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diff --git a/36882.txt b/36882.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..38cf2ba --- /dev/null +++ b/36882.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7544 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Grammar of Freethought, by Chapman Cohen + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Grammar of Freethought + +Author: Chapman Cohen + +Release Date: July 28, 2011 [EBook #36882] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A GRAMMAR OF FREETHOUGHT *** + + + + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, S.D., and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + + + + A Grammar of + Freethought. + + BY + CHAPMAN COHEN. + + (_Issued by the Secular Society, Ltd._) + + LONDON: + THE PIONEER PRESS, + 61 FARRINGDON STREET, E.C. 4. + + 1921. + + +_The Publishers wish to express their obligation to Mr. H. Cutner for +the very tasteful design which adorns the cover of this book._ + + + + +CONTENTS. + + + CHAPTER PAGE + + I.--OUTGROWING THE GODS 9 + + II.--LIFE AND MIND 18 + + III.--WHAT IS FREETHOUGHT? 37 + + IV.--REBELLION AND REFORM 51 + + V.--THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CHILD 61 + + VI.--THE NATURE OF RELIGION 72 + + VII.--THE UTILITY OF RELIGION 88 + + VIII.--FREETHOUGHT AND GOD 101 + + IX.--FREETHOUGHT AND DEATH 111 + + X.--THIS WORLD AND THE NEXT 123 + + XI.--EVOLUTION 134 + + XII.--DARWINISM AND DESIGN 146 + + XIII.--ANCIENT AND MODERN 162 + + XIV.--MORALITY WITHOUT GOD.--I. 172 + + XV.--MORALITY WITHOUT GOD.--II. 182 + + XVI.--CHRISTIANITY AND MORALITY 193 + + XVII.--RELIGION AND PERSECUTION 204 + + XVIII.--WHAT IS TO FOLLOW RELIGION? 223 + + + + +PREFACE. + + +It must be left for those who read the following pages to decide how far +this book lives up to its title. That it leaves many aspects of life +untouched is quite clear, but there must be a limit to everything, even +to the size and scope of a book; moreover, the work does not aim at +being an encyclopaedia, but only an outline of what may fairly be +regarded as the Freethought position. Freethought, again, is too fluid a +term to permit its teachings being summarized in a set creed, but it +does stand for a certain definite attitude of mind in relation to those +problems of life with which thoughtful men and women concern themselves. +It is that mental attitude which I aim at depicting. + +To those who are not directly concerned with the attack on +supernaturalism it may also be a matter of regret that so much of this +work is concerned with a criticism of religious beliefs. But that is an +accident of the situation. We have not yet reached that stage in affairs +when we can afford to let religion alone, and one may readily be excused +the suspicion that those who, without believing in it, profess to do so, +are more concerned with avoiding a difficult, if not dangerous, subject, +than they are with the problem of developing sane and sound methods of +thinking. And while some who stand forward as leaders of popular thought +fail to do their part in the work of attacking supernaturalistic +beliefs, others are perforce compelled to devote more time than they +would otherwise to the task. That, in brief, is my apology for +concerning myself so largely with religious topics, and leaving almost +untouched other fields where the Freethought attitude would prove +equally fruitful of results. + +After all, it is the mental attitude with which one approaches a problem +that really matters. The man or woman who has not learned to set mere +authority on one side in dealing with any question will never be more +than a mere echo, and what the world needs, now as ever, is not echoes +but voices. Information, knowledge, is essential to the helpful +consideration of any subject; but all the knowledge in the world will be +of very little real help if it is not under the control of a right +method. What is called scientific knowledge is, to-day, the commonest of +acquisitions, and what most people appear to understand by that is the +accumulation of a large number of positive facts which do, indeed, form +the raw material of science. But the getting of mere facts is like the +getting of money. The value of its accumulation depends upon the use +made thereof. It is the power of generalization, the perception and +application of principles that is all-important, and to this the grasp +of a right method of investigation, the existence of a right mental +attitude, is essential. + +The world needs knowledge, but still more imperatively it needs the +right use of the knowledge that is at its disposal. For this reason I +have been mainly concerned in these pages with indicating what I +consider to be the right mental attitude with which to approach certain +fundamental questions. For, in a world so distracted by conflicting +teachings as is ours, the value of a right method is almost +incalculable. Scepticism, said Buckle, is not the result, but the +condition of progress, and the same may be said of Freethought. The +condition of social development is the realization that no institution +and no teaching is beyond criticism. Criticism, rejection and +modification are the means by which social progress is achieved. It is +by criticism of existing ideas and institutions, by the rejection of +what is incapable of improvement, and by the modification of what +permits of betterment, that we show ourselves worthy of the better +traditions of the past, and profitable servants of the present and the +future. + + C. C. + + + + +A GRAMMAR OF FREETHOUGHT. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +OUTGROWING THE GODS. + + +One of the largest facts in the history of man is religion. If it were +otherwise the justification for writing the following pages, and for +attempting the proof that, so far as man's history is concerned with +religion, it is little better than a colossal blunder, would not be +nearly so complete. Moreover, it is a generalization upon which +religionists of all classes love to dwell, or even to parade as one of +the strongest evidences in their favour; and it is always pleasant to be +able to give your opponent all for which he asks--feeling, meanwhile, +that you lose nothing in the giving. Universality of belief in religion +really proves no more than the universality of telling lies. "All men +are liars" is as true, or as false, as "All men are religious." For some +men are not liars, and some men are not religious. All the +generalization means is that some of both are found in every age and in +every country, and that is true whether we are dealing with the liar or +with the religious person. + +What is ignored is the consideration that while at one stage of culture +religious belief is the widest and most embracing of all beliefs it +subsequently weakens, not quite in direct proportion to the advance of +culture, but yet in such a way that one can say there is an actual +relation between a preponderance of the one and a weakening of the +other. In very primitive communities gods are born and flourish with all +the rank exuberance of a tropical vegetation. In less primitive times +their number diminishes, and their sphere of influence becomes more and +more sharply defined. The gods are still credited with the ability to do +certain things, but there are other things which do somehow get done +without them. How that discovery and that division are made need not +detain us for the moment, but the fact is patent. Advancing civilization +sees the process continued and quickened, nay, that is civilization; for +until nature is rid of her "haughty lords" and man realizes that there +are at least some natural forces that come within the control of his +intelligence, civilization cannot really be said to have commenced. +Continued advance sees the gods so diminished in power and so weakened +in numbers that their very impotency is apt to breed for them the kind +of pity that one feels for a millionaire who becomes a pauper, or for an +autocratic monarch reduced to the level of a voteless citizen. + +The truth is that all the gods, like their human creators, have in their +birth the promise of death. The nature of their birth gives them life, +but cannot promise them immortality. However much man commences by +worshipping gods, he sooner or later turns his back upon them. Like the +biblical deity he may look at his creation and declare it good, but he +also resembles this deity in presently feeling the impulse to destroy +what he has made. To the products of his mind man can no more give +immortality than he can to the work of his hands. In many cases the work +of his hands actually outlives that of his mind, for we have to-day the +remains of structures that were built in the honour of gods whose very +names are forgotten. And to bury his gods is, after all, the only real +apology that man can offer for having created them. + +This outgrowing of religion is no new thing in human history. Thoughtful +observers have always been struck by the mortality among the gods, +although their demise has usually been chronicled in terms of exultation +by rival worshippers. But here and there a keener observer has brought +to bear on the matter a breadth of thought which robbed the phenomenon +of its local character and gave it a universal application. Thus, in one +of his wonderfully modern dialogues Lucian depicts the Olympian deities +discussing, much in the spirit of a modern Church Congress, the +prevalence of unbelief among men. The gods are disturbed at finding that +men are reaching the stage of either not believing, or not troubling +about them. There is a great deal of talk, and finally one of the minor +deities treats them to a little plain truth--which appears to be as +rare, and as unwelcome in heaven as on earth. He says--I quote from +Froude's translation:-- + + What other conclusion could they arrive at when they saw the + confusion around them? Good men neglected, perishing in penury and + slavery, and profligate wretches wealthy, honoured and powerful. + Sacrilegious temple robbers undiscovered and unpunished; devotees + and saints beaten and crucified. With such phenomena before them, + of course men have doubted our existence.... We affect surprise + that men who are not fools decline to put their faith in us. We + ought rather to be pleased that there is a man left to say his + prayers. We are among ourselves with no strangers present. Tell us, + then, Zeus, have you ever really taken pains to distinguish between + good men and bad? Theseus, not you, destroyed the robbers in + Attica. As far as Providence was concerned, Sciron and + Pity-O-Campus might have murdered and plundered to the end of time. + If Eurystheus had not looked into matters, and sent Hercules upon + his labours little would you have troubled yourself with the Hydras + and Centaurs. Let us be candid. All that we have really cared for + has been a steady altar service. Everything else has been left to + chance. And now men are opening their eyes. They perceive that + whether they pray or don't pray, go to church or don't go to + church, makes no difference to them. And we are receiving our + deserts. + +The case could hardly be put more effectively. It is the appeal to +experience with a vengeance, a form of argument of which religionists in +general are very fond. Of course, the argument does not touch the +question of the mere existence of a god, but it does set forth the +revolt of awakened common sense against the worship of a "moral governor +of the universe." We can say of our day, as Lucian said of his, that men +are opening their eyes, and as a consequence the gods are receiving +their deserts. + +Generally speaking, it is not difficult to see the various steps by +which man outgrew the conception of the government of the world by +intelligent forces. From what we know of primitive thought we may say +that at first the gods dominated all. From the fall of a rain-drop to +the movement of a planet all was the work of gods. Merely to question +their power was the wildest of errors and the gravest of crimes. Bit by +bit this vast territory was reclaimed--a task at the side of which the +conquest of the fever-stricken tropics or the frozen north is mere +child's play. It is quite needless to enter into an elaborate +speculation as to the exact steps by which this process of +deanthropomorphization--to use a word of the late John Fiske's--was +accomplished, but one can picture the main line by what we see taking +place at later stages of development. And there is no exception to the +rule that so soon as any group of phenomena is brought within the +conception of law the notion of deity in connection with those phenomena +tends to die out. And the sum of the process is seen in the work of the +great law givers of science, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, +Laplace, Lyell, Dalton, Darwin, etc., who between them have presented us +with a universe in which the conception of deity simply has no place. +Apologies apart, the idea of deity is foreign to the spirit and method +of modern science. + +In the region of the purely physical sciences this process may be +regarded as complete. In morals and sociology, purely on account of the +greater complexity of the subjects, mystical and semi-supernatural +conceptions still linger, but it is only a question of time for these +branches of knowledge to follow the same course as the physical +sciences. In morals we are able to trace, more or less completely, the +development of the moral sense from its first beginnings in the animal +world to its highest developments in man. What is called the "mystery of +morality" simply has no existence to anyone who is not a mystery-monger +by profession or inclination. And here, too, the gods have been +receiving their deserts. For it is now clear that instead of being a +help to morals there has been no greater obstacle to a healthy morality +than the play of religious ideas. In the name of God vices have been +declared virtues and virtues branded as vices. Belief in God has been an +unending source of moral perversion, and it lies upon the face of +historical development that an intelligent morality, one that is capable +of adapting itself to the changing circumstances of human nature, has +only become possible with the breaking down of religious authority. + +Exactly the same phenomenon faces us in connection with social life. We +have to go back but a little way in human history to come to a time +when the existence of a State without a religion would have seemed to +people impossible. Much as Christians have quarrelled about other +things, they have been in agreement on this point. The historic fight +between the established Church and the Nonconformists has never really +been for the disestablishment of all religion, and the confining of the +State to the discharge of purely secular functions, but mainly as to +_which_ religion the State shall uphold. To-day, the central issue is +whether the State shall teach any religion, whether that does not lie +right outside its legitimate functions. And this marks an enormous +advance. It is a plain recognition of the truth that the gods have +nothing to contribute of any value to the development of our social +life. It marks the beginning of the end, and registers the truth that +man must be his own saviour here as elsewhere. As in Lucian's day we are +beginning to realize that whether we pray or don't pray, go to church or +don't go to church, believe in the gods or don't believe in them, makes +no real or substantial difference to natural happenings. Now as then we +see good men punished and bad ones rewarded, and they who are not fools +and have the courage to look facts in the face, decline to put their +faith in a deity who is incapable of doing all things right or too +careless to exert his power. + +It is not that the fight is over, or that there is to-day little need to +fight the forces of superstition. If that were so, there would be no +need to write what is here written. Much as has been done, there is much +yet to do. The revolt against specific beliefs only serves to illustrate +a fight that is of much greater importance. For there is little real +social gain if one merely exchanges one superstition for another. And, +unfortunately, the gentleman who declared that he had given up the +errors of the Church of Rome in order to embrace those of the Church of +England represents a fairly common type. It is the prevalence of a +particular type of mind in society that constitutes a danger, and it is +against this that our aim is ultimately directed. Great as is the amount +of organized superstition that exists, the amount of unorganized +superstition is still greater, and probably more dangerous. One of the +revelations of the late war was the evidence it presented of the +tremendous amount of raw credulity, of the low type of intelligence that +was still current, and the small amount of critical ability the mass of +people bring to bear upon life. The legends that gained currency--the +army of Russians crossing England, the number of mutilated Belgian +babies that were seen, the story of the Germans boiling down their dead +to extract the fat, a story that for obscene stupidity beats everything +else, the Mons angels, the craze for mascots--all bore witness to the +prevalence of a frame of mind that bodes ill for progress. + +The truth is, as Sir James Frazer reminds us, that modern society is +honeycombed with superstitions that are not in themselves a whit more +intellectually respectable than those which dominate the minds of +savages. "The smooth surface of cultured society is sapped and mined by +superstition." Now and again these hidden mines explode noisily, but the +superstition is always there, to be exploited by those who have the wit +to use it. From this point of view Christianity is no more than a +symptom of a source of great social weakness, a manifestation of a +weakness that may find expression in strange and unexpected but always +more or less dangerous ways. It is against the prevalence of this type +of mind that the Freethinker is really fighting. Freethinkers +realize--apparently they are the only ones that do realize--that the +creation of a better type of society is finally dependent upon the +existence of a sanely educated intelligence, and that will never exist +while there are large bodies of people who can persuade themselves that +human welfare is in some way dependent upon, or furthered by, practices +and beliefs that are not a bit more intellectually respectable than +those of the cave men. If Christianity, as a mere system of beliefs, +were destroyed, we should only have cleared the way for the final fight. +Thousands of generations of superstitious beliefs and practices that +have embodied themselves in our laws, our customs, our language, and our +institutions, are not to be easily destroyed. It is comparatively simple +to destroy a particular manifestation of this disastrous heritage, but +the type of mind to which it has given birth is not so easily removed. + +The fight is not over, but it is being fought from a new vantage ground, +and with better weapons than have ever before been employed. History, +anthropology, and psychology have combined to place in the hands of the +modern Freethinker more deadly weapons than those of previous +generations were able to employ. Before these weapons the defences of +the faith crumble like wooden forts before modern artillery. It is no +longer a question of debating whether religious beliefs are true. So +long as we give a straightforward and honest meaning to those beliefs we +know that they are not true. It is, to-day, mainly a question of making +plain the nature of the forces which led men and women to regard them as +being true. We know that the history of religion is the history of a +delusion, and the task of the student is to recover those conditions +which gave to this delusion an appearance of truth and reality. That is +becoming more and more evident to all serious and informed students of +the subject. + +The challenge of Freethought to religion constitutes one of the oldest +struggles in human history. It must have had its beginning in the first +glimmer of doubt concerning a tribal deity which crossed the mind of +some more than usually thoughtful savage. Under various forms and in +many ways it has gone on ever since. It has had many variations of +fortune, often apparently completely crushed, only to rise again +stronger and more daring than ever. To-day, Freethought is the accepted +mental attitude of a growing number of men and women whose intelligence +admits of no question. It has taken a recognized place in the +intellectual world, and its hold on the educated intelligence is rapidly +increasing. It may well be that in one form or another the antagonism +between critical Freethought and accepted teaching, whether secular or +religious, will continue as one of the permanent aspects of social +conflict. But so far as supernaturalism is concerned the final issue can +be no longer in doubt. It is not by one voice or by one movement that +supernaturalism is condemned. Its condemnation is written in the best +forms of art, science and literature. And that is only another way of +saying that it is condemned by life. Freethought holds the future in +fee, and nothing but an entire reversal of the order of civilization can +force it to forego its claims. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +LIFE AND MIND. + + +The outstanding feature of what may be called the natural history of +associated life is the way in which biologic processes are gradually +dominated by psychologic ones. Whatever be the nature of mind, a +question that in no way concerns us here, there is no denying the +importance of the phenomena that come within that category. To speak of +the first beginnings of mind is, in this connection, idle language. In +science there are no real beginnings. Things do not begin to be, they +simply emerge, and their emergence is as imperceptible as the +displacement of night by day, or the development of the chicken from the +egg. But whatever the nature of the beginning of mind, its appearance in +the evolutionary series marked an event of profound and revolutionary +importance. Life received a new impetus, and the struggle for existence +a new significance, the importance of which is not, even to-day, +generally recognized. The old formulae might still be used, but they had +given to them a new significance. The race was still to the swift and +the battle to the strong, but swiftness and strength were manifested in +new ways and by new means. Cunning and intelligence began to do what was +formerly done without their co-operation. A new force had appeared, +arising out of the older forces as chemistry develops from physics and +biology from both. And, as we should expect from analogy, we find the +new force dominating the older ones, and even bending them to its +needs. + +Associated life meets us very early in the story of animal existence, +and we may assume that it ranks as a genuine "survival quality." It +enables some animals to survive the attacks of others that are +individually stronger, and it may even be, as has been suggested, that +associated life is the normal form, and that solitary animals represent +a variation from the normal, or perhaps a case of degeneration. But one +result of associated life is that it paves the way for the emergence of +mind as an active force in social evolution. In his suggestive and +important work on _Mutual Aid_, Kropotkin has well shown how in the +animal world the purely biologic form of the struggle for existence is +checked and transformed by the factors of mutual aid, association and +protection. His illustrations cover a very wide field; they include a +great variety of animal forms, and he may fairly claim to have +established the proposition that "an instinct has been slowly developed +among animals and men in the course of an extremely long evolution ... +which has taught animals and men alike the force they can borrow from +mutual aid and support, and the joys they can find in social life." + +But there is, on the whole, a very sharp limit set to the development of +mind in the animal world. One cause of this is the absence of a true +"social medium," to use the admirable phrase of that versatile thinker, +George Henry Lewes. In the case of man, speech and writing enable him to +give to his advances and discoveries a cumulative force such as can +never exist in their absence. On that subject more will be said later. +At present we may note another very important consequence of the +development of mind in evolution. In pre-human, or sub-human society, +perfection in the struggle for existence takes the form of the creation +or the perfecting of an organic tool. Teeth or claws become stronger or +larger, a limb is modified, sight becomes keener, or there is a new +effect in coloration. The changes here, it will be observed, are all of +an organic kind, they are a part of the animal and are inseparable from +it, and they are only transmissible by biologic heredity. And the rate +of development is, of necessity, slow. + +When we turn to man and note the way in which he overcomes the +difficulties of his environment, we find them to be mainly of a +different order. His instruments are not personal, in the sense of being +a part of his organic structure. We may say they do not belong to him so +much as they do to the race; while they are certainly transmitted from +generation to generation irrespective of individuals. Instead of +achieving conquest of his environment by developing an organic +structure, man creates an inorganic tool. In a sense he subdues and +moulds the environment to his needs, rather than modifies his structure +in order to cope with the environment. Against extremes of temperature +he fashions clothing and builds habitations. He discovers fire, probably +the most important discovery ever made by mankind. He adds to his +strength in defence and attack by inventing weapons. He guards himself +from starvation by planting seeds, and so harnesses the productive +forces of nature to his needs. He tames animals and so secures living +engines of labour. Later, he compensates for his bodily weaknesses by +inventing instruments which aid sight, hearing, etc. Inventions are +multiplied, methods of locomotion and transportation are discovered, and +the difficulties of space and time are steadily minimized. The net +result of all this is that as a mere biologic phenomenon man's evolution +is checked. The biologic modifications that still go on are of +comparatively small importance, except, probably, in the case of +evolution against disease. The developments that take place are mainly +mental in form and are social in their incidence. + +Now if the substantial truth of what has been said be admitted, and I do +not see how it can be successfully challenged, there arise one or two +considerations of supreme importance. The first of these is that social +history becomes more and more a history of social psychology. In social +life we are watching the play of social mind expressed through the +medium of the individual. The story of civilization is the record of the +piling of idea on idea, and the transforming power of the whole on the +environment. For tools, from the flint chip of primitive man, down to +the finished instrument of the modern mechanic, are all so many products +of human mentality. From the primitive dug-out to the Atlantic liner, +from the stone spear-head to the modern rifle, in all the inventions of +civilized life we are observing the application of mind to the conquest +of time, space, and material conditions. Our art, our inventions, our +institutions, are all so many illustrations of the power of mind in +transforming the environment. A history of civilization, as +distinguished from a mere record of biologic growth, is necessarily a +history of the growing power of mind. It is the cumulative ideas of the +past expressed in inventions and institutions that form the driving +power behind the man of to-day. These ideas form the most valuable part +of man's heritage, make him what he is, and contain the promise of all +that he may become. + +So long as we confine ourselves to biologic evolution, the way in which +qualities are transmitted is plain. There is no need to go beyond the +organism itself. But this heritage of ideas, peculiarly human as it is, +requires a "carrier" of an equally unique kind. It is at this point that +the significance of what we have called the "social medium" emerges. +The full significance of this was first seen by G. H. Lewes.[1] Writing +so far back as 1879 he said:-- + + The distinguishing character of human psychology is that to the + three great factors, organism, external medium, and heredity; it + adds a fourth, namely, the relation to a social medium, with its + product, the general mind.... While the mental functions are + products of the individual organism, the product, mind, is more + than an individual product. Like its great instrument language, it + is at once individual and social. Each man speaks in virtue of the + functions of vocal expression, but also in virtue of the social + need of communication. The words spoken are not his creation, yet + he, too, must appropriate them by what may be called a creative + process before he can understand them. What his tribe speaks he + repeats; but he does not simply echo their words, he rethinks them. + In the same way he adopts their experiences when he assimilates + them to his own.... Further, the experiences come and go; they + correct, enlarge, and destroy one another, leaving behind them a + certain residual store, which condensed in intuitions and + formulated in principles, direct and modify all future + experiences.... Men living in groups co-operate like the organs in + an organism. Their actions have a common impulse to a common end. + Their desires and opinions bear the common stamp of an impersonal + direction. Much of their life is common to all. The roads, + market-places and temples are for each and all. Customs arise and + are formulated in laws, the restraint of all.... Each generation is + born in this social medium, and has to adapt itself to the + established forms.... A nation, a tribe, a sect is the medium of + the individual mind, as a sea, a river, or a pond, is the medium of + a fish.[2] + +[1] It will ease my feelings if I am permitted to here make a protest +against the shameless way in which this suggestive writer has been +pillaged by others without the slightest acknowledgement. They have +found him, as Lamb said of some other writers, "damned good to steal +from." His series of volumes, _Problems of Life and Mind_, have been +borrowed from wholesale without the slightest thanks or recognition. + +[2] _Study of Psychology_, pp. 139, 161-5. So again, a more recent +writer says: "It is not man himself who thinks but his social community; +the source of his thoughts is in the social medium in which he lives, +the social atmosphere which he breathes.... The influence of environment +upon the human mind has always been recognized by psychologists and +philosophers, but it has been considered a secondary factor. On the +contrary, the social medium which the child enters at birth, in which he +lives, moves and has his being, is fundamental. Toward this environment +the individual from childhood to ripest old age is more or less +receptive; rarely can the maturest minds so far succeed in emancipating +themselves from this medium so far as to undertake independent +reflection, while complete emancipation is impossible, for all the +organs and modes of thought, all the organs for constructing thoughts +have been moulded or at least thoroughly imbued by it" (L. Gumplowicz, +_Outlines of Sociology_, p. 157). + +Biologically, what man inherits is capacity for acquisition. But what he +shall acquire, the direction in which his native capacity shall express +itself, is a matter over which biologic forces have no control. This is +determined by society and social life. Given quite equal capacity in two +individuals, the output will be very different if one is brought up in a +remote Spanish village and the other in Paris or London. Whether a man +shouts long live King George or long live the Kaiser is mainly a +question of social surroundings, and but very little one of difference +in native capacity. The child of parents living in the highest civilized +society, if taken away while very young and brought up amid a people in +a very primitive state of culture, would, on reaching maturity, differ +but little from the people around him. He would think the thoughts that +were common to the society in which he was living as he would speak +their language and wear their dress. Had Shakespeare been born among +savages he could never have written _Hamlet_. For the work of the +genius, as for that of the average man, society must provide the +materials in the shape of language, ideas, institutions, and the +thousand and one other things that go to make up the life of a group, +and which may be seen reflected in the life of the individual. Suppose, +says Dr. McDougall:-- + + that throughout the period of half a century every child born to + English parents was at once exchanged (by the power of a magician's + wand) for an infant of the French, or other, European nation. Soon + after the close of this period the English nation would be composed + of individuals of French extraction, and the French of individuals + of English extraction. It is, I think, clear that, in spite of this + complete exchange of innate characters between the two nations, + there would be but little immediate change of national + characteristics. The French people would still speak French, and + the English would speak English, with all the local diversities to + which we are accustomed and without perceptible change of + pronunciation. The religion of the French would still be + predominantly Roman Catholic, and the English people would still + present the same diversity of Protestant creeds. The course of + political institutions would have suffered no profound change, the + customs and habits of the two peoples would exhibit only such + changes as might be attributed to the lapse of time, though an + acute observer might notice an appreciable approximation of the two + peoples towards one another in all these respects. The inhabitant + of France would still be a Frenchman and the inhabitant of England + an Englishman to all outward seeming, save that the physical + appearance of the two peoples would be transposed. And we may go + even further and assert that the same would hold good if a similar + exchange of infants were effected between the English and any other + less closely allied nation, say the Turks or the Japanese.[3] + +[3] _Social Psychology_, pp. 330-1. + +The products of human capacity are the material of which civilization is +built; these products constitute the inheritance which one generation +receives from another. Whether this inheritance be large or small, +simple or complex, it is the chief determinant which shapes the +personality of each individual. What each has by biological heredity is +a given structure, that is, capacity. But the direction of that +capacity, the command it enables one to acquire over his environment, is +in turn determined by the society into which he happens to be born. + +It has already been said that the materials of civilization, whether +they be tools, or institutions, or inventions, or discoveries, or +religious or ethical teachings, are facts that can be directly described +as psychological. An institution--the Church, the Crown, the +Magistracy--is not transmitted as a building or as so many sheets of +paper, but as an idea or as a set of ideas. A piece of machinery is, in +the same way, a mental fact, and is a physical one in only a subordinate +sense. And if this be admitted, we reach the further truth that the +environment to which man has to adapt himself is essentially, so far as +it is a social environment, psychological. Not alone are the outward +marks of social life--the houses in which man lives, the machines he +uses to do his bidding--products of his mental activity, but the more +important features of his environment, to which he must adapt himself, +and which so largely shape his character and determine his conduct, are +of a wholly psychological character. In any society that is at all +distinct from the animal, there exist a number of beliefs, ideas and +institutions, traditions, and, in a later stage, a literature which play +a very important part in determining the direction of man's mind. With +increasing civilization, and the development of better means of +intercourse, any single society finds itself brought into touch and +under the influence of other social groups. The whole of these +influences constitute a force which, surrounding an individual at birth, +inevitably shapes character in this or that direction. They dominate the +physical aspect of life, and represent the determining forces of social +growth. Eliminate the psychological forces of life and you eliminate all +that can be properly called civilization. It is wholly the transforming +power of mind on the environment that creates civilization, and it is +only by a steady grasp of this fact that civilization can be properly +understood. + +I have pointed out a distinction between biological and social, or +psychological, heredity. But there is one instance in which the two +agree. This is that we can only understand a thing by its history. We +may catalogue the existing peculiarities of an animal form with no other +material than that of the organism before us, but thoroughly to +understand it we must know its history. Similarly, existing institutions +may have their justification in the present, but the causes of their +existence lie buried in the past. A king may to-day be honoured on +account of his personal worth, but the reason why there is a king to be +honoured carries us back to that state of culture in which the primitive +priest and magic worker inspires fear and awe. When we ring bells to +call people to church we perpetuate the fact that our ancestors rang +them to drive away evil spirits. We wear black at a funeral because our +primitive ancestors wished to hide themselves from the dead man's +ghost. We strew flowers on a grave because food and other things were +once buried with the dead so that their spirits might accompany the dead +to the next world. In short, with all human customs we are forced, if we +wish to know the reason for their present existence, to seek it in the +ideas that have dominated the minds of previous generations.[4] + +[4] "The tyranny exercised unconsciously on men's minds is the only real +tyranny, because it cannot be fought against. Tiberius, Ghengis Khan, +and Napoleon were assuredly redoubtable tyrants, but from the depths of +their graves Moses, Buddha, Jesus, and Mahomet exerted on the human soul +a far profounder tyranny. A conspiracy may overthrow a tyrant, but what +can it avail against a firmly established belief? In its violent +struggle with Roman Catholicism it is the French Revolution that has +been vanquished, and this in spite of the fact that the sympathy of the +crowd was apparently on its side, and in spite of recourse to +destructive measures as pitiless as those of the Inquisition. The only +real tyrants that humanity has known have always been the memories of +its dead, or the illusions it has forged for itself" (Gustave Le Bon, +_The Crowd_, p. 153). + +No one who has studied, in even a cursory manner, the development of our +social institutions can avoid recognition of the profound influence +exerted by the primitive conceptions of life, death, and of the +character of natural forces. Every one of our social institutions was +born in the shadow of superstition, and superstition acts as a powerful +force in determining the form they assume. Sir Henry Maine has shown to +what a large extent the laws of inheritance are bound up with ancestor +worship.[5] Spencer has done the same service for nearly all our +institutions,[6] and Mr. Elton says that "the oldest customs of +inheritance in England and Germany were, in their beginnings, connected +with a domestic religion, and based upon a worship of ancestral spirits +of which the hearthplace was essentially the altar."[7] The same truth +meets us in the study of almost any institution. In fact, it is not long +before one who _thinks_ evolution, instead of merely knowing its +formulae, begins to realize the truth of the saying by a German +sociologist that in dealing with social institutions we are concerned +with the "mental creations of aggregates." They are dependent upon the +persistence of a set of ideas, and so long as these ideas are unshaken +they are substantially indestructible. To remove them the ideas upon +which they rest must be shaken and robbed of their authority. That is +the reason why at all times the fight for reform so largely resolves +itself into a contest of ideas. Motives of self-interest may enter into +the defence of an institution, and in some case may be responsible for +the attempt to plant an institution where it does not already exist, but +in the main institutions persist because of their harmony with a frame +of mind that is favourable to their being. + +[5] See _Early History of Institutions_, and _Early Law and Custom_. + +[6] _Principles of Sociology_, Vol. I. + +[7] _Origins of English History_, p. 261. + +A great deal of criticism has been directed against the conclusion of +Buckle that improvement in the state of mankind has chiefly resulted +from an improvement in the intellectual outlook. And yet when stated +with the necessary qualifications the generalization is as sound as it +can well be. Certainly, the belief held in some quarters, and stated +with an air of scientific precision, that the material environment is +the active force which is ever urging to new mental development will not +fit the facts; for, as we have seen, the environment to which human +nature must adapt itself is mainly mental in character, that is, it is +made up in an increasing measure of the products of man's own mental +activity. The theory of the sentimental religionist that the evil in the +world results from the wickedness of man, or, as he is fond of putting +it, from the hardness of man's heart, is grotesque in its +ineffectiveness. Soft heads have far more to do with the evil in the +world than have hard hearts. Indeed, one of the standing difficulties of +the orthodox moralist is, not to explain the deeds of evil men, which +explain themselves, but to account for the harm done by "good" men, and +often as a consequence of their goodness. The moral monster is a rarity, +and evil is rarely the outcome of a clear perception of its nature and a +deliberate resolve to pursue it. Paradoxical as it may sound, it demands +a measure of moral strength to do wrong, consciously and deliberately, +which the average man or woman does not possess. And the world has never +found it a matter of great difficulty to deal with its "bad" characters; +it is the "good" ones that present it with a constant problem. + +The point is worth stressing, and we may do it from more than one point +of view. We may take, first of all, the familiar illustration of +religious persecution, as exemplified in the quarrels of Catholics and +Protestants. On the ground of moral distinction no line could be drawn +between the two parties. Each shuddered at the persecution inflicted by +the other, and each regarded the teachings of the other with the same +degree of moral aversion. And it has often been noted that the men who +administered so infamous an institution as the Inquisition were not, in +even the majority of cases, bad men.[8] A few may have had interested +motives, but it would have been impossible to have maintained so brutal +an institution in the absence of a general conviction of its rightness. +In private life those who could deliver men, women, and even children +over to torture were not worse husbands or parents than others. Such +differences as existed cannot be attributed to a lack of moral +endeavour, or to a difference of "moral temperament." It was a +difference of intellectual outlook, and given certain religious +convictions persecution became a religious necessity. The moral output +was poor because the intellectual standpoint was a wrong one. + +[8] Speaking of the Inquisition, Mr. H. C. Lea, in his classic _History +of the Inquisition_, says, "There is no doubt that the people were as +eager as their pastors to send the heretic to the stake. There is no +doubt that men of the kindliest tempers, the profoundest aspirations, +the purest zeal for righteousness, professing a religion founded on love +and charity, were ruthless where heresy was concerned, and were ready to +trample it out at any cost. Dominic and Francis, Bonaventure and Thomas +Aquinas, Innocent III. and St. Louis, were types, in their several ways, +of which humanity, in any age, might feel proud, and yet they were as +unsparing of the heretic as Ezzelin di Romano was of his enemies. With +such men it was not hope of gain or lust of blood or pride of opinion or +wanton exercise of power, but sense of duty, and they but represented +what was universal public opinion from the thirteenth to the seventeenth +century." Vol. I., p. 234. + +If we could once get over the delusion of thinking of human nature as +being fundamentally different five hundred years ago from what it is +to-day, we should escape a great many fallacies that are prevalent. The +changes that have taken place in human nature during the historic period +are so slight as to be practically negligible. The motives that animate +men and women to-day are the motives that animated men and women a +thousand or two thousand years ago. The change is in the direction and +form of their manifestation only, and it is in the light of the human +nature around us that we must study and interpret the human nature that +has gone before us. From that point of view we may safely conclude that +bad institutions were kept in being in the past for the same reason +that they are kept alive to-day. The majority must be blind to their +badness; and in any case it is a general perception of their badness +which leads to their destruction. + +The subject of crime illustrates the same point. Against crime as such, +society is as set as ever. But our attitude toward the causation and +cure of crime, and, above all, to the treatment of the criminal, has +undergone a profound alteration. And the change that has taken place +here has been away from the Christian conception which brutalized the +world for so long, towards the point of view taken up by the ancient +Greeks, that wrong doing is the outcome of ignorance. Expressed in the +modern manner we should say that crime is the result of an undeveloped +nature, or of a pathological one, or of a reversion to an earlier +predatory type, or the result of any or all of these factors in +combination with defective social conditions. But this is only another +way of saying that we have exchanged the old, brutal, and ineffective +methods for more humane and effective ones because we look at the +problem of crime from a different intellectual angle. A more exact +knowledge of the causation of crime has led us to a more sensible and a +more humane treatment of the criminal. And this, not alone in his own +behalf, but in the interests of the society in which he lives. We may +put it broadly that improvement comes from an enlightened way of looking +at things. Common observation shows that people will go on tolerating +forms of brutality, year after year, without the least sense of their +wrongness. Familiarity, and the absence of any impetus to examine +current practice from a new point of view seem to account for this. In +the seventeenth century the same people who could watch, without any +apparent hostility, the torture of an old woman on the fantastic charge +of intercourse with Satan, had their feelings outraged by hearing a +secular song on Sunday. Imprisonment for "blasphemy," once regarded as a +duty, has now become ridiculous to all reasonable people. At one and the +same time, a little more than a hundred years ago in this country, the +same people who could denounce cock-fighting on account of its +brutality, could watch unmoved the murdering of little children in the +factories of Lancashire. Not so long ago men in this country fought +duels under a sense of moral compulsion, and the practice was only +abandoned when a changed point of view made people realize the absurdity +of trying to settle the justice of a cause by determining which of two +people were the most proficient with sword or pistol. We have a +continuation of the same absurdity in those larger duels fought by +nations where the old verbal absurdities still retain their full force, +and where we actually add another absurdity by retaining a number of +professional duellists who must be ready to embark on a duel whether +they have any personal feeling in the matter or not. And it seems fairly +safe to say that when it is realized that the duel between nations as a +means of settling differences is not a bit more intellectually +respectable than was the ancient duello we shall not be far removed from +seeing the end of one of the greatest dangers to which modern society is +exposed. + +Examples might be multiplied indefinitely, but enough has been said to +show what small reason there is for assuming that changes in +institutions are brought about by the operation of some occult moral +sense. It is the enlightenment of the moral sense by the growth of new +ideas, by the impact of new knowledge leading to a revaluation of things +that is mainly responsible for the change. The question of whether a man +should or should not be burned for a difference in religious belief was +never one that could be settled by weighing up the moral qualities of +the two parties in the dispute. All the moral judgment that has ever +existed, even if combined in the person of a single individual could +never decide that issue. It was entirely a question of acquiring a new +point of view from which to examine the subject. Until that was done the +whole force of the moral sense was on the side of the persecutor. To put +the matter paradoxically, the better the man the worse persecutor he +became. It was mental enlightenment that was needed, not moral +enthusiasm. + +The question of progress thus becomes, in all directions, one of the +impact of new ideas, in an environment suitable to their reception and +growth. A society shut in on itself is always comparatively +unprogressive, and but for the movement of classes within it would be +completely so. The more closely the history of civilization is studied +the more clearly does that fact emerge. Civilization is a synthetic +movement, and there can be no synthesis in the absence of dissolution +and resolution. + +A fight of old ideas against new ones, a contest of clashing culture +levels, a struggle to get old things looked at from a new point of view, +these are the features that characterize all efforts after reform. It +was said by some of the eighteenth century philosophers that society was +held together by agreement in a bond. That is not quite correct. The +truth is that society is held together, as is any phase of social life, +by a bond of agreement. The agreement is not of the conscious, +documentary order, but it is there, and it consists in sharing a common +life created and maintained by having a common tradition, and a common +stock of ideas and ideals. It is this that makes a man a member of one +social group rather than of another--Chinese, American, French, German, +or Choctaw. There is no discriminating feature in what is called the +economic needs of people. The economic needs of human beings--food, +clothing, and shelter, are of the same order the world over. And +certainly the fact of a Chinaman sharing in the economic life of +Britain, or an Englishman sharing in the economic life of China, would +not entitle either to be called genuine members of the group in which he +happened to be living. Membership only begins to be when those belonging +to a group share in a common mental outfit. Even within a society, and +in relation to certain social groups, one can see illustrations of the +same principle. A man is not really a member of a society of artists, +lawyers, or doctors merely by payment of an annual subscription. He is +that only when he becomes a participant in the mental life of the +group.[9] It is this common stock of mental facts which lies at the +root of all collective ideas--an army, a Church, or a nation. And ever +the fight is by way of attack and defence of the psychologic fact.[10] + +[9] This seems to me to give the real significance of Nationality. It +has been argued by some that nationality is a pure myth, as unreal as +the divinity of a king. The principal ground for this denial of +nationality appears to be that so-called national characteristics are +seen to undergo drastic transformation when their possessors are subject +to a new set of influences. This may be quite true, but if nationality, +in the sense of being a product of biological heredity, is ruled out, it +does not follow that nationality is thereby destroyed. The fact may +remain but it demands a different interpretation. And if what has been +said above be true, it follows that nationality is not a personal fact, +but an extra or super-personal one. It belongs to the group rather than +to the individual, and is created by the possession of a common speech, +a common literature, and a common group life. And quite naturally, when +the individual is lifted out of this special social influence its power +may well be weakened, and in the case of his children may be +non-existent, or replaced by the special characteristics of the new +group into which he is born. The discussion of nationality ought not, +therefore, to move along the lines of acceptance or rejection of the +conception of nationality, but of how far specific national +characteristics admit of modification under the pressure of new +conditions. + +[10] It would take too long to elaborate, but it may be here noted that +in the human group the impelling force is not so much needs as desires, +and that fact raises the whole issue from the level of biology to that +of psychology. So long as life is at a certain level man shares with the +animal the mere need for food. But at another level there arises not +merely the need for food, but a desire for certain kind of food, cooked +in a particular manner, and served in a special style. And provided that +we do not by hunger reduce man to the level of the beast again, the +desire will be paramount and will determine whether food shall be eaten +or not. So, again, with the fact of sex and marriage. At the animal +level we have the crude fact of sex, and this is, indeed, inescapable at +any stage. But the growth of civilization brings about the fact that the +need for the gratification of the sexual appetite is regulated by the +secondary qualities of grace of form, or of disposition, which are the +immediate determinants of whether a particular man shall marry a +particular woman or not. Again, it is the _desire_ for power and +distinction, not the _need_ for money that impels men to spend their +lives in building up huge fortunes. And, finally, we have the fact that +a great many of our present needs are transformed desires. The working +man of to-day counts as needs, as do we all more or less, a number of +things that began as pure desires. We say we need books, pictures, +music, etc. But none of these things can be really brought under the +category of things necessary to life. They are the creation of man's +mental cravings. Without them we say life would not be worth living, and +it is well that we should all feel so. Professor Marshall rightly dwells +upon this point by saying: "Although it is man's wants in the early +stages of development that give rise to his activities, yet afterwards +each new step is to be regarded as the development of new activities +giving rise to new wants, rather than of new wants giving rise to new +activities."--(_Principles of Economics_, Vol. I., p. 164.) + +To do the Churches and other vested interests justice, they have never +lost sight of this truth, and it would have been better for the race +had others been equally alive to its importance. The Churches have never +ceased to fight for the control of those public organs that make for the +formation of opinion. Their struggle to control the press, the platform, +and the school means just this. Whatever they may have taught, +self-interest forced upon them recognition of the truth that it was what +men thought about things that mattered. They have always opposed the +introduction of new ideas, and have fought for the retention of old +ones. It was a necessity of their existence. It was also an admission of +the truth that in order for reform to become a fact the power of +traditional ideas must be broken. Man is what he thinks, is far nearer +the truth than the once famous saying, "Man is what he eats." As a +member of a social group man is dominated by his ideas of things, and +any movement of reform must take cognisance of that fact if it is to +cherish reasonable hopes of success. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +WHAT IS FREETHOUGHT? + + +Freedom of thought and freedom of speech stand to each other as the two +halves of a pair of scissors. Without freedom of speech freedom of +thought is robbed of the better part of its utility, even if its +existence is not threatened. The one reacts on the other. As thought +provides the material for speech, so, in turn, it deteriorates when it +is denied expression. Speech is, in fact, one of the great factors in +human progress. It is that which enables one generation to hand on to +another the discoveries made, the inventions produced, the thoughts +achieved, and so gives a degree of fixity to the progress attained. For +progress, while expressed through the individual, is achieved by the +race. Individually, the man of to-day is not strikingly superior in form +or capacity to the man of five or ten thousand years ago. But he knows +more, can achieve more, and is in that sense stronger than was his +ancestors. He is the heir of the ages, not as a figure of speech, but as +the most sober of facts. He inherits what previous generations have +acquired; the schoolboy of to-day starts with a capital of inherited +knowledge that would have been an outfit for a philosopher a few +thousand years ago. + +It is this that makes speech of so great importance to the fact of +progress. Without speech, written or verbal, it would be impossible to +conserve the products of human achievement. Each generation would have +to start where its predecessor commenced, and it would finish at about +the same point. It would be the fable of Sisyphus illustrated in the +passing of each generation of human beings. + +But speech implies communication. There is not very much pleasure in +speaking to oneself. Even the man who apologised for the practice on the +ground that he liked to address a sensible assembly would soon grow +tired of so restricted an audience. The function of speech is to +transmit ideas, and it follows, therefore, that every embargo on the +free exchange of ideas, every obstacle to complete freedom of speech, is +a direct threat to the well-being of civilisation. As Milton could say +that a good book "is the precious life-blood of a master spirit, +embalmed and treasured up to a life beyond life," and that "he who +destroys a good book kills reason itself," so we may say that he who +strikes at freedom of thought and speech is aiming a blow at the very +heart of human betterment. + +In theory, the truth of what has been said would be readily admitted, +but in practice it has met, and still meets, with a vigorous opposition. +Governments have exhausted their powers to prevent freedom of +intercourse between peoples, and every Church and chapel has used its +best endeavours to the same end. Even to-day, when all are ready to pay +lip-homage to freedom of thought, the obstacles in the way of a genuine +freedom are still very great. Under the best possible conditions there +will probably always be some coercion of opinion, if only of that +unconscious kind which society as a whole exerts upon its individual +members. But to this we have to add the coercion that is consciously +exerted to secure the formation of particular opinions, and which has +the dual effect of inducing dissimulation in some and impotency in +others. Quite ignorantly parents commence the work when they force upon +children their own views of religion and inculcate an exaggerated +respect for authority. They create an initial bias that is in only too +many cases fatal to real independence of thought. Social pressure +continues what a mistaken early training has commenced. When opinions +are made the test of "good form," and one's social standing partly +determined by the kind of opinions that one holds, there is developed on +the one side hypocrisy, and on the other, because certain opinions are +banned, thought in general is unhealthily freed from the sobering +influence of enlightened criticism.[11] + +[11] It is a curious thing, as Philip Gilbert Hamerton points out in one +of his essays, that in England religious freedom appears to exist in +inverse proportion to rank. The king has no freedom whatever in a choice +of religion. His religion is part of the position. An English nobleman, +speaking generally, has two religions from which to choose. He may be +either a member of the established Church or of the Roman Catholic. In +the middle classes there is the choice of all sorts of religious sects, +so long as they are Christian. Religious dissent is permitted so long as +it does not travel beyond the limits of the chapel. And when we come to +the better class working man, he has the greatest freedom of all. His +social position does not depend upon his belonging to this or that +Church, and he may, to borrow a phrase from Heine, go to hell in his own +fashion. + +To-day the legal prohibition of religious dissent is practically +ineffective, and is certainly far less demoralizing than the pressure +that is exerted socially and unofficially. In all probability this has +always been the case. For legal persecution must be open. Part of its +purpose is publicity, and that in itself is apt to rouse hostility. +Against open, legal persecution a man will make a stand, or if he gives +way to the force arrayed against him may do so with no feeling of +personal degradation. But the conformity that is secured by a threat of +social boycott, the freedom of speech that is prevented by choking the +avenues of intellectual intercourse, is far more deadly in its +consequences, and far more demoralizing in its influence on character. +To give way, as thousands do, not to the open application of force, +which carries no greater personal reflection than does the soldier's +surrender to superior numbers, but to the dread of financial loss, to +the fear of losing a social status, that one may inwardly despise even +while in the act of securing it, or from fear of offending those whom we +may feel are not worthy of our respect, these are the things that cannot +be done without eating into one's sense of self-respect, and inflicting +upon one's character an irreparable injury. + +On this matter more will be said later. For the present I am concerned +with the sense in which we are using the word "Freethought." +Fortunately, little time need be wasted in discussing the once popular +retort to the Freethinker that if the principle of determinism be +accepted "free" thought is impossible. It is surprising that such an +argument should ever have secured a vogue, and is only now interesting +as an indication of the mentality of the defender of orthodox religion. +Certainly no one who properly understands the meaning of the word would +use such an argument. At best it is taking a word from sociology, a +sphere in which the meaning is quite clear and intelligible, and +applying it in the region of physical science where it has not, and is +not intended to have, any meaning at all. In physical science a thing is +what it does, and the business of science is to note the doings of +forces and masses, their actions and reactions, and express them in +terms of natural "law." From the point of view of physical science a +thing is neither free nor unfree, and to discuss natural happenings in +terms of freedom or bondage is equal to discussing smell in terms of +sight or colour in terms of smell. But applied in a legitimate way the +word "free" is not only justifiable, it is indispensible. The confusion +arises when we take a word from a department in which its meaning is +quite clear and apply it in a region where it has no application +whatever. + +Applied to opinion "Free" has the same origin and the same application +as the expressions "a free man," or a "free State," or "a free people." +Taking either of these expressions it is plain that they could have +originated only in a state of affairs where some people are "free," and +some are living in a state of bondage or restraint. There is no need to +trace the history of this since so much is implied in the word itself. A +free State is one in which those belonging to it determine their own +laws without being coerced by an outside power. A free man is one who is +permitted to act as his own nature prompts. The word "free" implies +nothing as to the nature of moral or mental causation, that is a +question of a wholly different order. The free man exists over against +the one who is not free, the free State over against one that is held in +some degree of subjection to another State. There is no other meaning to +the word, and that meaning is quite clear and definite. + +Now Freethought has a precisely similar significance. It says nothing as +to the nature of thought, the origin of thought, or the laws of thought. +With none of these questions is it vitally concerned. It simply asserts +that there are conditions under which thought is not "free," that is, +where it is coerced to a foregone conclusion, and that these conditions +are fatal to thought in its higher and more valuable aspects. +Freethought is that form of thinking that proceeds along lines of its +own determining, rather than along lines that are laid down by +authority. In actual practice it is immediately concerned with the +expression of opinion rather than with its formation, since no authority +can prevent the formation of opinion in any mind that is at all +independent in its movements and forms opinions on the basis of observed +facts and adequate reasoning. But its chief and primary significance +lies in its repudiation of the right of authority to say what form the +expression of opinion shall take. And it is also clear that such a term +as "Freethought" could only have come into general use and prominence in +a society in which the free circulation of opinion was more or less +impeded. + +It thus becomes specially significant that, merely as a matter of +history, the first active manifestation of Freethought should have +occurred in connection with a revolt against religious teaching and +authority. This was no accident, but was rather a case of necessity. +For, in the first place, there is no other subject in which pure +authority plays so large a part as it does in religion. All churches and +all priesthoods, ancient and modern, fall back upon the principle of +pure authority as a final method of enforcing their hold upon the +people. That, it may be noted in passing, is one of the chief reasons +why in all ages governments have found religion one of the most +serviceable agencies in maintaining their sway. Secondly, there seems to +have been from the very earliest times a radically different frame of +mind in the approach to secular and religious matters. So far as one can +see there appears to be, even in primitive societies, no very strong +opposition to the free discussion of matters that are of a purely +secular nature. Questions of ways and means concerning these are freely +debated among savage tribes, and in all discussion differences of +opinion must be taken for granted. It is when we approach religious +subjects that a difference is seen. Here the main concern is to +determine the will of the gods, and all reasoning is thus out of place, +if not a positive danger. The only thing is to discover "God's will," +and when we have his, or his will given in "sacred" books the embargo on +free thinking is complete. This feature continues to the end. We do not +even to-day discuss religious matters in the same open spirit in which +secular matters are debated. There is a bated breath, a timidity of +criticism in discussing religious subjects that does not appear when we +are discussing secular topics. With the thoroughly religious man it is +solely a question of what God wishes him to do. In religion this affords +the only latitude for discussion, and even that disappears largely when +the will of God is placed before the people in the shape of "revealed" +writings. Fortunately for the world "inspired" writings have never been +so clearly penned as to leave no room for doubt as to what they actually +meant. Clarity of meaning has never been one of the qualities of divine +authorship. + +In this connection it is significant that the first form of democratic +government of which we have any clear record should have been in +freethinking, sceptical Greece. Equally notable is it that in both Rome +and Greece the measure of mental toleration was greater than it has ever +been in other countries before or since. In Rome to the very end of the +Pagan domination there existed no legislation against opinions, as such. +The holders of certain opinions might find themselves in uncomfortable +positions now and then, but action against them had to rest on some +ground other than that which was afterwards known as heresy. There +existed no law in the Roman Empire against freedom of opinion, and those +who are familiar with Mr. H. C. Lea's classic, _History of the +Inquisition_, will recall his account of the various tactics adopted by +the Christian Church to introduce measures that would accustom the +public mind to legislation which should establish the principle of +persecution for opinion.[12] In the end the Church succeeded in +effecting this, and its success was registered in the almost +unbelievable degradation of the human intellect which was exhibited in +the Christian world for centuries. So complete was this demoralization +that more than a thousand years later we find men announcing as a most +daring principle a demand for freedom of discussion which in old Greece +and Rome was never officially questioned. Christianity not merely killed +freedom wherever it established itself, but it came very near killing +even the memory of it. + +[12] See specially Vol. I., chapters 6, 7, and 8. One is sorely tempted +to engage in what would be a rather lengthy aside on the mental freedom +enjoyed by the people of ancient Greece, but considerations of cogency +advise a shorter comment in this form. In the first place we have to +note that neither the Greeks nor the Romans possessed anything in the +shape of "sacred" books. That, as the history of Mohammedanism and +Christianity shows, is one of the most disastrous things that can happen +to any people. But apart from this there were several circumstances +connected with the development of the Greek peoples that made for +freedom of opinion. There was no uniform theology to commence with, and +the configuration of the country, while enough to maintain local +independence, was not enough to prevent a certain amount of intercourse. +And it would certainly seem that no people were ever so devoid of +intolerance as were the ancient Greeks. It is true that the history of +Greece was not without its examples of intolerance, but these were +comparatively few, and, as Professor Bury says, persecution was never +organized. The gods were criticized in both speeches and plays. Theories +of Materialism and Atheism were openly taught and were made the topic of +public discussion. There was, indeed, a passion for the discussion of +all sorts of subjects, and to discussion nothing is sacred. The best +thought of Rome owed its impetus to Greece, and at a later date it was +the recovered thought of Greece which gave the impetus to Mohammedan +Spain in its cultivation of science and philosophy, and so led to the +partial recovery of Europe from the disastrous control of the Christian +Church. Nor need it be assumed that the work of Greece was due to the +possession of a superior brain power. Of that there is not the slightest +vestige of proof. It is simply that the ancient Greek lived in a freer +mental atmosphere. The mind had less to hamper it in its operations; it +had no organized and powerful Church that from the cradle to the grave +pursued its work of preventing free criticism and the play of +enlightened opinion. For several centuries the world has been seeking to +recover some of its lost liberties with only a very moderate success. +But if one thinks of what the Greeks were, and if one adds to what they +had achieved a possible two thousand years of development, he will then +have some notion of what the triumph of the Christian Church meant to +the world. + +It was, therefore, inevitable that in the western world Freethought +should come into prominence in relation to the Christian religion and +its claims. In the Christian Church there existed an organization which +not alone worked with the avowed intention of determining what men +should think, but finally proceeded to what was, perhaps, the logical +conclusion, to say what they should not think. No greater tyranny than +the Christian Church has ever existed. And this applies, not to the +Roman Church alone, but to every Church within the limit of its +opportunities. In the name and in the interests of religion the +Christian Church took some of the worst passions of men and consecrated +them. The killing of heretics became one of the most solemn duties and +it was urged upon secular rulers as such. The greatest instrument of +oppression ever formed, the Inquisition, was fashioned for no other +purpose than to root out opinions that were obnoxious to the Church. It +would have been bad enough had the attempts of the Church to control +opinion been limited to religion. But that was not the case. It aimed at +taking under its control all sorts of teaching on all sorts of +subjects. Nothing would have surprised an inhabitant of ancient Rome +more, could he have revisited the earth some dozen centuries after the +establishment of Christianity, than to have found men being punished for +criticising doctrines that were in his day openly laughed at. And +nothing could have given an ancient Athenian greater cause for wonder +than to have found men being imprisoned and burned for teaching cosmical +theories that were being debated in the schools of Athens two thousand +years before. Well might they have wondered what had happened to the +world, and well might they have come to the conclusion that it had been +overtaken by an attack of universal insanity. And the explanation would +not have been so very wide of the truth. + +In this matter of suppression of freedom of thinking there was little to +choose between the Churches. Each aimed at controlling the thought of +mankind, each was equally intolerant of any variation from the set line, +and each employed the same weapon of coercion so far as circumstances +permitted. At most the Protestant Churches substituted a dead book for a +living Church, and in the end it may be questioned, when all allowance +is made for the changed circumstances in which Protestantism operated, +whether the rule of the new Church was not more disastrous than the +older one. It had certainly less excuse for its intolerance. The Roman +Catholic Church might urge that it never claimed to stand for freedom of +opinion, and whatever its sins it was so far free from the offence of +hypocrisy. But the Protestant Churches could set up no such plea; they +professed to stand on freedom of conscience. And they thus added the +quality of inconsistency and hypocrisy to an offence that was already +grave enough in itself. + +But whatever opinion one may have on that point, it is certain that in +practice the Protestant leaders were as opposed to freedom of thought as +were the Roman Catholics. And Protestant bigotry left a mark on European +history that deserves special recognition. For the first time it made +the profession of Christianity a definite part of the law of the secular +State.[13] Hitherto there had been no law in any of the European States +which made a profession of Christianity necessary. There had been plenty +of persecutions of non-Christians, and the consequences of a rejection +of Christianity, if one lived in a Christian State, were serious enough. +But when the secular State punished the heretic it was a manifestation +of good will towards the Church and not the expression of a legal +enactment. It was the direct influence of the Church on the State. +Church and State were legally distinct during the mediaeval period, +however closely they may have been allied in practice. With the arrival +of Protestantism and the backing of the reformed religion given by +certain of the Princes, the machinery of intolerance, so to speak, was +taken over by the State and became one of its functions. It became as +much the duty of the secular officials to extirpate heresy, to secure +uniformity of religious belief as it was to the interest of the Church +to see that it was destroyed. Up to that time it was the aim of the +Church to make the State one of its departments. It had never legally +succeeded in doing this, but it was not for the Roman Church to sink to +the subordinate position of becoming a department of the State. It was +left for Protestantism to make the Church a branch of the State and to +give religious bigotry the full sanction of secular law. + +[13] See on this point Heeren's _Historical Treatises_, 1836, pp. +61-70. + +Neither with Catholic nor Protestant could there be, therefore, any +relaxation in the opposition offered to independent thinking. That still +remained the cardinal offence to the religious mind. In the name of +religion Protestants opposed the physics of Newton as bitterly as +Catholics opposed the physics of Galileo. The geology of Hutton and +Lyell, the chemistry of Boyle and Dalton, the biology of Von Baer, +Lamarck and Darwin, with almost any other branch of science that one +cares to select, tell the same tale. And when the desire for reform took +a social turn there was the same influence to be fought. For while the +Roman Catholic laid the chief insistence on obedience to the Church, the +Protestant laid as strong insistence on obedience to the State, and made +disobedience to its orders a matter of almost religious revolt. The +whole force of religion was thus used to induce contentment with the +existing order, instead of to the creation of an intelligent discontent +which would lead to continuous improvement. In view of these +circumstances it is not surprising that the word "Freethought" should +have lost in actual use its more general significance of a denial of the +place of mere authority in matters of opinion, and have acquired a more +definite and precise connotation. It could not, of course, lose its +general meaning, but it gained a special application and became properly +associated with a definitely anti-theological attitude. The growth in +this direction was gradual but inevitable. When the term first came into +general use, about the end of the seventeenth century, it was mainly +used with reference to those deists who were then attacking +Christianity. In that sense it continued to be used for some time. But +as Deism lost ground, thanks partly to the Christian attack, the clear +and logical issue between Theism and Atheism became apparent, with the +result that the definite anti-religious character of "Freethought" +became firmly established. And to-day it is mere affectation or timidity +to pretend that the word has any other vital significance. To say that a +man is a Freethinker is to give, to ninety-nine people out of a hundred, +the impression that he is anti-religious. And in this direction the +popular sense of the word discloses what has been its important historic +function. Historically, the chief stronghold of mere authority has been +religion. In science and in sociology, as well as in connection with +supernaturalism proper, every movement in the direction of the free +exercise of the intellect has met with the unceasing opposition of +religion. That has always been at once the symbol and the instrument of +oppression. To attack religion has been to attack the enemy in his +capital. All else has been matter of outpost skirmishing. + +I have apparently gone a long way round to get at the meaning of the +word "Freethought," but it was necessary. For it is of very little use, +in the case of an important word that has stood and stands for the name +of a movement, to go to a dictionary, or to appeal to etymology. The +latter has often a mere antiquarian interest, and the former merely +registers current meanings, it does not make them. The use of a word +must ultimately be determined by the ideas it conveys to those who hear +it. And from what has been said the meaning of this particular word +should be fairly clear. While standing historically for a reasoned +protest against the imposition of opinion by authority, and, negatively, +against such artificial conditions as prevent the free circulation of +opinion, it to-day stands actually for a definitely anti-religious +mental attitude. And this is what one would naturally expect. Protests, +after all, are protests against something in the concrete, even though +they may embody the affirmation of an abstract principle. And nowadays +the principle of pure authority has so few defenders that it would be +sheer waste of time, unless the protest embodied a definite attitude +with regard to specific questions. We may, then, put it that to us +"Freethought" stands for a reasoned and definite opposition to all forms +of supernaturalism, it claims the right to subject all religious beliefs +to the test of reason, and further claims that when so tested they break +down hopelessly. It is from this point of view that these pages are +written, and the warranty for so defining it should be apparent from +what has been said in this and the preceding chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +REBELLION AND REFORM. + + +Rebellion and reform are not exactly twins, but they are very closely +related. For while all rebellion is not reform, yet in the widest sense +of the word, there is no reform without rebellion. To fight for reform +is to rebel against the existing order and is part of the eternal and +fundamentally healthful struggle of the new against the old, and of the +living present against the dead past. The rebel is thus at once a public +danger and a benefactor. He threatens the existing order, but it is in +the name of a larger and better social life. And because of this it is +his usual lot to be crucified when living and deified when dead. So it +has always been, so in its main features will it always be. If +contemporaries were to recognize the reformer as such, they would +destroy his essential function by making it useless. Improvement would +become an automatic process that would perfect itself without +opposition. As it is, the function of the rebel is to act as an +explosive force, and no society of average human beings likes +explosions. They are noisy, and they are dangerous. For the reformer to +complain at not being hailed as a deliverer is for him to mistake his +part and place in social evolution. + +The rebel and the reformer is, again, always in minority. That follows +from what has already been said. It follows, too, from what we know of +development in general. Darwinism rests on the supreme importance of the +minority. It is an odd variation here and there that acts as the +starting point for a new species--and it has against it the swamping +influence of the rest of its kind that treads the old biological line. +Nature's choicest variations are of necessity with the few, and when +that variation has established itself and become normal another has to +appear before a new start can be made. + +Whether we take biology or psychology the same condition appears. A new +idea occurs to an individual and it is as strictly a variation from the +normal as anything that occurs in the animal world. The idea may form +the starting point of a new theory, or perhaps of a new social order. +But to establish itself, to become the characteristic property of the +group, it must run the gamut of persecution and the risk of suppression. +And suppressed it often is--for a time. It is an idle maxim which +teaches that truth always conquers, if by that is implied that it does +so at once. That is not the truth. Lies have been victorious over and +over again. The Roman Catholic Church, one of the greatest lies in the +history of the human race, stood the conqueror for many centuries. The +teaching of the rotundity of the earth and its revolution round the sun +was suppressed for hundreds of years until it was revived in the 16th +century. In the long run truth does emerge, but a lie may have a +terribly lengthy innings. For the lie is accepted by the many, while the +truth is seen only by the few. But it is the few to whom we turn when we +look over the names of those who have made the world what is it. All the +benefits to society come from the few, and society crucifies them to +show its gratitude. One may put it that society lives on the usual, but +flourishes on account of the exception. + +Now there is something extremely significant in the Christian religion +tracing all the disasters of mankind to a primal act of disobedience. It +is a fact which discloses in a flash the chief social function of +religion in general and of Christianity in particular. Man's duty is +summed up in the one word obedience, and the function of the +(religiously) good man is to obey the commands of God, as that of the +good citizen is to obey the commands of government. The two commands +meet and supplement each other with the mutual advantage which results +from the adjustment of the upper and lower jaws of a hyena. And it +explains why the powers that be have always favoured the claims of +religion. It enabled them to rally to their aid the tremendous and +stupefying aid of religion and to place rebellion to their orders on the +same level as rebellion against God. In Christian theology Satan is the +arch-rebel; hell is full of rebellious angels and disobedient men and +women. Heaven is reserved for the timid, the tame, the obedient, the +sheep-like. When the Christ of the Gospels divides the people into goats +and sheep, it is the former that go to hell, and the latter to heaven. +The Church has not a rebel in its calendar, although it has not a few +rogues and many fools. To the Church rebellion is always a sin, save on +those rare occasions when revolt is ordered in the interests of the +Church itself. In Greek mythology Prometheus steals fire from heaven for +the benefit of man and suffers in consequence. The myth symbolizes the +fact. Always the man has had to win knowledge and happiness in the teeth +of opposition from the gods. Always the race has owed its progress to +the daring of the rebel or of the rebellious few. + +Often the Freethinker is denounced because he is destructive or +dangerous. What other is he expected to be? And would he be of much use +if he were otherwise?? I would go further and say that he is the most +destructive of all agencies because he is so intimately concerned with +the handling of the most destructive of weapons--ideas. We waste a good +deal of time in denouncing certain people as dangerous when they are in +reality comparatively harmless. A man throws a bomb, or breaks into a +house, or robs one of a purse, and a judge solemnly denounces him as a +most "dangerous member of society." It is all wrong. These are +comparatively harmless individuals. One man throws a bomb, kills a few +people, damages some property, and there the matter ends. Another man +comes along and drops instead of a bomb a few ideas, and the whole +country is in a state of eruption. Charles Peace pursues a career of +piety and crime, gets himself comfortably and religiously hanged, and +society congratulates itself on having got rid of a dangerous person, +and then forgets all about it. Karl Marx visits England, prowls round +London studying the life of rich and poor, and drops _Das Kapital_ on +us. A quiet and outwardly inoffensive individual, one who never gave the +police a moment's anxiety, spends years studying earthworms, and +flowers, and horses and cats, and all sorts of moving things and +presents society with _The Origin of Species_. Organized society found +itself able to easily guard itself against the attacks of men such as +Charles Peace, it may with impunity extend its hospitality to the +thrower of bombs, or robber of houses, but by what means can it protect +itself against the "peaceful" Marx or the "harmless" Darwin? No society +can afford to ignore in its midst a score of original or independent +thinkers, or if society does ignore them they will not for long ignore +society. The thinker is really destructive. He destroys because he +creates; he creates because he destroys. The one is the obverse of the +other. + +I am not making idle play with the word "destruction." It is literally +true that in human society the most destructive and the most coercive +forces at work are ideas. They strike at established institutions and +demand either their modification or their removal. That is why the +emergence of a new idea is always an event of social significance. +Whether it be a good idea or a bad one will not affect the truth of this +statement. For over four years our political mediocrities and muddle +headed militarists were acting as though the real problem before them +was to establish the superiority of one armed group of men over another +group. That was really a simple matter. The important issue which +society had to face was the ideas that the shock of the war must give +rise to. Thinkers saw this; but thinkers do not get the public ear +either as politicians or militarists. And now events are driving home +the lesson. The ideas of Bolshevism and Sinn Feinism proved far more +"dangerous" than the German armies. The Allied forces could handle the +one, but they were powerless before the other. It is not a question of +whether these particular ideas are good or bad, or whether we approve or +disapprove of them, but entirely one that, being ideas, they represent a +far more "destructive" power than either bomb or gun. They are at once +the forces that act as the cement of society and those that may hurl it +into chaotic fragments. + +Whether an idea will survive or not must, in the end, be determined by +circumstances, but in itself a new idea may be taken as the mental +analogue of the variation which takes place in physical structures, and +which forms the raw material of natural selection. And if that is so, it +is evident that any attempt to prevent the play of new ideas on old +institutions is striking at the very fact of progress. For if we are to +encourage variation we must permit it in all directions, up as well as +down, for evil as well as for good. You cannot check variation in one +direction without checking it in all. You cannot prevent the appearance +of a new idea that you do not want without threatening the appearance of +a number of ideas that you would eagerly welcome. It is, therefore, +always better to encourage the appearance of a bad idea than it is to +risk the suppression of a good one. Besides, it is not always that force +applied to the suppression of ideas succeeds in its object. What it +often does is to cause the persecuted idea to assume a more violent +form, to ensure a more abrupt break with the past than would otherwise +occur, with the risk of a period of reaction before orderly progress is +resumed. The only way to silence an idea is to answer it. You cannot +reply to a belief with bullets, or bayonet a theory into silence. +History contains many lessons, but none that is plainer than this one, +and none that religious and secular tyrannies learn with greater +reluctance. + +The Churches admit by their practice the truth of what has been said. +They have always understood that the right way to keep society in a +stationary position is to prevent the introduction of new ideas. It is +thought against which they have warred, the thinker against whom they +have directed their deadliest weapons. The Christian Church has been +tolerant towards the criminal, and has always been intolerant towards +the heretic and the Freethinker. For the latter the naming _auto da fe_, +for the former the moderate penance and the "go, and sin no more." The +worst of its tortures were neither created for nor applied to the thief +and the assassin, but were specially designed for the unbeliever. In +this the Church acted with a sure instinct. The thief threatens no +institution, not even that of private property. "Thou shalt not steal" +is as much the law of a thieves' kitchen as it is of Mayfair. But +Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Lyell, Darwin, these are the men who +convey a threat in all they write, who destroy and create with a +splendour that smacks of the power with which Christians have endowed +their mythical deity. No aggregation of criminals has ever threatened +the security of the Church, or even disturbed its serenity. On the +contrary, the worse, morally, the time, the greater the influence of +Christianity. It flourishes on human weakness and social vice as the +bacilli of tuberculosis do in darkness and dirt. It is when weakness +gives place to strength, and darkness to light that the Church finds its +power weakening. The Church could forgive the men who instituted the +black slave trade, she could forgive those who were responsible for the +horrors of the English factory system, but she could never forgive the +writer of the _Age of Reason_. She has always known how to distinguish +her friends from her foes. + +Right or wrong, then, the heretic, the Freethinker, represents a figure +of considerable social significance. His social value does not lie +wholly in the fact of his opinions being sound or his judgment +impeccable. Mere revolt or heresy can never carry that assurance with +it. The important thing about the rebel is that he represents a spirit, +a temper, in the absence of which society would stagnate. It is bad when +people revolt without cause, but it is infinitely better that a people +should revolt without cause than that they should have cause for +rebellion without possessing the courage of a kick. That man should have +the courage to revolt against the thing which he believes to be wrong is +of infinitely greater consequence than that he should be right in +condemning the thing against which he revolts. Whether the rebel is +right or wrong time and consequence alone can tell, but nothing can make +good the evil of a community reduced to sheep-like acquiescence in +whatever may be imposed upon them. The "Their's not to reason why" +attitude, however admirable in an army, is intolerable and dangerous in +social life. Replying to those who shrieked about the "horrors" of the +French Revolution, and who preached the virtue of patriotic obedience to +established authority, Carlyle, with an eye on Ireland, sarcastically +admitted that the "horrors" were very bad indeed, but he added:-- + + What if history somewhere on this planet were to hear of a nation, + the third soul of whom had not for thirty weeks of each year as + many third-rate potatoes as would sustain him? History in that + case, feels bound to consider that starvation is starvation; that + starvation presupposes much; history ventures to assert that the + French Sansculotte of Nine-three, who roused from a long death + sleep, could rush at once to the frontiers and die fighting for an + immortal hope and faith of deliverance for him and his, was but the + second miserablest of men. + +And that same history, looking back through the ages, is bound to +confess that it is to the great rebels, from Satan onward, that the +world mainly owes whatever of greatness or happiness it has achieved. + +One other quality of the rebel remains to be noted. In his revolt +against established authority, in his determination to wreck cherished +institutions for the realization of an ideal, the rebel is not the +representative of an anti-social idea or of an anti-social force. He is +the true representative of the strongest of social influences. The very +revolt against the social institutions that exist is in the name and for +the realization of a larger and a better social order that he hopes to +create. A man who is ready to sacrifice his life in the pursuit of an +ideal cannot, whatever else he may be accused of, be reasonably accused +of selfishness or of a want of "social consciousness." He is a vital +expression of the centuries of social life which have gone before and +which have made us all what we are. Were his social sense weaker he +would risk less. Were he selfish he would not trouble about the +conversion of his fellows. The spirit of revolt represents an important +factor in the process of social development, and they who are most +strenuous in their denunciation of social control, are often, even +though unconsciously, the strongest evidence of its overpowering +influence. + +Fed as we are with the mental food prepared by our Churches and +governments, to whose interests it is that the rebel and the Freethinker +should be decried and denounced, we are all too apt to overlook the +significance of the rebel. Yet he is invariably the one who voices what +the many are afraid or unable to express. The masses suffer dumbly, and +the persistence of their suffering breeds a sense of its inevitability. +It is only when these dumb masses find a voice that they threaten the +established order, and for this the man of ideas is essential. That is +why all vested interests, religious and social, hate him so heartily. +They recognize that of all the forces with which they deal an idea is +the greatest and the most untamable. Once in being it is the most +difficult to suppress. It is more explosive than dynamite and more +shattering in its effects. Physical force may destroy a monarch, but it +is only the force of an idea that can destroy a monarchy. You may +destroy a church with cannon, but cannon are powerless against Church +doctrines. An idea comes as near realizing the quality of +indestructibility as anything we know. You may quiet anything in the +world with greater ease than you may reduce a strong thinker to silence, +or subdue anything with greater facility than you may subdue the idea +that is born of strenuous thought. Fire may be extinguished and strife +made to cease, ambition may be killed and the lust for power grow faint. +The one thing that defies all and that finally conquers is the truth +which strong men see and for which brave men fight. + +It is thus left for the philosophy of Freethought, comprehensive here as +elsewhere, to find a place for the rebel and to recognize the part he +plays in the evolution of the race. For rebellion roots itself +ultimately in the spirit of mental independence. And that whether a +particular act of revolt may be justifiable or not. It is bred of the +past, but it looks forward hopefully and fearlessly to the future, and +it sees in the present the material out of which that better future may +be carved. That the mass of people find in the rebel someone whom it is +moved to suppress is in no wise surprising. New things are not at first +always pleasant, even though they may be necessary. But the temper of +mind from which rebellion springs is one that society can only suppress +at its peril. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CHILD. + + +If the truth of what has been said above be admitted, it follows that +civilization has two fundamental aspects. On the one side there is the +environment, made up--so far as civilized humanity is concerned--of the +ideas, the beliefs, the customs, and the stored up knowledge of +preceding generations, and on the other side we have an organism which +in virtue of its education responds to the environmental stimuli in a +given manner. Between the man of to-day and the man of an earlier +generation the vital distinction is not that the present day one is, as +an organism, better, that he has keener sight, or stronger muscles, or a +brain of greater capacity, but that he has a truer perception of things, +and in virtue of his enlarged knowledge is able to mould natural forces, +including the impulses of his own nature, in a more desirable manner. +And he can do this because, as I have already said, he inherits what +previous generations have acquired, and so reaps the benefits of what +they have done. + +We may illustrate this in a very simple manner. One of the most striking +differences between the man of to-day and the man of the past is the +attitude of the two in relation to natural phenomena. To the people of +not so many generations ago an eclipse was a very serious thing, fraught +with the promise of disaster to mankind. The appearance of a comet was +no less ominous. John Knox saw in comets an indication of the wrath of +heaven, and in all countries the Churches fought with all their might +against the growth of the scientific view. Away back in antiquity we +meet with the same view. There is, for example, the classic case of the +Greek general Nikias, who, when about to extricate his army from a +dangerous position before Syracuse, was told that an eclipse of the sun +indicated that the gods wished him to stay where he was for three times +nine days. Nikias obeyed the oracles with the result that his army was +captured. Now it is certain that no general to-day would act in that +manner, and if he did it is equally certain that he would be +court-martialled. Equally clear is it that comets and eclipses have +ceased to infect the modern mind with terror, and are now only objects +of study to the learned, and of curiosity to the unlearned. But the +difference here is entirely one of knowledge. Our ancestors reacted to +the appearance of a comet or an eclipse in a particular manner because +their knowledge of these things was of a certain kind. It was not at all +a case of feeling, or of degree of feeling, or of having a better brain, +but simply a matter of reacting to an environmental influence in terms +of an understanding of certain things. Had we the same conception of +these things that our ancestors had we should react in the same manner. +We act differently because our understanding of things is different. We +may put it briefly that the kind of reaction which we make to the things +around us is mainly determined by our knowledge concerning their nature. + +There is one other fact that brings into prominence the importance of +the kind of reaction which we make to environmental stimuli. Put +briefly, we may say that an important distinction between the animal and +man is that the animal passes its existence in a comparatively simple +environment where the experiences are few in kind and often repeated, +whereas with man the environment is very complex, the experiences are +varied in character, and may be only repeated after long intervals. The +consequence is that in order to get through life an animal needs a few +simple instincts which automatically respond to frequently repeated +experiences, while on the other hand there must be with man opportunity +for the kind of response which goes under the name of intelligent +action. It is this which gives us the reason, or the explanation, why of +all animals the human being is born the most helpless, and why he +remains helpless for a longer period than does any other. The prolonged +infancy is the opportunity given to the human being to acquire the +benefits of education and so to reap the full advantage of that social +heritage which, as we have shown, raises him so far above the level of +past generations. Or we may express the matter with the late Professor +Fiske, who was the first, I think, to dwell at length upon this +phenomenon, that the distinction between man and the animal world is +that in the one case we have developed instincts with small capacity for +education, in the other few instincts with great capacity for education. + +It is often said that the Churches have failed to pay attention to +education, or have not taken it seriously. That is quite wrong. It may, +indeed, be said that they have never failed to attend to education, and +have always taken it seriously--with disastrous results to education and +to social life. Ever since the birth of the modern movement for +education the Church has fought hard to maintain its control of schools, +and there is every reason why this should be so. Survival in the animal +world may be secured in two ways. On the one side we may have a +continuance of a special sort of environment to which a given structure +is properly adapted; on the other there may be a modification of the +animal to meet the demands of a changing environment. + +Applying this principle to the question of the Churches and education +the moral is clear. The human environment changes more than that of any +other animal. The mere amassing of experience and its expression in the +form of new institutions or in the modification of already existing +ones, is enough to effect a change in the environment of successive +generations. The Christian Church, or for the matter of that, any form +of religion, has before it two possible courses. Either it must maintain +an environment that is as little as possible unchanged, or it must +modify its body of teaching to meet the changed surroundings. As a mere +matter of fact both processes go on side by side, but consciously the +Churches have usually followed the course of trying to maintain an +unchanged environment. This is the real significance of the attempt of +the more orthodox to boycott new, or heretical literature, or lectures, +or to produce a "religious atmosphere" round the child. It is an attempt +to create an environment to which the child's mind will respond in a +manner that is favourable to the claims and teachings of the Christian +Church. The Church dare not openly and plainly throw overboard its body +of doctrines to meet the needs of the modern mind; and the only thing +remaining is to keep the modern mind as backward as possible in order +that it may rest content with a teaching that is reminiscent of a past +stage of civilization. + +In this connection it is interesting to note that the struggle for the +child is essentially a modern phrase. So long as the teaching of +religion is in, at least, a working harmony with current knowledge and +the general body of the social forces the question of religious +instruction does not emerge. Life itself--social life that is--to a very +considerable extent enforces religious teaching. At all events it does +not violently contradict it. But as, owing to the accumulation of +knowledge, views of the world and of man develop that are not in harmony +with accepted religious teaching, the Churches are forced to attempt the +maintenance of an environment of a special religious kind to which their +teaching is adapted. Hence the growing prominence of the division of +secular and sacred as things that have to do with religion and things +that have not. Hence, too, the importance to the Churches of acquiring +power over the child's mind before it is brought completely under the +influence of an environment in which orthodox teachings can only present +themselves as a gross anachronism. + +Thus, one may say with absolute confidence that if in a modern +environment a child was left free with regard to modern influences there +is nothing that would lead to an acceptance of religion. Our ancestors +grew up familiar with the idea of the miraculous and the supernatural +generally because there was nothing in the existing knowledge of the +world that contradicted it. But what part is there in the general +education of the child in modern society that would lead to that end? So +far as it is taught anything about the world it learns to regard it in +terms of causation and of positive knowledge. It finds itself surrounded +with machinery, and inventions, and with a thousand and one mechanical +and other inventions which do not in the very remotest degree suggest +the supernatural. In other words, the response of a modern child in a +modern environment is of a strictly non-religious kind. Left alone it +would no more become religious in the sense of believing in the +religious teachings of any of the Churches than it would pass through +life looking for miracles or accepting fairy tales as sober statements +of historic fact. It would no more express itself in terms of religion +than it would describe an eclipse in the language of our ancestors of +five hundred years ago. + +In self defence the Churches are thus bound to make a fight for the +possession of the child. They cannot wait, because that means allowing +the child to grow to maturity and then dealing with it when it is able +to examine religion with some regard to its historic evolution, and with +a due appreciation of the hopelessly unscientific character of the +conception of the supernatural. They must, so far as they can, protect +the growing child from the influence of all those environmental forces +that make for the disintegration of religious beliefs. The only way in +which the Churches can at all make sure of a supply of recruits is by +impressing them before they are old enough to resist. As the Germany of +the Kaiser is said to have militarized the nation by commencing with the +schools, so the Churches hope to keep the nations religious by +commencing with the children. Apart from these considerations there is +no reason why religion could not wait, as other subjects wait, till the +child is old enough to understand and appreciate it. But with the +Churches it is literally the child or nothing. + +From the point of view of citizenship the retention of religion in State +schools is a manifest injustice. If ever religious instruction could be +justified in any circumstances it is when the religion taught represents +at least the professed beliefs of the whole of the people. But that is +clearly not the case to-day. Only a section of the people can be called, +even formally, Christian. Large numbers are quite opposed to +Christianity, and large numbers deliberately reject all religion. How, +then, can the State undertake the teaching of a religion without at the +same time rousing resentment in and inflicting an injustice on a large +number of its members? It cannot be done, and the crowning absurdity is +that the State acknowledges the non-essential character of religion by +permitting all who will to go without. In secular subjects it permits no +such option. It says that all children shall receive certain tuition in +certain subjects for a given period. It makes instruction in these +subjects compulsory on the definite and intelligible ground that the +education given is necessary to the intelligent discharge of the duties +of citizenship. It does not do that in the case of religion, and it dare +not do that. No government to-day would have the impudence to say that +discharge of the duties of citizenship is dependent upon acceptance of +the Athanasian Creed, or upon the belief in the Bible, or in an after +life. And not being able to say this it is driven to the absurd position +of, on the one hand saying to the people, that religion shall be taught +in the State schools, and on the other, if one doesn't care to have it +he may leave it alone without suffering the slightest disqualification. + +Indeed, it is impossible for instruction in religion to be genuinely +called education at all. If I may be allowed to repeat what I have said +elsewhere on this subject, one may well ask:-- + + What is it that the genuine educationalist aims at? The imparting + of knowledge is, of course, essential. But, in the main, education + consists in a wholesome training of mind and body, in forming + habits of cleanliness, truthfulness, honesty, kindness, the + development of a sense of duty and of justice. Can it be said in + truth that what is called religious instruction does these things, + or that instruction in them is actually inseparable from religion? + Does the creation of a religious "atmosphere," the telling of + stories of God or Jesus or angels or devils--I omit hell--have any + influence in the direction of cultivating a sound mind in a sound + body? Will anyone contend that the child has even a passing + understanding of subjects over which all adults are more or less + mystified? To confuse is not to instruct, to mystify is not to + enlighten, the repetition of meaningless phrases can leave behind + no healthy residuum in the mind. It is the development of capacity + along right lines that is important, not the mere cramming of + verbal formulae. Above all, it is the function of the true teacher + to make his pupil independent of him. The aim of the priest is to + keep one eternally dependent upon his ministrations. The final and + fatal criticism upon religious instruction is that it is not + education at all. + + It may be argued that a policy of creating sentiments in favour of + certain things not wholly understood by the child is followed in + connection with matters other than religion. We do not wait until a + child is old enough to appreciate the intellectual justification of + ethics to train it in morals. And in many directions we seek to + develop some tendencies and to suppress others in accordance with + an accepted standard. All this may be admitted as quite true, but + it may be said in reply that these are things for which an adequate + reason _can_ be given, and we are sure of the child's approbation + when it is old enough to appreciate what has been done. But in the + case of religion the situation is altogether different. We are here + forcing upon the child as true, as of the same admitted value as + ordinary ethical teaching, certain religious doctrines about which + adults themselves dispute with the greatest acrimony. And there is + clearly a wide and vital distinction between cultivating in a child + sentiments the validity of which may at any time be demonstrated, + or teachings upon the truth of which practically all adults are + agreed, and impressing upon it teachings which all agree may be + false. We are exploiting the child in the interests of a Church. + Parents are allowing themselves to be made the catspaws of priests; + and it is not the least formidable of the counts against the + Church's influence that it converts into active enemies of children + those who should stand as their chief protectors. It is religion + which makes it true that "a _child's_ foes shall be those of his + own household."[14] + +[14] _Religion and the Child_, Pioneer Press. + +Where the claim to force religion upon the child breaks down on such +grounds as those outlined above it is quite certain that it cannot be +made good upon any other ground. Historically, it is also clear that we +do not find that conduct was better in those ages when the Christian +religion was held most unquestioningly, but rather the reverse. The +moralization of the world has, as a matter of historic fact, kept pace +with the secularizing of life. This is true both as regards theory and +fact. The application of scientific methods to ethical problems has +taught us more of the nature of morality in the short space of three or +four generations than Christian teaching did in a thousand years. And it +is not with an expansion of the power and influence of religion that +conduct has undergone an improvement, but with the bringing of people +together in terms of secular relationships and reducing their religious +beliefs to the level of speculative ideas which men may hold or reject +as they think fit, so long as they do not allow them to influence their +relations to one another. + +On all grounds it is urgent that the child should be rescued from the +clutches of the priest. It is unfair to the child to so take advantage +of its trust, its innocence, and its ignorance, and to force upon it as +true teachings that which we must all admit may be false, and which, in +a growing number of cases, the child when it grows up either rejects +absolutely or considerably modifies. It is unjust to the principle upon +which the modern State rests, because it is teaching the speculative +beliefs of a few with money raised from the taxation of all. The whole +tendency of life in the modern State is in the direction of +secularization--confining the duties and activities of the State to +those actions which have their meaning and application to this life. +Every argument that is valid against the State forcing religion upon the +adult is valid also against the State forcing religion upon the child. +And, on the other hand, it is really absurd to say that religion must be +forced upon the child, but we are outraging the rights of the individual +and perpetuating an intolerable wrong if we force it upon the adult. +Surely the dawning and developing individuality of the child has claims +on the community that are not less urgent than those of the adult. + +Finally, the resolve to rescue the child from the clutches of the priest +is in the interest of civilization itself. All human experience shows +that a civilization that is under the control of a priesthood is doomed. +From the days of ancient Egypt there is no exception to this rule. And +sooner or later a people, if they are to progress, are compelled to +attempt to limit the control of the priest over life. The whole of the +struggle of the Reformation was fundamentally for the control of the +secular power--whether life should or should not be under the control of +the Church. In that contest, over a large part of Europe, the Roman +Church lost. But the victory was only a very partial one. It was never +complete. The old priest was driven out, but the new Presbyter remained, +and he was but the old tyrant in another form. Ever since then the fight +has gone on, and ever since, the Protestant minister, equally with the +Catholic priest, has striven for the control of education and so to +dominate the mind of the rising generation. The fight for the liberation +of the child is thus a fight for the control or the directing of +civilization. It is a question of whether we are to permit the priest to +hold the future to ransom by permitting this control of the child, or +whether we are to leave religious beliefs, as we leave other beliefs of +a speculative character, to such a time as the child is old enough to +understand them. It is a fight for the future of civilization. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE NATURE OF RELIGION. + + +It is no mere paradox to say that religion is most interesting to those +who have ceased to believe in it. The reason for this is not far to +seek. Religious beliefs play so large a part in the early history of +society, and are so influential in social history generally, that it is +impossible to leave religion alone without forfeiting an adequate +comprehension of a large part of social evolution. Human development +forms a continuous record; our institutions, whatever be their nature, +have their roots in the far past, and often, even when modified in form, +retain their essential characteristics. No student of social history can +travel far or dig deeply without finding himself in contact with +religion in some form. And the mass of mankind are not yet so far +removed from "primitive" humanity as to give to the study of religion an +exclusively archaeological interest. + +Where so much is discord it is well, if it be possible, to start with a +basis of agreement. And on one point, at least, there is substantial +unity among critics. There is a general agreement among students of folk +lore, comparative mythology, and anthropology, that religious ideas rest +ultimately upon an interpretation of nature that is now generally +discarded. Differing as they do on details, there is consent upon this +point. It is the world of the savage that originates the religion of the +savage, and upon that rests the religions of civilized man as surely as +his physical structure goes back to the animal world for its beginning. +And in giving birth to a religious explanation of his world the savage +was only pursuing the normal path of human development. Mankind +progresses through trial and error; doubtful and erroneous theories are +framed before more reliable ones are established, and while truth may +crown our endeavours it seldom meets us at the outset. Religious beliefs +thus form man's earliest interpretation of nature. On this there is, as +I have said, general agreement, and it is as well not to permit +ourselves to lose sight of that in the discussion of the various +theories that are put forward as to the exact nature of the stages of +religious development. + +In many directions the less accurate theories of things are replaced +gradually and smoothly by more reliable explanations. But in religion +this is not so. For many reasons, with which we are not now immediately +concerned, religious beliefs are not outgrown without considerable +"growing pains." And a long time after the point of view from which +religious beliefs sprang has been given up, the conclusions that were +based on that point of view are held to most tenaciously. And yet if one +accepts the scientific story of the origins of religious ideas there +seems no justification whatever for this. Religion cannot transcend its +origin. Multiply nothing to infinity and the result is still nothing. +Illusion can beget nothing but illusion, even though in its pursuit we +may stumble on reality. And no amount of ingenuity can extract truth +from falsehood. + +One's surprise at the perpetuation of this particular delusion is +diminished by the reflection that the period during which we have +possessed anything like an exact knowledge of the character and +operations of natural forces is, after all, but an infinitesimal +portion of the time the race has been in existence. Three or four +centuries at most cover the period during which such knowledge has been +at our command, and small as this is in relation to the thousands of +generations wherein superstition has reigned unchallenged, a knowledge +of the laws of mental life belongs only to the latter portion. And even +then the knowledge available has been till recently the possession of a +class, while to-day, large masses of the population are under the +domination of the crudest of superstitions. The belief that thirteen is +an unlucky number, that a horse-shoe brings luck, the extent to which +palmistry and astrology flourishes, the cases of witchcraft that crop up +every now and again, all bear testimony to the vast mass of superstition +that is still with us. The primitive mind is still alive and active, +disguised though it may be by a veneer of civilization and a terribly +superficial education. And when one reflects upon all the facts there is +cause for astonishment that in the face of so great a dead weight of +custom and tradition against a rational interpretation of the universe +so much has been done and in so short a time. + +In discussing religion very much turns upon the meaning of the word, and +unfortunately "religion" is to-day used in so many differing and +conflicting senses that without the most careful definition no one is +quite sure what is meant by it. The curious disinclination of so many to +avow themselves as being without a religion must also be noted. To be +without a religion, or rather to be known as one who is without a +religion, would seem to mark one off as apart from the rest of one's +kind, and to infringe all the tribal taboos at one sweep. And very few +seem to have the courage to stand alone. Mr. Augustine Birrell once +said, in introducing to the House of Commons an Education Bill, that +children would rather be wicked than singular. That is quite true, and +it is almost as true of adults as it is of children. There is no great +objection to having a religion different from that of other people, +because the religions of the world are already of so varied a character +that there is always companionship in difference. But to be without a +religion altogether is a degree of isolation that few can stand. The +consequence is that although vast numbers have given up everything that +is really religious they still cling to the name. They have left the +service, but they show a curious attachment to the uniform. Thus it +happens that we have a religion of Socialism, a religion of Ethics, +etc., and I should not be surprised to find one day a religion of +Atheism--if that has not already appeared. + +But all this is a mistake, and a very serious mistake. The Freethinker, +or Socialist, who calls his theory of life a religion is not causing the +religionist to think more highly of him, he is making his opponent think +more highly of his own opinions. Imitation becomes in such a case not +alone flattery, but confirmation. The Goddite does not think more highly +of Freethought because it is labelled religion, he merely becomes the +more convinced of the supreme value of his own faith, and still hopes +for the Freethinker's return to the fold. If Freethinkers are to command +the respect of the religious world they must show not only that they can +get along without religion, but that they can dispense with the name +also. If strength does not command respect weakness will certainly fail +to secure it. And those of us who are genuinely anxious that the world +should be done with false ideas and mischievous frames of mind ought to +at least take care that our own speech and thought are as free from +ambiguity as is possible. + +There is another and deeper aspect of the matter. As I have already +said, language not alone expresses thought, it also governs and directs +it. Locke expressed this truth when he said, "It is impossible that men +should ever truly seek, or certainly discover, the disagreement of ideas +themselves whilst their thoughts flutter about, or stick only on sounds +of doubtful and uncertain significance." Quite a number of theological +and metaphysical conundrums would lose their significance if it were +only realized that the words used are not alone of doubtful and +uncertain significance, but often of no possible significance whatever. +They are like counterfeit coins, which retain their value only so long +as they are not tested by a proper standard. And the evil of these +counterfeits is that they deceive both those who tender and those who +accept them. For even though slovenliness of speech is not always the +product of slovenly thought, in the long run it tends to induce it, and +those who realize this need to be specially on their guard against using +language which can only further confuse an already sufficiently confused +public opinion, and strengthen superstitions that are already +sufficiently strong without our clandestine or unintended assistance.[15] + +[15] Of the evil of an incautious use of current words we have an +example in the case of Darwin. Neither his expressions of regret at +having "truckled to public opinion" at having used the term "creator," +nor his explicit declaration that the word was to him only a synonym of +ignorance, prevented religious apologists from citing him as a believer +in deity on the strength of his having used the word. + +Unfortunately, it remains a favourite policy with many writers to use +and define the word religion, not in accordance with a comprehensive +survey of facts, but in a way that will harmonize with existing +pre-possessions. To this class belongs Matthew Arnold's famous +definition of religion as "Morality touched with emotion," Professor +Seeley's statement that we are entitled to call religion "any habitual +and permanent admiration," or the common description of religion as +consisting in devotion to an ideal. All such definitions may be set on +one side as historically worthless, and as not harmonizing with the +facts. Arnold's definition is in the highest degree superficial, since +there exists no morality that is not touched with emotion, and on the +other hand there exist phases of religion that have not any connection +with morality, however slight. Professor Leuba properly rules +definitions of this class out of order in the comment that, as it is +"the function of words to delimitate, one defeats the purpose of +language by stretching the meaning of a word until it has lost all +precision and unity of meaning."[16] A definition that includes +everything may as well, for all the use it is, not cover anything. + +[16] _The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion_, p. 92. + +Equally faulty are those definitions that are based upon an assumed +conscious effort to explain the mysteries of existence. No stranger +lapse ever overtook a great thinker than occurred to Herbert Spencer +when he described religion as consisting in a worship of the unknowable, +and as due to the desire to explain a mystery ever pressing for +interpretation. Granting the existence of an Unknowable, the sense of +its presence belongs to the later stages of mental evolution, not to the +earlier ones. Metaphysical and mystical theories of religion are +indications of its disintegration, not of its beginnings. Primitive man +began to believe in ghosts and gods for the same reasons that he +believed in other things; he worshipped his gods for very concrete +considerations. Even the distinction between "spiritual" and material +existence is quite foreign to his mind. Such distinctions arise +gradually with the progress of knowledge and its disintegrating +influence on inherited beliefs. If primitive man may be credited with a +philosophy, and if one may use the word in a purely convenient sense, +then one may say that he is neither a dualist, nor a pluralist, but a +monist. The soul or double he believes in is similar to the body he +sees; the unseen forces he credits with various activities are of the +same kind as those with which he is acquainted. To read our conceptions +into the mind of primitive man because we use our words to explain his +thoughts is a procedure that is bound to end in confusion. Man's +earliest conception of things is vague and indefinite. Later, he +distinguishes differences, qualitative and quantitative, his conception +of things becomes more definite, and distinctions are set up that lay +the foundations of science and philosophy, and which mark their +separation from religion. + +So far as one can see there are only two causes why people should +continue to use the word religion after giving up all for which it +properly stands. One is sheer conservatism. When, for instance, Thomas +Paine said, "To do good is my religion," he had at least the +justification of believing in a deity, but apart from this the only +cause for his calling the desire to do good a religion is that there had +grown up the fashion of calling one's rule of life a religion. The other +cause is the ill-repute that has been attached to those who avow +themselves as being without religion. Orthodoxy saw to it that they were +treated as pariahs without social status, and, in many cases, legal +rights. Once upon a time it was useless unless one believed in the +_right_ religion. Nowadays, any religion will do, or anything that one +cares to call a religion. But not to have any religion at all still puts +one outside the pale of respectability, and there seem to be few who +can stand that. And supernatural religion--the only genuine +article--being impossible with many, these may still, if they care to, +save their face by professing to use the name, even if they have not the +thing. Orthodoxy is very accommodating nowadays. + +Leaving for a time the question of how religion actually does arise, we +may turn to those writers who define religion in terms of ethics. It may +be admitted that so far as the later stages of religion are concerned +considerable emphasis is laid upon ethics. But we can only make religion +a part of ethics by expanding the term morality so as to include +everything, or by contracting it so as to exclude all the lower forms of +religious belief. And any definition of religion that does not embrace +all its forms is obviously inaccurate. It is not at all a question of +defining the higher in terms of the lower, or the lower in terms of the +higher, it is simply the need of so defining religion that our +definition will cover all religions, high and low, and thus deal with +their essential characteristics. + +The only sense in which ethics may be said to be included in religion +lies in the fact that in primitive times religion includes everything. +The fear of unseen intelligences is one of the most powerful factors of +which early humanity is conscious, and the necessity for conciliating +them is always present. The religious ceremonies connected with eating +and drinking, with lying down and rising up, with sowing and reaping, +with disease, hunting, and almost every circumstance of primitive life +prove this. Differentiation and discrimination arise very slowly, but +one after another the various departments of life do shake off the +controlling influence of religion. Ethics may, therefore, be said to +originate in the shadow of religion--as do most other things--but in no +sense can morality be said to owe its origin to religion. Its origin is +deeper and more fundamental than religion. As a matter of practice +morality is independent of religious belief and moral theory, and as a +matter of theory the formulation of definite moral rules is +substantially independent of religion and is an assertion of its +independence. Indeed, the conflict between a growing moral sense and +religion is almost as large a fact in the social sphere as the conflict +between religion and science is in the intellectual one. + +In all its earlier stages religion is at best non-moral. It becomes +otherwise later only because of the reaction of a socialized morality on +religious beliefs. Early religion is never concerned with the morality +of its teaching, nor are the worshippers concerned with the morality of +their gods. The sole question is what the gods desire and how best to +satisfy them. We cannot even conceive man ascribing ethical qualities to +his gods until he has first of all conceived them in regard to his +fellow men. The savage has no _moral_ reverence for his gods; they are +magnified men, but not perfect ones. He worships not because he admires, +but because he fears. Fear is, indeed, one of the root causes of +religious belief. Professor Leuba quite admits the origin of religion is +fear, but he reserves the possibility of man being occasionally placed +under such favourable conditions that fear may be absent. We admit the +possibility, but at present it remains a possibility only. At present +all the evidence goes to prove the words of Ribot that, "The religious +sentiment is composed first of all of the emotion of fear in its +different degrees, from profound terror to vague uneasiness, due to +faith in an unknown mysterious and impalpable power." And if that be +admitted, we can scarcely find here the origin of morality. + +What is here overlooked is the important fact that while religion, as +such, commences in a reasoned process, morality is firmly established +before mankind is even aware of its existence. A formulated religion is +essentially of the nature of a theory set forth to explain or to deal +with certain experiences. Morality, on the other hand, takes its rise in +those feelings and instincts that are developed in animal and human +societies under the pressure of natural selection. The affection of the +animal for its young, of the human mother for its child, the attraction +of male and female, the sympathetic feelings that bind members of the +same species together, these do not depend upon theory, or even upon an +intellectual perception of their value. Theory tries to account for +their existence, and reason justifies their being, but they are +fundamentally the product of associated life. And it is precisely +because morality is the inevitable condition of associated life that it +has upon religion the effect of modifying it until it is at least not +too great an outrage upon the conditions of social well-being. All along +we can, if we will, see how the developing moral sense forces a change +in religious teaching. At one time there is nothing revolting in the +Christian doctrine of election which dooms one to heaven and another to +hell without the slightest regard to personal merit. At another the +doctrine of eternal damnation is rejected as a matter of course. Heresy +hunting and heretic burning, practised as a matter of course by one +generation become highly repulsive to another. In every direction we see +religious beliefs undergoing a modification under the influence of moral +and social growth. It is always man who moralizes his gods; never by any +chance is it the gods who moralize man. + +If we are to arrive at a proper understanding of religion we can, +therefore, no more assume morals to be an integral part of religion +than we can assume medicine or any of the special arts, all of which may +be associated with religion. It will not even do to define religion with +Mr. W. H. Mallock[17] as a belief that the world "has been made and is +sustained by an intelligence external to and essentially independent of +it." That may pass as a definition of Theism, but Theism is only one of +the phases of religion, and the idea of a creator independent of the +universe is one that is quite alien to the earlier stages of religion. +And to deny the name of religion to primitive beliefs is to put oneself +on the level of the type of Christian who declines to call any +superstition but his own religion. It is for this reason impossible to +agree with Professor Leuba when he says that "the idea of a creator must +take precedence of ghosts and nature beings in the making of a +religion." If by precedence the order of importance, from the standpoint +of later and comparatively modern forms of religion, is intended, the +statement may pass. But if the precedence claimed is a time order, the +reply is that, instead of the idea of a creator taking precedence of +ghosts and nature beings, it is from these that the idea of a creator is +evolved. It is quite true Professor Leuba holds that "belief in the +existence of unseen anthropopathic beings is not religion. It is only +when man enters into relation with them that religion comes into +existence," but so soon as man believes in the existence of them he +believes himself to be in relation with them, and a large part of his +efforts is expended in making these relations of an amicable and +profitable character. + +[17] _Religion as a Credible Doctrine_, p. 11. + +A further definition of religion, first given, I think, by the late +Professor Fiske, but since widely used, as a craving for "fulness of +life," must be dismissed as equally faulty. For if by fulness of life +is meant the desire to make it morally and intellectually richer, the +answer is that this desire is plainly the product of a progressive +social life, of which much that now passes for religion is the +adulterated expression. Apologetically, it is an attempt so to state +religion that it may evade criticism of its essential character. From +one point of view this may be gratifying enough, but it is no help to an +understanding of the nature of religion. And how little religion does +help to a fuller life will be seen by anyone who knows the part played +by organized religion in mental development and how blindly obstructive +it is to new ideas in all departments of life. All these attempts to +define religion in terms of ethics, of metaphysics, or as the craving +after an ideal are wholly misleading. It is reading history backwards, +and attributing to primitive human nature feelings and conceptions which +it does not and cannot possess. + +In another work[18] I have traced the origin of the belief in God to the +mental state of primitive mankind, and there is no need to go over the +same ground here at any length. Commencing with the indisputable fact +that religion is something that is acquired, an examination of the state +of mind in which primitive mankind faced, and still faces, the world, +led to the conclusion that the idea of god begins in the personification +of natural forces by the savage. The growth of the idea of God was there +traced back to the ghost, not to the exclusion of other methods of god +making, but certainly as one of its prominent causes. I must refer +readers to that work who desire a more extended treatment of the +god-idea. + +[18] _Theism or Atheism_, Chapter 2. + +What remains to be traced here, in order to understand the other factor +that is common to religions, is the belief in a continued state of +existence after death, or at least of a soul. + +It has been shown to the point of demonstration by writers such as +Spencer, Tylor, and Frazer, that the idea of a double is suggested to +man by his experience of dreams, swoons, and allied normal and abnormal +experiences. Even in the absence of evidence coming to us from the +beliefs of existing tribes of savages, the fact that the ghost is always +depicted as identical in appearance with the living person would be +enough to suggest its dream origin. But there are other considerations +that carry the proof further. The savage sees in his dreams the figures +of dead men and assumes that there is a double that can get out of the +body during sleep. But he also dreams of dead men, and this is also +proof that the dead man still exists. Death does not, then, involve the +death of the ghost, but only its removal to some other sphere of +existence. Further, the likeness of sleep itself to death is so obvious +and so striking that it has formed one of the most insistent features of +human thought and speech. With primitive man it is far more than a +figure of speech. The Melanesians put this point of view when they say, +"the soul goes out of the body in some dreams, and if for some reason it +does not come back the man is found dead in the morning." Death and +dreaming have, therefore, this in common, they are both due to the +withdrawal of the double. Hence we find a whole series of ceremonies +designed to avert death or to facilitate the return of the double. The +lingering of this practice is well illustrated by Sir Frederick Treves +in his book, _The Other Side of the Lantern_. He there tells how he saw +a Chinese mother, with the tears streaming down her face, waving at the +door of the house the clothing of a recently deceased child in order to +bring back the departed spirit. + +Death is thus the separation of the double from the body; but if it may +return, its return is not always a matter of rejoicing, for we find +customs that are plainly intended to prevent the ghost recognizing the +living or to find its way back to its old haunts. Thus Frazer has shown +that the wearing of black is really a form of disguise. It is a method +taken to disguise the living from the attentions of the dead. It is in +order to avoid recognition by spirits who wish to injure them that the +Tongans change their war costume at every battle. The Chinese call their +best beloved children by worthless names in order to delude evil +spirits. In Egypt, too, the children who were most thought of were the +worst clad. In some places the corpse is never carried out through the +door, but by a hole in the side of the hut, which is afterwards closed +so that the ghost may not find its way back. + +The ghost being conceived as at all points identical with living beings, +it demands attention after death. It needs food, weapons, servants, +wives. In this way there originates a whole group of burial customs, +performed partly from fear of what the ghost may do if its wants are +neglected. The custom of burying food and weapons with the dead thus +receives a simple explanation. These things are buried with the dead man +in order that their spirit may accompany his to the next world and serve +the same uses there that they did here. The modern custom of scattering +flowers over a grave is unquestionably a survival of this primitive +belief. The killing of a wife on the husband's grave has the same +origin. Her spirit goes to attend the husband in the ghost-land. In the +case of a chief we have the killing of servants for the same reason. +When Leonidas says, "Bury me on my shield, I will enter even Hades as a +Lacedaemonian," he was exhibiting the persistence of this belief in +classical times. The Chinese offer a further example by making little +paper houses, filling them with paper models of the things used by the +dead person, and burning them on the grave. All over the world we have +the same class of customs developing from the same beliefs, and the same +beliefs projected by the human mind when brought face to face with the +same class of phenomena. + +As the ghost is pictured as like the physical man, so the next world is +more or less a replica of this. The chief distinction is that there is a +greater abundance of desirable things. Hunting tribes have elysiums +where there is an abundance of game. The old Norse heaven was a place +where there was unlimited fighting. The gold and diamonds and rubies of +the Christian heaven represent a stage of civilization where these +things had acquired a special value. Social distinctions, too, are often +maintained. The Caribs believe that every time they secure an enemy's +head they have gained a servant in the next world. And all know the +story of the French aristocrat who, when threatened with hell, replied, +"God will think twice before damning a person of my quality." + +Several other consequences of this service paid to the dead may be +noted. The ghost being drawn to the place where the body is buried, the +desire to preserve the corpse probably led to the practice of embalming. +The grave becomes a place of sanctity, of pilgrimage, and of religious +observance, and it has been maintained by many writers, notably by Mr. +W. Simpson in his _Worship of Death_, that the service round the grave +gives us the beginning of all temple worship. + +But from this brief view of the beginnings of religion we are able to +see how completely fallacious are all those efforts to derive religion +from an attempt to achieve an ideal, from a desire to solve certain +philosophical problems, or from any of the other sources that are +paraded by modern apologists. The origin and nature of religion is +comparatively simple to understand, once we have cleared our minds of +all these fallacies and carefully examine the facts. Religion is no more +than the explanation which the primitive mind gives of the experiences +which it has of the world. And, therefore, the only definition that +covers all the facts, and which stresses the essence of all religions, +high and low, savage and civilized, is that given by Tylor, namely, the +belief in supernatural beings. It is the one definition that expresses +the feature common to all religions, and with that definition before us +we are able to use language with a precision that is impossible so long +as we attempt to read into religion something that is absent from all +its earlier forms, and which is only introduced when advanced thought +makes the belief in the supernatural more and more difficult to retain +its hold over the human mind. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +THE UTILITY OF RELIGION. + + +The real nature of religion being as stated, it having originated in an +utterly erroneous view of things, it would seem that nothing more can be +needed to justify its rejection. But the conclusion would not be +correct, at least so far as the mass of believers or quasi-believers are +concerned. Here the conviction still obtains that religion, no matter +what its origin, still wields an enormous influence for good. The +curious thing is that when one enquires "what religion is it that has +exerted this beneficent influence?" the replies effectually cancel one +another. Each means by religion his own religion, and each accuses the +religion of the other man of all the faults with which the Freethinker +accuses the whole. The avowed object of our widespread missionary +activity is to save the "heathen" from the evil effects of their +religion; and there is not the least doubt that if the heathen had the +brute force at their command, and the impudence that we have, they would +cordially reciprocate. And the efforts of the various Christian sects to +convert each other is too well known to need mention. So that the only +logical inference from all this is that, while all religions are, when +taken singly, injurious, taken in the bulk they are sources of profound +benefit. + +It is not alone the common or garden order of religionist who takes up +this curious position, nor is it even the better educated believer; it +is not uncommon to find those who have rejected all the formal +religions of the world yet seeking to discover some good that religion +has done or is doing. As an illustration of this we may cite an example +from Sir James Frazer, than whom no one has done more to bring home to +students a knowledge of the real nature of religious beliefs. It is the +more surprising to find him putting in a plea for the good done by +religion, not in the present, but in the past. And such an instance, if +it does nothing else, may at least serve to mitigate our ferocity +towards the common type of religionist. + +In an address delivered in 1909, entitled "Psyche's Task: A discourse +concerning the influence of superstition on the growth of Institutions," +he puts in a plea for the consideration of superstition (religion) at +various stages of culture. Of its effects generally, he says:-- + + That it has done much harm in the world cannot be denied. It has + sacrificed countless lives, wasted untold treasures, embroiled + nations, severed friends, parted husbands and wives, parents and + children, putting swords and worse than swords between them; it has + filled gaols and madhouses with its deluded victims; it has broken + many hearts, embittered the whole of many a life, and not content + with persecuting the living it has pursued the dead into the grave + and beyond it, gloating over the horrors which its foul imagination + has conjured up to appal and torture the survivors. It has done all + this and more. + +Now this is a severe indictment, and one is a little surprised to find +following that a plea on behalf of this same superstition to the effect +that it has "among certain races and at certain times strengthened the +respect for government, property, marriage, and human life." In support +of this proposition he cites a large number of instances from various +races of people, all of which prove, not what Sir James sets out to +prove, but only that religious observances and beliefs have been +connected with certain institutions that are in themselves admirable +enough. And on this point there is not, nor can there be, any serious +dispute. One can find many similar instances among ourselves to-day. But +the real question at issue is a deeper one than that. It is not enough +for the religionist to show that religion has often been associated with +good things and has given them its sanction. The reply to this would be +that if it had been otherwise religion would long since have +disappeared. The essential question here is, Have the institutions named +a basis in secular and social life, and would they have developed in the +absence of superstition as they have developed with superstition in the +field? + +Now I do not see that Sir James Frazer proves either that these +institutions have not a sufficient basis in secular life--he would, I +imagine, admit that they have; or that they would not have developed as +well in the absence of superstition as they have done with it. In fact, +the whole plea that good has been done by superstition seems to be +destroyed in the statements that although certain institutions "have +been based partly on superstitions, it by no means follows that even +among these races they have never been based on anything else," and that +whenever institutions have proved themselves stable and permanent "there +is a strong presumption that they rest on something more solid than +superstition." So that, after all, it may well be that superstition is +all the time taking credit for the working of forces that are not of its +kind or nature. + +Let us take the example given of the respect for human life as a crucial +test. Admitting that religions have taught that to take life was a +sinful act, one might well interpose with the query as to whether it +was ever necessary to teach man that homicide within certain limits was +a wrong thing. Pre-evolutionary sociology, which sometimes taught that +man originally led an existence in which his hand was against every +other man, and who, therefore, fought the battle of life strictly off +his own bat, may have favoured that assumption. But that we now know is +quite wrong. We know that man slowly emerged from a pre-human gregarious +stage, and that in all group life there is an organic restraint on +mutual slaughter. The essential condition of group life is that the +nature of the individual shall be normally devoid of the desire for the +indiscriminate slaughter of his fellows. And if that is true of animals, +it is certainly true of man. Primitive human society does not and cannot +represent a group of beings each of whom must be restrained by direct +coercion from murdering the other. + +In this case, therefore, we have to reckon with both biological and +sociological forces, and I do not see that it needs more than this to +explain all there is to explain. Human life is always associated life, +and this means not alone a basis of mutual forbearance and co-operation, +but a development of the sympathetic feelings which tends to increase as +society develops, they being, as a matter of fact, the conditions of its +growth. And whatever competition existed between tribes would still +further emphasize the value of those feelings that led to effective +co-operation. + +The question, then, whether the anti-homicidal feeling is at all +dependent upon religion is answered in the negative by the fact that it +ante-dates what we may term the era of conscious social organization. +That of whether religion strengthens this feeling still remains, +although even that has been answered by implication. And the first thing +to be noted here is that whatever may be the value of the superstitious +safeguard against homicide it certainly has no value as against people +outside the tribe. In fact, when a savage desires to kill an enemy he +finds in superstition a fancied source of strength, and often of +encouragement. Westermarck points out that "savages carefully +distinguish between an act of homicide committed in their own community +and one where the victim is a stranger. Whilst the former is under +ordinary circumstances disapproved of, the latter is in most cases +allowed and often regarded as praiseworthy." And Frazer himself points +out that the belief in immortality plays no small part in encouraging +war among primitive peoples,[19] while if we add the facts of the killing +of children, of old men and women, and wives, together with the practice +of human sacrifice, we shall see little cause to attribute the +development of the feeling against homicide to religious beliefs. + +[19] The state of war which normally exists between many, if not most, +neighbouring savage tribes, springs in large measure directly from their +belief in immortality; since one of the commonest motives to hostility +is a desire to appease the angry ghosts of friends who are supposed to +have perished by baleful arts of sorcerers in another tribe, and who, if +vengeance is not inflicted on their real or imaginary murderers, will +wreak their fury on their undutiful fellow-tribesmen.--_The Belief in +Immortality_, Vol. I., p. 468. + +In one passage in his address Sir James does show himself quite alive to +the evil influence of the belief in immortality. He says:-- + + It might with some show of reason be maintained that no belief has + done so much to retard the economic and thereby the social progress + of mankind as the belief in the immortality of the soul; for this + belief has led race after race, generation after generation, to + sacrifice the real wants of the living to the imaginary wants of + the dead. The waste and destruction of life and property which + this faith has entailed has been enormous and incalculable. But I + am not here concerned with the disastrous and deplorable + consequences, the unspeakable follies and crimes and miseries which + have flowed in practice from the theory of a future life. My + business at present is with the more cheerful side of a gloomy + subject. + +Every author has, of course, the fullest right to select whichever +aspect of a subject he thinks deserves treatment, but all the same one +may point out that it is this dwelling on the "cheerful side" of these +beliefs that encourages the religionist to put forward claims on behalf +of present day religion that Sir James himself would be the first to +challenge. There is surely greater need to emphasize the darker side of +a creed that has thousands of paid advocates presenting an imaginary +bright side to the public gaze. + +But what has been said of the relation of the feeling against homicide +applies with no more than a variation of terms to the other instances +given by Sir James Frazer. Either these institutions have a basis in +utility or they have not. If they have not, then religion can claim no +social credit for their preservation. If they have a basis in utility, +then the reason for their preservation is to be found in social +selection, although the precise local form in which an institution +appears may be determined by other circumstances. And when Sir James +says that the task of government has been facilitated by the +superstition that the governors belonged to a superior class of beings, +one may safely assume that the statement holds good only of individual +governors, or of particular forms of government. It may well be that +when a people are led to believe that a certain individual possesses +supernatural powers, or that a particular government enjoys the favour +of supernatural beings, there will be less inclination to resentment +against orders than there would be otherwise. But government and +governors, in other words, a general body of rules for the government of +the tribe, and the admitted leadership of certain favoured individuals, +would remain natural facts in the absence of superstition, and their +development or suppression would remain subject to the operation of +social or natural selection. So, again, with the desire for private +property. The desire to retain certain things as belonging to oneself is +not altogether unnoticeable among animals. A dog will fight for its +bone, monkeys secrete things which they desire to retain for their own +use, etc., and so far as the custom possesses advantages, we may +certainly credit savages with enough common-sense to be aware of the +fact. But the curious thing is that the institution of private property +is not nearly so powerful among primitive peoples as it is among those +more advanced. So that we are faced with this curious comment upon Sir +James's thesis. Granting that the institution of private property has +been strengthened by superstition we have the strange circumstance that +that institution is weakest where superstition is strongest and +strongest where superstition is weakest. + +The truth is that Sir James Frazer seems here to have fallen into the +same error as the late Walter Bagehot, and to have formed the belief +that primitive man required breaking in to the "social yoke." The truth +is that the great need of primitive mankind is not to be broken in but +to acquire the courage and determination to break out. This error may +have originated in the disinclination of the savage to obey _our_ rules, +or it may have been a heritage from the eighteenth century philosophy of +the existence of an idyllic primitive social state. The truth is, +however, that there is no one so fettered by custom as is the savage. +The restrictions set by a savage society on its members would be +positively intolerable to civilized beings. And if it be said that these +customs required formation, the reply is that inheriting the imitability +of the pre-human gregarious animal, this would form the basis on which +the tyrannizing custom of primitive life is built. + +There was, however, another generalization of Bagehot's that was +unquestionably sound. Assuming that the first step necessary to +primitive mankind was to frame a custom as the means of his being +"broken in," the next step in progress was to break it, and that was a +far more difficult matter. Progress was impossible until this was done, +and how difficult it is to get this step taken observation of the people +living in civilized countries will show. But it is in relation to this +second and all important step that one can clearly trace the influence +of religion. And its influence is completely the reverse of being +helpful. For of all the hindrances to a change of custom there is none +that act with such force as does religion. This is the case with those +customs with which vested interest has no direct connection, but it +operates with tenfold force where this exists. Once a custom is +established in a primitive community the conditions of social life +surround it with religious beliefs, and thereafter to break it means a +breach in the wall of religious observances with which the savage is +surrounded. And so soon as we reach the stage of the establishment of a +regular priesthood, we have to reckon with the operation of a vested +interest that has always been keenly alive to anything which affected +its profit or prestige. + +It would not be right to dismiss the discussion of a subject connected +with so well-respected a name as that of Sir James Frazer and leave the +reader with the impression that he is putting in a plea for current +religion. He is not. He hints pretty plainly that his argument that +religion has been of some use to the race applies to savage times only. +We see this in such sentences as the following: "More and more, as time +goes on, morality shifts its grounds from the sands of superstition to +the rock of reason, from the imaginary to the real, from the +supernatural to the natural.... The State has found a better reason than +these old wives' fables for guarding with the flaming sword of justice +the approach to the tree of life," and also in saying that, "If it can +be proved that in certain races and at certain times the institutions in +question have been based partly on superstition, it by no means follows +that even among these races they have never been based on anything else. +On the contrary ... there is a strong presumption that they rest mainly +on something much more solid than superstition." In modern times no such +argument as the one I have been discussing has the least claim to +logical force. But that, as we all know, does not prevent its being used +by full-blown religionists, and by those whose minds are only partly +liberated from a great historic superstition. + +It will be observed that the plea of Frazer's we have been examining +argues that the function of religion in social life is of a conservative +character. And so far he is correct, he is only wrong in assuming it to +have been of a beneficial nature. The main function of religion in +sociology is conservative, not the wise conservatism which supports an +institution or a custom because of its approved value, but of the kind +that sees in an established custom a reason for its continuance. Urged, +in the first instance, by the belief that innumerable spirits are +forever on the watch, punishing the slightest infraction of their +wishes, opposition to reform or to new ideas receives definite shape and +increased strength by the rise of a priesthood. Henceforth economic +interest goes hand in hand with superstitious fears. Whichever way man +turns he finds artificial obstacles erected. Every deviation from the +prescribed path is threatened with penalties in this world and the next. +The history of every race and of every science tells the same story, and +the amount of time and energy that mankind has spent in fighting these +ghosts of its own savage past is the measure of the degree to which +religion has kept the race in a state of relative barbarism. + +This function of unreasoning conservatism is not, it must be remembered, +accidental. It belongs to the very nature of religion. Dependent upon +the maintenance of certain primitive conceptions of the world and of +man, religion dare not encourage new ideas lest it sap its own +foundations. Spencer has reminded us that religion is, under the +conditions of its origin, perfectly rational. That is quite true.[20] +Religion meets science, when the stage of conflict arises, as an +opposing interpretation of certain classes of facts. The one +interpretation can only grow at the expense of the other. While +religion is committed to the explanation of the world in terms of vital +force, science is committed to that of non-conscious mechanism. +Opposition is thus present at the outset, and it must continue to the +end. The old cannot be maintained without anathematizing the new; the +new cannot be established without displacing the old. The conflict is +inevitable; the antagonism is irreconcilable. + +[20] It may with equal truth be said that all beliefs are with a similar +qualification quite rational. The attempt to divide people into +"Rationalists" and "Irrationalists" is quite fallacious and is +philosophically absurd. Reason is used in the formation of religious as +in the formation of non-religious beliefs. The distinction between the +man who is religious and one who is not, or, if it be preferred, one who +is superstitious and one who is not, is not that the one reasons and the +other does not. Both reason. Indeed, the reasoning of the superstitionist +is often of the most elaborate kind. The distinction is that of one +having false premises, or drawing unwarrantable conclusions from sound +premises. The only ultimate distinctions are those of religionist and +non-religionist, supernaturalist and non-supernaturalist, Theist or +Atheist. All else are mere matters of compromise, exhibitions of +timidity, or illustrations of that confused thinking which itself gives +rise to religion in all its forms. + +It lies, therefore, in the very nature of the case that religion, as +religion, can give no real help to man in the understanding of himself +and the world. Whatever good religion may appear to do is properly to be +attributed to the non-religious forces with which it is associated. But +religion, being properly concerned with the relations between man and +mythical supernatural beings, can exert no real influence for good on +human affairs. Far from that being the case, it can easily be shown to +have had quite an opposite effect. There is not merely the waste of +energy in the direction above indicated, but in many other ways. If we +confine ourselves to Christianity some conception of the nature of its +influence may be formed if we think what the state of the world might +have been to-day had the work of enlightenment continued from the point +it had reached under the old Greek and Roman civilizations. Bacon and +Galileo in their prisons, Bruno and Vanini at the stake are +illustrations of the disservice that Christianity has done the cause of +civilization, and the obstruction it has offered to human well-being. + +Again, consider the incubus placed on human progress by the institution +of a priesthood devoted to the service of supernatural beings. In the +fullest and truest sense of the word a priesthood represents a parasitic +growth on the social body. I am not referring to individual members of +the priesthood in their capacity as private citizens, but as priests, as +agents or representatives of the supernatural. And here the truth is +that of all the inventions and discoveries that have helped to build up +civilization not one of them is owing to the priesthood, as such. One +may confidently say that if all the energies of all the priests in the +whole world were concentrated on a single community, and all their +prayers, formulae, and doctrines devoted to the one end, the well-being +of that community would not be advanced thereby a single iota. + +Far and away, the priesthood is the greatest parasitic class the world +has known. All over the world, in both savage and civilized times, we +see the priesthoods of the world enthroned, we see them enjoying a +subsistence wrung from toil through credulity, and from wealth through +self-interest. From the savage medicine hut up to the modern cathedral +we see the earth covered with useless edifices devoted to the foolish +service of imaginary deities. We see the priesthood endowed with special +privileges, their buildings relieved from the taxes which all citizens +are compelled to pay, and even special taxes levied upon the public for +their maintenance. The gods may no longer demand the sacrifice of the +first born, but they still demand the sacrifice of time, energy, and +money that might well be applied elsewhere. And the people in every +country, out of their stupidity, continue to maintain a large body of +men who, by their whole training and interest, are compelled to act as +the enemies of liberty and progress. + +It is useless arguing that the evils that follow religion are not +produced by it, that they are casual, and will disappear with a truer +understanding of what religion is. It is not true, and the man who +argues in that way shows that he does not yet understand what religion +is. The evils that follow religion are deeply imbedded in the nature of +religion itself. All religion takes its rise in error, and vested error +threatened with destruction instinctively resorts to force, fraud, and +imposture, in self defence. The universality of the evils that accompany +religion would alone prove that there is more than a mere accident in +the association. The whole history of religion is, on the purely +intellectual side, the history of a delusion. Happily this delusion is +losing its hold on the human mind. Year by year its intellectual and +moral worthlessness is being more generally recognized. Religion +explains nothing, and it does nothing that is useful. Yet in its name +millions of pounds are annually squandered and many thousands of men +withdrawn from useful labour, and saddled on the rest of the community +for maintenance. But here, again, economic and intellectual forces are +combining for the liberation of the race from its historic incubus. +Complete emancipation will not come in a day, but it will come, and its +arrival will mark the close of the greatest revolution that has taken +place in the history of the race. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +FREETHOUGHT AND GOD. + + +Why do people believe in God? If one turns to the pleas of professional +theologians there is no lack of answers to the question. These answers +are both numerous and elaborate, and if quantity and repetition were +enough, the Freethinker would find himself hopelessly "snowed under." +But on examination all these replies suffer from one defect. They should +ante-date the belief, whereas they post-date it. They cannot be the +cause of belief for the reason that the belief was here long before the +arguments came into existence. Neither singly nor collectively do these +so-called reasons correspond to the causes that have ever led a single +person, at any time or at any place, to believe in a God. If they +already believed, the arguments were enough to provide them with +sufficient justification to go on believing. If they did not already +believe, the arguments were powerless. And never, by any chance, do they +describe the causes that led to the existence of the belief in God, +either historically or individually. They are, in truth, no more than +excuses for continuing to believe. They are never the causes of belief. + +The evidence for the truth of this is at hand in the person of all who +believe. Let one consider, on the one hand, the various arguments for +the existence of God--the argument from causation, from design, from +necessary existence, etc., then put on the other side the age at which +men and women began to believe in deity, and their grasp of arguments of +the kind mentioned. There is clearly no relation between the two. +Leaving on one side the question of culture, it is at once apparent that +long before the individual is old enough to appreciate in the slightest +degree the nature of the arguments advanced he is already a believer. +And if he is not a believer in his early years, he is never one when he +reaches maturity, certainly not in a civilized society. And when we turn +from the individual Goddite to Goddites in the mass, the assumption that +they owe their belief to the philosophical arguments advanced becomes +grotesque in its absurdity. To assume that the average Theist, whose +philosophy is taken from the daily newspaper and the weekly sermon, +derives his conviction from a series of abstruse philosophical arguments +is simply ridiculous. Those who are honest to themselves will admit that +they were taught the belief long before they were old enough to bring +any real criticism to bear upon it. It was the product of their early +education, impressed upon them by their parents, and all the "reasons" +that are afterwards alleged in justification are only pleas why they +should not be disturbed in their belief. + +Are we in any better position if we turn from the individual to the +race? Is the belief in God similar to, say, the belief in gravitation, +which, discovered by a genius, and resting upon considerations which the +ordinary person finds too abstruse to thoroughly understand, becomes a +part of our education, and is accepted upon well established authority? +Again, the facts are dead against such an assumption. It is with the +race as with the individual. Science and philosophy do not precede the +belief in God and provide the foundation for it, they succeed it and +lead to its modification and rejection. We are, in this respect, upon +very solid ground. In some form or another the belief in God, or gods, +belongs to very early states of human society. Savages have it long +before they have the slightest inkling of what we moderns would call a +scientific conception of the world. And to assume that the savage, as we +know him, began to believe in his gods because of a number of scientific +reasons, such as the belief in universal causation, or any of the other +profound speculations with which the modern theologian beclouds the +issue, is as absurd as to attribute the belief of the Salvation Army +preacher to philosophical speculations. Added to which we may note that +the savage is a severely practical person. He is not at all interested +in metaphysics, and his contributions to the discussions of a +philosophical society would be of a very meagre character. His problem +is to deal with the concrete difficulties of his everyday life, and when +he is able to do this he is content. + +But, on the other hand, we know that our own belief in God is descended +from his belief. We know that we can trace it back without a break +through generations of social culture, until we reach the savage stage +of social existence. It is he who, so to speak, discovers God, he +establishes it as a part of the social institutions that govern the +lives of every member of the group; we find it in our immaturity +established as one of those many thought-forms which determine so +powerfully our intellectual development. The belief in God meets each +newcomer into the social arena. It is impressed upon each in a thousand +and one different ways, and it is only when the belief is challenged by +an opposing system of thought that philosophical theories are elaborated +in its defence. + +The possibility of deriving the idea of God from scientific and +philosophic thought being ruled out, what remains? The enquiry from +being philosophical becomes historical. That is, instead of discussing +whether there are sufficient reasons for justifying the belief in God, +we are left with the question of determining the causes that led people +to ever regard the belief as being solidly based upon fact. It is a +question of history, or rather, one may say, of anthropology of the +mental history of man. When we read of some poor old woman who has been +persecuted for bewitching someone's cattle or children we no longer +settle down to discuss whether witchcraft rests upon fact or not; we +know it does not, and our sole concern is to discover the conditions, +mental and social, which enabled so strange a belief to flourish. The +examination of evidence--the legal aspect--thus gives place to the +historical, and the historical finally resolves itself into the +psychological. For what we are really concerned with in an examination +of the idea of God is the discovery and reconstruction of those states +of mind which gave the belief birth. And that search is far easier and +the results far more conclusive than many imagine. + +In outlining this evidence it will only be necessary to present its +general features. This for two reasons. First, because a multiplicity of +detail is apt to hide from the general reader many of the essential +features of the truth; secondly, the fact of a difference of opinion +concerning the time order of certain stages in the history of the +god-idea is likely to obscure the fact of the unanimity which exists +among all those qualified to express an authoritative opinion as to the +nature of the conditions that have given the idea birth. The various +theories of the sequence of the different phases of the religious idea +should no more blind us to the fact that there exists a substantial +agreement that the belief in gods has its roots in the fear and +ignorance of uncivilized mankind, than the circumstance that there is +going on among biologists a discussion as to the machinery of evolution +should overshadow the fact that evolution itself is a demonstrated +truth which no competent observer questions. + +In an earlier chapter we have already indicated the essential conditions +which lead to the origin of religious beliefs, and there is no need +again to go over that ground. What is necessary at present is to sketch +as briefly as is consistent with lucidity those frames of mind to which +the belief in God owes its existence. + +To realize this no very recondite instrument of research is required. We +need nothing more elaborate than the method by which we are hourly in +the habit of estimating each other's thoughts, and of gauging one +another's motives. When I see a man laugh I assume that he is pleased; +when he frowns I assume that he is angry. There is here only an +application of the generally accepted maxim that when we see identical +results we are warranted in assuming identical causes. In this way we +can either argue from causes to effects or from effects to causes. A +further statement of the same principle is that when we are dealing with +biological facts we may assume that identical structures imply identical +functions. The structure of a dead animal will tell us what its +functions were when living as certainly as though we had the living +animal in front of us. We may relate function to structure or structure +to function. And in this we are using nothing more uncommon than the +accepted principle of universal causation. + +Now, in all thinking there are two factors. There is the animal or human +brain, the organ of thought, and there is the material for thought as +represented by the existing knowledge of the world. If we had an exact +knowledge of the kind of brain that functioned, and the exact quantity +and quality of the knowledge existing, the question as to the ideas +which would result would be little more than a problem in mathematics. +We could make the calculation with the same assurance that an +astronomer can estimate the position of a planet a century hence. In the +case of primitive mankind we do not possess anything like the exact +knowledge one would wish, but we do know enough to say in rather more +than a general way the kind of thinking of which our earliest ancestors +were capable, and what were its products. We can get at the machinery of +the primitive brain, and can estimate its actions, and that without +going further than we do when we assume that primitive man was hungry +and thirsty, was pleased and angry, loved and feared. And, indeed, it +was because he experienced fear and pleasure and love and hate that the +gods came into existence. + +Of the factors which determine the kind of thinking one does, we know +enough to say that there were two things certain of early mankind. We +know the kind of thinking of which he was capable, and we have a general +notion of the material existing for thinking. Speaking of one of these +early ancestors of ours, Professor Arthur Keith says, "Piltdown man saw, +heard, felt, thought and dreamt much as we do," that is, there was the +same _kind_ of brain at work that is at work now. And that much we could +be sure of by going no farther back than the savages of to-day. But as +size of brain is not everything, we are warranted in saying that the +brain was of a relatively simple type, while the knowledge of the world +which existed, and which gives us the material for thinking, was of a +very imperfect and elementary character. There was great ignorance, and +there was great fear. From these two conditions, ignorance and fear, +sprang the gods. Of that there is no doubt whatever. There is scarcely a +work which deals with the life of primitive peoples to-day that does not +emphasize that fact. Consciously or unconsciously it cannot avoid doing +so. Long ago a Latin writer hit on this truth in the well-known saying, +"Fear made the gods," and Aristotle expressed the same thing in a more +comprehensive form by saying that fear first set man philosophizing. The +undeveloped mind troubles little about things so long as they are going +smoothly and comfortably. It is when something painful happens that +concern is awakened. And all the gods of primitive life bear this primal +stamp of fear. That is why religion, with its persistent harking back to +the primitive, with its response to the "Call of the Wild" still dwells +upon the fear of the Lord as a means of arousing a due sense of piety. +The gods fatten on fear as a usurer does upon the folly of his clients, +and in both cases the interest demanded far outweighs the value of the +services rendered. At a later stage man faces his gods in a different +spirit; he loses his fear and examines them; and gods that are not +feared are but poor things. They exist mainly as indisputable records of +their own deterioration. + +Now to primitive man, struggling along in a world of which he was so +completely ignorant, the one certain thing was that the world was alive. +The wind that roared, the thunder that growled, the disease that left +him so mysteriously stricken, were all so many living things. The +division of these living forces into good and bad followed naturally +from this first conception of their nature. And whatever be the stages +of that process the main lines admit of no question, nor is there any +question as to the nature of the conditions that brought the gods into +existence. On any scientific theory of religion the gods represent no +more than the personified ignorance and fear of primitive humanity. +However much anthropologists may differ as to whether the god always +originates from the ghost or not, whether animism is first and the +worship of the ghost secondary or not, there is agreement on that +point. Whichever theory we care to embrace, the broad fact is generally +admitted that the gods are the products of ignorance and fear. Man fears +the gods as children and even animals fear the unknown and the +dangerous. + +And as the gods are born of conditions such as those outlined, as man +reads his own feelings and passions and desires into nature, so we find +that the early gods are frankly, obtrusively, man-like. The gods are +copies of their worshippers, faithful reflections of those who fear +them. This, indeed, remains true to the end. When the stage is reached +that the idea of God as a physical counterpart of man becomes repulsive, +it is still unable to shake off this anthropomorphic element. To the +modern worshipper God must not possess a body, but he must have love, +and intelligence--as though the mental qualities of man are less human +than the bodily ones! They are as human as arms or legs. And every +reason that will justify the rejection of the conception of the universe +being ruled over by a being who is like man in his physical aspects is +equally conclusive against believing the universe to be ruled over by a +being who resembles man in his mental characteristics. The one belief is +a survival of the other; and the one would not now be accepted had not +the other been believed in beforehand. + +I have deliberately refrained from discussing the various arguments put +forward to justify the belief in God in order that attention should not +be diverted from the main point, which is that the belief in deity owes +its existence to the ignorant interpretation of natural happenings by +early or uncivilized mankind. Everything here turns logically on the +question of origin. If the belief in God began in the way I have +outlined, the question of veracity may be dismissed. The question is +one of origin only. It is not a question of man first seeing a thing but +dimly and then getting a clearer vision as his knowledge becomes more +thorough. It is a question of a radical misunderstanding of certain +experiences, the vogue of an altogether wrong interpretation, and its +displacement by an interpretation of a quite different nature. The god +of the savage was in the nature of an inference drawn from the world of +the savage. There was the admitted premiss and there was the obvious +conclusion. But with us the premiss no longer exists. We deliberately +reject it as being altogether unwarrantable. And we cannot reject the +premiss while retaining the conclusion. Logically, the god of the savage +goes with the world of the savage; it should have no place in the mind +of the really civilized human being. + +It is for this reason that I am leaving on one side all those +semi-metaphysical and pseudo-philosophical arguments that are put +forward to justify the belief in God. As I have already said, they are +merely excuses for continuing a belief that has no real warranty in +fact. No living man or woman believes in God because of any such +argument. We have the belief in God with us to-day for the same reason +that we have in our bodies a number of rudimentary structures. As the +one is reminiscent of an earlier stage of existence so is the other. To +use the expressive phrase of Winwood Reade's, we have tailed minds as +well as tailed bodies. The belief in God meets each newcomer to the +social sphere. It is forced upon them before they are old enough to +offer effective resistance in the shape of acquired knowledge that would +render its lodgement in the mind impossible. Afterwards, the dice of +social power and prestige are loaded in its favour, while the mental +inertia of some, and the self-interest of others, give force to the +arguments which I have called mere mental subterfuges for perpetuating +the belief in God. + +Only one other remark need be made. In the beginning the gods exist as +the apotheosis of ignorance. The reason the savage had for believing in +God was that he did not know the real causes of the phenomena around +him. And that remains the reason why people believe in deity to-day. +Under whatever guise the belief is presented, analysis brings it +ultimately to that. The whole history of the human mind, in relation to +the idea of God, shows that so soon as man discovers the natural causes +of any phenomenon or group of phenomena the idea of God dies out in +connection therewith. God is only conceived as a cause or as an +explanation so long as no other cause or explanation is forthcoming. In +common speech and in ordinary thought we only bring in the name of God +where uncertainty exists, never where knowledge is obtainable. We pray +to God to cure a fever, but never to put on again a severed limb. We +associate God with the production of a good harvest, but not with a +better coal output. We use "God only knows" as the equivalent of our own +ignorance, and call on God for help only where our own helplessness is +manifest. The idea remains true to itself throughout. Born in ignorance +and cradled in fear, it makes its appeal to the same elements to the +end. And if it apes the language of philosophy, it does so only as do +those who purchase a ready-made pedigree in order to hide the obscurity +of their origin. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +FREETHOUGHT AND DEATH. + + +In the early months of the European war a mortally wounded British +soldier was picked up between the lines, after lying there unattended +for two days. He died soon after he was brought in, and one of his last +requests was that a copy of Ruskin's _Crown of Wild Olive_ should be +buried with him. He said the book had been with him all the time he had +been in France, it had given him great comfort, and he wished it to be +buried with him. Needless to say, his wish was carried out, and +"somewhere in France" there lies a soldier with a copy of the _Crown of +Wild Olive_ clasped to his breast. + +There is another story, of a commoner character, which, although +different in form, is wholly similar in substance. This tells of the +soldier who in his last moments asks to see a priest, accepts his +ministrations with thankfulness, and dies comforted with the repetition +of familiar formulae and customary prayers. In the one case a Bible and +a priest; in the other a volume of lectures by one of the masters of +English prose. The difference is, at first, striking, but there is an +underlying agreement, and they may be used together to illustrate a +single psychological principle. + +Freethinker and Christian read the record of both cases, but it is the +Freethinker alone whose philosophy of life is wide enough to explain +both. The Freethinker knows that the feeling of comfort and the fact of +truth are two distinct things. They may coalesce, but they may be as +far asunder as the poles. A delusion may be as consoling as a reality +provided it be accepted as genuine. The soldier with his copy of Ruskin +does not prove the truth of the teachings of the _Crown of Wild Olive_, +does not prove that Ruskin said the last word or even the truest word on +the subjects dealt with therein. Neither does the consolation which +religion gives some people prove the truth of its teachings. The comfort +which religion brings is a product of the belief in religion. The +consolation that comes from reading a volume of essays is a product of +the conviction of the truth of the message delivered, or a sense of the +beauty of the language in which the book is written. Both cases +illustrate the power of belief, and that no Freethinker was ever stupid +enough to question. The finest literature in the world would bring small +comfort to a man who was convinced that he stood in deadly need of a +priest, and the presence of a priest would be quite useless to a man who +believed that all the religions of the world were so many geographical +absurdities. Comfort does not produce conviction, it follows it. The +truth and the social value of convictions are quite distinct questions. + +There is here a confusion of values, and for this we have to thank the +influence of the Churches. Because the service of the priest is sought +by some we are asked to believe that it is necessary to all. But the +essential value of a thing is shown, not by the number of people who get +on with it, but by the number that can get on without it. The canon of +agreement and difference is applicable whether we are dealing with human +nature or conducting an ordinary scientific experiment. Thus, the +indispensability of meat-eating is not shown by the number of people who +swear that they cannot work without it, but by noting how people fare in +its absence. The drinker does not confound the abstainer; it is the +other way about. In the same way there is nothing of evidential value in +the protests of those who say that human nature cannot get along without +religion. We have to test the statement by the cases where religion is +absent. And here, it is not the Christian that confounds the +Freethinker, it is the Freethinker who confounds the Christian. If the +religious view of life is correct the Freethinker should be a very rare +bird indeed; he should be clearly recognizable as a departure from the +normal type, and, in fact, he was always so represented in religious +literature until he disproved the legend by multiplying himself with +confusing rapidity. Now it is the Freethinker who will not fit into the +Christian scheme of things. It is puzzling to see what can be done with +a man who repudiates the religious idea in theory and fact, root and +branch, and yet appears to be getting on quite well in its absence. That +is the awkward fact that will not fit in with the religious theory. And, +other things equal, one man without religion is greater evidential value +than five hundred with it. All the five hundred prove at the most is +that human nature can get on with religion, but the one case proves that +human nature can get on without it, and that challenges the whole +religious position. And unless we take up the rather absurd position +that the non-religious man is a sheer abnormality, this consideration at +once reduces religion from a necessity to a luxury or a dissipation. + +The bearing of this on our attitude towards such a fact as death should +be obvious. During the European war death from being an ever-present +fact became an obtrusive one. Day after day we received news of the +death of friend or relative, and those who escaped that degree of +intimacy with the unpleasant visitor, met him in the columns of the +daily press. And the Christian clergy would have been untrue to their +traditions and to their interests--and there is no corporate body more +alert in these directions--if they had not tried to exploit the +situation to the utmost. There was nothing new in the tactics employed, +it was the special circumstances that gave them a little more force than +was usual. The following, for example, may be accepted as typical:-- + + The weight of our sorrow is immensely lightened if we can feel sure + that one whom we have loved and lost has but ascended to spheres of + further development, education, service, achievement, where, by and + by, we shall rejoin him. + +Quite a common statement, and one which by long usage has become almost +immune from criticism. And yet it has about as much relation to fact as +have the stories of death-bed conversions, or of people dying and +shrieking for Jesus to save them. One may, indeed, apply a rough and +ready test by an appeal to facts. How many cases has the reader of these +lines come across in which religion has made people calmer and more +resigned in the presence of death than others have been who were quite +destitute of belief in religion? Of course, religious folk will repeat +religious phrases, they will attend church, they will listen to the +ministrations of their favourite clergyman, and they will say that their +religion brings them comfort. But if one gets below the stereotyped +phraseology and puts on one side also the sophisticated attitude in +relation to religion, one quite fails to detect any respect in which the +Freethinking parent differs from the Christian one. Does the religious +parent grieve less? Does he bear the blow with greater fortitude? Is his +grief of shorter duration? To anyone who will open his eyes the talk of +the comfort of religion will appear to be largely cant. There are +differences due to character, to temperament, to training; there is a +use of traditional phrases in the one case that is absent in the other, +but the incidence of a deep sorrow only serves to show how superficial +are the vapourings of religion to a civilized mind, and how each one of +us is thrown back upon those deeper feelings that are inseparable from a +common humanity. The thought of an only son who is living with the +angels brings no real solace to a parent's mind. Whatever genuine +comfort is available must come from the thought of a life that has been +well lived, from the sympathetic presence of friends, from the silent +handclasp, which on such occasions is so often more eloquent than +speech--in a word, from those healing currents that are part and parcel +of the life of the race. A Freethinker can easily appreciate the +readiness of a clergyman to help a mind that is suffering from a great +sorrow, but it is the deliberate exploitation of human grief in the name +and in the interests of religion, the manufacturing of cases of +death-bed consolation and repentance, the citation of evidence to which +the experience of all gives the lie, that fill one with a feeling akin +to disgust. + +The writer from whom I have quoted says:-- + + It is, indeed, possible for people who are Agnostic or unbelieving + with regard to immortality to give themselves wholly to the pursuit + of truth and to the service of their fellowmen, in moral + earnestness and heroic endeavour; they may endure pain and sorrow + with calm resignation, and toil on in patience and perseverance. + The best of the ancient Stoics did so, and many a modern Agnostic + is doing so to-day. + +The significance of such a statement is in no wise diminished by the +accompanying qualification that Freethinkers are "missing a joy which +would have been to them a well-spring of courage and strength." That is +a pure assumption. They who are without religious belief are conscious +of no lack of courage, and they are oppressed by no feeling of despair. +On this their own statement must be taken as final. Moreover, they are +speaking as, in the main, those who are fully acquainted with the +Christian position, having once occupied it. They are able to measure +the relative value of the two positions. The Christian has no such +experience to guide him. In the crises of life the behaviour of the +Freethinker is at least as calm and as courageous as that of the +Christian. And it may certainly be argued that a serene resignation in +the presence of death is quite as valuable as the hectic emotionalism of +cultivated religious belief. + +What, after all, is there in the fact of natural death that should breed +irresolution, rob us of courage, or fill us with fear? Experience proves +there are many things that people dread more than death, and will even +seek death rather than face, or, again, there are a hundred and one +things to obtain which men and women will face death without fear. And +this readiness to face or seek death does not seem to be at all +determined by religious belief. The millions of men who faced death +during the war were not determined in their attitude by their faith in +religious dogmas. If questioned they might, in the majority of cases, +say that they believed in a future life, and also that they found it a +source of strength, but it would need little reflection to assess the +reply at its true value. And as a racial fact, the fear of death is a +negative quality. The positive aspect is the will to live, and that may +be seen in operation in the animal world as well as in the world of man. +But this has no reference, not even the remotest, to a belief in a +future life. There are no "Intimations of Immortality" here. There is +simply one of the conditions of animal survival, developed in man to +the point at which its further strengthening would become a threat to +the welfare of the species. The desire to live is one of the conditions +that secures the struggle to live, and a species of animals in which +this did not exist would soon go under before a more virile type. And it +is one of the peculiarities of religious reasoning that a will to live +here should be taken as clear proof of a desire to live somewhere else. + +The fear of death could never be a powerful factor in life; existence +would be next to impossible if it were. It would rob the organism of its +daring, its tenacity, and ultimately divest life itself of value. +Against that danger we have an efficient guard in the operation of +natural selection. In the animal world there is no fear of death, there +is, in fact, no reason to assume that there exists even a consciousness +of death. And with man, when reflection and knowledge give birth to that +consciousness, there arises a strong other regarding instinct which +effectively prevents it assuming a too positive or a too dangerous form. +Fear of death is, in brief, part of the jargon of priestcraft. The +priest has taught it the people because it was to his interest to do so. +And the jargon retains a certain currency because it is only the +minority that rise above the parrot-like capacity to repeat current +phrases, or who ever make an attempt to analyse their meaning and +challenge their veracity. + +The positive fear of death is largely an acquired mental attitude. In +its origin it is largely motived by religion. Generally speaking there +is no very great fear of death among savages, and among the pagans of +old Greece and Rome there was none of that abject fear of death that +became so common with the establishment of Christianity. To the pagan, +death was a natural fact, sad enough, but not of necessity terrible. Of +the Greek sculptures representing death Professor Mahaffy says: "They +are simple pictures of the grief of parting, of the recollection of +pleasant days of love and friendship, of the gloom of an unknown future. +But there is no exaggeration in the picture." Throughout Roman +literature also there runs the conception of death as the necessary +complement of life. Pliny puts this clearly in the following: "Unto all, +the state of being after the last day is the same as it was before the +first day of life; neither is there any more variation of it in either +body or soul after death than there was before death." Among the +uneducated there does appear to have been some fear of death, and one +may assume that with some of even of the educated this was not +altogether absent. It may also be assumed that it was to this type of +mind that Christianity made its first appeal, and upon which it rested +its nightmare-like conception of death and the after-life. On this +matter the modern mind can well appreciate the attitude of Lucretius, +who saw the great danger in front of the race and sought to guard men +against it by pointing out the artificiality of the fear of death and +the cleansing effect of genuine knowledge. + + So shalt thou feed on Death who feeds on men, + And Death once dead there's no more dying then. + +The policy of Christianity was the belittling of this life and an +exaggeration of the life after death, with a boundless exaggeration of +the terrors that awaited the unwary and the unfaithful. The state of +knowledge under Christian auspices made this task easy enough. Of the +mediaeval period Mr. Lionel Cust, in his _History of Engraving during +the Fifteenth Century_, says:-- + + The keys of knowledge, as of salvation, were entirely in the hands + of the Church, and the lay public, both high and low, were, + generally speaking, ignorant and illiterate. One of the secrets of + the great power exercised by the Church lay in its ability to + represent the life of man as environed from the outset by legions + of horrible and insidious demons, who beset his path throughout + life at every stage up to his very last breath, and are eminently + active and often triumphant when man's fortitude is undermined by + sickness, suffering, and the prospect of dissolution. + +F. Parkes Weber also points out that, "It was in mediaeval Europe, under +the auspices of the Catholic Church, that descriptions of hell began to +take on their most horrible aspects."[21] So, again, we have Sir James +Frazer pointing out that the fear of death is not common to the lower +races, and "Among the causes which thus tend to make us cowards may be +numbered the spread of luxury and the doctrines of a gloomy theology, +which by proclaiming the eternal damnation and excruciating torments of +the vast majority of mankind has added incalculably to the dread and +horror of death."[22] + +[21] _Aspects of Death in Art and Epigram_, p. 28. + +[22] _Golden Bough_, Vol. IV., p. 136. + +No religion has emphasized the terror of death as Christianity has done, +and in the truest sense, no religion has so served to make men such +cowards in its presence. Upon that fear a large part of the power of the +Christian Church has been built, and men having become so obsessed with +the fear of death and what lay beyond, it is not surprising that they +should turn to the Church for some measure of relief. The poisoner thus +did a lucrative trade by selling a doubtful remedy for his own toxic +preparation. More than anything else the fear of death and hell laid the +foundation of the wealth and power of the Christian Church. If it drew +its authority from God, it derived its profit from the devil. The two +truths that emerge from a sober and impartial study of Christian history +are that the power of the Church was rooted in death and that it +flourished in dishonour. + +It was Christianity, and Christianity alone that made death so abiding a +terror to the European mind. And society once Christianized, the +uneducated could find no adequate corrective from the more educated. The +baser elements which existed in the Pagan world were eagerly seized upon +by the Christian writers and developed to their fullest extent. Some of +the Pagan writers had speculated, in a more or less fanciful spirit, on +a hell of a thousand years. Christianity stretched it to eternity. +Pre-Christianity had reserved the miseries of the after-life for adults. +Christian writers paved the floor of hell with infants, "scarce a span +long." Plutarch and other Pagan moralists had poured discredit upon the +popular notions of a future life. Christianity reaffirmed them with all +the exaggerations of a diseased imagination. The Pagans held that death +was as normal and as natural as life. Christianity returned to the +conception current among savages and depicted death as a penal +infliction. The Pagan art of living was superseded by the Christian art +of dying. Human ingenuity exhausted itself in depicting the terrors of +the future life, and when one remembers the powers of the Church, and +the murderous manner in which it exercised them, there is small wonder +that under the auspices of the Church the fear of death gained a +strength it had never before attained. + +Small wonder, then, that we still have with us the talk of the comfort +that Christianity brings in the face of death. Where the belief in the +Christian after-life really exists, the retention of a conviction of the +saving power of Christianity is a condition of sanity. Where the belief +does not really exist, we are fronted with nothing but a parrot-like +repetition of familiar phrases. The Christian talk of comfort is thus, +on either count, no more than a product of Christian education. +Christianity does not make men brave in the presence of death, that is +no more than a popular superstition. What it does is to cover a natural +fact with supernatural terrors, and then exploit a frame of mind that it +has created. The comfort is only necessary so long as the special belief +is present. Remove that belief and death takes its place as one of the +inevitable facts of existence, surrounded with all the sadness of a last +farewell, but rid of all the terror that has been created by religion. + +Our dying soldier, asking for a copy of the _Crown of Wild Olive_ to be +buried with him, and the other who calls for priestly ministrations, +represent, ultimately, two different educational results. The one is a +product of an educational process applied during the darkest periods of +European history, and perpetuated by a training that has been mainly +directed by the self-interest of a class. The other represents an +educational product which stands as the triumph of the pressure of life +over artificial dogmas. The Freethinker, because he is a Freethinker, +needs none of those artificial stimulants for which the Christian +craves. And he pays him the compliment--in spite of his protests--of +believing that without his religion the Christian would display as much +manliness in the face of death as he does himself. He believes there is +plenty of healthy human nature in the average Christian, and the +Freethinker merely begs him to give it a chance of finding expression. +In this matter, it must be observed, the Freethinker makes no claim to +superiority over the Christian; it is the Christian who forces that +claim upon him. The Freethinker does not assume that the difference +between himself and the Christian is nearly so great as the latter would +have him believe. He believes that what is dispensable by the one, +without loss, is dispensable by the other. If Freethinkers can devote +themselves to "the pursuit of truth and the service of their fellow +men," if they can "endure pain and sorrow with calm resignation," if +they live with honour and face death without fear, I see no reason why +the Christian should not be able to reach the same level of development. +It is paying the Freethinker a "violent compliment," to use an +expression of John Wesley's, to place him upon a level of excellence +that is apparently so far above that of the average Christian. As a +Freethinker, I decline to accept it. I believe that what the Freethinker +is, the Christian may well become. He, too, may learn to do his duty +without the fear of hell or the hope of heaven. All that is required is +that he shall give his healthier instincts an opportunity for +expression. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +THIS WORLD AND THE NEXT. + + +In the preceding chapter I have only discussed the fact of death in +relation to a certain attitude of mind. The question of the survival of +the human personality after death is a distinct question and calls for +separate treatment. Nor is the present work one in which that topic can +be treated at adequate length. The most that can now be attempted is a +bird's eye view of a large field of controversy, although it may be +possible in the course of that survey to say something on the more +important aspects of the subject. + +And first we may notice the curious assumption that the man who argues +for immortality is taking a lofty view of human nature, while he who +argues against it is taking a low one. In sober truth it is the other +way about. Consider the position. It is tacitly admitted that if human +motive, considered with reference to this world alone, is adequate as an +incentive to action, and the consequences of actions, again considered +with reference to this world, are an adequate reward for endeavour, then +it is agreed that the main argument for the belief in immortality breaks +down. To support or to establish the argument it is necessary to show +that life divorced from the conception of a future life can never reach +the highest possible level. Natural human society is powerless in itself +to realize its highest possibilities. It remains barren of what it might +be, a thing that may frame ideals, but can never realize them. + +Now that is quite an intelligible, and, therefore, an arguable +proposition. But whether true or not, there should be no question that +it involves a lower view of human nature than the one taken by the +Freethinker. He does at least pay human nature the compliment of +believing it capable, not alone of framing high ideals, but also of +realizing them. He says that by itself it is capable of realizing all +that may be legitimately demanded from it. He does not believe that +supernatural hopes or fears are necessary to induce man to live cleanly, +or die serenely, or to carry out properly his duties to his fellows. The +religionist denies this, and asserts that some form of supernaturalism +is essential to the moral health of men and women. If the Freethinker is +wrong, it is plain that his fault consists in taking a too optimistic +view of human nature. His mistake consists in taking not a low view of +human nature, but a lofty one. Substantially, the difference between the +two positions is the difference between the man who is honest from a +conviction of the value of honesty, and the one who refrains from +stealing because he feels certain of detection, or because he is afraid +of losing something that he might otherwise gain. Thus, we are told by +one writer that:-- + + If human life is but a by-product of the unconscious play of + physical force, like a candle flame soon to be blown out or burnt + out, what a paltry thing it is! + +But the questions of where human life came from, or where it will end, +are quite apart from the question of the value and capabilities of human +life now. That there are immense possibilities in this life none but a +fool will deny. The world is full of strange and curious things, and its +pleasures undoubtedly outweigh its pains in the experience of normal man +or woman. But the relations between ourselves and others remain +completely unaffected by the termination of existence at the grave, or +its continuation beyond. It is quite a defensible proposition that life +is not worth living. So is the reverse of the proposition. But it is +nonsense to say that life is a "paltry thing" merely because it ends at +the grave. It is unrestricted egotism manifesting itself in the form of +religious conviction. One might as well argue that a sunset ceases to be +beautiful because it does not continue all night. + +If I cannot live for ever, then is the universe a failure! That is +really all that the religious argument amounts to. And so to state it, +to reduce it to plain terms, and divest it of its disguising verbiage, +almost removes the need for further refutation. But it is seldom stated +in so plain and so unequivocal a manner. It is accompanied with much +talk of growth, of an evolutionary purpose, of ruined lives made good, +thus: + + Seeing that man is the goal towards which everything has tended + from the beginning, seeing that the same eternal and infinite + Energy has laboured through the ages at the production of man, and + man is the heir of the ages, nothing conceivable seems too great or + glorious to believe concerning his destiny.... If there is no limit + to human growth in knowledge and wisdom, in love and constructive + power, in beauty and joy, we are invested with a magnificent worth + and dignity. + +So fallacy and folly run on. What, for example, does anyone mean by man +as the goal towards which everything has tended since the beginning? +Whatever truth there is in the statement applies to all things without +exception. It is as true of the microbe as it is of man. If the +"infinite and eternal Energy" laboured to produce man, it laboured also +to produce the microbe which destroys him. The one is here as well as +the other; and one can conceive a religious microbe thanking an almighty +one for having created it, and declaring that unless it is to live for +ever in some microbic heaven, with a proper supply of human beings for +its nourishment, the whole scheme of creation is a failure. It is quite +a question of the point of view. As a matter of fact there are no "ends" +in nature. There are only results, and each result becomes a factor in +some further result. It is human folly and ignorance which makes an end +of a consequence. + +After all, what reason is there for anyone assuming that the survival of +man beyond the grave is even probably true? We do not know man as a +"soul" first and a body afterwards. Neither do we know him as a detached +"mind" which afterwards takes possession of a body. Our knowledge of man +commences with him, as does our knowledge of any animal, as a body +possessing certain definite functions of which we call one group mental. +And the two things are so indissolubly linked that we cannot even think +of them as separate. If anyone doubts this let him try and picture to +himself what a man is like in the absence of a body. He will find the +thing simply inconceivable. In the absence of the material organism, to +which the mind unquestionably stands in the relation of function to +organ, what remains is a mere blank. To the informed mind, that is. To +the intelligence of the savage, who is led, owing to his erroneous +conception of things, to think of something inside the body which leaves +it during sleep, wanders about, and then returns on awakening, and who +because of this affiliates sleep to death, the case may be different. +But to a modern mind, one which is acquainted with something of what +science has to say on the subject, the conception of a mind existing +apart from organization is simply unthinkable. All our knowledge is +against it. The development of mind side by side with the development of +the brain and the nervous system is one of the commonplaces of +scientific knowledge. The treatment of states of mind as functions of +the brain and the nervous system is a common-place of medical practice. +And the fact that diet, temperature, health and disease, accidents and +old age, all have their effects on mental manifestations is matter of +everyday observation. The whole range of positive science may safely be +challenged to produce a single indisputable fact in favour of the +assumption that there exists anything about man independent of the +material organism. + +All that can be urged in favour of such a belief is that there are still +many obscure facts which we are not altogether able to explain on a +purely mechanistic theory. But that is a confession of ignorance, not an +affirmation of knowledge. At any rate, there does not exist a single +fact against the functional theory of mind. All we _know_ is decidedly +in its favour, and a theory must be tested by what we know and by what +it explains, not by what we do not know or by what it cannot explain. +And there is here the additional truth that the only ground upon which +the theory can be opposed is upon certain metaphysical assumptions which +are made in order to bolster up an already existing belief. If the +belief in survival had not been already in existence these assumptions +would never have been made. They are not suggested by the facts, they +are invented to support an already established theory, which can no +longer appeal to the circumstances which gave it birth. + +And about those circumstance there is no longer the slightest reason for +justifiable doubt. We can trace the belief in survival after death +until we see it commencing in the savage belief in a double that takes +its origin in the phenomena of dreaming and unusual mental states. It is +from that starting point that the belief in survival takes its place as +an invariable element in the religions of the world. And as we trace the +evolution of knowledge we see every fact upon which was built the belief +in a double that survived death gradually losing its hold on the human +intelligence, owing to the fact that the experiences that gave it birth +are interpreted in a manner which allows no room for the religious +theory. The fatal fact about the belief in survival is its history. That +history shows us how it began, as surely as the course of its evolution +indicates the way in which it will end. + +So, as with the idea of God, what we have left in modern times are not +the reasons why such a belief is held, but only excuses why those who +hold it should not be disturbed. That and a number of arguments which +only present an air of plausibility because they succeed in jumbling +together things that have no connection with each other. As an example +of this we may take the favourite modern plea that a future life is +required to permit the growth and development of the individual. We find +this expressed in the quotation above given in the sentence "if there is +no limit to human growth, etc.," the inference being that unless there +is a future life there is a very sharp limit set to human growth, and +one that makes this life a mockery. This plea is presented in so many +forms that it is worth while analysing it a little, if only to bring out +more clearly the distinction between the religious and the Freethought +view of life. + +What now is meant by there being no limit to human growth? If by it is +meant individual growth, the reply is that there is actually a very +sharp limit set to growth, much sharper than the average person seems +to be aware of. It is quite clear that the individual is not capable of +unlimited growth in this world. There are degrees of capacity in +different individuals which will determine what amount of development +each is capable of. Capacity is not an acquired thing, it is an +endowment, and the child born with the brain capacity of a fool will +remain a fool to the end, however much his folly may be disguised or +lost amid the folly of others. And with each one, whether he be fool or +genius, acquisitions are made more easily and more rapidly in youth, the +power of mental adaptation is much greater in early than in later life, +while in old age the capacities of adaptation and acquisition become +negligible quantities. And provided one lives long enough, the last +stage sees, not a promise of further progress if life were continued, +but a process of degradation. The old saying that one can't put a quart +into a pint pot is strictly applicable here. Growth assumes acquisition; +acquisition is determined by capacity, and this while an indefinite +quantity (indefinite here is strictly referable to our ignorance, not to +the actual fact) is certainly not an unlimited one. Life, then, so far +as the individual is concerned, does not point to unlimited growth. It +indicates, so far as it indicates anything at all, that there is a limit +to growth as to all other things. + +Well, but suppose we say that man is capable of indefinite growth, what +do we mean? Let us also bear in mind at this point that we are strictly +concerned with the individual. For if man survives death he must do it +as an individual. To merely survive as a part of the chemical and other +elements of the world, or, to follow some mystical theologians, as an +indistinguishable part of a "world-soul," is not what people mean when +they talk of living beyond the grave. Here, again, it will be found +that we have confused two quite distinct things, even though the one +thing borrows its meaning from the other. + +When we compare the individual, as such, with the individual of three or +four thousand years ago, can we say with truth that the man of to-day is +actually superior to the man of the earlier date? To test the question +let us put it in this way. Does the man of to-day do anything or think +anything that is beyond the capacity of an ancient Egyptian or an +ancient Greek, if it were possible to suddenly revive one and to enable +him to pass through the same education that each one of us passes +through? I do not think that anyone will answer that question in the +affirmative. Reverse the process. Suppose that a modern man, with +exactly the same capacity that he now has had lived in the days of the +ancient Egyptians or the ancient Greeks, can we say that his capacity is +so much greater than theirs, that he would have done better than they +did? I do not think that anyone will answer that question in the +affirmative either. Is the soldier of to-day a better soldier, or the +sailor a better sailor than those who lived three thousand years ago? +Once more the answer will not be in the affirmative. And yet there are +certain things that are obvious. It is plain that we all know more than +did the people of long ago, we can do more, we understand the past +better, and we can see farther into the future. A schoolboy to-day +carries in his head what would have been a philosopher's outfit once +upon a time. Our soldiers and sailors utilize, single-handed, forces +greater than a whole army or navy wielded in the far-off days of the +Ptolemies. We call ourselves greater, we think ourselves greater, and in +a sense we are greater than the people of old. What, then, is the +explanation of the apparent paradox? + +The explanation lies in the simple fact that progress is not a +phenomenon of individual life at all. It is a phenomenon of social +existence. If each generation had to commence at the exact point at +which its predecessors started it would get no farther than they got. It +would be an eternal round, with each generation starting from and +reaching the same point, and progress would be an inconceivable thing. +But that we know is not the case. Instead of each generation starting +from precisely the same point, one inherits at least something of the +labours and discoveries of its predecessors. A thing discovered by the +individual is discovered for the race. A thought struck out by the +individual is a thought for the race. By language, by tradition, and by +institutions the advances of each generation are conserved, handed on, +and made part of our racial possessions. The strength, the knowledge, of +the modern is thus due not to any innate superiority over the ancient, +but because one is modern and the other ancient. If we could have +surrounded the ancient Assyrians with all the inventions, and given them +all the knowledge that we possess, they would have used that knowledge +and those inventions as wisely, or as unwisely as we use them. Progress +is thus not a fact of individual but of racial life. The individual +inherits more than he creates, and it is in virtue of this racial +inheritance that he is what he is. + +It is a mere trick of the imagination that converts this fact of social +growth into an essential characteristic of individual life. We speak of +"man" without clearly distinguishing between man as a biological unit +and man as a member of a social group developing in correspondence with +a true social medium. But if that is so, it follows that this capacity +for growth is, so to speak, a function of the social medium. It is +conditioned by it, it has relevance only in relation to it. Our +feelings, our sentiments, even our desires, have reference to this life, +and in a far deeper sense than is usually imagined. And removed from its +relation to this life human nature would be without meaning or value. + +There is nothing in any of the functions of man, in any of his +capacities, or in any of his properly understood desires that has the +slightest reference to any life but this. It is unthinkable that there +should be. An organ or an organism develops in relation to a special +medium, not in relation to one that--even though it exists--is not also +in relation with it. This is quite an obvious truth in regard to +structures, but it is not always so clearly recognized, or so carefully +borne in mind, that it is equally true of every feeling and desire. For +these are developed in relation to their special medium, in this case, +the existence of fellow beings with their actions and reactions on each +other. And man is not only a member of a social group, that much is an +obvious fact; but he is a product of the group in the sense that all his +characteristic human qualities have resulted from the interactions of +group life. Take man out of relation to that fact, and he is an enigma, +presenting fit opportunities for the wild theorizing of religious +philosophers. Take him in connection with it, and his whole nature +becomes susceptible of understanding in relation to the only existence +he knows and desires. + +The twin facts of growth and progress, upon which so much of the +argument for a future life turns nowadays, have not the slightest +possible reference to a life beyond the grave. They are fundamentally +not even personal, but social. It is the race that grows, not the +individual, he becomes more powerful precisely because the products of +racial acquisition are inherited by him. Remove, if only in thought, the +individual from all association with his fellows, strip him of all that +he inherits from association with them, and he loses all the qualities +we indicate when we speak of him as a civilized being. Remove him, in +fact, from that association, as when a man is marooned on a desert +island, and the more civilized qualities of his character begin to +weaken and in time disappear. Man, as an individual, becomes more +powerful with the passing of each generation, precisely because he is +thus dependent upon the life of the race. The secret of his weakness is +at the same time the source of his strength. We are what we are because +of the generations of men and women who lived and toiled and died before +we were born. We inherit the fruits of their labours, as those who come +after us will inherit the fruits of our struggles and conquests. It is +thus in the life of the race that man achieves immortality. None other +is possible, or conceivable. And to those whose minds are not distorted +by religious teaching, and who have taken the trouble to analyse and +understand their own mental states, it may be said that none other is +even desirable. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +EVOLUTION. + + +Language, we have said above, is one of the prime conditions of human +greatness and progress. It is the principal means by which man conserves +his victories over the forces of his environment, and transmits them to +his descendants. But it is, nevertheless, not without its dangers, and +may exert an influence fatal to exact thought. There is a sense in which +language necessarily lags behind thought. For words are coined to +express the ideas of those who fashion them; and as the knowledge of the +next generation alters, and some modification of existing conceptions is +found necessary, there is nothing but the existing array of words in +which to express them. The consequence is that there are nearly always +subtle shades of meaning in the words used differing from the exact +meaning which the new thought is trying to express. Thought drives us to +seek new or improved verbal tools, but until we get them we must go on +using the old ones, with all their old implications. And by the time the +new words arrive thought has made a still further advance, and the +general position remains. It is an eternal chase in which the pursued is +always being captured, but is never caught. + +Another way in which language holds a danger is that with many words, +especially when they assume the character of a formula, they tend to +usurp the place of thinking. The old lady who found so much consolation +in the "blessed" word Mesopotamia, is not alone in using that method of +consolation. It does not meet us only in connection with religion, it +is encountered over the whole field of sociology, and even of science. +A conception in science or sociology is established after a hard fight. +It is accepted generally, and thereafter takes its place as one of the +many established truths. And then the danger shows itself. It is +repeated as though it had some magical virtue in itself; it means +nothing to very many of those who use it, they simply hand over their +mental difficulties to its care, much as the penitent in the +confessional hands over his moral troubles to the priest, and there the +matter ends. But in such cases the words used do not express thought, +they simply blind people to its absence. And not only that, but in the +name of these sacred words, any number of foolish inferences are drawn +and receive general assent. + +A striking illustration of this is to be found in such a word as +"Evolution." One may say of it that while it began as a formula, it +continues as a fiat. Some invoke it with all the expectancy of a +mediaeval magician commanding the attendance of his favourite spirits. +Others approach it with a hushed reverence that is reminiscent of a +Catholic devotee before his favourite shrine. In a little more than half +a century it has acquired the characteristics of the Kismet of the +Mohammedan, the Beelzebub of the pious Christian, and the power of a +phrase that gives inspiration to a born soldier. It is used as often to +dispel doubt as it is to awaken curiosity. It may express comprehension +or merely indicate vacuity. Decisions are pronounced in its name with +all the solemnity of a "Thus saith the Lord." We are not sure that even +to talk about evolution in this way may not be considered wrong. For +there are crowds of folk who cannot distinguish profundity from +solemnity, and who mistake a long face for the sure indication of a +well-stored brain. The truth here is that what a man understands +thoroughly he can deal with easily; and that he laughs at a difficulty +is not necessarily a sign that he fails to appreciate it, he may laugh +because he has taken its measure. And why people do not laugh at such a +thing as religion is partly because they have not taken its measure, +partly from a perception that religion cannot stand it. Everywhere the +priest maintains his hold as a consequence of the narcotizing influence +of ill-understood phrases, and in this he is matched by the +pseudo-philosopher whose pompous use of imperfectly appreciated formulae +disguises from the crowd the mistiness of his understanding. + +A glance over the various uses to which the word "Evolution" is put will +well illustrate the truth of what has been said. These make one wonder +what, in the opinion of some people, evolution stands for. One of these +uses of evolution is to give it a certain moral implication to which it +has not the slightest claim. A certain school of Non-Theists are, in +this matter, if not the greatest offenders, certainly those with the +least excuse for committing the blunder. By these evolution is +identified with progress, or advancement, or a gradual "levelling up" of +society, and is even acclaimed as presenting a more "moral" view of the +Universe than is the Theistic conception. Now, primarily, this +ascription of what one may call a moral element to evolution is no more +than a carrying over into science of a frame of mind that properly +belongs to Theism. Quite naturally the Theist was driven to try and find +some moral purpose in the Universe, and to prove that its working did +not grate on our moral sense. That was quite understandable, and even +legitimate. The world, from the point of view of the Goddite, was God's +world, he made it; and we are ultimately compelled to judge the +character of God from his workmanship. An attack on the moral character +of the world is, therefore, an attack on the character of its maker. And +the Theist proceeded to find a moral justification for all that God had +done. + +So far all is clear. But now comes a certain kind of Non-Theist. And he, +always rejecting a formal Theism and substituting evolution, proceeds to +claim for his formula all that the Theist claimed for his. He also +strives to show that the idea of cosmic evolution involves conceptions +of nobility, justice, morality, etc. There is no wonder that some +Christians round on him, and tell him that he still believes in a god. +Substantially he does. That is, he carries over into his new camp the +same anthropomorphic conception of the workings of nature, and uses the +same pseudo-scientific reasoning that is characteristic of the Theist. +He has formally given up God, but he goes about uncomfortably burdened +with his ghost. + +Now, evolution is not a fiat, but a formula. It has nothing whatever to +do with progress, as such, nor with morality, as such, nor with a +levelling up, nor a levelling down. It is really no more than a special +application of the principle of causation, and whether the working out +of that principle has a good effect or a bad one, a moralizing, or a +demoralizing, a progressive, or a retrogressive consequence is not +"given" in the principle itself. Fundamentally, all cosmic phenomena +present us with two aspects--difference and change--and that is so +because it is the fundamental condition of our knowing anything at all. +But the law of evolution is no more, is nothing more serious or more +profound than an attempt to express those movements of change and +difference in a more or less precise formula. It aims at doing for +phenomena in general exactly what a particular scientific law aims at +doing for some special department. But it has no more a moral +implication, or a progressive implication than has the law of +gravitation or of chemical affinity. The sum of those changes that are +expressed in the law of evolution may result in one or the other; it has +resulted in one or the other. At one time we call its consequences moral +or progressive, at another time we call them immoral or retrogressive, +but these are some of the distinctions which the human mind creates for +its own convenience, they have no validity in any other sense. And when +we mistake these quite legitimate distinctions, made for our own +convenience, and argue as though they had an actual independent +existence, we are reproducing exactly the same mental confusion that +keeps Theism alive. + +The two aspects that difference and change resolve themselves into when +expressed in an evolutionary formula are, in the inorganic world, +equilibrium, and, in the organic world, adaptation. Of course, +equilibrium also applies to the organic world, I merely put it this way +for the purpose of clarity. Now, if we confine our attention to the +world of animal forms, what we have expressed, primarily, is the fact of +adaptation. If an animal is to live it must be adapted to its +surroundings to at least the extent of being able to overcome or to +neutralize the forces that threaten its existence. That is quite a +common-place, since all it says is that to live an animal must be fit to +live, but all great truths are common-places--when one sees them. Still, +if there were only adaptations to consider, and if the environment to +which adaptation is to be secured, remained constant, all we should have +would be the deaths of those not able to live, with the survival of +those more fortunately endowed. There would be nothing that we could +call, even to please ourselves, either progress or its reverse. Movement +up or down (both human landmarks) occurs because the environment itself +undergoes a change. Either the material conditions change, or the +pressure of numbers initiates a contest for survival, although more +commonly one may imagine both causes in operation at the same time. But +the consequence is the introduction of a new quality into the struggle +for existence. It becomes a question of a greater endowment of the +qualities that spell survival. And that paves the way to progress--or +the reverse. But one must bear in mind that, whether the movement be in +one direction or the other, it is still the same process that is at +work. Evolution levels neither "up" nor "down." Up and down is as +relative in biology as it is in astronomy. In nature there is neither +better nor worse, neither high nor low, neither good nor bad, there are +only differences, and if that had been properly appreciated by all, very +few of the apologies for Theism would ever have seen the light. + +There is not the slightest warranty for speaking of evolution as being a +"progressive force," it is, indeed, not a force at all, but only a +descriptive term on all fours with any other descriptive term as +expressed in a natural law. It neither, of necessity, levels up nor +levels down. In the animal world it illustrates adaptation only, but +whether that adaptation involves what we choose to call progression or +retrogression is a matter of indifference. On the one hand we have +aquatic life giving rise to mammalian life, and on the other hand, we +have mammalian life reverting to an aquatic form of existence. In one +place we have a "lower" form of life giving place to a "higher" form. In +another place we can see the reverse process taking place. And the +"lower" forms are often more persistent than the "higher" ones, while, +as the course of epidemical and other diseases shows certain lowly forms +of life may make the existence of the higher forms impossible. The +Theistic attempt to disprove the mechanistic conception of nature by +insisting that evolution is a law of progress, that it implies an end, +and indicates a goal, is wholly fallacious. From a scientific point of +view it is meaningless chatter. Science knows nothing of a plan, or an +end in nature, or even progress. All these are conceptions which we +humans create for our own convenience. They are so many standards of +measurement, of exactly the same nature as our agreement that a certain +length of space shall be called a yard, or a certain quantity of liquid +shall be called a pint. To think otherwise is pure anthropomorphism. It +is the ghost of God imported into science. + +So far, then, it is clear that the universal fact in nature is change. +The most general aspect of nature which meets us is that expressed in +the law of evolution. And proceeding from the more general to the less +general, in the world of living beings this change meets us in the form +of adaptation to environment. But what constitutes adaptation must be +determined by the nature of the environment. That will determine what +qualities are of value in the struggle for existence, which is not +necessarily a struggle against other animals, but may be no more than +the animal's own endeavours to persist in being. It is, however, in +relation to the environment that we must measure the value of qualities. +Whatever be the nature of the environment that principle remains true. +Ideally, one quality may be more desirable than another, but if it does +not secure a greater degree of adaptation to the environment it brings +no advantage to its possessor. It may even bring a positive +disadvantage. In a thieves' kitchen the honest man is handicapped. In a +circle of upright men the dishonest man is at a discount. In the +existing political world a perfectly truthful man would be a +parliamentary failure. In the pulpit a preacher who knew the truth about +Christianity and preached it would soon be out of the Church. +Adaptation is not, as such, a question of moral goodness or badness, it +is simply adaptation. + +A precautionary word needs be said on the matter of environment. If we +conceive the environment as made up only of the material surroundings we +shall not be long before we find ourselves falling into gross error. For +that conception of environment will only hold of the very lowest +organisms. A little higher, and the nature of the organism begins to +have a modifying effect on the material environment, and when we come to +animals living in groups the environment of the individual animal +becomes partly the habits and instincts of the other animals with which +it lives. Finally, when we reach man this transformation of the nature +of the environment becomes greatest. Here it is not merely the existence +of other members of the same species, with all their developed feelings +and ideas to which each must become adapted to live, but in virtue of +what we have described above as the social medium, certain "thought +forms" such as institutions, conceptions of right and wrong, ideals of +duty, loyalty, the relation of one human group to other human groups, +not merely those that are now living, but also those that are dead, are +all part of the environment to which adjustment must be made. And in the +higher stages of social life these aspects of the environment become of +even greater consequence than the facts of a climatic, geographic, or +geologic nature. In other words, the environment which exerts a +predominating influence on civilized mankind is an environment that has +been very largely created by social life and growth. + +If we keep these two considerations firmly in mind we shall be well +guarded against a whole host of fallacies and false analogies that are +placed before us as though they were unquestioned and unquestionable +truths. There is, for instance, the misreading of evolution which +asserts that inasmuch as what is called moral progress takes place, +therefore evolution involves a moral purpose. We find this view put +forward not only by avowed Theists, but by those who, while formally +disavowing Theism, appear to have imported into ethics all the false +sentiment and fallacious reasoning that formerly did duty in bolstering +up the idea of God. Evolution, as such, is no more concerned with an +ideal morality than it is concerned with the development of an ideal +apple dumpling. In the universal process morality is no more than a +special illustration of the principle of adaptation. The morality of man +is a summary of the relations between human beings that must be +maintained if the two-fold end of racial preservation and individual +development are to be secured. Fundamentally morality is the formulation +in either theory or practice of rules or actions that make group-life +possible. And the man who sees in the existence or growth of morality +proof of a "plan" or an "end" is on all fours with the mentality of the +curate who saw the hand of Providence in the fact that death came at the +end of life instead of in the middle of it. What we are dealing with +here is the fact of adaptation, although in the case of the human group +the traditions and customs and ideals of the group form a very important +part of the environment to which adaptation must be made and have, +therefore, a distinct survival value. The moral mystery-monger is only a +shade less objectionable than the religious mystery-monger, of whom he +is the ethical equivalent. + +A right conception of the nature of environment and the meaning of +evolution will also protect us against a fallacy that is met with in +connection with social growth. Human nature, we are often told, is +always the same. To secure a desired reform, we are assured, you must +first of all change human nature, and the assumption is that as human +nature cannot be changed the proposed reform is quite impossible. + +Now there is a sense in which human nature is the same, generation after +generation. But there is another sense in which human nature is +undergoing constant alteration, and, indeed, it is one of the +outstanding features of social life that it should be so. So far as can +be seen there exists no difference between the fundamental capacities +possessed by man during at least the historic period. There are +differences in people between the relative strengths of the various +capacities, but that is all. An ancient Assyrian possessed all the +capacities of a modern Englishman, and in the main one would feel +inclined to say the same of them in their quantitative aspect as well as +in their qualitative one. For when one looks at the matter closely it is +seen that the main difference between the ancient and the modern man is +in expression. Civilization does not so much change the man so much as +it gives a new direction to the existing qualities. Whether particular +qualities are expressed in an ideally good direction or the reverse +depends upon the environment to which they react. + +To take an example. The fundamental evil of war in a modern state is +that it expends energy in a harmful direction. But war itself, the +expression of the war-like character, is the outcome of pugnacity and +the love of adventure without which human nature would be decidedly the +poorer, and would be comparatively ineffective. It is fundamentally an +expression of these qualities that lead to the quite healthy taste for +exploration, discovery, and in intellectual pursuits to that contest of +ideas which lies at the root of most of our progress. And what war means +in the modern State is that the love of competition and adventure, the +pugnacity which leads a man to fight in defence of a right or to redress +a wrong, and without which human nature would be a poor thing, are +expended in the way of sheer destruction instead of through channels of +adventure and healthy intellectual contest. Sympathies are narrowed +instead of widened, and hatred of the stranger and the outsider, of +which a growing number of people in a civilized country are becoming +ashamed, assumes the rank of a virtue. In other words, a state of war +creates an environment--fortunately for only a brief period--which gives +a survival value to such expressions of human capacity as indicate a +reversion to a lower state of culture. + +We may put the matter thus. While conduct is a function of the organism, +and while the _kind_ of reaction is determined by structure, the _form_ +taken by the reaction is a matter of response to environmental +influences. It is this fact which explains why the capacities of man +remain fairly constant, while there is a continuous redirecting of these +capacities into new channels suitable to a developing social life. + +We are only outlining here a view of evolution that would require a +volume to discuss and illustrate adequately, but enough has been said to +indicate the enormous importance of the educative power of the +environment. We cannot alter the capacities of the individual for they +are a natural endowment. But we can, in virtue of an increased emphasis, +determine whether they shall be expressed in this or that direction. The +love of adventure may, for example, be exhausted in the pursuit of some +piratical enterprise, or it may be guided into channels of some useful +form of social effort. It lies with society itself to see that the +environment is such as to exercise a determining influence with regard +to expressions of activity that are beneficial to the whole of the +group. + +To sum up. Evolution is no more than a formula that expresses the way in +which a moving balance of forces is brought about by purely mechanical +means. So far as animal life is concerned this balance is expressed by +the phrase "adaptation to environment." But in human society the +environment is in a growing measure made up of ideas, customs, +traditions, ideals, and beliefs; in a word, of factors which are +themselves products of human activities. And it is for this reason that +the game of civilization is very largely in our own hands. If we +maintain an environment in which it is either costly or dangerous to be +honest and fearless in the expression of opinion, we shall be doing our +best to develop mental cowardice and hypocrisy. If we bring up the young +with the successful soldier or money-maker before them as examples, +while we continue to treat the scientist as a crank, and the reformer as +a dangerous criminal, we shall be continuing the policy of forcing the +expression of human capacity on a lower level than would otherwise be +the case. If we encourage the dominance of a religion which while making +a profession of disinterested loftiness continues to irradiate a narrow +egotism and a pessimistic view of life, we are doing our best to +perpetuate an environment which emphasizes only the poorer aspects of +human motive. Two centuries of ceaseless scientific activity have taught +us something of the rules of the game which we are all playing with +nature whether we will or no. To-day we have a good many of the winning +cards in our hands, if we will only learn to play them wisely. It is not +correct to say that evolution necessarily involves progress, but it does +indicate that wisdom and foresight may so control the social forces as +to turn that ceaseless change which is indicated by the law of evolution +into channels that make for happiness and prosperity. + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + +DARWINISM AND DESIGN. + + +The influence of the hypothesis of evolution on religion was not long in +making itself felt. Professor Huxley explained the rapid success of +Darwinism by saying that the scientific world was ready for it. And much +the same thing may be said of the better representatives of the +intellectual world with regard to the bearing of evolution on religion. +In many directions the cultivated mind had for more than half a century +been getting familiar with the general conception of growth in human +life and thought. Where earlier generations had seen no more than a +pattern to unravel there had developed a conviction that there was a +history to trace and to understand. Distant parts of the world had been +brought together during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, +readers and students were getting familiarized with the mass of customs +and religious ideas that were possessed by these peoples, and it was +perceived that beneath the bewildering variety of man's mental output +there were certain features which they had in common, and which might +hold in solution some common principle or principles. + +This common principle was found in the conception of evolution. It was +the one thing which, if true, and apart from the impossible idea of a +revelation, nicely graduated to the capacities of different races, +offered an explanation of the religions of the world in terms more +satisfactory than those of deliberate invention or imposture. Once it +was accepted, if only as an instrument of investigation, its use was +soon justified. And the thorough-going nature of the conquest achieved +is in no wise more clearly manifested than in the fact that the +conception of growth is, to-day, not merely an accepted principle with +scientific investigators, it has sunk deeply into all our literature and +forms an unconscious part of popular thought. + +One aspect of the influence of evolution on religious ideas has already +been noted. It made the religious idea but one of the many forms that +were assumed by man's attempt to reduce his experience of the world to +something like an orderly theory. But that carried with it, for +religion, the danger of reducing it to no more than one of the many +theories of things which man forms, with the prospect of its rejection +as a better knowledge of the world develops. Evolution certainly +divested religion of any authority save such as it might contain in +itself, and that is a position a religious mind can never contemplate +with equanimity. + +But so far as the theory of Darwinism is concerned it exerted a marked +and rapid influence on the popular religious theory of design in nature. +This is one of the oldest arguments in favour of a reasoned belief in +God, and it is the one which was, and is still in one form or another, +held in the greatest popular esteem. To the popular mind--and religion +in a civilized country is not seriously concerned about its failing grip +on the cultured intelligence so long as it keeps control of the ordinary +man and woman--to the popular mind the argument from design appealed +with peculiar force. Anyone is capable of admiring the wonders of +nature, and in the earlier developments of popular science the marvels +of plant and animal structures served only to deepen the Theist's +admiration of the "divine wisdom." The examples of complexity of +structure, of the interdependence of parts, and of the thousand and one +cunning devices by which animal life maintains itself in the face of a +hostile environment were there for all to see and admire. And when man +compared these with his own conscious attempts to adapt means to ends, +there seemed as strong proof here as anywhere of some scheming +intelligence behind the natural process. + +But the strength of the case was more apparent than real. It was weakest +at the very point where it should have been strongest. In the case of a +human product we know the purpose and can measure the extent of its +realization in the nature of the result. In the case of a natural +product we have no means of knowing what the purpose was, or even if any +purpose at all lies behind the product. The important element in the +argument from design--that of purpose--is thus pure assumption. In the +case of human productions we argue from purpose to production. In the +case of a natural object we are arguing from production to an assumed +purpose. The analogy breaks down just where it should be strongest and +clearest. + +Now it is undeniable that to a very large number of the more thoughtful +the old form of the argument from design received its death blow from +the Darwinian doctrine of natural selection. In the light of this theory +there was no greater need to argue that intelligence was necessary to +produce animal adaptations than there was to assume intelligence for the +sifting of sand by the wind. As the lighter grains are carried farthest +because they are lightest, so natural selection, operating upon organic +variations, favoured the better adapted specimens by killing off the +less favoured ones. The fittest is not created, it survives. The world +is not what it is because the animal is what it is, the animal is what +it is because the world is as it is. It cannot be any different and +live--a truth demonstrated by the destruction of myriads of animal +forms, and by the disappearance of whole species. The case was so plain, +the evidence so conclusive, that the clearer headed religionists dropped +the old form of the argument from design as no longer tenable. + +But the gentleman who exchanged the errors of the Church of Rome for +those of the Church of England is always with us. And the believer in +deity having dropped the argument from design in one form immediately +proceeded to revive it in another. This was, perhaps, inevitable. After +all, man lives in this world, and if proof of the existence of deity is +to be gathered from his works, it must be derived from the world we +know. So design _must_ be found somewhere, and it must be found here. +Only one chance was left. The general hypothesis of evolution--either +Darwinism alone, or Darwinism plus other factors--explained the +development of animal life. But that was _within_ the natural process. +What, then, of the process as a whole? If the hand of God could not be +seen in the particular adaptations of animal life, might it not be that +the whole of the process, in virtue of which these particular +adaptations occurred, might be the expression of the divine +intelligence? God did not create the particular parts directly, but may +he not have created the whole, leaving it for the forces he had set in +motion to work out his "plan." The suggestion was attractive. It +relieved religion from resting its case in a region where proof and +disproof are possible, and removed it to a region where they are +difficult, if not impossible. So, as it was not possible to uphold the +old teleology, one began to hear a great deal of the "wider teleology," +which meant that the Theist was thinking vaguely when he imagined he was +thinking comprehensively, and that, because he had reached a region +where the laws of logic could not be applied, he concluded that he had +achieved demonstration. And, indeed, when one gets outside the region of +verification there is nothing to stop one theorizing--save a dose of +common-sense and a gracious gift of humour. + +In another work (_Theism or Atheism_) I have dealt at length with the +argument from design. At present my aim is to take the presentation of +this "wider teleology" as given by a well-known writer on philosophical +subjects, Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, in a volume published a few years ago +entitled _Humanism: Philosophical Essays_. And in doing so, it is +certain that the theologian will lose nothing by leaving himself in the +hands of so able a representative. + +Mr. Schiller naturally accepts Darwinism as at least an important factor +in organic evolution, but he does not believe that it excludes design, +and he does believe that "our attitude towards life will be very +different, according as we believe it to be inspired and guided by +intelligence or hold it to be the fortuitous product of blind +mechanisms, whose working our helpless human intelligence can observe, +but cannot control." + +Now within its scope Darwinism certainly does exclude design, and even +though the forces represented by natural selection may be directed +towards the end produced, yet so far as the play of these forces is +concerned they are really self-directing, or self-contained. The +argument really seems to be just mere theology masquerading as +philosophy. Theories do play some part in the determination of the +individual attitude towards life, but they do not play the important +part that Mr. Schiller assumes they play. It is easily observable that +the same theory of life held by a Christian in England and by another +Christian in Asia Minor has, so far as it affects conduct, different +results. And if it be said that even though the results be different +they are still there, the reply is that they differ because the facts of +life compel an adjustment in terms of the general environment. Mr. +Schiller admits that the "prevalent conduct and that adapted to the +conditions of life must coincide," and the admission is fatal to his +position. The truth of the matter is that the conditions of life being +what they are, and the consequences of conduct being also what they are, +speculative theories of life cannot, in the nature of the case, affect +life beyond a certain point; that is, if life is to continue. That is +why in the history of belief religious teachings have sooner or later to +accommodate themselves to persistent facts. + +Mr. Schiller brings forward two arguments in favour of reconciling +Darwinism and Design, both of them ingenious, but neither of them +conclusive. With both of these I will deal later; but it is first +necessary to notice one or two of his arguments against a non-Theistic +Darwinism. The denial of the argument from design, he says, leads +farther than most people imagine:-- + + A complete denial of design in nature must deny the efficacy of all + intelligence as such. A consistently mechanical view has to regard + all intelligence as otiose, as an "epi-phenomenal by-product" or + fifth wheel to the cart, in the absence of which the given results + would no less have occurred. And so, if this view were the truth, + we should have to renounce all effort to direct our fated and + ill-fated course down the stream of time. Our consciousness would + be an unmeaning accident. + +A complete reply to this would involve an examination of the meaning +that is and ought to be attached to "intelligence," and that is too +lengthy an enquiry to be attempted here. It is, perhaps, enough to +point out that Mr. Schiller's argument clearly moves on the assumption +that intelligence is a _thing_ or a quality which exists, so to speak, +in its own right and which interferes with the course of events as +something from without. It is quite probable that he would repudiate +this construction being placed on his words, but if he does not mean +that, then I fail to see what he does mean, or what force there is in +his argument. And it is enough for my purpose to point out that +"intelligence" or mind is not a thing, but a relation. It asserts of a +certain class of actions exactly what "gravitation" asserts of a certain +class of motion, and "thingness" is no more asserted in the one case +than it is in the other. + +Intelligence, as a name given to a special class of facts or actions, +remains, whatever view we take of its nature, and it is puzzling to see +why the denial of extra natural intelligence--that is, intelligence +separated from all the conditions under which we know the phenomenon of +intelligence--should be taken as involving the denial of the existence +of intelligence as we know it. Intelligence as connoting purposive +action remains as much a fact as gravity or chemical attraction, and +continues valid concerning the phenomena it is intended to cover. All +that the evolutionist is committed to is the statement that it is as +much a product of evolution as is the shape or colouring of animals. It +is not at all a question of self-dependence. Every force in nature must +be taken for what it is worth, intelligence among them. Why, then, does +the view that intelligence is both a product of evolution and a cause of +another phase of evolution land us in self-contradiction, or make the +existence of itself meaningless? The truth is that intelligence +determines results exactly as every other force in nature determines +results, by acting as a link in an unending sequential chain. And the +question as to what intelligence is _per se_ is as meaningless as what +gravitation is _per se_. These are names which we give to groups of +phenomena displaying particular and differential characteristics, and +their purpose is served when they enable us to cognize and recognize +these phenomena and to give them their place and describe their function +in the series of changes that make up our world. + +Mr. Schiller's reply to this line of criticism is the familiar one that +it reduces human beings to automata. He says:-- + + The ease with which the Darwinian argument dispenses with + intelligence as a factor in survival excites suspicion. It is + proving too much to show that adaptation might equally well have + arisen in automata. For we ourselves are strongly persuaded that we + are not automata and strive hard to adapt ourselves. In us at + least, therefore, intelligence _is_ a source of adaptation.... + Intelligence therefore is a _vera causa_ as a source of adaptations + at least co-ordinate with Natural Selection, and this can be denied + only if it is declared inefficacious _everywhere_; if all living + beings, including ourselves, are declared to be automata. + +One is compelled again to point out that Darwinism does not dispense +with intelligence as a factor in survival, except so far as the +intelligence which determines survival is declared to be operating apart +from the organisms which survive. The conduct of one of the lower +animals which reacts only to the immediate promptings of its environment +is of one order, but the response of another animal not merely to the +immediate promptings of the environment, but to remote conditions, as +in the selection of food or the building of a home of some sort, or to +the fashioning of a tool, does obviously give to the intelligence +displayed a distinct survival value. And that effectively replies to the +triumphant conclusion, "If intelligence has no efficacy in promoting +adaptations, _i.e._, if it has no survival value, how comes it to be +developed at all?" + +Darwinism would never have been able to dispense with intelligence in +the way it did but for the fact that the opposite theory never stood for +more than a mere collection of words. That species are or were produced +by the operations of "Divine Intelligence" is merely a grandiloquent way +of saying nothing at all. It is absurd to pretend that such a formula +ever had any scientific value. It explains nothing. And it is quite +obvious that some adaptations do, so far as we know, arise without +intelligence, and are, therefore, to use Mr. Schiller's expression, +automata. (I do not like the word, since it conveys too much the notion +of someone behind the scenes pulling strings.) And it is on his theory +that animals actually are automata. For if there be a "Divine mind" +which stands as the active cause of the adaptations that meet us in the +animal world, and who arranges forces so that they shall work to their +pre-destined end, what is that but converting the whole of the animal +world into so many automata. One does not escape determinism in this +way; it is only getting rid of it in one direction in order to +reintroduce it in another. + +And one would like to know what our conviction that we are not automata +has to do with it. Whether the most rigid determinism is true or not is +a matter to be settled by an examination of the facts and a careful +reflection as to their real significance. No one questions that there is +a persuasion to the contrary; if there were not there would be nothing +around which controversy could gather. But it is the conviction that is +challenged, and it is idle to reply to the challenge by asserting a +conviction to the contrary. The whole history of human thought is the +record of a challenge and a reversal of such convictions. There never +was a conviction which was held more strenuously than that the earth was +flat. The experience of all men in every hour of their lives seemed to +prove it. And yet to-day no one believes it. The affirmation that we are +"free" rests, as Spinoza said, ultimately on the fact that all men know +their actions and but few know the causes thereof. A feather endowed +with consciousness, falling to the ground in a zigzag manner, might be +equally convinced that it determined the exact spot on which it would +rest, yet its persuasion would be of no more value than the "vulgar" +conviction that we independently adapt ourselves to our environment. + +Mr. Schiller's positive arguments in favour of reconciling Darwinism +with design--one of them is really negative;--are concerned with (1) the +question of variation, and (2) with the existence of progress. On the +first question it is pointed out that while Natural Selection operates +by way of favouring certain variations, the origin or cause of these +variations remains unknown. And although Mr. Schiller does not say so in +as many words, there is the implication, if I rightly discern his drift, +that there is room here for a directing intelligence, inasmuch as +science is at present quite unable to fully explain the causes of +variations. We are told that Darwin assumed for the purpose of his +theory that variations were indefinite both as to character and extent, +and it is upon these variations that Natural Selection depends. This +indefinite variation Mr. Schiller asserts to be a methodological device, +that is, it is something assumed as the groundwork of a theory, but +without any subsequent verification, and it is in virtue of this +assumption that intelligence is ruled out of evolution. And inasmuch as +Mr. Schiller sees no reason for believing that variations are of this +indefinite character, he asserts that there is in evolution room for a +teleological factor, in other words, "a purposive direction of +variations." + +Now it hardly needs pointing out to students of Darwinism that +indefinite variation is the equivalent of "a variation to which no exact +limits can be placed," and in this sense the assumption is a perfectly +sound one. From one point of view the variations must be definite, that +is, they can only occur within certain limits. An elephant will not vary +in the direction of wings, nor will a bird in the direction of a rose +bush. But so long as we cannot fix the exact limits of variation we are +quite warranted in speaking of them as indefinite. That this is a +methodological device no one denies, but so are most of the other +distinctions that we frame. Scientific generalizations consist of +abstractions, and Mr. Schiller himself of necessity employs the same +device. + +Mr. Schiller argues, quite properly, that while Natural Selection states +the conditions under which animal life evolves, it does not state any +reason why it should evolve. Selection may keep a species stationary or +it may even cause it to degenerate. Both are fairly common phenomena in +the animal and plant world. Moreover, if there are an indefinite number +of variations, and if they tend in an indefinite number of directions, +then the variation in any one direction can never be more than an +infinitesimal portion of the whole, and that this one should persist +supplies a still further reason for belief in "a purposive direction of +variations." Mr. Schiller overlooks an important point here, but a very +simple one. It is true that any one variation is small in relation to +the whole of the possible or actual number of variations. But it is not +in relation to quantity but quality that survival takes place, and in +proportion to the keenness of the struggle the variation that gives its +possessor an advantage need only be of the smaller kind. In a struggle +of endurance between two athletes it is the one capable of holding out +for an extra minute who carries off the prize. + +Further, as Mr. Schiller afterwards admits, the very smallness of the +number of successful variations makes against intelligence rather than +for it, and he practically surrenders his position in the statement, +"the teleological and anti-teleological interpretation of events will +ever decide their conflict by appealing to the facts; for in the facts +each finds what it wills and comes prepared to see." After this lame +conclusion it is difficult to see what value there is in Mr. Schiller's +own examination of the "facts." Not that it is strictly correct to say +that the facts bear each view out equally. They do not, and Mr. Schiller +only justifies his statement by converting the Darwinian position, which +is teleologically negative, into an affirmative. The Darwinian, he says, +denies intelligence as a cause of evolution. What the Darwinian does is +to deny the validity of the evidence which the teleologist brings to +prove his case. The Theist asserts mind as a cause of evolution. The +Darwinian simply points out that the facts may be explained in quite +another way and without the appeal to a quite unknown factor. + +And here one might reasonably ask, why, if there is a directive mind at +work, are there variations at all? Why should the "directive +intelligence" not get earlier to work, and instead of waiting until a +large number of specimens have been produced and then looking them over +with a view to "directing" the preservation of the better specimens, why +should it not set to work at the beginning and see that only the +desirable ones make their appearance? Certainly that is what a mere +human intelligence would do if it could. But it is characteristic of the +"Divine Intelligence" of the Theist that it never seems to operate with +a tenth part of the intelligence of an ordinary human being. + +Moreover, Mr. Schiller writes quite ignoring the fact that the +"directive intelligence" does not direct the preservation of the better +specimens. What it does, if it does anything at all, is to kill off the +less favoured ones. Natural Selection--the point is generally overlooked +by the Theistic sentimentality of most of our writers--does not preserve +anything. Its positive action is not to keep alive but to kill. It does +not take the better ones in hand and help them. It seizes on all it can +and kills them. It is the difference between a local council that tried +to raise the standard of health by a general improvement of the +conditions of life, and one that aimed at the same end by killing off +all children that failed to come up to a certain standard. The actual +preservation of a better type is, so far as Natural Selection is +concerned, quite accidental. So far as Natural Selection operates it +does so by elimination, not by preservation. + +Mr. Schiller's other plea in favour of Design is concerned with the +conception of progress. He points out that while degeneration and +stagnation both occur in nature, yet-- + + life has been on the whole progressive; but progress and + retrogression have both been effected under the same law of Natural + Selection. How, then, can the credit of that result be ascribed to + Natural Selection? Natural Selection is equally ready to bring + about degeneration or to leave things unchanged. How, then, can it + be that which determines which of the three possible (and actual) + cases shall be realized?... It cannot be Natural Selection that + causes one species to remain stationary, another to degenerate, a + third to develop into a higher form.... Some variable factor must + be added to Natural Selection. + +But why? Evolution, as we have pointed out in a previous chapter, makes +for adaptation in terms of animal preservation. If the adaptation of an +animal to its environment is secured by "degenerating" or "developing" +or by remaining stationary, it will do one of the three. That is the +normal consequence of Natural Selection, and it is surprising that Mr. +Schiller does not see this. He is actually accusing Natural Selection of +not being able to do what it does on his own showing. The proof he +himself gives of this operation of Natural Selection in the examples he +cites of its ineffectiveness. If Natural Selection could not make for +degeneration or development, in what way would it be able to establish +an equilibrium between an animal and its surroundings? Really, there is +nothing that so strengthens one's conviction of the truth of the +Freethought position so much as a study of the arguments that are +brought against it. + +Mr. Schiller is really misled, and so misleads his readers by an +unjustifiable use of the word "progress." He says that evolution has +been, on the whole, progressive, and appeals to "progress" as though it +were some objective fact. But that is not the case. There is no +"progress" in the animal world, there is only change. We have dealt with +this in a previous chapter, and there is no need to again labour the +point. "Progress" is a conception which we ourselves frame, and we +measure a movement towards or away from this arbitrary standard of ours +in terms of better or worse, higher or lower. But nature knows nothing +of a higher or a lower, it knows only of changing forms more or less +fitted to live in the existing environment. Scientifically, life has +not progressed, it has persisted, and a _sine qua non_ of its +persistence has been adaptation to environment. + +Progress, then, is not a "natural" fact, but a methodological one. It is +a useful word and a valuable ideal. I am not protesting against its use, +only against its misuse. It is one of the many abstractions created by +thinkers, and then worshipped as a reality by those who forget the +origin and purpose of its existence. And in this we can see one of the +fatal legacies we have inherited from Theistic methods of thinking. The +belief that things are designed to be as they are comes to us from those +primitive methods of thinking which personify and vitalize all natural +phenomena. We have outgrown the crude frame of mind which saw direct +volitional action in a storm or in the movements of natural forces. The +development of civilized and scientific thinking has removed these +conceptions from the minds of educated men and women, but it has left +behind it as a residuum the habit of looking for purpose where none +exists, and of reading into nature as objective facts our own +generalizations and abstractions. And so long as we have not outgrown +that habit we are retaining a fatal bar to exact scientific thinking. + +Finally, and this consideration is fatal to any theory of design such as +Mr. Schiller champions, adaptation is not a special quality of one form +of existence, but a universal quality of all. There is not a greater +degree of adaptation here and a less degree there, but the same degree +in every case. There is no other meaning to adaptation except that of +adjustment to surroundings. But whether an animal lives or dies, whether +it is higher or lower, deformed or perfect, the adjustment is the same. +That is, every form of existence represents the product of forces that +have made it what it is, and the same forces could not have produced +anything different. Every body in existence, organic or inorganic, +constitutes in ultimate analysis a balance of the forces represented by +it. It is not possible, therefore, for the Theist to say that design is +evidenced by adaptation in one case and its absence in another. There is +adaptation in every case, even though it may not be the adaptation we +should like to see. It is not possible for the Theist to say that the +_degree_ of adaptation is greater in the one case than in the other, for +_that_ is the same in every case. What needs to be done if design is to +be established is to prove that the forces we see at work could not have +produced the results that emerge without the introduction of a factor +not already given in our experience. Anything else is mere waste of +time. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + +ANCIENT AND MODERN. + + +In the preceding chapters we have, without saying it in so many words, +been emphasizing the modern as against the ancient point of view. The +distinction may not at first glance appear to be of great moment, and +yet reflection will prove it to be of vital significance. It expresses, +in a sentence, the essence of the distinction between the Freethinker +and the religionist. Objectively, the world in which we are living is +the same as that in which our ancestors lived. The same stars that +looked down upon them look down upon us. Natural forces affected them as +they affect us. Even the play of human passion and desire was the same +with them as with us. Hunger and thirst, love and hatred, cowardice and +courage, generosity and greed operate now as always. The world remains +the same in all its essential features; what alters is our conception of +it--in other words, the point of view. + +The question thus resolves itself into one of interpretation. +Freethinker and religionist are each living in the same world, they are +each fed with the same foods and killed with the same poisons. The same +feelings move both and the same problems face both. Their differences +are constituted by the canon of interpretation applied. It is on this +issue that the conflict between religion and science arises. For +religion is not, as some have argued, something that is supplementary or +complementary to science, nor does it deal with matters on which +science is incompetent to express an opinion. Religion and science face +each other as rival interpretations of the same set of facts, precisely +as the Copernican and the Ptolemaic systems once faced each other as +rival interpretations of astronomical phenomena. If the one is true the +other is false. You may reject the religious or the scientific +explanation of phenomena, but you cannot logically accept both. As Dr. +Johnson said, "Two contradictory ideas may inhere in the same mind, but +they cannot both be correct." + +Now while it is true that in order to understand the present we must +know the past, and that because the present is a product of the past, it +is also true that a condition of understanding is to interpret the past +by the present. In ordinary affairs this is not questioned. When +geologists set out to explain the causes of changes in the earth's +surface, they utilize the present-day knowledge of existing forces, and +by prolonging their action backward explain the features of the period +they are studying. When historians seek to explain the conduct of, say +Henry the Eighth, they take their knowledge of the motives animating +existing human nature, and by placing that in a sixteenth century +setting manage to present us with a picture of the period. So, again, +when the thirteenth century monkish historian gravely informs us that a +particular epidemic was due to the anger of God against the wickedness +of the people, we put that interpretation on one side and use our own +knowledge to find in defective social and sanitary conditions the cause +of what occurred. Illustrations to the same end may be found in every +direction. It is, indeed, not something that one may accept or reject as +one may take or leave a political theory, it is an indispensible +condition of rational thinking on any subject whatsoever. + +Accepted everywhere else, it is in connection with religion that one +finds this principle, not openly challenged, for there are degrees of +absurdity to which even the most ardent religionist dare not go, but it +is quietly set on one side and a method adopted which is its practical +negation. Either the procedure is inverted and the present is +interpreted by the past, as when it is assumed that because God did +certain things in the past therefore he will continue to do the same +things in the present, or it is assumed that the past was unlike the +present, and, therefore, the same method of interpretation cannot be +applied to both cases. Both plans have the effect of landing us, if not +in lunacy, at least well on the way to it. + +It is indispensible to the religionist to ignore the principle above +laid down. For if it is admitted that human nature is always and +everywhere the same, and that natural forces always and everywhere act +in the same manner, religious beliefs are brought to the test of their +conformity with present day knowledge of things and all claim to +objective validity must be abandoned. Yet the principle is quite clear. +The claim of the prophets of old to be inspired must be tested by what +we know of the conditions of "inspiration" to-day, and not by what +unenlightened people thought of its nature centuries ago. Whether the +story of the Virgin Birth is credible or not must be settled by an +appeal to what we know of the nature of animal procreation, and not by +whether our faith urges us to accept the statement as true. To act +otherwise is to raise an altogether false issue, the question of +evidence is argued when what is really at issue is that of credibility. +It is not at all a matter of whether there is evidence enough to +establish the reality of a particular recorded event, but whether our +actual knowledge of natural happenings is not enough for us to rule it +out as objectively untrue, and to describe the conditions which led to +its being accepted as true. + +Let us take as an illustration of this the general question of miracles. +The _Oxford Dictionary_ defines a miracle as "A marvellous event +occurring within human experience which cannot have been brought about +by human power or by the operation of any natural agency, and must, +therefore, be ascribed to the special intervention of the deity or some +supernatural being." That is a good enough definition, and is certainly +what people have had in mind when they have professed a belief in +miracles. A miracle must be something marvellous, that is, it must be +unusual, and it must not be even conceivably explainable in terms of the +operation of natural forces. If it is admitted that what is claimed as a +miracle might be explained as the result of natural forces provided our +knowledge was extensive enough and exact enough, it is confessed that +miracle and ignorance are convertible terms. And while that may be true +enough as a matter of fact, it would never suit the religious case to +admit it in so many words. + +Nor would it make the case any better to argue that the alleged miracle +has been brought about by some superior being with a much greater +knowledge of nature than man possesses, but which the latter may one day +acquire. That is placing a miracle on the same level as a performance +given by a clever conjuror, which puzzles the onlooker because he lacks +the technical knowledge requisite to understand the methods employed. A +miracle to be a miracle must not be in accordance with natural laws, +known or unknown, it must contravene them or suspend their operation. + +On the other hand, the demand made by some critics of the miraculous, +namely, that the alleged miracle shall be performed under test +conditions, is absurd, and shows that they have not grasped the +essential point at issue. The believer's reply to such a demand is plain +and obvious. He says, a miracle is by its nature a rare event, it is +performed under special circumstances to serve a special purpose. Where, +then, is the reason in asking that this miracle shall be re-performed in +order to convince certain people that it has already occurred? To +arrange for the performance of a miracle is an absurdity. For it to +become common is to destroy both its character as a miracle and the +justification for its existence. A miracle must carry its own evidence +or it fails of its purpose and ceases to be a miracle at all. Discussion +on these lines ends, at best, in a stalemate. + +It is just as wide of the mark to discuss miracles as though it were a +question of evidence. What possible evidence could there be, for +example, that Jesus fed five thousand people with a few loaves and +fishes, and had basketfuls left at the end of the repast? Suppose it +were possible to produce the sworn testimony of the five thousand +themselves that they had been so fed. Would that produce conviction? +Would it do any more than prove that they believed the food had been so +expanded or multiplied that it was enough for them all? It would be +convincing, perhaps, as proof of an act of belief. But would it prove +any more than that? Would it prove that these five thousand were not the +victims of some act of deception or of some delusion? A belief in a +miracle, whether the belief dates from two thousand years since or from +last week, proves only--belief. And the testimony of a Salvation Army +convert as to the truth of the resurrection of Jesus Christ is as good, +as evidence, as though we had the sworn testimony of the twelve +apostles, with that of the grave-diggers thrown in. + +The truth is that the question of belief in the miraculous has nothing +whatever to do with evidence. Miracles are never established by +evidence, nor are they disproved by evidence, that is, so long as we use +the term evidence with any regard to its judicial significance. What +amount or what kind of evidence did the early Christians require to +prove the miracles of Christianity? Or what evidence did our ancestors +require to prove to them that old women flew through the air on +broomsticks, or bewitched cows, or raised storms? Testimony in volumes +was forthcoming, and there is not the slightest reason for doubting its +genuineness. But what amount or kind of evidence was required to +establish the belief? Was it evidence to which anyone to-day would pay +the slightest regard? The slightest study of the available records is +enough to show that the question of evidence had nothing whatever to do +with the production of the belief. + +And, on the other hand, how many people have given up the belief in +miracles as a result of a careful study of the evidence against them? I +have never heard of any such case, although once a man disbelieves in +miracles he may be ready enough to produce reasons to justify his +disbelief in them. The man who begins to weigh evidence for and against +miracles has already begun to disbelieve them. + +The attitude of children in relation to the belief in fairies may well +be taken to illustrate the attitude of the adult mind in face of the +miraculous. No evidence is produced to induce the belief in fairies, and +none is ever brought forward to induce them to give it up. At one stage +of life it is there, at another it is gone. It is not reasoned out or +evidenced out, it is simply outgrown. In infancy the child's conception +of life is so inchoate that there is room for all kinds of fantastic +beliefs. In more mature years certain beliefs are automatically ruled +out by the growth of a conception of things which leaves no room for +beliefs that during childhood seemed perfectly reasonable. + +Now this is quite on all-fours with the question of miracles. The issue +is essentially one of psychology. Belief or disbelief is here mainly +determined by the psychological medium in which one lives and moves. +Given a psychological medium which is, scientifically, at its lowest, +and the belief in the miraculous flourishes. At the other extreme +miracles languish and decay. Tell a savage that the air is alive with +good and bad spirits and he will readily believe you. Tell it to a man +with a genuine scientific mind and he will laugh at you. Tell a peasant +in some parts of the country that someone is a witch and he will at once +believe it. Tell it to a city dweller and it will provide only occasion +for ridicule. People who accept miracles believe them before they +happen. The expressed belief merely registers the fact. Miracles never +happen to those who do not believe in them; as has been said, they never +occur to a critic. Those who reject miracles do so because their +acceptance would conflict with their whole conception of nature. That is +the sum and substance of the matter. + +A further illustration may be offered in the case of the once much +debated question of the authenticity of the books of the New Testament +and the historicity of the figure of Jesus. It appears to have been +assumed that if it could be shown that the books of the New Testament +were not contemporary records the case against the divinity of Jesus was +strengthened. On the other hand it was assumed that if these writings +represented the narratives of contemporaries the case for the truth of +the narratives was practically proven. In reality this was not the vital +issue at all. It would be, of course, interesting if it could be shown +that there once existed an actual personage around whom these stories +gathered, but it would make as little difference to the real question at +issue as the demonstration of the Baconian authorship of _Hamlet_ would +make in the psychological value of the play. + +Suppose then it were proven that a person named Jesus actually existed +at a certain date in Judea, and that this person is the Jesus of the New +Testament. Suppose it be further proven, or admitted, that the followers +whom this person gathered around him believed that he was born of a +virgin, performed a number of miracles, was crucified, and then rose +from the dead, and that the New Testament represents their written +memoirs. Suppose all this to be proven or granted, what has been +established? Simply this. That a number of people believed these things +of someone whom they had known. But no Freethinker need seriously +concern himself to disprove this. He may, indeed, take it as the data of +the problem which he sets out to solve. The scientific enquirer is not +really concerned with the New Testament as a narrative of fact any more +than he is concerned with Cotton Mather's _Invisible World Displayed_ as +a narrative of actual fact. What he is concerned with is the frame of +mind to which these stories seemed true, and the social medium which +gave such a frame of mind a vogue. It is not at all a question of +historical evidence, but of historical psychology. It is not a question +of the honesty of the witnesses, but of their ability, not whether they +wished to tell the truth, or intended to tell the truth, but whether +they were in a position to know what the truth was. We have not to +discuss whether these events occurred, such a proposition is an insult +to a civilized intelligence, the matter for discussion is the +conditions that bring such beliefs into existence and the conditions +that perpetuate them. + +The development of social life and of education thus shifts the point of +view from the past to the present. To understand the past we do not ask +what was it that people believed concerning the events around them, but +what do we know of the causes which produce beliefs of a certain kind. +Thus, we do not really reject the story of Jesus turning water into wine +because we are without legal evidence that he ever did anything of the +kind, but because, knowing the chemical constituents of both water and +wine we know that such a thing is impossible. It is only possible to an +uninstructed mind to which water and wine differ only in taste or +appearance. We do not reject the story of the demoniacs in the New +Testament because we have no evidence that these men were possessed of +devils, or that Jesus cast them out, but because we have exactly the +same phenomena with us to-day and know that it comes within the province +of the physician and not of the miracle worker. It is not a matter of +evidence whether a man rose from the dead or not, or whether he was born +of a virgin or not, but solely a question of examining these and similar +stories in the light of present day knowledge. The "evidence" offered is +proof only of belief, and no one ever questioned the existence of that. +And if the proof of belief is required there is no need to go back a +couple of thousand years or to consult ancient records. The testimony of +a present day believer, and the account of a revival meeting such as one +may find in any religious newspaper will serve equally well. As is so +often the case, the evidence offered is not merely inadequate, it is +absolutely irrelevant. + +Past events must be judged in the light of present knowledge. That is +the golden rule of guidance in judging the world's religious legends. +And that canon is fatal to their pretensions. On the one hand we see in +the life of contemporary savages and in that of semi-civilized peoples +all the conditions and the beliefs that meet us in the Bible and among +the early Christians. And with our wider and more exact knowledge we are +able to take exactly the same phenomena that impressed those of an +earlier generation and explain them without the slightest reference to +supernatural powers or beings. The modern mind is really not looking +round for evidence to disprove the truth of Christian legends. It knows +they are not true. There is no greater need to prove that the miracles +of Christianity never occurred, than there is to prove that an old woman +never raised a storm to wreck one of the kings of England. The issue has +been changed from one of history to one of psychology. It is the present +that of necessity sits in judgment on the past, and it is in the light +of the knowledge of the present that the religions of the past stand +condemned. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + +MORALITY WITHOUT GOD. + + +The mystery-monger flourishes almost as well in ethics as he does in +theology. Indeed, in some respects he seems to have forsaken one field +of exercise only to find renewed scope in the other. He approaches the +consideration of moral questions with the same hushed voice and +"reverential" air that is so usual in theology, and talks of the mystery +of morality with the same facility that he once talked about the mystery +of godliness--and with about an equal amount of enlightenment to his +hearers or readers. + +But the mystery of morality is nearly all of our own making. Essentially +there is no more mystery in morality than there is in any other question +that may engage the attention of mankind. There are, of course, problems +in the moral world as there are in the physical one, and he would be a +fool who pretended to the ability to satisfactorily solve them all. The +nature of morality, the causes that led to the development of moral +"laws," and still more to the development of a sense of morality, all +these are questions upon which there is ample room for research and +speculation. But the talk of a mystery is misleading and mystifying. It +is the chatter of the charlatan, or of the theologian, or of the partly +liberated mind that is still under the thraldom of theology. In ethics +we have exactly the same kind of problem that meets us in any of the +sciences. We have a fact, or a series of facts, and we seek some +explanation of them. We may fail in our search, but that is not +evidence of a "mystery," it is proof only of inadequate knowledge, of +limitations that we may hope the future will enable us to overcome. + +For the sake of clarity it will be better to let the meaning of morality +emerge from the discussion rather than to commence with it. And one of +the first things to help to clear the mind of confusion is to get rid of +the notion that there is any such thing as moral "laws" which correspond +in their nature to law as the term is used in science. In one sense +morality is not part of physical nature at all. It is characteristic of +that part of nature which is covered by the human--at most by the higher +animal--world. Nature can only, therefore, be said to be moral in the +sense that the term "Nature" includes all that is. In any other sense +nature is non-moral. The sense of values, which is, as we shall see, of +the essence of the conception of morality, nature knows nothing of. To +speak of nature punishing us for _bad_ actions or rewarding us for +_good_ ones is absurd. Nature neither punishes nor rewards. She meets +actions with consequences, and is quite indifferent to any moral +consideration. If I am weakly, and go out on a cold, wet night to help +someone in distress, nature does not act differently than it would if I +had gone out to commit a murder. I stand exactly the same chances in +either case of contracting a deadly chill. It is not the moral value of +an action with which natural forces are concerned, but merely with the +action, and in that respect nature never discriminates between the good +man and the bad, between the sinner and the saint. + +There is another sense in which moral laws differ from natural laws. We +can break the former but not the latter. The expression so often used, +"He broke a law of nature," is absurd. You cannot break a law of +nature. You do not break the law of gravitation when you prevent a stone +falling to the ground; the force required to hold it in the air is an +illustration of the law. It is, indeed, one of the proofs that our +generalization does represent a law of nature that it cannot be +"broken." For broken is here only another word for inoperative, and a +law of nature that is inoperative is non-existent. But in the moral +sphere we are in a different world. We not only can break moral laws, we +do break them; that is one of the problems with which our teachers and +moralisers have constantly to deal. Every time we steal we break the law +"Thou shalt not steal." Every time we murder we break the law "Thou +shalt not kill." We may keep moral laws, we ought to keep them, but we +can, quite clearly, break them. Between a moral law and a law of nature +there is plainly a very radical distinction. The discovery of that +distinction will, I think, bring us to the heart of the subject. + +Considering man as merely a natural object, or as a mere animal, there +is only one quality that nature demands of him. This is efficiency. +Nature's sole law is here "Be Strong." How that strength and efficiency +is secured and maintained is of no consequence whatever. The heat he +requires, the food he needs may be stolen from others, but it will +serve. The food will not nourish the less, the fire will not warm the +less. So long as efficiency is acquired it is a matter of absolute +indifference how it is secured. Considered as a mere animal object it is +difficult to see that morality has any meaning at all for man. It is +when we come to regard him in his relation to others that we begin to +see the meaning and significance of morality emerge. + +Now one of the first things that strike us in connection with moral laws +or rules is that they are all statements of relation. Such moral +commands as "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not kill," the commands +to be truthful, kind, dutiful, etc., all imply a relation to others. +Apart from this relation moral rules have simply no meaning whatever. By +himself a man could neither steal, nor lie, nor do any of the things +that we habitually characterize as immoral. A man living by himself on +some island would be absolved from all moral law; it would have no +meaning whatever for him. He would be neither moral nor immoral, he +would simply be without the conditions that make morality possible. But +once bring him into relations with his kind and his behaviour begins to +have a new and peculiar significance, not alone to these others, but +also to himself. What he does affects them, and also affects himself so +far as they determine the character of his relations to these others. He +must, for example, either work with them or apart from them. He must +either be on his guard against their securing their own efficiency at +his expense, or rest content that a mutual forbearance and trust will +govern their association. To ignore them is an impossibility. He must +reckon with these others in a thousand and one different ways, and this +reckoning will have its effect on the moulding of his nature and upon +theirs. + +Morality, then, whatever else it may be, is primarily the expression of +a relation. And the laws of morality are, consequently, a summary or +description of those relations. From this point of view they stand upon +exactly the same level as any of the arts or sciences. Moral actions are +the subject matter of observation, and the determination of their +essential quality or character is by the same methods as we determine +the essential quality of the "facts" in chemistry or biology. The task +before the scientific enquirer is, therefore, to determine the +conditions which give to moral rules or "laws" their meaning and +validity. + +One of the conditions of a moral action has already been pointed out. +This is that all moral rules imply a relation to beings of a similar +nature. A second feature is that conduct represents a form of +efficiency, it is a special feature of the universal biological fact of +adaptation. And the question of why man has a "moral sense" is really on +all fours with, and presents no greater mystery than is involved in, the +question of why man has digestive organs, and prefers some kinds of food +to others. Substantially, the question of why man should prefer a diet +of meat and potatoes to one of prussic acid is exactly the question of +why society should discourage certain actions and encourage others, or +why man's moral taste should prefer some forms of conduct to other +forms. The answer to both questions, while differing in form, is the +same in substance. + +Man as we know him is always found as a member of a group, and his +capacities, his feelings, and tastes must always be considered in +relation to that fact. But considering man merely as an animal, and his +conduct as merely a form of adaptation to environment, the plain +consideration which emerges is that even as an individual organism he is +compelled, in order to live, to avoid certain actions and to perform +others, to develop certain tastes and to form certain distastes. To take +our previous illustration it would be impossible for man to develop a +liking for life-destroying foods. It is one of the conditions of living +that he shall eat only that food which sustains life, or that he shall +abstain from eating substances which destroy it. But conduct at that +stage is not of the kind which considers the reasons for acting; indeed, +life cannot be based upon considered action, however much reason may +justify the actions taken. Further, as all conscious action is prompted +by the impulse to do what is pleasant and to avoid what is unpleasant, +it follows, as Spencer pointed out, that the course of evolution sets up +a close relation between actions that are pleasurable in the performance +and actions that are life preserving. It is one of the conditions of the +maintenance of life that the pleasurable and the beneficial shall in the +long run coincide. + +When we take man as a member of a group we have the same principle in +operation, even though the form of its expression undergoes alteration. +To begin with, the mere fact of living in a group implies the growth of +a certain restraint in one's relations to, and of reciprocity in dealing +with, others. Men can no more live together without some amount of trust +and confidence in each other, or without a crude sense of justice in +their dealings with each other, than an individual man can maintain his +life by eating deadly poisons. There must be a respect for the rights of +others, of justice in dealing with others, and of confidence in +associating with others, at least to the extent of not threatening the +possibility of group life. There are rules in the game of social life +that must be observed, and in its own defence society is bound to +suppress those of its members who exhibit strong anti-social tendencies. +No society can, for example, tolerate homicide as an admitted practice. +There is, thus, from the earliest times, a certain form of elimination +of the anti-social character which results in the gradual formation of +an emotional and mental disposition that habitually and instinctively +falls into line with the requirements of the social whole. + +To use an expression of Sir Leslie Stephen's, man as a member of the +group becomes a cell in the social tissue, and his fitness to survive is +dependent upon, positively, his readiness to perform such actions as the +welfare of the group require, and, negatively, upon his refraining from +doing those things that are inimical to social welfare.[23] Moreover, +there is the additional fact that the group itself is, as a whole, +brought into contact with other groups, and the survival of one group as +against another is determined by the quality and the degree of cohesion +of its units. From this point of view, participation in the life of the +group means more than refraining from acts that are injurious to the +group, it involves some degree of positive contribution to social +welfare. + +[23] The question of what are the things that are essential to the +welfare of the group, and the fact that individuals are often suppressed +for doing what they believe is beneficial to the group, with the kindred +fact that there may exist grave differences of opinion on the matter, +does not alter the essential point, which is that there must exist +sufficient conformity between conduct and group welfare to secure +survival. + +But the main thing to note is that from the very dawn of animal life the +organism is more or less under the pressure of a certain discipline that +tends to establish an identity between actions which there is a tendency +to perform and those that are beneficial to the organism. In the social +state we simply have this principle expressed in another way, and it +gives a degree of conscious adaptation that is absent from the +pre-social or even the lower forms of the social state. It is in the +truly social state also that we get the full influence of what may be +called the characteristically human environment, that is, the operation +of ideas and ideals. The importance of this psychological factor in the +life of man has been stressed in an earlier chapter. It is enough now to +point out that from the earliest moment the young human being is, by a +process of training, imbued with certain ideals of truthfulness, +loyalty, duty, etc., all of which play their part in the moulding of his +character. However much these ideals may vary in different societies, +the fact of the part played by them in moulding character is plain. They +are the dominant forces in moulding the individual to the social state, +even while the expressions of the social life may be in turn checked by +the fact that social conduct cannot persist if it threatens those +conditions upon which the persistence of life ultimately depends. + +There is one other consideration that must be noted. One very pregnant +fact in life is that nature seldom creates a new organ. What it usually +does is to refashion an old one, or to devote an old one to new uses. +This principle may be seen clearly in operation in connection with moral +evolution. On the one hand the various forces that play upon human +nature drive the moral feelings deeper into it. On the other hand it +develops them by their steady expansion over a wider area. Whether it is +an actual fact or not--I do not stress it because the point is the +subject of discussion--it is at least possible that the earliest human +group is the family. And so long as that was the case such feelings of +right and wrong as then existed will have been confined to the family. +But when a group of families combine and form the tribe, all those +feelings of confidence, justice, etc., which were formerly +characteristic of the smaller group are expanded to cover the larger +one. With the expansion of the tribe to the nation we have a further +development of the same phenomenon. There is no new creation, there is +nothing more than expansion and development. + +The process does not and cannot, obviously, stop here. From the tribe to +the nation, from the nation to the collection of nations which we call +an empire, and from the empire to the whole of humanity. That seems the +inevitable direction of the process, and there does not require profound +insight to see it already on the way. Development of national life +involves a growing interdependence of the world of humankind. Of hardly +any nation can it be said to-day that it is self-supporting or +self-contained or independent. There is nothing national or sectarian in +science, and it is to science that we have to look for our principal +help. All over the world we utilize each other's discoveries and profit +by each other's knowledge. Even economic interdependence carries with it +the same lesson. The human environment gets gradually broader and wider, +and the feelings that have hitherto been expanded over the narrower area +have now to be expanded over the wider one. It is the gradual +development of a human nature that is becoming adapted to a conception +of mankind as an organic unit. Naturally, in the process of adaptation +there is conflict between the narrower ideals, conserved in our +educational influences, and the wider ones. There are still large +numbers of those who, unable to picture the true nature of the +evolutionary process owing to their own defective education, yet think +of the world in terms of a few centuries ago, and still wave the flag of +a political nationalism as though that were the end of social growth, +instead of its being an early and transient expression of it. But this +conflict is inevitable, and the persistence of that type can no more +ensure its permanent domination than the persistence of the medicine man +in the person of the existing clergyman can give permanence to the +religious idea. + +There is, then, no mystery about the fact of morality. It is no more of +a mystery than is the compilation of the multiplication table, and it +has no greater need of a supernatural sanction than has the law of +gravitation. Morality is a natural fact, and its enforcement and growth +are brought about by natural means. In its lower form, morality is no +more than an expression of those conditions under which social life is +possible, and in its higher one, an expression of those ideal conditions +under which corporate life is desirable. In studying morality we are +really studying the physiology of associated life, and that study aims +at the determination of the conditions under which the best form of +living is possible. It is thus that here, as elsewhere, man is thrown +back upon himself for enlightenment and help. And if the process is a +slow one we may at least console ourselves with the reflection that the +labours of each generation are making the weapons which we bring to the +fight keener and better able to do their work. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + +MORALITY WITHOUT GOD. + +(_Continued._) + + +In the preceding chapter I have been concerned with providing the most +meagre of skeleton outlines of the way in which our moral laws and our +moral sense have come into existence. To make this as clear as possible +the chapter was restricted to exposition. Controversial points were +avoided. And as a matter of fact there are many religionists who might +concede the truth of what has been said concerning the way in which +morality has arisen, and the nature of the forces that have assisted in +its development. But they would proceed to argue, as men like Mr. +Balfour and Mr. Benjamin Kidd, with others of the like, have argued, +that a natural morality lacks all coercive power. The Freethought +explanation of morality, they say, is plausible enough, and may be +correct, but in conduct we have to deal not merely with the correctness +of things but with sanctions and motives that exercise a compulsive +influence on men and women. The religionist, it is argued, has such a +compulsive force in the belief in God and in the effect on our future +life of our obedience or disobedience to his commands. But what kind of +coercion can a purely naturalistic system of morals exert? If a man is +content to obey the naturalistic command to practise certain virtues and +to abstain from certain vices, well and good. But suppose he chooses to +disregard it. What then? Above all, on what compulsion is a man to +disregard his own inclinations to act as seems desirable to himself, +and not in conformity with the general welfare? We disregard the +religious appeal as pure sentimentalism, or worse, and we at once +institute an ethical sentimentalism which is, in practice, foredoomed to +failure. + +Or to put the same point in another way. Each individual, we say, should +so act as to promote the general welfare. Freethinker and religionist +are in agreement here. And so long as one's inclinations jump with the +advice no difficulty presents itself. But suppose a man's inclinations +do not run in the desired direction? You tell him that he must act so as +to promote the general well-being, and he replies that he is not +concerned with the promotion of the public welfare. You say that he +_ought_ to act differently, and he replies, "My happiness must consist +in what I regard as such, not in other people's conception of what it +should be." You proceed to point out that by persisting in his present +line of conduct he is laying up trouble for the future, and he retorts, +"I am willing to take the risk." What is to be done with him? Can +naturalism show that in acting in that way a man is behaving +unreasonably, that is, in the sense that he can be shown to be really +acting against his own interests, and that if he knew better he would +act differently? + +Now before attempting a reply to this it is worth while pointing out +that whatever strength there may be in this criticism when directed +against naturalism, it is equally strong when directed against +supernaturalism. We can see this at once if we merely vary the terms. +You tell a man to act in this or that way "in the name of God." He +replies, "I do not believe in God," and your injunction loses all force. +Or, if he believes in God, and you threaten him with the pains and +penalties of a future life, he may reply, "I am quite willing to risk a +probable punishment hereafter for a certain pleasure here." And it is +certain that many do take the risk, whether they express their +determination to do so in as many words or not. + +What is a supernaturalist compelled to do in this case? His method of +procedure is bound to be something like the following. First of all he +will seek to create assent to a particular proposition such as "God +exists, and also that a belief in his existence creates an obligation to +act in this or that manner in accordance with what is believed to be his +will." That proposition once established, his next business will be to +bring the subject's inclinations into line with a prescribed course of +action. He is thus acting in precisely the same manner as is the +naturalist who starts from an altogether different set of premises. And +both are resting their teaching of morals upon an intellectual +proposition to which assent is either implied or expressed. And that +lies at the basis of all ethical teaching--not ethical practice, be it +observed, but teaching. The precise form in which this intellectual +proposition is cast matters little. It may be the existence of God, or +it may be a particular view of human nature or of human evolution, but +it is there, and in either case the authoritative character of moral +precepts exists for such as accept it, and for none other. Moral +practice is rooted in life, but moral theory is a different matter. + +So far, then, it is clear that the complaint that Freethought ethics has +nothing about it of a compulsive or authoritative character is either a +begging of the question or it is absurd. + +Naturalistic ethics really assert three things. The first is that the +continuance of life ensures the performance of a certain level of +conduct, conduct being merely one of the means by which human beings +react to the necessities of their environment. Second, it asserts that +a proper understanding of the conditions of existence will in the +normally constituted mind strengthen the development of a feeling of +obligation to act in such and such a manner; and that while all +non-reasonable conduct is not immoral, all immoral conduct is +fundamentally irrational. Third, there is the further assumption that at +bottom individual and general welfare are not contradictory, but two +aspects of the same thing. + +Concerning the second point, Sir Leslie Stephen warns us (_Science of +Ethics_, p. 437) that every attempt so to state the ethical principle +that disobedience will be "unreasonable" is "doomed to failure in a +world which is not made up of working syllogisms." And for the other two +points Professor Sorley (_Ethics of Naturalism_, p. 42) tells us that +"It is difficult ... to offer any consideration fitted to convince the +individual that it is reasonable for him to seek the happiness of the +community rather than his own"; while Mr. Benjamin Kidd asserts that +"the interests of the individual and those of the social organism are +not either identical or capable of being reconciled, as has been +necessarily assumed in all those systems of ethics which have sought to +establish a naturalistic basis of conduct. The two are fundamentally and +inherently irreconcilable, and a large proportion of the existing +individuals at any time have ... no personal interest whatever in the +progress of the race, or in the social development we are undergoing." + +It has already been said that however difficult it may be to establish +the precise relationship between reason and ethical commands, such a +connection must be assumed, whether we base our ethics on naturalistic +or supernaturalistic considerations. And it cannot be denied by anyone +to-day that a causal relation must exist between actions and their +consequences, whether those causal consequences be of the natural and +non-moral kind, or of the more definitely moral order such as exists in +the shape of social approval and disapproval. And if we once grant that, +then it seems quite allowable to assume that provided a man perceives +the reason underlying moral judgments, and also the justification for +the sense of approval and disapproval expressed, we have as much reason +for calling his conduct reasonable or unreasonable as we have for +applying the same terms to a man's behaviour in dressing in view of the +variations of the temperature. + +Consequently, while I agree that _in the present state of knowledge_ it +is impossible in all cases to demonstrate that immoral conduct is +irrational in the sense that it would be unreasonable to refuse assent +to a mathematical proposition, there seems no justification for +regarding such a state of things as of necessity permanent. If a +scientific system of ethics consists in formulating rules for the +profitable guidance of life, not only does their formulation presuppose +a certain constancy in the laws of human nature and of the world in +general, but the assumption is also involved that one day it may be +possible to give to moral laws the same precision that now is attached +to physiological laws and to label departure from them as "unreasonable" +in a very real sense of the word. + +The other objection that it is impossible to establish a "reasonable" +relation between individual and social well-being arises from a dual +confusion as to what is the proper sphere of ethics, and of the mutual +relation of the individual and society. To take an individual and ask, +"Why should he act so as to promote the general welfare?" is to imply +that ethical rules may have an application to man out of relation with +his fellows. That, we have already seen, is quite wrong, since moral +rules fail to be intelligible once we separate man from his fellows. +Discussing ethics while leaving out social life is like discussing the +functions of the lungs and leaving out of account the existence of an +atmosphere. + +If, then, instead of treating the individual and society as two distinct +things, either of which may profit at the expense of the other, we treat +them as two sides of the same thing, each an abstraction when treated +alone, the problem is simplified, and the solution becomes appreciably +easier. For the essential truth here is that just as there is no such +thing as a society in the absence of the individuals composing it, so +the individual, as we know him, disappears when we strip him of all that +he is in virtue of his being a part of the social structure. Every one +of the characteristic human qualities has been developed in response to +the requirements of the social medium. It is in virtue of this that +morality has anything of an imperative nature connected with it, for if +man is, to use Sir Leslie Stephen's phrase, a cell in the social tissue, +receiving injury as the body social is injured, and benefitting as it is +benefitted, then the refusal of a man to act so that he may promote the +general welfare can be shown to be unreasonable, and also unprofitable +to the individual himself. In other words, our efficiency as an +individual must be measured in terms of our fitness to form part of the +social structure, and consequently the antithesis between social and +personal well-being is only on the surface. Deeper knowledge and a more +exact understanding reveals them as two sides of the same fact. + +It may be granted to Mr. Kidd that "a large proportion of the existing +individuals at any time" have no _conscious_ interest in "the progress +of the race or in the development we are undergoing," and that is only +what one would expect, but it would be absurd to therefore come to the +conclusion that no such identity of interest exists. Moliere's +character, who all his life had been talking prose without knowing it, +is only a type of the majority of folk who all their lives are acting in +accordance with principles of which they are ignorant, and which they +may even repudiate when they are explained to them. From one point of +view the whole object of a scientific morality is to awaken a conscious +recognition of the principles underlying conduct, and by this means to +strengthen the disposition to right action. We make explicit in language +what has hitherto been implicit in action, and thus bring conscious +effort to the aid of non-conscious or semi-conscious behaviour. + +In the light of the above consideration the long and wordy contest that +has been waged between "Altruists" and "Egoists" is seen to be very +largely a waste of time and a splutter of words. If it can be shown on +the one hand that all men are not animated by the desire to benefit +self, it is as easy to demonstrate that so long as human nature is human +nature, all conduct must be an expression of individual character, and +that even the morality of self-sacrifice is self-regarding viewed from +the personal feelings of the agent. And it being clear that the position +of Egoist and Altruist, while each expressing a truth, is neither +expressing the whole truth, and that each does in fact embody a definite +error, it seems probable that here, as in so many other cases, the truth +lies between the two extremes, and that a reconciliation may be effected +along these lines. + +Taking animal life as a whole it is at least clear that what are called +the self-regarding feelings must come first in order of development. +Even with the lower races of human beings there is less concern shown +with the feelings and welfare of others than is the case with the +higher races of men. Or, again, with children we have these feelings +strongest in childhood and undergoing a gradual expansion as maturity is +reached. This is brought about, as was shown in the last chapter, not by +the destruction of existing feelings, but by their extension to an ever +widening area. There is a transformation, or an elaboration of existing +feelings under the pressure of social growth. One may say that ethical +development does not proceed by the destruction of the feeling of +self-interest, so much as by its extension to a wider field. Ethical +growth is thus on all fours with biological growth. In biology we are +all familiar with the truth that maintenance of life is dependent upon +the existence of harmonious relations between an organism and its +environment. Yet it is not always recognized that this principle is as +true of the moral self as it is of the physical structure, nor that in +human evolution the existence of others becomes of increasing importance +and significance. For not only do I have to adapt myself, mentally and +morally, to the society now existing, but also to societies that have +long since passed away and have left their contribution to the building +up of _my_ environment in the shape of institutions and beliefs and +literature. + +We have in this one more illustration that while the environment of the +animal is overwhelmingly physical in character, that of man tends to +become overwhelmingly social or psychological. Desires are created that +can only be gratified by the presence and the labour of others. Feelings +arise that have direct reference to others, and in numerous ways a body +of "altruistic" feeling is created. So by social growth first, and +afterwards by reflection, man is taught that the only life that is +enjoyable to himself is one that is lived in the companionship and by +the co-operation of others. As Professor Ziegler well puts the +process:-- + + Not only on the one hand does it concern the interests of the + general welfare that every individual should take care of himself + outwardly and inwardly; maintain his health; cultivate his + faculties and powers; sustain his position, honour, and worth, and + so his own welfare being secured, diffuse around him happiness and + comfort; but also, on the other hand, it concerns the personal, + well understood interests of the individual himself that he should + promote the interests of others, contribute to their happiness, + serve their interests, and even make sacrifices for them. Just as + one forgoes a momentary pleasure in order to secure a lasting and + greater enjoyment, so the individual willingly sacrifices his + personal welfare and comfort for the sake of society in order to + share in the welfare of this society; he buries his individual + well-being in order that he may see it rise in richer and fuller + abundance in the welfare and happiness of the whole community + (_Social Ethics_, pp. 59-60). + +These motives are not of necessity conscious ones. No one imagines that +before performing a social action each one sits down and goes through a +more or less elaborate calculation. All that has been written on this +head concerning a "Utilitarian calculus" is poor fun and quite beside +the mark. In this matter, as in so many others, it is the evolutionary +process which demands consideration, and generations of social struggle, +by weeding out individuals whose inclinations were of a pronounced +anti-social kind, and tribes in which the cohesion between its members +was weak, have resulted in bringing about more or less of an +identification between individual desires and the general welfare. It is +not a question of conscious evolution so much as of our becoming +conscious of an evolution that is taking place, and in discussing the +nature of morals one is bound to go beyond the expressed reasons for +conduct--more often wrong than right--and discover the deeper and truer +causes of instincts and actions. When this is done it will be found that +while it is absolutely impossible to destroy the connection between +conduct and self-regarding actions, there is proceeding a growing +identity between the gratification of desire and the well-being of the +whole. This will be, not because of some fantastical or ascetic teaching +of self-sacrifice, but because man being an expression of social life is +bound to find in activities that have a social reference the beginning +and end of his conduct. + +The fears of a morality without God are, therefore, quite unfounded. If +what has been said be granted, it follows that all ethical rules are +primarily on the same level as a generalization in any of the sciences. +Just as the "laws" of astronomy or of biology reduce to order the +apparently chaotic phenomena of their respective departments, so ethical +laws seek to reduce to an intelligible order the conditions of +individual and social betterment. There can be no ultimate antithesis +between individual reason and the highest form of social conduct, +although there may exist an apparent conflict between the two, chiefly +owing to the fact that we are often unable to trace the remote effects +of conduct on self and society. Nor can there be an ultimate or +permanent conflict between the true interests of the individual and of +society at large. That such an opposition does exist in the minds of +many is true, but it is here worthy of note that the clearest and most +profound thinkers have always found in the field of social effort the +best sphere for the gratification of their desires. And here again we +may confidently hope that an increased and more accurate appreciation +of the causes that determine human welfare will do much to diminish +this antagonism. At any rate it is clear that human nature has been +moulded in accordance with the reactions of self and society in such a +way that even the self has become an expression of social life, and with +this dual aspect before us there is no reason why emphasis should be +laid on one factor rather than on the other. + +To sum up. Eliminating the form of coercion that is represented by a +policeman, earthly or otherwise, we may safely say that a naturalistic +ethics has all the coercive force that can be possessed by any system. +And it has this advantage over the coercive force of the +supernaturalist, that while the latter tends to weaken with the advance +of intelligence, the former gains strength as men and women begin to +more clearly appreciate the true conditions of social life and +development. It is in this way that there is finally established a +connection between what is "reasonable" and what is right. In this case +it is the function of reason to discover the forces that have made for +the moralization--really the socialization--of man, and so strengthen +man's moral nature by demonstrating the fundamental identity between his +own welfare and that of the group to which he belongs. That the coercion +may in some cases be quite ineffective must be admitted. There will +always, one fancies, be cases where the personal character refuses to +adapt itself to the current social state. That is a form of +mal-adaptation which society will always have to face, exactly as it has +to face cases of atavism in other directions. But the socializing and +moralizing process continues. And however much this may be, in its +earlier stages, entangled with conceptions of the supernatural, it is +certain that growth will involve the disappearance of that factor here +as it has done elsewhere. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. + +CHRISTIANITY AND MORALITY. + + +The association of religion with morality is a very ancient one. This is +not because the one is impossible without the other, we have already +shown that this is not the case. The reason is that unless religious +beliefs are associated with certain essential social activities their +continuance is almost impossible. Thus it happens in the course of +social evolution that just in proportion as man learns to rely upon the +purely social activities to that extent religion is driven to dwell more +upon them and to claim kinship with them. + +While this is true of religions in general, it applies with peculiar +force to Christianity. And in the last two or three centuries we have +seen the emphasis gradually shifted from a set of doctrines, upon the +acceptance of which man's eternal salvation depends, to a number of +ethical and social teachings with which Christianity, as such, has no +vital concern. The present generation of Christian believers has had +what is called the moral aspect of Christianity so constantly impressed +upon them, and the essential and doctrinal aspect so slurred over, that +many of them have come to accept the moral teaching associated with +Christianity as its most important aspect. More than that, they have +come to regard the immense superiority of Christianity as one of those +statements the truth of which can be doubted by none but the most +obtuse. To have this alleged superiority of Christian ethical teaching +questioned appears to them proof of some lack of moral development on +the part of the questioner. + +To this type of believer it will come with something of a shock to be +told quite plainly and without either circumlocution or apology that his +religion is of an intensely selfish and egoistic character, and that its +ethical influence is of a kind that is far from admirable. It will shock +him because he has for so long been told that his religion is the very +quintessence of unselfishness, he has for so long been telling it to +others, and he has been able for so many generations to make it +uncomfortable for all those who took an opposite view, that he has +camouflaged both the nature of his own motives and the tendency of his +religion. + +From one point of view this is part of the general scheme in virtue of +which the Christian Church has given currency to the legend that the +doctrines taught by it represented a tremendous advance in the +development of the race. In sober truth it represented nothing of the +kind. That the elements of Christian religious teaching existed long +before Christianity as a religious system was known to the world is now +a commonplace with all students of comparative religions, and is +admitted by most Christian writers of repute. Even in form the Christian +doctrines represented but a small advance upon their pagan prototypes, +but it is only when one bears in mind the fact that the best minds of +antiquity were rapidly throwing off these superstitions and leading the +world to a more enlightened view of things, we realize that in the main +Christianity represented a step backward in the intellectual evolution +of the race. What we then see is Christianity reaffirming and +re-establishing most of the old superstitions in forms in which only the +more ignorant classes of antiquity accepted them. We have an assertion +of demonism in its crudest forms, an affirmation of the miraculous that +the educated in the Roman world had learned to laugh at, and which is +to-day found among the savage people of the earth, while every form of +scientific thought was looked upon as an act of impiety. The scientific +eclipse that overtook the old pagan civilization was one of the +inevitable consequences of the triumph of Christianity. From the point +of view of general culture the retrogressive nature of Christianity is +unmistakable. It has yet to be recognized that the same statement holds +good in relation even to religion. One day the world will appreciate the +fact that no greater disaster ever overtook the world than the triumph +of the Christian Church. + +For the moment, however, we are only concerned with the relation of +Christianity to morality. And here my thesis is that Christianity is an +essentially selfish creed masking its egoistic impulses under a cover of +unselfishness and self-sacrifice. To that it will probably be said that +the charge breaks down on the fact that Christian teaching is full of +the exhortation that this world is of no moment, that we gain salvation +by learning to ignore its temptations and to forgo its pleasures, and +that it is, above all other faiths, the religion of personal sacrifice. +And that this teaching is there it would be stupid to deny. But this +does not disprove what has been said, indeed, analysis only serves to +make the truth still plainer. That many Christians have given up the +prizes of the world is too plain to be denied; that they have forsaken +all that many struggle to possess is also plain. But when this has been +admitted there still remains the truth that there is a vital distinction +in the consideration of whether a man gives up the world in order to +save his own soul, or whether he saves his soul as a consequence of +losing the world. In this matter it is the aim that is important, not +only to the outsider who may be passing judgment, but more importantly +to the agent himself. It is the effect of the motive on character with +its subsequent flowering in social life that must be considered. + +The first count in the indictment here is that the Christian appeal is +essentially a selfish one. The aim is not the saving of others but of +one's self. If other people must be saved it is because their salvation +is believed to be essential to the saving of one's own soul. That this +involves, or may involve, a surrender of one's worldly possessions or +comfort, is of no moment. Men will forgo many pleasures and give up much +when they have what they believe to be a greater purpose in view. We see +this in directions quite unconnected with religion. Politics will show +us examples of men who have forsaken many of what are to others the +comforts of life in the hopes of gaining power and fame. Others will +deny themselves many pleasures in the prospect of achieving some end +which to them is of far greater value than the things they are +renouncing. And it is the same principle that operates in the case of +religious devotees. There is no reason to doubt but that when a young +woman forsakes the world and goes into a cloister she is surrendering +much that has considerable attractions for her. But what she gives is to +her of small importance to what she gains in return. And if one believed +in Christianity, in immortal damnation, with the intensity of the great +Christian types of character, it would be foolish not to surrender +things of so little value for others of so great and transcendent +importance. + +To do Christians justice they have not usually made a secret of their +aim. Right through Christian literature there runs the teaching that it +is the desire of personal and immortal salvation that inspires them, and +they have affirmed over and over again that but for the prospect of +being paid back with tremendous interest in the next world they could +see no reason for being good in this one. That is emphatically the +teaching of the New Testament and of the greatest of Christian +characters. You are to give in secret that you may be rewarded openly, +to cast your bread upon the waters that it may be returned to you, and +Paul's counsel is that if there be no resurrection from the dead then we +may eat, drink, and be merry for death only is before us. Thus, what you +do is in the nature of a deliberate and conscious investment on which +you will receive a handsome dividend in the next world. And your +readiness to invest will be exactly proportionate to your conviction of +the soundness of the security. But there is in all this no perception of +the truly ethical basis of conduct, no indication of the inevitable +consequences of conduct on character. What is good is determined by what +it is believed will save one's own soul and increase the dividend in the +next world. What is bad is anything that will imperil the security. It +is essentially an appeal to what is grasping and selfish in human +nature, and while you may hide the true character of a thing by the +lavish use of attractive phrases, you cannot hinder it working out its +consequences in actual life. And the consequence of this has been that +while Christian teaching has been lavish in the use of attractive +phrases its actual result has been to create a type of character that +has been not so much immoral as _a_moral. And with that type the good +that has been done on the one side has been more than counterbalanced by +the evil done on the other. + +What the typical Christian character had in mind in all that he did was +neither the removal of suffering nor of injustice, but the salvation of +his own soul. That justified everything so long as it was believed to +contribute to that end. The social consequences of what was done simply +did not count. And if, instead of taking mere phrases from the +principal Christian writers, we carefully examine their meaning we shall +see that they were strangely devoid of what is now understood by the +expression "moral incentive." The more impressive the outbreak of +Christian piety the clearer does this become. No one could have +illustrated the Christian ideal of self-sacrifice better than did the +saints and monks of the earlier Christian centuries. Such a character as +the famous St. Simon Stylites, living for years on his pillar, filthy +and verminous, and yet the admired of Christendom, with the lives of +numerous other saints, whose sole claim to be remembered is that they +lived the lives of worse than animals in the selfish endeavours to save +their shrunken souls, will well illustrate this point. If it entered the +diseased imagination of these men that the road to salvation lay through +attending to the sick and the needy, they were quite ready to labour in +that direction; but of any desire to remove the horrible social +conditions that prevailed, or to remedy the injustice of which their +clients were the victims, there is seldom a trace. And, on the other +hand, if they believed that their salvation involved getting away from +human society altogether and leading the life of a hermit, they were as +ready to do that. If it meant the forsaking of husband or wife or parent +or child, these were left without compunction, and their desertion was +counted as proof of righteousness. The lives of the saints are full of +illustrations of this. Professor William James well remarks, in his +_Varieties of Religious Experience_, that "In gentle characters, where +devoutness is intense and the intellect feeble, we have an imaginative +absorption in the love of God to the exclusion of all practical human +interests.... When the love of God takes possession of such a mind it +expels all human loves and human uses." Of the Blessed St. Mary +Alacoque, her biographer points out that as she became absorbed in the +love of Christ she became increasingly useless to the practical life of +the convent. Of St. Teresa, James remarks that although a woman of +strong intellect his impression of her was a feeling of pity that so +much vitality of soul should have found such poor employment. And of so +famous a character as St. Augustine a Christian writer, Mr. A. C. +Benson, remarks:-- + + I was much interested in reading St. Augustine's _Confessions_ + lately to recognize how small a part, after his conversion, any + aspirations for the welfare of humanity seem to play in his mind + compared with the consciousness of his own personal relations with + God. It was this which gave him his exuberant sense of joy and + peace, and his impulse was rather the impulse of sharing a + wonderful and beautiful secret with others than an immediate desire + for their welfare, forced out of him, so to speak, by his own + exultation rather than drawn out of him by compassion for the needs + of others. + +That is one of the most constant features which emerges from a careful +study of the character of Christian types. St. Francis commenced his +career by leaving his parents. John Fox did the same. In that Puritan +classic, _The Pilgrim's Progress_, one of the outstanding features is +the striking absence of emphasis on the value of the social and domestic +virtues, and the Rev. Principal Donaldson notes this as one of the +features of early Christian literature in general. Christian preaching +was for centuries full of contemptuous references to "filthy rags of +righteousness," "mere morality," etc. The aim of the saints was a purely +selfish and personal one. It was not even a refined or a metaphysical +selfishness. It was a simple teaching that the one thing essential was +to save one's own soul, and that the main reason for doing good in this +world was to reap a benefit from it in the world to come. If it can +properly be called morality, it was conduct placed out at the highest +rate of interest. Christianity may often have used a naturally lofty +character, it was next to impossible for it to create one. + +If one examines the attack made by Christians upon Freethought morality, +it is surprising how often the truth of what has been said is implied. +For the complaint here is, in the main, not that naturalism fails to +give an adequate account of the nature and development of morality, but +that it will not satisfy mankind, and so fails to act as an adequate +motive to right conduct. When we enquire precisely what is meant by +this, we learn that if there is no belief in God, and if there is no +expectation of a future state in which rewards and punishments will be +dispensed, there remains no inducement to the average man or woman to do +right. It is the moral teaching of St. Paul over again. We are in the +region of morality as a deliberate investment, and we have the threat +that if the interest is not high enough or certain enough to satisfy the +dividend hunting appetite of the true believer, then the investment will +be withdrawn. Really this is a complaint, not that the morality which +ignores Christianity is too low but that it is too high. It is doubted +whether human nature, particularly Christian human nature, can rise to +such a level, and whether, unless you can guarantee a Christian a +suitable reward for not starving his family or for not robbing his +neighbour, he will continue to place any value on decency or honesty. + +So to state the case makes the absurdity of the argument apparent, but +unless that is what is meant it is difficult to make it intelligible. To +reply that Christians do not require these inducements to behave with a +tolerable amount of decency is not a statement that I should dispute; on +the contrary, I would affirm it. It is the Christian defender who makes +himself and his fellow believers worse than the Freethinker believes +them to be. For it is part of the case of the Freethinker that the +morality of the Christian has really no connection with his religion, +and that the net influence of his creed is to confuse and distort his +moral sense instead of developing it. It is the argument of the +Christian that makes the Freethinker superior to the Christian; it is +the Freethinker who declines the compliment and who asserts that the +social forces are adequate to guarantee the continuance of morality in +the complete absence of religious belief. + +How little the Christian religion appreciates the nature of morality is +seen by the favourite expression of Christian apologists that the +tendency of non-religion is to remove all moral "restraints." The use of +the word is illuminating. To the Christian morality is no more than a +system of restraints which aim at preventing a man gratifying his +appetite in certain directions. It forbids him certain enjoyments here, +and promises him as a reward for his abstention a greater benefit +hereafter. And on that assumption he argues, quite naturally, that if +there be no after life then there seems no reason why man should undergo +the "restraints" which moral rules impose. On this scheme man is a born +criminal and God an almighty policeman. That is the sum of orthodox +Christian morality. To assume that this conception of conduct can have a +really elevating effect on life is to misunderstand the nature of the +whole of the ethical and social problem. + +What has been said may go some distance towards suggesting an answer to +the question so often asked as to the reason for the moral failure of +Christianity. For that it has been a moral failure no one can doubt. +Nay, it is an assertion made very generally by Christians themselves. +Right from New Testament times the complaint that the conduct of +believers has fallen far short of what it should have been is constantly +met with. And there is not a single direction in which Christians can +claim a moral superiority over other and non-Christian peoples. They are +neither kinder, more tolerant, more sober, more chaste, nor more +truthful than are non-Christian people. Nor is it quite without +significance that those nations that pride themselves most upon their +Christianity are what they are. Their state reflects the ethical spirit +I have been trying to describe. For when we wipe out the disguising +phrases which we use to deceive ourselves--and it is almost impossible +to continually deceive others unless we do manage to deceive +ourselves--when we put on one side the "rationalizing" phrases about +Imperial races, carrying civilization to the dark places of the earth, +bearing the white man's burden, peopling the waste places of the earth, +etc., we may well ask what for centuries have the Christian nations of +the world been but so many gangs of freebooters engaged in world-wide +piracy? All over the world they have gone, fighting, stealing, killing, +lying, annexing, in a steadily rising crescendo. To be possessed of +natural wealth, without the means of resisting aggression, has for four +centuries been to invite the depredations of some one or more of the +Christian powers. It is the Christian powers that have militarized the +world in the name of the Prince of Peace, and made piracy a national +occupation in the name of civilization. Everywhere they have done these +things under the shelter of their religion and with the sanction of +their creed. Christianity has offered no effective check to the +cupidity of man, its chief work has been to find an outlet for it in a +disguised form. To borrow a term from the psycho-analysts, the task of +Christianity has been to "rationalize" certain ugly impulses, and so +provide the opportunity for their continuous expression. The world of +to-day is beginning to recognize the intellectual weakness of +Christianity; what it has next to learn is that its moral bankruptcy is +no less assured. + +One of the great obstacles in the way of this is the sentimentalism of +many who have given up all intellectual adherence to the Christian +creed. The power of the Christian Church has been so great, it has for +so long had control of the machinery of public education and +information, that many find it almost impossible to conclude that the +ethical spirit of Christianity is as alien to real progress as are its +cosmical teachings. The very hugeness of this century-old imposture +blinds many to its inherent defects. And yet the continuous and +world-wide moral failure of Christianity can only be accounted for on +the ground that it had a fatal moral defect from the start. I have +suggested above what is the nature of that defect. It has never regarded +morality as a natural social growth, but only as something imposed upon +man from without. It has had no other reason for its existence than the +fear of punishment and the hope of reward. Christian morality is the +morality of the stock exchange _plus_ the intellectual outlook of the +savage. And with that in control of national destinies our surprise +should be, not that things are as they are, but rather that with so +great a handicap the world has contrived to reach its present moderate +degree of development. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. + +RELIGION AND PERSECUTION. + + +Intolerance is one of the most general of what we may call the mental +vices. It is so general that few people seem to look upon it as a fault, +and not a few are prepared to defend it as a virtue. When it assumes an +extreme form, and its consequences are unpleasantly obvious, it may meet +with condemnation, but usually its nature is disguised under a show of +earnestness and sincere conviction. And, indeed, no one need feel called +upon to dispute the sincerity and the earnestness of the bigot. As we +have already pointed out, that may easily be seen and admitted. All that +one need remark is that sincerity is no guarantee of accuracy, and +earnestness naturally goes with a conviction strongly held, whether the +conviction be grounded on fact or fancy. The essential question is not +whether a man holds an opinion strongly, but whether he has taken +sufficient trouble to say that he has a right to have that opinion. Has +he taken the trouble to acquaint himself with the facts upon which the +expressed opinion is professedly based? Has he made a due allowance for +possible error, and for the possibility of others seeing the matter from +another and a different point of view? If these questions were frankly +and truthfully answered, it would be found that what we have to face in +the world is not so much opinion as prejudice. + +Some advance in human affairs is indicated when it is found necessary to +apologise for persecution, and a still greater one when men and women +feel ashamed of it. It is some of these apologies at which we have now +to glance, and also to determine, if possible, the probable causes of +the change in opinion that has occurred in relation to the subject of +persecution. + +A favourite argument with the modern religionist is that the element of +persecution, which it is admitted, has hitherto been found in +association with religion, is not due to religion as such, but results +from its connection with the secular power. Often, it is argued, the +State for its own purposes has seen fit to ally itself with the Church, +and when that has taken place the representatives of the favoured Church +have not been strong enough to withstand the temptation to use physical +force in the maintenance of their position. Hence the generalization +that a State Church is always a persecuting Church, with the corollary +that a Church, as such, has nothing to do with so secular a thing as +persecution. + +The generalization has all the attractiveness which appeals to those who +are not in the habit of looking beneath the surface, and in particular +to those whose minds are still in thraldom to religious beliefs. It is +quite true that State Churches have always persecuted, and it is equally +true that persecution on a general scale could not have been carried on +without the assistance of the State. On the other hand, it is just as +true that all Churches have persecuted within the limits of their +opportunity. There is no exception to this rule in any age or country. +On a wider survey it is also clear that all forms of religious belief +carry with them a tendency to persecution more or less marked. A close +examination of the facts will show that it is the tendency to toleration +that is developed by the secular power, and the opposite tendency +manifested by religion. + +It is also argued that intolerance is not a special quality of religion; +it is rather a fault of human nature. There is more truth in this than +in the previous plea, but it slurs over the indictment rather than meets +it. At any rate, it is the same human nature that meets us in religion +that fronts us in other matters, and there is no mistaking the fact that +intolerance is far more pronounced in relation to religion than to any +other subject. In secular matters--politics, science, literature, or +art--opinions may differ, feelings run high, and a degree of intolerance +be exhibited, but the right to differ remains unquestioned. Moreover, +the settlement of opinion by discussion is recognized. In religion it is +the very right of difference that is challenged, it is the right of +discussion that is denied. And it is in connection with religion alone +that intolerance is raised to the level of a virtue. Refusal to discuss +the validity of a religious opinion will be taken as the sign of a +highly developed spiritual nature, and a tolerance of diverging opinions +as an indication of unbelief. If a political leader refused to stand +upon the same platform with political opponents, on non-political +questions, nearly everyone would say that such conduct was intolerable. +But how many religious people are there who would see anything wrong in +the Archbishop of Canterbury refusing to stand upon the same platform as +a well-known Atheist? + +We are here approaching the very heart of the subject, and in what +follows I hope to make clear the truth of the following propositions: +(1) That the great culture ground of intolerance is religion; (2) That +the natural tendency of secular affairs is to breed tolerance; (3) That +the alliance of religion with the State has fostered persecution by the +State, the restraining influences coming from the secular half of the +partnership; (4) That the decline of persecution is due to causes that +are quite unconnected with religious beliefs. + +The first three points can really be taken together. So far as can be +seen there is no disinclination among primitive peoples to discuss the +pros and cons of matters that are unconnected with religious beliefs. So +soon as we get people at a culture stage where the course of events is +seen to be decided by human action, there goes on a tolerance of +conflicting opinions that is in striking contrast with what occurs with +such matters as are believed to directly involve the action of deity. +One could not expect things to be otherwise. In the carrying on of +warfare, as with many other tribal activities, so many of the +circumstances are of a determinable character, and are clearly to be +settled by an appeal to judgment and experience, that very early in +social history they must have presented themselves as a legitimate field +for discussion, and to discussion, as Bagehot says, nothing is sacred. +And as a matter of fact we have a survival of this to-day. However +intolerant the character, so long as we are dealing with secular matters +it is admitted that differences of opinion must be tolerated, and are, +indeed, necessary if we are to arrive at the wisest conclusion. The most +autocratic of monarchs will call upon his advisers and take their +dissension from his own views as a matter of course. But when we get to +the field of religion, it is no longer a question of the legitimacy of +difference, but of its wrongness. For a religious man to admit a +discussion as to whether his religious belief is founded on fact or not +is to imply a doubt, and no thoroughly religious man ever encourages +that. What we have is prayers to be saved from doubt, and deliberate +efforts to keep away from such conditions and circumstances as may +suggest the possibility of wrong. The ideal religious character is the +one who never doubts. + +It may also be noted, in passing, that in connection with religion there +is nothing to check intolerance at any stage. In relation to secular +matters an opinion is avowedly based upon verifiable facts and has no +value apart from those facts. The facts are common property, open to +all, and may be examined by all. In religion facts of a common and +verifiable kind are almost wanting. The facts of the religious life are +mainly of an esoteric character--visions, intuitions, etc. And while on +the secular side discussion is justified because of the agreement which +results from it, on the religious side the value of discussion is +discounted because it never does lead to agreement. The more people +discuss religion the more pronounced the disagreement. That is one +reason why the world over the only method by which people have been +brought to a state of agreement in religious doctrines is by excluding +all who disagreed. It is harmony in isolation. + +Now if we turn to religion we can see that from the very beginning the +whole tendency here was to stifle difference of opinion, and so +establish intolerance as a religious duty. The Biblical story of Jonah +is a case that well illustrates the point. God was not angry with the +rest of the ship's inhabitants, it was Jonah only who had given offence. +But to punish Jonah a storm was sent and the whole crew was in danger of +shipwreck. In their own defence the sailors were driven to throw Jonah +overboard. Jonah's disobedience was not, therefore, his concern alone. +All with him were involved; God was ready to punish the whole for the +offence of one. + +Now if for the ship we take a primitive tribe, and for Jonah a primitive +heretic, or one who for some reason or other has omitted a service to +the gods, we have an exact picture of what actually takes place. In +primitive societies rights are not so much individual as they are +social. Every member of the tribe is responsible to the members of other +tribes for any injury that may have been done. And as with the members +of another tribe, so with the relation of the tribe to the gods. If an +individual offends them the whole of the tribe may suffer. There is a +splendid impartiality about the whole arrangement, although it lacks all +that we moderns understand by Justice. But the point here is that it +makes the heretic not merely a mistaken person, but a dangerous +character. His heresy involves treason to the tribe, and in its own +defence it is felt that the heretic must be suppressed. How this feeling +lingers in relation to religion is well seen in the fact that there are +still with us large numbers of very pious people who are ready to see in +a bad harvest, a war, or an epidemic, a judgment of God on the whole of +the people for the sins of a few. It is this element that has always +given to religious persecutions the air of a solemn duty. To suppress +the heretic is something that is done in the interests of the whole of +the people. Persecution becomes both a religious and a social duty. + +The pedigree of religious persecution is thus clear. It is inherent in +religious belief, and to whatever extent human nature is prone to +intolerance, the tendency has been fostered and raised to the status of +a virtue by religious teaching and practice. Religion has served to +confuse man's sense of right here as elsewhere. + +We have thus two currents at work. On the one hand, there is the +influence of the secular side of life, which makes normally for a +greater tolerance of opinion, on the other side there is religion which +can only tolerate a difference of opinion to the extent that religious +doctrines assume a position of comparative unimportance. Instead of it +being the case that the Church has been encouraged to persecute by the +State, the truth is the other way about. I know all that may be said as +to the persecutions that have been set on foot by vested interests and +by governments, but putting on one side the consideration that this begs +the question of how far it has been the consequence of the early +influence of religion, there are obvious limits beyond which a secular +persecution cannot go. A government cannot destroy its subjects, or if +it does the government itself disappears. And the most thorough scheme +of exploitation must leave its victims enough on which to live. There +are numerous considerations which weigh with a secular government and +which have little weight with a Church. + +It may safely be said, for example, that no government in the world, in +the absence of religious considerations would have committed the +suicidal act which drove the Moors and the Jews from Spain.[24] As a +matter of fact, the landed aristocracy of Spain resisted suggestions for +expulsions for nearly a century because of the financial ruin they saw +would follow. It was the driving power of religious belief that finally +brought about the expulsion. Religion alone could preach that it was +better for the monarch to reign over a wilderness than over a nation of +Jews and unbelievers. The same thing was repeated a century later in the +case of the expulsion of the Huguenots from France. Here again the crown +resisted the suggestions of the Church, and for the same reason. And it +is significant that when governments have desired to persecute in their +own interests they have nearly always found it advantageous to do so +under the guise of religion. So far, and in these instances, it may be +true that the State has used religion for its own purpose of +persecution, but this does not touch the important fact that, given the +sanction of religion, intolerance and persecution assume the status of +virtues. And to the credit of the State it must be pointed out that it +has over and over again had to exert a restraining influence in the +quarrels of sects. It will be questioned by few that if the regulative +influence of the State had not been exerted the quarrels of the sects +would have made a settled and orderly life next to impossible. + +[24] For this, as well as for the general consequences of persecution on +racial welfare, see my pamphlet _Creed and Character_. + +So far as Christianity is concerned it would puzzle the most zealous of +its defenders to indicate a single direction in which it did anything to +encourage the slightest modification of the spirit of intolerance. +Mohammedans can at least point to a time when, while their religion was +dominant, a considerable amount of religious freedom was allowed to +those living under its control. In the palmy days of the Mohammedan rule +in Spain both Jews and Christians were allowed to practise their +religion with only trifling inconveniences, certainly without being +exposed to the fiendish punishments that characterized Christianity all +over the world. Moreover, it must never be overlooked that in Europe all +laws against heresy are of Christian origin. In the old Roman Empire +liberty of worship was universal. So long as the State religion was +treated with a moderate amount of respect one might worship whatever god +one pleased, and the number was sufficient to provide for the most +varied tastes. When Christians were proceeded against it was under laws +that did not aim primarily to shackle liberty of worship or of opinion. +The procedure was in every case formal, the trial public, time was given +for the preparation of the defence, and many of the judges showed their +dislike to the prosecutions.[25] But with the Christians, instead of +persecution being spasmodic it was persistent. It was not taken up by +the authorities with reluctance, but with eagerness, and it was counted +as the most sacred of duties. Nor was it directed against a sectarian +movement that threatened the welfare of the State. The worst periods of +Christian persecution were those when the State had the least to fear +from internal dissension. The persecuted were not those who were guilty +of neglect of social duty. On the contrary they were serving the State +by the encouragement of literature, science, philosophy, and commerce. +One of the Pagan Emperors, the great Trajan, had advised the magistrates +not to search for Christians, and to treat anonymous accusations with +contempt. Christians carried the search for heresy into a man's own +household. It used the child to obtain evidence against its own parents, +the wife to secure evidence against the husband; it tortured to provide +dictated confessions, and placed boxes at church doors to receive +anonymous accusations. It established an index of forbidden books, an +institution absolutely unknown to the pagan world. The Roman trial was +open, the accused could hear the charge and cite witnesses for the +defence. The Christian trial was in secret; special forms were used and +no witnesses for the defence were permitted. Persecution was raised to a +fine art. Under Christian auspices it assumed the most damnable form +known in the history of the world. "There are no wild beasts so +ferocious as Christians" was the amazed comment of the Pagans on the +behaviour of Christians towards each other, and the subsequent history +of Christianity showed that the Pagans were but amateurs in the art of +punishing for a difference of opinion. + +[25] I am taking the story of the persecutions of the early Christians +for granted, although the whole question is surrounded with the greatest +suspicion. As a matter of fact the accounts are grossly exaggerated, and +some of the alleged persecutions never occurred. The story of the +persecutions is so foreign to the temper of the Roman government as to +throw doubt on the whole account. The story of there being ten +persecutions is clearly false, the number being avowedly based upon the +legend of the ten plagues of Egypt. + +Up to a comparatively recent time there existed a practically unanimous +opinion among Christians as to the desirability of forcibly suppressing +heretical opinions. Whatever the fortunes of Christianity, and whatever +the differences of opinion that gradually developed among Christians +there was complete unanimity on this point. Whatever changes the +Protestant Reformation effected it left this matter untouched. In his +_History of Rationalism_ Lecky has brought forward a mass of evidence in +support of this, and I must refer to that work readers who are not +already acquainted with the details. Luther, in the very act of pleading +for toleration, excepted "such as deny the common principles of the +Christian religion, and advised that the Jews should be confined as +madmen, their synagogues burned and their books destroyed." The +intolerance of Calvin has became a byword; his very apology for the +burning of Servetus, entitled _A Defence of the Orthodox Faith_, bore +upon its title page the significant sentence "In which it is proved that +heretics may justly be coerced with the sword." His follower, Knox, was +only carrying out the teaching of the master in declaring that +"provoking the people to idolatry ought not to be exempt from the +penalty of death," and that "magistrates and people are bound to do so +(inflict the death penalty) unless they will provoke the wrath of God +against themselves." In every Protestant country laws against heresy +were enacted. In Switzerland, Geneva, Sweden, England, Germany, +Scotland, nowhere could one differ from the established faith without +running the risk of torture and death. Even in America, with the +exception of Maryland,[26] the same state of things prevailed. In some +States Catholic priests were subject to imprisonment for life, Quaker +women were whipped through the streets at the cart's tail, old men of +the same denomination were pressed to death between stones. At a later +date (about 1770) laws against heresy were general. "Anyone," says +Fiske,-- + + who should dare to speculate too freely about the nature of Christ, + or the philosophy of the plan of salvation, or to express a doubt + as to the plenary inspiration of every word between the two covers + of the Bible, was subject to fine and imprisonment. The tithing man + still arrested the Sabbath-breakers, and shut them up in the town + cage in the market-place; he stopped all unnecessary riding or + driving on Sunday, and haled people off to the meeting-house + whether they would or no.[27] + +[26] The case of Maryland is peculiar. But the reason for the toleration +there seems to have been due to the desire to give Catholics a measure +of freedom they could not have elsewhere in Protestant countries. + +[27] For a good sketch of the Puritan Sunday in New England see _The +Sabbath in Puritan New England_, by Alice Morse Earle. For an account of +religious intolerance see the account of the Blue Laws of Connecticut as +contained in Hart's _American History told by Contemporaries_, Vol. I. + +And we have to remember that the intolerance shown in America was +manifested by men who had left their own country on the ostensible +ground of freedom of conscience. As a matter of fact, in Christian +society genuine freedom of conscience was practically unknown. What was +meant by the expression was the right to express one's own religious +opinions, with the privilege of oppressing all with whom one happened to +disagree. The majority of Christians would have as indignantly +repudiated the assertion that they desired to tolerate non-Christian or +anti-Christian opinions as they would the charge of themselves holding +Atheistic ones. + +How deeply ingrained was the principle that the established religion was +justified in suppressing all others may be seen from a reading of such +works as Locke's _Letters on Toleration_, and Milton's _Areopagitica_, +which stand in the forefront of the world's writings in favour of +liberty of thought and speech. Yet Locke was of opinion that "Those are +not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, +covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no +hold upon an Atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in +thought, dissolves all." And Milton, while holding that it was more +prudent and wholesome that many be tolerated rather than all compelled, +yet hastened to add "I mean not tolerated popery and open superstition, +which as it extirpates all religious and civil supremacies so should +itself be extirpated." In short, intolerance had become so established a +part of a society saturated in religion that not even the most liberal +could conceive a state of being in which all opinions should be placed +upon an equal footing. + +Yet a change was all the time taking place in men's opinions on this +matter, a change which has in recent years culminated in the affirmation +of the principle that the coercion of opinion is of all things the least +desirable and the least beneficial to society at large. And as in so +many other cases, it was not the gradual maturing of that principle that +attracted attention so much as its statement in something like a +complete and logical form. The tracing of the conditions which have led +to this tremendous revolution in public opinion will complete our survey +of the subject. + +It has already been pointed out that in primitive societies a very +important fact is that the relation of the individual to the community +is of a different nature from that which exists in a later stage of +culture. The whole is responsible for the part in a very literal sense, +and especially so in regard to religious beliefs. Individual rights and +responsibilities have but a precarious existence at best. The individual +exists far more for the benefit of the tribe than the tribe can be said +to exist for the benefit of the individual. The sense of corporate +responsibility is strong, and even in secular affairs we see this +constantly manifested. When a member of one tribe inflicts an injury +upon a member of another tribe, retaliation on any one of the group to +which the offending person belongs will suffice. We see the remnants of +this primitive view of life in the feuds of schoolboys, and it is also +manifested in the relations of nations, which move upon a lower ethical +level than do individuals. Most wars are ostensibly waged because in +some obscure way the nation is held responsible for the offences of one +or more individuals. And an instance of the same feeling is seen in the +now obsolete practice of punishing the members of a man's family when +the parents happen to have committed certain offences. + +In religion, as we have already pointed out, the sense of corporate +responsibility completely governs primitive man's sense of his relation +to the tribal gods. In the development of the tribal chief into the +tribal god the ghost is credited with much the same powers as the man, +with the added terror of having more subtle and terrible ways of +inflicting punishment. The man who offends the ghost or the god is a +standing danger to the whole of the tribe. The whole of the tribe +becomes responsible for the offence committed, and the tribe in self +protection must not alone take measures to punish the offender, but must +also guard itself against even the possibility of the offence being +perpetrated. The consequence is that there is not a religion in which +one can fail to trace the presence of this primitive conception of +personal and social responsibility, and consequently, where we cannot +find persecution, more or less severe, and also more or less organized, +in the interest of what is believed to be social welfare. In the case of +the failure of the Spanish Armada to effect the conquest of England, the +Spanish monarch was convinced that its non-success was partly due to his +not having weeded out the heretics from his own dominion before +troubling about the heretics abroad. And right down to our own day there +has not been a national calamity the cause of which has not been found +by numbers of religious people to lie in the fact that some members of +the suffering nation have offended God. The heretic becomes, as we have +already said, a social danger of the gravest description. Society must +be guarded against his presence just as we learn to-day to protect +ourselves against the presence of a death-dealing germ. The suppression +of heresy thus becomes a social duty, because it protects society from +the anger of the gods. The destruction of the heretic is substantially +an act of social sanitation. Given the primitive conception of religion, +affiliated to the existing conception of corporate responsibility, and +persecution becomes one of the most important of social duties. + +This, I believe, is not alone the root of persecution, but it serves to +explain as nothing else can its persistence in social life and the fact +of its having became almost a general mental characteristic. To realize +this one need only bear in mind the overpowering part played by +religious conceptions in early communities. There is nothing done that +is not more or less under the assumed control of supernatural agencies. +Fear is the dominant emotion in relation to the gods, and experience +daily proves that there is nothing that can make men so brutal and so +callous to the sufferings of others as can religious belief. And while +there has all along been a growing liberation of the mind from the +control of religion, the process has been so slow that this particular +product of religious rule has had time to root itself very deeply in +human nature. And it is in accordance with all that we know of the order +of development that the special qualities engendered by a particular set +of conditions should persist long after the conditions themselves have +passed away. + +The conditions that co-operate in the final breaking down of the +conviction of the morality of persecution are many and various. +Primarily, there is the change from the social state in which the +conception of corporate responsibility is dominant to one in which there +is a more or less clearly marked line between what concerns the +individual alone and what concerns society as a whole. This is +illustrated in the growth from what Spencer called the military type of +society to an industrial one. In the case of a militant type of society, +to which the religious organization is so closely affiliated, a State is +more self contained, and the governing principle is, to use a +generalization of Sir Henry Maine's, status rather than contract. With +the growth of commerce and industrialism there is developed a greater +amount of individual initiative, a growing consideration for personal +responsibility, and also the development of a sense of interdependence +between societies. And the social developments that go on teach people, +even though the lesson may be unconsciously learned, to value each +other in terms of social utility rather than in terms of belief in +expressed dogmas. They are brought daily into contact with men of widely +differing forms of opinion; they find themselves working in the same +movements, and participating in the same triumphs or sharing the same +defeats. Insensibly the standard of judgment alters; the strength of the +purely social feelings overpowers the consciousness of theological +differences, and thus serves to weaken the frame of mind from which +persecution springs. + +The growing complexity of life leads to the same end. Where the +conditions of life are simple, and the experiences through which people +pass are often repeated, and where, moreover, the amount of positive +knowledge current is small, conclusions are reached rapidly, and the +feeling of confidence in one's own opinions is not checked by seeing +others draw different conclusions from the same premises. Under such +conditions an opinion once formed is not easily or quickly changed. +Experience which makes for wider knowledge makes also for greater +caution in forming opinions and a greater readiness to tolerate +conclusions of an opposite character at which others may have arrived. + +Finally, on the purely intellectual side one must reckon with the growth +of new ideas, and of knowledge that is in itself quite inconsistent with +the established creed. If the primary reason for killing the heretic is +that he is a social danger, one who will draw down on the tribe the +vengeance of the gods, the strength of that feeling against the heretic +must be weakened by every change that lessens men's belief in the power +of their deity. And one must assume that every time a fresh piece of +definite knowledge was acquired towards the splendid structure that now +meets us in the shape of modern science there was accomplished +something that involved an ultimate weakening of the belief in the +supremacy of the gods. The effect is cumulative, and in time it is bound +to make itself felt. Religious opinion after religious opinion finds +itself attacked and its power weakened. Things that were thought to be +solely due to the action of the gods are found to occur without their +being invoked, while invocation does not make the slightest difference +to the production of given results. Scientific generalizations in +astronomy, in physics, in biology, etc., follow one another, each +helping to enforce the lesson that it really does not matter what +opinions a man may hold about the gods provided his opinions about the +world in which he is living and the forces with which he _must_ deal are +sound and solidly based. In a world where opinion is in a healthy state +of flux it is impossible for even religion to remain altogether +unchanged. So we have first a change in the rigidity of religious +conceptions, then a greater readiness to admit the possibility of error, +and, finally, the impossibility of preventing the growth and expression +of definitely non-religious and anti-religious opinions in a community +where all sorts of opinions cannot but arise. + +With the social consequences of religious persecution, and particularly +of Christian persecution, I have dealt elsewhere, and there is no need +to repeat the story here. I have been here concerned with making plain +the fact that persecution does not arise with a misunderstanding of +religion, or with a decline of what is vaguely called "true religion," +nor does it originate in the alliance of some Church with the secular +State. It lies imbedded in the very nature of religion itself. With +polytheism there is a certain measure of toleration to gods outside the +tribe, because here the admitted existence of a number of gods is part +of the order of things. But this tendency to toleration disappears when +we come to the monotheistic stage which inevitably treats the claim to +existence of other gods in the same spirit as an ardent royalist treats +the appearance of a pretender to the throne. To tolerate such is a crime +against the legitimate ruler. And when we get the Christian doctrine of +eternal damnation and salvation tacked on to the religious idea we have +all the material necessary to give the persecutor the feeling of moral +obligation, and to make him feel that he is playing the part of a real +saviour to society. + +At bottom that is one of the chief injuries that a religion such as +Christianity inflicts on the race; it throws human feeling into some of +the most objectionable forms, and provides a religious and moral +justification for their expression. The very desire to benefit one's +fellows, normally and naturally healthy, thus becomes under Christian +influences an instrument of oppression and racial degradation. The +Christian persecutor does not see himself for what he is, he pictures +himself as a saviour of men's souls by suppressing the unbeliever who +would corrupt them. And if Christianity be true he is correct in +thinking himself such. I have no hesitation in saying that if +Christianity be true persecution becomes the most important of duties. A +community that is thoroughly Christian is bound to persecute, and as a +mere matter of historic fact every wholly Christian community has +persecuted. The community which says that a man may take any religion he +pleases, or go without one altogether if he so chooses, proclaims its +disbelief in the importance of religion. The measure of religious +freedom is also the measure of religious indifference. + +There are some experiences through which a human being may pass the +effects of which he never completely outgrows. Usually he may appear to +have put them quite out of his mind, but there are times when he is +lifted a little out of the normal, and then the recollection of what he +has passed through comes back with terrifying force. And acute observers +may also be able to perceive that even in normal circumstances what he +has passed through manifests itself for the worse in his everyday +behaviour. So with religion and the life history of the race. For +thousands of generations the race has been under the influence of a +teaching that social welfare depended upon a right belief about the +gods. The consequence of this has been that persecution became deeply +ingrained in human nature and in the social traditions which play so +large a part in the character building of each new generation. We have +as yet hardly got beyond the tradition that lack of religion robs a man +of social rights and dispenses with the necessity for courteous and +considered treatment. And there is, therefore, small cause for wonder +that the element of intolerance should still manifest itself in +connection with non-religious aspects of life. But the certain thing is +that throughout the whole of our social history it is religion that has +been responsible for the maintenance of persecution as a social duty. +Something has been done in more recent times to weaken its force, the +growth of science, the rationalizing of one institution after +another--in a word, the secularizing of life--is slowly creating more +tolerant relations between people. But the poison is deep in the blood, +and will not be eradicated in a generation. Religion is still here, and +so long as it remains it will never cease--under the guise of an appeal +to the higher sentiments of man--to make its most effective appeals to +passions of which the best among us are most heartily ashamed. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII. + +WHAT IS TO FOLLOW RELIGION? + + +Books on the future of religion are numerous, and to one blessed with a +sense of humour, full of entertainment. They are also not without +instruction of a psychological kind. Reliable information as to what the +future will be like they certainly do not give, but they do unlock the +innermost desires of the writers thereof. They express what the writers +of the prophecies would like the future to be. And they create the +future state on earth exactly as devout believers have built up the +character of their heaven beyond the clouds. Every form of faith which +they disagree with is rejected as not possessing the element of +vitality, with the result that there is only their own form left. And +that, they triumphantly proclaim, is the religion of the future. + +But the future has an old-fashioned and disconcerting habit of +disappointing expectations. The factors that govern human nature are so +many and so complex, their transmutations and combinations are so +numerous, that it is as well to tread cautiously, and to a very +considerable extent leave the future to take care of itself. At the +utmost all that we can do with safety is to detect tendencies, and to +hasten or retard their development as we think them good or bad. The +factors that make up a science of human nature are not to-day so +well-known and so well understood that we can depict the state of +society a century hence with the same certainty that we can foretell the +position of the planet Venus in the year 2000. + +My aim in this chapter is, therefore, not to describe precisely what +will be the state of society when religious belief has ceased to exist. +It is rather to offer a general reply to those gloomy individuals who +declare that when the aims of the Freethinker are fully realized we +shall find that in destroying religion we have destroyed pretty much all +that makes human life worth living. We have managed to empty the baby +out with the bath. + +The most general form of this fear is expressed in calling Freethought a +creed of negation, or a policy of destruction, and assuring the world +that mankind can never rest content with such things. That may be quite +true, but we fail to see in what way it touches Freethought. A +Freethought that is wholly destructive, that is a mere negation, is a +creation of the pulpit, and belongs to the same class of imaginative +efforts as the pietistic outbursts of famous unbelievers on their +death-beds. That such things could have obtained so wide a currency, and +be looked upon as quite natural occurrences, offers demonstrative +evidence of the paralyzing power of Christian belief on the human mind. + +As a matter of fact, neither reformers in general nor Freethinkers in +particular deserve the charge of being mere destructionists. They are +both far more interested in building up than they are in pulling down, +and it is sheer lack of understanding that fixes the eyes of so many on +one aspect of the reformer's task and so steadily ignores the other one. +Of course, the phenomenon is not an unusual one. In a revolution it is +the noise, the street fighting, the breaking of old rules and the +shattering of established institutions that attract the most attention. +The deeper aims of the revolutionists, the hidden social forces of which +the revolution is the expression, the work of reconstruction that is +attempted, escape notice. The old order shrieks its loudest at the +threat of dissolution, the new can hardly make its voice heard. +Carlyle's division of the people into the shrieking thousands and the +dumb millions is eternally true. And even the millions are impressed +with the importance of the thousands because of the noise they are able +to make. + +Actually the charge to which reformers in general are open is that of a +too great zeal for reconstruction, a belittling of the difficulties that +stand in the way of a radical change. They are apt to make too small an +allowance for the occurrence of the unexpected and the incalculable, +both of which are likely to interfere with the fruition of the most +logical of schemes. And they are so obsessed with reconstruction that +destruction seems no more than an incident by the way. A little less +eagerness for reconstruction might easily result in a greater concern +for what is being pulled down. The two greatest "destructive" movements +of modern times--the French revolution of 1789 and the Russian +revolution--both illustrate this point. In both movements the leading +figures were men who were obsessed with the idea of building a new +world. They saw this new world so clearly that the old one was almost +ignored. And this is equally true of the literature that precedes and is +the mouthpiece of such movements. The leading appeal is always to what +is to be, what existed is only used as a means of enforcing the +desirability of the new order. It is, in short, the mania for +reconstruction that is chiefly responsible for the destruction which so +horrifies those whose vision can never see anything but the world to +which they have become accustomed. + +In parenthesis it may be remarked that it is a tactical blunder to make +one's attack upon an existing institution or idea depend upon the +attractiveness of the ideal state depicted. It enables critics to fix +attention on the precise value of the proposed remedy instead of +discussing whether the suggested reform is necessary. The attacker is +thus placed in the position of the defender and the point at issue +obscured. This is, that a certain institution or idea has outgrown its +usefulness and its removal is necessary to healthy growth. And it may +well be that its removal is all that is required to enable the social +organism to function naturally and healthily. The outworn institution is +often the grit in the machine that prevents it running smoothly. + +This by the way. The fact remains that some of our best teachers have +shown themselves apt to stumble in the matter. Without belief in +religion they have too often assumed that its removal would leave a +serious gap in life, and so would necessitate the creation of a number +of substitutes to "take the place of religion." Thus, no less profound a +thinker than Herbert Spencer remarks in the preface to his _Data of +Ethics_:-- + + Few things can happen more disastrous than the death and decay of a + regulative system no longer fit, before another and a better + regulative system has grown up to replace it. Most of those who + reject the current creed appear to assume that the controlling + agency furnished by it may safely be thrown aside, and the vacancy + left unfilled by any other controlling agency. + +Had Spencer first of all set himself to answer the question, "What is it +that the Freethinker sets himself to remove?" or even the question, +"What is the actual control exerted by religion?" one imagines that the +passage above given would either never have been written or would have +been differently worded. And when a man such as Spencer permits himself +to put the matter in this form one need not be surprised at the ordinary +believer assuming that he has put an unanswerable question to the +Freethinker when he asks what it is that we propose to put in the place +of religion, with the assumption that the question is on all fours with +the enquiry as to what substitutes we have for soap and coal if we +destroy all stocks of these articles. + +The question assumes more than any scientific Freethinker would ever +grant. It takes for granted the statement that religion does at present +perform some useful function in the State. And that is the very +statement that is challenged. Nor does the Freethinker deny that some +"controlling agency" is desirable. What he does say is that in the +modern State, at least, religion exerts no control for good, that its +activities make for stagnation or retrogression, that its removal will +make for the healthier operation of other agencies, and that to these +other and non-religious agencies belongs the credit which is at present +given to religion. + +Moreover, Spencer should not have needed reminding that systems of +thought while they have any vital relation to life will successfully +defy all attempts at eradication. The main cause of the decay of +religion is not the attack made upon it by the forces of reasoned +unbelief. That attack is largely the conscious expression of a revolt +against a system that has long lost all touch with reality, and so has +ceased to derive support from current life and thought. From this point +of view the reformer is what he is because he is alive to the drift of +events, susceptible to those social influences which affect all more or +less, and his strength is derived from the thousand and one subtle +influences that extend from generation to generation and express +themselves in what we are pleased to call the story of civilization. + +But the quotation given does represent a fairly common point of view, +and it is put in a form that is most favourable to religious +pretensions. For it assumes that religion does really in our modern +lives perform a function so useful that it would be the height of folly +to remove it before we had something equally useful to take its place. +But something in the place of religion is a thing that no scientific +Freethinker desires. It is not a new religion, or another religion that +the world needs, but the removal of religion from the control of life, +and a restatement of those social qualities that have hitherto been +expressed in a religious form so that their real nature will be apparent +to all. Then we shall at last begin to make progress with small chance +of getting a serious set-back. + +This does not, of course, deny that there are many things associated +with religion for the absence of which society would have cause for +regret. It is part of the Freethought case that this is so. And it may +also be admitted that large numbers of people honestly believe that +their religious beliefs serve as motives to the expression of their +better qualities. That, again, is part of the delusion we are fighting. +We cannot agree that religion, as such, contains anything that is +essentially useful to the race. It has maintained its power chiefly +because of its association with serviceable social qualities, and it is +part of the work of Freethought to distinguish between what properly +belongs to religion and what has become associated with it during its +long history. At present the confusion exists and the fact need cause no +surprise. At best the instincts of man are deep-laid, the motives to +conduct are mostly of an obscure kind, and it would be cause for +surprise if, seeing how closely religion is associated with every phase +of primitive life, and how persistent are primitive modes of thinking, +there were not this confusion between the actual part played by religion +in life and the part assigned it by tradition. + +At any rate, it is idle to argue as though human conduct was governed by +a single idea--that of religion. At the most religious beliefs represent +no more than a part of the vast mass of influences that determine human +effort. And when we see how largely religious beliefs are dependent upon +constant stimulation and protection for their existence, it seems +extremely unlikely that they can hold a very vital relation to life. The +impotency of religion in matters of conduct is, too, decisively shown in +the fact that it is quite impossible to arrange men and women in a scale +of values that shall correspond with the kind or the fervency of their +religious beliefs. A religious person may be a useful member of society +or he may be a quite useless one. A profound religious conviction may be +accompanied by the loftiest of ideals or by the meanest of aims. The +unbeliever may be, and often is, a better man than the believer. No +business man would ever think of making a man's religion the condition +of taking one into his service, or if he did the general opinion would +be that it indicated bigotry and not shrewdness. We find it quite +impossible to determine the nature of religious belief by watching the +way people behave. In no stage of social life does religion provide us +with anything in the nature of a differentiating factor. + +It was argued by the late Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, himself a +Freethinker, that as men have for a long time been in the habit of +associating moral feelings with the belief in God, a severance of the +two may entail moral disaster. It is, of course, hard to say what may +not happen in certain cases, but it is quite certain that such a +consequence could not follow on any general scale. One has only to bring +a statement of this kind down from the region of mere theory to that of +definite fact to see how idle the fear is. If, instead of asserting in a +vague way that the moral life is in some way bound up with religious +beliefs we ask what moral action or moral disposition is so connected, +we realize the absurdity of the statement. Professor Leuba well says:-- + + Our alleged essential dependence upon transcendental beliefs is + belied by the most common experiences of daily life. Who does not + feel the absurdity of the opinion that the lavish care for a sick + child by a mother is given because of a belief in God and + immortality? Are love of father and mother on the part of children, + affection and serviceableness between brothers and sisters, + straightforwardness and truthfulness between business men + essentially dependent upon these beliefs? What sort of person would + be the father who would announce divine punishment or reward in + order to obtain the love and respect of his children? And if there + are business men preserved from unrighteousness by the fear of + future punishment, they are far more numerous who are deterred by + the threat of human law. Most of them would take their chances with + heaven a hundred times before they would once with society, or + perchance with the imperative voice of humanity heard in the + conscience (_The Belief in God and Immortality_, p. 323). + +And in whatever degree the fear may be justified in special cases, it +applies to any attempt whatever that may be made to disturb existing +conventions. Luther complained that some of his own converts were +behaving worse as Protestants than they behaved as Catholics, and even +in the New Testament we have the same unfavourable comparison made of +many of Christ's followers when compared with the Pagans around them. A +transference of allegiance may easily result in certain ill-balanced +minds kicking over the traces, but in the long run, and with the mass, +the deeper social needs are paramount. There was the same fear expressed +concerning man's political and social duties when the relations of +Church and State were first challenged. Yet the connection between the +two has been quite severed in some countries, and very much weakened in +many more, without society in the least suffering from the change. On +the contrary, one may say that man's duties towards the State have been +more intelligently perceived and more efficiently discharged in +proportion as those religious considerations that once ruled have been +set on one side. + +The reply of the Freethinker to the question of "What is to follow +religion?" may, therefore, easily be seen. In effect it is, "Nothing at +all." In any study of social evolution the properly equipped student +commences his task with the full conviction that whatever the future may +be like its germs are already with us. If nature does not "abhor a +vacuum" it has at least an intense dislike to absolute beginnings. The +future will be an elaboration of the present as the present is an +elaboration of the past. For good or evil that principle remains +unimpeachable. + +The essential question is not, What is to follow religion? but rather +what will the disappearance of religion affect that is of real value to +the world. The moment the question is raised in this unambiguous manner +the answer suggests itself. For assume that by some strange and +unexpected happening there set in a raging epidemic of common sense. +Assume that as a consequence of this the world was to awake with its +mind completely cleared of all belief in religion. What would be the +effect of the transformation? It is quite clear that it would not affect +any of the fundamental processes of life. The tragi-comedy of life would +still be performed, it would run through the same number of acts, and it +would end in the same happy or unhappy manner. Human beings would still +get born, they would grow up, they would fall in love, they would marry, +they would beget their kind, and they would in turn pass away to make +room for another generation. Birth and death, with all their +accompanying feelings, would remain. Human society would continue, all +the glories of art, the greatness of science, all the marvels and +wonders of the universe would be there whether we believed in a God or +not. The only difference would be that we should no longer associate +these things with the existence of a God. And in that respect we should +be following the same course of development that has been followed in +many other departments of life. We do not nowadays associate the +existence of spirits with a good or a bad harvest, the anger of God with +an epidemic, or the good-will of deity with a spell of fine weather. Yet +in each case there was once the same assumed association between these +things, and the same fears of what would happen if that association was +discarded. We are only carrying the process a step further; all that is +required is a little courage to take the step. In short, there is not a +single useful or worthy quality, intellectual or moral, that can +possibly suffer from the disappearance of religion. + +On this point we may again quote from Professor Leuba:-- + + The heroism of religious martyrs is often flaunted as marvellous + instances of the unique sustaining strength derived from the belief + in a personal God and the anticipation of heaven. And yet for + every martyr of this sort there has been one or more heroes who has + risked his life for a noble cause, without the comfort which + transcendental beliefs may bring. The very present offers almost + countless instances of martyrs to the cause of humanity, who are + strangers to the idea of God and immortality. How many men and + women in the past decade gladly offered and not infrequently lost + their lives in the cause of freedom, or justice, or science? In the + monstrous war we are now witnessing, is there a less heroic defence + of home and nation, and less conscious self-renunciation among the + non-believers than among the professed Christians? Have modern + nations shown a more intense or a purer patriotism than ancient + Greece and Rome, where men did not pretend to derive inspiration + for their deeds of devotion in the thoughts of their gods.... The + fruitful deeds of heroism are at bottom inspired not by the thought + of God or a future life, but by innate tendencies or promptings + that have reference to humanity. Self sacrifice, generosity, is + rooted in nothing less superficial and accidental than social + instincts older than the human race, for they are already present + in a rudimentary form in the higher animals. + +These are quite familiar statements to all Freethinkers, but to a great +many Christians they may come with all the force of a new revelation. + +In the earlier pages of this work I have given what I conceive solid +reasons for believing that every one of the social and individual +virtues is born of human intercourse and can never be seriously deranged +for any length of time, so long as human society endures. The scale of +values may well undergo a change with the decay of religion, but that is +something which is taking place all the time, provided society is not in +a state of absolute stagnation. There is not any change that takes +place in society that does not affect our view of the relative value of +particular qualities. The value we place upon personal loyalty to a king +is not what it once was. At one stage a man is ready to place the whole +of his fortune at the disposal of a monarch merely because he happens to +be his "anointed" king. To-day, the man who had no better reason for +doing that would be looked upon as an idiot. Unquestioning obedience to +established authority, which once played so high a part in the education +of children, is now ranked very low by all who understand what genuine +education means. From generation to generation we go on revising our +estimate of the value of particular qualities, and the world is the +better for the revision. And that is what we may assume will occur with +the decay of religious belief. We shall place a higher value upon +certain qualities than we do at present and a lower value upon others. +But there will be no discarding the old qualities and creation of new +ones. Human nature will be the same then as now, as it has been for +thousands of years. The nature of human qualities will be more directly +conceived and more intelligently applied, and that will be an +undesirable development only for those who live by exploiting the +ignorance and the folly of mankind. + +Thus, if one may venture upon a prophecy with regard to the +non-religious society of the future it may be said with confidence that +what are known as the ascetic qualities are not likely to increase in +value. The cant of Christianity has always placed an excessive value +upon what is called self-sacrifice. But there is no value in +self-sacrifice, as such. At best it is only of value in exceptional +circumstances, as an end it is worse than useless, and it may easily +degenerate from a virtue to a vice. It assumed high rank with Christian +teachers for various reasons. First, it was an expression of that +asceticism which lies at the root of Christianity, second, because +Christianity pictured this world as no more than a preparation for +another, and taught that the deprivations and sufferings of the present +life would be placed to a credit account in the next one, and third, +because it helped men and women to tolerate injustice in this world and +so helped the political game that governments and the Christian Church +have together played. A really enlightened society would rank +comparatively low the virtue of asceticism. Its principle would be not +self-sacrifice but self-development. + +What must result from this is an enlargement of our conception of +justice and also of social reform. Both of these things occupy a very +low place in the Christian scale of virtues. Social reform it has never +bothered seriously about, and in its earlier years simply ignored. A +people who were looking for the end of the world, whose teaching was +that it was for man's spiritual good to suffer, and who looked for all +help to supernatural intervention, could never have had seriously in +their minds what we understand by social reform. And so with the +conception of Justice. There is much of this in pre-Christian +literature, and its entrance into the life and thought of modern Europe +can be traced directly back to Greek and Roman sources. But the work of +the Christian, while it may have been to heal wounds, was not to prevent +their infliction. It was to minister to poverty, not to remove those +conditions that made poverty inevitable. + +A Spanish writer has put this point so well that I cannot do better than +quote him. He says:-- + + The notion of justice is as entirely foreign to the spirit of + Christianity as is that of intellectual honesty. It lies wholly + outside the field of its ethical vision. Christianity--I am not + referring to interpretations disclaimed as corruptions or + applications which may be set down to frailty and error, but to the + most idealized conceptions of its substance and the most exalted + manifestations of its spirit--Christianity has offered consolation + and comfort to men who suffered under injustice, but of that + injustice itself it has remained absolutely incognizant. It has + called upon the weary and heavy laden, upon the suffering and the + afflicted, it has proclaimed to them the law of love, the duty of + mercy and forgiveness, the Fatherhood of God; but in that torment + of religious and ethical emotion which has impressed men as the + summit of the sublime, and been held to transcend all other ethical + ideals, common justice, common honesty have no place. The ideal + Christian is seen in the saint who is seen descending like an angel + from heaven amid the welter of human misery, among the victims of + ruthless oppression and injustice ... but the cause of that misery + lies wholly outside the range of his consciousness; no glimmer of + right or wrong enters into his view of it. It is the established + order of things, the divinely appointed government of the world, + the trial laid upon sinners by divine ordinance. St. Vincent de + Paul visits the hell of the French galleys; he proclaims the + message of love and calls sinners to repentance; but to the + iniquity which creates and maintains that hell he remains + absolutely indifferent. He is appointed Grand Almoner to his Most + Christian Majesty. The world might groan in misery under the + despotism of oppressors, men's lives and men's minds might be + enslaved, crushed and blighted; the spirit of Christianity would go + forth and _comfort_ them, but it would never occur to it to redress + a single one of those wrongs. It has remained unconscious of them. + To those wrongs, to men's right to be delivered from them, it was + by nature completely blind. In respect to justice, to right and + wrong, the spirit of Christianity is not so much immoral as amoral. + The notion was as alien to it as the notion of truth. Included in + its code was, it might be controversially alleged, an old formula, + "the golden rule," a commonplace of most literature, which was + popular in the East from China to Asia Minor; but that isolated + precept was never interpreted in the sense of justice. It meant + forgiveness, forbearing, kindness, but never mere justice, common + equity; those virtues were far too unemotional in aspect to appeal + to the religious enthusiast. The renunciation of life and all its + vanities, the casting overboard of all sordid cares for its + maintenance, the suppression of desire, prodigal almsgiving, the + consecration of a life, the value of which had disappeared in his + eyes, to charity and love, non-resistance, passive obedience, the + turning of the other cheek to an enemy, the whole riot of these + hyperbolic ethical emotions could fire the Christian consciousness, + while it remained utterly unmoved by every form of wrong, iniquity + and injustice (Dr. Falta de Gracia. Cited by Dr. R. Briffault, _The + Making of Humanity_, pp. 334-5.) + +That, we may assume, will be one of the most striking consequences of +the displacement of Christianity in the social economy. There will be +less time wasted on what is called philanthropic work--which is often +the most harmful of all social labours--and more attention to the +removal of those conditions that have made the display of philanthropy +necessary. There will not be less feeling for the distressed or the +unfortunate, but it will be emotion under the guidance of the intellect, +and the dominant feeling will be that of indignation against the +conditions that make human suffering and degradation inevitable, rather +than a mere gratification of purely egoistic feeling which leaves the +source of the evil untouched. + +That will mean a rise in the scale of values of what one may call the +intellectual virtues--the duty of truthseeking and truth speaking. +Hitherto the type of character held up for admiration by Christianity +has been that of the blind believer who allowed nothing to stand in the +way of his belief, who required no proofs of its truth and allowed no +disproofs to enter his mind. A society in which religion does not hold a +controlling place is not likely to place a very high value upon such +precepts as "Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed," +or "Though he slay me yet will I trust him." But a very high value will +be placed upon the duty of investigation and the right of criticism. And +one cannot easily over-estimate the consequences of a generation or two +brought up in an atmosphere where such teachings obtain. It would mean a +receptiveness to new ideas, a readiness to overhaul old institutions, a +toleration of criticism such as would rapidly transform the whole mental +atmosphere and with it enormously accentuate the capacity for, and the +rapidity of, social progress. + +There is also to be borne in mind the effect of the liberation of the +enormous amount of energy at present expended in the service of +religion. Stupid religious controversialists often assume that it is +part of the Freethinker's case that religion enlists in its service bad +men, and much time is spent in proving that religious people are mostly +worthy ones. That could hardly be otherwise in a society where the +overwhelming majority of men and women profess a religion of some sort. +But that is, indeed, not the Freethinker's case at all, and if the +badness of some religious people is cited it is only in answer to the +foolish argument that religionists are better than others. The real +complaint against religion is of a different kind altogether. Just as +the worst thing that one can say about a clergyman intellectually is, +not that he does not believe in what he preaches, but that he does, so +the most serious indictment of current religion is not that it enlists +in its service bad characters, but that it dissipates the energy of +good men and women in a perfectly useless manner. The dissipation of +Christian belief means the liberating of a store of energy for service +that is at present being expended on ends that are without the least +social value. A world without religion would thus be a world in which +the sole ends of endeavour would be those of human betterment or human +enlightenment, and probably in the end the two are one. For there is no +real betterment without enlightenment, even though there may come for a +time enlightenment without betterment. It would leave the world with all +the means of intellectual and aesthetic and social enjoyment that exist +now, and one may reasonably hope that it will lead to their cultivation +and diffusion over the whole of society. + + + _Printed and Published by_ + THE PIONEER PRESS + (G. W. FOOTE & CO., LTD.), + _61 Farringdon Street, London, E.C. 4_. + + + + +ANNOUNCEMENTS. + + +THE SECULAR SOCIETY, Limited. + +_Registered Office_: 62 Farringdon Street, London, E.C. 4. + +_Secretary_: Miss E. M. 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Price 1s. 6d. per + 100, postage 3d. + + DYING FREETHINKERS. By CHAPMAN COHEN. Price 1s. 6d. per 100, postage + 3d. + + THE BELIEFS OF UNBELIEVERS. By CHAPMAN COHEN. Price 1s. 6d. per 100, + postage 3d. + + ARE CHRISTIANS INFERIOR TO FREETHINKERS? By CHAPMAN COHEN. Price 1s. + 6d., per 100, postage 3d. + + DOES MAN DESIRE GOD? By CHAPMAN COHEN. Price 1s. 6d. per 100, postage + 3d. + +THE PIONEER PRESS, 61 Farringdon Street, E.C. 4. + + + READ + + THE FREETHINKER + + EDITED BY + CHAPMAN COHEN. + + Brilliant Articles by Capable Writers on + Religion, Literature, and Life. + + One of the Liveliest and Most Outspoken + Journals in Great Britain. + + _PUBLISHED EVERY THURSDAY._ + + PRICE THREEPENCE. + + Of all Newsagents, or direct from the Publishing Office, + 61 FARRINGDON STREET, LONDON, E.C. 4. + + _SPECIMEN COPY POST FREE._ + + + + +Transcriber's Note: + + +Minor punctuation errors and letters printed upside down have been +corrected without note. Inconsistent hyphenation (e.g. common-place vs. +commonplace) has been retained. Variant and unusual spellings used +consistently (e.g. indispensible) have also been kept. + +The following corrections and changes were made to the text: + +p. 65: knowlelge to knowledge (accumulation of knowledge) + +p. 98: upder to under (under the old Greek) + +p. 102: extra "to" removed (owe their belief to the philosophical) + +p. 114: sterotyped to stereotyped (stereotyped phraseology) + +p. 132: developes to develops (organ or an organism develops) + +p. 157: it to is (After this lame conclusion it is difficult) + +p. 186: percieves to perceives (provided a man perceives) + +p. 190: Zeigler to Ziegler (Professor Ziegler) + +p. 215: mayority to majority (majority of Christians) + +p. 216: precariout to precarious (precarious existence at best) + +Advertisements: entrace to entrance (an entrance fee of ten shillings) + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's A Grammar of Freethought, by Chapman Cohen + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A GRAMMAR OF FREETHOUGHT *** + +***** This file should be named 36882.txt or 36882.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/6/8/8/36882/ + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, S.D., and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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