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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/36801-8.txt b/36801-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3803464 --- /dev/null +++ b/36801-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4567 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Logic Of Facts, by George Jacob Holyoake + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Logic Of Facts + Or, Every-day Reasoning + +Author: George Jacob Holyoake + +Release Date: July 20, 2011 [EBook #36801] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LOGIC OF FACTS *** + + + + +Produced by David Widger + + + + + +A LOGIC OF FACTS: + +or + +Every-day Reasoning + +By G. J. Holyoake + + "Call him wise whose thoughts and words are a clear + because to a clear why."--Lavater. + +[FOURTH THOUSAND.] + +LONDON: F. FARRAH, 282, STRAND, W.C. + +1866. + + + + +INTRODUCTION OF 1848. + +The Logic of the Schools, however indispensable in its place, fails to +meet half the common want in daily life. The Logic of the Schools begins +with the _management_ of the premises of an argument; there is, however, +a more practical lesson to be learned in beginning with the _premises_ +themselves. A thousand errors arise through the assumption of premises +for one arising in the misplacement of terms. The Logic of the Schools +is an elaborate attack upon the lesser evil. + +Sir James Mackintosh has remarked that 'Popular reason can alone correct +popular sophistry'--and it is in vain that we expect amendment in the +reasoning of the multitude, unless we make reasoning intelligible to +the multitude. As to my object, could I, like Gridiron-Cobbett, adopt a +symbol of it, I would have engraved Ęsop's 'Old Man and his Ass,' who, +in a vain attempt to please everybody, failed (like his disciples--for +even _he_ has disciples) to please anybody. The folly of that +superfluously philanthropic old gentleman should teach us _proportion_ +of purpose. To be of real service; to _some_ is in the compass of +individual capacity, and consequently, the true way of serving, if not +of pleasing _all_. The republic of literature, like society, has its +aristocratic, its middle, and its lower classes. No one has combined, in +one performance, the refinement applauded in the universities, with the +practical purpose, popular among those who toil to live, and live to +toil. The populace are my choice--of them I am one, and, like a recent +premier, Earl Grey, am disposed 'to stand by my order.' I write for this +class both from affection and taste. If I can benefit any, I can them. +I know their difficulties, for I have encountered them--their wants, for +they have been mine. This will account for the liberties taken with the +subjects upon which I treat. There is more than one kind of hunger that +will break through barriers, and I have taken with an unlicensed hand, +wherever it was to be found, what I wanted for myself, and what I know +to be wanted by those who stand at the anvil and the loom, and who never +had the benefits of scholastic education, and who never will. + +Many of the arts and sciences, which formerly resided exclusively in the +colleges, and ministered only to the sons of opulence and leisure, +have escaped from their retreat, and have become the hand-maids of the +populace. But as respects logic, there still remains between the learned +and the illiterate an impassable gulf. The uninformed look on the +recondite structure of logic, and they are repelled by the difficulty +of comprehending it, and wrap themselves up in absolute and obstinate +ignorance, which they believe to be their destiny. The populace, in our +manufactories, have to choose between subsistence and intelligence. For +study, after protracted toil, they have not the strength--and to abridge +their labour is to abridge their subsistence, and this they cannot +afford. But because they are precluded by the destiny of civilisation +from knowing much, they need not remain utterly unskilled in reasoning. +Their natural good sense may be systematized, their natural logic may be +reduced to some rule and order--though it may not be refined it may be +practical, it may give power, and develop capacity now dormant. + +The hints, general rules, and elementary remarks dispersed throughout +this work, will probably be of service to the uninitiated, perhaps put +them on the road to higher acquirements, give them a confidence in their +own powers, perhaps inspire them with a love of these essential studies, +and impart a taste for the refinements which lie beyond. My hope is that +many will be induced to consult scholastic treatises, and acquire +that accurate knowledge which makes the society of educated people so +interesting. Impulse has been given to knowledge, and the populace have +begun to think, and both to speak and write their thinkings--and why +should they not be enabled to do it free from obvious mistakes, and with +a broad propriety commensurate with the native capacity they possess? +Why should they, like a certain learned politician on a public +occasion, propose, as a sentiment, 'The three R's, Reading, 'Riting, and +'Rithmetic?'* Why, in writing, should they not express themselves with +strong grammatical coherence, and a certain bold perspicuity, if not +able to reach refinement and elegance? Why, in pronunciation, should +they not speak with a certain manly openness of vowel sound and a +distinct articulation, if not with all elocutionary modulation? Why +should not their discourse be expressed in brief, clear sentences? If +their punctuation went no farther than placing capital letters at +the commencement of sentences and of proper names, and periods at +the conclusion of sentences, it would render their writings more +intelligible than are half the communications they now send to the +press. If they mastered only brevity and abrupt directness, and learned +to omit tedious prolixity, they would command a hearing in many cases +where now they are denied one. If in logic they made a shrewd mastery +of plain facts--being as sure as they could, when once set on surety, +eschewing conjecture and pernicious supposition--if they followed the +methods of nature and good sense, where the elaborate methods of art +are hidden from them, who will not admit that they would be more +intelligible than now, exercise a power they never yet possessed, and +extort the attention and esteem of the public where now they excite only +its pity, or contempt, or outrage what just taste it has? The people +would be enabled to do these things, but that so many who prepare +treatises for their guidance alarm them by the display of abstruse +dissertation above their powers, their means, their time, and their +wants. That a little learning is a dangerous thing is not a maxim +alone believed in by the race of country squires steeped in port and +prejudice, but by schoolmen who cannot bring themselves to give a little +proportion of sound knowledge, but must give all, the reconite as well. +The statesman decries the ignorance and want of wisdom displayed by +embryo politicians who will accept no instalment of liberty, but insist +on the concession of _all_ their claims--but the scholar does the same +thing when he will impart none but the completest information to the +people. + + * This case is cited by S. G. Goodrich, the original Peter + Parley, in his preface to 'Fireside Education.' Sir William + Curtis, to whom, probably, Mr. Goodrich refers, gave also + 'the three K's--King, Church, and Constitution.' + +In quoting, I have been a borrower, but not a plagiarist. In no case am +I conscious of having taken from others without at the same time making +the fairest acknowledgment in my power. + +If the references to the highest authorities are sometimes through +others, it is because the highest authorities have not always been +accessible. Those who have had ordinary experience estimate highly the +value of minute integrity in this respect. Fruitless hours are spent +in tracing false and careless references, and to one whose time is his +means, no little injury is done when it is thus wasted. + +Unbounded gratitude is due to those authors, old and new, who, with +learning and grace, with care and patience, have put the world in +possession of thoughts which are real additions to its knowledge--and +corresponding should be the contempt of those whose high-sounding and +pretending books seduce readers to wade through them only to find in +them the millioneth echo of some commonplace idea. + +The 'Spectator' was pleased to say that I wrote 'Practical Grammar' in +the spirit of an 'ultra-radical, setting the world to rights.' Yet I +have always declared, with Butler-- + + Reforming schemes are none of mine, + To mend the world's a vast design; + Like those who toil in little boat + To drag to them the ship afloat. + +Utopianism is not my idiosyncracy. But I have confidence in endeavour. +Continuity of ameliorative effort is the sole enthusiasm that can serve +the cause of improvement. It is useful to do what seems to be useful, +whether little or much--a moderate rule, but one that will take those +who carry it out, a long way. + +My illustrations, I need scarcely say, are neutral in politics and +theology. In the grammar of J. A. D. D'Orsey, published in 'Chambers' +Educational Course,' there are disputations, Biblicisms, and bits of +intense theology. Professor John Radford Young, in his treatise on +Algebra, has introduced a reply to Hume's controverted theory of +miracles--and Dr. Whately makes his 'Logic' an avowedly theological +auxiliary, showing that much passes for good taste in this country which +is only an irrelevant propitiation of powerful opinion. I have not, +however, been seduced by this species of example. There are distinct +provinces in intellect as well as in industry--and what political +economy justifies in one case, good sense dictates in the other. No man +has a right to intrude theology into every question, and agitate points +of faith when he pretends to instruct the understanding. + +There is less occasion to speak of the utility of logic, than to show +it to be easy of acquisition. Mr. Stuart Mill, in confirmation of this +view, observes: We need not seek far for a solution of the question so +often agitated, respecting the utility of Logic. If a science of logic +exists, or is capable of existing, it must be useful. If there be rules +to which every mind conforms, in every instance in which it judges +rightly, there seems little necessity for discussing whether a person is +more likely to observe those rules when he knows the rules, than when he +is unacquainted with them.* Certainly people are not so much prejudiced +against logic on account of its supposed uselessness as on account of +its supposed difficulties. Deserved or not, logic has always had a good +reputation. Well or ill founded, the popular impression has uniformly +been in its favour. It has been valued like the diamond--but considered, +like that precious stone, of very uncertain access. + + *'System of Logic,' p. 12. Second Edition. + +The high popularity of common sense--'the exercise of the judgment +unaided by rule'--has been interpreted into a virtual rejection of logic +by the multitude. But it ought not to be overlooked, that the credit +in which mere common sense is held, is a matter of necessity as well as +choice. It being the best sense the untutored have, they wisely use it, +and no wonder that they are inclined to laud what they are constrained +to employ. Doubtless they always perceived that common sense would be +the better for being made orderly, as a spirited horse is the fitter for +use after being 'broken.' Logical sense, among the masses, is secretly +supposed to be disciplined sense, and to have all the advantage of the +trained soldier over the raw recruit. + +It is quite true, as Abram Tucker puts it, that 'The science of abstruse +learning, when completely attained, is like Achilles' spear, that healed +the wounds it had made before; so this knowledge serves to repair the +damage itself had occasioned, it casts no additional light upon the +paths of life.' But few persons sensible of the value of exact knowledge +will complain of the _necessary_ elaboration to which it sometimes +leads. Nor will those who have felt the thrill of pleasure which +complete analysis imparts, regret the patience which put them in +possession of a secret of science, or made them master of a new field of +knowledge. + +Common sense is the substratum of all logic. Common sense is the natural +sense of mankind. It is founded on common observation and experience. It +is modest and plain and unsophisticated. It sees with everybody's eyes +and hears with everybody's ears. It has no capricious distinctions, no +partialities, and no mysteries. It never equivocates and never trifles. +Its language is always the same, and is always intelligible. It is known +by its perspicuity of speech and singleness of purpose. The most prudent +of all the children of fact, it never forsakes nature or reason. Some +outline laws for its employment, if they can be indicated, must be +better than its popular aimless and desultory use. + + + + +PREFACE OF 1866. + +One has no right to make a literary subject political--that is, to make +it partisan; but to give a political motive which concerns all equally, +for promoting a literary study, is allowable, and does not partake of +the nature of party politics. One may, like Cobbett, look on literature +with political eyes, without, like him, making it a vehicle of party +attacks. + +In this country, where the political genius of the people lies in +self-government--where the public growth of the people and their +internal liberty depend upon their capacity to manage their own +affairs--the art of public speaking has political importance to every +aide in politics. + +To be able to take a subject well in hand, like a stage-coach driver +does his horses--to hold the reins of your arguments firmly--to direct +and drive well home the burden of your meaning, is a power which every +man ought to study to attain, who rises to address a council, or stands +up on a platform to convince a meeting. + + + + + +A LOGIC OF FACTS. + + + +CHAPTER I. THE LOGIC OF THE SCHOOLS + +It is a humiliating reflection that mankind never reasoned so ill as +when they most professed to cultivate the art of reasoning.--Life of +Galileo, p. 1. society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. + +Common sense--the foundation of logic--first received (to a limited +extent) the regularity of an art and the certainty of a science, from +the master hand of Aristotle. Impartial scholars, familiar with his +writings on logic, allow them to have not only ingenuity but real merit; +and his admirers contend that he has been misunderstood by some and +abused by others. This is highly probable, as we are certain that when +his works were interpreted by the schools, and his logic proclaimed the +great text-book of knowledge and the only weapon of truth, 'men's minds, +instead of studying nature, were in an endless ferment about occult +qualities and imaginary essences; little was talked of but intention +and remission, proportion and degree, infinity, formality, quiddity and +individuality.'* Logic then was jargon, controversy chicane, and truth +a shuttlecock, with which the disputants respectively played, or the +object which they mutually disguised. Logic was a labyrinth in which the +subtlest lost their Way--a bourne from which the traveller after truth +seldom returned. + + * Account of Lord Bacon's Novum Organon Scientiarum, Lib. of + Useful Knowledge, p. 4. + +A striking illustration of this has been furnished by a candid and +distinguished writer--Dr. Reid. 'Of the analytics and of the topics +of Aristotle, ingenuousness requires me to confess, that though I have +often purposed to read the whole with care, and to understand _what is +intelligible_, yet my courage and patience always failed me before I had +done. Why should I throw away so much time and painful attention upon +a thing of so little real use? If I had lived in those ages when the +knowledge of Aristotle's Organon entitled a man to the highest rank in +philosophy, ambition might have Induced me to employ upon it some years +of painful study; and, less, I conceive, would not be sufficient. Such +reflections as these always got the better of my resolution.'* + +Dr. Whately, who has for many years occupied the throne of Logic and +whose work maybe taken, from its currency in our colleges and academies, +as the representative of the logic of the schools, seems to obviate all +objections to the abstruseness of this subject by a counter charge, +to the effect that logic is now underrated only because it has been +overrated. But it is not the complexity found in it, but the laudations +bestowed upon it which have brought it into neglect. Dr. Whately contends +that certain writers, 'by representing logic as furnishing the sole +instrument for the discovery of truth in all subjects, and as teaching +the use of the intellectual faculties in general, raised expectations +which could not be realised, and which naturally led to a reaction--to +logic being regarded as utterly futile and empty.'** Deeply deploring +this kind of injury, from which many important arts have suffered, I am +neither disposed to defend such a course, nor to imitate it. But I demur +to the truth of this representation with regard to logic. If logic be not +the 'sole instrument for the discovery of truth in all subjects,' it is +certainly the _principal_ one. Instead of charging scholastic logicians +with having unduly 'raised,' it would be nearer the truth, in my opinion, +to say that they have _confused_ 'expectations' by intricate machinery +and extreme elaborations. + + * Lord Kamet's Sketches vol. 8, chap. S. Aristotle's + Logic. + + ** Dr. Whately: Elements of Logic, preface, p. vii. Second + edition. + +Intricacy and minuteness of detail might be a trifling disqualification +did they lead to something immediately practical. But Dr. Whately +contends that logic, in the most extensive sense which the name can, +with propriety, be made to bear, is that of the science, and also the +art of reasonings 'Inasmuch as logic institutes an analysis of the +process of the mind in reasoning, it is strictly a _science_, while +considered in reference to the practical rules it furnishes it is an +_art_.'* He confines the province of logic, as an art, to 'employing +language properly for the purpose of reasoning,' and restricts the +logician to the use of the syllogism as the sole test of argument. Mr. +Augustus de Morgan thus exhibits the spirit of Whately's restriction:-- + +Logic has nothing to do with the truth of the facts, opinions, or +presumptions, from which an inference is derived; but simply takes care +that the inference shall certainly be true if the premises be true.' + +It has been, and _is_ to be, objected, that logic, thus confined, +'leaves untouched the greatest difficulties, and those which are the +sources of the greatest errors in reasoning.' To this powerful objection +Dr. Whately thinks it sufficient to reply, that 'no art is to be +censured for not teaching more than falls within its province, and, +indeed, more than can be taught by any conceivable art. Such a system +of universal knowledge as should instruct us in the full meaning +or meanings of every term, and the truth or falsity, certainty or +uncertainty of every proposition, thus superseding all other studies, it +is most unphilosophical to expect, or even to imagine. And to find fault +with logic for not performing this, is as if one should object to optics +for not giving sight to the blind--or complain of a reading glass for +being of no service to a person who had never learnt to read.'*** +This would be a most conclusive answer if confident assertion could be +accepted in lieu of proof. The objection still remains to be removed. +We may still demand, does it not fall within the legitimate province of +logic to provide means of encountering the 'greatest difficulties' with +which it is confessed logic is beset? True, there is no art can teach +everything, but is that a reason why logic should teach nothing, or next +to nothing, compared with what seems essentially necessary? + + * Intro., p. 1. + + ** Klein. of Logic, Synthetical Compendium, chap. 2, part + 1, sec. 9. + + *** Elem. of Logic, Intro., pp. 12, 13. + +Dr. Whately contends that the 'difficulties' and 'errors' in the +objection adduced, are in the _subject matter_ about which logic is +employed, and _not_ in the process of reasoning--which alone is the +appropriate province of logic. But it seems to me that Dr. Whately has +found it impossible to keep within the bounds of the restriction he thus +endeavours to establish. + +In treating upon 'apprehension,' he introduces, as indeed he was obliged +to do, from the department of metaphysics, several speculations on +'generalisation' and 'abstractions,' and from ontology (the science +which explains the most general conceptions respecting the phenomena of +nature) he borrows the leading principles of definition. Because he thus +goes so far, it is not to be contended that _therefore_ he should have +gone further; but when he found he must depart from his rule and borrow +from other branches of knowledge (no matter for what end), why did he +not depart from it to some purpose, and borrow from natural philosophy +such rules as would have guarded the logician from the 'chief errors' +into which he may fall? + +Dr. Whately informs us, indeed, that logic furnishes certain syllogistic +forms to which all sound arguments may be reduced, and thus establishes +universal tests for the detection of fallacy--but it is to be observed +that it is only _such_ fallacy as may creep in _between_ the premises +and the conclusion of an argument. It is to this narrow and Aristotelian +object that logic is restricted. 'The process of reasoning itself is +alone the appropriate province of logic. This process will have been +correctly conducted if it have conformed to the logical rules, which +preclude the possibility of any error creeping in _between_ the +principles from which we are arguing, and the conclusions we deduce from +them.'* We learn from our authority, that as arithmetic does not profess +to introduce any notice of the _things_, whether coins, persons, or +dimensions, respecting which calculations are made; neither does logic +undertake 'the ascertainment of facts, or the degree of evidence of +doubtful propositions.' And just as an arithmetical result will be +useless if the data of the calculation be incorrect, so a logical +conclusion is liable to be false if the premises are so. Neither does +the logic, now under consideration, concern itself with the 'discovery +of truth,' excepting so far as that may be said to be implied by the +detection of error in a false inference.** Logic thus, confined to the +actual process of reasoning, however important its functions there, +evidently leaves us in the dark as to the value of what we reason about. +For the information thus missing, this logic refers us to knowledge +in general--to grammar and composition for the art of expressing, with +correctness and perspicuity, the terms of propositions--to natural, +moral, political, or other philosophy, for the facts which alone can +establish the truth of the premises reasoned from. + + * Intro., p. 13. + + ** For the grounds of these representations, see + Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning, chap. 2, sec. 4 + Dr. Whately's Logic. + +The exclusion from logic of all consideration of the facts on which +propositions are founded, is thus endeavoured to be justified by the +Archbishop of Dublin:--'No arithmetical skill will secure a correct +result, unless the data are correct from which we calculate: nor does +any one on that account undervalue arithmetic; and yet the objection +against logic rests on no better foundation.' This is true, but is +it true that arithmetic is on _this account_ to be imitated? If the +arithmetician must take his data for granted, it is what the searcher +after truth must never do--_he_ must use his eyes and examine for +himself, in all cases, as far as possible, unless he intends to be +deceived. And for want of such precaution as this, the arithmetician is +at sea the moment he steps out of the narrow path of mechanical routine. +Who is not aware of the failures of calculation when applied to the +general business of life--to statistics, moral and political? Every +day, facts have to be called in to correct the egregious blunders of +figures.* The calculations are conducted in most approved form, but are +of no use. Does not this demonstrate that when arithmetic, like logic, +is applied to the business of life, general rules for securing the +accuracy of data would be of essential service? Supposing, however, that +arithmetic could do very well without them, does it follow that logic +should, when it would be safer and more efficient with them? + + * 'In Art, in Practice, innumerable critics will demonstrate + that most things are impossible. It was proved by fluxionary + calculus, that steam-ships could never get across from the + farthest point of Ireland to the nearest of Newfoundland; + impelling force, resisting force, maximum here, minimum + there; by law of Nature, and geometric demonstration--what + could be done? The Great Western could weigh anchor from + Bristol Port; that could be done. The Great Western, + bounding safe through the gullets of the Hudson, threw her + cable out on the capstan of New York, and left our still + moist paper-demonstration to dry itself at leisure.'-- + Thomas Carlyle, Chartism, pp. 96-7. + +Since our author's canons are held absolute in the schools, it may be +useful to consider this last cited argument in another light. A stronger +objection may be urged, one which particularly addresses itself to those +who mistake mere pertinence for general relevance, and suppose that a +single analogy decides a case. + +His Grace reasons, that, because arithmetic does not concern itself +about its data, logic should follow the same example. But why overlooks +he pure mathematics--a much higher science than arithmetic? Surely +geometry, which through all time has been the model of the sciences, was +better worthy than arithmetic to be the model of logic! Was it classical +in the principal of St. Alban's College to abandon Euclid and cleave +unto Cocker or Walkingame? + +Arithmetic is mechanical--geometry is reasoning; surely it was more +befitting to compare reason with reason, when endeavouring to discover +the true way of perfecting reason. Geometry is, of all sciences, reputed +the most conclusive in its arguments--and we know it is distinguished +above all sciences for carefulness in its data. It begins with axioms, +the most indubitable of all data, and its subsequent conclusions +are founded only on established facts--and to be sure that they are +established facts, the geometer, before he employs them, establishes +them himself. If an analogy is to decide the province of logic, here is +an analogy whose pretensions over those of arithmetic are eminent. + +So conclusive did Dr. Whately deem the argument just examined, that he +many times, in various forms, reproduced it. One of the last instances +is under the head of 'Fallacies.' 'It has been made a subject of bitter +complaint against logic, that it presupposes the most difficult point to +be already accomplished; viz., the sense of the terms to be ascertained. +A similar objection might be urged against every other art in existence +e.g., against agriculture, that all the precepts for the cultivation of +land presuppose the possession of a farm.'* + + * Logic, chap. 3. Fallacies, sec. 2. + +Already has been pointed out what may reasonably induce a suspicion +of the soundness of these analogies; viz., that their author found +it necessary to disregard them and introduce, from other branches of +knowledge, certain disquisitions on the 'sense of terms.' With regard to +this particular instance, it may be observed, that though treatises +on agriculture do presuppose the possession of a farm, they do not +presuppose the knowledge requisite for cultivating it, but inform +_fully_ of soil, and seed, and crops. So logic may be allowed to +presuppose the existence of the universe, whence truth is drawn, or the +existence of language, 'whereby it is expressed; but it is surely not +to _pre-suppose_ the knowledge of facts and terms, the great instruments +for the cultivation of truth. Agricultural treatises hardly warrant this +inference. There are the representations that induced the confession +that 'Logic is not so much an instrument of acquirement as of defence. +It is a good armour to buckle on when compelled to battle for our +heritage, but a poor implement for its cultivation.'* + +All _practical_ arts include a knowledge of materials as well as +implements. Platers, ignorant of the nature of metals, cabinetmakers, +of the different species of wood, make but sorry artizans; and in like +manner, reasoners, unacquainted, at least in a general way, with the +accuracy of what is reasoned about, make but sorry logicians.** + +It will readily be expected that in the modern progress of knowledge, +the Aristotelian province of logic would be enlarged. The far-seeing +intellect of Lord Verulam heralded the innovation--'Our glorious Bacon +led philosophy forth from the jargon of schools and the fopperies +of sects. He made her to be--the handmaid of nature, friendly to her +creatures, and faithful to her laws.'*** + + * W. J. Fox, Mon. Rep., p. 45: 1835. + + ** The reader will find that logician is need in the sense + of skilfulness in eliciting and exhibiting reality. By that + which I call logical is meant that which is truthful. I + presume that is the sense to which this high word should be + confined. It is the lax application of this term to mere + dexterity in evading the truth according to rule, that has + so increased the unsatisfactory race of professed sceptics. + --See Scepticism, chap. XII. + + *** Langhornea' Preface to the Lives of Plutarch. + +The general object of Lord Bacon's philosophy, writes Bruce, an +Edinburgh professor of logic of the last century, is to connect the +reasoning powers of man with experiments for the improvement of natural +knowledge. + +To create a just taste for philosophical investigation, required-- + +1. A display of the true, that they may be distinguished from the false +subjects of inquiry. + +2. Scientific rules to direct the discovery of the laws of nature. + +But to 'display the true,' is to display the _facts_ on which the truth +rests. The 'discovery of the laws of nature' implies _observation_ of +the operations of nature. The philosophy of Bacon, says Macaulay, began +in observation and ended in arts. + +It is most obvious, as the reader will gather from what has been +advanced, that for guarding, to the greatest possible extent, against +error in conclusions, it is necessary to take into consideration the +character of the data from which we reason--and to do this, we must draw +from the general sources of knowledge to which the Logic of the Schools +refers us. If we happen not to possess an accurate acquaintance with +these branches, we must draw upon the best notions we have of them, or +apply such natural sagacity as we happen to possess. But whether the +information we happen to possess be complete or partial, it is not well +that we are left to apply it at random, without any definite mode of +procedure; and if logic refuses to assist us, and gives only a vague +reference elsewhere, we must endeavour to assist ourselves. The datum +of all arguments is a proposition, an assertion, or denial; and to +ascertain its truth (upon which the value of the whole reasoning +depends) we have to do with the facts upon which it rests, and the terms +in which it is expressed. For it may be here observed, that the truth +or falsity of every proposition depends upon facts. To ascertain the +general accuracy of facts, we have to appeal to received standards of +certainty; and to fix the meaning of terms, we have recourse to a plain +principle of definition. In the task of recognising truth, so necessary +in examining the premises of an argument, one is wonderfully assisted +by being familiarised with the sources of truth, and the mode of its +discovery. In these operations the tutored and untutored may alike be +assisted by simple general rules. If these rules prove not infallible in +every case, they will prove successful in the majority of cases. + +Since general rules are the only, rules that the vast field of facts +admits of, they are not to be rejected on light grounds. They enable +us to set forth intelligibly the reasons of our own conviction, and to +detect and expose the fundamental fallacies of apparent arguments. Since +they direct us where the Logic of the Schools leaves us without a guide, +their value is apparent. + +The logical management of the syllogism involves much abstruseness +respecting 'genus' and 'species,' the 'quantity' and 'quality' of +'propositions', 'contraries,' 'sub-contraries,' 'contradictions,' +and 'subalterns.' Stepping by 'illative conversion,' 'six rules to be +observed with respect to categorical syllogism' next demand attention, +followed hard by eleven moods which can be used in a legitimate +syllogism, Viz.---- A, A, A, A, A, I, A., E, E, A, E, O, A, I, I, A, O, +O, E, A, E, E, A, O, E, I, O, I, A, I, O, A, O.' In the middle of +this abstract train march the 'undistributed middle' and the 'illicit +process,' attended by four figures represented by the following +mnemonic lines, which must be carefully committed to memory:'-- + +Fig. 1. bArbArA, cElArEnt, dArII, fErIOque prioris. + +Fig. 2. cEsArE, dAmEstrEs, fEstInO, bArOkO,* secundę. + +Fig. 3. tertia, dArAptI, dIsAmIs, dAtIsI, fElAptOn, bOkArdO,** fErlsO, +habet; quarta insuper addit. + +Fig. 4. brAmAntIp, cAmEnEs, dImArIs, fEsApo, frEsIsOn. + +A motley group, too numerous to be particularised, bring up the complex +rear of 'Modals,' 'Hypotheticals,' 'Conditionals,' and 'Disjunctives.' +This is certainly not the portal through which the populace can at +present pass to logic, even if such logic helped them to all truth, and +saved them from all fallacy. + +But this species of logic is not without interest. Symbolic letters and +mnemonic lines are not without attractions to those who understand +them. There is poetry in an algebraic sign, when it is the emblem of a +difficulty solved, and a wonderful result simply arrived at. To try the +whole power of words, and discover every form of language in which a +legitimate deduction can be expressed, is no ignoble task. It is a high +discipline, but it belongs rather to the age of leisure than this of +'copperasfames, cotton-fuz, gin-riot, wrath, and toil'--to the luxuries +rather than the utilities of learning. + +There is the inefficiency of the syllogism, and also the vitiation +produced by its employment. + +1. It corrupts the taste for philosophical invention by placing +philosophy in abstractions, and withdrawing it from the observation of +nature. + +2. It creates a reliance on principles, which originate in the +_hypotheses_ of philosophers, not in the laws of nature. + +3. It makes truth the result of the forms of argument, not of scientific +evidence.*** + + * Or, Fakoro, as indeed all the particulars in this place + recited. + + ** Or, Dokamo. but a brief summary of the subjects + comprised in his logic in reference to the syllogism. + + ***Bruce. These references to Fakoro and Dokamo are Whately's. + +Lord Kames cites from the father of logic the following syllogism, which +will bear repetition as an extraordinary instance of that assumption for +which the Logic of the Schools provides no remedy:-- + + Heavy bodies naturally tend to the centre of the universe. + We know, by experience, that heavy bodies tend to the centre of the earth. + Therefore the centre of the earth is the centre of the universe. + +But by what experience did Aristotle discover the centre of the +universe, so as to become aware that heavy bodies _naturally_ tend +there? On what facts rest the measurement of the radii from our earth to +the boundless circumference of space? How did he ascertain the limits of +that which has no limits? Yet, strange to say, the Logic of the Schools +prides itself in leaving us where the Stagyrite left us. + +'When mankind began to reason on the phenomena of nature, they were +solicitous to _abstract_, and they formed general propositions from a +_limited_ observation. Though these propositions were assumed, they were +admitted as true. They were not examined _by appeals to nature_, but by +comparison with other propositions.'* + +In this syllogism from Aristotle, there is the usual compliance with +accredited rules, and the same defiance of common sense. Such examples +are deemed perfect reasoning and legitimate argument; but is it not a +mockery to encourage the belief that we can have reason and argument, +without the truth? Only this shallow consolation remains to us. If the +logician of the schoole does not enlighten the understanding, he is at +least reputed not to offend the taste, and he wins the equivocal praise +of Butler:-- + + 'He'll run in debt by disputation, + And pay with ratiocination; + All this by syllogism, true + In mood and figure, he will do.' + +Syllogisms are to truth what rhyme is to poetry. 'It is a well known +fact that verse, faultless in form, may be utterly destitute of poetic +fire or feeling.'** + + * Bruce. + + ** A. J. D. D'Orsey, Eng. Gram., part 2, article Prosody. + +According to the Logic of the Schools, 'the question respecting the +validity of an argument is not whether the conclusion be _true_, but +whether it _follows_ from the premises adduced.' It was the bitter +experience of Bordon of the delusiveness of such partial logic that +induced him to exclaim, '_one_ fact is worth fifty _arguments_.' + +With such authorities, 'a valid argument is that which it so stated that +its conclusiveness is evident from the mere _form_ of the expression.' +But since it is admitted that if the data reasoned upon be incorrect, +no logical skill can secure a correct result; it is evident that however +_faultless the form_, the inquirer after truth is in no way nearer his +object, unless he be instructed how to lay a foundation of _faultless +facts_. He then, who is in love with truth rather than logomachy, will +admit, in spite of the most ingenious analogies, that there is some room +for a logic of facts, as well as a logic of words. + + + +CHAPTER II. LOCKE-LOGIC. + +Logic is a general guide to the discovery of truth, and teaches us +its systematic communication to others. This definition is intended to +combine logic and rhetoric into one system. According to a quotation in +Pinnock's Guide to Knowledge, Locke defined logic as 'that art by which +we rightly use our mental faculties in the discovery and communication +of truth,' a definition, called by the writer, the definition of nature +echoed by genius. There exists a natural connection between logic +and rhetoric. The discovery of truth could avail us little if we were +without the means of communicating it; and it is easy to see that it +would be in vain to possess the means of communicating truth, unless we +had the truth to communicate. Therefore, ingenuity is but ill employed +in separating these mutual departments of learning which nature has +connected together. Besides, the skill of the logician is as serviceable +in the statement of a case, as in arguing it. Arrangement is as much a +matter of logic as ratiocination; and to impress this neglected +truth upon the young inquirer, is one reason for proposing a combined +definition. + +The mutual connection of logic and rhetoric is illustrated by the +fact, that the Logic of the Schools is purely a branch of rhetoric. It +consists in putting an argument into 'the most perspicuous form in +which it can be exhibited,'*--i. e., in _communicating_ it in the most +efficient way to others. + + * Dr. Whatetly: Anal. Ont., chap. 1, aec. 6, p. 45. + +Indeed, Dr. Whately (who makes logic to consist in reasoning) defines +reasoning as _discourse_, and discourse is rhetoric. '_Grammar_,' +says Doherty,' represents the mechanism of letters in forming +words--_Rhemar_, the mechanism of words in forming sentences. We have +_Grammar_ for letters, _Rhemar_ for words, _Logic for arguments_, and +_Rhetoric_ for discourse.' Locke-logic, therefore--i. e., logic in the +sense in which Locke treated it--seems to come nearer the truth, as well +as nearer the common requirement, than the restricted definition of it +by others insisted on. + + + +CHAPTER III. LOGICAL TRUTH + +All men know something of truth. Happily it is the first impulse of +childhood, and nature teaches us its pleasure before reason instructs us +in its truth. In infancy we own its beauty, in manhood its power. There +is nothing, says Cicero, sweeter to man than the light of truth. Truth, +observes Godwin, is the native element of an intellectual nature. It +has been wisely remarked, said Lord Kames, that truth is to the +understanding what beauty is to the eye, or music to the ear. + +Philosophy sanctions what unsophisticated feelings suggested. He that +has made but a little progress beyond ignorance and privilege, cannot be +edified by anything but truth.** Truth, like a mathematical point, has +had various descriptions; and it may be useful to select those which +graduate to its logical definition. Bulwer tells us, that 'the agitation +of thought is the beginning of truth.' Locke, Lord Kames, Mill, and +others, agree that truth, or falsehood, is an affair of language. An +assertion which represents things as they really are, is a truth--an +assertion that represents things what in reality they are _not_, is a +falsehood. + + ** Mr. Hobhouse: Note 15. to 4th Canto of Childe Harold. + +Truth, in sculpture, means an exact similitude of some living form, +chiselled in stone or marble. Truth, in painting, is a natural +representation on canvass of some person, or object. In the same +manner, moral 'truth is an exact image of things set forth in speech, +or writing.' The logical definition of truth is given in these +words:--'Truth is that which admits of proof,'* that is, an assertion or +denial which can be substantiated by facts. + + * Chambers' Information. + +A fact is commonly called a truth, but this practice leads to great +confusion in reasoning. A fact is only an element in truth, A logical +truth is a proposition supported by facts. Facts compose the premises +of an argument--a truth is the inference from the facts. Unless this +distinction is observed, recourse must be had to the expedient of +calling a fact a particular truth, and an induction from facts a general +truth. Or we must adopt this distinction, that a moral truth, that is, +the truth of parlance, is the coincidence of language with reality; and +a logical truth, a proposition which admits of demonstration. + +A lady, who has given intellectual laws to many whom I address, has +said--'A truth I consider to be an ascertained fact, which truth would +be changed into an error the moment the fact on which it rested was +disproved.' But that which can be disproved cannot be an '_ascertained_ +fact.' Allowing, however, the relevancy of this definition of a truth, +it would, in a treatise on logic, be considered as a definition only +of a particular truth. Many such truths are required to make a logical +truth. + + + +CHAPTER IV. DISCOVERY OF TRUTH + + The great treasure-house of nature is open to all, and the + only fee demanded for inspection is attention.--Detrosibr. + +Observation** of nature is the only source of truth. Discursive +observation is the art of noticing circumstances evident to the senses. +Men who do this intentionally and carefully, with a view of acquiring +a knowledge of phenomena and their causes, are distinguished for their +varied knowledge and often for their great discoveries. Shakspere must +have owed the varied facts interwoven into his delineations of human +character to this source. The clever personations of Garrick were +suggested by his curious observations of men and manners. Sir Walter +Scott is known to have been a careful observer. It is said, 'no +expression escaped him if it bore on the illustration of character.' + + ** The term observation is used here in the sense in which + it is commonly understood, signifying cognisance in general. + It includes whatever information we acquire by the meant of + consciousness, or experience, or through the agency of the + senses. + +Claude Lorraine, with a passionate sympathy for the beautiful, sate in +the fields from sun-rise to dewy eve, watching, catching, and saturating +his very soul, as it were, with all the evanescent beauties of a +summer's day, as they chased each other over the face of the fair scene; +fixing on canvass, taking captive and imprisoning in our cabinets, the +wanton daughters of nature, that before his time never were caught, but +flitted before the fascinated eye only long enough to make the heart +afterwards feel more achingly the void of their vanishing. And the +artist who has done all this, do we not justly call him an _imaginative_ +painter, to distinguish him from those meaner geniuses who were, in +painting, very like Crabbe in poetry, merely faithful delineators of +the vulgarer objects of social life, bunches of carrots, drunken boors, +chamber maids and chimney corners. + +'Has the reader ever seen Mr. Macready in the character of Macbeth? If +he have, he can never forget the stupefied murderer withdrawing from the +chamber in which he has just done the dread act, with fascinated gaze +retreatingly regarding his royal victim, and awaking with a guilty start +as he runs unconsciously against his hard-souled partner in guilt, who +in vain tries to infuse into the weaker spirit of her paralysed husband +her own metaphysical superiority. In this scene we know that Mr. +Macready's acting was perfect, for the pressure at our heart, the +suspension of our breathing, and the creeping of our hair, made us +_feel_ that it was so. We see him now, as stealthily he places his foot +over the threshold of the chamber of death to re-appear on the stage; +the intensely staring eye, that cannot remove from what 'tis horror to +look upon; the awfully natural absorption of his soul by that "sorry +sight," which one little minute has brought about; his starting and +awaking from his entranced state, as he runs against his wife in his +retreat, and his full passionate burst of blended remorse, terror, and +superstition, as refusing counsel, regardless of remonstrance, heedless +of probable detection, he pours forth his "brain-sickly" convictions, of +having in one little moment cut the cable that had held him to the rest +of the great human family. All this we can see in our mind's eye, for +the actor gave us a picture of passion that time can never obliterate. +But how would it have been with a cloddish unimaginative fellow, +whom nature never intended should understand Shakspere? Would he not, +conscious that he was among shoals and quicksands of feelings, too nice +for his appreciation, seek to tear over all by a tempest of rant, which +would be a more ruthless murder on Shakspere than Macbeth's on the king? +And why should we be delighted with Mr. Macready's delineation, and +disgusted with the ranter? Simply because the former has _observed_, +treasured up, and felt every genuine exhibition of human feeling that +came in his way, and applied it appropriately to all the situations to +which it was related in nature. A single instance will make this clear. +Mr. Kean one night, in the concluding part of the combat scene of +Richard III., when supposed to be wounded to the death, before falling, +steadily regarded his foe, and painfully raising his right arm in act +to strike, the relaxed and dying limb, unable to second the spirit, fell +heavily and harmlessly to his side, indicating merely the fierce bravery +of the usurper living in all its strength, when the body which it would +move, was all but a senseless clod. Pit, gallery, and boxes arose with +an enthusiasm beyond description, and by their repeated plaudits bore +testimony the intense naturalness of the struggle. The actor being +afterwards complimented upon the _hit_, said, that he had taken the +action from Jack Painter, the prize-fighter, when the latter was beaten +in some one of his contests, and it immediately struck the tragedian +that the very same thing would come in beautifully in the dying scene +of Richard III. What was this, if not imagination? Kean saw Painter's +action to be the natural effects of undying valour in vain endeavouring +to contend against overwhelming power. Remembering and associating it +with his previous conception of the character of Richard III., the +actor saw it could be most strikingly incorporated with that picture of +passion the usurper's death should present to our view. Seeing this, he +combined it with his previous delineation, and thereby did precisely +the same thing as the poet in using a fine simile, or the painter in +introducing sun-light over a part of his picture. It was a portion +of nature carried away by the actor to be reproduced on a future and +fitting occasion.'* + +The beginning of all knowledge is observation. It has been shown by Mr. +Mill that 'axioms,' which lie at the foundation of all reasoning and all +science, 'are experimental truths--generalisations _from observation_. +The proposition that Two straight lines cannot inclose a space--or, in +other words, Two straight lines which have once met do not meet again, +but continue to diverge--is an induction from the _evidence of our +senses._'** 'Axioms are but a class of inductions from _experience_: the +simplest and easiest cases of generalisation,' from the facts furnished +to, us by our senses or by our internal consciousness.'*** + +Autobiography, or the metaphysical revelation of a man to himself, is +a source of valuable psychological and moral truths. From this centre +frequently radiate new lights upon human nature. But this is resolvable +into a species of mental observation. It is self-inspection. + +We have lately been told that 'Poetry is called upon to work in +the _discovery_ of truth. The imagination has always been the great +discovering power. Discoveries are the poetry of science. The case is +rare indeed in which, by merely advancing step by step in the exercise +of the logical faculty, any new truth has been arrived at. Logic comes +afterwards, to verify that which imagination sees with its far-darting +glance.'**** + + * Phrenology Tested, by A. M., of the Middle Temple, pp. + 143-5. + + ** Logic, vol 1, p. 305. + + *** Idem, pp. 328-9. + + **** W. J. Fox's Lectures to the Working Classes: Genius and + Poetry of Campbell, p.;5. + +This seems to call upon us to recognise the imagination as fresh source +of truth. But the definition of imagination, as given by Emerson, +reveals to us its origin in observation;--'The imagination may be +defined to be the use which reason makes of the material world. +Shakspere's imperial muse tosses the creation like a bauble from hand to +hand, to embody any capricious shade of thought that is uppermost in his +mind.' Hence, though we agree with Gilfillan that imagination is thought +on fire, we must confess that the ignition is material. + +We will, however, hear a poet's defence of his fraternity:--'Poets are +vulgarly considered deficient in the reasoning faculty; whereas no man +was ever a great poet without having it in excess, and after a century +or two, men become convinced of it. They jump the middle terms of their +syllogisms, it is true, and assume premises to which the world has not +yet arrived; but time stamps their deductions as invincible.'* + +Imagination is based on observation, and bears the same relation to the +'material world' that the magician bears to the appliances of his art. +Imagination is the dexterous and astonishing use of realities. It is +a species of mental experiment, whereby, without permission of the +line-and-rule men, we join strange things together, and to the surprise +of every body, the junction is a happy one. 'Angelo's greatness lay in +searching for untried existence.'** But observation primarily suggests +the combination. If, as in the case of Angelo, imagination essays the +highest flights of genius, and goes in search of untried existence, it +is not existence out of nature, but founded upon nature--its success is +a revelation of some hidden reality. + + * Lowell's Conversations on the Old Poets. + + ** J. T. Seymour; Oracle of Reason. + +Some of the most praised conceptions of Shakspere have been traced by +critics to the tritest observation. Instance Hamlet's remark:-- + + There's a divinity doth shape our ends, + Bough-hew them as we will. + +Critics tell us, that Shakspere here fell into the conventional cant +of a mechanic making skewers. But it is no detraction to cull the best +phrases from the most common sources. Knight remarks:--'Philosophy, as +profound as it is beautiful! says the uninitiated reader of Shakspere. +But he that is endued with the wisdom of the commentators, will learn +how easy it is to mistake for philosophy and poetry what really only +proceeded from the very vulgar recollection of an ignorant mind. Dr. +Farmer informs me, says Steevens, that these words are merely technical. +A woodman, butcher, and dealer in skewers, lately observed to him, that +his nephew (an idle lad), could only assist in making them; he could +rough-hew them, but I was obliged to shape their ends. To shape the ends +of wood skewers, i. e., to point them, requires a degree of skill: any +one can rough-hew them. Whoever recollects the profession of Shakspere's +father, will admit that his son might be no stranger to such terms. I +have frequently seen packages of wool pinned up with skewers.'* To admit +the likelihood of all this, notwithstanding Mr. Knight's jeer at the +'wisdom of the commentators,' is rather to exalt than degrade the genius +of Shakspere, who could derive exalted figures from humble sources. +The 'Athenęum,' far more wisely than Mr. Knight, in this instance, +observes:--'This is the test of a truly great man; that his thoughts +should be _things_, and become things in instantaneous act, and not for +a moment mere speculations and abstractions.' + +As the theories of the schoolmen subside, and men no longer ignore +nature, it will become recognised as the source rather than the tool +of intellect. We shall have less occasion to contend that all lofty and +sublime ideas derive their value and beauty from their coherence with +the instincts of sensation, 'Poetry, we grant, creates a world of its +own; but it creates it out of _existing_ materials.' 'Imagination' may +be but 'thought on fire,' but the spark, which ignites it, is material. +Is there any other distinction between the nights of the rhapsodist +and those of genius, than that genius _illumines_ reality and rhapsody +_obscures_ it? 'We know of no great generalisation that has ever been +made by a man unacquainted with the details on which it rests.' + +Experiment is invented observation. It is putting into operation certain +supposed causes in order to observe their effects. An experiment may +be defined as an observation, which we are at some trouble to make. +Experiment is usually set down as being a process of discovering truth +different from observation. It is evidently included under observation, +and there is no practical advantage in separating it. Discursive, +general, ordinary, or common observation is the observation of the +phenomena we _find_. Experiment is observation of the phenomena we +_bring together_. Experimental observation has been the great agent +of modern discovery. Newton ranked it as the most valuable knowledge. +Whatever is not founded on phenomena is hypothesis, and has no place in +experimental philosophy. It is the principal source of accurate +facts. When Jenner first communicated to John Hunter, what he thought +respecting the prevention of small pox--'Don't think, but try; be +patient, be accurate,' was Hunter's characteristic reply. Locke +remarks--'While the philosophy of Aristotle prevailed in the schools, +which dealt often in words without meaning, the knowledge of nature was +at a stand; men argued concerning things of which they had no idea; +in this enlightened age, we keep to trial and experiment, as the only +certain foundation of philosophy.' + + * Philosophy and Religion of Shakspere, pp. 173-4 + + ** No 946. p. 1103. + + *** Athenęum, No. 946, p. 1191. + +Hypothesis may be noticed here as being a species of _embryo_ +experiment. Hypothesis is guessing at the truth. It is a conjecture or +supposition relating to the cause of an effect. It imagines that where +certain conditions exist, the desired result will ensue. But all +these conjectures must be founded on observation. For, in the wildest +conjecture, unless made by a madman, there is some reason. Hypothesis is +incipient truth founded on a few facts which make it probable, but not +on sufficient to make it certain. Hypothesis does not directly discover +truth, but it is a guide to experiment, which does. The hypotheses of +Columbus respecting an unknown continent, did not of itself discover +America--but it directed the experiment of his voyage there, which did. +To hypothesise alone is the error of the visionary and the dreamer. +Practical wisdom, as far as possible, tests hypothesis by experiment. +Sir C. Bell conjectured that the nervous fluid of the human body +was analogous to galvanic fluid, and then, by experiments on various +animals, he endeavoured to test his hypothesis. However, great +thinkers arise who are best employed in contriving plans for others to +execute--in telling others what they are to do. Great poets belong +to this class. They are often incapable of the concentrated labour of +furnishing proofs of their hypothesis. Gladly should we recognise the +mission of such men. They work for humanity by thinking for humanity. +'All who think,' says Lytton, 'are co-operative with all who work.' +Labour supplies our wants, thought teaches us dominion over nature. +Labour is but the means of subsistence, it is thought that makes it the +source of wealth by multiplying its powers. + +To the value of hypothesis Mr. Mill bears this testimony, that by +suggesting observations and experiments, it puts us upon the road +to, independent evidence, if it be really attainable, and till it be +attained, the hypothesis ought not to count for more than a suspicion. +The function of hypothesis is one which must be reckoned absolutely +indispensable in science. Without such assumption, science would not +have attained its present state. Nearly everything which is now theory +was once hypothesis.* + + * Logic, Vol. II, p. 18. + +Induction is systematic observation of a given class of phenomena. +It consists in bringing together a variety of facts and instances, +carefully and patiently viewing them in all possible lights to +discover from a comparison of the whole what, if any, new principle is +elicitable. Induction is an experiment with a number of facts, to see +if any general result can be arrived at. Thus observation is of three +kinds--discursive, experimental, and inductive. For brevity of speech, +we use respectively the terms observation, experiment, and induction, +as the names of the three recognised modes of investigation. But it +facilitates a clear view of this subject, to note that experiment and +induction are but phases of observation--and that observation is the +great source of the discovery of truth. + +Discursive observation and experiment are the sources of facts or +particular truths. Nature, poetically says Dr. Reid, is put to the +question by a thousand observations and experiments, and forced to +confess her secrets. Out of these secrets induction gathers its general +truths, which become the premises of argument. Facts, like stones, are +of little service while scattered--it is in the edifice raised by them +that their value is apparent. They have been compared to blocks, upon +_one_ of which, if a person stand, he has but a partially increased +view; but when many are piled up, a person from their summit commands +the prospect round. Particular truth seldom proves anything but itself. +Argument is proving something else, and we have seen that that which is +proved must be _contained_ in something which proves it. In other words, +an argument is an assertion or denial of something substantiated by +other things--by facts. + +Gall _observed_ the peculiar formation of a certain head, but the one +fact proved nothing, except that the head had a certain form. It was +a barren observation, except that it suggested to his imagination +the hypothesis that the peculiar form of the head might be caused by +peculiarity of mind. This set him upon the experiment of observing +the habits and dispositions of the individual in order to test his +hypothesis. But the one fact of finding a peculiarity proved nothing new +of any value. The two facts, though incident, were hardly convincing. +They proved only that a peculiar head was accompanied in one case by +peculiar habits--but whether one was the cause of the other, or whether +the phenomena were in any way connected, still remained unknown. When, +however, Gall, Spurzheim, and others, had travelled through Europe, +making observations and experiments, and at last putting all the facts +and instances together, and carefully and patiently viewing them in all +possible lights, and finding that they shadowed forth that the brain was +the organ, the map and measure of intelligence, they inducted a general +truth, which enters the lists of argument and takes its place as an +addition to our metaphysical and moral treasures. + +Mr. Macaulay, who, perhaps, might be accused of underrating both Bacon +and Induction, with a view of exalting Aristotle, remarks that 'The +vulgar notion about Bacon we take to be this, that he invented a new +method of arriving at truth, which method is called induction, and that +he detected some fallacy in the syllogistic reasoning which had been in +vogue before his time. This notion is about as well founded as that of +the people who, in the middle ages, imagined that Virgil was a great +conjurer. Many who are far too well informed to talk such extravagant +nonsense, entertain what we think incorrect notions as to what Bacon +really effected in this matter. The inductive method has been practised +ever since the beginning of the world by every human being. It is +constantly practised by the most ignorant clown, by the most thoughtless +schoolboy, by the very child at the breast. That method leads the clown +to the conclusion, that if he sows barley he shall not reap wheat. By +that method, the schoolboy learns that a cloudy day is the best for +catching trout. The very infant we imagine is led by induction to expect +milk from his mother or nurse, and none from his father. Not only is it +not true that Bacon invented the inductive method, but it is not true +that he was the first person who correctly analysed that method and +explained its uses. Aristotle had long before pointed out the absurdity +of supposing that syllogistic reasoning could ever conduct men to the +discovery of any new principle, had shown that such discoveries must be +made by induction and by induction alone, and had given the history of +the inductive process concisely, indeed, but with great perspicuity and +precision. We are not inclined to ascribe much practical value to that +analysis of the Inductive method which Bacon has given in the second +book of the Novum Organon. It is, indeed, an elaborate and correct +analysis. But it is an analysis of that which we are all doing from +morning to night, and which we continue to do even in our dream.'* + + * Macaulay's Hist Essays, vol. 3, p. 407. + +It is not 'some fallacy in the syllogistic reasoning' which Bacon is +supposed to have detected, it is rather the partial protection against +error afforded by syllogisms, which he exposed and provided against, +for which he is estimated. Certainly Aristotle must have had a very +different opinion of the value of inductive philosophy from that +entertained by Bacon, or he would have indoctrinated his disciples with +it. Few will doubt that had Bacon's Novum Organon appeared in the place +of Aristotle's logic, and Aristotle's work in the place of Bacon's, +that the advancement of learning in the world would now be in a very +different state. Could Bacon have arrested the attention of the +ancient sages with his methods of discovering new principles, ancient +philosophy, instead of being a treadmill, would have been a path, and we +should not have had a contempt for all learning which was useful. When +Posidonius said that we owed to philosophy the principles of the +arch and the introduction of metals. We should not have had Seneca +repudiating such insulting compliments, nor Archimedes considering that +geometry was degraded by being employed in anything useful. + +But these observations of Macaulay have the merit of showing us +that induction has its foundation in nature, and afford a further +confirmation of our views, that observation is the source of our +knowledge, and that it is the province of logic to teach us to +systematise our thoughts. Observation, experiment, hypothesis and +induction, are but different names for the operation--varying in degree, +in method, in expedient, and elaboration--whereby we discover truth. +Nature is the treasure-house of truth, and the sole fee of appropriation +is attention. + +Much discussion has taken place upon the nature of necessary truths. +Mr. Mill, however, after an elaborate analysis of Dr. Whewell's theory, +pronounces that 'nothing is necessary except the connection between a +conclusion and the premises.' A necessary truth is commonly defined as a +proposition, the negation of which is not only false, but inconceivable. +Mr. Mill contests this doctrine in words embodying suggestions of great +value. + +'Now I cannot but wonder that so much stress should be laid upon the +circumstance of inconceivableness, when there is such ample experience +to show that our capacity or incapacity of conceiving a thing has very +little to do with a possibility of the thing in itself; but is in truth +very much an affair of accident, and depends upon the past history and +habits of our own minds. There is no more generally acknowledged fact +in human nature, than the extreme difficulty at first felt in conceiving +anything as possible, which is in contradiction to long established and +familiar experience; or even to old and familiar habits of thought. And +this difficulty is a necessary result of the fundamental laws of the +human mind. When we have often seen and thought of two things together, +and have never in any one instance either seen or thought of them +separately, there is by the primary law of association an increasing +difficulty, which in the end becomes insuperable, of conceiving the two +things apart. This is most of all conspicuous in uneducated persons, who +are in general utterly unable to separate any two ideas which have once +become firmly associated in their minds; and if persons of cultivated +intellect have any advantage on the point, it is only because, having +seen and heard and read more, and been more accustomed to exercise their +imagination, they have experienced their sensations and thoughts in +more varied combinations, and have been prevented from forming these +inseparable associations. But this advantage has necessarily its limits. +The man of the most practised intellect is not exempt from the universal +laws of our conceptive faculty. If daily habit presents to him for a +long period two facts in combination, and if he is not led during that +period either by accident or intention to think of them apart, he will +in time become incapable of doing so even by the strongest effort; and +the supposition that the two facts can be separated in nature, will +at last present itself to his mind with all the characters of an +inconceivable phenomenon. There are remarkable instances of this in +the history of science: instances, in which the wisest men rejected +as impossible, because inconceivable, things which their posterity, by +earlier practice and longer perseverance in the attempt, found it quite +easy to conceive, and which everybody knows to be true. 'If, then, it be +so natural to the human mind, even in its highest state of culture, to +be incapable of conceiving, and on that ground to believe impossible, +what is afterwards not only found to be conceivable but proved to be +true; what wonder if in cases where the association is still older, more +confirmed, and more familiar, and in which nothing ever occurs to shake +our conviction, or even suggest to us any conception at variance +with the association, the acquired incapacity should continue, and be +mistaken for a natural incapacity? It is true our experience of the +varieties in nature enables us, within certain limits, to conceive other +varieties analogous to them. We can conceive the sun or moon falling; +for although we never saw them fall, nor ever perhaps, imagined +them falling, we have seen so many other things fall, that we have +innumerable familiar analogies to assist the conception; which after +all, we should probably have some difficulty in framing, were we not +well accustomed to see the sun and moon move, (or appear to move,) +so that we are only called upon to conceive a slight change in the +direction of motion, a circumstance familiar to our experience. But when +experience affords no model on which to shape the new conception, how is +it possible for us to form it? How, for example, can we imagine an end +to space or time? We never saw any object without something beyond +it, nor experienced any feeling without something following it. When, +therefore, we attempt to conceive the last point of space, we have +the idea irresistibly raised of other points beyond it. When we try +to imagine the last instant of time, we cannot help conceiving another +instant after it Nor is there any necessity to assume, as is done by a +modern school of metaphysicians, a peculiar fundamental law of the mind +to account for the feeling of infinity inherent in our conceptions of +space and time; that apparent infinity is sufficiently accounted for by +simpler and universally acknowledged laws.'* + + * Mill's Logic, vol. 1, pp. 313-17. + +Thus we stand on the verge of boundless possibility. What truths may yet +be discovered in that great and untrodden field, which lies without our +experience, no man can tell. All we have yet brought between assertion +and proof, is all we have yet conquered, is all that we as yet know, +is all that we can yet rely upon. The search after the untried is the +highest and apparently the inherent aspiration of roan. The revelation +of new worlds continually rewards his noble ambition. At once arrested +and allured by the magnificence of nature--we wonder, we work, we wait. + + + +CHAPTER V. FACTS + + We must never forget that accurate and multiplied + quantitative facts form the only substantial basis of + science.--Parker. + +As clear fountains send forth pellucid streams, so do clear truths give +accurate sciences. The more definite the facts, the more perfect the +science; it is therefore of importance that all facts should be capable +of being tested by the standard of physical certainty. Dr. Reid says, +that 'the inquirer after truth must take only facts for his guide.' It +is then of moment that he takes true and not false guides. A writer in +the 'Monthly Repository' observes, that 'the basis of all knowledge is +such an extensive induction from particular facts, as leads to general +conclusions and fundamental axioms'--and if the facts are erroneous, +evidently the conclusions will be also erroneous. He also remarks, +that 'in reasoning, all sciences are the same, being founded on an +examination of facts--comparison of ideas.' But If the examination is +incomplete, or the facts admitted incorrect, the comparison will +be alike defective and the reasoning vitiated. If suppositions or +conjectures are mixed up with facts, the inductions from them will be +suppositions, and the conclusions but conjectures. + +There are three words--consciousness, conscience, and +conscientiousness--very much alike to the ear but very different in +signification. Consciousness, is feeling--conscience, the sense of right +and wrong---conscientiousness, the practice of what is believed to be +right. Conscience and conscientiousness are often confounded. We say, +lawyers have no conscience, we mean no conscientiousness. They +know right from wrong as men, but not professionally. It is with +consciousness that the logician has to deal. Consciousness is the +primary source of knowledge. Consciousness and the 'Evidences of the +Senses' are synonymous terms. Facts referable to consciousness are said +to be physically certain. The evidence of the senses is the highest +standard of certainty. + +The intuitive principles of belief are-- + + 1st. A conviction of our own existence. + 2nd. A confidence in the evidences of our senses. + 3rd. In our mental operations. + 4th. In our mental identity. + 5th. In the conformity of the operations of nature. + +These truths of intuition or consciousness are the foundation of all +knowledge. Truths which we know, by way of inference, are occurrences +which took place while we were absent--the events of history and the +theorems of mathematics. But the truths known by intuition are the +original premises from which all others axe inferred. Our assent to the +conclusion being grounded upon the truth of the premises, we could never +arrive at any knowledge by reasoning, unless something could be known +antecedently to all reasoning. + +'Whatever is known to us by consciousness, is known beyond possibility +of question. What one sees, or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one +cannot but be sure that one sees or feels. No science is required for +the purpose of establishing such truths; no rules of art can render our +knowledge of them more certain than it is in itself. There is no logic +for this portion of our know ledge.'* + +All discussions pertaining to the nature and limits of intuition or +consciousness are referred to the higher or transcendental metaphysics, +but all the facts that compose evidence and become the grounds of +inference are, according to the view taken here, necessarily subjects of +examination. + +'Cogito ergo sum--I think, therefore I am, argued Des Cartes. We +learn by this that consciousness of the operations of the mind is the +strongest evidence of our existence. It cannot be proved so forcibly by +any other means; and although Des Cartes' language may appear to involve +a logical fallacy, yet the proof of our personal existence which we have +from _thinking_, is the fullest and best we are acquainted with.'** + + * J. 8. Mil: Logic, vol. l, p. 7. + + ** Rev. Robert Amalie. + +There is a numerous class of facts from which all men draw conclusions, +which facts are not referable to the evidence of the senses. There are +the facts of testimony. Testimony is founded on laws almost as fixed +and certain as those of nature. All our knowledge, scientific, +literary, historical--all except what arises from our experience and +consciousness--depends on it. In the administration of justice it is +the sole guardian of property and life. If a man of known integrity and +veracity state a fact, without any possible motive of self-interest, and +evidently subject to no delusion; and if others of like character, who +could have no understanding or collusion with him, state the same, men +are nearly as certain of it as of any truth in mathematics. I believe +in the existence of Rome and the facts of astronomy on this evidence, +although I never saw the city or examined the stars through a telescope. + +The conclusiveness of testimony is designated moral certainty. The value +of testimony depends on three things. 1. On the nature of the subject. +Some subjects are capable of more accurate observation than others. 2. +On the powers and character of the observer--his ability to understand +or note that of which he testifies--and his honesty in common matters. +3. On the number of our informers. Several persons are less likely to be +imposed upon than one. + +Testimony or moral certainty is inferior to physical certainty. A +physical certainty bears uniformly the name of certainty, while a moral +certainty is characterised as a probability. Great, very great may +be the probability, still it is less in reliableness than a +physical certainty. The evidence of Cato or Aristides would be very +conclusive--yet somewhat less certain than that which our own senses +have proved. + +The conclusions from moral certainties are obtained like other +conclusions, by induction. The induction from moral facts is like +the induction from physical facts, with this difference--that the +conclusions from moral facts are probabilities, like the facts on which +they are founded. Whatever has physical certainty in its favour is +considered demonstrable, and when sufficient probable evidence is +adduced in favour of a proposition, it is considered to be fairly +proved. Some persons, biased by the strictness of mathematical proof, +insist upon the same accuracy in moral investigations. I have elsewhere +pointed out the juvenility and infatuation of this error. Insist upon +demonstration where the nature of the questions admits it. Less should +not, in such case, suffice. Accept probability where probability is the +sole evidence attainable. Never ask more than reason can grant. We must +admit gradations of validity. What we are conscious of, we _know_. +All we receive on testimony, we _believe_. Physical certainty is +_knowledge_: moral certainty, _belief_. Hume remarks, in his 'Essay on +Probabilities,' that 'Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative +and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all +men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform +our language more to common us, we ought to divide arguments into +_demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities_. By proofs, meaning such +arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.'* + + * Hume's Essays, vol. 2, p.59. + +Conjecture is probable truth. Some subjects only furnish a sufficient +number of facts to make them probable in the lowest degree--not to +decide them as positively true. The propositions expressing results +pertaining to such subjects are called conjectures. + +A conjecture founded on no fact or upon too few to make it likely, is +called a vagary. + +It will be seen that probability is a thing of degree. A probability may +vary in weight from a moral certainty, where it ranks next to a physical +certainty, down to a conjecture, and descend lower in likelihood till it +is lost in conjecture. + +Lord Kames remarks, in his preface to his 'Sketches'--'Most of +the subjects handled in the following sheets, admit but of probable +reasoning: and, with respect to such reasoning, it is often difficult to +say, what degree of conviction they ought to produce. It is easy to form +plausible arguments; but to form such as can stand the test of time, +is not always easy. I could amuse the reader with numerous examples +of conjectural arguments, which, fair at a distant view, vanish like a +cloud on a near approach'. Did all authors so judiciously apprise their +readers of the probable logical value of their speculations, fewer would +be misled than now. + +To numerous questions of undoubted interest, which have been agitated in +all ages, only a moderate degree of certainty attaches--these are termed +speculative. Such subjects may afford but few facts and instances, and +the chances of conclusiveness may seem remote--yet ultimate results +are not to be despaired of: the new comparison of conjectures and the +arrangement of facts daily throws new light on age-contested points. +Systems of conduct should not be founded on conjectures in opposition to +evident moral utility; but if speculation is kept 'within the sphere of +speculation, it may be prosecuted with safety and prospect of success. + +There are problems in metaphysics as there are in mathematics, which may +be demonstrated to be insolvable. To describe the limit of human power +with respect to contested questions will yet result from speculative +controversy. The capacities of our understanding will be one day well +considered, the extent of our knowledge discovered, and the horizon +found which sets bounds between the enlightened and the dark part of +things--between what is and what is not comprehensible by us. But this +will only be when the _untried_ has been _universally_ attempted in all +directions. Bailey, I think, has defined truth as being that which is +universally accepted after having been universally examined. Little of +this truth is yet extant. When every man shall be a thinker, when the +autobiography of intellect shall be more freely furnished than it ever +yet has been, unanimity of opinion not yet dreamed of will prevail. +Harmony of opinion is the sign of intellectual conquest--the +standard-bearer of truth no advocacy is victorious while dissent +occupies the field. + +What we _know_ to be true, is _knowledge_; what we have only reason +to believe true, is _opinion_. All human information is made up of +knowledge and opinion. The primary importance of knowledge is evident +from the fact that knowledge is the umpire of all opinion. We believe +in the existence of the ruins of Palmyra and Thebes, and in certain +discoveries of algebraists and astronomers. It is our _opinion_ that +these things are true, although we may never have visited Palmyra +or Thebes, nor made the calculations of the algebraist, nor the +observations of the astronomer. In these cases our belief is founded +on our _experience_ and knowledge of mankind. It is quite true that +travellers exaggerate, and scientific men are sometimes mistaken; but +we know that there is always _some_ truth at the bottom of what +is communicated by well-meaning writers. More or less, every man's +_experience_ assures him of this; and it is the cause of our reliance on +the records of history, and the reports of science. Therefore, since all +information is made up of knowledge and opinion, plainly knowledge is +the one thing which comprises all intelligence. + +'Questions of fact,' observes Pascal, in his celebrated 'Provincial +Letters,' 'are only to be determined by the senses. If what you assert +be true, prove it to be so; if it be not, you labour in _vain_ to induce +belief. All the authority in the world cannot enforce or alter belief as +to facts; nothing can possibly have power to cause that not to be which +actually _is_.'* + +A remarkable instance of the verification of what was assumed to be +is related of Pascal by Goodrich. 'Pascal was a philosopher even in +childhood. At a very early age he was taught the ten commandments. For +several days after, he was observed to be measuring the growth of a +blade of grass. When asked the meaning of this, he replied, "The fourth +commandment says, 'Six days shalt thou labour, but the seventh is the +Sabbath in which thou shalt do no work.' Now I wished to ascertain if +nature obeyed this great law, and therefore measured the grass, to see +if it grew as much on Sunday as on other days." '** + +'We are informed,' says Beattie, 'by Father Malebranche, that the senses +were at first as honest faculties as one could desire to be endued with, +till after they were debauched by original sin; an adventure from which +they contracted such an invincible propensity to cheating, that they +are now continually lying in wait to deceive us. But there is in man, +it seems, a certain clear-sighted, stout, old faculty, called _reason_, +which, without being deceived by appearances, keeps an eye upon the +rogues, and often proves too cunning for them.'*** + + * Letter xviii. + + ** Fireside Education, p. 89. + + *** Essay on Truth, p. 105. + +Though it is so abundantly obvious that the evidences of our senses, +internal and external, are, in effect, the sources of all certainty, +yet we are not warranted in rejecting, as mere hypothesis, every theory +which we cannot at once corroborate. When Euler remarked of his new +law of arches, 'This will be found true, though contrary to all +experience'--when Gall exclaimed of his new philosophy of the sensorium, +'This is true, though opposed to the philosophy of ages'--they expressed +demonstrable truths hidden from the multitude. They announced new +generalisations to man. New truths are commonly found to be old unnoted +experiences, for the first time subjected to classification, and +presented in a scientific form. + +To me it seems almost in vain to urge men to notice facts who have +never noticed themselves. The truest standards of certainty arise +from individuality of retrospection. An intelligent man is, himself to +himself, the measure of all things in the universe. + +In appealing to the young on the aspiration after improvement, one +cannot say 'Consult your aptitudes--follow your bias.' This Is the +sole appeal-injunctive to which all natures can respond. But in this +half-natured, half-trained, doubtfully-conditioned state of society, +though the generous would be incited to noble deeds, the sordid would +lay their vulture claws on the world, and the unprincipled victimise +their fellows. You have, therefore, to say, 'Man, do what thou listest, +provided it be compatible with the welfare of thy fellow men.' Men are +not well-natured, and we have thus to guard individuality, and qualify +the appeal, and so we miss the soil of great enterprise. Great is the +disadvantage. For the fulcrum which is to raise men is without their +natures--remote in the wide world. + +Man should begin with himself. He loves Truth--it is the first impulse +of his nature. He loves Justice--the bandit on the throne, as well as +the bandit in the forest, respects justice in some form or other. Man +loves Cheerfulness--it is the attribute of innocence and courage. He +loves Fraternity--it knits society together in brotherhood. These are +standards. His codes of life and judgment arise from these aspirations. +That which accords with these principles is _reasonable_. Whatever +develops these principles in conduct is _moral_. These sentiments are to +be confirmed by his own observations. His experience in connection with +these rules is the right with which he may examine religions, creeds, +books, systems, opinions. + +The right understanding of physical and moral facts greatly depends upon +intellectual character--and there enters largely into the recondite and +ultimate inquiries of intelligent men another class of facts, called +mental facts. There is no chance of identifying these without the power +of self-analysis, which is one reason why metaphysic ability belongs to +so few, and why questions involving metaphysical considerations are such +profound enigmas to the majority of the people. The illiterate in these +things are easily led or misled by words. They who will not bow before a +throne fall prostrate before a sound. + +The first principles of things are few. The axioms from which men date +their reasoning are chiefly personal. They are expressed in an infinite +variety of ways, occasioned by the various conceptions of those who +conceive them, and by the different capacities to which they are adapted +when offered for the instruction and guidance of others. But this +must not mislead us as to the number, and overwhelm us with a sense of +complexity, where in fact simplicity reigns. Those who have the power +of self-analysis make for themselves rules of conduct, and the best are +originated in this way--for when a man recasts his acquirements of sense +and education, in order to see on what all rests, and what are essential +standards of action and judgment, he resolves all into few, and those +the clear and strong. Rob Roy's self-examination paper is presented +to us in those lines which Sir Walter Scott, with grace and justice, +characterised as the 'high-toned poetry of his gifted friend +Wordsworth.' + + Say, then, that he was wise as brave, + As wise in thought as bold in deed; + For in the principles of things + He sought his morai creed. + + Said generous Rob, 'What need of Books? + Burn all the statutes and their shelves! + They stir us up against our kind, + And worse, against ourselves. + + We have a passion, make a law, + Too false to guide us or control; + And for the law itself we fight + In bitterness of soul. + + And puzzled, blinded, then we lose + Distinctions that are plain and few; + These find I graven on my heart, + That tells me what to do. + +Sir Walter Scott himself has enforced the same views:--'How much do I +need such a monitor,' said Waverley to Flora. 'A better one by far Mr. +Waverley will always find in his own bosom, when he will give its still +small voice leisure to be heard. + + All that hath been majestical + In life or death, since time began, + Is native in the simple heart of all,-- + The angel heart of man.--Lowell. + +To awaken the senses and instruct them and direct them aright in the art +of observation, is a great and essential undertaking. All scattered aids +need collecting together. De la Beche in 'Geology,' and Miss Martineau +have written books, entitled 'How to Observe.' This quality is the +distinction between the natural and artificial man--the natural man +observes what is in nature--the artificial notes what he finds in +books--the one depends on himself--the other on an encyclopaedia. +We want contrast, in order to know as well as to explain. Foreigners +observe us better than we observe ourselves. The common escapes our +attention. To know a fact fully we seek its opposite to compare it with. + +Were men reared with the powers of men without the genius of the child +being impaired, the ability to observe would be more general and perfect +among us. Children stop at everything to question its nature, at every +word to ask its import. It was the aim of Pestalozzi to cultivate by his +system of tuition this incessant questioning. But parents among the poor +know not the value of the habit, or knowing it have not time to gratify +it, and thus this happiest aptitude of childhood is repressed. + +With regard to the analysis of groups of facts, Mr. J. S. Mill +remarks--'The observer is not he who merely sees the thing before his +eyes, but he who sees what parts that thing is composed of. To do this +well is a rare talent. One person from inattention, or attending only in +the wrong place, overlooks half of what he sees; another sets down much +more than he sees, confounding it with what he imagines, or with what +he infers $ another takes note of the kind of all the circumstances, but +being inexpert in estimating their degree, leaves the quantity of each +vague and uncertain; another sees indeed the whole, but makes such an +awkward division of it into parts, throwing things into one mass +which require to be separated, and separating others which might more +conveniently be considered as one, that the result is much the same, +sometimes even worse, than if no analysis had been attempted at all.'* + + * Logic, vol. 1, p. 438. + +In the case of the Leigh Peerage there was a number of witnesses +examined in the House of Lords, as to the existence of a certain +monument in Stonely Church--'The first witness described the monument as +being black; the second spoke of it as a kind of dove-colour; the third +said it was black and white; the fourth said it was originally white, +but dirty, when he saw it; the fifth differing from the others, said it +was blue; the next witness described it as a light marble, but said it +had a dark appearance as if it had been bronzed, and the last witness +spoke of it as feeing of a light grey colour. Then, as to the form of +the monument, the first witness said it was oblong; the next said it +was square at the top, and came down narrower to the bottom, and there +rested on a single truss; the third witness described it as being +square at the bottom, testing upon two trusses; and went up narrower and +narrower to a point at the top; the fourth witness said it was angular +at the top; the next said it was square at the bottom, was brought to +a point in the middle, and was then curved into a sort of festoon; the +sixth witness stated that it was square at the top and bottom, and had a +curve; and the last said it was square at the top and bottom. As to the +language of the inscriptions, the first witness stated that the names +of _Thomas_ and _Christopher Leigh_ were in English; the next said the +inscription was not in English; the third said there was a great deal in +English; the fourth witness said the whole, (with the exception of the +name Christopher Lee), was in a language, which he did not understand; +the next witness stated that the inscription was all in English, +except the words _Anno Domini_; and the last witness said it was not in +English.'* + + * Times, May 10, 1828. + +All these witnesses agree as to the fact in dispute, but their variances +in testimony illustrate the common inattention of observation--and this +case farther admonishes us that if such differences may exist as to +a question of fact, where the senses are the same, little wonder that +differences exist as to matters of opinion, where intellectual capacity +and information are so various. + +We know from experience that the sportsman sees a point which is hidden +from the unpractised aimer--the painter sees traits of character of +light and shade in an object which the untaught limner never observes; +the musician distinguishes harmonies and discords that fall unnoted on +the uneducated ear. + +Thus we learn that by cultivation we can increase natural susceptibility +to observe. + +The extent is surprising to which the unanalytic are in ignorance of the +real nature of phenomena. 'There is nothing which we appear to ourselves +more directly conscious of, than the distance of an object from us. Yet +it has long been ascertained, that what is perceived by the eye, is at +most nothing more than a variously coloured surface; that when we fancy +we see distance, all we really see is certain variation of apparent +size, and more or less faintness of colour.'* + +In preparing to support an argument on any question, we must first +determine the sources whence the facts are to be collected. Instance: +The objects of municipal laws are rights and crimes. + +The evidence of rights are:-- 1. Public consent. + 2. Testimony. + 3. Records. + +The evidence of crimes are:-- 1. Confession. + 2. Previous malice. + 3. Testimony. + +This outline of the investigation prosecuted, the inquirer next consults +the authors who treat of the rules which are applied for determining +the facts of public consent, testimony, records, confessions: he is +then able to support his own argument in a valid manner, or prepared to +examine the facts offered by an opponent in support of an opposite view. + +The opinion may be hazarded that it is not so much from want of capacity +to observe that error arises, as from the want of conviction that we +should observe well before we attempt to infer. Nature is inventive, and +desire, once awakened, will, without formal rules, find out a thousand +modes of gratification. The foundation for a soldier logic than now +prevails will be laid when the people are impressed with the great +importance of looking well to facts as the data of all inferential +truth. + +There is a noted aphorism of Cendillac, to the effect that the one +sufficient rule for discovering the nature and properties of objects is +to name them properly, as if, observes Mr. J. S. Mill, 'the reverse was +not the truth, that it is impossible to name them properly except +in proportion as we are already acquainted with their nature and +properties.' Need it be added that this knowledge is only to be had by +patient observation? + + * Mill Logic vol. l, p.7. + +To assist this habit, Dr. Watts recommends the thinker to ascertain if +a given idea is clear and distinct, obscure and confused, learned or +vulgar, perfect or imperfect, adequate or inadequate--true or false. +'View a subject, says he, as through a telescope, so as to command a +clear view of it; examine its whole bearings as you look over a globe; +consider it in its several properties--anatomise it as with a scalpel. +Take cognizance of its various aspects as though inspecting it through +a prismatic glass. Whenever we contemplate a single object in nature +is obvious it must have duration, size, weight, form, colour, such +qualities being essentially present in all adequate conceptions of +physical phenomena.' + +It was objected to the 'Cricket' of Mr. Dickens, that his delineation of +Bertha was wanting in truthfulness. The teachers of the blind who knew +their nature could detect the departure from the reality of their habits +in the sketch of Bertha. The study of the blind was necessary to insure +success. We may not be able in any one book to give rules for the study +of all subjects, but we may indicate that we ought not to speak of what +we do not know, and that if we mean to introduce certain facts into our +speech or writing, we should consult the records and experienee of those +persons who are known to have written upon the subject, and follow the +best directions they give, and we shall generally attain accuracy. + +Mr. Combe observes, in his introduction to his notes on the United +States of North America, p. xi.--'I was told that a _certain person_ +boasts of having given Miss Martineau erroneous information for the +purpose of leading her into mistakes; and another in Philadelphia +assures his friends that he "crammed" Capt. Marryatt with old "Joe +Millers," which the Capt. embodied into his books as facts illustrative +of American manners. This seems to be a case in which some uncertainty +must ever exist as to the value of the facts collected by travellers. +They cannot observe all, or test half that they do observe. They must +rely on testimony. But they might do this--They might tell us precisely +the kind of authority they followed, and then the reader could form some +opinion of the value of what was communicated. Had Miss Martineau and +Captain Marryatt given the name and addresses of their informants, +the latter would now be punished by being infamously known throughout +Europe; and all future travellers warned from them--and all future +informants warned by their example. Where informants cannot be mentioned +by name and address, the chances are, they cannot be trusted. When first +connected with public proceedings, I found myself made the depository of +innumerable bits of scandal, and ominous reports of public characters. +To all who told me anything, if I attached importance to it, I made it +a rule to ask--'May I mention it to the party with your name?' 'O, no, +I would rather not,' was the common reply. To all written communications +answer--'Please add your name and address--and may I publish them if +occasion requires?' 'O, no, don't,' would be the general injunction. +Thus I found that huge reports, inflated as balloons, shrunk like them +when pricked by the pin of a question--'Will you answer for it?' Thus +I saved myself from being imposed upon by, or being the retailer of, +reports for which the originator or relator would not or could not +vouch. + +'Upwards of twenty years ago,' says George Combe, 'I accompanied a +member of the bar of Paris, a philosopher and a man of letters, on a +visit to the Highlands of Scotland. At Callendar a boy of twelve or +thirteen years of age attended as a guide to some interesting spot, +and in external appearance he seemed to be in every respect one of the +common lads of the village. My Parisian friend entered into conversation +with him; asked him if he had been at school, and soon discovered that +to a tolerable acquaintance with the Greek and Latin languages, he added +a pretty extensive-knowledge of arithmetic and geography, and was then +engaged in the study of mathematics. My friend conceived that the boy +was an average specimen of the peasantry of the country; and greatly +admired the educational attainments of the Scotch people, which he had +previously heard highly extolled. But,' adds Mr. Combe, 'the boy was the +natural son of an English officer, who had resided in the neighbourhood, +and who, while he ordered him to be reared in the hardy habits of +the Scottish Highlanders, had provided ample funds for his mental +education.'* + + * Intro, to notes on United States of North America, p. 10., + vol. 1 + +It is difficult to believe in this Frenchman being a 'philosopher, +making, as he did, a national induction from a single instance. Had he +previously inquired, as he ought to have done, the particulars of that +lad's life and rearing, before coming to so large a conclusion, he would +at once have discovered the error he was falling into. + +In the Registrar General's Report of 1840, the mean of married +persons unable to write is presented. The conclusion is based upon the +statistics of nine counties. But when it was found that only three +per cent, of the persons marriageable, did marry, the datum was found +insufficient to afford sure results. This fact; is given by Mr. Combe +in the same book. Then how many boys ought our 'philosopher' to have +questioned before making his vast inference? + +Another instance of the value of a question I extract from the +same work. Mr. Combe says:--'A few years ago, when travelling in +Somersetshire, I saw four horses, attended by two men, drawing a light +plough in a light soil. "What a waste of labour is here," said I to an +intelligent farmer; "in Scotland, two horses and one man will accomplish +this work." "We rear and train young horses for the London market," +said he; "two of the four which you see are serving an apprenticeship to +labour."' Had Mr. Combe asked a few questions as to the correctness +of his assumed inference, he would have been saved from his erroneous +conclusion. We should be wary of unquestioned data. + +When Murray's Grammar was first placed in my hands, I found in it +certain references to the Canons of Language in the larger edition. +I questioned my teacher as to what it meant. 'It is a trick of the +printer,' he answered, 'to induce you to buy the larger volume.' I do +not believe this now. I believe that it was a necessary reference. An +author who has written upon a given subject, naturally finds his own +ideas coincident illustrations of his views, and honestly refers to +them. In this book I have made a few references to previous works of +mine, and it has struck me that nine ont of ten of the readers will set +this down to artifice or egotism. Yet it is neither. I have referred +only to avoid the full quotation of some necessary illustration of the +argument. Yet few will penetrate to the fact, and most will be apt to +infer a trick from appearances. + + + +CHAPTER VI. SCIENCE + + Whatever we know must be in the number of the primitive + data, or of the conclusions which can be drawn therefrom.-- + J.S. Mill + +To have reached, in the study of observed phenomena, the point of +perception indicated in this motto, and to feel the full force of the +remark, is to have imbibed the spirit of science---whose traits are dear +distinctions, accurate classification, and strict reference to primitive +data. The bases of all science are methodical facts. The first step to +the perfection and enlargement of a science is the resolution of its +propositions into axioms, and into propositions which are to be +proved. Dr. Reid observes--'This has been done in mathematics from the +beginning, and has tended greatly to the emolument of that science. +It has lately been done in natural philosophy, and by this means that +science has advanced more in 160 years than it had done before in 2,000. +Every science is in an unformed state until its first principles are +ascertained; after this it advances regularly, and secures the ground it +has gained.' + +Classification is one of the first steps to Science. The maxim in +government, divide and conquer, retains, when applied to science, all +its wisdom without its machiavelialism. The young grammarian reduces the +mass of words, that so threaten to confound his powers, to a few natural +classes, and he conquers them separately with ease. + +'The single power by which we discover resemblance or relation in +general, is a sufficient aid to us in the perplexity and confusion of +our first attempts at arrangement. It begins by converting thousands, +and more than thousands, into one; and, reducing in the same manner +the numbers tiros formed, it arrives at last at the few distinctive +characters of those great comprehensive tribes, on which it ceases to +operate, 'because there is nothing left to oppress the memory or the +understanding.'* + + * Brown's Moral Philosophy, Lect, xvi. + +Merell has spoken more comprehensively on this subject--'That human +knowledge dees not consist in the bare collection and enumeration of +facts; this alone would be of little service were we net to attempt the +classification of them, and to educe from such classification general +laws and principles. The knowledge, which consists in individual truths, +could never be either extensive ear definite--for the multiplicity of +objects which then must crowd in upon the mind only tends to confound +and perplex it, while the memory, overburdened with particulars, is not +able to retain a hundredth part of the materials which are collected. To +prevent this, the power el generalisation comes to our aid, by which the +individual facts are so classified under their proper conceptions, that +they may at the same time be more easily retained, and their several +relations to all other branches of knowledge accurately defined. The +colligation and classification of facts, then, we may regard as the two +first steps, which are to be taken in the attainment of truth.'* + +Aristotle, says Morell, classified the _matter_, Kant the _forms_. +Aristotle was the first man who undertook the gigantic task of reducing +the multiplicity of all the objects of human knowledge to a few general +heads---1. Substance. 2. Quality. 3. Quantity. 4. Relation. Action. +6. Passion. 7. Place. 8. Time. 9. Posture. 10. Habit. Aristotle's +philosophy was _objective_, Kant's _subjective_. Kant's categories were +twelve. 1. Unity. 2. Plurality. 3. Totality. 4. Affirmation. Negation. +6. limitation. 7. Substance. 8. Casualty. 9. Reciprocity. 10. +Possibility. 11. Actuality. 12. Necessity. + +'It is a fundamental principle in logic, that the power of framing +classes is unlimited as long as there is any (even the smallest) +difference to found a distinction upon.** + +What Geoffroy Saint Hilaire has said of natural history is applicable +to all science:--'The first problem to be solved by him who wishes to +penetrate deeply into this; study, consists evidently in the formation +of clear and precise distinctions between the various brings. This is +the most elementary problem, in so-far as it precedes all the +others; but it is in reality, in most cases, complicated and full of +difficulties. Its accurate solution requires--first, _Observation_, +which makes known the facts; next, _Description_, which fixes them +permanently; then _Characterisation_, which selects and displays +prominently the most important of them--and lastly, _Classification_, +which arranges them in systematic order.'*** + +Of the value of classification, Lamartine has given a fine +illustration:----'Montesquieu had sounded the institutions and analysed +the laws of all people. By _classing_ governments he had compared them, +by comparing them he passed judgment on them; and this judgment brought +out, in its bold relief and contrast, on every page, right and force, +privilege and equality, tyranny and liberty.'**** + + * Morell's Hist. of Speculative Phil., p. 34, vol. 1. + + ** Mill, p. 165, vol. 1. + + *** T. W. Thornton: Reasoner No. 72, p. 664. + + **** Lamartine's Hist. Girondists, pp. 14-15, vol. 1. + +Familiarity with the characteristics of science imparts considerable +power for the detection of fallacy. A logician is imperfect without +scientific tastes and habits. The man of science has all his knowledge +systematised and arranged. What other people have in confusion, he +has in order. The elements of knowledge are, more or less, as has been +observed, known to all men--but in their perfect, communicable, and +usable state, they are-known only to the educated and scientific man. +What training is to the soldier, science is to the thinker. It enables +him to control all his resources and employ his natural powers to the +best advantage. It is this which constitutes the superiority of the +educated over the ignorant. Astronomy, navigation, architecture, +geometry, political economy, morals, all rest, or should rest, and do +rest, if they have-attained to the perfection of science, on +primary facts and first principles. Every step can be measured by an +axiom--every result can be traced to a first principle.* To detect +error, then, in any province of investigation, or any domain of +argument, the logician first looks to the primary principles on which it +is based, and thus tests the legitimacy of its conclusions. + +As respects those who deal in things professedly above reason, It +was well said by an anonymous writer of the old school of sturdy +thinkers,--'Of such men as these I usually demand, whether their own +assent to things they would have us believe, be grounded upon some +_rational argument_. If they say 'tis not, they are fools to believe +it themselves; and I should add to the number of fools, if, after this +acknowledgment, I should believe them: but if they say it is, I desire +them to produce their argument; for since 'tis framed by a human +understanding, the force of it may also be comprehended and judged of +by a human understanding: and tis to no purpose to say that the subject +surpasses human reason: for if it do so indeed, it will surpass _theirs_ +as well as _mine_, and so leave us both upon even terms. And let the +thing assented to be what it will, the assent itself must be founded +upon a _sufficient reason_, and consequently upon one that is +_intelligible_ to the human intellect that is wrought on by it.'** + + * See Beauties and Uses of Euclid, chap. vi., Logic of + Euclid. + + ** A Discourse on Things above Reason, 1681. + +"What is it?--" "'Tis impossible the same thing should be, and not be +at the same time," are maxims of such universal usefulness, that without +them we could neither _judge, discourse,_ nor _act_. These principles +may not always make their appearance in formal propositions, but still +they guide all our thoughts in the same manner as when a musician plays +a careless voluntary upon a harpsichord--he is guided by rules of music +he long since became familiar with, though now scarcely sensible of +them. + +'A butcher loses his knife, and looks all about for it, and remarks as +the motive of his search, "I am sure it must be somewhere or other." +By which rude saying it is evident he is guided by the axiom last +mentioned. Had he not the knowledge of this axiom beforehand, did he +think it possible that his knife could be _no where_ or in _no place_ +he would never take pains to look for it. We may observe many such +axioms as this guiding the actions of the vulgar, and it is no unworthy +speculation to observe their behaviour and words, which proceed from +uncorrupted nature, and retrieve the axioms from which their conduct +proceeds.'* + + * Solid Philosophy, asserted against the Fancies of the + Idealists. (Locke's Understanding is the work controverted.) + By J. S.. London, 1679. + +The outlines of the science of morality are thus comprehensively +sketched by Sir James Mackintosh: the origin, value, and application of +first principles are indicated with his usual felicity. 'The usages and +laws of nations, the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, +the sentiments of orators and poets, as well as the observations of +common life, are in truth, the materials out of which the science of +morality to formed; and those who neglect them are justly chargeable +with a vain attempt to philosophise without regard to fact and +experienee--the sole foundation of all true philosophy. + +The natural order undoubtedly dictates that we should first search for +the _original principles_ of the science in human nature; then apply them +to the regulation of the conduct of individuals, and lastly employ them +for the decision of those difficult and complicated questions that arise +with respect to the intercourse of nations.' + +To search for ultimate principles is to discover at a glance the whole +bearings of a great question. Through what clouds of politics had the +historian of Rome penetrated when he announced that the principles of a +free constitution are irrecoverably lost when the legislative power is +nominated by the executive. + +This habit--it cannot be too often insisted on aids not only the +acquisition of knowledge, but also its _retention_. Around these first +principles, as around a standard, the thoughts naturally associate. +Touch but a remote chord of any question, and it will vibrate to +the central principle to which it has once been well attached. Every +relative impression owns a kindred connection, and the moment one is +attacked, it, like a faithful sentinel, arouses a whole troop, which, +marshalled and disciplined, bear down and challenge the enemy.'* + + * Beauties and Uses of Euclid, pp. 47-9. + +What Rogers has so exquisitely sung of the associations of childhood, is +true of the associations of science. + + Childhood's loved group revisit! every scene,-- + The tangled wood-walk and the tufted green. + The school's lone porch, with reverend mosses grey, + Just tells the pensive pilgrim where it lay. + + Mute is the bell which rang at peep of dawn, + Quick'ning my truant steps across the lawn: + Unheard the shout that rent the noontide air, + When the slow dial gave a pause to care. + + Up springs at every step, to claim a tear, + Some little friendship formed and cherished here? + And not the lightest leaf but trembling teems + With golden visions and romantic dreams. + + + +CHAPTER VII. PROPOSITIONS + + All truth and all error lie in Propositions.--J. S. Mill. + +In accordance with that experience which directs to the profoundest +books for the simplest statements, we turn to Mill's Logic for the +philosophy of propositions. The answer to every question which it is +possible to frame is contained in a proposition or assertion. Whatever +can be an object of belief or even of disbelief, must, when put into +words, assume the form of a proposition * * What we call a truth is +simply a true proposition; and errors are false propositions. To know +the import of all possible propositions would be to know all questions +which can be raised, all matters which are susceptible of being either +believed or disbelieved. * * Since then the objects of all belief and +all inquiry express themselves in propositions, a sufficient scrutiny +of propositions and of their varieties will apprise us what questions +mankind have asked themselves, and what it the nature of the answers to +those questions they have actually thought they had grounds to believe. + +'Now the first glance at a proposition shows that it is formed by +putting together two names. A proposition, according to the common +simple definition, which is sufficient for our purpose, is, _discourse +in which something is affirmed or denied of something_. Thus, in the +proposition, gold is yellow, the quality _yellow_ is affirmed of the +substance _gold_. In the proposition, Franklin was not born in England, +the fact expressed by the words _born in England_ is denied of the man +Franklin. + +'Every proposition consists of three parts: the subject, the predicate, +and the copula. The predicate is the name denoting that which is +affirmed or denied. The subject is the name denoting the person or +thing which something is affirmed or denied of. The copula is the sign +denoting that there is an affirmation or denial; and thereby enabling +the hearer or reader to distinguish a proposition from any other kind of +discourse. Thus, in the proposition, the earth is round, the predicate +is the word _round_, which denotes the quality affirmed, or (as the +phrase is) predicated: _the earth_ words denoting the object which that +quality is affirmed of, compose the subject; the word it, which serves +as the connecting mark between the subject and predicate, to show that +one of them is affirmed of the other, is called the copula.' + + + +CHAPTER VIII. DEFINITIONS + + No difficulty is unsurmountable, if words be allowed to pass + without meaning.--Lord Kames. + +As every proposition consists of two names, and as every proposition +affirms or denies one of these names of the other, the value of +definition, which fixes the import of names, is apparent. + +'A _name_ is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, which may +raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and +which being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought +the speaker had before in his mind [Hobbes]. This simple definition of +a name, as a word (or set of words) serving the double purpose of a mark +to recall to ourselves the likeness of a former thought, and a sign to +make it known to others, appears unexceptionable.'* + +Definition originates in accurate and comprehensive observation. 'There +cannot be,' says Mill, 'agreement about the definition of a thing, until +there is agreement about the thing itself. _To define a thing is to +select from among the whole of its properties those which shall +be understood to be designated and declared by its name_; and the +properties must be very well known to us before we can be competent to +determine which of them are fittest to be chosen for this purpose.'** + +'The simplest and most correct notion of a definition is, a proposition +declaratory of the meaning of a word; namely, either the meaning which +it bears in common acceptation, or that which the speaker or writer, for +the particular purposes of his discourse, intends to annex to it.'*** + + * J. Stuart Mill: System of Logic, 2nd ed., chap. 11, sec. + I. p. 27. + + ** Introduction to Logic, p. 1. + + *** Mill's Logic, p. 183, vol. 1. + +But with most persons the object of a definition is merely to guide them +to the correct use of a term as a protection against applying it in a +manner inconsistent with custom and convention. Anything, therefore, is +to them a sufficient definition of a term which will serve as a correct +index to what the term denotes; although not embracing the whole, and +sometimes perhaps not even any part of what it connotes. + +Definitions are sometimes explained as being of two kinds--of things and +words. + +The definition of _words_ is the explanation of the sense in which they +are used. + +The definition of _things_ is an explanation of the specific properties +by which they differ from all other things. + +To define a thing, says Dr. Watts, we must ascertain with what it +agrees, then note the most remarkable attribute of difference, and join +the two together. + +Probity--the disposition to acknowledge the rights of mankind. + +Justice--the disposition to maintain the rights of mankind. + +Benevolence--the disposition to improve the rights of mankind. + +Deceit--the concealed violation of the rights of mankind. + +Injustice--the open violation of the rights of mankind. + +Malevolence--hatred of the rights of mankind. + +In defining a word we seek some class to which to refer it, that we may +identify it, and fix attention upon that peculiarity by which we +can distinguish it from all other things. 'Probity and 'justice' are +referred to 'disposition,' with reference to the 'rights of mankind' as +their sphere of existence: and _acknowledgment, and maintenance_, are +mentioned as the distinguishing features. + +Distinctions must not be made without differences. The definition should +be plainer than the thing defined. Aristotle's definition of motion is +considered defective in this respect:--'Motion--an act of a being in +power, so far forth as it is in power.' Tautological definitions cause +more to be supposed than is true--the too terse explanation leaves some +necessary thing unmentioned. A perfect definition requires the union of +the concise, the clear, and the adequate. Some persons are so +unskilful in the analysis of terms as to occasion the advice _Nil +explicare_--never explain yourself if you wish to be understood. + +Double meanings should be avoided. The writer may himself alternate in +their use, and the reader may take the word in the unintended meaning. +All men have not the strong sense of Johnson. When Caleb Whiteford +inquired seriously of the Doctor, whether he really considered that a +man ought to be transported, like Barrington, the pickpocket, for being +guilty of a double meaning. 'Sir,' said Johnson, 'if a man means well, +the more he means the better'--which, whether real or fictitious, is one +of the happiest answers that ever crushed a quibble.* + + * Hood's Own. + +I have frequently put the question--What is consciousness? to persons +who have been conscious for twenty or thirty years, but who were yet +unable to reply. Had any one deprived these persons of consciousness, a +judge would have hanged him for the offence; yet, could they themselves +have been interrogated as to what harm they had suffered, they could +not have told what they had lost. And upon the principle, that he not +knowing what he has lost, is no loser, these persons, though murdered, +had suffered no harm. + +The various definitions of the same subject which prevail, originate in +the caprice, or partial, or profound knowledge the definer may have of +his subject. It seems to be admitted by logicians, that an author has a +right to give whatever provisional definition he pleases of his terms. +But having once given them, perspicuity requires that he should adhere +to them. Any new sense in which a term is employed should be specially +defined. In discoursing on an ordinary subject, as the right of public +assembly,--such words as perception, conception, apprehension, might be +used reciprocally, but in a dissertation on metaphysics each requires +restriction in use and precision in purport. + +Often genius strikes out new relations of words. In recent political +debates, Mr. Cobden resorted with new force and point to a charge of +rashness against ministers: he showed that rashness consisted more +frequently in inaction than action. He is rash who stands surrounded +by the elements of danger without taking; any precaution against the +contingencies of peril; he is rash who does not take advantage of the +calm, to repair his shattered rigging; he is rash who looks not out for +a proper supply of water until the conflagration is raging around +him; and more rash than all is he who exercises no provident care for +supplying a nation with food, but waits for the pressure of famine and +the perils of starvation. + +At the last soiree of the Leeds Mechanics' Institution, Mr. Dickens +referred to ignorance, commonly considered as a passive negation, and +placed it in the light of a power. 'Look where we will, do we not find +ignorance powerful for every kind of wrong and evil? Powerful to take +its enemies to its heart and strike its best friends down--powerful +to fill the prisons, the hospitals, and the graves--powerful for blind +violence, prejudice, and error in all their destructive shapes.' + +The variations which not only common but technical terms undergo, is +a considerable source of perplexity in reasoning. Mr. Mill cites the +instance of the term felony. No lawyer will undertake to tell what a +felony is otherwise than by enumerating the various kinds of offences +which are so called. Originally, felony denoted all offences, the +penalty of which included forfeiture of goods; but, subsequent Acts +of Parliament have declared various offences to be felonies without +enjoining that penalty, and have taken away the penalty from others +which continue still to be called felonies, insomuch that the acts +so called have now no property whatever in common, save that of being +unlawful and punishable. This inattention to precision in terms has +arisen not among the vulgar, but among educated English lawyers. + +'Language,' says Mr. Mill, borrowing a political simile from Sir James +Mackintosh, '"is not made, but grows." A name not unfrequently passes +by successive links of resemblance from one object to another, until it +becomes applied to things having nothing in common with the first things +to which the name was given; which, however, do not, for that reason, +drop the name; so that it at last denotes a confused huddle of objects, +having nothing whatever in common; and connotes nothing, not even a +vague and general resemblance. When a name has fallen into this state, +in which by predicating it of any object we assert literally nothing +about the object, it has become unfit for the purposes either of thought +or of the communication of thought; and can only be made serviceable by +stripping it of some part of its multifarious denotation, and confining +it to objects possessed of some attributes in common, which it may be +made to connote. Such are the inconveniences of a language which "is not +made, but grows." like a road which is not made, but has made itself, it +requires continual mending in order to be passable.'* + + * Logic, p. 207. + +It is well observed, that the spontaneous growth of language is of +the utmost importance to the thinker. There seems to be so palpable a +substratum of right sense, in the rude classifications of the multitude, +that the logician has little else to do, in many cases, than to retouch +them and give them precision. Guizot observes, there is frequently more +truth in common acceptations of general terms than in the more precise +definitions of science. Common sense gives to words their ordinary +signification. The leading terms of philosophy are clothed in +innumerable shades of meaning acquired in their transitional use, and +immense is the knowledge of _thing:_ requisite to enable a man to affirm +that any given argument turns wholly on _words_. The study of terms, +for which logicians have provided multiplied means, is one of the most +interesting and profitable upon which men can enter. If it be worth +while to speak at all, it is worth while to know certainly what we speak +about. + +Philanthropic genius has pointed out a perversion of power, arising +through definitional incapacity, which makes it a moral duty to study +analysis of terms, and exactitude of expression. + +'All battle,' says Carlyle, 'is _misunderstanding_--did the parties know +one another, the battle would cease. No man at bottom means injustice; +he contends for some distorted image of right. _Clear_, undeniable +right--_clear_, undeniable might--either of these, once ascertained, +puts an end to battle. Battle is a confused experiment to ascertain +these.' + +Of the power of names to impose on the multitude, history furnishes too +many examples. Strength to forefend us against they delusion ability to +see that the meaning governs the term, and not the term the meaning--are +species of intellectual self-defence. + +'Augustus,' says Gibbon, 'was sensible that mankind is governed by +names; nor was he deceived in his expectation that the senate and people +would submit to slavery provided that they were respectably assured that +they still enjoyed their ancient freedom.' + +'Never,' adjures W. J. Fox, 'be deceived by words. Always try to +penetrate to realities. Have your wits sharpened, your senses exercised +to discern good and evil. Be not imposed upon by pompous manners. Many a +solemnly-uttered sentence is often a sheer inanity, which will not +bear the scrutiny of an observant intellect. Be not frightened by +denunciations; by being told that you are not a good subject or a good +Christian, if you do not believe, or say that you believe this or +that. Be not led astray by iteration--mistake not the familiar for the +intelligible. Ascertain what words are meant to convey, and what they +actually do convey. Go to the substance and soul of whatever is +propounded. Be on your guard against bold assumptions, nor let them bear +you away against the dictates of your own understanding. + +Look at phrases as counters, or paper money, that may pass for much or +little according to circumstances. Endeavour to arrive at truth, and +make that your treasure. Be ever wide awake to see through any veil +of sophistry and cant; nor by the agency of words be made the dupe of +critic or lawyer, of priest of politician.'* + + * Lectures to the Working Classes, p. 70, vol. 2. + + + +CHAPTER IX. SYLLOGISMS + +Propositions being assertions--as soon as sufficient reasons are +adduced to make the proposition credible, it becomes a truth probable or +certain, as the case may be. + +Reasoning is a simple business. To reason is to state facts in support +of a proposition. A conclusive fact so advanced is called a reason. All +the reasons offered in proof of a proposition are called premises. The +Pythagorean, who lays down the proposition that fruits and grain are the +proper food of man, and cites facts to prove his assertion--reasons. A +proposition and its reasons are called an argument. + +Reason is the faculty of perceiving coherences. Effective reasoning is +stating them so that others cannot but see them too. 'Reasoning on the +abstrusest questions is nothing more than arriving at a remote truth by +discovering its coherence with the preceding facts in the same chain.'* + + * Uses and Beauties of Euclid, p. 52. + +A syllogism is a peculiar _form_ of expression, in which every argument +may be stated. It consists of three propositions. + +1. Whoever have their heads cut off ought to be allowed to ask the +reason why. + +2. Women have their heads cut off. + +3. Therefore women ought to be allowed to ask (politically) the reason +why. + +This is an argument of Mad. de Stael, in allusion to the beheading of +women in France, without allowing them any voice in making the laws +which determine the offences for which they suffered. + +A syllogism is constructed upon the principle (known as the Dictum of +Aristotle) that whatever is affirmed or denied universally of a whole +class of things, may be affirmed or denied of anything comprehended in +that class. Thus the first proposition introduces the class of persons +who have their heads cut off. Of this class it is affirmed that they +ought to be allowed to ask the reason why. But women are included in the +class of persons who have their heads cut off, and consequently that +may be affirmed of them which is affirmed of the whole class--that they +should be allowed to ask the reason why. + +'To prove an affirmative,' says Mr. Mill, 'the argument must admit of +being stated in this form:-- + +All animals are mortal; + + All men | + Some men } are animals; + Socrates | + + therefore + + All men | + Some men } are mortal. + Socrates | + +'To prove a negative, the argument must be capable of being expressed in +this form:-- + +'No one who is capable of self-control is necessarily vicious; + + All negroes | + Some negroes } are capable of self-control; + Mr. A.'s negro | + + therefore + + No negroes are | + Some negroes are not } necessarily vicious. + Mr. A.'s negro is not | + +'Although all ratiocination admits of being thrown into one or the other +of these forms, and sometimes gains considerably by the transformation, +both in clearness and in the obviousness of its consequence; there are, +no doubt, cases in which the argument falls more naturally into one +of the other three figures, and in which its conclusiveness is more +apparent at the first glance in those figures, than when reduced into +the first. Thus, if the proposition were that pagans may be virtuous, +and the evidence to prove it were the example of Aristides; a syllogism +in the third figure, + + Aristides was virtuous, + Aristides was a pagan, + +therefore + + Some pagan was virtuous, + +Would be a more natural mode of stating the argument, and would carry +conviction more instantly home, than the same ratiocination strained +into the first figure, thus-- + + Aristides was virtuous, + Some pagan was Aristides, + +therefore + + Some pagan was virtuous.' + +The best thing that can be said in favour of the syllogism, as an +instrument of reasoning, is that it is a regular form to which every +valid argument can be reduced; and may be accompanied by a rule, showing +the validity of every argument in that form, and consequently the +unsoundness of any apparent argument which cannot be reduced to it. This +would be high praise if every 'valid argument' was a trusty one. But +unfortunately 'the question respecting the validity of an argument is +not whether the conclusion be _true_, but whether it _follows_ from the +premises adduced.'* Even this small advantage is purchased at a greater +expense of tedium and trouble than the bulk of mankind are willing to +pay, or able to pay if they were willing. + + * Logic, vol. 1, pp. 232-3. + +There is some reason to believe that the syllogistic form, as a _test_ +of valid arguments, may be entirely dispensed with, if we can secure +accuracy of data, and intelligibility in terms. + +It is not contended now that we discover new truths by the syllogism. +The syllogism is allowed to be only a form of _stating_ a truth. +Example:-- + + No predacious animals are ruminant, + The lion is predacious, + +therefore + + The lion is not ruminant. + + * Whately's Logic, Anal. Out. chap. 1, sec. 3. + + +Of course, if we know that no animal that lives by prey chews the cud, +and know, also, that the lion lives by prey, we know that the lion +does not chew the cud. This conclusion, as Lord Kames contends, and Dr. +Whately admits, is not a truth _inferred_ from the fundamental premises, +but _included_ in it. Smart, whom Mr. J. S. Mill calls acute and often +profound, remarks--'Every one, as to the _mere_ act of reasoning, +_reasons rightly_: we may reason from wrong premises, or mistake right +ones; we may be unable to infer from proper ones; but from such premises +as we do reason from, we reason _correctly_: for all premises contain +their conclusion; and in knowing the premises, we therefore know the +conclusion. The art wanted is one that will enable us to use +language perspicuously in expressing our premises:' and he might +have added--_direct us in selecting proper materials of which to make +premises_. + +The strength and weakness of the syllogism as an instrument of reasoning +will now be understood. Whately remarks, that 'since all reasoning may +be resolved into syllogisms, and since in a syllogism the premises do +virtually assert the conclusion, it follows at once that no new truth can +be elicited by any process of reasoning.'* We therefore no longer look to +the syllogism to discover truth, its value is in stating it. In this +sense it is worthy of all attention. It is the form of nature. + + * Logic, p. 223. + +Of such a syllogism as the one quoted-- + + No predacious animals are ruminant, + The lion is predacious, + +therefore + + The lion is not ruminant. + +It has been insisted by some logicians that the genius required for its +construction was _invention_. Having made a general proposition like +the first, we then have to invent or find out a middle term as the +second--but if we bear in mind that the general affirmation of the first +proposition relates to a class of (predacious animals in this case) +objects which include the middle term, the necessity of invention is +consequently dispensed with. We need only look well to what we have +there. Simplicity will be promoted by returning to our previous remark, +viz.--that reasoning is asserting a proposition, and then showing why +it is true--in other words, adducing the fact or facts, on which the +assertion rests. + +In the Logic given in 'Chambers' Information,' it is said--' In choosing +your middle terms, or arguments to prove any question, always take such +topics as are purest and least fallible, and which carry the greatest +evidence and strength with them,' But it rather appears that we have +not to invent a middle term, but only to look to the major premises, and +find it included there. + +By methodical questioning any argument may be tested. Thus, on any +assertion being made, ask--Why is the assertion true? In this manner, if +an argument has truth in it, it may be elicited. In this manner you dig +through assertions down to premises, and discover whether any ore of +truth lies there. + +The value of the argument depends upon the final answer which reveals +the premises or data of facts, upon which the conclusion rests. Forms +of speech, classification of propositions, figures of syllogisms, are of +minor importance when you have once elicited the rough truth. The best +test of an argument is the soundness of its data, and the simplest +formula for drawing out and exhibiting such data, is of the greatest +service in enabling us to judge of the validity thereof. + +Tyranny, says Cobbett, has no enemy so formidable as the pen, Why? +'Because the pen pursues tyranny both in life and beyond the grave.' +How is this proved to be the most formidable enemy of tyranny? 'From the +fact that tyranny has no enemy so formidable as that which assails not +only its existence, but its reputation, which pursues it in life +and beyond the grave.' Such interrogatories and replies generate the +expository syllogism. + +1. Tyranny has no enemy so formidable as that which assails not only its +existence, but its reputation, which pursues it in life and beyond the +grave. + +2. The pen pursues tyranny in life and beyond the grave. + +3. Therefore, tyranny has no enemy so formidable as the pen. A syllogism +is made up of collective and single facts. It is the process of +reasoning, whereby we show that a single truth is proved by a collective +one which contains it, or a less quantity is proved by a greater, or +that an assertion is proved by an induction from a class of facts. From +the class of the enemies of tyranny the pen is selected, and is +proved, by passing in inductive review the whole class, to be the most +formidable. + +The usual manner in which an argument is presented is called the +entihymeme. Thus:-- + + He is an industrious man, + +therefore + + He will acquire wealth. + +The first or major proposition is in this form suppressed. The +syllogistic form would be this:-- + + Every industrious man acquires wealth, + He is an industrious man, + +therefore + + He will acquire wealth. + +But if we ask for the proof that every industrious man acquires wealth, +we find the facts wanting--for the idle are often rich, and the diligent +poor. The industrious _may_ acquire wealth, the chances are in their +favour. + +Again. + + We must cherish self-respect, + Because self-respect is the stay of virtue. + +The suppressed proposition is--'We must cherish whatever is the stay of +virtue.' + +The whole syllogism then stands thus:-- + + We must cherish whatever is the stay of virtue, + Self-respect is the stay of virtue, + +therefore + + We must cherish self-respect. + +Dilemma is derived from a Greek word, and signifies twice an argument. +It is an argument divided into several members, and infers of each part +what is to be inferred of the whole. Thus: Either we shall live or die. +If we live, we can only live happily by being virtuous; and if we die, +we can only die happy by being virtuous; therefore, we ought always +to be virtuous. In the dilemma, question one argument at a time, as in +preceding cases. + +The Sorites uses several middle terms by which the predicate of the last +proposition is connected with the first subject. Of this argument the +well-known speech of Themistocles is a specimen. 'My son,' said that +eminent person, 'governs his mother, his mother governs me, I govern +the Athenians, the Athenians govern Greece, Greece governs Europe, and +Europe governs the world; therefore, my son governs the world.' In +these instances, question each assertion, as there are as many acts of +reasoning as intermediate propositions. + +The Onus Probandi, or Burden of Proof, is said to rest with him who +would dispute any point in favour of a presumptive, or generally +allowed truth. But manly logic holds no quibbling about who shall prove. +Whatever he asserts, the honest reasoner should be prompt to prove. + +Chalmers, it is said, made Morell known--but Morell has written a +synopsis of metaphysical philosophy that only needed to be known to be +appreciated. If Chalmers gave Morell distinction, Morell had previously +earned it. From his work I extract the following passage, which passes +in review the steps taken, marks the analytic point reached, and +outlines the ground before us:--'Different as were the minds of those +two great men [Bacon and Descartes] in themselves, different as were +their respective labours, and opposite as were, in many respects, the +results at which they arrived, yet the writings of both were marked +by one and the same great characteristic, namely, by the _spirit of +method_. The most important works of Bacon, it will be remembered, were +the "Instanratio Magna," and the "Novum Organum;" those of Descartes +were his "Dissertatio de Methodo," and his "Meditationes de Prima +Philosophia," The fruitlessness of the ancient logic, as an instrument +of discovery, had been abundantly proved by past experience, and the +watchword which these two great thinkers of their age both uttered, +and which has been ever since the guiding principle of all philosophy, +was--analysis. Bacon, who gave his attention chiefly to the direction +and improvement of physical science, taught to analyse nature, while +Descartes, who aimed rather at grounding all human knowledge upon its +ultimate principles, instructed how to analyse _thought_. All modern +philosophy, therefore, whether it arise from the Baconian or the +Cartesian point of view, bears upon it the broad outline of the analytic +method. It matters not whether it be the outer or the inner world to +which its investigations apply, in each case it teaches us to observe +and analyse _facts_ to induce instances, and upon such observation and +induction to ground our knowledge of laws and principles. In this alone +consists the Unity of modern science, and from this arises its broad +distinction from that of the ancient world. Every natural philosopher +since Bacon has grounded his success upon an induction of the facts +of the outward world, and every metaphysician, since Descartes, has +progressed onwards in his department of knowledge by analysing the facts +of our inward consciousness.'* + + * Morell: Modern Philosophy, pp. 76-8. + + + +CHAPTER X. INDUCTION + +Induction is an inference from many facts. Induction is verification. +Just as in a syllogism we show that a part is contained in the whole, so +in induction we show that a part is illustrated by the whole. It seems +that every single fact contains many truths, but induction establishes +their _universality_. A single brain contains all the truths of +phrenology, a single stone includes the phenomena of gravitation, the +temperance of a single individual exhibits the whole law of moderation, +but we learn the universality of these truths by induction. + +Every legal statute, says Dr. Johnson, is founded on induction. 'Law is +the science in which the greatest powers of understanding are applied +to the greatest number of facts.' The _basis of all_ science is such an +extensive induction of particulars as leads to general definitions and +fundamental axioms, and furnishes the premises from which inferences may +be deduced. + +Inductive observation is the great instrument of discovering important +truths. 'What are called the principles of human nature are learned from +individual instances. It is the only possible way of learning them. * +* When we reason from a general law or principle, we are in truth +reasoning from a number of instances represented by It.'* + + * Rationale of Political Representation, p. 34. + +A general election is an induction of the intelligence of the country +represented by the members of Parliament. The difference between +democracy and monarchy is in one sense an affair of logic. Where +electors are limited in franchise, and candidates restricted by property +qualification, the induction is partial, but where all can vote and many +can be chosen from, the premises are more capacious and the inference +sounder. + +Dr. Whately says, that 'in Natural Philosophy a _single instance_ is +often accounted a _sufficient_ induction; e.g., having once ascertained +that an individual magnet will attract iron, we are authorised to +conclude that this property is universal.' + +'The Edinburgh Reviewer of Whewell's "History of the Inductive +Sciences," observes that, "by the _accidental_ placing of a rhomb +of calcareous spar, upon a book or line, Bartholinus discovered the +property of the double refraction of light. By _accidentally_ combining +two rhombs in different positions, Huygens discovered the polarisation +of light. By _accidentally_ looking through a prism of the same +substance, and turning it round, Mains discovered the polarisation of +light by reflection; and by placing thin chrystalline films between two +similar prisms or rhombs, M. Arago discovered the phenomena of polarised +tints." + +'To this Mr. Whewell, in his "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," +makes the following reply:--"But Bartholinus could have seen no such +consequence in the accident, if he had not previously had a clear +conception of single refraction. A lady, in describing an optical +experiment which had been shown her, said of her teacher, 'he told me +to increase and diminish the angle of refraction: and, at last, I found +that he only meant me to move my head up and down.' At any rate, till +the lady had acquired a knowledge of the meaning which the technical +terms convey, she could not have made Bartholinus's discovery by means +of this accident. Suppose that Huygens made the experiment alluded to, +without design, what he really observed was that the images appeared +and disappeared alternately as he turned the rhomb round. His success +depended on his clearness of thought, which enabled him to perform +the intellectual analysis which would never have occurred to most men, +however often they had combined two rhombs in different positions. Malus +saw that in some positions the light reflected from the windows of +the Louvre became dim. Another person would have attributed this to +accident; he, however, considered the position of the prism, and the +window; repeated the experiment often; and by virtue of the eminently +distinct conceptions of space which he possessed, resolved the +phenomenon into its geometrical conditions."* "If it were true, that +the fall of an apple was the occasion of Newton's pursuing that train of +thought which led to the doctrine of universal gravitation, the habits +and constitution of Newton's intellect were the real source of this +great event in the progress of knowledge."** "In whatever manner facts +may be presented to the notice of a discoverer, they can never become +the materials of exact knowledge, except they find his mind already +provided with precise and suitable conceptions, by which they may be +analysed and connected."'*** + + * Whewell: Phil. Induct. Sciences, vol. 2. pp. 199-1. + + ** Ibid, vol. 2, p. 189. + + *** See J. N. Bailey's Essays pp. 87-8-9. + +These admissions seem to me to prove that whenever a casual fact proves +to us a new truth, it does so by its coincidence with previously known +facts, and that the novelty of the occasion attracts all credit to +itself, and we lose sight of the generalisation below--the fruitful +soil of experience on which the new fact, like a seed, falls. We only +recognise difference by comparison, and the comparison is an induction, +however slender. + +Monsieur de Montmorine was recaptured and brought to the scaffold, +through the trifling circumstance of some chicken bones being found near +the door of his landlady--a woman too poor to indulge in such dainties.* +The discovery of de Montmorine was not, as at first sight appears, an +inference from a single fact, but from an adjacent induction. It was +a general truth, (known to the party who observed the bones) a truth +inducted from a number of facts that poor people could not afford to +luxuriate on chickens. It was, therefore, from this induction, inferred +that some one of superior fortune must be living in that particular +place. + + * Chambers' Miscellany of Useful and Entertaining Tracts, + No. 61: the Story of Lavaiette, p. 27 + +The judicious care which the great fathers of science have exhibited in +making their inferences, incontestably establishes their conviction +of the danger of any other reasoning than that from inductions. Lord +Brougham informs us, that what Newton's Principia is to science, Locke's +essay to metaphysics, Demosthenes in oratory, and Homer in poetry, +Cuvier's researches to our fossil osteology. But Cuvier never attempted +to draw any inferences until he had examined the _whole_ osteology of +the living species. + +Lord Brougham remarks, that 'from examining a _single_ fragment of bone +we infer that, in the wilds where we found it, there lived and ranged, +some thousands of years ago, an animal of a peculiar kind.' This is a +case in which the inference spoken of is arrived at in a way different +from that apparently stated. We recognise in the 'fragment of bone' +a link in a chain of facts constituting the basis of a well-known +induction, which comparative anatomy has many times verified. It +is important to distinguish well the grounds from which accurate +inferences, such as these in the cases before us, have really been +adduced, in order to ascertain the grounds from which we should reason +generally. It will be found that solid reasoning can only proceed from +general rules--i.e., inductions from facts. It will be found that the +prime source of fallacy lies in reasoning from isolated facts. It is +not to be denied that such reasoning is sometimes right, but it is to +be remembered that it is right by accident, not by design. There is no +science or certainty in it. It is hazard, not logic. + +This habit however, is very common. Mr. Mill says, that 'Not only _may_ +we reason from particulars to particulars, without passing through +generals, but we perpetually do so reason. All our earliest inferences +are of this nature. From the first dawn of intelligence we draw +inferences, but years elapse before we learn the use of general +language. The child, who, having burnt his fingers, avoids to thrust +them again into the fire, has reasoned or inferred, though he has never +thought of the general maxim--fire burns. He knows from memory that he +has been burnt, and on this evidence believes, when he sees a candle, +that if he puts his fingers into the flame of it, he will be burnt +again. He believes this in every case which happens to arise; but +without looking, in each instance, beyond the present case. He is not +generalising; he is inferring a particular from particulars. In the same +way, also, brutes reason. There is little or no ground, for attributing +to any of the lower animals the use of conventional signs, without +which general propositions are impossible. But those animals profit by +experience, and avoid what they have found to cause them pain, in the +same manner, though not always with the same skill, as a human creature. +Not only the burnt child, but the burnt dog, dreads the fire. + +'I believe that, in point of fact, when drawing inferences from our +personal experience, and not from maxims handed down to us by books +or tradition, we much oftener conclude from particulars to particulars +directly, than through the intermediate agency of any general +proposition. We are constantly reasoning from ourselves to other people, +or from one person to another, without giving ourselves the trouble to +erect our observations into general maxims of human or external nature. +When we conclude that some person will, on some given occasion, feel or +act so and so, we sometimes judge from an enlarged consideration of the +manner in which men in general, or men of some particular character, +are accustomed to feel and act; but much oftener from having known the +feelings and conduct of the same man in some previous instance, or from +considering how we should feel or act ourselves. It is not only the +village matron who, when called to a consultation upon the case of a +neighbour's child, pronounces on the evil and its remedy simply on the +recollection and authority of what she accounts the similar case of +her Lucy. We all, where we have no definite maxims to steer by, guide +ourselves in the same way; and if we have an extensive experience, and +retain its impressions strongly, we may acquire, in this manner, a +very considerable power of accurate judgment, which we may be utterly +incapable of justifying or of communicating to others. Among the higher +order of practical intellects, there have been many of whom it was +remarked how admirably they suited their means to their ends, without +being able to give any sufficient reasons for what they did and +applied, or seemed to apply, recondite principles which they were wholly +unable to state. This is a natural consequence of having a mind stored +with appropriate particulars, and having been long accustomed to reason +at once from these to fresh particulars, without practising the habit of +stating to oneself or to others the corresponding general propositions. +An old warrior, on a rapid glance at the outlines of the ground, is able +at once to give the necessary orders for a skilful arrangement of his +troops; though if he has received little theoretical instruction, and +has seldom been called upon to answer to other people for his conduct, +he may never have had in his mind a single general theorem respecting +the relation between ground and array. But his experience of +encampments, under circumstances more or less similar, has left a number +of vivid, unexpressed, ungeneralised analogies in his mind, the most +appropriate of which, instantly suggesting itself, determines him to a +judicious arrangement. + +'The skill of an uneducated person in the use of weapons, or of tools, +is of a precisely similar nature. The savage who executes unerringly the +exact throw which brings down his game, or his enemy, in the manner +most suited to his purpose, under the operation of all the conditions +necessarily involved, the weight and form of the weapon, the direction +and distance of the object, the action of the wind, &c., owes this +power to a long series of previous experiments, the results of which he +certainly never framed into any verbal theorems or rules. It is the +same in all extraordinary manual dexterity. Not long ago a Scotch +manufacturer procured from England, at a high rate of wages, a working +dyer, famous for producing very fine colours, with a view of teaching +to his other workmen the same skill. The workman came; but his mode of +proportioning the ingredients, in which lay the secret of the effects he +produced, was by taking them up in handfuls while the common method was +to weigh them. The manufacturer sought to make him turn his handling +system into an equivalent weighing system, that the general principle of +his peculiar mode of proceeding might be ascertained. This, however, +the man found himself quite unable to do, and therefore could impart +his skill to nobody. He had, from the individual cases of his own +experience, established a connection in his mind between fine effects +of colour, and tactual perceptions in handling his dyeing materials; +and from these perceptions he could, in any particular cases, infer the +means to be employed, and the effect which would be produced, but could +not put others in possession of the grounds on which he proceeded, from +having never generalised them in his own mind, or expressed them in +language. + +'Almost every one knows Lord Mansfield's advice to a man of practical +good sense, who, being appointed governor of a colony, had to preside +in its court of justice, without previous judicial practice or legal +education. The advice was to give his decision boldly, for it would +probably be right; but never to venture on assigning reasons, for they +would almost infallibly be wrong. In cases like this, which are of no +uncommon occurrence, it would be absurd to suppose that the bad reason +was the source of the good decision. Lord Mansfield knew that if any +reason were assigned it would be necessarily an afterthought, the judge +being _in fact_ guided by impressions from past experience, without the +circuitous process of framing general principles from them, and that if +he attempted to frame any such he would assuredly fail. Lord Mansfield, +however, would not have doubted that a man of equal experience, who +had also a mind stored with general propositions derived by legitimate +induction from that experience, would have been greatly preferable as +a judge, to one, however sagacious, who could not be trusted with the +explanation and justification of his own judgments. The cases of able +men performing wonderful things they know not how, are examples of the +less civilised and most spontaneous form of the operations of superior +minds It is a _defect in them_, and _often a source of errors_, not to +have generalised as they went on; but generalisation is a help, the most +important indeed of all helps, yet not an essential.'* + + * Mill's Logic, pp. 251-5. + +In illustration of generalising from single instances, Miss Martineau +gives this example:--'A raw Chinese traveller in England was landed by +a Thames waterman who had a wooden leg. The stranger saw that the wooden +leg was used to stand in the water with, while the other was high and +dry. The apparent economy of the fact struck the Chinese; he saw in it +strong evidence of design, and wrote home that in England one-legged men +are kept for watermen, to the saving of all injury to health, shoe, and +stocking, from standing in the river.'* + +Reasoning on insufficient data-- + + Falls like an inverted cone, + Wanting its proper base to stand upon. + +Samuel Bailey has furnished, in one passage, both a clear illustration +of the process, and the validity of an induction:--'Whoever had +witnessed the acts of a landlord to his tenants, of a schoolmaster to +his pupils, of artizans towards their apprentices, of husbands towards +their wives, on points where the power of the superior could not be +contested, and where his personal gratification was incompatible with +just conduct to the subordinate, would necessarily have formed in his +own mind a species of general rule; and from this rule he might safely +draw an inference as to what would be the conduct of a despot, seated on +a throne, in the possession of unchecked authority; assisted too, as the +inquirer would be, by that _indispensable and inestimable guide to the +knowledge of mankind, an appeal to his own feelings_, in a variety of +_analogous_ instances. + +'We conclude, that a ruler with uncontrolled power will act the tyrant, +not merely from the fact that Caligula, or Nero, or Bonaparte did, +but from a thousand facts attesting that men, in, every situation, use +uncontrolled power in this way--just as we infer that all bodies tend to +the centre of the earth, _not merely from the circumstance of an apple +dropping from a tree, but from seeing the tendency in stones, water, +animals, and all things within our observation_. The use of uncontrolled +power, for the gratification of the possessor, without an equitable +respect to others, is no more peculiar to monarchs, than a tendency +to the earth is peculiar to apples. It may be useful to know that +_monarchs_ act in this way, as it may be useful to know that apples drop +to the ground; but it is much more useful to know that _men_ act in +this manner. _An inference is safer when gathered from the widest +induction.'_ + + * How to Observe, p. 6. + + ** Rationale of Political Representation. Introduction, pp. + 85-6. The last sentence of this extract is abridged--but, as + the reader will find upon reference, the sense of the author + is faithfully rendered. + +It may be useful to observe that, though a few instances are insufficient +to establish a theory, one may be sufficient to overturn a theory, +fancifully or hypothetically supported, Gibbon overturns the entertaining +theory of Rudbeck, an antiquarian of Upsal, of profound learning and easy +faith, who, by the dim light of legends and traditions, of conjectures +and etymologies, sought to establish the antiquity of Sweden over half +the earth. Gibbon annihilated this well laboured system of German +antiquities, by a single fact too well attested to admit of any doubt, +and of too decisive a nature to leave room for any reply--the fact that +the Germans, of the age of Tacitus, were unacquainted with the use of +letters. A circumstance fatal to their literary claims, urged by Olaus +Rudbeck. + +In the chapter on 'Facts' I have cautioned the reader against +unquestioned data. This seems the place to remark that the unsuspected +sources of error and unfriendliness have their rise in the criminal +implicitness with which we listen to reports, and infer from rumours as +from facts. These are the very little handles which move men and women +to strange performances.'* All the plots of dramas and romances are +founded on misunderstandings, which a little sagacity of action (such as +a wise resolution not to be imposed upon would lead to) would commonly +suffice to arrest the error at its birth. With regard to character we +constantly infer from data, partial, limited, and doubtful. If most +quarrelers were called into a court of Inquiry to confess the real +grounds from which they have arrived at certain conclusions with regard +to their neighbours, and often with regard to their friends, they would +be at once overwhelmed with a conviction of the weakness of which they +have been guilty. Upon analysing the miserable sources of opinions +of which scandal and calumny are born, I have found it impossible +to restrain astonishment at the imbecility of logical power men will +sometimes be content to exhibit, where meanness prevails, malice +incites, and passion governs. Well might Bacon exclaim--'Doth any man +doubt, that if there were taken out of men's minds, vain opinions, +flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations, and the like, but it +would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things?'** The +wise rule is, never judge from appearances when facts can be had--never +receive a report without challenging its foundation, nor adopt it +without permission to give the authority. + + * Cricket on the Hearth. + + ** Essay on Truth. + +In all cases, in which you must judge from appearances and reason +from conjectures, adopt the _fairest_ interpretation possible. On this +principle, credit will sometimes be given where none is due--but in nine +cases out of ten, justice will be done, for I am satisfied that there is +more worth among men than wisdom, and that we do well much oftener than +we reason well. We seldom need judge charitably, did we always endeavour +to judge justly. But we make a virtue of our own errors, and we often +affect to _condescend_ to pronounce an opinion, which it would be +criminal to withhold. If ever I go to the Herald's, office, the motto I +will have emblazoned shall be this--Justice is sufficient. Could we only +get justice in the world, we could afford to excuse it all its 'charity' +of judgment, and its benevolence even of act. + +Where should a man's reputation be safe from suspicion if not in the +hands of his friend? It ought to be a principle of action with all +men, never to judge a friend except out of his own mouth. 'There was +a generous friend of mine once, who never would have judged me or any +other man unheard.'* With the sublime intensity of one who felt the +infinite value of private justice, has Schiller delineated this spirit +in the interview between Octavio and his son Max Piccolomini. After +a violent and visible struggle with his feelings--wrought upon by his +father's endeavours to sow suspicions in his mind, and detach him from +the service of his friend, Wallenstein--Max exclaims:-- + + * Edward to Mr. Peerybing. + +I will procure me light a shorter way. Farewell. + +Octavio. Where now? + +Max. (To the Duke.) + + If thou hast believed that I shall act + A part in this thy play---- + Thou hast miscalculated on me grievously. + My way must be straight on. + True with the tongue, + False with the heart--I may not, cannot be: + Nor can I suffer that a man should trust me-- + As his friend trust me--and then lull my conscience + With such low pleas as these:--"I ask him not-- + He did it all at his own hazard--and + My mouth has never lied to him."--No, no + What a friend takes me for, that I must be. + --I'll to the Duke; ere yet this day is ended + Will I demand of him that he do save + His good name from the world, and with one stride + Break through and rend this fine-spun web of yours. + He can, he will!--I still am his believer. + Yet I'll not pledge myself, but that those letters + May furnish you, perchance, with proofs against him. + How far may not this Tertsky have proceeded-- + What may not he himself too have permitted + Himself to do, to snare the enemy, + The laws of war excusing? Nothing, save + His own mouth shall convict him--nothing less! + And face to face will I go question him. + Ay--this state-policy? O how I curse it! + You will some time, with your state-policy, + Compel him to the measure; it may happen + Because ye are _determined_ that he is guilty, + Guilty ye'll make him. All retreat cut off, + You close up every outlet, hem him in + Narrower and narrower, till at length ye force him-- + Yes, ye,--ye force him in his desperation, + To set fire to his prison. Father! father! + That never can end well--it cannot--will not! + Deem of it what thou wilt; but pardon me, + That I must bear me on in my own way. + All must remain pure betwixt him and me; + And, ere the day-light dawns, it must be known + Which I must lose--my father, or my friend.* + + * Shiller's Piccolomini, act 3, scene 9. + +Had Othello been thus honourable to Desdemona, he would never have +murdered her. Incalculable is the evil we bring on ourselves and +society, by supposing and surmising facts we ought resolutely to +question. The motto of the garter-- + + Evil be to him who evil thinks, + +ought to be, + + Evil is to him who evil thinks. + +Every man will be his own Lawyer and his own Doctor, and such is the +perversity of human nature, he will also be his own _Iago_, and feed +himself with suspicions. Nearly all tragedies hinge on this error. + +To avoid being the cause of misunderstanding to others, it is a good +rule never to speak critically of others, except in their presence, or +in print. When I am obliged to do this in conversation, with persons of +unknown or doubtful exactitude, I take care to keep much below the truth +in matters of censure, as anything of that kind may gain ten or twenty +per cent, in carriage. When with men of just habits of interpretation, +I pay them the highest compliment of friendship, and speak to them of +others, without reserve. + +Notorious are the contumelies put upon the cases of grievance presented +from the people in the House of Commons. Nor is it altogether causeless. +So prone are the ignorant to mistake their prejudices for facts, and +ascribe to others as crimes what exists only in their own surmises, that +most popular cases may be stripped of half their pretensions without +injuring their truth. Exaggeration is the vice of ignorance. Half the +speeches addressed to 'King Mob' are hyperbolic. The sentiments of +public meetings minister too often to the prevalent inflation. The +people will be powerful when they learn to be exact--and not till then. + +The only mode of correcting this evil is to instil into the people the +wise rule of Burlamiqui. To reason, (that is, inductively) says this +writer, is to calculate, and as it were draw up an account, after +balancing all arguments, in order to see on which side the advantage +lies. Burlamiqui had law chiefly in view in his remark, but the rule is +of immense application. A logician is a secretary or banker's clerk, who +keeps an account between truth and error. When a lady once consulted Dr. +Johnson on the degree of turpitude to be attached to her son's robbing +an orchard--'Madam,' said Johnson, 'it all depends upon the weight of +the boy. I remember my schoolfellow, Davy Garrick, who was always a +little fellow, robbing a dozen orchards with impunity, but the very +first time I climbed up an apple tree, for I was always a heavy boy, the +bough broke with me, and it was called a judgment. I suppose that is +why Justice is represented with a pair of scales.' This may not be the +precise reason why Justice has a pair of scales, but the point goes to +the root of the matter. Without weighing there can be neither justice +nor fair induction. + +In illustration of these views Mr. Mill has some able remarks:--'In +proportion to any person's deficiency of knowledge and mental +cultivation, is generally his inability to discriminate between his +inferences and the perceptions on which they were grounded. + +Many a marvellous tale many a scandalous anecdote, owes its origin to +this incapacity. The narrater relates, not what he saw or heard, but +the impression which he derived from what he saw or heard, and of which +perhaps the greater part consisted of inference, though the whole +is related not as inference but as matter-of-fact. The difficulty +of inducing witnesses to restrain, within any moderate limits, +the intermixture of their inferences with the narrative of their +perceptions, is well known to experienced cross-examiners; and still +more is this the case when ignorant persons attempt to describe any +natural phenomenon. "The simplest narrative," says Dugald Stewart, "of +the most illiterate observer involves more or less of hypothesis nay, +in general, it will be found that, in proportion to his ignorance, +the greater is the number of conjectural principle involved in his +statements. A village apothecary (and, if possible, in a still greater +degree, an experienced nurse) is seldom able to describe; the plainest +case, without employing a phraseology of which every word is a theory; +whereas a simple and genuine specification of the phenomena which mark a +particular disease--a specification unsophisticated by fancy, or by +preconceived opinions, may be regarded as unequivocal evidence of a mind +trained by long and successful study to the most difficult of all arts, +that of the faithful _interpretation_ of nature."'* + + * Logic, pp. 408-9, vol. 2. + +It is in judgments formed, in reprehensible indifference to the actual +facts of the case, that party rancour and the proverbial injustice of +popular political opinion take their rise. A useful caution on this +head is pronounced by Lord Brougham in his sketch of the life of Lord +Wellesley:--'How often do we see,' observes his lordship, 'vehement: and +unceasing; attacks made upon a minister or a statesman, perhaps not in +the public service, for something which he does not choose to defend or +explain, resting his claims to the confidence of his countrymen upon +his past exertions and his known character. Yet these assaults are +unremittingly made upon him, and the people believe that so much noise +could not be stirred up without something to authorise it. Sometimes the +objects of the calumny are silent from disdain; sometimes from knowing +that the base propagators of it will only return to their slander the +more eagerly alter their conviction of falsehood; but sometimes, also, +the silencer may be owing to official reserve, of which we see a most +remarkable instance in the ease of Lord Wellesly.' + +Not only are enemies of the people afforded a justification for their +opposition by wrongful judgment pronounced upon them, but the friends +of the people often pass over to the other side through the same cause. +When a leader of the people first comes in personal contact with the +opposite party, and becomes acquainted with merits of feeling and +judgment which he had as it were pledged himself to deny, and indeed +achieved himself a position by disbelieving in, he becomes ashamed of +the injustice exacted from him by his inexorable adherents, and forsakes +his party when he should only forsake its errors. The case of Barnave, +in the first French Revolution, is a memorable instance of this. On +lesser theatres I have seen many instances of this kind of conversion; +Such changes have always been ascribed to venality, yet they are men +of generous instincts who are thus overcome--but they want logical +strength, and cannot correct themselves without falling. + +It is a wise rule in conversation, never to guess at meanings. When, an +observation is made, capable of affording two inferences, at once put +the question which shall elicit the meaning intended. Conversation is +held to no purpose unless explicitness comes out of it. Innumerable are +the errors that arise through letting remarks pass, of which we +only _suppose_ we know the purport. This is a fruitful source of +misunderstanding. When in Scotland I was much instructed by the +intellectual characteristics of the people. The Scotch are essentially a +reflective people. The English conceive doubts, but the Scotch put them +into queries. Before I had been in the country many hours I was struck +by the inductive habits of the people. A very old and illiterate woman, +to whom I put an indefinite question, eyed me deliberately from head to +foot before she gave me an answer. Not in rudeness did she gaze, so much +as in inquiry as to what could be my object. I spent more than a week +in inquiring at places, where apartments were to be let, by which I +acquired profitable acquaintance with the people. Upon asking the +terms of apartments, I was met, in all cases, by several preliminary +questions, as for whom were they? what number of persons? what station, +habits, and probable stay? Then I received the precise answer required. +It did not seem to me that they were answering one question by asking +another, as is sometimes said of the Scotch--but by a happy and wise +presence of mind they asked, as all should do, at many questions as were +required to complete the data of the specific answer they were called +upon to give. + +A wise practice is followed in courts of law. No judge pronounces an +opinion on a hypothetical case. What he would do? or what would be the +judgment of the law, suppose a certain case should arise?--are questions +he never condescends to answer. 'Bring the plaintiff into court, let the +evidence be taken, and then we will decide. We sit here to judge actual, +not suppositious cases.' Such would be the reply. People out of court +might profit by the example. + +I remember one striking instance of the pernicious effects of surmise. +Some years ago I took part in a Fraternal Demonstration at Highbury +Barn. The assembly was numerous, and composed of persons of all nations +and all parties. The celebration was avowedly one of fraternity. The +tone of the meeting reflected its object. Pacific words were on every +tongue, and harmony reigned up till eleven o'clock. At that hour +Monsieur Chillman asked me if some steps could not be taken to annualize +the meeting, and he requested me to prepare and propose a resolution to +that effect. Monsieur Chillman, thinking the resolution ought to come +from an Englishman, strongly urged me to move it. I, thinking it too +important to emanate from a young man, looked about for a person of +experience and known discretion to introduce it. After several had +declined, Mr. Hetherington undertook it. The English politicians were +composed of two parties, the friends of Mr. O'Connor, and the members of +the National Hall. At that time they were pleased to be the antipodes of +each other. No sooner had Mr. Hetherington spoken, he being the friend +of Mr. Lovett, than his motion was supposed to come from Mr. Lovett's +party, though they were utterly ignorant of its origination. Clamour's +hundred tongues were loosened. Slumbering differences were awakened. +Suspicion spread like an infection. Fraternity perished of the +contagion. Twenty amendments were proposed, and it was not till +midnight, and then in a storm indescribably contradictory of the +meeting's whole purport, that a common understanding was come to. +Had the least inquiry been made by the objecting party, previously +to dissenting, they would have found that the suspicious proposition +originated with one of themselves. But assuming premises, they inferred +from conjecture instead of fact, and raised disastrous doubts as to the +ability of that assembly for domestic or international fraternisation. + +The use and abuse of authority Is a subject worthy of the young +logician's serious attention. Many great writers like Bacon, through +policy--Burke through position, or Shakspere through versatility of +genius, have written on both sides of important questions. Such men, +taken piece-meal, may be quoted by the most opposite parties in favour +of the most opposite opinions. Unless there is time to make a broad +induction from their writings, showing, by weighty, quantitive evidence, +the side to which they leaned, better not quote them as _authorities_ +at all, but give what expresses your own views on your own +responsibility--indeed, in _all_ cases, the quoter ought to stand +prepared, if possible, to justify all he cites from another in argument. +'There is perhaps something weak and servile in our wishing to rely +on, or draw assistance from, ancient opinions. Reason ought not, like +vanity, to adorn herself with old parchments, and the display of a +genealogical tree; more dignified in her proceedings, she ought to +derive everything from herself; she should disregard past times, and be, +if I may use the phrase, the contemporary of all ages.'* Quote others as +Grotius did: not as judges from whose decision there is no appeal, but +as witnesses whose conspiring testimony confirms the view taken. + + * Necker. + +Analogy has frequently been confounded with induction. Analogy signifies +reasoning from resemblances subsisting between phenomena--induction, +reasoning from the sameness of phenomena. + +The phenomena affording an induction of a law of nature must be obvious, +uniform, and universal. + +The rules to be observed in deducing general principles are, that the +case be true and the facts universal. + +On this subject, as exhibiting the clearest results arrived at, I +transcribe a passage from Mill: 'There is no word which is used more +loosely, or in a greater variety of senses, than analogy. It sometimes +stands for arguments which may be examples of the most rigid induction. +Archbishop Whately, for instance, following Ferguson and other writers, +defines analogy conformably to its primitive acceptation, that which was +given to it by mathematicians, resemblance of relations. In this sense, +when a country which has sent out colonies is termed the mother country, +the expression is analogical, signifying that the colonies of a country +stand in the same _relation_ to her in which children stand to their +parents. And if any inference be drawn from this resemblance of +relations, as, for instance, that the same obedience or affection is +due from colonies to the mother country which is due from children to a +parent, this is called reasoning by analogy. Or if it be argued that +a nation is most beneficially governed by an assembly elected by the +people, from the admitted fact that other associations for a common +purpose, such as joint stock companies, are best managed by a committee +chosen by the parties interested; this, too, is an argument from analogy +in the preceding sense, because its foundation is, not that a nation is +like a joint stock company, or Parliament like a board of directors, but +that Parliament stands in the same _relation_ to the nation in which a +board of directors stands to a joint stock company. Now, in an argument +of this nature, there is no inherent inferiority of conclusiveness like +other arguments from resemblance, it may amount to nothing, or it may +be a perfect and conclusive induction. The circumstance in which the +two cases resemble, may be capable of: being shown to be the _matereal_ +circumstance; to be that on which all the consequences, necessary to be +taken into account in the particular discussion, depend. In the case +in question, the resemblance is one of relation; the _fundamentum +relationis_ being the management, by a few persons, of affairs in which +a much greater number are interested along with them. Now, some may +contend that this circumstance which is common to the two cases, and +the various consequences which follow from it, have the chief share in +determining all those effects which make up what we term good or bad +administration. If they can establish this, their argument has the force +of a rigid induction: if they cannot, they are said to have failed +in proving the analogy between the two cases, a mode of speech which +implies that when the analogy can be proved, the argument founded upon +it cannot be resisted.'* + + * Logic, pp. 97-8, vol. 2. + +'Many of the most splendid and important discoveries in this science +were the result of analogical reasonings. It was from this source that +Dr. Priestley proved the compound nature of atmospheric air; and it is +related that it was in consequence of hints which he had given, when +on a visit to Paris, to Lavoisier, founded entirely upon analogical +conjectures, that the latter philosopher was induced to commence +experiments, with the view of proving the compound nature of water, and +of reducing it to its constituent elements. Indeed the whole history of +this very important and useful department of human knowledge exhibits +very striking and incontestable proofs how much of the art owed its +existence to mere hints and conjectures, founded, in many cases, upon +very slight resemblances or analogies.*. The chief province of analogy +is confined to that of suggestion. Analogies are the great hinters of +experiments. They illustrate an argument, but do not establish it. +They are probabilities, not proofs. Hence Lord Brougham in one place +exclaims:--'I have a dread, at least a suspicion, of all analogies, and +never more than when on the slippery heights of an obscure subject; +when we are, as it were, _inter apices_ of a metaphysical argument, and +feeling, perhaps groping, our way in the dark, or among the clouds. +I then regard analogy as a dangerous light, a treacherous _ignii +fatuus_.'** + +A striking instance of the fallacy of analogy is afforded in the +experiments of Professor Matteuoci, which seem to prove that though the +analogies between electricity and nervous substance are nearly perfect, +yet they are two distinct agencies.*** + + * Blakey's Logic, pp. 97-7. + + ** Pal. Illus. vol. 2. + + *** See Zoist No. 20, p. 363. + + + +CHAPTER XI. DETECTION OF FALLACIES + +WE hope to be able to save students from the fate of Diodorus, (a great +logician, who died in his school through shame at being, unable to +resolve a quibble propounded by Stilno)--not by hardening, but by +enlightening them. Though we bring neither mood nor figure wherewith to +test the presence of error, we are not without the hope of qualifying +the student for its discovery. + +It has been confessed from the throne of logic that, 'After all, in the +practical detection of each individual fallacy, _much must depend on +natural and acquired acuteness_: nor can any rules be given, the +mere learning of which will enable us to _apply_ them with mechanical +certainty and readiness.' + +Bulwer, in remarking that error is a view of _some_ facts instead of +a survey of _all_, indicated the key to logical fallacy. Error lies +principally in defective premises. Sophistry in science is referable +to incomplete analysis of nature, of systems--to artificial +arrangements--to _supposing_ qualities, to _assuming_ principles, to +false inductions from imperfect demonstration. + +Dickens, in 'Nicholas Nickleby,' gives the case of a certain lady, who, +because she knew _one_ young milliner, who retained red cheeks and +did not die of consumption, was immovably of opinion that all +representations of the injurious effect of such sedentary occupation +were false. It is ever so with the vulgar. Some one case has come under +their notice, and it is in vain that you appeal to a chain of facts. +They know nothing of induction--they know one case to the contrary, and +that is enough. This error is the source of vulgar prejudice. Once teach +men that truth does not lie in a single instance, but in a calculation +in a balance of probabilities, and you rationalise them. 'The chapter +of accidents [or single instances] is the Bible of the fool--it supplies +him with a text against everything great, or good, or wise.'* + + * Times. + + Where others toil with philosophic force, + Their nimble nonsense takes a shorter course, + Flings at your head convictions in the lump, + And gains' remote conclusions with a jump.--Cowper, + +The first source of error is defective induction. We easily arrive at +this point of examination by the questions we have proposed for use +in the test of syllogism. Formerly, one syllogism was required to be +defeated by another--we now attack a fallacy by induction. No false +syllogism, says Biennan, can resist the inductive process of sifting +particulars. + + I do not like thee. Dr. Fell, + The reason why, I cannot tell-- + But this I know, and know full well, + I do not like thee, Dr. Fell. + +This kind of thing will not do. Induction pursues the reasoner with an +eternal _why_. A clear because to a clear why, is a demand that is never +remitted in sound logic. + +Lord Melbourne, in giving his reason for his religion in the House +of Lords, said it was the religion of his forefathers and that of his +country, _therefore_, he would support the church. (Cheers from the +opposition benches.) The Brahmin and Mussulman give the same reason +for theirs. A logician in facts would have said, I hold and support my +religion because it is _true_. What the standard of physical certainty +is to facts, what axioms are to science, such is induction to +syllogisms--it is the test of their correctness. + +Dr. Whately exhibits the following instance of a regularly expressed +syllogism:-- + + Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial: + Afflictions are dispensations of Providence, + Therefore, they are beneficial. + +Every applicable rule of Dr. Whately's logic is, of course, applied +here--it is true in mood and figure, and yet the argument is fallacious. +A fallacy is defined as 'an ingenious mixture of truth and falsehood, +so entangled as to be intimately blended--that the falsehood is, in +chemical phrase, _held in solution_: one drop of sound logic is that +test which immediately disunites them, makes the foreign substance +visible, and precipitates it to the bottom.'* But whence is to come +'this drop of sound logic?' Not from the Doctor's _Elements,_ they have +sent forth the fallacy. But touch it with the talisman of facts and; the +error will appear. + + * Whately's Logic, Anal. Out., chap. 1, stc. 4. + +What facts support the assertion that Afflictions are dispensations of +Providence?' The simple question is fatal to the argument. Can such +a proposition have facts for its support? Ignorance, congregating in +narrow courts, and laziness, accumulating filth, generate sickness +and affliction. Are these the dispensations of Providence, or the +dispensations of folly and crime? To ascribe them to Providence is +virtually to allow ignorance and laziness to step into the throne of +God, and call upon men to believe in _their_ beneficent dispensations. +Dr. Watts, another writer on logic, set the Christian congregations of +England to sing the same species of fallacy:--- + + "Diseases are the servants, Lord, + They come at thy command; + I'll not attempt a murm'ring word, + Against thy chast'ning hand." + +According to this lyrical logician, whenever wise precautions arrest +the progress of pestilence, or the physician's skill subdues disease, +Jehovah is robbed of a servant. By such an argument, humanity is made +to be in rebellion against heaven, and our medical colleges are in +antagonism with Deity, and the recent appointment, by the Russell +government, of a Sanatory Commission, was high blasphemy. It is the +degradation of language to employ it to such a purpose, and logic +needs revising to save us from publishing such puerility in the name +of learning and of reason. It must have been logic of this kind +that induced a strong-thoughted woman to hazard the bold but tenable +conjecture, that 'If an argument has truth in it, less than a +philosopher will see it--and if it has not, less than a logician will +refute it.'* + + * A Few Days in Athens, by Frances Wright. + +R. G. Latham, M.D., in his 'First Outlines of Logic applied to Grammar +and Etymology,' has introduced the particular instance of the syllogism +on Providence here cited from Whately. It would be no difficult task to +present other instances of the same species of polemical fallacy from +Dr. Whately and other writers on logic, did it comport with the rule +I have chosen for observance. I give these cases chiefly to show how +extensively and obtrusively they are introduced. + +'We have,' says Mr. Mill, 'five distinguishable classes of fallacy, +which may to expressed in the following synoptic table:-- + +[Illustration: Mill's Fallacy Table] + +It was the boast of Archimedes, that if any one would find him a +fulcrum, on which to rest a prop, he would raise the world, But this was +mere assertion unsupported by facts, for if the fulcrum had been found +him, Archimedes could not have performed his promise. This has been +proved by Ferguson, who has demonstrated that if Archimedes could have +moved with the swiftness of a cannon ball--480 miles every hour--it +would have taken him just 44,963,540,000,000 of years to have-raised the +world one inch. Bulwer remarks, 'Critics have said, what a fine idea of +Archimedes! But how much finer is the fact that refutes it. _One of the +sublimest things in the world is plain truth_.' + + All motion generates warmth, + Shaking (with cold) is motion, + _Ergo_, shaking with cold generates warmth. + +We look, in this case, to the facts on which the first proposition +rests, and find the assertion too general. + +To one who said that none were happy who were not above opinion, a +Spartan replied, 'Then none are happy but knaves and robbers.' + +Mr. Goodrich, the original Peter Farley gives, In his 'Fireside +Education,' an instance to this effect of two boys arguing on the +division of their beds. William exclaims, 'You take more than your share +of the bed, James.' James answers, 'I only take half the bed.' William +replies, 'True, but you take your half out of the middle, and I am +obliged to lie on both sides to get my half.' + +Innumerable sophisms are suffered to pass in consequence of Some +brilliancy of position which, dazzles us and prevents our seeing that +they are wide of the' mark of reason. An instance occurs in Bulwer--who +says, 'Helvetius erred upon education--but his dogma has been +beneficial.' Probably so--but not so beneficial as the truth would have +been. Many persons have argued from such an instance, that error is +useful. Dickens, in those incidental observations of striking good +sense strewed up and down his writings, says, in the 'Cricket on the +Hearth:'--'These remarks (of Mrs. Fielding) were quite unanswerable: +which is the happy property of all remarks that are _sufficiently wide +of the purpose_.' Of the refutation of such remarks he has presented an +able instance in 'Martin Chuzzlewit': + +'Bless my soul, Westlock,' says Pinch, is it nothing to see Pecksniff +moved to that extent and know one's self to be the cause? And did you +not hear him say that he could have shed his blood for me? + +'Do you want any blood shed for you?' returned Westlock with +considerable irritation. 'Does he shed anything for you that you _do_ +want? Does he shed employment for you, instruction for you pocket +money for you? Does he even shed legs of mutton for you in any decent +proportion to potatoes and garden stuff?' + + + +CHAPTER XII. SCEPTICISM + +Man has been called the plaything of chance, but there is no logic more +close and inflexible than that of human life: all is entwined together; +and for him who is able to disentangle the premises and patiently await +the conclusion it is the most correct of syllogisms.--Jules Sandau: +People's Journal, No. 87. + +'To quote authors,' says Harris, in his preface to his Hermes,' 'who +have lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full +maturity of Grecian and Roman literature; some in its declension; +and others in periods still more barbarous and depraved; may afford, +perhaps, no unpleasing speculation, to see how the same reason has +at all times prevailed; how there is one truth like one sun, that has +enlightened human intelligence through every age, and saved it from the +darkness both of sophistry and error.' This is the assurance which right +reason will ever impart. Underneath all the change after which we pant, +amid all the variety which surrounds us, and seem the very aliment of +our nature, lies the instinct after the permanent. It is the province of +sound logic to guarantee this in conclusion. + +The novelty, change, fluctuation, which scientific discovery has +brought, and will yet bring, into the formerly settled worlds of opinion +and social condition, will unsettle men's minds, and pave the way to an +age of scepticism. Sound logic is necessary to provide that this doubt +is transitional and not ultimate. + +Scepticism is of two kinds, that of Pyrrho, and that of examination. The +followers of Pyrrho, it is said, made doubting a profession, until at +last they doubted whether they did doubt. This is the scepticism of the +scorner and trifler. + +He did not know that he did not know it, and if he did know it it was +more than he knew. This is as far as the philosopher, of this school can +go. Dickens has drawn the portrait of these, logicians in Mr. Tigg:-- + +'When a man like Slyme,' said Mr. Tigg, 'is detained for such a thing as +a bill' I reject the superstition of ages, and believe nothing. I don't +even believe that I don't believe, curse me if I do.' + +Hood is ironical on the professors of uncertainty. 'On a certain day +of a certain year, certain officers went, on certain information, to +a certain court, in a certain city, to take up a certain Italian for +a certain crime. What gross fools are they who say there is nothing +certain in this world.' + +But scepticism is not capable of disturbing the well-grounded repose +of the wise; for when the sceptic thinks he has involved everything in +doubt, everything is still left in as much certainty as his scepticism. + +In the great maze of conflicting opinion, it matters little that we are +cautioned that reason is not all-sufficient--it is the best sufficiency +we have. If reason will not serve us well, will anything serve us +better? Bishop Berkeley may demonstrate that we are not sure of matter's +existence--but are we more sure of any thing else? We are not thus to +be cajoled. But it is right to say that Mr. J. S. Mill contends that +Berkeley has been misunderstood--but if he did argue, as popularly +believed, to such argument, the answer of Byron is sufficient-- + + When Berkeley said there was no matter, + It was no matter what he said. + +If all is delusion, the delusion is very orderly--it observes regular +laws, and we proceed in logical method to inform each other, how +the delusion of things appears to our understandings or affects our +fortunes. + + Where nothing is, and all things seem, + And we the shadows of a dream, + +We discuss the seemings with the same gravity as realities.' If a man +seems to do wrong, and I seem to prevent him, and the wrong, therefore, +seems not to be done, I am satisfied. + +The 'wise considerate scepticism' of inquiry has been well expressed by +Emerson, in his recent lecture on Montaigne.--'Who shall forbid a wise +scepticism, seeing that there is no practical question on which anything +more than a proximate solution is to be had? Marriage itself is an open +question: those "out" wish to be "in:" those "in" to be "out." + +The state. With all its obvious advantages, nobody loves it. Is +it; otherwise with the Church? Shall the young man enter trade or a +profession without being vitiated? Shall he stay on shore or put out to +sea? There is much to be said on both sides. Then there is competition +and the attractions of the co-operative system. The labourer has a poor +hut, is without knowledge, virtue, civilisation. If: we say, "Let us +have culture," the expression awakens a new indisposition; for culture +destroys spontaneous and hearty unencumbered action. Let us have a +robust manly life; let us have to do with realities, not with shadowy +ghosts. Now this precisely is the right ground of the sceptic; not of +unbelief, denying or doubting--least of all of scoffing and profligate +jeering at what is stable and good. He is _the considerer_. He has, +too many enemies around him to wish to be his own. The position of the +sceptic is one taken up for defence; as we build a house not too high or +too low; under the wind, but out of the dust. For him the Spartan vigour +is too-austere. St. John too thin and aerial. The wise sceptic avoids to +be fooled by any extreme; he wishes to, see the game. He wishes to see +all things, but mainly men. Really our life in this world not of so easy +interpretation as preachers and school-books are accustomed to describe +it.' These have not so efficiently solved the problem, that the sceptic +should yield himself contentedly to their interpretation. True, he does +not wish to speak harshly of what is best in us,--to turn himself into a +"devil's attorney." But he points out the room there is for doubt;--the +power of moods;--the power of complexion, and so forth. Shall we, then, +because good-nature inclines us to virtue's side, smoothly cry: "There +are no doubts!"--and lie for the right? We ask whether life is to be led +in a brave or a cowardly way: whether the satisfaction of our doubts be +not essential to all manliness: whether the name of virtue is to be a +barrier to that which is virtue? The sceptic wants truth, wants to have +things made plain to him, and has a right to be convinced in his own +way. In such scepticism there is no malignity; it is honest, and does +not hinder his being convinced; and this hard-headed man, once convinced +will prove a giant in defence of his faith. The true and final answer +in which all scepticism is lost is the moral sentiment: that never +forfeits the supremacy. It is the drop that balances the universe.' + +Science and logic have so far advanced as to abridge the field of +doubtful questions. When syllogism answered syllogism, uncertainty +reigned absolute--but now that the appeal is to facts, we can, wherever +facts can be had, weigh or number them, and decide on one side or the +other. + +When Ali Pacha was at Janina, the case of a poor woman, who accused a +man of the theft of all her property, was brought before him; but the +plaintiff having no witnesses, the case was discharged, as the other +asserted his innocence, and insisted as a proof, that he had not a +farthing in the world. On their leaving his presence, Ali ordered +both to be weighed, and then released them without further notice. A +fortnight afterwards, he commanded both into his presence, and again +weighed them; the accuser had lost as much as the defendant had +gained in weight. The thing spoke for itself, and Ali decided that the +accusation was just. Ali Pacha was the Burlamiqui of justice. Induction, +too, has its scales, and seldom leaves us in doubt when it gets truth +and falsehood in them. Scepticism is now happily restricted to those +questions resting on conjectures, and which do not pertain to the +practical affairs of this life. On matter-of-fact questions, only the +weak are perplexed. After men have been in deliberation till the time of +action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, +it is a sign the difference of motives the one way and the other is +not great; therefore, not to resolve then is to lose the occasion by +weighing of trifles, which is pusillanimity. + +Quaint old Bunyan tells us, that when he had completed his 'Pilgrim's +Progress' he took the opinions of various friends on the propriety of +publishing it. Some said 'John, do;' others 'John, don't.' But solid +old John was not to be thus confounded. 'Then I will print it,' said +he, 'and thus the case decide.' To this good sense the public owe that +immortal dream. + +In the great field of physical investigation, science has conquered +doubt. 'Contingency and versimilitude are the offspring of human +ignorance, and, with an intellect of the highest order, cannot be +supposed to have any existence.'* + + *Edinburgh Review, September 1814, article Probabilities + +'Probability,' says Laplace,' has reference partly to our ignorance, and +partly to our knowledge.' + +'Chance,' observes Mr. Mill, 'is usually spoken of in direct antithesis +to _law_; whatever (it is supposed) cannot be ascribed to law, If +attributed to chance. It is, however, certain, that whatever happens +is the result of some law; is an effect of causes, and could have been +predicted from a knowledge of the existence of those causes, and from +their laws. If I turn up a particular card, that is a consequence of its +place in the pack. Its place in the pack was a consequence of the manner +in which the cards were shuffled, or of the order in which they were +played in the last game; which, again, were the effects of prior causes. +At every stage, if we had possessed an accurate knowledge of the causes +in existence, it would have been abstractedly possible to foretell the +effect.'* + +'In the domain of morals, too, a certainty, not dreamed of in past +times, now prevails. However much man, as an individual, may be an +enigma, in the aggregate he is a mathematical problem.'** + +In the great world of opinion it is the duty of honest reasoners to +endeavour to find out the truth, and take sides, undeterred by the +philosophical frivolity now growing fashionable. If men are silent +concerning objects and principles, it is said they have none, and it is +impatiently asked 'where is their bond of union?' And no sooner is it +explained than they are told 'it is very unphilosophical to think of +setting up a creed.' Where the alternatives are thus put against them +they should take their own course. Creeds are the necessary exponents +of conviction. The creedless philosopher is out on the sea of opinion, +without compass or chart. To bind yourself for the future to present +opinions is doubtless unwise, but he who has inquired to any purpose has +come to some conclusion, affirmative, negative, or neutral; and it is +the province of a creed to avow the actual result, and the consequent; +conduct intended to be followed. It is the vice of free thinking that +it spreads universal uncertainty, and assumes right and wrong to be so +protean that no man can tell one hour what opinion he shall hold the +next. Logic should correct this unsatisfactory extreme, and extirpate +the tiresome race whom Shelley described in Peter Bell:-- + + To Peter's view, all seems one hue; + He is no Whig, he is no Tory; + No Deist and no Christian he-- + But is so subtle, that to be + Nothing is all his glory** + + * Logic, pp. 57-8, vol. 2 + + ** Vestiges. + + + +CHAPTER XIII. INTELLECTUAL DARING + +Freedom has been hunted through the world, and is ever exposed to Insult +and injury. It is crushed by conquest; frowned from courts; expelled +from colleges; scorned out of society; flogged in schools; and +anathematised in churches. Mind is her last asylum; and if freedom quail +there, what becomes of the hope of the world, or the worth of human +nature?--W. J. Fox's Lectures to the Working Classes, part 12, p. 65. + +We should be prepared to dare all things for truth. If the 'very hopes +of man, the thoughts of his heart, the religion of nations, the manners +and morals of mankind, are all at the mercy of a new generalisation,' +we should be prepared to risk them. If we must choose between truth +and repose, we ought not to hesitate. There is danger in having the +truth--philosophers are obliged to conceal it. Mankind vaunt their love +of truth, but they are not to be trusted. From interest or ignorance +they always persecute, and often kill, the discoverer. Still the +pursuit of truth is a _duty_, and we must find consolation in the heroic +reflection of Burke, that _in all exertions of duty there it something +to be hazarded_. But intellectual daring will never be common while it +is so generally believed to be criminal. We will, therefore, quote some +considerations touching the rightfulness of inquiry. + +Without inquiry it is impossible for us to know whether our opinions +are true or false, and various are the pretences employed for declining +investigation: frequently they are masked under vague and metaphorical +phrases: "inquiry implies the weighing of evidence, and might lead to +doubt and perplexity"--"to search into a subject might shake the settled +convictions of the understanding"--to examine opposite arguments, and +contradictory opinions, might contaminate the mind with false views. + +'Every one who alleges pretexts like these for declining inquiry, must +obviously begin by assuming that his own opinions are unerringly in the +right. Nothing could justify a man for declining the investigation of +a subject involving important opinions, but the possession of +an understanding free from liability of error. Not gifted with +infallibility, in what way, except by diligent inquiry, can he obtain +any assurance that he is not pursuing a course of injurious action? If +he holds any opinion, he must have acquired it either by examination, +by instillation, rote, or some other process. On the supposition that +he has acquired it by proper examination, the duty on which I am now +insisting has been discharged, and the matter is at an end--but if he +has acquired it in any other manner, the mere plea, that his mind might +become unsettled, can be no argument against the duty of investigation. +For anything he can allege to the contrary, his present opinions are +wrong--and, in that case, the disturbance of his blind convictions, +instead of being an evil, is an essential step towards arriving at the +truth. + +'It may possibly be assigned, as a further reason for his declining +inquiry, that he may come to some fallacy which he cannot surmount, +although convinced of its character. If he is convinced of its +character, he must either have grounds for that conviction or not. +If he has grounds, let him examine them, draw them out, try if they are +valid, and then the fallacy will stand exposed. If he has no grounds for +suspecting a fallacy, what an irrational conclusion he confesses himself +to have arrived at! But perhaps he will reply--he may be unable to solve +the difficulty; his mind may become perplexed, and the issue may prove, +after all, that it would have been much better had he remained in his +former strong, though unenlightened, conviction. Why better? If he is in +perplexity let him read, think, consult the learned and the wise, and +in the end he will probably reach a definite opinion on one side or the +other. But if he should still remain in doubt, where is the harm? or +rather, why is it not to be considered a good? The subject is evidently +one which admits strong probabilities on opposite sides. Doubt is +therefore the proper sentiment for the occasion--it is the result of +the best exercise of the faculties--and either positively to believe, +or positively to disbelieve, would imply an erroneous appreciation of +evidence. + +In the minds of some people a strong prejudice appears to exist +against that state of the understanding which is termed doubt. A little +reflection, however, will convince any one that on certain subjects +"doubt" is as appropriate a state of the reasoning faculties as belief +or disbelief on others. There are doctrines, propositions, facts, +supported and opposed by every degree of evidence, and amongst them +by that degree of evidence of which the proper effect is to leave the +understanding in an equipoise between two conclusions. In these cages +"doubt" is the appropriate result, which there can be no reason to +shrink from or lament. But it may be further urged, that inquiry might +contaminate the understanding with false views--and, therefore, It is +wise and laudable to abstain from it. + +'We can comprehend what is meant by contaminating a man's habits or +disposition, or even imagination. But there is no analogy on these +points in reference to the understanding. There is contamination, +there is evil, in preposterous and obscene images crowding before the +intellectual vision, notwithstanding a full and distinct perception of +their character--but there is no contamination, no evil, in a thousand +false arguments coming before the understanding, if their quality is +clearly discerned. The only possible evil in this case is mistaking +false for true--but the man who shrinks from investigation lest he +should mistake false for true, can have no reason for supposing himself +free from that delusion in his actual opinions. Besides these objections +to inquiry, there are other prejudices of a similar character, forming +serious impediments to the attainment of truth. + +'One of these is a _fear that we may search too far, and become +chargeable with presumption in prying into things we ought not to know_. +A few words will suffice to prove that nothing can be more irrational +and absurd. We have already shown that true opinions are conducive to +the welfare of mankind--and the prosecution of inquiry is therefore a +process from which we have everything to hope and nothing to fear, and +to which there are no limits but such as the nature of our own faculties +pre scribes. + +'A second prejudice--that _we may contract guilt, if, in the course of +our researches, we miss the right conclusion, and had therefore better +let inquiry alone_--is still more influential in preventing those +investigations which it is our duty to make. As our opinions on any +subject are not voluntary acts, but involuntary effects, in whatever +conclusions our researches terminate they can involve us in no +culpability. All that we have to take care of is, to bestow on every +subject an adequate and impartial attention. Having done this, we have +discharged our duty; and it would be irrational and unmanly to entertain +any apprehension for the result. + +'In fact, there is the grossest inconsistency in the prejudice now under +consideration. If we may contract guilt by searching after truth, wo may +equally do so by remaining in our present state The reason alleged in +the prejudice itself, and the only reason which can be assigned with any +plausibility, why we may commit an offence by embarking in any inquiry, +is that we may, by so doing, miss the right conclusion, or, in other +words, fall into error--for no one would seriously contend that we +incur any moral culpability by an investigation which conducts us to the +truth. But it is obvious that we may equally miss the right conclusion +by remaining in our actual opinions. It is, then, incumbent on us to +ascertain whether we are committing an offence by remaining in them--in +other words, it is necessary to examine whether those opinions are true. +Thus the reasons assigned for not inquiring, lead to the conclusion that +it is necessary to inquire. + +'The third prejudice is that acquiescence in received opinions, or +forbearing to think for ourselves, shows a degree of humility highly +proper and commendable--if closely examined will be found usually +to evince nothing but a great degree of indolent presumption, or +intellectual cowardice. There is often, in truth, as great a measure of +presumption in this species of acquiescence as in the boldest hypothesis +which human invention can start. That received and established opinions +are true, is one of those sweeping conclusions which would require +very strong reasons, and often elaborate research, to justify. On +what grounds are they considered to be true by one who declines +investigation? Because (on the most favourable supposition) they have +been handed down to us by our predecessors, and have been held +with unhesitating faith by a multitude of illustrious men. But what +comprehensive reasons are these? What investigation would it require to +shew that they were valid? As the whole history of mankind teems with +instances of the transmission of the grossest errors from one generation +to another, and of their having been countenanced by the concurrence of +the most eminent of our race--how, without examination, can we show that +this particular instance is an exception from the general lot? + +'From the necessity of using our own judgment, or, in other words, of +arriving at a conclusion for ourselves, we cannot be absolved. Far from +being a virtue, blind acquiescence in the opinions of others is, in most +cases, a positive vice, tending to stop all advancement in knowledge, +and all improvement in practice. + +From the preceding it is evident that the inquirer may enter on his task +with full confidence that he is embarking in no criminal, or forbidden, +or presumptuous enterprise, but is, on the contrary, engaging in +the discharge of a duty. Let him be as circumspect as he pleases in +collecting his facts and deducing his conclusions, cautious in the +process, but fearless in the result. Let him be fully aware of his +liability to error, of the thousand sources of illusions, of the limited +powers of the individual, of the paramount importance of truth--but let +him dismiss all apprehensions of the issue of an investigation conducted +with due application of mind and rectitude of purpose.'* + + * Extracts of Summary, by Aliquis. of arguments on the Duty + of Inquiry, from the 'Pursuit of Truth, and other Essays, by + S. Bailey, in Reasoner No. 12. + +Marcus Antoninus, indeed, said 'I seek after truth, by which no man yet +was ever injured.' But there is a great practical mistake here. There is +danger in truth---and the admission should be plainly made. Men, where +forewarned, make the choice more manfully. We have been wisely told by +Emerson, that the cherished thoughts and institutions of mankind are +at the mercy of a new generalisation--rest, commodity, reputation. +Inconvenience, and suspense, are the consequences of the partizanship +of truth. Certain political truths annihilate the interests of whole +classes. Certain social truths war with life-cherished prejudices. +Certain sanitary truths reduce the value of all city property. Certain +scientific truths ruin the working classes by thousands. In a wiser +state of society this could be prevented, but our present business is +with what is. It is therefore idle to conceal the truth--that there is +danger in truth. Pope's dictum, that party is the madness of many for +the gain of a few, is inversely true of truth. Truth is the ultimate +benefit of many, but the immediate ruin of the few. Here, however, comes +to our aid the wise and far-seeing aphorism of Burke--'In all exertions +of duty there is something to be hazarded'--and the brave man and wise +friend of mankind will risk the fate which surely awaits him--the fate +of Galileo, Newton, Salomon de Caus, Volta, Fulton, Winser, Arkwright, +Gall, and all who present themselves, with truth in their hands, at the +door of this great bedlam called the world--the fate of being received +with stones and hisses. + + + +CHAPTER XIV. IDOLS + +The term Idol is employed by Bacon to designate those prejudices which +men prefer to truth. A prejudice is a bias without a reason for it, an +opinion without a foundation, a judgment formed of persons and things +without sufficient examination, an assent given to a proposition without +sufficient evidence. The bias may be honourable, the opinion correct, +the assent in the right direction, but still of the nature of +prejudice, because, if right, it is right by accident rather than +design. + +Ignorance hides from us facts, and we decide partially rather than +confess our deficiency. Ill-directed education gives us pre-possessions, +which are obstacles in the way of truth, and we continue to cherish +what, having become a part of our nature, it pains us to discard. The +senses will occasionally mislead us and although we are conscious that +appearances are not to be wholly trusted, we reluctantly doubt our own +infallibility. From early, and therefore unquestioned, associations, we +have acquired certain habits, and from fashion certain sentiments, +and we continue old customs, and fall into the current opinion +unconsciously. Of these sources of prejudice, logic warns us to beware. +Of so much importance did Bacon regard these hindrances to truth, +that he considered the pursuit of new truth hopeless while they +were cherished. In a mixed vein of poetry and philosophy, he divided +prejudices into four classes, which he called Idols of the Tribe, the +Den, the Market and the Theatre. Idols of the Tribe are prejudices men +imbibe from early training, and love of hypothesis. They are so called +because common to the whole race or tribe of mankind. Idols of the Den +are those which relate to a man's particular character, Idols of the +Market are those which are accommodated to common notions. Idols of the +Theatre denote such as pertain to hypothetical systems of philosophy. + +Remembering the declarations of Euler and Gall, and the daily +discoveries of science, we should stand, as it were, on the verge of +the old world of experience, and look out on the new world of troth. +A young thinker should make for himself a chart of proposed reforms, +systems, and changes, agitated in his day--place + +In relative positions in the scale of importance such as he deems of +value, if true--and then analyse his experience to see what is +soundly opposed thereto. Such a practice would go far to rid men of +idol-prejudices, which retard private improvement and public progress. + + + +CHAPTER XV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXERCISES + +1. All men possessed of an uncontrolled discretionary power, leading +to the aggrandisement and profit of their own body, have always abused +it.'--Burke's Thoughts on the Present Discontents. + +The student will find the proof of this proposition exhibited in the +example of Induction, quoted from Mr. Bailey, p. 63. + +2. Prosperity could never be reached and maintained in this country, +without some provision for the regular employment of the poor.--Mr. +Beckett's Speech in the House of Commons, Feb. 3,1842. + +The demonstration, to universal conviction, of this proposition, would +lead to an entire and beneficial change of the social condition of this +country. + +3. The pen is the tongue of the world.--Paine. Put this in the +syllogistic form. + +4. A good instance of a metaphorical argument drawn out is given by Mr. +Mill:--'For instance, when Mr. Carlyle, rebuking the Byronic vein, says +that "strength does not manifest itself in spasms, but in stout bearing +of burdens;" the metaphor proves nothing, it is no argument, only +an allusion to an argument; in no other way however could so much of +argument be so completely suggested in so few words. The expression +suggests a whole train of reasoning, which it would take many sentences +to write out at length. As thus: Motions which are violent but brief, +which lead to no end, and are not under the control of the will, are, +in the physical body, more incident to a weak than to a strong +constitution. If this be owing to a cause which equally operates in what +relates to the mind, the same conclusion will told there likewise. But +such is really the fact. For the body's liability to these sudden +and uncontrollable motions arises from irritability, that is, unusual +susceptibility of being moved out of its ordinary course by +transient influences: which may equally be said of the mind. And this +susceptibility, whether of mind or body, must arise from a weakness +of the forces which maintain and carry on the ordinary action of the +system. All this is conveyed in one short sentence. And since the causes +are alike in the body and in the mind, the analogy is a just one, and +the maxim holds of the one as much as of the other.'* + + * Logic, pp. 433-4, vol. 2. + +5. A youth, named Evathlus, engaged with Protagoras to learn dialectics, +and promised his tutor a large sum of money, _in case he gained the +first cause he pleaded_, Evathlus, when fully instructed, refused to pay +his instructor. Protagoras brought his action thus--'You must pay the +money however the cause go, for if I gain you must pay in consequence of +the sentence, as being cast in the cause; and if you gain it, you must +pay in pursuance of our covenant.' 'Nay,' Evathlus retorts, 'which way +soever the cause be decided, you will have nothing, for if I prevail, +the sentence gives it that nothing is due: and if I lose, then there is +nothing due by the covenant.' What should be the decision in this case? + +6. The first case, says Cervantes, requiring Sancho's attention was a +question put by a stranger, in presence of the stewards and rest of the +attendants. 'My Lord,' said he, 'a certain manor is divided by a large +river. I beg your honour will be attentive, for the case is of great +consequence and of some difficulty. I say then, upon this river is a +bridge, and at one end of it the gibbet, together with a sort of court +hall, in which four judges usually sit to execute the law enacted by the +lord of the river, bridge, and manor, which runs to this effect: Whoever +shall pass this bridge, must first swear whence he comes and whither +he goes; if he swear the truth he shall be allowed to pass, but if he +forswear himself he shall die upon the gallows without mercy or respite. +This law, together with the rigorous penalty, being known, numbers +passed, and as it appeared they swore nothing but the truth, the judges +permitted them to pass freely and without control. It happened, however, +that one man's oath being taken, he affirmed and swore by his deposition +that he was going to be hanged on that gibbet, and had no other errand +or intention. The judges, having considered this oath, observed: if we +allow this man to pass freely, he swore to a lie, and, therefore, ought +to be hanged according to law; and if we ordered him to be hanged after +he hath sworn he was going to be suspended on that gibbet, he will have +sworn the truth, and by the same law he ought to be acquitted, I beg, +therefore, to know, my lord governor [and student], what the judges must +do with this man?' + + + +CHAPTER XVI. TECHNICAL TERMS. + +Abstract names--the names of attributes.--J. S. Mill. Abstraction--fixing +thought on the point of resemblance in one body.--drawing off and +contemplating separately any part of an an object. + +Action--a volition followed by an effect.--J. S. Mill. + +Analogy--resemblance of relation.--Whately. + +Analysis--the resolution of a complex whole into its component elements. +--J. S. Mill. + +Argument--an expression in which, from something laid down as granted, +something else is deduced--Whately. + +Argumentum ad hominem--appealing to an opponent's professed views. + +A priori--reasoning from cause to effect. + +A posteriori--arguing from effects to cause. + +Body--the unknown cause of our sensations--J. S. Mill. + +Cause--the invariable antecedent, or thing going before.--the stimulus +of an effect. + +Conclusion--a proposition proved by argument. + +Connotative terms--denote a subject, and imply an attribute.---. J.S. +Mill. + +Consciousness--sensation of existences. + +Definition--the separation of a thing, as by a boundary, from everything +else. + +Discovery--finding out something already existing. + +Effect--the immediate, invariable consequent, or the change produced by +power. + +ENTHYMEME-An argument with one premiss suppressed being understood. + +Experience--events which have taken place within a person's own +knowledge.--Whately. + +Fallacy--an apparent argument. + +General Terms--express the notion of partial similarity. + +Generalisation--tracing certain points of resemblance.--naming one +respect in which many things agree. + +Induction--universalisation of truth by inference from uniform facts. + +Intuition--imaginary looking.--Whewell, + +Logic--a scientific use of facts. + +Logical Truth--that which admits of proof.--Chambers. + +Mind--the unknown percipient of sensation.--J. S. Mill. + +Necessary Truths--are those in which we not only learn that the +proposition is true, but see that it must be true; in which the negative +of the truth is not only false, but impossible; in which we cannot, even +by an effort of the imagination, or in a supposition, conceive the +reverse of that which is asserted.--Dr. Whewell: Phil. Inductive +Sciences, pp. 54-5, vol. 1.* + +* As 'necessary truths' are much talked of I have introduced here, from +Whewell, the completest definition with which I am acquainted. For +myself, I coincide on this question with J. S. Mill, as quoted pp. 22-3. + +Non-connotative Terms--denote a subject only and an attribute only.--J. +S. Mill. + +Philosophy--the science of realities in opposition to that of mere +appearances--the attempt to comprehend things as they are, rather than as +they seem.--Morell. + +Point at issue--the real question to be decided. + +Power in logic, is the relation of circumstances to each other in time. + +Premises the propositions which precede a "conclusion."--the name of the +propositions from which a conclusion is deduced. + +Principle--an invariable rule. + +Proof--sufficient evidence; the balance of probability in favour of a +proposition. + +Proposition--a sentence which affirms or denies something.--Whately.--An +expression in words of a judgment.--J. S. Mill, Reason--the recognition +of facts.--the classification of facts.--following in the pathway of +facts.--the power of discerning coherences.--a premiss placed after its +conclusion.--the minor premiss--in the sense of Reason for asserting +something. + +Reasoning--argumentation.--process, the same always. Subject--first term +of a proposition. + +Syllogism--1. A general rule. 2. A fact contained under that rule. 3. A +conclusion that the fact is so contained.--an argument stated regularly +and at full length.--a valid argument so stated that its conclusiveness +is evident from the mere form of the expression. + +Technical Terms--the tools of art.--Whately. + +Technical Language--regularly formed, defined, and agreed on set of +expressions. + +Testimony--second-hand experience. Direct evidence is that which is +professedly given. Incidental, is corroboration casually introduced on +one subject in the course of an evidence delivered on another. + +Theory--is a system of rules intended to explain a class of facts. The +rules should be precise, and rest on a rigorous induction of facts or +probabilities. + +Tradition--the relation of a circumstance, not committed to writing by +any person who observed it, but communicated orally from one to another +for a long period of time. + + + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's A Logic Of Facts, by George Jacob Holyoake + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LOGIC OF FACTS *** + +***** This file should be named 36801-8.txt or 36801-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/6/8/0/36801/ + +Produced by David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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J. Holyoake + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Logic Of Facts, by George Jacob Holyoake + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Logic Of Facts + Or, Every-day Reasoning + +Author: George Jacob Holyoake + +Release Date: July 20, 2011 [EBook #36801] +Last Updated: January 25, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LOGIC OF FACTS *** + + + + +Produced by David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + A LOGIC OF FACTS: + </h1> + <h3> + or + </h3> + <h2> + Every-day Reasoning + </h2> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + By G. J. Holyoake + </h2> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h4> + "Call him wise whose thoughts and words are a clear because to a clear + why."—Lavater. <br /> <br /> LONDON: F. FARRAH, 282, STRAND, W.C. + <br /><br /> 1866. + </h4> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h2> + Contents + </h2> + <p> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION OF 1848. </a><br /> <a + href="#link2H_PREF"> PREFACE OF 1866. </a><br /><br /> <a + href="#link2H_4_0003"> <b>A LOGIC OF FACTS.</b> </a> + </p> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0001"> CHAPTER I. </a> + </td> + <td> + THE LOGIC OF THE SCHOOLS + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0002"> CHAPTER II. </a> + </td> + <td> + LOCKE-LOGIC + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0003"> CHAPTER III. </a> + </td> + <td> + LOGICAL TRUTH + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0004"> CHAPTER IV. </a> + </td> + <td> + DISCOVERY OF TRUTH + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0005"> CHAPTER V. </a> + </td> + <td> + FACTS + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0006"> CHAPTER VI. </a> + </td> + <td> + SCIENCE + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0007"> CHAPTER VII. </a> + </td> + <td> + PROPOSITIONS + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0008"> CHAPTER VIII. </a> + </td> + <td> + DEFINITIONS + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0009"> CHAPTER IX. </a> + </td> + <td> + SYLLOGISMS + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0010"> CHAPTER X. </a> + </td> + <td> + INDUCTION + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0011"> CHAPTER XI. </a> + </td> + <td> + DETECTION OF FALLACIES + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0012"> CHAPTER XII. </a> + </td> + <td> + SCEPTICISM + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0013"> CHAPTER XIII. </a> + </td> + <td> + INTELLECTUAL DARING + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0014"> CHAPTER XIV. </a> + </td> + <td> + IDOLS + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0015"> CHAPTER XV. </a> + </td> + <td> + ILLUSTRATIVE EXERCISES + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + <a href="#link2HCH0016"> CHAPTER XVI. </a> + </td> + <td> + TECHNICAL TERMS + </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION OF 1848. + </h2> + <p> + The Logic of the Schools, however indispensable in its place, fails to + meet half the common want in daily life. The Logic of the Schools begins + with the <i>management</i> of the premises of an argument; there is, + however, a more practical lesson to be learned in beginning with the <i>premises</i> + themselves. A thousand errors arise through the assumption of premises for + one arising in the misplacement of terms. The Logic of the Schools is an + elaborate attack upon the lesser evil. + </p> + <p> + Sir James Mackintosh has remarked that 'Popular reason can alone correct + popular sophistry'—and it is in vain that we expect amendment in the + reasoning of the multitude, unless we make reasoning intelligible to the + multitude. As to my object, could I, like Gridiron-Cobbett, adopt a symbol + of it, I would have engraved Ęsop's 'Old Man and his Ass,' who, in a vain + attempt to please everybody, failed (like his disciples—for even <i>he</i> + has disciples) to please anybody. The folly of that superfluously + philanthropic old gentleman should teach us <i>proportion</i> of purpose. + To be of real service; to <i>some</i> is in the compass of individual + capacity, and consequently, the true way of serving, if not of pleasing <i>all</i>. + The republic of literature, like society, has its aristocratic, its + middle, and its lower classes. No one has combined, in one performance, + the refinement applauded in the universities, with the practical purpose, + popular among those who toil to live, and live to toil. The populace are + my choice—of them I am one, and, like a recent premier, Earl Grey, + am disposed 'to stand by my order.' I write for this class both from + affection and taste. If I can benefit any, I can them. I know their + difficulties, for I have encountered them—their wants, for they have + been mine. This will account for the liberties taken with the subjects + upon which I treat. There is more than one kind of hunger that will break + through barriers, and I have taken with an unlicensed hand, wherever it + was to be found, what I wanted for myself, and what I know to be wanted by + those who stand at the anvil and the loom, and who never had the benefits + of scholastic education, and who never will. + </p> + <p> + Many of the arts and sciences, which formerly resided exclusively in the + colleges, and ministered only to the sons of opulence and leisure, have + escaped from their retreat, and have become the hand-maids of the + populace. But as respects logic, there still remains between the learned + and the illiterate an impassable gulf. The uninformed look on the + recondite structure of logic, and they are repelled by the difficulty of + comprehending it, and wrap themselves up in absolute and obstinate + ignorance, which they believe to be their destiny. The populace, in our + manufactories, have to choose between subsistence and intelligence. For + study, after protracted toil, they have not the strength—and to + abridge their labour is to abridge their subsistence, and this they cannot + afford. But because they are precluded by the destiny of civilisation from + knowing much, they need not remain utterly unskilled in reasoning. Their + natural good sense may be systematized, their natural logic may be reduced + to some rule and order—though it may not be refined it may be + practical, it may give power, and develop capacity now dormant. + </p> + <p> + The hints, general rules, and elementary remarks dispersed throughout this + work, will probably be of service to the uninitiated, perhaps put them on + the road to higher acquirements, give them a confidence in their own + powers, perhaps inspire them with a love of these essential studies, and + impart a taste for the refinements which lie beyond. My hope is that many + will be induced to consult scholastic treatises, and acquire that accurate + knowledge which makes the society of educated people so interesting. + Impulse has been given to knowledge, and the populace have begun to think, + and both to speak and write their thinkings—and why should they not + be enabled to do it free from obvious mistakes, and with a broad propriety + commensurate with the native capacity they possess? Why should they, like + a certain learned politician on a public occasion, propose, as a + sentiment, 'The three R's, Reading, 'Riting, and 'Rithmetic?'* Why, in + writing, should they not express themselves with strong grammatical + coherence, and a certain bold perspicuity, if not able to reach refinement + and elegance? Why, in pronunciation, should they not speak with a certain + manly openness of vowel sound and a distinct articulation, if not with all + elocutionary modulation? Why should not their discourse be expressed in + brief, clear sentences? If their punctuation went no farther than placing + capital letters at the commencement of sentences and of proper names, and + periods at the conclusion of sentences, it would render their writings + more intelligible than are half the communications they now send to the + press. If they mastered only brevity and abrupt directness, and learned to + omit tedious prolixity, they would command a hearing in many cases where + now they are denied one. If in logic they made a shrewd mastery of plain + facts—being as sure as they could, when once set on surety, + eschewing conjecture and pernicious supposition—if they followed the + methods of nature and good sense, where the elaborate methods of art are + hidden from them, who will not admit that they would be more intelligible + than now, exercise a power they never yet possessed, and extort the + attention and esteem of the public where now they excite only its pity, or + contempt, or outrage what just taste it has? The people would be enabled + to do these things, but that so many who prepare treatises for their + guidance alarm them by the display of abstruse dissertation above their + powers, their means, their time, and their wants. That a little learning + is a dangerous thing is not a maxim alone believed in by the race of + country squires steeped in port and prejudice, but by schoolmen who cannot + bring themselves to give a little proportion of sound knowledge, but must + give all, the reconite as well. The statesman decries the ignorance and + want of wisdom displayed by embryo politicians who will accept no + instalment of liberty, but insist on the concession of <i>all</i> their + claims—but the scholar does the same thing when he will impart none + but the completest information to the people. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * This case is cited by S. G. Goodrich, the original Peter + Parley, in his preface to 'Fireside Education.' Sir William + Curtis, to whom, probably, Mr. Goodrich refers, gave also + 'the three K's—King, Church, and Constitution.' +</pre> + <p> + In quoting, I have been a borrower, but not a plagiarist. In no case am I + conscious of having taken from others without at the same time making the + fairest acknowledgment in my power. + </p> + <p> + If the references to the highest authorities are sometimes through others, + it is because the highest authorities have not always been accessible. + Those who have had ordinary experience estimate highly the value of minute + integrity in this respect. Fruitless hours are spent in tracing false and + careless references, and to one whose time is his means, no little injury + is done when it is thus wasted. + </p> + <p> + Unbounded gratitude is due to those authors, old and new, who, with + learning and grace, with care and patience, have put the world in + possession of thoughts which are real additions to its knowledge—and + corresponding should be the contempt of those whose high-sounding and + pretending books seduce readers to wade through them only to find in them + the millioneth echo of some commonplace idea. + </p> + <p> + The 'Spectator' was pleased to say that I wrote 'Practical Grammar' in the + spirit of an 'ultra-radical, setting the world to rights.' Yet I have + always declared, with Butler— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Reforming schemes are none of mine, + To mend the world's a vast design; + Like those who toil in little boat + To drag to them the ship afloat. +</pre> + <p> + Utopianism is not my idiosyncracy. But I have confidence in endeavour. + Continuity of ameliorative effort is the sole enthusiasm that can serve + the cause of improvement. It is useful to do what seems to be useful, + whether little or much—a moderate rule, but one that will take those + who carry it out, a long way. + </p> + <p> + My illustrations, I need scarcely say, are neutral in politics and + theology. In the grammar of J. A. D. D'Orsey, published in 'Chambers' + Educational Course,' there are disputations, Biblicisms, and bits of + intense theology. Professor John Radford Young, in his treatise on + Algebra, has introduced a reply to Hume's controverted theory of miracles—and + Dr. Whately makes his 'Logic' an avowedly theological auxiliary, showing + that much passes for good taste in this country which is only an + irrelevant propitiation of powerful opinion. I have not, however, been + seduced by this species of example. There are distinct provinces in + intellect as well as in industry—and what political economy + justifies in one case, good sense dictates in the other. No man has a + right to intrude theology into every question, and agitate points of faith + when he pretends to instruct the understanding. + </p> + <p> + There is less occasion to speak of the utility of logic, than to show it + to be easy of acquisition. Mr. Stuart Mill, in confirmation of this view, + observes: We need not seek far for a solution of the question so often + agitated, respecting the utility of Logic. If a science of logic exists, + or is capable of existing, it must be useful. If there be rules to which + every mind conforms, in every instance in which it judges rightly, there + seems little necessity for discussing whether a person is more likely to + observe those rules when he knows the rules, than when he is unacquainted + with them.* Certainly people are not so much prejudiced against logic on + account of its supposed uselessness as on account of its supposed + difficulties. Deserved or not, logic has always had a good reputation. + Well or ill founded, the popular impression has uniformly been in its + favour. It has been valued like the diamond—but considered, like + that precious stone, of very uncertain access. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + *'System of Logic,' p. 12. Second Edition. +</pre> + <p> + The high popularity of common sense—'the exercise of the judgment + unaided by rule'—has been interpreted into a virtual rejection of + logic by the multitude. But it ought not to be overlooked, that the credit + in which mere common sense is held, is a matter of necessity as well as + choice. It being the best sense the untutored have, they wisely use it, + and no wonder that they are inclined to laud what they are constrained to + employ. Doubtless they always perceived that common sense would be the + better for being made orderly, as a spirited horse is the fitter for use + after being 'broken.' Logical sense, among the masses, is secretly + supposed to be disciplined sense, and to have all the advantage of the + trained soldier over the raw recruit. + </p> + <p> + It is quite true, as Abram Tucker puts it, that 'The science of abstruse + learning, when completely attained, is like Achilles' spear, that healed + the wounds it had made before; so this knowledge serves to repair the + damage itself had occasioned, it casts no additional light upon the paths + of life.' But few persons sensible of the value of exact knowledge will + complain of the <i>necessary</i> elaboration to which it sometimes leads. + Nor will those who have felt the thrill of pleasure which complete + analysis imparts, regret the patience which put them in possession of a + secret of science, or made them master of a new field of knowledge. + </p> + <p> + Common sense is the substratum of all logic. Common sense is the natural + sense of mankind. It is founded on common observation and experience. It + is modest and plain and unsophisticated. It sees with everybody's eyes and + hears with everybody's ears. It has no capricious distinctions, no + partialities, and no mysteries. It never equivocates and never trifles. + Its language is always the same, and is always intelligible. It is known + by its perspicuity of speech and singleness of purpose. The most prudent + of all the children of fact, it never forsakes nature or reason. Some + outline laws for its employment, if they can be indicated, must be better + than its popular aimless and desultory use. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_PREF" id="link2H_PREF"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PREFACE OF 1866. + </h2> + <p> + One has no right to make a literary subject political—that is, to + make it partisan; but to give a political motive which concerns all + equally, for promoting a literary study, is allowable, and does not + partake of the nature of party politics. One may, like Cobbett, look on + literature with political eyes, without, like him, making it a vehicle of + party attacks. + </p> + <p> + In this country, where the political genius of the people lies in + self-government—where the public growth of the people and their + internal liberty depend upon their capacity to manage their own affairs—the + art of public speaking has political importance to every aide in politics. + </p> + <p> + To be able to take a subject well in hand, like a stage-coach driver does + his horses—to hold the reins of your arguments firmly—to + direct and drive well home the burden of your meaning, is a power which + every man ought to study to attain, who rises to address a council, or + stands up on a platform to convince a meeting. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + A LOGIC OF FACTS. + </h1> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0001" id="link2HCH0001"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER I. THE LOGIC OF THE SCHOOLS + </h2> + <p> + It is a humiliating reflection that mankind never reasoned so ill as when + they most professed to cultivate the art of reasoning.—Life of + Galileo, p. 1. society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. + </p> + <p> + Common sense—the foundation of logic—first received (to a + limited extent) the regularity of an art and the certainty of a science, + from the master hand of Aristotle. Impartial scholars, familiar with his + writings on logic, allow them to have not only ingenuity but real merit; + and his admirers contend that he has been misunderstood by some and abused + by others. This is highly probable, as we are certain that when his works + were interpreted by the schools, and his logic proclaimed the great + text-book of knowledge and the only weapon of truth, 'men's minds, instead + of studying nature, were in an endless ferment about occult qualities and + imaginary essences; little was talked of but intention and remission, + proportion and degree, infinity, formality, quiddity and individuality.'* + Logic then was jargon, controversy chicane, and truth a shuttlecock, with + which the disputants respectively played, or the object which they + mutually disguised. Logic was a labyrinth in which the subtlest lost their + Way—a bourne from which the traveller after truth seldom returned. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Account of Lord Bacon's Novum Organon Scientiarum, Lib. of + Useful Knowledge, p. 4. +</pre> + <p> + A striking illustration of this has been furnished by a candid and + distinguished writer—Dr. Reid. 'Of the analytics and of the topics + of Aristotle, ingenuousness requires me to confess, that though I have + often purposed to read the whole with care, and to understand <i>what is + intelligible</i>, yet my courage and patience always failed me before I + had done. Why should I throw away so much time and painful attention upon + a thing of so little real use? If I had lived in those ages when the + knowledge of Aristotle's Organon entitled a man to the highest rank in + philosophy, ambition might have Induced me to employ upon it some years of + painful study; and, less, I conceive, would not be sufficient. Such + reflections as these always got the better of my resolution.'* + </p> + <p> + Dr. Whately, who has for many years occupied the throne of Logic and whose + work maybe taken, from its currency in our colleges and academies, as the + representative of the logic of the schools, seems to obviate all + objections to the abstruseness of this subject by a counter charge, to the + effect that logic is now underrated only because it has been overrated. + But it is not the complexity found in it, but the laudations bestowed upon + it which have brought it into neglect. Dr. Whately contends that certain + writers, 'by representing logic as furnishing the sole instrument for the + discovery of truth in all subjects, and as teaching the use of the + intellectual faculties in general, raised expectations which could not be + realised, and which naturally led to a reaction—to logic being + regarded as utterly futile and empty.'** Deeply deploring this kind of + injury, from which many important arts have suffered, I am neither + disposed to defend such a course, nor to imitate it. But I demur to the + truth of this representation with regard to logic. If logic be not the + 'sole instrument for the discovery of truth in all subjects,' it is + certainly the <i>principal</i> one. Instead of charging scholastic + logicians with having unduly 'raised,' it would be nearer the truth, in my + opinion, to say that they have <i>confused</i> 'expectations' by intricate + machinery and extreme elaborations. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Lord Kamet's Sketches vol. 8, chap. S. Aristotle's + Logic. + + ** Dr. Whately: Elements of Logic, preface, p. vii. Second + edition. +</pre> + <p> + Intricacy and minuteness of detail might be a trifling disqualification + did they lead to something immediately practical. But Dr. Whately contends + that logic, in the most extensive sense which the name can, with + propriety, be made to bear, is that of the science, and also the art of + reasonings 'Inasmuch as logic institutes an analysis of the process of the + mind in reasoning, it is strictly a <i>science</i>, while considered in + reference to the practical rules it furnishes it is an <i>art</i>.'* He + confines the province of logic, as an art, to 'employing language properly + for the purpose of reasoning,' and restricts the logician to the use of + the syllogism as the sole test of argument. Mr. Augustus de Morgan thus + exhibits the spirit of Whately's restriction:— + </p> + <p> + Logic has nothing to do with the truth of the facts, opinions, or + presumptions, from which an inference is derived; but simply takes care + that the inference shall certainly be true if the premises be true.' + </p> + <p> + It has been, and <i>is</i> to be, objected, that logic, thus confined, + 'leaves untouched the greatest difficulties, and those which are the + sources of the greatest errors in reasoning.' To this powerful objection + Dr. Whately thinks it sufficient to reply, that 'no art is to be censured + for not teaching more than falls within its province, and, indeed, more + than can be taught by any conceivable art. Such a system of universal + knowledge as should instruct us in the full meaning or meanings of every + term, and the truth or falsity, certainty or uncertainty of every + proposition, thus superseding all other studies, it is most + unphilosophical to expect, or even to imagine. And to find fault with + logic for not performing this, is as if one should object to optics for + not giving sight to the blind—or complain of a reading glass for + being of no service to a person who had never learnt to read.'*** This + would be a most conclusive answer if confident assertion could be accepted + in lieu of proof. The objection still remains to be removed. We may still + demand, does it not fall within the legitimate province of logic to + provide means of encountering the 'greatest difficulties' with which it is + confessed logic is beset? True, there is no art can teach everything, but + is that a reason why logic should teach nothing, or next to nothing, + compared with what seems essentially necessary? + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Intro., p. 1. + + ** Klein. of Logic, Synthetical Compendium, chap. 2, part + 1, sec. 9. + + *** Elem. of Logic, Intro., pp. 12, 13. +</pre> + <p> + Dr. Whately contends that the 'difficulties' and 'errors' in the objection + adduced, are in the <i>subject matter</i> about which logic is employed, + and <i>not</i> in the process of reasoning—which alone is the + appropriate province of logic. But it seems to me that Dr. Whately has + found it impossible to keep within the bounds of the restriction he thus + endeavours to establish. + </p> + <p> + In treating upon 'apprehension,' he introduces, as indeed he was obliged + to do, from the department of metaphysics, several speculations on + 'generalisation' and 'abstractions,' and from ontology (the science which + explains the most general conceptions respecting the phenomena of nature) + he borrows the leading principles of definition. Because he thus goes so + far, it is not to be contended that <i>therefore</i> he should have gone + further; but when he found he must depart from his rule and borrow from + other branches of knowledge (no matter for what end), why did he not + depart from it to some purpose, and borrow from natural philosophy such + rules as would have guarded the logician from the 'chief errors' into + which he may fall? + </p> + <p> + Dr. Whately informs us, indeed, that logic furnishes certain syllogistic + forms to which all sound arguments may be reduced, and thus establishes + universal tests for the detection of fallacy—but it is to be + observed that it is only <i>such</i> fallacy as may creep in <i>between</i> + the premises and the conclusion of an argument. It is to this narrow and + Aristotelian object that logic is restricted. 'The process of reasoning + itself is alone the appropriate province of logic. This process will have + been correctly conducted if it have conformed to the logical rules, which + preclude the possibility of any error creeping in <i>between</i> the + principles from which we are arguing, and the conclusions we deduce from + them.'* We learn from our authority, that as arithmetic does not profess + to introduce any notice of the <i>things</i>, whether coins, persons, or + dimensions, respecting which calculations are made; neither does logic + undertake 'the ascertainment of facts, or the degree of evidence of + doubtful propositions.' And just as an arithmetical result will be useless + if the data of the calculation be incorrect, so a logical conclusion is + liable to be false if the premises are so. Neither does the logic, now + under consideration, concern itself with the 'discovery of truth,' + excepting so far as that may be said to be implied by the detection of + error in a false inference.** Logic thus, confined to the actual process + of reasoning, however important its functions there, evidently leaves us + in the dark as to the value of what we reason about. For the information + thus missing, this logic refers us to knowledge in general—to + grammar and composition for the art of expressing, with correctness and + perspicuity, the terms of propositions—to natural, moral, political, + or other philosophy, for the facts which alone can establish the truth of + the premises reasoned from. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Intro., p. 13. + + ** For the grounds of these representations, see + Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning, chap. 2, sec. 4 + Dr. Whately's Logic. +</pre> + <p> + The exclusion from logic of all consideration of the facts on which + propositions are founded, is thus endeavoured to be justified by the + Archbishop of Dublin:—'No arithmetical skill will secure a correct + result, unless the data are correct from which we calculate: nor does any + one on that account undervalue arithmetic; and yet the objection against + logic rests on no better foundation.' This is true, but is it true that + arithmetic is on <i>this account</i> to be imitated? If the arithmetician + must take his data for granted, it is what the searcher after truth must + never do—<i>he</i> must use his eyes and examine for himself, in all + cases, as far as possible, unless he intends to be deceived. And for want + of such precaution as this, the arithmetician is at sea the moment he + steps out of the narrow path of mechanical routine. Who is not aware of + the failures of calculation when applied to the general business of life—to + statistics, moral and political? Every day, facts have to be called in to + correct the egregious blunders of figures.* The calculations are conducted + in most approved form, but are of no use. Does not this demonstrate that + when arithmetic, like logic, is applied to the business of life, general + rules for securing the accuracy of data would be of essential service? + Supposing, however, that arithmetic could do very well without them, does + it follow that logic should, when it would be safer and more efficient + with them? + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * 'In Art, in Practice, innumerable critics will demonstrate + that most things are impossible. It was proved by fluxionary + calculus, that steam-ships could never get across from the + farthest point of Ireland to the nearest of Newfoundland; + impelling force, resisting force, maximum here, minimum + there; by law of Nature, and geometric demonstration—what + could be done? The Great Western could weigh anchor from + Bristol Port; that could be done. The Great Western, + bounding safe through the gullets of the Hudson, threw her + cable out on the capstan of New York, and left our still + moist paper-demonstration to dry itself at leisure.'— + Thomas Carlyle, Chartism, pp. 96-7. +</pre> + <p> + Since our author's canons are held absolute in the schools, it may be + useful to consider this last cited argument in another light. A stronger + objection may be urged, one which particularly addresses itself to those + who mistake mere pertinence for general relevance, and suppose that a + single analogy decides a case. + </p> + <p> + His Grace reasons, that, because arithmetic does not concern itself about + its data, logic should follow the same example. But why overlooks he pure + mathematics—a much higher science than arithmetic? Surely geometry, + which through all time has been the model of the sciences, was better + worthy than arithmetic to be the model of logic! Was it classical in the + principal of St. Alban's College to abandon Euclid and cleave unto Cocker + or Walkingame? + </p> + <p> + Arithmetic is mechanical—geometry is reasoning; surely it was more + befitting to compare reason with reason, when endeavouring to discover the + true way of perfecting reason. Geometry is, of all sciences, reputed the + most conclusive in its arguments—and we know it is distinguished + above all sciences for carefulness in its data. It begins with axioms, the + most indubitable of all data, and its subsequent conclusions are founded + only on established facts—and to be sure that they are established + facts, the geometer, before he employs them, establishes them himself. If + an analogy is to decide the province of logic, here is an analogy whose + pretensions over those of arithmetic are eminent. + </p> + <p> + So conclusive did Dr. Whately deem the argument just examined, that he + many times, in various forms, reproduced it. One of the last instances is + under the head of 'Fallacies.' 'It has been made a subject of bitter + complaint against logic, that it presupposes the most difficult point to + be already accomplished; viz., the sense of the terms to be ascertained. A + similar objection might be urged against every other art in existence + e.g., against agriculture, that all the precepts for the cultivation of + land presuppose the possession of a farm.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Logic, chap. 3. Fallacies, sec. 2. +</pre> + <p> + Already has been pointed out what may reasonably induce a suspicion of the + soundness of these analogies; viz., that their author found it necessary + to disregard them and introduce, from other branches of knowledge, certain + disquisitions on the 'sense of terms.' With regard to this particular + instance, it may be observed, that though treatises on agriculture do + presuppose the possession of a farm, they do not presuppose the knowledge + requisite for cultivating it, but inform <i>fully</i> of soil, and seed, + and crops. So logic may be allowed to presuppose the existence of the + universe, whence truth is drawn, or the existence of language, 'whereby it + is expressed; but it is surely not to <i>pre-suppose</i> the knowledge of + facts and terms, the great instruments for the cultivation of truth. + Agricultural treatises hardly warrant this inference. There are the + representations that induced the confession that 'Logic is not so much an + instrument of acquirement as of defence. It is a good armour to buckle on + when compelled to battle for our heritage, but a poor implement for its + cultivation.'* + </p> + <p> + All <i>practical</i> arts include a knowledge of materials as well as + implements. Platers, ignorant of the nature of metals, cabinetmakers, of + the different species of wood, make but sorry artizans; and in like + manner, reasoners, unacquainted, at least in a general way, with the + accuracy of what is reasoned about, make but sorry logicians.** + </p> + <p> + It will readily be expected that in the modern progress of knowledge, the + Aristotelian province of logic would be enlarged. The far-seeing intellect + of Lord Verulam heralded the innovation—'Our glorious Bacon led + philosophy forth from the jargon of schools and the fopperies of sects. He + made her to be—the handmaid of nature, friendly to her creatures, + and faithful to her laws.'*** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * W. J. Fox, Mon. Rep., p. 45: 1835. + + ** The reader will find that logician is need in the sense + of skilfulness in eliciting and exhibiting reality. By that + which I call logical is meant that which is truthful. I + presume that is the sense to which this high word should be + confined. It is the lax application of this term to mere + dexterity in evading the truth according to rule, that has + so increased the unsatisfactory race of professed sceptics. + —See Scepticism, chap. XII. + + *** Langhornea' Preface to the Lives of Plutarch. +</pre> + <p> + The general object of Lord Bacon's philosophy, writes Bruce, an Edinburgh + professor of logic of the last century, is to connect the reasoning powers + of man with experiments for the improvement of natural knowledge. + </p> + <p> + To create a just taste for philosophical investigation, required— + </p> + <p> + 1. A display of the true, that they may be distinguished from the false + subjects of inquiry. + </p> + <p> + 2. Scientific rules to direct the discovery of the laws of nature. + </p> + <p> + But to 'display the true,' is to display the <i>facts</i> on which the + truth rests. The 'discovery of the laws of nature' implies <i>observation</i> + of the operations of nature. The philosophy of Bacon, says Macaulay, began + in observation and ended in arts. + </p> + <p> + It is most obvious, as the reader will gather from what has been advanced, + that for guarding, to the greatest possible extent, against error in + conclusions, it is necessary to take into consideration the character of + the data from which we reason—and to do this, we must draw from the + general sources of knowledge to which the Logic of the Schools refers us. + If we happen not to possess an accurate acquaintance with these branches, + we must draw upon the best notions we have of them, or apply such natural + sagacity as we happen to possess. But whether the information we happen to + possess be complete or partial, it is not well that we are left to apply + it at random, without any definite mode of procedure; and if logic refuses + to assist us, and gives only a vague reference elsewhere, we must + endeavour to assist ourselves. The datum of all arguments is a + proposition, an assertion, or denial; and to ascertain its truth (upon + which the value of the whole reasoning depends) we have to do with the + facts upon which it rests, and the terms in which it is expressed. For it + may be here observed, that the truth or falsity of every proposition + depends upon facts. To ascertain the general accuracy of facts, we have to + appeal to received standards of certainty; and to fix the meaning of + terms, we have recourse to a plain principle of definition. In the task of + recognising truth, so necessary in examining the premises of an argument, + one is wonderfully assisted by being familiarised with the sources of + truth, and the mode of its discovery. In these operations the tutored and + untutored may alike be assisted by simple general rules. If these rules + prove not infallible in every case, they will prove successful in the + majority of cases. + </p> + <p> + Since general rules are the only, rules that the vast field of facts + admits of, they are not to be rejected on light grounds. They enable us to + set forth intelligibly the reasons of our own conviction, and to detect + and expose the fundamental fallacies of apparent arguments. Since they + direct us where the Logic of the Schools leaves us without a guide, their + value is apparent. + </p> + <p> + The logical management of the syllogism involves much abstruseness + respecting 'genus' and 'species,' the 'quantity' and 'quality' of + 'propositions', 'contraries,' 'sub-contraries,' 'contradictions,' and + 'subalterns.' Stepping by 'illative conversion,' 'six rules to be observed + with respect to categorical syllogism' next demand attention, followed + hard by eleven moods which can be used in a legitimate syllogism, Viz.—— + A, A, A, A, A, I, A., E, E, A, E, O, A, I, I, A, O, O, E, A, E, E, A, O, + E, I, O, I, A, I, O, A, O.' In the middle of this abstract train march the + 'undistributed middle' and the 'illicit process,' attended by four figures + represented by the following mnemonic lines, which must be carefully + committed to memory:'— + </p> + <p> + Fig. 1. bArbArA, cElArEnt, dArII, fErIOque prioris. + </p> + <p> + Fig. 2. cEsArE, dAmEstrEs, fEstInO, bArOkO,* secundę. + </p> + <p> + Fig. 3. tertia, dArAptI, dIsAmIs, dAtIsI, fElAptOn, bOkArdO,** fErlsO, + habet; quarta insuper addit. + </p> + <p> + Fig. 4. brAmAntIp, cAmEnEs, dImArIs, fEsApo, frEsIsOn. + </p> + <p> + A motley group, too numerous to be particularised, bring up the complex + rear of 'Modals,' 'Hypotheticals,' 'Conditionals,' and 'Disjunctives.' + This is certainly not the portal through which the populace can at present + pass to logic, even if such logic helped them to all truth, and saved them + from all fallacy. + </p> + <p> + But this species of logic is not without interest. Symbolic letters and + mnemonic lines are not without attractions to those who understand them. + There is poetry in an algebraic sign, when it is the emblem of a + difficulty solved, and a wonderful result simply arrived at. To try the + whole power of words, and discover every form of language in which a + legitimate deduction can be expressed, is no ignoble task. It is a high + discipline, but it belongs rather to the age of leisure than this of + 'copperasfames, cotton-fuz, gin-riot, wrath, and toil'—to the + luxuries rather than the utilities of learning. + </p> + <p> + There is the inefficiency of the syllogism, and also the vitiation + produced by its employment. + </p> + <p> + 1. It corrupts the taste for philosophical invention by placing philosophy + in abstractions, and withdrawing it from the observation of nature. + </p> + <p> + 2. It creates a reliance on principles, which originate in the <i>hypotheses</i> + of philosophers, not in the laws of nature. + </p> + <p> + 3. It makes truth the result of the forms of argument, not of scientific + evidence.*** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Or, Fakoro, as indeed all the particulars in this place + recited. + + ** Or, Dokamo. but a brief summary of the subjects + comprised in his logic in reference to the syllogism. + + ***Bruce. These references to Fakoro and Dokamo are Whately's. +</pre> + <p> + Lord Kames cites from the father of logic the following syllogism, which + will bear repetition as an extraordinary instance of that assumption for + which the Logic of the Schools provides no remedy:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Heavy bodies naturally tend to the centre of the universe. + We know, by experience, that heavy bodies tend to the centre of the earth. + Therefore the centre of the earth is the centre of the universe. +</pre> + <p> + But by what experience did Aristotle discover the centre of the universe, + so as to become aware that heavy bodies <i>naturally</i> tend there? On + what facts rest the measurement of the radii from our earth to the + boundless circumference of space? How did he ascertain the limits of that + which has no limits? Yet, strange to say, the Logic of the Schools prides + itself in leaving us where the Stagyrite left us. + </p> + <p> + 'When mankind began to reason on the phenomena of nature, they were + solicitous to <i>abstract</i>, and they formed general propositions from a + <i>limited</i> observation. Though these propositions were assumed, they + were admitted as true. They were not examined <i>by appeals to nature</i>, + but by comparison with other propositions.'* + </p> + <p> + In this syllogism from Aristotle, there is the usual compliance with + accredited rules, and the same defiance of common sense. Such examples are + deemed perfect reasoning and legitimate argument; but is it not a mockery + to encourage the belief that we can have reason and argument, without the + truth? Only this shallow consolation remains to us. If the logician of the + schoole does not enlighten the understanding, he is at least reputed not + to offend the taste, and he wins the equivocal praise of Butler:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'He'll run in debt by disputation, + And pay with ratiocination; + All this by syllogism, true + In mood and figure, he will do.' +</pre> + <p> + Syllogisms are to truth what rhyme is to poetry. 'It is a well known fact + that verse, faultless in form, may be utterly destitute of poetic fire or + feeling.'** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Bruce. + + ** A. J. D. D'Orsey, Eng. Gram., part 2, article Prosody. +</pre> + <p> + According to the Logic of the Schools, 'the question respecting the + validity of an argument is not whether the conclusion be <i>true</i>, but + whether it <i>follows</i> from the premises adduced.' It was the bitter + experience of Bordon of the delusiveness of such partial logic that + induced him to exclaim, '<i>one</i> fact is worth fifty <i>arguments</i>.' + </p> + <p> + With such authorities, 'a valid argument is that which it so stated that + its conclusiveness is evident from the mere <i>form</i> of the + expression.' But since it is admitted that if the data reasoned upon be + incorrect, no logical skill can secure a correct result; it is evident + that however <i>faultless the form</i>, the inquirer after truth is in no + way nearer his object, unless he be instructed how to lay a foundation of + <i>faultless facts</i>. He then, who is in love with truth rather than + logomachy, will admit, in spite of the most ingenious analogies, that + there is some room for a logic of facts, as well as a logic of words. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0002" id="link2HCH0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER II. LOCKE-LOGIC. + </h2> + <p> + Logic is a general guide to the discovery of truth, and teaches us its + systematic communication to others. This definition is intended to combine + logic and rhetoric into one system. According to a quotation in Pinnock's + Guide to Knowledge, Locke defined logic as 'that art by which we rightly + use our mental faculties in the discovery and communication of truth,' a + definition, called by the writer, the definition of nature echoed by + genius. There exists a natural connection between logic and rhetoric. The + discovery of truth could avail us little if we were without the means of + communicating it; and it is easy to see that it would be in vain to + possess the means of communicating truth, unless we had the truth to + communicate. Therefore, ingenuity is but ill employed in separating these + mutual departments of learning which nature has connected together. + Besides, the skill of the logician is as serviceable in the statement of a + case, as in arguing it. Arrangement is as much a matter of logic as + ratiocination; and to impress this neglected truth upon the young + inquirer, is one reason for proposing a combined definition. + </p> + <p> + The mutual connection of logic and rhetoric is illustrated by the fact, + that the Logic of the Schools is purely a branch of rhetoric. It consists + in putting an argument into 'the most perspicuous form in which it can be + exhibited,'*—i. e., in <i>communicating</i> it in the most efficient + way to others. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Dr. Whatetly: Anal. Ont., chap. 1, aec. 6, p. 45. +</pre> + <p> + Indeed, Dr. Whately (who makes logic to consist in reasoning) defines + reasoning as <i>discourse</i>, and discourse is rhetoric. '<i>Grammar</i>,' + says Doherty,' represents the mechanism of letters in forming words—<i>Rhemar</i>, + the mechanism of words in forming sentences. We have <i>Grammar</i> for + letters, <i>Rhemar</i> for words, <i>Logic for arguments</i>, and <i>Rhetoric</i> + for discourse.' Locke-logic, therefore—i. e., logic in the sense in + which Locke treated it—seems to come nearer the truth, as well as + nearer the common requirement, than the restricted definition of it by + others insisted on. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0003" id="link2HCH0003"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER III. LOGICAL TRUTH + </h2> + <p> + All men know something of truth. Happily it is the first impulse of + childhood, and nature teaches us its pleasure before reason instructs us + in its truth. In infancy we own its beauty, in manhood its power. There is + nothing, says Cicero, sweeter to man than the light of truth. Truth, + observes Godwin, is the native element of an intellectual nature. It has + been wisely remarked, said Lord Kames, that truth is to the understanding + what beauty is to the eye, or music to the ear. + </p> + <p> + Philosophy sanctions what unsophisticated feelings suggested. He that has + made but a little progress beyond ignorance and privilege, cannot be + edified by anything but truth.** Truth, like a mathematical point, has had + various descriptions; and it may be useful to select those which graduate + to its logical definition. Bulwer tells us, that 'the agitation of thought + is the beginning of truth.' Locke, Lord Kames, Mill, and others, agree + that truth, or falsehood, is an affair of language. An assertion which + represents things as they really are, is a truth—an assertion that + represents things what in reality they are <i>not</i>, is a falsehood. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + ** Mr. Hobhouse: Note 15. to 4th Canto of Childe Harold. +</pre> + <p> + Truth, in sculpture, means an exact similitude of some living form, + chiselled in stone or marble. Truth, in painting, is a natural + representation on canvass of some person, or object. In the same manner, + moral 'truth is an exact image of things set forth in speech, or writing.' + The logical definition of truth is given in these words:—'Truth is + that which admits of proof,'* that is, an assertion or denial which can be + substantiated by facts. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Chambers' Information. +</pre> + <p> + A fact is commonly called a truth, but this practice leads to great + confusion in reasoning. A fact is only an element in truth, A logical + truth is a proposition supported by facts. Facts compose the premises of + an argument—a truth is the inference from the facts. Unless this + distinction is observed, recourse must be had to the expedient of calling + a fact a particular truth, and an induction from facts a general truth. Or + we must adopt this distinction, that a moral truth, that is, the truth of + parlance, is the coincidence of language with reality; and a logical + truth, a proposition which admits of demonstration. + </p> + <p> + A lady, who has given intellectual laws to many whom I address, has said—'A + truth I consider to be an ascertained fact, which truth would be changed + into an error the moment the fact on which it rested was disproved.' But + that which can be disproved cannot be an '<i>ascertained</i> fact.' + Allowing, however, the relevancy of this definition of a truth, it would, + in a treatise on logic, be considered as a definition only of a particular + truth. Many such truths are required to make a logical truth. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0004" id="link2HCH0004"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER IV. DISCOVERY OF TRUTH + </h2> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + The great treasure-house of nature is open to all, and the + only fee demanded for inspection is attention.—Detrosibr. +</pre> + <p> + Observation** of nature is the only source of truth. Discursive + observation is the art of noticing circumstances evident to the senses. + Men who do this intentionally and carefully, with a view of acquiring a + knowledge of phenomena and their causes, are distinguished for their + varied knowledge and often for their great discoveries. Shakspere must + have owed the varied facts interwoven into his delineations of human + character to this source. The clever personations of Garrick were + suggested by his curious observations of men and manners. Sir Walter Scott + is known to have been a careful observer. It is said, 'no expression + escaped him if it bore on the illustration of character.' + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + ** The term observation is used here in the sense in which + it is commonly understood, signifying cognisance in general. + It includes whatever information we acquire by the meant of + consciousness, or experience, or through the agency of the + senses. +</pre> + <p> + Claude Lorraine, with a passionate sympathy for the beautiful, sate in the + fields from sun-rise to dewy eve, watching, catching, and saturating his + very soul, as it were, with all the evanescent beauties of a summer's day, + as they chased each other over the face of the fair scene; fixing on + canvass, taking captive and imprisoning in our cabinets, the wanton + daughters of nature, that before his time never were caught, but flitted + before the fascinated eye only long enough to make the heart afterwards + feel more achingly the void of their vanishing. And the artist who has + done all this, do we not justly call him an <i>imaginative</i> painter, to + distinguish him from those meaner geniuses who were, in painting, very + like Crabbe in poetry, merely faithful delineators of the vulgarer objects + of social life, bunches of carrots, drunken boors, chamber maids and + chimney corners. + </p> + <p> + 'Has the reader ever seen Mr. Macready in the character of Macbeth? If he + have, he can never forget the stupefied murderer withdrawing from the + chamber in which he has just done the dread act, with fascinated gaze + retreatingly regarding his royal victim, and awaking with a guilty start + as he runs unconsciously against his hard-souled partner in guilt, who in + vain tries to infuse into the weaker spirit of her paralysed husband her + own metaphysical superiority. In this scene we know that Mr. Macready's + acting was perfect, for the pressure at our heart, the suspension of our + breathing, and the creeping of our hair, made us <i>feel</i> that it was + so. We see him now, as stealthily he places his foot over the threshold of + the chamber of death to re-appear on the stage; the intensely staring eye, + that cannot remove from what 'tis horror to look upon; the awfully natural + absorption of his soul by that "sorry sight," which one little minute has + brought about; his starting and awaking from his entranced state, as he + runs against his wife in his retreat, and his full passionate burst of + blended remorse, terror, and superstition, as refusing counsel, regardless + of remonstrance, heedless of probable detection, he pours forth his + "brain-sickly" convictions, of having in one little moment cut the cable + that had held him to the rest of the great human family. All this we can + see in our mind's eye, for the actor gave us a picture of passion that + time can never obliterate. But how would it have been with a cloddish + unimaginative fellow, whom nature never intended should understand + Shakspere? Would he not, conscious that he was among shoals and quicksands + of feelings, too nice for his appreciation, seek to tear over all by a + tempest of rant, which would be a more ruthless murder on Shakspere than + Macbeth's on the king? And why should we be delighted with Mr. Macready's + delineation, and disgusted with the ranter? Simply because the former has + <i>observed</i>, treasured up, and felt every genuine exhibition of human + feeling that came in his way, and applied it appropriately to all the + situations to which it was related in nature. A single instance will make + this clear. Mr. Kean one night, in the concluding part of the combat scene + of Richard III., when supposed to be wounded to the death, before falling, + steadily regarded his foe, and painfully raising his right arm in act to + strike, the relaxed and dying limb, unable to second the spirit, fell + heavily and harmlessly to his side, indicating merely the fierce bravery + of the usurper living in all its strength, when the body which it would + move, was all but a senseless clod. Pit, gallery, and boxes arose with an + enthusiasm beyond description, and by their repeated plaudits bore + testimony the intense naturalness of the struggle. The actor being + afterwards complimented upon the <i>hit</i>, said, that he had taken the + action from Jack Painter, the prize-fighter, when the latter was beaten in + some one of his contests, and it immediately struck the tragedian that the + very same thing would come in beautifully in the dying scene of Richard + III. What was this, if not imagination? Kean saw Painter's action to be + the natural effects of undying valour in vain endeavouring to contend + against overwhelming power. Remembering and associating it with his + previous conception of the character of Richard III., the actor saw it + could be most strikingly incorporated with that picture of passion the + usurper's death should present to our view. Seeing this, he combined it + with his previous delineation, and thereby did precisely the same thing as + the poet in using a fine simile, or the painter in introducing sun-light + over a part of his picture. It was a portion of nature carried away by the + actor to be reproduced on a future and fitting occasion.'* + </p> + <p> + The beginning of all knowledge is observation. It has been shown by Mr. + Mill that 'axioms,' which lie at the foundation of all reasoning and all + science, 'are experimental truths—generalisations <i>from + observation</i>. The proposition that Two straight lines cannot inclose a + space—or, in other words, Two straight lines which have once met do + not meet again, but continue to diverge—is an induction from the <i>evidence + of our senses.</i>'** 'Axioms are but a class of inductions from <i>experience</i>: + the simplest and easiest cases of generalisation,' from the facts + furnished to, us by our senses or by our internal consciousness.'*** + </p> + <p> + Autobiography, or the metaphysical revelation of a man to himself, is a + source of valuable psychological and moral truths. From this centre + frequently radiate new lights upon human nature. But this is resolvable + into a species of mental observation. It is self-inspection. + </p> + <p> + We have lately been told that 'Poetry is called upon to work in the <i>discovery</i> + of truth. The imagination has always been the great discovering power. + Discoveries are the poetry of science. The case is rare indeed in which, + by merely advancing step by step in the exercise of the logical faculty, + any new truth has been arrived at. Logic comes afterwards, to verify that + which imagination sees with its far-darting glance.'**** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Phrenology Tested, by A. M., of the Middle Temple, pp. + 143-5. + + ** Logic, vol 1, p. 305. + + *** Idem, pp. 328-9. + + **** W. J. Fox's Lectures to the Working Classes: Genius and + Poetry of Campbell, p.;5. +</pre> + <p> + This seems to call upon us to recognise the imagination as fresh source of + truth. But the definition of imagination, as given by Emerson, reveals to + us its origin in observation;—'The imagination may be defined to be + the use which reason makes of the material world. Shakspere's imperial + muse tosses the creation like a bauble from hand to hand, to embody any + capricious shade of thought that is uppermost in his mind.' Hence, though + we agree with Gilfillan that imagination is thought on fire, we must + confess that the ignition is material. + </p> + <p> + We will, however, hear a poet's defence of his fraternity:—'Poets + are vulgarly considered deficient in the reasoning faculty; whereas no man + was ever a great poet without having it in excess, and after a century or + two, men become convinced of it. They jump the middle terms of their + syllogisms, it is true, and assume premises to which the world has not yet + arrived; but time stamps their deductions as invincible.'* + </p> + <p> + Imagination is based on observation, and bears the same relation to the + 'material world' that the magician bears to the appliances of his art. + Imagination is the dexterous and astonishing use of realities. It is a + species of mental experiment, whereby, without permission of the + line-and-rule men, we join strange things together, and to the surprise of + every body, the junction is a happy one. 'Angelo's greatness lay in + searching for untried existence.'** But observation primarily suggests the + combination. If, as in the case of Angelo, imagination essays the highest + flights of genius, and goes in search of untried existence, it is not + existence out of nature, but founded upon nature—its success is a + revelation of some hidden reality. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Lowell's Conversations on the Old Poets. + + ** J. T. Seymour; Oracle of Reason. +</pre> + <p> + Some of the most praised conceptions of Shakspere have been traced by + critics to the tritest observation. Instance Hamlet's remark:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + There's a divinity doth shape our ends, + Bough-hew them as we will. +</pre> + <p> + Critics tell us, that Shakspere here fell into the conventional cant of a + mechanic making skewers. But it is no detraction to cull the best phrases + from the most common sources. Knight remarks:—'Philosophy, as + profound as it is beautiful! says the uninitiated reader of Shakspere. But + he that is endued with the wisdom of the commentators, will learn how easy + it is to mistake for philosophy and poetry what really only proceeded from + the very vulgar recollection of an ignorant mind. Dr. Farmer informs me, + says Steevens, that these words are merely technical. A woodman, butcher, + and dealer in skewers, lately observed to him, that his nephew (an idle + lad), could only assist in making them; he could rough-hew them, but I was + obliged to shape their ends. To shape the ends of wood skewers, i. e., to + point them, requires a degree of skill: any one can rough-hew them. + Whoever recollects the profession of Shakspere's father, will admit that + his son might be no stranger to such terms. I have frequently seen + packages of wool pinned up with skewers.'* To admit the likelihood of all + this, notwithstanding Mr. Knight's jeer at the 'wisdom of the + commentators,' is rather to exalt than degrade the genius of Shakspere, + who could derive exalted figures from humble sources. The 'Athenęum,' far + more wisely than Mr. Knight, in this instance, observes:—'This is + the test of a truly great man; that his thoughts should be <i>things</i>, + and become things in instantaneous act, and not for a moment mere + speculations and abstractions.' + </p> + <p> + As the theories of the schoolmen subside, and men no longer ignore nature, + it will become recognised as the source rather than the tool of intellect. + We shall have less occasion to contend that all lofty and sublime ideas + derive their value and beauty from their coherence with the instincts of + sensation, 'Poetry, we grant, creates a world of its own; but it creates + it out of <i>existing</i> materials.' 'Imagination' may be but 'thought on + fire,' but the spark, which ignites it, is material. Is there any other + distinction between the nights of the rhapsodist and those of genius, than + that genius <i>illumines</i> reality and rhapsody <i>obscures</i> it? 'We + know of no great generalisation that has ever been made by a man + unacquainted with the details on which it rests.' + </p> + <p> + Experiment is invented observation. It is putting into operation certain + supposed causes in order to observe their effects. An experiment may be + defined as an observation, which we are at some trouble to make. + Experiment is usually set down as being a process of discovering truth + different from observation. It is evidently included under observation, + and there is no practical advantage in separating it. Discursive, general, + ordinary, or common observation is the observation of the phenomena we <i>find</i>. + Experiment is observation of the phenomena we <i>bring together</i>. + Experimental observation has been the great agent of modern discovery. + Newton ranked it as the most valuable knowledge. Whatever is not founded + on phenomena is hypothesis, and has no place in experimental philosophy. + It is the principal source of accurate facts. When Jenner first + communicated to John Hunter, what he thought respecting the prevention of + small pox—'Don't think, but try; be patient, be accurate,' was + Hunter's characteristic reply. Locke remarks—'While the philosophy + of Aristotle prevailed in the schools, which dealt often in words without + meaning, the knowledge of nature was at a stand; men argued concerning + things of which they had no idea; in this enlightened age, we keep to + trial and experiment, as the only certain foundation of philosophy.' + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Philosophy and Religion of Shakspere, pp. 173-4 + + ** No 946. p. 1103. + + *** Athenęum, No. 946, p. 1191. +</pre> + <p> + Hypothesis may be noticed here as being a species of <i>embryo</i> + experiment. Hypothesis is guessing at the truth. It is a conjecture or + supposition relating to the cause of an effect. It imagines that where + certain conditions exist, the desired result will ensue. But all these + conjectures must be founded on observation. For, in the wildest + conjecture, unless made by a madman, there is some reason. Hypothesis is + incipient truth founded on a few facts which make it probable, but not on + sufficient to make it certain. Hypothesis does not directly discover + truth, but it is a guide to experiment, which does. The hypotheses of + Columbus respecting an unknown continent, did not of itself discover + America—but it directed the experiment of his voyage there, which + did. To hypothesise alone is the error of the visionary and the dreamer. + Practical wisdom, as far as possible, tests hypothesis by experiment. Sir + C. Bell conjectured that the nervous fluid of the human body was analogous + to galvanic fluid, and then, by experiments on various animals, he + endeavoured to test his hypothesis. However, great thinkers arise who are + best employed in contriving plans for others to execute—in telling + others what they are to do. Great poets belong to this class. They are + often incapable of the concentrated labour of furnishing proofs of their + hypothesis. Gladly should we recognise the mission of such men. They work + for humanity by thinking for humanity. 'All who think,' says Lytton, 'are + co-operative with all who work.' Labour supplies our wants, thought + teaches us dominion over nature. Labour is but the means of subsistence, + it is thought that makes it the source of wealth by multiplying its + powers. + </p> + <p> + To the value of hypothesis Mr. Mill bears this testimony, that by + suggesting observations and experiments, it puts us upon the road to, + independent evidence, if it be really attainable, and till it be attained, + the hypothesis ought not to count for more than a suspicion. The function + of hypothesis is one which must be reckoned absolutely indispensable in + science. Without such assumption, science would not have attained its + present state. Nearly everything which is now theory was once hypothesis.* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Logic, Vol. II, p. 18. +</pre> + <p> + Induction is systematic observation of a given class of phenomena. It + consists in bringing together a variety of facts and instances, carefully + and patiently viewing them in all possible lights to discover from a + comparison of the whole what, if any, new principle is elicitable. + Induction is an experiment with a number of facts, to see if any general + result can be arrived at. Thus observation is of three kinds—discursive, + experimental, and inductive. For brevity of speech, we use respectively + the terms observation, experiment, and induction, as the names of the + three recognised modes of investigation. But it facilitates a clear view + of this subject, to note that experiment and induction are but phases of + observation—and that observation is the great source of the + discovery of truth. + </p> + <p> + Discursive observation and experiment are the sources of facts or + particular truths. Nature, poetically says Dr. Reid, is put to the + question by a thousand observations and experiments, and forced to confess + her secrets. Out of these secrets induction gathers its general truths, + which become the premises of argument. Facts, like stones, are of little + service while scattered—it is in the edifice raised by them that + their value is apparent. They have been compared to blocks, upon <i>one</i> + of which, if a person stand, he has but a partially increased view; but + when many are piled up, a person from their summit commands the prospect + round. Particular truth seldom proves anything but itself. Argument is + proving something else, and we have seen that that which is proved must be + <i>contained</i> in something which proves it. In other words, an argument + is an assertion or denial of something substantiated by other things—by + facts. + </p> + <p> + Gall <i>observed</i> the peculiar formation of a certain head, but the one + fact proved nothing, except that the head had a certain form. It was a + barren observation, except that it suggested to his imagination the + hypothesis that the peculiar form of the head might be caused by + peculiarity of mind. This set him upon the experiment of observing the + habits and dispositions of the individual in order to test his hypothesis. + But the one fact of finding a peculiarity proved nothing new of any value. + The two facts, though incident, were hardly convincing. They proved only + that a peculiar head was accompanied in one case by peculiar habits—but + whether one was the cause of the other, or whether the phenomena were in + any way connected, still remained unknown. When, however, Gall, Spurzheim, + and others, had travelled through Europe, making observations and + experiments, and at last putting all the facts and instances together, and + carefully and patiently viewing them in all possible lights, and finding + that they shadowed forth that the brain was the organ, the map and measure + of intelligence, they inducted a general truth, which enters the lists of + argument and takes its place as an addition to our metaphysical and moral + treasures. + </p> + <p> + Mr. Macaulay, who, perhaps, might be accused of underrating both Bacon and + Induction, with a view of exalting Aristotle, remarks that 'The vulgar + notion about Bacon we take to be this, that he invented a new method of + arriving at truth, which method is called induction, and that he detected + some fallacy in the syllogistic reasoning which had been in vogue before + his time. This notion is about as well founded as that of the people who, + in the middle ages, imagined that Virgil was a great conjurer. Many who + are far too well informed to talk such extravagant nonsense, entertain + what we think incorrect notions as to what Bacon really effected in this + matter. The inductive method has been practised ever since the beginning + of the world by every human being. It is constantly practised by the most + ignorant clown, by the most thoughtless schoolboy, by the very child at + the breast. That method leads the clown to the conclusion, that if he sows + barley he shall not reap wheat. By that method, the schoolboy learns that + a cloudy day is the best for catching trout. The very infant we imagine is + led by induction to expect milk from his mother or nurse, and none from + his father. Not only is it not true that Bacon invented the inductive + method, but it is not true that he was the first person who correctly + analysed that method and explained its uses. Aristotle had long before + pointed out the absurdity of supposing that syllogistic reasoning could + ever conduct men to the discovery of any new principle, had shown that + such discoveries must be made by induction and by induction alone, and had + given the history of the inductive process concisely, indeed, but with + great perspicuity and precision. We are not inclined to ascribe much + practical value to that analysis of the Inductive method which Bacon has + given in the second book of the Novum Organon. It is, indeed, an elaborate + and correct analysis. But it is an analysis of that which we are all doing + from morning to night, and which we continue to do even in our dream.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Macaulay's Hist Essays, vol. 3, p. 407. +</pre> + <p> + It is not 'some fallacy in the syllogistic reasoning' which Bacon is + supposed to have detected, it is rather the partial protection against + error afforded by syllogisms, which he exposed and provided against, for + which he is estimated. Certainly Aristotle must have had a very different + opinion of the value of inductive philosophy from that entertained by + Bacon, or he would have indoctrinated his disciples with it. Few will + doubt that had Bacon's Novum Organon appeared in the place of Aristotle's + logic, and Aristotle's work in the place of Bacon's, that the advancement + of learning in the world would now be in a very different state. Could + Bacon have arrested the attention of the ancient sages with his methods of + discovering new principles, ancient philosophy, instead of being a + treadmill, would have been a path, and we should not have had a contempt + for all learning which was useful. When Posidonius said that we owed to + philosophy the principles of the arch and the introduction of metals. We + should not have had Seneca repudiating such insulting compliments, nor + Archimedes considering that geometry was degraded by being employed in + anything useful. + </p> + <p> + But these observations of Macaulay have the merit of showing us that + induction has its foundation in nature, and afford a further confirmation + of our views, that observation is the source of our knowledge, and that it + is the province of logic to teach us to systematise our thoughts. + Observation, experiment, hypothesis and induction, are but different names + for the operation—varying in degree, in method, in expedient, and + elaboration—whereby we discover truth. Nature is the treasure-house + of truth, and the sole fee of appropriation is attention. + </p> + <p> + Much discussion has taken place upon the nature of necessary truths. Mr. + Mill, however, after an elaborate analysis of Dr. Whewell's theory, + pronounces that 'nothing is necessary except the connection between a + conclusion and the premises.' A necessary truth is commonly defined as a + proposition, the negation of which is not only false, but inconceivable. + Mr. Mill contests this doctrine in words embodying suggestions of great + value. + </p> + <p> + 'Now I cannot but wonder that so much stress should be laid upon the + circumstance of inconceivableness, when there is such ample experience to + show that our capacity or incapacity of conceiving a thing has very little + to do with a possibility of the thing in itself; but is in truth very much + an affair of accident, and depends upon the past history and habits of our + own minds. There is no more generally acknowledged fact in human nature, + than the extreme difficulty at first felt in conceiving anything as + possible, which is in contradiction to long established and familiar + experience; or even to old and familiar habits of thought. And this + difficulty is a necessary result of the fundamental laws of the human + mind. When we have often seen and thought of two things together, and have + never in any one instance either seen or thought of them separately, there + is by the primary law of association an increasing difficulty, which in + the end becomes insuperable, of conceiving the two things apart. This is + most of all conspicuous in uneducated persons, who are in general utterly + unable to separate any two ideas which have once become firmly associated + in their minds; and if persons of cultivated intellect have any advantage + on the point, it is only because, having seen and heard and read more, and + been more accustomed to exercise their imagination, they have experienced + their sensations and thoughts in more varied combinations, and have been + prevented from forming these inseparable associations. But this advantage + has necessarily its limits. The man of the most practised intellect is not + exempt from the universal laws of our conceptive faculty. If daily habit + presents to him for a long period two facts in combination, and if he is + not led during that period either by accident or intention to think of + them apart, he will in time become incapable of doing so even by the + strongest effort; and the supposition that the two facts can be separated + in nature, will at last present itself to his mind with all the characters + of an inconceivable phenomenon. There are remarkable instances of this in + the history of science: instances, in which the wisest men rejected as + impossible, because inconceivable, things which their posterity, by + earlier practice and longer perseverance in the attempt, found it quite + easy to conceive, and which everybody knows to be true. 'If, then, it be + so natural to the human mind, even in its highest state of culture, to be + incapable of conceiving, and on that ground to believe impossible, what is + afterwards not only found to be conceivable but proved to be true; what + wonder if in cases where the association is still older, more confirmed, + and more familiar, and in which nothing ever occurs to shake our + conviction, or even suggest to us any conception at variance with the + association, the acquired incapacity should continue, and be mistaken for + a natural incapacity? It is true our experience of the varieties in nature + enables us, within certain limits, to conceive other varieties analogous + to them. We can conceive the sun or moon falling; for although we never + saw them fall, nor ever perhaps, imagined them falling, we have seen so + many other things fall, that we have innumerable familiar analogies to + assist the conception; which after all, we should probably have some + difficulty in framing, were we not well accustomed to see the sun and moon + move, (or appear to move,) so that we are only called upon to conceive a + slight change in the direction of motion, a circumstance familiar to our + experience. But when experience affords no model on which to shape the new + conception, how is it possible for us to form it? How, for example, can we + imagine an end to space or time? We never saw any object without something + beyond it, nor experienced any feeling without something following it. + When, therefore, we attempt to conceive the last point of space, we have + the idea irresistibly raised of other points beyond it. When we try to + imagine the last instant of time, we cannot help conceiving another + instant after it Nor is there any necessity to assume, as is done by a + modern school of metaphysicians, a peculiar fundamental law of the mind to + account for the feeling of infinity inherent in our conceptions of space + and time; that apparent infinity is sufficiently accounted for by simpler + and universally acknowledged laws.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Mill's Logic, vol. 1, pp. 313-17. +</pre> + <p> + Thus we stand on the verge of boundless possibility. What truths may yet + be discovered in that great and untrodden field, which lies without our + experience, no man can tell. All we have yet brought between assertion and + proof, is all we have yet conquered, is all that we as yet know, is all + that we can yet rely upon. The search after the untried is the highest and + apparently the inherent aspiration of roan. The revelation of new worlds + continually rewards his noble ambition. At once arrested and allured by + the magnificence of nature—we wonder, we work, we wait. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0005" id="link2HCH0005"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER V. FACTS + </h2> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + We must never forget that accurate and multiplied + quantitative facts form the only substantial basis of + science.—Parker. +</pre> + <p> + As clear fountains send forth pellucid streams, so do clear truths give + accurate sciences. The more definite the facts, the more perfect the + science; it is therefore of importance that all facts should be capable of + being tested by the standard of physical certainty. Dr. Reid says, that + 'the inquirer after truth must take only facts for his guide.' It is then + of moment that he takes true and not false guides. A writer in the + 'Monthly Repository' observes, that 'the basis of all knowledge is such an + extensive induction from particular facts, as leads to general conclusions + and fundamental axioms'—and if the facts are erroneous, evidently + the conclusions will be also erroneous. He also remarks, that 'in + reasoning, all sciences are the same, being founded on an examination of + facts—comparison of ideas.' But If the examination is incomplete, or + the facts admitted incorrect, the comparison will be alike defective and + the reasoning vitiated. If suppositions or conjectures are mixed up with + facts, the inductions from them will be suppositions, and the conclusions + but conjectures. + </p> + <p> + There are three words—consciousness, conscience, and + conscientiousness—very much alike to the ear but very different in + signification. Consciousness, is feeling—conscience, the sense of + right and wrong—-conscientiousness, the practice of what is believed + to be right. Conscience and conscientiousness are often confounded. We + say, lawyers have no conscience, we mean no conscientiousness. They know + right from wrong as men, but not professionally. It is with consciousness + that the logician has to deal. Consciousness is the primary source of + knowledge. Consciousness and the 'Evidences of the Senses' are synonymous + terms. Facts referable to consciousness are said to be physically certain. + The evidence of the senses is the highest standard of certainty. + </p> + <p> + The intuitive principles of belief are— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 1st. A conviction of our own existence. + 2nd. A confidence in the evidences of our senses. + 3rd. In our mental operations. + 4th. In our mental identity. + 5th. In the conformity of the operations of nature. +</pre> + <p> + These truths of intuition or consciousness are the foundation of all + knowledge. Truths which we know, by way of inference, are occurrences + which took place while we were absent—the events of history and the + theorems of mathematics. But the truths known by intuition are the + original premises from which all others axe inferred. Our assent to the + conclusion being grounded upon the truth of the premises, we could never + arrive at any knowledge by reasoning, unless something could be known + antecedently to all reasoning. + </p> + <p> + 'Whatever is known to us by consciousness, is known beyond possibility of + question. What one sees, or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one cannot + but be sure that one sees or feels. No science is required for the purpose + of establishing such truths; no rules of art can render our knowledge of + them more certain than it is in itself. There is no logic for this portion + of our know ledge.'* + </p> + <p> + All discussions pertaining to the nature and limits of intuition or + consciousness are referred to the higher or transcendental metaphysics, + but all the facts that compose evidence and become the grounds of + inference are, according to the view taken here, necessarily subjects of + examination. + </p> + <p> + 'Cogito ergo sum—I think, therefore I am, argued Des Cartes. We + learn by this that consciousness of the operations of the mind is the + strongest evidence of our existence. It cannot be proved so forcibly by + any other means; and although Des Cartes' language may appear to involve a + logical fallacy, yet the proof of our personal existence which we have + from <i>thinking</i>, is the fullest and best we are acquainted with.'** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * J. 8. Mil: Logic, vol. l, p. 7. + + ** Rev. Robert Amalie. +</pre> + <p> + There is a numerous class of facts from which all men draw conclusions, + which facts are not referable to the evidence of the senses. There are the + facts of testimony. Testimony is founded on laws almost as fixed and + certain as those of nature. All our knowledge, scientific, literary, + historical—all except what arises from our experience and + consciousness—depends on it. In the administration of justice it is + the sole guardian of property and life. If a man of known integrity and + veracity state a fact, without any possible motive of self-interest, and + evidently subject to no delusion; and if others of like character, who + could have no understanding or collusion with him, state the same, men are + nearly as certain of it as of any truth in mathematics. I believe in the + existence of Rome and the facts of astronomy on this evidence, although I + never saw the city or examined the stars through a telescope. + </p> + <p> + The conclusiveness of testimony is designated moral certainty. The value + of testimony depends on three things. 1. On the nature of the subject. + Some subjects are capable of more accurate observation than others. 2. On + the powers and character of the observer—his ability to understand + or note that of which he testifies—and his honesty in common + matters. 3. On the number of our informers. Several persons are less + likely to be imposed upon than one. + </p> + <p> + Testimony or moral certainty is inferior to physical certainty. A physical + certainty bears uniformly the name of certainty, while a moral certainty + is characterised as a probability. Great, very great may be the + probability, still it is less in reliableness than a physical certainty. + The evidence of Cato or Aristides would be very conclusive—yet + somewhat less certain than that which our own senses have proved. + </p> + <p> + The conclusions from moral certainties are obtained like other + conclusions, by induction. The induction from moral facts is like the + induction from physical facts, with this difference—that the + conclusions from moral facts are probabilities, like the facts on which + they are founded. Whatever has physical certainty in its favour is + considered demonstrable, and when sufficient probable evidence is adduced + in favour of a proposition, it is considered to be fairly proved. Some + persons, biased by the strictness of mathematical proof, insist upon the + same accuracy in moral investigations. I have elsewhere pointed out the + juvenility and infatuation of this error. Insist upon demonstration where + the nature of the questions admits it. Less should not, in such case, + suffice. Accept probability where probability is the sole evidence + attainable. Never ask more than reason can grant. We must admit gradations + of validity. What we are conscious of, we <i>know</i>. All we receive on + testimony, we <i>believe</i>. Physical certainty is <i>knowledge</i>: + moral certainty, <i>belief</i>. Hume remarks, in his 'Essay on + Probabilities,' that 'Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative + and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men + must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language + more to common us, we ought to divide arguments into <i>demonstrations, + proofs, and probabilities</i>. By proofs, meaning such arguments from + experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Hume's Essays, vol. 2, p.59. +</pre> + <p> + Conjecture is probable truth. Some subjects only furnish a sufficient + number of facts to make them probable in the lowest degree—not to + decide them as positively true. The propositions expressing results + pertaining to such subjects are called conjectures. + </p> + <p> + A conjecture founded on no fact or upon too few to make it likely, is + called a vagary. + </p> + <p> + It will be seen that probability is a thing of degree. A probability may + vary in weight from a moral certainty, where it ranks next to a physical + certainty, down to a conjecture, and descend lower in likelihood till it + is lost in conjecture. + </p> + <p> + Lord Kames remarks, in his preface to his 'Sketches'—'Most of the + subjects handled in the following sheets, admit but of probable reasoning: + and, with respect to such reasoning, it is often difficult to say, what + degree of conviction they ought to produce. It is easy to form plausible + arguments; but to form such as can stand the test of time, is not always + easy. I could amuse the reader with numerous examples of conjectural + arguments, which, fair at a distant view, vanish like a cloud on a near + approach'. Did all authors so judiciously apprise their readers of the + probable logical value of their speculations, fewer would be misled than + now. + </p> + <p> + To numerous questions of undoubted interest, which have been agitated in + all ages, only a moderate degree of certainty attaches—these are + termed speculative. Such subjects may afford but few facts and instances, + and the chances of conclusiveness may seem remote—yet ultimate + results are not to be despaired of: the new comparison of conjectures and + the arrangement of facts daily throws new light on age-contested points. + Systems of conduct should not be founded on conjectures in opposition to + evident moral utility; but if speculation is kept 'within the sphere of + speculation, it may be prosecuted with safety and prospect of success. + </p> + <p> + There are problems in metaphysics as there are in mathematics, which may + be demonstrated to be insolvable. To describe the limit of human power + with respect to contested questions will yet result from speculative + controversy. The capacities of our understanding will be one day well + considered, the extent of our knowledge discovered, and the horizon found + which sets bounds between the enlightened and the dark part of things—between + what is and what is not comprehensible by us. But this will only be when + the <i>untried</i> has been <i>universally</i> attempted in all + directions. Bailey, I think, has defined truth as being that which is + universally accepted after having been universally examined. Little of + this truth is yet extant. When every man shall be a thinker, when the + autobiography of intellect shall be more freely furnished than it ever yet + has been, unanimity of opinion not yet dreamed of will prevail. Harmony of + opinion is the sign of intellectual conquest—the standard-bearer of + truth no advocacy is victorious while dissent occupies the field. + </p> + <p> + What we <i>know</i> to be true, is <i>knowledge</i>; what we have only + reason to believe true, is <i>opinion</i>. All human information is made + up of knowledge and opinion. The primary importance of knowledge is + evident from the fact that knowledge is the umpire of all opinion. We + believe in the existence of the ruins of Palmyra and Thebes, and in + certain discoveries of algebraists and astronomers. It is our <i>opinion</i> + that these things are true, although we may never have visited Palmyra or + Thebes, nor made the calculations of the algebraist, nor the observations + of the astronomer. In these cases our belief is founded on our <i>experience</i> + and knowledge of mankind. It is quite true that travellers exaggerate, and + scientific men are sometimes mistaken; but we know that there is always <i>some</i> + truth at the bottom of what is communicated by well-meaning writers. More + or less, every man's <i>experience</i> assures him of this; and it is the + cause of our reliance on the records of history, and the reports of + science. Therefore, since all information is made up of knowledge and + opinion, plainly knowledge is the one thing which comprises all + intelligence. + </p> + <p> + 'Questions of fact,' observes Pascal, in his celebrated 'Provincial + Letters,' 'are only to be determined by the senses. If what you assert be + true, prove it to be so; if it be not, you labour in <i>vain</i> to induce + belief. All the authority in the world cannot enforce or alter belief as + to facts; nothing can possibly have power to cause that not to be which + actually <i>is</i>.'* + </p> + <p> + A remarkable instance of the verification of what was assumed to be is + related of Pascal by Goodrich. 'Pascal was a philosopher even in + childhood. At a very early age he was taught the ten commandments. For + several days after, he was observed to be measuring the growth of a blade + of grass. When asked the meaning of this, he replied, "The fourth + commandment says, 'Six days shalt thou labour, but the seventh is the + Sabbath in which thou shalt do no work.' Now I wished to ascertain if + nature obeyed this great law, and therefore measured the grass, to see if + it grew as much on Sunday as on other days." '** + </p> + <p> + 'We are informed,' says Beattie, 'by Father Malebranche, that the senses + were at first as honest faculties as one could desire to be endued with, + till after they were debauched by original sin; an adventure from which + they contracted such an invincible propensity to cheating, that they are + now continually lying in wait to deceive us. But there is in man, it + seems, a certain clear-sighted, stout, old faculty, called <i>reason</i>, + which, without being deceived by appearances, keeps an eye upon the + rogues, and often proves too cunning for them.'*** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Letter xviii. + + ** Fireside Education, p. 89. + + *** Essay on Truth, p. 105. +</pre> + <p> + Though it is so abundantly obvious that the evidences of our senses, + internal and external, are, in effect, the sources of all certainty, yet + we are not warranted in rejecting, as mere hypothesis, every theory which + we cannot at once corroborate. When Euler remarked of his new law of + arches, 'This will be found true, though contrary to all experience'—when + Gall exclaimed of his new philosophy of the sensorium, 'This is true, + though opposed to the philosophy of ages'—they expressed + demonstrable truths hidden from the multitude. They announced new + generalisations to man. New truths are commonly found to be old unnoted + experiences, for the first time subjected to classification, and presented + in a scientific form. + </p> + <p> + To me it seems almost in vain to urge men to notice facts who have never + noticed themselves. The truest standards of certainty arise from + individuality of retrospection. An intelligent man is, himself to himself, + the measure of all things in the universe. + </p> + <p> + In appealing to the young on the aspiration after improvement, one cannot + say 'Consult your aptitudes—follow your bias.' This Is the sole + appeal-injunctive to which all natures can respond. But in this + half-natured, half-trained, doubtfully-conditioned state of society, + though the generous would be incited to noble deeds, the sordid would lay + their vulture claws on the world, and the unprincipled victimise their + fellows. You have, therefore, to say, 'Man, do what thou listest, provided + it be compatible with the welfare of thy fellow men.' Men are not + well-natured, and we have thus to guard individuality, and qualify the + appeal, and so we miss the soil of great enterprise. Great is the + disadvantage. For the fulcrum which is to raise men is without their + natures—remote in the wide world. + </p> + <p> + Man should begin with himself. He loves Truth—it is the first + impulse of his nature. He loves Justice—the bandit on the throne, as + well as the bandit in the forest, respects justice in some form or other. + Man loves Cheerfulness—it is the attribute of innocence and courage. + He loves Fraternity—it knits society together in brotherhood. These + are standards. His codes of life and judgment arise from these + aspirations. That which accords with these principles is <i>reasonable</i>. + Whatever develops these principles in conduct is <i>moral</i>. These + sentiments are to be confirmed by his own observations. His experience in + connection with these rules is the right with which he may examine + religions, creeds, books, systems, opinions. + </p> + <p> + The right understanding of physical and moral facts greatly depends upon + intellectual character—and there enters largely into the recondite + and ultimate inquiries of intelligent men another class of facts, called + mental facts. There is no chance of identifying these without the power of + self-analysis, which is one reason why metaphysic ability belongs to so + few, and why questions involving metaphysical considerations are such + profound enigmas to the majority of the people. The illiterate in these + things are easily led or misled by words. They who will not bow before a + throne fall prostrate before a sound. + </p> + <p> + The first principles of things are few. The axioms from which men date + their reasoning are chiefly personal. They are expressed in an infinite + variety of ways, occasioned by the various conceptions of those who + conceive them, and by the different capacities to which they are adapted + when offered for the instruction and guidance of others. But this must not + mislead us as to the number, and overwhelm us with a sense of complexity, + where in fact simplicity reigns. Those who have the power of self-analysis + make for themselves rules of conduct, and the best are originated in this + way—for when a man recasts his acquirements of sense and education, + in order to see on what all rests, and what are essential standards of + action and judgment, he resolves all into few, and those the clear and + strong. Rob Roy's self-examination paper is presented to us in those lines + which Sir Walter Scott, with grace and justice, characterised as the + 'high-toned poetry of his gifted friend Wordsworth.' + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Say, then, that he was wise as brave, + As wise in thought as bold in deed; + For in the principles of things + He sought his morai creed. + + Said generous Rob, 'What need of Books? + Burn all the statutes and their shelves! + They stir us up against our kind, + And worse, against ourselves. + + We have a passion, make a law, + Too false to guide us or control; + And for the law itself we fight + In bitterness of soul. + + And puzzled, blinded, then we lose + Distinctions that are plain and few; + These find I graven on my heart, + That tells me what to do. +</pre> + <p> + Sir Walter Scott himself has enforced the same views:—'How much do I + need such a monitor,' said Waverley to Flora. 'A better one by far Mr. + Waverley will always find in his own bosom, when he will give its still + small voice leisure to be heard. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + All that hath been majestical + In life or death, since time began, + Is native in the simple heart of all,— + The angel heart of man.—Lowell. +</pre> + <p> + To awaken the senses and instruct them and direct them aright in the art + of observation, is a great and essential undertaking. All scattered aids + need collecting together. De la Beche in 'Geology,' and Miss Martineau + have written books, entitled 'How to Observe.' This quality is the + distinction between the natural and artificial man—the natural man + observes what is in nature—the artificial notes what he finds in + books—the one depends on himself—the other on an + encyclopaedia. We want contrast, in order to know as well as to explain. + Foreigners observe us better than we observe ourselves. The common escapes + our attention. To know a fact fully we seek its opposite to compare it + with. + </p> + <p> + Were men reared with the powers of men without the genius of the child + being impaired, the ability to observe would be more general and perfect + among us. Children stop at everything to question its nature, at every + word to ask its import. It was the aim of Pestalozzi to cultivate by his + system of tuition this incessant questioning. But parents among the poor + know not the value of the habit, or knowing it have not time to gratify + it, and thus this happiest aptitude of childhood is repressed. + </p> + <p> + With regard to the analysis of groups of facts, Mr. J. S. Mill remarks—'The + observer is not he who merely sees the thing before his eyes, but he who + sees what parts that thing is composed of. To do this well is a rare + talent. One person from inattention, or attending only in the wrong place, + overlooks half of what he sees; another sets down much more than he sees, + confounding it with what he imagines, or with what he infers $ another + takes note of the kind of all the circumstances, but being inexpert in + estimating their degree, leaves the quantity of each vague and uncertain; + another sees indeed the whole, but makes such an awkward division of it + into parts, throwing things into one mass which require to be separated, + and separating others which might more conveniently be considered as one, + that the result is much the same, sometimes even worse, than if no + analysis had been attempted at all.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Logic, vol. 1, p. 438. +</pre> + <p> + In the case of the Leigh Peerage there was a number of witnesses examined + in the House of Lords, as to the existence of a certain monument in + Stonely Church—'The first witness described the monument as being + black; the second spoke of it as a kind of dove-colour; the third said it + was black and white; the fourth said it was originally white, but dirty, + when he saw it; the fifth differing from the others, said it was blue; the + next witness described it as a light marble, but said it had a dark + appearance as if it had been bronzed, and the last witness spoke of it as + feeing of a light grey colour. Then, as to the form of the monument, the + first witness said it was oblong; the next said it was square at the top, + and came down narrower to the bottom, and there rested on a single truss; + the third witness described it as being square at the bottom, testing upon + two trusses; and went up narrower and narrower to a point at the top; the + fourth witness said it was angular at the top; the next said it was square + at the bottom, was brought to a point in the middle, and was then curved + into a sort of festoon; the sixth witness stated that it was square at the + top and bottom, and had a curve; and the last said it was square at the + top and bottom. As to the language of the inscriptions, the first witness + stated that the names of <i>Thomas</i> and <i>Christopher Leigh</i> were + in English; the next said the inscription was not in English; the third + said there was a great deal in English; the fourth witness said the whole, + (with the exception of the name Christopher Lee), was in a language, which + he did not understand; the next witness stated that the inscription was + all in English, except the words <i>Anno Domini</i>; and the last witness + said it was not in English.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Times, May 10, 1828. +</pre> + <p> + All these witnesses agree as to the fact in dispute, but their variances + in testimony illustrate the common inattention of observation—and + this case farther admonishes us that if such differences may exist as to a + question of fact, where the senses are the same, little wonder that + differences exist as to matters of opinion, where intellectual capacity + and information are so various. + </p> + <p> + We know from experience that the sportsman sees a point which is hidden + from the unpractised aimer—the painter sees traits of character of + light and shade in an object which the untaught limner never observes; the + musician distinguishes harmonies and discords that fall unnoted on the + uneducated ear. + </p> + <p> + Thus we learn that by cultivation we can increase natural susceptibility + to observe. + </p> + <p> + The extent is surprising to which the unanalytic are in ignorance of the + real nature of phenomena. 'There is nothing which we appear to ourselves + more directly conscious of, than the distance of an object from us. Yet it + has long been ascertained, that what is perceived by the eye, is at most + nothing more than a variously coloured surface; that when we fancy we see + distance, all we really see is certain variation of apparent size, and + more or less faintness of colour.'* + </p> + <p> + In preparing to support an argument on any question, we must first + determine the sources whence the facts are to be collected. Instance: The + objects of municipal laws are rights and crimes. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> +The evidence of rights are:— 1. Public consent. + 2. Testimony. + 3. Records. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> +The evidence of crimes are:— 1. Confession. + 2. Previous malice. + 3. Testimony. +</pre> + <p> + This outline of the investigation prosecuted, the inquirer next consults + the authors who treat of the rules which are applied for determining the + facts of public consent, testimony, records, confessions: he is then able + to support his own argument in a valid manner, or prepared to examine the + facts offered by an opponent in support of an opposite view. + </p> + <p> + The opinion may be hazarded that it is not so much from want of capacity + to observe that error arises, as from the want of conviction that we + should observe well before we attempt to infer. Nature is inventive, and + desire, once awakened, will, without formal rules, find out a thousand + modes of gratification. The foundation for a soldier logic than now + prevails will be laid when the people are impressed with the great + importance of looking well to facts as the data of all inferential truth. + </p> + <p> + There is a noted aphorism of Cendillac, to the effect that the one + sufficient rule for discovering the nature and properties of objects is to + name them properly, as if, observes Mr. J. S. Mill, 'the reverse was not + the truth, that it is impossible to name them properly except in + proportion as we are already acquainted with their nature and properties.' + Need it be added that this knowledge is only to be had by patient + observation? + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Mill Logic vol. l, p.7. +</pre> + <p> + To assist this habit, Dr. Watts recommends the thinker to ascertain if a + given idea is clear and distinct, obscure and confused, learned or vulgar, + perfect or imperfect, adequate or inadequate—true or false. 'View a + subject, says he, as through a telescope, so as to command a clear view of + it; examine its whole bearings as you look over a globe; consider it in + its several properties—anatomise it as with a scalpel. Take + cognizance of its various aspects as though inspecting it through a + prismatic glass. Whenever we contemplate a single object in nature is + obvious it must have duration, size, weight, form, colour, such qualities + being essentially present in all adequate conceptions of physical + phenomena.' + </p> + <p> + It was objected to the 'Cricket' of Mr. Dickens, that his delineation of + Bertha was wanting in truthfulness. The teachers of the blind who knew + their nature could detect the departure from the reality of their habits + in the sketch of Bertha. The study of the blind was necessary to insure + success. We may not be able in any one book to give rules for the study of + all subjects, but we may indicate that we ought not to speak of what we do + not know, and that if we mean to introduce certain facts into our speech + or writing, we should consult the records and experienee of those persons + who are known to have written upon the subject, and follow the best + directions they give, and we shall generally attain accuracy. + </p> + <p> + Mr. Combe observes, in his introduction to his notes on the United States + of North America, p. xi.—'I was told that a <i>certain person</i> + boasts of having given Miss Martineau erroneous information for the + purpose of leading her into mistakes; and another in Philadelphia assures + his friends that he "crammed" Capt. Marryatt with old "Joe Millers," which + the Capt. embodied into his books as facts illustrative of American + manners. This seems to be a case in which some uncertainty must ever exist + as to the value of the facts collected by travellers. They cannot observe + all, or test half that they do observe. They must rely on testimony. But + they might do this—They might tell us precisely the kind of + authority they followed, and then the reader could form some opinion of + the value of what was communicated. Had Miss Martineau and Captain + Marryatt given the name and addresses of their informants, the latter + would now be punished by being infamously known throughout Europe; and all + future travellers warned from them—and all future informants warned + by their example. Where informants cannot be mentioned by name and + address, the chances are, they cannot be trusted. When first connected + with public proceedings, I found myself made the depository of innumerable + bits of scandal, and ominous reports of public characters. To all who told + me anything, if I attached importance to it, I made it a rule to ask—'May + I mention it to the party with your name?' 'O, no, I would rather not,' + was the common reply. To all written communications answer—'Please + add your name and address—and may I publish them if occasion + requires?' 'O, no, don't,' would be the general injunction. Thus I found + that huge reports, inflated as balloons, shrunk like them when pricked by + the pin of a question—'Will you answer for it?' Thus I saved myself + from being imposed upon by, or being the retailer of, reports for which + the originator or relator would not or could not vouch. + </p> + <p> + 'Upwards of twenty years ago,' says George Combe, 'I accompanied a member + of the bar of Paris, a philosopher and a man of letters, on a visit to the + Highlands of Scotland. At Callendar a boy of twelve or thirteen years of + age attended as a guide to some interesting spot, and in external + appearance he seemed to be in every respect one of the common lads of the + village. My Parisian friend entered into conversation with him; asked him + if he had been at school, and soon discovered that to a tolerable + acquaintance with the Greek and Latin languages, he added a pretty + extensive-knowledge of arithmetic and geography, and was then engaged in + the study of mathematics. My friend conceived that the boy was an average + specimen of the peasantry of the country; and greatly admired the + educational attainments of the Scotch people, which he had previously + heard highly extolled. But,' adds Mr. Combe, 'the boy was the natural son + of an English officer, who had resided in the neighbourhood, and who, + while he ordered him to be reared in the hardy habits of the Scottish + Highlanders, had provided ample funds for his mental education.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Intro, to notes on United States of North America, p. 10., + vol. 1 +</pre> + <p> + It is difficult to believe in this Frenchman being a 'philosopher, making, + as he did, a national induction from a single instance. Had he previously + inquired, as he ought to have done, the particulars of that lad's life and + rearing, before coming to so large a conclusion, he would at once have + discovered the error he was falling into. + </p> + <p> + In the Registrar General's Report of 1840, the mean of married persons + unable to write is presented. The conclusion is based upon the statistics + of nine counties. But when it was found that only three per cent, of the + persons marriageable, did marry, the datum was found insufficient to + afford sure results. This fact; is given by Mr. Combe in the same book. + Then how many boys ought our 'philosopher' to have questioned before + making his vast inference? + </p> + <p> + Another instance of the value of a question I extract from the same work. + Mr. Combe says:—'A few years ago, when travelling in Somersetshire, + I saw four horses, attended by two men, drawing a light plough in a light + soil. "What a waste of labour is here," said I to an intelligent farmer; + "in Scotland, two horses and one man will accomplish this work." "We rear + and train young horses for the London market," said he; "two of the four + which you see are serving an apprenticeship to labour."' Had Mr. Combe + asked a few questions as to the correctness of his assumed inference, he + would have been saved from his erroneous conclusion. We should be wary of + unquestioned data. + </p> + <p> + When Murray's Grammar was first placed in my hands, I found in it certain + references to the Canons of Language in the larger edition. I questioned + my teacher as to what it meant. 'It is a trick of the printer,' he + answered, 'to induce you to buy the larger volume.' I do not believe this + now. I believe that it was a necessary reference. An author who has + written upon a given subject, naturally finds his own ideas coincident + illustrations of his views, and honestly refers to them. In this book I + have made a few references to previous works of mine, and it has struck me + that nine ont of ten of the readers will set this down to artifice or + egotism. Yet it is neither. I have referred only to avoid the full + quotation of some necessary illustration of the argument. Yet few will + penetrate to the fact, and most will be apt to infer a trick from + appearances. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0006" id="link2HCH0006"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER VI. SCIENCE + </h2> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Whatever we know must be in the number of the primitive + data, or of the conclusions which can be drawn therefrom.— + J.S. Mill +</pre> + <p> + To have reached, in the study of observed phenomena, the point of + perception indicated in this motto, and to feel the full force of the + remark, is to have imbibed the spirit of science—-whose traits are + dear distinctions, accurate classification, and strict reference to + primitive data. The bases of all science are methodical facts. The first + step to the perfection and enlargement of a science is the resolution of + its propositions into axioms, and into propositions which are to be + proved. Dr. Reid observes—'This has been done in mathematics from + the beginning, and has tended greatly to the emolument of that science. It + has lately been done in natural philosophy, and by this means that science + has advanced more in 160 years than it had done before in 2,000. Every + science is in an unformed state until its first principles are + ascertained; after this it advances regularly, and secures the ground it + has gained.' + </p> + <p> + Classification is one of the first steps to Science. The maxim in + government, divide and conquer, retains, when applied to science, all its + wisdom without its machiavelialism. The young grammarian reduces the mass + of words, that so threaten to confound his powers, to a few natural + classes, and he conquers them separately with ease. + </p> + <p> + 'The single power by which we discover resemblance or relation in general, + is a sufficient aid to us in the perplexity and confusion of our first + attempts at arrangement. It begins by converting thousands, and more than + thousands, into one; and, reducing in the same manner the numbers tiros + formed, it arrives at last at the few distinctive characters of those + great comprehensive tribes, on which it ceases to operate, 'because there + is nothing left to oppress the memory or the understanding.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Brown's Moral Philosophy, Lect, xvi. +</pre> + <p> + Merell has spoken more comprehensively on this subject—'That human + knowledge dees not consist in the bare collection and enumeration of + facts; this alone would be of little service were we net to attempt the + classification of them, and to educe from such classification general laws + and principles. The knowledge, which consists in individual truths, could + never be either extensive ear definite—for the multiplicity of + objects which then must crowd in upon the mind only tends to confound and + perplex it, while the memory, overburdened with particulars, is not able + to retain a hundredth part of the materials which are collected. To + prevent this, the power el generalisation comes to our aid, by which the + individual facts are so classified under their proper conceptions, that + they may at the same time be more easily retained, and their several + relations to all other branches of knowledge accurately defined. The + colligation and classification of facts, then, we may regard as the two + first steps, which are to be taken in the attainment of truth.'* + </p> + <p> + Aristotle, says Morell, classified the <i>matter</i>, Kant the <i>forms</i>. + Aristotle was the first man who undertook the gigantic task of reducing + the multiplicity of all the objects of human knowledge to a few general + heads—-1. Substance. 2. Quality. 3. Quantity. 4. Relation. Action. + 6. Passion. 7. Place. 8. Time. 9. Posture. 10. Habit. Aristotle's + philosophy was <i>objective</i>, Kant's <i>subjective</i>. Kant's + categories were twelve. 1. Unity. 2. Plurality. 3. Totality. 4. + Affirmation. Negation. 6. limitation. 7. Substance. 8. Casualty. 9. + Reciprocity. 10. Possibility. 11. Actuality. 12. Necessity. + </p> + <p> + 'It is a fundamental principle in logic, that the power of framing classes + is unlimited as long as there is any (even the smallest) difference to + found a distinction upon.** + </p> + <p> + What Geoffroy Saint Hilaire has said of natural history is applicable to + all science:—'The first problem to be solved by him who wishes to + penetrate deeply into this; study, consists evidently in the formation of + clear and precise distinctions between the various brings. This is the + most elementary problem, in so-far as it precedes all the others; but it + is in reality, in most cases, complicated and full of difficulties. Its + accurate solution requires—first, <i>Observation</i>, which makes + known the facts; next, <i>Description</i>, which fixes them permanently; + then <i>Characterisation</i>, which selects and displays prominently the + most important of them—and lastly, <i>Classification</i>, which + arranges them in systematic order.'*** + </p> + <p> + Of the value of classification, Lamartine has given a fine illustration:——'Montesquieu + had sounded the institutions and analysed the laws of all people. By <i>classing</i> + governments he had compared them, by comparing them he passed judgment on + them; and this judgment brought out, in its bold relief and contrast, on + every page, right and force, privilege and equality, tyranny and + liberty.'**** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Morell's Hist. of Speculative Phil., p. 34, vol. 1. + + ** Mill, p. 165, vol. 1. + + *** T. W. Thornton: Reasoner No. 72, p. 664. + + **** Lamartine's Hist. Girondists, pp. 14-15, vol. 1. +</pre> + <p> + Familiarity with the characteristics of science imparts considerable power + for the detection of fallacy. A logician is imperfect without scientific + tastes and habits. The man of science has all his knowledge systematised + and arranged. What other people have in confusion, he has in order. The + elements of knowledge are, more or less, as has been observed, known to + all men—but in their perfect, communicable, and usable state, they + are-known only to the educated and scientific man. What training is to the + soldier, science is to the thinker. It enables him to control all his + resources and employ his natural powers to the best advantage. It is this + which constitutes the superiority of the educated over the ignorant. + Astronomy, navigation, architecture, geometry, political economy, morals, + all rest, or should rest, and do rest, if they have-attained to the + perfection of science, on primary facts and first principles. Every step + can be measured by an axiom—every result can be traced to a first + principle.* To detect error, then, in any province of investigation, or + any domain of argument, the logician first looks to the primary principles + on which it is based, and thus tests the legitimacy of its conclusions. + </p> + <p> + As respects those who deal in things professedly above reason, It was well + said by an anonymous writer of the old school of sturdy thinkers,—'Of + such men as these I usually demand, whether their own assent to things + they would have us believe, be grounded upon some <i>rational argument</i>. + If they say 'tis not, they are fools to believe it themselves; and I + should add to the number of fools, if, after this acknowledgment, I should + believe them: but if they say it is, I desire them to produce their + argument; for since 'tis framed by a human understanding, the force of it + may also be comprehended and judged of by a human understanding: and tis + to no purpose to say that the subject surpasses human reason: for if it do + so indeed, it will surpass <i>theirs</i> as well as <i>mine</i>, and so + leave us both upon even terms. And let the thing assented to be what it + will, the assent itself must be founded upon a <i>sufficient reason</i>, + and consequently upon one that is <i>intelligible</i> to the human + intellect that is wrought on by it.'** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * See Beauties and Uses of Euclid, chap. vi., Logic of + Euclid. + + ** A Discourse on Things above Reason, 1681. +</pre> + <p> + "What is it?—" "'Tis impossible the same thing should be, and not be + at the same time," are maxims of such universal usefulness, that without + them we could neither <i>judge, discourse,</i> nor <i>act</i>. These + principles may not always make their appearance in formal propositions, + but still they guide all our thoughts in the same manner as when a + musician plays a careless voluntary upon a harpsichord—he is guided + by rules of music he long since became familiar with, though now scarcely + sensible of them. + </p> + <p> + 'A butcher loses his knife, and looks all about for it, and remarks as the + motive of his search, "I am sure it must be somewhere or other." By which + rude saying it is evident he is guided by the axiom last mentioned. Had he + not the knowledge of this axiom beforehand, did he think it possible that + his knife could be <i>no where</i> or in <i>no place</i> he would never + take pains to look for it. We may observe many such axioms as this guiding + the actions of the vulgar, and it is no unworthy speculation to observe + their behaviour and words, which proceed from uncorrupted nature, and + retrieve the axioms from which their conduct proceeds.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Solid Philosophy, asserted against the Fancies of the + Idealists. (Locke's Understanding is the work controverted.) + By J. S.. London, 1679. +</pre> + <p> + The outlines of the science of morality are thus comprehensively sketched + by Sir James Mackintosh: the origin, value, and application of first + principles are indicated with his usual felicity. 'The usages and laws of + nations, the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, the + sentiments of orators and poets, as well as the observations of common + life, are in truth, the materials out of which the science of morality to + formed; and those who neglect them are justly chargeable with a vain + attempt to philosophise without regard to fact and experienee—the + sole foundation of all true philosophy. + </p> + <p> + The natural order undoubtedly dictates that we should first search for the + <i>original principles</i> of the science in human nature; then apply them + to the regulation of the conduct of individuals, and lastly employ them + for the decision of those difficult and complicated questions that arise + with respect to the intercourse of nations.' + </p> + <p> + To search for ultimate principles is to discover at a glance the whole + bearings of a great question. Through what clouds of politics had the + historian of Rome penetrated when he announced that the principles of a + free constitution are irrecoverably lost when the legislative power is + nominated by the executive. + </p> + <p> + This habit—it cannot be too often insisted on aids not only the + acquisition of knowledge, but also its <i>retention</i>. Around these + first principles, as around a standard, the thoughts naturally associate. + Touch but a remote chord of any question, and it will vibrate to the + central principle to which it has once been well attached. Every relative + impression owns a kindred connection, and the moment one is attacked, it, + like a faithful sentinel, arouses a whole troop, which, marshalled and + disciplined, bear down and challenge the enemy.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Beauties and Uses of Euclid, pp. 47-9. +</pre> + <p> + What Rogers has so exquisitely sung of the associations of childhood, is + true of the associations of science. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Childhood's loved group revisit! every scene,— + The tangled wood-walk and the tufted green. + The school's lone porch, with reverend mosses grey, + Just tells the pensive pilgrim where it lay. + + Mute is the bell which rang at peep of dawn, + Quick'ning my truant steps across the lawn: + Unheard the shout that rent the noontide air, + When the slow dial gave a pause to care. + + Up springs at every step, to claim a tear, + Some little friendship formed and cherished here? + And not the lightest leaf but trembling teems + With golden visions and romantic dreams. +</pre> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0007" id="link2HCH0007"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER VII. PROPOSITIONS + </h2> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + All truth and all error lie in Propositions.—J. S. Mill. +</pre> + <p> + In accordance with that experience which directs to the profoundest books + for the simplest statements, we turn to Mill's Logic for the philosophy of + propositions. The answer to every question which it is possible to frame + is contained in a proposition or assertion. Whatever can be an object of + belief or even of disbelief, must, when put into words, assume the form of + a proposition * * What we call a truth is simply a true proposition; and + errors are false propositions. To know the import of all possible + propositions would be to know all questions which can be raised, all + matters which are susceptible of being either believed or disbelieved. * * + Since then the objects of all belief and all inquiry express themselves in + propositions, a sufficient scrutiny of propositions and of their varieties + will apprise us what questions mankind have asked themselves, and what it + the nature of the answers to those questions they have actually thought + they had grounds to believe. + </p> + <p> + 'Now the first glance at a proposition shows that it is formed by putting + together two names. A proposition, according to the common simple + definition, which is sufficient for our purpose, is, <i>discourse in which + something is affirmed or denied of something</i>. Thus, in the + proposition, gold is yellow, the quality <i>yellow</i> is affirmed of the + substance <i>gold</i>. In the proposition, Franklin was not born in + England, the fact expressed by the words <i>born in England</i> is denied + of the man Franklin. + </p> + <p> + 'Every proposition consists of three parts: the subject, the predicate, + and the copula. The predicate is the name denoting that which is affirmed + or denied. The subject is the name denoting the person or thing which + something is affirmed or denied of. The copula is the sign denoting that + there is an affirmation or denial; and thereby enabling the hearer or + reader to distinguish a proposition from any other kind of discourse. + Thus, in the proposition, the earth is round, the predicate is the word <i>round</i>, + which denotes the quality affirmed, or (as the phrase is) predicated: <i>the + earth</i> words denoting the object which that quality is affirmed of, + compose the subject; the word it, which serves as the connecting mark + between the subject and predicate, to show that one of them is affirmed of + the other, is called the copula.' + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0008" id="link2HCH0008"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER VIII. DEFINITIONS + </h2> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + No difficulty is unsurmountable, if words be allowed to pass + without meaning.—Lord Kames. +</pre> + <p> + As every proposition consists of two names, and as every proposition + affirms or denies one of these names of the other, the value of + definition, which fixes the import of names, is apparent. + </p> + <p> + 'A <i>name</i> is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, which may + raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which + being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought the + speaker had before in his mind [Hobbes]. This simple definition of a name, + as a word (or set of words) serving the double purpose of a mark to recall + to ourselves the likeness of a former thought, and a sign to make it known + to others, appears unexceptionable.'* + </p> + <p> + Definition originates in accurate and comprehensive observation. 'There + cannot be,' says Mill, 'agreement about the definition of a thing, until + there is agreement about the thing itself. <i>To define a thing is to + select from among the whole of its properties those which shall be + understood to be designated and declared by its name</i>; and the + properties must be very well known to us before we can be competent to + determine which of them are fittest to be chosen for this purpose.'** + </p> + <p> + 'The simplest and most correct notion of a definition is, a proposition + declaratory of the meaning of a word; namely, either the meaning which it + bears in common acceptation, or that which the speaker or writer, for the + particular purposes of his discourse, intends to annex to it.'*** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * J. Stuart Mill: System of Logic, 2nd ed., chap. 11, sec. + I. p. 27. + + ** Introduction to Logic, p. 1. + + *** Mill's Logic, p. 183, vol. 1. +</pre> + <p> + But with most persons the object of a definition is merely to guide them + to the correct use of a term as a protection against applying it in a + manner inconsistent with custom and convention. Anything, therefore, is to + them a sufficient definition of a term which will serve as a correct index + to what the term denotes; although not embracing the whole, and sometimes + perhaps not even any part of what it connotes. + </p> + <p> + Definitions are sometimes explained as being of two kinds—of things + and words. + </p> + <p> + The definition of <i>words</i> is the explanation of the sense in which + they are used. + </p> + <p> + The definition of <i>things</i> is an explanation of the specific + properties by which they differ from all other things. + </p> + <p> + To define a thing, says Dr. Watts, we must ascertain with what it agrees, + then note the most remarkable attribute of difference, and join the two + together. + </p> + <p> + Probity—the disposition to acknowledge the rights of mankind. + </p> + <p> + Justice—the disposition to maintain the rights of mankind. + </p> + <p> + Benevolence—the disposition to improve the rights of mankind. + </p> + <p> + Deceit—the concealed violation of the rights of mankind. + </p> + <p> + Injustice—the open violation of the rights of mankind. + </p> + <p> + Malevolence—hatred of the rights of mankind. + </p> + <p> + In defining a word we seek some class to which to refer it, that we may + identify it, and fix attention upon that peculiarity by which we can + distinguish it from all other things. 'Probity and 'justice' are referred + to 'disposition,' with reference to the 'rights of mankind' as their + sphere of existence: and <i>acknowledgment, and maintenance</i>, are + mentioned as the distinguishing features. + </p> + <p> + Distinctions must not be made without differences. The definition should + be plainer than the thing defined. Aristotle's definition of motion is + considered defective in this respect:—'Motion—an act of a + being in power, so far forth as it is in power.' Tautological definitions + cause more to be supposed than is true—the too terse explanation + leaves some necessary thing unmentioned. A perfect definition requires the + union of the concise, the clear, and the adequate. Some persons are so + unskilful in the analysis of terms as to occasion the advice <i>Nil + explicare</i>—never explain yourself if you wish to be understood. + </p> + <p> + Double meanings should be avoided. The writer may himself alternate in + their use, and the reader may take the word in the unintended meaning. All + men have not the strong sense of Johnson. When Caleb Whiteford inquired + seriously of the Doctor, whether he really considered that a man ought to + be transported, like Barrington, the pickpocket, for being guilty of a + double meaning. 'Sir,' said Johnson, 'if a man means well, the more he + means the better'—which, whether real or fictitious, is one of the + happiest answers that ever crushed a quibble.* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Hood's Own. +</pre> + <p> + I have frequently put the question—What is consciousness? to persons + who have been conscious for twenty or thirty years, but who were yet + unable to reply. Had any one deprived these persons of consciousness, a + judge would have hanged him for the offence; yet, could they themselves + have been interrogated as to what harm they had suffered, they could not + have told what they had lost. And upon the principle, that he not knowing + what he has lost, is no loser, these persons, though murdered, had + suffered no harm. + </p> + <p> + The various definitions of the same subject which prevail, originate in + the caprice, or partial, or profound knowledge the definer may have of his + subject. It seems to be admitted by logicians, that an author has a right + to give whatever provisional definition he pleases of his terms. But + having once given them, perspicuity requires that he should adhere to + them. Any new sense in which a term is employed should be specially + defined. In discoursing on an ordinary subject, as the right of public + assembly,—such words as perception, conception, apprehension, might + be used reciprocally, but in a dissertation on metaphysics each requires + restriction in use and precision in purport. + </p> + <p> + Often genius strikes out new relations of words. In recent political + debates, Mr. Cobden resorted with new force and point to a charge of + rashness against ministers: he showed that rashness consisted more + frequently in inaction than action. He is rash who stands surrounded by + the elements of danger without taking; any precaution against the + contingencies of peril; he is rash who does not take advantage of the + calm, to repair his shattered rigging; he is rash who looks not out for a + proper supply of water until the conflagration is raging around him; and + more rash than all is he who exercises no provident care for supplying a + nation with food, but waits for the pressure of famine and the perils of + starvation. + </p> + <p> + At the last soiree of the Leeds Mechanics' Institution, Mr. Dickens + referred to ignorance, commonly considered as a passive negation, and + placed it in the light of a power. 'Look where we will, do we not find + ignorance powerful for every kind of wrong and evil? Powerful to take its + enemies to its heart and strike its best friends down—powerful to + fill the prisons, the hospitals, and the graves—powerful for blind + violence, prejudice, and error in all their destructive shapes.' + </p> + <p> + The variations which not only common but technical terms undergo, is a + considerable source of perplexity in reasoning. Mr. Mill cites the + instance of the term felony. No lawyer will undertake to tell what a + felony is otherwise than by enumerating the various kinds of offences + which are so called. Originally, felony denoted all offences, the penalty + of which included forfeiture of goods; but, subsequent Acts of Parliament + have declared various offences to be felonies without enjoining that + penalty, and have taken away the penalty from others which continue still + to be called felonies, insomuch that the acts so called have now no + property whatever in common, save that of being unlawful and punishable. + This inattention to precision in terms has arisen not among the vulgar, + but among educated English lawyers. + </p> + <p> + 'Language,' says Mr. Mill, borrowing a political simile from Sir James + Mackintosh, '"is not made, but grows." A name not unfrequently passes by + successive links of resemblance from one object to another, until it + becomes applied to things having nothing in common with the first things + to which the name was given; which, however, do not, for that reason, drop + the name; so that it at last denotes a confused huddle of objects, having + nothing whatever in common; and connotes nothing, not even a vague and + general resemblance. When a name has fallen into this state, in which by + predicating it of any object we assert literally nothing about the object, + it has become unfit for the purposes either of thought or of the + communication of thought; and can only be made serviceable by stripping it + of some part of its multifarious denotation, and confining it to objects + possessed of some attributes in common, which it may be made to connote. + Such are the inconveniences of a language which "is not made, but grows." + like a road which is not made, but has made itself, it requires continual + mending in order to be passable.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Logic, p. 207. +</pre> + <p> + It is well observed, that the spontaneous growth of language is of the + utmost importance to the thinker. There seems to be so palpable a + substratum of right sense, in the rude classifications of the multitude, + that the logician has little else to do, in many cases, than to retouch + them and give them precision. Guizot observes, there is frequently more + truth in common acceptations of general terms than in the more precise + definitions of science. Common sense gives to words their ordinary + signification. The leading terms of philosophy are clothed in innumerable + shades of meaning acquired in their transitional use, and immense is the + knowledge of <i>thing:</i> requisite to enable a man to affirm that any + given argument turns wholly on <i>words</i>. The study of terms, for which + logicians have provided multiplied means, is one of the most interesting + and profitable upon which men can enter. If it be worth while to speak at + all, it is worth while to know certainly what we speak about. + </p> + <p> + Philanthropic genius has pointed out a perversion of power, arising + through definitional incapacity, which makes it a moral duty to study + analysis of terms, and exactitude of expression. + </p> + <p> + 'All battle,' says Carlyle, 'is <i>misunderstanding</i>—did the + parties know one another, the battle would cease. No man at bottom means + injustice; he contends for some distorted image of right. <i>Clear</i>, + undeniable right—<i>clear</i>, undeniable might—either of + these, once ascertained, puts an end to battle. Battle is a confused + experiment to ascertain these.' + </p> + <p> + Of the power of names to impose on the multitude, history furnishes too + many examples. Strength to forefend us against they delusion ability to + see that the meaning governs the term, and not the term the meaning—are + species of intellectual self-defence. + </p> + <p> + 'Augustus,' says Gibbon, 'was sensible that mankind is governed by names; + nor was he deceived in his expectation that the senate and people would + submit to slavery provided that they were respectably assured that they + still enjoyed their ancient freedom.' + </p> + <p> + 'Never,' adjures W. J. Fox, 'be deceived by words. Always try to penetrate + to realities. Have your wits sharpened, your senses exercised to discern + good and evil. Be not imposed upon by pompous manners. Many a + solemnly-uttered sentence is often a sheer inanity, which will not bear + the scrutiny of an observant intellect. Be not frightened by + denunciations; by being told that you are not a good subject or a good + Christian, if you do not believe, or say that you believe this or that. Be + not led astray by iteration—mistake not the familiar for the + intelligible. Ascertain what words are meant to convey, and what they + actually do convey. Go to the substance and soul of whatever is + propounded. Be on your guard against bold assumptions, nor let them bear + you away against the dictates of your own understanding. + </p> + <p> + Look at phrases as counters, or paper money, that may pass for much or + little according to circumstances. Endeavour to arrive at truth, and make + that your treasure. Be ever wide awake to see through any veil of + sophistry and cant; nor by the agency of words be made the dupe of critic + or lawyer, of priest of politician.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Lectures to the Working Classes, p. 70, vol. 2. +</pre> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0009" id="link2HCH0009"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER IX. SYLLOGISMS + </h2> + <p> + Propositions being assertions—as soon as sufficient reasons are + adduced to make the proposition credible, it becomes a truth probable or + certain, as the case may be. + </p> + <p> + Reasoning is a simple business. To reason is to state facts in support of + a proposition. A conclusive fact so advanced is called a reason. All the + reasons offered in proof of a proposition are called premises. The + Pythagorean, who lays down the proposition that fruits and grain are the + proper food of man, and cites facts to prove his assertion—reasons. + A proposition and its reasons are called an argument. + </p> + <p> + Reason is the faculty of perceiving coherences. Effective reasoning is + stating them so that others cannot but see them too. 'Reasoning on the + abstrusest questions is nothing more than arriving at a remote truth by + discovering its coherence with the preceding facts in the same chain.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Uses and Beauties of Euclid, p. 52. +</pre> + <p> + A syllogism is a peculiar <i>form</i> of expression, in which every + argument may be stated. It consists of three propositions. + </p> + <p> + 1. Whoever have their heads cut off ought to be allowed to ask the reason + why. + </p> + <p> + 2. Women have their heads cut off. + </p> + <p> + 3. Therefore women ought to be allowed to ask (politically) the reason + why. + </p> + <p> + This is an argument of Mad. de Stael, in allusion to the beheading of + women in France, without allowing them any voice in making the laws which + determine the offences for which they suffered. + </p> + <p> + A syllogism is constructed upon the principle (known as the Dictum of + Aristotle) that whatever is affirmed or denied universally of a whole + class of things, may be affirmed or denied of anything comprehended in + that class. Thus the first proposition introduces the class of persons who + have their heads cut off. Of this class it is affirmed that they ought to + be allowed to ask the reason why. But women are included in the class of + persons who have their heads cut off, and consequently that may be + affirmed of them which is affirmed of the whole class—that they + should be allowed to ask the reason why. + </p> + <p> + 'To prove an affirmative,' says Mr. Mill, 'the argument must admit of + being stated in this form:— + </p> + <p> + All animals are mortal; + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + All men | + Some men } are animals; + Socrates | + + therefore + + All men | + Some men } are mortal. + Socrates | +</pre> + <p> + 'To prove a negative, the argument must be capable of being expressed in + this form:— + </p> + <p> + 'No one who is capable of self-control is necessarily vicious; + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + All negroes | + Some negroes } are capable of self-control; + Mr. A.'s negro | + + therefore + + No negroes are | + Some negroes are not } necessarily vicious. + Mr. A.'s negro is not | +</pre> + <p> + 'Although all ratiocination admits of being thrown into one or the other + of these forms, and sometimes gains considerably by the transformation, + both in clearness and in the obviousness of its consequence; there are, no + doubt, cases in which the argument falls more naturally into one of the + other three figures, and in which its conclusiveness is more apparent at + the first glance in those figures, than when reduced into the first. Thus, + if the proposition were that pagans may be virtuous, and the evidence to + prove it were the example of Aristides; a syllogism in the third figure, + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Aristides was virtuous, + Aristides was a pagan, +</pre> + <p> + therefore + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Some pagan was virtuous, +</pre> + <p> + Would be a more natural mode of stating the argument, and would carry + conviction more instantly home, than the same ratiocination strained into + the first figure, thus— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Aristides was virtuous, + Some pagan was Aristides, +</pre> + <p> + therefore + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Some pagan was virtuous.' +</pre> + <p> + The best thing that can be said in favour of the syllogism, as an + instrument of reasoning, is that it is a regular form to which every valid + argument can be reduced; and may be accompanied by a rule, showing the + validity of every argument in that form, and consequently the unsoundness + of any apparent argument which cannot be reduced to it. This would be high + praise if every 'valid argument' was a trusty one. But unfortunately 'the + question respecting the validity of an argument is not whether the + conclusion be <i>true</i>, but whether it <i>follows</i> from the premises + adduced.'* Even this small advantage is purchased at a greater expense of + tedium and trouble than the bulk of mankind are willing to pay, or able to + pay if they were willing. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Logic, vol. 1, pp. 232-3. +</pre> + <p> + There is some reason to believe that the syllogistic form, as a <i>test</i> + of valid arguments, may be entirely dispensed with, if we can secure + accuracy of data, and intelligibility in terms. + </p> + <p> + It is not contended now that we discover new truths by the syllogism. The + syllogism is allowed to be only a form of <i>stating</i> a truth. Example:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + No predacious animals are ruminant, + The lion is predacious, +</pre> + <p> + therefore + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + The lion is not ruminant. + + * Whately's Logic, Anal. Out. chap. 1, sec. 3. +</pre> + <p> + Of course, if we know that no animal that lives by prey chews the cud, and + know, also, that the lion lives by prey, we know that the lion does not + chew the cud. This conclusion, as Lord Kames contends, and Dr. Whately + admits, is not a truth <i>inferred</i> from the fundamental premises, but + <i>included</i> in it. Smart, whom Mr. J. S. Mill calls acute and often + profound, remarks—'Every one, as to the <i>mere</i> act of + reasoning, <i>reasons rightly</i>: we may reason from wrong premises, or + mistake right ones; we may be unable to infer from proper ones; but from + such premises as we do reason from, we reason <i>correctly</i>: for all + premises contain their conclusion; and in knowing the premises, we + therefore know the conclusion. The art wanted is one that will enable us + to use language perspicuously in expressing our premises:' and he might + have added—<i>direct us in selecting proper materials of which to + make premises</i>. + </p> + <p> + The strength and weakness of the syllogism as an instrument of reasoning + will now be understood. Whately remarks, that 'since all reasoning may be + resolved into syllogisms, and since in a syllogism the premises do + virtually assert the conclusion, it follows at once that no new truth can + be elicited by any process of reasoning.'* We therefore no longer look to + the syllogism to discover truth, its value is in stating it. In this sense + it is worthy of all attention. It is the form of nature. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Logic, p. 223. +</pre> + <p> + Of such a syllogism as the one quoted— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + No predacious animals are ruminant, + The lion is predacious, +</pre> + <p> + therefore + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + The lion is not ruminant. +</pre> + <p> + It has been insisted by some logicians that the genius required for its + construction was <i>invention</i>. Having made a general proposition like + the first, we then have to invent or find out a middle term as the second—but + if we bear in mind that the general affirmation of the first proposition + relates to a class of (predacious animals in this case) objects which + include the middle term, the necessity of invention is consequently + dispensed with. We need only look well to what we have there. Simplicity + will be promoted by returning to our previous remark, viz.—that + reasoning is asserting a proposition, and then showing why it is true—in + other words, adducing the fact or facts, on which the assertion rests. + </p> + <p> + In the Logic given in 'Chambers' Information,' it is said—' In + choosing your middle terms, or arguments to prove any question, always + take such topics as are purest and least fallible, and which carry the + greatest evidence and strength with them,' But it rather appears that we + have not to invent a middle term, but only to look to the major premises, + and find it included there. + </p> + <p> + By methodical questioning any argument may be tested. Thus, on any + assertion being made, ask—Why is the assertion true? In this manner, + if an argument has truth in it, it may be elicited. In this manner you dig + through assertions down to premises, and discover whether any ore of truth + lies there. + </p> + <p> + The value of the argument depends upon the final answer which reveals the + premises or data of facts, upon which the conclusion rests. Forms of + speech, classification of propositions, figures of syllogisms, are of + minor importance when you have once elicited the rough truth. The best + test of an argument is the soundness of its data, and the simplest formula + for drawing out and exhibiting such data, is of the greatest service in + enabling us to judge of the validity thereof. + </p> + <p> + Tyranny, says Cobbett, has no enemy so formidable as the pen, Why? + 'Because the pen pursues tyranny both in life and beyond the grave.' How + is this proved to be the most formidable enemy of tyranny? 'From the fact + that tyranny has no enemy so formidable as that which assails not only its + existence, but its reputation, which pursues it in life and beyond the + grave.' Such interrogatories and replies generate the expository + syllogism. + </p> + <p> + 1. Tyranny has no enemy so formidable as that which assails not only its + existence, but its reputation, which pursues it in life and beyond the + grave. + </p> + <p> + 2. The pen pursues tyranny in life and beyond the grave. + </p> + <p> + 3. Therefore, tyranny has no enemy so formidable as the pen. A syllogism + is made up of collective and single facts. It is the process of reasoning, + whereby we show that a single truth is proved by a collective one which + contains it, or a less quantity is proved by a greater, or that an + assertion is proved by an induction from a class of facts. From the class + of the enemies of tyranny the pen is selected, and is proved, by passing + in inductive review the whole class, to be the most formidable. + </p> + <p> + The usual manner in which an argument is presented is called the + entihymeme. Thus:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + He is an industrious man, +</pre> + <p> + therefore + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + He will acquire wealth. +</pre> + <p> + The first or major proposition is in this form suppressed. The syllogistic + form would be this:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Every industrious man acquires wealth, + He is an industrious man, +</pre> + <p> + therefore + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + He will acquire wealth. +</pre> + <p> + But if we ask for the proof that every industrious man acquires wealth, we + find the facts wanting—for the idle are often rich, and the diligent + poor. The industrious <i>may</i> acquire wealth, the chances are in their + favour. + </p> + <p> + Again. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + We must cherish self-respect, + Because self-respect is the stay of virtue. +</pre> + <p> + The suppressed proposition is—'We must cherish whatever is the stay + of virtue.' + </p> + <p> + The whole syllogism then stands thus:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + We must cherish whatever is the stay of virtue, + Self-respect is the stay of virtue, +</pre> + <p> + therefore + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + We must cherish self-respect. +</pre> + <p> + Dilemma is derived from a Greek word, and signifies twice an argument. It + is an argument divided into several members, and infers of each part what + is to be inferred of the whole. Thus: Either we shall live or die. If we + live, we can only live happily by being virtuous; and if we die, we can + only die happy by being virtuous; therefore, we ought always to be + virtuous. In the dilemma, question one argument at a time, as in preceding + cases. + </p> + <p> + The Sorites uses several middle terms by which the predicate of the last + proposition is connected with the first subject. Of this argument the + well-known speech of Themistocles is a specimen. 'My son,' said that + eminent person, 'governs his mother, his mother governs me, I govern the + Athenians, the Athenians govern Greece, Greece governs Europe, and Europe + governs the world; therefore, my son governs the world.' In these + instances, question each assertion, as there are as many acts of reasoning + as intermediate propositions. + </p> + <p> + The Onus Probandi, or Burden of Proof, is said to rest with him who would + dispute any point in favour of a presumptive, or generally allowed truth. + But manly logic holds no quibbling about who shall prove. Whatever he + asserts, the honest reasoner should be prompt to prove. + </p> + <p> + Chalmers, it is said, made Morell known—but Morell has written a + synopsis of metaphysical philosophy that only needed to be known to be + appreciated. If Chalmers gave Morell distinction, Morell had previously + earned it. From his work I extract the following passage, which passes in + review the steps taken, marks the analytic point reached, and outlines the + ground before us:—'Different as were the minds of those two great + men [Bacon and Descartes] in themselves, different as were their + respective labours, and opposite as were, in many respects, the results at + which they arrived, yet the writings of both were marked by one and the + same great characteristic, namely, by the <i>spirit of method</i>. The + most important works of Bacon, it will be remembered, were the + "Instanratio Magna," and the "Novum Organum;" those of Descartes were his + "Dissertatio de Methodo," and his "Meditationes de Prima Philosophia," The + fruitlessness of the ancient logic, as an instrument of discovery, had + been abundantly proved by past experience, and the watchword which these + two great thinkers of their age both uttered, and which has been ever + since the guiding principle of all philosophy, was—analysis. Bacon, + who gave his attention chiefly to the direction and improvement of + physical science, taught to analyse nature, while Descartes, who aimed + rather at grounding all human knowledge upon its ultimate principles, + instructed how to analyse <i>thought</i>. All modern philosophy, + therefore, whether it arise from the Baconian or the Cartesian point of + view, bears upon it the broad outline of the analytic method. It matters + not whether it be the outer or the inner world to which its investigations + apply, in each case it teaches us to observe and analyse <i>facts</i> to + induce instances, and upon such observation and induction to ground our + knowledge of laws and principles. In this alone consists the Unity of + modern science, and from this arises its broad distinction from that of + the ancient world. Every natural philosopher since Bacon has grounded his + success upon an induction of the facts of the outward world, and every + metaphysician, since Descartes, has progressed onwards in his department + of knowledge by analysing the facts of our inward consciousness.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Morell: Modern Philosophy, pp. 76-8. +</pre> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0010" id="link2HCH0010"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER X. INDUCTION + </h2> + <p> + Induction is an inference from many facts. Induction is verification. Just + as in a syllogism we show that a part is contained in the whole, so in + induction we show that a part is illustrated by the whole. It seems that + every single fact contains many truths, but induction establishes their <i>universality</i>. + A single brain contains all the truths of phrenology, a single stone + includes the phenomena of gravitation, the temperance of a single + individual exhibits the whole law of moderation, but we learn the + universality of these truths by induction. + </p> + <p> + Every legal statute, says Dr. Johnson, is founded on induction. 'Law is + the science in which the greatest powers of understanding are applied to + the greatest number of facts.' The <i>basis of all</i> science is such an + extensive induction of particulars as leads to general definitions and + fundamental axioms, and furnishes the premises from which inferences may + be deduced. + </p> + <p> + Inductive observation is the great instrument of discovering important + truths. 'What are called the principles of human nature are learned from + individual instances. It is the only possible way of learning them. * * + When we reason from a general law or principle, we are in truth reasoning + from a number of instances represented by It.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Rationale of Political Representation, p. 34. +</pre> + <p> + A general election is an induction of the intelligence of the country + represented by the members of Parliament. The difference between democracy + and monarchy is in one sense an affair of logic. Where electors are + limited in franchise, and candidates restricted by property qualification, + the induction is partial, but where all can vote and many can be chosen + from, the premises are more capacious and the inference sounder. + </p> + <p> + Dr. Whately says, that 'in Natural Philosophy a <i>single instance</i> is + often accounted a <i>sufficient</i> induction; e.g., having once + ascertained that an individual magnet will attract iron, we are authorised + to conclude that this property is universal.' + </p> + <p> + 'The Edinburgh Reviewer of Whewell's "History of the Inductive Sciences," + observes that, "by the <i>accidental</i> placing of a rhomb of calcareous + spar, upon a book or line, Bartholinus discovered the property of the + double refraction of light. By <i>accidentally</i> combining two rhombs in + different positions, Huygens discovered the polarisation of light. By <i>accidentally</i> + looking through a prism of the same substance, and turning it round, Mains + discovered the polarisation of light by reflection; and by placing thin + chrystalline films between two similar prisms or rhombs, M. Arago + discovered the phenomena of polarised tints." + </p> + <p> + 'To this Mr. Whewell, in his "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," makes + the following reply:—"But Bartholinus could have seen no such + consequence in the accident, if he had not previously had a clear + conception of single refraction. A lady, in describing an optical + experiment which had been shown her, said of her teacher, 'he told me to + increase and diminish the angle of refraction: and, at last, I found that + he only meant me to move my head up and down.' At any rate, till the lady + had acquired a knowledge of the meaning which the technical terms convey, + she could not have made Bartholinus's discovery by means of this accident. + Suppose that Huygens made the experiment alluded to, without design, what + he really observed was that the images appeared and disappeared + alternately as he turned the rhomb round. His success depended on his + clearness of thought, which enabled him to perform the intellectual + analysis which would never have occurred to most men, however often they + had combined two rhombs in different positions. Malus saw that in some + positions the light reflected from the windows of the Louvre became dim. + Another person would have attributed this to accident; he, however, + considered the position of the prism, and the window; repeated the + experiment often; and by virtue of the eminently distinct conceptions of + space which he possessed, resolved the phenomenon into its geometrical + conditions."* "If it were true, that the fall of an apple was the occasion + of Newton's pursuing that train of thought which led to the doctrine of + universal gravitation, the habits and constitution of Newton's intellect + were the real source of this great event in the progress of knowledge."** + "In whatever manner facts may be presented to the notice of a discoverer, + they can never become the materials of exact knowledge, except they find + his mind already provided with precise and suitable conceptions, by which + they may be analysed and connected."'*** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Whewell: Phil. Induct. Sciences, vol. 2. pp. 199-1. + + ** Ibid, vol. 2, p. 189. + + *** See J. N. Bailey's Essays pp. 87-8-9. +</pre> + <p> + These admissions seem to me to prove that whenever a casual fact proves to + us a new truth, it does so by its coincidence with previously known facts, + and that the novelty of the occasion attracts all credit to itself, and we + lose sight of the generalisation below—the fruitful soil of + experience on which the new fact, like a seed, falls. We only recognise + difference by comparison, and the comparison is an induction, however + slender. + </p> + <p> + Monsieur de Montmorine was recaptured and brought to the scaffold, through + the trifling circumstance of some chicken bones being found near the door + of his landlady—a woman too poor to indulge in such dainties.* The + discovery of de Montmorine was not, as at first sight appears, an + inference from a single fact, but from an adjacent induction. It was a + general truth, (known to the party who observed the bones) a truth + inducted from a number of facts that poor people could not afford to + luxuriate on chickens. It was, therefore, from this induction, inferred + that some one of superior fortune must be living in that particular place. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Chambers' Miscellany of Useful and Entertaining Tracts, + No. 61: the Story of Lavaiette, p. 27 +</pre> + <p> + The judicious care which the great fathers of science have exhibited in + making their inferences, incontestably establishes their conviction of the + danger of any other reasoning than that from inductions. Lord Brougham + informs us, that what Newton's Principia is to science, Locke's essay to + metaphysics, Demosthenes in oratory, and Homer in poetry, Cuvier's + researches to our fossil osteology. But Cuvier never attempted to draw any + inferences until he had examined the <i>whole</i> osteology of the living + species. + </p> + <p> + Lord Brougham remarks, that 'from examining a <i>single</i> fragment of + bone we infer that, in the wilds where we found it, there lived and + ranged, some thousands of years ago, an animal of a peculiar kind.' This + is a case in which the inference spoken of is arrived at in a way + different from that apparently stated. We recognise in the 'fragment of + bone' a link in a chain of facts constituting the basis of a well-known + induction, which comparative anatomy has many times verified. It is + important to distinguish well the grounds from which accurate inferences, + such as these in the cases before us, have really been adduced, in order + to ascertain the grounds from which we should reason generally. It will be + found that solid reasoning can only proceed from general rules—i.e., + inductions from facts. It will be found that the prime source of fallacy + lies in reasoning from isolated facts. It is not to be denied that such + reasoning is sometimes right, but it is to be remembered that it is right + by accident, not by design. There is no science or certainty in it. It is + hazard, not logic. + </p> + <p> + This habit however, is very common. Mr. Mill says, that 'Not only <i>may</i> + we reason from particulars to particulars, without passing through + generals, but we perpetually do so reason. All our earliest inferences are + of this nature. From the first dawn of intelligence we draw inferences, + but years elapse before we learn the use of general language. The child, + who, having burnt his fingers, avoids to thrust them again into the fire, + has reasoned or inferred, though he has never thought of the general maxim—fire + burns. He knows from memory that he has been burnt, and on this evidence + believes, when he sees a candle, that if he puts his fingers into the + flame of it, he will be burnt again. He believes this in every case which + happens to arise; but without looking, in each instance, beyond the + present case. He is not generalising; he is inferring a particular from + particulars. In the same way, also, brutes reason. There is little or no + ground, for attributing to any of the lower animals the use of + conventional signs, without which general propositions are impossible. But + those animals profit by experience, and avoid what they have found to + cause them pain, in the same manner, though not always with the same + skill, as a human creature. Not only the burnt child, but the burnt dog, + dreads the fire. + </p> + <p> + 'I believe that, in point of fact, when drawing inferences from our + personal experience, and not from maxims handed down to us by books or + tradition, we much oftener conclude from particulars to particulars + directly, than through the intermediate agency of any general proposition. + We are constantly reasoning from ourselves to other people, or from one + person to another, without giving ourselves the trouble to erect our + observations into general maxims of human or external nature. When we + conclude that some person will, on some given occasion, feel or act so and + so, we sometimes judge from an enlarged consideration of the manner in + which men in general, or men of some particular character, are accustomed + to feel and act; but much oftener from having known the feelings and + conduct of the same man in some previous instance, or from considering how + we should feel or act ourselves. It is not only the village matron who, + when called to a consultation upon the case of a neighbour's child, + pronounces on the evil and its remedy simply on the recollection and + authority of what she accounts the similar case of her Lucy. We all, where + we have no definite maxims to steer by, guide ourselves in the same way; + and if we have an extensive experience, and retain its impressions + strongly, we may acquire, in this manner, a very considerable power of + accurate judgment, which we may be utterly incapable of justifying or of + communicating to others. Among the higher order of practical intellects, + there have been many of whom it was remarked how admirably they suited + their means to their ends, without being able to give any sufficient + reasons for what they did and applied, or seemed to apply, recondite + principles which they were wholly unable to state. This is a natural + consequence of having a mind stored with appropriate particulars, and + having been long accustomed to reason at once from these to fresh + particulars, without practising the habit of stating to oneself or to + others the corresponding general propositions. An old warrior, on a rapid + glance at the outlines of the ground, is able at once to give the + necessary orders for a skilful arrangement of his troops; though if he has + received little theoretical instruction, and has seldom been called upon + to answer to other people for his conduct, he may never have had in his + mind a single general theorem respecting the relation between ground and + array. But his experience of encampments, under circumstances more or less + similar, has left a number of vivid, unexpressed, ungeneralised analogies + in his mind, the most appropriate of which, instantly suggesting itself, + determines him to a judicious arrangement. + </p> + <p> + 'The skill of an uneducated person in the use of weapons, or of tools, is + of a precisely similar nature. The savage who executes unerringly the + exact throw which brings down his game, or his enemy, in the manner most + suited to his purpose, under the operation of all the conditions + necessarily involved, the weight and form of the weapon, the direction and + distance of the object, the action of the wind, &c., owes this power + to a long series of previous experiments, the results of which he + certainly never framed into any verbal theorems or rules. It is the same + in all extraordinary manual dexterity. Not long ago a Scotch manufacturer + procured from England, at a high rate of wages, a working dyer, famous for + producing very fine colours, with a view of teaching to his other workmen + the same skill. The workman came; but his mode of proportioning the + ingredients, in which lay the secret of the effects he produced, was by + taking them up in handfuls while the common method was to weigh them. The + manufacturer sought to make him turn his handling system into an + equivalent weighing system, that the general principle of his peculiar + mode of proceeding might be ascertained. This, however, the man found + himself quite unable to do, and therefore could impart his skill to + nobody. He had, from the individual cases of his own experience, + established a connection in his mind between fine effects of colour, and + tactual perceptions in handling his dyeing materials; and from these + perceptions he could, in any particular cases, infer the means to be + employed, and the effect which would be produced, but could not put others + in possession of the grounds on which he proceeded, from having never + generalised them in his own mind, or expressed them in language. + </p> + <p> + 'Almost every one knows Lord Mansfield's advice to a man of practical good + sense, who, being appointed governor of a colony, had to preside in its + court of justice, without previous judicial practice or legal education. + The advice was to give his decision boldly, for it would probably be + right; but never to venture on assigning reasons, for they would almost + infallibly be wrong. In cases like this, which are of no uncommon + occurrence, it would be absurd to suppose that the bad reason was the + source of the good decision. Lord Mansfield knew that if any reason were + assigned it would be necessarily an afterthought, the judge being <i>in + fact</i> guided by impressions from past experience, without the + circuitous process of framing general principles from them, and that if he + attempted to frame any such he would assuredly fail. Lord Mansfield, + however, would not have doubted that a man of equal experience, who had + also a mind stored with general propositions derived by legitimate + induction from that experience, would have been greatly preferable as a + judge, to one, however sagacious, who could not be trusted with the + explanation and justification of his own judgments. The cases of able men + performing wonderful things they know not how, are examples of the less + civilised and most spontaneous form of the operations of superior minds It + is a <i>defect in them</i>, and <i>often a source of errors</i>, not to + have generalised as they went on; but generalisation is a help, the most + important indeed of all helps, yet not an essential.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Mill's Logic, pp. 251-5. +</pre> + <p> + In illustration of generalising from single instances, Miss Martineau + gives this example:—'A raw Chinese traveller in England was landed + by a Thames waterman who had a wooden leg. The stranger saw that the + wooden leg was used to stand in the water with, while the other was high + and dry. The apparent economy of the fact struck the Chinese; he saw in it + strong evidence of design, and wrote home that in England one-legged men + are kept for watermen, to the saving of all injury to health, shoe, and + stocking, from standing in the river.'* + </p> + <p> + Reasoning on insufficient data— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Falls like an inverted cone, + Wanting its proper base to stand upon. +</pre> + <p> + Samuel Bailey has furnished, in one passage, both a clear illustration of + the process, and the validity of an induction:—'Whoever had + witnessed the acts of a landlord to his tenants, of a schoolmaster to his + pupils, of artizans towards their apprentices, of husbands towards their + wives, on points where the power of the superior could not be contested, + and where his personal gratification was incompatible with just conduct to + the subordinate, would necessarily have formed in his own mind a species + of general rule; and from this rule he might safely draw an inference as + to what would be the conduct of a despot, seated on a throne, in the + possession of unchecked authority; assisted too, as the inquirer would be, + by that <i>indispensable and inestimable guide to the knowledge of + mankind, an appeal to his own feelings</i>, in a variety of <i>analogous</i> + instances. + </p> + <p> + 'We conclude, that a ruler with uncontrolled power will act the tyrant, + not merely from the fact that Caligula, or Nero, or Bonaparte did, but + from a thousand facts attesting that men, in, every situation, use + uncontrolled power in this way—just as we infer that all bodies tend + to the centre of the earth, <i>not merely from the circumstance of an + apple dropping from a tree, but from seeing the tendency in stones, water, + animals, and all things within our observation</i>. The use of + uncontrolled power, for the gratification of the possessor, without an + equitable respect to others, is no more peculiar to monarchs, than a + tendency to the earth is peculiar to apples. It may be useful to know that + <i>monarchs</i> act in this way, as it may be useful to know that apples + drop to the ground; but it is much more useful to know that <i>men</i> act + in this manner. <i>An inference is safer when gathered from the widest + induction.'</i> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * How to Observe, p. 6. + + ** Rationale of Political Representation. Introduction, pp. + 85-6. The last sentence of this extract is abridged—but, as + the reader will find upon reference, the sense of the author + is faithfully rendered. +</pre> + <p> + It may be useful to observe that, though a few instances are insufficient + to establish a theory, one may be sufficient to overturn a theory, + fancifully or hypothetically supported, Gibbon overturns the entertaining + theory of Rudbeck, an antiquarian of Upsal, of profound learning and easy + faith, who, by the dim light of legends and traditions, of conjectures and + etymologies, sought to establish the antiquity of Sweden over half the + earth. Gibbon annihilated this well laboured system of German antiquities, + by a single fact too well attested to admit of any doubt, and of too + decisive a nature to leave room for any reply—the fact that the + Germans, of the age of Tacitus, were unacquainted with the use of letters. + A circumstance fatal to their literary claims, urged by Olaus Rudbeck. + </p> + <p> + In the chapter on 'Facts' I have cautioned the reader against unquestioned + data. This seems the place to remark that the unsuspected sources of error + and unfriendliness have their rise in the criminal implicitness with which + we listen to reports, and infer from rumours as from facts. These are the + very little handles which move men and women to strange performances.'* + All the plots of dramas and romances are founded on misunderstandings, + which a little sagacity of action (such as a wise resolution not to be + imposed upon would lead to) would commonly suffice to arrest the error at + its birth. With regard to character we constantly infer from data, + partial, limited, and doubtful. If most quarrelers were called into a + court of Inquiry to confess the real grounds from which they have arrived + at certain conclusions with regard to their neighbours, and often with + regard to their friends, they would be at once overwhelmed with a + conviction of the weakness of which they have been guilty. Upon analysing + the miserable sources of opinions of which scandal and calumny are born, I + have found it impossible to restrain astonishment at the imbecility of + logical power men will sometimes be content to exhibit, where meanness + prevails, malice incites, and passion governs. Well might Bacon exclaim—'Doth + any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men's minds, vain opinions, + flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations, and the like, but it + would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things?'** The wise + rule is, never judge from appearances when facts can be had—never + receive a report without challenging its foundation, nor adopt it without + permission to give the authority. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Cricket on the Hearth. + + ** Essay on Truth. +</pre> + <p> + In all cases, in which you must judge from appearances and reason from + conjectures, adopt the <i>fairest</i> interpretation possible. On this + principle, credit will sometimes be given where none is due—but in + nine cases out of ten, justice will be done, for I am satisfied that there + is more worth among men than wisdom, and that we do well much oftener than + we reason well. We seldom need judge charitably, did we always endeavour + to judge justly. But we make a virtue of our own errors, and we often + affect to <i>condescend</i> to pronounce an opinion, which it would be + criminal to withhold. If ever I go to the Herald's, office, the motto I + will have emblazoned shall be this—Justice is sufficient. Could we + only get justice in the world, we could afford to excuse it all its + 'charity' of judgment, and its benevolence even of act. + </p> + <p> + Where should a man's reputation be safe from suspicion if not in the hands + of his friend? It ought to be a principle of action with all men, never to + judge a friend except out of his own mouth. 'There was a generous friend + of mine once, who never would have judged me or any other man unheard.'* + With the sublime intensity of one who felt the infinite value of private + justice, has Schiller delineated this spirit in the interview between + Octavio and his son Max Piccolomini. After a violent and visible struggle + with his feelings—wrought upon by his father's endeavours to sow + suspicions in his mind, and detach him from the service of his friend, + Wallenstein—Max exclaims:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Edward to Mr. Peerybing. +</pre> + <p> + I will procure me light a shorter way. Farewell. + </p> + <p> + Octavio. Where now? + </p> + <p> + Max. (To the Duke.) + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + If thou hast believed that I shall act + A part in this thy play—— + Thou hast miscalculated on me grievously. + My way must be straight on. + True with the tongue, + False with the heart—I may not, cannot be: + Nor can I suffer that a man should trust me— + As his friend trust me—and then lull my conscience + With such low pleas as these:—"I ask him not— + He did it all at his own hazard—and + My mouth has never lied to him."—No, no + What a friend takes me for, that I must be. + —I'll to the Duke; ere yet this day is ended + Will I demand of him that he do save + His good name from the world, and with one stride + Break through and rend this fine-spun web of yours. + He can, he will!—I still am his believer. + Yet I'll not pledge myself, but that those letters + May furnish you, perchance, with proofs against him. + How far may not this Tertsky have proceeded— + What may not he himself too have permitted + Himself to do, to snare the enemy, + The laws of war excusing? Nothing, save + His own mouth shall convict him—nothing less! + And face to face will I go question him. + Ay—this state-policy? O how I curse it! + You will some time, with your state-policy, + Compel him to the measure; it may happen + Because ye are <i>determined</i> that he is guilty, + Guilty ye'll make him. All retreat cut off, + You close up every outlet, hem him in + Narrower and narrower, till at length ye force him— + Yes, ye,—ye force him in his desperation, + To set fire to his prison. Father! father! + That never can end well—it cannot—will not! + Deem of it what thou wilt; but pardon me, + That I must bear me on in my own way. + All must remain pure betwixt him and me; + And, ere the day-light dawns, it must be known + Which I must lose—my father, or my friend.* + + * Shiller's Piccolomini, act 3, scene 9. +</pre> + <p> + Had Othello been thus honourable to Desdemona, he would never have + murdered her. Incalculable is the evil we bring on ourselves and society, + by supposing and surmising facts we ought resolutely to question. The + motto of the garter— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Evil be to him who evil thinks, +</pre> + <p> + ought to be, + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Evil is to him who evil thinks. +</pre> + <p> + Every man will be his own Lawyer and his own Doctor, and such is the + perversity of human nature, he will also be his own <i>Iago</i>, and feed + himself with suspicions. Nearly all tragedies hinge on this error. + </p> + <p> + To avoid being the cause of misunderstanding to others, it is a good rule + never to speak critically of others, except in their presence, or in + print. When I am obliged to do this in conversation, with persons of + unknown or doubtful exactitude, I take care to keep much below the truth + in matters of censure, as anything of that kind may gain ten or twenty per + cent, in carriage. When with men of just habits of interpretation, I pay + them the highest compliment of friendship, and speak to them of others, + without reserve. + </p> + <p> + Notorious are the contumelies put upon the cases of grievance presented + from the people in the House of Commons. Nor is it altogether causeless. + So prone are the ignorant to mistake their prejudices for facts, and + ascribe to others as crimes what exists only in their own surmises, that + most popular cases may be stripped of half their pretensions without + injuring their truth. Exaggeration is the vice of ignorance. Half the + speeches addressed to 'King Mob' are hyperbolic. The sentiments of public + meetings minister too often to the prevalent inflation. The people will be + powerful when they learn to be exact—and not till then. + </p> + <p> + The only mode of correcting this evil is to instil into the people the + wise rule of Burlamiqui. To reason, (that is, inductively) says this + writer, is to calculate, and as it were draw up an account, after + balancing all arguments, in order to see on which side the advantage lies. + Burlamiqui had law chiefly in view in his remark, but the rule is of + immense application. A logician is a secretary or banker's clerk, who + keeps an account between truth and error. When a lady once consulted Dr. + Johnson on the degree of turpitude to be attached to her son's robbing an + orchard—'Madam,' said Johnson, 'it all depends upon the weight of + the boy. I remember my schoolfellow, Davy Garrick, who was always a little + fellow, robbing a dozen orchards with impunity, but the very first time I + climbed up an apple tree, for I was always a heavy boy, the bough broke + with me, and it was called a judgment. I suppose that is why Justice is + represented with a pair of scales.' This may not be the precise reason why + Justice has a pair of scales, but the point goes to the root of the + matter. Without weighing there can be neither justice nor fair induction. + </p> + <p> + In illustration of these views Mr. Mill has some able remarks:—'In + proportion to any person's deficiency of knowledge and mental cultivation, + is generally his inability to discriminate between his inferences and the + perceptions on which they were grounded. + </p> + <p> + Many a marvellous tale many a scandalous anecdote, owes its origin to this + incapacity. The narrater relates, not what he saw or heard, but the + impression which he derived from what he saw or heard, and of which + perhaps the greater part consisted of inference, though the whole is + related not as inference but as matter-of-fact. The difficulty of inducing + witnesses to restrain, within any moderate limits, the intermixture of + their inferences with the narrative of their perceptions, is well known to + experienced cross-examiners; and still more is this the case when ignorant + persons attempt to describe any natural phenomenon. "The simplest + narrative," says Dugald Stewart, "of the most illiterate observer involves + more or less of hypothesis nay, in general, it will be found that, in + proportion to his ignorance, the greater is the number of conjectural + principle involved in his statements. A village apothecary (and, if + possible, in a still greater degree, an experienced nurse) is seldom able + to describe; the plainest case, without employing a phraseology of which + every word is a theory; whereas a simple and genuine specification of the + phenomena which mark a particular disease—a specification + unsophisticated by fancy, or by preconceived opinions, may be regarded as + unequivocal evidence of a mind trained by long and successful study to the + most difficult of all arts, that of the faithful <i>interpretation</i> of + nature."'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Logic, pp. 408-9, vol. 2. +</pre> + <p> + It is in judgments formed, in reprehensible indifference to the actual + facts of the case, that party rancour and the proverbial injustice of + popular political opinion take their rise. A useful caution on this head + is pronounced by Lord Brougham in his sketch of the life of Lord + Wellesley:—'How often do we see,' observes his lordship, 'vehement: + and unceasing; attacks made upon a minister or a statesman, perhaps not in + the public service, for something which he does not choose to defend or + explain, resting his claims to the confidence of his countrymen upon his + past exertions and his known character. Yet these assaults are + unremittingly made upon him, and the people believe that so much noise + could not be stirred up without something to authorise it. Sometimes the + objects of the calumny are silent from disdain; sometimes from knowing + that the base propagators of it will only return to their slander the more + eagerly alter their conviction of falsehood; but sometimes, also, the + silencer may be owing to official reserve, of which we see a most + remarkable instance in the ease of Lord Wellesly.' + </p> + <p> + Not only are enemies of the people afforded a justification for their + opposition by wrongful judgment pronounced upon them, but the friends of + the people often pass over to the other side through the same cause. When + a leader of the people first comes in personal contact with the opposite + party, and becomes acquainted with merits of feeling and judgment which he + had as it were pledged himself to deny, and indeed achieved himself a + position by disbelieving in, he becomes ashamed of the injustice exacted + from him by his inexorable adherents, and forsakes his party when he + should only forsake its errors. The case of Barnave, in the first French + Revolution, is a memorable instance of this. On lesser theatres I have + seen many instances of this kind of conversion; Such changes have always + been ascribed to venality, yet they are men of generous instincts who are + thus overcome—but they want logical strength, and cannot correct + themselves without falling. + </p> + <p> + It is a wise rule in conversation, never to guess at meanings. When, an + observation is made, capable of affording two inferences, at once put the + question which shall elicit the meaning intended. Conversation is held to + no purpose unless explicitness comes out of it. Innumerable are the errors + that arise through letting remarks pass, of which we only <i>suppose</i> + we know the purport. This is a fruitful source of misunderstanding. When + in Scotland I was much instructed by the intellectual characteristics of + the people. The Scotch are essentially a reflective people. The English + conceive doubts, but the Scotch put them into queries. Before I had been + in the country many hours I was struck by the inductive habits of the + people. A very old and illiterate woman, to whom I put an indefinite + question, eyed me deliberately from head to foot before she gave me an + answer. Not in rudeness did she gaze, so much as in inquiry as to what + could be my object. I spent more than a week in inquiring at places, where + apartments were to be let, by which I acquired profitable acquaintance + with the people. Upon asking the terms of apartments, I was met, in all + cases, by several preliminary questions, as for whom were they? what + number of persons? what station, habits, and probable stay? Then I + received the precise answer required. It did not seem to me that they were + answering one question by asking another, as is sometimes said of the + Scotch—but by a happy and wise presence of mind they asked, as all + should do, at many questions as were required to complete the data of the + specific answer they were called upon to give. + </p> + <p> + A wise practice is followed in courts of law. No judge pronounces an + opinion on a hypothetical case. What he would do? or what would be the + judgment of the law, suppose a certain case should arise?—are + questions he never condescends to answer. 'Bring the plaintiff into court, + let the evidence be taken, and then we will decide. We sit here to judge + actual, not suppositious cases.' Such would be the reply. People out of + court might profit by the example. + </p> + <p> + I remember one striking instance of the pernicious effects of surmise. + Some years ago I took part in a Fraternal Demonstration at Highbury Barn. + The assembly was numerous, and composed of persons of all nations and all + parties. The celebration was avowedly one of fraternity. The tone of the + meeting reflected its object. Pacific words were on every tongue, and + harmony reigned up till eleven o'clock. At that hour Monsieur Chillman + asked me if some steps could not be taken to annualize the meeting, and he + requested me to prepare and propose a resolution to that effect. Monsieur + Chillman, thinking the resolution ought to come from an Englishman, + strongly urged me to move it. I, thinking it too important to emanate from + a young man, looked about for a person of experience and known discretion + to introduce it. After several had declined, Mr. Hetherington undertook + it. The English politicians were composed of two parties, the friends of + Mr. O'Connor, and the members of the National Hall. At that time they were + pleased to be the antipodes of each other. No sooner had Mr. Hetherington + spoken, he being the friend of Mr. Lovett, than his motion was supposed to + come from Mr. Lovett's party, though they were utterly ignorant of its + origination. Clamour's hundred tongues were loosened. Slumbering + differences were awakened. Suspicion spread like an infection. Fraternity + perished of the contagion. Twenty amendments were proposed, and it was not + till midnight, and then in a storm indescribably contradictory of the + meeting's whole purport, that a common understanding was come to. Had the + least inquiry been made by the objecting party, previously to dissenting, + they would have found that the suspicious proposition originated with one + of themselves. But assuming premises, they inferred from conjecture + instead of fact, and raised disastrous doubts as to the ability of that + assembly for domestic or international fraternisation. + </p> + <p> + The use and abuse of authority Is a subject worthy of the young logician's + serious attention. Many great writers like Bacon, through policy—Burke + through position, or Shakspere through versatility of genius, have written + on both sides of important questions. Such men, taken piece-meal, may be + quoted by the most opposite parties in favour of the most opposite + opinions. Unless there is time to make a broad induction from their + writings, showing, by weighty, quantitive evidence, the side to which they + leaned, better not quote them as <i>authorities</i> at all, but give what + expresses your own views on your own responsibility—indeed, in <i>all</i> + cases, the quoter ought to stand prepared, if possible, to justify all he + cites from another in argument. 'There is perhaps something weak and + servile in our wishing to rely on, or draw assistance from, ancient + opinions. Reason ought not, like vanity, to adorn herself with old + parchments, and the display of a genealogical tree; more dignified in her + proceedings, she ought to derive everything from herself; she should + disregard past times, and be, if I may use the phrase, the contemporary of + all ages.'* Quote others as Grotius did: not as judges from whose decision + there is no appeal, but as witnesses whose conspiring testimony confirms + the view taken. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Necker. +</pre> + <p> + Analogy has frequently been confounded with induction. Analogy signifies + reasoning from resemblances subsisting between phenomena—induction, + reasoning from the sameness of phenomena. + </p> + <p> + The phenomena affording an induction of a law of nature must be obvious, + uniform, and universal. + </p> + <p> + The rules to be observed in deducing general principles are, that the case + be true and the facts universal. + </p> + <p> + On this subject, as exhibiting the clearest results arrived at, I + transcribe a passage from Mill: 'There is no word which is used more + loosely, or in a greater variety of senses, than analogy. It sometimes + stands for arguments which may be examples of the most rigid induction. + Archbishop Whately, for instance, following Ferguson and other writers, + defines analogy conformably to its primitive acceptation, that which was + given to it by mathematicians, resemblance of relations. In this sense, + when a country which has sent out colonies is termed the mother country, + the expression is analogical, signifying that the colonies of a country + stand in the same <i>relation</i> to her in which children stand to their + parents. And if any inference be drawn from this resemblance of relations, + as, for instance, that the same obedience or affection is due from + colonies to the mother country which is due from children to a parent, + this is called reasoning by analogy. Or if it be argued that a nation is + most beneficially governed by an assembly elected by the people, from the + admitted fact that other associations for a common purpose, such as joint + stock companies, are best managed by a committee chosen by the parties + interested; this, too, is an argument from analogy in the preceding sense, + because its foundation is, not that a nation is like a joint stock + company, or Parliament like a board of directors, but that Parliament + stands in the same <i>relation</i> to the nation in which a board of + directors stands to a joint stock company. Now, in an argument of this + nature, there is no inherent inferiority of conclusiveness like other + arguments from resemblance, it may amount to nothing, or it may be a + perfect and conclusive induction. The circumstance in which the two cases + resemble, may be capable of: being shown to be the <i>matereal</i> + circumstance; to be that on which all the consequences, necessary to be + taken into account in the particular discussion, depend. In the case in + question, the resemblance is one of relation; the <i>fundamentum + relationis</i> being the management, by a few persons, of affairs in which + a much greater number are interested along with them. Now, some may + contend that this circumstance which is common to the two cases, and the + various consequences which follow from it, have the chief share in + determining all those effects which make up what we term good or bad + administration. If they can establish this, their argument has the force + of a rigid induction: if they cannot, they are said to have failed in + proving the analogy between the two cases, a mode of speech which implies + that when the analogy can be proved, the argument founded upon it cannot + be resisted.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Logic, pp. 97-8, vol. 2. +</pre> + <p> + 'Many of the most splendid and important discoveries in this science were + the result of analogical reasonings. It was from this source that Dr. + Priestley proved the compound nature of atmospheric air; and it is related + that it was in consequence of hints which he had given, when on a visit to + Paris, to Lavoisier, founded entirely upon analogical conjectures, that + the latter philosopher was induced to commence experiments, with the view + of proving the compound nature of water, and of reducing it to its + constituent elements. Indeed the whole history of this very important and + useful department of human knowledge exhibits very striking and + incontestable proofs how much of the art owed its existence to mere hints + and conjectures, founded, in many cases, upon very slight resemblances or + analogies.*. The chief province of analogy is confined to that of + suggestion. Analogies are the great hinters of experiments. They + illustrate an argument, but do not establish it. They are probabilities, + not proofs. Hence Lord Brougham in one place exclaims:—'I have a + dread, at least a suspicion, of all analogies, and never more than when on + the slippery heights of an obscure subject; when we are, as it were, <i>inter + apices</i> of a metaphysical argument, and feeling, perhaps groping, our + way in the dark, or among the clouds. I then regard analogy as a dangerous + light, a treacherous <i>ignii fatuus</i>.'** + </p> + <p> + A striking instance of the fallacy of analogy is afforded in the + experiments of Professor Matteuoci, which seem to prove that though the + analogies between electricity and nervous substance are nearly perfect, + yet they are two distinct agencies.*** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Blakey's Logic, pp. 97-7. + + ** Pal. Illus. vol. 2. + + *** See Zoist No. 20, p. 363. +</pre> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0011" id="link2HCH0011"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER XI. DETECTION OF FALLACIES + </h2> + <p> + WE hope to be able to save students from the fate of Diodorus, (a great + logician, who died in his school through shame at being, unable to resolve + a quibble propounded by Stilno)—not by hardening, but by + enlightening them. Though we bring neither mood nor figure wherewith to + test the presence of error, we are not without the hope of qualifying the + student for its discovery. + </p> + <p> + It has been confessed from the throne of logic that, 'After all, in the + practical detection of each individual fallacy, <i>much must depend on + natural and acquired acuteness</i>: nor can any rules be given, the mere + learning of which will enable us to <i>apply</i> them with mechanical + certainty and readiness.' + </p> + <p> + Bulwer, in remarking that error is a view of <i>some</i> facts instead of + a survey of <i>all</i>, indicated the key to logical fallacy. Error lies + principally in defective premises. Sophistry in science is referable to + incomplete analysis of nature, of systems—to artificial arrangements—to + <i>supposing</i> qualities, to <i>assuming</i> principles, to false + inductions from imperfect demonstration. + </p> + <p> + Dickens, in 'Nicholas Nickleby,' gives the case of a certain lady, who, + because she knew <i>one</i> young milliner, who retained red cheeks and + did not die of consumption, was immovably of opinion that all + representations of the injurious effect of such sedentary occupation were + false. It is ever so with the vulgar. Some one case has come under their + notice, and it is in vain that you appeal to a chain of facts. They know + nothing of induction—they know one case to the contrary, and that is + enough. This error is the source of vulgar prejudice. Once teach men that + truth does not lie in a single instance, but in a calculation in a balance + of probabilities, and you rationalise them. 'The chapter of accidents [or + single instances] is the Bible of the fool—it supplies him with a + text against everything great, or good, or wise.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Times. + + Where others toil with philosophic force, + Their nimble nonsense takes a shorter course, + Flings at your head convictions in the lump, + And gains' remote conclusions with a jump.—Cowper, +</pre> + <p> + The first source of error is defective induction. We easily arrive at this + point of examination by the questions we have proposed for use in the test + of syllogism. Formerly, one syllogism was required to be defeated by + another—we now attack a fallacy by induction. No false syllogism, + says Biennan, can resist the inductive process of sifting particulars. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + I do not like thee. Dr. Fell, + The reason why, I cannot tell— + But this I know, and know full well, + I do not like thee, Dr. Fell. +</pre> + <p> + This kind of thing will not do. Induction pursues the reasoner with an + eternal <i>why</i>. A clear because to a clear why, is a demand that is + never remitted in sound logic. + </p> + <p> + Lord Melbourne, in giving his reason for his religion in the House of + Lords, said it was the religion of his forefathers and that of his + country, <i>therefore</i>, he would support the church. (Cheers from the + opposition benches.) The Brahmin and Mussulman give the same reason for + theirs. A logician in facts would have said, I hold and support my + religion because it is <i>true</i>. What the standard of physical + certainty is to facts, what axioms are to science, such is induction to + syllogisms—it is the test of their correctness. + </p> + <p> + Dr. Whately exhibits the following instance of a regularly expressed + syllogism:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial: + Afflictions are dispensations of Providence, + Therefore, they are beneficial. +</pre> + <p> + Every applicable rule of Dr. Whately's logic is, of course, applied here—it + is true in mood and figure, and yet the argument is fallacious. A fallacy + is defined as 'an ingenious mixture of truth and falsehood, so entangled + as to be intimately blended—that the falsehood is, in chemical + phrase, <i>held in solution</i>: one drop of sound logic is that test + which immediately disunites them, makes the foreign substance visible, and + precipitates it to the bottom.'* But whence is to come 'this drop of sound + logic?' Not from the Doctor's <i>Elements,</i> they have sent forth the + fallacy. But touch it with the talisman of facts and; the error will + appear. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Whately's Logic, Anal. Out., chap. 1, stc. 4. +</pre> + <p> + What facts support the assertion that Afflictions are dispensations of + Providence?' The simple question is fatal to the argument. Can such a + proposition have facts for its support? Ignorance, congregating in narrow + courts, and laziness, accumulating filth, generate sickness and + affliction. Are these the dispensations of Providence, or the + dispensations of folly and crime? To ascribe them to Providence is + virtually to allow ignorance and laziness to step into the throne of God, + and call upon men to believe in <i>their</i> beneficent dispensations. Dr. + Watts, another writer on logic, set the Christian congregations of England + to sing the same species of fallacy:—- + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + "Diseases are the servants, Lord, + They come at thy command; + I'll not attempt a murm'ring word, + Against thy chast'ning hand." +</pre> + <p> + According to this lyrical logician, whenever wise precautions arrest the + progress of pestilence, or the physician's skill subdues disease, Jehovah + is robbed of a servant. By such an argument, humanity is made to be in + rebellion against heaven, and our medical colleges are in antagonism with + Deity, and the recent appointment, by the Russell government, of a + Sanatory Commission, was high blasphemy. It is the degradation of language + to employ it to such a purpose, and logic needs revising to save us from + publishing such puerility in the name of learning and of reason. It must + have been logic of this kind that induced a strong-thoughted woman to + hazard the bold but tenable conjecture, that 'If an argument has truth in + it, less than a philosopher will see it—and if it has not, less than + a logician will refute it.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * A Few Days in Athens, by Frances Wright. +</pre> + <p> + R. G. Latham, M.D., in his 'First Outlines of Logic applied to Grammar and + Etymology,' has introduced the particular instance of the syllogism on + Providence here cited from Whately. It would be no difficult task to + present other instances of the same species of polemical fallacy from Dr. + Whately and other writers on logic, did it comport with the rule I have + chosen for observance. I give these cases chiefly to show how extensively + and obtrusively they are introduced. + </p> + <p> + 'We have,' says Mr. Mill, 'five distinguishable classes of fallacy, which + may to expressed in the following synoptic table:— + </p> + <p> + <a name="linkimage-0001" id="linkimage-0001"> + <!-- IMG --></a> + </p> + <div class="fig" style="width:80%;"> + <img src="images/fallacy.jpg" alt="Mill's Fallacy Table " width="100%" /><br /> + </div> + <p> + It was the boast of Archimedes, that if any one would find him a fulcrum, + on which to rest a prop, he would raise the world, But this was mere + assertion unsupported by facts, for if the fulcrum had been found him, + Archimedes could not have performed his promise. This has been proved by + Ferguson, who has demonstrated that if Archimedes could have moved with + the swiftness of a cannon ball—480 miles every hour—it would + have taken him just 44,963,540,000,000 of years to have-raised the world + one inch. Bulwer remarks, 'Critics have said, what a fine idea of + Archimedes! But how much finer is the fact that refutes it. <i>One of the + sublimest things in the world is plain truth</i>.' + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + All motion generates warmth, + Shaking (with cold) is motion, + <i>Ergo</i>, shaking with cold generates warmth. +</pre> + <p> + We look, in this case, to the facts on which the first proposition rests, + and find the assertion too general. + </p> + <p> + To one who said that none were happy who were not above opinion, a Spartan + replied, 'Then none are happy but knaves and robbers.' + </p> + <p> + Mr. Goodrich, the original Peter Farley gives, In his 'Fireside + Education,' an instance to this effect of two boys arguing on the division + of their beds. William exclaims, 'You take more than your share of the + bed, James.' James answers, 'I only take half the bed.' William replies, + 'True, but you take your half out of the middle, and I am obliged to lie + on both sides to get my half.' + </p> + <p> + Innumerable sophisms are suffered to pass in consequence of Some + brilliancy of position which, dazzles us and prevents our seeing that they + are wide of the' mark of reason. An instance occurs in Bulwer—who + says, 'Helvetius erred upon education—but his dogma has been + beneficial.' Probably so—but not so beneficial as the truth would + have been. Many persons have argued from such an instance, that error is + useful. Dickens, in those incidental observations of striking good sense + strewed up and down his writings, says, in the 'Cricket on the Hearth:'—'These + remarks (of Mrs. Fielding) were quite unanswerable: which is the happy + property of all remarks that are <i>sufficiently wide of the purpose</i>.' + Of the refutation of such remarks he has presented an able instance in + 'Martin Chuzzlewit': + </p> + <p> + 'Bless my soul, Westlock,' says Pinch, is it nothing to see Pecksniff + moved to that extent and know one's self to be the cause? And did you not + hear him say that he could have shed his blood for me? + </p> + <p> + 'Do you want any blood shed for you?' returned Westlock with considerable + irritation. 'Does he shed anything for you that you <i>do</i> want? Does + he shed employment for you, instruction for you pocket money for you? Does + he even shed legs of mutton for you in any decent proportion to potatoes + and garden stuff?' + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0012" id="link2HCH0012"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER XII. SCEPTICISM + </h2> + <p> + Man has been called the plaything of chance, but there is no logic more + close and inflexible than that of human life: all is entwined together; + and for him who is able to disentangle the premises and patiently await + the conclusion it is the most correct of syllogisms.—Jules Sandau: + People's Journal, No. 87. + </p> + <p> + 'To quote authors,' says Harris, in his preface to his Hermes,' 'who have + lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full maturity + of Grecian and Roman literature; some in its declension; and others in + periods still more barbarous and depraved; may afford, perhaps, no + unpleasing speculation, to see how the same reason has at all times + prevailed; how there is one truth like one sun, that has enlightened human + intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness both of + sophistry and error.' This is the assurance which right reason will ever + impart. Underneath all the change after which we pant, amid all the + variety which surrounds us, and seem the very aliment of our nature, lies + the instinct after the permanent. It is the province of sound logic to + guarantee this in conclusion. + </p> + <p> + The novelty, change, fluctuation, which scientific discovery has brought, + and will yet bring, into the formerly settled worlds of opinion and social + condition, will unsettle men's minds, and pave the way to an age of + scepticism. Sound logic is necessary to provide that this doubt is + transitional and not ultimate. + </p> + <p> + Scepticism is of two kinds, that of Pyrrho, and that of examination. The + followers of Pyrrho, it is said, made doubting a profession, until at last + they doubted whether they did doubt. This is the scepticism of the scorner + and trifler. + </p> + <p> + He did not know that he did not know it, and if he did know it it was more + than he knew. This is as far as the philosopher, of this school can go. + Dickens has drawn the portrait of these, logicians in Mr. Tigg:— + </p> + <p> + 'When a man like Slyme,' said Mr. Tigg, 'is detained for such a thing as a + bill' I reject the superstition of ages, and believe nothing. I don't even + believe that I don't believe, curse me if I do.' + </p> + <p> + Hood is ironical on the professors of uncertainty. 'On a certain day of a + certain year, certain officers went, on certain information, to a certain + court, in a certain city, to take up a certain Italian for a certain + crime. What gross fools are they who say there is nothing certain in this + world.' + </p> + <p> + But scepticism is not capable of disturbing the well-grounded repose of + the wise; for when the sceptic thinks he has involved everything in doubt, + everything is still left in as much certainty as his scepticism. + </p> + <p> + In the great maze of conflicting opinion, it matters little that we are + cautioned that reason is not all-sufficient—it is the best + sufficiency we have. If reason will not serve us well, will anything serve + us better? Bishop Berkeley may demonstrate that we are not sure of + matter's existence—but are we more sure of any thing else? We are + not thus to be cajoled. But it is right to say that Mr. J. S. Mill + contends that Berkeley has been misunderstood—but if he did argue, + as popularly believed, to such argument, the answer of Byron is sufficient— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + When Berkeley said there was no matter, + It was no matter what he said. +</pre> + <p> + If all is delusion, the delusion is very orderly—it observes regular + laws, and we proceed in logical method to inform each other, how the + delusion of things appears to our understandings or affects our fortunes. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Where nothing is, and all things seem, + And we the shadows of a dream, +</pre> + <p> + We discuss the seemings with the same gravity as realities.' If a man + seems to do wrong, and I seem to prevent him, and the wrong, therefore, + seems not to be done, I am satisfied. + </p> + <p> + The 'wise considerate scepticism' of inquiry has been well expressed by + Emerson, in his recent lecture on Montaigne.—'Who shall forbid a + wise scepticism, seeing that there is no practical question on which + anything more than a proximate solution is to be had? Marriage itself is + an open question: those "out" wish to be "in:" those "in" to be "out." + </p> + <p> + The state. With all its obvious advantages, nobody loves it. Is it; + otherwise with the Church? Shall the young man enter trade or a profession + without being vitiated? Shall he stay on shore or put out to sea? There is + much to be said on both sides. Then there is competition and the + attractions of the co-operative system. The labourer has a poor hut, is + without knowledge, virtue, civilisation. If: we say, "Let us have + culture," the expression awakens a new indisposition; for culture destroys + spontaneous and hearty unencumbered action. Let us have a robust manly + life; let us have to do with realities, not with shadowy ghosts. Now this + precisely is the right ground of the sceptic; not of unbelief, denying or + doubting—least of all of scoffing and profligate jeering at what is + stable and good. He is <i>the considerer</i>. He has, too many enemies + around him to wish to be his own. The position of the sceptic is one taken + up for defence; as we build a house not too high or too low; under the + wind, but out of the dust. For him the Spartan vigour is too-austere. St. + John too thin and aerial. The wise sceptic avoids to be fooled by any + extreme; he wishes to, see the game. He wishes to see all things, but + mainly men. Really our life in this world not of so easy interpretation as + preachers and school-books are accustomed to describe it.' These have not + so efficiently solved the problem, that the sceptic should yield himself + contentedly to their interpretation. True, he does not wish to speak + harshly of what is best in us,—to turn himself into a "devil's + attorney." But he points out the room there is for doubt;—the power + of moods;—the power of complexion, and so forth. Shall we, then, + because good-nature inclines us to virtue's side, smoothly cry: "There are + no doubts!"—and lie for the right? We ask whether life is to be led + in a brave or a cowardly way: whether the satisfaction of our doubts be + not essential to all manliness: whether the name of virtue is to be a + barrier to that which is virtue? The sceptic wants truth, wants to have + things made plain to him, and has a right to be convinced in his own way. + In such scepticism there is no malignity; it is honest, and does not + hinder his being convinced; and this hard-headed man, once convinced will + prove a giant in defence of his faith. The true and final answer in which + all scepticism is lost is the moral sentiment: that never forfeits the + supremacy. It is the drop that balances the universe.' + </p> + <p> + Science and logic have so far advanced as to abridge the field of doubtful + questions. When syllogism answered syllogism, uncertainty reigned absolute—but + now that the appeal is to facts, we can, wherever facts can be had, weigh + or number them, and decide on one side or the other. + </p> + <p> + When Ali Pacha was at Janina, the case of a poor woman, who accused a man + of the theft of all her property, was brought before him; but the + plaintiff having no witnesses, the case was discharged, as the other + asserted his innocence, and insisted as a proof, that he had not a + farthing in the world. On their leaving his presence, Ali ordered both to + be weighed, and then released them without further notice. A fortnight + afterwards, he commanded both into his presence, and again weighed them; + the accuser had lost as much as the defendant had gained in weight. The + thing spoke for itself, and Ali decided that the accusation was just. Ali + Pacha was the Burlamiqui of justice. Induction, too, has its scales, and + seldom leaves us in doubt when it gets truth and falsehood in them. + Scepticism is now happily restricted to those questions resting on + conjectures, and which do not pertain to the practical affairs of this + life. On matter-of-fact questions, only the weak are perplexed. After men + have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not + then manifest what is best to be done, it is a sign the difference of + motives the one way and the other is not great; therefore, not to resolve + then is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles, which is + pusillanimity. + </p> + <p> + Quaint old Bunyan tells us, that when he had completed his 'Pilgrim's + Progress' he took the opinions of various friends on the propriety of + publishing it. Some said 'John, do;' others 'John, don't.' But solid old + John was not to be thus confounded. 'Then I will print it,' said he, 'and + thus the case decide.' To this good sense the public owe that immortal + dream. + </p> + <p> + In the great field of physical investigation, science has conquered doubt. + 'Contingency and versimilitude are the offspring of human ignorance, and, + with an intellect of the highest order, cannot be supposed to have any + existence.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + *Edinburgh Review, September 1814, article Probabilities +</pre> + <p> + 'Probability,' says Laplace,' has reference partly to our ignorance, and + partly to our knowledge.' + </p> + <p> + 'Chance,' observes Mr. Mill, 'is usually spoken of in direct antithesis to + <i>law</i>; whatever (it is supposed) cannot be ascribed to law, If + attributed to chance. It is, however, certain, that whatever happens is + the result of some law; is an effect of causes, and could have been + predicted from a knowledge of the existence of those causes, and from + their laws. If I turn up a particular card, that is a consequence of its + place in the pack. Its place in the pack was a consequence of the manner + in which the cards were shuffled, or of the order in which they were + played in the last game; which, again, were the effects of prior causes. + At every stage, if we had possessed an accurate knowledge of the causes in + existence, it would have been abstractedly possible to foretell the + effect.'* + </p> + <p> + 'In the domain of morals, too, a certainty, not dreamed of in past times, + now prevails. However much man, as an individual, may be an enigma, in the + aggregate he is a mathematical problem.'** + </p> + <p> + In the great world of opinion it is the duty of honest reasoners to + endeavour to find out the truth, and take sides, undeterred by the + philosophical frivolity now growing fashionable. If men are silent + concerning objects and principles, it is said they have none, and it is + impatiently asked 'where is their bond of union?' And no sooner is it + explained than they are told 'it is very unphilosophical to think of + setting up a creed.' Where the alternatives are thus put against them they + should take their own course. Creeds are the necessary exponents of + conviction. The creedless philosopher is out on the sea of opinion, + without compass or chart. To bind yourself for the future to present + opinions is doubtless unwise, but he who has inquired to any purpose has + come to some conclusion, affirmative, negative, or neutral; and it is the + province of a creed to avow the actual result, and the consequent; conduct + intended to be followed. It is the vice of free thinking that it spreads + universal uncertainty, and assumes right and wrong to be so protean that + no man can tell one hour what opinion he shall hold the next. Logic should + correct this unsatisfactory extreme, and extirpate the tiresome race whom + Shelley described in Peter Bell:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + To Peter's view, all seems one hue; + He is no Whig, he is no Tory; + No Deist and no Christian he— + But is so subtle, that to be + Nothing is all his glory** + + * Logic, pp. 57-8, vol. 2 + + ** Vestiges. +</pre> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0013" id="link2HCH0013"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER XIII. INTELLECTUAL DARING + </h2> + <p> + Freedom has been hunted through the world, and is ever exposed to Insult + and injury. It is crushed by conquest; frowned from courts; expelled from + colleges; scorned out of society; flogged in schools; and anathematised in + churches. Mind is her last asylum; and if freedom quail there, what + becomes of the hope of the world, or the worth of human nature?—W. + J. Fox's Lectures to the Working Classes, part 12, p. 65. + </p> + <p> + We should be prepared to dare all things for truth. If the 'very hopes of + man, the thoughts of his heart, the religion of nations, the manners and + morals of mankind, are all at the mercy of a new generalisation,' we + should be prepared to risk them. If we must choose between truth and + repose, we ought not to hesitate. There is danger in having the truth—philosophers + are obliged to conceal it. Mankind vaunt their love of truth, but they are + not to be trusted. From interest or ignorance they always persecute, and + often kill, the discoverer. Still the pursuit of truth is a <i>duty</i>, + and we must find consolation in the heroic reflection of Burke, that <i>in + all exertions of duty there it something to be hazarded</i>. But + intellectual daring will never be common while it is so generally believed + to be criminal. We will, therefore, quote some considerations touching the + rightfulness of inquiry. + </p> + <p> + Without inquiry it is impossible for us to know whether our opinions are + true or false, and various are the pretences employed for declining + investigation: frequently they are masked under vague and metaphorical + phrases: "inquiry implies the weighing of evidence, and might lead to + doubt and perplexity"—"to search into a subject might shake the + settled convictions of the understanding"—to examine opposite + arguments, and contradictory opinions, might contaminate the mind with + false views. + </p> + <p> + 'Every one who alleges pretexts like these for declining inquiry, must + obviously begin by assuming that his own opinions are unerringly in the + right. Nothing could justify a man for declining the investigation of a + subject involving important opinions, but the possession of an + understanding free from liability of error. Not gifted with infallibility, + in what way, except by diligent inquiry, can he obtain any assurance that + he is not pursuing a course of injurious action? If he holds any opinion, + he must have acquired it either by examination, by instillation, rote, or + some other process. On the supposition that he has acquired it by proper + examination, the duty on which I am now insisting has been discharged, and + the matter is at an end—but if he has acquired it in any other + manner, the mere plea, that his mind might become unsettled, can be no + argument against the duty of investigation. For anything he can allege to + the contrary, his present opinions are wrong—and, in that case, the + disturbance of his blind convictions, instead of being an evil, is an + essential step towards arriving at the truth. + </p> + <p> + 'It may possibly be assigned, as a further reason for his declining + inquiry, that he may come to some fallacy which he cannot surmount, + although convinced of its character. If he is convinced of its character, + he must either have grounds for that conviction or not. If he has grounds, + let him examine them, draw them out, try if they are valid, and then the + fallacy will stand exposed. If he has no grounds for suspecting a fallacy, + what an irrational conclusion he confesses himself to have arrived at! But + perhaps he will reply—he may be unable to solve the difficulty; his + mind may become perplexed, and the issue may prove, after all, that it + would have been much better had he remained in his former strong, though + unenlightened, conviction. Why better? If he is in perplexity let him + read, think, consult the learned and the wise, and in the end he will + probably reach a definite opinion on one side or the other. But if he + should still remain in doubt, where is the harm? or rather, why is it not + to be considered a good? The subject is evidently one which admits strong + probabilities on opposite sides. Doubt is therefore the proper sentiment + for the occasion—it is the result of the best exercise of the + faculties—and either positively to believe, or positively to + disbelieve, would imply an erroneous appreciation of evidence. + </p> + <p> + In the minds of some people a strong prejudice appears to exist against + that state of the understanding which is termed doubt. A little + reflection, however, will convince any one that on certain subjects + "doubt" is as appropriate a state of the reasoning faculties as belief or + disbelief on others. There are doctrines, propositions, facts, supported + and opposed by every degree of evidence, and amongst them by that degree + of evidence of which the proper effect is to leave the understanding in an + equipoise between two conclusions. In these cages "doubt" is the + appropriate result, which there can be no reason to shrink from or lament. + But it may be further urged, that inquiry might contaminate the + understanding with false views—and, therefore, It is wise and + laudable to abstain from it. + </p> + <p> + 'We can comprehend what is meant by contaminating a man's habits or + disposition, or even imagination. But there is no analogy on these points + in reference to the understanding. There is contamination, there is evil, + in preposterous and obscene images crowding before the intellectual + vision, notwithstanding a full and distinct perception of their character—but + there is no contamination, no evil, in a thousand false arguments coming + before the understanding, if their quality is clearly discerned. The only + possible evil in this case is mistaking false for true—but the man + who shrinks from investigation lest he should mistake false for true, can + have no reason for supposing himself free from that delusion in his actual + opinions. Besides these objections to inquiry, there are other prejudices + of a similar character, forming serious impediments to the attainment of + truth. + </p> + <p> + 'One of these is a <i>fear that we may search too far, and become + chargeable with presumption in prying into things we ought not to know</i>. + A few words will suffice to prove that nothing can be more irrational and + absurd. We have already shown that true opinions are conducive to the + welfare of mankind—and the prosecution of inquiry is therefore a + process from which we have everything to hope and nothing to fear, and to + which there are no limits but such as the nature of our own faculties pre + scribes. + </p> + <p> + 'A second prejudice—that <i>we may contract guilt, if, in the course + of our researches, we miss the right conclusion, and had therefore better + let inquiry alone</i>—is still more influential in preventing those + investigations which it is our duty to make. As our opinions on any + subject are not voluntary acts, but involuntary effects, in whatever + conclusions our researches terminate they can involve us in no + culpability. All that we have to take care of is, to bestow on every + subject an adequate and impartial attention. Having done this, we have + discharged our duty; and it would be irrational and unmanly to entertain + any apprehension for the result. + </p> + <p> + 'In fact, there is the grossest inconsistency in the prejudice now under + consideration. If we may contract guilt by searching after truth, wo may + equally do so by remaining in our present state The reason alleged in the + prejudice itself, and the only reason which can be assigned with any + plausibility, why we may commit an offence by embarking in any inquiry, is + that we may, by so doing, miss the right conclusion, or, in other words, + fall into error—for no one would seriously contend that we incur any + moral culpability by an investigation which conducts us to the truth. But + it is obvious that we may equally miss the right conclusion by remaining + in our actual opinions. It is, then, incumbent on us to ascertain whether + we are committing an offence by remaining in them—in other words, it + is necessary to examine whether those opinions are true. Thus the reasons + assigned for not inquiring, lead to the conclusion that it is necessary to + inquire. + </p> + <p> + 'The third prejudice is that acquiescence in received opinions, or + forbearing to think for ourselves, shows a degree of humility highly + proper and commendable—if closely examined will be found usually to + evince nothing but a great degree of indolent presumption, or intellectual + cowardice. There is often, in truth, as great a measure of presumption in + this species of acquiescence as in the boldest hypothesis which human + invention can start. That received and established opinions are true, is + one of those sweeping conclusions which would require very strong reasons, + and often elaborate research, to justify. On what grounds are they + considered to be true by one who declines investigation? Because (on the + most favourable supposition) they have been handed down to us by our + predecessors, and have been held with unhesitating faith by a multitude of + illustrious men. But what comprehensive reasons are these? What + investigation would it require to shew that they were valid? As the whole + history of mankind teems with instances of the transmission of the + grossest errors from one generation to another, and of their having been + countenanced by the concurrence of the most eminent of our race—how, + without examination, can we show that this particular instance is an + exception from the general lot? + </p> + <p> + 'From the necessity of using our own judgment, or, in other words, of + arriving at a conclusion for ourselves, we cannot be absolved. Far from + being a virtue, blind acquiescence in the opinions of others is, in most + cases, a positive vice, tending to stop all advancement in knowledge, and + all improvement in practice. + </p> + <p> + From the preceding it is evident that the inquirer may enter on his task + with full confidence that he is embarking in no criminal, or forbidden, or + presumptuous enterprise, but is, on the contrary, engaging in the + discharge of a duty. Let him be as circumspect as he pleases in collecting + his facts and deducing his conclusions, cautious in the process, but + fearless in the result. Let him be fully aware of his liability to error, + of the thousand sources of illusions, of the limited powers of the + individual, of the paramount importance of truth—but let him dismiss + all apprehensions of the issue of an investigation conducted with due + application of mind and rectitude of purpose.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Extracts of Summary, by Aliquis. of arguments on the Duty + of Inquiry, from the 'Pursuit of Truth, and other Essays, by + S. Bailey, in Reasoner No. 12. +</pre> + <p> + Marcus Antoninus, indeed, said 'I seek after truth, by which no man yet + was ever injured.' But there is a great practical mistake here. There is + danger in truth—-and the admission should be plainly made. Men, + where forewarned, make the choice more manfully. We have been wisely told + by Emerson, that the cherished thoughts and institutions of mankind are at + the mercy of a new generalisation—rest, commodity, reputation. + Inconvenience, and suspense, are the consequences of the partizanship of + truth. Certain political truths annihilate the interests of whole classes. + Certain social truths war with life-cherished prejudices. Certain sanitary + truths reduce the value of all city property. Certain scientific truths + ruin the working classes by thousands. In a wiser state of society this + could be prevented, but our present business is with what is. It is + therefore idle to conceal the truth—that there is danger in truth. + Pope's dictum, that party is the madness of many for the gain of a few, is + inversely true of truth. Truth is the ultimate benefit of many, but the + immediate ruin of the few. Here, however, comes to our aid the wise and + far-seeing aphorism of Burke—'In all exertions of duty there is + something to be hazarded'—and the brave man and wise friend of + mankind will risk the fate which surely awaits him—the fate of + Galileo, Newton, Salomon de Caus, Volta, Fulton, Winser, Arkwright, Gall, + and all who present themselves, with truth in their hands, at the door of + this great bedlam called the world—the fate of being received with + stones and hisses. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0014" id="link2HCH0014"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER XIV. IDOLS + </h2> + <p> + The term Idol is employed by Bacon to designate those prejudices which men + prefer to truth. A prejudice is a bias without a reason for it, an opinion + without a foundation, a judgment formed of persons and things without + sufficient examination, an assent given to a proposition without + sufficient evidence. The bias may be honourable, the opinion correct, the + assent in the right direction, but still of the nature of prejudice, + because, if right, it is right by accident rather than design. + </p> + <p> + Ignorance hides from us facts, and we decide partially rather than confess + our deficiency. Ill-directed education gives us pre-possessions, which are + obstacles in the way of truth, and we continue to cherish what, having + become a part of our nature, it pains us to discard. The senses will + occasionally mislead us and although we are conscious that appearances are + not to be wholly trusted, we reluctantly doubt our own infallibility. From + early, and therefore unquestioned, associations, we have acquired certain + habits, and from fashion certain sentiments, and we continue old customs, + and fall into the current opinion unconsciously. Of these sources of + prejudice, logic warns us to beware. Of so much importance did Bacon + regard these hindrances to truth, that he considered the pursuit of new + truth hopeless while they were cherished. In a mixed vein of poetry and + philosophy, he divided prejudices into four classes, which he called Idols + of the Tribe, the Den, the Market and the Theatre. Idols of the Tribe are + prejudices men imbibe from early training, and love of hypothesis. They + are so called because common to the whole race or tribe of mankind. Idols + of the Den are those which relate to a man's particular character, Idols + of the Market are those which are accommodated to common notions. Idols of + the Theatre denote such as pertain to hypothetical systems of philosophy. + </p> + <p> + Remembering the declarations of Euler and Gall, and the daily discoveries + of science, we should stand, as it were, on the verge of the old world of + experience, and look out on the new world of troth. A young thinker should + make for himself a chart of proposed reforms, systems, and changes, + agitated in his day—place + </p> + <p> + In relative positions in the scale of importance such as he deems of + value, if true—and then analyse his experience to see what is + soundly opposed thereto. Such a practice would go far to rid men of + idol-prejudices, which retard private improvement and public progress. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0015" id="link2HCH0015"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER XV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXERCISES + </h2> + <p> + 1. All men possessed of an uncontrolled discretionary power, leading to + the aggrandisement and profit of their own body, have always abused it.'—Burke's + Thoughts on the Present Discontents. + </p> + <p> + The student will find the proof of this proposition exhibited in the + example of Induction, quoted from Mr. Bailey, p. 63. + </p> + <p> + 2. Prosperity could never be reached and maintained in this country, + without some provision for the regular employment of the poor.—Mr. + Beckett's Speech in the House of Commons, Feb. 3,1842. + </p> + <p> + The demonstration, to universal conviction, of this proposition, would + lead to an entire and beneficial change of the social condition of this + country. + </p> + <p> + 3. The pen is the tongue of the world.—Paine. Put this in the + syllogistic form. + </p> + <p> + 4. A good instance of a metaphorical argument drawn out is given by Mr. + Mill:—'For instance, when Mr. Carlyle, rebuking the Byronic vein, + says that "strength does not manifest itself in spasms, but in stout + bearing of burdens;" the metaphor proves nothing, it is no argument, only + an allusion to an argument; in no other way however could so much of + argument be so completely suggested in so few words. The expression + suggests a whole train of reasoning, which it would take many sentences to + write out at length. As thus: Motions which are violent but brief, which + lead to no end, and are not under the control of the will, are, in the + physical body, more incident to a weak than to a strong constitution. If + this be owing to a cause which equally operates in what relates to the + mind, the same conclusion will told there likewise. But such is really the + fact. For the body's liability to these sudden and uncontrollable motions + arises from irritability, that is, unusual susceptibility of being moved + out of its ordinary course by transient influences: which may equally be + said of the mind. And this susceptibility, whether of mind or body, must + arise from a weakness of the forces which maintain and carry on the + ordinary action of the system. All this is conveyed in one short sentence. + And since the causes are alike in the body and in the mind, the analogy is + a just one, and the maxim holds of the one as much as of the other.'* + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Logic, pp. 433-4, vol. 2. +</pre> + <p> + 5. A youth, named Evathlus, engaged with Protagoras to learn dialectics, + and promised his tutor a large sum of money, <i>in case he gained the + first cause he pleaded</i>, Evathlus, when fully instructed, refused to + pay his instructor. Protagoras brought his action thus—'You must pay + the money however the cause go, for if I gain you must pay in consequence + of the sentence, as being cast in the cause; and if you gain it, you must + pay in pursuance of our covenant.' 'Nay,' Evathlus retorts, 'which way + soever the cause be decided, you will have nothing, for if I prevail, the + sentence gives it that nothing is due: and if I lose, then there is + nothing due by the covenant.' What should be the decision in this case? + </p> + <p> + 6. The first case, says Cervantes, requiring Sancho's attention was a + question put by a stranger, in presence of the stewards and rest of the + attendants. 'My Lord,' said he, 'a certain manor is divided by a large + river. I beg your honour will be attentive, for the case is of great + consequence and of some difficulty. I say then, upon this river is a + bridge, and at one end of it the gibbet, together with a sort of court + hall, in which four judges usually sit to execute the law enacted by the + lord of the river, bridge, and manor, which runs to this effect: Whoever + shall pass this bridge, must first swear whence he comes and whither he + goes; if he swear the truth he shall be allowed to pass, but if he + forswear himself he shall die upon the gallows without mercy or respite. + This law, together with the rigorous penalty, being known, numbers passed, + and as it appeared they swore nothing but the truth, the judges permitted + them to pass freely and without control. It happened, however, that one + man's oath being taken, he affirmed and swore by his deposition that he + was going to be hanged on that gibbet, and had no other errand or + intention. The judges, having considered this oath, observed: if we allow + this man to pass freely, he swore to a lie, and, therefore, ought to be + hanged according to law; and if we ordered him to be hanged after he hath + sworn he was going to be suspended on that gibbet, he will have sworn the + truth, and by the same law he ought to be acquitted, I beg, therefore, to + know, my lord governor [and student], what the judges must do with this + man?' + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0016" id="link2HCH0016"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER XVI. TECHNICAL TERMS. + </h2> + <p> + Abstract names—the names of attributes.—J. S. Mill. + Abstraction—fixing thought on the point of resemblance in one body.—drawing + off and contemplating separately any part of an an object. + </p> + <p> + Action—a volition followed by an effect.—J. S. Mill. + </p> + <p> + Analogy—resemblance of relation.—Whately. + </p> + <p> + Analysis—the resolution of a complex whole into its component + elements. —J. S. Mill. + </p> + <p> + Argument—an expression in which, from something laid down as + granted, something else is deduced—Whately. + </p> + <p> + Argumentum ad hominem—appealing to an opponent's professed views. + </p> + <p> + A priori—reasoning from cause to effect. + </p> + <p> + A posteriori—arguing from effects to cause. + </p> + <p> + Body—the unknown cause of our sensations—J. S. Mill. + </p> + <p> + Cause—the invariable antecedent, or thing going before.—the + stimulus of an effect. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_CONC" id="link2H_CONC"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Conclusion—a proposition proved by argument. + </h2> + <p> + Connotative terms—denote a subject, and imply an attribute.—-. + J.S. Mill. + </p> + <p> + Consciousness—sensation of existences. + </p> + <p> + Definition—the separation of a thing, as by a boundary, from + everything else. + </p> + <p> + Discovery—finding out something already existing. + </p> + <p> + Effect—the immediate, invariable consequent, or the change produced + by power. + </p> + <p> + ENTHYMEME-An argument with one premiss suppressed being understood. + </p> + <p> + Experience—events which have taken place within a person's own + knowledge.—Whately. + </p> + <p> + Fallacy—an apparent argument. + </p> + <p> + General Terms—express the notion of partial similarity. + </p> + <p> + Generalisation—tracing certain points of resemblance.—naming + one respect in which many things agree. + </p> + <p> + Induction—universalisation of truth by inference from uniform facts. + </p> + <p> + Intuition—imaginary looking.—Whewell, + </p> + <p> + Logic—a scientific use of facts. + </p> + <p> + Logical Truth—that which admits of proof.—Chambers. + </p> + <p> + Mind—the unknown percipient of sensation.—J. S. Mill. + </p> + <p> + Necessary Truths—are those in which we not only learn that the + proposition is true, but see that it must be true; in which the negative + of the truth is not only false, but impossible; in which we cannot, even + by an effort of the imagination, or in a supposition, conceive the reverse + of that which is asserted.—Dr. Whewell: Phil. Inductive Sciences, + pp. 54-5, vol. 1.* + </p> + <p> + * As 'necessary truths' are much talked of I have introduced here, from + Whewell, the completest definition with which I am acquainted. For myself, + I coincide on this question with J. S. Mill, as quoted pp. 22-3. + </p> + <p> + Non-connotative Terms—denote a subject only and an attribute only.—J. + S. Mill. + </p> + <p> + Philosophy—the science of realities in opposition to that of mere + appearances—the attempt to comprehend things as they are, rather + than as they seem.—Morell. + </p> + <p> + Point at issue—the real question to be decided. + </p> + <p> + Power in logic, is the relation of circumstances to each other in time. + </p> + <p> + Premises the propositions which precede a "conclusion."—the name of + the propositions from which a conclusion is deduced. + </p> + <p> + Principle—an invariable rule. + </p> + <p> + Proof—sufficient evidence; the balance of probability in favour of a + proposition. + </p> + <p> + Proposition—a sentence which affirms or denies something.—Whately.—An + expression in words of a judgment.—J. S. Mill, Reason—the + recognition of facts.—the classification of facts.—following + in the pathway of facts.—the power of discerning coherences.—a + premiss placed after its conclusion.—the minor premiss—in the + sense of Reason for asserting something. + </p> + <p> + Reasoning—argumentation.—process, the same always. Subject—first + term of a proposition. + </p> + <p> + Syllogism—1. A general rule. 2. A fact contained under that rule. 3. + A conclusion that the fact is so contained.—an argument stated + regularly and at full length.—a valid argument so stated that its + conclusiveness is evident from the mere form of the expression. + </p> + <p> + Technical Terms—the tools of art.—Whately. + </p> + <p> + Technical Language—regularly formed, defined, and agreed on set of + expressions. + </p> + <p> + Testimony—second-hand experience. Direct evidence is that which is + professedly given. Incidental, is corroboration casually introduced on one + subject in the course of an evidence delivered on another. + </p> + <p> + Theory—is a system of rules intended to explain a class of facts. + The rules should be precise, and rest on a rigorous induction of facts or + probabilities. + </p> + <p> + Tradition—the relation of a circumstance, not committed to writing + by any person who observed it, but communicated orally from one to another + for a long period of time. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's A Logic Of Facts, by George Jacob Holyoake + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LOGIC OF FACTS *** + +***** This file should be named 36801-h.htm or 36801-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/6/8/0/36801/ + +Produced by David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Logic Of Facts + Or, Every-day Reasoning + +Author: George Jacob Holyoake + +Release Date: July 20, 2011 [EBook #36801] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LOGIC OF FACTS *** + + + + +Produced by David Widger + + + + + +A LOGIC OF FACTS: + +or + +Every-day Reasoning + +By G. J. Holyoake + + "Call him wise whose thoughts and words are a clear + because to a clear why."--Lavater. + +[FOURTH THOUSAND.] + +LONDON: F. FARRAH, 282, STRAND, W.C. + +1866. + + + + +INTRODUCTION OF 1848. + +The Logic of the Schools, however indispensable in its place, fails to +meet half the common want in daily life. The Logic of the Schools begins +with the _management_ of the premises of an argument; there is, however, +a more practical lesson to be learned in beginning with the _premises_ +themselves. A thousand errors arise through the assumption of premises +for one arising in the misplacement of terms. The Logic of the Schools +is an elaborate attack upon the lesser evil. + +Sir James Mackintosh has remarked that 'Popular reason can alone correct +popular sophistry'--and it is in vain that we expect amendment in the +reasoning of the multitude, unless we make reasoning intelligible to +the multitude. As to my object, could I, like Gridiron-Cobbett, adopt a +symbol of it, I would have engraved AEsop's 'Old Man and his Ass,' who, +in a vain attempt to please everybody, failed (like his disciples--for +even _he_ has disciples) to please anybody. The folly of that +superfluously philanthropic old gentleman should teach us _proportion_ +of purpose. To be of real service; to _some_ is in the compass of +individual capacity, and consequently, the true way of serving, if not +of pleasing _all_. The republic of literature, like society, has its +aristocratic, its middle, and its lower classes. No one has combined, in +one performance, the refinement applauded in the universities, with the +practical purpose, popular among those who toil to live, and live to +toil. The populace are my choice--of them I am one, and, like a recent +premier, Earl Grey, am disposed 'to stand by my order.' I write for this +class both from affection and taste. If I can benefit any, I can them. +I know their difficulties, for I have encountered them--their wants, for +they have been mine. This will account for the liberties taken with the +subjects upon which I treat. There is more than one kind of hunger that +will break through barriers, and I have taken with an unlicensed hand, +wherever it was to be found, what I wanted for myself, and what I know +to be wanted by those who stand at the anvil and the loom, and who never +had the benefits of scholastic education, and who never will. + +Many of the arts and sciences, which formerly resided exclusively in the +colleges, and ministered only to the sons of opulence and leisure, +have escaped from their retreat, and have become the hand-maids of the +populace. But as respects logic, there still remains between the learned +and the illiterate an impassable gulf. The uninformed look on the +recondite structure of logic, and they are repelled by the difficulty +of comprehending it, and wrap themselves up in absolute and obstinate +ignorance, which they believe to be their destiny. The populace, in our +manufactories, have to choose between subsistence and intelligence. For +study, after protracted toil, they have not the strength--and to abridge +their labour is to abridge their subsistence, and this they cannot +afford. But because they are precluded by the destiny of civilisation +from knowing much, they need not remain utterly unskilled in reasoning. +Their natural good sense may be systematized, their natural logic may be +reduced to some rule and order--though it may not be refined it may be +practical, it may give power, and develop capacity now dormant. + +The hints, general rules, and elementary remarks dispersed throughout +this work, will probably be of service to the uninitiated, perhaps put +them on the road to higher acquirements, give them a confidence in their +own powers, perhaps inspire them with a love of these essential studies, +and impart a taste for the refinements which lie beyond. My hope is that +many will be induced to consult scholastic treatises, and acquire +that accurate knowledge which makes the society of educated people so +interesting. Impulse has been given to knowledge, and the populace have +begun to think, and both to speak and write their thinkings--and why +should they not be enabled to do it free from obvious mistakes, and with +a broad propriety commensurate with the native capacity they possess? +Why should they, like a certain learned politician on a public +occasion, propose, as a sentiment, 'The three R's, Reading, 'Riting, and +'Rithmetic?'* Why, in writing, should they not express themselves with +strong grammatical coherence, and a certain bold perspicuity, if not +able to reach refinement and elegance? Why, in pronunciation, should +they not speak with a certain manly openness of vowel sound and a +distinct articulation, if not with all elocutionary modulation? Why +should not their discourse be expressed in brief, clear sentences? If +their punctuation went no farther than placing capital letters at +the commencement of sentences and of proper names, and periods at +the conclusion of sentences, it would render their writings more +intelligible than are half the communications they now send to the +press. If they mastered only brevity and abrupt directness, and learned +to omit tedious prolixity, they would command a hearing in many cases +where now they are denied one. If in logic they made a shrewd mastery +of plain facts--being as sure as they could, when once set on surety, +eschewing conjecture and pernicious supposition--if they followed the +methods of nature and good sense, where the elaborate methods of art +are hidden from them, who will not admit that they would be more +intelligible than now, exercise a power they never yet possessed, and +extort the attention and esteem of the public where now they excite only +its pity, or contempt, or outrage what just taste it has? The people +would be enabled to do these things, but that so many who prepare +treatises for their guidance alarm them by the display of abstruse +dissertation above their powers, their means, their time, and their +wants. That a little learning is a dangerous thing is not a maxim +alone believed in by the race of country squires steeped in port and +prejudice, but by schoolmen who cannot bring themselves to give a little +proportion of sound knowledge, but must give all, the reconite as well. +The statesman decries the ignorance and want of wisdom displayed by +embryo politicians who will accept no instalment of liberty, but insist +on the concession of _all_ their claims--but the scholar does the same +thing when he will impart none but the completest information to the +people. + + * This case is cited by S. G. Goodrich, the original Peter + Parley, in his preface to 'Fireside Education.' Sir William + Curtis, to whom, probably, Mr. Goodrich refers, gave also + 'the three K's--King, Church, and Constitution.' + +In quoting, I have been a borrower, but not a plagiarist. In no case am +I conscious of having taken from others without at the same time making +the fairest acknowledgment in my power. + +If the references to the highest authorities are sometimes through +others, it is because the highest authorities have not always been +accessible. Those who have had ordinary experience estimate highly the +value of minute integrity in this respect. Fruitless hours are spent +in tracing false and careless references, and to one whose time is his +means, no little injury is done when it is thus wasted. + +Unbounded gratitude is due to those authors, old and new, who, with +learning and grace, with care and patience, have put the world in +possession of thoughts which are real additions to its knowledge--and +corresponding should be the contempt of those whose high-sounding and +pretending books seduce readers to wade through them only to find in +them the millioneth echo of some commonplace idea. + +The 'Spectator' was pleased to say that I wrote 'Practical Grammar' in +the spirit of an 'ultra-radical, setting the world to rights.' Yet I +have always declared, with Butler-- + + Reforming schemes are none of mine, + To mend the world's a vast design; + Like those who toil in little boat + To drag to them the ship afloat. + +Utopianism is not my idiosyncracy. But I have confidence in endeavour. +Continuity of ameliorative effort is the sole enthusiasm that can serve +the cause of improvement. It is useful to do what seems to be useful, +whether little or much--a moderate rule, but one that will take those +who carry it out, a long way. + +My illustrations, I need scarcely say, are neutral in politics and +theology. In the grammar of J. A. D. D'Orsey, published in 'Chambers' +Educational Course,' there are disputations, Biblicisms, and bits of +intense theology. Professor John Radford Young, in his treatise on +Algebra, has introduced a reply to Hume's controverted theory of +miracles--and Dr. Whately makes his 'Logic' an avowedly theological +auxiliary, showing that much passes for good taste in this country which +is only an irrelevant propitiation of powerful opinion. I have not, +however, been seduced by this species of example. There are distinct +provinces in intellect as well as in industry--and what political +economy justifies in one case, good sense dictates in the other. No man +has a right to intrude theology into every question, and agitate points +of faith when he pretends to instruct the understanding. + +There is less occasion to speak of the utility of logic, than to show +it to be easy of acquisition. Mr. Stuart Mill, in confirmation of this +view, observes: We need not seek far for a solution of the question so +often agitated, respecting the utility of Logic. If a science of logic +exists, or is capable of existing, it must be useful. If there be rules +to which every mind conforms, in every instance in which it judges +rightly, there seems little necessity for discussing whether a person is +more likely to observe those rules when he knows the rules, than when he +is unacquainted with them.* Certainly people are not so much prejudiced +against logic on account of its supposed uselessness as on account of +its supposed difficulties. Deserved or not, logic has always had a good +reputation. Well or ill founded, the popular impression has uniformly +been in its favour. It has been valued like the diamond--but considered, +like that precious stone, of very uncertain access. + + *'System of Logic,' p. 12. Second Edition. + +The high popularity of common sense--'the exercise of the judgment +unaided by rule'--has been interpreted into a virtual rejection of logic +by the multitude. But it ought not to be overlooked, that the credit +in which mere common sense is held, is a matter of necessity as well as +choice. It being the best sense the untutored have, they wisely use it, +and no wonder that they are inclined to laud what they are constrained +to employ. Doubtless they always perceived that common sense would be +the better for being made orderly, as a spirited horse is the fitter for +use after being 'broken.' Logical sense, among the masses, is secretly +supposed to be disciplined sense, and to have all the advantage of the +trained soldier over the raw recruit. + +It is quite true, as Abram Tucker puts it, that 'The science of abstruse +learning, when completely attained, is like Achilles' spear, that healed +the wounds it had made before; so this knowledge serves to repair the +damage itself had occasioned, it casts no additional light upon the +paths of life.' But few persons sensible of the value of exact knowledge +will complain of the _necessary_ elaboration to which it sometimes +leads. Nor will those who have felt the thrill of pleasure which +complete analysis imparts, regret the patience which put them in +possession of a secret of science, or made them master of a new field of +knowledge. + +Common sense is the substratum of all logic. Common sense is the natural +sense of mankind. It is founded on common observation and experience. It +is modest and plain and unsophisticated. It sees with everybody's eyes +and hears with everybody's ears. It has no capricious distinctions, no +partialities, and no mysteries. It never equivocates and never trifles. +Its language is always the same, and is always intelligible. It is known +by its perspicuity of speech and singleness of purpose. The most prudent +of all the children of fact, it never forsakes nature or reason. Some +outline laws for its employment, if they can be indicated, must be +better than its popular aimless and desultory use. + + + + +PREFACE OF 1866. + +One has no right to make a literary subject political--that is, to make +it partisan; but to give a political motive which concerns all equally, +for promoting a literary study, is allowable, and does not partake of +the nature of party politics. One may, like Cobbett, look on literature +with political eyes, without, like him, making it a vehicle of party +attacks. + +In this country, where the political genius of the people lies in +self-government--where the public growth of the people and their +internal liberty depend upon their capacity to manage their own +affairs--the art of public speaking has political importance to every +aide in politics. + +To be able to take a subject well in hand, like a stage-coach driver +does his horses--to hold the reins of your arguments firmly--to direct +and drive well home the burden of your meaning, is a power which every +man ought to study to attain, who rises to address a council, or stands +up on a platform to convince a meeting. + + + + + +A LOGIC OF FACTS. + + + +CHAPTER I. THE LOGIC OF THE SCHOOLS + +It is a humiliating reflection that mankind never reasoned so ill as +when they most professed to cultivate the art of reasoning.--Life of +Galileo, p. 1. society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. + +Common sense--the foundation of logic--first received (to a limited +extent) the regularity of an art and the certainty of a science, from +the master hand of Aristotle. Impartial scholars, familiar with his +writings on logic, allow them to have not only ingenuity but real merit; +and his admirers contend that he has been misunderstood by some and +abused by others. This is highly probable, as we are certain that when +his works were interpreted by the schools, and his logic proclaimed the +great text-book of knowledge and the only weapon of truth, 'men's minds, +instead of studying nature, were in an endless ferment about occult +qualities and imaginary essences; little was talked of but intention +and remission, proportion and degree, infinity, formality, quiddity and +individuality.'* Logic then was jargon, controversy chicane, and truth +a shuttlecock, with which the disputants respectively played, or the +object which they mutually disguised. Logic was a labyrinth in which the +subtlest lost their Way--a bourne from which the traveller after truth +seldom returned. + + * Account of Lord Bacon's Novum Organon Scientiarum, Lib. of + Useful Knowledge, p. 4. + +A striking illustration of this has been furnished by a candid and +distinguished writer--Dr. Reid. 'Of the analytics and of the topics +of Aristotle, ingenuousness requires me to confess, that though I have +often purposed to read the whole with care, and to understand _what is +intelligible_, yet my courage and patience always failed me before I had +done. Why should I throw away so much time and painful attention upon +a thing of so little real use? If I had lived in those ages when the +knowledge of Aristotle's Organon entitled a man to the highest rank in +philosophy, ambition might have Induced me to employ upon it some years +of painful study; and, less, I conceive, would not be sufficient. Such +reflections as these always got the better of my resolution.'* + +Dr. Whately, who has for many years occupied the throne of Logic and +whose work maybe taken, from its currency in our colleges and academies, +as the representative of the logic of the schools, seems to obviate all +objections to the abstruseness of this subject by a counter charge, +to the effect that logic is now underrated only because it has been +overrated. But it is not the complexity found in it, but the laudations +bestowed upon it which have brought it into neglect. Dr. Whately contends +that certain writers, 'by representing logic as furnishing the sole +instrument for the discovery of truth in all subjects, and as teaching +the use of the intellectual faculties in general, raised expectations +which could not be realised, and which naturally led to a reaction--to +logic being regarded as utterly futile and empty.'** Deeply deploring +this kind of injury, from which many important arts have suffered, I am +neither disposed to defend such a course, nor to imitate it. But I demur +to the truth of this representation with regard to logic. If logic be not +the 'sole instrument for the discovery of truth in all subjects,' it is +certainly the _principal_ one. Instead of charging scholastic logicians +with having unduly 'raised,' it would be nearer the truth, in my opinion, +to say that they have _confused_ 'expectations' by intricate machinery +and extreme elaborations. + + * Lord Kamet's Sketches vol. 8, chap. S. Aristotle's + Logic. + + ** Dr. Whately: Elements of Logic, preface, p. vii. Second + edition. + +Intricacy and minuteness of detail might be a trifling disqualification +did they lead to something immediately practical. But Dr. Whately +contends that logic, in the most extensive sense which the name can, +with propriety, be made to bear, is that of the science, and also the +art of reasonings 'Inasmuch as logic institutes an analysis of the +process of the mind in reasoning, it is strictly a _science_, while +considered in reference to the practical rules it furnishes it is an +_art_.'* He confines the province of logic, as an art, to 'employing +language properly for the purpose of reasoning,' and restricts the +logician to the use of the syllogism as the sole test of argument. Mr. +Augustus de Morgan thus exhibits the spirit of Whately's restriction:-- + +Logic has nothing to do with the truth of the facts, opinions, or +presumptions, from which an inference is derived; but simply takes care +that the inference shall certainly be true if the premises be true.' + +It has been, and _is_ to be, objected, that logic, thus confined, +'leaves untouched the greatest difficulties, and those which are the +sources of the greatest errors in reasoning.' To this powerful objection +Dr. Whately thinks it sufficient to reply, that 'no art is to be +censured for not teaching more than falls within its province, and, +indeed, more than can be taught by any conceivable art. Such a system +of universal knowledge as should instruct us in the full meaning +or meanings of every term, and the truth or falsity, certainty or +uncertainty of every proposition, thus superseding all other studies, it +is most unphilosophical to expect, or even to imagine. And to find fault +with logic for not performing this, is as if one should object to optics +for not giving sight to the blind--or complain of a reading glass for +being of no service to a person who had never learnt to read.'*** +This would be a most conclusive answer if confident assertion could be +accepted in lieu of proof. The objection still remains to be removed. +We may still demand, does it not fall within the legitimate province of +logic to provide means of encountering the 'greatest difficulties' with +which it is confessed logic is beset? True, there is no art can teach +everything, but is that a reason why logic should teach nothing, or next +to nothing, compared with what seems essentially necessary? + + * Intro., p. 1. + + ** Klein. of Logic, Synthetical Compendium, chap. 2, part + 1, sec. 9. + + *** Elem. of Logic, Intro., pp. 12, 13. + +Dr. Whately contends that the 'difficulties' and 'errors' in the +objection adduced, are in the _subject matter_ about which logic is +employed, and _not_ in the process of reasoning--which alone is the +appropriate province of logic. But it seems to me that Dr. Whately has +found it impossible to keep within the bounds of the restriction he thus +endeavours to establish. + +In treating upon 'apprehension,' he introduces, as indeed he was obliged +to do, from the department of metaphysics, several speculations on +'generalisation' and 'abstractions,' and from ontology (the science +which explains the most general conceptions respecting the phenomena of +nature) he borrows the leading principles of definition. Because he thus +goes so far, it is not to be contended that _therefore_ he should have +gone further; but when he found he must depart from his rule and borrow +from other branches of knowledge (no matter for what end), why did he +not depart from it to some purpose, and borrow from natural philosophy +such rules as would have guarded the logician from the 'chief errors' +into which he may fall? + +Dr. Whately informs us, indeed, that logic furnishes certain syllogistic +forms to which all sound arguments may be reduced, and thus establishes +universal tests for the detection of fallacy--but it is to be observed +that it is only _such_ fallacy as may creep in _between_ the premises +and the conclusion of an argument. It is to this narrow and Aristotelian +object that logic is restricted. 'The process of reasoning itself is +alone the appropriate province of logic. This process will have been +correctly conducted if it have conformed to the logical rules, which +preclude the possibility of any error creeping in _between_ the +principles from which we are arguing, and the conclusions we deduce from +them.'* We learn from our authority, that as arithmetic does not profess +to introduce any notice of the _things_, whether coins, persons, or +dimensions, respecting which calculations are made; neither does logic +undertake 'the ascertainment of facts, or the degree of evidence of +doubtful propositions.' And just as an arithmetical result will be +useless if the data of the calculation be incorrect, so a logical +conclusion is liable to be false if the premises are so. Neither does +the logic, now under consideration, concern itself with the 'discovery +of truth,' excepting so far as that may be said to be implied by the +detection of error in a false inference.** Logic thus, confined to the +actual process of reasoning, however important its functions there, +evidently leaves us in the dark as to the value of what we reason about. +For the information thus missing, this logic refers us to knowledge +in general--to grammar and composition for the art of expressing, with +correctness and perspicuity, the terms of propositions--to natural, +moral, political, or other philosophy, for the facts which alone can +establish the truth of the premises reasoned from. + + * Intro., p. 13. + + ** For the grounds of these representations, see + Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning, chap. 2, sec. 4 + Dr. Whately's Logic. + +The exclusion from logic of all consideration of the facts on which +propositions are founded, is thus endeavoured to be justified by the +Archbishop of Dublin:--'No arithmetical skill will secure a correct +result, unless the data are correct from which we calculate: nor does +any one on that account undervalue arithmetic; and yet the objection +against logic rests on no better foundation.' This is true, but is +it true that arithmetic is on _this account_ to be imitated? If the +arithmetician must take his data for granted, it is what the searcher +after truth must never do--_he_ must use his eyes and examine for +himself, in all cases, as far as possible, unless he intends to be +deceived. And for want of such precaution as this, the arithmetician is +at sea the moment he steps out of the narrow path of mechanical routine. +Who is not aware of the failures of calculation when applied to the +general business of life--to statistics, moral and political? Every +day, facts have to be called in to correct the egregious blunders of +figures.* The calculations are conducted in most approved form, but are +of no use. Does not this demonstrate that when arithmetic, like logic, +is applied to the business of life, general rules for securing the +accuracy of data would be of essential service? Supposing, however, that +arithmetic could do very well without them, does it follow that logic +should, when it would be safer and more efficient with them? + + * 'In Art, in Practice, innumerable critics will demonstrate + that most things are impossible. It was proved by fluxionary + calculus, that steam-ships could never get across from the + farthest point of Ireland to the nearest of Newfoundland; + impelling force, resisting force, maximum here, minimum + there; by law of Nature, and geometric demonstration--what + could be done? The Great Western could weigh anchor from + Bristol Port; that could be done. The Great Western, + bounding safe through the gullets of the Hudson, threw her + cable out on the capstan of New York, and left our still + moist paper-demonstration to dry itself at leisure.'-- + Thomas Carlyle, Chartism, pp. 96-7. + +Since our author's canons are held absolute in the schools, it may be +useful to consider this last cited argument in another light. A stronger +objection may be urged, one which particularly addresses itself to those +who mistake mere pertinence for general relevance, and suppose that a +single analogy decides a case. + +His Grace reasons, that, because arithmetic does not concern itself +about its data, logic should follow the same example. But why overlooks +he pure mathematics--a much higher science than arithmetic? Surely +geometry, which through all time has been the model of the sciences, was +better worthy than arithmetic to be the model of logic! Was it classical +in the principal of St. Alban's College to abandon Euclid and cleave +unto Cocker or Walkingame? + +Arithmetic is mechanical--geometry is reasoning; surely it was more +befitting to compare reason with reason, when endeavouring to discover +the true way of perfecting reason. Geometry is, of all sciences, reputed +the most conclusive in its arguments--and we know it is distinguished +above all sciences for carefulness in its data. It begins with axioms, +the most indubitable of all data, and its subsequent conclusions +are founded only on established facts--and to be sure that they are +established facts, the geometer, before he employs them, establishes +them himself. If an analogy is to decide the province of logic, here is +an analogy whose pretensions over those of arithmetic are eminent. + +So conclusive did Dr. Whately deem the argument just examined, that he +many times, in various forms, reproduced it. One of the last instances +is under the head of 'Fallacies.' 'It has been made a subject of bitter +complaint against logic, that it presupposes the most difficult point to +be already accomplished; viz., the sense of the terms to be ascertained. +A similar objection might be urged against every other art in existence +e.g., against agriculture, that all the precepts for the cultivation of +land presuppose the possession of a farm.'* + + * Logic, chap. 3. Fallacies, sec. 2. + +Already has been pointed out what may reasonably induce a suspicion +of the soundness of these analogies; viz., that their author found +it necessary to disregard them and introduce, from other branches of +knowledge, certain disquisitions on the 'sense of terms.' With regard to +this particular instance, it may be observed, that though treatises +on agriculture do presuppose the possession of a farm, they do not +presuppose the knowledge requisite for cultivating it, but inform +_fully_ of soil, and seed, and crops. So logic may be allowed to +presuppose the existence of the universe, whence truth is drawn, or the +existence of language, 'whereby it is expressed; but it is surely not +to _pre-suppose_ the knowledge of facts and terms, the great instruments +for the cultivation of truth. Agricultural treatises hardly warrant this +inference. There are the representations that induced the confession +that 'Logic is not so much an instrument of acquirement as of defence. +It is a good armour to buckle on when compelled to battle for our +heritage, but a poor implement for its cultivation.'* + +All _practical_ arts include a knowledge of materials as well as +implements. Platers, ignorant of the nature of metals, cabinetmakers, +of the different species of wood, make but sorry artizans; and in like +manner, reasoners, unacquainted, at least in a general way, with the +accuracy of what is reasoned about, make but sorry logicians.** + +It will readily be expected that in the modern progress of knowledge, +the Aristotelian province of logic would be enlarged. The far-seeing +intellect of Lord Verulam heralded the innovation--'Our glorious Bacon +led philosophy forth from the jargon of schools and the fopperies +of sects. He made her to be--the handmaid of nature, friendly to her +creatures, and faithful to her laws.'*** + + * W. J. Fox, Mon. Rep., p. 45: 1835. + + ** The reader will find that logician is need in the sense + of skilfulness in eliciting and exhibiting reality. By that + which I call logical is meant that which is truthful. I + presume that is the sense to which this high word should be + confined. It is the lax application of this term to mere + dexterity in evading the truth according to rule, that has + so increased the unsatisfactory race of professed sceptics. + --See Scepticism, chap. XII. + + *** Langhornea' Preface to the Lives of Plutarch. + +The general object of Lord Bacon's philosophy, writes Bruce, an +Edinburgh professor of logic of the last century, is to connect the +reasoning powers of man with experiments for the improvement of natural +knowledge. + +To create a just taste for philosophical investigation, required-- + +1. A display of the true, that they may be distinguished from the false +subjects of inquiry. + +2. Scientific rules to direct the discovery of the laws of nature. + +But to 'display the true,' is to display the _facts_ on which the truth +rests. The 'discovery of the laws of nature' implies _observation_ of +the operations of nature. The philosophy of Bacon, says Macaulay, began +in observation and ended in arts. + +It is most obvious, as the reader will gather from what has been +advanced, that for guarding, to the greatest possible extent, against +error in conclusions, it is necessary to take into consideration the +character of the data from which we reason--and to do this, we must draw +from the general sources of knowledge to which the Logic of the Schools +refers us. If we happen not to possess an accurate acquaintance with +these branches, we must draw upon the best notions we have of them, or +apply such natural sagacity as we happen to possess. But whether the +information we happen to possess be complete or partial, it is not well +that we are left to apply it at random, without any definite mode of +procedure; and if logic refuses to assist us, and gives only a vague +reference elsewhere, we must endeavour to assist ourselves. The datum +of all arguments is a proposition, an assertion, or denial; and to +ascertain its truth (upon which the value of the whole reasoning +depends) we have to do with the facts upon which it rests, and the terms +in which it is expressed. For it may be here observed, that the truth +or falsity of every proposition depends upon facts. To ascertain the +general accuracy of facts, we have to appeal to received standards of +certainty; and to fix the meaning of terms, we have recourse to a plain +principle of definition. In the task of recognising truth, so necessary +in examining the premises of an argument, one is wonderfully assisted +by being familiarised with the sources of truth, and the mode of its +discovery. In these operations the tutored and untutored may alike be +assisted by simple general rules. If these rules prove not infallible in +every case, they will prove successful in the majority of cases. + +Since general rules are the only, rules that the vast field of facts +admits of, they are not to be rejected on light grounds. They enable +us to set forth intelligibly the reasons of our own conviction, and to +detect and expose the fundamental fallacies of apparent arguments. Since +they direct us where the Logic of the Schools leaves us without a guide, +their value is apparent. + +The logical management of the syllogism involves much abstruseness +respecting 'genus' and 'species,' the 'quantity' and 'quality' of +'propositions', 'contraries,' 'sub-contraries,' 'contradictions,' +and 'subalterns.' Stepping by 'illative conversion,' 'six rules to be +observed with respect to categorical syllogism' next demand attention, +followed hard by eleven moods which can be used in a legitimate +syllogism, Viz.---- A, A, A, A, A, I, A., E, E, A, E, O, A, I, I, A, O, +O, E, A, E, E, A, O, E, I, O, I, A, I, O, A, O.' In the middle of +this abstract train march the 'undistributed middle' and the 'illicit +process,' attended by four figures represented by the following +mnemonic lines, which must be carefully committed to memory:'-- + +Fig. 1. bArbArA, cElArEnt, dArII, fErIOque prioris. + +Fig. 2. cEsArE, dAmEstrEs, fEstInO, bArOkO,* secundae. + +Fig. 3. tertia, dArAptI, dIsAmIs, dAtIsI, fElAptOn, bOkArdO,** fErlsO, +habet; quarta insuper addit. + +Fig. 4. brAmAntIp, cAmEnEs, dImArIs, fEsApo, frEsIsOn. + +A motley group, too numerous to be particularised, bring up the complex +rear of 'Modals,' 'Hypotheticals,' 'Conditionals,' and 'Disjunctives.' +This is certainly not the portal through which the populace can at +present pass to logic, even if such logic helped them to all truth, and +saved them from all fallacy. + +But this species of logic is not without interest. Symbolic letters and +mnemonic lines are not without attractions to those who understand +them. There is poetry in an algebraic sign, when it is the emblem of a +difficulty solved, and a wonderful result simply arrived at. To try the +whole power of words, and discover every form of language in which a +legitimate deduction can be expressed, is no ignoble task. It is a high +discipline, but it belongs rather to the age of leisure than this of +'copperasfames, cotton-fuz, gin-riot, wrath, and toil'--to the luxuries +rather than the utilities of learning. + +There is the inefficiency of the syllogism, and also the vitiation +produced by its employment. + +1. It corrupts the taste for philosophical invention by placing +philosophy in abstractions, and withdrawing it from the observation of +nature. + +2. It creates a reliance on principles, which originate in the +_hypotheses_ of philosophers, not in the laws of nature. + +3. It makes truth the result of the forms of argument, not of scientific +evidence.*** + + * Or, Fakoro, as indeed all the particulars in this place + recited. + + ** Or, Dokamo. but a brief summary of the subjects + comprised in his logic in reference to the syllogism. + + ***Bruce. These references to Fakoro and Dokamo are Whately's. + +Lord Kames cites from the father of logic the following syllogism, which +will bear repetition as an extraordinary instance of that assumption for +which the Logic of the Schools provides no remedy:-- + + Heavy bodies naturally tend to the centre of the universe. + We know, by experience, that heavy bodies tend to the centre of the earth. + Therefore the centre of the earth is the centre of the universe. + +But by what experience did Aristotle discover the centre of the +universe, so as to become aware that heavy bodies _naturally_ tend +there? On what facts rest the measurement of the radii from our earth to +the boundless circumference of space? How did he ascertain the limits of +that which has no limits? Yet, strange to say, the Logic of the Schools +prides itself in leaving us where the Stagyrite left us. + +'When mankind began to reason on the phenomena of nature, they were +solicitous to _abstract_, and they formed general propositions from a +_limited_ observation. Though these propositions were assumed, they were +admitted as true. They were not examined _by appeals to nature_, but by +comparison with other propositions.'* + +In this syllogism from Aristotle, there is the usual compliance with +accredited rules, and the same defiance of common sense. Such examples +are deemed perfect reasoning and legitimate argument; but is it not a +mockery to encourage the belief that we can have reason and argument, +without the truth? Only this shallow consolation remains to us. If the +logician of the schoole does not enlighten the understanding, he is at +least reputed not to offend the taste, and he wins the equivocal praise +of Butler:-- + + 'He'll run in debt by disputation, + And pay with ratiocination; + All this by syllogism, true + In mood and figure, he will do.' + +Syllogisms are to truth what rhyme is to poetry. 'It is a well known +fact that verse, faultless in form, may be utterly destitute of poetic +fire or feeling.'** + + * Bruce. + + ** A. J. D. D'Orsey, Eng. Gram., part 2, article Prosody. + +According to the Logic of the Schools, 'the question respecting the +validity of an argument is not whether the conclusion be _true_, but +whether it _follows_ from the premises adduced.' It was the bitter +experience of Bordon of the delusiveness of such partial logic that +induced him to exclaim, '_one_ fact is worth fifty _arguments_.' + +With such authorities, 'a valid argument is that which it so stated that +its conclusiveness is evident from the mere _form_ of the expression.' +But since it is admitted that if the data reasoned upon be incorrect, +no logical skill can secure a correct result; it is evident that however +_faultless the form_, the inquirer after truth is in no way nearer his +object, unless he be instructed how to lay a foundation of _faultless +facts_. He then, who is in love with truth rather than logomachy, will +admit, in spite of the most ingenious analogies, that there is some room +for a logic of facts, as well as a logic of words. + + + +CHAPTER II. LOCKE-LOGIC. + +Logic is a general guide to the discovery of truth, and teaches us +its systematic communication to others. This definition is intended to +combine logic and rhetoric into one system. According to a quotation in +Pinnock's Guide to Knowledge, Locke defined logic as 'that art by which +we rightly use our mental faculties in the discovery and communication +of truth,' a definition, called by the writer, the definition of nature +echoed by genius. There exists a natural connection between logic +and rhetoric. The discovery of truth could avail us little if we were +without the means of communicating it; and it is easy to see that it +would be in vain to possess the means of communicating truth, unless we +had the truth to communicate. Therefore, ingenuity is but ill employed +in separating these mutual departments of learning which nature has +connected together. Besides, the skill of the logician is as serviceable +in the statement of a case, as in arguing it. Arrangement is as much a +matter of logic as ratiocination; and to impress this neglected +truth upon the young inquirer, is one reason for proposing a combined +definition. + +The mutual connection of logic and rhetoric is illustrated by the +fact, that the Logic of the Schools is purely a branch of rhetoric. It +consists in putting an argument into 'the most perspicuous form in +which it can be exhibited,'*--i. e., in _communicating_ it in the most +efficient way to others. + + * Dr. Whatetly: Anal. Ont., chap. 1, aec. 6, p. 45. + +Indeed, Dr. Whately (who makes logic to consist in reasoning) defines +reasoning as _discourse_, and discourse is rhetoric. '_Grammar_,' +says Doherty,' represents the mechanism of letters in forming +words--_Rhemar_, the mechanism of words in forming sentences. We have +_Grammar_ for letters, _Rhemar_ for words, _Logic for arguments_, and +_Rhetoric_ for discourse.' Locke-logic, therefore--i. e., logic in the +sense in which Locke treated it--seems to come nearer the truth, as well +as nearer the common requirement, than the restricted definition of it +by others insisted on. + + + +CHAPTER III. LOGICAL TRUTH + +All men know something of truth. Happily it is the first impulse of +childhood, and nature teaches us its pleasure before reason instructs us +in its truth. In infancy we own its beauty, in manhood its power. There +is nothing, says Cicero, sweeter to man than the light of truth. Truth, +observes Godwin, is the native element of an intellectual nature. It +has been wisely remarked, said Lord Kames, that truth is to the +understanding what beauty is to the eye, or music to the ear. + +Philosophy sanctions what unsophisticated feelings suggested. He that +has made but a little progress beyond ignorance and privilege, cannot be +edified by anything but truth.** Truth, like a mathematical point, has +had various descriptions; and it may be useful to select those which +graduate to its logical definition. Bulwer tells us, that 'the agitation +of thought is the beginning of truth.' Locke, Lord Kames, Mill, and +others, agree that truth, or falsehood, is an affair of language. An +assertion which represents things as they really are, is a truth--an +assertion that represents things what in reality they are _not_, is a +falsehood. + + ** Mr. Hobhouse: Note 15. to 4th Canto of Childe Harold. + +Truth, in sculpture, means an exact similitude of some living form, +chiselled in stone or marble. Truth, in painting, is a natural +representation on canvass of some person, or object. In the same +manner, moral 'truth is an exact image of things set forth in speech, +or writing.' The logical definition of truth is given in these +words:--'Truth is that which admits of proof,'* that is, an assertion or +denial which can be substantiated by facts. + + * Chambers' Information. + +A fact is commonly called a truth, but this practice leads to great +confusion in reasoning. A fact is only an element in truth, A logical +truth is a proposition supported by facts. Facts compose the premises +of an argument--a truth is the inference from the facts. Unless this +distinction is observed, recourse must be had to the expedient of +calling a fact a particular truth, and an induction from facts a general +truth. Or we must adopt this distinction, that a moral truth, that is, +the truth of parlance, is the coincidence of language with reality; and +a logical truth, a proposition which admits of demonstration. + +A lady, who has given intellectual laws to many whom I address, has +said--'A truth I consider to be an ascertained fact, which truth would +be changed into an error the moment the fact on which it rested was +disproved.' But that which can be disproved cannot be an '_ascertained_ +fact.' Allowing, however, the relevancy of this definition of a truth, +it would, in a treatise on logic, be considered as a definition only +of a particular truth. Many such truths are required to make a logical +truth. + + + +CHAPTER IV. DISCOVERY OF TRUTH + + The great treasure-house of nature is open to all, and the + only fee demanded for inspection is attention.--Detrosibr. + +Observation** of nature is the only source of truth. Discursive +observation is the art of noticing circumstances evident to the senses. +Men who do this intentionally and carefully, with a view of acquiring +a knowledge of phenomena and their causes, are distinguished for their +varied knowledge and often for their great discoveries. Shakspere must +have owed the varied facts interwoven into his delineations of human +character to this source. The clever personations of Garrick were +suggested by his curious observations of men and manners. Sir Walter +Scott is known to have been a careful observer. It is said, 'no +expression escaped him if it bore on the illustration of character.' + + ** The term observation is used here in the sense in which + it is commonly understood, signifying cognisance in general. + It includes whatever information we acquire by the meant of + consciousness, or experience, or through the agency of the + senses. + +Claude Lorraine, with a passionate sympathy for the beautiful, sate in +the fields from sun-rise to dewy eve, watching, catching, and saturating +his very soul, as it were, with all the evanescent beauties of a +summer's day, as they chased each other over the face of the fair scene; +fixing on canvass, taking captive and imprisoning in our cabinets, the +wanton daughters of nature, that before his time never were caught, but +flitted before the fascinated eye only long enough to make the heart +afterwards feel more achingly the void of their vanishing. And the +artist who has done all this, do we not justly call him an _imaginative_ +painter, to distinguish him from those meaner geniuses who were, in +painting, very like Crabbe in poetry, merely faithful delineators of +the vulgarer objects of social life, bunches of carrots, drunken boors, +chamber maids and chimney corners. + +'Has the reader ever seen Mr. Macready in the character of Macbeth? If +he have, he can never forget the stupefied murderer withdrawing from the +chamber in which he has just done the dread act, with fascinated gaze +retreatingly regarding his royal victim, and awaking with a guilty start +as he runs unconsciously against his hard-souled partner in guilt, who +in vain tries to infuse into the weaker spirit of her paralysed husband +her own metaphysical superiority. In this scene we know that Mr. +Macready's acting was perfect, for the pressure at our heart, the +suspension of our breathing, and the creeping of our hair, made us +_feel_ that it was so. We see him now, as stealthily he places his foot +over the threshold of the chamber of death to re-appear on the stage; +the intensely staring eye, that cannot remove from what 'tis horror to +look upon; the awfully natural absorption of his soul by that "sorry +sight," which one little minute has brought about; his starting and +awaking from his entranced state, as he runs against his wife in his +retreat, and his full passionate burst of blended remorse, terror, and +superstition, as refusing counsel, regardless of remonstrance, heedless +of probable detection, he pours forth his "brain-sickly" convictions, of +having in one little moment cut the cable that had held him to the rest +of the great human family. All this we can see in our mind's eye, for +the actor gave us a picture of passion that time can never obliterate. +But how would it have been with a cloddish unimaginative fellow, +whom nature never intended should understand Shakspere? Would he not, +conscious that he was among shoals and quicksands of feelings, too nice +for his appreciation, seek to tear over all by a tempest of rant, which +would be a more ruthless murder on Shakspere than Macbeth's on the king? +And why should we be delighted with Mr. Macready's delineation, and +disgusted with the ranter? Simply because the former has _observed_, +treasured up, and felt every genuine exhibition of human feeling that +came in his way, and applied it appropriately to all the situations to +which it was related in nature. A single instance will make this clear. +Mr. Kean one night, in the concluding part of the combat scene of +Richard III., when supposed to be wounded to the death, before falling, +steadily regarded his foe, and painfully raising his right arm in act +to strike, the relaxed and dying limb, unable to second the spirit, fell +heavily and harmlessly to his side, indicating merely the fierce bravery +of the usurper living in all its strength, when the body which it would +move, was all but a senseless clod. Pit, gallery, and boxes arose with +an enthusiasm beyond description, and by their repeated plaudits bore +testimony the intense naturalness of the struggle. The actor being +afterwards complimented upon the _hit_, said, that he had taken the +action from Jack Painter, the prize-fighter, when the latter was beaten +in some one of his contests, and it immediately struck the tragedian +that the very same thing would come in beautifully in the dying scene +of Richard III. What was this, if not imagination? Kean saw Painter's +action to be the natural effects of undying valour in vain endeavouring +to contend against overwhelming power. Remembering and associating it +with his previous conception of the character of Richard III., the +actor saw it could be most strikingly incorporated with that picture of +passion the usurper's death should present to our view. Seeing this, he +combined it with his previous delineation, and thereby did precisely +the same thing as the poet in using a fine simile, or the painter in +introducing sun-light over a part of his picture. It was a portion +of nature carried away by the actor to be reproduced on a future and +fitting occasion.'* + +The beginning of all knowledge is observation. It has been shown by Mr. +Mill that 'axioms,' which lie at the foundation of all reasoning and all +science, 'are experimental truths--generalisations _from observation_. +The proposition that Two straight lines cannot inclose a space--or, in +other words, Two straight lines which have once met do not meet again, +but continue to diverge--is an induction from the _evidence of our +senses._'** 'Axioms are but a class of inductions from _experience_: the +simplest and easiest cases of generalisation,' from the facts furnished +to, us by our senses or by our internal consciousness.'*** + +Autobiography, or the metaphysical revelation of a man to himself, is +a source of valuable psychological and moral truths. From this centre +frequently radiate new lights upon human nature. But this is resolvable +into a species of mental observation. It is self-inspection. + +We have lately been told that 'Poetry is called upon to work in +the _discovery_ of truth. The imagination has always been the great +discovering power. Discoveries are the poetry of science. The case is +rare indeed in which, by merely advancing step by step in the exercise +of the logical faculty, any new truth has been arrived at. Logic comes +afterwards, to verify that which imagination sees with its far-darting +glance.'**** + + * Phrenology Tested, by A. M., of the Middle Temple, pp. + 143-5. + + ** Logic, vol 1, p. 305. + + *** Idem, pp. 328-9. + + **** W. J. Fox's Lectures to the Working Classes: Genius and + Poetry of Campbell, p.;5. + +This seems to call upon us to recognise the imagination as fresh source +of truth. But the definition of imagination, as given by Emerson, +reveals to us its origin in observation;--'The imagination may be +defined to be the use which reason makes of the material world. +Shakspere's imperial muse tosses the creation like a bauble from hand to +hand, to embody any capricious shade of thought that is uppermost in his +mind.' Hence, though we agree with Gilfillan that imagination is thought +on fire, we must confess that the ignition is material. + +We will, however, hear a poet's defence of his fraternity:--'Poets are +vulgarly considered deficient in the reasoning faculty; whereas no man +was ever a great poet without having it in excess, and after a century +or two, men become convinced of it. They jump the middle terms of their +syllogisms, it is true, and assume premises to which the world has not +yet arrived; but time stamps their deductions as invincible.'* + +Imagination is based on observation, and bears the same relation to the +'material world' that the magician bears to the appliances of his art. +Imagination is the dexterous and astonishing use of realities. It is +a species of mental experiment, whereby, without permission of the +line-and-rule men, we join strange things together, and to the surprise +of every body, the junction is a happy one. 'Angelo's greatness lay in +searching for untried existence.'** But observation primarily suggests +the combination. If, as in the case of Angelo, imagination essays the +highest flights of genius, and goes in search of untried existence, it +is not existence out of nature, but founded upon nature--its success is +a revelation of some hidden reality. + + * Lowell's Conversations on the Old Poets. + + ** J. T. Seymour; Oracle of Reason. + +Some of the most praised conceptions of Shakspere have been traced by +critics to the tritest observation. Instance Hamlet's remark:-- + + There's a divinity doth shape our ends, + Bough-hew them as we will. + +Critics tell us, that Shakspere here fell into the conventional cant +of a mechanic making skewers. But it is no detraction to cull the best +phrases from the most common sources. Knight remarks:--'Philosophy, as +profound as it is beautiful! says the uninitiated reader of Shakspere. +But he that is endued with the wisdom of the commentators, will learn +how easy it is to mistake for philosophy and poetry what really only +proceeded from the very vulgar recollection of an ignorant mind. Dr. +Farmer informs me, says Steevens, that these words are merely technical. +A woodman, butcher, and dealer in skewers, lately observed to him, that +his nephew (an idle lad), could only assist in making them; he could +rough-hew them, but I was obliged to shape their ends. To shape the ends +of wood skewers, i. e., to point them, requires a degree of skill: any +one can rough-hew them. Whoever recollects the profession of Shakspere's +father, will admit that his son might be no stranger to such terms. I +have frequently seen packages of wool pinned up with skewers.'* To admit +the likelihood of all this, notwithstanding Mr. Knight's jeer at the +'wisdom of the commentators,' is rather to exalt than degrade the genius +of Shakspere, who could derive exalted figures from humble sources. +The 'Athenaeum,' far more wisely than Mr. Knight, in this instance, +observes:--'This is the test of a truly great man; that his thoughts +should be _things_, and become things in instantaneous act, and not for +a moment mere speculations and abstractions.' + +As the theories of the schoolmen subside, and men no longer ignore +nature, it will become recognised as the source rather than the tool +of intellect. We shall have less occasion to contend that all lofty and +sublime ideas derive their value and beauty from their coherence with +the instincts of sensation, 'Poetry, we grant, creates a world of its +own; but it creates it out of _existing_ materials.' 'Imagination' may +be but 'thought on fire,' but the spark, which ignites it, is material. +Is there any other distinction between the nights of the rhapsodist +and those of genius, than that genius _illumines_ reality and rhapsody +_obscures_ it? 'We know of no great generalisation that has ever been +made by a man unacquainted with the details on which it rests.' + +Experiment is invented observation. It is putting into operation certain +supposed causes in order to observe their effects. An experiment may +be defined as an observation, which we are at some trouble to make. +Experiment is usually set down as being a process of discovering truth +different from observation. It is evidently included under observation, +and there is no practical advantage in separating it. Discursive, +general, ordinary, or common observation is the observation of the +phenomena we _find_. Experiment is observation of the phenomena we +_bring together_. Experimental observation has been the great agent +of modern discovery. Newton ranked it as the most valuable knowledge. +Whatever is not founded on phenomena is hypothesis, and has no place in +experimental philosophy. It is the principal source of accurate +facts. When Jenner first communicated to John Hunter, what he thought +respecting the prevention of small pox--'Don't think, but try; be +patient, be accurate,' was Hunter's characteristic reply. Locke +remarks--'While the philosophy of Aristotle prevailed in the schools, +which dealt often in words without meaning, the knowledge of nature was +at a stand; men argued concerning things of which they had no idea; +in this enlightened age, we keep to trial and experiment, as the only +certain foundation of philosophy.' + + * Philosophy and Religion of Shakspere, pp. 173-4 + + ** No 946. p. 1103. + + *** Athenaeum, No. 946, p. 1191. + +Hypothesis may be noticed here as being a species of _embryo_ +experiment. Hypothesis is guessing at the truth. It is a conjecture or +supposition relating to the cause of an effect. It imagines that where +certain conditions exist, the desired result will ensue. But all +these conjectures must be founded on observation. For, in the wildest +conjecture, unless made by a madman, there is some reason. Hypothesis is +incipient truth founded on a few facts which make it probable, but not +on sufficient to make it certain. Hypothesis does not directly discover +truth, but it is a guide to experiment, which does. The hypotheses of +Columbus respecting an unknown continent, did not of itself discover +America--but it directed the experiment of his voyage there, which did. +To hypothesise alone is the error of the visionary and the dreamer. +Practical wisdom, as far as possible, tests hypothesis by experiment. +Sir C. Bell conjectured that the nervous fluid of the human body +was analogous to galvanic fluid, and then, by experiments on various +animals, he endeavoured to test his hypothesis. However, great +thinkers arise who are best employed in contriving plans for others to +execute--in telling others what they are to do. Great poets belong +to this class. They are often incapable of the concentrated labour of +furnishing proofs of their hypothesis. Gladly should we recognise the +mission of such men. They work for humanity by thinking for humanity. +'All who think,' says Lytton, 'are co-operative with all who work.' +Labour supplies our wants, thought teaches us dominion over nature. +Labour is but the means of subsistence, it is thought that makes it the +source of wealth by multiplying its powers. + +To the value of hypothesis Mr. Mill bears this testimony, that by +suggesting observations and experiments, it puts us upon the road +to, independent evidence, if it be really attainable, and till it be +attained, the hypothesis ought not to count for more than a suspicion. +The function of hypothesis is one which must be reckoned absolutely +indispensable in science. Without such assumption, science would not +have attained its present state. Nearly everything which is now theory +was once hypothesis.* + + * Logic, Vol. II, p. 18. + +Induction is systematic observation of a given class of phenomena. +It consists in bringing together a variety of facts and instances, +carefully and patiently viewing them in all possible lights to +discover from a comparison of the whole what, if any, new principle is +elicitable. Induction is an experiment with a number of facts, to see +if any general result can be arrived at. Thus observation is of three +kinds--discursive, experimental, and inductive. For brevity of speech, +we use respectively the terms observation, experiment, and induction, +as the names of the three recognised modes of investigation. But it +facilitates a clear view of this subject, to note that experiment and +induction are but phases of observation--and that observation is the +great source of the discovery of truth. + +Discursive observation and experiment are the sources of facts or +particular truths. Nature, poetically says Dr. Reid, is put to the +question by a thousand observations and experiments, and forced to +confess her secrets. Out of these secrets induction gathers its general +truths, which become the premises of argument. Facts, like stones, are +of little service while scattered--it is in the edifice raised by them +that their value is apparent. They have been compared to blocks, upon +_one_ of which, if a person stand, he has but a partially increased +view; but when many are piled up, a person from their summit commands +the prospect round. Particular truth seldom proves anything but itself. +Argument is proving something else, and we have seen that that which is +proved must be _contained_ in something which proves it. In other words, +an argument is an assertion or denial of something substantiated by +other things--by facts. + +Gall _observed_ the peculiar formation of a certain head, but the one +fact proved nothing, except that the head had a certain form. It was +a barren observation, except that it suggested to his imagination +the hypothesis that the peculiar form of the head might be caused by +peculiarity of mind. This set him upon the experiment of observing +the habits and dispositions of the individual in order to test his +hypothesis. But the one fact of finding a peculiarity proved nothing new +of any value. The two facts, though incident, were hardly convincing. +They proved only that a peculiar head was accompanied in one case by +peculiar habits--but whether one was the cause of the other, or whether +the phenomena were in any way connected, still remained unknown. When, +however, Gall, Spurzheim, and others, had travelled through Europe, +making observations and experiments, and at last putting all the facts +and instances together, and carefully and patiently viewing them in all +possible lights, and finding that they shadowed forth that the brain was +the organ, the map and measure of intelligence, they inducted a general +truth, which enters the lists of argument and takes its place as an +addition to our metaphysical and moral treasures. + +Mr. Macaulay, who, perhaps, might be accused of underrating both Bacon +and Induction, with a view of exalting Aristotle, remarks that 'The +vulgar notion about Bacon we take to be this, that he invented a new +method of arriving at truth, which method is called induction, and that +he detected some fallacy in the syllogistic reasoning which had been in +vogue before his time. This notion is about as well founded as that of +the people who, in the middle ages, imagined that Virgil was a great +conjurer. Many who are far too well informed to talk such extravagant +nonsense, entertain what we think incorrect notions as to what Bacon +really effected in this matter. The inductive method has been practised +ever since the beginning of the world by every human being. It is +constantly practised by the most ignorant clown, by the most thoughtless +schoolboy, by the very child at the breast. That method leads the clown +to the conclusion, that if he sows barley he shall not reap wheat. By +that method, the schoolboy learns that a cloudy day is the best for +catching trout. The very infant we imagine is led by induction to expect +milk from his mother or nurse, and none from his father. Not only is it +not true that Bacon invented the inductive method, but it is not true +that he was the first person who correctly analysed that method and +explained its uses. Aristotle had long before pointed out the absurdity +of supposing that syllogistic reasoning could ever conduct men to the +discovery of any new principle, had shown that such discoveries must be +made by induction and by induction alone, and had given the history of +the inductive process concisely, indeed, but with great perspicuity and +precision. We are not inclined to ascribe much practical value to that +analysis of the Inductive method which Bacon has given in the second +book of the Novum Organon. It is, indeed, an elaborate and correct +analysis. But it is an analysis of that which we are all doing from +morning to night, and which we continue to do even in our dream.'* + + * Macaulay's Hist Essays, vol. 3, p. 407. + +It is not 'some fallacy in the syllogistic reasoning' which Bacon is +supposed to have detected, it is rather the partial protection against +error afforded by syllogisms, which he exposed and provided against, +for which he is estimated. Certainly Aristotle must have had a very +different opinion of the value of inductive philosophy from that +entertained by Bacon, or he would have indoctrinated his disciples with +it. Few will doubt that had Bacon's Novum Organon appeared in the place +of Aristotle's logic, and Aristotle's work in the place of Bacon's, +that the advancement of learning in the world would now be in a very +different state. Could Bacon have arrested the attention of the +ancient sages with his methods of discovering new principles, ancient +philosophy, instead of being a treadmill, would have been a path, and we +should not have had a contempt for all learning which was useful. When +Posidonius said that we owed to philosophy the principles of the +arch and the introduction of metals. We should not have had Seneca +repudiating such insulting compliments, nor Archimedes considering that +geometry was degraded by being employed in anything useful. + +But these observations of Macaulay have the merit of showing us +that induction has its foundation in nature, and afford a further +confirmation of our views, that observation is the source of our +knowledge, and that it is the province of logic to teach us to +systematise our thoughts. Observation, experiment, hypothesis and +induction, are but different names for the operation--varying in degree, +in method, in expedient, and elaboration--whereby we discover truth. +Nature is the treasure-house of truth, and the sole fee of appropriation +is attention. + +Much discussion has taken place upon the nature of necessary truths. +Mr. Mill, however, after an elaborate analysis of Dr. Whewell's theory, +pronounces that 'nothing is necessary except the connection between a +conclusion and the premises.' A necessary truth is commonly defined as a +proposition, the negation of which is not only false, but inconceivable. +Mr. Mill contests this doctrine in words embodying suggestions of great +value. + +'Now I cannot but wonder that so much stress should be laid upon the +circumstance of inconceivableness, when there is such ample experience +to show that our capacity or incapacity of conceiving a thing has very +little to do with a possibility of the thing in itself; but is in truth +very much an affair of accident, and depends upon the past history and +habits of our own minds. There is no more generally acknowledged fact +in human nature, than the extreme difficulty at first felt in conceiving +anything as possible, which is in contradiction to long established and +familiar experience; or even to old and familiar habits of thought. And +this difficulty is a necessary result of the fundamental laws of the +human mind. When we have often seen and thought of two things together, +and have never in any one instance either seen or thought of them +separately, there is by the primary law of association an increasing +difficulty, which in the end becomes insuperable, of conceiving the two +things apart. This is most of all conspicuous in uneducated persons, who +are in general utterly unable to separate any two ideas which have once +become firmly associated in their minds; and if persons of cultivated +intellect have any advantage on the point, it is only because, having +seen and heard and read more, and been more accustomed to exercise their +imagination, they have experienced their sensations and thoughts in +more varied combinations, and have been prevented from forming these +inseparable associations. But this advantage has necessarily its limits. +The man of the most practised intellect is not exempt from the universal +laws of our conceptive faculty. If daily habit presents to him for a +long period two facts in combination, and if he is not led during that +period either by accident or intention to think of them apart, he will +in time become incapable of doing so even by the strongest effort; and +the supposition that the two facts can be separated in nature, will +at last present itself to his mind with all the characters of an +inconceivable phenomenon. There are remarkable instances of this in +the history of science: instances, in which the wisest men rejected +as impossible, because inconceivable, things which their posterity, by +earlier practice and longer perseverance in the attempt, found it quite +easy to conceive, and which everybody knows to be true. 'If, then, it be +so natural to the human mind, even in its highest state of culture, to +be incapable of conceiving, and on that ground to believe impossible, +what is afterwards not only found to be conceivable but proved to be +true; what wonder if in cases where the association is still older, more +confirmed, and more familiar, and in which nothing ever occurs to shake +our conviction, or even suggest to us any conception at variance +with the association, the acquired incapacity should continue, and be +mistaken for a natural incapacity? It is true our experience of the +varieties in nature enables us, within certain limits, to conceive other +varieties analogous to them. We can conceive the sun or moon falling; +for although we never saw them fall, nor ever perhaps, imagined +them falling, we have seen so many other things fall, that we have +innumerable familiar analogies to assist the conception; which after +all, we should probably have some difficulty in framing, were we not +well accustomed to see the sun and moon move, (or appear to move,) +so that we are only called upon to conceive a slight change in the +direction of motion, a circumstance familiar to our experience. But when +experience affords no model on which to shape the new conception, how is +it possible for us to form it? How, for example, can we imagine an end +to space or time? We never saw any object without something beyond +it, nor experienced any feeling without something following it. When, +therefore, we attempt to conceive the last point of space, we have +the idea irresistibly raised of other points beyond it. When we try +to imagine the last instant of time, we cannot help conceiving another +instant after it Nor is there any necessity to assume, as is done by a +modern school of metaphysicians, a peculiar fundamental law of the mind +to account for the feeling of infinity inherent in our conceptions of +space and time; that apparent infinity is sufficiently accounted for by +simpler and universally acknowledged laws.'* + + * Mill's Logic, vol. 1, pp. 313-17. + +Thus we stand on the verge of boundless possibility. What truths may yet +be discovered in that great and untrodden field, which lies without our +experience, no man can tell. All we have yet brought between assertion +and proof, is all we have yet conquered, is all that we as yet know, +is all that we can yet rely upon. The search after the untried is the +highest and apparently the inherent aspiration of roan. The revelation +of new worlds continually rewards his noble ambition. At once arrested +and allured by the magnificence of nature--we wonder, we work, we wait. + + + +CHAPTER V. FACTS + + We must never forget that accurate and multiplied + quantitative facts form the only substantial basis of + science.--Parker. + +As clear fountains send forth pellucid streams, so do clear truths give +accurate sciences. The more definite the facts, the more perfect the +science; it is therefore of importance that all facts should be capable +of being tested by the standard of physical certainty. Dr. Reid says, +that 'the inquirer after truth must take only facts for his guide.' It +is then of moment that he takes true and not false guides. A writer in +the 'Monthly Repository' observes, that 'the basis of all knowledge is +such an extensive induction from particular facts, as leads to general +conclusions and fundamental axioms'--and if the facts are erroneous, +evidently the conclusions will be also erroneous. He also remarks, +that 'in reasoning, all sciences are the same, being founded on an +examination of facts--comparison of ideas.' But If the examination is +incomplete, or the facts admitted incorrect, the comparison will +be alike defective and the reasoning vitiated. If suppositions or +conjectures are mixed up with facts, the inductions from them will be +suppositions, and the conclusions but conjectures. + +There are three words--consciousness, conscience, and +conscientiousness--very much alike to the ear but very different in +signification. Consciousness, is feeling--conscience, the sense of right +and wrong---conscientiousness, the practice of what is believed to be +right. Conscience and conscientiousness are often confounded. We say, +lawyers have no conscience, we mean no conscientiousness. They +know right from wrong as men, but not professionally. It is with +consciousness that the logician has to deal. Consciousness is the +primary source of knowledge. Consciousness and the 'Evidences of the +Senses' are synonymous terms. Facts referable to consciousness are said +to be physically certain. The evidence of the senses is the highest +standard of certainty. + +The intuitive principles of belief are-- + + 1st. A conviction of our own existence. + 2nd. A confidence in the evidences of our senses. + 3rd. In our mental operations. + 4th. In our mental identity. + 5th. In the conformity of the operations of nature. + +These truths of intuition or consciousness are the foundation of all +knowledge. Truths which we know, by way of inference, are occurrences +which took place while we were absent--the events of history and the +theorems of mathematics. But the truths known by intuition are the +original premises from which all others axe inferred. Our assent to the +conclusion being grounded upon the truth of the premises, we could never +arrive at any knowledge by reasoning, unless something could be known +antecedently to all reasoning. + +'Whatever is known to us by consciousness, is known beyond possibility +of question. What one sees, or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one +cannot but be sure that one sees or feels. No science is required for +the purpose of establishing such truths; no rules of art can render our +knowledge of them more certain than it is in itself. There is no logic +for this portion of our know ledge.'* + +All discussions pertaining to the nature and limits of intuition or +consciousness are referred to the higher or transcendental metaphysics, +but all the facts that compose evidence and become the grounds of +inference are, according to the view taken here, necessarily subjects of +examination. + +'Cogito ergo sum--I think, therefore I am, argued Des Cartes. We +learn by this that consciousness of the operations of the mind is the +strongest evidence of our existence. It cannot be proved so forcibly by +any other means; and although Des Cartes' language may appear to involve +a logical fallacy, yet the proof of our personal existence which we have +from _thinking_, is the fullest and best we are acquainted with.'** + + * J. 8. Mil: Logic, vol. l, p. 7. + + ** Rev. Robert Amalie. + +There is a numerous class of facts from which all men draw conclusions, +which facts are not referable to the evidence of the senses. There are +the facts of testimony. Testimony is founded on laws almost as fixed +and certain as those of nature. All our knowledge, scientific, +literary, historical--all except what arises from our experience and +consciousness--depends on it. In the administration of justice it is +the sole guardian of property and life. If a man of known integrity and +veracity state a fact, without any possible motive of self-interest, and +evidently subject to no delusion; and if others of like character, who +could have no understanding or collusion with him, state the same, men +are nearly as certain of it as of any truth in mathematics. I believe +in the existence of Rome and the facts of astronomy on this evidence, +although I never saw the city or examined the stars through a telescope. + +The conclusiveness of testimony is designated moral certainty. The value +of testimony depends on three things. 1. On the nature of the subject. +Some subjects are capable of more accurate observation than others. 2. +On the powers and character of the observer--his ability to understand +or note that of which he testifies--and his honesty in common matters. +3. On the number of our informers. Several persons are less likely to be +imposed upon than one. + +Testimony or moral certainty is inferior to physical certainty. A +physical certainty bears uniformly the name of certainty, while a moral +certainty is characterised as a probability. Great, very great may +be the probability, still it is less in reliableness than a +physical certainty. The evidence of Cato or Aristides would be very +conclusive--yet somewhat less certain than that which our own senses +have proved. + +The conclusions from moral certainties are obtained like other +conclusions, by induction. The induction from moral facts is like +the induction from physical facts, with this difference--that the +conclusions from moral facts are probabilities, like the facts on which +they are founded. Whatever has physical certainty in its favour is +considered demonstrable, and when sufficient probable evidence is +adduced in favour of a proposition, it is considered to be fairly +proved. Some persons, biased by the strictness of mathematical proof, +insist upon the same accuracy in moral investigations. I have elsewhere +pointed out the juvenility and infatuation of this error. Insist upon +demonstration where the nature of the questions admits it. Less should +not, in such case, suffice. Accept probability where probability is the +sole evidence attainable. Never ask more than reason can grant. We must +admit gradations of validity. What we are conscious of, we _know_. +All we receive on testimony, we _believe_. Physical certainty is +_knowledge_: moral certainty, _belief_. Hume remarks, in his 'Essay on +Probabilities,' that 'Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative +and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all +men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform +our language more to common us, we ought to divide arguments into +_demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities_. By proofs, meaning such +arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.'* + + * Hume's Essays, vol. 2, p.59. + +Conjecture is probable truth. Some subjects only furnish a sufficient +number of facts to make them probable in the lowest degree--not to +decide them as positively true. The propositions expressing results +pertaining to such subjects are called conjectures. + +A conjecture founded on no fact or upon too few to make it likely, is +called a vagary. + +It will be seen that probability is a thing of degree. A probability may +vary in weight from a moral certainty, where it ranks next to a physical +certainty, down to a conjecture, and descend lower in likelihood till it +is lost in conjecture. + +Lord Kames remarks, in his preface to his 'Sketches'--'Most of +the subjects handled in the following sheets, admit but of probable +reasoning: and, with respect to such reasoning, it is often difficult to +say, what degree of conviction they ought to produce. It is easy to form +plausible arguments; but to form such as can stand the test of time, +is not always easy. I could amuse the reader with numerous examples +of conjectural arguments, which, fair at a distant view, vanish like a +cloud on a near approach'. Did all authors so judiciously apprise their +readers of the probable logical value of their speculations, fewer would +be misled than now. + +To numerous questions of undoubted interest, which have been agitated in +all ages, only a moderate degree of certainty attaches--these are termed +speculative. Such subjects may afford but few facts and instances, and +the chances of conclusiveness may seem remote--yet ultimate results +are not to be despaired of: the new comparison of conjectures and the +arrangement of facts daily throws new light on age-contested points. +Systems of conduct should not be founded on conjectures in opposition to +evident moral utility; but if speculation is kept 'within the sphere of +speculation, it may be prosecuted with safety and prospect of success. + +There are problems in metaphysics as there are in mathematics, which may +be demonstrated to be insolvable. To describe the limit of human power +with respect to contested questions will yet result from speculative +controversy. The capacities of our understanding will be one day well +considered, the extent of our knowledge discovered, and the horizon +found which sets bounds between the enlightened and the dark part of +things--between what is and what is not comprehensible by us. But this +will only be when the _untried_ has been _universally_ attempted in all +directions. Bailey, I think, has defined truth as being that which is +universally accepted after having been universally examined. Little of +this truth is yet extant. When every man shall be a thinker, when the +autobiography of intellect shall be more freely furnished than it ever +yet has been, unanimity of opinion not yet dreamed of will prevail. +Harmony of opinion is the sign of intellectual conquest--the +standard-bearer of truth no advocacy is victorious while dissent +occupies the field. + +What we _know_ to be true, is _knowledge_; what we have only reason +to believe true, is _opinion_. All human information is made up of +knowledge and opinion. The primary importance of knowledge is evident +from the fact that knowledge is the umpire of all opinion. We believe +in the existence of the ruins of Palmyra and Thebes, and in certain +discoveries of algebraists and astronomers. It is our _opinion_ that +these things are true, although we may never have visited Palmyra +or Thebes, nor made the calculations of the algebraist, nor the +observations of the astronomer. In these cases our belief is founded +on our _experience_ and knowledge of mankind. It is quite true that +travellers exaggerate, and scientific men are sometimes mistaken; but +we know that there is always _some_ truth at the bottom of what +is communicated by well-meaning writers. More or less, every man's +_experience_ assures him of this; and it is the cause of our reliance on +the records of history, and the reports of science. Therefore, since all +information is made up of knowledge and opinion, plainly knowledge is +the one thing which comprises all intelligence. + +'Questions of fact,' observes Pascal, in his celebrated 'Provincial +Letters,' 'are only to be determined by the senses. If what you assert +be true, prove it to be so; if it be not, you labour in _vain_ to induce +belief. All the authority in the world cannot enforce or alter belief as +to facts; nothing can possibly have power to cause that not to be which +actually _is_.'* + +A remarkable instance of the verification of what was assumed to be +is related of Pascal by Goodrich. 'Pascal was a philosopher even in +childhood. At a very early age he was taught the ten commandments. For +several days after, he was observed to be measuring the growth of a +blade of grass. When asked the meaning of this, he replied, "The fourth +commandment says, 'Six days shalt thou labour, but the seventh is the +Sabbath in which thou shalt do no work.' Now I wished to ascertain if +nature obeyed this great law, and therefore measured the grass, to see +if it grew as much on Sunday as on other days." '** + +'We are informed,' says Beattie, 'by Father Malebranche, that the senses +were at first as honest faculties as one could desire to be endued with, +till after they were debauched by original sin; an adventure from which +they contracted such an invincible propensity to cheating, that they +are now continually lying in wait to deceive us. But there is in man, +it seems, a certain clear-sighted, stout, old faculty, called _reason_, +which, without being deceived by appearances, keeps an eye upon the +rogues, and often proves too cunning for them.'*** + + * Letter xviii. + + ** Fireside Education, p. 89. + + *** Essay on Truth, p. 105. + +Though it is so abundantly obvious that the evidences of our senses, +internal and external, are, in effect, the sources of all certainty, +yet we are not warranted in rejecting, as mere hypothesis, every theory +which we cannot at once corroborate. When Euler remarked of his new +law of arches, 'This will be found true, though contrary to all +experience'--when Gall exclaimed of his new philosophy of the sensorium, +'This is true, though opposed to the philosophy of ages'--they expressed +demonstrable truths hidden from the multitude. They announced new +generalisations to man. New truths are commonly found to be old unnoted +experiences, for the first time subjected to classification, and +presented in a scientific form. + +To me it seems almost in vain to urge men to notice facts who have +never noticed themselves. The truest standards of certainty arise +from individuality of retrospection. An intelligent man is, himself to +himself, the measure of all things in the universe. + +In appealing to the young on the aspiration after improvement, one +cannot say 'Consult your aptitudes--follow your bias.' This Is the +sole appeal-injunctive to which all natures can respond. But in this +half-natured, half-trained, doubtfully-conditioned state of society, +though the generous would be incited to noble deeds, the sordid would +lay their vulture claws on the world, and the unprincipled victimise +their fellows. You have, therefore, to say, 'Man, do what thou listest, +provided it be compatible with the welfare of thy fellow men.' Men are +not well-natured, and we have thus to guard individuality, and qualify +the appeal, and so we miss the soil of great enterprise. Great is the +disadvantage. For the fulcrum which is to raise men is without their +natures--remote in the wide world. + +Man should begin with himself. He loves Truth--it is the first impulse +of his nature. He loves Justice--the bandit on the throne, as well as +the bandit in the forest, respects justice in some form or other. Man +loves Cheerfulness--it is the attribute of innocence and courage. He +loves Fraternity--it knits society together in brotherhood. These are +standards. His codes of life and judgment arise from these aspirations. +That which accords with these principles is _reasonable_. Whatever +develops these principles in conduct is _moral_. These sentiments are to +be confirmed by his own observations. His experience in connection with +these rules is the right with which he may examine religions, creeds, +books, systems, opinions. + +The right understanding of physical and moral facts greatly depends upon +intellectual character--and there enters largely into the recondite and +ultimate inquiries of intelligent men another class of facts, called +mental facts. There is no chance of identifying these without the power +of self-analysis, which is one reason why metaphysic ability belongs to +so few, and why questions involving metaphysical considerations are such +profound enigmas to the majority of the people. The illiterate in these +things are easily led or misled by words. They who will not bow before a +throne fall prostrate before a sound. + +The first principles of things are few. The axioms from which men date +their reasoning are chiefly personal. They are expressed in an infinite +variety of ways, occasioned by the various conceptions of those who +conceive them, and by the different capacities to which they are adapted +when offered for the instruction and guidance of others. But this +must not mislead us as to the number, and overwhelm us with a sense of +complexity, where in fact simplicity reigns. Those who have the power +of self-analysis make for themselves rules of conduct, and the best are +originated in this way--for when a man recasts his acquirements of sense +and education, in order to see on what all rests, and what are essential +standards of action and judgment, he resolves all into few, and those +the clear and strong. Rob Roy's self-examination paper is presented +to us in those lines which Sir Walter Scott, with grace and justice, +characterised as the 'high-toned poetry of his gifted friend +Wordsworth.' + + Say, then, that he was wise as brave, + As wise in thought as bold in deed; + For in the principles of things + He sought his morai creed. + + Said generous Rob, 'What need of Books? + Burn all the statutes and their shelves! + They stir us up against our kind, + And worse, against ourselves. + + We have a passion, make a law, + Too false to guide us or control; + And for the law itself we fight + In bitterness of soul. + + And puzzled, blinded, then we lose + Distinctions that are plain and few; + These find I graven on my heart, + That tells me what to do. + +Sir Walter Scott himself has enforced the same views:--'How much do I +need such a monitor,' said Waverley to Flora. 'A better one by far Mr. +Waverley will always find in his own bosom, when he will give its still +small voice leisure to be heard. + + All that hath been majestical + In life or death, since time began, + Is native in the simple heart of all,-- + The angel heart of man.--Lowell. + +To awaken the senses and instruct them and direct them aright in the art +of observation, is a great and essential undertaking. All scattered aids +need collecting together. De la Beche in 'Geology,' and Miss Martineau +have written books, entitled 'How to Observe.' This quality is the +distinction between the natural and artificial man--the natural man +observes what is in nature--the artificial notes what he finds in +books--the one depends on himself--the other on an encyclopaedia. +We want contrast, in order to know as well as to explain. Foreigners +observe us better than we observe ourselves. The common escapes our +attention. To know a fact fully we seek its opposite to compare it with. + +Were men reared with the powers of men without the genius of the child +being impaired, the ability to observe would be more general and perfect +among us. Children stop at everything to question its nature, at every +word to ask its import. It was the aim of Pestalozzi to cultivate by his +system of tuition this incessant questioning. But parents among the poor +know not the value of the habit, or knowing it have not time to gratify +it, and thus this happiest aptitude of childhood is repressed. + +With regard to the analysis of groups of facts, Mr. J. S. Mill +remarks--'The observer is not he who merely sees the thing before his +eyes, but he who sees what parts that thing is composed of. To do this +well is a rare talent. One person from inattention, or attending only in +the wrong place, overlooks half of what he sees; another sets down much +more than he sees, confounding it with what he imagines, or with what +he infers $ another takes note of the kind of all the circumstances, but +being inexpert in estimating their degree, leaves the quantity of each +vague and uncertain; another sees indeed the whole, but makes such an +awkward division of it into parts, throwing things into one mass +which require to be separated, and separating others which might more +conveniently be considered as one, that the result is much the same, +sometimes even worse, than if no analysis had been attempted at all.'* + + * Logic, vol. 1, p. 438. + +In the case of the Leigh Peerage there was a number of witnesses +examined in the House of Lords, as to the existence of a certain +monument in Stonely Church--'The first witness described the monument as +being black; the second spoke of it as a kind of dove-colour; the third +said it was black and white; the fourth said it was originally white, +but dirty, when he saw it; the fifth differing from the others, said it +was blue; the next witness described it as a light marble, but said it +had a dark appearance as if it had been bronzed, and the last witness +spoke of it as feeing of a light grey colour. Then, as to the form of +the monument, the first witness said it was oblong; the next said it +was square at the top, and came down narrower to the bottom, and there +rested on a single truss; the third witness described it as being +square at the bottom, testing upon two trusses; and went up narrower and +narrower to a point at the top; the fourth witness said it was angular +at the top; the next said it was square at the bottom, was brought to +a point in the middle, and was then curved into a sort of festoon; the +sixth witness stated that it was square at the top and bottom, and had a +curve; and the last said it was square at the top and bottom. As to the +language of the inscriptions, the first witness stated that the names +of _Thomas_ and _Christopher Leigh_ were in English; the next said the +inscription was not in English; the third said there was a great deal in +English; the fourth witness said the whole, (with the exception of the +name Christopher Lee), was in a language, which he did not understand; +the next witness stated that the inscription was all in English, +except the words _Anno Domini_; and the last witness said it was not in +English.'* + + * Times, May 10, 1828. + +All these witnesses agree as to the fact in dispute, but their variances +in testimony illustrate the common inattention of observation--and this +case farther admonishes us that if such differences may exist as to +a question of fact, where the senses are the same, little wonder that +differences exist as to matters of opinion, where intellectual capacity +and information are so various. + +We know from experience that the sportsman sees a point which is hidden +from the unpractised aimer--the painter sees traits of character of +light and shade in an object which the untaught limner never observes; +the musician distinguishes harmonies and discords that fall unnoted on +the uneducated ear. + +Thus we learn that by cultivation we can increase natural susceptibility +to observe. + +The extent is surprising to which the unanalytic are in ignorance of the +real nature of phenomena. 'There is nothing which we appear to ourselves +more directly conscious of, than the distance of an object from us. Yet +it has long been ascertained, that what is perceived by the eye, is at +most nothing more than a variously coloured surface; that when we fancy +we see distance, all we really see is certain variation of apparent +size, and more or less faintness of colour.'* + +In preparing to support an argument on any question, we must first +determine the sources whence the facts are to be collected. Instance: +The objects of municipal laws are rights and crimes. + +The evidence of rights are:-- 1. Public consent. + 2. Testimony. + 3. Records. + +The evidence of crimes are:-- 1. Confession. + 2. Previous malice. + 3. Testimony. + +This outline of the investigation prosecuted, the inquirer next consults +the authors who treat of the rules which are applied for determining +the facts of public consent, testimony, records, confessions: he is +then able to support his own argument in a valid manner, or prepared to +examine the facts offered by an opponent in support of an opposite view. + +The opinion may be hazarded that it is not so much from want of capacity +to observe that error arises, as from the want of conviction that we +should observe well before we attempt to infer. Nature is inventive, and +desire, once awakened, will, without formal rules, find out a thousand +modes of gratification. The foundation for a soldier logic than now +prevails will be laid when the people are impressed with the great +importance of looking well to facts as the data of all inferential +truth. + +There is a noted aphorism of Cendillac, to the effect that the one +sufficient rule for discovering the nature and properties of objects is +to name them properly, as if, observes Mr. J. S. Mill, 'the reverse was +not the truth, that it is impossible to name them properly except +in proportion as we are already acquainted with their nature and +properties.' Need it be added that this knowledge is only to be had by +patient observation? + + * Mill Logic vol. l, p.7. + +To assist this habit, Dr. Watts recommends the thinker to ascertain if +a given idea is clear and distinct, obscure and confused, learned or +vulgar, perfect or imperfect, adequate or inadequate--true or false. +'View a subject, says he, as through a telescope, so as to command a +clear view of it; examine its whole bearings as you look over a globe; +consider it in its several properties--anatomise it as with a scalpel. +Take cognizance of its various aspects as though inspecting it through +a prismatic glass. Whenever we contemplate a single object in nature +is obvious it must have duration, size, weight, form, colour, such +qualities being essentially present in all adequate conceptions of +physical phenomena.' + +It was objected to the 'Cricket' of Mr. Dickens, that his delineation of +Bertha was wanting in truthfulness. The teachers of the blind who knew +their nature could detect the departure from the reality of their habits +in the sketch of Bertha. The study of the blind was necessary to insure +success. We may not be able in any one book to give rules for the study +of all subjects, but we may indicate that we ought not to speak of what +we do not know, and that if we mean to introduce certain facts into our +speech or writing, we should consult the records and experienee of those +persons who are known to have written upon the subject, and follow the +best directions they give, and we shall generally attain accuracy. + +Mr. Combe observes, in his introduction to his notes on the United +States of North America, p. xi.--'I was told that a _certain person_ +boasts of having given Miss Martineau erroneous information for the +purpose of leading her into mistakes; and another in Philadelphia +assures his friends that he "crammed" Capt. Marryatt with old "Joe +Millers," which the Capt. embodied into his books as facts illustrative +of American manners. This seems to be a case in which some uncertainty +must ever exist as to the value of the facts collected by travellers. +They cannot observe all, or test half that they do observe. They must +rely on testimony. But they might do this--They might tell us precisely +the kind of authority they followed, and then the reader could form some +opinion of the value of what was communicated. Had Miss Martineau and +Captain Marryatt given the name and addresses of their informants, +the latter would now be punished by being infamously known throughout +Europe; and all future travellers warned from them--and all future +informants warned by their example. Where informants cannot be mentioned +by name and address, the chances are, they cannot be trusted. When first +connected with public proceedings, I found myself made the depository of +innumerable bits of scandal, and ominous reports of public characters. +To all who told me anything, if I attached importance to it, I made it +a rule to ask--'May I mention it to the party with your name?' 'O, no, +I would rather not,' was the common reply. To all written communications +answer--'Please add your name and address--and may I publish them if +occasion requires?' 'O, no, don't,' would be the general injunction. +Thus I found that huge reports, inflated as balloons, shrunk like them +when pricked by the pin of a question--'Will you answer for it?' Thus +I saved myself from being imposed upon by, or being the retailer of, +reports for which the originator or relator would not or could not +vouch. + +'Upwards of twenty years ago,' says George Combe, 'I accompanied a +member of the bar of Paris, a philosopher and a man of letters, on a +visit to the Highlands of Scotland. At Callendar a boy of twelve or +thirteen years of age attended as a guide to some interesting spot, +and in external appearance he seemed to be in every respect one of the +common lads of the village. My Parisian friend entered into conversation +with him; asked him if he had been at school, and soon discovered that +to a tolerable acquaintance with the Greek and Latin languages, he added +a pretty extensive-knowledge of arithmetic and geography, and was then +engaged in the study of mathematics. My friend conceived that the boy +was an average specimen of the peasantry of the country; and greatly +admired the educational attainments of the Scotch people, which he had +previously heard highly extolled. But,' adds Mr. Combe, 'the boy was the +natural son of an English officer, who had resided in the neighbourhood, +and who, while he ordered him to be reared in the hardy habits of +the Scottish Highlanders, had provided ample funds for his mental +education.'* + + * Intro, to notes on United States of North America, p. 10., + vol. 1 + +It is difficult to believe in this Frenchman being a 'philosopher, +making, as he did, a national induction from a single instance. Had he +previously inquired, as he ought to have done, the particulars of that +lad's life and rearing, before coming to so large a conclusion, he would +at once have discovered the error he was falling into. + +In the Registrar General's Report of 1840, the mean of married +persons unable to write is presented. The conclusion is based upon the +statistics of nine counties. But when it was found that only three +per cent, of the persons marriageable, did marry, the datum was found +insufficient to afford sure results. This fact; is given by Mr. Combe +in the same book. Then how many boys ought our 'philosopher' to have +questioned before making his vast inference? + +Another instance of the value of a question I extract from the +same work. Mr. Combe says:--'A few years ago, when travelling in +Somersetshire, I saw four horses, attended by two men, drawing a light +plough in a light soil. "What a waste of labour is here," said I to an +intelligent farmer; "in Scotland, two horses and one man will accomplish +this work." "We rear and train young horses for the London market," +said he; "two of the four which you see are serving an apprenticeship to +labour."' Had Mr. Combe asked a few questions as to the correctness +of his assumed inference, he would have been saved from his erroneous +conclusion. We should be wary of unquestioned data. + +When Murray's Grammar was first placed in my hands, I found in it +certain references to the Canons of Language in the larger edition. +I questioned my teacher as to what it meant. 'It is a trick of the +printer,' he answered, 'to induce you to buy the larger volume.' I do +not believe this now. I believe that it was a necessary reference. An +author who has written upon a given subject, naturally finds his own +ideas coincident illustrations of his views, and honestly refers to +them. In this book I have made a few references to previous works of +mine, and it has struck me that nine ont of ten of the readers will set +this down to artifice or egotism. Yet it is neither. I have referred +only to avoid the full quotation of some necessary illustration of the +argument. Yet few will penetrate to the fact, and most will be apt to +infer a trick from appearances. + + + +CHAPTER VI. SCIENCE + + Whatever we know must be in the number of the primitive + data, or of the conclusions which can be drawn therefrom.-- + J.S. Mill + +To have reached, in the study of observed phenomena, the point of +perception indicated in this motto, and to feel the full force of the +remark, is to have imbibed the spirit of science---whose traits are dear +distinctions, accurate classification, and strict reference to primitive +data. The bases of all science are methodical facts. The first step to +the perfection and enlargement of a science is the resolution of its +propositions into axioms, and into propositions which are to be +proved. Dr. Reid observes--'This has been done in mathematics from the +beginning, and has tended greatly to the emolument of that science. +It has lately been done in natural philosophy, and by this means that +science has advanced more in 160 years than it had done before in 2,000. +Every science is in an unformed state until its first principles are +ascertained; after this it advances regularly, and secures the ground it +has gained.' + +Classification is one of the first steps to Science. The maxim in +government, divide and conquer, retains, when applied to science, all +its wisdom without its machiavelialism. The young grammarian reduces the +mass of words, that so threaten to confound his powers, to a few natural +classes, and he conquers them separately with ease. + +'The single power by which we discover resemblance or relation in +general, is a sufficient aid to us in the perplexity and confusion of +our first attempts at arrangement. It begins by converting thousands, +and more than thousands, into one; and, reducing in the same manner +the numbers tiros formed, it arrives at last at the few distinctive +characters of those great comprehensive tribes, on which it ceases to +operate, 'because there is nothing left to oppress the memory or the +understanding.'* + + * Brown's Moral Philosophy, Lect, xvi. + +Merell has spoken more comprehensively on this subject--'That human +knowledge dees not consist in the bare collection and enumeration of +facts; this alone would be of little service were we net to attempt the +classification of them, and to educe from such classification general +laws and principles. The knowledge, which consists in individual truths, +could never be either extensive ear definite--for the multiplicity of +objects which then must crowd in upon the mind only tends to confound +and perplex it, while the memory, overburdened with particulars, is not +able to retain a hundredth part of the materials which are collected. To +prevent this, the power el generalisation comes to our aid, by which the +individual facts are so classified under their proper conceptions, that +they may at the same time be more easily retained, and their several +relations to all other branches of knowledge accurately defined. The +colligation and classification of facts, then, we may regard as the two +first steps, which are to be taken in the attainment of truth.'* + +Aristotle, says Morell, classified the _matter_, Kant the _forms_. +Aristotle was the first man who undertook the gigantic task of reducing +the multiplicity of all the objects of human knowledge to a few general +heads---1. Substance. 2. Quality. 3. Quantity. 4. Relation. Action. +6. Passion. 7. Place. 8. Time. 9. Posture. 10. Habit. Aristotle's +philosophy was _objective_, Kant's _subjective_. Kant's categories were +twelve. 1. Unity. 2. Plurality. 3. Totality. 4. Affirmation. Negation. +6. limitation. 7. Substance. 8. Casualty. 9. Reciprocity. 10. +Possibility. 11. Actuality. 12. Necessity. + +'It is a fundamental principle in logic, that the power of framing +classes is unlimited as long as there is any (even the smallest) +difference to found a distinction upon.** + +What Geoffroy Saint Hilaire has said of natural history is applicable +to all science:--'The first problem to be solved by him who wishes to +penetrate deeply into this; study, consists evidently in the formation +of clear and precise distinctions between the various brings. This is +the most elementary problem, in so-far as it precedes all the +others; but it is in reality, in most cases, complicated and full of +difficulties. Its accurate solution requires--first, _Observation_, +which makes known the facts; next, _Description_, which fixes them +permanently; then _Characterisation_, which selects and displays +prominently the most important of them--and lastly, _Classification_, +which arranges them in systematic order.'*** + +Of the value of classification, Lamartine has given a fine +illustration:----'Montesquieu had sounded the institutions and analysed +the laws of all people. By _classing_ governments he had compared them, +by comparing them he passed judgment on them; and this judgment brought +out, in its bold relief and contrast, on every page, right and force, +privilege and equality, tyranny and liberty.'**** + + * Morell's Hist. of Speculative Phil., p. 34, vol. 1. + + ** Mill, p. 165, vol. 1. + + *** T. W. Thornton: Reasoner No. 72, p. 664. + + **** Lamartine's Hist. Girondists, pp. 14-15, vol. 1. + +Familiarity with the characteristics of science imparts considerable +power for the detection of fallacy. A logician is imperfect without +scientific tastes and habits. The man of science has all his knowledge +systematised and arranged. What other people have in confusion, he +has in order. The elements of knowledge are, more or less, as has been +observed, known to all men--but in their perfect, communicable, and +usable state, they are-known only to the educated and scientific man. +What training is to the soldier, science is to the thinker. It enables +him to control all his resources and employ his natural powers to the +best advantage. It is this which constitutes the superiority of the +educated over the ignorant. Astronomy, navigation, architecture, +geometry, political economy, morals, all rest, or should rest, and do +rest, if they have-attained to the perfection of science, on +primary facts and first principles. Every step can be measured by an +axiom--every result can be traced to a first principle.* To detect +error, then, in any province of investigation, or any domain of +argument, the logician first looks to the primary principles on which it +is based, and thus tests the legitimacy of its conclusions. + +As respects those who deal in things professedly above reason, It +was well said by an anonymous writer of the old school of sturdy +thinkers,--'Of such men as these I usually demand, whether their own +assent to things they would have us believe, be grounded upon some +_rational argument_. If they say 'tis not, they are fools to believe +it themselves; and I should add to the number of fools, if, after this +acknowledgment, I should believe them: but if they say it is, I desire +them to produce their argument; for since 'tis framed by a human +understanding, the force of it may also be comprehended and judged of +by a human understanding: and tis to no purpose to say that the subject +surpasses human reason: for if it do so indeed, it will surpass _theirs_ +as well as _mine_, and so leave us both upon even terms. And let the +thing assented to be what it will, the assent itself must be founded +upon a _sufficient reason_, and consequently upon one that is +_intelligible_ to the human intellect that is wrought on by it.'** + + * See Beauties and Uses of Euclid, chap. vi., Logic of + Euclid. + + ** A Discourse on Things above Reason, 1681. + +"What is it?--" "'Tis impossible the same thing should be, and not be +at the same time," are maxims of such universal usefulness, that without +them we could neither _judge, discourse,_ nor _act_. These principles +may not always make their appearance in formal propositions, but still +they guide all our thoughts in the same manner as when a musician plays +a careless voluntary upon a harpsichord--he is guided by rules of music +he long since became familiar with, though now scarcely sensible of +them. + +'A butcher loses his knife, and looks all about for it, and remarks as +the motive of his search, "I am sure it must be somewhere or other." +By which rude saying it is evident he is guided by the axiom last +mentioned. Had he not the knowledge of this axiom beforehand, did he +think it possible that his knife could be _no where_ or in _no place_ +he would never take pains to look for it. We may observe many such +axioms as this guiding the actions of the vulgar, and it is no unworthy +speculation to observe their behaviour and words, which proceed from +uncorrupted nature, and retrieve the axioms from which their conduct +proceeds.'* + + * Solid Philosophy, asserted against the Fancies of the + Idealists. (Locke's Understanding is the work controverted.) + By J. S.. London, 1679. + +The outlines of the science of morality are thus comprehensively +sketched by Sir James Mackintosh: the origin, value, and application of +first principles are indicated with his usual felicity. 'The usages and +laws of nations, the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, +the sentiments of orators and poets, as well as the observations of +common life, are in truth, the materials out of which the science of +morality to formed; and those who neglect them are justly chargeable +with a vain attempt to philosophise without regard to fact and +experienee--the sole foundation of all true philosophy. + +The natural order undoubtedly dictates that we should first search for +the _original principles_ of the science in human nature; then apply them +to the regulation of the conduct of individuals, and lastly employ them +for the decision of those difficult and complicated questions that arise +with respect to the intercourse of nations.' + +To search for ultimate principles is to discover at a glance the whole +bearings of a great question. Through what clouds of politics had the +historian of Rome penetrated when he announced that the principles of a +free constitution are irrecoverably lost when the legislative power is +nominated by the executive. + +This habit--it cannot be too often insisted on aids not only the +acquisition of knowledge, but also its _retention_. Around these first +principles, as around a standard, the thoughts naturally associate. +Touch but a remote chord of any question, and it will vibrate to +the central principle to which it has once been well attached. Every +relative impression owns a kindred connection, and the moment one is +attacked, it, like a faithful sentinel, arouses a whole troop, which, +marshalled and disciplined, bear down and challenge the enemy.'* + + * Beauties and Uses of Euclid, pp. 47-9. + +What Rogers has so exquisitely sung of the associations of childhood, is +true of the associations of science. + + Childhood's loved group revisit! every scene,-- + The tangled wood-walk and the tufted green. + The school's lone porch, with reverend mosses grey, + Just tells the pensive pilgrim where it lay. + + Mute is the bell which rang at peep of dawn, + Quick'ning my truant steps across the lawn: + Unheard the shout that rent the noontide air, + When the slow dial gave a pause to care. + + Up springs at every step, to claim a tear, + Some little friendship formed and cherished here? + And not the lightest leaf but trembling teems + With golden visions and romantic dreams. + + + +CHAPTER VII. PROPOSITIONS + + All truth and all error lie in Propositions.--J. S. Mill. + +In accordance with that experience which directs to the profoundest +books for the simplest statements, we turn to Mill's Logic for the +philosophy of propositions. The answer to every question which it is +possible to frame is contained in a proposition or assertion. Whatever +can be an object of belief or even of disbelief, must, when put into +words, assume the form of a proposition * * What we call a truth is +simply a true proposition; and errors are false propositions. To know +the import of all possible propositions would be to know all questions +which can be raised, all matters which are susceptible of being either +believed or disbelieved. * * Since then the objects of all belief and +all inquiry express themselves in propositions, a sufficient scrutiny +of propositions and of their varieties will apprise us what questions +mankind have asked themselves, and what it the nature of the answers to +those questions they have actually thought they had grounds to believe. + +'Now the first glance at a proposition shows that it is formed by +putting together two names. A proposition, according to the common +simple definition, which is sufficient for our purpose, is, _discourse +in which something is affirmed or denied of something_. Thus, in the +proposition, gold is yellow, the quality _yellow_ is affirmed of the +substance _gold_. In the proposition, Franklin was not born in England, +the fact expressed by the words _born in England_ is denied of the man +Franklin. + +'Every proposition consists of three parts: the subject, the predicate, +and the copula. The predicate is the name denoting that which is +affirmed or denied. The subject is the name denoting the person or +thing which something is affirmed or denied of. The copula is the sign +denoting that there is an affirmation or denial; and thereby enabling +the hearer or reader to distinguish a proposition from any other kind of +discourse. Thus, in the proposition, the earth is round, the predicate +is the word _round_, which denotes the quality affirmed, or (as the +phrase is) predicated: _the earth_ words denoting the object which that +quality is affirmed of, compose the subject; the word it, which serves +as the connecting mark between the subject and predicate, to show that +one of them is affirmed of the other, is called the copula.' + + + +CHAPTER VIII. DEFINITIONS + + No difficulty is unsurmountable, if words be allowed to pass + without meaning.--Lord Kames. + +As every proposition consists of two names, and as every proposition +affirms or denies one of these names of the other, the value of +definition, which fixes the import of names, is apparent. + +'A _name_ is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, which may +raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and +which being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought +the speaker had before in his mind [Hobbes]. This simple definition of +a name, as a word (or set of words) serving the double purpose of a mark +to recall to ourselves the likeness of a former thought, and a sign to +make it known to others, appears unexceptionable.'* + +Definition originates in accurate and comprehensive observation. 'There +cannot be,' says Mill, 'agreement about the definition of a thing, until +there is agreement about the thing itself. _To define a thing is to +select from among the whole of its properties those which shall +be understood to be designated and declared by its name_; and the +properties must be very well known to us before we can be competent to +determine which of them are fittest to be chosen for this purpose.'** + +'The simplest and most correct notion of a definition is, a proposition +declaratory of the meaning of a word; namely, either the meaning which +it bears in common acceptation, or that which the speaker or writer, for +the particular purposes of his discourse, intends to annex to it.'*** + + * J. Stuart Mill: System of Logic, 2nd ed., chap. 11, sec. + I. p. 27. + + ** Introduction to Logic, p. 1. + + *** Mill's Logic, p. 183, vol. 1. + +But with most persons the object of a definition is merely to guide them +to the correct use of a term as a protection against applying it in a +manner inconsistent with custom and convention. Anything, therefore, is +to them a sufficient definition of a term which will serve as a correct +index to what the term denotes; although not embracing the whole, and +sometimes perhaps not even any part of what it connotes. + +Definitions are sometimes explained as being of two kinds--of things and +words. + +The definition of _words_ is the explanation of the sense in which they +are used. + +The definition of _things_ is an explanation of the specific properties +by which they differ from all other things. + +To define a thing, says Dr. Watts, we must ascertain with what it +agrees, then note the most remarkable attribute of difference, and join +the two together. + +Probity--the disposition to acknowledge the rights of mankind. + +Justice--the disposition to maintain the rights of mankind. + +Benevolence--the disposition to improve the rights of mankind. + +Deceit--the concealed violation of the rights of mankind. + +Injustice--the open violation of the rights of mankind. + +Malevolence--hatred of the rights of mankind. + +In defining a word we seek some class to which to refer it, that we may +identify it, and fix attention upon that peculiarity by which we +can distinguish it from all other things. 'Probity and 'justice' are +referred to 'disposition,' with reference to the 'rights of mankind' as +their sphere of existence: and _acknowledgment, and maintenance_, are +mentioned as the distinguishing features. + +Distinctions must not be made without differences. The definition should +be plainer than the thing defined. Aristotle's definition of motion is +considered defective in this respect:--'Motion--an act of a being in +power, so far forth as it is in power.' Tautological definitions cause +more to be supposed than is true--the too terse explanation leaves some +necessary thing unmentioned. A perfect definition requires the union of +the concise, the clear, and the adequate. Some persons are so +unskilful in the analysis of terms as to occasion the advice _Nil +explicare_--never explain yourself if you wish to be understood. + +Double meanings should be avoided. The writer may himself alternate in +their use, and the reader may take the word in the unintended meaning. +All men have not the strong sense of Johnson. When Caleb Whiteford +inquired seriously of the Doctor, whether he really considered that a +man ought to be transported, like Barrington, the pickpocket, for being +guilty of a double meaning. 'Sir,' said Johnson, 'if a man means well, +the more he means the better'--which, whether real or fictitious, is one +of the happiest answers that ever crushed a quibble.* + + * Hood's Own. + +I have frequently put the question--What is consciousness? to persons +who have been conscious for twenty or thirty years, but who were yet +unable to reply. Had any one deprived these persons of consciousness, a +judge would have hanged him for the offence; yet, could they themselves +have been interrogated as to what harm they had suffered, they could +not have told what they had lost. And upon the principle, that he not +knowing what he has lost, is no loser, these persons, though murdered, +had suffered no harm. + +The various definitions of the same subject which prevail, originate in +the caprice, or partial, or profound knowledge the definer may have of +his subject. It seems to be admitted by logicians, that an author has a +right to give whatever provisional definition he pleases of his terms. +But having once given them, perspicuity requires that he should adhere +to them. Any new sense in which a term is employed should be specially +defined. In discoursing on an ordinary subject, as the right of public +assembly,--such words as perception, conception, apprehension, might be +used reciprocally, but in a dissertation on metaphysics each requires +restriction in use and precision in purport. + +Often genius strikes out new relations of words. In recent political +debates, Mr. Cobden resorted with new force and point to a charge of +rashness against ministers: he showed that rashness consisted more +frequently in inaction than action. He is rash who stands surrounded +by the elements of danger without taking; any precaution against the +contingencies of peril; he is rash who does not take advantage of the +calm, to repair his shattered rigging; he is rash who looks not out for +a proper supply of water until the conflagration is raging around +him; and more rash than all is he who exercises no provident care for +supplying a nation with food, but waits for the pressure of famine and +the perils of starvation. + +At the last soiree of the Leeds Mechanics' Institution, Mr. Dickens +referred to ignorance, commonly considered as a passive negation, and +placed it in the light of a power. 'Look where we will, do we not find +ignorance powerful for every kind of wrong and evil? Powerful to take +its enemies to its heart and strike its best friends down--powerful +to fill the prisons, the hospitals, and the graves--powerful for blind +violence, prejudice, and error in all their destructive shapes.' + +The variations which not only common but technical terms undergo, is +a considerable source of perplexity in reasoning. Mr. Mill cites the +instance of the term felony. No lawyer will undertake to tell what a +felony is otherwise than by enumerating the various kinds of offences +which are so called. Originally, felony denoted all offences, the +penalty of which included forfeiture of goods; but, subsequent Acts +of Parliament have declared various offences to be felonies without +enjoining that penalty, and have taken away the penalty from others +which continue still to be called felonies, insomuch that the acts +so called have now no property whatever in common, save that of being +unlawful and punishable. This inattention to precision in terms has +arisen not among the vulgar, but among educated English lawyers. + +'Language,' says Mr. Mill, borrowing a political simile from Sir James +Mackintosh, '"is not made, but grows." A name not unfrequently passes +by successive links of resemblance from one object to another, until it +becomes applied to things having nothing in common with the first things +to which the name was given; which, however, do not, for that reason, +drop the name; so that it at last denotes a confused huddle of objects, +having nothing whatever in common; and connotes nothing, not even a +vague and general resemblance. When a name has fallen into this state, +in which by predicating it of any object we assert literally nothing +about the object, it has become unfit for the purposes either of thought +or of the communication of thought; and can only be made serviceable by +stripping it of some part of its multifarious denotation, and confining +it to objects possessed of some attributes in common, which it may be +made to connote. Such are the inconveniences of a language which "is not +made, but grows." like a road which is not made, but has made itself, it +requires continual mending in order to be passable.'* + + * Logic, p. 207. + +It is well observed, that the spontaneous growth of language is of +the utmost importance to the thinker. There seems to be so palpable a +substratum of right sense, in the rude classifications of the multitude, +that the logician has little else to do, in many cases, than to retouch +them and give them precision. Guizot observes, there is frequently more +truth in common acceptations of general terms than in the more precise +definitions of science. Common sense gives to words their ordinary +signification. The leading terms of philosophy are clothed in +innumerable shades of meaning acquired in their transitional use, and +immense is the knowledge of _thing:_ requisite to enable a man to affirm +that any given argument turns wholly on _words_. The study of terms, +for which logicians have provided multiplied means, is one of the most +interesting and profitable upon which men can enter. If it be worth +while to speak at all, it is worth while to know certainly what we speak +about. + +Philanthropic genius has pointed out a perversion of power, arising +through definitional incapacity, which makes it a moral duty to study +analysis of terms, and exactitude of expression. + +'All battle,' says Carlyle, 'is _misunderstanding_--did the parties know +one another, the battle would cease. No man at bottom means injustice; +he contends for some distorted image of right. _Clear_, undeniable +right--_clear_, undeniable might--either of these, once ascertained, +puts an end to battle. Battle is a confused experiment to ascertain +these.' + +Of the power of names to impose on the multitude, history furnishes too +many examples. Strength to forefend us against they delusion ability to +see that the meaning governs the term, and not the term the meaning--are +species of intellectual self-defence. + +'Augustus,' says Gibbon, 'was sensible that mankind is governed by +names; nor was he deceived in his expectation that the senate and people +would submit to slavery provided that they were respectably assured that +they still enjoyed their ancient freedom.' + +'Never,' adjures W. J. Fox, 'be deceived by words. Always try to +penetrate to realities. Have your wits sharpened, your senses exercised +to discern good and evil. Be not imposed upon by pompous manners. Many a +solemnly-uttered sentence is often a sheer inanity, which will not +bear the scrutiny of an observant intellect. Be not frightened by +denunciations; by being told that you are not a good subject or a good +Christian, if you do not believe, or say that you believe this or +that. Be not led astray by iteration--mistake not the familiar for the +intelligible. Ascertain what words are meant to convey, and what they +actually do convey. Go to the substance and soul of whatever is +propounded. Be on your guard against bold assumptions, nor let them bear +you away against the dictates of your own understanding. + +Look at phrases as counters, or paper money, that may pass for much or +little according to circumstances. Endeavour to arrive at truth, and +make that your treasure. Be ever wide awake to see through any veil +of sophistry and cant; nor by the agency of words be made the dupe of +critic or lawyer, of priest of politician.'* + + * Lectures to the Working Classes, p. 70, vol. 2. + + + +CHAPTER IX. SYLLOGISMS + +Propositions being assertions--as soon as sufficient reasons are +adduced to make the proposition credible, it becomes a truth probable or +certain, as the case may be. + +Reasoning is a simple business. To reason is to state facts in support +of a proposition. A conclusive fact so advanced is called a reason. All +the reasons offered in proof of a proposition are called premises. The +Pythagorean, who lays down the proposition that fruits and grain are the +proper food of man, and cites facts to prove his assertion--reasons. A +proposition and its reasons are called an argument. + +Reason is the faculty of perceiving coherences. Effective reasoning is +stating them so that others cannot but see them too. 'Reasoning on the +abstrusest questions is nothing more than arriving at a remote truth by +discovering its coherence with the preceding facts in the same chain.'* + + * Uses and Beauties of Euclid, p. 52. + +A syllogism is a peculiar _form_ of expression, in which every argument +may be stated. It consists of three propositions. + +1. Whoever have their heads cut off ought to be allowed to ask the +reason why. + +2. Women have their heads cut off. + +3. Therefore women ought to be allowed to ask (politically) the reason +why. + +This is an argument of Mad. de Stael, in allusion to the beheading of +women in France, without allowing them any voice in making the laws +which determine the offences for which they suffered. + +A syllogism is constructed upon the principle (known as the Dictum of +Aristotle) that whatever is affirmed or denied universally of a whole +class of things, may be affirmed or denied of anything comprehended in +that class. Thus the first proposition introduces the class of persons +who have their heads cut off. Of this class it is affirmed that they +ought to be allowed to ask the reason why. But women are included in the +class of persons who have their heads cut off, and consequently that +may be affirmed of them which is affirmed of the whole class--that they +should be allowed to ask the reason why. + +'To prove an affirmative,' says Mr. Mill, 'the argument must admit of +being stated in this form:-- + +All animals are mortal; + + All men | + Some men } are animals; + Socrates | + + therefore + + All men | + Some men } are mortal. + Socrates | + +'To prove a negative, the argument must be capable of being expressed in +this form:-- + +'No one who is capable of self-control is necessarily vicious; + + All negroes | + Some negroes } are capable of self-control; + Mr. A.'s negro | + + therefore + + No negroes are | + Some negroes are not } necessarily vicious. + Mr. A.'s negro is not | + +'Although all ratiocination admits of being thrown into one or the other +of these forms, and sometimes gains considerably by the transformation, +both in clearness and in the obviousness of its consequence; there are, +no doubt, cases in which the argument falls more naturally into one +of the other three figures, and in which its conclusiveness is more +apparent at the first glance in those figures, than when reduced into +the first. Thus, if the proposition were that pagans may be virtuous, +and the evidence to prove it were the example of Aristides; a syllogism +in the third figure, + + Aristides was virtuous, + Aristides was a pagan, + +therefore + + Some pagan was virtuous, + +Would be a more natural mode of stating the argument, and would carry +conviction more instantly home, than the same ratiocination strained +into the first figure, thus-- + + Aristides was virtuous, + Some pagan was Aristides, + +therefore + + Some pagan was virtuous.' + +The best thing that can be said in favour of the syllogism, as an +instrument of reasoning, is that it is a regular form to which every +valid argument can be reduced; and may be accompanied by a rule, showing +the validity of every argument in that form, and consequently the +unsoundness of any apparent argument which cannot be reduced to it. This +would be high praise if every 'valid argument' was a trusty one. But +unfortunately 'the question respecting the validity of an argument is +not whether the conclusion be _true_, but whether it _follows_ from the +premises adduced.'* Even this small advantage is purchased at a greater +expense of tedium and trouble than the bulk of mankind are willing to +pay, or able to pay if they were willing. + + * Logic, vol. 1, pp. 232-3. + +There is some reason to believe that the syllogistic form, as a _test_ +of valid arguments, may be entirely dispensed with, if we can secure +accuracy of data, and intelligibility in terms. + +It is not contended now that we discover new truths by the syllogism. +The syllogism is allowed to be only a form of _stating_ a truth. +Example:-- + + No predacious animals are ruminant, + The lion is predacious, + +therefore + + The lion is not ruminant. + + * Whately's Logic, Anal. Out. chap. 1, sec. 3. + + +Of course, if we know that no animal that lives by prey chews the cud, +and know, also, that the lion lives by prey, we know that the lion +does not chew the cud. This conclusion, as Lord Kames contends, and Dr. +Whately admits, is not a truth _inferred_ from the fundamental premises, +but _included_ in it. Smart, whom Mr. J. S. Mill calls acute and often +profound, remarks--'Every one, as to the _mere_ act of reasoning, +_reasons rightly_: we may reason from wrong premises, or mistake right +ones; we may be unable to infer from proper ones; but from such premises +as we do reason from, we reason _correctly_: for all premises contain +their conclusion; and in knowing the premises, we therefore know the +conclusion. The art wanted is one that will enable us to use +language perspicuously in expressing our premises:' and he might +have added--_direct us in selecting proper materials of which to make +premises_. + +The strength and weakness of the syllogism as an instrument of reasoning +will now be understood. Whately remarks, that 'since all reasoning may +be resolved into syllogisms, and since in a syllogism the premises do +virtually assert the conclusion, it follows at once that no new truth can +be elicited by any process of reasoning.'* We therefore no longer look to +the syllogism to discover truth, its value is in stating it. In this +sense it is worthy of all attention. It is the form of nature. + + * Logic, p. 223. + +Of such a syllogism as the one quoted-- + + No predacious animals are ruminant, + The lion is predacious, + +therefore + + The lion is not ruminant. + +It has been insisted by some logicians that the genius required for its +construction was _invention_. Having made a general proposition like +the first, we then have to invent or find out a middle term as the +second--but if we bear in mind that the general affirmation of the first +proposition relates to a class of (predacious animals in this case) +objects which include the middle term, the necessity of invention is +consequently dispensed with. We need only look well to what we have +there. Simplicity will be promoted by returning to our previous remark, +viz.--that reasoning is asserting a proposition, and then showing why +it is true--in other words, adducing the fact or facts, on which the +assertion rests. + +In the Logic given in 'Chambers' Information,' it is said--' In choosing +your middle terms, or arguments to prove any question, always take such +topics as are purest and least fallible, and which carry the greatest +evidence and strength with them,' But it rather appears that we have +not to invent a middle term, but only to look to the major premises, and +find it included there. + +By methodical questioning any argument may be tested. Thus, on any +assertion being made, ask--Why is the assertion true? In this manner, if +an argument has truth in it, it may be elicited. In this manner you dig +through assertions down to premises, and discover whether any ore of +truth lies there. + +The value of the argument depends upon the final answer which reveals +the premises or data of facts, upon which the conclusion rests. Forms +of speech, classification of propositions, figures of syllogisms, are of +minor importance when you have once elicited the rough truth. The best +test of an argument is the soundness of its data, and the simplest +formula for drawing out and exhibiting such data, is of the greatest +service in enabling us to judge of the validity thereof. + +Tyranny, says Cobbett, has no enemy so formidable as the pen, Why? +'Because the pen pursues tyranny both in life and beyond the grave.' +How is this proved to be the most formidable enemy of tyranny? 'From the +fact that tyranny has no enemy so formidable as that which assails not +only its existence, but its reputation, which pursues it in life +and beyond the grave.' Such interrogatories and replies generate the +expository syllogism. + +1. Tyranny has no enemy so formidable as that which assails not only its +existence, but its reputation, which pursues it in life and beyond the +grave. + +2. The pen pursues tyranny in life and beyond the grave. + +3. Therefore, tyranny has no enemy so formidable as the pen. A syllogism +is made up of collective and single facts. It is the process of +reasoning, whereby we show that a single truth is proved by a collective +one which contains it, or a less quantity is proved by a greater, or +that an assertion is proved by an induction from a class of facts. From +the class of the enemies of tyranny the pen is selected, and is +proved, by passing in inductive review the whole class, to be the most +formidable. + +The usual manner in which an argument is presented is called the +entihymeme. Thus:-- + + He is an industrious man, + +therefore + + He will acquire wealth. + +The first or major proposition is in this form suppressed. The +syllogistic form would be this:-- + + Every industrious man acquires wealth, + He is an industrious man, + +therefore + + He will acquire wealth. + +But if we ask for the proof that every industrious man acquires wealth, +we find the facts wanting--for the idle are often rich, and the diligent +poor. The industrious _may_ acquire wealth, the chances are in their +favour. + +Again. + + We must cherish self-respect, + Because self-respect is the stay of virtue. + +The suppressed proposition is--'We must cherish whatever is the stay of +virtue.' + +The whole syllogism then stands thus:-- + + We must cherish whatever is the stay of virtue, + Self-respect is the stay of virtue, + +therefore + + We must cherish self-respect. + +Dilemma is derived from a Greek word, and signifies twice an argument. +It is an argument divided into several members, and infers of each part +what is to be inferred of the whole. Thus: Either we shall live or die. +If we live, we can only live happily by being virtuous; and if we die, +we can only die happy by being virtuous; therefore, we ought always +to be virtuous. In the dilemma, question one argument at a time, as in +preceding cases. + +The Sorites uses several middle terms by which the predicate of the last +proposition is connected with the first subject. Of this argument the +well-known speech of Themistocles is a specimen. 'My son,' said that +eminent person, 'governs his mother, his mother governs me, I govern +the Athenians, the Athenians govern Greece, Greece governs Europe, and +Europe governs the world; therefore, my son governs the world.' In +these instances, question each assertion, as there are as many acts of +reasoning as intermediate propositions. + +The Onus Probandi, or Burden of Proof, is said to rest with him who +would dispute any point in favour of a presumptive, or generally +allowed truth. But manly logic holds no quibbling about who shall prove. +Whatever he asserts, the honest reasoner should be prompt to prove. + +Chalmers, it is said, made Morell known--but Morell has written a +synopsis of metaphysical philosophy that only needed to be known to be +appreciated. If Chalmers gave Morell distinction, Morell had previously +earned it. From his work I extract the following passage, which passes +in review the steps taken, marks the analytic point reached, and +outlines the ground before us:--'Different as were the minds of those +two great men [Bacon and Descartes] in themselves, different as were +their respective labours, and opposite as were, in many respects, the +results at which they arrived, yet the writings of both were marked +by one and the same great characteristic, namely, by the _spirit of +method_. The most important works of Bacon, it will be remembered, were +the "Instanratio Magna," and the "Novum Organum;" those of Descartes +were his "Dissertatio de Methodo," and his "Meditationes de Prima +Philosophia," The fruitlessness of the ancient logic, as an instrument +of discovery, had been abundantly proved by past experience, and the +watchword which these two great thinkers of their age both uttered, +and which has been ever since the guiding principle of all philosophy, +was--analysis. Bacon, who gave his attention chiefly to the direction +and improvement of physical science, taught to analyse nature, while +Descartes, who aimed rather at grounding all human knowledge upon its +ultimate principles, instructed how to analyse _thought_. All modern +philosophy, therefore, whether it arise from the Baconian or the +Cartesian point of view, bears upon it the broad outline of the analytic +method. It matters not whether it be the outer or the inner world to +which its investigations apply, in each case it teaches us to observe +and analyse _facts_ to induce instances, and upon such observation and +induction to ground our knowledge of laws and principles. In this alone +consists the Unity of modern science, and from this arises its broad +distinction from that of the ancient world. Every natural philosopher +since Bacon has grounded his success upon an induction of the facts +of the outward world, and every metaphysician, since Descartes, has +progressed onwards in his department of knowledge by analysing the facts +of our inward consciousness.'* + + * Morell: Modern Philosophy, pp. 76-8. + + + +CHAPTER X. INDUCTION + +Induction is an inference from many facts. Induction is verification. +Just as in a syllogism we show that a part is contained in the whole, so +in induction we show that a part is illustrated by the whole. It seems +that every single fact contains many truths, but induction establishes +their _universality_. A single brain contains all the truths of +phrenology, a single stone includes the phenomena of gravitation, the +temperance of a single individual exhibits the whole law of moderation, +but we learn the universality of these truths by induction. + +Every legal statute, says Dr. Johnson, is founded on induction. 'Law is +the science in which the greatest powers of understanding are applied +to the greatest number of facts.' The _basis of all_ science is such an +extensive induction of particulars as leads to general definitions and +fundamental axioms, and furnishes the premises from which inferences may +be deduced. + +Inductive observation is the great instrument of discovering important +truths. 'What are called the principles of human nature are learned from +individual instances. It is the only possible way of learning them. * +* When we reason from a general law or principle, we are in truth +reasoning from a number of instances represented by It.'* + + * Rationale of Political Representation, p. 34. + +A general election is an induction of the intelligence of the country +represented by the members of Parliament. The difference between +democracy and monarchy is in one sense an affair of logic. Where +electors are limited in franchise, and candidates restricted by property +qualification, the induction is partial, but where all can vote and many +can be chosen from, the premises are more capacious and the inference +sounder. + +Dr. Whately says, that 'in Natural Philosophy a _single instance_ is +often accounted a _sufficient_ induction; e.g., having once ascertained +that an individual magnet will attract iron, we are authorised to +conclude that this property is universal.' + +'The Edinburgh Reviewer of Whewell's "History of the Inductive +Sciences," observes that, "by the _accidental_ placing of a rhomb +of calcareous spar, upon a book or line, Bartholinus discovered the +property of the double refraction of light. By _accidentally_ combining +two rhombs in different positions, Huygens discovered the polarisation +of light. By _accidentally_ looking through a prism of the same +substance, and turning it round, Mains discovered the polarisation of +light by reflection; and by placing thin chrystalline films between two +similar prisms or rhombs, M. Arago discovered the phenomena of polarised +tints." + +'To this Mr. Whewell, in his "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," +makes the following reply:--"But Bartholinus could have seen no such +consequence in the accident, if he had not previously had a clear +conception of single refraction. A lady, in describing an optical +experiment which had been shown her, said of her teacher, 'he told me +to increase and diminish the angle of refraction: and, at last, I found +that he only meant me to move my head up and down.' At any rate, till +the lady had acquired a knowledge of the meaning which the technical +terms convey, she could not have made Bartholinus's discovery by means +of this accident. Suppose that Huygens made the experiment alluded to, +without design, what he really observed was that the images appeared +and disappeared alternately as he turned the rhomb round. His success +depended on his clearness of thought, which enabled him to perform +the intellectual analysis which would never have occurred to most men, +however often they had combined two rhombs in different positions. Malus +saw that in some positions the light reflected from the windows of +the Louvre became dim. Another person would have attributed this to +accident; he, however, considered the position of the prism, and the +window; repeated the experiment often; and by virtue of the eminently +distinct conceptions of space which he possessed, resolved the +phenomenon into its geometrical conditions."* "If it were true, that +the fall of an apple was the occasion of Newton's pursuing that train of +thought which led to the doctrine of universal gravitation, the habits +and constitution of Newton's intellect were the real source of this +great event in the progress of knowledge."** "In whatever manner facts +may be presented to the notice of a discoverer, they can never become +the materials of exact knowledge, except they find his mind already +provided with precise and suitable conceptions, by which they may be +analysed and connected."'*** + + * Whewell: Phil. Induct. Sciences, vol. 2. pp. 199-1. + + ** Ibid, vol. 2, p. 189. + + *** See J. N. Bailey's Essays pp. 87-8-9. + +These admissions seem to me to prove that whenever a casual fact proves +to us a new truth, it does so by its coincidence with previously known +facts, and that the novelty of the occasion attracts all credit to +itself, and we lose sight of the generalisation below--the fruitful +soil of experience on which the new fact, like a seed, falls. We only +recognise difference by comparison, and the comparison is an induction, +however slender. + +Monsieur de Montmorine was recaptured and brought to the scaffold, +through the trifling circumstance of some chicken bones being found near +the door of his landlady--a woman too poor to indulge in such dainties.* +The discovery of de Montmorine was not, as at first sight appears, an +inference from a single fact, but from an adjacent induction. It was +a general truth, (known to the party who observed the bones) a truth +inducted from a number of facts that poor people could not afford to +luxuriate on chickens. It was, therefore, from this induction, inferred +that some one of superior fortune must be living in that particular +place. + + * Chambers' Miscellany of Useful and Entertaining Tracts, + No. 61: the Story of Lavaiette, p. 27 + +The judicious care which the great fathers of science have exhibited in +making their inferences, incontestably establishes their conviction +of the danger of any other reasoning than that from inductions. Lord +Brougham informs us, that what Newton's Principia is to science, Locke's +essay to metaphysics, Demosthenes in oratory, and Homer in poetry, +Cuvier's researches to our fossil osteology. But Cuvier never attempted +to draw any inferences until he had examined the _whole_ osteology of +the living species. + +Lord Brougham remarks, that 'from examining a _single_ fragment of bone +we infer that, in the wilds where we found it, there lived and ranged, +some thousands of years ago, an animal of a peculiar kind.' This is a +case in which the inference spoken of is arrived at in a way different +from that apparently stated. We recognise in the 'fragment of bone' +a link in a chain of facts constituting the basis of a well-known +induction, which comparative anatomy has many times verified. It +is important to distinguish well the grounds from which accurate +inferences, such as these in the cases before us, have really been +adduced, in order to ascertain the grounds from which we should reason +generally. It will be found that solid reasoning can only proceed from +general rules--i.e., inductions from facts. It will be found that the +prime source of fallacy lies in reasoning from isolated facts. It is +not to be denied that such reasoning is sometimes right, but it is to +be remembered that it is right by accident, not by design. There is no +science or certainty in it. It is hazard, not logic. + +This habit however, is very common. Mr. Mill says, that 'Not only _may_ +we reason from particulars to particulars, without passing through +generals, but we perpetually do so reason. All our earliest inferences +are of this nature. From the first dawn of intelligence we draw +inferences, but years elapse before we learn the use of general +language. The child, who, having burnt his fingers, avoids to thrust +them again into the fire, has reasoned or inferred, though he has never +thought of the general maxim--fire burns. He knows from memory that he +has been burnt, and on this evidence believes, when he sees a candle, +that if he puts his fingers into the flame of it, he will be burnt +again. He believes this in every case which happens to arise; but +without looking, in each instance, beyond the present case. He is not +generalising; he is inferring a particular from particulars. In the same +way, also, brutes reason. There is little or no ground, for attributing +to any of the lower animals the use of conventional signs, without +which general propositions are impossible. But those animals profit by +experience, and avoid what they have found to cause them pain, in the +same manner, though not always with the same skill, as a human creature. +Not only the burnt child, but the burnt dog, dreads the fire. + +'I believe that, in point of fact, when drawing inferences from our +personal experience, and not from maxims handed down to us by books +or tradition, we much oftener conclude from particulars to particulars +directly, than through the intermediate agency of any general +proposition. We are constantly reasoning from ourselves to other people, +or from one person to another, without giving ourselves the trouble to +erect our observations into general maxims of human or external nature. +When we conclude that some person will, on some given occasion, feel or +act so and so, we sometimes judge from an enlarged consideration of the +manner in which men in general, or men of some particular character, +are accustomed to feel and act; but much oftener from having known the +feelings and conduct of the same man in some previous instance, or from +considering how we should feel or act ourselves. It is not only the +village matron who, when called to a consultation upon the case of a +neighbour's child, pronounces on the evil and its remedy simply on the +recollection and authority of what she accounts the similar case of +her Lucy. We all, where we have no definite maxims to steer by, guide +ourselves in the same way; and if we have an extensive experience, and +retain its impressions strongly, we may acquire, in this manner, a +very considerable power of accurate judgment, which we may be utterly +incapable of justifying or of communicating to others. Among the higher +order of practical intellects, there have been many of whom it was +remarked how admirably they suited their means to their ends, without +being able to give any sufficient reasons for what they did and +applied, or seemed to apply, recondite principles which they were wholly +unable to state. This is a natural consequence of having a mind stored +with appropriate particulars, and having been long accustomed to reason +at once from these to fresh particulars, without practising the habit of +stating to oneself or to others the corresponding general propositions. +An old warrior, on a rapid glance at the outlines of the ground, is able +at once to give the necessary orders for a skilful arrangement of his +troops; though if he has received little theoretical instruction, and +has seldom been called upon to answer to other people for his conduct, +he may never have had in his mind a single general theorem respecting +the relation between ground and array. But his experience of +encampments, under circumstances more or less similar, has left a number +of vivid, unexpressed, ungeneralised analogies in his mind, the most +appropriate of which, instantly suggesting itself, determines him to a +judicious arrangement. + +'The skill of an uneducated person in the use of weapons, or of tools, +is of a precisely similar nature. The savage who executes unerringly the +exact throw which brings down his game, or his enemy, in the manner +most suited to his purpose, under the operation of all the conditions +necessarily involved, the weight and form of the weapon, the direction +and distance of the object, the action of the wind, &c., owes this +power to a long series of previous experiments, the results of which he +certainly never framed into any verbal theorems or rules. It is the +same in all extraordinary manual dexterity. Not long ago a Scotch +manufacturer procured from England, at a high rate of wages, a working +dyer, famous for producing very fine colours, with a view of teaching +to his other workmen the same skill. The workman came; but his mode of +proportioning the ingredients, in which lay the secret of the effects he +produced, was by taking them up in handfuls while the common method was +to weigh them. The manufacturer sought to make him turn his handling +system into an equivalent weighing system, that the general principle of +his peculiar mode of proceeding might be ascertained. This, however, +the man found himself quite unable to do, and therefore could impart +his skill to nobody. He had, from the individual cases of his own +experience, established a connection in his mind between fine effects +of colour, and tactual perceptions in handling his dyeing materials; +and from these perceptions he could, in any particular cases, infer the +means to be employed, and the effect which would be produced, but could +not put others in possession of the grounds on which he proceeded, from +having never generalised them in his own mind, or expressed them in +language. + +'Almost every one knows Lord Mansfield's advice to a man of practical +good sense, who, being appointed governor of a colony, had to preside +in its court of justice, without previous judicial practice or legal +education. The advice was to give his decision boldly, for it would +probably be right; but never to venture on assigning reasons, for they +would almost infallibly be wrong. In cases like this, which are of no +uncommon occurrence, it would be absurd to suppose that the bad reason +was the source of the good decision. Lord Mansfield knew that if any +reason were assigned it would be necessarily an afterthought, the judge +being _in fact_ guided by impressions from past experience, without the +circuitous process of framing general principles from them, and that if +he attempted to frame any such he would assuredly fail. Lord Mansfield, +however, would not have doubted that a man of equal experience, who +had also a mind stored with general propositions derived by legitimate +induction from that experience, would have been greatly preferable as +a judge, to one, however sagacious, who could not be trusted with the +explanation and justification of his own judgments. The cases of able +men performing wonderful things they know not how, are examples of the +less civilised and most spontaneous form of the operations of superior +minds It is a _defect in them_, and _often a source of errors_, not to +have generalised as they went on; but generalisation is a help, the most +important indeed of all helps, yet not an essential.'* + + * Mill's Logic, pp. 251-5. + +In illustration of generalising from single instances, Miss Martineau +gives this example:--'A raw Chinese traveller in England was landed by +a Thames waterman who had a wooden leg. The stranger saw that the wooden +leg was used to stand in the water with, while the other was high and +dry. The apparent economy of the fact struck the Chinese; he saw in it +strong evidence of design, and wrote home that in England one-legged men +are kept for watermen, to the saving of all injury to health, shoe, and +stocking, from standing in the river.'* + +Reasoning on insufficient data-- + + Falls like an inverted cone, + Wanting its proper base to stand upon. + +Samuel Bailey has furnished, in one passage, both a clear illustration +of the process, and the validity of an induction:--'Whoever had +witnessed the acts of a landlord to his tenants, of a schoolmaster to +his pupils, of artizans towards their apprentices, of husbands towards +their wives, on points where the power of the superior could not be +contested, and where his personal gratification was incompatible with +just conduct to the subordinate, would necessarily have formed in his +own mind a species of general rule; and from this rule he might safely +draw an inference as to what would be the conduct of a despot, seated on +a throne, in the possession of unchecked authority; assisted too, as the +inquirer would be, by that _indispensable and inestimable guide to the +knowledge of mankind, an appeal to his own feelings_, in a variety of +_analogous_ instances. + +'We conclude, that a ruler with uncontrolled power will act the tyrant, +not merely from the fact that Caligula, or Nero, or Bonaparte did, +but from a thousand facts attesting that men, in, every situation, use +uncontrolled power in this way--just as we infer that all bodies tend to +the centre of the earth, _not merely from the circumstance of an apple +dropping from a tree, but from seeing the tendency in stones, water, +animals, and all things within our observation_. The use of uncontrolled +power, for the gratification of the possessor, without an equitable +respect to others, is no more peculiar to monarchs, than a tendency +to the earth is peculiar to apples. It may be useful to know that +_monarchs_ act in this way, as it may be useful to know that apples drop +to the ground; but it is much more useful to know that _men_ act in +this manner. _An inference is safer when gathered from the widest +induction.'_ + + * How to Observe, p. 6. + + ** Rationale of Political Representation. Introduction, pp. + 85-6. The last sentence of this extract is abridged--but, as + the reader will find upon reference, the sense of the author + is faithfully rendered. + +It may be useful to observe that, though a few instances are insufficient +to establish a theory, one may be sufficient to overturn a theory, +fancifully or hypothetically supported, Gibbon overturns the entertaining +theory of Rudbeck, an antiquarian of Upsal, of profound learning and easy +faith, who, by the dim light of legends and traditions, of conjectures +and etymologies, sought to establish the antiquity of Sweden over half +the earth. Gibbon annihilated this well laboured system of German +antiquities, by a single fact too well attested to admit of any doubt, +and of too decisive a nature to leave room for any reply--the fact that +the Germans, of the age of Tacitus, were unacquainted with the use of +letters. A circumstance fatal to their literary claims, urged by Olaus +Rudbeck. + +In the chapter on 'Facts' I have cautioned the reader against +unquestioned data. This seems the place to remark that the unsuspected +sources of error and unfriendliness have their rise in the criminal +implicitness with which we listen to reports, and infer from rumours as +from facts. These are the very little handles which move men and women +to strange performances.'* All the plots of dramas and romances are +founded on misunderstandings, which a little sagacity of action (such as +a wise resolution not to be imposed upon would lead to) would commonly +suffice to arrest the error at its birth. With regard to character we +constantly infer from data, partial, limited, and doubtful. If most +quarrelers were called into a court of Inquiry to confess the real +grounds from which they have arrived at certain conclusions with regard +to their neighbours, and often with regard to their friends, they would +be at once overwhelmed with a conviction of the weakness of which they +have been guilty. Upon analysing the miserable sources of opinions +of which scandal and calumny are born, I have found it impossible +to restrain astonishment at the imbecility of logical power men will +sometimes be content to exhibit, where meanness prevails, malice +incites, and passion governs. Well might Bacon exclaim--'Doth any man +doubt, that if there were taken out of men's minds, vain opinions, +flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations, and the like, but it +would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things?'** The +wise rule is, never judge from appearances when facts can be had--never +receive a report without challenging its foundation, nor adopt it +without permission to give the authority. + + * Cricket on the Hearth. + + ** Essay on Truth. + +In all cases, in which you must judge from appearances and reason +from conjectures, adopt the _fairest_ interpretation possible. On this +principle, credit will sometimes be given where none is due--but in nine +cases out of ten, justice will be done, for I am satisfied that there is +more worth among men than wisdom, and that we do well much oftener than +we reason well. We seldom need judge charitably, did we always endeavour +to judge justly. But we make a virtue of our own errors, and we often +affect to _condescend_ to pronounce an opinion, which it would be +criminal to withhold. If ever I go to the Herald's, office, the motto I +will have emblazoned shall be this--Justice is sufficient. Could we only +get justice in the world, we could afford to excuse it all its 'charity' +of judgment, and its benevolence even of act. + +Where should a man's reputation be safe from suspicion if not in the +hands of his friend? It ought to be a principle of action with all +men, never to judge a friend except out of his own mouth. 'There was +a generous friend of mine once, who never would have judged me or any +other man unheard.'* With the sublime intensity of one who felt the +infinite value of private justice, has Schiller delineated this spirit +in the interview between Octavio and his son Max Piccolomini. After +a violent and visible struggle with his feelings--wrought upon by his +father's endeavours to sow suspicions in his mind, and detach him from +the service of his friend, Wallenstein--Max exclaims:-- + + * Edward to Mr. Peerybing. + +I will procure me light a shorter way. Farewell. + +Octavio. Where now? + +Max. (To the Duke.) + + If thou hast believed that I shall act + A part in this thy play---- + Thou hast miscalculated on me grievously. + My way must be straight on. + True with the tongue, + False with the heart--I may not, cannot be: + Nor can I suffer that a man should trust me-- + As his friend trust me--and then lull my conscience + With such low pleas as these:--"I ask him not-- + He did it all at his own hazard--and + My mouth has never lied to him."--No, no + What a friend takes me for, that I must be. + --I'll to the Duke; ere yet this day is ended + Will I demand of him that he do save + His good name from the world, and with one stride + Break through and rend this fine-spun web of yours. + He can, he will!--I still am his believer. + Yet I'll not pledge myself, but that those letters + May furnish you, perchance, with proofs against him. + How far may not this Tertsky have proceeded-- + What may not he himself too have permitted + Himself to do, to snare the enemy, + The laws of war excusing? Nothing, save + His own mouth shall convict him--nothing less! + And face to face will I go question him. + Ay--this state-policy? O how I curse it! + You will some time, with your state-policy, + Compel him to the measure; it may happen + Because ye are _determined_ that he is guilty, + Guilty ye'll make him. All retreat cut off, + You close up every outlet, hem him in + Narrower and narrower, till at length ye force him-- + Yes, ye,--ye force him in his desperation, + To set fire to his prison. Father! father! + That never can end well--it cannot--will not! + Deem of it what thou wilt; but pardon me, + That I must bear me on in my own way. + All must remain pure betwixt him and me; + And, ere the day-light dawns, it must be known + Which I must lose--my father, or my friend.* + + * Shiller's Piccolomini, act 3, scene 9. + +Had Othello been thus honourable to Desdemona, he would never have +murdered her. Incalculable is the evil we bring on ourselves and +society, by supposing and surmising facts we ought resolutely to +question. The motto of the garter-- + + Evil be to him who evil thinks, + +ought to be, + + Evil is to him who evil thinks. + +Every man will be his own Lawyer and his own Doctor, and such is the +perversity of human nature, he will also be his own _Iago_, and feed +himself with suspicions. Nearly all tragedies hinge on this error. + +To avoid being the cause of misunderstanding to others, it is a good +rule never to speak critically of others, except in their presence, or +in print. When I am obliged to do this in conversation, with persons of +unknown or doubtful exactitude, I take care to keep much below the truth +in matters of censure, as anything of that kind may gain ten or twenty +per cent, in carriage. When with men of just habits of interpretation, +I pay them the highest compliment of friendship, and speak to them of +others, without reserve. + +Notorious are the contumelies put upon the cases of grievance presented +from the people in the House of Commons. Nor is it altogether causeless. +So prone are the ignorant to mistake their prejudices for facts, and +ascribe to others as crimes what exists only in their own surmises, that +most popular cases may be stripped of half their pretensions without +injuring their truth. Exaggeration is the vice of ignorance. Half the +speeches addressed to 'King Mob' are hyperbolic. The sentiments of +public meetings minister too often to the prevalent inflation. The +people will be powerful when they learn to be exact--and not till then. + +The only mode of correcting this evil is to instil into the people the +wise rule of Burlamiqui. To reason, (that is, inductively) says this +writer, is to calculate, and as it were draw up an account, after +balancing all arguments, in order to see on which side the advantage +lies. Burlamiqui had law chiefly in view in his remark, but the rule is +of immense application. A logician is a secretary or banker's clerk, who +keeps an account between truth and error. When a lady once consulted Dr. +Johnson on the degree of turpitude to be attached to her son's robbing +an orchard--'Madam,' said Johnson, 'it all depends upon the weight of +the boy. I remember my schoolfellow, Davy Garrick, who was always a +little fellow, robbing a dozen orchards with impunity, but the very +first time I climbed up an apple tree, for I was always a heavy boy, the +bough broke with me, and it was called a judgment. I suppose that is +why Justice is represented with a pair of scales.' This may not be the +precise reason why Justice has a pair of scales, but the point goes to +the root of the matter. Without weighing there can be neither justice +nor fair induction. + +In illustration of these views Mr. Mill has some able remarks:--'In +proportion to any person's deficiency of knowledge and mental +cultivation, is generally his inability to discriminate between his +inferences and the perceptions on which they were grounded. + +Many a marvellous tale many a scandalous anecdote, owes its origin to +this incapacity. The narrater relates, not what he saw or heard, but +the impression which he derived from what he saw or heard, and of which +perhaps the greater part consisted of inference, though the whole +is related not as inference but as matter-of-fact. The difficulty +of inducing witnesses to restrain, within any moderate limits, +the intermixture of their inferences with the narrative of their +perceptions, is well known to experienced cross-examiners; and still +more is this the case when ignorant persons attempt to describe any +natural phenomenon. "The simplest narrative," says Dugald Stewart, "of +the most illiterate observer involves more or less of hypothesis nay, +in general, it will be found that, in proportion to his ignorance, +the greater is the number of conjectural principle involved in his +statements. A village apothecary (and, if possible, in a still greater +degree, an experienced nurse) is seldom able to describe; the plainest +case, without employing a phraseology of which every word is a theory; +whereas a simple and genuine specification of the phenomena which mark a +particular disease--a specification unsophisticated by fancy, or by +preconceived opinions, may be regarded as unequivocal evidence of a mind +trained by long and successful study to the most difficult of all arts, +that of the faithful _interpretation_ of nature."'* + + * Logic, pp. 408-9, vol. 2. + +It is in judgments formed, in reprehensible indifference to the actual +facts of the case, that party rancour and the proverbial injustice of +popular political opinion take their rise. A useful caution on this +head is pronounced by Lord Brougham in his sketch of the life of Lord +Wellesley:--'How often do we see,' observes his lordship, 'vehement: and +unceasing; attacks made upon a minister or a statesman, perhaps not in +the public service, for something which he does not choose to defend or +explain, resting his claims to the confidence of his countrymen upon +his past exertions and his known character. Yet these assaults are +unremittingly made upon him, and the people believe that so much noise +could not be stirred up without something to authorise it. Sometimes the +objects of the calumny are silent from disdain; sometimes from knowing +that the base propagators of it will only return to their slander the +more eagerly alter their conviction of falsehood; but sometimes, also, +the silencer may be owing to official reserve, of which we see a most +remarkable instance in the ease of Lord Wellesly.' + +Not only are enemies of the people afforded a justification for their +opposition by wrongful judgment pronounced upon them, but the friends +of the people often pass over to the other side through the same cause. +When a leader of the people first comes in personal contact with the +opposite party, and becomes acquainted with merits of feeling and +judgment which he had as it were pledged himself to deny, and indeed +achieved himself a position by disbelieving in, he becomes ashamed of +the injustice exacted from him by his inexorable adherents, and forsakes +his party when he should only forsake its errors. The case of Barnave, +in the first French Revolution, is a memorable instance of this. On +lesser theatres I have seen many instances of this kind of conversion; +Such changes have always been ascribed to venality, yet they are men +of generous instincts who are thus overcome--but they want logical +strength, and cannot correct themselves without falling. + +It is a wise rule in conversation, never to guess at meanings. When, an +observation is made, capable of affording two inferences, at once put +the question which shall elicit the meaning intended. Conversation is +held to no purpose unless explicitness comes out of it. Innumerable are +the errors that arise through letting remarks pass, of which we +only _suppose_ we know the purport. This is a fruitful source of +misunderstanding. When in Scotland I was much instructed by the +intellectual characteristics of the people. The Scotch are essentially a +reflective people. The English conceive doubts, but the Scotch put them +into queries. Before I had been in the country many hours I was struck +by the inductive habits of the people. A very old and illiterate woman, +to whom I put an indefinite question, eyed me deliberately from head to +foot before she gave me an answer. Not in rudeness did she gaze, so much +as in inquiry as to what could be my object. I spent more than a week +in inquiring at places, where apartments were to be let, by which I +acquired profitable acquaintance with the people. Upon asking the +terms of apartments, I was met, in all cases, by several preliminary +questions, as for whom were they? what number of persons? what station, +habits, and probable stay? Then I received the precise answer required. +It did not seem to me that they were answering one question by asking +another, as is sometimes said of the Scotch--but by a happy and wise +presence of mind they asked, as all should do, at many questions as were +required to complete the data of the specific answer they were called +upon to give. + +A wise practice is followed in courts of law. No judge pronounces an +opinion on a hypothetical case. What he would do? or what would be the +judgment of the law, suppose a certain case should arise?--are questions +he never condescends to answer. 'Bring the plaintiff into court, let the +evidence be taken, and then we will decide. We sit here to judge actual, +not suppositious cases.' Such would be the reply. People out of court +might profit by the example. + +I remember one striking instance of the pernicious effects of surmise. +Some years ago I took part in a Fraternal Demonstration at Highbury +Barn. The assembly was numerous, and composed of persons of all nations +and all parties. The celebration was avowedly one of fraternity. The +tone of the meeting reflected its object. Pacific words were on every +tongue, and harmony reigned up till eleven o'clock. At that hour +Monsieur Chillman asked me if some steps could not be taken to annualize +the meeting, and he requested me to prepare and propose a resolution to +that effect. Monsieur Chillman, thinking the resolution ought to come +from an Englishman, strongly urged me to move it. I, thinking it too +important to emanate from a young man, looked about for a person of +experience and known discretion to introduce it. After several had +declined, Mr. Hetherington undertook it. The English politicians were +composed of two parties, the friends of Mr. O'Connor, and the members of +the National Hall. At that time they were pleased to be the antipodes of +each other. No sooner had Mr. Hetherington spoken, he being the friend +of Mr. Lovett, than his motion was supposed to come from Mr. Lovett's +party, though they were utterly ignorant of its origination. Clamour's +hundred tongues were loosened. Slumbering differences were awakened. +Suspicion spread like an infection. Fraternity perished of the +contagion. Twenty amendments were proposed, and it was not till +midnight, and then in a storm indescribably contradictory of the +meeting's whole purport, that a common understanding was come to. +Had the least inquiry been made by the objecting party, previously +to dissenting, they would have found that the suspicious proposition +originated with one of themselves. But assuming premises, they inferred +from conjecture instead of fact, and raised disastrous doubts as to the +ability of that assembly for domestic or international fraternisation. + +The use and abuse of authority Is a subject worthy of the young +logician's serious attention. Many great writers like Bacon, through +policy--Burke through position, or Shakspere through versatility of +genius, have written on both sides of important questions. Such men, +taken piece-meal, may be quoted by the most opposite parties in favour +of the most opposite opinions. Unless there is time to make a broad +induction from their writings, showing, by weighty, quantitive evidence, +the side to which they leaned, better not quote them as _authorities_ +at all, but give what expresses your own views on your own +responsibility--indeed, in _all_ cases, the quoter ought to stand +prepared, if possible, to justify all he cites from another in argument. +'There is perhaps something weak and servile in our wishing to rely +on, or draw assistance from, ancient opinions. Reason ought not, like +vanity, to adorn herself with old parchments, and the display of a +genealogical tree; more dignified in her proceedings, she ought to +derive everything from herself; she should disregard past times, and be, +if I may use the phrase, the contemporary of all ages.'* Quote others as +Grotius did: not as judges from whose decision there is no appeal, but +as witnesses whose conspiring testimony confirms the view taken. + + * Necker. + +Analogy has frequently been confounded with induction. Analogy signifies +reasoning from resemblances subsisting between phenomena--induction, +reasoning from the sameness of phenomena. + +The phenomena affording an induction of a law of nature must be obvious, +uniform, and universal. + +The rules to be observed in deducing general principles are, that the +case be true and the facts universal. + +On this subject, as exhibiting the clearest results arrived at, I +transcribe a passage from Mill: 'There is no word which is used more +loosely, or in a greater variety of senses, than analogy. It sometimes +stands for arguments which may be examples of the most rigid induction. +Archbishop Whately, for instance, following Ferguson and other writers, +defines analogy conformably to its primitive acceptation, that which was +given to it by mathematicians, resemblance of relations. In this sense, +when a country which has sent out colonies is termed the mother country, +the expression is analogical, signifying that the colonies of a country +stand in the same _relation_ to her in which children stand to their +parents. And if any inference be drawn from this resemblance of +relations, as, for instance, that the same obedience or affection is +due from colonies to the mother country which is due from children to a +parent, this is called reasoning by analogy. Or if it be argued that +a nation is most beneficially governed by an assembly elected by the +people, from the admitted fact that other associations for a common +purpose, such as joint stock companies, are best managed by a committee +chosen by the parties interested; this, too, is an argument from analogy +in the preceding sense, because its foundation is, not that a nation is +like a joint stock company, or Parliament like a board of directors, but +that Parliament stands in the same _relation_ to the nation in which a +board of directors stands to a joint stock company. Now, in an argument +of this nature, there is no inherent inferiority of conclusiveness like +other arguments from resemblance, it may amount to nothing, or it may +be a perfect and conclusive induction. The circumstance in which the +two cases resemble, may be capable of: being shown to be the _matereal_ +circumstance; to be that on which all the consequences, necessary to be +taken into account in the particular discussion, depend. In the case +in question, the resemblance is one of relation; the _fundamentum +relationis_ being the management, by a few persons, of affairs in which +a much greater number are interested along with them. Now, some may +contend that this circumstance which is common to the two cases, and +the various consequences which follow from it, have the chief share in +determining all those effects which make up what we term good or bad +administration. If they can establish this, their argument has the force +of a rigid induction: if they cannot, they are said to have failed +in proving the analogy between the two cases, a mode of speech which +implies that when the analogy can be proved, the argument founded upon +it cannot be resisted.'* + + * Logic, pp. 97-8, vol. 2. + +'Many of the most splendid and important discoveries in this science +were the result of analogical reasonings. It was from this source that +Dr. Priestley proved the compound nature of atmospheric air; and it is +related that it was in consequence of hints which he had given, when +on a visit to Paris, to Lavoisier, founded entirely upon analogical +conjectures, that the latter philosopher was induced to commence +experiments, with the view of proving the compound nature of water, and +of reducing it to its constituent elements. Indeed the whole history of +this very important and useful department of human knowledge exhibits +very striking and incontestable proofs how much of the art owed its +existence to mere hints and conjectures, founded, in many cases, upon +very slight resemblances or analogies.*. The chief province of analogy +is confined to that of suggestion. Analogies are the great hinters of +experiments. They illustrate an argument, but do not establish it. +They are probabilities, not proofs. Hence Lord Brougham in one place +exclaims:--'I have a dread, at least a suspicion, of all analogies, and +never more than when on the slippery heights of an obscure subject; +when we are, as it were, _inter apices_ of a metaphysical argument, and +feeling, perhaps groping, our way in the dark, or among the clouds. +I then regard analogy as a dangerous light, a treacherous _ignii +fatuus_.'** + +A striking instance of the fallacy of analogy is afforded in the +experiments of Professor Matteuoci, which seem to prove that though the +analogies between electricity and nervous substance are nearly perfect, +yet they are two distinct agencies.*** + + * Blakey's Logic, pp. 97-7. + + ** Pal. Illus. vol. 2. + + *** See Zoist No. 20, p. 363. + + + +CHAPTER XI. DETECTION OF FALLACIES + +WE hope to be able to save students from the fate of Diodorus, (a great +logician, who died in his school through shame at being, unable to +resolve a quibble propounded by Stilno)--not by hardening, but by +enlightening them. Though we bring neither mood nor figure wherewith to +test the presence of error, we are not without the hope of qualifying +the student for its discovery. + +It has been confessed from the throne of logic that, 'After all, in the +practical detection of each individual fallacy, _much must depend on +natural and acquired acuteness_: nor can any rules be given, the +mere learning of which will enable us to _apply_ them with mechanical +certainty and readiness.' + +Bulwer, in remarking that error is a view of _some_ facts instead of +a survey of _all_, indicated the key to logical fallacy. Error lies +principally in defective premises. Sophistry in science is referable +to incomplete analysis of nature, of systems--to artificial +arrangements--to _supposing_ qualities, to _assuming_ principles, to +false inductions from imperfect demonstration. + +Dickens, in 'Nicholas Nickleby,' gives the case of a certain lady, who, +because she knew _one_ young milliner, who retained red cheeks and +did not die of consumption, was immovably of opinion that all +representations of the injurious effect of such sedentary occupation +were false. It is ever so with the vulgar. Some one case has come under +their notice, and it is in vain that you appeal to a chain of facts. +They know nothing of induction--they know one case to the contrary, and +that is enough. This error is the source of vulgar prejudice. Once teach +men that truth does not lie in a single instance, but in a calculation +in a balance of probabilities, and you rationalise them. 'The chapter +of accidents [or single instances] is the Bible of the fool--it supplies +him with a text against everything great, or good, or wise.'* + + * Times. + + Where others toil with philosophic force, + Their nimble nonsense takes a shorter course, + Flings at your head convictions in the lump, + And gains' remote conclusions with a jump.--Cowper, + +The first source of error is defective induction. We easily arrive at +this point of examination by the questions we have proposed for use +in the test of syllogism. Formerly, one syllogism was required to be +defeated by another--we now attack a fallacy by induction. No false +syllogism, says Biennan, can resist the inductive process of sifting +particulars. + + I do not like thee. Dr. Fell, + The reason why, I cannot tell-- + But this I know, and know full well, + I do not like thee, Dr. Fell. + +This kind of thing will not do. Induction pursues the reasoner with an +eternal _why_. A clear because to a clear why, is a demand that is never +remitted in sound logic. + +Lord Melbourne, in giving his reason for his religion in the House +of Lords, said it was the religion of his forefathers and that of his +country, _therefore_, he would support the church. (Cheers from the +opposition benches.) The Brahmin and Mussulman give the same reason +for theirs. A logician in facts would have said, I hold and support my +religion because it is _true_. What the standard of physical certainty +is to facts, what axioms are to science, such is induction to +syllogisms--it is the test of their correctness. + +Dr. Whately exhibits the following instance of a regularly expressed +syllogism:-- + + Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial: + Afflictions are dispensations of Providence, + Therefore, they are beneficial. + +Every applicable rule of Dr. Whately's logic is, of course, applied +here--it is true in mood and figure, and yet the argument is fallacious. +A fallacy is defined as 'an ingenious mixture of truth and falsehood, +so entangled as to be intimately blended--that the falsehood is, in +chemical phrase, _held in solution_: one drop of sound logic is that +test which immediately disunites them, makes the foreign substance +visible, and precipitates it to the bottom.'* But whence is to come +'this drop of sound logic?' Not from the Doctor's _Elements,_ they have +sent forth the fallacy. But touch it with the talisman of facts and; the +error will appear. + + * Whately's Logic, Anal. Out., chap. 1, stc. 4. + +What facts support the assertion that Afflictions are dispensations of +Providence?' The simple question is fatal to the argument. Can such +a proposition have facts for its support? Ignorance, congregating in +narrow courts, and laziness, accumulating filth, generate sickness +and affliction. Are these the dispensations of Providence, or the +dispensations of folly and crime? To ascribe them to Providence is +virtually to allow ignorance and laziness to step into the throne of +God, and call upon men to believe in _their_ beneficent dispensations. +Dr. Watts, another writer on logic, set the Christian congregations of +England to sing the same species of fallacy:--- + + "Diseases are the servants, Lord, + They come at thy command; + I'll not attempt a murm'ring word, + Against thy chast'ning hand." + +According to this lyrical logician, whenever wise precautions arrest +the progress of pestilence, or the physician's skill subdues disease, +Jehovah is robbed of a servant. By such an argument, humanity is made +to be in rebellion against heaven, and our medical colleges are in +antagonism with Deity, and the recent appointment, by the Russell +government, of a Sanatory Commission, was high blasphemy. It is the +degradation of language to employ it to such a purpose, and logic +needs revising to save us from publishing such puerility in the name +of learning and of reason. It must have been logic of this kind +that induced a strong-thoughted woman to hazard the bold but tenable +conjecture, that 'If an argument has truth in it, less than a +philosopher will see it--and if it has not, less than a logician will +refute it.'* + + * A Few Days in Athens, by Frances Wright. + +R. G. Latham, M.D., in his 'First Outlines of Logic applied to Grammar +and Etymology,' has introduced the particular instance of the syllogism +on Providence here cited from Whately. It would be no difficult task to +present other instances of the same species of polemical fallacy from +Dr. Whately and other writers on logic, did it comport with the rule +I have chosen for observance. I give these cases chiefly to show how +extensively and obtrusively they are introduced. + +'We have,' says Mr. Mill, 'five distinguishable classes of fallacy, +which may to expressed in the following synoptic table:-- + +[Illustration: Mill's Fallacy Table] + +It was the boast of Archimedes, that if any one would find him a +fulcrum, on which to rest a prop, he would raise the world, But this was +mere assertion unsupported by facts, for if the fulcrum had been found +him, Archimedes could not have performed his promise. This has been +proved by Ferguson, who has demonstrated that if Archimedes could have +moved with the swiftness of a cannon ball--480 miles every hour--it +would have taken him just 44,963,540,000,000 of years to have-raised the +world one inch. Bulwer remarks, 'Critics have said, what a fine idea of +Archimedes! But how much finer is the fact that refutes it. _One of the +sublimest things in the world is plain truth_.' + + All motion generates warmth, + Shaking (with cold) is motion, + _Ergo_, shaking with cold generates warmth. + +We look, in this case, to the facts on which the first proposition +rests, and find the assertion too general. + +To one who said that none were happy who were not above opinion, a +Spartan replied, 'Then none are happy but knaves and robbers.' + +Mr. Goodrich, the original Peter Farley gives, In his 'Fireside +Education,' an instance to this effect of two boys arguing on the +division of their beds. William exclaims, 'You take more than your share +of the bed, James.' James answers, 'I only take half the bed.' William +replies, 'True, but you take your half out of the middle, and I am +obliged to lie on both sides to get my half.' + +Innumerable sophisms are suffered to pass in consequence of Some +brilliancy of position which, dazzles us and prevents our seeing that +they are wide of the' mark of reason. An instance occurs in Bulwer--who +says, 'Helvetius erred upon education--but his dogma has been +beneficial.' Probably so--but not so beneficial as the truth would have +been. Many persons have argued from such an instance, that error is +useful. Dickens, in those incidental observations of striking good +sense strewed up and down his writings, says, in the 'Cricket on the +Hearth:'--'These remarks (of Mrs. Fielding) were quite unanswerable: +which is the happy property of all remarks that are _sufficiently wide +of the purpose_.' Of the refutation of such remarks he has presented an +able instance in 'Martin Chuzzlewit': + +'Bless my soul, Westlock,' says Pinch, is it nothing to see Pecksniff +moved to that extent and know one's self to be the cause? And did you +not hear him say that he could have shed his blood for me? + +'Do you want any blood shed for you?' returned Westlock with +considerable irritation. 'Does he shed anything for you that you _do_ +want? Does he shed employment for you, instruction for you pocket +money for you? Does he even shed legs of mutton for you in any decent +proportion to potatoes and garden stuff?' + + + +CHAPTER XII. SCEPTICISM + +Man has been called the plaything of chance, but there is no logic more +close and inflexible than that of human life: all is entwined together; +and for him who is able to disentangle the premises and patiently await +the conclusion it is the most correct of syllogisms.--Jules Sandau: +People's Journal, No. 87. + +'To quote authors,' says Harris, in his preface to his Hermes,' 'who +have lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full +maturity of Grecian and Roman literature; some in its declension; +and others in periods still more barbarous and depraved; may afford, +perhaps, no unpleasing speculation, to see how the same reason has +at all times prevailed; how there is one truth like one sun, that has +enlightened human intelligence through every age, and saved it from the +darkness both of sophistry and error.' This is the assurance which right +reason will ever impart. Underneath all the change after which we pant, +amid all the variety which surrounds us, and seem the very aliment of +our nature, lies the instinct after the permanent. It is the province of +sound logic to guarantee this in conclusion. + +The novelty, change, fluctuation, which scientific discovery has +brought, and will yet bring, into the formerly settled worlds of opinion +and social condition, will unsettle men's minds, and pave the way to an +age of scepticism. Sound logic is necessary to provide that this doubt +is transitional and not ultimate. + +Scepticism is of two kinds, that of Pyrrho, and that of examination. The +followers of Pyrrho, it is said, made doubting a profession, until at +last they doubted whether they did doubt. This is the scepticism of the +scorner and trifler. + +He did not know that he did not know it, and if he did know it it was +more than he knew. This is as far as the philosopher, of this school can +go. Dickens has drawn the portrait of these, logicians in Mr. Tigg:-- + +'When a man like Slyme,' said Mr. Tigg, 'is detained for such a thing as +a bill' I reject the superstition of ages, and believe nothing. I don't +even believe that I don't believe, curse me if I do.' + +Hood is ironical on the professors of uncertainty. 'On a certain day +of a certain year, certain officers went, on certain information, to +a certain court, in a certain city, to take up a certain Italian for +a certain crime. What gross fools are they who say there is nothing +certain in this world.' + +But scepticism is not capable of disturbing the well-grounded repose +of the wise; for when the sceptic thinks he has involved everything in +doubt, everything is still left in as much certainty as his scepticism. + +In the great maze of conflicting opinion, it matters little that we are +cautioned that reason is not all-sufficient--it is the best sufficiency +we have. If reason will not serve us well, will anything serve us +better? Bishop Berkeley may demonstrate that we are not sure of matter's +existence--but are we more sure of any thing else? We are not thus to +be cajoled. But it is right to say that Mr. J. S. Mill contends that +Berkeley has been misunderstood--but if he did argue, as popularly +believed, to such argument, the answer of Byron is sufficient-- + + When Berkeley said there was no matter, + It was no matter what he said. + +If all is delusion, the delusion is very orderly--it observes regular +laws, and we proceed in logical method to inform each other, how +the delusion of things appears to our understandings or affects our +fortunes. + + Where nothing is, and all things seem, + And we the shadows of a dream, + +We discuss the seemings with the same gravity as realities.' If a man +seems to do wrong, and I seem to prevent him, and the wrong, therefore, +seems not to be done, I am satisfied. + +The 'wise considerate scepticism' of inquiry has been well expressed by +Emerson, in his recent lecture on Montaigne.--'Who shall forbid a wise +scepticism, seeing that there is no practical question on which anything +more than a proximate solution is to be had? Marriage itself is an open +question: those "out" wish to be "in:" those "in" to be "out." + +The state. With all its obvious advantages, nobody loves it. Is +it; otherwise with the Church? Shall the young man enter trade or a +profession without being vitiated? Shall he stay on shore or put out to +sea? There is much to be said on both sides. Then there is competition +and the attractions of the co-operative system. The labourer has a poor +hut, is without knowledge, virtue, civilisation. If: we say, "Let us +have culture," the expression awakens a new indisposition; for culture +destroys spontaneous and hearty unencumbered action. Let us have a +robust manly life; let us have to do with realities, not with shadowy +ghosts. Now this precisely is the right ground of the sceptic; not of +unbelief, denying or doubting--least of all of scoffing and profligate +jeering at what is stable and good. He is _the considerer_. He has, +too many enemies around him to wish to be his own. The position of the +sceptic is one taken up for defence; as we build a house not too high or +too low; under the wind, but out of the dust. For him the Spartan vigour +is too-austere. St. John too thin and aerial. The wise sceptic avoids to +be fooled by any extreme; he wishes to, see the game. He wishes to see +all things, but mainly men. Really our life in this world not of so easy +interpretation as preachers and school-books are accustomed to describe +it.' These have not so efficiently solved the problem, that the sceptic +should yield himself contentedly to their interpretation. True, he does +not wish to speak harshly of what is best in us,--to turn himself into a +"devil's attorney." But he points out the room there is for doubt;--the +power of moods;--the power of complexion, and so forth. Shall we, then, +because good-nature inclines us to virtue's side, smoothly cry: "There +are no doubts!"--and lie for the right? We ask whether life is to be led +in a brave or a cowardly way: whether the satisfaction of our doubts be +not essential to all manliness: whether the name of virtue is to be a +barrier to that which is virtue? The sceptic wants truth, wants to have +things made plain to him, and has a right to be convinced in his own +way. In such scepticism there is no malignity; it is honest, and does +not hinder his being convinced; and this hard-headed man, once convinced +will prove a giant in defence of his faith. The true and final answer +in which all scepticism is lost is the moral sentiment: that never +forfeits the supremacy. It is the drop that balances the universe.' + +Science and logic have so far advanced as to abridge the field of +doubtful questions. When syllogism answered syllogism, uncertainty +reigned absolute--but now that the appeal is to facts, we can, wherever +facts can be had, weigh or number them, and decide on one side or the +other. + +When Ali Pacha was at Janina, the case of a poor woman, who accused a +man of the theft of all her property, was brought before him; but the +plaintiff having no witnesses, the case was discharged, as the other +asserted his innocence, and insisted as a proof, that he had not a +farthing in the world. On their leaving his presence, Ali ordered +both to be weighed, and then released them without further notice. A +fortnight afterwards, he commanded both into his presence, and again +weighed them; the accuser had lost as much as the defendant had +gained in weight. The thing spoke for itself, and Ali decided that the +accusation was just. Ali Pacha was the Burlamiqui of justice. Induction, +too, has its scales, and seldom leaves us in doubt when it gets truth +and falsehood in them. Scepticism is now happily restricted to those +questions resting on conjectures, and which do not pertain to the +practical affairs of this life. On matter-of-fact questions, only the +weak are perplexed. After men have been in deliberation till the time of +action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, +it is a sign the difference of motives the one way and the other is +not great; therefore, not to resolve then is to lose the occasion by +weighing of trifles, which is pusillanimity. + +Quaint old Bunyan tells us, that when he had completed his 'Pilgrim's +Progress' he took the opinions of various friends on the propriety of +publishing it. Some said 'John, do;' others 'John, don't.' But solid +old John was not to be thus confounded. 'Then I will print it,' said +he, 'and thus the case decide.' To this good sense the public owe that +immortal dream. + +In the great field of physical investigation, science has conquered +doubt. 'Contingency and versimilitude are the offspring of human +ignorance, and, with an intellect of the highest order, cannot be +supposed to have any existence.'* + + *Edinburgh Review, September 1814, article Probabilities + +'Probability,' says Laplace,' has reference partly to our ignorance, and +partly to our knowledge.' + +'Chance,' observes Mr. Mill, 'is usually spoken of in direct antithesis +to _law_; whatever (it is supposed) cannot be ascribed to law, If +attributed to chance. It is, however, certain, that whatever happens +is the result of some law; is an effect of causes, and could have been +predicted from a knowledge of the existence of those causes, and from +their laws. If I turn up a particular card, that is a consequence of its +place in the pack. Its place in the pack was a consequence of the manner +in which the cards were shuffled, or of the order in which they were +played in the last game; which, again, were the effects of prior causes. +At every stage, if we had possessed an accurate knowledge of the causes +in existence, it would have been abstractedly possible to foretell the +effect.'* + +'In the domain of morals, too, a certainty, not dreamed of in past +times, now prevails. However much man, as an individual, may be an +enigma, in the aggregate he is a mathematical problem.'** + +In the great world of opinion it is the duty of honest reasoners to +endeavour to find out the truth, and take sides, undeterred by the +philosophical frivolity now growing fashionable. If men are silent +concerning objects and principles, it is said they have none, and it is +impatiently asked 'where is their bond of union?' And no sooner is it +explained than they are told 'it is very unphilosophical to think of +setting up a creed.' Where the alternatives are thus put against them +they should take their own course. Creeds are the necessary exponents +of conviction. The creedless philosopher is out on the sea of opinion, +without compass or chart. To bind yourself for the future to present +opinions is doubtless unwise, but he who has inquired to any purpose has +come to some conclusion, affirmative, negative, or neutral; and it is +the province of a creed to avow the actual result, and the consequent; +conduct intended to be followed. It is the vice of free thinking that +it spreads universal uncertainty, and assumes right and wrong to be so +protean that no man can tell one hour what opinion he shall hold the +next. Logic should correct this unsatisfactory extreme, and extirpate +the tiresome race whom Shelley described in Peter Bell:-- + + To Peter's view, all seems one hue; + He is no Whig, he is no Tory; + No Deist and no Christian he-- + But is so subtle, that to be + Nothing is all his glory** + + * Logic, pp. 57-8, vol. 2 + + ** Vestiges. + + + +CHAPTER XIII. INTELLECTUAL DARING + +Freedom has been hunted through the world, and is ever exposed to Insult +and injury. It is crushed by conquest; frowned from courts; expelled +from colleges; scorned out of society; flogged in schools; and +anathematised in churches. Mind is her last asylum; and if freedom quail +there, what becomes of the hope of the world, or the worth of human +nature?--W. J. Fox's Lectures to the Working Classes, part 12, p. 65. + +We should be prepared to dare all things for truth. If the 'very hopes +of man, the thoughts of his heart, the religion of nations, the manners +and morals of mankind, are all at the mercy of a new generalisation,' +we should be prepared to risk them. If we must choose between truth +and repose, we ought not to hesitate. There is danger in having the +truth--philosophers are obliged to conceal it. Mankind vaunt their love +of truth, but they are not to be trusted. From interest or ignorance +they always persecute, and often kill, the discoverer. Still the +pursuit of truth is a _duty_, and we must find consolation in the heroic +reflection of Burke, that _in all exertions of duty there it something +to be hazarded_. But intellectual daring will never be common while it +is so generally believed to be criminal. We will, therefore, quote some +considerations touching the rightfulness of inquiry. + +Without inquiry it is impossible for us to know whether our opinions +are true or false, and various are the pretences employed for declining +investigation: frequently they are masked under vague and metaphorical +phrases: "inquiry implies the weighing of evidence, and might lead to +doubt and perplexity"--"to search into a subject might shake the settled +convictions of the understanding"--to examine opposite arguments, and +contradictory opinions, might contaminate the mind with false views. + +'Every one who alleges pretexts like these for declining inquiry, must +obviously begin by assuming that his own opinions are unerringly in the +right. Nothing could justify a man for declining the investigation of +a subject involving important opinions, but the possession of +an understanding free from liability of error. Not gifted with +infallibility, in what way, except by diligent inquiry, can he obtain +any assurance that he is not pursuing a course of injurious action? If +he holds any opinion, he must have acquired it either by examination, +by instillation, rote, or some other process. On the supposition that +he has acquired it by proper examination, the duty on which I am now +insisting has been discharged, and the matter is at an end--but if he +has acquired it in any other manner, the mere plea, that his mind might +become unsettled, can be no argument against the duty of investigation. +For anything he can allege to the contrary, his present opinions are +wrong--and, in that case, the disturbance of his blind convictions, +instead of being an evil, is an essential step towards arriving at the +truth. + +'It may possibly be assigned, as a further reason for his declining +inquiry, that he may come to some fallacy which he cannot surmount, +although convinced of its character. If he is convinced of its +character, he must either have grounds for that conviction or not. +If he has grounds, let him examine them, draw them out, try if they are +valid, and then the fallacy will stand exposed. If he has no grounds for +suspecting a fallacy, what an irrational conclusion he confesses himself +to have arrived at! But perhaps he will reply--he may be unable to solve +the difficulty; his mind may become perplexed, and the issue may prove, +after all, that it would have been much better had he remained in his +former strong, though unenlightened, conviction. Why better? If he is in +perplexity let him read, think, consult the learned and the wise, and +in the end he will probably reach a definite opinion on one side or the +other. But if he should still remain in doubt, where is the harm? or +rather, why is it not to be considered a good? The subject is evidently +one which admits strong probabilities on opposite sides. Doubt is +therefore the proper sentiment for the occasion--it is the result of +the best exercise of the faculties--and either positively to believe, +or positively to disbelieve, would imply an erroneous appreciation of +evidence. + +In the minds of some people a strong prejudice appears to exist +against that state of the understanding which is termed doubt. A little +reflection, however, will convince any one that on certain subjects +"doubt" is as appropriate a state of the reasoning faculties as belief +or disbelief on others. There are doctrines, propositions, facts, +supported and opposed by every degree of evidence, and amongst them +by that degree of evidence of which the proper effect is to leave the +understanding in an equipoise between two conclusions. In these cages +"doubt" is the appropriate result, which there can be no reason to +shrink from or lament. But it may be further urged, that inquiry might +contaminate the understanding with false views--and, therefore, It is +wise and laudable to abstain from it. + +'We can comprehend what is meant by contaminating a man's habits or +disposition, or even imagination. But there is no analogy on these +points in reference to the understanding. There is contamination, +there is evil, in preposterous and obscene images crowding before the +intellectual vision, notwithstanding a full and distinct perception of +their character--but there is no contamination, no evil, in a thousand +false arguments coming before the understanding, if their quality is +clearly discerned. The only possible evil in this case is mistaking +false for true--but the man who shrinks from investigation lest he +should mistake false for true, can have no reason for supposing himself +free from that delusion in his actual opinions. Besides these objections +to inquiry, there are other prejudices of a similar character, forming +serious impediments to the attainment of truth. + +'One of these is a _fear that we may search too far, and become +chargeable with presumption in prying into things we ought not to know_. +A few words will suffice to prove that nothing can be more irrational +and absurd. We have already shown that true opinions are conducive to +the welfare of mankind--and the prosecution of inquiry is therefore a +process from which we have everything to hope and nothing to fear, and +to which there are no limits but such as the nature of our own faculties +pre scribes. + +'A second prejudice--that _we may contract guilt, if, in the course of +our researches, we miss the right conclusion, and had therefore better +let inquiry alone_--is still more influential in preventing those +investigations which it is our duty to make. As our opinions on any +subject are not voluntary acts, but involuntary effects, in whatever +conclusions our researches terminate they can involve us in no +culpability. All that we have to take care of is, to bestow on every +subject an adequate and impartial attention. Having done this, we have +discharged our duty; and it would be irrational and unmanly to entertain +any apprehension for the result. + +'In fact, there is the grossest inconsistency in the prejudice now under +consideration. If we may contract guilt by searching after truth, wo may +equally do so by remaining in our present state The reason alleged in +the prejudice itself, and the only reason which can be assigned with any +plausibility, why we may commit an offence by embarking in any inquiry, +is that we may, by so doing, miss the right conclusion, or, in other +words, fall into error--for no one would seriously contend that we +incur any moral culpability by an investigation which conducts us to the +truth. But it is obvious that we may equally miss the right conclusion +by remaining in our actual opinions. It is, then, incumbent on us to +ascertain whether we are committing an offence by remaining in them--in +other words, it is necessary to examine whether those opinions are true. +Thus the reasons assigned for not inquiring, lead to the conclusion that +it is necessary to inquire. + +'The third prejudice is that acquiescence in received opinions, or +forbearing to think for ourselves, shows a degree of humility highly +proper and commendable--if closely examined will be found usually +to evince nothing but a great degree of indolent presumption, or +intellectual cowardice. There is often, in truth, as great a measure of +presumption in this species of acquiescence as in the boldest hypothesis +which human invention can start. That received and established opinions +are true, is one of those sweeping conclusions which would require +very strong reasons, and often elaborate research, to justify. On +what grounds are they considered to be true by one who declines +investigation? Because (on the most favourable supposition) they have +been handed down to us by our predecessors, and have been held +with unhesitating faith by a multitude of illustrious men. But what +comprehensive reasons are these? What investigation would it require to +shew that they were valid? As the whole history of mankind teems with +instances of the transmission of the grossest errors from one generation +to another, and of their having been countenanced by the concurrence of +the most eminent of our race--how, without examination, can we show that +this particular instance is an exception from the general lot? + +'From the necessity of using our own judgment, or, in other words, of +arriving at a conclusion for ourselves, we cannot be absolved. Far from +being a virtue, blind acquiescence in the opinions of others is, in most +cases, a positive vice, tending to stop all advancement in knowledge, +and all improvement in practice. + +From the preceding it is evident that the inquirer may enter on his task +with full confidence that he is embarking in no criminal, or forbidden, +or presumptuous enterprise, but is, on the contrary, engaging in +the discharge of a duty. Let him be as circumspect as he pleases in +collecting his facts and deducing his conclusions, cautious in the +process, but fearless in the result. Let him be fully aware of his +liability to error, of the thousand sources of illusions, of the limited +powers of the individual, of the paramount importance of truth--but let +him dismiss all apprehensions of the issue of an investigation conducted +with due application of mind and rectitude of purpose.'* + + * Extracts of Summary, by Aliquis. of arguments on the Duty + of Inquiry, from the 'Pursuit of Truth, and other Essays, by + S. Bailey, in Reasoner No. 12. + +Marcus Antoninus, indeed, said 'I seek after truth, by which no man yet +was ever injured.' But there is a great practical mistake here. There is +danger in truth---and the admission should be plainly made. Men, where +forewarned, make the choice more manfully. We have been wisely told by +Emerson, that the cherished thoughts and institutions of mankind are +at the mercy of a new generalisation--rest, commodity, reputation. +Inconvenience, and suspense, are the consequences of the partizanship +of truth. Certain political truths annihilate the interests of whole +classes. Certain social truths war with life-cherished prejudices. +Certain sanitary truths reduce the value of all city property. Certain +scientific truths ruin the working classes by thousands. In a wiser +state of society this could be prevented, but our present business is +with what is. It is therefore idle to conceal the truth--that there is +danger in truth. Pope's dictum, that party is the madness of many for +the gain of a few, is inversely true of truth. Truth is the ultimate +benefit of many, but the immediate ruin of the few. Here, however, comes +to our aid the wise and far-seeing aphorism of Burke--'In all exertions +of duty there is something to be hazarded'--and the brave man and wise +friend of mankind will risk the fate which surely awaits him--the fate +of Galileo, Newton, Salomon de Caus, Volta, Fulton, Winser, Arkwright, +Gall, and all who present themselves, with truth in their hands, at the +door of this great bedlam called the world--the fate of being received +with stones and hisses. + + + +CHAPTER XIV. IDOLS + +The term Idol is employed by Bacon to designate those prejudices which +men prefer to truth. A prejudice is a bias without a reason for it, an +opinion without a foundation, a judgment formed of persons and things +without sufficient examination, an assent given to a proposition without +sufficient evidence. The bias may be honourable, the opinion correct, +the assent in the right direction, but still of the nature of +prejudice, because, if right, it is right by accident rather than +design. + +Ignorance hides from us facts, and we decide partially rather than +confess our deficiency. Ill-directed education gives us pre-possessions, +which are obstacles in the way of truth, and we continue to cherish +what, having become a part of our nature, it pains us to discard. The +senses will occasionally mislead us and although we are conscious that +appearances are not to be wholly trusted, we reluctantly doubt our own +infallibility. From early, and therefore unquestioned, associations, we +have acquired certain habits, and from fashion certain sentiments, +and we continue old customs, and fall into the current opinion +unconsciously. Of these sources of prejudice, logic warns us to beware. +Of so much importance did Bacon regard these hindrances to truth, +that he considered the pursuit of new truth hopeless while they +were cherished. In a mixed vein of poetry and philosophy, he divided +prejudices into four classes, which he called Idols of the Tribe, the +Den, the Market and the Theatre. Idols of the Tribe are prejudices men +imbibe from early training, and love of hypothesis. They are so called +because common to the whole race or tribe of mankind. Idols of the Den +are those which relate to a man's particular character, Idols of the +Market are those which are accommodated to common notions. Idols of the +Theatre denote such as pertain to hypothetical systems of philosophy. + +Remembering the declarations of Euler and Gall, and the daily +discoveries of science, we should stand, as it were, on the verge of +the old world of experience, and look out on the new world of troth. +A young thinker should make for himself a chart of proposed reforms, +systems, and changes, agitated in his day--place + +In relative positions in the scale of importance such as he deems of +value, if true--and then analyse his experience to see what is +soundly opposed thereto. Such a practice would go far to rid men of +idol-prejudices, which retard private improvement and public progress. + + + +CHAPTER XV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXERCISES + +1. All men possessed of an uncontrolled discretionary power, leading +to the aggrandisement and profit of their own body, have always abused +it.'--Burke's Thoughts on the Present Discontents. + +The student will find the proof of this proposition exhibited in the +example of Induction, quoted from Mr. Bailey, p. 63. + +2. Prosperity could never be reached and maintained in this country, +without some provision for the regular employment of the poor.--Mr. +Beckett's Speech in the House of Commons, Feb. 3,1842. + +The demonstration, to universal conviction, of this proposition, would +lead to an entire and beneficial change of the social condition of this +country. + +3. The pen is the tongue of the world.--Paine. Put this in the +syllogistic form. + +4. A good instance of a metaphorical argument drawn out is given by Mr. +Mill:--'For instance, when Mr. Carlyle, rebuking the Byronic vein, says +that "strength does not manifest itself in spasms, but in stout bearing +of burdens;" the metaphor proves nothing, it is no argument, only +an allusion to an argument; in no other way however could so much of +argument be so completely suggested in so few words. The expression +suggests a whole train of reasoning, which it would take many sentences +to write out at length. As thus: Motions which are violent but brief, +which lead to no end, and are not under the control of the will, are, +in the physical body, more incident to a weak than to a strong +constitution. If this be owing to a cause which equally operates in what +relates to the mind, the same conclusion will told there likewise. But +such is really the fact. For the body's liability to these sudden +and uncontrollable motions arises from irritability, that is, unusual +susceptibility of being moved out of its ordinary course by +transient influences: which may equally be said of the mind. And this +susceptibility, whether of mind or body, must arise from a weakness +of the forces which maintain and carry on the ordinary action of the +system. All this is conveyed in one short sentence. And since the causes +are alike in the body and in the mind, the analogy is a just one, and +the maxim holds of the one as much as of the other.'* + + * Logic, pp. 433-4, vol. 2. + +5. A youth, named Evathlus, engaged with Protagoras to learn dialectics, +and promised his tutor a large sum of money, _in case he gained the +first cause he pleaded_, Evathlus, when fully instructed, refused to pay +his instructor. Protagoras brought his action thus--'You must pay the +money however the cause go, for if I gain you must pay in consequence of +the sentence, as being cast in the cause; and if you gain it, you must +pay in pursuance of our covenant.' 'Nay,' Evathlus retorts, 'which way +soever the cause be decided, you will have nothing, for if I prevail, +the sentence gives it that nothing is due: and if I lose, then there is +nothing due by the covenant.' What should be the decision in this case? + +6. The first case, says Cervantes, requiring Sancho's attention was a +question put by a stranger, in presence of the stewards and rest of the +attendants. 'My Lord,' said he, 'a certain manor is divided by a large +river. I beg your honour will be attentive, for the case is of great +consequence and of some difficulty. I say then, upon this river is a +bridge, and at one end of it the gibbet, together with a sort of court +hall, in which four judges usually sit to execute the law enacted by the +lord of the river, bridge, and manor, which runs to this effect: Whoever +shall pass this bridge, must first swear whence he comes and whither +he goes; if he swear the truth he shall be allowed to pass, but if he +forswear himself he shall die upon the gallows without mercy or respite. +This law, together with the rigorous penalty, being known, numbers +passed, and as it appeared they swore nothing but the truth, the judges +permitted them to pass freely and without control. It happened, however, +that one man's oath being taken, he affirmed and swore by his deposition +that he was going to be hanged on that gibbet, and had no other errand +or intention. The judges, having considered this oath, observed: if we +allow this man to pass freely, he swore to a lie, and, therefore, ought +to be hanged according to law; and if we ordered him to be hanged after +he hath sworn he was going to be suspended on that gibbet, he will have +sworn the truth, and by the same law he ought to be acquitted, I beg, +therefore, to know, my lord governor [and student], what the judges must +do with this man?' + + + +CHAPTER XVI. TECHNICAL TERMS. + +Abstract names--the names of attributes.--J. S. Mill. Abstraction--fixing +thought on the point of resemblance in one body.--drawing off and +contemplating separately any part of an an object. + +Action--a volition followed by an effect.--J. S. Mill. + +Analogy--resemblance of relation.--Whately. + +Analysis--the resolution of a complex whole into its component elements. +--J. S. Mill. + +Argument--an expression in which, from something laid down as granted, +something else is deduced--Whately. + +Argumentum ad hominem--appealing to an opponent's professed views. + +A priori--reasoning from cause to effect. + +A posteriori--arguing from effects to cause. + +Body--the unknown cause of our sensations--J. S. Mill. + +Cause--the invariable antecedent, or thing going before.--the stimulus +of an effect. + +Conclusion--a proposition proved by argument. + +Connotative terms--denote a subject, and imply an attribute.---. J.S. +Mill. + +Consciousness--sensation of existences. + +Definition--the separation of a thing, as by a boundary, from everything +else. + +Discovery--finding out something already existing. + +Effect--the immediate, invariable consequent, or the change produced by +power. + +ENTHYMEME-An argument with one premiss suppressed being understood. + +Experience--events which have taken place within a person's own +knowledge.--Whately. + +Fallacy--an apparent argument. + +General Terms--express the notion of partial similarity. + +Generalisation--tracing certain points of resemblance.--naming one +respect in which many things agree. + +Induction--universalisation of truth by inference from uniform facts. + +Intuition--imaginary looking.--Whewell, + +Logic--a scientific use of facts. + +Logical Truth--that which admits of proof.--Chambers. + +Mind--the unknown percipient of sensation.--J. S. Mill. + +Necessary Truths--are those in which we not only learn that the +proposition is true, but see that it must be true; in which the negative +of the truth is not only false, but impossible; in which we cannot, even +by an effort of the imagination, or in a supposition, conceive the +reverse of that which is asserted.--Dr. Whewell: Phil. Inductive +Sciences, pp. 54-5, vol. 1.* + +* As 'necessary truths' are much talked of I have introduced here, from +Whewell, the completest definition with which I am acquainted. For +myself, I coincide on this question with J. S. Mill, as quoted pp. 22-3. + +Non-connotative Terms--denote a subject only and an attribute only.--J. +S. Mill. + +Philosophy--the science of realities in opposition to that of mere +appearances--the attempt to comprehend things as they are, rather than as +they seem.--Morell. + +Point at issue--the real question to be decided. + +Power in logic, is the relation of circumstances to each other in time. + +Premises the propositions which precede a "conclusion."--the name of the +propositions from which a conclusion is deduced. + +Principle--an invariable rule. + +Proof--sufficient evidence; the balance of probability in favour of a +proposition. + +Proposition--a sentence which affirms or denies something.--Whately.--An +expression in words of a judgment.--J. S. Mill, Reason--the recognition +of facts.--the classification of facts.--following in the pathway of +facts.--the power of discerning coherences.--a premiss placed after its +conclusion.--the minor premiss--in the sense of Reason for asserting +something. + +Reasoning--argumentation.--process, the same always. Subject--first term +of a proposition. + +Syllogism--1. A general rule. 2. A fact contained under that rule. 3. A +conclusion that the fact is so contained.--an argument stated regularly +and at full length.--a valid argument so stated that its conclusiveness +is evident from the mere form of the expression. + +Technical Terms--the tools of art.--Whately. + +Technical Language--regularly formed, defined, and agreed on set of +expressions. + +Testimony--second-hand experience. Direct evidence is that which is +professedly given. Incidental, is corroboration casually introduced on +one subject in the course of an evidence delivered on another. + +Theory--is a system of rules intended to explain a class of facts. The +rules should be precise, and rest on a rigorous induction of facts or +probabilities. + +Tradition--the relation of a circumstance, not committed to writing by +any person who observed it, but communicated orally from one to another +for a long period of time. + + + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's A Logic Of Facts, by George Jacob Holyoake + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LOGIC OF FACTS *** + +***** This file should be named 36801.txt or 36801.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/6/8/0/36801/ + +Produced by David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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