anything else. Thus the +principles, from which men rush upon certain ruin for the +destruction of an enemy, and for the preservation of a friend, have +the same respect to the private affection, and are equally +interested, or equally disinterested; and it is of no avail whether +they are said to be one or the other. Therefore to those who are +shocked to hear virtue spoken of as disinterested, it may be allowed +that it is indeed absurd to speak thus of it; unless hatred, several +particular instances of vice, and all the common affections and +aversions in mankind, are acknowledged to be disinterested too. Is +there any less inconsistence between the love of inanimate things, +or of creatures merely sensitive, and self-love, than between self- +love and the love of our neighbour? Is desire of and delight in the +happiness of another any more a diminution of self-love than desire +of and delight in the esteem of another? They are both equally +desire of and delight in somewhat external to ourselves; either both +or neither are so. The object of self-love is expressed in the term +self; and every appetite of sense, and every particular affection of +the heart, are equally interested or disinterested, because the +objects of them all are equally self or somewhat else. Whatever +ridicule therefore the mention of a disinterested principle or +action may be supposed to lie open to, must, upon the matter being +thus stated, relate to ambition, and every appetite and particular +affection as much as to benevolence. And indeed all the ridicule, +and all the grave perplexity, of which this subject hath had its +full share, is merely from words. The most intelligible way of +speaking of it seems to be this: that self-love and the actions +done in consequence of it (for these will presently appear to be the +same as to this question) are interested; that particular affections +towards external objects, and the actions done in consequence of +those affections are not so. But every one is at liberty to use +words as he pleases. All that is here insisted upon is that +ambition, revenge, benevolence, all particular passions whatever, +and the actions they produce, are equally interested or +disinterested. + +Thus it appears that there is no peculiar contrariety between self- +love and benevolence; no greater competition between these than +between any other particular affections and self-love. This relates +to the affections themselves. Let us now see whether there be any +peculiar contrariety between the respective courses of life which +these affections lead to; whether there be any greater competition +between the pursuit of private and of public good, than between any +other particular pursuits and that of private good. + +There seems no other reason to suspect that there is any such +peculiar contrariety, but only that the course of action which +benevolence leads to has a more direct tendency to promote the good +of others, than that course of action which love of reputation +suppose, or any other particular affection leads to. But that any +affection tends to the happiness of another does not hinder its +tending to one's own happiness too. That others enjoy the benefit +of the air and the light of the sun does not hinder but that these +are as much one's own private advantage now as they would be if we +had the property of them exclusive of all others. So a pursuit +which tends to promote the good of another, yet may have as great +tendency to promote private interest, as a pursuit which does not +tend to the good of another at all, or which is mischievous to him. +All particular affections whatever, resentment, benevolence, love of +arts, equally lead to a course of action for their own +gratification; i.e., the gratification of ourselves; and the +gratification of each gives delight: so far, then, it is manifest +they have all the same respect to private interest. Now take into +consideration, further, concerning these three pursuits, that the +end of the first is the harm, of the second, the good of another, of +the last, somewhat indifferent; and is there any necessity that +these additional considerations should alter the respect, which we +before saw these three pursuits had to private interest, or render +any one of them less conducive to it, than any other? Thus one +man's affection is to honour as his end; in order to obtain which he +thinks no pains too great. Suppose another, with such a singularity +of mind, as to have the same affection to public good as his end, +which he endeavours with the same labour to obtain. In case of +success, surely the man of benevolence hath as great enjoyment as +the man of ambition; they both equally having the end their +affections, in the same degree, tended to; but in case of +disappointment, the benevolent man has clearly the advantage; since +endeavouring to do good, considered as a virtuous pursuit, is +gratified by its own consciousness, i.e., is in a degree its own +reward. + +And as to these two, or benevolence and any other particular +passions whatever, considered in a further view, as forming a +general temper, which more or less disposes us for enjoyment of all +the common blessings of life, distinct from their own gratification, +is benevolence less the temper of tranquillity and freedom than +ambition or covetousness? Does the benevolent man appear less easy +with himself from his love to his neighbour? Does he less relish +his being? Is there any peculiar gloom seated on his face? Is his +mind less open to entertainment, to any particular gratification? +Nothing is more manifest than that being in good humour, which is +benevolence whilst it lasts, is itself the temper of satisfaction +and enjoyment. + +Suppose then, a man sitting down to consider how he might become +most easy to himself, and attain the greatest pleasure he could, all +that which is his real natural happiness. This can only consist in +the enjoyment of those objects which are by nature adapted to our +several faculties. These particular enjoyments make up the sum +total of our happiness, and they are supposed to arise from riches, +honours, and the gratification of sensual appetites. Be it so; yet +none profess themselves so completely happy in these enjoyments, but +that there is room left in the mind for others, if they were +presented to them: nay, these, as much as they engage us, are not +thought so high, but that human nature is capable even of greater. +Now there have been persons in all ages who have professed that they +found satisfaction in the exercise of charity, in the love of their +neighbour, in endeavouring to promote the happiness of all they had +to do with, and in the pursuit of what is just and right and good as +the general bent of their mind and end of their life; and that doing +an action of baseness or cruelty would be as great violence to THEIR +self, as much breaking in upon their nature, as any external force. +Persons of this character would add, if they might be heard, that +they consider themselves as acting in the view of an Infinite Being, +who is in a much higher sense the object of reverence and of love, +than all the world besides; and therefore they could have no more +enjoyment from a wicked action done under His eye than the persons +to whom they are making their apology could if all mankind were the +spectators of it; and that the satisfaction of approving themselves +to his unerring judgment, to whom they thus refer all their actions, +is a more continued settled satisfaction than any this world can +afford; as also that they have, no less than others, a mind free and +open to all the common innocent gratifications of it, such as they +are. And if we go no further, does there appear any absurdity in +this? Will any one take upon him to say that a man cannot find his +account in this general course of life as much as in the most +unbounded ambition, and the excesses of pleasure? Or that such a +person has not consulted so well for himself, for the satisfaction +and peace of his own mind, as the ambitious or dissolute man? And +though the consideration that God himself will in the end justify +their taste, and support their cause, is not formally to be insisted +upon here, yet thus much comes in, that all enjoyments whatever are +much more clear and unmixed from the assurance that they will end +well. Is it certain, then, that there is nothing in these +pretensions to happiness? especially when there are not wanting +persons who have supported themselves with satisfactions of this +kind in sickness, poverty, disgrace, and in the very pangs of death; +whereas it is manifest all other enjoyments fail in these +circumstances. This surely looks suspicions of having somewhat in +it. Self-love, methinks, should be alarmed. May she not possibly +pass over greater pleasures than those she is so wholly taken up +with? + +The short of the matter is no more than this. Happiness consists in +the gratification of certain affections, appetites, passions, with +objects which are by nature adapted to them. Self-love may indeed +set us on work to gratify these, but happiness or enjoyment has no +immediate connection with self-love, but arises from such +gratification alone. Love of our neighbour is one of those +affections. This, considered as a VIRTUOUS PRINCIPLE, is gratified +by a consciousness of ENDEAVOURING to promote the good of others, +but considered as a natural affection, its gratification consists in +the actual accomplishment of this endeavour. Now indulgence or +gratification of this affection, whether in that consciousness or +this accomplishment, has the same respect to interest as indulgence +of any other affection; they equally proceed from or do not proceed +from self-love, they equally include or equally exclude this +principle. Thus it appears, that benevolence and the pursuit of +public good hath at least as great respect to self-love and the +pursuit of private good as any other particular passions, and their +respective pursuits. + +Neither is covetousness, whether as a temper or pursuit, any +exception to this. For if by covetousness is meant the desire and +pursuit of riches for their own sake, without any regard to, or +consideration of, the uses of them, this hath as little to do with +self-love as benevolence hath. But by this word is usually meant, +not such madness and total distraction of mind, but immoderate +affection to and pursuit of riches as possessions in order to some +further end, namely, satisfaction, interest, or good. This, +therefore, is not a particular affection or particular pursuit, but +it is the general principle of self-love, and the general pursuit of +our own interest, for which reason the word SELFISH is by every one +appropriated to this temper and pursuit. Now as it is ridiculous to +assert that self-love and the love of our neighbour are the same, so +neither is it asserted that following these different affections +hath the same tendency and respect to our own interest. The +comparison is not between self-love and the love of our neighbour, +between pursuit of our own interest and the interest of others, but +between the several particular affections in human nature towards +external objects, as one part of the comparison, and the one +particular affection to the good of our neighbour as the other part +of it: and it has been shown that all these have the same respect +to self-love and private interest. + +There is indeed frequently an inconsistence or interfering between +self-love or private interest and the several particular appetites, +passions, affections, or the pursuits they lead to. But this +competition or interfering is merely accidental, and happens much +oftener between pride, revenge, sensual gratifications, and private +interest, than between private interest and benevolence. For +nothing is more common than to see men give themselves up to a +passion or an affection to their known prejudice and ruin, and in +direct contradiction to manifest and real interest, and the loudest +calls of self-love: whereas the seeming competitions and +interfering, between benevolence and private interest, relate much +more to the materials or means of enjoyment than to enjoyment +itself. There is often an interfering in the former when there is +none in the latter. Thus as to riches: so much money as a man +gives away, so much less will remain in his possession. Here is a +real interfering. But though a man cannot possibly give without +lessening his fortune, yet there are multitudes might give without +lessening their own enjoyment, because they may have more than they +can turn to any real use or advantage to themselves. Thus the more +thought and time any one employs about the interests and good of +others, he must necessarily have less to attend his own: but he may +have so ready and large a supply of his own wants, that such thought +might be really useless to himself, though of great service and +assistance to others. + +The general mistake, that there is some greater inconsistence +between endeavouring to promote the good of another and self- +interest, than between self-interest and pursuing anything else, +seems, as hath already been hinted, to arise from our notions of +property, and to be carried on by this property's being supposed to +be itself our happiness or good. People are so very much taken up +with this one subject, that they seem from it to have formed a +general way of thinking, which they apply to other things that they +have nothing to do with. Hence in a confused and slight way it +might well be taken for granted that another's having no interest in +an affection (i.e., his good not being the object of it) renders, as +one may speak, the proprietor's interest in it greater; and that if +another had an interest in it this would render his less, or +occasion that such affection could not be so friendly to self-love, +or conducive to private good, as an affection or pursuit which has +not a regard to the good of another. This, I say, might be taken +for granted, whilst it was not attended to, that the object of every +particular affection is equally somewhat external to ourselves, and +whether it be the good of another person, or whether it be any other +external thing, makes no alteration with regard to its being one's +own affection, and the gratification of it one's own private +enjoyment. And so far as it is taken for granted that barely having +the means and materials of enjoyment is what constitutes interest +and happiness; that our interest or good consists in possessions +themselves, in having the property of riches, houses, lands, +gardens, not in the enjoyment of them; so far it will even more +strongly be taken for granted, in the way already explained, that an +affection's conducing to the good of another must even necessarily +occasion it to conduce less to private good, if not to be positively +detrimental to it. For, if property and happiness are one and the +same thing, as by increasing the property of another you lessen your +own property, so by promoting the happiness of another you must +lessen your own happiness. But whatever occasioned the mistake, I +hope it has been fully proved to be one, as it has been proved, that +there is no peculiar rivalship or competition between self-love and +benevolence: that as there may be a competition between these two, +so there many also between any particular affection whatever and +self-love; that every particular affection, benevolence among the +rest, is subservient to self-love by being the instrument of private +enjoyment; and that in one respect benevolence contributes more to +private interest, i.e., enjoyment or satisfaction, than any other of +the particular common affections, as it is in a degree its own +gratification. + +And to all these things may be added that religion, from whence +arises our strongest obligation to benevolence, is so far from +disowning the principle of self-love, that it often addresses itself +to that very principle, and always to the mind in that state when +reason presides, and there can no access be had to the +understanding, but by convincing men that the course of life we +would persuade them to is not contrary to their interest. It may be +allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion, +that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas the +nearest and most important to us; that they will, nay, if you +please, that they ought to prevail over those of order, and beauty, +and harmony, and proportion, if there should ever be, as it is +impossible there ever should be, any inconsistence between them, +though these last, too, as expressing the fitness of actions, are +real as truth itself. Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral +rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is +right and good, as such, yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, +we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till +we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not +contrary to it. + +Common reason and humanity will have some influence upon mankind, +whatever becomes of speculations; but, so far as the interests of +virtue depend upon the theory of it being secured from open scorn, +so far its very being in the world depends upon its appearing to +have no contrariety to private interest and self-love. The +foregoing observations, therefore, it is hoped, may have gained a +little ground in favour of the precept before us, the particular +explanation of which shall be the subject of the next discourse. + +I will conclude at present with observing the peculiar obligation +which we are under to virtue and religion, as enforced in the verses +following the text, in the epistle for the day, from our Saviour's +coming into the world. THE NIGHT IS FAR SPENT, THE DAY IS AT HAND; +LET US THEREFORE CAST OFF THE WORKS OF DARKNESS, AND LET US PUT ON +THE ARMOUR OF LIGHT, &c. The meaning and force of which exhortation +is, that Christianity lays us under new obligations to a good life, +as by it the will of God is more clearly revealed, and as it affords +additional motives to the practice of it, over and above those which +arise out of the nature of virtue and vice, I might add, as our +Saviour has set us a perfect example of goodness in our own nature. +Now love and charity is plainly the thing in which He hath placed +His religion; in which, therefore, as we have any pretence to the +name of Christians, we must place ours. He hath at once enjoined it +upon us by way of command with peculiar force, and by His example, +as having undertaken the work of our salvation out of pure love and +goodwill to mankind. The endeavour to set home this example upon +our minds is a very proper employment of this season, which is +bringing on the festival of His birth, which as it may teach us many +excellent lessons of humility, resignation, and obedience to the +will of God, so there is none it recommends with greater authority, +force, and advantage than this love and charity, since it was FOR US +MEN, AND FOR OUR SALVATION, that HE CAME DOWN FROM HEAVEN, AND WAS +INCARNATE, AND WAS MADE MAN, that He might teach us our duty, and +more especially that He might enforce the practice of it, reform +mankind, and finally bring us to that ETERNAL SALVATION, of which HE +IS THE AUTHOR TO ALL THOSE THAT OBEY HIM. + + + +SERMON XII. +UPON THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR. +ROM. xiii. 9. + + + +And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in +this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. + +Having already removed the prejudices against public spirit, or the +love of our neighbour, on the side of private interest and self- +love, I proceed to the particular explanation of the precept before +us, by showing, Who is our neighbour: In what sense we are required +to love him as ourselves; The influence such love would have upon +our behaviour in life; and lastly, How this commandment comprehends +in it all others. + +I. The objects and due extent of this affection will be understood +by attending to the nature of it, and to the nature and +circumstances of mankind in this world. The love of our neighbour +is the same with charity, benevolence, or goodwill: it is an +affection to the good and happiness of our fellow-creatures. This +implies in it a disposition to produce happiness, and this is the +simple notion of goodness, which appears so amiable wherever we meet +with it. From hence it is easy to see that the perfection of +goodness consists in love to the whole universe. This is the +perfection of Almighty God. + +But as man is so much limited in his capacity, as so small a part of +the Creation comes under his notice and influence, and as we are not +used to consider things in so general a way, it is not to be thought +of that the universe should be the object of benevolence to such +creatures as we are. Thus in that precept of our Saviour, Be ye +perfect, even as your Father, which is in heaven, is perfect, {26} +the perfection of the divine goodness is proposed to our imitation +as it is promiscuous, and extends to the evil as well as the good; +not as it is absolutely universal, imitation of it in this respect +being plainly beyond us. The object is too vast. For this reason +moral writers also have substituted a less general object for our +benevolence, mankind. But this likewise is an object too general, +and very much out of our view. Therefore persons more practical +have, instead of mankind, put our country, and made the principle of +virtue, of human virtue, to consist in the entire uniform love of +our country: and this is what we call a public spirit, which in men +of public stations is the character of a patriot. But this is +speaking to the upper part of the world. Kingdoms and governments +are large, and the sphere of action of far the greatest part of +mankind is much narrower than the government they live under: or +however, common men do not consider their actions as affecting the +whole community of which they are members. There plainly is wanting +a less general and nearer object of benevolence for the bulk of men +than that of their country. Therefore the Scripture, not being a +book of theory and speculation, but a plain rule of life for +mankind, has with the utmost possible propriety put the principle of +virtue upon the love of our neighbour, which is that part of the +universe, that part of mankind, that part of our country, which +comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and influence, and +with which we have to do. + +This is plainly the true account or reason why our Saviour places +the principle of virtue in the love of our NEIGHBOUR, and the +account itself shows who are comprehended under that relation. + +II. Let us now consider in what sense we are commanded to love our +neighbour AS OURSELVES. + +This precept, in its first delivery by our Saviour, is thus +introduced:- Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, +with all thy soul, and with all thy strength; and thy neighbour as +thyself. These very different manners of expression do not lead our +thoughts to the same measure or degree of love, common to both +objects, but to one peculiar to each. Supposing, then, which is to +be supposed, a distinct meaning and propriety in the words, AS +THYSELF; the precept we are considering will admit of any of these +senses: that we bear the SAME KIND of affection to our neighbour as +we do to ourselves, or, that the love we bear to our neighbour +should have SOME CERTAIN PROPORTION OR OTHER to self-love: or, +lastly, that it should bear the particular proportion of EQUALITY, +that IT BE IN THE SAME DEGREE. + +First, The precept may be understood as requiring only that we have +the SAME KIND of affection to our fellow-creatures as to ourselves; +that, as every man has the principle of self-love, which disposes +him to avoid misery, and consult his own happiness, so we should +cultivate the affection of goodwill to our neighbour, and that it +should influence us to have the same kind of regard to him. This at +least must be commanded, and this will not only prevent our being +injurious to him, but will also put us upon promoting his good. +There are blessings in life, which we share in common with others, +peace, plenty, freedom, healthful seasons. But real benevolence to +our fellow-creatures would give us the notion of a common interest +in a stricter sense, for in the degree we love another, his +interest, his joys and sorrows, are our own. It is from self-love +that we form the notion of private good, and consider it is our own: +love of our neighbour would teach us thus to appropriate to +ourselves his good and welfare; to consider ourselves as having a +real share in his happiness. Thus the principle of benevolence +would be an advocate within our own breasts, to take care of the +interests of our fellow-creatures in all the interfering and +competitions which cannot but be, from the imperfection of our +nature, and the state we are in. It would likewise, in some +measure, lessen that interfering, and hinder men from forming so +strong a notion of private good, exclusive of the good of others, as +we commonly do. Thus, as the private affection makes us in a +peculiar manner sensible of humanity, justice or injustice, when +exercised towards ourselves, love of our neighbour would give us the +same kind of sensibility in his behalf. This would be the greatest +security of our uniform obedience to that most equitable rule. +WHATSOEVER YE WOULD THAT MEN SHOULD DO UNTO YOU, DO YE EVEN SO UNTO +THEM. + +All this is indeed no more than that we should have a real love to +our neighbour; but then, which is to be observed, the words AS +THYSELF express this in the most distinct manner, and determine the +precept to relate to the affection itself. The advantage which this +principle of benevolence has over other remote considerations is, +that it is itself the temper of virtue, and likewise that it is the +chief, nay, the only effectual security of our performing the +several offices of kindness we owe to our fellow-creatures. When +from distant considerations men resolve upon any thing to which they +have no liking, or perhaps an averseness, they are perpetually +finding out evasions and excuses, which need never be wanting, if +people look for them: and they equivocate with themselves in the +plainest cases in the world. This may be in respect to single +determinate acts of virtue, but it comes in much more, where the +obligation is to a general course of behaviour, and most of all, if +it be such as cannot be reduced to fixed determinate rules. This +observation may account for the diversity of the expression in that +known passage of the prophet Micah, TO DO JUSTLY, AND TO LOVE MERCY. +A man's heart must be formed to humanity and benevolence, he must +LOVE MERCY, otherwise he will not act mercifully in any settled +course of behaviour. As consideration of the future sanctions of +religion is our only security of preserving in our duty, in cases of +great temptation: so to get our heart and temper formed to a love +and liking of what is good is absolutely necessary in order to our +behaving rightly in the familiar and daily intercourses amongst +mankind. + +Secondly, The precept before us may be understood to require that we +love our neighbour in some certain PROPORTION or other, ACCORDING AS +we love ourselves. And indeed a man's character cannot be +determined by the love he bears to his neighbour, considered +absolutely, but the proportion which this bears to self-love, +whether it be attended to or not, is the chief thing which forms the +character and influences the actions. For, as the form of the body +is a composition of various parts, so likewise our inward structure +is not simple or uniform, but a composition of various passions, +appetites, affections, together with rationality, including in this +last both the discernment of what is right, and a disposition to +regulate ourselves by it. There is greater variety of parts in what +we call a character than there are features in a face, and the +morality of that is no more determined by one part than the beauty +or deformity of this is by one single feature: each is to be judged +of by all the parts or features, not taken singly, but together. In +the inward frame the various passions, appetites, affections, stand +in different respects to each other. The principles in our mind may +be contradictory, or checks and allays only, or incentives and +assistants to each other. And principles, which in their nature +have no kind of contrariety or affinity, may yet accidentally be +each other's allays or incentives. + +From hence it comes to pass, that though we were able to look into +the inward contexture of the heart, and see with the greatest +exactness in what degree any one principle is in a particular man, +we could not from thence determine how far that principle would go +towards forming the character, or what influence it would have upon +the actions, unless we could likewise discern what other principles +prevailed in him, and see the proportion which that one bears to the +others. Thus, though two men should have the affection of +compassion in the same degree exactly, yet one may have the +principle of resentment or of ambition so strong in him as to +prevail over that of compassion, and prevent its having any +influence upon his actions, so that he may deserve the character of +a hard or cruel man, whereas the other having compassion in just the +same degree only, yet having resentment or ambition in a lower +degree, his compassion may prevail over them, so as to influence his +actions, and to denominate his temper compassionate. So that, how +strange soever it may appear to people who do not attend to the +thing, yet it is quite manifest that, when we say one man is more +resenting or compassionate than another, this does not necessarily +imply that one has the principle of resentment or of compassion +stronger than the other. For if the proportion which resentment or +compassion bears to other inward principles is greater in one than +in the other, this is itself sufficient to denominate one more +resenting or compassionate than the other. + +Further, the whole system, as I may speak, of affections (including +rationality), which constitute the heart, as this word is used in +Scripture and on moral subjects, are each and all of them stronger +in some than in others. Now the proportion which the two general +affections, benevolence and self-love, bear to each other, according +to this interpretation of the text, demonstrates men's character as +to virtue. Suppose, then, one man to have the principle of +benevolence in a higher degree than another; it will not follow from +hence that his general temper or character or actions will be more +benevolent than the other's. For he may have self-love in such a +degree as quite to prevail over benevolence, so that it may have no +influence at all upon his action, whereas benevolence in the other +person, though in a lower degree, may yet be the strongest principle +in his heart, and strong enough to be the guide of his actions, so +as to denominate him a good and virtuous man. The case is here as +in scales: it is not one weight considered in itself, which +determines whether the scale shall ascend or descend, but this +depends upon the proportion which that one weight hath to the other. + +It being thus manifest that the influence which benevolence has upon +our actions, and how far it goes towards forming our character, is +not determined by the degree itself of this principle in our mind, +but by the proportion it has to self-love and other principles: a +comparison also being made in the text between self-love and the +love of our neighbour; these joint considerations afforded +sufficient occasion for treating here of that proportion. It +plainly is implied in the precept, though it should be questioned, +whether it be the exact meaning of the words, as THYSELF. + +Love of our neighbour, then, must bear some proportion to self-love, +and virtue, to be sure, consists in the due proportion. What this +due proportion is, whether as a principle in the mind, or as exerted +in actions, can be judged of only from our nature and condition in +this world. Of the degree in which affections and the principles of +action, considered in themselves, prevail, we have no measure: let +us, then, proceed to the course of behaviour, the actions they +produce. + +Both our nature and condition require that each particular man +should make particular provision for himself: and the inquiry, what +proportion benevolence should have to self-love, when brought down +to practice, will be, what is a competent care and provision for +ourselves? And how certain soever it be that each man must +determine this for himself, and how ridiculous soever it would be +for any to attempt to determine it for another, yet it is to be +observed that the proportion is real, and that a competent provision +has a bound, and that it cannot be all which we can possibly get and +keep within our grasp, without legal injustice. Mankind almost +universally bring in vanity, supplies for what is called a life of +pleasure, covetousness, or imaginary notions of superiority over +others, to determine this question: but every one who desires to +act a proper part in society would do well to consider how far any +of them come in to determine it, in the way of moral consideration. +All that can be said is, supposing what, as the world goes, is so +much to be supposed that it is scarce to be mentioned, that persons +do not neglect what they really owe to themselves; the more of their +care and thought and of their fortune they employ in doing good to +their fellow-creatures the nearer they come up to the law of +perfection, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. + +Thirdly, if the words AS THYSELF were to be understood of an +equality of affection, it would not be attended with those +consequences which perhaps may be thought to follow from it. +Suppose a person to have the same settled regard to others as to +himself; that in every deliberate scheme or pursuit he took their +interest into the account in the same degree as his own, so far as +an equality of affection would produce this: yet he would, in fact, +and ought to be, much more taken up and employed about himself, and +his own concerns, than about others, and their interests. For, +besides the one common affection toward himself and his neighbour he +would have several other particular affections, passions, appetites, +which he could not possibly feel in common both for himself and +others. Now these sensations themselves very much employ us, and +have perhaps as great influence as self-love. So far indeed as +self-love, and cool reflection upon what is for our interest, would +set us on work to gain a supply of our own several wants, so far the +love of our neighbour would make us do the same for him: but the +degree in which we are put upon seeking and making use of the means +of gratification, by the feeling of those affections, appetites, and +passions, must necessarily be peculiar to ourselves. + +That there are particular passions (suppose shame, resentment) which +men seem to have, and feel in common, both for themselves and +others, makes no alteration in respect to those passions and +appetites which cannot possibly be thus felt in common. From hence +(and perhaps more things of the like kind might be mentioned) it +follows, that though there were an equality of affection to both, +yet regards to ourselves would be more prevalent than attention to +the concerns of others. + +And from moral considerations it ought to be so, supposing still the +equality of affection commanded, because we are in a peculiar +manner, as I may speak, intrusted with ourselves, and therefore care +of our own interests, as well as of our conduct, particularly +belongs to us. + +To these things must be added, that moral obligations can extend no +further than to natural possibilities. Now we have a perception of +our own interests, like consciousness of our own existence, which we +always carry about with us, and which, in its continuation, kind, +and degree, seems impossible to be felt in respect to the interests +of others. + +From all these things it fully appears that though we were to love +our neighbour in the same degree as we love ourselves, so far as +this is possible, yet the care of ourselves, of the individual, +would not be neglected, the apprehended danger of which seems to be +the only objection against understanding the precept in this strict +sense. + +III. The general temper of mind which the due love of our neighbour +would form us to, and the influence it would have upon our behaviour +in life, is now to be considered. + +The temper and behaviour of charity is explained at large in that +known passage of St. Paul: {27} Charity suffereth long, and is +kind; charity envieth not, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh +not her own, thinketh no evil, beareth all things, believeth all +things, hopeth all things. As to the meaning of the expressions, +seeketh not her own, thinketh no evil, believeth all things; however +those expressions may be explained away, this meekness, and in some +degree easiness of temper, readiness to forego our right for the +sake of peace, as well as in the way of compassion, freedom from +mistrust, and disposition to believe well of our neighbour, this +general temper, I say, accompanies, and is plainly the effect of +love and goodwill. And, though such is the world in which we live, +that experience and knowledge of it not only may, but must beget, in +as greater regard to ourselves, and doubtfulness of the characters +of others, than is natural to mankind, yet these ought not to be +carried further than the nature and course of things make necessary. +It is still true, even in the present state of things, bad as it is, +that a real good man had rather be deceived than be suspicious; had +rather forego his known right, than run the venture of doing even a +hard thing. This is the general temper of that charity, of which +the apostle asserts, that if he had it not, giving his BODY TO BE +BURNED WOULD AVAIL HIM NOTHING; and which he says SHALL NEVER FAIL. + +The happy influence of this temper extends to every different +relation and circumstance in human life. It plainly renders a man +better, more to be desired, as to all the respects and relations we +can stand in to each other. The benevolent man is disposed to make +use of all external advantages in such a manner as shall contribute +to the good of others, as well as to his own satisfaction. His own +satisfaction consists in this. He will be easy and kind to his +dependents, compassionate to the poor and distressed, friendly to +all with whom he has to do. This includes the good neighbour, +parent, master, magistrate: and such a behaviour would plainly make +dependence, inferiority, and even servitude easy. So that a good or +charitable man of superior rank in wisdom, fortune, authority, is a +common blessing to the place he lives in: happiness grows under his +influence. This good principle in inferiors would discover itself +in paying respect, gratitude, obedience, as due. It were therefore, +methinks, one just way of trying one's own character to ask +ourselves, am I in reality a better master or servant, a better +friend, a better neighbour, than such and such persons, whom, +perhaps, I may think not to deserve the character of virtue and +religion so much as myself? + +And as to the spirit of party, which unhappily prevails amongst +mankind, whatever are the distinctions which serve for a supply to +it, some or other of which have obtained in all ages and countries, +one who is thus friendly to his kind will immediately make due +allowances for it, as what cannot but be amongst such creatures as +men, in such a world as this. And as wrath and fury and overbearing +upon these occasions proceed, as I may speak, from men's feeling +only on their own side, so a common feeling, for others as well as +for ourselves, would render us sensible to this truth, which it is +strange can have so little influence, that we ourselves differ from +others, just as much as they do from us. I put the matter in this +way, because it can scarce be expected that the generality of men +should see that those things which are made the occasions of +dissension and fomenting the party-spirit are really nothing at all: +but it may be expected from all people, how much soever they are in +earnest about their respective peculiarities, that humanity and +common goodwill to their fellow-creatures should moderate and +restrain that wretched spirit. + +This good temper of charity likewise would prevent strife and enmity +arising from other occasions: it would prevent our giving just +cause of offence, and our taking it without cause. And in cases of +real injury, a good man will make all the allowances which are to be +made, and, without any attempts of retaliation, he will only consult +his own and other men's security for the future against injustice +and wrong. + +IV. I proceed to consider, lastly, what is affirmed of the precept +now explained, that it comprehends in it all others, i.e., that to +love our neighbour as ourselves includes in it all virtues. + +Now the way in which every maxim of conduct, or general speculative +assertion, when it is to be explained at large should be treated, +is, to show what are the particular truths which were designed to be +comprehended under such a general observation, how far it is +strictly true, and then the limitations, restrictions, and +exceptions, if there be exceptions, with which it is to be +understood. But it is only the former of these, namely, how far the +assertion in the text holds, and the ground of the pre-eminence +assigned to the precept of it, which in strictness comes into our +present consideration. + +However, in almost everything that is said, there is somewhat to be +understood beyond what is explicitly laid down, and which we of +course supply, somewhat, I mean, which would not be commonly called +a restriction or limitation. Thus, when benevolence is said to be +the sum of virtue, it is not spoken of as a blind propension, but a +principle in reasonable creatures, and so to be directed by their +reason, for reason and reflection comes into our notion of a moral +agent. And that will lead us to consider distant consequences, as +well as the immediate tendency of an action. It will teach us that +the care of some persons, suppose children and families, is +particularly committed to our charge by Nature and Providence, as +also that there are other circumstances, suppose friendship or +former obligations, which require that we do good to some, +preferably to others. Reason, considered merely as subservient to +benevolence, as assisting to produce the greatest good, will teach +us to have particular regard to these relations and circumstances, +because it is plainly for the good of the world that they should be +regarded. And as there are numberless cases in which, +notwithstanding appearances, we are not competent judges, whether a +particular action will upon the whole do good or harm, reason in the +same way will teach us to be cautious how we act in these cases of +uncertainty. It will suggest to our consideration which is the +safer side; how liable we are to be led wrong by passion and private +interest; and what regard is due to laws, and the judgment of +mankind. All these things must come into consideration, were it +only in order to determine which way of acting is likely to produce +the greatest good. Thus, upon supposition that it were in the +strictest sense true, without limitation, that benevolence includes +in it all virtues, yet reason must come in as its guide and +director, in order to attain its own end, the end of benevolence, +the greatest public good. Reason, then, being thus included, let us +now consider the truth of the assertion itself. + +First, It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind +or any creature but happiness. This, then, is all which any person +can, in strictness of speaking, be said to have a right to. We can +therefore OWE NO MAN ANYTHING, but only to farther and promote his +happiness, according to our abilities. And therefore a disposition +and endeavour to do good to all with whom we have to do, in the +degree and manner which the different relations we stand in to them +require, is a discharge of all the obligations we are under to them. + +As human nature is not one simple uniform thing but a composition of +various parts, body, spirit, appetites, particular passions, and +affections, for each of which reasonable self-love would lead men to +have due regard, and make suitable provision, so society consists of +various parts to which we stand in different respects and relations, +and just benevolence would as surely lead us to have due regard to +each of these and behave as the respective relations require. +Reasonable goodwill and right behaviour towards our fellow-creatures +are in a manner the same, only that the former expresseth the +principle as it is in the mind; the latter, the principle as it were +become external, i.e., exerted in actions. + +And so far as temperance, sobriety, and moderation in sensual +pleasures, and the contrary vices, have any respect to our fellow- +creatures, any influence upon their quiet, welfare, and happiness, +as they always have a real, and often a near influence upon it, so +far it is manifest those virtues may be produced by the love of our +neighbour, and that the contrary vices would be prevented by it. +Indeed, if men's regard to themselves will not restrain them from +excess, it may be thought little probable that their love to others +will be sufficient: but the reason is, that their love to others is +not, any more than their regard to themselves, just, and in its due +degree. There are, however, manifest instances of persons kept +sober and temperate from regard to their affairs, and the welfare of +those who depend upon them. And it is obvious to every one that +habitual excess, a dissolute course of life, implies a general +neglect of the duties we owe towards our friends, our families, and +our country. + +From hence it is manifest that the common virtues and the common +vices of mankind may be traced up to benevolence, or the want of it. +And this entitles the precept, THOU SHALT LOVE THY NEIGHBOUR AS +THYSELF, to the pre-eminence given to it, and is a justification of +the apostle's assertion, that all other commandments are +comprehended in it, whatever cautions and restrictions {28} there +are, which might require to be considered, if we were to state +particularly and at length what is virtue and right behaviour in +mankind. But, + +Secondly, It might be added, that in a higher and more general way +of consideration, leaving out the particular nature of creatures, +and the particular circumstances in which they are placed, +benevolence seems in the strictest sense to include in it all that +is good and worthy, all that is good, which we have any distinct +particular notion of. We have no clear conception of any position +moral attribute in the Supreme Being, but what may be resolved up +into goodness. And, if we consider a reasonable creature or moral +agent, without regard to the particular relations and circumstances +in which he is placed, we cannot conceive anything else to come in +towards determining whether he is to be ranked in a higher or lower +class of virtuous beings, but the higher or lower degree in which +that principle, and what is manifestly connected with it, prevail in +him. + +That which we more strictly call piety, or the love of God, and +which is an essential part of a right temper, some may perhaps +imagine no way connected with benevolence: yet surely they must be +connected, if there be indeed in being an object infinitely good. +Human nature is so constituted that every good affection implies the +love of itself, i.e., becomes the object of a new affection in the +same person. Thus, to be righteous, implies in it the love of +righteousness; to be benevolent, the love of benevolence; to be +good, the love of goodness; whether this righteousness, benevolence, +or goodness be viewed as in our own mind or another's, and the love +of God as a being perfectly good is the love of perfect goodness +contemplated in a being or person. Thus morality and religion, +virtue and piety, will at last necessarily coincide, run up into one +and the same point, and LOVE will be in all senses THE END OF THE +COMMANDMENT. + + +O Almighty God, inspire us with this divine principle; kill in us +all the seeds of envy and ill-will; and help us, by cultivating +within ourselves the love of our neighbour, to improve in the love +of Thee. Thou hast placed us in various kindreds, friendships, and +relations, as the school of discipline for our affections: help us, +by the due exercise of them, to improve to perfection; till all +partial affection be lost in that entire universal one, and thou, O +God, shalt be all in all. + + + +SERMON XIII., XIV. +UPON THE LOVE OF GOD. +MATTHEW xxii. 37. + + + +Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all +thy soul, and with all thy mind. + +Everybody knows, you therefore need only just be put in mind, that +there is such a thing as having so great horror of one extreme as to +run insensibly and of course into the contrary; and that a +doctrine's having been a shelter for enthusiasm, or made to serve +the purposes of superstition, is no proof of the falsity of it: +truth or right being somewhat real in itself, and so not to be +judged of by its liableness to abuse, or by its supposed distance +from or nearness to error. It may be sufficient to have mentioned +this in general, without taking notice of the particular +extravagances which have been vented under the pretence or endeavour +of explaining the love of God; or how manifestly we are got into the +contrary extreme, under the notion of a reasonable religion; so very +reasonable as to have nothing to do with the heart and affections, +if these words signify anything but the faculty by which we discern +speculative truth. + +By the love of God I would understand all those regards, all those +affections of mind which are due immediately to Him from such a +creature as man, and which rest in Him as their end. As this does +not include servile fear, so neither will any other regards, how +reasonable soever, which respect anything out of or besides the +perfection of the Divine nature, come into consideration here. But +all fear is not excluded, because His displeasure is itself the +natural proper object of fear. Reverence, ambition of His love and +approbation, delight in the hope or consciousness of it, come +likewise into this definition of the love of God, because He is the +natural object of all those affections or movements of mind as +really as He is the object of the affection, which is in the +strictest sense called love; and all of them equally rest in Him as +their end. And they may all be understood to be implied in these +words of our Saviour, without putting any force upon them: for He +is speaking of the love of God and our neighbour as containing the +whole of piety and virtue. + +It is plain that the nature of man is so constituted as to feel +certain affections upon the sight or contemplation of certain +objects. Now the very notion of affection implies resting in its +object as an end. And the particular affection to good characters, +reverence and moral love of them, is natural to all those who have +any degree of real goodness in themselves. This will be illustrated +by the description of a perfect character in a creature; and by +considering the manner in which a good man in his presence would be +affected towards such a character. He would of course feel the +affections of love, reverence, desire of his approbation, delight in +the hope or consciousness of it. And surely all this is applicable, +and may be brought up to that Being, who is infinitely more than an +adequate object of all those affections; whom we are commanded to +LOVE WITH ALL OUR HEART, WITH ALL OUR SOUL, AND WITH ALL OUR MIND. +And of these regards towards Almighty God some are more particularly +suitable to and becoming so imperfect a creature as man, in this +mortal state we are passing through; and some of them, and perhaps +other exercises of the mind, will be the employment and happiness of +good men in a state of perfection. + +This is a general view of what the following discourse will contain. +And it is manifest the subject is a real one: there is nothing in +it enthusiastical or unreasonable. And if it be indeed at all a +subject, it is one of the utmost importance. + +As mankind have a faculty by which they discern speculative truth, +so we have various affections towards external objects. +Understanding and temper, reason and affection, are as distinct +ideas as reason and hunger, and one would think could no more be +confounded. It is by reason that we get the ideas of several +objects of our affections; but in these cases reason and affection +are no more the same than sight of a particular object, and the +pleasure or uneasiness consequent thereupon, are the same. Now as +reason tends to and rests in the discernment of truth, the object of +it, so the very nature of affection consists in tending towards, and +resting in, its objects as an end. We do indeed often in common +language say that things are loved, desired, esteemed, not for +themselves, but for somewhat further, somewhat out of and beyond +them; yet, in these cases, whoever will attend will see that these +things are not in reality the objects of the affections, i.e. are +not loved, desired, esteemed, but the somewhat further and beyond +them. If we have no affections which rest in what are called their +objects, then what is called affection, love, desire, hope, in human +nature, is only an uneasiness in being at rest; an unquiet +disposition to action, progress, pursuit, without end or meaning. +But if there be any such thing as delight in the company of one +person, rather than of another; whether in the way of friendship, or +mirth and entertainment, it is all one, if it be without respect to +fortune, honour, or increasing our stores of knowledge, or anything +beyond the present time; here is an instance of an affection +absolutely resting in its object as its end, and being gratified in +the same way as the appetite of hunger is satisfied with food. Yet +nothing is more common than to hear it asked, what advantage a man +hath in such a course, suppose of study, particular friendships, or +in any other; nothing, I say, is more common than to hear such a +question put in a way which supposes no gain, advantage, or +interest, but as a means to somewhat further: and if so, then there +is no such thing at all as real interest, gain, or advantage. This +is the same absurdity with respect to life as an infinite series of +effects without a cause is in speculation. The gain, advantage, or +interest consists in the delight itself, arising from such a +faculty's having its object: neither is there any such thing as +happiness or enjoyment but what arises from hence. The pleasures of +hope and of reflection are not exceptions: the former being only +this happiness anticipated; the latter the same happiness enjoyed +over again after its time. And even the general expectation of +future happiness can afford satisfaction only as it is a present +object to the principle of self-love. + +It was doubtless intended that life should be very much a pursuit to +the gross of mankind. But this is carried so much further than is +reasonable that what gives immediate satisfaction, i.e. our present +interest, is scarce considered as our interest at all. It is +inventions which have only a remote tendency towards enjoyment, +perhaps but a remote tendency towards gaining the means only of +enjoyment, which are chiefly spoken of as useful to the world. And +though this way of thinking were just with respect to the imperfect +state we are now in, where we know so little of satisfaction without +satiety, yet it must be guarded against when we are considering the +happiness of a state of perfection; which happiness being enjoyment +and not hope, must necessarily consist in this, that our affections +have their objects, and rest in those objects as an end, i.e. be +satisfied with them. This will further appear in the sequel of this +discourse. + +Of the several affections, or inward sensations, which particular +objects excite in man, there are some, the having of which implies +the love of them, when they are reflected upon. {29} This cannot be +said of all our affections, principles, and motives of action. It +were ridiculous to assert that a man upon reflection hath the same +kind of approbation of the appetite of hunger or the passion of fear +as he hath of goodwill to his fellow-creatures. To be a just, a +good, a righteous man, plainly carries with it a peculiar affection +to or love of justice, goodness, righteousness, when these +principles are the objects of contemplation. + +Now if a man approves of, or hath an affection to, any principle in +and for itself, incidental things allowed for, it will be the same +whether he views it in his own mind or in another; in himself or in +his neighbour. This is the account of our approbation of, or moral +love and affection to good characters; which cannot but be in those +who have any degrees of real goodness in themselves, and who discern +and take notice of the same principle in others. + +From observation of what passes within ourselves, our own actions, +and the behaviour of others, the mind may carry on its reflections +as far as it pleases; much beyond what we experience in ourselves, +or discern in our fellow creatures. It may go on and consider +goodness as become a uniform continued principle of action, as +conducted by reason, and forming a temper and character absolutely +good and perfect, which is in a higher sense excellent, and +proportionably the object of love and approbation. + +Let us then suppose a creature perfect according to his created +nature--let his form be human, and his capacities no more than equal +to those of the chief of men--goodness shall be his proper +character, with wisdom to direct it, and power within some certain +determined sphere of action to exert it: but goodness must be the +simple actuating principle within him; this being the moral quality +which is amiable, or the immediate object of love as distinct from +other affections of approbation. Here then is a finite object for +our mind to tend towards, to exercise itself upon: a creature, +perfect according to his capacity, fixed, steady, equally unmoved by +weak pity or more weak fury and resentment; forming the justest +scheme of conduct; going on undisturbed in the execution of it, +through the several methods of severity and reward, towards his end, +namely, the general happiness of all with whom he hath to do, as in +itself right and valuable. This character, though uniform in +itself, in its principle, yet exerting itself in different ways, or +considered in different views, may by its appearing variety move +different affections. Thus, the severity of justice would not +affect us in the same way as an act of mercy. The adventitious +qualities of wisdom and power may be considered in themselves; and +even the strength of mind which this immovable goodness supposes may +likewise be viewed as an object of contemplation distinct from the +goodness itself. Superior excellence of any kind, as well as +superior wisdom and power, is the object of awe and reverence to all +creatures, whatever their moral character be; but so far as +creatures of the lowest rank were good, so far the view of this +character, as simply good, must appear amiable to them, be the +object of, or beget love. Further suppose we were conscious that +this superior person so far approved of us that we had nothing +servilely to fear from him; that he was really our friend, and kind +and good to us in particular, as he had occasionally intercourse +with us: we must be other creatures than we are, or we could not +but feel the same kind of satisfaction and enjoyment (whatever would +be the degree of it) from this higher acquaintance and friendship as +we feel from common ones, the intercourse being real and the persons +equally present in both cases. We should have a more ardent desire +to be approved by his better judgment, and a satisfaction in that +approbation of the same sort with what would be felt in respect to +common persons, or be wrought in us by their presence. + +Let us now raise the character, and suppose this creature, for we +are still going on with the supposition of a creature, our proper +guardian and governor; that we were in a progress of being towards +somewhat further; and that his scheme of government was too vast for +our capacities to comprehend: remembering still that he is +perfectly good, and our friend as well as our governor. Wisdom, +power, goodness, accidentally viewed anywhere, would inspire +reverence, awe, love; and as these affections would be raised in +higher or lower degrees in proportion as we had occasionally more or +less intercourse with the creature endued with those qualities, so +this further consideration and knowledge that he was our proper +guardian and governor would much more bring these objects and +qualities home to ourselves; teach us they had a greater respect to +us in particular, that we had a higher interest in that wisdom and +power and goodness. We should, with joy, gratitude, reverence, +love, trust, and dependence, appropriate the character, as what we +had a right in, and make our boast in such our relation to it. And +the conclusion of the whole would be that we should refer ourselves +implicitly to him, and cast ourselves entirely upon him. As the +whole attention of life should be to obey his commands, so the +highest enjoyment of it must arise from the contemplation of this +character, and our relation to it, from a consciousness of his +favour and approbation, and from the exercise of those affections +towards him which could not but be raised from his presence. A +Being who hath these attributes, who stands in this relation, and is +thus sensibly present to the mind, must necessarily be the object of +these affections: there is as real a correspondence between them as +between the lowest appetite of sense and its object. + +That this Being is not a creature, but the Almighty God; that He is +of infinite power and wisdom and goodness, does not render Him less +the object of reverence and love than He would be if He had those +attributes only in a limited degree. The Being who made us, and +upon whom we entirely depend, is the object of some regards. He +hath given us certain affections of mind, which correspond to +wisdom, power, goodness, i.e. which are raised upon view of those +qualities. If then He be really wise, powerful, good, He is the +natural object of those affections which He hath endued us with, and +which correspond to those attributes. That He is infinite in power, +perfect in wisdom and goodness, makes no alteration, but only that +He is the object of those affections raised to the highest pitch. +He is not, indeed, to be discerned by any of our senses. I go +forward, but He is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive +Him: on the left hand where He doth work, but I cannot behold Him: +He hideth Himself on the right hand, that I cannot see Him, Oh that +I knew where I might find Him! that I might come even to His seat! +{30} But is He then afar off? does He not fill heaven and earth +with His presence? The presence of our fellow-creatures affects our +senses, and our senses give us the knowledge of their presence; +which hath different kinds of influence upon us--love, joy, sorrow, +restraint, encouragement, reverence. However, this influence is not +immediately from our senses, but from that knowledge. Thus suppose +a person neither to see nor hear another, not to know by any of his +senses, but yet certainly to know, that another was with him; this +knowledge might, and in many cases would, have one or more of the +effects before mentioned. It is therefore not only reasonable, but +also natural, to be affected with a presence, though it be not the +object of our senses; whether it be, or be not, is merely an +accidental circumstance, which needs not come into consideration: +it is the certainty that he is with us, and we with him, which hath +the influence. We consider persons then as present, not only when +they are within reach of our senses, but also when we are assured by +any other means that they are within such a nearness; nay, if they +are not, we can recall them to our mind, and be moved towards them +as present; and must He, who is so much more intimately with us, +that IN HIM WE LIVE AND MOVE AND HAVE OUR BEING, be thought too +distant to be the object of our affections? We own and feel the +force of amiable and worthy qualities in our fellow creatures; and +can we be insensible to the contemplation of perfect goodness? Do +we reverence the shadows of greatness here below, are we solicitous +about honour and esteem and the opinion of the world, and shall we +not feel the same with respect to Him whose are wisdom and power in +the original, who IS THE GOD OF JUDGMENT BY WHOM ACTIONS ARE +WEIGHED? Thus love, reverence, desire of esteem, every faculty, +every affection, tends towards and is employed about its respective +object in common cases: and must the exercise of them be suspended +with regard to Him alone who is an object, an infinitely more than +adequate object, to our most exalted faculties; Him, OF WHOM, AND +THROUGH WHOM, AND TO WHOM ARE ALL THINGS? + +As we cannot remove from this earth, or change our general business +on it, so neither can we alter our real nature. Therefore no +exercise of the mind can be recommended, but only the exercise of +those faculties you are conscious of. Religion does not demand new +affections, but only claims the direction of those you already have, +those affections you daily feel; though unhappily confined to +objects not altogether unsuitable but altogether unequal to them. +We only represent to you the higher, the adequate objects of those +very faculties and affections. Let the man of ambition go on still +to consider disgrace as the greatest evil, honour as his chief good. +But disgrace in whose estimation? Honour in whose judgment? This +is the only question. If shame, and delight in esteem, be spoken of +as real, as any settled ground of pain or pleasure, both these must +be in proportion to the supposed wisdom, and worth of him by whom we +are contemned or esteemed. Must it then be thought enthusiastical +to speak of a sensibility of this sort which shall have respect to +an unerring judgment, to infinite wisdom, when we are assured this +unerring judgment, this infinite wisdom does observe upon our +actions? + +It is the same with respect to the love of God in the strictest and +most confined sense. We only offer and represent the highest object +of an affection supposed already in your mind. Some degree of +goodness must be previously supposed; this always implies the love +of itself, an affection to goodness: the highest, the adequate +object of this affection, is perfect goodness; which therefore we +are to LOVE WITH ALL OUR HEART, WITH ALL OUR SOUL, AND WITH ALL OUR +STRENGTH. "Must we then, forgetting our own interest, as it were go +out of ourselves, and love God for His own sake?" No more forget +your own interest, no more go out of yourselves, than when you +prefer one place, one prospect, the conversation of one man to that +of another. Does not every affection necessarily imply that the +object of it be itself loved? If it be not it is not the object of +the affection. You may, and ought if you can, but it is a great +mistake to think you can love or fear or hate anything, from +consideration that such love or fear or hatred may be a means of +obtaining good or avoiding evil. But the question whether we ought +to love God for His sake or for our own being a mere mistake in +language, the real question which this is mistaken for will, I +suppose, be answered by observing that the goodness of God already +exercised towards us, our present dependence upon Him, and our +expectation of future benefits, ought, and have a natural tendency, +to beget in us the affection of gratitude, and greater love towards +Him, than the same goodness exercised towards others; were it only +for this reason, that every affection is moved in proportion to the +sense we have of the object of it; and we cannot but have a more +lively sense of goodness when exercised towards ourselves than when +exercised towards others. I added expectation of future benefits +because the ground of that expectation is present goodness. + +Thus Almighty God is the natural object of the several affections, +love, reverence, fear, desire of approbation. For though He is +simply one, yet we cannot but consider Him in partial and different +views. He is in himself one uniform Being, and for ever the same +without VARIABLENESS OR SHADOW OF TURNING; but His infinite +greatness, His goodness, His wisdom, are different objects to our +mind. To which is to be added, that from the changes in our own +characters, together with His unchangeableness, we cannot but +consider ourselves as more or less the objects of His approbation, +and really be so. For if He approves what is good, He cannot, +merely from the unchangeableness of His nature, approve what is +evil. Hence must arise more various movements of mind, more +different kinds of affections. And this greater variety also is +just and reasonable in such creatures as we are, though it respects +a Being simply one, good and perfect. As some of these actions are +most particularly suitable to so imperfect a creature as man in this +mortal state we are passing through, so there may be other exercises +of mind, or some of these in higher degrees, our employment and +happiness in a state of perfection. + + + +SERMON XIV. + + + +Consider then our ignorance, the imperfection of our nature, our +virtue, and our condition in this world, with respect to aim +infinitely good and just Being, our Creator and Governor, and you +will see what religious affections of mind are most particularly +suitable to this mortal state we are passing through. + +Though we are not affected with anything so strongly as what we +discern with our senses, and though our nature and condition require +that we be much taken up about sensible things, yet our reason +convinces us that God is present with us, and we see and feel the +effects of His goodness: He is therefore the object of some +regards. The imperfection of our virtue, joined with the +consideration of His absolute rectitude or holiness, will scarce +permit that perfection of love which entirely casts out all fear: +yet goodness is the object of love to all creatures who have any +degree of it themselves; and consciousness of a real endeavour to +approve ourselves to Him, joined with the consideration of His +goodness, as it quite excludes servile dread and horror, so it is +plainly a reasonable ground for hope of His favour. Neither fear +nor hope nor love then are excluded, and one or another of these +will prevail, according to the different views we have of God, and +ought to prevail, according to the changes we find in our own +character. There is a temper of mind made up of, or which follows +from all three, fear, hope, love--namely, resignation to the Divine +will, which is the general temper belonging to this state; which +ought to be the habitual frame of our mind and heart, and to be +exercised at proper seasons more distinctly, in acts of devotion. + +Resignation to the will of God is the whole of piety. It includes +in it all that is good, and is a source of the most settled quiet +and composure of mind. There is the general principle of submission +in our nature. Man is not so constituted as to desire things, and +be uneasy in the want of them, in proportion to their known value: +many other considerations come in to determine the degrees of +desire; particularly whether the advantage we take a view of be +within the sphere of our rank. Whoever felt uneasiness upon +observing any of the advantages brute creatures have over us? And +yet it is plain they have several. It is the same with respect to +advantages belonging to creatures of a superior order. Thus, though +we see a thing to be highly valuable, yet that it does not belong to +our condition of being is sufficient to suspend our desires after +it, to make us rest satisfied without such advantage. Now there is +just the same reason for quiet resignation in the want of everything +equally unattainable and out of our reach in particular, though +others of our species be possessed of it. All this may be applied +to the whole of life; to positive inconveniences as well as wants, +not indeed to the sensations of pain and sorrow, but to all the +uneasinesses of reflection, murmuring, and discontent. Thus is +human nature formed to compliance, yielding, submission of temper. +We find the principles of it within us; and every one exercises it +towards some objects or other, i.e. feels it with regard to some +persons and some circumstances. Now this is an excellent foundation +of a reasonable and religious resignation. Nature teaches and +inclines as to take up with our lot; the consideration that the +course of things is unalterable hath a tendency to quiet the mind +under it, to beget a submission of temper to it. But when we can +add that this unalterable course is appointed and continued by +infinite wisdom and goodness, how absolute should be our submission, +how entire our trust and dependence! + +This would reconcile us to our condition, prevent all the +supernumerary troubles arising from imagination, distant fears, +impatience--all uneasiness, except that which necessarily arises +from the calamities themselves we may be under. How many of our +cares should we by this means be disburdened of! Cares not properly +our own, how apt soever they may be to intrude upon us, and we to +admit them; the anxieties of expectation, solicitude about success +and disappointment, which in truth are none of our concern. How +open to every gratification would that mind be which was clear of +these encumbrances! + +Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be perfect when +our will is lost and resolved up into His: when we rest in His will +as our end, as being itself most just and right and good. And where +is the impossibility of such an affection to what is just, and +right, and good, such a loyalty of heart to the Governor of the +universe as shall prevail over all sinister indirect desires of our +own? Neither is this at bottom anything more than faith and honesty +and fairness of mind--in a more enlarged sense indeed than those +words are commonly used. And as, in common cases, fear and hope and +other passions are raised in us by their respective objects, so this +submission of heart and soul and mind, this religious resignation, +would be as naturally produced by our having just conceptions of +Almighty God, and a real sense of His presence with us. In how low +a degree soever this temper usually prevails amongst men, yet it is +a temper right in itself: it is what we owe to our Creator: it is +particularly suitable to our mortal condition, and what we should +endeavour after for our own sakes in our passage through such a +world as this, where is nothing upon which we can rest or depend, +nothing but what we are liable to be deceived and disappointed in. +Thus we might ACQUAINT OURSELVES WITH GOD, AND BE AT PEACE. This is +piety an religion in the strictest sense, considered as a habit of +mind: an habitual sense of God's presence with us; being affected +towards Him, as present, in the manner His superior nature requires +from such a creature as man: this is to WALK WITH GOD. + +Little more need be said of devotion or religious worship than that +it is this temper exerted into act. The nature of it consists in +the actual exercise of those affections towards God which are +supposed habitual in good men. He is always equally present with +us: but we are so much taken up with sensible things that, Lo, He +goeth by us, and we see Him not: He passeth on also, but we +perceive Him not. {31} Devotion is retirement from the world He has +made to Him alone: it is to withdraw from the avocations of sense, +to employ our attention wholly upon Him as upon an object actually +present, to yield ourselves up to the influence of the Divine +presence, and to give full scope to the affections of gratitude, +love, reverence, trust, and dependence; of which infinite power, +wisdom, and goodness is the natural and only adequate object. We +may apply to the whole of devotion those words of the Son of Sirach, +When you glorify the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for even +yet will He far exceed: and when you exalt Him, put forth all your +strength, and be not weary; for you can never go far enough. {32} +Our most raised affections of every kind cannot but fall short and +be disproportionate when an infinite being is the object of them. +This is the highest exercise and employment of mind that a creature +is capable of. As this divine service and worship is itself +absolutely due to God, so also is it necessary in order to a further +end, to keep alive upon our minds a sense of His authority, a sense +that in our ordinary behaviour amongst men we act under him as our +Governor and Judge. + +Thus you see the temper of mind respecting God which is particularly +suitable to a state of imperfection, to creatures in a progress of +being towards somewhat further. + +Suppose now this something further attained, that we were arrived at +it, what a perception will it be to see and know and feel that our +trust was not vain, our dependence not groundless? That the issue, +event, and consummation came out such as fully to justify and answer +that resignation? If the obscure view of the divine perfection +which we have in this world ought in just consequence to beget an +entire resignation, what will this resignation be exalted into when +WE SHALL SEE FACE TO FACE, AND KNOW AS WE ARE KNOWN? If we cannot +form any distinct notion of that perfection of the love of God which +CASTS OUT ALL FEAR, of that enjoyment of Him which will be the +happiness of good men hereafter, the consideration of our wants and +capacities of happiness, and that He will be adequate supply to +them, must serve us instead of such distinct conception of the +particular happiness itself. + +Let us then suppose a man entirely disengaged from business and +pleasure, sitting down alone and at leisure, to reflect upon himself +and his own condition of being. He would immediately feel that he +was by no means complete of himself, but totally insufficient for +his own happiness. One may venture to affirm that every man hath +felt this, whether he hath again reflected upon it or not. It is +feeling this deficiency, that they are unsatisfied with themselves, +which makes men look out for assistance from abroad, and which has +given rise to various kinds of amusements, altogether needless any +otherwise than as they serve to fill up the blank spaces of time, +and so hinder their feeling this deficiency, and being uneasy with +themselves. Now, if these external things we take up with were +really an adequate supply to this deficiency of human nature, if by +their means our capacities and desires were all satisfied and filled +up, then it might be truly said that we had found out the proper +happiness of man, and so might sit down satisfied, and be at rest in +the enjoyment of it. But if it appears that the amusements which +men usually pass their time in are so far from coming up to or +answering our notions and desires of happiness or good that they are +really no more than what they are commonly called, somewhat to pass +away the time, i.e. somewhat which serves to turn us aside from, and +prevent our attending to, this our internal poverty and want; if +they serve only, or chiefly, to suspend instead of satisfying our +conceptions and desires of happiness; if the want remains, and we +have found out little more than barely the means of making it less +sensible; then are we still to seek for somewhat to be an adequate +supply to it. It is plain that there is a capacity in the nature of +man which neither riches nor honours nor sensual gratifications, nor +anything in this world, can perfectly fill up or satisfy: there is +a deeper and more essential want than any of these things can be the +supply of. Yet surely there is a possibility of somewhat which may +fill up all our capacities of happiness, somewhat in which our souls +may find rest, somewhat which may be to us that satisfactory good we +are inquiring after. But it cannot be anything which is valuable +only as it tends to some further end. Those therefore who have got +this world so much into their hearts as not to be able to consider +happiness as consisting in anything but property and possessions-- +which are only valuable as the means to somewhat else--cannot have +the least glimpse of the subject before us, which is the end, not +the means; the thing itself, not somewhat in order to it. But if +you can lay aside that general, confused, undeterminate notion of +happiness, as consisting in such possessions, and fix in your +thoughts that it really can consist in nothing but in a faculty's +having its proper object, you will clearly see that in the coolest +way of consideration, without either the heat of fanciful enthusiasm +or the warmth of real devotion, nothing is more certain than that an +infinite Being may Himself be, if He pleases, the supply to all the +capacities of our nature. All the common enjoyments of life are +from the faculties He hath endued us with and the objects He hath +made suitable to them. He may Himself be to us infinitely more than +all these; He may be to us all that we want. As our understanding +can contemplate itself, and our affections be exercised upon +themselves by reflection, so may each be employed in the same manner +upon any other mind; and since the Supreme Mind, the Author and +Cause of all things, is the highest possible object to Himself, He +may be an adequate supply to all the faculties of our souls, a +subject to our understanding, and an object to our affections. + +Consider then: when we shall have put off this mortal body, when we +shall be divested of sensual appetites, and those possessions which +are now the means of gratification shall be of no avail, when this +restless scene of business and vain pleasures, which now diverts us +from ourselves, shall be all over, we, our proper self, shall still +remain: we shall still continue the same creatures we are, with +wants to be supplied and capacities of happiness. We must have +faculties of perception, though not sensitive ones; and pleasure or +uneasiness from our perceptions, as now we have. + +There are certain ideas which we express by the words order, +harmony, proportion, beauty, the furthest removed from anything +sensual. Now what is there in those intellectual images, forms, or +ideas, which begets that approbation, love, delight, and even +rapture, which is seen in some persons' faces upon having those +objects present to their minds?--"Mere enthusiasm!"--Be it what it +will: there are objects, works of nature and of art, which all +mankind have delight from quite distinct from their affording +gratification to sensual appetites, and from quite another view of +them than as being for their interest and further advantage. The +faculties from which we are capable of these pleasures, and the +pleasures themselves, are as natural, and as much to be accounted +for, as any sensual appetite whatever, and the pleasure from its +gratification. Words to be sure are wanting upon this subject; to +say that everything of grace and beauty throughout the whole of +nature, everything excellent and amiable shared in differently lower +degrees by the whole creation, meet in the Author and Cause of all +things, this is an inadequate and perhaps improper way of speaking +of the Divine nature; but it is manifest that absolute rectitude, +the perfection of being, must be in all senses, and in every +respect, the highest object to the mind. + +In this world it is only the effects of wisdom and power and +greatness which we discern; it is not impossible that hereafter the +qualities themselves in the supreme Being may be the immediate +object of contemplation. What amazing wonders are opened to view by +late improvements! What an object is the universe to a creature, if +there be a creature who can comprehend its system! But it must be +an infinitely higher exercise of the understanding to view the +scheme of it in that mind which projected it before its foundations +were laid. And surely we have meaning to the words when we speak of +going further, and viewing, not only this system in His mind, but +the wisdom and intelligence itself from whence it proceeded. The +same may be said of power. But since wisdom and power are not God, +He is a wise, a powerful Being; the divine nature may therefore be a +further object to the understanding. It is nothing to observe that +our senses give us but an imperfect knowledge of things: effects +themselves, if we knew them thoroughly, would give us but imperfect +notions of wisdom and power; much less of His being in whom they +reside. I am not speaking of any fanciful notion of seeing all +things in God, but only representing to you how much a higher object +to the understanding an infinite Being Himself is than the things +which He has made; and this is no more than saying that the Creator +is superior to the works of His hands. + +This may be illustrated by a low example. Suppose a machine, the +sight of which would raise, and discoveries in its contrivance +gratify, our curiosity: the real delight in this case would arise +from its being the effect of skill and contrivance. This skill in +the mind of the artificer would be a higher object, if we had any +senses or ways to discern it. For, observe, the contemplation of +that principle, faculty, or power which produced any effect must be +a higher exercise of the understanding than the contemplation of the +effect itself. The cause must be a higher object to the mind than +the effect. + +But whoever considers distinctly what the delight of knowledge is +will see reason to be satisfied that it cannot be the chief good of +man: all this, as it is applicable, so it was mentioned with regard +to the attribute of goodness. I say goodness. Our being and all +our enjoyments are the effects of it: just men bear its +resemblance; but how little do we know of the original, of what it +is in itself? Recall what was before observed concerning the +affection to moral characters--which, in how low a degree soever, +yet is plainly natural to man, and the most excellent part of his +nature. Suppose this improved, as it may be improved, to any degree +whatever, in the SPIRITS OF JUST MEN MADE PERFECT; and then suppose +that they had a real view of that RIGHTEOUSNESS WHICH IS AN +EVERLASTING RIGHTEOUSNESS, of the conformity of the Divine will to +THE LAW OF TRUTH in which the moral attributes of God consist, of +that goodness in the sovereign Mind which gave birth to the +universe. Add, what will be true of all good men hereafter, a +consciousness of having an interest in what they are contemplating-- +suppose them able to say, THIS GOD IS OUR GOD FOR EVER AND EVER. +Would they be any longer to seek for what was their chief happiness, +their final good? Could the utmost stretch of their capacities look +further? Would not infinite perfect goodness be their very end, the +last end and object of their affections, beyond which they could +neither have nor desire, beyond which they could not form a wish or +thought? + +Consider wherein that presence of a friend consists which has often +so strong an effect as wholly to possess the mind, and entirely +suspend all other affections and regards, and which itself affords +the highest satisfaction and enjoyment. He is within reach of the +senses. Now as our capacities of perception improve we shall have, +perhaps by some faculty entirely new, a perception of God's presence +with us in a nearer and stricter way, since it is certain He is more +intimately present with us than anything else can be. Proof of the +existence and presence of any being is quite different from the +immediate perception, the consciousness of it. What then will be +the joy of heart which His presence and THE LIGHT OF HIS +COUNTENANCE, who is the life of the universe, will inspire good men +with when they shall have a sensation that He is the sustainer of +their being, that they exist in Him; when they shall feel His +influence to cheer and enliven and support their frame, in a manner +of which we have now no conception? He will be in a literal sense +THEIR STRENGTH AND THEIR PORTION FOR EVER. + +When we speak of things so much above our comprehension as the +employment and happiness of a future state, doubtless it behoves us +to speak with all modesty and distrust of ourselves. But the +Scripture represents the happiness of that state under the notions +of SEEING GOD, SEEING HIM AS HE IS, KNOWING AS WE ARE KNOWN, AND +SEEING FACE TO FACE. These words are not general or undetermined, +but express a particular determinate happiness. And I will be bold +to say that nothing can account for or come up to these expressions +but only this, that God Himself will be an object to our faculties, +that He Himself will be our happiness as distinguished from the +enjoyments of the present state, which seem to arise not immediately +from Him but from the objects He has adapted to give us delight. + +To conclude: Let us suppose a person tired with care and sorrow and +the repetition of vain delights which fill up the round of life; +sensible that everything here below in its best estate is altogether +vanity. Suppose him to feel that deficiency of human nature before +taken notice of, and to be convinced that God alone was the adequate +supply to it. What could be more applicable to a good man in this +state of mind, or better express his present wants and distant +hopes, his passage through this world as a progress towards a state +of perfection, than the following passages in the devotions of the +royal prophet? They are plainly in a higher and more proper sense +applicable to this than they could be to anything else. I have seen +an end of all perfection. Whom have I in heaven but Thee? And +there is none upon earth that I desire in comparison of Thee. My +flesh and may heart faileth: but God is the strength of my heart +and my portion for ever. Like as the hart desireth the water- +brooks, so longeth my soul after Thee, O God. My soul is athirst +for God, yea, even for the living God: when shall I come to appear +before Him? How excellent is Thy loving-kindness, O God! and the +children of men shall put their trust under the shadow of Thy wings. +They shall be satisfied with the plenteousness of Thy house: and +Thou shalt give them drink of Thy pleasures, as out of the river. +For with Thee is the well of life: and in Thy light shall we see +light. Blessed is the man whom Thou choosest, and receivest unto +Thee: he shall dwell in Thy court, and shall be satisfied with the +pleasures of Thy house, even of Thy holy temple. Blessed is the +people, O Lord, that can rejoice in Thee: they shall walk in the +light of Thy countenance. Their delight shall be daily in Thy name, +and in Thy righteousness shall they make their boast. For Thou art +the glory of their strength: and in Thy lovingkindness they shall +be exalted. As for me, I will behold Thy presence in righteousness: +and when I awake up after Thy likeness, I shall be satisfied with +it. Thou shalt shew me the path of life; in Thy presence is the +fulness of joy, and at Thy right hand there is pleasure for +evermore. + + + +Footnotes: + +{1} 1 Cor. xii + +{2} Suppose a man of learning to be writing a grave book upon HUMAN +NATURE, and to show in several parts of it that he had an insight +into the subject he was considering, amongst other things, the +following one would require to be accounted for--the appearance of +benevolence or good-will in men towards each other in the instances +of natural relation, and in others. {2a} Cautions of being deceived +with outward show, he retires within himself to see exactly what +that is in the mind of man from whence this appearance proceeds; +and, upon deep reflection, asserts the principle in the mind to be +only the love of power, and delight in the exercise of it. Would +not everybody think here was a mistake of one word for another--that +the philosopher was contemplating and accounting for some other +HUMAN ACTIONS, some other behaviour of man to man? And could any +one be thoroughly satisfied that what is commonly called benevolence +or good-will was really the affection meant, but only by being made +to understand that this learned person had a general hypothesis, to +which the appearance of good-will could no otherwise be reconciled? +That what has this appearance is often nothing but ambition; that +delight in superiority often (suppose always) mixes itself with +benevolence, only makes it more specious to call it ambition than +hunger, of the two: but in reality that passion does no more +account for the whole appearances of good-will than this appetite +does. Is there not often the appearance of one man's wishing that +good to another, which he knows himself unable to procure him; and +rejoicing in it, though bestowed by a third person? And can love of +power any way possibly come in to account for this desire or +delight? Is there not often the appearance of men's distinguishing +between two or more persons, preferring one before another, to do +good to, in cases where love of power cannot in the least account +for the distinction and preference? For this principle can no +otherwise distinguish between objects than as it is a greater +instance and exertion of power to do good to one rather than to +another. Again, suppose good-will in the mind of man to be nothing +but delight in the exercise of power: men might indeed be +restrained by distant and accidental consideration; but these +restraints being removed, they would have a disposition to, and +delight in, mischief as an exercise and proof of power: and this +disposition and delight would arise from, or be the same principle +in the mind, as a disposition to and delight in charity. Thus +cruelty, as distinct from envy and resentment, would be exactly the +same in the mind of man as good-will: that one tends to the +happiness, the other to the misery, of our fellow-creatures, is, it +seems, merely an accidental circumstance, which the mind has not the +least regard to. These are the absurdities which even men of +capacity run into when they have occasion to belie their nature, and +will perversely disclaim that image of God which was originally +stamped upon it, the traces of which, however faint, are plainly +discernible upon the mind of man. + +If any person can in earnest doubt whether there be such a thing as +good-will in one man towards another (for the question is not +concerning either the degree or extensiveness of it, but concerning +the affection itself), let it be observed that WHETHER MAN BE THUS, +OR OTHERWISE CONSTITUTED, WHAT IS THE INWARD FRAME IN THIS +PARTICULAR is a mere question of fact of natural history not +provable immediately by reason. It is therefore to be judged of and +determined in the same way other facts or matters of natural history +are--by appealing to the external senses, or inward perceptions +respectively, as the matter under consideration is cognisable by one +or the other: by arguing from acknowledged facts and actions for a +great number of actions in the same kind, in different +circumstances, and respecting different objects, will prove to a +certainty what principles they do not, and to the greatest +probability what principles they do, proceed from: and, lastly, by +the testimony of mankind. Now that there is some degree of +benevolence amongst men may be as strongly and plainly proved in all +these ways, as it could possibly be proved, supposing there was this +affection in our nature. And should any one think fit to assert +that resentment in the mind of man was absolutely nothing but +reasonable concern for our own safety, the falsity of this, and what +is the real nature of that passion, could be shown in no other ways +than those in which it may be shown that there is such a thing in +SOME DEGREE as real good-will in man towards man. It is sufficient +that the seeds of it be implanted in our nature by God. There is, +it is owned, much left for us to do upon our own heart and temper; +to cultivate, to improve, to call it forth, to exercise it in a +steady, uniform manner. This is our work: this is virtue and +religion. + +{2a} Hobbes, "Of Human Nature," c. ix. 7. + +{3} Everybody makes a distinction between self-love and the several +particular passions, appetites, and affections; and yet they are +often confounded again. That they are totally different, will be +seen by any one who will distinguish between the passions and +appetites THEMSELVES, and ENDEAVOURING after the means of their +gratification. Consider the appetite of hunger, and the desire of +esteem: these being the occasion both of pleasure and pain, the +coolest self-love, as well as the appetites and passions themselves, +may put us upon making use of the PROPER METHODS OF OBTAINING that +pleasure, and avoiding that pain; but the FEELINGS themselves, the +pain of hunger and shame, and the delight from esteem, are no more +self-love than they are anything in the world. Though a man hated +himself, he would as much feel the pain of hunger as he would that +of the gout; and it is plainly supposable there may be creatures +with self-love in them to the highest degree, who may be quite +insensible and indifferent (as men in some cases are) to the +contempt and esteem of those upon whom their happiness does not in +some further respects depend. And as self-love and the several +particular passions and appetites are in themselves totally +different, so that some actions proceed from one and some from the +other will be manifest to any who will observe the two following +very supposable cases. One man rushes upon certain ruin for the +gratification of a present desire: nobody will call the principle +of this action self-love. Suppose another man to go through some +laborious work upon promise of a great reward, without any distinct +knowledge what the reward will be: this course of action cannot be +ascribed to any particular passion. The former of these actions is +plainly to be imputed to some particular passion or affection; the +latter as plainly to the general affection or principle of self- +love. That there are some particular pursuits or actions concerning +which we cannot determine how far they are owing to one, and how far +to the other, proceeds from this, that the two principles are +frequently mixed together, and run up into each other. This +distinction is further explained in the Eleventh Sermon. + +{4} If any desire to see this distinction and comparison made in a +particular instance, the appetite and passion now mentioned may +serve for one. Hunger is to be considered as a private appetite, +because the end for which it was given us is the preservation of the +individual. Desire of esteem is a public passion; because the end +for which it was given us is to regulate our behaviour towards +society. The respect which this has to private good is as remote as +the respect that has to public good; and the appetite is no more +self-love than the passion is benevolence. The object and end of +the former is merely food; the object and end of the latter is +merely esteem; but the latter can no more be gratified without +contributing to the good of society, than the former can be +gratified without contributing to the preservation of the +individual. + +{5} Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with or +superiority over others with whom we compare ourselves. There does +not appear to be any other GRIEF in the natural passion, but only +THAT WANT which is implied in desire. However, this may be so +strong as to be the occasion of great GRIEF. To desire the +attainment of this equality or superiority by the PARTICULAR MEANS +of others being brought down to our own level, or below it, is, I +think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see +that the real end, which the natural passion emulation, and which +the unlawful one envy aims at, is exactly the same; namely, that +equality or superiority: and consequently, that to do mischief is +not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain +its end. As to resentment, see the Eighth Sermon. + +{6} Ephes. ii. 3. + +{7} Every man in his physical nature is one individual single +agent. He has likewise properties and principles, each of which may +be considered separately, and without regard to the respects which +they have to each other. Neither of these is the nature we are +taking a view of. But it is the inward frame of man considered as a +SYSTEM or CONSTITUTION: whose several parts are united, not by a +physical principle of individuation, but by the respects they have +to each other; the chief of which is the subjection which the +appetites, passions, and particular affections have to the one +supreme principle of reflection or conscience. The system or +constitution is formed by and consists in these respects and this +subjection. Thus the body is a SYSTEM or CONSTITUTION: so is a +tree: so is every machine. Consider all the several parts of a +tree without the natural reselects they have to each other, and you +have not at all the idea of a tree; but add these respects, and this +gives you the idea. This body may be impaired by sickness, a tree +may decay, a machine be out of order, and yet the system and +constitution of them not totally dissolved. There is plainly +somewhat which answers to all this in the moral constitution of man. +Whoever will consider his own nature will see that the several +appetites, passions, and particular affections have different +respects amongst themselves. They are restraints upon, and are in a +proportion to, each other. This proportion is just and perfect, +when all those under principles are perfectly coincident with +conscience, so far as their nature permits, and in all cases under +its absolute and entire direction. The least excess or defect, the +least alteration of the due proportions amongst themselves, or of +their coincidence with conscience, though not proceeding into +action, is some degree of disorder in the moral constitution. But +perfection, though plainly intelligible and unsupportable, was never +attained by any man. If the higher principle of reflection +maintains its place, and as much as it can corrects that disorder, +and hinders it from breaking out into action, this is all that can +be expected in such a creature as man. And though the appetites and +passions have not their exact due proportion to each other, though +they often strive for mastery with judgment or reflection, yet, +since the superiority of this principle to all others is the chief +respect which forms the constitution, so far as this superiority is +maintained, the character, the man, is good, worthy, virtuous. + +{8} Chap. iii., ver. 6. + +{9} Job xiii. 5. + +{10} Eccles. x. 3. + +{11} Prov. x. 19. + +{12} Mark xii. 38, 40. + +{13} There being manifestly this appearance of men's substituting +others for themselves, and being carried out and affected towards +them as towards themselves; some persons, who have a system which +excludes every affection of this sort, have taken a pleasant method +to solve it; and tell you it is NOT ANOTHER you are at all concerned +about, but your SELF ONLY, when you feel the affection called +compassion, i.e. Here is a plain matter of fact, which men cannot +reconcile with the general account they think fit to give of things: +they therefore, instead of that manifest fact, substitute ANOTHER, +which is reconcilable to their own scheme. For does not everybody +by compassion mean an affection, the object of which is another in +distress? instead of this, but designing to have it mistaken for +this, they speak of an affection or passion, the object of which is +ourselves, or danger to ourselves. Hobbes defines PITY, +IMAGINATION, OR FICTION OF FUTURE CALAMITY TO OURSELVES, PROCEEDING +FROM THE SENSE (he means sight or knowledge) OF ANOTHER MAN'S +CALAMITY. Thus fear and compassion would be the same idea, and a +fearful and a compassionate man the same character, which every one +immediately sees are totally different. Further, to those who give +any scope to their affections, there is no perception or inward +feeling more universal than this: that one who has been merciful +and compassionate throughout the course of his behaviour should +himself be treated with kindness, if he happens to fall into +circumstances of distress. Is fear, then, or cowardice, so great a +recommendation to the favour of the bulk of mankind? Or is it not +plain that mere fearlessness (and therefore not the contrary) is one +of the most popular qualifications? This shows that mankind are not +affected towards compassion as fear, but as somewhat totally +different. + +Nothing would more expose such accounts as these of the affections +which are favourable and friendly to our fellow-creatures than to +substitute the definitions, which this author, and others who follow +his steps, give of such affections, instead of the words by which +they are commonly expressed. Hobbes, after having laid down that +pity or compassion is only fear for ourselves, goes on to explain +the reason why we pity our friends in distress more than others. +Now substitute the word DEFINITION instead of the word PITY in this +place, and the inquiry will be, why we fear our friends, &c., which +words (since he really does not mean why we are afraid of them) make +no question or sentence at all. So that common language, the words +TO COMPASSIONATE, TO PITY, cannot be accommodated to his account of +compassion. The very joining of the words to PITY OUR FRIENDS is a +direct contradiction to his definition of pity: because those +words, so joined, necessarily express that our friends are the +objects of the passion; whereas his definition of it asserts that +ourselves (or danger to ourselves) are the only objects of it. He +might indeed have avoided this absurdity, by plainly saying what he +is going to account for; namely, why the sight of the innocent, or +of our friends in distress, raises greater fear for ourselves than +the sight of other persons in distress. But had he put the thing +thus plainly, the fact itself would have been doubted; that THE +SIGHT OF OUR FRIENDS IN DISTRESS RAISES IN US GREATER FEAR FOR +OURSELVES THAN THE SIGHT OF OTHERS IN DISTRESS. And in the next +place it would immediately have occurred to every one that the fact +now mentioned, which at least is doubtful whether, true or false, +was not the same with this fact, which nobody ever doubted, that THE +SIGHT OF OUR FRIENDS IN DISTRESS RAISES IN US GREATER COMPASSION +THAN THE SIGHT OF OTHERS IN DISTRESS: every one, I say, would have +seen that these are not the same, but TWO DIFFERENT inquiries; and, +consequently, that fear and compassion are not the same. Suppose a +person to be in real danger, and by some means or other to have +forgot it; any trifling accident, any sound might alarm him, recall +the danger to his remembrance, and renew his fear; but it is almost +too grossly ridiculous (though it is to show an absurdity) to speak +of that sound or accident as an object of compassion; and yet, +according to Mr. Hobbes, our greatest friend in distress is no more +to us, no more the object of compassion, or of any affection in our +heart: neither the one nor the other raises any emotion in one +mind, but only the thoughts of our liableness to calamity, and the +fear of it; and both equally do this. It is fit such sort of +accounts of human nature should be shown to be what they really are, +because there is raised upon them a general scheme, which undermines +the whole foundation of common justice and honesty. See Hobbes of +Human Nature, c. 9. section 10. + +There are often three distinct perceptions or inward feelings upon +sight of persons in distress: real sorrow and concern for the +misery of our fellow-creatures; some degree of satisfaction from a +consciousness of our freedom from that misery; and as the mind +passes on from one thing to another it is not unnatural from such an +occasion to reflect upon our own liableness to the same or other +calamities. The two last frequently accompany the first, but it is +the first ONLY which is properly compassion, of which the distressed +are the objects, and which directly carries us with calmness and +thought to their assistance. Any one of these, from various and +complicated reasons, may in particular cases prevail over the other +two; and there are, I suppose, instances, where the bare SIGHT of +distress, without our feeling any compassion for it, may be the +occasion of either or both of the two latter perceptions. One might +add that if there be really any such thing as the fiction or +imagination of danger to ourselves from sight of the miseries of +others, which Hobbes specks of, and which he has absurdly mistaken +for the whole of compassion; if there be anything of this sort +common to mankind, distinct from the reflection of reason, it would +be a most remarkable instance of what was furthest from his +thoughts--namely, of a mutual sympathy between each particular of +the species, a fellow-feeling common to mankind. It would not +indeed be an example of our substituting others for ourselves, but +it would be an example of user substituting ourselves for others. +And as it would not be an instance of benevolence, so neither would +it be any instance of self-love: for this phantom of danger to +ourselves, naturally rising to view upon sight of the distresses of +others, would be no more an instance of love to ourselves than the +pain of hunger is. + +{14} Ecclus. xxxii. 28. + +{15} Ecclus. xlii. 24. + +{16} Ver. 4, 5. + +{17} Ver. 6. + +{18} Micah vi. + +{19} Chap. xxii. 12. + +{20} Ver. 21. + +{21} Chap. iv. + +{22} Chap. xxv. + +{23} Chap. xxxi. + +{24} Chap. ii. + +{24a} In the Cassell edition the sermons jump from sermon VII to XI +with no explanation as to where VIII, IX and X are. I've left the +numbering as is in case there is a good reason for it.--DP + +{25} P. 137. + +{26} Matt. v. 48. + +{27} 1 Cor. xiii. + +{28} For instance as we are not competent judges, what is upon the +whole for the good of the world, there MAY be other immediate ends +appointed us to pursue, besides that one of doing good or producing +happiness. Though the good of the Creation be the only end of the +Author of it, yet he may have laid us under particular obligations, +which we may discern and feel ourselves under, quite distinct from a +perception, that the observance or violation of them it for the +happiness or misery of our fellow-creatures. And this is in fart +the ease, for there are certain dispositions of mind, and certain +actions, which are in themselves approved or disapproved by mankind, +abstracted from the consideration of their tendency to the happiness +or misery of the world approved or disapproved by reflection, by +that principle within, whirls is the guile of life, the judge of +right and wrong. Numberless instances of this kind might be +mentioned. There are pieces of treachery, which in themselves +appear base and detestable to every one. There are actions, which +perhaps can scarce have any other general name given them than +indecencies, which yet are odious and shocking to human nature. +There is such a thing as meanness, a little mind, which as it is +quite distinct from incapacity, so it raises a dislike and +disapprobation quite different from that contempt, which men are too +apt to have, of mere folly. On the other hand, what we call +greatness of mind is the object of another most of approbation, than +superior understanding. Fidelity, honour, strict justice, are +themselves approved in the highest degree, abstracted from the +consideration of their tendency. Now, whether it be thought that +each of these are connected with benevolence in our nature, amid so +may he considered as the same thing with it, or whether some of them +he thought an inferior kind of virtues and vices, somewhat like +natural beauties and deformities, or lastly, plain exceptions to the +general rule, thus such however is certain, that the things now +instanced in, and numberless others, are approved or disapproved by +mankind in general, in quite another view than as conducive to the +happiness or misery of the world. + +{29} St. Austin observes, Amor ipse ordinate amandus est, quo bene +amatur quod amandum sit, ut sit in nobis virtue qua vivitur bene, +i.e. The affection which we rightly have for what is lovely must +ordinate justly, in due manner end proportion, become the object of +a new affection, or be itself beloved, in order to our being endued +with that virtue which is the principle of a good life. Civ. Dei, +1. xv. c. 22. + +{30} Job xxii. + +{31} Job ix. 2. + +{32} Eccius. xliii. 50. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg Human Nature & Other Sermons, by Joseph Butler + diff --git a/old/hmntr10.zip b/old/hmntr10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f35bac9 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/hmntr10.zip |