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| author | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-14 20:01:19 -0700 |
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| committer | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-14 20:01:19 -0700 |
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left: -0.4em;} + .x3 {position: absolute; top: 1.75ex; left: -0.4em;} + .x4 {position: absolute; top: 1.65ex; left: -0.6em;} + .x5 {position: absolute; top: -0.5ex; left: -0.3em;} + .x6 {position: absolute; top: 0.3ex; left: -0.5em;} + .x7 {position: absolute; top: -0.6ex; left: -0.5em;} + + hr.pg { width: 100%; + margin-top: 3em; + margin-bottom: 0em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + height: 4px; + border-width: 4px 0 0 0; /* remove all borders except the top one */ + border-style: solid; + border-color: #000000; + clear: both; } + pre {font-size: 85%;} + </style> +</head> +<body> +<h1>The Project Gutenberg eBook, History of Modern Philosophy, by Alfred +William Benn</h1> +<pre> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at <a href = "http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre> +<p>Title: History of Modern Philosophy</p> +<p>Author: Alfred William Benn</p> +<p>Release Date: November 11, 2010 [eBook #34283]</p> +<p>Language: English</p> +<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p> +<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY***</p> +<p> </p> +<h3>E-text prepared by Steven Gibbs, Keith Edkins,<br /> + and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br /> + (http://www.pgdp.net)</h3> +<p> </p> +<table border="0" cellpadding="10" style="background-color: #ccccff;"> +<tr> +<td style="width:25%; vertical-align:top"> +Transcriber's note: +</td> +<td> +A few typographical errors have been corrected. They +appear in the text <span class="correction" title="explanation will pop up">like this</span>, and the +explanation will appear when the mouse pointer is moved over the marked +passage.<br /><br /> +</td> +</tr> +</table> +<p> </p> +<hr class="pg" /> +<p> </p> + + <div class="figcenter" style="width:20%;"> + <a href="images/frontispiece.jpg"><img style="width:100%" src="images/frontispiece.jpg" + alt="Kant" title="Kant" /></a> + <span class="sc">Giordano Bruno.</span> + + <p class="cenhead">From the Statue in the Campo dei Fiori, Rome.</p> + + <p class="poem"></p> + </div> + +<h2>HISTORY OF</h2> + +<h1>MODERN</h1> + +<h1>PHILOSOPHY</h1> + + <p> </p> + +<h4>BY</h4> + +<h3>A. W. BENN,</h3> + +<p class="cenhead">AUTHOR OF "THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH RATIONALISM IN THE<br /> +NINETEENTH CENTURY," ETC.</p> + +<p class="cenhead">[ISSUED FOR THE RATIONALIST PRESS ASSOCIATION, LIMITED]</p> + +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> + +<h3><span class="sc">London:</span></h3> + +<h2>WATTS & CO.,</h2> + +<h3>17 JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEET STREET, E.C.</h3> + +<h3>1912</h3> + +<p class="cenhead">PRINTED BY WATTS AND CO.,<br /> +JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEET STREET,<br /> +LONDON, E.C.</p> + + <p><br style="clear:both" /></p> +<hr class="full" /> + +<h3>CONTENTS</h3> + +<table class="nobctr" summary="Contents" title="Contents"> +<tr><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:center; padding-top:1em;"> CHAPTER I. </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> PAGE</td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">The Philosophical Renaissance</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page1">1</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:center; padding-top:1em;"> CHAPTER II.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">The Metaphysicians</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page31">31</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:center; padding-top:1em;"> CHAPTER III.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">The Theorists of Knowledge</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page65">65</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:center; padding-top:1em;"> CHAPTER IV.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">The German Idealists</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page101">101</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:center; padding-top:1em;"> CHAPTER V.</td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">The Humanists of the Nineteenth Century</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page124">124</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">Bibliography</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page149">149</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">Index</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page153">153</a></td></tr> +</table> + +<h3>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</h3> + +<table class="nobctr" summary="List of Illustrations" title="List of Illustrations"> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">Giordano Bruno</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <i>Frontispiece</i></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> PAGE</td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">Francis Bacon</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page13">13</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">René Descartes</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page34">34</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">Benedictus Spinoza</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page47">47</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">David Hume</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page78">78</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">Immanuel Kant</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page86">86</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">G. W. F. Hegel</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page111">111</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">Arthur Schopenhauer</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page117">117</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">Auguste Comte</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page128">128</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="spacsingle"> <span class="sc">Herbert Spencer</span> </td><td class="spacsingle" style="text-align:right;"> <a href="#page138">138</a></td></tr> +</table> + + <p><br style="clear:both" /></p> +<hr class="full" /> + +<p><!-- Page 1 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page1"></a>{1}</span></p> + +<h3><span class="sc">Chapter I.</span></h3> + +<h3>THE PHILOSOPHICAL RENAISSANCE</h3> + + <p>For a thousand years after the schools of Athens were closed by + Justinian philosophy made no real advance; no essentially new ideas about + the constitution of nature, the workings of mind, or the ends of life + were put forward. It would be false to say that during this period no + progress was made. The civilisation of the Roman Empire was extended far + beyond its ancient frontiers; and, although much ground was lost in Asia + and Africa, more than the equivalent was gained in Northern Europe. + Within Europe also the gradual abolition of slavery and the increasing + dignity of peaceful labour gave a wider diffusion to culture, combined + with a larger sense of human fellowship than any but the best minds of + Greece and Rome had felt. Whether the status of women was really raised + may be doubted; but the ideas and sentiments of women began to exercise + an influence on social intercourse unknown before. And the arts of war + and peace were in some ways almost revolutionised.</p> + + <p>This remarkable phenomenon of movement in everything except ideas has + been explained by the influence of Christianity, or rather of + Catholicism. There is truth in the contention, but it is not the whole + truth. The Church entered into a heritage that she did not create; she + defined and accentuated tendencies that <!-- Page 2 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page2"></a>{2}</span>long before her advent had + secretly been at work. In the West that diffusion of civilisation which + is her historic boast had been begun and carried far by the Rome whence + her very name is taken. In the East the title of orthodox by which the + Greek Church is distinguished betrays the presence of that Greek thought + which moulded her dogmas into logical shape. What is more, the very idea + of right belief as a vital and saving thing came to Christianity from + Platonism, accompanied by the persuasion that wrong belief was immoral + and its promulgation a crime to be visited by the penalty of death.</p> + + <p>Ecclesiastical intolerance has been made responsible for the + speculative stagnation of the Middle Ages, and it has been explained as + an effect of the belief in the future punishment of heresy by eternal + torments. But in truth the persecuting spirit was responsible for the + dogma, not the dogma for persecution. And we must look for the underlying + cause of the whole evil in the premature union of metaphysics with + religion and morality first effected by Plato, or rather by the genius of + Athens working through Plato. Indeed, on a closer examination we shall + find that the slowing-down of speculation had begun long before the + advent of Christianity, and coincides with the establishment of its + headquarters at Athens, where also the first permanent schools of + philosophy were established. These schools were distinctly religious in + their character; and none was so set against innovation as that of + Epicurus, falsely supposed to have been a home of freethought. In the + last Greek system of philosophy, Neo-Platonism, theology reigned supreme; + and during the two and a-half centuries of its existence no real advance + on the teaching of Plotinus was made. <!-- Page 3 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page3"></a>{3}</span></p> + + <p>Neo-Platonism when first constituted had incorporated a large + Aristotelian element, the expulsion of which had been accomplished by its + last great master, Proclus; and Christendom took over metaphysics under + what seemed a Platonic form—the more welcome as Plato passed for + giving its creeds the independent support of pure reason. This support + extended beyond a future life and went down to the deepest mysteries of + revealed faith. For, according to the Platonic doctrine of ideas, it was + quite in order that there should be a divine unity existing independently + of the three divine persons composing it; that the idea of humanity + should be combined with one of these persons; and that the same idea, + being both one with and distinct from Adam, should involve all mankind in + the guilt of his transgression. Thus the Church started with a strong + prejudice in favour of Plato which continued to operate for many + centuries, although the first great schoolman, John Scotus Eriugena + (810-877), incurred a condemnation for heresy by adopting the pantheistic + metaphysics of Neo-Platonism.</p> + + <p>As the Platonic doctrine of ideas came to life again in the realism, + as it was called, of scholastic philosophy, so the conflicting view of + his old opponent Aristotle was revived under the form of conceptualism. + According to this theory the genera and species of the objective world + correspond to real and permanent distinctions in the nature of things; + but, apart from the conceptions by which they are represented in the + intellect of God and man, those distinctions have no separate existence. + Aristotle's philosophy was first brought into Europe by the Mohammedan + conquerors of Spain, which became an important centre of learning in the + earlier Middle Ages. Not a few Christian scholars went there to <!-- Page + 4 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page4"></a>{4}</span>study. Latin + translations were made from Arabic versions of Aristotle, and in this way + his doctrines became more widely known to the lecture-rooms of the + Catholic world. But their derivation from infidel sources roused a + prejudice against them, still further heightened by the circumstance that + an Arabian commentator, Averroes, had interpreted the theology of the + <i>Metaphysics</i> in a pantheistic sense. And on any sincere reading + Aristotle denied the soul's immortality which Plato had upheld. + Accordingly, all through the twelfth century Platonism still dominated + religious thought, and even so late as the early thirteenth century the + study of Aristotle was still condemned by the Church.</p> + + <p>Nevertheless a great revolution was already in progress. As a result + of the capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders in <span + class="scac">A.D.</span> 1204 the Greek manuscripts of Aristotle's + writings were brought to Paris, and at a subsequent period they were + translated into Latin under the direction of St. Thomas Aquinas, the + ablest of the schoolmen, who so manipulated the Peripatetic philosophy as + to convert it from a battering-ram into a buttress of Catholic + theology—a position still officially assigned to it at the present + day. Aristotelianism, however, did not reign without a rival even in the + later Middle Ages. Aquinas was a Dominican; and the jealousy of the + competing Franciscan Order found expression in maintaining a certain + tradition of Platonism, represented in different ways by Roger Bacon + (1214-1294) and by Duns Scotus (1265-1308). In this connection we have to + note the extraordinary fertility of the British islands in eminent + thinkers during the Middle Ages. Besides the two last mentioned there is + Eriugena ("born in Ireland"), John of Salisbury <!-- Page 5 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page5"></a>{5}</span>(1115-1180), the first + Humanist, William of Ockham, and Wycliffe, the first + reformer—making six in all, a larger contribution than any other + region of Europe, or indeed all the rest of Europe put together, has made + to the stars of Scholasticism. This advantage is probably not due to any + inherent genius for philosophy in the inhabitants of these islands, but + to their relative immunity from war and to the political liberty that + cannot but have been favourable to independent thought. Five out of the + six were more or less inclined to Platonism, and their idealist or + mystical tendencies were sometimes associated with the same practicality + that distinguished their master. The sixth, commonly called Occam (died + about 1349), is famous as the champion of Nominalism—that is, of + the doctrine that genera and species have no real existence either in + nature or in mind; there are only individuals more or less resembling one + another. He is the author of the famous saying—the sole legacy of + Scholasticism to common thought: "Entities ought not to be gratuitously + multiplied" (entia non sunt pręter necessitatem multiplicanda).</p> + + <p>The capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders had led to Aristotle's + triumph in the thirteenth century. Two hundred years later the conquering + Ottoman advance on the same city was the immediate cause of his + overthrow. For the Byzantine scholars who fled for help and refuge to + Italy brought with them the manuscripts of Plato and Plotinus, and these + soon became known to Western Europe through the Latin translations of + Marsilio Ficino. On its literary side the Platonic revival fell in + admirably with the Humanism to which the Schoolmen had long been + intensely distasteful. And the religious movement that preceded <!-- Page + 6 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page6"></a>{6}</span>Luther's + Reformation found a welcome ally in Neo-Platonic mysticism. At the same + time the invention of printing, by opening the world of books to + non-academic readers, vastly widened the possibilities of independent + thought. And the Reformation, by discrediting the scholastic theology in + Northern Europe, dealt another blow at the system with which it had been + associated by Aquinas.</p> + + <p>It has been supposed that the discovery of America and the + circumnavigation of the globe contributed also to the impending + philosophical revolution. But the true theory of the earth's figure + formed the very foundation of Aristotle's cosmology, and was as well + known to Dante as to ourselves. Made by a fervent Catholic, acting under + the patronage of the Catholic queen <i>par excellence</i>, the discovery + of Columbus increased the prestige of Catholicism by opening a new world + to its missions and adding to the wealth of its supporters in the Old + World.</p> + + <p>The decisive blow to medieval ideas came from another + quarter—from the Copernican astronomy. What the true theory of the + earth's motion meant for philosophy has not always been rightly + understood. It seems to be commonly supposed that the heliocentric system + excited hostility because it degraded the earth from her proud position + as centre of the universe. But the reverse is true. According to + Aristotle and his scholastic followers, the centre of the universe is the + lowest and least honourable, the circumference the highest and most + distinguished position in it. And that is why earth, as the vilest of the + four elements, tends to the centre; while fire, being the most precious, + flies upward. Again, the incorruptible ęther of which the heavens are + composed shows its eternal character <!-- Page 7 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page7"></a>{7}</span>by moving for ever round in + a circle of which God, as Prime Mover, occupies the outermost verge. And + this metaphysical topography is faithfully followed by Dante, who even + improves on it by placing the worst criminals (that is, the rebels and + traitors—Satan, with Judas and Brutus and Cassius) in the eternal + ice at the very centre of the earth. Such fancies were incompatible with + the new astronomy. No longer cold and dead, our earth might henceforth + take her place among the stars, animated like them—if animated they + were—and suggesting by analogy that they too supported teeming + multitudes of reasonable inhabitants.</p> + + <p>But the transposition of values did not end here. Aristotle's whole + philosophy had been based on a radical antithesis between the sublunary + and the superlunary spheres—the world of growth, decay, + vicissitude, and the world of everlasting realities. In the sublunary + sphere, also, it distinguished sharply between the Forms of things, which + were eternal, and the Matter on which they were imposed, an intangible, + evanescent thing related to Form as Possibility to Actuality. We know + that these two convenient categories are logically independent of the + false cosmology that may or may not have suggested their world-wide + application. But the immediate effect of having it denied, or even + doubted, was greatly to exalt the credit of Matter or Power at the + expense of Form or Act.</p> + + <p>The first to draw these revolutionary inferences from the Copernican + theory was Giordano Bruno (1548-1600). Born at Nola, a south Italian city + not far from Naples, Bruno entered the Dominican Order before the age of + fifteen, and on that occasion exchanged his baptismal name of Filippo for + that by which he has ever since been known. Here he became acquainted + with the <!-- Page 8 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page8"></a>{8}</span>whole of ancient and medieval philosophy, + besides the Copernican astronomy, then not yet condemned by the Church. + At the early age of eighteen he first came into collision with the + authorities; and at twenty-eight (1576) [McIntyre, pp. 9-10] he openly + questioned the chief characteristic dogmas of Catholicism, was menaced + with an action for heresy, and fled from the convent. The pursuit must + have been rather perfunctory, for Bruno found himself free to spend two + years wandering from one Italian city to another, earning a precarious + livelihood by tuition and authorship. Leaving Italy at last, rather from + a desire to push his fortunes abroad than from any fear of molestation, + and finding France too hot to hold him, he tried Geneva for a little + while, but, on being given to understand that he could only stay on the + condition of embracing Calvinism, returned to France, where he lived + first for two years as Professor of Philosophy at Toulouse, and three + more in a somewhat less official position at Paris. Thence, in the train + of the French ambassador, he passed to England, where his two years' + sojourn seems to have been the happiest and most fruitful period of his + restless career. It was cut short by his chief's return to Paris. But the + philosopher's fearless advocacy of Copernicanism made that bigoted + capital impossible. The truth, however, seems to be that Bruno never + could hit it off with anyone or any society; and the next five years, + spent in trying to make himself acceptable at one German university after + another, are a record of hopeless failure. Finally, in an evil hour, he + goes to Venice at the invitation of a young noble, Mocenigo, who, in + revenge for disappointed expectations, betrays him to the Inquisition. + Questioned about his heresies, Bruno showed perfect willingness to accept + all the theological dogmas that <!-- Page 9 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page9"></a>{9}</span>he had formerly denied. Whether he withdrew + his retractation on being transferred from a Venetian to a Roman prison + does not appear, as the Roman depositions are not forthcoming. Neither is + it clear why so long a delay as six years (1594-1600) was granted to the + philosopher when such short work was made of other heretics. It seems + most probable that Bruno, while pliant enough on questions of religious + belief, remained inflexible in maintaining the infinity of inhabited + worlds. When the final condemnation was read out, he told the judges that + he heard it with less fear than they felt in pronouncing it. In the + customary euphemistic terms they had sent him to death by fire. At the + stake, when the crucifix was held up to him, he turned away his + eyes—with what thoughts we cannot tell. There is a monument to the + heroic thinker at Nola, and another in the Campo dei Fiori on the spot + where he suffered at Rome, raised against the strongest protests of the + ecclesiastical authorities.</p> + + <p>The Greek-Italian philosophers—the Pythagoreans and + Parmenides—had introduced the idea of finiteness or Limitation as a + necessary condition of reality and perfection into thought. From them it + passed over to Plato and Aristotle, who made it dominant in the schools. + Epicurus and Lucretius had, indeed, carried on the older Ionian tradition + of infinite atoms and infinite worlds dispersed through infinite space; + but their philosophy was practically atheistic, and the Church condemned + it as both heretical and false. Probably the discovery of the earth's + globular shape had first suggested the idea of a finite universe to + Parmenides; at any rate, the discovery of the earth's motion suggested + the idea of an infinite universe to his Greek-souled Italian successor; + or rather it was <!-- Page 10 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page10"></a>{10}</span>the break-up of Aristotle's spherical world + by Copernicanism that threw Bruno back—as he gives us himself to + understand—on the older Ionian cosmologies, with their assumption + of infinite space and infinite worlds. In this reference Bruno went far + beyond Copernicus, and even Kepler; for both had assumed, in deference to + current opinion, that the fixed stars were equidistant from the solar + system, and formed a single sphere enclosing it on all sides. He, on the + contrary, anticipated modern astronomy in conceiving the stars as so many + suns dispersed without assignable limits through space, and each + surrounded by inhabited planets.</p> + + <p>Infinite space had been closely associated by Democritus and Epicurus + with infinite atoms; and the next great step taken by Bruno was to + rehabilitate atomism as a necessary concept of modern science. He figured + the atoms as very minute spheres of solid earthy matter, forming by their + combinations the framework of visible bodies. But their combinations are + by no means fortuitous, as Democritus had impiously supposed; nor do they + move through an absolute void. All space is filled with an ocean of + liquid ęther, which is no other than the quintessence of which + Aristotle's celestial spheres were composed. Only in Bruno's system it + takes the place of that First Matter which is the extreme antithesis of + the disembodied Form personified in the Prime Mover, God. And here we + come to that reversal of cosmic values brought about by the reversal of + the relations between the earth and sun which Copernicus had effected. + The primordial Matter, so far from passively receiving the Forms imposed + on it from without, has an infinite capacity for evolving Forms from its + own bosom; and, so far <!-- Page 11 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page11"></a>{11}</span>from being unspiritual, is itself the + universal spirit, the creative and animating soul of the world. The First + Matter, Form, Energy, Life, and Reason are identified with Nature, Nature + with the Universe, and the Universe with God.</p> + + <p>So far all is clear, if not convincing. It is otherwise with the + theory of Monads. This is only expounded in Bruno's Latin works, for the + most part ill-written and hopelessly obscure. It seems possible that by + the monads Bruno sometimes means the infinitesimal parts into which the + ęther of space may conceivably be divided. Each of these possesses + consciousness, and therefore may be considered as reflecting and + representing the whole universe. A number of monads, or rather a + continuous portion of the ęther surrounding and interpenetrating a group + of atoms, endows them with the forms and qualities of elementary bodies, + ascending gradually through vegetal and animal organisations to human + beings. But the animating process does not stop with man. The earth, with + the other planets, the sun, and all the stars, are also monads on the + largest scale, with reasonable souls, just as Aristotle thought. In fact, + the old mythology whence he derived the idea repeats itself in his great + enemy Bruno.</p> + + <p>Beyond and above all these partial unities is the Monas + Monadum—the supreme unity, the infinite God who is the soul of the + infinite universe. Doubtless there is here a reminiscence of the + Neo-Platonic One, the ineffable Absolute, beyond all existence, yet + endowed with the infinite power whence all existence proceeds. Bruno had + learned from Cardinal Nicolas of Cusa—a Copernican before + Copernicus—to recognise the principle of Heracleitus that opposites + are one; and in this instance he applies it with brilliant audacity; for + every infinitesimal <!-- Page 12 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page12"></a>{12}</span>part of the space-filling ęther is no less + the soul of the universe than the Monad of Monads itself. And both agree + in being non-existent in the sense of being transfinite, since there can + be no sum of infinity and no animated mathematical points.</p> + + <p>From Anaximander to Plotinus there is hardly a great Greek thinker + whose influence cannot be traced in the system of Giordano Bruno. And + while he represents the philosophical Renaissance in this eminent degree, + he heads the two lines of speculation which, separately or combined, run + through the whole history of modern metaphysics—the monistic, and + what is now called the pluralistic tendency. With none, except, perhaps, + with Hegel, have the two been perfectly balanced; and in Bruno himself + the leaning is distinctly towards plurality, his Supreme Monad being a + mere survival from the Neo-Platonic One.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Francis Bacon.</b></p> + + <p>Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was by profession a lawyer, by taste a + scientific inquirer, by character a seeker after wealth and power, by + natural genius an immortal master of words. He began life as the friend, + adviser, and client of Elizabeth's favourite, the Earl of Essex. When + that unfortunate courtier, in disregard of his warnings, rushed into a + treasonable enterprise, Bacon appeared as one of the most zealous of the + counsel for the prosecution. Strictly speaking, this may have been his + duty as a loyal subject of the Queen; it was hardly his duty, even on the + Queen's commission, after Essex's execution, to assist in the composition + of a pamphlet blackening the memory of his former friend and patron. In + the next reign Bacon paid assiduous court to James and his favourites. + <!-- Page 13 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page13"></a>{13}</span></p> + + <div class="figcenter" style="width:23%;"> + <a href="images/p013.jpg"><img style="width:100%" src="images/p013.jpg" + alt="Francis Bacon" title="Francis Bacon" /></a> + <span class="sc">Francis Bacon.</span> + + <p class="author">(<i>Copyright B. P. C.</i>)</p> + + <p class="poem"></p> + </div> + +<p><!-- Page 14 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page14"></a>{14}</span></p> + + <p>When the first of these, Somerset, fell and was tried on a charge of + murder, he conducted the prosecution, and, finding the evidence + insufficient, suggested to James that the prisoner should be entrapped + into a confession by dangling a false promise of forgiveness before his + eyes. Bacon owed his final exaltation to Buckingham, and as Lord Keeper + allowed himself to be made the tool of that bad man for the perversion of + justice. A suit was brought before him by a young man against a + fraudulent trustee (his own uncle) for the restitution of a sum of money. + Bacon gave sentence for the plaintiff. Buckingham then intervened with a + demand that the case should be retried. "Upon this Bacon saw the parties + privately, and, annulling all the deliberate decisions of the Court, + compelled the youth to assent to the ceasing of all proceedings, and to + accept" a smaller sum than he was entitled to (E. A. Abbott). On another + occasion he exercised his judicial authority in a way that did not square + with Buckingham's wishes, but quite legitimately and without any + consciousness of giving offence; whereupon the insolent favourite + addressed him in a letter filled with outrageous abuse, to which Bacon + replied in terms of abject submission. This meanness had its reward, for + in 1618 the philosopher became Lord Chancellor.</p> + + <p>After a three years' tenure Bacon was flung from his high position by + a charge of judicial corruption, to the truth of every count in which he + confessed. The question is very complicated, obscure, and much + controverted, not admitting of discussion within the limits here + assigned. On the subject of Bacon's truthfulness, however, a word must be + said. The Chancellor admitted having taken presents from suitors, but + <!-- Page 15 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page15"></a>{15}</span>denied having ever let his judgments be + influenced thereby; and his word seems to be generally accepted as a + sufficient exoneration. But its value may be doubted in view of two + statements quoted by Dean Church. Of these "one was made in the House of + Commons by Sir George Hastings, a member of the House, who had been the + channel of Awbry's gift [made to the Chancellor <i>pendente lite</i>], + that when he had told Bacon that if questioned he must admit it, Bacon's + answer was: 'George, if you do so, I must deny it, upon my + honour—upon my oath.' The other was that he had given an opinion in + favour of some claim of the Masters in Chancery, for which he received + £1,200, and with which he said that all the judges agreed—an + assertion which all the judges denied. Of these charges there is no + contradiction." The denial of Bacon that he ever allowed his judgments to + be influenced by bribes, and his assertion that he was the justest judge + since his own father, cannot, then, count for much. As to the plea that + the justice of his sentences was never challenged, who was to challenge + it? The successful suitor would hold his tongue; and the unsuccessful + suitor could hardly be expected to complete his own ruin by going to law + again on the strength of the Chancellor's condemnation.</p> + + <p>Bacon, at any rate, knew quite well that to take presents before + judgment was wrong and criminal, as his answer to Egerton sufficiently + shows—an answer which also fully disposes of the plea that to take + such presents was the common custom of the age. Moreover, had such been + the common custom, Bacon might have taken his trial and pleaded it as a + sufficient apology or extenuation for his own conduct. This would have + been a somewhat more dignified course <!-- Page 16 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page16"></a>{16}</span>than the one he actually + pursued, which was to plead guilty to all the charges, throwing himself + on the mercy of the Lords. It has been suggested that he did this at the + desire of his powerful patrons, whose malpractices might have been + brought to light by a public investigation. As his punishment was + immediately remitted, some arrangement with the King and Buckingham seems + probable. But for an innocent man to have saved himself by a false + acknowledgment of guilt would, as Macaulay shows, have been still more + infamous than to take bribes.</p> + + <p>The desperate efforts of some apologists to whitewash Bacon are + apparently due to a very exaggerated estimate of his services to mankind. + Other critics give themselves the pleasure of painting what has been + called a Rembrandt portrait, with noon on the forehead and night at the + heart. And a third class argue from a rotten morality to a rotten + intelligence. In fact, Bacon as little deserves to be called the wisest + and greatest as the meanest of mankind. He really loved humanity, and + tried hard to serve it, devoting a truly philosophical intellect to that + end. The service was to consist in an immense extension of man's power + over nature, to be obtained by a complete knowledge of her secrets; and + this knowledge he hoped to win by reforming the methods of scientific + investigation. Unfortunately, intellect alone proved unequal to that + mighty task. Bacon passes, and not without good grounds, for a great + upholder of the principle that truth can only be learned by experience. + But his philosophy starts by setting that principle at defiance. He who + took all knowledge for his province omitted from his survey the rather + important subject of knowledge itself, its limits and its laws. Had his + attention <!-- Page 17 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page17"></a>{17}</span>been drawn that way, the very first + requisite, on empirical principles, would have been to take stock of the + leading truths already ascertained. But the enormous vanity of the + amateur reformer seems to have persuaded him that these amounted to + little or nothing. The later Renaissance was an age of intense scientific + activity, conditioned, in the first instance, by a revival of Greek + learning. Already before the middle of the sixteenth century great + advance had been made in algebra, trigonometry, astronomy, mineralogy, + botany, anatomy, and physiology. Before the publication of the <i>Novum + Organum</i> Napier had invented logarithms, Galileo was reconstituting + physics, Gilbert had created the science of magnetism, and Harvey had + discovered the circulation of the blood. These were facts that Bacon took + no pains to study; he either ignores or slights or denies the work done + by his illustrious predecessors and contemporaries. That he rejected the + Copernican theory with scorn is an exaggeration; but he never accepted + it, notwithstanding arguments that the best astronomers of his time found + convincing; and the longer he lived the more unfavourable became his + opinion of its merits. And it is certain that Tycho Brahe's wonderful + mass of observations, with the splendid generalisations based on them by + Kepler, are never mentioned in his writings. Now what really ruined + Aristotelianism was the heliocentric astronomy, as Bruno perfectly saw; + and ignorance of this left Bacon after all in the bonds of medieval + philosophy.</p> + + <p>We have seen in studying Bruno that the very soul of Aristotle's + system was his distinction between form and matter, and this distinction + Bacon accepted without examination from scholasticism. The purpose of his + <!-- Page 18 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page18"></a>{18}</span>life was to ascertain by what combination of + forms each particular body was constituted, and then, by artificially + superinducing them on some portion of matter, to call the desired + substance into existence. His celebrated inductive method was devised as + a means to that end. To discover the forms "we are instructed first to + draw up exhaustive tables of the phenomena and forms under investigation, + and then to exclude from our list any 'form' which does not invariably + co-exist with the phenomenon of which <i>the</i> form is sought. For + example, if we are trying to discover the form of heat it will not do to + adduce 'celestial nature'; for, though the sun's light is hot, that of + the moon is cold. After a series of such <i>exclusions</i>, Bacon + believed that a single form would finally remain to be the invariable + cause of the phenomenon investigated, and of nothing else" (F. C. S. + Schiller).</p> + + <p>As Dr. Schiller observes, this <i>method of exclusions</i> is not new; + nor, indeed, does Bacon claim to have originated it; at least he observes + in his <i>Novum Organum</i> that it had been already employed by Plato to + a certain extent for the purpose of discussing definitions and ideas. And + elsewhere he praises Plato as "a man (and one that surveyed all things + from a lofty cliff) for having discerned in his doctrine of Ideas that + Forms were the true object of knowledge; howsoever he lost the fruit of + this most true opinion by considering and trying to apprehend Forms as + absolutely abstracted from matter, whence it came that he turned aside to + theological speculations." Bacon must have known that this reproach does + not apply to Aristotle; as, indeed, the very schoolmen knew that he did + not—except in the single case of God—give Forms a separate + <!-- Page 19 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page19"></a>{19}</span>existence. But, probably from jealousy, he + specially hated Aristotle, and in this particular instance the Stagirite + more particularly excited his hostility by identifying Forms with Final + Causes. These Bacon rather contemptuously handed over to the sole + cognisance of theology as consecrated virgins bearing no fruit. As a + point of scientific method this condemnation of teleology is quite + unjustified even in the eyes of inquirers who reject the theological + argument from design. To a Darwinian, purpose means survival value, and + the parts of an organism are so many utilities evolved in the action and + reaction between living beings and their environment. But Bacon disliked + any theory tending to glorify the existing arrangements of nature as + perfect and unalterable achievements, for the good reason that it + threatened to discountenance his own scheme for practically creating the + world over again with exclusive reference to the good of humanity. Thus + in his Utopia, the <i>New Atlantis</i>, there are artificial mines, + producing artificial metals, plants raised without seeds, contrivances + for turning one tree or plant into another, for prolonging the lives of + animals after the removal of particular organs, for making "a number of + kinds of serpents, worms, flies, fishes of putrefaction; whereof some are + advanced to be perfect creatures like beasts or birds"; with + flying-machines, submarines, and perpetual motions—in short, a + general anticipation of Jules Verne and Mr. H. G. Wells.</p> + + <p>Such dreams, however, do not entitle Bacon to be regarded as a true + prophet of modern science and modern mechanical inventions. In themselves + his ideas do not go beyond the magic of the Middle Ages, or rather of all + ages. The original thing was his <!-- Page 20 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page20"></a>{20}</span>Method; and this Method, considered as a + means for surprising the secrets of nature, we know to be completely + chimerical, because there are no such Forms as he imagined, to be + enucleated by induction, with or without the Method of Exclusion. The + truth is that the inductive method which he borrowed from Socrates and + Plato was originally created by Athenian philosophy for the humanistic + studies of law, morality, ęsthetics, and psychology. Physical science, on + the other hand, should be approached, as the Greeks rightly felt, through + the door of mathematics, an instrument of whose potency the great + Chancellor notoriously had no conception. Thus his prodigious powers + would have been much more usefully devoted to moral philosophy. As it is, + the <i>Essays</i> alone remain to show what great things he might have + done by limiting himself to the subjects with which they deal. The famous + logical and physical treatises, the <i>Novum Organum</i> and the <i>De + Augmentis</i>, notwithstanding their wealth and splendour of language, + are to us at the present day less living than the fragments of early + Greek thought, than most of Plato, than much of Aristotle, than Atomism + as expounded by Lucretius.</p> + + <p>Macaulay rests his claim of the highest place among philosophers for + Bacon not on his inductive theory, to which the historian rightly denies + any novelty, but on the new purpose and direction that the search for + knowledge is assumed to have received from his teaching. On this view the + whole of modern science has been created by the desire to convert nature + into an instrument for the satisfaction of human wants—an ambition + dating from the publication of the <i>Novum Organum</i>. The claim will + not stand, for two reasons. The first is that the great movement of + modern science <!-- Page 21 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page21"></a>{21}</span>began at least half a century before Bacon's + birth, growing rapidly during his life, but without his knowledge, and + continuing its course without being perceptibly accelerated by his + intervention ever since. The one man of science who most commonly passes + for his disciple is Robert Boyle (1627-1691). But Boyle did not read the + <i>Novum Organum</i> before he was thirty, whereas, residing at Florence + before fifteen, he received a powerful stimulus from the study of + Galileo. And his chemistry was based on the atomic theory which Bacon + rejected.</p> + + <p>The second reason for not accepting Macaulay's claim is that in modern + Europe no less than in ancient Greece the great advances in science have + only been made by those who loved knowledge for its own sake, or, if the + expression be preferred, simply for the gratification of their + intellectual curiosity. No doubt their discoveries have added enormously + to the utilities of life; but such advantages have been gained on the + sole condition of not making them the primary end in view. The labours of + Bacon's own contemporaries, Kepler and Gilbert, have led to the + navigation of the sea by lunar distances, and to the various industrial + applications of electro-magnetism; but they were undertaken without a + dream of these remote results. And in our own day the greatest of + scientific triumphs, which is the theory of evolution, was neither worked + out with any hope of material benefits to mankind nor has it offered any + prospect of them as yet. The same may be said of modern sidereal + astronomy. From the humanist point of view it would not be easy to + justify the enormous expenditure of energy, money, and time that this + science has absorbed. The schoolmen have been much ridiculed for + discussing the question how <!-- Page 22 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page22"></a>{22}</span>many angels could dance on the point of a + needle; but as a purely speculative problem it surely merits as much + attention as the total number of the stars, the rates of their + velocities, or the law of their distribution through space. A schoolman + might even have urged in justification of his curiosity that some of us + might feel a reasonable curiosity about the exact size—if size they + have—of beings with whom we hope to associate one day; whereas by + the confession of the astronomers themselves neither we nor our + descendants can ever hope to verify by direct measurement the precarious + guesses of their science in this branch of celestial statics and + dynamics.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Thomas Hobbes.</b></p> + + <p>It has been shown that one momentous effect of the Copernican + astronomy, as interpreted by Giordano Bruno, was to reverse the relative + importance ascribed in Aristotle's philosophy to the two great categories + of Power and Act, giving to Power a value and dignity of which it had + been stripped by the judgment of Plato and Aristotle. Even Epicurus, when + he rehabilitated infinite space, had been careful as a moralist to urge + the expediency of placing a close limitation on human desires, denouncing + the excesses of avarice and ambition more mildly but not less decisively + than the contemporary Stoic school. Thus Lucretius describes his master + as travelling beyond the flaming walls of the world only that he may + bring us back a knowledge of the fixed barrier set by the very laws of + existence to our aspirations and hopes.</p> + + <p>The classic revival of the Renaissance did not bring back the Greek + spirit of moderation. On the contrary, the new world, the new astronomy, + the new monarchy, <!-- Page 23 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page23"></a>{23}</span>and the new religion combined to create such + a sense of Power, in contradistinction to Act, as the world had never + before known. For us this new feeling has received its most triumphant + artistic expression from Shakespeare and Milton, for France from + Rabelais, for Italy from Ariosto and Michelangelo. In philosophy Bacon + strikes the same note when he values knowledge as a source of + power—knowledge which for Greek philosophy meant rather a lesson in + self-restraint. And this idea receives a further development from Bacon's + chief successor in English philosophy, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), in + whose system love of power figures as the very essence of human nature, + the self-conscious manifestation of that Motion which is the real + substance of the physical world.</p> + + <p>Hobbes was a precocious child, and received a good school training; + but the five years he spent at Oxford added nothing to his information, + and a continental tour with the young heir of the Cavendishes had no + other effect than to convince him of the general contempt into which the + scholasticism still taught at Oxford had fallen. On returning to England, + he began his studies over again in the Cavendish library, acquiring a + thorough familiarity with the classic literature of Greece and Rome, a + deep hatred (imbibed through Thucydides) of democracy, and a genuinely + antique theory that the State should be supreme in religious no less than + in civil matters. Amid these studies Hobbes occasionally enjoyed the + society of Bacon, then spending his last years in the retirement of + Gorhambury. As secretary and Latin translator he proved serviceable to + the ex-Chancellor, but remained quite unaffected by his inductive and + experimental philosophy. Indeed, the determining impulse of his <!-- Page + 24 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page24"></a>{24}</span>speculative + activity came from the opposite quarter. Going abroad once more as + travelling tutor, at the age of forty, he chanced on a copy of Euclid in + a gentleman's library lying open at the famous Forty-Seventh Proposition. + His first impulse was to reject the theorem as impossible; but, on going + backwards from proposition to proposition, he laid down the book not only + convinced, but "in love with geometry."</p> + + <p>Beginning so late in life, his ulterior studies led Hobbes into the + belief that he had squared the circle, besides the far more pernicious + error of applying the deductive method of geometry to the solution of + political problems. Could he and Bacon have exchanged philosophies, the + brilliant faculties of each might have been employed to better purpose. + The categories of Form and Matter, combined with the logic of elimination + and tentative generalisation, would have found a fitting field for their + application in the familiar facts of human nature. But those facts + refused to be treated as so many wheels, pulleys, and cords in a machine + for crushing the life out of society and transmitting the will of a + single despot unresisted through its whole extent; for such is a faithful + picture of what a well-governed community, as Hobbes conceived it, ought + to be. During his second residence abroad he had become acquainted with + the physical philosophy of Galileo—the theory that regards every + change in the external or phenomenal world as a mere rearrangement of + matter and motion, matter being an aggregate of independent molecules + held together by mechanical pressure and impact. The component parts of + this aggregate become known to us by the impressions their movements + produce on our senses, traces of which <!-- Page 25 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page25"></a>{25}</span>are preserved in memory, + and subsequently recalled by association. Language consists of signs + conventionally affixed to such images; only the signs, standing as they + do for all objects of a certain sort, have a universal value, not + possessed by the original sensations, through which reasoning becomes + possible. Hobbes had evidently fallen in love with algebra as well as + with geometry; and it is on the type of algebraic reasoning—in + other words, on the type of rigorous deduction—that his logic is + constructed. And such a view of the way in which knowledge advances + seemed amply justified by the scientific triumphs of his age. But his + principle that all motion originates in antecedent motion, although + plausible in itself and occasionally revived by ingenious speculators, + has not been verified by modern science. Gravitation, cohesion, and + chemical affinity have, so far, to be accepted as facts not resoluble + into more general facts. Hobbes died before the great discoveries of + Newton which first turned away men's minds from the purely mechanical + interpretation of energy.</p> + + <p>That mechanical interpretation led our philosopher to reject + Aristotle's notion of sociality as an essentially human characteristic. + To him this seemed a mere occult quality, the substitution of a word for + an explanation. The counter-view put forth in his great work, + <i>Leviathan</i>, is commonly called atomistic. But it would be gross + flattery to compare the ultimate elements of society, as Hobbes conceived + them, to the molecules of modern science, which attract as well as repel + each other; or even with the Democritean atoms, which are at least + neutral. According to him, the tendency to self-preservation, shared by + men with all other beings, takes the form of an insatiable appetite <!-- + Page 26 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page26"></a>{26}</span>for + power, leading each individual to pursue his own aggrandisement at the + cost of any loss or suffering to the rest. And he tries to prove the + permanence of this impulse by referring to the precautions against + robbery taken by householders and travellers. Aristotle had much more + justly mentioned the kindnesses shown to travellers as a proof of how + widely goodwill is diffused. Our countryman, with all his acuteness, + strangely ignores the necessity as a matter of prudence of going armed + and locking the door at night, even if the robbers only amounted to one + in a thousand of the population. Modern researches have shown that there + are very primitive societies where the assumed war of all against each is + unknown, predatory conflicts being a mark of more advanced civilisation, + and the cause rather than the effect of anti-social impulses.</p> + + <p>Granting an original state of anarchy and internecine hostility, there + is, according to Hobbes, only one way out of it, which is a joint + resolution of the whole community to surrender their rights of individual + sovereignty into the hands of one man, who thenceforth becomes absolute + ruler of the State, with authority to defend its citizens against mutual + aggressions, and the whole community against attacks from a foreign + Power. This agreement constitutes the famous Social Contract, of which so + much was to be heard during the next century and a-half. It holds as + between the citizens themselves, but not between the subjects and their + sovereign, for that would be admitting a responsibility which there is no + power to enforce. And anyone refusing to obey the sovereign justly + forfeits his life; for he thereby returns to the State of Nature, where + any man that likes may kill his neighbour if he can.</p> + + <p>All this theory of an original institution of the State <!-- Page 27 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page27"></a>{27}</span>by contract + impresses a modern reader as utterly unhistorical. But its value, if any, + does not depend on its historical truth. Even if the remote ancestors of + the seventeenth-century Europeans had surrendered all their individual + rights, with certain trifling exceptions, into the hands of an autocrat, + no sophistry could show that their mutual engagements were binding on the + subjects of Charles I. and Louis XIV. And it is really on expediency, + understood in the largest sense, that the claims of the New Monarchy are + based by Hobbes. What he maintains is that nothing short of a despotic + government exercised by one man can save society from relapsing into + chaos. But even under this amended form the theory remains amenable to + historical criticism. Had Hobbes pursued his studies beyond Thucydides, + he would have found that other polities besides the Athenian democracy + broke down at the hour of trial. Above all, Roman Imperialism, which + seems to have been his ideal, failed to secure its subjects either + against internal disorder or against foreign invasion.</p> + + <p>Democracy, however, was not the sole or the worst enemy dreaded by the + author of <i>Leviathan</i> as a competitor with his "mortal god." In the + frontispiece of that work the deified monarch who holds the sword erect + with his right hand grasps the crozier with his left, thus typifying the + union of the spiritual and temporal powers in the same person. The + publicists of the Italian Renaissance, with their classical ideals, had, + indeed, been as anti-papal as the Protestants; and the political + disorders fomented by the agents of the Catholic reaction during the last + hundred years had given Hobbes an additional reason for perpetuating + their point of view. Meanwhile another menace to <!-- Page 28 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page28"></a>{28}</span>public order had + presented itself from an opposite quarter. Calvinism had created a new + spiritual power based on the free individual interpretation of Scripture, + in close alliance with the alleged rights of conscience and with the + spirit of republican liberty. Each creed in turn had attacked the Stuart + monarchy, and the second had just effected its overthrow. Therefore, to + save the State it was necessary that religious creeds, no less than codes + of conduct, should be dictated by the secular authority, enslaving men's + minds as well as their bodies.</p> + + <p>By the dialectic irony of the speculative movement, this attempt to + fetter opinion was turned into an instrument for its more complete + emancipation. In order to discredit the pretensions of the religious + zealots, Hobbes made a series of attacks on the foundations of their + faith, mostly by way of suggestion and innuendo—no more being + possible under the conditions then obtaining—-but with such effect + that, according to Macaulay, "for many years the <i>Leviathan</i> was the + gospel of cold-blooded and hard-headed unbelievers." That one who made + religious belief a matter to be fixed by legislation could be in any + sense a Christian seems most unlikely. He professed, with what sincerity + we know not, to regard the existence of God as something only a fool + could deny. But his philosophy from beginning to end forms a + rigorously-thought-out system of materialism which any atheist, if + otherwise it satisfied him, might without inconsistency accept.</p> + + <p>On the meeting of the Long Parliament, Hobbes again left England for + the Continent, where he remained for eleven years. But his principles + were no more to the taste of the exiled royalists than of <!-- Page 29 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page29"></a>{29}</span>their opponents. + He therefore returned once more to England, made his submission to the + Parliament, and spent the rest of his days, practically unmolested by + either party, under the Commonwealth and the Restoration until his death + in 1679 at the age of ninety-one.</p> + + <p>It may be said of Hobbes, as of Bacon, that the intellect at work is + so amazing and the mass of literary performance so imposing that the + illusions of historians about the value of their contributions to the + progress of thought are excusable. Nevertheless, it cannot be too + distinctly stated that the current or academic estimate of these great + men as having effected a revolution in physical and moral science is + wrong. They stand as much apart from the true line of evolution as do the + gigantic saurians of a remote geological period whose remains excite our + wonder in museums of natural history. Their systems proved as futile as + the monarchies of Philip II. and of Louis XIV. Bacon's dreams are no more + related to the coming victories of science than Raleigh's El Dorado was + to the future colonial empire of Britain. Hobbes had better fortune than + Strafford, in so far as he kept his head on his shoulders; but the logic + of his absolutism shrivelled up under the sun of English liberty like the + great Minister's policy of Thorough.</p> + + <p>The theory of a Social Contract is a speculative idea of the highest + practical importance. But the idea of contract as the foundation of + morals goes back to Epicurus, and it is assumed in a more developed form + by Hooker's <i>Ecclesiastical Polity</i>. Its potency as a revolutionary + instrument comes from the reinterpretations of Locke and Rousseau, which + run directly counter to the assumptions of the <i>Leviathan</i>. <!-- + Page 30 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page30"></a>{30}</span></p> + + <p>Hobbes shares with Bacon the belief that all knowledge comes from + experience, besides making it clearer than his predecessor that + experience of the world comes through external sense alone. Here also + there can be no claim to originality, for more than one school of Greek + philosophy had said the same. As an element of subsequent thought, more + importance belongs to the idea of Power, which was to receive its full + development from Spinoza; but only in association with other ideas + derived from the philosopher whom we have next to examine, the founder of + modern metaphysics, Descartes.</p> + + <p><br style="clear:both" /></p> +<hr class="full" /> + +<p><!-- Page 31 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page31"></a>{31}</span></p> + +<h3><span class="sc">Chapter II.</span></h3> + +<h3>THE METAPHYSICIANS</h3> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz.</b></p> + + <p>René Descartes (1596-1650) was a Frenchman, born in Touraine, and + belonging by family to the inferior nobility. Educated at the Jesuit + college of La Flčche, he early acquired a distaste for the scholastic + philosophy, or at least for its details; the theology of scholasticism, + as we shall see, left a deep impression on him through life. On leaving + college he took up mathematics, varied by a short plunge into the + dissipations of Paris. Some years of military service as a volunteer with + the Catholic armies at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War enabled him + to travel and see the world. Returning to Paris, he resumed his studies, + but found them seriously interrupted by the tactless bores who, as we + know from Moličre's amusing comedy <i>Les Fācheux,</i> long continued to + infest French society. To escape their assiduities Descartes, who prized + solitude before all things, fled the country. The inheritance of an + independent income enabled the philosopher to live where he liked; and + Holland became, with a few interruptions, his chosen residence for the + next twenty years (1629-49). Even here frequent changes of residence and + occasional concealment of his address were necessary in order to elude + the visits of importunate admirers. With all his unsociability there + seems to have <!-- Page 32 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page32"></a>{32}</span>been something singularly magnetic about the + personality of Descartes; yet he only fell in with one congenial spirit, + the Princess Elizabeth, daughter of the unfortunate Winter King and + granddaughter of our James I. Possessing to the fullest extent the + intellectual brilliancy and the incomparable charm of the Stuart family, + this great lady impressed the lonely thinker as the only person who ever + understood his philosophy.</p> + + <p>Another royal friendship brought his career to an untimely end. Queen + Christina of Sweden, the gifted and restless daughter of Gustavus + Adolphus, heard of Descartes, and invited him to her Court. On his + arrival she sent for the pilot who had brought the illustrious stranger + to Stockholm and questioned him about his passenger. "Madame," he + replied, "it is not a man whom I conducted to your Majesty, but a + demi-god. He taught me more in three weeks of the science of seamanship + and of winds and navigation than I had learned in the sixty years I had + been at sea" (Miss E. S. Haldane's <i>Life of René Descartes</i>). The + Queen fully came up to the expectations of her visitor, in whose eyes she + had no fault but an unfortunate tendency to waste her time on learning + Greek. Besides her other merits, she possessed "a sweetness and goodness + which made men devoted to her service." It soon appeared that, as with + others of the same rank, this was only the veneer of a heartless + selfishness. Christina, who was an early riser, required his attendance + in her library to give her lessons in philosophy at five o'clock in the + morning. Descartes was by habit a very late riser. Besides, he had not + even a lodging in the royal palace, but was staying at the French + Embassy, and in going there "had to pass over a long bridge which was + always bitterly cold." The cold <!-- Page 33 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page33"></a>{33}</span>killed him. He had arrived at Stockholm in + October, and meant to leave in January; but remained at the urgent + request of the Queen, who, however, made no change in the hour of their + interviews, although that winter was one of the severest on record. At + the beginning of February, 1650, he fell ill and died of inflammation of + the lungs on the 11th, in the fifty-fourth year of his age.</p> + + <p>Descartes had the physical courage which Hobbes lacked; but he seems, + like Bacon, to have been a moral coward. The most striking instance of + this is that, on hearing of Galileo's condemnation for teaching the + heliocentric astronomy, he withheld from publication and had even + thoughts of destroying a work of his own in which the same doctrine was + maintained. This was at a time when he was living in a country where + there could be no question of personal danger from the Inquisition. But + something of the same weakness shows itself in his running away from + France to escape those intrusions on his studious retirement which one + would think might have been checked by letting it be known with + sufficient firmness that his hours could not be wasted on idle + conversation. And we have seen how at last his life was lost for no + better reason than the dread of giving offence to Queen Christina.</p> + + <p>It seems strange that a character so unheroic should figure among the + great emancipators of human thought. In fact, Descartes's services to + liberty have been much exaggerated. His intellectual fame rests on three + foundations. Of these the most indubitable is the creation of analytical + geometry, the starting-point of modern mathematics. The value of his + contributions to physics has been much disputed; but, on the whole, + expert opinion seems to have decided that what was new in them was not + true, and what was true was not new. However, the place we must assign + Descartes in the history of philosophy can only be determined by our + opinion of his metaphysics.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 34 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page34"></a>{34}</span></p> + + <div class="figcenter" style="width:21%;"> + <a href="images/p034.jpg"><img style="width:100%" src="images/p034.jpg" + alt="Francis Bacon" title="Francis Bacon" /></a> + <span class="sc">René Descartes.</span> + </div> + +<p><!-- Page 35 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page35"></a>{35}</span></p> + + <p>As a philosopher Descartes has, to begin with, the merit of exemplary + clearness. The fault is not with him if we cannot tell what he thought + and how he came to think it. The classic <i>Discourse on Method</i> + (1637) relates his mental history in a style of almost touching + simplicity. It appears that from an early age truth had been his + paramount object, not as with Bacon and Hobbes for its utility, but for + its own sake. In search of this ideal he read widely, but without finding + what he wanted. The great and famous works of literature might entertain + or dazzle; they could not convince. The philosophers professed to teach + truth; their endless disputes showed that they had not found it. + Mathematics, on the other hand, presented a pleasing picture of + demonstrated certainty, but a certainty that seemed to be prized only as + a sure foundation for the mechanical arts. Wearily throwing his books + aside, the young man then applied himself to the great book of life, + mingling with all sorts and conditions of men to hear what they had to + say about the prime interests of existence. But the same vanity and + vexation of spirit followed him here. Men were no more agreed among + themselves than were the authorities of his college days. The truths of + religion seemed, indeed, to offer a safe refuge; but they were an + exception that proved the rule; being, as Descartes observes, a + supernatural revelation, not the natural knowledge that he wanted.</p> + + <p>The conflict of authorities had at least one good result, which was to + discredit the very notion of <!-- Page 36 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page36"></a>{36}</span>authority, thus throwing the inquirer back + on his own reason as the sole remaining resource. And as mathematics + seemed, so far, to be the only satisfactory science, the most reasonable + course was to give a wider extension and application to the methods of + algebra and geometry. Four fundamental rules were thus obtained: (1) To + admit nothing as true that was not evidently so; (2) to analyse every + problem into as many distinct questions as the nature of the subject + required; (3) to ascend gradually from the simplest to the most complex + subjects; and (4) to be sure that his enumerations and surveys were so + exhaustive and complete as to let no essential element of the question + escape.</p> + + <p>The rules as they stand are ill-arranged, vague, and imperfect. The + last should come first and the first last. The notions of simplicity, + complexity, and truth are neither illustrated nor defined. And no pains + are taken to discriminate judgments from concepts. It may be said that + the method worked well; at least Descartes tells us that with the help of + his rules he made rapid progress in the solution of mathematical + problems. We may believe in his success without admitting that an + inferior genius could have achieved the same results by the same means. + The real point is to ascertain whether the method, whatever its utility + in mathematics, could be advantageously applied to metaphysics. And the + answer seems to be that as manipulated by its author the new system led + to nothing but hopeless fallacies.</p> + + <p>After reserving a provisional assent to the customs of the country + where he happens to be residing and to the creed of the Roman Church, + Descartes begins by calling in question the whole mass of beliefs he has + <!-- Page 37 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page37"></a>{37}</span>hitherto accepted, including the reality of + the external world. But the very act of doubt implies the existence of + the doubter himself. I think, therefore I am. It has been supposed that + the initial affirmation of this self-evident principle implies that + Descartes identified Being with Thought. He did no such thing. No more is + meant, to begin with, than that, whatever else is or is not, I the + thinker certainly am. This is no great discovery; the interesting thing + is to find out what it implies. A good deal according to Descartes. First + he infers that, since the act of thinking assures him of his existence, + therefore he is a substance the whole essence of which consists in + thought, which is independent of place and of any material + object—in short, an immaterial soul, entirely distinct from the + body, easier to know, and capable of existing without it. Here the + confusion of conception with judgment is apparent, and it leads to a + confusion of our thoughts about reality with the realities themselves. + And Descartes carries this loose reasoning a step further by going on to + argue that, as the certainty of his own existence has no other guarantee + than the clearness with which it is inferred from the fact of his + thinking, it must therefore be a safe rule to conclude that whatever + things we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true.</p> + + <p>In his other great philosophical work, the <i>Meditations</i>, + Descartes sets out at greater length, but with less clearness, his + arguments for the immateriality of the soul. Here it is fully admitted + that, besides thinking, self-consciousness covers the functions of + perceiving, feeling, desiring, and willing; nor does it seem to be + pretended that these experiences are reducible to forms of thought. But + it is claimed that they depend on <!-- Page 38 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page38"></a>{38}</span>thought in the sense that + without thought one would not be aware of their existence; whereas it can + easily be conceived without them. A little more introspection would show + that the second part of the assertion is not true; for there is no + thought without words, and no words, however inaudibly articulated, + without a number of tactual and muscular sensations, nor even without a + series of distinct volitions.</p> + + <p>Another noticeable point is that, so far from obeying the methodical + rule to proceed from the simple to the complex, Descartes does just the + contrary. Starting with the whole complex content of consciousness, he + works down by a series of arbitrary rejections to what, according to him, + is the simple fact of immaterial thought. Let us see how it fares with + his attempt to reconstruct knowledge on that elementary basis.</p> + + <p>Returning to his postulate of universal doubt, our philosopher argues + from this to an imperfection in his nature, and thence to the idea of a + perfect being. The reasoning is most slipshod; for, even admitting that + knowledge is preferable to ignorance—which has not been + proved—it does not follow that the dogmatist is more perfect than + the doubter. Indeed, one might infer the contrary from Descartes's having + passed with <span class="correction" title="Original reads 'progress-sive' on line break." + >progressive</span> reflection from the one stage to the other. + Overlooking the paralogism, let us grant that he has the idea of a + perfect being, and go on to the question of how he came to possess it. + One might suggest that the consciousness of perfect self-knowledge, + combined with the wish to know more of other subjects, would be + sufficient to create an ideal of omniscience, and, proceeding in like + manner from a comparison of wants with their satisfactions, to enlarge + this ideal into the <!-- Page 39 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page39"></a>{39}</span>notion of infinite perfection all round. + Descartes, however, is not really out for truth—at least, not in + metaphysics; he is out for a justification of what the Jesuits had taught + him at La Flčche, and no Jesuit casuistry could be more sophistical than + the logic he finds good enough for the purpose. To argue, as he does, + that the idea of a perfect being, in his mind, can be explained only by + its proceeding from such a being as its creator is already sufficiently + audacious. But this feat is far surpassed by his famous ontological proof + of Theism. A triangle, he tells us, need not necessarily exist; but, + assuming there to be one, its three angles must be equal to two right + angles. With God, on the other hand, to be conceived is to be; for, + existence being a perfection, it follows, from the idea of a perfect + Being, that he must exist. The answer is more clear and distinct than any + of Descartes's demonstrations. Perfection is affirmed of existing or of + imaginary subjects, but existence is not a perfection in itself.</p> + + <p>A third argument for Theism remains to be considered. Descartes asks + how he came to exist. Not by his own act; for on that hypothesis he would + have given himself all the perfections that now he lacks; nor from any + other imperfect cause, for that would be to repeat the difficulty, not to + solve it. Besides, the simple continuance of his existence from moment to + moment needs an explanation. For time consists of an infinity of parts, + none depending in any way on the others; so that my having been a little + while ago is no reason why I should be now, unless there is some power by + which I am created anew. Here we must observe that Descartes is playing + fast and loose with the law of causation. By what he calls the light of + nature—in other words, the light of Greek <!-- Page 40 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page40"></a>{40}</span>philosophy—things + can no more pass into nothing than they can come out of it. Moreover, the + difficulty is the same for my supposed Creator as for myself. We are told + that thought is a necessary perfection of the divine nature. But thinking + implies time; therefore God also exists from moment to moment. How, then, + can he recover his being any more than we can? The answer, of course, + would be: because he is perfect, and perfection involves existence. Thus + the argument from causation throws us back on the so-called ontological + argument, whose futility has already been shown.</p> + + <p>This very idea of perfection involves us in fresh difficulties with + the law of causation. A perfect Being might be expected to make perfect + creatures—which by hypothesis we are not. Descartes quite sees + this, and only escapes by a verbal quibble. Our imperfections, he says, + come from the share that Nothingness has in our nature. Once allow so + much to the creative power of zero, and God seems to be a rather + gratuitous postulate.</p> + + <p>After proving to his own satisfaction the existence of the soul and of + God, Descartes returns to the starting-point of his whole + inquiry—that is, the reality of the material world and of its laws. + And now his theology supplies him with a short and easy method for + getting rid of the sceptical doubts that had troubled him at first. He + has a clear and distinct idea of his own body and of other bodies + surrounding it on all sides as extended substances communicating + movements to one another. And he has a tendency to accept whatever is + clearly and distinctly conceived by him as true. But to suppose that God + created that tendency with the intention of deceiving him would argue a + want of veracity in the divine nature incompatible with its <!-- Page 41 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page41"></a>{41}</span>perfection. Such + reasoning obviously ignores the alternative that God might be deceiving + us for our good. Or rather what we call truth might not be an insight + into the nature of things in themselves, but a correct judgment of + antecedents and consequents. Our consciousness would then be a vast + sensori-motor machinery adjusted to secure the maintenance and perfection + of life.</p> + + <p>Descartes, as a mathematician, places the essence of Matter or Body in + extension. Here he agrees with another mathematical philosopher, Plato, + who says the same in his <i>Timęus</i>. So far the coincidence might be + accidental; but when we find that the Frenchman, like the Greek, + conceives his materialised space as being originally divided into + triangular bodies, the evidence of unacknowledged borrowing seems + irresistible—the more so that Huyghens mentions this as customary + with Descartes.</p> + + <p>The great author of the <i>Method</i> and the + <i>Meditations</i>—for, after every critical deduction, his + greatness as a thinker remains undoubted—contributed nothing to + ethics. Here he is content to reaffirm the general conclusions of Greek + philosophy, the necessary superiority of mind to matter, of the soul to + the body, of spirit to sense. He accepts free-will from Aristotle without + any attempt to reconcile it with the rigid determinism of his own + mechanical naturalism. At the same time there is a remarkable + anticipation of modern psychology in his doctrine of intellectual assent + as an act of the will. When our judgments go beyond what is guaranteed by + a clear and distinct perception of their truth there is a possibility of + error, and then the error is our own fault, the precipitate conclusion + having been a voluntary act. Thus human free-will intervenes to clear God + of all <!-- Page 42 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page42"></a>{42}</span>responsibility for our delusions as well as + for our crimes.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Malebranche.</b></p> + + <p>Pascal, we are told, could not forgive Descartes for limiting God's + action on the world to the "initial fillip" by which the process of + evolution was started. Nevertheless, Pascal's friends, the Jansenists, + were content to adopt Cartesianism as their religious philosophy, and his + epigram certainly does not apply to the next distinguished Cartesian, + Arnold Geulincx (1625-1669), a Fleming of Antwerp. Unfortunate in his + life, this eminent teacher has of all original thinkers received the + least credit for his services to metaphysics from posterity, being, + outside a small circle of students, still utterly unknown to fame. + Geulincx is the author of a theory called Occasionalism. Descartes had + represented mind, which he identified with Thought, and matter, which he + identified with Extension, as two antithetical substances with not a note + in common. Nevertheless, he supposed that communications between them + took place through a part of the brain called the pineal body. Geulincx + cut through even this narrow isthmus, denying the possibility of any + machinery for transmitting sensible images from the material world to our + consciousness, or volitions from the mind to the limbs. How, then, were + the facts to be explained? According to him, by the intervention of God. + When the so-called organs of sense are acted on by vibrations from the + external world, or when a particular movement is willed by the mind, the + corresponding mental and material modifications are miraculously produced + by the exercise of his omnipotence; and it is because these events occur + <i>on occasion</i> of signals of which they <!-- Page 43 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page43"></a>{43}</span>are not the effects but + the consequents that the theory has received the name of + Occasionalism.</p> + + <p>The theory, as Geulincx formulated it, seems at first sight simply + grotesque; and from a religious point of view it has the additional + drawback of making God the immediate executor of every crime committed by + man. Nevertheless, it is merely the logical application of a principle + subsequently admitted by profound thinkers of the most opposing + schools—namely, that consciousness cannot produce or transmit + energy, combined with the belief in a God who does not exist for nothing. + Even past the middle of the nineteenth century many English and French + naturalists were persuaded that animal species to the number of 300,000 + represented as many distinct creative acts; and at least one astronomer, + who was also a philosopher, declared that the ultimate atoms of matter, + running up to an immeasurably higher figure, "bore the stamp of the + manufactured article."</p> + + <p>The capture of Cartesianism by theology was completed by Nicolas + Malebranche (1638-1715). This accomplished writer and thinker, dedicated + by physical infirmity to a contemplative life, entered the Oratory at an + early age, and remained in it until his death. Coming across a copy of + Descartes's <i>Treatise on Man</i> at twenty-six, he at once became a + convert to the new philosophy, and devoted the next ten years to its + exclusive study. At the end of that period he published his masterpiece, + <i>On the Investigation of Truth</i> (<i>De la Recherche de la Vérité, + 1674</i>), which at once won him an enormous reputation. It was followed + by other works of less importance. The legend that Malebranche's end was + hastened by an argument with Berkeley has been disproved. <!-- Page 44 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page44"></a>{44}</span></p> + + <p>Without acknowledging the obligation, Malebranche accepts the + conclusions of Geulincx to the extent of denying the possibility of any + communication between mind and matter. Indeed, he goes further, and + denies that one portion of matter can act on another. But his real + advance on Occasionalism lies in the question: How, then, can we know the + laws of the material universe, or even that there is such a thing as + matter at all? Once more God intervenes to solve the difficulty, but + after a fashion much less crude than the miraculous apparatus of + Geulincx. Introspection assures us that we are thinking things, and that + our minds are stored with ideas, including the idea of God the + all-perfect Being, and the idea of Extension with all the mathematical + and physical truths logically deducible therefrom. We did not make this + idea, therefore it comes from God, was in God's mind before it was in + ours. Following Plotinus, Malebranche calls this idea intelligible + Extension. It is the archetype of our material world. The same is true of + all other clear and distinct ideas; they are, as Platonism teaches, of + divine origin. But is it necessary to suppose that the ideal contents of + each separate soul were placed in it at birth by the Creator? Surely the + law of parsimony forbids. It is a simpler and easier explanation to + suppose that the divine archetypal ideas alone exists, and that we + apprehend them by a mystical communion with the divine consciousness; + that, in short, we see all things in God. And in order to make this + vision possible we must, as the Apostle says, live, move, and have our + being in God. As a mathematician would say, God must be the <i>locus</i>, + the place of souls.</p> + + <p>There is unquestionably something grandiose about this theory, which, + however, has the defect in orthodox <!-- Page 45 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page45"></a>{45}</span>opinion of logically + leading to the Pantheism, held in abhorrence by Malebranche, of his + greater contemporary Spinoza. And it is a suggestive circumstance that + the very similar philosophy of the Eternal Consciousness held by our + countryman T. H. Green has been shown by the criticism of Henry Sidgwick + to exclude the personality of God.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Spinoza.</b></p> + + <p>With the philosopher whom I have just named we come for the first time + in modern history to a figure recalling in its sustained equality of + intellectual and moral excellence the most heroic figures of Hellenic + thought. Giordano Bruno we may, indeed, pronounce, like Lucan or Cranmer, + "by his death approved," but his submission at Venice has to be set + against his martyrdom at Rome; and if there is nothing very censurable in + his career as a wandering teacher, there is also nothing worthy of any + particular respect. Differences of environment and heredity may no doubt + be invoked to account for the difference of character; and in the + philosophy about to be considered the determining influence of such + causes for the first time finds due recognition; but on the same + principle our ethical judgments also are determined by the very + constitution of things.</p> + + <p>Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677), born at Amsterdam, belonged to a family + of Portuguese Jews, exiled on account of their Hebrew faith, in which + also he was brought up. Soon after reaching manhood he fell away from the + synagogue, preferring to share in the religious exercises of certain + latitudinarian Christian sects. Spies were set to report his + conversation, which soon supplied evidence of sufficiently heterodox + opinions. <!-- Page 46 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page46"></a>{46}</span>A sentence of formal excommunication + followed; but modern research has discredited the story of an attempt to + assassinate him made by an emissary of the synagogue. After successfully + resisting the claim of his sister and his brother-in-law to shut out the + apostate from his share of the paternal inheritance, Spinoza surrendered + the disputed property, but henceforth broke off all communication with + his family. Subsequently he refused an offer of 2,000 florins, made by a + wealthy friend and admirer, Simon de Vries, as also a proposal from the + same friend to leave him his whole fortune, insisting that it should go + to the legal heir, Simon's brother Isaac. The latter, on succeeding, + wished to settle an annual pension of 500 florins on Spinoza, but the + philosopher would accept no more than 300. Books were his only luxury, + material wants being supplied by polishing glass lenses, an art in which + he attained considerable proficiency. But it was an unhealthy occupation, + and probably contributed to his death by consumption.</p> + + <p>Democracy was then and long afterwards associated with fanaticism and + intolerance rather than with free-thought in religion. The liberal party + in Dutch politics was the aristocratic party. Spinoza sympathised with + its leader, John de Witt; he wept bitter tears over the great statesman's + murder; and only the urgent remonstrances of his friends, who knew what + danger would be incurred by such a step, prevented him from placarding + the walls of the Hague, where he then resided, with an address + reproaching the infuriated people for their crime.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 47 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page47"></a>{47}</span></p> + + <div class="figcenter" style="width:26%;"> + <a href="images/p047.jpg"><img style="width:100%" src="images/p047.jpg" + alt="Spinoza" title="Spinoza" /></a> + Reproduced (by permission) from <i>Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, + Man, and his Well-being</i>, by Professor A. Wolf (A. & C. Black). + </div> + +<p><!-- Page 48 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page48"></a>{48}</span></p> + + <p>In 1673 the enlightened ruler of the Palatinate, a brother of + Descartes's Princess Elizabeth, offered Spinoza a professorship at + Heidelberg, with full liberty to teach his philosophy. But the + pantheistic recluse wisely refused it. Even at the present day such + teaching as his would meet with little mercy at Berlin, Cambridge, or + Edinburgh. As it was, we have reason to believe that even in free Holland + only a premature death saved him from a prosecution for blasphemy, and + his great work the <i>Ethica</i> could not with safety be published + during his lifetime. It appeared anonymously among his posthumous works + in November, 1677, without the name of the true place of publication on + the title-page.</p> + + <p>Spinoza was for his time no less daring as a Biblical critic than as a + metaphysician. His celebrated <i>Tractatus Theologico-Politicus</i> has + for its primary purpose to vindicate the freedom of scientific thought + against ecclesiastical interference. And this he does by drawing a + trenchant line of demarcation between the respective offices of religion + and of philosophy. The business of the one is to form the character and + to purify the heart, of the other to guide and inform the intellect. When + religion undertakes to teach scientific truth the very ends for which it + exists are defeated. When theological dogmatism gains control of the + Churches the worst passions are developed under its influence. Instead of + becoming lowly and charitable, men become disturbers of public order, + grasping intriguers, bitter and censorious persecutors. The claims of + theology to dictate our intellectual beliefs are not only mischievous, + but totally invalid. They rest on the authority of the Bible as a + revelation of God's will. But no such supernatural revelation ever was or + could be given. Such violation of the order of nature as the miracles + recorded in Scripture history would be impossible. And the narratives + recording them are discredited by <!-- Page 49 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page49"></a>{49}</span>the criticism which shows + that various books of the Old Testament were not written by the men whose + names they bear, but long after their time. As a Hebrew scholar Spinoza + discusses the Jewish Scriptures in some detail, showing in particular + that the Pentateuch is of a later date than Moses. His limited knowledge + of Greek is offered as a reason for not handling the New Testament with + equal freedom; but some contradictions are indicated as disallowing the + infallibility claimed for it. At the same time the perfection of Christ's + character is fully acknowledged and accepted as a moral revelation of + God.</p> + + <p>Spinoza shared to the fullest extent, and even went beyond, + Descartes's ambition to reconstruct philosophy on a mathematical basis. + The idea may have come to him from the French thinker, but it is actually + of much older origin, being derived from Plato, the leading spirit of the + Renaissance, as Aristotle had been the oracle of the later Middle Ages. + Now Plato's ideal had been to construct a philosophy transcending the + assumptions—or, as he calls them, the hypotheses—of geometry + as much as those assumptions transcend the demonstrations of geometry; + and this also was the ideal of Spinoza. Descartes had been content to + accept from tradition his ultimate realities, Thought, Extension, and + God, without showing that they must necessarily exist; for his proof of + God's existence starts from an idea in the human mind, while Thought and + Extension are not deduced at all.</p> + + <p>To appreciate the work of the Hebrew philosopher, of the lonely muser, + bred in the religion of Jahveh—a name traditionally interpreted as + the very expression of absolute self-existence—we must conceive him + as starting with a question deeper even than the Cartesian <!-- Page 50 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page50"></a>{50}</span>doubt, asking + not How can I know what is? but Why should there <i>be</i> anything + whatever? And the answer, divested of scholastic terminology, is: Because + it is inconceivable that there should be nothing, and if there is + anything there must be everything. This universe of things, which must + also be everlasting, Spinoza calls God.</p> + + <p>The philosophy or religion—for it is both—which identifies + God with the totality of existence was of long standing in Greece, and + had been elaborated in systematic detail by the Stoics. It has been known + for the last two centuries under the name of Pantheism, a word of Greek + etymology, but not a creation of the Greeks themselves, and, indeed, of + more modern date than Spinoza. Historians always speak of him as a + Pantheist, and there is no reason to think that he would have objected to + the designation had it been current during his lifetime. But there are + important points of distinction between him and those who preceded or + followed him in the same speculative direction. The Stoics differed from + him in being materialists. To them reality and corporeality were + convertible terms. It seems likely that Hobbes and his contemporary, the + atomist Gassendi, were of the same opinion, although they did not say it + in so many words. But Descartes was a strong spiritualist; and Spinoza + followed the master's lead so far, at any rate, as to give Thought at + least equal reality with matter, which he also identified with Extension. + It has been seen what difficulties were created by the radical Cartesian + antithesis between Thought and Extension, or—to call them by their + more familiar names—mind and body, when taken together with the + intimate association shown by experience to obtain between them; and also + how <!-- Page 51 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page51"></a>{51}</span>Geulincx and Malebranche were led on by the + very spirit of philosophy itself almost to submerge the two disparate + substances in the all-absorbing agency of God. The obvious course, then, + for Spinoza, being unfettered by the obligations of any Christian creed, + was to take the last remaining step, to resolve the dualism of Thought + and Extension into the unity of the divine substance.</p> + + <p>In fact, the Hebrew philosopher does this, declaring boldly that + Thought and Extension are one and the same thing—which thing is + God, the only true reality of which they are merely appearances. And, so + far, he has had many followers who strive to harmonise the opposition of + what we now call subject and object in the synthesis of the All-One. But + he goes beyond this, expanding the conception of God—or the + Absolute—to a degree undreamed of by any religion or philosophy + formulated before or after his time. God, Spinoza tells us, is "a + Substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses his + absolute and eternal essence." But of these attributes two alone, Thought + and Extension, are known to us at present, so that our ignorance + infinitely exceeds our knowledge of reality. His extant writings do not + explain by what process he mounted to this, the most dizzy height of + speculation ever attained by man; but, in the absence of definite + information, some guiding considerations suggest themselves as + probable.</p> + + <p>Bruno, whom Spinoza is held, on strong grounds, to have read, + identified God with the supreme unifying principle of a universe + extending through infinite space. Descartes, on the other hand, conceived + God as a thinking rather than as an extended substance. But his school + tended, as we saw, to conceive God as mediating <!-- Page 52 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page52"></a>{52}</span>between mind and body in + a way that suggested their real union through his power. Furthermore, the + habit common to all Cartesians of regarding geometrical reasoning as the + most perfect form of thought inevitably led to the conception of thought + as accompanying space wherever it went—in fact, as stretching like + it to infinity. Again, from the Cartesian point of view, that Extension + which is the very essence of the material world, while it covers space, + is more than mere space; it includes not only co-existence, but + succession or time—that is, scientifically speaking, the eternal + sequence of physical causes; or, theologically speaking, the creative + activity of God. And reason or thought had also since Aristotle been more + or less identified with the law of universal causation no less than with + the laws of geometry.</p> + + <p>Thus, then, the ground was prepared for Spinoza, as a pantheistic + monist, to conceive God under the two attributes of Extension and + Thought, each in its own way disclosing his essence as no other than + infinite Power. But why should God have, or consist of, two attributes + and no more? There is a good reason why <i>we</i> should know only those + two. It is that we are ourselves modes of Thought united to modes of + Extension, of which our thoughts are the revealing ideas. But it would be + gross anthropomorphism to impose the limitations of our knowledge on the + infinite being of God, manifested through those very attributes as + unlimited Power. The infinite of co-existence, which is space, the + infinite of causal procession, which is time, suggest an infinity of + unimaginable but not inconceivable attributes of which the one divine + substance consists. And here at last we get the explanation of why there + should be such things as Thought and Extension at all. They are there + simply because everything is. If I grant <!-- Page 53 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page53"></a>{53}</span>anything—and I + must, at least, grant myself—I grant existence, which, having + nothing outside itself, must fill up all the possibilities of being which + only exclude the self-contradictory from their domain. Thus, the + philosophy of Spinoza neither obliges him to believe in the monsters of + mythology nor in the miracles of Scripture, nor in the dogmas of Catholic + theology, nor even in free-will; nor, again, would it oblige him to + reject by anticipation the marvels of modern science. For, according to + him, the impossibility of really incredible things could be deduced with + the certainty of mathematical demonstration from the law of contradiction + itself.</p> + + <p>Hegel has given the name of acosmism, or negation of the world, to + this form of pantheism, interpreting it as a doctrine that absorbs all + concrete reality and individuality in the absolute unity of the divine + essence. No misconception could be more complete. Differentiation is the + very soul of Spinoza's system. It is, indeed, more open to the charge of + excessive dispersion than of excessive centralisation. Power, which is + God's essence, means no more than the realisation through all eternity of + all possibilities of existence, with no end or aim but just the process + of infinite production itself. There is, indeed, a nominal identification + between the material processes of Extension and the ideal processes of + Thought. But this amounts to no more than a re-statement in abstract + terms of the empirical truth that there is a close connection between + body and mind. Like the double-aspect theory, the parallelistic theory, + the materialistic theory, the theory of interaction, and the theory of + more or less complete reciprocal independence, it is a mere verbalism, + telling us nothing that we did not know before. Or, if there <!-- Page 54 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page54"></a>{54}</span>is more, it + consists of the very questionable assumption that body and mind must come + in somewhere to fill up what would otherwise be blank possibilities of + existence. And this, like other metaphysical assumptions, is an + illegitimate generalisation from experience. The ideas of space and time + as filled-up <i>continua</i> supply the model on which the whole universe + must be constructed. Like them, it must be infinite and eternal, but, so + to speak, at a higher power; as in them, every part must be determined by + the position of all other parts, with the determination put at a logical + instead of at a descriptive value; corresponding to their infinitely + varied differentiation of position and quantity, there must be an + infinite differentiation of concrete content; and, finally, the laws of + the universe must be demonstrable by the same <i>ą priori</i> + mathematical method that has been so successfully applied to continuous + quantity.</p> + + <p>The geometrical form into which Spinoza has thrown his philosophy + unfortunately restricts the number of readers—always rather + small—that it might otherwise attract. People feel themselves + mystified, wearied, and cheated by the appearance, without the reality, + of logical demonstration; and the repulsion is aggravated by the + barbarous scholasticism with which—unlike Bacon, Hobbes, and + Descartes—he peppers his pages. Yet, like the Greek philosophers, + he is much more modern, more on the true line of developing thought than + they are. But to get at the true kernel of his teaching we must, like + Goethe, disregard the logical husks in which it is wrapped up. And, as it + happens, Spinoza has greatly facilitated this operation by printing his + most interesting and suggestive discussions in the form of Scholia, + Explanations, and Appendices. Even <!-- Page 55 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page55"></a>{55}</span>these are not easy + reading; but, to quote his own pathetic words, "If the way of salvation + lay ready to hand, and could be found without great toil, would it be + neglected by nearly everyone? But all glorious things are as difficult as + they are rare."</p> + + <p>Some of his expositors have called Spinoza a mystic; and his + philosophy has been traced, in part at least, to the mystical pantheism + of certain medieval Jews. In my opinion this is a mistake; and I will now + proceed to show that the phrases on which it rests are open to an + interpretation more consistent with the rational foundations of the whole + system.</p> + + <p>The things that have done most to fasten the character of a mystic on + Spinoza are his identification of virtue with the knowledge and love of + God, and his theory—so suggestive of Christian theology at its + highest flight—that God loves himself with an infinite love. That, + like Plato and Matthew Arnold, he should value religion as a means of + popular moralisation might seem natural enough; but not, except from a + mystical motive, that he should apparently value morality merely as a + help to the religious life. On examination, however, it appears that the + beatific vision of this pantheist offers no experience going beyond the + limits of nature and reason. Since God and the universe are one, to know + God is to know that we are, body and soul, necessary modes of the two + attributes, Extension and Thought, by which the infinite Power which is + the essence of the universe expresses itself for us. To love God is to + recognise our own vitality as a portion of that power, welcoming it with + grateful joy as a gift from the universe whence we come. And to say that + God loves himself with an infinite love is merely to say that the + attribute of Thought eternally divides itself among an infinity of <!-- + Page 56 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page56"></a>{56}</span>thinking + beings, through whose activity the universe keeps up a delighted + consciousness of itself.</p> + + <p>Spinoza declares by the very name of his great work that for him the + philosophical problem is essentially a problem of ethics, being, indeed, + no other than the old question, first started by Plato, how to reconcile + disinterestedness with self-interest; and his metaphysical system is + really an elaborate mechanism for proving that, on the profoundest + interpretation, their claims coincide. His great contemporary, Hobbes, + had taught that the fundamental impulse of human nature is the will for + power; and Spinoza accepts this idea to the fullest extent in proclaiming + Power to be the very stuff of which we and all other things are made. But + he parts company with the English philosopher in his theory of what it + means. On his view it is an utter illusion to suppose that to gratify + such passions as pride, avarice, vanity, and lust is to acquire or + exercise power. For strength means freedom, self-determination; and no + man can be free whose happiness depends on a fortuitous combination of + external circumstances, or on the consent of other persons whose desires + are such as to set up a conflict between his gratification and theirs. + Real power means self-realisation, the exercise of that faculty which is + most purely human—that is to say, of Thought under the form of + reason.</p> + + <p>In pleading for the subordination of the self-seeking desires to + reason Spinoza repeats the lessons of moral philosophy in all ages and + countries since its first independent constitution. In connecting the + interests of morality with the interests of science as such, he follows + the tradition of Athenian thought. In interpreting pantheism as an + ethical enthusiasm of the universe he returns to the creed of Stoicism, + and <!-- Page 57 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page57"></a>{57}</span>strikes the keynote of Wordsworth's loftiest + poetry. In fixing each man's place in nature as one among the infinite + individuations of divine power he repeats another Stoic idea—with + this difference, however, that among the Stoics it was intimately + associated with their teleology, with the doctrine that everything in + nature has a function without whose performance the universe would not be + complete; whereas Spinoza, following Bacon and Descartes, utterly abjures + final causes as an anthropomorphism, an intrusion of human interests into + a universe whose sole perfection is to exhaust the possibilities of + existence. And herein lies his justification of evil which the Stoics + could only defend on aesthetic <span class="correction" title="Original reads 'grounps'." + >grounds</span> as enhancing the beauty of moral heroism by contrast and + conflict. "If I am asked," he says, "why God did not create all men of + such a character as to be guided by reason alone, my answer is because he + had materials enough to create all things from the highest to the lowest + degree of perfection." Perfection with him meaning reality, this account + of evil—and of error also—points to the theory of degrees of + reality, revived and elaborated in our own time by Mr. F. H. Bradley, + involving a correlative theory of illusion. Now, the idea of illusion, + although older than Plato, was first applied on a great scale in Plato's + philosophy, of whose influence on seventeenth-century thought this is not + the only example. We shall find it to some extent countervailed by a + revived Aristotelian current in the work of the metaphysician who now + remains to be considered.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Leibniz.</b></p> + + <p>G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716), son of a professor at the University of + Leipzig, is marked by some of the distinguishing intellectual characters + of the German genius. <!-- Page 58 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page58"></a>{58}</span>Far more truly than Francis Bacon, this man + took all knowledge for his province. At once a mathematician, a + physicist, a historian, a metaphysician, and a diplomatist, he went to + the bottom of whatever subject he touched, and enriched all his + multifarious studies with new views or with new facts. And as with other + great countrymen of his, the final end of all this curiosity and interest + was to combine and reconcile. One of his ambitions was to create a + universal language of philosophy, by whose means its problems were to be + made a matter of mathematical demonstration; another to harmonise ancient + with modern speculation; a third—the most chimerical of + all—to compose the differences between Rome and Protestantism; a + fourth—partly realised long after his time—to unite the + German Calvinists with the Lutherans. In politics he tried, with equal + unsuccess, to build up a Confederation of the Rhine as a barrier against + Louis XIV., and to divert the ambition of Louis himself from + encroachments on his neighbours to the conquest of Egypt.</p> + + <p>It seems probable that no intellect of equal power was ever applied in + modern times to the service of philosophy. And this power is + demonstrated, not, as with other metaphysicians, by constructions of more + or less contestable value, however dazzling the ingenuity they may + display, but by contributions of the first order to positive science. It + is now agreed that Leibniz discovered the differential calculus + independently of Newton; and, what is more, that the formulation by which + alone it has been made available for fruitful application was his + exclusive invention. In physics he is a pioneer of the conservation of + energy. In geology he starts the theory that our planet began as a + glowing molten mass derived from the sun; and the modern <!-- Page 59 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page59"></a>{59}</span>theory of + evolution is a special application of his theory of development.</p> + + <p>Intellect alone, however, does not make a great philosopher; character + also is required; and Leibniz's character was quite unworthy of his + genius. Ambitious and avaricious, a courtier and a time-server, he + neither made truth for its own sake a paramount object, nor would he keep + on terms with those who cherished a nobler ideal. After cultivating + Spinoza's acquaintance, he joined in the cry of obloquy raised after his + death, and was mean enough to stir up religious prejudice against + Newton's theory of gravitation. Of the calamity that embittered his + closing days we may say with confidence that it could not possibly have + befallen Spinoza. On the accession of the Elector of Hanover to the + English crown as George I., Leibniz sought for an invitation to the Court + of St. James. Apparently the prince had not found him very satisfactory + as a State official, and had reason to believe that Leibniz would have + liked to exchange his office of historiographer at Hanover for a better + appointment at Vienna. Greatness in other departments could not recommend + one whom he knew only as a negligent and perhaps unfaithful servant to + the favour of such an illiterate master. Anyhow, the English appointment + was withheld, and the worn-out encyclopędist succumbed to disease and + vexation combined. The only mourner at his funeral was his secretary, + Eckhardt, who hastened to solicit the reversion of the offices left + vacant by his chief's decease.</p> + + <p>A single theory of Leibniz has attained more celebrity than any one + utterance of any other philosopher; but that fame is due to the undying + fire in which it has been enveloped by the mocking irony of Voltaire. + <!-- Page 60 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page60"></a>{60}</span>Everything is for the best in the best of + all possible worlds. Such is the famous text as a satire on which + <i>Candide</i> was composed. Yet whatever value Voltaire's objections to + optimism may possess tells nearly as much against Voltaire himself as + against his unfortunate butt. For, after all, believing as he did in a + God who combined omnipotence with perfect goodness he could not any more + than Leibniz evade the obligation of reconciling the divine character + with the divine work. On <i>ą priori</i> grounds the German philosopher + seems to have an incontrovertible case. A perfect Being must have made + the best possible world. The only question is what we mean by goodness + and by possibility. Spinoza had solved the problem by identifying + goodness with existence. It is enough that the things we call evil are + possible; the infinite Power of nature would be a self-contradiction were + they not realised. Leibniz rejects the pantheistic position in terms, but + nearly admits it in practice. Evil for him means imperfection, and if God + made a world at all it was bound to be imperfect. The next step was to + call pain an imperfection, which suggests a serious logical deficiency in + the optimist; for, although in certain circumstances the production of + pain argues imperfection in the operator, we are not entitled to argue + that wherever there is pain there must be imperfection. Another plea is + the necessity of pain as a punishment for crime, or, more generally, as a + result of moral freedom. Such an argument is only open to the believers + in free-will. A world of free and responsible agents, they urge, is + infinitely more valuable than a world of automata; and it is not too + dearly purchased even at the cost of such suffering as we witness. The + argument is not very convincing; for liberty of choice <!-- Page 61 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page61"></a>{61}</span>in a painless + world is quite conceivable. But, be it a good or bad argument, although + it might appeal to Voltaire, who believed in free-will, it could not + decently be used by Leibniz, who was a determinist of the strictest type. + To make this clear we must now turn to his metaphysical system.</p> + + <p>Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza, disagreeing widely on other subjects, + were agreed in discountenancing the study of final causes: Bacon, + apparently, from dislike of the idea that the perfect adaptation of all + things to the service of man rendered superfluous any efforts to make + them more serviceable still; Descartes from his devotion to the + mathematical method which was more applicable to a system of mechanical + causation; Spinoza for the same reason, and also from his disbelief in a + personal God. Leibniz, on the contrary, felt deeply impressed by a famous + passage in Plato's <i>Phędo,</i> where Socrates, opposing the philosophy + of teleology to the philosophy of mechanism, desiderates an explanation + of nature as designed with a view to the highest good. But Leibniz did + not go so far as Plato. Mediating between the two methods, he taught that + all is done for the best, but also that all is done through an unbroken + series of efficient causes. At the same time, these causes are only + material in appearance; in reality they are spiritual beings. There is no + such thing as dead matter; the universe consists of living forces all + through. The general idea of force probably came from that infinite Power + of which, according to Spinoza, the whole universe is at once the product + and the expression; or it may have been suggested by Plato's incidental + identification of Being with Action. But Leibniz found his type of force + in human personality, which, following the lead of Aristotle <!-- Page 62 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page62"></a>{62}</span>rather than of + Plato, he conceived as an Entelechy, or realised Actuality, and a First + Substance. After years of anxious reflection he chose the far happier + name of Monad, a term originally coined by Bruno, but not, as would + appear, directly borrowed from him by the German metaphysician.</p> + + <p>According to Leibniz, the monads or ultimate elements of existence are + constituted by the two essential properties of psychic life, perception + and appetency. In this connection two points have to be made clear. What + he calls bare monads—<i>i.e.</i>, the components of what is known + as inorganic matter—although percipient, are not conscious of their + perceptions; in his language they do not <i>apperceive</i>. And he + endeavours to prove that such a mentality is possible by a reference to + our own experience. We hear the roaring of waves on the seashore, but we + do not hear the sound made by the falling of each particle of water. And + yet we certainly must perceive it in some way or other, since the total + volume of sound is made up of those inaudible impacts. He overlooks the + conceivable alternative that the immediate antecedent of our auditory + sensations is a cerebral disturbance, and that this must attain a certain + volume in order to produce an effect on our consciousness. The other + point is that the appetency of a monad does not mean an active impulse, + but a search for more and more perceptions, a continuous widening of its + cognitive range. In short, each monad is a little Leibniz for ever + increasing the sum of its knowledge.</p> + + <p>At no stage does that knowledge come from experience. The monad has no + windows, no communication of any kind with the external world. But each + reflects the whole universe, knowing what it knows by <!-- Page 63 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page63"></a>{63}</span>mere + introspection. And each reflects all the others at a different angle, the + angles varying from one another by infinitesimal degrees, so that in + their totality they form a continuous series of differentiated + individuals. And the same law of infinitesimal differentiation is + observed by the series of progressive changes through which the monads + are ever passing, so that they keep exact step, the continuity of + existence being unbroken in the order of succession as in the order of + co-existence. Evidently there is no place for free-will in such a system; + and that Leibniz, with his relentless fatalism, should not only admit the + eternal punishment of predestined sinners, but even defend it as morally + appropriate, obliges us to condemn his theology as utterly irrational or + utterly insincere.</p> + + <p>In this system animal and human souls are conceived as monads of + superior rank occupying a central and commanding position among a + multitude of inferior monads constituting what we call their bodies, and + changing <i>pari passu</i> with them, the correspondence of their + respective states being, according to Leibniz, of such a peculiarly + intimate character that the phenomena of sensation and volition seem to + result from a causal reaction instead of from a mechanical adjustment + such as we can imagine to exist between two clocks so constructed and set + as to strike the same hour at the same time. This theory of the relations + between body and soul is known to philosophy as the system of + pre-established harmony.</p> + + <p>It may be asked how every monad can possibly reflect every other monad + when we do not know what is passing in our own bodies, still less what is + passing all over the universe. The answer consists in a convenient + distinction between clear and confused <!-- Page 64 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page64"></a>{64}</span>perceptions, the one + constituting our actual and the other our potential knowledge. A more + difficult problem is to explain how any particular monad—Leibniz or + another—can consistently be a monadologist rather than a solipsist + believing only in its own existence. Here, as usual, the <i>Deus ex + Machina</i> comes in. Following Descartes, I think of God as a perfect + Being whose idea involves his existence, with, of course, the power, + will, and wisdom to create the best possible world—a universe of + monads—which, again, by its perfect mutual adjustments, proves that + there is a God. A more serious, and indeed absolutely insuperable, + objection arises from the definition of the monads as nothing but + mutually reflecting entities. For even an infinity of little mirrors with + nothing but each other to reflect must at once collapse into absolute + vacuity. And with their disappearance their creator also disappears. God, + the supreme monad, we are told, has only clear perceptions; but the + clearness is of no avail when he has nothing to perceive but an absolute + blank. Leibniz rejected the objectivity of time and space; yet the hollow + infinity of those blank forms seems, in his philosophy, to have reached + the consciousness of itself.</p> + + <p><br style="clear:both" /></p> +<hr class="full" /> + +<p><!-- Page 65 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page65"></a>{65}</span></p> + +<h3><span class="sc">Chapter III.</span></h3> + +<h3>THE THEORISTS OF KNOWLEDGE</h3> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant.</b></p> + + <p>Epistemology, or theory of knowledge, did not begin in modern times. + Among the Greeks it goes back, at least, to Empedocles, and figures + largely in the programmes of the later schools. And Descartes's universal + doubt seems to give the question, How can we be sure of anything? a + foremost place in speculation. But the singular assurance with which the + Cartesian metaphysicians presented their adventurous hypotheses as + demonstrated certainties showed that with them the test of truth meant + whatever told for that which, on other grounds, they believed to be true. + In reality, the thing they called reason was hardly more than a covert + appeal to authority, a suggestion that the duty of philosophy was to + reconcile old beliefs with new. And the last great dogmatist, Leibniz, + was the one who practised this method of uncritical assumption to the + utmost extent.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Locke.</b></p> + + <p>It is the peculiar glory of John Locke (1632-1704) to have resumed + that method of doubt which Descartes had attempted, but which his + dogmatic prepossessions had falsified almost at the first start. This + illustrious thinker is memorable not only for his services to + speculation, but for the example of a genuinely philosophic life <!-- + Page 66 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page66"></a>{66}</span>entirely + devoted to truth and good—a character in which personal sweetness, + simplicity, and charm were combined with strenuous, disinterested, and + fearless devotion to the service of the State. Locke was a Whig when + Whiggism meant advanced Liberalism in religion and politics, and when + <i>that</i> often meant a choice between exile and death. Thus, after the + fall of his patron, Lord Shaftesbury, the philosopher had to take refuge + in Holland, remaining there for some years, lying hid even there for some + time to escape an extradition order for which the Government of James II. + had applied. It was in Holland that he wrote the <i>Essay Concerning + Human Understanding</i>.</p> + + <p>This revolutionist in thought was no solitary recluse, but, in the + best sense, a thorough man of the world. Educated at Westminster and + Christ Church, he had, in the German poet's phrase, the supreme happiness + of combining the seriousness of an enthusiast with the sagacity of a + statesman, so that great statesmen recognised him as one of themselves. + With the triumph of the Whig cause at a time when diplomacy demanded the + utmost tact and skill, it was proposed to send Locke as Ambassador to the + Court of Brandenburg, and, as that would not have suited his sober + habits, to the Court of Vienna. Weak health obliging him to decline this + also, he received office in the Ministry at home, taking a department + where business talents were eminently required. In that capacity he bore + a leading part in the restoration of the coinage, besides inspiring the + Toleration Act and the Act for Unlicensed Printing. Even the wisest men + make mistakes; and it must be noticed with regret that Locke's theory of + toleration excluded Roman Catholics on the one side and atheists on the + other—the former because their <!-- Page 67 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page67"></a>{67}</span>creed made persecution a + duty, the latter because their want of a creed left them no sanction for + any duties whatever. To say that Locke had not our experience does not + excuse him, for in both cases the expediency of toleration can be proved + <i>ą priori</i>. Romanists must be expected to suppress a heresy whose + spokesman declares that when he has the power he will suppress their + Church; and, if atheists are without moral principle, they will + propagate, under cover of orthodoxy, negations that they are not allowed + openly to profess.</p> + + <p>Locke was brought up by a Puritan father; and, although in after life + he wandered far from its doctrinal standards, he no doubt always retained + a sense of that close connection between religion and morality which + Puritanism implies. Telling about the train of thought that started his + great Essay, he refers it to a conversation between himself and some + friends, in which they "found themselves quickly at a stand by the + difficulties that rose on every side;" and, according to an intimate + friend of his, the discussion turned "on the principles of morality and + revealed religion." It then occurred to him that they should first + ascertain "what objects their understandings were or were not fitted to + deal with." And the mottoes prefixed to the essay prove that the results + were of a decidedly sceptical cast. Indeed, his successors, though not + himself, were destined to develop them into what is now called + Agnosticism.</p> + + <p>We have further to note that, while his Continental rivals were + mathematicians, our English philosopher never went deeply into + mathematics, but was by calling a physician. In this he resembles + Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus among the Greeks; and so it is quite in + order that, with the same sort of training, he should <!-- Page 68 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page68"></a>{68}</span>adopt + Aristotle's method of experience as against Platonic transcendentalism, + and the sceptical relativism of Sextus as against the dogmatism of the + schools.</p> + + <p>Locke begins his essay with a vigorous polemic against the doctrine of + Innate Ideas. The word "idea," as he uses it, is ambiguous, serving to + denote perceptions, notions, and propositions; but this confusion is of + no practical importance, his object being to show that all our knowledge + originates in experience; whereas the reigning belief was that at least + the first principles of knowledge had a more authoritative, if not a + mystical, source. Hobbes had been beforehand with him in deriving every + kind of knowledge from experience, but had been content to assume his + case; whereas Locke supports his by a formidable array of proofs. The + gist of his argument is that intellectual and moral principles supposed + to be recognised by all mankind from their infancy are admitted only by + some, and by those only as the result of teaching.</p> + + <p>As we saw, the whole inquiry began with questions about religion and + morality; and it is precisely in reference to the alleged universality + and innateness of the belief in God and the moral law that Locke is most + successful. And the more modern anthropology teaches us about primitive + man, the stronger becomes the case against the transcendental side in the + controversy. Where his analysis breaks down is in dealing with the + difficult and important ideas of Space, Time, Substance, and + Causality—with the fatal result that such questions as, How is + experience itself possible? or, How from a partial experience can we draw + universal and necessary conclusions? find no place in his theory of + knowledge. Of course, his contemporaries are open to the same <!-- Page + 69 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page69"></a>{69}</span>criticism—nor, indeed, had the time + come even for the statement of such problems. Meanwhile, the facility + with which the founder of epistemology accepts fallacies whence Spinoza + had already found his way out shows how little he was master of his + means. According to Locke, it is "a certain and evident truth that there + is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being, which whether + anyone will please to call God it matters not." On examination the proof + appears to involve two unproved assumptions. The first is that nothing + can begin to exist without a cause. The second is that effects must + resemble their causes. And from these it is inferred that an all-powerful + being must have existed from all eternity. The alternative is overlooked + that a succession of more limited beings would answer the purpose equally + well, while it would also be more consistent with our experience. But a + far more fatal objection to Locke's theism results from his second + assumption. This, although not explicitly stated, is involved in the + assertion that for knowledge such as we possess to originate from things + without knowledge is impossible. For, on the same principle, matter must + have been made by something material, pain by something that is pained, + and evil by something that is evil. It would not even be going too far to + say that by this logic I myself must have existed from all eternity; for + to say that I was created by a not-myself would be to say that something + may come from nothing.</p> + + <p>We have seen how Locke refused toleration to atheists on the ground + that their denial of a divine lawgiver and judge destroys the basis of + morality. He did not, like Spinoza, believe that morality is of the + nature of things. For him it is constituted by the will of God. Possibly, + if pressed, he might have explained <!-- Page 70 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page70"></a>{70}</span>that what atheism denies + is not the rule of right, but the sanction of that rule, the fear of + supernatural retribution. Yet being, like Spinoza and Leibniz, a + determinist, he should have seen that a creator who sets in motion the + train of causes and effects necessarily resulting in what we call good or + bad human actions has the same responsibility for those actions as if he + had committed them himself. To reward one of his passive agents and to + punish another would be grossly unjust and at the same time perfectly + useless. But how do we know that he will, on any theory of volition, + reward the good and punish the bad? "Because we have his word for it." + And how do we know that he will keep his word? "Because he is all-good." + But that, on Locke's principles, is pure assumption; and God, being quite + sure that <i>he</i> has no retribution to fear, must be even more + irresponsible than the atheist.</p> + + <p>The principle that nothing can come from nothing, so far from proving + theism, leads logically either to pantheism or to a much more thorough + monadism than the system of Leibniz. And, metaphysics apart, it conflicts + with a leading doctrine of the essay—that is the fundamental + distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter. We + think of bodies as in themselves extended, resisting and mobile, but not + in themselves as coloured, sonorous, odorous, hot, cold, or sapid. They + cause our special sensations, but cause them by an unknown power. Again + we perceive—or think we perceive—both primary and secondary + qualities in close union as properties of a single object, and this + object in which they jointly inhere is called a substance. And to the + question, What is substance? Locke admits that he has no answer except + something we know not what. He has returned to the agnostic standpoint of + the <!-- Page 71 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page71"></a>{71}</span>Cyrenaic school. This something, for aught + we know, might have created the world.</p> + + <p>Continental historians regard the whole rationalistic movement of the + eighteenth century, or what in Germany is called the Enlightenment + (Aufklärung), as having been started by Locke. But the sort of arguments + that he adduces for the existence of a God prove that in theology at + least his rationalism had rather narrow limits. Both his theism and his + acceptance of Christianity on the evidence of prophecy and miracles show + no advance on medieval logic. In this respect Spinoza and Bayle + (1622-1709) were far more in line with the modern movement. Still, + assuming scripture as an authoritative revelation, Locke shows that, + rationally interpreted, it yields much less support to dogmatic orthodoxy + than English Churchmen supposed. And whatever may have been the letter of + his religious teaching, there can be little doubt that the English + Deists, Toland, Shaftesbury, and Anthony Collins, represented its true + spirit more faithfully than the philosopher himself.</p> + + <p>Representative government and the subordination of ecclesiastical to + secular authority—or, better still, their separation—are both + good things in themselves and favourable conditions to the life of + reason. Another condition is that children should be trained to exercise + their intelligence instead of relying blindly on authority. In these + respects also Locke's writings acted powerfully on the public opinion of + the next century, especially through the agency of French writers; + France, as Macaulay justly claims, being the interpreter between England + and the world. Our present business, however, is not with the diffusion + but the development of thought, and to trace this we must return to + British philosophy. <!-- Page 72 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page72"></a>{72}</span></p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Berkeley.</b></p> + + <p>George Berkeley (1684-1753) was born and educated in Ireland. The fact + is of no racial or national importance, but interests us as accounting + for his having received a better training in philosophy than at that time + was possible in England. For the study of Locke, then proscribed at + Oxford, had already been introduced into Dublin when Berkeley was an + undergraduate there; and it was as a critical advance on Locke that his + first publication, the <i>New Theory of Vision</i> (1709), was offered. + Next year came the epoch-making <i>Principles of Human Knowledge</i>, + followed in 1713 by the more popular <i>Dialogues</i>. At twenty-nine his + work was done, and although he lived forty years longer, rising to be a + Bishop in the Irish Church, after projecting a Christian Utopia for the + civilisation of the North American Indians that never came to anything, + and practising "every virtue under heaven," he made no other permanent + contribution to thought.</p> + + <p>Berkeley is at once a theorist of knowledge and a metaphysician, + combining, in a way, the method of Locke with the method of Descartes and + his successors. The popular notion of his philosophy is that it resolved + the external world into a dream, or at least into something that has no + existence outside our minds. But this is an utter misconception, against + which Berkeley constantly protested. His quarrel was not with common + sense, but with the theorists of perception. To understand this we must + return for a moment to Locke's teaching. It will be remembered in what a + tangle of difficulties the essay had left its author. Matter had two sets + of qualities, primary and secondary, the one belonging to things in + themselves, the other existing only <!-- Page 73 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page73"></a>{73}</span>in our minds; yet both + somehow combined in real substances independent of us, but acting on our + senses. Substance as such is an unknown and unknowable postulate; + nevertheless, we know that it was created by God, of whom our knowledge + is, if anything, inconveniently extensive. Now Berkeley, to find his way + out of these perplexities, begins by attacking the distinction between + primary and secondary qualities. For this purpose his <i>Theory of + Vision</i> was written. It proves—or attempts to prove—that + extension is not a real attribute of things in themselves, but an + intellectual construction, or what Locke would have called an "idea of + reflection." Till then people had thought that its objectivity was firmly + established by the concurrent testimony of two senses, sight and touch. + Berkeley shows, on the contrary, that visible and tangible extension are + not the same thing, that the sensations—or, as he calls them, the + ideas—of sight and touch are two different languages whose words we + learn by experience to interpret in terms of each other without their + being necessarily connected. A man born blind would not at first sight + know how to interpret the visual signs of distance, direction, and + magnitude; he would have to learn them by experience. These, in fact, are + ideal relations only existing in the mind; and so we have no right to + oppose mind as inextended to an extended or an external world.</p> + + <p>Having thus cleared the ground, our young idealist proceeds in his + next and greatest work, <i>Of the Principles of Human Knowledge</i>, to + attack the problem from another side. The world of objects revealed + through sensation and reflection is clearly no illusion, no creation of + our own. We find it there, changing, when it changes, without or even + very much against our will. <!-- Page 74 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page74"></a>{74}</span>What, then, is its origin and nature? + Locke's view, which is the common view, tells us that it consists of + material bodies, some animated and some not. And matter, the supposed + substance of body, is made known to us by impressions on our organs of + sense. But when we try to think of matter apart from these sensible + qualities and the relations between them it vanishes into an empty + abstraction. Now, according to Berkeley there are no abstract + ideas—<i>i.e.</i>, no thoughts unassociated with some mental image + besides a mere word; and Matter or inanimate substance would be such an + idea, therefore it does not exist. There is nothing but mind and its + contents—what we call states of consciousness, what Locke and + Berkeley called ideas. Whence, then, come the objects of our + consciousness, and whither do they go when we cease to perceive them? At + this point the new metaphysical system intervenes. Berkeley says that all + things subsist in the consciousness of God, and by their subsistence his + existence is proved. The direct apprehension of a reality that is not + ourselves only becomes possible through what would be called in modern + language a subjective participation in the divine consciousness, more + feebly reflected, as would seem, in the memories, imaginations, and + reasonings of our finite minds.</p> + + <p>In pursuing these wonderful speculations Berkeley deviated widely from + the direct line of English philosophy, and it is difficult not to believe + that the deflection was determined by the influence of Malebranche, + especially when we find that the writings of the Oratorian Father were + included in his college studies. Moreover, a parallel line of idealistic + development derived from the same source was evolving itself at <!-- Page + 75 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page75"></a>{75}</span>the same time + in English thought. John Norris (1657-1711), a correspondent of the + Platonist Henry More, an opponent of Locke, and a disciple of + Malebranche, had himself found an enthusiastic admirer in Arthur Collier + (1680-1732), whose <i>Clavis Universalis</i> professed to be "a + demonstration of the <i>non-existence or impossibility of an external + world</i>" (1713). Both Norris and Collier, like Malebranche and + Berkeley, were Churchmen; but so strong was the drift towards idealism + that Leibniz, a layman and a man of science, contributed by his + Monadology to the same current. Malebranche neither was nor could he be a + complete idealist in the sense of denying the reality of matter; for the + dogma of transubstantiation bound him, as a Catholic, to its acceptance, + while Berkeley, Collier, and Leibniz, as Protestants, were under no such + obligation. His idealism agreed more nearly with the Neo-Platonic + doctrine of Archetypes in the divine Reason among which Matter was one. + On the other hand, Berkeley probably borrowed from him the notion of a + direct contact with God, the difference being that with the Cartesian it + is conceived as an objective vision, with Locke's disciple as (if the + expression may be permitted) a subjective con-consciousness. Leibniz, + again, while abolishing Matter, retains an external world composed indeed + of spirits and so far immaterial, but existing independently of God.</p> + + <p>All these systems involve the negation of two fundamental scientific + principles. The first is that every change must be explained by reference + to an antecedent change to which it bears a strict quantitative relation. + The second is that no particular change can be referred to another change + as its necessary antecedent unless it can be shown by experience that a + precisely similar <!-- Page 76 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page76"></a>{76}</span>couple of changes are, in fact, always so + connected. Let me illustrate these principles by an example. I leave a + kettle full of cold water on the fire, and on returning after a + sufficient interval of time I find the water boiling. Had I stayed by the + fire and watched the process, my kettle would—a popular proverb to + the contrary notwithstanding—have certainly boiled as soon, but + also no sooner for being helped by my consciousness. The essential thing + is that energy of combustion in the fire should be turned into energy of + boiling in the water. Now, what is Berkeley's interpretation of the + facts? Fire, kettle, water, and ebullition are what in his writings are + called "ideas"—<i>i.e.</i>, phenomena occasionally in my mind, but + always in God's mind. And according to this view the necessary antecedent + to the boiling of the water is not the fire's burning, but God's + consciousness of its burning, his perception being the essence of the + operation. But it is proved by experience that neither my perception nor + anyone else's ever made a single drop of water boil. In other words, + perception is not in this instance a <i>vera causa</i>. Why, then, should + the perception of any other mind, however exalted, have that effect?</p> + + <p>Nor is this all. How does Berkeley know that God exists? Because, he + says, to exist is to be perceived, and therefore for the universe to + exist implies a universal Percipient. But he got the idea of God from + other men, who certainly did not come by it as a generalisation from + their perceptions; they got it by generalising from their voluntary + actions, which do produce the changes that perception cannot produce. It + will be said that volitions and the feelings that prompt them exist only + in consciousness. In whose consciousness? In that of a spirit. And what + is spirit apart from <!-- Page 77 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page77"></a>{77}</span>sensation, thought, feeling, and volition? + Simply one of those abstract ideas whose existence Berkeley himself + denied.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Hume.</b></p> + + <p>The next step in the evolution of English thought was to consist in a + return to Locke's method, involving a complete breach with + seventeenth-century Platonism, and with the Continental metaphysics that + it had inspired. This decisive movement was effected by one in whom + German criticism has recognised the greatest of all British philosophers. + David Hume (1711-1776) was born and bred at Edinburgh, which also seems + to have been through life his favourite residence. But his great work, + the <i>Treatise on Human Nature</i>, was written during a stay in France, + between the ages of twenty-three and twenty-six. Thus his precocity was + even greater than Berkeley's. Indeed, such maturity of thought so early + reached is without a parallel in history. But Hume's style had not then + acquired the perfection—the inimitable charm, Kant calls + it—of his later writings; and, whether for this or for other + reasons, the book, in his own words, "fell dead-born from the press." In + middle life the office of librarian of the Advocates' Library at + Edinburgh gave him access to the materials for his <i>History of + England</i>, which proved a source of fame and profit. A profound + historical scholar, J. S. Brewer, tells us that Hume "possessed in a + pre-eminent degree some of the highest excellences of a historian." Other + historians have treated their subjects philosophically; he furnishes the + sole instance of a great speculative genius who has also produced a + historical masterpiece of the first order. But morally it is a blot on + his fame. It is sad that a philosopher should have deliberately perverted + the truth, that one who has <!-- Page 78 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page78"></a>{78}</span><span class="figright" style="width:18%;"><a + href="images/p078.jpg"><img style="width:100%" src="images/p078.jpg" + alt="David Hume" title="David Hume" /></a><span class="sc">David + Hume.</span></span> performed priceless services to freedom of thought + should have made himself the apologist of clericalising absolutism, and, + still more, that a master of English played this part to some extent + through hatred of the great English people engendered by disappointed + literary ambition. It may be mentioned, however, as a possible + extenuation that towards the middle of the eighteenth century the highest + English ability had thrown itself, with few exceptions, on the Tory side. + It must be mentioned <!-- Page 79 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page79"></a>{79}</span>also that in private life Hume's character + was entirely admirable—cheerful, generous, and gentle, without a + frailty and without a stain. His opinions were unpopular; but his life + offered no handle for obloquy, although his studious retirement was more + than once exchanged for the responsibilities of political office, and the + freedom from pedantry so conspicuous in his writings bears witness to + habits of well-bred social intercourse.</p> + + <p>Hume's philosophy is best understood when we consider it as, in the + first place, a criticism of Berkeley, just as Berkeley's had been a + criticism of Locke. It will be remembered that the founder of subjective + idealism discarded the notion of material substance as an "abstract + idea," an unintelligible figment devoid of any sensuous or imaginative + content. The only true substances are the subjects of what we call + experience communicating through sensation with God, the infinite spirit + whose eternal consciousness is reality itself. Hume applied the same + tests to spiritual substance, and found that it equally disappeared under + his introspective analysis. He begins by dividing the contents of + consciousness into two classes, impressions and ideas—the second + being copies of the first, and distinguished from them by their relative + faintness. Now, from these perceptions (which he called thoughts) + Descartes had passed by an immediate inference to the ego or self, which + he affirms as the primary fact of consciousness, using it as a basis for + sundry other conclusions. But Hume stops him at once, and will not grant + the existence of the metaphysical self—that is, a simple and + continued substance, as distinguished from particular states of + consciousness. We are, he declares, "nothing but a bundle of different + perceptions, which <!-- Page 80 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page80"></a>{80}</span>succeed each other with an inconceivable + rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." "There is properly + no <i>simplicity</i> in it [the self] at one time, nor <i>identity</i> in + different [times]; whatever natural propensity we may have to imagine + that simplicity and identity." So much being assumed, Berkeley's whole + argument for a new theology founded on subjective idealism is bound to + collapse, as also is the argument for natural immortality derived from + the supposed simplicity and identity of the thinking substance.</p> + + <p>Modern critics have rightly insisted, as against Hume, that isolated + perceptions without a self are abstractions not less unintelligible than + a self without perceptions. But the metaphysical argument for human + immortality has not benefited by this more concrete interpretation of + epistemology; and probably Hume was really more interested in destroying + this than in maintaining the sceptical paradox which does not recur in + his later writings.</p> + + <p>A word must be added about Hume's division of perceptions into + impressions and ideas. The point left out of sight in this analysis is + that impressions of sense habitually find their reflexes not in revived + sensations, but in expressions, in motor reactions which, with human + beings, mostly take the form of words uttered or thought. These, no + doubt, are associated to some small extent with revived sensations; but + they are more commonly grouped with other words, with movements of the + limbs, and with actions on the material or human environment of the + percipient. Such expressions are incomparably easier to revive in memory, + imagination, or expectation than the impressions that originally excited + them; and, indeed, it is in connection with them that such revivals of + sensation <!-- Page 81 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page81"></a>{81}</span>as we actually experience take place. And it + is probable that to this active side of our consciousness that we may + trace those associative processes which Hume studies next in his analysis + of human knowledge.</p> + + <p>Putting aside principles of doubtful or secondary value, the relations + between states of consciousness that first offer themselves to view are, + according to Hume, Co-existence and Succession (united under the name of + Contiguity), Resemblance, and Causation. It is with the account he gives + of this last category that his name is inseparably associated, for from + it all subsequent speculation has taken rise. Yet primarily he seems to + have had no other object in view than to simplify the laws of knowledge + by resolving one of them into a particular case of another, and thus + reducing his three categories to two. The relation of cause and effect, + he tells us, is no more than a certain relation between antecedent and + consequent in time where the sequence is so habitual as to establish in + our minds a custom of expecting the one whenever the other occurs. The + sequence is not necessary, for one can think, without any + self-contradiction, of a change which has not been preceded by another + change; nor is it, like the truths of geometry, something that can be + known <i>ą priori</i>. Without experience no one could tell that bread + will nourish a man and not nourish a lion, nor even predict how a + billiard-ball will behave when another ball strikes it. Should it be + objected that the <i>ą priori</i> knowledge of a general principle need + not involve an equal knowledge of nature's operations in particular + cases, Hume would doubtless reply by saying that there is no abstract + idea of causation apart from its concrete exemplifications.</p> + + <p>It is possible to accept Hume's theory in principle <!-- Page 82 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page82"></a>{82}</span>without pledging + oneself to all his incidental contentions. Causation, as a general law, + may be known only by experience, whether we can or cannot think of it as + a pure abstraction. And we may interpret it in terms of unconditional + antecedence and consequence, while discarding his apparent assumption of + an inscrutable connection between the two; a mysterious necessity for the + production of the one by the other, for which it is felt that a reason + exists, but for which our reason cannot account. It is inconceivable that + our knowledge of any given sequence could be increased, except by the + disclosure of intermediate sequences, making their continuity, in space + and time, more absolute than we had before perceived, until the whole + process has been resolved into a transference of momentum from one + molecule to another—a change for which, according to Hume, no + reason can be given. Nor, on his principles, would it help us to explain + such transferences by bringing them under the law of the Conservation of + Energy. For, although this would be a great triumph for science, his + philosophy demands a reason why the quantity of energy should remain + unalterable for ever.</p> + + <p>It is a mistake, shared by Hume with his opponents, to suppose that + the common sense of mankind ever saw more than invariable sequence in the + relation of cause and effect, or ever interpolated a mysterious power + between them. In the famous verse, "Let there be light, and there was + light," it is the instantaneity of succession, not the interpolation of + any exerted effort, that so impresses the imagination. And when + Shakespeare wants to illustrate logical compulsion in conduct, his + reference is to an instance of invariable succession:— <!-- Page 83 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page83"></a>{83}</span></p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>This above all,—to thine own self be true;</p> + <p>And it must follow, as the night the day,</p> + <p>Thou canst not then be false to any man.</p> + </div> + </div> + + <p>Indeed, I think it will be found on examination that when we associate + the idea of power, or of necessity, with causal sequences, it is not in + connection with a case of causation here and now, but rather in reference + to similar effects that may be expected from the same cause elsewhere or + at another time. And that "custom," by which Hume seeks to explain our + belief in the "power" of the cause to produce its effect as well as the + "necessity" of the connection between them, rather acts negatively by + eliminating all other antecedents as possible causes than positively by + setting up a habit of thinking about a particular antecedent and + consequent at the same time. And that is why a burnt child needs no + repetition of the experiment to be convinced that contact with fire was + the cause of its pain. The very novelty of the experiment was enough to + eliminate any explanation other than that of contact with the flame.</p> + + <p>The child, as it grows older, may learn to speak of the fire as having + a power to burn. But that merely means, "if I touch it, it will burn + me—or light paper if I hold the paper to it." Power, in fact, is + incomplete causation, the presence of every condition but that one which, + in Aristotelian phrase, turns potency into act. And it is in + contradistinction to that idea of possibility that the idea of necessary + connection comes in. When all the elements of the causal antecedent are + combined the effect necessarily supervenes. Furthermore, the causal + antecedent is thought of as necessary in contrast with the contingency of + other antecedents whose connection with the effect is merely accidental. + Finally, <!-- Page 84 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page84"></a>{84}</span>the idea of production has been quoted as + vitally distinguishing true causation from invariable sequence. But + various myths, of which the story of Œdipus is the best known, show + that primitive folk regard day and night as alternately producing one + another, just as Polonius quotes their sequence as a type of logical + necessity.</p> + + <p>Hume professed himself a Deist, but probably with no more seriousness + than when he, or when Gibbon, called Christianity "our religion." At any + rate, his philosophy destroys every argument for the existence of a + Creator advanced in his own or in the preceding century. Nor need his + particular theory of causation be invoked for the purpose. The most + telling attack is on the argument from design. The apparent adaptation of + means to ends in living organisms is quoted as evidence of their having + been planned by a conscious intelligence. But, answers Hume, such an + intelligence would itself exhibit marks of design, and so on for ever. + Why not, then, stop at the animal organism as an ultimate fact? It was + Shelley's unlucky demand for a solution of this difficulty that led to + his expulsion from Oxford.</p> + + <p>It has been shown how the new analysis of mind cut the ground from + under Berkeley's theism, and from under the metaphysical argument for + human immortality. By denying the substantiality of the ego it also + confirmed the necessitarianism of Spinoza. Hume seemed to think he could + abate the unpopularity of this doctrine by interpreting the constant + motivation of human actions as a mere relation of antecedence and + consequence. But the decisive point was that he assimilated sequences in + conscious behaviour to the unconscious sequences in physical events. + Thus, for <!-- Page 85 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page85"></a>{85}</span>the vulgar and the theologians, he remained + what would now be called a materialist.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Kant.</b></p> + + <p>The English philosophy of experience and the Continental philosophy of + <i>ą priori</i> spiritualism, after their brief convergence in the + metaphysics of Berkeley, parted company once more, the empirical + tradition being henceforth represented, not only by Hume, but in a more + or less anti-Christian and much more superficial form by Voltaire, + Rousseau, and the French Encyclopędists; while the Leibnizian philosophy + was systematised and taught in Germany by Wolf, and a dull but useful + sort of modernised Aristotelianism was set up under the name of "common + sense" by Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and his school in the Scottish + Universities.</p> + + <p>The extraordinary genius who was to re-combine the parted currents in + a speculative movement of unexampled volume, velocity, and depth showed + nothing of the precocity that had distinguished Berkeley and Hume. + Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the son of a saddler of Scottish extraction, + was born at Königsberg in Prussia, where he spent his whole life, holding + a chair at the University from 1770 to 1797. It is related that on the + day of his death a small bright cloud was seen sailing alone across the + clear blue sky, of such a remarkable appearance that a crowd assembled on + the bridge to watch it. One of them, a common soldier, exclaimed, "That + is Kant's soul going to heaven!"—a touching and beautiful tribute + to the illustrious German, whose lofty, pure, and luminous spirit it was + uniquely fitted to characterise.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 86 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page86"></a>{86}</span></p> + + <div class="figcenter" style="width:23%;"> + <a href="images/p086.jpg"><img style="width:100%" src="images/p086.jpg" + alt="Kant" title="Kant" /></a> + <span class="sc">Kant.</span> + + <p class="author">(<i>Copyright B. P. C.</i>)</p> + + <p class="poem"></p> + </div> + +<p><!-- Page 87 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page87"></a>{87}</span></p> + + <p>Kant grew up among the Pietists, a school which played much the same + part in Germany that the Methodists and the Evangelicals played in + England; indeed, it was from them that John Wesley received his final + inspiration. The Königsberg student came in time to discard their + theology while retaining the stern Puritan morality with which it was + wedded, and even, Rationalist as he became, some of their mystical + religiosity. What drew him away to philosophy seems to have been first + the study of classical philology and then physical science, especially as + presented to him in Newton's works. And so the young man's first + ambition, after settling down as a University teacher at Königsberg, was + to extend the Newtonian method still further by explaining, on mechanical + principles, the origin and constitution of that celestial system whose + movements Newton had reduced to law, but whose beginning he had left + unaccounted for except by—what was not science—the direct + fiat of omnipotence.</p> + + <p>Kant offered a brilliant solution of the problem in his <i>Natural + History of the Heavens</i> (1755), a work embodying the celebrated + nebular hypothesis rediscovered forty years later by Laplace. It has been + well observed that great philosophers are mostly, if not always, what at + Oxford and Cambridge would be called "double-firsts"—that is, apart + from their philosophy, they have done first-class work in some special + line of investigation, as Descartes by creating analytical geometry, + Spinoza by applying Biblical criticisms to theology, Leibniz by + discovering the differential calculus, Locke by his theory of + constitutional government, Berkeley by his theory of vision, Hume by his + contributions to history and political economy. Kant's cosmogony may have + been premature and mistaken in its details; but his idea of the heavenly + bodies as having originated from the condensation of diffused gaseous + matter still holds its <!-- Page 88 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page88"></a>{88}</span>ground; and although the more general idea + of natural evolution as opposed to supernatural creation is not modern + but Greek, to have revived and reapplied it on so great a scale is a + service of extraordinary merit.</p> + + <p>The next great event in Kant's intellectual career is his rejection of + Continental apriorism in metaphysics for the empiricism of the English + school, especially as regards the idea of causation. For a few years + (1762-1765) Kant accepts Hume's theory that there is nothing in any + succession of events or in change generally to prove on grounds of pure + reason that there must be more in it than a customary sequence. To + believe that anything may happen without a cause does not involve a + logical contradiction; and at that time he believed nothing to be known + <i>ą priori</i> except that the denial of which involves such a + contradiction. But on reconsidering the basis of mathematical truth it + seemed to him to be something other than the logical laws of Identity and + Contradiction. When we say that seven and five are twelve we put + something into the predicate that was not affirmed in the subject, and + also when we say that a straight line is the shortest distance between + two points. Yet the second proposition is as certain as the first, and + both are certain in the highest degree, more certain than anything + learned from experience, and needing no experience to confirm them.</p> + + <p>So much being admitted, we have to recognise a fundamental division of + judgments into two classes, analytic and synthetic. Judgments in which + the predicate adds nothing to the subject are analytic. When we affirm + all matter to be extended, that is an instance of the former, for here we + are only making more explicit what was already contained in the notion of + matter. On the other hand, when we affirm that all matter is heavy, that + is an <!-- Page 89 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page89"></a>{89}</span>instance of the latter or synthetic class, + for we can think of matter without thinking that it has weight. + Furthermore, this is not only a synthetic judgment, but it is a synthetic + judgment <i>ą posteriori</i>; for the law of universal gravitation is + known only by experience. But there are also synthetic judgments <i>ą + priori</i>; for, as we have just seen, the fundamental truths of + arithmetic and geometry belong to this class, as do also by consequence + all the propositions logically deduced from these—that is to say, + the whole of mathematical science.</p> + + <p>Up to this point Kant would have carried the whole Cartesian school, + and, more generally, all the modern Platonists, along with him; while he + would have given the English empiricists and their French disciples a + rather hard nut to crack. For they would have had to choose between + admitting that mathematics was a mass of identical propositions or + explaining, in the face of Hume's criticism, what claims to absolute + certainty its truths, any more than the Law of Causation, possess. Now, + the great philosophical genius of Kant is shown by nothing more than by + this, that he did not stop here. Recognising to the same extent as Locke + and Hume that all knowledge comes from experience—at any rate, in + the sense of not coming by supernatural communication, as Malebranche and + Berkeley thought—he puts the famous question, How are synthetic + judgments <i>ą priori</i> possible? Or, as it might be paradoxically + expressed, How come we to know with the most certainty the things that we + have not been taught by experience? The answer is, that we know them by + the most intimate experience of all—the underlying consciousness + that we have made them what they are. Our minds are no mere passive + recipients, in which a mass of sensations, poured in from some external + <!-- Page 90 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page90"></a>{90}</span>source, are then arranged after an order + equally originated from without; there is a principle of spontaneity in + our own subjectivity by which the objective order of nature is created. + What Kant calls the Matter of knowledge is given from without, the Form + from within. And this process begins with the imposition of the two great + fundamental Forms, Space and Time, on the raw material of sensation by + our minds.</p> + + <p>By space and time Kant does not mean the abstract ideas of coexistence + and succession; nor does he call them, as some critics used incorrectly + to suppose, forms of thought, but forms of intuition. We do not build + them up with the help of muscular or other feelings, but are conscious of + them in a way not admitting of any further analysis. The parts of space, + no doubt, are coexistent, but they are also connected and continuous; + more than this, positions in space do not admit of mutual substitution; + the right hand and left hand glove are perfectly symmetrical, but the one + cannot be superimposed on the other. Besides, all particular spaces are + contained in universal space, not as particular conceptions are contained + in a general conception, but as parts of that which extends to infinity, + and where each has an individual place of its own, repeating all the + characters of space in general except its illimitable extension. And the + same is true of time, with this further distinction from abstract + succession, that succession may be reversed; whereas the order of past, + present, and future is irreversibly maintained.</p> + + <p>The contemporary school of Reid in Scotland, and the subsequent + Eclectic school of Victor Cousin in France, would agree with Kant in + maintaining that sensuous experience will not account for our knowledge + of space and time. But they would protest, in the name <!-- Page 91 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page91"></a>{91}</span>of common sense, + against the reduction of these apparently fundamental elements to purely + subjective forms. They would ask, with the German critic Trendelenburg, + Why cannot space and time be known intuitively and yet really exist? Kant + furnishes no direct answer to the question, but he has suggested one in + another connection. Mathematical truth is concerned with spatial and + temporal relations, and for that truth to be above suspicion and + exception we must assume that the objects with which it deals are wholly + within our grasp—that our knowledge of them is exhaustive. But + there could be no such assurance on the supposition that, besides the + space and time of our sensuous experience, another space and time existed + independently of our consciousness as attributes of things in + themselves—possibly differing in important respects from + ours—as, for example, a finite, or a non-continuous, or a + four-dimensional space, and a time with a circular instead of a + progressive movement.</p> + + <p>This easy assumption that reality accommodates itself to our + intellectual convenience, instead of our being obliged to accommodate our + theories of knowledge to reality, runs through and vitiates the whole of + Kant's philosophy. But, taking the narrower ground of logical + consistency, one hardly sees how his principles can hold together. We are + told that the subjectivity of space and time is not presented as a + plausible hypothesis, but as a certain and indubitable truth, for in no + other way can mathematical certainty be explained. The claim is + questionable, but let it be granted. Immediately a fresh difficulty + starts up. What is the source of our certainty that space and time are + subjective forms of intuition? If the answer is, because that assumption + guarantees the certainty of mathematics, then Kant is <!-- Page 92 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page92"></a>{92}</span>reasoning in a + circle. If he appeals—as in consistency he ought—to another + order of subjectivity as the sanction of his first transcendental + argument, such reasoning involves the regress to infinity.</p> + + <p>Again, on Kant's theory, time is the form of intuition for the inner + sense. So when we become conscious of mental events we know them only as + phenomena; we remain ignorant of what mind is in itself. But before the + publication in 1770 of Kant's inaugural dissertation on <i>The Sensible + and the Intelligible World</i> every one, plain men and philosophers + alike, believed that the consciousness of our successive thoughts and + feelings was the very type of reality itself; and they held this belief + with a higher degree of assurance than that given to the axioms of + geometry. By what right, then, are we asked to give up the greater for + the less, to surrender our self-assurance as a ransom for Euclid's + <i>Elements</i> or even for Newton's <i>Principia</i>?</p> + + <p>Once more, surely mathematics is concerned not with space and time as + such, but with their artificial delimitations as points, lines, figures, + numbers, moments, etc. And it may be granted that these are purely + subjective in the sense of being imposed by our imagination (with the aid + of sensible signs) on the external world. What if <i>this</i> + subjectivity were the true source of that peculiar certainty belonging to + synthetic judgments <i>ą priori</i>? True, Kant counts in our judgments + about the infinity and eternity of space and time with other accepted + characteristics of theirs as intuitive certainties. But there are + thinkers who find the negation of such properties not inconceivable, so + that they cannot be adduced as evidence of a priority, still less of + subjectivity.</p> + + <p>Eleven years after the inaugural dissertation Kant <!-- Page 93 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page93"></a>{93}</span>published his + most important contribution to philosophy, <i>The Critique of Pure + Reason</i> (1781). Pure Reason means the faculty by which ideas are + obtained independently of all experience, and the critic's object is to + ascertain how far such ideas are valid. As a preliminary to that inquiry + the question is also mooted, How is experience possible? It is answered + by a critique of the understanding or faculty of conception; and as + conception implies perception, this again is prefaced by a section in + which Kant's theory of space and time is repeated and reinforced.</p> + + <p>It will be remembered that what started the whole of the new criticism + was Hume's sceptical analysis of Causation; and the central interest of + <i>The Critique of Pure Reason</i> lies in the effort to reconstitute the + causal law in the light of the new theory of knowledge; but so enormous + is the mass of technicalities piled up for this purpose as largely to + conceal it from view, and, on its disclosure, to give the idea of a + gigantic machine set in motion to crack a nut. And the nut after all is + <i>not</i> cracked; the shell slips from between the grappling surfaces + long before they meet.</p> + + <p>We have seen how Kant interpreted every judgment as a synthesis of + subject and predicate. Now, whether the synthesis be <i>ą priori</i> or + <i>ą posteriori</i>, a study of the forms of judgment as enumerated in + the common logic shows that there are four, and only four, ways in which + it can be effected. All judgments fall under the following classes: + Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality—terms whose meaning will + be presently explained. And each of these again is tripartite. We may say + (i.) that one A is B, or that some A's are B, or that all A's are B; + (ii.) that A is B, that A is not B, that not all A's are B; (iii.) that A + is B, that A <!-- Page 94 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page94"></a>{94}</span>is B if C is D, that A is either B, C, or D; + or (iv.) that A may be B, that A is B, or that A must be B. The reason + why there are four and only four classes is that judgment has to do with + the subject in reference to the predicate, which gives Quantity; with the + predicate in reference to the subject, which gives Quality; with the + connection between the two, which gives Relation; and with the synthesis + between them in reference to our knowledge of it, which gives + Modality.</p> + + <p>Now, according to Kant, that there should be so many kinds of judgment + and no more implies that our understanding contributes a formal element + to the constitution of all knowledge, consisting of four combining + principles, without which experience would be impossible. He calls these + Categories, and they are enumerated in the following table:—</p> + +<blockquote class="b1n"> + + <p>(i.) Quantity.</p> + + <p>Unity, Plurality, Totality.</p> + + <p>(ii.) Quality.</p> + + <p>Reality, Negation, Limitation.</p> + + <p>(iii.) Relation.</p> + + <p>Substance and Accident; Cause and Effect; Action and Reaction + (Reciprocity).</p> + + <p>(iv.) Modality.</p> + + <p>Possibility and Impossibility; Existence and Non-Existence; Necessity + and Contingency.</p> + +</blockquote> + + <p>A study of the Categories suggests some rather obvious criticisms on + the Critical Philosophy itself. (i.) The first two terms in each triad + evidently form an antithetical couple, of which the third term is the + synthesis. Here we have the first germ of a disease by which the systems + of Kant's successors were much more seriously infected. In the table it + is shown by <!-- Page 95 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page95"></a>{95}</span>the intrusion of Limitation, a wholly + superfluous adjunct to Reality and Negation; in the conversion of + Reciprocity into a wholly fictitious synthesis of Substantiality with + Causation; and in the complete absurdity of making Necessity a + combination of Possibility with Existence. (ii.) Innate ideas, after they + had been exploded by Locke, are reintroduced into philosophy by a + sufficiently transparent piece of legerdemain. For assuming that the + human intelligence possesses a power of organising and drilling the + sensuous appearances which without its control would appear only as a + disorderly mob, it by no means follows that they must thereby be referred + to an extraphenomenal principle. But such a principle is plainly implied + by the category of Substance. Used in a scholastic sense, it does not + mean the sensuous attributes of a thing taken altogether, but something + that underlies and supports them. And Kant himself seems to take his + category in that significance. For he claims to deduce from it the law of + the indestructibility of matter; as if I could not say snow is white + without committing myself to the assertion that the ultimate particles of + snow have existed and will exist for ever. (iii.) The substitution of + Causation for logical sequence, as implicated in the hypothetical + judgment of Relation, is perfectly scandalous; and still more scandalous + is substitution of Reciprocity or Action and Reaction for Disjunction. + The last points require to be examined a little more in detail.</p> + + <p>The sequence of an effect to its cause has only a verbal resemblance + to the sequence of a logical consequent to its reason. We declare + categorically that every change has a cause which precedes it. Logical + sequence is, on the other hand, as the very name of the <!-- Page 96 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page96"></a>{96}</span>judgment shows, + hypothetical, and may possibly not represent any actual occurrence, + besides being, what causation is not, independent of time. A particular + case of causation may be hypothetical in respect to our belief that it + actually occurred; never the law of causation itself as a general truth. + And the same distinction applies with even greater force to the alleged + connection between a logical disjunction and a physical reaction. When I + say A is either B or C, but not both, there is only this much + resemblance, that both cases involve the ideas of equality and of + opposition. From the admission that A is not B, I infer that it is C, or, + contrariwise, from the admission that it is B, I infer that it is not C, + and in both instances with the same certainty; but this does not prove + that the earth attracts the moon as much as the moon attracts the earth, + only in opposite directions; nor yet that in certain instances all the + heat lost by one body is gained by another.</p> + + <p>Kant had learned this much from Hume, that causation is essentially a + relation of antecedence and consequence in time; and apparently his way + of "categorising" the relation—<i>i.e.</i>, of proving its + apriority—is to represent it as the logical form of reason and + consequent masquerading, so to speak, under the intuitional time-form. + Yet he frequently speaks of our senses as being affected by things in + themselves, implying that the resulting sensations are somehow caused by + those otherwise unknown entities. But since things in themselves do not, + according to Kant, exist in space and time, they cannot be causally + related to phenomena or to anything else.</p> + + <p>In his criticism of Pure Reason, properly so called—that is, of + inferences made by human faculty with <!-- Page 97 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page97"></a>{97}</span>regard to questions + transcending all experience—Kant shows that of such things nothing + can be known. The ideality of time and space once taken as proved, this + amount of agnosticism seems to follow as a matter of course. It is idle + to speculate about the possible extent or duration of a universe that + cannot be described in terms of coexistence and succession. For each of + us at the dissolution of our bodily organism time itself, and therefore + existence as alone we conceive it, comes to an end. The law of causation, + applying as it does to phenomena alone, offers no evidence for the + existence of a God who transcends phenomena. Kant, however, is not + satisfied with such a simple and summary procedure as this. He tries to + show, with most unnecessary pedantry, that the conditional synthesis of + the Understanding inevitably leads thought on to the unconditional + synthesis of the Reason only to find itself lost in a hopeless welter of + paralogisms and self-contradictions.</p> + + <p>At this stage we are handed over to the guidance of what Kant calls + the Practical Reason. This faculty gives a synthesis for conduct, as Pure + Reason gave a synthesis for intelligence. All reason demands uniformity, + order, law; only what in theory is recognised as true has in practice to + be imposed as right. In this way Kant arrives at his formula of absolute + morality: Act so that the principle of thy conduct may be the law for all + rational beings. He calls this the Categorical Imperative, as + distinguished from such hypothetical imperatives as: Act this way if you + wish to be happy either here or hereafter; or, act as public opinion + tells you. Moreover, the motive, as distinguished from the end of moral + action, should not be calculating self-interest nor uncalculating + impulse, but simply desire to fulfil the law as such. Previous moralists + had set up <!-- Page 98 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page98"></a>{98}</span>the greatest happiness of the greatest + number as the end of action, and such an aim does not lie far from Kant's + philosophy; but they could think of no better motive for pursuing it than + self-love or a rather undefined social instinct; and their <i>summum + bonum</i> would take the happiness of irrational animals into account, + while Kant absolutely subordinates the interests of these to human good. + A further coincidence between the Utilitarian and the Kantian ethics is + that in the latter also the happiness of others, not their perfection, + should be the end and aim of each. Finally, the philosophy of Pure Reason + adopts from contemporary French thought as the governing idea of + political organisation what was long to be a principle of English + Utilitarianism—"the liberty of each, bounded only by the equal + liberty of all."</p> + + <p>Nevertheless, the old postulate of a necessary connection between + virtue and individual happiness reappears in Kant's ethical theory, and + leads to the construction of a new religious philosophy. His critique had + left no place for the old theology, nor yet for that doctrine of + free-will so dear to most theologians. Its whole object had been to + vindicate against Hume the necessity and universality of causation. Human + actions then must, like all other phenomena, form an unbroken chain of + antecedents and consequents. Nor does Kant conceal his conviction that, + with sufficient knowledge and powers of calculation, a man's whole future + conduct might be foretold. Nevertheless, under the eighteenth-century + idea of man as naturally the creature of passion or self-interest, he + claims for us, as moral agents, the power of choosing to obey duty in + preference to either. And this freedom is supposed to be made conceivable + by the subjectivity of time and causation, outside of which, <!-- Page 99 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page99"></a>{99}</span>as a thing in + itself, stands the moral will. That morality, whether as action or mere + intention, involves succession in time is utterly ignored. Nor is this + all. Assuming without warrant that the moral law demands an ultimate + coincidence between happiness and virtue, made impossible in this life by + human weakness, Kant argues that there must be an unending future life to + secure time enough for working out a problem whose solution is infinitely + remote. And, finally, there must be an omnipotent moral God to provide + facilities for undertaking that somewhat gratuitous Psyche's task. Before + Kant moral theology had argued that the Judge of all the world must do + right, apportioning happiness to desert. It was reserved for him to + argue, conversely, that for right to be done such a Judge must exist, and + that therefore he does exist.</p> + + <p>In appreciating the services of Kant to philosophy we must guard + ourselves against being influenced by the extravagant panegyrics of his + countrymen, whose passion for square circles he so generously gratifies. + Still, after every deduction for mere Laputian pedantry has been made, + the balance of fruitful suggestion remains vast. (i.) The antithesis of + object and subject, although not counted among the categories of his + <i>Critique</i>, has remained a prime category of thought ever since. + (ii.) The idea of a necessary limit to human knowledge, given by the very + theory of that knowledge, as distinguished from the Scepticism of the + Greeks—in other words, what we now call Agnosticism—may not + be final, but it still remains to be dealt with. (iii.) The possibility + of reducing <i>ą priori</i> knowledge to a form of unconscious experience + has put an end to dogmatic metaphysics. (iv.) The problems of Time and + Space have taken a central place in speculation; it has been <!-- Page + 100 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page100"></a>{100}</span>shown—what Hume did not + see—that Causation has the certainty of a mathematical axiom; and + it has been made highly probable that all these difficulties may find + their solution in a larger interpretation of experience. (v.) Morality + has been definitely dissociated from the appeal to selfish interests, + whether in this life or in another.</p> + + <p>We have now to trace, within the limits prescribed by the nature of + this work, the development of philosophy under Kant's German + successors.</p> + + <p><br style="clear:both" /></p> +<hr class="full" /> + +<p><!-- Page 101 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page101"></a>{101}</span></p> + +<h3><span class="sc">Chapter IV.</span></h3> + +<h3>THE GERMAN IDEALISTS</h3> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Herbart.</b></p> + + <p>The Critical Philosophy won its first success in Germany less as a new + epistemology than as what, in fact, its author meant it to be, a + rehabilitation of religious belief. The limits of Reason had been drawn + so closely only to make room for Faith. But the current of Rationalism + was running too strongly to be so summarily stopped; and so with Kant's + ablest successors faith is altogether abandoned, while the claims of + reason are pushed relentlessly through. Among these more logical thinkers + the first is J. G. Fichte (1762-1814). In him—for the third time in + modern history, for the first and last time in Germany—the hero as + philosopher finds a worthy representative. Born in Silesia, like Kant of + humble parentage, and bred in circumstances of more oppressive poverty, + he also received a severely religious and moral training as a preparation + for the pastoral office. The bounty of an aristocratic patron gave him an + excellent public-school education; but as a university student, first at + Jena and then at Leipzig, he had to earn a scanty living by private + tuition, finally abandoning his destined career to accept a post in a + Swiss family at Zurich. There, as the result of an attachment in which + the love was nearly all on the lady's side, he became engaged to a niece + of the poet Klopstock, and after a long delay, caused by money <!-- Page + 102 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page102"></a>{102}</span>difficulties, was enabled to marry her. In + the meantime he had become a convert to Kant's philosophy, winning the + admiration of the old master himself by a <i>Critique of all + Revelation</i>, written in four weeks. Published anonymously by an + oversight, it was generally attributed to Kant himself, and, on the real + authorship becoming known, won for Fichte an extraordinary Professorate + of Philosophy at Jena, where his success as a lecturer and writer gave + him for a time the leadership in German speculation (1794-1799). An + untoward incident brought this stage of his career to an end. Writing in + a philosophical review, he defined God as "the moral order of the + universe." Dr. Temple long afterwards used much the same phrase when + Bishop of Exeter, finding it, presumably, compatible with official + Theism; but such was not the impression created in Saxony. A cry of + atheism arose, much to the disgust of Fichte, whose position would have + been better described as pantheistic. But what incensed him most was the + suspicion of an attempt to interfere with the liberty of academic + teaching. With his usual impetuosity he talked about resigning his + chair—with a hint that others would follow his example—were + the authorities at Weimar to permit such an outrage. Goethe, who was then + Minister, observed that no Government could allow itself to be + threatened, and Fichte was at once relieved of his post. Settling at + Berlin, he became Professor of Philosophy in the new University founded + after the French conquest of Prussia, having previously done much to + revive the national spirit by his <i>Addresses to the German Nation</i> + (1807-1808). These were in appearance the programme of a new educational + Utopia; but their real purpose was so evident that the speaker lived in + daily expectation of being summoned <!-- Page 103 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page103"></a>{103}</span>before a French + court-martial and shot. Unlike his countrymen, Goethe, Hegel, and + Schopenhauer, Fichte passionately resented the Napoleonic despotism, + throwing himself heart and soul into the great uprising by which it was + finally overthrown. Although his wish to accompany the victorious army as + field preacher could not be gratified, the campaign of 1813 still claimed + him as one of its victims. After nursing his heroic wife to recovery from + a hospital fever caught in attendance on the sick and wounded at Berlin, + he took the infection from her and died early in 1814, soon after hearing + that Blücher had crossed the Rhine.</p> + + <p>G. H. Lewes, in a well-known story, has made himself and his readers + merry over a German savant who undertakes to evolve the idea of a camel + out of the depths of his moral consciousness. The phrase is commonly + quoted as "inner consciousness," but this takes away its whole point. For + the original satirist, who, I think, was not Lewes, but Heine, had in + view the philosophy of Fichte. It need hardly be said that German savants + are as careful observers and diligent collectors of facts as any others; + and Fichte in particular trusted solely to experience for the knowledge + of natural phenomena. But even as regards his general philosophy the + place it gives to morality has been misconceived even by his closest + students. With him goodwill really plays a less important part than with + Kant, being not an end in itself, but a means towards an end. And what + that end is his teaching makes quite clear.</p> + + <p>Kant's first critics put their finger on the weak point of his system, + the thing in itself. So, assuming it to be discarded, Fichte set to work + on new lines, the lines of pure idealism. But, though an idealist, he is + not, any more than Berkeley, a solipsist. The celebrated <!-- Page 104 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page104"></a>{104}</span>antithesis of + the ego and the non-ego dates from him, and strikes the keynote of his + whole system. It might be thought that, as compared with the old realism, + this was a distinction without a difference. But that is not so; for, + according to Fichte, the non-ego is subjective in its origin, and that is + where he departs widely from Berkeley's theological idealism. Not that I + create the not-myself; I <i>assume</i> it as the condition of my + self-consciousness—a remarkable feat of logic, but after all not + more wonderful than that space and time should result from the activity + of the outer and inner senses. This figment of my imagination is anyhow + solid enough to beget a new feeling of resistance and recoil, throwing + the self back on itself, and bringing with it the interpretation of that + external impact by the category of causation, of its own activity as + substance, and of the whole deal between the ego and the non-ego as + interaction or reciprocity. In this way the first triad of thesis, + antithesis, and synthesis is obtained; and from this, by a vast + expenditure of ingenuity, the whole array of Kant's forms, categories, + and faculties is evolved as a coherent system of scientific thought in + obedience to a single principle—the self-realisation of the ego, + alternatively admitting and transcending a limit to its activity.</p> + + <p>It will be easily understood that this self-realising ego is neither + Fichte's nor anyone else's self, but a universal principle, fundamentally + the same in all. One is reminded of Descartes's self-thinking thought by + which the reality of the universe was guaranteed; but between the two + there is this vast difference, that the Frenchman's ego resembles a box + containing a variety of independent ideas, to be separately handled and + examined; the German's is a box enclosing a coiled-up spring by <!-- Page + 105 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page105"></a>{105}</span>the + expansion of which all the wheels of the philosophical machine are made + go round. From the action of the not-self on the self results the whole + of nature as we conceive it; from the reaction of the self on the + not-self, the whole mentality and morality of man—morality being + understood to include the domestic, social, political, educational, and + industrial organisation of life. The final cause, the impelling ideal of + existence, is the self-realisation of the ego, the entire absorption into + its personal energy of the non-ego, of nature, to be effected by perfect + knowledge of how the physical universe is constituted issuing in perfect + subjugation of its forces to the human will. But such a realisation of + the Absolute Ego would mean its annihilation, for, as we have seen, the + antithesis between objective and subjective is the very condition of + consciousness that without which it could neither begin nor continue to + exist. Therefore the process must go on for ever, and this necessity + guarantees the eternal duration of the human race—not, as Kant had + dreamed, of the individual soul, since for Fichte the Categorical + Imperative demands a consummation widely different from that combination + of virtue with happiness which had satisfied his master. And the agency + by which it is being effected through infinite time is not a personal + God, but that moral order of the world which Fichte regarded as the only + true object of religious feeling. As for human immortality, he seems to + have first accepted, but afterwards rejected it in favour of a mystical + union with the divine.</p> + + <p>It has been said that morality was not with Fichte what it had been + with Kant—the highest good. Nevertheless, as a means towards the + final synthesis, morality interested him intensely, and his best work has + been <!-- Page 106 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page106"></a>{106}</span>done in ethics. As a condition of + self-realisation the primal ego becomes personified in a multitude of + free individualities. Just as in Stoicism, each individual is conceived + as having a special office to perform in the world-process, and the State + exists—ideally speaking—in order to guarantee the necessary + independence of all its citizens. For this purpose everyone must have the + right to work and the right to a living wage. Thus Fichte appears as the + first theorist of State Socialism in the history of German thought. + Probably the example of the Greek Stoics with their communistic utopias + acting on a kindred spirit, rather than any prophetic vision of the + coming century, is to be credited for this remarkable anticipation.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Schelling.</b></p> + + <p>German philosophy is prolific of self-contradictions; and so far the + most flagrant example has been offered by Fichte's <i>Theory of + Knowledge</i>, starting as it does with the idea of an impersonal ego, + developing through a process in which this selfless self demands its own + negation at every step, and determined by the prospect of a catastrophe + that would be the annihilation of consciousness itself. In fact, there + seemed no need to wait until time had run out; the self, or, as it was + now called, the subject, had absorbed all reality, only to find that the + material universe, reconstituted as the object of knowledge, was an + indispensable condition of its existence. And meanwhile the physical + sciences, more particularly those concerned with inorganic nature, were + entering on a series of triumphs unparalleled since the days of Newton. + Philosophy must come to terms with these or cease to exist.</p> + + <p>The task of reconciliation was first attempted by <!-- Page 107 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page107"></a>{107}</span>F. W. J. + Schelling (1775-1854), a Suabian, and the first South German who made a + name in pure philosophy. Educated at the University of Tübingen, at an + early age he covered an encyclopędic range of studies and began + authorship at nineteen, gaining a professorship at Jena four years later. + Wandering about from one university to another, and putting forward new + opinions as often as he changed his residence, the young adventurer + ceased to publish after 1813, and remained silent till in 1841 he came + forward at Berlin as the champion of a reactionary current, practically + renouncing the naturalistic pantheism by which his early reputation had + been made. But he utterly failed in the attempt, which was finally + abandoned in the fifth year from its inception. Lewes, who saw Schelling + in his old age, describes him as remarkably like Socrates; his admirers + called him a modern Plato; but he had nothing of the deep moral + earnestness that characterised either, nor indeed was morality needed for + the work that he actually did. This, to use the phrase of his + fellow-student Hegel, consisted in raising philosophy to its absolute + standpoint, in passing from the subjective moralism of the eighteenth + century to the all-comprehensive systematisation of the nineteenth.</p> + + <p>Schelling began as a disciple of Fichte, but he came simultaneously + under the influence of Spinoza, whose fame had been incessantly spreading + through the last generation in Germany, with some reinforcement from the + revived name of Bruno. Their teaching served to make the latent pantheism + of Fichte more explicit, while the great contemporary discoveries gave a + new interest to the study of nature, which Fichte, unlike Kant, had put + in the background, strictly subordinating it to the moral service of man. + Had he cared to evolve <!-- Page 108 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page108"></a>{108}</span>the idea of a camel from his moral + consciousness, the operation would not have demanded several years, but + only a few minutes' thought. As thus: the moral development of humanity + needed the co-operation of such a race as the Semites. To form their + character a long residence in the Arabian deserts was needed. But for + such nomads an auxiliary animal would be needed with long legs and neck, + a stomach for storing water, hump, etc.—Q. E. D. Schelling also + began by explaining the material world as a preparation for the + spiritual; only he did not employ the method of teleological adaptation, + but a method of rather fanciful analogy. As the evolution of + self-conscious reason had proceeded by a triple movement of thesis, + antithesis, and synthesis, so a parallel process had to be discovered in + the advance towards a consciousness supposed to be exhibited in organic + and inorganic nature.</p> + + <p>The fundamental idea of natural philosophy is polarity—opposite + forces combining to neutralise one another and then parting to be + reunited at a higher stage of evolution. Thus attraction and + repulsion—represented as space and time—by their synthesis + compose matter; magnetism and electricity produce chemical affinity; life + results from a triad of inorganic forces; in life itself productivity and + irritability give birth to sensibility. The order of the terms made + little, if any, difference. When long afterwards iron was magnetised by + the electric current, Schelling claimed for himself the credit of + anticipating this discovery, although he had placed magnetism before + electricity.</p> + + <p>The next step was to construct a philosophy of history. This, with + much else, is included under the name of <i>A System of Transcendental + Idealism</i> (1800) in the most finished of Schelling's literary + compositions. <!-- Page 109 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page109"></a>{109}</span>History, according to the view here + unfolded, is the gradual self-revelation of God, or the Absolute, in whom + Nature and Spirit are united and identified, who never is nor can be, but + always is to be. Meanwhile the supreme ideal is not that ever-increasing + mastery of nature by man which Fichte contemplated, but their + reconciliation as achieved by Art. For just as natural philosophy carried + an element of consciousness into the material universe, so ęstheticism + recognises a corresponding element of unconscious creation in the supreme + works of artistic genius where spirit reaches its highest and best. Here + Schelling appears as the philosopher of Romanticism, a movement that + characterised German thought from 1795 to 1805, and is known to ourselves + by the faded and feeble image of it exhibited in a certain section of + English society nearly a century later. Beginning with a more cultivated + intelligence of Hellenic antiquity, this movement rapidly grew into a new + appreciation of medieval culture, falsely supposed to have given more + scope to individuality than modern civilisation, and then into a search + for ever-varying sources of excitement or distraction in the whole + history, art, and literature of past or present times, religion being at + last singled out as the vitalising principle of all.</p> + + <p>Singularly enough, Fichte accepted the <i>Transcendental Idealism</i> + as an orthodox exposition of his own philosophy. But its composition + seems to have given Schelling the consciousness of his own independence. + Soon afterwards he defined the new position as a philosophy of Identity + or of Indifference. Nature and Spirit, like Spinoza's Thought and + Extension, were all the same and all one—that is to say, in their + totality or in the Absolute. For, considered as appearances, <!-- Page + 110 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page110"></a>{110}</span>they might + present quantitative differences determined by the varying preponderance + of the objective or of the subjective side. In this way Schelling found + himself able to repeat his fanciful construction of the forces and forms + of nature in successive triads under new names. The essential departure + from Fichte, who repudiated the Philosophy of Identity with undisguised + contempt, was that it practically repudiated the idea of an eternal + progress in man's ever-growing mastery of nature. But, in spite of all + disclaimers, the master silently followed his former disciple's evolution + in the direction of a pantheistic monism. His later writings represent + God no longer as the moral order of the world, but, like Spinoza, as the + world's eternal Being, of which man's knowledge is the reflected image. + Finally, both philosophers accepted the Christian doctrines of the Fall, + the Incarnation, and the Trinity as mythical symbols of an eternal + process in which God, after becoming alienated from himself in the + material universe, returns to himself in man's consciousness of identity + with the Absolute. Instead of the rather abrupt method of position, + negation, and re-affirmation known as Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis, + we have here the more fluid process of a spiral movement, departing from + and returning to itself. And this was to be the very mainspring of the + system that next comes up for consideration.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Hegel.</b></p> + +<p><!-- Page 111 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page111"></a>{111}</span></p> + + <div class="figcenter" style="width:23%;"> + <a href="images/p111.jpg"><img style="width:100%" src="images/p111.jpg" + alt="Hegel" title="Hegel" /></a> + Hegel + + <p class="author">(<i>Copyright B. P. C.</i>)</p> + + <p class="poem"></p> + </div> + +<p><!-- Page 112 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page112"></a>{112}</span></p> + + <p>G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), in the opinion of some good judges + Germany's greatest philosopher, was, like Schelling, a Suabian, and + intimately associated with his younger contemporary, first at Tübingen + and afterwards at Jena, where the two friends jointly conducted a + philosophical review. But they gradually drifted apart. Hegel was not a + romanticist, but a classic; not a naturalist, but a humanist. Largely + influenced by Greek thought and Greek literature, for which he continued + to be an enthusiast through life, he readily accepted, as against Kant + and Fichte, the change from a purely subjective to an objective point of + view. But, although he gave some attention to physical science, Hegel was + less interested in it than his colleague, with whose crude and fanciful + metaphysics he also failed to sympathise. With the publication of Hegel's + first important work, the <i>Phenomenology of Mind</i> (1807), things + came to a breach; for its preface amounts to a declaration of war against + the philosophy of Romanticism. Schelling himself is not named; but there + is no mistaking the object of certain picturesque references to + "exploding the Absolute on us," and "the darkness in which every cow is + black." Next year Hegel became what we should call headmaster of a public + school at Nuremberg, filling that post for eight years, during which his + greatest work, the <i>System of Logic</i>, in three volumes, was composed + and published. He then obtained a chair of philosophy at Heidelberg, + passing thence to Berlin in 1818, where he taught until his death by + cholera in 1831. David Strauss, who saw the revered teacher a few days + before the fatal seizure, describes him first as he appeared in the + lecture-room, "looking ever so old, bent and coughing"; then in his home, + "looking ten years younger, with clear blue eyes, and showing the most + beautiful white teeth when he smiled." He had published a summary of his + whole system, under the name of an <i>Encyclopędia of the Philosophical + Sciences</i>, in 1817, and a <i>Philosophy of Law</i>—which is + really a treatise on Government—in 1821. His <!-- Page 113 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page113"></a>{113}</span>sympathies were with + bureaucratic absolutism in a modernised form, with Napoleon against the + German patriots, with the restored Prussian Government against the new + Liberalism, with English Toryism against the Whigs of the Reform Bill, + and finally with the admirers of war against the friends of peace.</p> + + <p>Hegel's collected works, published after his death, fill over twenty + good-sized volumes. Besides the treatises already mentioned, they include + his <i>Lectures on the History of Philosophy</i>, the <i>Philosophy of + History</i>, the <i>Philosophy of Religion</i>, <i>Ęsthetics</i>, etc., + made up with much literary skill from the Professor's own notes and from + the reports of his hearers. The most permanently valuable of these is the + <i>Ęsthetics</i>; but any student desirous of getting a notion of + Hegelianism at first hand had better begin with the <i>Philosophy of + History</i>, of which there is a good and cheap English translation in + one of Bohn's Libraries. Some general points of view serving to connect + the system with its predecessors are all that room can be found for + here.</p> + + <p>As compared with Kant, Hegel is distinguished above all by his + complete abjuration of the agnostic standpoint in epistemology. "The + universe is penetrable to thought": an unknowable thing in itself does + not exist. Indeed, the intelligible reality of things is just what we + know best; the unaccountable residuum, if any, lurks in the details of + their appearance. So also in Greek philosophy Hegel holds that the truth + was not in the ideal world of Plato, but in the self-realising Forms of + Aristotle. As against Fichte, Hegel will not allow that the + reconciliation of the subjective with the objective is an infinitely + "far-off divine event"; on the contrary, it is a process being + continually realised by ourselves and all about us. In his homely + expression, the very <!-- Page 114 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page114"></a>{114}</span>animals as they eat turn their food into + consciousness, in utter disregard of prejudice. But Fichte's condemnation + of Schelling's Indifferentism is quite right. <i>The Absolute is + Mind</i>. Nature exists only as the lower stage, whence Spirit emerges to + contradict, to confront, and to explain her as the necessary preparation + for his supreme self-assertion. And Fichte was right in working out his + system by the dialectical method of contradiction and solution, as + against the dogmatism that summarily decrees the Absolute, without taking + the trouble to reason it out, in imitation of the plan pursued by the + universe in becoming conscious of itself.</p> + + <p>The most portentous thing about Hegel's philosophy is this notion of + the world's having, so to speak, argued itself into existence. To + rationalise the sum of being, to explain, without assumptions, why there + should be anything, and then why it should be as we know it, had been a + problem suggested by Plato and solved rather summarily by Spinoza's + challenge to conceive Infinite Power as non-existing. Hegel is more + patient and ingenious; but, after all, his superiority merely consists in + spinning the web of arbitrary dialectic so fine that we can hardly see + the thread. The root-idea is to identify, or rather to confuse, causal + evolution with logic. The chain of causes and effects that constitutes + the universe is made out to be one with the series of reasons and + consequents by which the conclusion is demonstrated. As usual, the + equation is effected by a transference of terms from each side to the + other. The categories and processes of logic are credited with a life and + movement that belongs only to the human reasoner operating with them. And + the moving, interacting masses of which the material universe consists + are represented as parties to a dialectical <!-- Page 115 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page115"></a>{115}</span>discussion in which one + denies what the other asserts until it is discovered, on lifting the + argument to a higher plane, that after all they are agreed. Nor is this + all. The world as we know it is composed of co-existent elements grouped + together or distinguished according to their resemblances and differences + as so many natural kinds; and of successive events linked together as + causes and effects. But while there is no general law of coexistence + except such as may be derived from the collocation of the previously + existing elements whence they are derived, there <i>is</i> a law of + causal succession—namely, this, that the quantities of mass and + energy involved are conserved without loss or gain through all time. Now, + Hegel's way of rationalising or, in plainer words, accounting for the + coexistent elements and their qualities, is to bring them under a + supposed law of complementary opposition, revived from Heracleitus, + according to which everything necessarily involves the existence, both in + thought and reality, of its contradictory. And the same principle is + applied to causal succession—a proceeding which would be fatal to + the scientific law of conservation.</p> + + <p>There is another way of rationalising experience—namely, the + theological hypothesis of a supreme intelligence by which the world was + created and is governed with a view to the attainment of some ultimate + good. And there is a sort of teleology in Hegel evidently inspired by his + religious education. But the two do not mean the same thing. For he + places conscious reason not at the beginning but at the end of evolution. + The rationality of things is immanent, not transcendent. Purposes somehow + work retrospectively so as to determine the course of events towards a + good end. That end is self-consciousness—not yours or mine, but the + <!-- Page 116 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page116"></a>{116}</span>world-spirit's consciousness and + possession of itself. And this is reached in four ways: in Art by + intuition, in Religion by representation, in Philosophy by conception, in + History and Politics by the realisation of righteousness through the + agency of the modern State.</p> + + <p>Hegel looked on this world and this life of ours as the only world and + the only life. When Heine pointed to the starry skies he told the young + poet that the stars were a brilliant leprosy on the face of the heavens, + and met the appeal for future compensation with the sarcastic + observation: "So you expect a trinkgeld for nursing your sick mother and + for not poisoning your brother!"</p> + + <p>German historians have justly extolled the ingenuity, the subtlety, + the originality, the systematising power—unequalled since + Aristotle—and the enormous knowledge of their country's chief + idealist. But this, after all, amounts to no more than claiming for Hegel + that much of what he said is true and that much is new. The vital + question is whether what is new is also true—and this is more than + they seem prepared to maintain.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Schopenhauer.</b></p> + + <p>The leaders of the party known in the fourth and fifth decades of the + last century as Young Germany, among whom Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) was + the most brilliant and famous, were more or less associated with the + Hegelian school. They were, however, what Hegel was not, political + revolutionists with a tendency to Socialism; while their religious + rationalism, unlike his, was openly proclaimed. The temporary collapse in + 1849 of the movement they initiated brought discredit on idealism as + represented by Germany's classic philosophers, which also had been + seriously damaged by the luminous criticism of Trendelenburg, the + neo-Aristotelian professor at Berlin (1802-1872).</p> + +<p><!-- Page 117 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page117"></a>{117}</span></p> + + <div class="figcenter" style="width:23%;"> + <a href="images/p117.jpg"><img style="width:100%" src="images/p117.jpg" + alt="Schopenhauer" title="Schopenhauer" /></a> + <span class="sc">Schopenhauer</span> + </div> + +<p><!-- Page 118 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page118"></a>{118}</span></p> + + <p>At this crisis attention was drawn to the long-neglected writings of + Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), which then attained a vogue that they + never since have lost. The son of a Hamburg banker and of a literary lady + whose novels enjoyed some reputation in their day, he was placed from the + beginning in a position of greater material and social independence than + usually falls to the lot of German thinkers; and to this, combined with + the fact that he failed entirely as a university teacher, it is partly + due that he wrote about philosophy not like a pedant, but like a man of + the world. At the same time the German professors, resenting the + intrusion of an outsider on their privileged domain, were strong enough + to prevent the reading public from ever hearing of Schopenhauer's + existence until an article in the <i>Westminster Review</i> (April, 1853) + astonished Germany by the revelation that she possessed a thinker whom + the man in the street could understand.</p> + + <p>Schopenhauer found his earliest teachers of philosophy in Plato and + Kant. He then attended Fichte's lectures at Berlin. At some uncertain + date—probably soon after taking his doctor's degree in + 1813—at the suggestion of an Orientalist he took up the study of + the Vedanta system. All these various influences converged to impress him + with the belief that the things of sense are a delusive appearance under + which a fundamental reality lies concealed. According to Hegel, the + reality is reason; but the Romanticists, with Schelling at their head, + never accepted his conclusion, thinking of the absolute rather as a + blind, unconscious substance; still less could it please <!-- Page 119 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page119"></a>{119}</span>Schopenhauer, + who sought for the supreme good under the form of happiness conceived as + pleasure unalloyed by pain. A gloomy and desponding temperament combined, + as in the case of Byron and Rousseau, with passionately sensuous + instincts and anti-social habits, debarred him from attaining it. The + loss of a large part of his private fortune, and the world's refusal to + recognise his genius, completed what natural temperament had begun; and + it only remained for the philosophy of the Upanishads to give a theoretic + sanction to the resulting state of mind by teaching that all existence is + in itself an evil—a position which placed him in still more + thoroughgoing antagonism to Hegel.</p> + + <p>It will be remembered that Kant's criticism had denied the human mind + all knowledge of things in themselves, and that the post-Kantian systems + had been so many efforts to get at the Absolute in its despite. But none + had stated the question at issue so clearly as Schopenhauer put it, or + answered it in such luminous terms. Like theirs, his solution is + idealist; but the idealism is constructed on new lines. If we know + nothing else, we know ourselves; only it has to be ascertained what + exactly we are. Hegel said that the essence of consciousness is reason, + and that reason is the very stuff of which the world is made. No, replies + Schopenhauer, that is a one-sided scholastic view. Much the most + important part of ourselves is <i>not</i> reason, but that very + unreasonable thing called will—that aimless, hopeless, infinite, + insatiable craving which is the source of all our activity and of all our + misery as well. <i>This</i> is the thing-in-itself, the timeless, + inextended entity behind all phenomena, come to the consciousness of + itself, but also of its utter futility, in man. <!-- Page 120 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page120"></a>{120}</span></p> + + <p>The cosmic will presents itself to us objectively under the form of + the great natural forces—gravitation, heat, light, electricity, + chemical affinity, etc.; then as the organising power of life in + vegetables and animals; finally as human self-consciousness and + sociability. These, Schopenhauer says, are what is really meant by the + Platonic ideas, and they figure in his philosophy as first + differentiations of the primordial will, coming between its absolute + unity and the individualised objects and events that fill all space and + time. It is the function of architecture, plastic art, painting, and + poetry to give each of these dynamic ideas, singly or in combination, its + adequate interpretation for the ęsthetic sense. One art alone brings us a + direct revelation of the real world, and that is music. Musical + compositions have the power to express not any mere ideal embodiment of + the underlying will, but the will itself in all its majesty and unending + tragic despair.</p> + + <p>Schopenhauer's theory of knowledge is given in the essay by which he + obtained his doctor's degree, <i>On the Four-fold Root of the Sufficient + Reason</i>. Notwithstanding this rather alarming title, it is a + singularly clear and readable work. The standpoint is a simplification of + Kant's <i>Critique</i>. The objects of consciousness offer themselves to + the thinking, acting subject as grouped presentations in which there is + "nothing sudden, nothing single." (1) When a new object appears to us, it + must have a cause, physical, physiological, or psychological; and this we + call the reason why it becomes. (2) Objects are referred to concepts of + more or less generality, according to the logical rules of definition, + classification, and inference; that is the reason of their being known. + (3) Objects are mathematically determined by their position relatively to + <!-- Page 121 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page121"></a>{121}</span>other objects in space and time; that is + the reason of their being. (4) Practical objects or ends of action are + determined by motives; the motive is the reason why one thing rather than + another is done.</p> + + <p>The last "sufficient reason" takes us to ethics. Schopenhauer agrees + with Kant in holding that actions considered as phenomena are strictly + determined by motives, so much so that a complete knowledge of a man's + character and environment would enable us to predict his whole course of + conduct through life. Nevertheless, each man, as a timeless subject, is + and knows himself to be free. To reconcile these apparently conflicting + positions we must accept Plato's theory that each individual's whole fate + has been determined by an ante-natal or transcendental choice for which + he always continues responsible. Nevertheless, cases of religious + "conversion" and the like prove that the eternal reality of the Will + occasionally asserts itself in radical transformations of character and + conduct.</p> + + <p>In ethics Schopenhauer distinguishes between two ideals which may be + called "relative" and "absolute" good. Relative good agrees with the + standard of what in England is known as Universalistic Hedonism—the + greatest pleasure combined with the least pain for all sensitive beings, + each agent counting for no more than one. Personally passionate, selfish, + and brutal, Schopenhauer still had a righteous abhorrence of cruelty to + animals; whereas Kant had no such feeling. But positive happiness is a + delusion, and no humanity can appreciably diminish the amount of pain + produced by vital competition—recognised by our philosopher before + Darwin—in the world. Therefore Buddhism is right, and the higher + morality bids us extirpate the <!-- Page 122 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page122"></a>{122}</span>will-to-live altogether by ascetic + practices and meditation on the universal vanity of things. Suicide is + not allowed, for while annihilating the intelligence it would not exclude + some fresh incarnation of the will. And the last dying wish of + Schopenhauer was that the end of this life might be the end of all living + for him.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Herbart.</b></p> + + <p>J. F. Herbart (1776-1841) occupies a peculiar position among German + idealists. Like the others, he distinguishes between reality and + appearance; and, like Schopenhauer in particular, he altogether rejects + Hegel's identification of reality with reason. But, alone among + post-Kantian metaphysicians, he is a pluralist. According to him, + things-in-themselves, the eternal existents underlying all phenomena, are + not one, but many. So far his philosophy is a return to the pre-Kantian + system of Wolf and Leibniz; but whereas the monads of Leibniz were + credited with an inward principle of evolution carrying them for ever + onward through an infinite series of progressive changes, Herbart pushes + his metaphysical logic to the length of denying all change and all + movement to the eternal entities of which reality is made up.</p> + + <p>Herbart is entitled to the credit—whatever it may be + worth—of devising a system unlike every other in history; for while + Hegel has a predecessor in Heracleitus, his rival combines the Eleatic + immobilism with a pluralism that is all his own. It is not, however, on + these paradoxes that his reputation rests, but on more solid services as + a psychologist and an educationalist. Without any acquaintance, as would + seem, with the work doing in Britain, Herbart discarded the old faculty + psychology, conceiving mentality as made up <!-- Page 123 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page123"></a>{123}</span>of "presentations," + among which a constant competition for the field of consciousness is + going on; and it is to this view that such terms as "inhibition" and + "threshold of consciousness" are due. And the enormous prominence now + given to the idea of value in ethics may be traced back to the teaching + of a thinker whom he greatly influenced, F. E. Beneke (1798-1854).</p> + + <p><br style="clear:both" /></p> +<hr class="full" /> + +<p><!-- Page 124 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page124"></a>{124}</span></p> + +<h3><span class="sc">Chapter V.</span></h3> + +<h3>THE HUMANISTS OF THE NINETEENTH +CENTURY</h3> + + <p>The philosophical movement of the nineteenth century, after the + collapse of German idealism, has not been dominated by any single master + or any single direction to anything like the same extent as its + predecessors. But if we are called on to select the dominant note by + which all its products have been more or less coloured and characterised, + none more impressive than the note of Humanism can be named. As applied + to the culture of the Renaissance, humanism meant a tendency to + concentrate interest on this world rather than on the next, using classic + literature as the best means of understanding what man had been and again + might be. At the period on which we are entering human interests again + become ascendant; but they assume the widest possible range, claiming for + their dominion the whole of experience—all that has ever been done + or known or imagined or dreamed or felt. Hegel's inventory, in a sense, + embraced all this; but Hegel had a way of packing his trunk that + sometimes crushed the contents out of recognition, and a way of opening + it that few could understand. Besides, much was left out of the trunk + that could ill be spared by mankind.</p> + + <p>Aristotle has well said that the soul is in a way everything; and as + such its analysis, under the name of <!-- Page 125 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page125"></a>{125}</span>psychology, has entered + largely into the philosophy of the century. Theory of knowledge, together + with logic, has figured copiously in academic courses, with the result of + putting what is actually known before the student in a new and + interesting light; but with the result also of developing so much + pedantry and scepticism as to give many besides dull fools the impression + that divine philosophy is both crabbed and harsh.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>The French Eclectics.</b></p> + + <p>In the two centuries after Descartes France, so great in science, + history, and literature, had produced no original philosopher, although + general ideas derived from English thought were extensively circulated + for the purpose of discrediting the old order in Church and State. When + this work had been done with a thoroughness going far beyond the + intention of the first reformers a reaction set in, and the demand arose + for something more conservative than the so-called sensualism and + materialistic atheism of the pre-revolutionary times. A certain + originality and speculative disinterestedness must be allowed to Maine de + Biran (1766-1824), who, some years after Fichte—but, as would seem, + independently of him—referred to man's voluntary activity as a + source of <i>ą priori</i> knowledge. A greater immediate impression was + produced by Royer-Collard (1763-1845), who, as Professor at the Sorbonne + in 1811, imported the common-sense spiritualism of Reid (1710-1796) as an + antidote to the then reigning theories of Condillac (1715-1780), who, + improving on Locke, abolished reflection as a distinct source of our + ideas. Then came Victor Cousin (1792-1867), a brilliant rhetorician, and, + after Madame de Staėl, the first to popularise German philosophy in + France. As <!-- Page 126 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page126"></a>{126}</span>Professor at the Sorbonne in the last + years of the Bourbon monarchy he distinctly taught a pantheistic + Absolutism compounded of Schelling and Hegel; but, whether from + conviction or opportunism, this was silently withdrawn, and a so-called + eclectic philosophy put in its place. According to Cousin, in all + countries and all ages, from ancient India to modern Europe, speculation + has developed under the four contrasted forms of sensualism, idealism, + scepticism, and mysticism. Each is true in what it asserts, false in what + it denies, and the right method is to preserve the positive while + rejecting the negative elements of all four. But neither the master nor + his disciples have ever consistently answered the vital question, what + those elements are.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Hamilton and the Philosophy of the Conditioned.</b></p> + + <p>Among other valuable contributions to the history of philosophy, + Victor Cousin had lectured very agreeably on the philosophy of Kant, + accepting the master's arguments for the apriorism of space and time, but + rejecting his reduction of them to mere subjective forms as against + common sense. He had not gone into Kant's destructive criticism of all + metaphysics, and this was now to be turned against him by an unexpected + assailant. Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856), afterwards widely celebrated + as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh, began his + philosophical career by an essay on "The Philosophy of the Conditioned" + in the <i>Edinburgh Review</i> for October, 1829, controverting the + Absolutism both of Cousin and of his master, Schelling. The reviewer had + acquired some not very accurate knowledge of Kant in Germany ten years + before; and he uses this, with other rather flimsy <!-- Page 127 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page127"></a>{127}</span>erudition, to establish + the principle that <i>to think is to condition</i>, and that therefore + the Absolute cannot be thought—cannot be conceived. Hamilton + enjoyed the reputation of having read "all that mortal man had ever + written about philosophy"; but this evidently did not include Hegel, who + certainly had performed the feat declared to be impossible. Thirty years + later the philosophy of the conditioned attained a sudden but transient + notoriety, thanks to the use made of it by Hamilton's disciple, H. L. + Mansel, in his Bampton Lectures on <i>The Limits of Religious Thought</i> + (1858). The object of these was to prove that, as we know nothing about + Things-in-themselves, nothing told about God in the Bible or the Creeds + can be rejected <i>ą priori</i> as incredible. As an apology, the book + failed utterly, its only effect being to prepare public opinion for the + Agnosticism of Herbert Spencer and Huxley.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Auguste Comte.</b></p> + + <p>The brilliant audiences that hung spell-bound on the lips of Victor + Cousin as he unrolled before them the Infinite, the Finite, and the + relation between the two, little knew that France's only great + philosopher since Descartes was working in obscurity among them. Auguste + Comte (1798-1857), the founder of Positivism, belonged to a Catholic and + Legitimist family. By profession a mathematical teacher, he fell early + under the influence of the celebrated St. Simon, a mystical socialist who + exercised a powerful attraction on others besides Comte. The connection + lasted four years, when they quarrelled; indeed Comte's character was + such as to make permanent co-operation with him impossible, except on + terms of absolute agreement with his opinions and submission to his will. + At a <!-- Page 128 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page128"></a>{128}</span>subsequent period he obtained some fairly + well-paid employment at the École Polytechnique, but lost it again owing + to the injurious terms in which he spoke of his colleagues. In his later + years he lived on a small annuity made up by contributions from his + admirers.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" style="width:20%;"> + <a href="images/p128.jpg"><img style="width:100%" src="images/p128.jpg" + alt="Auguste Comte" title="Auguste Comte" /></a> + <span class="sc">Auguste Comte.</span> + </div> + +<p><!-- Page 129 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page129"></a>{129}</span></p> + + <p>Auguste Comte disliked and despised Plato, altogether preferring + Aristotle to him as a philosopher; but it is fundamentally as a + Platonist, not as an Aristotelian, that he should himself be + classed—in this sense, that he valued knowledge above all as the + means towards reconstituting society on the basis of an ideal life. And + this is the first reason why his philosophy is called positive—to + distinguish it as reconstructive from the purely negative thought of the + Revolution. The second reason is to distinguish it as dealing with real + facts from the figments of theology and the abstractions of metaphysics. + Positive science explains natural events neither by the intervention of + supernatural beings nor by the mutual relations of hypostasised concepts, + but by verifiable laws of succession and resemblance. Turgot was the + first to distinguish the theological, metaphysical, and mechanical + interpretations as successive stages of a historical evolution (1750); + Hume was the first to single out the relations of orderly succession and + resemblance as the essential elements of real knowledge (1739); Comte, + with the synthetic genius of the nineteenth century, first combined these + isolated suggestions with a wealth of other ideas into a vast theory of + human progress set out in the fifth and sixth volumes of his + <i>Philosophie Positive</i>—the best sketch of universal history + ever written.</p> + + <p>The positive sciences fall into two great divisions—the + concrete, dealing with the actual phenomena as presented in space and + time; the abstract, which alone concern philosophy, dealing with their + laws. The most important of the abstract sciences is Sociology, claimed + by Comte as his own special creation. The study of this demands a + previous knowledge of biology, psychology <!-- Page 130 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page130"></a>{130}</span>being dismissed as a + metaphysical delusion and phrenology put in its place. The science of + life presupposes Chemistry, before which comes Physics, presupposing + Astronomy, and, as the basis of all, Mathematics, divided into the + calculus and geometry. At a later period Morality was placed as a seventh + fundamental science at the head of the whole hierarchy.</p> + + <p>At a first glance some serious flaws reveal themselves in the imposing + logic of this scheme. Astronomy as a concrete science ought to have been + excluded from the series, its admission being apparently due to the + historical circumstance that the most general laws of physics were + ascertained through the study of celestial phenomena. But on the same + ground geology can no longer be excluded, as its records led to the + recognition of the evolution of life; or should evolution be referred to + the concrete sciences of zoology and botany, by parity of reasoning human + progress should be treated as a branch of universal history—which, + in fact, is what Comte makes it in his fifth and sixth volumes. It would + have been better had he also studied social statics on the historical + method. As it is, the volume in which the conditions of social + equilibrium are supposed to be established contains only one chapter on + the subject, and that is very meagre, consisting of some rather + superficial observations on family life and the division of labour. No + doubt the matter receives a far more thorough discussion in the author's + later work, <i>Politique Positive</i>. But this merely embodies his own + plan of reorganisation for the society of the future, and therefore + should count not as science, but as art.</p> + + <p>The Positivist theory of social dynamics is that all <!-- Page 131 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page131"></a>{131}</span>branches of + knowledge pass through three successive stages already described as the + theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific. And this advance is + accompanied by a parallel evolution on the governmental side from the + military to the industrial régime, with a revolutionary or transitional + period answering to metaphysical philosophy. To this scheme it might be + objected that the parallelism is merely accidental. A scientific view of + nature and a profound knowledge of her laws is no doubt far more + conducive to industry than a superstitious view; but it is also more + favourable to the successful prosecution of war, which, indeed, always + has been an industry like another. Nor, to judge by modern experience, + does it look as if a government placed in the hands of a country's chief + capitalists—which was what Comte proposed—would be less + militant in its general disposition than the parliamentary governments + which he condemns as "metaphysical." In fact, it is by theologians and + metaphysicians that our modern horror of war has been inspired rather + than by scientists.</p> + + <p>The great idea of Comte's life, that the positive sciences, + philosophically systematised, are destined to supply the basis of a new + religion surpassing Catholicism in its social efficacy, seems a delusion + really inherited from one of his pet aversions, Plato. It arose from a + profound misconception of what Catholicism had done, and a misconception, + equally profound, of the means by which its priesthood worked. In spite + of Comte's denials, the leverage was got not by appeals to the heart, but + by appeals to that future judgment with which the preaching of + righteousness and temperance was associated by St. Paul, his supposed + precursor in religion, as Aristotle was his precursor in philosophy. <!-- + Page 132 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page132"></a>{132}</span></p> + + <p>The worship of Humanity, or, as it has been better called, the Service + of Man, is a great and inspiring thought. Only it is not a religion, but + a metaphysical idea, derived by Comte from the philosophers of the + eighteenth century, and by them through imperial Rome from the Humanists + and Stoics of ancient Athens.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>J. S. Mill.</b></p> + + <p>John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was, like Comte, a Platonist in the sense + of valuing knowledge chiefly as an instrument of social reform. He was + indeed bred up by his father, James Mill (1773-1836), and by Jeremy + Bentham as a prophet of the new Utilitarianism as Comte was, to some + extent, trained by St. Simon to substitute a new order for that which the + Revolution had destroyed. Mill, however, had been educated on the lines + of Greek liberty rather than in the tradition of Roman authority; while + both were largely affected by the Romanticism current in their youth. The + worship of women, revived from the age of chivalry, entered into the + romantic movement; and it may be mentioned in this connection that Mill + calls Mrs. Taylor, the lady with whom he fell in love at twenty-four and + married eighteen years later, "the inspirer and in part the author of + all" that was best in his writings; while Comte refers his religious + conversion to Madame Clotilde de Vaux, the object of his adoration in + middle life. It seems probable, however, from the little we know of Mrs. + Taylor—whom Carlyle credits with "the keenest insight and the + royallest volition"—that her influence was the reverse of + Clotilde's. If anything, she attached Mill still more firmly to the cause + of pure reason.</p> + + <p>It has been mentioned how Kant's metaphysical <!-- Page 133 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page133"></a>{133}</span>agnosticism was played + out by Hamilton against Cousin. A little later Whewell, the Cambridge + historian of physical science, imported Kant's theory of necessary truth + in opposition to the empiricism of popular English thought, and Kant's + Categorical Imperative in still more express contradiction to Bentham's + utilitarian morality. Now Mill, educated as he had been on the + associationist psychology and in the central line of the English + epistemological tradition, rejected the German apriorism as false in + itself, while more particularly hating it as, in his opinion, a dangerous + enemy to all social progress. For to him what people called their + intuitions, whether theoretic or practical, were merely the time-honoured + prejudices in which they had been brought up, and the contradictory of + which they could not conceive. Comte similarly interpreted the + metaphysical stage of thought as the erection into immutable principles + of certain abstract ideas whose value—if they had any—was + merely relative and provisional. Mill, with his knowledge of history, + might have remembered that past thought, beginning with Plato, shows no + such connection between intuitionism and immobility or reaction, while + such experientialists as Hobbes and Hume have been political Tories. But + in his own time the <i>ą priori</i> philosophy went hand in hand with + conservatism in Church and State, so he set himself to explode it in his + <i>System of Logic</i> (1843).</p> + + <p>Mill's <i>Logic</i>, the most important English contribution to + philosophy since Hume, is based on Hume's theory of knowledge, amended + and supplemented by some German and French ideas. It is conceded to Kant + that mathematical truths are synthetic, not analytic. It is not contained + in the idea of two and <!-- Page 134 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page134"></a>{134}</span>two that they make four, nor in the idea + of two straight lines that they cannot enclose a space. Such propositions + are real additions to our knowledge; but it is only experience that + justifies us in accepting them. What constitutes their peculiar certainty + is that they can be verified by trial on imagined numbers and lines, + without reference to external objects. But by what right we generalise + from mental experience to all experience Mill does not explain. Hume's + analysis of causation into antecedence and sequence of phenomena is + accepted by Mill as it was accepted by Kant; but the law that every + change must have a cause is affirmed, in adhesion to Dr. Thomas Brown + (1778-1820), with more distinctness than by Hume. As Laplace put it, the + whole present state of the universe is a product of its whole preceding + state. But we only know this truth by experience; and we can conceive a + state of things where phenomena succeed one another by a different law or + without any law at all. Mill himself was ready to believe that causation + did not obtain at some very remote point of space; though what difference + remoteness could make, except we suppose it to be causal—which + would be a reassertion of the law—he does not explain; nor yet what + warrant we have for assuming that causation holds through all time, or at + any future moment of time.</p> + + <p>Next to the law of universal causation inductive science rests on the + doctrine of natural kinds. The material universe is known to consist of a + number of substances—namely, the chemical elements and their + combinations, so constituted that a certain set of characteristic + properties are invariably associated with an indefinite number of other + properties. Thus, if in a strange country a certain mineral answers the + usual <!-- Page 135 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page135"></a>{135}</span>tests for arsenic, we know that a given + dose of it will destroy life; and we are equally certain that if the + spectroscopic examination of a new star shows the characteristic lines of + iron, a metal possessing all the properties of iron as we find it in our + mines is present in that distant luminary. According to Mill, we are + justified in drawing that sweeping inference on the strength of a single + well-authenticated observation, because we know by innumerable + observations on terrestrial substances that natural kinds possessing such + index qualities do exist, whereas there is not a single instance of a + substance possessing those qualities without the rest.</p> + + <p>For Mill, as for Hume, reality means states of consciousness and the + relations between them. Matter he defines as a permanent possibility of + sensation; mind as a permanent possibility of thought and feeling. But + the latter definition is admittedly not satisfactory. For a stream of + thoughts and feelings which is proved by memory to have the consciousness + of itself seems to be something more than a mere stream. All explanations + must end in an ultimate inexplicability. God may be conceived as a series + of thoughts and feelings prolonged through eternity; and it is a + logically defensible hypothesis that the order of nature was designed by + such a being, although the amount of suffering endured by living + creatures excludes the notion of a Creator at once beneficent and + omnipotent. And if the Darwinian theory were established, the case for a + designing intelligence would collapse. Personally Mill believed neither + in a God nor in a future life.</p> + + <p>In morals Mill may be considered the creator of what Henry Sidgwick, + in his <i>Methods of Ethics</i> (1874), called Universalistic Hedonism. + The English moralists of the <!-- Page 136 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page136"></a>{136}</span>eighteenth century had set up the greatest + happiness of the greatest number as the ideal end of action; but they did + not hold that each individual could be expected to pursue anything but + his own happiness; the object of Bentham (1748-1832) being to make the + two coincide. Kant showed that the rule of right excluded any such + accommodation, and a crisis in his own life led Mill to adopt the same + conclusion. Afterwards he rather confused the issues by distinguishing + between higher and lower pleasures, leaving experts to decide which were + the pleasures to be preferred. The universalistic standard settles the + question summarily by estimating pleasures according to their social + utility.</p> + + <p>Mill fully sympathised with Comte's demand for social reorganisation + as a means towards the moral end. But, with his English and Protestant + traditions, he had no faith in the creation of a new spiritual power with + an elaborate religious code and ritual as the best machinery for the + purpose. In his opinion, the claims of the individual to extended liberty + of thought and action, not their restriction, were what first needed + attention. Second to this—if second at all—came the necessity + for reforming representative government on the lines of an enlarged + franchise and a readjusted electoral system with plural suffrage + determined by merit, votes for women, and a contrivance for giving + minorities a weight proportioned to their numbers. The problem of poverty + was to be dealt with by restrictions on the increase of population and on + the amount of inheritable property, the maximum of which ought not to + exceed a modest competence.</p> + + <p>Among the noble characters presented by the history of philosophy we + may distinguish between the heroic and the saintly types. To the former + in modern <!-- Page 137 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page137"></a>{137}</span>times belong Giordano Bruno, Fichte, and + to some extent Comte; to the latter, Spinoza, Berkeley, and Kant. To the + second class we may surely add John Stuart Mill, whom Gladstone called + "the saint of rationalism," and of whom Auguste Laugel said, "He was not + sincere—he was sincerity itself."</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>Herbert Spencer.</b></p> + + <p>Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was the son of a Nonconformist country + schoolmaster, but was educated chiefly by his uncle Thomas, an + Evangelical clergyman of the Church of England. A radical reformer of the + old school, Thomas Spencer seems to have indoctrinated his youthful + charge with the germinal principles afterwards generalised into a whole + cosmic philosophy. He had a passion for justice realised under the form + of liberty, individual responsibility, and self-help. In his opinion, + until it was modified by private misfortunes, everything served everybody + right. Beginning as an economical administrator of the new Poor Law, he + at last became an advocate of its total abolition; and, alone among + fifteen thousand clergymen, he was an active member of the Anti-Corn Law + League, besides supporting the separation of Church and State. At + twenty-two Herbert Spencer accepted and summed up this policy under the + form of a general hostility to State interference with individual + liberty, supporting it by a reference to the reign of Natural Law in all + orders of existence. In his first great work, <i>Social Statics</i>, the + principle of <i>laissez-faire</i> received its full systematic + development as the restriction of State action to the defence of liberty + against internal and external aggression, the raising of taxes for any + other purpose being unjust, as is also private ownership of <!-- Page 138 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page138"></a>{138}</span>land, which is + by nature the common heritage of all. Spencer subsequently came to + abandon land nationalisation, probably from alarm at its socialistic + implications.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" style="width:17%;"> + <a href="images/p138.jpg"><img style="width:100%" src="images/p138.jpg" + alt="Herbert Spencer" title="Herbert Spencer" /></a> + <span class="sc">Herbert Spencer.</span> + </div> + + <p>The doctrine of natural law and liberty carried with it for Spencer a + strong repugnance not only to protectionism in politics, but also to + miracles in theology. The profession of journalism brought him into touch + <!-- Page 139 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page139"></a>{139}</span>with a freethinking set in London. Whether + under their influence, or Shelley's, or by some spontaneous process, his + religious convictions evaporated by twenty-eight into the agnosticism + which thenceforth remained their permanent expression. There might or not + be a First Cause; if there was, we know nothing about it. At this stage + Lyell's attempted refutation of Lamarck converted Spencer to the belief + in man's derivation from some lower animal by a process of gradual + adaptation. Thus the scion of an educationalist family came to interpret + the whole history of life on our planet as an educative process.</p> + + <p>It seemed, however, as if there was one fatal exception to the scheme + of naturalistic optimism. The Rev. Thomas Malthus had originally + published his <i>Essay on Population</i> (1798) as a telling answer to + the "infidel" Godwin's <i>Political Justice</i> (1793), the bolder + precursor of <i>Social Statics</i>. The argument was that the tendency of + population to outrun the means of subsistence put human perfectibility + out of the question. It had been suggested by the idealists, Mill among + the number, that the difficulty might be obviated by habitual + self-restraint on the part of married people. But Spencer, with great + ingenuity, made the difficulty its own solution. The pressure of + population on the means of subsistence is the source of all progress; and + of progress not only in discoveries and inventions, but also, through its + increased exercise, in the instrument which effects them—that is, + the human brain. Now, it is a principle of Aristotle's, revived by modern + biology, that individuation is antagonistic to reproduction; and + increasing individuation is the very law of developing life, shown above + all in the growing power of life's chief instrument, which is thought's + organ, the brain. For, as Spencer proceeded <!-- Page 140 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page140"></a>{140}</span>to show in his next + work, the <i>Principles of Psychology</i>, life means a continuous series + of adjustments of internal to external relations. Therefore the rate of + multiplication must go on falling with the growth of intellectual and + moral power until it only just suffices to balance the loss by death. The + next step was to revive Laplace's nebular hypothesis, and to connect it + through Lyell's uniformitarian geology with Lamarck's developmental + biology, thereby extending the same evolutionary process through the + whole history of the universe.</p> + + <p>Nor was this all. Milne-Edwards, by another return to Aristotle, had + pointed to the "physiological division of labour" as a mark of ascending + organic perfection, to which Spencer adds integration of structure as its + obverse side, at the same time extending the world-law, already made + familiar in part through its industrial applications by Adam Smith, to + all orders of social activity. Finally, differentiation and integration + were stretched back from living to lifeless matter, thus bringing + astronomy and geology, which had already entered into the causal series + of cosmic transformations, under one common law of evolution; while at + the same time, seeing it to be generally admitted that inorganic changes + originated from the operation of purely mechanical forces, they suggested + that mechanism, without teleology, could adequately explain organic + evolution also.</p> + + <p>Finally came the great discovery of Darwin and Wallace, with its + extension of Malthus's law to the whole world of living things. Spencer + had just touched, without grasping, the same idea years before. He now + gladly accepted Natural Selection as supplementing without superseding + Lamarck's theory of spontaneous adaptation. <!-- Page 141 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page141"></a>{141}</span></p> + + <p>To complete even in outline the vast sweep of his projected Synthetic + Philosophy two steps more remained for Spencer to take. The law of + evolution had to be brought under the recently-discovered law of the + Conservation of Energy, or, as he called it, the Persistence of Force, + and the whole of unified science had to be reconciled with religion. The + first problem was solved by interpreting evolution as a redistribution of + matter and motion—a process in which, of course, energy is neither + lost nor gained. The second problem was solved by reducing faith and + knowledge to the common denominator of Agnosticism—a method that + found more favour with Positivists (in the wide sense) than with + Christian believers.</p> + + <p>Herbert Spencer was disappointed to find that people took more + interest in the portico (as he called it in a letter to the present + writer)—that is to say, the metaphysical introduction to his + philosophical edifice—than in its interior. He probably had some + suspicion that the portico was mere lath and plaster, while he felt sure + that the columns and architraves behind it were of granite. The public, + however, besides their perennial interest in religion, might be excused + for giving more attention to even a baroque exterior with some novelty + about it than to the formalised eclecticism of what stood behind it. + Unfortunately, they soon found that the alleged reconciliation was a + palpable sham. Religion is nothing if not a revelation, and an unknowable + God is no God at all. Even the pretended proofs of that poor residual + deity involved their author in the transparent self-contradiction of + calling the universe the manifestation of an Unknowable Power. Then the + relations between this Power (such as it was) and the Energy (or Force) + whose conservation (or persistence) was the very first <!-- Page 142 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page142"></a>{142}</span>of First + Principles seemed hard to adjust. Either energy is created, or it is not. + In the one case, what becomes of its eternity? in the other case, what + need is there to assume a Power (knowable or not) behind it? Science will + not shrink back before such a phantom, nor will Religion adore it.</p> + + <p>Such faulty building in the portico prepares us for somewhat unsteady + masonry within; and in fact none holds together except what has been + transported bodily from other temples. In the past history of the + universe, considered as a "rearrangement of matter and motion," + disintegration and assimilation play quite as great a part as integration + and differentiation. Such formulas have no advantage over the + metaphysical systematisation of Aristotle, and they give us as little + power either to predict or to direct. Will war be abolished at some + future time, or property equalised or abolished, or morality exalted, or + religion superseded? Spencer was ready with his answer; but the law of + evolution could not prove it true. Nevertheless, his name will long be + associated with evolution as a world-wide process, though neither in the + way of original discovery nor of complete generalisation, and far less of + successful application to modern problems; but rather of diffusion and + popularisation, even as other valuable ideas have been impressed on the + public mind by other philosophies at a vast expense of ingenuity, + knowledge, and labour, but not at greater expense than the eventual gain + has been worth.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>The English Hegelians.</b></p> + + <p>Hegel's philosophy first drew attention in England through its + supposed connection with Strauss's mythic theory of the Gospels and + Baur's theory of New <!-- Page 143 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page143"></a>{143}</span>Testament literature as a product of party + conflicts and compromises in the primitive Church. Rightly interpreted as + a system of Pantheism, it was decried and ridiculed by orthodox + theologians in the name of religion and common sense, while cherished by + the advanced Broad Church as a means of symbolising away the creeds they + continued to repeat. Then the triumph of Spencer's Agnosticism in the + middle Victorian period (1864-1874) suggested an appeal to a logic whose + object had been to resolve the negations of eighteenth-century + enlightenment in the synthesis of a higher unity. The first pronunciation + in this sense was <i>The Secret of Hegel</i> (1865), by Dr. Hutchison + Stirling (1820-1909), a writer of geniality and genius, who, writing from + the Hegelian standpoint, tried to represent the English rationalists of + the day as a superficial and retrograde school. It was a bold but + unsuccessful attempt to plant the banner of the Hegelian Right on British + soil. By attacking Darwinism Stirling put himself out of touch with the + general movement of thought. Professor William Wallace (1844-1897), John + Caird (1820-1898), and his brother Edward Caird (1835-1908) inclined more + or less to the Left, as also does Lord Haldane (<i>b.</i> 1865) in his + <i>Gifford Lectures</i> (1903); and all have the advantage over Stirling + of writing in a clearer if less picturesque style.</p> + + <p>T. H. Green (1836-1882) is sometimes quoted as a Hegelian, but his + intellectual affinities were rather with Fichte. According to him, + reality is the thought of an Eternal Consciousness, of which personality + need not be predicated, while the endless duration of personal spirits + seems to be denied. Another idealist, F. H. Bradley (<i>b.</i> + 1846)—perhaps the greatest living English <!-- Page 144 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page144"></a>{144}</span>thinker—develops + in his <i>Appearance and Reality</i> (1893) a metaphysical system which, + though Absolutist in form, is, to me at least, in substance practically + indistinguishable from the dogmatic Agnosticism of Herbert Spencer, and + even more destructive of the popular Theism. Finally the writings of Dr. + J. E. McTaggart (<i>b.</i> 1866), teaching as they do a doctrine of + developmental personal immortality without a God, show a tendency to + combine Hegel with Lotze.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>The German Eclectics.</b></p> + + <p>By general consent the most serious and influential of German + systematic thinkers since Hegel is R. H. Lotze (1817-1881). His + philosophy is built up of materials derived in varying proportions from + all his German predecessors, the most distinctive idea being pluralism, + probably suggested in the first instance by Herbart, whom he succeeded as + Professor at Göttingen. But Lotze discards the rigid monads of his master + for the more intelligible soul-substances of Leibniz—or rather of + Bruno—whose example he also follows in his attempt to combine + pluralism with monism. Very strenuous efforts are made to give the + unifying principle the character of a personal God; but the suspicion of + a leaning to Pantheism is not altogether eluded.</p> + + <p>More original and far more uncompromising is the work of Ed. v. + Hartmann (1842-1906). Personally he enjoyed the twofold + distinction—whatever it may be worth—of having served as an + officer for a short time in the Prussian army, and of never having taught + in a university. His great work, published at twenty-seven, appeared + under the telling title of the <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>. It + won immediate popularity, and reached its eleventh edition in 1904. + Hartmann adopts, <!-- Page 145 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page145"></a>{145}</span>with some slight attenuation, + Schopenhauer's pessimism, and his metaphysics with a considerable + emendation. In this new version the world is still conceived as Will and + Representation; but whereas for Schopenhauer the intellective side had + been subordinated to the volitional, with Hartmann the two are co-equal + and intimately united, together forming that "Unconscious" which is the + new Absolute. In this way Reason again becomes, what it had been with + Hegel, a great cosmic principle; only as the optimistic universe had + argued itself <i>into</i> existence, so conversely the pessimistic + universe has to argue itself <i>out of</i> existence. As in the process + of developing differentiation, the volitional and intellective sides draw + apart, the Unconscious becomes self-conscious, and thus awakens to the + terrible mistake it committed in willing to be. Thenceforth the whole of + evolution is determined by the master-thought of how not to be. The + problem is how to annul the creative Will. And the solution is to divide + it into two halves so opposed that the one shall be the negation and + destruction of the other. There will be then, not indeed a certainty, but + an equal chance of definitive self-annihilation and eternal repose. Thus, + the immediate duty for mankind, as also their predestined task, is the + furtherance of scientific and industrial progress as a means towards this + consummation, which is likewise their predestined end. A religious + colouring is given to the process by representing it as an inverted + Christian scheme in which man figures as the redeemer of + God—<i>i.e.</i> the Absolute—from the unspeakable torments to + which he is now condemned by the impossibility of satisfying his + will.</p> + + <p>Like Hartmann, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), the greatest writer of + modern Germany, took his start from <!-- Page 146 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page146"></a>{146}</span>Schopenhauer, but broke + with pessimism at an early date, having come to disbelieve in the + hedonism on which it is founded. His restless vanity drove him to improve + on Darwinism by interpreting evolution as the means towards creating what + he called the Superman—that is, a race as much superior to us as we + are to the apes. Progress, however, is not to be in the direction of a + higher morality, but of greater power—the Will-to-Power, not the + Will-to-Live, being the essence of what is. Later in life Nietzsche + revived the Stoic doctrine that events move, and have moved through all + time, in a series of recurring cycles, each being the exact repetition of + its predecessor. It is a worthless idea, and Nietzsche, who had been a + Greek professor, must have known where he got it; but the megalomania to + which he eventually succumbed prevented his recognising the debt. By a + merited irony of fate this worshipper of the Napoleonic type will survive + only as a literary moralist in the history of thought.</p> + + <p>The modern revolt against metaphysical systemisation, with or without + a theological colouring, took in Germany the form of two distinct + philosophical currents. The first is scientific materialism, or, as some + of its advocates prefer to call it, energism. This began about 1850, but + boasts two great living representatives, the biologist Haeckel and the + chemist Ostwald. In their practical aims these men are idealists; but + their admission of space and time as objective realities beyond which + there is nothing, and their repudiation of agnosticism, distinguish them + from the French and English Positivists. The other and more powerful + school is known as Neo-Kantianism. It numbers numerous adherents in the + German universities, and also in those of France and Italy, representing + various <!-- Page 147 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page147"></a>{147}</span>shades of opinion united by a common + reference to Kant's first Critique, dissociated from its concessions to + deism, as the true starting-point of modern thought.</p> + +<p class="cenhead"><b>The Latest Developments.</b></p> + + <p>Since the beginning of the twentieth century the interest in + philosophy and the ability devoted to its cultivation have shown no sign + of diminution. Two new doctrines in particular have become subjects of + world-wide discussion. I refer to the theory of knowledge called + Pragmatism, and to the metaphysics of Professor Henri Bergson. Both are + of so revolutionary, so contentious, and so elusive a character as to + preclude any discussion or even outline of the new solutions for old + problems which they claim to provide. But I would recommend the study of + both, and especially of Bergson, to all who imagine that the + possibilities of speculation are exhausted, or that we are any nearer + finality and agreement than when Heracleitus first glorified war as the + father of all things, and contradiction as the central spring of + life.</p> + + <p><br style="clear:both" /></p> +<hr class="full" /> + +<p><!-- Page 149 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page149"></a>{149}</span></p> + +<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h3> + + <p>Kuno Fischer. <i>Geschichte der neuern Philosophie.</i> Nine vols. + Fourth ed.; Heidelberg, 1897-1904. (Comes down to Schopenhauer.)</p> + + <p>Erdmann. <i>Geschichte der Philosophie.</i> Vol. ii. Fourth ed.; + Berlin, 1896. (Comes down to Lotze; third ed.; trans. by W. S. Hough; + London, 1889.)</p> + + <p>Windelband. <i>Geschichte der neuern Philosophie.</i> Two vols. Fifth + ed. (Comes down to Herbart and Beneke. There is an English trans. of + Windelband's <i>General History of Philosophy</i>, by J. H. Tufts, New + York, 1893. In his contribution to the General History of Philosophy in + the <i>Kultur der Gegenwart</i>, Berlin, 1909, Windelband includes a + brief but useful summary of Pragmatism and Bergson.)</p> + + <p>Levy-Bruhl. <i>History of Modern Philosophy in France.</i> Trans. by + Miss Coblence. London, 1890.</p> + + <p>Forsyth, T. M. <i>English Philosophy: A Study of its Methods and + General Development.</i> London, 1910. (A. & C. Black.)</p> + + <p>Giordano Bruno. <i>Opere Italiane.</i> Ed. P. Lagarde. Göttingen, + 1888.</p> + + <p>—— <i>Opera latine conscripta.</i> Naples and Florence, + 1879-91.</p> + + <p>McIntyre, J. L. <i>Life of Giordano Bruno.</i> London, 1903.</p> + + <p>Bacon, Francis. <i>Works and Life.</i> Ed. by Ellis and Spedding. + Fourteen vols. 1864-74.—Works. One vol. Ed. by Ellis, Spedding, and + Robertson. (Routledge.)—<i>Novum Organum.</i> Ed. by T. Fowler. + Oxford, 1878.</p> + + <p>Abbott, Edwin. <i>Francis Bacon.</i> London, 1885.</p> + + <p>Church, R. W. <i>Bacon</i> (English Men of Letters). London, 1889.</p> + + <p>Hobbes, Thomas. <i>Works English and Latin.</i> Ed. Sir Wm. + Molesworth. Sixteen vols. London, 1839-45.</p> + + <p>Robertson, G. C. <i>Hobbes.</i> London, 1886 (Blackwood's + Philosophical Classics).</p> + + <p>Stephen, Sir Leslie. <i>Hobbes.</i> London, 1903 (English Men of + Letters).</p> + + <p>—— <i>English Thought in the Eighteenth Century.</i> + Second ed.; two vols. London, 1881.</p> + + <p>—— <i>The English Utilitarians.</i> Three vols. London, + 1900. <!-- Page 150 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page150"></a>{150}</span></p> + + <p>Descartes. <i>Œuvres.</i> Ed. V. Cousin. Eleven vols. Paris, + 1824-1828. A new edition is in course of publication.—English + trans. of the <i>Method and the Meditations</i> in the Scott Library. + London, 1901.—<i>Life</i>, by Elizabeth Haldane. London, 1905.</p> + + <p>Malebranche. <i>Œuvres.</i> Three vols. Ed. Jules Simon. Paris, + 1871.</p> + + <p>Spinoza. <i>Opera.</i> Ed. Van Vloten and Land. Two vols. The Hague, + 1882-83.</p> + + <p>—— <i>Life and Philosophy.</i> By Sir Fr. Pollock. London, + 1880; second ed., 1899.</p> + + <p>—— <i>A Study of.</i> By James Martineau. London, + 1883.</p> + + <p>——<i>'s Ethics, A Study of.</i> By H. H. Joachim. Oxford, + 1901.</p> + + <p>—— Trans. of his principal works. By Elwes in Bohn's + Library. Two vols., 1883-86. Also Everyman's Library. (Dent.)</p> + + <p>—— <i>Ethics.</i> Trans. by Hale White, revised by Amelia + Stirling. London, 1899.</p> + + <p>—— <i>Leben und Lehre.</i> Von J. Frendenthal. 1904.</p> + + <p>Leibniz. <i>Philosophische Schriften.</i> Seven vols. Ed. C. J. + Gerhardt. Berlin, 1875-90.—<i>The Philosophy of Leibniz.</i> By + Bertrand Russell. Cambridge, 1900.</p> + + <p>Locke, John. <i>Works.</i> Nine vols. London, 1824.</p> + + <p>—— <i>Essay Concerning Human Understanding.</i> Two vols.; + in Bohn's Library. London, 1877.</p> + + <p>—— <i>Life of.</i> By Fox Bourne. Two vols. London, + 1876.</p> + + <p>—— By Thomas Fowler. London, 1880 (English Men of + Letters).</p> + + <p>—— By Prof. A. C. Fraser; in Blackwood's Phil. Classics. + 1890.</p> + + <p>Berkeley, George. <i>Works and Life.</i> Ed. A. C. Fraser. Four vols. + Oxford, 1871.</p> + + <p>—— By Fraser (Philosophical Classics). 1881.</p> + + <p>Hume, David. <i>Philosophical Works.</i> Four vols. Ed. Green and + Grose. London, 1874-75.</p> + + <p>—— By T. H. Huxley (English Men of Letters). New edition. + London, 1894.</p> + + <p>Kant. <i>Werke.</i> Ed. Rosenkranz and Schubert. Twelve vols. 1838-40. + Two new editions, including the correspondence, are now in course of + publication at Berlin. There are English translations of all the + principal works.</p> + + <p>—— <i>Life and Doctrine.</i> By F. Paulsen; trans. by + Creighton and Lefevre. London, 1908.</p> + + <p>Fichte, J. G. <i>Werke.</i> Eleven vols. 1834-46. Trans. of his more + popular works by Dr. W. Smith. Two vols. London, 1890.</p> + + <p>Adamson. <i>Fichte.</i> In Blackwood's Phil. Classics. 1901. <!-- Page + 151 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page151"></a>{151}</span></p> + + <p>Schelling, F. W. J. <i>Werke.</i> Fourteen vols. Stuttgart, + 1856-61.</p> + + <p>Watson, Prof. J. <i>Schelling's Transcendental Idealism</i>, Chicago, + 1882.</p> + + <p>Hegel, G. W. F. <i>Werke.</i> Nineteen vols. in twenty-one. Leipzig, + 1832-87.</p> + + <p>Hegel. By Prof. E. Caird (Philosophical Classics for English Readers.) + Edinburgh, 1883. Hegel's Philosophies of <i>Law, Religion, History, Mind, + his History of Philosophy</i>, and the smaller <i>Logic</i>, have been + translated into English.</p> + + <p>Schopenhauer. <i>Werke.</i> Six volumes in the Reclam Series. Leipzig, + 1892.</p> + + <p>Ribot. <i>La Philosophie de Schopenhauer.</i> Ninth ed.; Paris, + 1909.</p> + + <p>Wallace, Prof. W. <i>Life of Schopenhauer</i> (Great Writers Series). + London, 1890.</p> + + <p>Whittaker, Thomas. "Schopenhauer," in <i>Philosophies Ancient and + Modern</i>. London, 1908.</p> + + <p>Schopenhauer's <i>World as Will and Idea.</i> Trans. by Haldane and + Kemp. Three vols. London, 1884-86.—Essays. Trans. by Belfort Bax + (Bohn's Library). London, 1891.</p> + + <p>Schopenhauer. <i>Studies.</i> Consisting of translations by T. Bailey + Saunders. Seven vols. London, 1889-96.—Other essays translated by + Madame Hillebrand (London, 1889) and by A. B. Ballock (London, 1903)</p> + + <p>Herbart, J. F. <i>Werke.</i> Ed. Kehrbach. Fifteen vols. 1887 + <i>ff.</i></p> + + <p>Wagner. <i>Vollständige Darstellung d. Lehre Herbarts.</i> 1896.</p> + + <p>Hayward, F. H. <i>The Student's Herbart.</i> 1902.</p> + + <p>Hamilton, Sir W. <i>Discussions on Philosophy.</i> Second ed. London, + 1853.</p> + + <p>Comte, Auguste. <i>Cours de Philosophie Positive.</i> Five vols. + Paris, 1830-42.—<i>Politique Positive.</i> Four vols. Paris, + 1851-54.</p> + + <p>Caird, Edward. <i>The Social Philosophy of Auguste Comte.</i> Glasgow, + 1885.</p> + + <p>Levy-Bruhl. <i>The Philosophy of Auguste Comte.</i> English trans. + London, 1903.</p> + + <p>Whewell, Wm. <i>Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.</i> London, + 1840.</p> + + <p>Mill, J. S. <i>A System of Logic.</i> Two vols. London, + 1843.—<i>On Liberty.</i> London, 1859.—<i>Utilitarianism.</i> + London, 1863.—<i>Examination of Sir William Hamilton's + Philosophy.</i> London, 1865.</p> + + <p>Whittaker, T. "Comte and Mill," in <i>Philosophies Ancient and + Modern.</i> London, 1908.</p> + + <p>Spencer, Herbert. <i>First Principles.</i> London, + 1862.—<i>Essays.</i> Three vols. London, + 1891.—<i>Autobiography.</i> London, 1904.</p> + + <p>Macpherson, Hector. <i>Herbert Spencer.</i> London, 1900. <!-- Page + 152 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page152"></a>{152}</span></p> + + <p>Green, T. H. <i>Prolegomena to Ethics.</i> Oxford, 1884.</p> + + <p>Green, T. H. <i>Works.</i> Three vols. London, 1885-1900.</p> + + <p>Bradley, F. H. <i>Appearance and Reality.</i> Third ed. London, + 1889.</p> + + <p>Lotze, H. <i>Mikrocosmus.</i> 1856-64.—<i>System der + Philosophie.</i> 1874-79.—English trans. of the <i>Microc.</i> Two + vols. Edinburgh, 1885.—Of the <i>Metaphysics.</i> Two vols. Oxford. + 1884.</p> + + <p>Jones, Sir Henry. <i>The Philosophy of Lotze.</i> Glasgow, 1895.</p> + + <p>Hartmann, Ed. von. <i>Die Philosophie des Unbewussten.</i> 1869. + English trans. by W. C. Coupland. Three vols. London, 1884.</p> + + <p>Nietzsche, Fr. <i>Werke.</i> Leipzig, 1895 <i>ff.</i> English trans. + in fourteen vols. Edinburgh. (T. N. Foulis.)—D. Halévy, <i>La Vie + de Nietzsche.</i> Paris, 1909.</p> + + <p>Russell, Bertrand. <i>The Problems of Philosophy</i> (Home University + Library). London, 1912.</p> + + <p><br style="clear:both" /></p> +<hr class="full" /> + +<p><!-- Page 153 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page153"></a>{153}</span></p> + +<h3>INDEX</h3> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Abbott, E. A., quoted, <a href="#page14">14</a></p> + <p>Agnosticism, <a href="#page67">67</a>, <a href="#page70">70</a>, <a href="#page141">141</a>, <a href="#page143">143</a>, <a href="#page144">144</a></p> + <p>Anaximander, <a href="#page12">12</a></p> + <p>Aquinas, St. Thomas, <a href="#page4">4</a></p> + <p>Aristotle, <a href="#page3">3</a>, <a href="#page5">5</a>, <a href="#page6">6</a>, <a href="#page7">7</a>, <a href="#page19">19</a>, <a href="#page25">25</a>, <a href="#page49">49</a>, <a href="#page52">52</a>, <a href="#page129">129</a>, <a href="#page139">139</a>, <a href="#page142">142</a></p> + <p>Arnold, Matthew, <a href="#page55">55</a></p> + <p>Athens, <a href="#page1">1</a> <i>f.</i></p> + <p>Atomism, revival of, <a href="#page10">10</a>, <a href="#page21">21</a></p> + <p>Averroes, <a href="#page4">4</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Bacon, Roger, <a href="#page4">4</a></p> + <p>Bacon, Francis, <a href="#page12">12</a> <i>ff.</i>, <a href="#page24">24</a>, <a href="#page29">29</a>, <a href="#page32">32</a>, <a href="#page61">61</a></p> + <p>Baur, F. C., <a href="#page142">142</a></p> + <p>Bayle, Pierre, <a href="#page71">71</a></p> + <p>Beneke, F. E., <a href="#page123">123</a></p> + <p>Bergson, Henri, <a href="#page147">147</a></p> + <p>Berkeley, Bishop, <a href="#page43">43</a>, <a href="#page72">72</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Theory of Vision</i>, <a href="#page73">73</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">Idealism, <a href="#page73">73</a> <i>ff.</i>, <a href="#page89">89</a></p> + <p>Boyle, Robert, <a href="#page21">21</a></p> + <p>Bradley, F. H., <a href="#page57">57</a>, <a href="#page143">143</a></p> + <p>Brahe, Tycho, <a href="#page17">17</a></p> + <p>Brown, Dr. Thomas, <a href="#page134">134</a></p> + <p>Bruno, Giordano, <a href="#page7">7</a> <i>ff.</i>, <a href="#page22">22</a>, <a href="#page45">45</a>, <a href="#page51">51</a>, <a href="#page107">107</a></p> + <p>Byron, <a href="#page119">119</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Caird, Edward, <a href="#page143">143</a></p> + <p>Caird, John, <i>ib.</i></p> + <p>Calvinism, <a href="#page28">28</a></p> + <p>Catholicism and philosophy, <a href="#page2">2</a> <i>ff.</i></p> + <p>Causation. <i>See</i> Hume, Kant, Hegel, Mill</p> + <p>Christianity. <i>See</i> Catholicism</p> + <p>Christina, Queen, <a href="#page32">32</a> <i>f.</i></p> + <p>Church, Dean, quoted, <a href="#page15">15</a></p> + <p>Collier, Arthur, <a href="#page75">75</a></p> + <p>Collins, Anthony, <a href="#page71">71</a></p> + <p>Columbus, <a href="#page6">6</a></p> + <p>Comte, Auguste, <a href="#page127">127</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">classification of the sciences, <a href="#page130">130</a>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Politique Positive</i>, <i>ib.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">philosophy of history, <a href="#page131">131</a>, <a href="#page133">133</a></p> + <p>Condillac, <a href="#page125">125</a></p> + <p>Copernicanism, <a href="#page6">6</a> <i>f.</i></p> + <p>Cousin, Victor, <a href="#page90">90</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Dante, <a href="#page6">6</a> <i>f.</i></p> + <p>Darwin, Charles, <a href="#page140">140</a></p> + <p>Democritus, <a href="#page10">10</a></p> + <p>Descartes, <a href="#page30">30</a>, <a href="#page31">31</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">on belief, <a href="#page41">41</a>, <a href="#page49">49</a>, <a href="#page61">61</a>, <a href="#page65">65</a>, <a href="#page87">87</a></p> + <p>Duns Scotus, <a href="#page4">4</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Eclectics, French, <a href="#page125">125</a> <i>f.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">German, <a href="#page144">144</a></p> + <p>Ego, the Absolute, <a href="#page105">105</a></p> + <p>Elizabeth, Princess, <a href="#page32">32</a></p> + <p>Empedocles, <a href="#page65">65</a></p> + <p>Epicurus, <a href="#page9">9</a>, <a href="#page22">22</a>, <a href="#page29">29</a></p> + <p>Epistemology, <a href="#page65">65</a></p> + <p>Eriugena, John Scotus, <a href="#page3">3</a>, <a href="#page4">4</a></p> + <p><i>Ethica</i>, Spinoza's, <a href="#page48">48</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Fichte, J. G., <a href="#page101">101</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">his definition of God, <a href="#page102">102</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">as German patriot, <a href="#page102">102</a> <i>f.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">his idealism, <a href="#page103">103</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">ethical standpoint, <a href="#page106">106</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">later teaching, <a href="#page110">110</a></p> + <p>Ficino, Marsilio, <a href="#page5">5</a></p> + <p>Final causes in modern philosophy, <a href="#page61">61</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">in Plato, <i>ib.</i></p> + <p>Form and Matter, <a href="#page10">10</a>, <a href="#page18">18</a>, <a href="#page24">24</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Galileo, <a href="#page17">17</a>, <a href="#page24">24</a></p> + <p>Gassendi, <a href="#page50">50</a></p> + <p>Geulincx, <a href="#page42">42</a>, <a href="#page44">44</a>, <a href="#page51">51</a></p> + <p>Gilbert, <a href="#page17">17</a>, <a href="#page21">21</a></p> + <p>Godwin, William, <a href="#page139">139</a></p> + <p>Goethe, <a href="#page102">102</a>, <a href="#page105">105</a></p> + <p>Green, T. H., <a href="#page143">143</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Haeckel, Ernst, <a href="#page146">146</a></p> + <p>Haldane, Lord, <a href="#page143">143</a></p> + <p>Haldane, Miss E. S.,</p> + <p class="i2">quoted, <a href="#page32">32</a></p> + <p>Hamilton, Sir William, <a href="#page126">126</a> f., <a href="#page132">132</a></p> + <p>Hartmann, Ed. von, <a href="#page144">144</a> f.</p> + <p>Harvey, <a href="#page17">17</a></p> + <p>Hegel, G. F. W., <a href="#page24">24</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">on Spinoza, <a href="#page53">53</a>, <a href="#page103">103</a>, <a href="#page107">107</a>, <a href="#page110">110</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Phenomenology of Mind</i>, <a href="#page112">112</a>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Science of Logic</i>, <i>ib.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Encyclopędia</i>, <i>ib.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Philosophy of Law</i>, <i>ib.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Ęsthetics</i>, <a href="#page113">113</a>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Philosophy of History</i>, <i>ib.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">his didactic method, <a href="#page113">113</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">negation of supernatural religion, <a href="#page116">116</a>, <a href="#page118">118</a>, <a href="#page124">124</a>, <a href="#page126">126</a></p> + <p>Hegelians, the English, <a href="#page142">142</a> <i>ff.</i></p> + <p>Heine, <a href="#page103">103</a>, <a href="#page116">116</a></p> + <p>Heracleitus, <a href="#page11">11</a>, <a href="#page147">147</a></p> + <p>Herbart, J. F., <a href="#page122">122</a>, <a href="#page144">144</a></p> + <p>Hobbes, Thomas, <a href="#page22">22</a> <i>ff.</i>, <a href="#page50">50</a>, <a href="#page56">56</a>, <a href="#page68">68</a></p> + <p>Hooker, Richard, and the Social Contract, <a href="#page29">29</a></p> + <p>Humanism in the nineteenth century, <a href="#page124">124</a></p> + <p>Hume, David, <a href="#page77">77</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">character as a historian, <a href="#page77">77</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">theory of causation, <a href="#page81">81</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">attitude towards theism, <a href="#page84">84</a>, <a href="#page89">89</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">a precursor of Comte, <a href="#page129">129</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">and of Mill, <a href="#page133">133</a> <i>ff.</i></p> + <p>Huxley, T. H., <a href="#page127">127</a></p> + <p>Huyghens on Descartes, <a href="#page41">41</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Induction, Baconian, <a href="#page20">20</a></p> + <p>Innate ideas, <a href="#page68">68</a>, <a href="#page95">95</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>John of Salisbury, <a href="#page4">4</a></p> + <p>Justinian, <a href="#page1">1</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Kant, Immanuel, <a href="#page85">85</a> ff.;</p> + <p class="i2">his nebular hypothesis, <a href="#page87">87</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">on synthetic and analytic judgments, <a href="#page87">87</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">on space and time, <a href="#page90">90</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>, <a href="#page93">93</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">on causation, <a href="#page95">95</a> <i>f.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">moral and religious philosophy, <a href="#page97">97</a> ff., <a href="#page118">118</a>, <a href="#page119">119</a>, <a href="#page132">132</a>, <a href="#page133">133</a>, <a href="#page134">134</a>, <a href="#page147">147</a></p> + <p>Kepler, <a href="#page10">10</a>, <a href="#page17">17</a>, <a href="#page21">21</a></p> + <p>Klopstock, <a href="#page101">101</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> +<!-- Page 154 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page154"></a>{154}</span> + <p>Lamarck, <a href="#page139">139</a>, <a href="#page140">140</a></p> + <p>Laplace, <a href="#page87">87</a></p> + <p>Leibniz, G. W., <a href="#page57">57</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">optimism, <a href="#page59">59</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">monadology, <a href="#page62">62</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">determinism, <a href="#page63">63</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">pre-established harmony, <i>ib.</i>, <a href="#page144">144</a></p> + <p>Lewes, G. H., <a href="#page103">103</a>, <a href="#page107">107</a></p> + <p>Locke, John, <a href="#page29">29</a>, <a href="#page65">65</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">on toleration, <a href="#page67">67</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">his proof of theism, <a href="#page69">69</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">moral inconsistency, <a href="#page69">69</a> <i>f.</i>, <a href="#page72">72</a>, <a href="#page87">87</a>, <a href="#page89">89</a></p> + <p>Lotze, R. H., <a href="#page144">144</a></p> + <p>Lucretius, <a href="#page9">9</a>, <a href="#page20">20</a>, <a href="#page22">22</a></p> + <p>Luther, <a href="#page6">6</a></p> + <p>Lyell, Sir Charles, <a href="#page139">139</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Macaulay on Bacon, <a href="#page16">16</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">on Hobbes, <a href="#page28">28</a>, <a href="#page71">71</a></p> + <p>McTaggart, Dr. J. E., <a href="#page144">144</a></p> + <p>Maine de Biran, <a href="#page125">125</a></p> + <p>Malebranche, <a href="#page42">42</a> <i>ff.</i>, <a href="#page51">51</a>, <a href="#page74">74</a>, <a href="#page89">89</a></p> + <p>Malthus, <a href="#page137">137</a></p> + <p>Mansel, H. L., <a href="#page127">127</a></p> + <p>Materialists, German, <a href="#page146">146</a></p> + <p>Mill, J. S., <a href="#page132">132</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>System of Logic</i>, <a href="#page133">133</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">metaphysics, <a href="#page135">135</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">theology, <i>ib.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">ethics, <a href="#page135">135</a> <i>f.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">politics, <a href="#page136">136</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">character, <a href="#page137">137</a></p> + <p>Milne-Edwards, <a href="#page140">140</a></p> + <p>Monadism, <a href="#page11">11</a>, <a href="#page70">70</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Napier, <a href="#page17">17</a></p> + <p>Neo-Kantianism, <a href="#page146">146</a></p> + <p>Neo-Platonism, <a href="#page2">2</a> f.</p> + <p>Newton, Isaac, <a href="#page58">58</a>, <a href="#page59">59</a></p> + <p>Nicolas of Cusa, <a href="#page11">11</a></p> + <p>Nietzsche, Friedrich, <a href="#page145">145</a> <i>f.</i></p> + <p>Norris, John, <a href="#page75">75</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Occam, <a href="#page5">5</a></p> + <p>Occasionalism, <a href="#page42">42</a></p> + <p>Ostwald, <a href="#page146">146</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Pantheism, <a href="#page45">45</a>,<a href="#page50">50</a></p> + <p>Parmenides, <a href="#page9">9</a></p> + <p>Pascal, <a href="#page42">42</a></p> + <p>Plotinus, <a href="#page2">2</a>, <a href="#page5">5</a>, <a href="#page12">12</a>, <a href="#page44">44</a></p> + <p>Positivism. See Comte</p> + <p>Power, idea of, in Spinoza, <a href="#page52">52</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">how connected with causation, <a href="#page83">83</a></p> + <p>Pragmatism, <a href="#page147">147</a></p> + <p>Proclus, <a href="#page3">3</a></p> + <p>Pythagoreans, <a href="#page9">9</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Reality, degrees of, <a href="#page57">57</a></p> + <p>Reid, Thomas, <a href="#page85">85</a>, <a href="#page125">125</a></p> + <p>Renaissance, scientific activity of the, <a href="#page17">17</a></p> + <p>Rousseau, <a href="#page29">29</a>, <a href="#page119">119</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>St. Simon, <a href="#page127">127</a></p> + <p>Schelling, F. W. J., <a href="#page106">106</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">natural philosophy, <a href="#page108">108</a>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Transcendental Idealism</i>, <a href="#page108">108</a> <i>f.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">romanticism, <a href="#page109">109</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">Absolutism, <a href="#page110">110</a>, <a href="#page126">126</a></p> + <p>Schiller, F. C. S., quoted, <a href="#page18">18</a></p> + <p>Schopenhauer, Arthur, <a href="#page103">103</a>, <a href="#page118">118</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">pessimism, <a href="#page119">119</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">metaphysics, <a href="#page119">119</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">ethics, <a href="#page121">121</a> <i>f.</i>, <a href="#page145">145</a></p> + <p>Sextus Empiricus, <a href="#page67">67</a></p> + <p>Shaftesbury, Lord, author of the <i>Characteristics</i>, <a href="#page71">71</a></p> + <p>Shelley, <a href="#page139">139</a></p> + <p>Sidgwick, Henry, <a href="#page135">135</a></p> + <p>Smith, Adam, <a href="#page140">140</a></p> + <p>Social Contract, <a href="#page26">26</a></p> + <p>Spencer, Herbert, <a href="#page127">127</a>, <a href="#page137">137</a> ff.;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Social Statics</i>, <a href="#page137">137</a>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Psychology</i>, <a href="#page140">140</a>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Synthetic Philosophy</i>, <a href="#page141">141</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">on religion, <i>ib.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">formula of evolution, <a href="#page142">142</a>, <a href="#page144">144</a></p> + <p>Spencer, Rev. Thomas, <a href="#page137">137</a></p> + <p>Spinoza, <a href="#page30">30</a>, <a href="#page45">45</a> <i>ff.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Tractatus Theologico-Politicus</i>, <a href="#page48">48</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">not a mystic, <a href="#page55">55</a>;</p> + <p class="i2">ethics, <a href="#page56">56</a> <i>f.</i>;</p> + <p class="i2">return to Stoicism, <a href="#page56">56</a>, <a href="#page59">59</a>, <a href="#page61">61</a>, <a href="#page69">69</a>, <a href="#page87">87</a>, <a href="#page106">106</a>, <a href="#page110">110</a></p> + <p>Staėl, Madame de, <a href="#page125">125</a></p> + <p>Stirling, Dr. Hutchison, <a href="#page143">143</a></p> + <p>Strauss, David, <a href="#page112">112</a>, <a href="#page142">142</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Taylor, Mrs., and J. S. Mill, <a href="#page132">132</a></p> + <p>Temple, Archbishop, <a href="#page102">102</a></p> + <p>Theism. <i>See</i> Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Mill</p> + <p><i>Timęus</i>, Plato's, <a href="#page41">41</a></p> + <p>Toland, <a href="#page71">71</a></p> + <p>Turgot, <a href="#page129">129</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Vaux, Clotilde de, and Comte, <a href="#page132">132</a></p> + <p>Voltaire and optimism, <a href="#page59">59</a></p> + <p>Vries, Simon de and Spinoza, <a href="#page46">46</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Wallace, A. R., <a href="#page140">140</a></p> + <p>Wallace, Prof. William, <a href="#page143">143</a></p> + <p>Whewell, William, <a href="#page133">133</a></p> + <p>Wordsworth, <a href="#page57">57</a></p> + <p>Wycliffe, <a href="#page5">5</a></p> + </div> + </div> + +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<hr class="pg" /> +<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY***</p> +<p>******* This file should be named 34283-h.txt or 34283-h.zip *******</p> +<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br /> +<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/3/4/2/8/34283">http://www.gutenberg.org/3/4/2/8/34283</a></p> +<p>Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed.</p> + +<p>Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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