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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Know the Truth; A critique of the
+Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation, by Jesse H. Jones
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Know the Truth; A critique of the Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation
+
+Author: Jesse H. Jones
+
+Release Date: October 27, 2011 [EBook #37864]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KNOW THE TRUTH; A CRITIQUE ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Charlene Taylor, Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe,
+Matthew Wheaton and the Online Distributed Proofreading
+Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from
+images generously made available by the Digital & Multimedia
+Center, Michigan State University Libraries.)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+    KNOW THE TRUTH;
+
+    A CRITIQUE ON THE HAMILTONIAN THEORY OF LIMITATION,
+
+    INCLUDING
+
+    SOME STRICTURES UPON THE THEORIES OF REV. HENRY L. MANSEL AND
+    MR. HERBERT SPENCER
+
+    BY JESSE H. JONES
+
+
+    "Give me to see, that I may know where to strike."
+
+
+    NEW YORK:
+    PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR BY HURD AND HOUGHTON.
+    BOSTON: NICHOLS AND NOYES
+    1865.
+
+
+    Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865, by JESSE
+    H. JONES, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the
+    Southern District of New York.
+
+    RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE:
+    STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY
+    H. O. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY.
+
+
+    Dedication.
+
+    TO MY FELLOW-STUDENTS AND FRIENDS OF ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL
+    SEMINARY WHO HAVE READ MANSEL AND REJECTED HIS TEACHINGS,
+
+    This Little Treatise
+
+    IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY
+
+    _THE AUTHOR_.
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+This book has been written simply in the interest of Truth. It was
+because the doctrines of the Hamiltonian School were believed to be
+dangerous errors, which this process of thought exposes, that it was
+undertaken.
+
+Logically, and in the final analysis, there can be but two systems of
+philosophical theology in the world. The one will be Pantheism, or
+Atheism,--both of which contain the same essential principle, but viewed
+from different standpoints,--the other will be a pure Theism. In the
+schools of Brahma and Buddh, or in the schools of Christ, the truth is
+to be found. And this is so because every teacher is to be held
+responsible for all which can be logically deduced from his system; and
+every erroneous result which can be so deduced is decisive of the
+presence of an error in principle in the foundation; and all schemes of
+philosophy, by such a trial, are seen to be based on one of these two
+classes of schools. Just here a quotation from Dr. Laurens Hickok's
+"Rational Psychology" will be in point:
+
+"Except as we determine the absolute to be personality wholly out of and
+beyond all the conditions and modes of space and time, we can by no
+possibility leave nature for the supernatural. The clear-sighted and
+honest intellect, resting in this conclusion that the conditions of
+space and time cannot be transcended, will be Atheistic; while the
+deluded intellect, which has put the false play of the discursive
+understanding in its abstract speculations for the decisions of an
+all-embracing reason, and deems itself so fortunate as to have found a
+deity within the modes of space and time, will be Pantheistic. The
+Pantheism will be ideal and transcendent, when it reaches its
+conclusions by a logical process in the abstract law of thought; and it
+will be material and empiric, when it concludes from the fixed
+connections of cause and effect in the generalized law of nature; but in
+neither case is the Pantheism any other than Atheism, for the Deity,
+circumscribed in the conditions of space and time with nature, is but
+nature still, and, whether in abstract thought or generalized reality,
+is no God."
+
+The Hamiltonian system is logically Atheism. Perceiving that the Deity
+cannot be found in Nature, it denies that he can be known at all. What
+the mind cannot know at all, _it is irrational to believe_. If man
+cannot _know that_ God is, and have a clear sight of his attributes as a
+rational ground of confidence in what he says, it is the height of blind
+credulity to believe in him. And more; if man cannot have such
+knowledge, he has _no standard_ by which to measure teachings, and be
+_sure_ he has the truth. Under such circumstances, faith is
+_impossible_. Faith can only be based on _Reason_. If there is no
+Reason, there can be no faith. Hence he who talks about faith, and
+denies Reason, does not know what faith is. The logician rightfully held
+that God could not be found in Nature; but he was just as wrong in
+asserting that man is wholly in Nature and cannot know God, as he was
+right in the former instance. The acceptance of his one truth, and one
+error, compels man to be an Atheist; because then he has no faculty by
+which to know aught of God; and few thorough men will accept blind
+credulity as the basis of Religion.
+
+The author's sense of obligation to President Hickok cannot be too
+strongly stated. But for his works, it is believed that this little
+treatise could never have been written. Indeed, the author looks for but
+scanty credit on the score of originality, since most of what he has
+written he has learned, directly or indirectly, from that profound
+thinker. He has deemed it his chief work, to apply the principles
+developed by others to the exposure of a great error. And if he shall be
+judged to have accomplished this, his ambition will have been satisfied.
+
+After the substance of this treatise had been thought out, and while the
+author was committing it to paper, the essays on "Space and Time," and
+on "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," in the numbers of the "North
+American Review" for July and October, 1864, happened to fall under his
+notice. Some persons will appreciate the delight and avidity with which
+he read them; and how grateful it was to an obscure student, almost
+wholly isolated in the world, to find the views which he had wrought out
+in his secluded chamber, so ably advocated in the leading review of his
+country. Not that he had gone as far, or examined the subjects in hand
+as thoroughly as has been there done. By no means. Rather what results
+he had attained accord with some of those therein laid down. Of those
+essays it is not too much to say, that, if they have not exhausted the
+topics of which they treat, they have settled forever the conclusions to
+be reached, and leave for other writers only illustration and comment.
+If the author shall seem to differ from them on a minor question,--that
+of quantitative infinity,--the difference will, it is believed, be found
+to be one of the form of expression only. And the difference is
+maintained from the conviction that no term in science should have more
+than one signification. It is better to adopt illimitable and
+indivisible, as the technical epithets of Space, in place of the
+commonly used terms infinite and absolute.
+
+A metaphysical distinction has been incidentally touched upon in the
+following discussion, which deserves a more extensive consideration than
+the scope and plan of this work would permit to it here; and which, so
+far as the author's limited reading goes, has received very little
+attention from modern writers on metaphysics. He refers to the
+distinction between the animal nature and spiritual person, so
+repeatedly enounced by that profound metaphysical theologian, the
+apostle Paul, and by that pure spiritual pastor, the apostle John, in
+the terms "flesh" and "spirit." The thinkers of the world, even the best
+Christian philosophers, seem to have esteemed this a moral and religious
+distinction, and no more, when in fact it cleaves down through the whole
+human being, and forms the first great radical division in any proper
+analysis of man's soul, and classification of his constituent elements.
+_This is a purely natural division._ It is organic in man. It belonged
+as much to Adam in his purity, as it does to the most degraded wretch on
+the globe now. It is of such a character that, had it been properly
+understood and developed, the Hamiltonian system of philosophy could
+never have been constructed.
+
+An adequate statement of the truth would be conducted as follows. First,
+the animal nature should be carefully analyzed, its province accurately
+defined, and both the laws and forms of its activity exactly stated.
+Second, a like examination of the spiritual person should follow; and
+third, the relations, interactions, and influences of the two parts upon
+each other should be, as extensively as possible, presented. But it is
+to be remarked, that, while the analysis, by the human intellect, of
+these two great departments of man's soul, may be exhaustive, it is
+doubtful if any but the All-seeing Eye can read all their relations and
+inter-communications. The development of the third point, by any one
+mind, must needs, therefore, be partial. Whether any portion of the
+above designated labor shall be hereafter entered upon, will depend upon
+circumstances beyond control of the writer.
+
+As will appear, it is believed, in the development of the subject, the
+great, the _vital_ point upon which the whole controversy with the
+Hamiltonian school must turn, is a question of _fact_; viz., whether man
+has a Reason, as the faculty giving _a priori_ principles, or not. If he
+has such a Reason, then by it the questions now at issue can be settled,
+and that finally. If he has no Reason, then he can have no knowledge,
+except of appearances and events, as perceived by the Sense and judged
+by the Understanding. Until, then, the question of fact is decided, it
+would be a gain if public attention was confined wholly to it. Establish
+first a well ascertained and sure foundation before erecting a
+superstructure.
+
+The method adopted in constructing this treatise does not admit the
+presentation of the matter in a symmetrical form. On the contrary, it
+involves some, perhaps many, repetitions. What has been said at one
+point respecting one author must be said again in reply to another. Yet
+the main object for which the work was undertaken could, it seemed, be
+thoroughly accomplished in no other way.
+
+The author has in each case used American editions of the works named.
+
+
+
+
+KNOW THE TRUTH.
+
+
+
+
+PART I.
+
+THE SEEKING AND THE FINDING.
+
+
+In April, 1859, there was republished in Boston, from an English print,
+a volume entitled "The Limits of Religious Thought Examined," &c., "by
+Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D."
+
+The high position occupied by the publishers,--a firm of Christian
+gentlemen, who, through a long career in the publication of books either
+devoutly religious, or, at least, having a high moral tone, and being
+marked by deep, earnest thought, have obtained the confidence of the
+religious community; the recommendations with which its advent was
+heralded, but most of all the intrinsic importance of the theme
+announced, and its consonance with many of the currents of mental
+activity in our midst,--gave the book an immediate and extensive
+circulation. Its subject lay at the foundation of all religious, and
+especially of all theological thinking. The author, basing his teaching
+on certain metaphysical tenets, claimed to have circumscribed the
+boundary to all positive, and so valid effort of the human intellect in
+its upward surging towards the Deity, and to have been able to say,
+"Thus far canst thou come, and no farther, and here must thy proud waves
+be stayed." And this effort was declaredly made in the interest of
+religion. It was asserted that from such a ground only, as was therein
+sought to be established, could infidelity be successfully assailed and
+destroyed. Moreover, the writer was a learned and able divine in the
+Anglican Church, orthodox in his views; and his volume was composed of
+lectures delivered upon what is known as "The Bampton Foundation;"--a
+bequest of a clergyman, the income of which, under certain rules, he
+directed should be employed forever, in furthering the cause of Christ,
+by Divinity Lecture Sermons in Oxford. Such a book, on such a theme, by
+such a man, and composed under such auspices, would necessarily receive
+the almost universal attention of religious thinkers, and would mark an
+era in human thought. Such was the fact in this country. New England,
+the birthplace and home of American Theology, gave it her most careful
+and studious examination. And the West alike with the East pored over
+its pages, and wrought upon its knotty questions. Clergymen especially,
+and theological students, perused it with the earnestness of those who
+search for hid treasures. And what was the result? We do not hesitate to
+say that it was unqualified rejection. The book now takes its place
+among religious productions, not as a contribution to our positive
+knowledge, not as a practicable new road, surveyed out through the
+Unknown Regions of Thought, but rather as possessing only a negative
+value, as a monument of warning, erected at that point on the roadside
+where the writer branched off in his explorations, and on which is
+inscribed, "In this direction the truth cannot be found."
+
+The stir which this book produced, naturally brought prominently to
+public attention a writer heretofore not extensively read in this
+country, Sir William Hamilton, upon whose metaphysical teachings the
+lecturer avowedly based his whole scheme. The doctrines of the
+metaphysician were subjected to the same scrutinizing analysis, which
+dissolved the enunciations of the divine; and they, like these, were
+pronounced "wanting." This decision was not reached or expressed in any
+extensive and exhaustive criticism of these writers; in which the errors
+of their principles and the revolting nature of the results they
+attained, were presented; but it rather was a shoot from the spontaneous
+and deep-seated conviction, that the whole scheme, of both teacher and
+pupil, was utterly insufficient to satisfy the craving of man's highest
+nature. It was rejected because it _could_ not be received.
+
+Something more than a year ago, and while the American theological mind,
+resting in the above-stated conviction, was absorbed in the tremendous
+interests connected with the Great Rebellion, a new aspirant for honors
+appeared upon the stage. A book was published entitled "The Philosophy
+of Herbert Spencer: First Principles." This was announced as the
+foundation of a new system of Philosophy, which would command the
+confidence of the present, and extort the wonder of all succeeding ages.
+Avowing the same general principles with Mansel and Hamilton, this
+writer professed to have found a radical defect in their system, which
+being corrected, rendered that system complete and final; so that, from
+it as a base, he sets out to construct a new scheme of Universal
+Science. This man, too, has been read, not so extensively as his
+predecessors; because when one has seen a geometrical absurdity
+demonstrated, he does not care, unless from professional motives, to
+examine and disprove further attempts to bolster up the folly; but still
+so widely read, as to be generally associated with the other writers
+above mentioned, and, like them, rejected. Upon being examined, he is
+found to be a man of less scope and mental muscle than either of his
+teachers; yet going over the same ground and expressing the same ideas,
+scarcely in new language even; and it further appears that his discovery
+is made at the expense of his logic and consistency, and involves an
+unpardonable contradiction. Previous to the publication of the books
+just mentioned, an American writer had submitted to the world a system
+of thought upon the questions of which they treat, which certainly
+seems worthy of some notice from their authors. Yet it has received
+none. To introduce him we must retrace our steps for a little.
+
+In 1848, Laurens P. Hickok, then a Professor in Auburn Theological
+Seminary, published a work entitled "Rational Psychology," in which he
+professed to establish, by _a priori_ processes, positions which, if
+true, afford a ground for the answer, at once and forever, of all the
+difficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his school. Being
+comparatively a new writer, his work attracted only a moiety of the
+attention it should have done. It was too much like Analytical Geometry
+and Calculus for the popular mind, or even for any but a few patient
+thinkers. For them it was marrow and fatness.
+
+Since the followers of Sir William Hamilton, whom we will hereafter term
+Limitists, have neglected to take the great truths enunciated by the
+American metaphysician, and apply them to their own system, and so be
+convinced by their own study of the worthlessness of that system, it
+becomes their opponents, in the interest of truth, to perform this work
+in their stead; viz., upon the basis of immutable truth, to unravel each
+of their well-knit sophistries, to show to the world that it may "_know
+the truth_;" and thus to destroy a system which, if allowed undisputed
+sway, would sap the very foundations of Christian faith.
+
+The philosophical system of the Limitists is built upon a single
+fundamental proposition, which carries all their deductions with it. He
+who would strike these effectually, must aim his blow, and give it with
+all his might, straight at that one object; sure that if he destroys
+that, the destruction of the whole fabric is involved therein. But, as
+the Limitists are determined not to confess the dissolution of their
+scheme, by the simple establishment of principles, which they cannot
+prove false, and which, if true, involve the absurdity of their own
+tenets, it is further necessary to go through their writings, and
+examine them passage by passage, and show the fallacy of each. In the
+former direction we can but re-utter some of the principles of the great
+American teacher. In the latter there is room for new effort; and this
+shall be our especial province.
+
+The proposition upon which the whole scheme of the Limitists is founded,
+was originally enunciated by Sir William Hamilton, in the following
+terms. "The Unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable; its notion
+being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be
+positively known or conceived." "In our opinion, the mind can conceive,
+and consequently can know, only the _limited and the conditionally
+limited_. The unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the
+unconditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot positively be construed
+to the mind; they can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or
+abstraction of, those very conditions under which thought itself is
+realized; consequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only
+negative--negative of the conceivable itself. For example, on the one
+hand we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a
+whole so great, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a
+still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small,
+that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into
+smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent, or
+realize, or construe to the mind, (as here understanding and imagination
+coincide,) an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the
+infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would itself
+require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same
+reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of
+parts.... As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the
+conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge, and of
+positive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions. _To think_ is
+_to condition_; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the
+possibility of thought." ... "The conditioned is the mean between two
+extremes--two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of
+which _can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on the principles of
+contradiction and excluded middle, one _must be admitted as necessary_."
+
+This theory may be epitomized as follows:--"The Unconditioned denotes
+the genus of which the Infinite and Absolute are the species." This
+genus is inconceivable, is "negative of the conceivable itself." Hence
+both the species must be so also. Although they are thus incognizable,
+they may be defined; the one, the Infinite, as "that which is beyond all
+limits;" the other, the Absolute, as "a whole beyond all conditions:"
+or, concisely, the one is illimitable immensity, the other,
+unconditional totality. As defined, these are seen to be "mutually
+repugnant:" that is, if there is illimitable immensity, there cannot be
+absolute totality; and the reverse. Within these two all possible being
+is included; and, because either excludes the other, it can be in only
+one. Since both are inconceivable we can never know in which the
+conditioned or conceivable being is. Either would give us a
+being--God--capable of accounting for the Universe. This fact is assumed
+to be a sufficient ground for faith; and man may therefore rationally
+satisfy himself with the study of those matters which are
+cognizable--the conditioned.
+
+It is not our purpose at this point to enter upon a criticism of the
+philosophical theory thus enounced. This will fall, in the natural
+course, upon a subsequent page. We have stated it here, for the purpose
+of placing in that strong light which it deserves, another topic, which
+has received altogether too little attention from the opponents of the
+Limitists. Underlying and involved in the above theory, there is a
+question of _fact_, of the utmost importance. Sir William Hamilton's
+metaphysic rests upon his psychology; and if his psychology is true, his
+system is impregnable. It is his diagnosis of the human mind, then,
+which demands our attention. He has presented this in the following
+passage:--
+
+"While we regard as conclusive Kant's analysis of Time and Space into
+conditions of thought, we cannot help viewing his deduction of the
+'Categories of Understanding' and the 'Ideas of Speculative Reason' as
+the work of a great but perverse ingenuity. The categories of
+understanding are merely subordinate forms of the conditioned. Why not,
+therefore, generalize the _Conditioned--Existence Conditioned_, as the
+supreme category, or categories, of thought?--and if it were necessary
+to analyze this form into its subaltern applications, why not develop
+these immediately out of the generic principle, instead of
+preposterously, and by a forced and partial analogy, deducing the laws
+of the understanding from a questionable division of logical
+proposition? Why distinguish Reason (Vernunft) from Understanding
+(Verstand), simply on the ground that the former is conversant about, or
+rather tends toward, the unconditioned; when it is sufficiently
+apparent, that the unconditioned is conceived as the negation of the
+conditioned, and also that the conception of contradictories is one? In
+the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same function, both
+seek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the Concept (Begriff)
+sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the Understanding which
+has 'overleaped itself.'"
+
+Not stopping now to correct the entirely erroneous statement that "both
+faculties," _i. e._, Understanding and Reason, "perform the same
+function," we are to notice the two leading points which are made,
+viz.:--1. That there is no distinction between the Understanding and the
+Reason; or, in other words, there is no such faculty as the Reason is
+claimed to be, there is none but the Understanding; and, 2. A
+generalization is the highest form of human knowledge; both of which may
+be comprised in one affirmation; the Understanding is the highest
+faculty of knowledge belonging to the human soul. Upon this, a class of
+thinkers, following Plato and Kant, take issue with the logician, and
+assert that the distinction between the two faculties named above, has a
+substantial basis; that, in fact, they are different in _kind_, and that
+the mode of activity in the one is wholly unlike the mode of activity
+in the other. Thus, then, is the great issue between the Hamiltonian and
+Platonic schools made upon a question of _fact_. He who would attack the
+former school successfully, must aim his blow straight at their
+fundamental assumption; and he who shall establish the fact of the Pure
+Reason as an unquestionable faculty in the human soul, will, in such
+establishment, accomplish the destruction of the Hamiltonian system of
+philosophy. Believing this system to be thoroughly vicious in its
+tendencies; being such indeed, as would, if carried out, undermine the
+whole Christian religion; and what is of equal importance, being false
+to the facts in man's soul as God's creature, the writer will attempt to
+achieve the just named and so desirable result; and by the mode
+heretofore indicated.
+
+It is required, then, to _prove_ that there is a faculty belonging to
+the human soul, essentially diverse from the Sense or the Understanding;
+a faculty peculiar and unique, which possesses such qualities as have
+commonly been ascribed by its advocates to the Pure Reason; and thereby
+to establish such faculty as a fact, and under that name.
+
+Previous to bringing forward any proofs, it is important to make an
+exact statement of what is to be proved. To this end, let the following
+points be noted:--
+
+_a._ Its modes of activity are essentially diverse from those of the
+Sense or Understanding. The Sense is only capacity. According to the
+laws of its construction, it receives impressions from objects, either
+material, and so in a different place from that which it occupies, or
+imaginary, and so proceeding from the imaging faculty in itself. But it
+is only capacity to receive and transmit impressions. The Understanding,
+though more than this, even faculty, is faculty shut within the limits
+of the Sense. According to its laws, it takes up the presentations of
+the Sense, analyzes and classifies them, and deduces conclusions: but it
+can attain to nothing more than was already in the objects presented. It
+can construct a system; it cannot develop a science. It can observe a
+relation it cannot intuit a law. What we seek is capacity, but of
+another and higher kind from that of the Sense. Sense can have no object
+except such, at least, as is constructed out of impressions received
+from without. What we seek does not observe outside phenomena; and can
+have no object except as inherent within itself. It is faculty moreover,
+but not faculty walled in by the Sense. It is faculty and capacity in
+one, which, possessing inherent within itself, as objects, the _a
+priori_ conditional laws of the Universe, and the _a priori_ conditional
+ideal forms which these laws, standing together according to their
+necessary relations, compose, transcends, in its activity and
+acquisitions, all limitations of a _Nature_; and attends to objects
+which belong to the Supernatural, and hence which absoluteness
+qualifies. We observe, therefore,
+
+_b._ The objects of its activity are also essentially diverse in kind
+from those of the Sense and the Understanding. All the objects of the
+Sense must come primarily or secondarily, from a material Universe; and
+the discussions and conclusions of the Understanding must refer to such
+a Universe. The faculty which we seek must have for its objects, _laws_,
+or, if the term suit better, first principles, which are reasons why
+conduct must be one way, and not another; which, in their combinations,
+compose the forms conditional for all activity; and which, therefore,
+constitute within us an _a priori_ standard by which to determine the
+validity of all judgments. To illustrate. Linnaeus constructed a system
+of botanical classification, upon the basis of the number of stamens in
+a flower. This was satisfactory to the Sense and the Understanding.
+Later students have, however, discovered that certain _organic laws_
+extend as a framework through the whole vegetable kingdom; which, once
+seen, throw back the Linnaean system into company with the Ptolemaic
+Astronomy; and upon which laws a _science_ of Botany becomes possible.
+That faculty which intuits these laws, is called the Pure Reason.
+
+To recapitulate. What we seek is, in its modes and objects of activity,
+diverse from the Sense and Understanding. It is at once capacity and
+faculty, having as object first principles, possessing these as an
+_inherent heritage_, and able to compare with them as standard all
+objects of the Sense and judgments of the Understanding; and to decide
+thereby their validity. These principles, and combinations of
+principles, are known as _Ideas_, and, being innate, are denominated
+_innate Ideas_. It is their reality which Sir William Hamilton denies,
+declaring them to be only higher generalizations of the Understanding,
+and it is the faculty called the Pure Reason, in which they are supposed
+to inhere, whose actuality is now to be proved.
+
+The effort to do this will be successful if it can be shown that the
+logician's statement of the facts is partial, and essentially defective;
+what are the phenomena which cannot be comprehended in his scheme; and,
+finally, that they can be accounted for on no other ground than that
+stated.
+
+1. The statement of facts by the Limitists is partial and essentially
+defective. They start with the assumption that a generalization is the
+highest form of human knowledge. To appreciate this fully, let us
+examine the process they thus exalt. A generalization is a process of
+thought through which one advances from a discursus among facts, to a
+conclusion, embodying a seemingly general truth, common to all the facts
+of the class. For instance. The inhabitants of the north temperate zone
+have long observed it to be a fact, that north winds are cold; and so
+have arrived at the general conclusion that such winds will lower the
+temperature. A more extensive experience teaches them, however, that in
+the south temperate zone, north winds are warm, and their judgment has
+to be modified accordingly. A yet larger investigation shows that, at
+one period in geologic history, north winds, even in northern climes,
+were warm, and that tropical animals flourished in arctic regions; and
+the judgment is again modified. Now observe this most important fact
+here brought out. _Every judgment may be modified by a larger
+experience._ Apply this to another class of facts. An apple is seen to
+fall when detached from the parent stem. An arrow, projected into the
+air, returns again. An invisible force keeps the moon in its orbit.
+Other like phenomena are observed; and, after patient investigation, it
+is found to be a fact, that there is a force in the system to which our
+planet belongs, which acts in a ratio inverse to the square of the
+distance, and which thus binds it together. But if a generalization is
+the highest form of knowledge, we can never be sure we are right, for a
+subsequent experience may teach us the reverse. We know we have not _all
+the facts_. We may again find that the north wind is elsewhere, or was
+once here, warm. Should a being come flying to us from another sphere so
+distant, that the largest telescope could catch no faintest ray, even,
+of its shining, and testify to us that there, the force we called
+gravitation, was inversely as the _cube_ of the distance, we could only
+accept the testimony, and modify our judgment accordingly. Conclusions
+of to-day may be errors to-morrow; and we can never know we are right.
+The Limitists permit us only interminable examinations of interminable
+changes in phenomena; which afford no higher result than a new basis for
+new studies.
+
+From this wearisome, Io-like wandering, the soul returns to itself,
+crying its wailing cry, "Is this true? Is this all?" when suddenly, as
+if frenzied by the presence of a god, it shouts exultingly "The truth!
+the truth! I see the eternal truth."
+
+The assumption of the Limitists is not all the truth. Their diagnosis is
+both defective and false. It is defective, in that they have failed to
+perceive those qualities of _universality_ and _necessity_, which most
+men instinctively accord to certain perceptions of the mind; and false,
+in that they deny the reality of those qualities, and of the certain
+perceptions as modified by them, and the actuality of that mental
+faculty which gives the perceptions, and thus qualified. They state a
+part of the truth, and deny a part. The whole truth is, the mind both
+generalizes and intuits.
+
+It is the _essential_ tenet of their whole scheme, that the human mind
+nowhere, and under no circumstance, makes an affirmation which it
+unreservedly qualifies as necessary and universal. Their doctrine is,
+that these affirmations _seem_ to be such, but that a searching
+examination shows this seeming to be only a bank of fog. For instance.
+The mind seems to affirm that two and two _must_ make four. "Not so,"
+says the Limitist. "As a fact, we see that two and two do make four, but
+it may make five, or any other sum. For don't you see? if two and two
+must make four, then the Infinite must see it so; and if he must see it
+so, he is thereby conditioned; and what is worse, we know just as much
+about it as he does." In reply to all such quibbles, it is to be
+said,--there is no seeming about it! If the mind is not utterly
+mendacious, it affirms, positively and unreservedly, "Two and two are
+four, _must_ be four; and to see it so, _is conditional for_ ALL
+_intellect_." Take another illustration. The mind instinctively, often
+unconsciously, always compulsorily, affirms that the sentiment, In
+society the rights of the individual can never trench upon the rights of
+the body politic,--is a necessary, and universally applicable principle;
+which, however much it may be violated, can never be changed. The whole
+fabric of society is based upon this. Could a mind think this away, it
+could not construct a practical system of society upon what would be
+left,--its negation. But the Limitists step in here, and say, "All this
+seems so, perhaps, but then the mind is so weak, that it can never be
+sure. You must modify (correct?) this seeming, by the consideration
+that, if it is so, then the Infinite must know it so, and the finite and
+Infinite must know it alike, and the Infinite will be limited and
+conditioned thereby, which would be impious." Again, the intellect
+unreservedly asserts, "There is no seeming in the matter. The utterance
+is true, absolutely and universally true, and every intellect _must_ see
+it so."
+
+Illustrations like the above might be drawn from every science of which
+the human mind is cognizant. But more are not needed. Enough has been
+adduced to establish the _fact_ of those qualities, universality and
+necessity, as inherent in certain mental affirmations. Having thus
+pointed out the essential defect of the logician's scheme, it is
+required to state:
+
+2. What the phenomena are which cannot be comprehended therein.
+
+In general, it may be said that all those perceptions and assertions of
+the mind, which are instinctive, and which it involuntarily qualifies as
+universal and necessary, are not, and cannot be comprehended in Sir
+William Hamilton's scheme. To give an exhaustive presentation of all the
+_a priori_ laws of the mind, would be beyond the scope of the present
+undertaking, and would be unnecessary to its success. This will be
+secured by presenting a classification of them, and sufficient examples
+under each class. Moreover, to avoid a labor which would not be in place
+here, we shall attempt no new classification; but shall accept without
+question, as ample for our purpose, that set forth by one of our purest
+and every way best thinkers,--Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., President of
+Williams College, Mass.
+
+"The ideas and beliefs which come to us thus, may be divided into,
+first, mathematical ideas and axioms. These are at the foundation of the
+abstract sciences, having for their subject, quantity. In the second
+division are those which pertain to mere being and its relations. Upon
+these rest all sciences pertaining to actual being and its relations.
+The third division comprises those which pertain to beauty. These are at
+the foundation of aesthetical science. In the fourth division are those
+which pertain to morals and religion. Of these the pervading element is
+the sense of obligation or duty. Of this the idea necessarily arises in
+connection with the choice by a rational being of a supreme end, and
+with the performance of actions supposed to bear upon that."--_Moral
+Science_, p. 161.
+
+First.--Mathematical ideas and axioms.
+
+Take, for instance, the multiplication table. Can any one, except a
+Limitist, be induced to believe that it was originally _constructed_;
+that a will put it together, and might take it apart? Seven times seven
+now make forty-nine. Will any one say that it might have been made to
+make forty-seven; or that at some future time such may be the case? Or
+again, take the axiom "Things which are equal to the same thing are
+equal to one another." Will some one say, that the intellectual beings
+in the universe might, with equal propriety, have been so constructed as
+to affirm that, in some instances, things which are equal to the same
+thing are _unequal_ to one another? Or consider the properties of a
+triangle. Will our limitist teachers instruct us that these properties
+are a matter of indifference; that for aught we know, the triangle might
+have been made to have three right angles? Yet again. Examine the
+syllogism. Was its law constructed?
+
+    All M is X;
+    All Z is M;
+    All Z is X.
+
+Will any one say that _perhaps_, we don't know but it might have been so
+made, as to appear to us that the conclusion was Some Z is not X? Or
+will the Limitists run into that miserable petty subterfuge of an
+assertion, "All this _seems_ to us as it is, and we cannot see how it
+could be different; but then, our minds are so feeble, they are confined
+in such narrow limits, that it would be the height of presumption to
+assert positively with regard to stronger minds, and those of wider
+scope? Perhaps they see things differently." _Perhaps_ they do; but if
+they do, their minds or ours falsify! The question is one of _veracity_,
+nothing more. Throughout all the range of mathematics, the positive and
+_unqualified_ affirmation of the mind is that its intuitions are
+absolute and universal; that they are _a priori_ laws conditional of
+_all_ intellect; that of the Deity just as much as that of man.
+Feebleness and want of scope have nothing to do with mind in its
+affirmation, "Seven times seven _must_ make forty-nine; _and cannot by
+any possibility of effort make any other product_;" and every intellect,
+_if it sees at all, must see it so_. And so on through the catalogue.
+From this, it follows in this instance, that human knowledge is
+_exhaustive_, and so is exactly similar, and equal to the Deity's
+knowledge.
+
+Second. Those ideas and beliefs which pertain to mere being and its
+relations.
+
+Take, for instance, the axiom, A material body cannot exist in the
+Universe without standing in some relation to all the other material
+bodies in that Universe. Either this is absolutely true, or it is not.
+If it is so true, then every intellectual being to whom it presents
+itself as object at all, must see it as every other does. One may see
+more relations than another; but the axiom in its intrinsic nature must
+be seen alike by all. If it is not absolutely true, then the converse,
+or any partially contradictory proposition, may be true. For example. A
+material body may exist in the Universe, and stand in no relation to
+some of the other material bodies in that Universe. But, few men will
+hesitate to say, that this is not only utterly unthinkable, but that it
+could only become thinkable by a denial and destruction of the laws of
+thought; or, in other words, by the stultification of the mind.
+
+Take another instance, arising from the fact of parentage and offspring,
+in the sentient beings of the world. A pair, no matter to what class
+they belong, by the fact of becoming parents, establish a new relation
+for themselves; and, "after their kind," they are under bonds to their
+young. And, to a greater or less extent, their young have a claim upon
+them. As we ascend in the scale of being, the duty imposed is greater,
+and the claim of the offspring stronger. Whether it be the fierce eagle,
+or the timid dove, or the chirping sparrow; whether it be the prowling
+lion, or the distrustful deer, or the cowering hare; or whether it be
+the races of man who are examined, the relations established by
+parentage are everywhere recognized. Now, will one say that all this
+might be changed for aught we know; that, what we call law, is only a
+judgment of mankind; and so that this relation did not exist at first,
+but was the product of growth? And will one further say that there is no
+necessity or universality in this relation; but that the races might,
+for aught we know, have just as well been established with a parentage
+which involved no relation at all; that the fabled indifference of the
+ostrich, intensified a hundredfold, might have been the law of sentient
+being? Yet such results logically flow from the principles of the
+Limitists. Precisely the same line of argument might be pursued
+respecting the laws of human society. But it is not needed here. It is
+evident now, that what gives validity to judgments _is the fact that
+they accord with an a priori principle in the mind_.
+
+Third. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to beauty. A science of
+beauty has not yet been sufficiently developed to permit of so extensive
+an illustration of this class as the others. Yet enough is established
+for our purpose. Let us consider beauty as in proportioned form. It is
+said that certain Greek mathematicians, subsequently to the Christian
+era, studied out a mathematical formula for the human body, and
+constructed a statue according to it; and that both were pronounced at
+the time _perfect_. Both statue and formula are now lost. Be the story
+true, or a legend, there is valid ground for the assertion, that the
+mind instinctively assumes, in all its criticisms, the axiom, There is a
+perfect ideal by which as standard, all art must be judged. The very
+fact that the mind, though acknowledging the imperfection of its own
+ideal, unconsciously asserts, that somewhere, in some mind, there is an
+ideal, in which a perfect hand joins a perfect arm, and a perfect foot a
+perfect leg, and these a perfect trunk; and a perfect neck supports a
+perfect head, adorned by perfect features, and thus there is a perfect
+ideal, is _decisive_ that such an ideal exists. And this conclusion is
+true, because God who made us, and constructed the ground from whence
+this instinctive affirmation springs, is true.
+
+Take another instance. Few men, who have studied Gothic spires, have
+failed to observe that the height of some, in proportion to their base,
+is too great, and that of others, too small. The mind irresistibly
+affirms, that between these opposite imperfections, there is a golden
+mean, at which the proportion shall be _perfect_. When the formula of
+this proportion shall be studied out, any workman, who is skilled with
+tools, can construct a perfect spire. The law once discovered and
+promulgated, becomes common knowledge. Mechanical skill will be all that
+can differentiate one workman from another. The fact that the law has
+not been discovered yet, throws no discredit upon the positive
+affirmation of the mind, that there must be such a law; any more than
+the fact of Newton's ignorance of the law of gravitation, when he saw
+the apple fall, discredited his instinctive affirmation, upon seeing
+that phenomenon, there is a law in accordance with which it fell.
+
+Now how comes the mind instinctively and positively to make these
+assertions. If they were judgments, the mind would only speak of
+probabilities; but here, it qualifies the assertion with necessity. Men,
+however positive in their temperament, do not say, "I know it will rain
+to-morrow," but only, "In all probability it will." Not so here. Here
+the mind refuses to express itself doubtfully. Its utterance is the
+extreme of positiveness. It says _must_. And if its affirmation is not
+true, then there is no _reason_ why those works of art which are held in
+highest esteem, should be adjudged better than the efforts of the tyro,
+except the whim of the individual, or the arbitrary determination of
+their admirers.
+
+Fourth. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to morals and religion.
+
+We now enter a sphere of which no understanding could by any possibility
+ever guess, much less investigate. Here no sense could ever penetrate;
+there is no object for it to perceive. Here all judgments are
+impertinent; for in this sphere are only laws, and duties, and
+obligations. An understanding cannot "conceive" of a moral law, because
+such a law is inconceivable; and it cannot perceive one, because it has
+no eye. If it were competent to explain every phenomenon in the other
+classes, it would be utterly impotent to explain a single phenomenon in
+this. What is moral obligation? Whence does it arise, or how is it
+imposed? and who will enforce it, and how will it be enforced? All
+these, and numerous such other questions, cannot be raised even by the
+Understanding, much less answered by it. The moral law of the Universe
+is one which can be learned from no judgment, or combination of
+judgments. It can be learned only by being _seen_. The moral law is no
+conclusion, which may be modified by a subsequent experience. It is an
+affirmation which is _imperative_. To illustrate. It is an axiom, that
+the fact of free moral agency involves the fact of obligation. Man is a
+free moral agent; and so, under the obligation imposed. At the first, it
+was optional with the Deity whether he would create man or not. But will
+any one assert that, having determined to create man such as he is, it
+was optional with him, whether man should be under the obligation, or
+not? Can man be a free moral agent, and be free from the duties inherent
+therein? Does not the mind instinctively and necessarily affirm, that
+the fact of free moral agency assures the fact of such a relation to
+God's moral government, that obligation _must_ follow? One cannot
+hesitate to say, that the formula, A free agent may be released from his
+obligation to moral law, is absolutely unthinkable.
+
+Again, no judgment can attain to the moral law of the Universe; and yet
+man knows it. Jesus Christ, when he proclaimed that law in the words
+"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy mind and strength, and
+thy neighbor as thyself," only uttered what no man can, in thought,
+deny. A man can no more think selfishness as the moral law of the
+Universe, than he can think two and two to be five. Man not only sees
+the law, but he feels and acknowledges the obligation, even in his
+rebellion. In fact there would be no rebellion, no sense of sin, if
+there were no obligation. Whence comes the authority of the law? No
+power can give it authority, or enforce obedience. Power can crush a
+Universe, it cannot change a heart. The law has, and can have authority;
+it imposes, and can impose obligation; only because _it is an a priori
+law of the Universe_, alike binding upon _all_ moral beings, upon God as
+well as man; and is so seen immediately, and necessarily, by a direct
+intuition. Man finds this law fundamental to his self; and as well, a
+necessarily fundamental law of _all_ moral beings. _Therefore_ he
+acknowledges it. And the very efforts he makes to set up a throne for
+Passion, over against the throne of Benevolence, is an involuntary
+acknowledgment of the authority of that law he seeks to rival.
+
+It was said above, that neither Sense nor Understanding can take any
+cognizance of the objects of investigation which fall in this class.
+This is because the Sense can gather no material over which the
+Understanding can run. Is the moral law matter? No. How then can the
+Sense observe it? One answer may possibly be made, viz.: It is deduced
+from the conduct of men; and sense observes that. To this it is replied
+
+_a._ The allegation is not true. Most men violate the moral law of the
+Universe. Their conduct accords with the law of selfishness. Such
+conclusions as that of Hobbes, that war is the natural condition of
+Society, are those which would follow from a consideration of man, as he
+appears to the Sense.
+
+_b._ If it were true, the question obtrudes itself,--How came it there?
+_How came this fundamental law to be?_ and to this the Sense and
+Understanding return no shadow of answer.
+
+But from the stand-point of a Pure Reason, all is clear. All the ideas
+and beliefs, every process of thought which belongs to this sphere, are
+absolute and universal. They must be what they are; and so are
+conditional of all moral beings. Here what the human mind sees, is just
+what the Deity sees; and it sees just as the Divine mind sees, so that
+the truth, as far as so seen, is _common_ to both.
+
+Although the facts which have been adduced above, are inexplicable by
+the Limitists, and are decisive of the actuality of the Reason, as it
+has been heretofore described, yet another line of argument of great
+wight must not be omitted. There are in language certain _positive_
+terms, which the Limitists, and the advocates of the Reason agree in
+asserting cannot convey any meaning to, or be explained by the Sense and
+Understanding. Such are the words infinite and absolute. The mere
+presence of such words in language, as positive terms, is a decisive
+evidence of the fact, that there is also a faculty which entertains
+positive ideas corresponding to them. Sir William Hamilton's position in
+this matter, is not only erroneous, but astonishing. He asserts that
+these words express only "negative notions." "They," the infinite and
+absolute, "can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or abstraction
+of, those very conditions under which thought itself is realized;
+consequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative--negative
+of the conceivable itself." But, if this is true, how came these words
+in the language at all? Negative ideas produce negative expressions.
+Indeed, the Limitists are confidently challenged to designate another
+case in language, in which a positive term can be alleged to have a
+_purely_ negative signification. Take an illustration to which we shall
+recur further on. The question has been raised, whether a sixth sense
+can be. Can the Limitists find in language, or can they construct, a
+positive term which will represent the negation of a sixth sense? We
+find in language the positive terms, ear and hearing; but can such
+positive terms be found, which will correspond to the phrase, no sixth
+sense? In this instance, in physics, the absurdity is seen at once. Why
+is not as readily seen the equal absurdity of affirming that, in
+metaphysics, positive terms have grown up in the language which are
+simple negations? Here, for the present, the presentation of facts may
+rest. Let us recapitulate those which have been adduced. The axioms in
+mathematics, the principles of the relations of being, the laws of
+aesthetics, and most of all the whole system of principles pertaining to
+morals and religion, standing, as they do, a series of mental
+affirmations, which all mankind, except the Limitists, qualify as
+necessary and universal, compel assent to the proposition, that
+there must be a faculty different in kind from the Sense and
+Understanding,--for these have already been found impotent--which can be
+ground to account of all these facts satisfactorily. And the presence in
+language of such positive terms as absolute and infinite, is a most
+valuable auxiliary argument. The faculty which is required,--the faculty
+which qualifies all the products of its activity with the
+characteristics above named, is the Pure Reason. And its actuality may
+therefore be deemed established.
+
+The Pure Reason having thus been proved to be, it is next required to
+show the mode of its activity. This can best be done, by first noticing
+the _kind_ of results which it produces. The Reason gives us, not
+thoughts, but ideas. These are simple, pure, primary, necessary. It is
+evident that any such object of mental examination can be known only in,
+and by, itself. It cannot be analyzed, for it is simple. It cannot be
+compared, for it is pure; and so possesses no element which can be
+ground for a comparison. It cannot be deduced, for it is primary and
+necessary. _It can only be seen._ Such an object must be known under the
+following circumstances. It must be inherent in the seeing faculty, and
+must be _immediately and directly seen_ by that faculty; all this in
+such a manner, that the abstraction of the object seen, would annihilate
+the faculty itself. Now, how is it with the Reason? Above we found it to
+be both capacity and faculty: capacity in that it possessed as integral
+elements, _a priori_ first principles, as objects of sight; faculty in
+that it saw, brought forward, and made available, those principles. The
+mode of activity of the Pure Reason is then a _seeing_, direct,
+immediate, _sure_; which holds pure truth _fast_, right in the very
+centre of the field of vision. This act of the Reason in thus seeing
+pure truth is best denominated an intuition of the Reason. And here it
+may be said,--If perception and perceive could be strictly confined to
+the Sense; concept and conceive to the Understanding; and intuition and
+intuit to the Reason, a great gain would be made in accuracy of
+expression regarding these departments of the mind.
+
+Having thus, as it is believed, established the fact of the existence of
+a Pure Reason, and shown the mode of its activity, it devolves to
+declare the function of that faculty.
+
+The function of the Pure Reason is, first:--to intuit, by an immediate
+perception, the _a priori_ elemental principles which condition all
+being; second,--to intuit, by a like immediate perception, those
+principles, combined in _a priori_ systematic processes, which are the
+conditional ideal forms for all being; and third,--again to intuit, by
+another immediate perception, precisely similar in kind to the others,
+the fact, at least, of the perfectly harmonious combination of all _a
+priori_ elemental principles, in all possible systematic processes, into
+a perfect unity,--an absolute, infinite Person,--God.
+
+To illustrate.
+
+1. The Reason asserts that "Malice is criminal;" and that it is
+_necessarily_ criminal; or, in other words, that no act, of any will,
+can make it otherwise than it is. The assertion, then, that "Malice is
+criminal," is an axiom, and conditions all being, God as well as man.
+
+2. The Reason asserts that every mathematical form must be seen in Space
+and Time, and it affirms the same necessity in this as in the former
+case.
+
+3. The full illustration of this point would be Anselm's _a priori_
+argument for the existence of God. His statement of it should, however,
+be so modified as to appear, not as an _a priori_ argument for the
+existence of God, but as an amplified declaration of the fact, that the
+existence of God is a first principle of Reason; and as such, can no
+more be denied than the multiplication table. Objection.--This doctrine
+degrades God to the level of the finite; both being alike conditioned.
+Answer.--By no means; as will be seen from the two following points.
+
+1. It is universally acknowledged that God must be self-existent, which
+means, if it means anything, that the existence of God is _beyond his
+own control_; or, in other words, that self-existence is an _a priori_
+elemental principle, which conditions God's existing at all.
+
+2. In the two instances under consideration, the word condition has
+entirely different significations. God is conditioned only by _Himself_.
+Not only is this conditioning not a limitation, properly speaking, but
+the very absence of limitation. The fact that He is absolute and
+infinite, is a condition of His existence. Man's conditions are the very
+opposite of these. He is relative, instead of absolute; finite, instead
+of infinite; dependent, instead of self-existent. Hence he differs in
+_kind_ from God as do his conditions.
+
+Such being the function of the Pure Reason, it is fully competent to
+solve the difficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his followers;
+and the statement of such solution is the work immediately in hand.
+
+Much of the difficulty and obscurity which have, thus far, attended
+every discussion of this subject, will be removed by examining the
+definitions given to certain terms;--either by statement, or by
+implication in the use made of them;--by exposing the errors involved;
+and by clearly expressing the true signification of each term.
+
+By way of criticism the general statement may be made,--that the
+Limitists--as was natural from their rejection of the faculty of the
+Pure Reason--use only such terms, and in such senses, as are pertinent
+to those subjects which come under the purvey of the Understanding and
+the Sense; but which are entirely impertinent, in reference to the
+sphere of spiritual subjects. The two following phases of this error
+are sufficient to illustrate the criticism.
+
+1. The terms Infinite and Absolute are used to express abstractions. For
+instance, "_the infinite_, from a human point of view, is merely a name
+for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible."
+"It is thus manifest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally
+self-contradictory with that of the Infinite."--_Limits of Religious
+Thought_, pp. 94 and 96. If asked "Absolute" what? "Infinite" what? Will
+you allow person, or other definite term to be supplied? Mansel would
+reply--No! no possible answer can be given by man.
+
+Now, without passing at all upon the question whether these terms can
+represent concrete objects of thought or not, it is to be said, that the
+use of them to express abstract notions, is utterly unsound. The mere
+fact of abstraction is an undoubted limitation. There may be an Infinite
+and Absolute Person. By no possibility can there be an abstract
+Infinite.
+
+2. But a more glaring and unpardonable error is made by the Limitists in
+their use of the words infinite and absolute, as expressing quantity.
+Take a few examples from many.
+
+"For example, we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole,
+that is, a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative
+part of a still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so
+small, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible
+into smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent,
+or realize, or construe to the mind (as here understanding and
+imagination coincide), an infinite whole, for this could only be done by
+the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes which would itself
+require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same
+reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of
+parts."--_Hamilton's Essays_, p. 20.
+
+"The metaphysical representation of the Deity as absolute and infinite,
+must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged,
+amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality."--_Limits of
+Religious Thought_, p. 76.
+
+"Is the First Cause finite or infinite?... To think of the First Cause
+as finite, is to think of it as limited. To think of it as limited,
+necessarily implies a conception of something beyond its limits; it is
+absolutely impossible to conceive a thing as bounded, without conceiving
+a region surrounding its boundaries."--_Spencer's First Principles_, p.
+37.
+
+The last extract tempts one to ask Mr. Spencer if he ever stood on the
+north side of the affections. Besides the extracts selected, any person
+reading the authors above named, will find numerous phrases like these:
+"infinite whole," "infinite sum," "infinite number," "infinite series,"
+by which they express sometimes a mathematical, and sometimes a material
+amount.
+
+Upon this whole topic it is to be said, that the terms infinite and
+absolute have, and can have, no relevancy to any object of the Sense or
+of the Understanding, judging according to the Sense, or to any number.
+There is no whole, no sum, no number, no amount, but is definite and
+limited; and to use those words with the word infinite, is as absurd as
+to say an infinite finite. And to use words thus, is to "multiply words
+without knowledge."
+
+Again, the lines of thought which these writers pursue, do not tend in
+any degree to clear up the fogs in which they have lost themselves, but
+only make the muddle thicker. Take, for instance, the following
+extract:--
+
+"Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be
+conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious; it
+cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple;
+it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by
+the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the
+Universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the
+Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike
+incomprehensible."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 79.
+
+The soul, while oaring her way with weary wing, over the watery waste of
+such a philosophy, can find no rest for the sole of her foot, except on
+that floating carcase of a doctrine, Chaos is God. The simple fact that
+such confusion logically results from the premises of the Limitists, is
+a sufficient warrant for rejecting their whole system of
+thought,--principle and process; and for striking for a new base of
+operations. But where shall such a base be sought for? On what immutable
+Ararat can the soul find her ark, and a sure resting-place? Man seeks a
+Rock upon which he can climb and cry, I KNOW that this is truth. Where
+is the Everlasting Rock? In our search for the answer to these queries,
+we may be aided by setting forth the goal to be reached,--the object to
+be obtained.
+
+By observation and reflection man comes to know that he is living in,
+and forms part of, a system of things, which he comprehensively terms
+the Universe. The problem is,--_To find an Ultimate Ground, a Final
+Cause, which shall be adequate to account for the existence and
+sustentation of this Universe_. There are but two possible directions
+from which the solution of this problem can come. It must be found
+either within the Universe, or without the Universe.
+
+Can it be found within the Universe? If it can, one of two positions
+must be true. Either a part of the Universe is cause for the existence
+of the whole of the Universe; or the Universe is self-existent. Upon the
+first position nothing need be said. Its absurdity is manifested in the
+very statement of it. A full discussion, or, in fact, anything more than
+a notice of the doctrine of Pantheism, set forth in the second point,
+would be beyond the intention of the author. The questions at issue lie
+not between theists and pantheists, but between those who alike reject
+Pantheism as erroneous. The writer confesses himself astonished that a
+class of rational men could ever have been found, who should have
+attempted to find the Ultimate Ground of the Universe _in itself_. All
+that man can know of the facts of the Universe, he learns by
+observation; and the sum of the knowledge he thus gains is, that a vast
+system of physical objects exists. From the facts observed, he draws
+conclusions: but the stream cannot rise higher than its fountain. With
+reference to any lesser object, as a watch, the same process goes on. A
+watch is. It has parts; and these parts move in definite relations to
+each other; and to secure a given object. If now, any person, upon being
+asked to account for the existence of the watch, should confine himself
+wholly to an examination of the nature of the springs, the wheels, the
+hands, face, &c., endeavoring to find the reason of its being within
+itself, the world would laugh at him. How much more justly may the world
+laugh, yea, shout its ridicule, at the mole-eyed man who rummages among
+the springs and wheels of the vast machine of the Universe, to find the
+reason of _its_ being. In the former instance, the bystander would
+exclaim,--"The watch is an evidence of intelligence. Man is the only
+intelligent being on the earth; and is superior to the watch. Man made
+the watch." And his assertion would be true. _A fortiori_ would a
+bystander of the Universe exclaim, "The Universe is an evidence of
+intelligence. An intelligent Being, superior to the Universe, made the
+Universe." And his assertion is true. We are driven then to our last
+position; but it is the Gibraltar of Philosophy.
+
+THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF THE UNIVERSE MUST BE SOUGHT FOR, AND CAN ONLY BE
+FOUND, WITHOUT THE UNIVERSE.
+
+From this starting-point alone can we proceed, with any hope of reaching
+the goal. Setting out on our new course we will gain a step by noticing
+a fact involved in the illustration just given. The bystander exclaims,
+"The watch is an evidence of intelligence." In this very utterance is
+necessarily expressed the fact of two diverse spheres of existence: the
+one the sphere of matter, the other the sphere of mind. One cannot think
+of matter except as inferior, nor of mind except as superior. These
+two, matter and mind, comprise all possible existence. The Reason not
+only cannot see _how_ any other existence can be, but affirms _that_ no
+other can be. Mind, then, is the Ultimate Ground of the Universe. What
+mind?
+
+By examination, man perceives what appears to be an order in the
+Universe, concludes that there is such an order, assumes the conclusion
+to be valid, and names the order Nature. Turning his eye upon himself,
+he finds himself not only associated with, but, through a portion of his
+faculties, forming a part of that Nature. But a longer, sharper
+scrutiny, a profounder examination, reveals to him his soul's most
+secret depth; and the fact of his spiritual personality glows refulgent
+in the calm light of consciousness. He sees himself, indeed, in Nature;
+but he thrills with joy at the quickly acquired knowledge that Nature is
+only a nest, in which he, a purely supernatural being, must flutter for
+a time, until he shall be grown, and ready to plume his flight for the
+Spirit Land. If then, man, though bound in Nature, finds his central
+self utterly diverse from, and superior to Nature, so that he
+instinctively cries, "My soul is worth more than a Universe of gold and
+diamonds;" _a fortiori_ must that Being, who is the Ultimate Ground, not
+only of Nature, but of those supernatural intelligences who live in
+Nature, be supernatural, spiritual, and supreme?
+
+Just above, it was seen that matter and mind comprise all possible
+existence. It has now been found that mind, in its highest form, even in
+man, is pure spirit; and as such, wholly supernatural. It has further
+been determined, that the object of our search must be the Supreme
+Spirit.
+
+Just at this point it is suitable to notice, what is, perhaps, the most
+egregious and unpardonable blunder the Limitists have made. In order to
+do this satisfactorily, the following analysis of the human mind is
+presented. The soul is a spiritual person, and an animal nature. To this
+animal nature belong the Sense and the Understanding. It is universally
+acknowledged,--at least the Limitists will not deny,--that the Sense and
+the Understanding are wholly within, and conditioned by Nature. Observe
+then their folly. They deny that a part can account for a whole; they
+reject Pantheism; _and yet they employ only those faculties which they
+confess are wholly within and conditioned by Nature_--for they deny the
+existence of the Pure Reason, the perceptive faculty of the spiritual
+person--_to search, only in Nature, for the cause of Nature_. A fly
+would buzz among the wheels of a clock to as little purpose.
+
+The result arrived at just above, now claims our careful attention.
+
+_The Ultimate Ground of the Universe is_ THE SUPREME SPIRIT.
+
+To appreciate this result, we must return to our analysis of man. In his
+spiritual personality we have found him wholly supernatural. We have
+further found that, only as a spiritual person is he capable of pursuing
+this investigation to a final and valid termination. If, then, we would
+complete our undertaking, we must ascend into a sphere whose light no
+eagle's eye can ever bear; and whose atmosphere his daring wing can
+never beat. There no sense can ever enter; no judgments are needed.
+Through Reason--the soul's far-darting eye,--and through Reason alone,
+can we gaze on the Immutable.
+
+Turning this searching eye upon ourselves, we find that man, as
+spiritual person, is a Pure Reason,--the faculty which gives him _a
+priori_ first principles, as the standard for conduct and the forms for
+activity,--a Spiritual Sensibility, which answers with emotive music to
+the call of the Reason; and lastly, a Will, in which the Person dwells
+central, solitary, and supreme, the final arbiter of its own destiny.
+Every such being is therefore a miniature final cause.
+
+The goal of our search must be near at hand. In man appears the very
+likeness of the Being we seek. His highest powers unmistakably shadow
+forth the form of that Being, who is The Final. Man originates; but he
+is dependent for his power, and the sphere of that power is confined to
+his own soul. We seek a being who can originate, who is utterly
+independent; and the sphere of whose activity extends wherever, without
+himself, he chooses. Man, after a process of culture, comes to intuit
+some first principles, in some combinations. We seek a being who
+necessarily sees, at once and forever, all possible first principles, in
+all possible relations, as the ideal forms for all possible effort. Man
+stumbles along on the road of life, frequently ignorant of the way, but
+more frequently perversely violating the eternal law which he finds
+written on his heart. We seek a being who never stumbles, but who is
+perfectly wise; and whose conduct is in immutable accord with the _a
+priori_ standards of his Reason. Man is a spiritual person, dependent
+for existence, and limited to himself in his exertions. He whom we seek
+will be found to be also a spiritual person who is self-existent, and
+who sets his own bounds to his activity.
+
+That the line of thought we are now pursuing is the true one, and that
+the result which we approach, and are about to utter, is well founded,
+receives decisive confirmation from the following facts. Man perceives
+that malice must be criminal. Just so the Eternal Eye must see it. A
+similar remark is true of mathematical, and all other _a priori_ laws.
+Sometimes, at least, there awakens in man's bosom the unutterable thrill
+of benevolence; and thus he tastes of the crystal river which flows,
+calmly and forever, through the bosom of the "Everlasting Father." For
+his own conduct, man is the final cause. In this is he, must he be, the
+likeness of the Ultimate. Spiritual personality is the highest possible
+form of being. It is then a form common to God and man. Here, therefore,
+Philosophy and Revelation are at one. With startling, and yet grateful
+unanimity, they affirm the solemn truth, "GOD MADE MAN IN HIS OWN
+IMAGE."
+
+We reach the goal at last. The Final Truth stands full in the field of
+our vision. "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith
+Jehovah, who is, and who was, and who is to come, the Almighty." THAT
+SPIRITUAL PERSON WHO IS SELF-EXISTENT, ABSOLUTE, AND INFINITE, IS THE
+ULTIMATE GROUND, THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE.
+
+The problem of the Universe is solved. We stand within the portico of
+the sublime temple of truth. Mortal has lifted, at last, the veil of
+Isis, and looked upon the eternal mysteries.
+
+It is manifest now, how irrelevant and irreverent those expressions must
+be, in which the terms infinite and absolute are employed as signifying
+abstractions or amounts. They can have no meaning with reference to the
+Universe. But what their true significance is, stands out with
+unmistakable clearness and precision.
+
+1. _Absoluteness is that distinctive spiritual_ QUALITY _of the
+necessary Being which establishes Him as unqualified except by Himself,
+and as complete_.
+
+2. Absoluteness and Unconditionedness are,--the one the positive, and
+the other the negative term expressive of the same idea.
+
+3. _Infinity is that distinctive spiritual_ QUALITY _of the necessary
+Being which gives to Him universality_.
+
+Absoluteness and Infinity are, then, spiritual qualities of the
+self-existent Person, which, distinguishing Him from all other persons,
+constitute Him unique and supreme.
+
+It is a law of Logic, which even the child must acknowledge, that
+whenever, by a process of thought, a result has been attained and set
+forth, he who propounds the result is directly responsible for all that
+is logically involved in it. The authority of that law is here both
+acknowledged and invoked. The most rigid and exhaustive logical
+development of the premises heretofore obtained, which the human mind is
+capable of, is challenged, in the confidence that there can be found
+therein no jot of discrepancy, no tittle of contradiction. As germain,
+and important to the matter in hand, some steps in this development will
+be noted.
+
+In solving the problem placed before us, viz: To account for the being
+and continuance of the Universe, we have found that the Universe and its
+Cause are two distinct and yet intimately and necessarily connected
+beings, the one dependent upon the other, and that other utterly
+independent; and so that the one is limited and finite, and the other
+absolute and infinite; that the one is partly thing and partly person,
+and that to both thing and person limitation and finiteness belong;
+while the other is wholly person, and consequently the pure, absolute,
+and infinite Person. We have further found that absoluteness and
+infinity are spiritual qualities of that one Person, which are
+incommunicable, and differentiate Him from all other possible beings;
+and which establish Him as the uncaused, self-active ground for all
+possible beings besides. It is then a Person with all the limitations
+and conditions of personality,--a Person at once limited and unlimited,
+conditioned and unconditioned, related and unrelated, whose limitations,
+conditions, and relations are entirely consistent with his absoluteness
+and infinity, who is the final Cause, the Ultimate Ground of the
+Universe.
+
+The finite person is self-conscious, and in a measure
+self-comprehending; but he only partially perceives the workings of his
+own being. _A fortiori_, must the infinite Person be self-conscious, and
+exhaustively self-comprehending. The finite person is an intellect,
+sensibility, and will; but these are circumscribed by innumerable
+limitations. So must the infinite Person be intellect, sensibility, and
+will; but His intellect must be Universal Genius; His sensibility Pure
+Delight, and His will, as choice, Universal Benevolence, and as act,
+Omnipotence.
+
+1. As intellect, the infinite Person is Universal Genius.
+
+Then, he "must possess the primary copies or patterns of what it is
+possible may be, in his own subjective apprehension;" or, in other
+words, "The pure ideals of all possible entities, lie as pure reason
+conceptions in the light of the divine intelligence, and in these must
+be found the rules after which the creative agency must go forth."
+These _a priori_ "pure ideals" are _conditional_ of his knowledge. They
+are the sum and limit of all possible knowledge. He must know them as
+they are. He cannot intuit, or think otherwise than in accordance with
+them. However many there may be of these ideals, the number is fixed and
+definite, and must be so; and so the infinite Person must see it. In
+fine, in the fact of exhaustive self-comprehension is involved the fact,
+that the number of his qualities, attributes, faculties, forms of
+activity, and acts, are, and must be limited, definite, and so known to
+him; and yet he is infinite and absolute, and thoroughly knows himself
+to be so.
+
+2. As sensibility, the infinite Person is Pure Delight.
+
+Then he exists in a state of unalloyed and complete bliss, produced by
+the ceaseless consciousness of his perfect worth and worthiness, and his
+entire complacency therein. Yet he is pleased with the good conduct, and
+displeased with the evil conduct, of the moral beings he has made. And
+if two are good, and one better than another, he loves the one more than
+the other. Yet all this in no way modifies, or limits, or lessens his
+own absolute self-satisfaction and happiness.
+
+3. As will, the infinite Person is, in choice, Universal Benevolence; in
+act, Omnipotence.
+
+_a._ In choice, the whole personality,--both the spontaneous and self
+activity, are entirely and concordantly active in the one direction.
+Some of the objects towards which this state manifests itself may be
+very small. The fact that each receives the attention appropriate to his
+place in the system of beings in no way modifies the Great Heart, which
+spontaneously prompts to all good acts. But
+
+_b._ In act, the infinite Person, though omnipotent, is, always must be,
+limited. His ability to act is limited and determined by the "pure
+ideals," in which "must be found the rules after which the creative
+agency must go forth." In act he is also limited by his choice. The fact
+that he is Universal Benevolence estops him from performing any act
+which is not in exact accordance therewith. He cannot construct a
+rational being, to whom two and two will appear five; and if he should
+attempt to, he would cease to be perfect Goodness. Again, the infinite
+Person performs an act--of Creation. The act is, must be, limited and
+definite; and so must the product--the Universe be. He cannot create an
+unlimited Universe, nor perform an infinite act. The very words
+unlimited Universe, and as well the notions they express, are
+contradictory, and annihilate each other. Further, an infinite act, even
+if possible, would not, could not create, or have any relation to the
+construction of a Universe. An infinite act must be the realization of
+an infinite ideal. The infinite Person has a thorough comprehension of
+himself; and consequently a complete idea of himself. That idea, being
+the idea of the infinite Person, is infinite; and it is the only
+possible infinite idea. He finds this idea realized in himself. But,
+should it be in his power to realize it _again_, that exertion of power
+would be an infinite act, and its product another infinite Person. No
+other infinite act, and no other result, are rationally supposable.
+
+The Universe, then, however large it be, is, must be, limited and
+definite. Its magnitude may be inconceivable to us; but in the mind of
+its Creator every atom is numbered. No spirit may ever have skirted its
+boundary; but that boundary is as clear and distinct to his eye as the
+outline of the Alps against a clear sky is to the traveller's. The
+questions Where? How far? How long? How much? and the like, are
+pertinent only in the Universe; and their answers are always limited and
+definite.
+
+The line of thought we have been pursuing is deemed by a large class of
+thinkers not only paradoxical, but utterly contradictory and
+self-destructive. We speak of a Person, a term which necessarily
+involves limitation and condition, as infinite and absolute. We speak of
+this infinity and absoluteness as spiritual qualities, which are
+conditional and limiting to him. We speak of him as conditioned by an
+inability to be finite. In fine, to those good people, the Limitists,
+our sense seems utter nonsense. It is required, therefore, for the
+completion of this portion of our task, to present a rational ground
+upon which these apparent contradictions shall become manifestly
+consistent.
+
+In those sentences where the infinite Person is spoken of as limited and
+unlimited, &c., it is evident that there is a play upon words, and that
+they apply to different qualities in the personality. It is not said, of
+course, that the number of his faculties is limited and unlimited; or
+that his self-complacency is boundless and constrained; or that his act
+is conditioned and unconditioned. Nor are these seeming paradoxes stated
+to puzzle and disturb. They are written to express a great, fundamental,
+and all-important truth, which seems never once to have shadowed the
+minds of the Limitists,--a truth which, when once seen, dispels forever
+all the ghostly battalions of difficulties which they have raised. The
+truth is this.
+
+That Being whose limitations, conditions, and relations are wholly
+subjective, _i. e._ find their whole base and spring in his self; and
+who is therefore entirely free from on all possible limitations,
+conditions, and relations, from without himself; and who possesses,
+therefore, all possible fulness of all possible excellences, and finds
+the perennial acme of happiness in self-contemplation, and the
+consciousness of his perfect worth; and being such is ground for all
+other possible being; is, in the true philosophical sense, unrelated,
+unconditioned, unlimited. Or, in other words, the conditions imposed by
+Universal Genius upon the absolute and infinite Person are _different in
+kind_ from the conditions imposed upon finite persons and physical
+things. The former in no way diminish aught from the fulness of their
+possessor's endowments; the latter not only do so diminish, but render
+it impossible for their possessor to supply the deficiency.
+
+The following dictum will, then, concisely and exactly express the truth
+we have attained.
+
+_Those only are conditions, in the philosophical sense, which diminish
+the fulness of the possessor's endowments._
+
+An admirable illustration of this truth can be drawn from some
+reflections of Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., which we quote. "What we need
+is not merely a rule by which to direct _the process_ in the attainment
+of any artistic end, but we must find the legislator who may determine
+the end itself"...
+
+Whence is the ultimate behest that is to determine the archetype, and
+control the pure spontaneity in its action.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+"Must the artist work merely because there is an inner want to gratify,
+with no higher end than the gratification of the highest constitutional
+craving? Can we find nothing beyond a want, which shall from its own
+behest demand that this, and not its opposite, shall be? Grant that the
+round worlds and all their furniture are _good_--but why good? Certainly
+as means to an end. Grant that this end, the happiness of sentient
+beings, is _good_--but why good? Because it supplies the want of the
+Supreme Architect. And is this the _supreme good_? Surely if it is, we
+are altogether within nature's conditions, call our ultimate attainment
+by what name we may. We have no origin for our legislation, only as the
+highest architect finds such wants within himself, and the archetypal
+rule for gratifying his wants in the most effectual manner; and
+precisely as the ox goes to his fodder in the shortest way, so he goes
+to his work in making and peopling worlds in the most direct manner.
+Here is no will; no personality; no pure autonomy. The artist finds
+himself so constituted that he must work in this manner, or the craving
+of his own nature becomes intolerable to himself, and the gratifying of
+this craving is _the highest good_."
+
+We attain hereby a mark by which to distinguish the diminishing from the
+undiminishing condition. A sense of want, _a craving_, is the necessary
+result of a diminishing condition. Hence the presence of any craving is
+the distinguishing mark of the finite; and that plenitude of endowments
+which excludes all possible craving or lack, is the distinguishing mark
+of the infinite and absolute Person. In this plenitude his infinity and
+absoluteness consist; and it is, therefore, conditional of them. Upon
+this plenitude, as conditional of this Person's perfection, Dr. Hickok
+speaks further, as follows:--
+
+"We must find that which shall itself be the reason and law for
+benevolence, and for the sake of which the artist shall be put to his
+beneficent agency above all considerations that he finds his nature
+craving it. It must be that for whose sake, happiness, even that which,
+as kind and benevolent, craves on all sides the boon to bless others,
+itself should be. Not sensient nor artistic autonomy, but a pure ethic
+autonomy, which knows that within itself there is an excellency which
+obliges for the sake of itself. This is never to be found, nor anything
+very analogous to it, in sensient nature and a dictate from some
+generalized experience. It lies within the rational spirit, and is law
+in the heart, as an inward imperative in its own right, and must there
+be found.... This inward witnessing capacitates for self-legislating and
+self-rewarding. It is inward consciousness of a worth imperative above
+want; an end in itself, and not means to another end; a user of things,
+but not itself to be used by anything; and, on account of its intrinsic
+excellency, an authoritative determiner for its own behoof of the entire
+artistic agency with all its products, and thus a conscience excusing or
+accusing.
+
+"This inward witnessing of the absolute to his own worthiness, gives the
+ultimate estimate to nature, which needs and can attain to nothing
+higher, than that it should satisfy this worthiness as end; and thereby
+in all his works, he fixes, in his own light, upon the subjective
+archetype, and attains to the objective result of that which is
+befitting his own dignity. It is, therefore, in no craving want which
+must be gratified, but from the interest of an inner behest, which
+should be executed for his own worthiness' sake, that 'God has created
+all things, and for his pleasure they are and were created.'"
+
+In the light of the foregoing discussion and illustrations, the division
+of conditions into two classes--the one class, conditions proper,
+comprising those which diminish the endowments of the being upon whom
+they lie, and are ground for a craving or lack; and the other class,
+comprising those conditions which do not diminish the endowments of the
+being upon whom they lie, and which are, therefore, ground for perfect
+plenitude of endowments, and of self-satisfaction on account thereof--is
+seen to be thoroughly philosophical. And let it be here noted, that the
+very construction, or, if the term suit better, perception of this
+distinction, is a decisive evidence of the fact, and a direct product of
+the operation of the Pure Reason. If our intellect comprised only what
+the Limitists acknowledge it to be, a Sense and an Understanding, not
+only could no other but diminishing conditions be thought of, but by no
+possibility could a hint that there were any others flit through the
+mind. Such a mind, being wholly in nature, and conditioned by nature,
+_cannot_ climb up out of nature, and perceive aught there. But those
+conditions which lie upon the infinite Person are supernatural and
+spiritual; and could not be even vaguely guessed at, much more examined
+critically and classified, but by a being possessed of a faculty the
+same in kind with the intellect in which such spiritual conditions
+inhere.
+
+The actual processes which go on in the mind are as follows. The Sense,
+possessing a purely mechanical structure, a structure not differing in
+_kind_ from that of the vegetable,--both being alike entirely
+conditioned by the law of cause and effect,--perceives phenomena. The
+relation of the object to the sensorium, or of the image to the sensory,
+and the forms under which the Sense shall receive the impression, are
+fixed. Because the Sense acts compulsorily, in fixed mechanical forms,
+it is, by this very construction, incapable, not only of receiving
+impressions and examining phenomena outside of those forms, but it can
+never be startled with the guess that there _is_ anything else than what
+is received therein. For instance: A man born blind, though he can have
+no possible notion of what light is, knows that light is, from the
+testimony of those who can see. But if a race of men born blind should
+be found, who had never had any communication with men who could see, it
+is notorious that they could have no possible notion even that light
+was. A suspicion of its existence could never cross their minds. This
+position is strengthened and established beyond controversy, by the
+failure of the mind in its efforts to construct an entirely new sense.
+Every attempt only intensifies our appreciation of the futility of the
+effort. From fragments of the five senses we might, perhaps, construct a
+patchwork sixth; but the mind makes no presentation to itself of a new
+sense. The reason is, that, to do so, the Sense, as mental faculty, must
+transcend the very conditions of its existence. It is precisely with the
+Understanding as with the lower faculty. It cannot transcend its limits.
+It can add no item to the sum of human knowledge, except as it deduces
+it from a presentation by the Sense. Hence its conditions correspond to
+those in its associate faculty.
+
+It is manifest, then, that a being with only these faculties may
+construct a _system_, but can never develop a _science_. It can arrange,
+classify, by such standards as its fancy may select, the phenomena in
+nature; but this must be in accordance with some sensuous form. _No law
+can be seen_, by which it ought to be so, and not otherwise. Such
+classification must always be determined by the number of stamens in the
+flower, for instance; and that standard, though arbitrary, will be as
+good as any other, _unless there comes a higher faculty_ which,
+overlooking all nature, perceives the _a priori_ law working in nature,
+which gives the ultimate ground for an exhaustive development of a
+science which in its _idea_ cannot be improved. It is manifest, further,
+that those conditions, to which we have applied the epithet proper, lie
+upon the two faculties we have been considering. In this we agree with
+the Limitists.
+
+It now behooves to present the fact that the faculty whose existence was
+proved in the earlier part of our work, is competent to overlook, and so
+comprehend nature, and all the conditions of nature, and thereby assign
+to said conditions their true and inferior place, while it soars out of
+nature, and intuits those _a priori_ laws which, though the conditions
+of, are wholly unconditioned _by nature_; but which are both the
+conditions of and conditioned by the supernatural; and this in an
+entirely different sense from the other. This is the province of the
+Pure Reason. Standing on some lofty peak, above all clouds of sense,
+under the full blaze of eternal truth, the soul sees all nature spread
+like a vast map before her searching eye, sharply observes, and
+appreciates all the conditions of nature; and then, while holding it
+full in the field of her vision, with equal fulness perceives that other
+land, the spiritual plains of the supernatural, sees them too in all
+their conditionings; and sees, with a clearness of vision never
+approximated by the earthly eye, the fact that these supernatural
+conditions are no deprivation which awaken a want, but that they inhere
+and cohere, as final ground for absolute plenitude of endowments and
+fulness of bliss, in the Self-existent Person.
+
+It will be objected to the position now attained, that it involves the
+doctrine that the Pure Reason in the finite spiritual person is on a par
+with the Universal Genius in the infinite spiritual Person. The
+objection is fallacious, because based upon the assumption that likeness
+in mode of action involves entire similarity. The mode of action in the
+finite Pure Reason is precisely similar to that of the Universal Genius;
+the objects perceived by both are the same, they are seen in the same
+light, and so are in accord; but the _range_ of the finite is one, and
+the _range_ of the infinite is another; and so diverse also are the
+circumstances attending the act of seeing. The range of the finite
+Reason is, _always must be, partial_: the range of the infinite Reason
+is, _always must be, exhaustive_ (not infinite). In circumstances, the
+finite Reason is created dependent for existence, must begin in a germ
+in which it is inactive, and _must_ be developed by association with
+nature, and under forms of nature; and can never, by any possibility of
+growth, attain to that perfectness in which it shall be satisfied, or to
+a point in development from which it can continue its advance as _pure
+spirit_. It always must be spirit in a body; even though that be a
+spiritual body. The infinite Reason is self-existent, and therefore
+independent; and is, and always must be, in the absolute possession of
+all possible knowledge, and so cannot grow. Hence, while the infinite
+and finite reasons see the same object in the same light, and therefore
+_alike_, the difference in range, and the difference in circumstance,
+must forever constitute them dissimilar. The exact likeness of sight
+just noticed is the _necessary a priori_ ground upon which a moral
+government is _possible_.
+
+In thus declaring the basis upon which the above distinction between the
+two classes of conditions rests, we have been led to distinguish more
+clearly between the faculties of the mind, and especially to observe how
+the Pure Reason enables us thereby to solve the problems she has raised.
+In this radical distinction lies the rational ground for the explication
+of all the problems which the Limitists raise. It also appears that the
+terms must, possible, and the like, being used to express no idea of
+restraint, as coming from without upon the infinite Person, or of lack
+or craving, as subsisting within him, are properly employed in
+expressing the fact that his _Self, as a priori ground for his
+activity_, is, though the only, yet a real, positive, and irremovable
+limit, condition, and law of his action. Of two possible ends he may
+freely choose either. Of all possible modes of action he may choose one;
+but the constituting laws of the Self he _cannot_, and the moral laws of
+his Self he _will not_, violate.
+
+That point has now been reached at which this branch of the discussion
+in hand may be closed. The final base from which to conduct an
+examination of the questions respecting absoluteness and infinity has
+been attained. In the progress to this consummation it was found that a
+radical psychological error lay at the root of the philosophy taught by
+the Limitists. Their theory was seen to be partial, and essentially
+defective. Qualities which they do not recognise were found to belong to
+certain mental affirmations. Four classes of these affirmations or ideas
+were named and illustrated; and by them the fact of the Reason was
+established. Then its mode of activity and its functions were stated;
+and finally the great truth which solves the problem of the ages was, by
+this faculty, attained and stated. It became evident that the final
+cause of the Universe must be found without the Universe; and it was
+then seen that
+
+     That spiritual Person who is self-existent, absolute, and
+     infinite, is the Ultimate Ground, the Final Cause, of the
+     Universe.
+
+Definitions of the terms absolute and infinite suitable to such a
+position were then given, with a few concluding reflections. From the
+result thus secured the way is prepared for an examination of the
+general principles and their special applications which the Limitists
+maintain, and this will occupy our future pages.
+
+
+
+
+PART II.
+
+AN EXAMINATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITION OF THE LIMITISTS, AND OF
+CERTAIN GENERAL COROLLARIES UNDER IT.
+
+
+It has been attempted in the former pages to find a valid and final
+basis of truth, one which would satisfy the cravings of the human soul,
+and afford it a sure rest. In the fact that God made man in his own
+image, and that thus there is, _to a certain extent_, a community of
+faculties, a community of knowledge, a community of obligations, and a
+community of interests, have we found such a basis. We have hereby
+learned that a part of man's knowledge is necessary and final; in other
+words, that he can know the truth, and be sure that his knowledge is
+correct. If the proofs which have been offered of the fact of the Pure
+Reason, and the statements which have been made of the mode of its
+activity and of its functions, and, further, of the problem of the
+Universe, and the true method for solving it, shall have been
+satisfactory to the reader, he will now be ready to consider the
+analysis of Sir William Hamilton's fundamental proposition, which was
+promised on an early page. We there gave, it was thought, sufficiently
+full extracts for a fair presentation of his theory, and followed them
+with a candid epitome. In recurring to the subject now, and for the
+purpose named, we are constrained at the outset to make an
+acknowledgment.
+
+It would be simple folly, a childish egotism, to pass by in silence the
+masterly article on this subject in the "North American Review" for
+October, 1864, and after it to pretend to offer anything new. Whatever
+the author might have wrought out in his own mental workshop,--and his
+work was far less able than what is there given,--that article has left
+nothing to be said. He has therefore been tempted to one of two courses:
+either to transfer it to these pages, or pass by the subject entirely.
+Either course may, perhaps, be better than the one finally chosen; which
+is, while pursuing the order of his own thought, to add a few short
+extracts therefrom. One possibility encourages him in this, which is,
+that some persons may see this volume, who have no access to the Review,
+and to whom, therefore, these pages will be valuable. To save needless
+repetition, this discussion will presuppose that the reader has turned
+back and perused the extracts and epitome above alluded to.
+
+Upon the very threshold of Sir William Hamilton's statement, one is met
+by a logical _faux pas_ which is truly amazing. Immediately after the
+assertion that "the mind can know only the _limited and the
+conditionally limited_," and in the very sentence in which he denies the
+possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute, _he proceeds to
+define those words in definite and known terms_! The Infinite he defines
+as "the unconditionally unlimited," and the Absolute as "the
+unconditionally limited." Or, to save him, will one say that the
+defining terms are unknown? So much the worse, then! "The Infinite," an
+unknown term, may be represented by _x_; and the unconditionally
+unlimited, a compound unknown term, by _ab_. Now, who has the right to
+say, either in mathematics or metaphysics, in any philosophy, that
+_x_=_ab_? Yet such dicta are the basis of "The Philosophy of the
+Unconditioned." But, one of two suppositions is possible. Either the
+terms infinite and absolute are known terms and definable, or they are
+unknown terms and undefinable. Yet, Hamilton says, they are unknown and
+definable. Which does he mean? If he is held to the former, they are
+unknown; then all else that he has written about them are batches of
+meaningless words. If he is held to the latter, they are definable;
+then are they known, and his system is denied in the assertion of it.
+Since his words are so contradictory, he must be judged by his deeds;
+and in these he always assumes that we have a positive knowledge of the
+infinite and absolute, else he would not have argued the matter; for
+there can be no argument about nothing. Our analysis of his theory,
+then, must be conducted upon this hypothesis.
+
+Turn back for a moment to the page upon which his theory is quoted, and
+read the last sentence. Is his utterance a "principle," or is it a
+judgment? Is it an axiom, or is it a guess. The logician asserts that we
+know only the conditioned, and yet bases his assertion upon "the
+principles," &c. What is a principle, and how is it known? If it is
+axiom, then he has denied his own philosophy in the very sentence in
+which he uttered it. And this, we have no hesitation in saying, is just
+what he did. He blindly assumed certain "fundamental laws of
+thought,"--to quote another of his phrases--to establish the impotence
+of the mind to know those laws _as fundamental_. Again, if his
+philosophy is valid, the words "must," "necessary," and the like are
+entirely out of place; for they are unconditional. In the conditioned
+there is, can be, no must, no necessity.
+
+From these excursions about the principle let us now return to the
+principle itself. It may be stated concisely thus: There are two
+extremes,--"the Absolute" and the "Infinite." These include all being.
+They are contradictories, that is, one must be, to the exclusion of the
+other. But the mind can "conceive" of neither. What, then, is the
+logical conclusion? _That the mind cannot conceive of anything._ What is
+his conclusion? That the mind can conceive of something between the
+infinite and the absolute, which is neither the one nor the other, but a
+_tertium quid_--the conditioned. Where did this _tertium quid_ come
+from, when he had already comprehended everything in the two extremes?
+If there is a mean, the conditioned, and the two extremes, then
+"excluded middle" has nothing to do with the matter at all.
+
+To avoid the inevitable conclusion of his logic as just stated, Hamilton
+erected the subterfuge of _mental imbecility_. To deny any knowledge to
+man, was to expose himself to ridicule. He, therefore, and his followers
+after him, drew a line in the domain of knowledge, and assigned to the
+hither side of it all knowledge that can come through generalizations in
+the Understanding; and then asserted that the contradictions which
+appeared in the mind, when one examined those questions which lie on the
+further side of that line, resulted from the impotency of the mind to
+comprehend the questions themselves. This was, is, their psychology. How
+satisfactory it may be to Man, a hundred years, perhaps, will show. But
+strike out the last assertion, and write, Both are cognizable; and then
+let us proceed with our reasoning. The essayist in the North American
+presents the theory under four heads, as follows:--
+
+"1. The Infinite and Absolute as defined, are contradictory and
+exclusive of each other; yet, one must be true.
+
+"2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible.
+
+"3. Each is inconceivable; and the inconceivability of each is referable
+to the same cause, namely, mental imbecility.
+
+"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable between
+them."
+
+The first and fourth points require our especial attention.
+
+1. Let us particularly mark, then, that it is _as defined_, that the
+terms are "contradictory." The question, therefore, turns upon the
+definitions. Undoubtedly the definitions are erroneous; but in order to
+see wherein, the following general reflections may be made:--
+
+The terms infinite and absolute, as used by philosophers, have two
+distinct applications: one to Space and Time, and one to God. Such
+definitions as are suitable to the latter application, and
+self-consistent, have already been given. Though reluctant to admit into
+a philosophical treatise a term bearing two distinct meanings, we shall
+waive for a little our scruples,--though choosing, for ourselves, to
+use the equivalent rather than the term.
+
+Such definitions are needed, then, as that absolute Space and Time shall
+not be contradictory to infinite Space and Time. Let us first observe
+Hamilton's theory. According to it, Space, for instance, is either
+unconditional illimitation, or it is unconditional limitation; in other
+words, it is illimitable, or it is a limited whole. The first part of
+the assertion is true. That Space is illimitable, is unquestionably a
+self-evident truth. Any one who candidly considers the subject will see
+not only that the mind cannot assign limits to Space, but that the
+attempt is an absurdity just alike in kind with the attempt to think two
+and two five. The last part is a psychological blunder, has no
+pertinence to the question, and is not what Hamilton was groping for. He
+was searching for the truth, that _there is no absolute unit in
+Space_. A limited whole has nothing to do with the matter in
+hand--absoluteness--at all. The illimitability of Space, which has just
+been established as an axiom, precludes this. What, then, is the
+opposite pole of thought? We have just declared it. There is no absolute
+unit of Space; or, in other words, all division is in Space, but Space
+is indivisible. This, also, is an axiom, is self-evident. We attain,
+then, two poles of thought, and definitions of the two terms given,
+which are exhaustive and consistent.
+
+    "Space is illimitable.
+    Space is indivisible."
+
+The one is the infinity of Space, the other is the absoluteness of
+Space. The fact, then, is, all limitation is _in_ Space, and all
+division is _in_ Space; but Space is neither limited or divided. One of
+the logician's extremes is seen, then, to have no foundation in fact;
+and that which is found to be true is also found to be consistent with,
+nay, essential to, what should have been the other.
+
+Having hitherto expressed a decided protest against any attempt to find
+out God through the forms of Space and Time, a repetition will not be
+needed here. God is only to be sought for, found, and studied, by such
+methods as are suitable to the supreme spiritual Person. Hence all the
+attempts of the Limitists to reason from spatial and temporal
+difficulties over to those questions which belong to God, are simply
+absurd. The questions respecting Space and Time are to be discussed by
+themselves. And the questions respecting God are to be discussed by
+themselves. He who tries to reason from the one to the other is not less
+absurd than he who should try to reason from a farm to the
+multiplication table.
+
+In Sir William Hamilton's behalf it should be stated, that there is just
+a modicum of truth underlying his theory,--just enough to give it a
+degree of plausibility. The Sense, as faculty for the perception of
+physical objects, or their images, and the Understanding as discursive
+faculty for passing over and forming judgments upon the materials
+gathered by the Sense, lie under the shadow of a law very like the one
+he stated. The Sense was made _incapable_ of perceiving an ultimate atom
+or of comprehending the universe. From the fact that the Sense never has
+perceived these objects, the Understanding concludes that it never will.
+Only by the insight and oversight of that higher faculty, the Pure
+Reason, do we come to know that it never _can_. It was because those
+lower faculties are thus walled in by the conditions of Space and Time,
+and are unable to perceive or conceive anything out of those conditions,
+and because, in considering them, he failed to see the other mental
+powers, that Sir William Hamilton constructed his Philosophy of the
+Unconditioned.
+
+2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible.
+
+Literally, this is true. The word "conceive" applies strictly to the
+work of the Understanding; and that faculty can never have any notion of
+the Infinite or Absolute. But, assuming that "conceive" is a general
+term for cognize, the conclusion developed just above is inevitable. If
+all being is in one or the other, and neither can be known, nothing can
+be known.
+
+3. They cannot be known, because of mental imbecility. If man can know
+nothing because of mental imbecility, why suppose that he has a mental
+faculty at all? Why not enounce, as the fundamental principle of one's
+theory, the assertion, All men are idiots? This would be logically
+consistent. The truth is, the logician was in a dilemma. He must confess
+that men know something. By a false psychology he had ruled the Reason
+out of the mind, and so had left himself no faculty by which to form any
+notion of absoluteness and infinity; and yet they would thrust
+themselves before him, and demand an explanation. Hence, he constructed
+a subterfuge. He would have been more consistent if he had said, There
+is no absolute and infinite. The conditioned is the whole of existence;
+and this the mind knows.
+
+"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable between
+them."
+
+What the essayist in the North American says upon this point is so apt,
+and so accords with our own previous reflections, that we will not
+forbear making an extract. "The last of the four theses will best be
+re-stated in Hamilton's own words; the italics are his. 'The conditioned
+is the mean between two extremes--two inconditionates, exclusive of each
+other, neither of which _can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on
+the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, one _must be
+admitted as necessary_.' This sentence excites unmixed wonder. To
+mention in the same breath the law of excluded middle, and two
+contradictions with a mean between them, requires a hardihood
+unparalleled in the history of philosophy, except by Hegel. If the two
+contradictory extremes are themselves incogitable, yet include a
+cogitable mean, why insist upon the necessity of accepting either
+extreme? This necessity of accepting one of two contradictories is
+wholly based upon the supposed impossibility of a mean; if the mean
+exists, that may be true, and both the contradictories false. But if a
+mean between the two contradictories be both impossible and absurd,
+(and we have hitherto so interpreted the law of excluded middle,)
+Hamilton's conditioned entirely vanishes."
+
+Upon a system which, in whatever aspect one looks at it, is found to be
+but a bundle of contradictions and absurdities, further criticism would
+appear to be unnecessary.
+
+Having, impliedly at least, accepted as true Sir William Hamilton's
+psychological error,--the rejection of the Reason as the intellectual
+faculty of the spiritual person,--and having, with him, used the terms
+limit, condition, and the like, in such significations as are pertinent
+to the Sense and Understanding only, the Limitists proceed to present in
+a paradoxical light many questions which arise concerning "the
+Infinite." They take the ground that, to our view, he can be neither
+person, nor intellect, nor consciousness; for each of these implies
+limitation; and yet that it is impossible for us to know aught of him,
+except as such. Then having, as they think, completely confused the
+mind, they draw hence new support for their conclusion, that we can
+attain to no satisfactory knowledge on the subject. The following
+extracts selected from many will show this.
+
+"Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in
+whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction
+between one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of
+something; and that something can only be known as that which it is, by
+being distinguished from that which it is not. But distinction is
+necessarily a limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from
+another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not,
+or it must not possess some form which the other has. But it is obvious
+that the Infinite cannot be distinguished, as such, from the Finite, by
+the absence of any quality which the Finite possesses; for such absence
+would be a limitation. Nor yet can it be distinguished by the presence
+of an attribute which the Finite has not; for as no finite part can be a
+constituent of an infinite whole, this differential characteristic must
+itself be infinite; and must at the same time have nothing in common
+with the finite....
+
+"That a man can be conscious of the Infinite, is thus a supposition
+which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, annihilates itself.
+Consciousness is essentially a limitation; for it is the determination
+of the mind to one actual out of many possible modifications. But the
+Infinite, if it is conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially
+everything, and actually nothing; for if there is anything in general
+which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is anything
+in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being
+any other thing. But again, it must also be conceived as actually
+everything, and potentially nothing; for an unrealized potentiality is
+likewise a limitation. If the infinite can be that which it is not, it
+is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a
+higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no
+characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything
+else, and discerned as an object of consciousness....
+
+"Rationalism is thus only consistent with itself when it refuses to
+attribute consciousness to God. Consciousness, in the only form in which
+we can conceive it, implies limitation and change,--the perception of
+one object out of many, and a comparison of that object with others. To
+he always conscious of the same object, is, humanly speaking, not to be
+conscious at all; and, beyond its human manifestation, we can have no
+conception of what consciousness is."--_Limits of Religious Thought_,
+pp. 93-95.
+
+"As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the
+conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge and of
+positive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions. To _think_ is
+to _condition_; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the
+possibility of thought....
+
+"Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible
+under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought; known only in
+correlation, and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of
+this, all that we know either of subject or object, either of mind or
+matter, is only a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of
+the different, of the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit that the
+consequence of this doctrine is--that philosophy, if viewed as more than
+a science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from the
+particular, we admit that we can never, in out highest generalizations,
+rise above the finite; that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter,
+can be nothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of
+an existence, which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recognize as
+beyond the reach of philosophy."
+
+"In all this, so far as human intelligence is concerned, we cordially
+agree; for a more complete admission could not be imagined, not only
+that a knowledge, and even a notion, of the absolute is impossible for
+man, but that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such a
+knowledge even in the Deity himself, without contradicting our human
+conceptions of the possibility of intelligence itself."--_Sir William
+Hamilton's Essays_, pp. 21, 22, 38.
+
+"The various mental attributes which we ascribe to God--Benevolence,
+Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, for example--can be conceived by us only as
+existing in a benevolent and holy and just and wise Being, who is not
+identical with any one of his attributes, but the common subject of them
+all; in one word, a _Person_. But Personality, as we conceive it, is
+essentially a limitation and relation. Our own personality is presented
+to us as relative and limited; and it is from that presentation that all
+our representative notions of personality are derived. Personality is
+presented to us as a relation between the conscious self and the various
+modes of his consciousness. There is no personality in abstract thought
+without a thinker: there is no thinker unless he exercises some mode of
+thought. Personality is also a limitation; for the thought and the
+thinker are distinguished from and limit each other; and the various
+modes of thought are distinguished each from each by limitation
+likewise...."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 102.
+
+"Personality, with all its limitations, though far from exhibiting the
+absolute nature of God as He is, is yet truer, grander, more elevating,
+more religious, than those barren, vague, meaningless abstractions in
+which men babble about nothing under the name of the Infinite and
+Personal conscious existence, limited though it be, is yet the noblest
+of all existence of which man can dream.... It is by consciousness alone
+that we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer Him any
+service. It is only by conceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can
+stand in any religious relation to Him at all; that we can form
+such a representation of Him as is demanded by our spiritual
+wants, insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual
+curiosity."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 104.
+
+The conclusions of these writers upon this whole topic are as follows:--
+
+"The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive
+of each other as equally possible; _but only as unable to understand_ as
+possible two extremes; one of which, however, on the ground of their
+mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognize as true.... And by a
+wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our
+inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with
+a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere
+of all comprehensive reality."--_Sir William Hamilton's Essays_, p. 22.
+
+"To sum up briefly this portion of my argument. The conception of the
+Absolute and Infinity, from whatever side we view it, appears
+encompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing
+such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others;
+and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a
+contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in
+conceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as
+personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal.
+It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active; nor, without
+equal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived
+as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only
+of that sum."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, pp. 84, 85.
+
+We have quoted thus largely, preferring that the Limitists should speak
+for themselves. Their doctrine, as taught, not simply in these passages,
+but throughout their writings, may be briefly summed up as follows.
+
+The human mind, whenever it attempts to investigate the profoundest
+subjects which come before it, and which it is goaded to examine, finds
+itself in an inextricable maze of contradictions; and, after vainly
+struggling for a while to get out, becomes nonplussed, confused,
+confounded, dazed; and, falling down helpless and effortless in the
+maze, and with devout humility acknowledging its impotence, it finds
+that the "highest reason" is to pass beyond the sphere and out of the
+light of reason, into the sphere of a superrational and therefore dark,
+and therefore _blind_ faith.
+
+But it is to be stated, and here we strike to the centre of the errors
+of the Limitists, that a perception and confession of mental impotence
+is _not_ the logical deduction from their premises. Lustrous as may be
+their names in logic,--and Sir William Hamilton is esteemed a sun in the
+logical firmament,--no one of them ever saw, or else dared to
+acknowledge, the logical sequence from their principles. They have
+climbed upon the dizzy heights of thought, and out on their verge; and
+there they stand, hesitating and shivering, like naked men on Alpine
+precipices, with no eagle wings to spread and soar away towards the
+Eternal Truth; and not daring to take the awful plunge before them.
+Behold the gulf from which they shrink. Mr. Mansel says:--
+
+"It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our duty
+to believe that He is infinite. It is true that we cannot reconcile
+these two representations with each other, as our conception of
+personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion
+of infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists
+anywhere but in our own minds: it does not follow that it implies any
+impossibility in the absolute nature of God. The apparent contradiction,
+in this case, as in those previously noticed, is the necessary
+consequence of an attempt on the part of the human thinker to transcend
+the boundaries of his own consciousness. It proves that there are limits
+to man's power of thought; and it proves no more."--_Limits of Religious
+Thought_, p. 106.
+
+Or, to put it in sharp and accurate, plain and unmistakable English. "It
+is our duty to think of God as personal," when to think of Him as
+personal is to think a lie; "to believe that He is infinite," when so to
+believe is to believe the lie already thought; and when to believe a lie
+is to incur the penalty decreed by the Bible--God's book--upon all who
+believe lies. And this is the religious teaching of a professed
+Christian minister in one of the first Universities in the world. Not
+that Mr. Mansel meant to teach this. By no means. But it logically
+follows from his premises. In his philosophy the mind instinctively,
+necessarily, and with equal authority in each case, asserts
+
+That there must be an infinite Being;
+
+That that Being must be Self-conscious,
+
+Must be unlimited; and that
+
+Consciousness is a limitation.
+
+These assertions are contradictory and self-destructive. What follows
+then? That the mind is impotent? No! It follows that the mind is a
+deceiver! We learn again the lesson we have learned before. It is not
+weakness, it is falsehood: it is not want of capacity, it is want of
+integrity that is proved by this contradiction. Man is worse than a
+hopeless, mental imbecile, he is a hopeless, mental cheat.
+
+But is the result true? How can it be, when with all its might the mind
+revolts from it, as nature does from a vacuum? True that the human mind
+is an incorrigible falsifier? With the indignation of outraged honesty,
+man's soul rejects the insulting aspersion, and reasserts its own
+integrity and authority. Ages of controversy have failed to obliterate
+or cry down the spontaneous utterance of the soul, "I have within myself
+the ultimate standard of truth."
+
+It now devolves to account for the aberrations of the Limitists. The
+ground of all their difficulties is simple and plain. While denying to
+the human mind the faculty of the Pure Reason, they have, _by the (to
+them) undistinguished use of that faculty_, raised questions which the
+Understanding by no possibility could raise, which the Reason alone is
+capable of presenting, and which that Reason alone can solve; and have
+attempted to solve them solely by the assistance, and in the forms of,
+the Sense and the Understanding. Their problems belong to a spiritual
+person; and they attempt to solve them by the inferior modes of an
+animal nature. Better, by far, could they see with their ears. All their
+processes are developed on the vicious assumption, that the highest form
+of knowledge possible to the human mind is a generalization in the
+Understanding, upon facts given in the Sense: a form of knowledge which
+is always one, whether the substance be distinguished in the form, be a
+peach, as diverse from an apple; or a star, as one among a million. The
+meagreness and utter insufficiency of this doctrine, to account for all
+the phenomena of the human mind, we have heretofore shown; and shall
+therefore need only now to distinguish certain special phases of their
+fundamental error.
+
+As heretofore, there will be continual occasion to note how the doctrine
+of the Limitists, that the Understanding is man's highest faculty of
+knowledge, and the logical sequences therefrom respecting the laws of
+thought and consciousness vitiate their whole system. One of their most
+important errors is thus expressed:--"To be conscious, we must be
+conscious of something; and that something can only be known as that
+which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not." "Thought
+cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible under the
+antithesis of subject and object of thought known only in correlation,
+and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of this, all that
+we know either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a
+knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the different, of
+the modified, of the phenomenal." In other words, our highest possible
+form of knowledge is that by which we examine the peach, distinguish its
+qualities among themselves, and discriminate between them and the
+qualities of the apple. And Sir William Hamilton fairly and truly
+acknowledges that, as a consequence, science, except as a system of
+objects of sense, is impossible.
+
+The fact is, as has been made already sufficiently apparent, that the
+diagnosis by the Limitists of the constitution of the mind is erroneous.
+Their dictum, that all knowledge must be attained through "relation,
+plurality, and difference," is not true. There is a kind of knowledge
+which we obtain by a direct and immediate _sight_; and that, too, under
+such conditions as are no limitation upon the object thought. For
+instance, the mind, by a direct intuition, affirms, "Malice is
+criminal." It also affirms that this is an eternal, immutable, universal
+law, conditional for all possibility of moral beings. This direct and
+immediate sight, and the consciousness attending it, are _full_ of that
+one object, and so are occupied only with it; and it does NOT come under
+any forms of relation, plurality, and difference. So is it with all _a
+priori_ laws. The mode of the pure reason is thus seen to be the direct
+opposite of that of the Understanding and the Sense.
+
+Intimately connected with the foregoing is a question whose importance
+cannot be overstated. It is one which involves the very possibility of
+God's existence as a self-conscious person. To present it, we recur
+again to the extracts made just above from Sir William Hamilton.
+"Consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and
+object of thought known only in correlation, and mutually limiting each
+other." Subsequently, he makes the acknowledgment as logically following
+from this: "that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such
+knowledge," _i. e._ of the absolute, "even in the Deity himself." That
+is, God can be believed to be self-conscious only on the ground that the
+human intellect is a cheat. The theory which underlies this assertion of
+the logician--a theory not peculiar to the Limitists, but which has,
+perhaps, been hitherto universally maintained by philosophers--may be
+concisely stated thus. In every correlation of subject and object,--in
+every instance where they are to be contrasted,--the subject must be
+one, and the object must be _another and different_. Hamilton, in
+another place, utters it thus: "Look back for a moment into yourselves,
+and you will find, that what constitutes intelligence in our feeble
+consciousness, is, that there are there several terms, of which the one
+perceives the other, of which the other is perceived by the first; in
+this consists self-knowledge," &c. Mark the "several terms," and that
+the one can only see the other, never itself.
+
+This position is both a logical and psychological error. It is a logical
+error because it _assumes_, without argument, that there is involved in
+the terms subject and object such a logical contradiction and
+contradistinction that the subject cannot be object to itself. This
+assumption is groundless. As a matter of fact, it is _generally_ true
+that, so far as man is concerned, the subject is one, and the object
+another and different. But this by no means proves that it is _always_
+so; it only raises the presumption that such may be the case. And when
+one comes to examine the question in itself, there is absolutely no
+logical ground for the assumption. It is found to be a question upon
+which no decision from logical considerations can have any validity,
+because _it is purely psychological_, and can only be decided by
+evidence upon a matter of fact. Furthermore, it is a psychological
+error, because a careful examination shows that, in some instances, the
+opposite is the fact; that, in certain experiences, the subject and
+object are identical.
+
+This fact that the subject and object are often identical in the
+searching eye of human reason, and _always_ so under the eye of
+Universal Genius, is of too vast scope and too vital importance to be
+passed with a mere allusion. It seems amazing that a truth which, the
+instant it is stated, solves a thousand difficulties which philosophy
+has raised, should never yet have been affirmed by any of the great
+spiritual-eyed thinkers, and that it should have found utterance, only
+to be denied, by the pen of the Limitists. A word of personal
+reminiscence may be allowed here. The writer came to see this truth
+during a process of thought, having for its object the solution of the
+problem, How can the infinite Person be self-comprehending, and still
+infinite? While considering this, and without ever having received a
+hint from any source that the possibility of such a problem had dawned
+on a human mind before, there blazed upon him suddenly, like a heaven
+full of light, this, which appeared the incomparably profounder
+question: How can any soul, not God only, but any soul, be a
+self-examiner? Why don't the Limitists entertain and explain this? It
+was only years after that he met the negative statement in Herbert
+Spencer's book. The difficulty is, that the Limitists have represented
+to their minds the mode of the seeing of the Reason, by a sensuous
+image, as the eye; and because the eye cannot see itself, have concluded
+that the Reason cannot see itself. It is always dangerous to argue from
+an illustration; and, in this instance, it has been fatal. If man was
+only an animal nature, and so only a _receiver_ of impressions, with a
+capacity to generalize from the impressions received, the doctrine of
+the Limitists would be true. But once establish that man is also a
+spiritual _person_, with a reason, which sees truth by immediate
+intuition, and their whole teaching becomes worthless. The Reason is not
+receptivity merely, or mainly; it is originator. In its own light it
+gives to itself _a priori_ truth, and itself as seeing that truth; and
+so the subject and object are identical. This is one of the
+differentiating qualities of the spiritual person.
+
+Our position may be more accurately stated and more amply illustrated
+and sustained as follows:
+
+_Sometimes, in the created spiritual person, and always in the
+self-existent, the absolute and infinite spiritual Person, the subject
+and object are_ IDENTICAL.
+
+1. Sometimes in the created spiritual person, the subject and object are
+identical. The question is a question of fact. In illustrating the fact,
+it will be proved. When a man looks at his hands, he sees they are
+instruments for _his_ use. When he considers his physical sense, he
+still perceives it to be instrument for _his_ use. In all his
+conclusions, judgments, he still finds, not himself, but _his_
+instrument. Even in the Pure Reason he finds only _his_ faculty; though
+it be the highest possible to intellect. Yet still he searches, searches
+for the _I am_; which claims, and holds, and uses, the faculties and
+capacities. There is a phrase universally familiar to American
+Christians, a fruit of New England Theology, which leads us directly to
+the goal we seek. It is the phrase, "self-examination." In all thorough,
+religious self-examination the subject and object are identical. In the
+ordinary labors and experiences of life, man says, "I can do this or
+that;" and he therein considers only his aptitudes and capabilities. But
+in this last, this profoundest act, the assertion is not, "I can do this
+or that." It is, "I am this or that." The person stands unveiled before
+itself, in the awful sanctuary of God's presence. The decision to be
+made is not upon the use of one faculty or another. It is upon the end
+for which all labor shall be performed. The character of the person is
+under consideration, and is to be determined. The selfhood, with all its
+wondrous mysteries, is at once subject and object. The I am in man,
+alike in kind to that most impenetrable mystery, the eternal I AM of
+"the everlasting Father," is now stirred to consider its most solemn
+duty. How shall the finite I am accord _itself_ to the pure purpose of
+the infinite I AM? It may be, possibly is, that some persons have never
+been conscious of this experience. To some, from a natural inaptitude,
+and to others, from a perverse disinclination, it may never come. Some
+have so little gift of introspection, that their inner experiences are
+never observed and analyzed. Their conduct may be beautiful, but they
+never know it. Their impressions ever come from without. Another class
+of persons shun such an experience as Balshazzar would have shunned, if
+he could, the handwriting on the wall. Their whole souls are absorbed in
+the pursuit of earthly things. They are intoxicated with sensuous
+gratification. The fore-thrown shadow of the coming thought of
+self-examination awakens within them a vague instinctive dread; and they
+shudder, turn away, and by every effort avoid it. Sometimes they
+succeed; and through the gates of death rush headlong into the
+spirit-land, only to be tortured forever there with the experience they
+so successfully eluded here. For the many thousands, who know by
+experience what a calm, candid, searching, self-examination is, now that
+their attention has been drawn to its full psychological import, no
+further word is necessary. They know that in that supreme insight there
+was seen and known, at one and the same instant, in a spontaneous and
+simultaneous action of the soul, the seer and the seen as one, as
+identical. And this experience is so wide-spread, that the wonder is
+that it has not heretofore been assigned its suitable place in
+philosophy.
+
+2. Always in the self-existent, the absolute and infinite, spiritual
+Person, the subject and object are identical. This question, though one
+of fact, cannot be determined _by us_, by our experience; it must be
+shown to follow logically from certain _a priori_ first principles. This
+may be done as follows. Eternity, independence, universality, are
+qualities of God. Being eternal, he is ever the same. Being independent,
+he excludes the possibility of another Being to whom he is necessarily
+related. Being universal, he possesses all possible endowment, and is
+ground for all possible existence; so that no being can exist but by his
+will. As Universal Genius, all possible objects of knowledge or
+intellectual effort are immanent before the eye of his Reason; and this
+is a _permanent state_. He is an object of knowledge, comprehending all
+others; and therefore he _exhaustively_ knows himself. He distinguishes
+his Self as object, from no what else, because there is no else to
+distinguish his Self from; but having an exhaustive self-comprehension,
+he distinguishes within that Self all possible forms of being each from
+each.
+
+He is absolute, and never learns or changes. There is nothing to learn
+and nothing to change to, except to a wicked state; and for this there
+_can be to him no temptation_. He is ever the same, and hence there can
+be no instant in time when he does not _exhaustively_ know himself. Thus
+always in him are the subject and object identical.
+
+These two great principles, viz: That the Pure Reason sees _a priori_
+truth _immediately_, and out of all relation, plurality and difference,
+and that in the Pure Reason, in self-examination, the subject and object
+are identical, by their simple statement explode, as a Pythagorean
+system, the mental astronomy of the Limitists. Reason is the sun, and
+the Sense and the Understanding, with their satellite faculties, the
+circumvolving planets.
+
+The use of terms by the Limitists has been as vicious as their processes
+of thought, and has naturally sprung from their fundamental error. We
+will note one in the following sentence. "Consciousness, in the only
+form in which we can conceive it, implies limitation and change,--the
+perception of one object out of many, and a comparison of that object
+with others." Conceive is the vicious word. Strictly, it is usable only
+with regard to things in Nature, and can have no relevancy to such
+subjects as are now under consideration. It is a word which expresses
+_only_ such operations as lie in the Sense and Understanding. The
+following definition explains this: "The concept refers to all the
+things whose common or similar attributes or traits it conceives
+(con-cepis), or _grasps together_ into one class and one act of
+mind."--_Bowen's Logic_, p. 7. This is not the mode of the Reason's
+action at all. It does not run over a variety of objects and select out
+from them the points of similarity, and grasp these together into one
+act of mind. It sees one object in its unity as pure law, or first
+truth; and examines that in its own light. Hence, the proper word is,
+_intuits_. Seen from this standpoint, consciousness does _not_ imply
+limitation and change. A first truth we always see as _absolute_,--we
+are conscious of this sight; and yet we know that neither consciousness
+nor sight is any limitation upon the truth. We would paraphrase the
+sentence thus: Consciousness, in the highest form in which we know it,
+implies and possesses _permanence_; and is the light in which pure truth
+is seen as pure object by itself, and forever the same.
+
+It is curious to observe how the Understanding and the Pure Reason run
+along side by side in the same sentence; the inferior faculty
+encumbering and defeating the efforts of the other. Take the following
+for example.
+
+"If the infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that very
+possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a higher
+perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no characteristic
+feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else, and
+discerned as an object of consciousness." The presence in language of
+the word infinite and its cognates is decisive evidence of the presence
+of a faculty capable of entertaining it as a subject for investigation.
+This faculty, the Reason having presented the subject for consideration,
+the Understanding seizes upon it and drags it down into her den, and
+says, "can be that which it is not." This she says, because she cannot
+act, except to conceive, and cannot conceive, except to distinguish
+this from something else; and so cannot perceive that the very utterance
+of the word "infinite" excludes the word "else." The Understanding
+conceives the finite as one and independent, and the infinite as one and
+independent. Then the Reason steps in, and says the infinite is
+all-comprehending. This conflicts with the Understanding's _conception_,
+and so the puzzle comes. In laboring for a solution, the Reason's
+affirmation is expressed hypothetically: "If it (the infinite) is
+actually everything;" and thereupon the Understanding puts in its blind,
+impertinent assertion, "it possesses no characteristic feature by which
+it can be distinguished from anything else." _There is nothing else from
+which to distinguish it._ The perception of the Reason is as follows.
+The infinite Person comprehends intellectually, and is ground for
+potentially and actually, all that is possible and real; and so there
+can be no else with which to compare him. Because, possessing all
+fulness, he is actually everything, by this characteristic feature of
+completeness he distinguishes himself from nothing, which is all there
+is, (if no-thing--void--can be said to _be_,) beside him; and from any
+part, which there is within him. Thus is he object to himself in his own
+consciousness.
+
+This vicious working of the Understanding against the Reason, in the
+same sentences, can be more fully illustrated from the following
+extracts. "God, as necessarily determined to pass from absolute essence
+to relative manifestation, is determined to pass either _from the better
+to the worse, or from the worse to the better_. A third possibility that
+both states are equal, as contradictory in itself, and as contradicted
+by our author, it is not necessary to consider."--_Sir William
+Hamilton's Essays_, p. 42. "Again, how can the Relative be conceived as
+coming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it
+must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence. But to
+conceive an object as non-existent is again a self-contradiction; for
+that which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that
+conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; but if we
+think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at
+one time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it
+as already in being; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the
+progress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very
+thought, annihilates itself. Here again the Pantheistic hypothesis seems
+forced upon us. We can think of creation only as a change in the
+condition of that which already exists; and thus the creature is
+conceivable only as a phenomenal mode of the being of the
+Creator."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 81.
+
+"God," a word which has _no significance_ except to the Reason: "as
+necessarily determined,"--a phrase which belongs only to the
+Understanding. The opposite is the truth: "to pass from absolute
+essence." This can have no meaning except to the Pure Reason: "to
+relative manifestation." This belongs to the Understanding. It
+contradicts the other; and the process is absurd. The mind balks in the
+attempt to think it. In creation there is no such process as "passing
+from absolute essence to relative manifestation." The words imply that
+God, in passing from the state of absolute essence, ceased to be
+absolute essence, and became "relative manifestation." All this is
+absurd; and is in the Understanding and Sense. God never _became_. The
+Creator is still absolute essence, as before creation; and the
+logician's this or that are both false; and his third possibility is not
+a contradiction, but the truth. The fact of creation may be thus stated.
+The infinite Person, freely according his will to the behest of his
+worth, and yet equally free to not so accord his will, put forth from
+himself the creative energy; and this under such modes, that he neither
+lost nor gained by the act; but that, though the latter state was
+diverse from the first, still neither was better than the other, but
+both were equally good. Before creation, he possessed absolute plenitude
+of endowments. All possible ideals were present before his eye. All
+possible joy continued a changeless state in his sensibility. His will,
+as choice, was absolute benevolence; and, as act, was competent to all
+possible effort. To push the ideal out, and make it real, added nothing
+to, and subtracted nothing from, his fulness.
+
+The fact must be learned that muscular action and the working of pure
+spirit are so diverse, that the inferior mode cannot be an illustration
+of the superior. A change in a pure spirit, which neither adds nor
+subtracts, leaves the good unchanged. Hence, when the infinite Person
+created, he passed neither from better to worse, nor from worse to
+better; but the two states, though diverse, were equally good.
+
+We proceed now to the other extract. "Again, how can the relative," etc.
+"If the Relative is a distinct reality from the absolute," then each is
+_self-existent_, and independent. The sentence annihilates itself. "It
+must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence." The
+image here is from the Sense, as usual, and vicious accordingly. It is,
+that the soul is to look into void, and see, out of that void, existence
+come, without there being any cause for that existence coming. This
+would be the phenomenon to the Sense. And the Sense is utterly unable to
+account for the phenomenon. The object in the Sense must appear as
+_form_; but in the Reason it is idea. Mr. Mansel's presentation may well
+be illustrated by a trick of jugglery. The performer stands before his
+audience, dressed in tights, and presents the palms of his hands to the
+spectators, apparently empty. He then closes his right hand, and then
+opening it again, appears holding a bouquet of delicious flowers, which
+he hands about to the astonished gazers. The bouquet seems to come from
+nothing, _i. e._ to have no cause. It appears "to pass from
+non-existence to existence." But common sense corrects the cheating
+seeming, and asserts, "There is an adequate cause for the coming of the
+bunch of flowers, though we cannot see it." Precisely similar is
+creation. Could there have been a Sense present at that instant,
+creation would have seemed to it a juggler's trick. Out of nothing
+something would have seemed to come. But under the correcting guide of
+the Pure Reason, an adequate cause is found. Before creation, the
+infinite Person did not manifest himself; and so was actually alone. At
+creation his power, which before was immanent, he now made emanent; and
+put it forth in the forms chosen from his Reason, and according to the
+requirement of his own worth. Nothing was added to God. That which was
+ideal he now made actual. The form as Idea was one, the power as
+Potentiality was another, and each was in him by itself. He put forth
+the power into the form, the Potentiality into the Idea, and the
+Universe was. Thus it was that "the Relative came into being." In the
+same manner it might be shown how, all along through the writings of the
+Limitists, the Understanding runs along by the Reason, and vitiates her
+efforts to solve her problems. We shall have occasion to do something of
+this farther on.
+
+The topic now under discussion could not be esteemed finished without an
+examination of the celebrated dictum, "To think is to condition." Those
+who have held this to be universally true, have also received its
+logical sequence, that to the finite intellect God cannot appear
+self-comprehending. In our present light, the dictum is known to be, not
+a universal, but only a partial, truth. It is incumbent, therefore, to
+circumscribe its true sphere, and fix it there. We shall best enter upon
+this labor by answering the question, What is thinking?
+
+First. In general, and loosely, any mental operation is called thinking.
+Second. Specifically, all acts of reflection are thinkings. Under this
+head we notice two points. _a._ That act of the Understanding in which
+an object presented by the Sense is analyzed, and its special and
+generic elements noted, and is thus classified, and its relations
+determined, is properly a thinking. Thus, in the object cat I
+distinguish specifically that it is domestic, and generically that it is
+carnivorous. _b._ That act of the finite spiritual person by which he
+compares the judgments of the Understanding with the _a priori_ laws of
+the Pure Reason, and by this final standard decides their truth or
+error. Thus, the judgment of the young Indian warrior is, that he ought
+to hunt down and slay the man who killed his father in battle. The
+standard of Reason is, that Malice is criminal. This judgment is found
+to involve malice, and so is found to be wrong. Third, the intuitions of
+the reason. These, in the finite person, come _after_ a process of
+reflection, and are partly consequent upon it; yet they take place in
+another faculty, which is developed by this process; but they are such,
+that by no process of reflection _alone_ could they be. Thinking, in the
+Universal Genius, is the _sight_, at once and forever, of all possible
+object of mental effort. It is necessary and _spontaneous_, and so is an
+endowment, not an attainment; and is possessed without effort. We are
+prepared now to entertain the following statements:--
+
+A. So far as it represents thinking as the active, _i. e._ causative
+ground, or agent of the condition, the dictum is not true. The fact of
+the thinking is not, cannot be, the ground of the condition. The
+condition of the object thought, whatever the form of thinking may be,
+must lie as far back at least as the ground of the thinker. Thus, God's
+self, as ground for his Genius, must also be ground for _all_
+conditions. Yet men think of an object _in its conditions_. This is
+because the same Being who constructed the objects in their conditions,
+constructed also man as thinker, _correlated to those conditions_, so
+that he should think upon things _as they are_. In this view, to think
+is not condition, but is mental activity in the conditions already
+imposed. Thus it is with the Understanding; and the process of thinking,
+as above designated, goes on in accordance with the law stated in _a_,
+of the second general definition. It follows, therefore,
+
+B. That so far as the dictum expresses the fact, that within the sphere
+of conditions proper,--observing the distinction of conditions into two
+classes heretofore made,--the finite intellect must act under them, and
+see those objects upon which they lie, accordingly,--as, for instance,
+a geometrical figure must be seen in Time and Space,--so far it is true,
+and no farther. For instance: To see an eagle flying, is to see it under
+all the conditions imposed upon the bird as flying, and the observer as
+seeing. But when men intuit the _a priori_ truth, Malice is criminal,
+they perceive that it lies under no conditions proper, but is absolute
+and universal. We perceive, then,
+
+C. That for all mental operations which have as object pure laws and
+ideal forms, and that Being in whom all these inhere, this dictum is not
+true. The thinker may be conditioned in the proper sense of that term;
+yet he entertains objects of thought which are unconditioned; and they
+are not affected by it. Thus, it does not affect the universality of the
+principle in morals above noted that I perceive it to be such, and that
+necessarily.
+
+Assuming, then, that by the dictum, To think is to condition, is meant,
+not that the thinker, by the act of thinking, constructs the conditions,
+but that he recognizes in himself, as thinking subject, and in the
+object thought, the several conditions (proper) thereof,--the following
+statements will define the province of this dictum.
+
+1. The Universe as physical object, the observing Sense, and the
+discursive Understanding, lie wholly within it.
+
+2. Created spiritual persons, _as constituted beings,_ also lie wholly
+within it. _But it extends no farther._ On the other hand,
+
+3. Created spiritual persons, in their capacities to intuit pure laws,
+and pure ideal forms; and those laws and forms themselves lie wholly
+without it.
+
+4. So also does God the absolute Being in whom those laws and forms
+inhere. Or, in general terms,
+
+When conditions (proper) already lie upon the object thought, since the
+thinker must needs see the object under its conditions, it is true that,
+To think is to condition. But so far as it is meant that thinking is
+such a kind of operation that it cannot proceed except the object be
+conditioned, it is not true; for there are processes of thought whose
+objects are unconditioned.
+
+The question, "What are Space and Time?" with which Mr. Spencer opens
+his chapter on "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," introduces a subject common
+to all the Limitists, and which, therefore, should be considered in this
+part of our work. A remark made a few pages back, respecting an essay in
+the "North American Review" for October 1864, applies with equal force
+here in reference to another essay by the same writer, in the preceding
+July number of that periodical. At most, his view can only be unfolded.
+He has left nothing to be added. In discussing a subject so abstruse and
+difficult as this, it would seem, in the present stage of human thought
+at least, most satisfactory to set out from the Reason rather than the
+Sense, from the idea rather than the phenomenon; and so will we do.
+
+In general, then, it may be said that Space and Time are _a priori_
+conditions of created being. The following extracts are in point. "Pure
+Space, therefore, as given in the primitive intuition, is pure form for
+any possible phenomenon. As unconjoined in the unity of any form, it is
+given in the primitive intuition, and is a cognition necessary and
+universal. Though now obtained from experience, and in chronological
+order subsequent to experience, yet is it no deduction from experience,
+nor at all given by experience; but it is wholly independent of all
+experience, prior to it, and without which it were impossible that any
+experience of outer object should be." "Pure Time, as given in the
+intuition, is immediately beheld to be conditional for all possible
+period, prior to any period being actually limited, and necessarily
+continuing, though all bounded period be taken away."--_Rational
+Psychology_, pp. 125, 128.
+
+Again, a clearly defined distinction may be made between them as
+conditions. Space is the _a priori_ condition of _material_ being.
+Should a spiritual person, as the soul of a man, be stripped of all its
+material appurtenances, and left to exist as pure spirit, it could hold
+no communication with any other being but God; and no other being but he
+could hold any communication with it. It would exist out of all relation
+to Space. Not so, however, with Time. Time is the _a priori_ condition
+of all created being, of the spiritual as well as material. In the case
+just alluded to, the isolated spiritual person would have a
+consciousness of succession and duration, although he would have no
+standard by which to measure that duration, he could think in processes,
+and only in processes, and thus would be necessarily related to Time.
+Dr. Hickok has expressed this thus: "Space in reference to time has no
+significancy. Time is the pure form for phenomena as given in the
+internal sense only, and in these there can be only succession. The
+inner phenomenon may endure in time, but can have neither length,
+breadth, nor thickness in space. A thought, or other mental phenomenon,
+may fill a period, but cannot have superficial or solid content; it may
+be before or after another, but not above or below it, nor with any
+outer or inner side."--_Rational Psychology_, p. 135.
+
+Space and Time may also be distinguished thus: "Space has three
+dimensions," or, rather, there can be three dimensions in
+space,--length, breadth, and thickness. In other words, it is solid
+room. "Time has but one dimension," or, rather, but one dimension can
+enter into Time,--length. In Time there can only be procession. Space
+and Time may then be called, the one "statical," the other "dynamical,"
+illimitation. Following the essayist already referred to, they may be
+defined as follows:
+
+"Space is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Matter.
+
+"Time is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Existence."
+
+Both, then, are marked by receptivity, indivisibility, and
+illimitability. The one is receptivity, that material object may come
+into it; the other, that event may occur in it. There is for neither a
+final unit nor any limit. All objects are divisible in Space, and all
+periods in Time; and thus also are all limits comprehended, but they are
+without limit. Turning now from these more general aspects of the
+subject, a detailed examination may be conducted as follows.
+
+The fundamental law given by the Reason is, as was seen above, that
+Space and Time are _a priori_ conditions of created being. We can best
+consider this law in its application to the facts, by observing two
+general divisions, with two sub-divisions under each. Space and Time
+have, then, two general phases, one within, and one without, the mind.
+Each of these has two special phases. The former, one in the Sense, and
+one in the Understanding. The latter, one within, and one without, the
+Universe.
+
+First general phase within the mind. First special phase, in the Sense.
+"As pure form in the primitive intuition, they are wholly limitless, and
+void of any conjunction in unity, having themselves no figure nor
+period, and having within themselves no figure nor period, but only pure
+diversity, in which any possible conjunction of definite figures and
+periods may, in some way, be effected." In other words, they are pure,
+_a priori_, formal laws, which are conditional to the being of any sense
+as the perceiver of a phenomenon; and yet this sense could present no
+figure or period, till some figure or period was produced into it by an
+external agency. As such necessary formal laws, Space and Time "have a
+necessity of being independently of all phenomena." Or, in other words,
+the fact that all phenomena _must_ appear in them, lies beyond the
+province of power. This, however, is no more a limit to the Deity than
+it is a limit to him that he cannot hate his creatures and be good. In
+our experience the Sense gives two kinds of phenomena: the one the
+actual phenomena of actual objects, the other, ideal phenomena with
+ideal objects. The one is awakened by the presentation, in the physical
+sense, of a material object, as a house; the other, by the activity of
+the imaging faculty, engaged in constructing some form in the inner or
+mental sense, from forms actually observed. Upon both alike the formal
+law of Space and Time must lie.
+
+Second special phase, in the Understanding. Although there is pure form,
+if there was no more than this, no notion of a system of things could
+be. Each object would have its own space, and each event its own time.
+But one object and event could not be seen in any relation to another
+object and event. In order that this shall be, there must be some ground
+by which all the spaces and times of phenomena shall be joined into a
+unity of Space and Time; so that all objects shall be seen in one Space,
+and all events in one Time. "A notional connective for the phenomena may
+determine these phenomena in their places and periods in the whole of
+all space and of all time, and so may give both the phenomena and their
+space and time in an objective experience." The operation of the
+Understanding is, then, the connection, by a notional, of all particular
+spaces and times; _i. e._ the space and time of each phenomenon in the
+Sense, into a comprehensive unity of Space and Time, in which all
+phenomena can be seen to occur; and thus a system can be. In a word, not
+only must each phenomenon be seen in its own space and time, but all
+phenomena must be seen in _one_ Space and Time. This connection of the
+manifold into unity is the peculiar work of the Understanding. An
+examination of the facts as above set forth enables us to construct a
+general formula for the application to all minds of the fundamental law
+given by the Reason. That law, that all objects must be seen in Space,
+and all events in Time, involves the subordinate law:
+
+_That no mind can observe material objects or any events except under
+the conditions of Space and Time_; or, to change the phraseology, _Space
+and Time are_ a priori _conditional to the being of any mind or faculty
+in a mind capable of observing a material object or any event_. This
+will, perhaps, be deemed to be, in substance, Kant's theory. However
+that may be, this is true, but is only _a part of the truth_. The rest
+will appear just below. The reader will notice that no exception is made
+to the law here laid down, and will start at the thought that this law
+lies upon the Deity equally as upon created beings. No exception is
+made, because none can be truthfully made. The intellect is just as
+unqualified in its assertion on this point as in those noticed on an
+earlier page of this work. Equally with the laws of numbers does the law
+of Space and Time condition all intellect. The Deity can no more see a
+house out of all relation to Space and Time than he can see how to make
+two and two five.
+
+Second general phase, without the mind. First special phase, within the
+Universe. All that we are now to examine is objective to us; and all the
+questions which can arise are questions of fact. Let us search for the
+fact carefully and hold it fearlessly. To recur to the general law. It
+was found at the outset that Reason gave the idea of Space and Time as
+pure conditions for matter and event. We are now to observe the pure
+become the actual condition; or, in other words, we are to see the
+condition _realized_. Since, then, we are to observe material objects
+and events in a material system, it is fitting to use the Sense and the
+Understanding; and our statements and conclusions will conform to those
+faculties.
+
+We have a concept of the Universe as a vast system in the form of a
+sphere in which all things are included. This spherical system is
+complete, definite, limited, and so has boundaries. A portion of
+"immeasurable void"--Space--has been occupied. Where there was nothing,
+something has become. Now it is evident that the possibility of our
+having a concept of the Universe, or of a space and a time in the
+Universe, is based upon the presence of an actual, underlying,
+all-pervading substance, which fills and forms the boundaries of the
+Universe, and thus enables spaces and times to be. We have no concept
+except as in limits, and those limits are conceived to be substance. In
+other words, space is distance, and time is duration, in our concept.
+Take away the boundaries which mark the distance, and the procession of
+events which forms the duration, and in the concept pure negation is
+left. To illustrate. Suppose there be in our presence a cubic yard of
+vacuum. Is this vacuum an entity? Not at all. It can neither be
+perceived by the Sense nor conceived by the Understanding. Yet it is a
+space. Speaking carelessly, we should say that this cube was object to
+us. Why? Because it is enclosed by substantial boundaries. All, then,
+that is object, all that is entity, is substance. In our concept,
+therefore, a space is solid distance within the substance, and the
+totality of all distances in the Universe is conceived to be Space.
+Again; suppose there pass before our mind a procession of events. One
+event has a fixed recurrence. In our concept the procession of events is
+a time, and the recurring event marks a period in time. The events
+proceeding are all that there is in the concept; and apart from the
+procession a conception of time is impossible. The procession of all the
+events of the Universe, that is _duration_, is our concept of Time.
+Thus, within the Universe, space is solid distance and time is duration;
+and neither has any actuality except as the Universe is. Let us assume
+for a moment that our concept is the final truth, and observe the
+result. In that concept space is limited by matter, and matter is
+conceived of as unlimited. This result is natural and necessary, because
+matter, substance, "a space-filling force," is the underlying notional
+upon which as ground any concept is possible. If matter is truly
+illimitable, then materialistic pantheism, which is really atheism,
+logically follows. Again; in our concept time is duration, and duration
+is conceived of as unlimited. If so, the during event is unlimited. From
+this hypothesis idealistic pantheism logically follows. But bring our
+concept into the clear light, and under the searching eye of Reason, and
+all ground for those systems vanishes instantly. Instead of finding
+matter illimitable and the limit for a space, Space is seen to be
+illimitable and pure condition, that matter may establish a limit within
+it. And Time, instead of being duration, and so limited by the during
+event, is found to be illimitable and pure condition, that event may
+have duration in it. This brings us to the
+
+Second special phase, without or independent of the Universe. We have
+been considering facts in an objective experience, and have used
+therefore the Sense and Understanding, as was proper. What we are now to
+consider is a subject of which all experience is impossible. It can
+therefore be examined only by that faculty which presents it, the Pure
+Reason. Remove now from our presence all material object in Space, and
+all during event in Time; in a word, remove the Universe, and what will
+be left? As the Universe had a beginning, and both it and all things in
+it are conditioned by Space and Time, so also let it have an end. Will
+its conditions cease in its ceasing? Could another Universe arise, upon
+which would be imposed no conditions of Space and Time? These questions
+are answered in the statement of them. Those conditions must remain.
+When we have abstracted from our _concept_ all substance and duration,
+there is left only _void_. Hence, in our concept it would be proper to
+say that without the Universe is void, and before the Universe there was
+void. Also, that in void there is no thing, no where, and no when; or,
+void is the negation of actual substance, space and time. But pure Space
+and Time, as _a priori_ conditions that material object and during event
+may be, have not ceased. There is still _room_, that an object may
+become. There is still _opportunity_, that an event may occur. By the
+Reason it is seen that these conditions have the same necessary being
+for material object and occurring event, as the conditions of mental
+activity have for mind; and they have their peculiar characteristics
+exactly according with what they do condition, just as the laws of
+thought have their peculiar characteristics, which exactly suit them to
+what they condition. If there be a spiritual person, the moral law must
+be given in the intuition as necessarily binding upon him; and this is
+an _a priori_ condition of the being of such person. Precisely similar
+is the relation between Space and Time as _a priori_ conditions, and
+object and event upon which they lie. The moral law has its
+characteristics, which fit it to condition spiritual person. Space and
+Time have their characteristics, which fit them to condition object and
+event. Space, then, as room, and Time as opportunity, and both as _a
+priori_ conditions of a Universe, must have the same necessity of being
+that God has. They _must_ be, as he _must_ be. But observe, they are
+pure conditions, and no more. They are neither things nor persons. The
+idea of them in the Reason is simple and unanalyzable. They can be
+assigned their logical position, but further than this the mind cannot
+go.
+
+The devout religious soul will start, perhaps, at some of the positions
+stated above. We have not wrought to pain such soul, but only for truth,
+and the clue of escape from all dilemmas. The only question to be raised
+is, are they true? If a more patient investigation than we have given to
+this subject shall show our positions false, then we shall only have
+failed as others before us have; but we shall love the truth which shall
+be found none the less. But if they shall be found true, then is it
+certain that God always knew them so and was always pleased with them,
+and no derogation to his dignity can come from the proclamation of them,
+however much they may contravene hitherto cherished opinions. Most
+blessed next after the Saviour's tender words of forgiveness are those
+pure words of the apostle John, "No lie is of the truth."
+
+The conclusions to which we have arrived enable us to state how it is
+that primarily God was out of all relation to Space and Time. He was out
+of all relation to Space, because he is not material object, thereby
+having limits, form, and position in Space. He was out of all relation
+to Time, because he holds immediately, and at once, all possible
+objects of knowledge before the Eye of his mind. Hence he can learn
+nothing, and can experience no process of thought. Within his mind no
+event occurs, no substance endures. Yet, while this is true, it is
+equally true that, as the Creator, he is conditioned by Space and Time,
+just as he is conditioned by himself; and it may be found by future
+examination that they are essential to that Self. But, whatever
+conclusion may be arrived at respecting so difficult and abstract a
+subject, this much is certain: God, as the infinite and absolute
+spiritual Person, self-existent and supreme, is the great Fact; and
+Space and Time, whatever they are, will, _can_ in no wise interfere with
+and compromise his perfectness and supremacy. It is a pleasure to be
+able to close this discussion with reflections profound and wise as
+those contained in the following extract from the essay heretofore
+alluded to.
+
+"The reciprocal relations of Space, Time, and God, are veiled in
+impenetrable darkness. Many minds hesitate to attribute real infinity to
+Space and Time, lest it should conflict with the infinity of God. Such
+timidity has but a slender title to respect. If the Laws of Thought
+necessitate any conclusion whatever, they necessitate the conclusion
+that Space and Time are each infinite; and if we cannot reconcile this
+result with the infinity of God, there is no alternative but to accept
+of scepticism with as good a grace as possible. No man is worthy to join
+in the search for truth, who trembles at the sight of it when found. But
+a profound faith in the unity of all truth destroys scepticism by
+anticipation, and prophesies the solutions of reason. Space is infinite,
+Time is infinite, God is infinite; three infinites coexist. Limitation
+is possible only between existences of the same kind. There could not be
+two infinite Spaces, two infinite Times, or two infinite Gods; but while
+infinites of the same kind cannot coexist, infinites of unlike kinds
+may. When an hour limits a rod, infinite Time will limit infinite Space;
+when a year and an acre limit wisdom, holiness, and love, infinite Space
+and Time will limit the infinite God. _But not before._ Time exists
+ubiquitously, Space exists eternally, God exists ubiquitously and
+eternally. The nature of the relations between the three infinites, so
+long as Space and Time are ontologically incognizable, is utterly and
+absolutely incomprehensible; but to assume contradiction, exclusion, or
+mutual limitation to be among these relations, is as gratuitous as it is
+irreverent."
+
+
+
+
+PART III.
+
+AN EXAMINATION IN DETAIL OF CERTAIN IMPORTANT PASSAGES IN THE WRITINGS
+OF THE LIMITISTS.
+
+ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS UPON THE WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.
+
+
+It never formed any part of the plan of this work to give an extended
+examination of the logician's system of metaphysics, or even to notice
+it particularly. From the first, it was only proposed to attempt the
+refutation of that peculiar theory which he enounced in his celebrated
+essay, "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," a monograph that has
+generally been received as a fair and sufficient presentation thereof;
+and which he supplemented, but never superseded. If the arguments
+adduced, and illustrations presented, in the first part, in behalf of
+the fact of the Pure Reason, are satisfactory, and the analysis and
+attempted refutation of the celebrated dictum based upon two extremes,
+an excluded middle and a mean, in the second part, are accepted as
+sufficient, as also the criticisms upon certain general corollaries, and
+the explanation of certain general questions, then, so far at least as
+Sir William Hamilton is concerned, but little, if any, further remark
+will be expected. A few subordinate passages in the essay above referred
+to may, however, it is believed, be touched with profit by the hand of
+criticism and explanation. To these, therefore, the reader's attention
+is now called.
+
+In remarking upon Cousin's philosophy, Hamilton says: "Now, it is
+manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin is involved in the
+proposition, _that the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite, is
+immediately known in consciousness, and this by difference, plurality,
+and relation_." It is hardly necessary to repeat here the criticism,
+that the terms infinite, absolute, &c. are entirely out of place when
+used to express abstractions. As before, we ask, infinite--what? The
+fact of abstraction is one of the greatest of limitations, and vitiates
+every such utterance of the Limitists. The truth may be thus
+stated:--The infinite Person, or the necessary principle as inhering in
+that Person, is _immediately_ known in consciousness, and this, not by
+difference, plurality, and relation, but by a direct intuition of the
+Pure Reason. In this act the object seen--the idea--is held right in the
+Reason's eye; and so is seen by itself and in itself. Hence it is not
+known by difference, because there is no other object but the one before
+that eye, with which to compare it. Neither is it known by plurality,
+because it is seen by itself, and there is no other object contemplated,
+with which to join it. Nor is it known by relation, because it is seen
+to be what it is _in itself_, and as out of all relation. A little
+below, in the same paragraph, Hamilton again remarks upon Cousin,
+thus:--"The recognition of the absolute as a constitutive principle of
+intelligence, our author regards as at once the condition and the end of
+philosophy." The true idea, accurately stated, is as follows. The fact
+that, by a constituting law of intelligence, the Pure Reason immediately
+intuits absoluteness as the distinctive quality of _a priori_ first
+principles, and of the infinite Person in whom they inhere, is the
+condition, and the application of that fact is the end of philosophy.
+
+These two erroneous positions the logician follows with his celebrated
+"statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the
+Unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought." The
+four "opinions," to which he reduces all those held by philosophers, are
+too well known to need quotation here. They are noticed now, only to
+afford an opportunity for the presentation of a fifth, and, as it is
+believed, the true opinion, which is as follows.
+
+The infinite Person is "inconceivable," but is cognizable as a fact, is
+known to be, and is, to a certain extent, known to be such and such; all
+this, by an immediate intuition of the Pure Reason, of which the
+spiritual person is definitely conscious; and that Person is so seen to
+be primarily unconditioned, _i. e._ out of all relation, difference, and
+plurality.
+
+"Inconceivable." As we have repeatedly said, this word has no force
+except with regard to things in nature.
+
+Is cognizable as a fact, &c. Nothing can be more certain than that an
+_exhaustive_ knowledge of the Deity is impossible to any creature. But
+equally certain is it, that, except as we have some true, positive,
+_reliable_ knowledge of him _as he is_, we cannot be moral beings under
+his moral government. Take, for instance, the moral law as the
+expression of God's nature. 1. Either "God is love," or he is not
+love--hate; or he is indifferent, _i. e._ love has no relation to him.
+If the last alternative is true, then the other two have no relevancy to
+the subject in hand. Upon such a supposition, it is unquestionably true
+that he is utterly inscrutable. Then are we in just the condition which
+the Limitists assert. But observe the results respecting ourselves. Our
+whole moral nature is the most bitter, tantalizing falsehood which it is
+possible for us to entertain as an object of knowledge. We feel that we
+ought to love the perfect Being. At times we go starving for love to him
+and beg that bread. He has no love to give. He never felt a pulsation of
+affection. He sits alone on his icy throne, in a realm of eternal snow;
+and, covered with the canopy, and shut in by the panoply, of inscrutable
+mystery, he mocks our cry. We beg for bread. He gives us a stone. Does
+such a picture instantly shock, yea, horrify, all our finer
+sensibilities? Does the soul cry out in agony, her rejection of such a
+conclusion? In that cry we hear the truth in God's voice; for he made
+the soul. Still less can the thought be entertained that he is hate. It
+is impossible, then, to think of God except as _love_. We know what love
+is. We know what God is. There is a somewhat common to the Deity and
+his spiritual creatures. This enables us to attain a final law, as
+follows.
+
+_In so far as God's creatures have faculties and capacities in common
+with him, in so far do they know him positively; but in all matters to
+which their peculiarities as creatures pertain, they only know him
+negatively;_ i. e. _they know that he is the opposite of themselves._
+
+That passage which was quoted in a former page, simply to prove that Sir
+William Hamilton denied the reality of the Reason as distinct from the
+Understanding, requires and will now receive a particular examination.
+He says: "In the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same
+function; both seek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the
+Concept (Begriff) sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the
+Understanding which has 'overleaped itself.'" In this sentence, and the
+remarks which follow it, the logician shows that he neither comprehends
+the assigned function and province of the Reason, nor possesses any
+accurate knowledge of the mental phenomena upon which he passes
+judgment. A diagnosis could not well be more thoroughly erroneous than
+his. For "both faculties" do _not_ "perform the same function." Only the
+Understanding seeks "the one in the many." The Reason seeks _the many in
+the one_. The functions and modes of activity of the two faculties are
+exactly opposite. The Understanding runs about through the universe, and
+gathers up what facts it may, and concludes truth therefrom. The Reason
+sees the truth _first_, as necessary _a priori_ law, and holding it up
+as standard, measures facts by it, or uses the Sense to find the facts
+in which it inheres. Besides, the author, in this assertion, is guilty
+of a most glaring _petitio principii_. For, the very question at issue
+is, whether "both faculties" do "perform the same function"; whether
+"both" do "seek the one in the many." In order not to leave the hither
+side of the question built upon a bare assertion, it will be proper to
+revert to a few of those proofs adduced heretofore. The Reason sees the
+truth first. Take now the assertion, Malice is criminal. Is this
+primarily learned by experience; or is it an intuitive conviction, which
+conditions experience. Or, in more general terms, does a child need to
+be taught what guilt is, before it can feel guilty, as it is taught its
+letters before it can read; or does the feeling of guilt arise within it
+spontaneously, upon a breach of known law. If the latter be the true
+experience, then it can only be accounted for upon the ground that an
+idea of right and wrong, as an _a priori_ law, is organic in man; and,
+by our definition, the presentation of this law to the attention in
+consciousness is the act of the Reason. Upon such a theory the one
+principle was not sought, and is not found, in the many acts, but the
+many acts are compared with, and judged by, that one standard, which was
+seen _first_, and as necessarily true. Take another illustration. All
+religions, in accounting for the universe, have one common point of
+agreement, which is, that some being or beings, superior to it and men,
+produced it. And, except perhaps among the most degraded, the more
+subtle notion of a final cause, though often developed in a crude form,
+is associated with the other. These notions must be accounted for. How
+shall it be done? Are they the result of experience? Then, the first
+human beings had no such notions. But another and more palpable
+objection arises. Are they the result of individual experience? Then
+there would be as many religions as individuals. But, very ignorant
+people have the experience,--persons who never learned anything but the
+rudest forms of work, from the accumulated experience of others; nor by
+their own experience, to make the smallest improvement in a simple
+agricultural instrument. How, then, could they learn by experience one
+of the profoundest speculative ideas? As a last resort, it may be said
+they were taught it by philosophers. But this is negatived by the fact,
+that philosophers do not, to any considerable extent, teach the people,
+either immediately or mediately; but that generally those who have the
+least philosophy have the largest influence. And what is most in point,
+none of these hypotheses will account for the fact, that the gist of the
+idea, however crude its form, is everywhere the same. Be it a Fetish, or
+Brahm, or God, in the kernel final cause will be found. It would seem
+that any candid mind must acknowledge that no combined effort of men,
+were this possible, could secure such universal exactitude. But turn now
+and examine any individual in the same direction, as we did just above,
+respecting the question of right and wrong, and a plain answer will come
+directly. The notion of first cause, however crude and rudimentary its
+form, is organic. It arises, then, spontaneously, and the individual
+takes it--"the one,"--and in it finds a reason for the phenomena of
+nature--"the many,"--and is satisfied. And this is an experience not
+peculiar to the philosopher; but is shared equally by the
+illiterate,--those entirely unacquainted with scientific abstractions.
+These illustrations might be carried to an almost indefinite length,
+showing that commonly, in the every-day experiences of life, men are
+accustomed not only to observe phenomena and form conclusions, as "It is
+cloudy to-day, and may rain to-morrow," but also to measure phenomena by
+an original and fixed standard, as, "This man is malicious, and
+therefore wicked." Between the two modes of procedure, the following
+distinction may always be observed. Conclusions are always doubtful,
+only probable. Decisions are always certain. Conclusions give us what
+may be, decisions what must be. The former result from concepts and
+experience, the latter from intuitions and logical processes. Thus is
+made plain the fact that, to give it the most favorable aspect, Sir
+William Hamilton, in his eagerness to maintain his theory, has entirely
+mistaken one class of human experiences, and so was led to deny the
+actuality of the most profound and important faculty of the human mind.
+In view of the foregoing results, one need not hesitate to say that,
+whether he ever attempted it or not, Kant never "has clearly shown that
+the idea of the unconditioned can have no objective reality," for it is
+impossible to do this, the opposite being the truth. Its objective
+reality is God; it therefore "conveys" to us the most important
+"knowledge," and "involves" no "contradictions." Moreover,
+unconditionedness is a "simple," "positive," "notion," and not "a
+fasciculus of negations"; but is an attribute of God, who comprehends
+all positives. A little after, Hamilton says: "And while he [Kant]
+appropriated Reason as a specific faculty to take cognizance of these
+negations, hypostatized as positive, under the Platonic name of
+_Ideas_," &c. Here, again, the psychological question arises, Is the
+Reason such a faculty? Are its supposed objects negations? Are they
+hypostatized as positive? Evidently, if we establish an affirmative
+answer to the first question, a negative to the others follows directly,
+and the logician's system is a failure. Again, the discrimination of
+thought into _positive_ and _negative_ is simply absurd. All thought is
+_positive_. The phrase, negative thought, is only a convenient
+expression for the refusal of the mind to think. But "Ideas" are not
+thoughts at all, in the strict sense of that term. It refers to the
+operations of the mind upon objects which have been presented. Ideas are
+a part of such objects. All objects in the mind are positive. The
+phrase, negative object, is a contradiction. But, without any deduction,
+we see immediately that ideas are positives. The common consciousness of
+the human race affirms this.
+
+The following remark upon Cousin requires some notice. "For those who,
+with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the unconditioned as a positive and
+real knowledge of existence in its all-comprehensive unity, and who
+consequently employ the terms _Absolute_, _Infinite_, _Unconditioned_,
+as only various expressions for the same identity, are imperatively
+bound to prove that their idea of _the One corresponds, either with that
+Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Absolute, or with that
+Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Infinite, or that it includes
+both, or that it excludes both_. This they have not done, and, we
+suspect, have never attempted to do." The italics are Hamilton's. The
+above statement is invalid, for the following reasons. The Absolute,
+therein named, has been shown to be irrelevant to the matter in hand,
+and an absurdity. It is self-evident that the term "limited whole," as
+applied to Space and Time, is a violation of the laws of thought. Since
+we seek the truth, that Absolute must be rejected. Again, the
+definitions of the terms absolute and infinite, which have been found
+consistent, and pertinent to Space and Time, have been further found
+irrelevant and meaningless, when applied to the Being, the One, who is
+the Creator. That Being, existing primarily out of all relation to Space
+and Time, must, if known at all, be studied, and known as he is. The
+terms infinite and absolute will, of necessity, then, when applied to
+him, have entirely different significations from what they will when
+applied to Space and Time. So, then, no decision of questions arising in
+this latter sphere will have other than a negative value in the former.
+The questions in that sphere must be decided on their own merits, as
+must those in this. What is really required, then, is, that the One, the
+Person, be shown to be both absolute and infinite, and that these, as
+qualities, consistently inhere in that _unity_. As this has already been
+done in the first Part of this treatise, nothing need be added here.
+
+Some pages afterwards, in again remarking upon M. Cousin, Hamilton
+quotes from him as follows: "The condition of intelligence _is
+difference_; and an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists
+a plurality of terms." In a subsequent paragraph the essayist argues
+from this, thus: "But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the
+condition of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference;
+consequently, the condition of the absolute as existing, and under which
+it must be known, and the condition of intelligence, as capable of
+knowing, are incompatible. For, if we suppose the absolute cognizable,
+it must be identified either, first, with the subject knowing; or,
+second, with the object known; or, third, with the indifference of
+both." Rejecting the first two, Hamilton says: "The _third_ hypothesis,
+on the other hand, is _contradictory of the plurality of intelligence_;
+for, if the subject of consciousness be known as one, a plurality of
+terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence. The alternative is
+therefore necessary: Either the absolute cannot be known or conceived at
+all, or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to the conditions of
+plurality and difference."
+
+In these extracts may be detected an error which, so far as the author
+is informed, has been hitherto overlooked by philosophers. The logician
+presents an alternative which is unquestionably valid. Yet with almost,
+if not entire unanimity, writers have been accustomed to assign
+plurality, relation, difference, and--to adopt a valuable suggestion of
+Mr. Spencer--likeness, as conditions of all knowledge; and among them
+those who have claimed for man a positive knowledge of the absolute. The
+error by which they have been drawn into this contradiction is purely
+psychological; and arises, like the other errors which we have pointed
+out, from an attempt to carry over the laws of the animal nature, the
+Sense and Understanding, by which man learns of, and concludes about,
+things in nature, to the Pure Reason, by which he sees and knows, with
+an _absolutely certain_ knowledge, principles and laws; and to subject
+this faculty to those conditions. Now, there can be no doubt but that if
+the logician's premiss is true, the conclusion is unavoidable. If "an
+act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality of
+terms," then is it impossible that we should know God, _or that he
+should know himself_. The logic is impregnable. But the conclusion is
+revolting. What must be done, then? Erect some makeshift subterfuge of
+mental impotence? It will not meet the exigency of the case. It will not
+satisfy the demand of the soul. Nay, more, she casts it out utterly, as
+a most gross insult. Unquestionably, but one course is left; and that is
+so plain, that one cannot see how even a Limitist could have overlooked
+it. Correct the premiss. Study out the true psychology, and that will
+give us perfect consistency. Hold with a death-grip to the principle
+that _every truth is in complete harmony with every other truth_; and
+hold with no less tenacity to the principle that the human intellect is
+true. And what is the true premiss which through an irrefutable logic
+will give us a satisfactory, a true, an undoubted conclusion. This. A
+plurality of terms is _not_ the necessary condition of intelligence; but
+objects which are pure, simple, unanalyzable, may be directly known by
+an intellect. Or, to be more explicit. Plurality, relation, difference,
+and likeness, are necessary conditions of intelligence through the Sense
+and Understanding; but they do not in the least degree lie upon the
+Reason, which sees its objects as pure, simple ideas which are
+_self-evident_, and, consequently, are not subject to those conditions.
+Whatever knowledge we may have of "mammals," we undoubtedly gain under
+the conditions of plurality, relation, difference, and likeness; for
+"mammals" are things in nature. But absoluteness is a pure, simple,
+unanalyzable idea in the Reason, and as such is seen and known by a
+direct insight as out of all plurality, relation, difference, and
+likeness: for this is a _quality_ of the self-existent Person, and so
+belongs wholly to the sphere of the supernatural, and can be examined
+only by a spiritual person who is also supernatural.
+
+Let us illustrate these two kinds of knowledge. 1. The knowledge given
+by the Sense and Understanding. This is of material objects. Take, for
+example, an apple. The Sense observes it as one of many apples, and that
+many characteristics belong to it as one apple. Among these, color,
+skin, pulp, juices, flavor, &c. may be mentioned. It observes, also,
+that it bears a relation to the stem and tree on which it grows, and, as
+well, that its several qualities have relations among themselves. One
+color belongs to the skin, another to the pulp. The skin, as cover,
+relates to the pulp as covered, and the like. The apple, moreover, is
+distinguished from other fruits by marks of difference and marks of
+likeness. It has a different skin, a different pulp, and a different
+flavor. Yet, it is like other fruits, in that it grows on a tree, and
+possesses those marks just named, which, though differing among
+themselves, according to the fruit in which they inhere, have a
+commonality of kind, as compared with other objects. This
+distinguishing, analyzing, and classifying of characteristics, and
+connecting them into a unity, as an apple, is the work of the Sense and
+Understanding.
+
+2. The knowledge given by the Pure Reason. This is of _a priori_ laws,
+of these laws combined in pure archetypal forms, and of God as the
+Supreme Being who comprehends all laws and forms. A fundamental
+difference in the two modes of activity immediately strikes one's
+attention. In the former case, the mode was by distinguishment and
+_analysis_. In the latter it is by comprehension and _synthesis_. Take
+the idea of moral obligation to illustrate this topic. No one but a
+Limitist will, it is believed, contend against the position of Dr
+Hopkins, "that this idea of obligation or _oughtness_ is a simple idea."
+This being once acceded, carries with it the whole theory which the
+author seeks to maintain. How may "a simple idea" be known? It cannot be
+distinguished or analyzed. Being simple, it is _sui generis_. Hence, it
+cannot be known by plurality or relation, difference or likeness. If
+known at all, it must be known _as it is in itself_, by a spontaneous
+insight. Such, in fact, is the mode of the activity of the Pure Reason,
+and such are the objects of that activity. In maintaining, then, the
+doctrine of "intellectual intuition," M. Cousin was right, but wrong in
+subjecting all knowledge "to the conditions of plurality and
+difference."
+
+Near the close of the essay under examination Sir Wm. Hamilton states
+certain problems, which he is "confident" Cousin cannot solve. There is
+nothing very difficult about them; and it is a wonder that he should
+have so presented them. Following the passage--which is here
+quoted--will be found what appear simple and easy solutions.
+
+"But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties)--(1) how liberty can be
+conceived, supposing always a plurality of modes of activity, without a
+knowledge of that plurality;--(2) how a faculty can resolve to act by
+preference in a particular manner, and not determine itself by final
+causes;--(3) how intelligence can influence a blind power, without
+operating as an efficient cause;--(4) or how, in fine, morality can be
+founded on a liberty which at best only escapes necessity by taking
+refuge with chance;--these are problems which M. Cousin, in none of his
+works, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable to solve."
+
+1. Liberty cannot be _conceived_. It must be intuited. There is "a
+plurality of modes," and there is "a knowledge of that plurality." 2. "A
+faculty" cannot resolve to act; cannot have a preference; and cannot
+determine itself _at all_. Only a _spiritual person_ can _resolve_, can
+have a preference, can determine. 3. Intelligence cannot influence.
+Blind power cannot be influenced. Only a spiritual person can be
+influenced, and he by object through the intelligence as medium, and
+only he can be an efficient cause. 4. Morality cannot "be founded on a
+liberty, which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance;"
+and, what is more, such a liberty is impossible, and to speak of it as
+possible is absurd. What vitiates the processes of thought of the
+Limitists so largely, crops out very plainly here: viz., the employment
+both in thinking and expressions of faculties, capacities, and
+qualities, as if they possessed all the powers of persons. This habit is
+thoroughly erroneous, and destructive of truth. The truth desired to
+answer this whole passage, may be stated in exact terms thus: The
+infinite and absolute spiritual Person, the ultimate and indestructible,
+and indivisible and composite unit, possesses as a necessary quality of
+personality pure liberty; which is freedom from compulsion or restraint
+in the choice of one of two possible ends. This Person intuits a
+multitude of modes of activity. He possesses also perfect wisdom, which
+enables him, having chosen the right end, to determine with unerring
+accuracy which one of all the modes of activity is the best to secure
+the end. Involved in the choice of the end, is the determination to put
+in force the best means for securing that end. Hence this Person decides
+that the best mode shall _be_. He also possesses all-power. This is
+_his_ endowment, not that of his intelligence. The intelligence is not
+person, but _faculty_ in the person. So is it with the _power_. So then
+this Person, intuiting through his intelligence what is befitting his
+dignity, puts forth, in accordance therewith, his power; and is
+efficient cause. Such a being is neither under necessity nor chance. He
+is not under necessity, because there is no constraint which compels him
+to choose the right end, rather than the wrong one. He is not under
+chance, because he is _certain_ which is the best mode of action to gain
+the end chosen. In this distinction between ends and modes of activity,
+which has been so clearly set forth by Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., and in
+the motions of spiritual persons in each sphere, lie the ground for
+answering _all_ difficulties raised by the advocates of necessity or
+chance. With these remarks we close the discussion of Hamilton's
+philosophical system, and proceed to take up the teachings of his
+followers.
+
+
+
+
+REVIEW OF "LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT."
+
+
+This volume is one which will always awaken in the mind of the candid
+and reflective reader a feeling of profound respect. The writer is
+manifestly a deeply religious man. The book bears the marks of piety,
+and an earnest search after the truth respecting that august Being whom
+its author reverentially worships. However far wrong we may believe him
+to have gone in his speculative theory, his devout spirit must ever
+inspire esteem. Though it is ours to criticize and condemn the
+intellectual principles upon which his work is based, we cannot but
+desire to be like him, in rendering solemn homage to the Being he deems
+inscrutable.
+
+In proceeding with our examination, all the defects which were formerly
+noticed as belonging to the system of the Limitists will here be found
+plainly observable. Following his teacher, Mr. Mansel holds the
+Understanding to be the highest faculty of the human intellect, and the
+consequent corollary that a judgment is its highest form of knowledge.
+The word "conceive" he therefore uses as expressive of the act of the
+mind in grasping together various marks into a concept, when that word
+and act of mind are utterly irrelevant to the object to which he applies
+them; and hence they can have no meaning as used. We shall see him speak
+of "starting from the divine, and reasoning down to the human"; or of
+"starting from the human, and reasoning up to the divine"; where, upon
+the hypothesis that the two are entirely diverse, no reasoning process,
+based upon either one, can reach the other. On the other hand, if any
+knowledge of God is possible to the created mind, it is only on the
+ground that there is a similarity, an exact likeness in certain
+respects, between the two; in other words, that the Creator plainly
+declared a simple fact, in literal language, when he said, "God made man
+in his own image." If man's mind is wholly unlike God's mind, he cannot
+know truth as God knows it. And if the human intellect is thus faulty,
+man cannot be the subject of a moral government, for every subject of a
+moral government is amenable to law. In order to be so amenable, he must
+know the law _as it is_. No phantasmagoria of law, no silhouette will
+do. It must be immediately seen, and known to be binding. Truth is
+_one_. He, then, who sees it as it is, and knows it to be binding, sees
+it as God sees it, and feels the same obligation that God feels. And
+such an one must man be if he is a moral agent. Whether he is such an
+agent or not, we will not argue here; since all governments and laws of
+society are founded upon the hypothesis that he is, it may well be
+assumed as granted.
+
+Of the "three terms, familiar as household words," which Mr. Mansel, in
+his second lecture, proceeds to examine, it is to be said, that "First
+Cause," if properly mentioned at all, should have been put last; and
+that "Infinite" and "Absolute" are not pertinent to Cause, but to
+Person. So then when we consider "the Deity as He is," we consider him,
+not as Cause, for this is _incidental_, but as the infinite and absolute
+Person, for these three marks are _essential_. Further, these
+last-mentioned terms express ideas in the Reason; while the term Cause
+expresses "an _a priori_ Element of connection, and thus a primitive
+understanding-conception." Hardly more satisfactory than his use of the
+term Cause is his definition of the terms absolute and infinite. He
+defines "the Absolute" to be "that which exists in and by itself, having
+no necessary relation to any other Being," when it is rather the
+exclusion of the possibility of any other Being. Again, he defines "the
+Infinite" to be "that which is free from all possible limitation; that
+than which a greater is inconceivable; and which, consequently, can
+receive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not
+from all eternity." "That which" means the thing which, for which is
+neuter. Mr. Mansel's infinite is, then, the _Thing_. This _Thing_ "is
+free from all possible limitation." How can that be when the Being he
+thus defines is, must be, necessarily existent, and so is bound by one
+of the greatest of limitations, the inability to cease to be. But some
+light may be thrown upon his use of the term "limitation" by the
+subsequent portions of his definition. The Thing "which is free from all
+possible limitation" is "that than which a greater is inconceivable."
+Moreover, this greatest of all possible things possesses all possible
+"attributes," and is in every possible "mode of existence" "from all
+eternity." Respecting the phrase "than which a greater is
+inconceivable," two suppositions may be made. Either there may be a
+thing "greater" than, and diverse from, all other things; or there may
+be a thing greater than, and including all, other things. Probably the
+latter is Mr. Mansel's thought; but it is Materialistic Pantheism. This
+Being must be in every "mode of existence" "from all eternity."
+Personality is a "mode of existence"; therefore this Being must forever
+have been in that mode. But impersonality is also a mode of existence,
+therefore this Being must forever have been in that mode. Yet again
+these two modes are contradictory and mutually exclusive; then this
+Being must have been from all eternity in two contradictory and mutually
+exclusive modes of existence! Is further remark necessary to show
+that Mr. Mansel's definition is thoroughly vitiated by the
+understanding-conception that infinity is amount, and is, therefore,
+utterly worthless? Can there be a thing so great as to be without
+limits? Has greatness anything to do with infinity? Manifestly not. It
+becomes necessary, then, to recur to and amplify those definitions which
+we have already given to the terms he uses.
+
+Absoluteness and infinity are qualities of the necessary Being.
+
+Absoluteness is that quality of the necessary Being by which he is
+endowed with self-existence, self-dependence, and totality. Or in other
+words, having this quality, he is wholly independent of any other being;
+and also the possibility of the existence of any other independent Being
+is excluded; and so he is the Complete, the Final, upon whom all
+possible beings must depend.
+
+Infinity is that quality of the necessary Being which gives him
+universality in the totality. It expresses the fact, that he possesses
+all possible endowments in perfection.
+
+Possessing these qualities, that Being is free from any external
+restraint or limitation; but those restraints and limitations, which his
+very constituting elements themselves impose, are not removed by these
+qualities. For instance, the possession of Love, Mercy, Justice, Wisdom,
+Power, and the like, are essential to God's entirety; and the possession
+of them in _perfect harmony_ is essential to his perfectness in the
+entirety. This fact of perfect harmony, exact balance, bars him from the
+_undue_ exercise of any one of his attributes; or, concisely, his
+perfection restrains him from being imperfect. We revert, then, to the
+fundamental distinction, attained heretofore, between improper
+limitations, or those which are involved in perfection; and proper
+limitations, or those which are involved in deficiency and dependence;
+and applying it here, we see that those limitations, which we speak of
+as belonging to God, are not indicative of a lack, but rather are
+necessarily incidental to that possession of all possible perfection
+which constitutes him the Ultimate.
+
+In this view infinity can have no relevancy to "number." It is not that
+God has one, or one million endowments. It asks no question about the
+number; and cares not for it. It is satisfied in the assertion that he
+possesses _all that are possible_, and in perfect harmony. It is,
+further, an idea, not a concept. It must be intuited, for it cannot be
+"conceived." No analogy of "line" or "surface" has any pertinence;
+because these are concepts, belonging wholly in the Understanding and
+Sense, where no idea can come. Yet it may be, _is_, the quality of an
+intelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes;--for there can
+be no number without limitation, since the phrase unlimited number is a
+contradiction of terms;--but this limitation involves no lack, because
+there are no "others," which can be "thereby related to it, as cognate
+or opposite modes of consciousness." Without doubt it is, in a certain
+sense, true, that "the metaphysical representation of the Deity, as
+absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest
+metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of
+all reality." This sense is that all reality is by him, and for him, and
+from him; and is utterly dependent upon him. But Hegel's conclusion by
+no means follows, in which he says: "What kind of an Absolute Being is
+that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil
+included." This is founded upon the suppressed premiss, that such a
+Being _must_ do what he does, and his creatures _must_ do what they do;
+and so evil must come. This much only can be admitted, and this may be
+admitted, without derogating aught from God's perfectness: viz., that he
+sees in the ideals of his Reason _how_ his laws may be violated, and so,
+how sin may and will be in this moral system; but it is a perversion of
+words to say that this knowledge on the part of God is evil.
+
+The knowing how a moral agent may break the perfect law, is involved in
+the knowing how such agent may keep that law. But the fact of the
+knowledge does not involve any whit of consent to the act of violation.
+On the other hand, it may, does, become the ground for the putting forth
+of every wise effort to prevent that act. Again; evil is produced by
+those persons whom God has made, who violate his moral laws. He being
+perfectly wise and perfectly good, for perfectly wise and good reasons
+sustains them in the ability to sin. There can be, in the nature of
+things, no persons at all, without this ability to sin. But God does not
+direct them to sin; neither when they do sin does any stain fall upon
+him for sustaining their existence during their sinning. That definition
+of the term absolute, upon which Hegel bases his assertion, is one fit
+only for the Sense and Understanding; as if God was the physical sum of
+all existence. It is Materialistic Pantheism. But by observing the
+definitions and distinctions, which have been heretofore laid down, it
+may be readily seen how an actual mode of existence, as that of finite
+person, may be denied to God, and no lack be indicated thereby. Hegel's
+blasphemy may, then, be answered as follows: God is the infinite and
+absolute spiritual Person. Personality is the form of his being. The
+form cannot be empty. Organized essence fills the form. Infinity and
+absoluteness are _qualities_ of the Person as thus organized. The
+quality of absoluteness, for instance, as transfusing the essence, is
+the endowment of pure independence, and involves the exclusion of the
+possibility of any other independent Being, and the possession of the
+ability to create every possible dependent being. In so far, then, as
+Hegel's assertion means that no being can exist, and do evil, except he
+is created and sustained by the Deity, it is true. But in so far as it
+means--and this is undoubtedly what Hegel did mean--that God must be the
+efficient author of sin, that, forced by the iron rod of Fate, he must
+produce evil, the assertion is utterly false, and could only have been
+uttered by one who, having dwelt all his life in the gloomy cave of the
+Understanding, possessed not even a tolerably correct notion of the true
+nature of the subject he had in hand,--the character of God. From the
+above considerations it is apparent that all the requirements of the
+Reason are fulfilled when it is asserted that all things--the
+Universe--are dependent upon God; and he is utterly independent.
+
+The paragraphs next succeeding, which have been quoted with entire
+approbation by Mr. Herbert Spencer, are thoroughly vitiated by their
+author's indefensible assumption, that cause is "indispensable" to our
+idea of the Deity. As was remarked above, the notion of cause is
+incidental. The Deity may or may not become a cause, as he shall
+decide. But he has no choice as to whether he shall be a person or not.
+Hence we may freely admit that "the cause, as such, exists only in
+relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the
+effect is an effect of the cause." It is also true that "the
+conception"--idea--"of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of
+all relation." The position we have taken is in advance of this, for we
+say, involves an actual existence out of all relation. Introducing,
+then, not "the idea of succession in time," but the idea of the logical
+order, we rightly say, "the Absolute exists first by itself, and
+afterwards becomes a Cause." Nor are we here "checked by the third
+conception, that of the Infinite." "Causation is a possible mode of
+existence," and yet "that which exists without causing" is infinite. How
+is this? It is thus. Infinity is the universality of perfect endowment.
+Now, taking as the point of departure the first creative nisus or effort
+of the Deity, this is true. Before that act he was perfect in every
+possible endowment, and accorded his choice thereto. He was able to
+create, but did not, for a good and sufficient reason. In and after that
+act, he was still perfect as before. That act then involved no
+_essential_ change in God. But he was in one mode of being before, and
+in another mode of being in and after that act. Yet he was equally
+perfect, and equally blessed, before as after. What then follows? This:
+that there was some good and sufficient reason why before that act he
+should be a potential creator, and in that act he should become an
+actual creator: and this reason preserves the perfection, _i. e._ the
+infinity of God, equally in both modes. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, "if
+Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without
+causing is not infinite, that which becomes a cause has passed beyond
+its former limits," his utterance is prompted by that pantheistic
+understanding-conception of God, which thinks him the sum of all that
+was, and is, and ever shall be, or can be; and that in all this, he is
+_actual_. On the other hand, as we have seen, all that is required to
+fulfil the idea of infinity is, that the Being, whom it qualifies,
+possesses all fulness, has all the forms and springs of being in
+himself. It is optional with him whether he will create or not; and his
+remaining out of all relation, or his creating a Universe, and thus
+establishing relations to and for himself, in no way affect his
+essential nature, _i. e._ his infinity. He is a person, possessing all
+possible endowments, and in this does his infinity consist. In this
+view, "creation at any particular moment of time" is seen to be the only
+possible hypothesis by which to account for the Universe. Such a
+_Person_, the necessary Being, must have been in existence before the
+Universe; and his first act in producing that Universe would mark the
+first moment of time. No "alternative of Pantheism" is, can be,
+presented to the advocates of this theory. On the other hand, that
+scheme is seen to be both impossible and absurd.
+
+One cannot disagree with Mr. Mansel, when in the next paragraph he says,
+that, "supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it
+operates by means of free will and consciousness." But the difficulties
+which he then raises lie only in the Understanding, and may be explained
+thus. Always in God's consciousness _the subject and object are
+identical_. All that God is, is always present to his Eye. Hence all
+relations always appear subordinate to, and dependent upon him; and it
+is a misapprehension of the true idea to suppose, that any relation
+which falls _in idea_ within him, and only becomes actual at his will,
+is any proper limitation. Both subject and object are thus absolute,
+being identical; and yet there is no contradiction.
+
+The difficulty is further raised that there cannot be in the absolute
+Being any interrelations, as of attributes among themselves, or of
+attributes to the Being. This arises from an erroneous definition of the
+term absolute. The definition heretofore given in this treatise presents
+no such difficulty. The possession of these attributes and
+interrelations is essential to the exclusion by then possessor of
+another independent Being; and it is a perversion to so use a quality
+which is essential to a being, that it shall militate against the
+consistency of his being what he must be. If then "the almost unanimous
+voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and
+simple," uses the term "simple" in the same sense that it would have
+when applied to the idea of moral obligation, viz., that it is
+unanalyzable, then that voice is wrong, just as thoroughly as the voice
+of antiquity in favor of the Ptolemaic system of Astronomy was wrong;
+and is to be treated as that was. On such questions _opinions_ have no
+weight. The search is after a knowledge which is sure, and which every
+man may have within himself. We land, then, in no "inextricable
+dilemma." The absolute Person we see to be conscious; and to possess
+complexity in unity, universality in totality. By an immediate intuition
+we know him as primarily out of all relation, plurality, difference, and
+likeness; and yet as having, of his own self, established the Universe,
+which is still entirely dependent upon him; from which he differs, and
+with which he is not identified.
+
+Again Mr. Mansel says: "A mental attribute to be conceived as infinite,
+must be in actual exercise on every possible object: otherwise it is
+potential only, with regard to those on which it is not exercised; and
+an unrealized potentiality is a limitation." With our interpretation the
+assertion is true and contains no puzzle. Every mental attribute of the
+Deity is most assuredly "in actual exercise," upon every one of its
+"possible objects" _as ideas_. But the objects are not therefore actual.
+Neither is there any need that they should ever become so. He sees them
+just as clearly, and knows them just as thoroughly as ideals, as he does
+as actual objects. All ideal objects are "unrealized potentialities";
+and yet they are the opposite of limitations proper. But this sentence,
+as an expression of the thought which Mr. Mansel seemingly wished to
+convey, is vitiated by the presence of that understanding-conception
+that infinity is amount, which must be actual. Once regard infinity as
+_quality_ of the necessarily existent Person, and it directly follows
+that this or that act, of that Person, in no way disturbs that infinity.
+The quality conditions the acting being; but the act of that being
+cannot limit the quality. The quality is, that the act may be; not the
+reverse. Hence the questions arising from the interrelations of Power
+and Goodness, Justice and Mercy, are solved at once. Infinity as
+quality, not amount, pervades them all, and holds them all in perfect
+harmony, adjusting each to each, in a melody more beautiful than that of
+the spheres. Even "the existence of Evil" is "compatible with that of"
+this "perfectly good Being." He does not will that it shall be; neither
+does he will that it shall not be. If he willed that it should not be,
+and it was, then he would be "thwarted"; but only on such a hypothesis
+can the conclusion follow. But he does will that certain creatures shall
+be, who, though dependent upon him for existence and sustenance, are,
+like him, final causes,--the final arbiters of their own destinies, who
+in the choice of ends are unrestrained, and may choose good or ill. He
+made these creatures, knowing that some of them would choose wrong, and
+so evil would be: but _he_ did not will the evil. He only willed the
+conditions upon which evil was possible, and placed all proper bars to
+prevent the evil; and the _a priori_ facts of his immutable perfection
+in endowments, and of his untarnished holiness, are decisive of the
+consequent fact, that, in willing those conditions, God did the very
+best possible deed. If it be further asserted that the fact, that the
+Being who possesses all possible endowments in perfection could not
+wisely prevent sin, is a limitation; and, further, that it were better
+to have prevented sin by an unwise act than to have permitted it by a
+wise act; it can only be replied: This is the same as to say, that it is
+essential to God's perfection that he be imperfect; or, that it was
+better for the perfect Being to violate his Self than to permit sin. If
+any one in his thinking chooses to accept of such alternatives, there
+remains no ground of argument with him; but only "a certain fearful
+looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the
+adversary."
+
+Carrying on his presentation of difficulties, Mr. Mansel further
+remarks: "Let us however suppose for an instant, that these difficulties
+are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established
+on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling
+this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining
+how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the
+finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that
+of quiescence, the absolute, whether acting voluntarily or
+involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection
+to one of comparative perfection; and therefore was not originally
+perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of
+quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original
+perfection." On this topic we can but repeat the argument heretofore
+adduced. Let the supposition be entertained that perfection does not
+belong to a state, but to God's nature, to what God _is_, as ground for
+what God does, and standing in the logical order before his act; and it
+will directly appear that a state of quiescence or a state of activity
+in no way modifies his perfection. What God is, remains permanent and
+perfect, and his acts are only manifestations of that permanent and
+perfect. It follows, then, taking the first moment of time as the point
+of departure, that, before that point, God was in a state of complete
+blessedness, and that after that point he was also in such a state; and,
+further, that while these two states are equal, there is not "complete
+indifference," because there was a reason, clearly seen by the Divine
+mind, why the passage from quiescence to activity should be when it was,
+and as it was, and that this reason having been acknowledged in his
+conduct, gives to the two states equality, and yet differentiates the
+one from the other.
+
+"Again, how can the Relative be conceived as coming into being?" It
+cannot be _conceived_ at all. The faculty of the mind by which it forms
+a concept--the discursive Understanding--is impotent to conceive what
+cannot be conceived--the act of creation. The changes of matter can be
+concluded into a system, but not the power by which the matter came to
+be, and the changes were produced. If the how is known at all, it must
+be seen. The laws of the process must be intuited, as also the process
+as logically according with those laws. The following is believed to be
+an intelligible account of the process, and an answer to the above
+question. The absolute and infinite Person possesses as _a priori_
+organic elements of his being, all possible endowments in perfect
+harmony. Hence all laws, and all possible combinations of laws, are at
+once and always present before the Eye of his Reason, which is thus
+constituted Universal Genius. These combinations may be conveniently
+named ideal forms. They arise spontaneously, being in no way dependent
+upon his will, but are rather _a priori_ conditional of any creative
+activity. So, too, they harmoniously arrange themselves into
+systems,--archetypes of what may be, some of which may appear nobler,
+and others inferior. This Person, being such as we have stated,
+possesses also as endowment all power, and thereby excludes the
+possibility of there being any "_other_" power. This power is adequate
+to do all that _power_ can do,--to accomplish all that lies within the
+province of power. So long as the Person sees fit not to exert his
+power, his ideal forms will be only ideals, and the power will be simply
+power. But whenever he shall see fit to send forth his power, and
+organize it according to the ideal forms, the Universe will become. In
+all this the Person, "of his own will," freely establishes whatever his
+unerring wisdom shows is most worthy of his dignity; and so the
+actualities and relations which he thus ordains are no proper limit or
+restraint, for they in no way lessen his fulness, but are only a
+manifestation of that fulness,--a declaration of his glory. In a word,
+Creation is that executive act of God by which he combines with his
+power that ideal system which he had chosen because best, or _it is the
+organization of ample power according to perfect law_. If one shall now
+ask, "How could he send forth the power?" it is to be replied that the
+question is prompted by the curiosity of the "flesh," man's animal
+nature; and since no representation--picture--can be made, no answer can
+be furnished. It is not needed to know _how_ God is, or does anything,
+but only that he does it. All the essential requirements of the problem
+are met when it is ascertained in the light of the Reason, that all
+fulness is in God, that from this fulness he established all other
+beings and their natural relations, and that no relation is _imposed_
+upon him by another. The view thus advanced avoids the evil of the
+understanding-conception, that creation is the bringing of something out
+of nothing. There is an actual self-existent ground, from which the
+Universe is produced. Neither is the view pantheistic, for it starts
+with the _a priori_ idea of an absolute and infinite Person who is
+"before all things, and by whom all things consist,"--who organizes his
+own power in accordance with his own ideals, and thus produces the
+Universe, and all this by free will in self-consciousness.
+
+On page eighty-four, in speaking "of the atheistic alternative," Mr.
+Mansel makes use of the following language: "A limit is itself a
+relation; and to conceive a limit as such, is virtually to acknowledge
+the existence of a correlative on the other side of it." Upon reading
+this sentence, some sensuous form spontaneously appears in the Sense.
+Some object is conceived, and something outside it, that bounds it. But
+let the idea be once formed of a Being who possesses all limitation
+within himself, and for whom there is no "other side," nor any
+"correlative," and the difficulty vanishes. We do not seek to account
+for sensuous objects. It is pure Spirit whom we consider. We do not need
+to form a concept of "a first moment in time," or "a first unit of
+space," nor could we if we would. To do so would be for the faculty
+which forms concepts to transcend the very laws of its organization.
+What we need is, to see the fact that a Spirit is, who, possessing
+personality as form, and absoluteness and infinity as qualities, thereby
+contains all limits and the ground of all being in himself, and
+antithetical to whom is only negation.
+
+From the ground thus attained there is seen to result, not the dreary
+Sahara of interminable contradictions, but the fair land of harmonious
+consistency. A Spirit, sole, personal, self-conscious, the absolute and
+infinite Person, is the Being we seek and have found; and upon such a
+Being the soul of man may rest with the unquestioning trust of an infant
+in its mother's arms. One cannot pass by unnoticed the beautiful spirit
+of religious reverence which shines through the closing paragraphs of
+this lecture. It is evident with what dissatisfaction the writer views
+the sterile puzzles of which he has been treating, and what a relief it
+is to turn from them to "the God who is 'gracious and merciful, slow to
+anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth Him of the evil.'" The
+wonder is, that he did not receive that presentation which his devout
+spirit has made, as the truth--which it is--and say, "I will accept this
+as final. My definitions and deductions shall accord with this highest
+revelation. This shall be my standard of interpretation." Had he done
+so, far other, and, as it is believed, more satisfactory and truthful
+would have been the conclusions he would have given us.
+
+In his third Lecture Mr. Mansel is occupied with an examination of the
+human nature, for the purpose, if possible, of finding "some explanation
+of the singular phenomenon of human thought," which he has just
+developed. At the threshold of the investigation the fact of
+consciousness appears, and he begins the statement of its conditions in
+the following language: "Now, in the first place, the very conception of
+Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily
+implies _distinction between one object and another_. To be conscious we
+must be conscious of something; and that something can only be known as
+that which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not." In
+this statement Mr. Mansel unconsciously assumes as settled, the very
+question at issue; for, the position maintained by one class of writers
+is, that in certain of our mental operations, viz., in intuitions, the
+mind sees a simple truth, idea, first principle, as it is, in itself,
+and that there is no distinction in the act of knowledge. It is
+unquestionably true that, in the examination of objects on the Sense,
+and the conclusion of judgments in the Understanding, no object can come
+into consciousness without implying a "distinction between one object
+and another." But it is also evident that a first truth, to be known as
+such, must be intuited--seen as it is in itself; and so directly known
+to have the qualities of necessity and universality which constitute it
+a first truth. Of this fact Sir William Hamilton seems to have been
+aware, when he denied the actuality of the Reason,--perceiving,
+doubtless, that only on the ground of such a denial was his own theory
+tenable. But if it shall be admitted, as it would seem it must be, that
+men have necessary and universal convictions, then it must also be
+admitted that these convictions are not entertained by distinguishing
+them from other mental operations, but that they are seen of themselves
+to be true; and thus it appears that there are some modes of
+consciousness which do not imply the "distinction" claimed. The
+subsequent sentences seem capable of more than one interpretation. If
+the author means that "the Infinite" cannot be infinite without he is
+also finite, so that all distinction ceases, then his meaning is both
+pantheistic and contradictory; for the word infinite has no meaning, if
+it is not the opposite of finite, and to identify them is undoubtedly
+Pantheism. Or if he means "that the Infinite cannot be distinguished" as
+independent, from the Finite _as independent_, and thus, as possessing
+some quality with which it was not endowed by the infinite Person, then
+there can be no doubt of his correctness. But if, as would seem, his
+idea of infinity is that of amount, is such that it appears
+inconsistent, contradictory, for the infinite Person to retain his
+infinity, and still create beings who are really other than himself, and
+possessing, as quality, finiteness, which he cannot possess as quality,
+then is his idea of what infinity is wrong. Infinity is quality, and the
+capacity to thus create is essential to it. All that the Reason requires
+is, that the finite be created by and wholly dependent upon the infinite
+Person; then all the relations and conditions are only _improper_,--such
+as that Person has established, and which, therefore, in no way diminish
+his glory or detract from his fulness. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, "A
+consciousness of the Infinite, as such, thus necessarily involves a
+self-contradiction, for it implies the recognition, by limitation and
+difference, of that which can only be given as unlimited and
+indifferent," it is evident that he uses the term infinite to express
+the understanding-conception of unlimited amount, which is not relevant
+here, rather than the reason-idea of universality which is not
+contradictory to a real distinction between the Infinite and finite.
+There is also involved the unexpressed assumption that we have no
+knowledge except of the limited and different, or, in other words, that
+the Understanding is the highest faculty of the mind. It has already
+been abundantly shown that this is erroneous,--that the Reason knows its
+objects in themselves, as out of all relation, plurality, difference, or
+likeness. Dropping now the abstract term "the infinite," and using the
+concrete and proper form, we may say:
+
+We are conscious of infinity, _i. e._ we are conscious that we see with
+the eye of Reason infinity as a simple, _a priori_ idea; and that it is
+quality of the Deity.
+
+2. We are conscious of the infinite Person; in that we are conscious,
+that we see with the eye of Reason the complex _a priori_ idea of a
+perfect Person possessing independence and universality as qualities of
+his Self. But we are not conscious of him in that we exhaustively
+comprehend him. As is said elsewhere, we know that he is, and to a
+certain extent, but not wholly what he is.
+
+In further discussing this question Mansel is guilty of another grave
+psychological error. He says, "Consciousness is essentially a
+limitation, for it is the determination to one actual out of many
+possible modifications." There is no truth in this sentence.
+Consciousness is not a limitation; it is not a determination; it is not
+a modification. It may be well to state here certain conclusions on this
+assertion, which will be brought out in the fuller discussion of it,
+when we come to speak of Mr. Spencer's book. Consciousness is _one_, and
+retains that oneness throughout all modifications. These occur in the
+unity as items of experience affect it. Doubtless Dr. Hickok's
+illustration is the best possible. Consciousness is the _light_ in which
+a spiritual person sees the modifications of himself, _i. e._ the
+activity of his faculties and capacities. Like Space, only in a
+different sphere, it is an illimitable indivisible unity, which is, that
+all limits may be in it--that all objects may come into it. If, then,
+only one modification--object--comes into it at a time, this is because
+the faculties which see in its light are thus organized;--the being to
+whom it belongs is partial; but there is nothing pertaining to
+consciousness _as such_, which constitutes a limit,--which could bar the
+infinite Person from seeing all things at once in its light. This
+Person, then, so far as known, must be known as an actual absolute,
+infinite Spirit, and hence no "thing"; and further as the originator and
+sustainer of all "_things_,"--which, though dependent on him, in no way
+take aught from him. He may be known also, as potentially everything, in
+the sense that all possible combinations, or forms of objects, must ever
+stand as ideals in his Reason; and he can, at his will, organize his
+power in accordance therewith. But he must also be known as free to
+create or not to create; and that the fact that many potential forms
+remain such, in no way detracts from his infinity.
+
+Another of Mr. Mansel's positions involve conclusions which, we feel
+assured, he will utterly reject. He says, "If all thought is
+limitation,--if whatever we conceive is, by the very act of conception,
+regarded as finite,--the infinite, from a human point of view, is merely
+a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is
+possible." "From a human point of view," and _we_, at least, can take no
+other, what follows? That the Deity _can have no thoughts_; cannot know
+what our thoughts are, or that we think. But three suppositions can be
+made. Either he has no thoughts, is destitute of an intellect; or his
+intellect is Universal Genius, and he sees all possible objects at once;
+or there is a faculty different in kind from and higher than the Reason,
+of which we have, can have, no knowledge. The first, though acknowledged
+by Hamilton in a passage elsewhere quoted, and logically following from
+the position taken by Mr. Mansel, is so abhorrent to the soul that it
+must be unhesitatingly rejected. The second is the position advocated in
+this treatise. The third is hinted at by Mr. Herbert Spencer. We reject
+this third, because the Reason affirms it to be impossible; and because,
+being unnecessary, by the law of parsimony it should not be allowed. To
+advocate a position of which, in the very terms of it, the intellect can
+have no possible shadow of knowledge, is, to say the least, no part of
+the work of a philosopher. "The condition of consciousness is" not
+"distinction" in the understanding-conception of that term. So
+consciousness is not a limitation, though all limits when cognized are
+seen in the light of consciousness. According to the philosophy we
+advocate, God is a particular being, and is so known; yet he is not
+known as "one thing out of many," but is known in himself, as being such
+and such, and yet being _unique_. When Mr. Mansel says, "In assuming the
+possibility of an infinite object of consciousness, I assume, therefore,
+that it is at the same time limited and unlimited," he evidently uses
+those terms with a signification pertinent only to the Understanding. He
+is thinking of _amount_ under the forms of Space and Time; and so his
+remark has no validity. He who thinks of God rightly, will think of him
+as the infinite and absolute spiritual Person; and will define infinity
+and absoluteness in accordance therewith.
+
+If the views now advanced are presentations of truth, a consistent
+rationalism _must_ attribute "consciousness to God." _We_ are always
+conscious of "limitation and change," because partiality and growth are
+organic with us. But we can perceive no peculiarity in consciousness,
+which should produce such an effect. On the contrary we see, that if a
+person has little knowledge, he will be conscious of so much and no
+more. And if a person has great capabilities, and corresponding
+information, he is conscious of just so much. Whence, it appears, that
+the "limitation and change" spring from the nature of the constitution,
+and not from the consciousness. If, then, there should be one Person who
+possessed the sum of all excellencies, there could arise no reason from
+consciousness why he should be conscious thereof.
+
+Mr. Mansel names as the "second characteristic of Consciousness, that it
+is only possible in the form of a _relation_. There must be a Subject,
+or person conscious, and an Object or thing of which he is conscious."
+This utterance, taken in the sense which Mr. Mansel wishes to convey,
+involves the denial of consciousness to God. But upon the ground that
+the subject and object in the Deity are always identical the difficulty
+vanishes. But how can man be "conscious of the Absolute?" If by this is
+meant, have an exhaustive comprehension of the absolute Person, the
+experience is manifestly impossible. But man may have a certain
+knowledge, _that_ such Person is without knowing in all respects _what_
+he is, just as a child may know that an apple is, without knowing what
+it is. Again Mr. Mansel uses the terms absolute and infinite to
+represent a simple unanalyzable Being. In this he is guilty of
+personifying an abstract term, and then reasoning with regard to the
+Being as he would with regard to the term. Absoluteness is a simple
+unanalyzable idea, but it is not God; it is only one quality of God. So
+with infinity. God is universal complexity; and to reason of him as
+unanalyzable simplicity is as absurd as to select the color of the
+apple's skin, and call that the apple, and then reason from it about the
+apple. So, then, though man cannot comprehend the absolute Person _as
+such_, he has a positive idea of absoluteness, and a positive knowledge
+that the Being is who is thus qualified. Upon the subsequent question
+respecting the partiality of our knowledge of the infinite and absolute
+Person, a remark made above may be repeated and amplified. We may have a
+true, clear, thorough knowledge _that_ he exists without having an
+exhaustive knowledge of _what_ he is. The former is necessary to us; the
+latter impossible. So, too, the knowledge by us, of any _a priori_ law,
+will be exhaustive. Yet while we know that it _must_ be such, and not
+otherwise, it neither follows that we know all other _a priori_ laws,
+nor that we know all the exemplifications of this one. And since, as we
+have heretofore seen, neither absoluteness nor infinity relate to
+number, and God is not material substance that can be broken into
+"parts," but an organized Spirit, we see that we may consider the
+elements of his organization in their logical order; and, remembering
+that absoluteness and infinity as qualities pervade all, we may examine
+his nature and attributes without impiety.
+
+Mr. Mansel says further: "But in truth it is obvious, on a moment's
+reflection, that neither the Absolute nor the Infinite can be
+represented in the form of a whole composed of parts." This is
+tantamount to saying, the spiritual cannot be represented under the form
+of the material--a truth so evident as hardly to need so formal a
+statement. But what the Divine means is, that that Being cannot be known
+as having qualities and attributes which may be distinguished in and
+from himself; which is an error. God is infinite. So is his Knowledge,
+his Wisdom, his Holiness, his Love, &c. Yet these are distinguished from
+each other, and from him. All this is consistent, because infinity is
+_quality_, and permeates them all; and not amount, which jumbles them
+all into a confused, _indistinguishable_ mass.
+
+In speaking of "human consciousness" as "necessarily subject to the law
+of Time," Mr. Mansel says, "Every object of whose existence we can be in
+any way conscious is necessarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time
+to some former object of consciousness, and as itself occupying a
+certain portion of time." In so far as there is here expressed the law
+of created beings, under which they must see objects, the remark is
+true. But when Mr. Mansel proceeds further, and concludes that, because
+we are under limitation in seeing the object, it is under the same
+limitation, so far as we apprehend it in being seen, he asserts what is
+a psychological error. To show this, take the mathematical axiom,
+"Things which are equal to the same things, are equal to one another."
+Except under the conditions of Time, we cannot see this, that is, we do,
+must, occupy a time in observing it. But do we see that the axiom is
+under any condition of Time? By no means. We see, directly, that it is,
+_must be_, true, and that in itself it has no relation to Time. It is
+thus _absolutely_ true; and as one of the ideas of the infinite and
+absolute Person, it possesses these his qualities. We have, then, a
+faculty, the Reason, which, while it sees its objects in succession, and
+so under the law of Time, also sees that those objects, whether ideas,
+or that Being to whom all ideas belong, are, _in themselves_, out of all
+relation to Time. Thus is the created spiritual person endowed; thus is
+he like God; thus does he know "the Infinite." Hence, "the command, so
+often urged upon man by philosophers and theologians, 'In contemplating
+God, transcend time,'" means, "In all your reflections upon God, behold
+him in his true aspect, in the reason-idea, as out of all relation." It
+is true that "to know the infinite" _exhaustively_, "the human mind must
+itself be infinite." But this knowledge is not required of that mind.
+Only that knowledge is required which is possible, viz., that the Deity
+is, and what he is, _in so far as we are in his image_.
+
+Again; personality is not "essentially a limitation and a relation," in
+the sense that it necessarily detracts aught from any being who
+possesses it. It rather adds,--is, indeed, a pure addition. We appear to
+ourselves as limited and related, not because of our personality, but
+because of our finiteness as _quality_ in the personality.
+
+Hence we not only see no reason why the complete and universal Spirit
+should not have personality, but we see that if he was destitute of it,
+he must possess a lower form of being,--since this is the highest
+possible form,--which would be an undoubted limitation; or, in other
+words, we see that he must be a Person. In what Mr. Mansel subsequently
+says upon this subject, he presents arguments for the personality of God
+so strong, that one is bewildered with the question, "How could he
+escape the conviction which they awaken? How could he reject the cry of
+his spiritual nature, and accept the barren contradictions of his lower
+mind?" Let us note a few sentences. "It is by consciousness alone that
+we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer him any service.
+It is only by conceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can stand in
+any religious relation to Him at all,--that we can form such a
+representation of Him as is demanded by our spiritual wants,
+insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity."
+"Personality comprises all that we know of that which exists; relation
+to personality comprises all that we know of that which seems to exist.
+And when, from the little world of man's consciousness and its objects,
+we would lift up our eyes to the inexhaustible universe beyond, and ask
+to whom all this is related, the highest existence is still the highest
+personality, and the Source of all Being reveals Himself by His name, 'I
+AM.'" "It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our
+duty to believe that He is infinite." We may at this point quote with
+profit the words of that Book whose authority Mr. Mansel, without
+doubt, most heartily acknowledges. "And for this cause God shall send
+them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all
+might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in
+unrighteousness." "I have not written unto you because ye know not the
+truth, but because ye know it, and that no lie is of the truth." Either
+God is personal or he is not. If he is, then all that we claim is
+conceded. If he is not personal, and "it is our duty to think" of him as
+personal, then it is our duty to think and believe a _falsehood_. This
+no man, at least neither Mr. Mansel nor any other enlightened man, _can_
+bring his mind to accept as a moral law. The soul instinctively asserts
+that obligation lies parallel with _truth_, and "that no lie is of the
+truth." So, then, there can be no duty except where truth is. And the
+converse may also be accepted, viz.: Where an enlightened sense of duty
+is, there is truth. When, therefore, so learned and truly spiritual a
+man as Mr. Mansel asserts "that it is our duty to think God personal,
+and believe him infinite," we unhesitatingly accept it as the utterance
+of a great fundamental truth in that spiritual realm which is the
+highest realm of being, and so, as one of the highest truths, and with
+it we accept all its logical consequences. It is a safe rule anywhere,
+that if two mental operations seem to clash, and one must be rejected,
+man should cling to, and trust in the higher--the teaching of the nobler
+nature. Thus will we do, and from the Divine's own ground will we see
+the destruction of his philosophy. "It is our duty to think of God as
+personal," because he is personal; and we know that he is personal
+because it is our duty to think him so. We need pay no regard to the
+perplexities of the Understanding. We soar with the eagle above the
+clouds, and float ever in the light of the Sun. The teachings of the
+Moral Sense are far more sure, safe, and satisfactory than any
+discursions of the lower faculty. Therefore it is man's wisdom, in all
+perplexity to heed the cry of his highest nature, and determine to
+stand on its teachings, as his highest knowledge, interpret all
+utterances by this, and reject all which contradict it. At the least,
+the declaration of this faculty is _as_ valid as that of the lower, and
+is to be more trusted in every disagreement, because higher. Still
+further, no man would believe that God, in the most solemn, yea, awful
+moment of his Self-revelation, would declare a lie. The bare thought,
+fully formed, horrifies the soul as a blasphemy of the damned. Yet, in
+that supreme act, in the solitude of the Sinaitic wilderness, to one of
+the greatest, one of the profoundest, most devout of men, He revealed
+Himself by the pregnant words, "I AM": the most positive, the most
+unquestionable form in which He could utter the fact of His personality.
+This, then, and all that is involved in it, we accept as truth; and all
+perplexities must be interpreted by this surety.
+
+In summing up the results to which an examination of the facts of
+consciousness conducted him, Mr. Mansel utters the following
+psychological error: "But a limit is necessarily conceived as a relation
+between something within and something without itself; and the
+consciousness of a limit of thought implies, though it does not directly
+present to us, the existence of something of which we do not and cannot
+think." Not so; for a limit may be seen to be wholly within the being to
+whom it belongs, and so _not_ to be "a relation between something within
+and something without itself." This is precisely the case with the
+Deity. All relations and limits spring from within him, and there is
+nothing "without" to establish the relation claimed. This absence of all
+limit from without is rudely expressed in such common phrases as this:
+"It must be so in the _nature of things_." This "nature of things" is,
+in philosophical language, the system of _a priori_ laws of the
+Universe, and these are necessary ideas in the Divine Reason. It
+appears, then, that what must be in the nature of things, finds its
+limits wholly within, and its relations established by the Deity.
+
+With these remarks the author would close his criticism upon Mr.
+Mansel's book. We start from entirely different bases, and these two
+systems logically follow from their foundations. If Sir William Hamilton
+is right in his psychology, his follower is unquestionably right in his
+deductions. But if that psychology is partial, if besides the
+Understanding there is the Reason, if above the judgment stands the
+intuition, giving the final standard by which to measure that judgment,
+then is the philosophical system of the Divine utterly fallacious. The
+establishment of the validity of the Pure Reason is the annihilation of
+"the Philosophy of the Unconditioned." On the ground which the author
+has adopted, it is seen that "God is a spirit," infinite, absolute,
+self-conscious, personal; and a consistent interpretation of these terms
+has been given. We have found that certain objects may be seen as out of
+all relation, plurality, difference, or likeness. Consciousness and
+personality have also been found to involve no limit, in the proper
+sense of that term. On the contrary, the one was ascertained to be the
+light in which any or all objects might be seen under conditions of
+Time, or at once; and that this seeing was according to the capacity
+with which the being was endowed, and was not determined by any
+peculiarity of the consciousness; while the other appeared to be the
+highest possible form of existence, and that also in which God had
+revealed himself. From such a ground it is possible to go forward and
+construct a Rational Theology which shall verify by Reason the teachings
+of the Bible.
+
+
+
+
+REVIEW OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S "FIRST PRINCIPLES."
+
+
+In the criticisms heretofore made, some points, held in common by the
+three writers named early in this work, have been, it may be, passed
+over unnoticed. This was done, because, being held in common, it was
+believed that an examination of them, as presented by the latest writer,
+would be most satisfactory. Therefore, what was peculiar in thought or
+expression to Sir Wm. Hamilton or Mr. Mansel, we have intended to notice
+when speaking of those writers. But where Mr. Spencer seems to present
+their very thought as his own, it has appeared better to remark upon it
+in his latest form of expression. Mr. Spencer also holds views peculiar
+to himself. These we shall examine in their place. And for convenience'
+sake, what we have to say will take the form of a running commentary
+upon those chapters entitled, "Ultimate Religious Ideas," "Ultimate
+Scientific Ideas," "The Relativity of all Knowledge," and "The
+Reconciliation." Before entering upon this, however, some general
+remarks will be pertinent.
+
+1. Like his teachers, Mr. Spencer believes that the Understanding is the
+highest faculty of the human intellect. This is implied in the following
+sentence: "Those imbecilities of the understanding that disclose
+themselves when we try to answer the highest questions of objective
+science, subjective science proves to be necessitated by the laws of
+that understanding."--_First Principles_, p. 98.
+
+His illustrations, also, are all, or nearly all, taken from sensuous
+objects. In speaking of the Universe, evidently the _material_ Universe
+is present to his mind. His questions refer to objects of sense, and he
+shows plainly enough that any attempt to answer them by the Sense or
+Understanding is futile. Hence he concludes that they cannot be
+answered. But those who "know of a surety," that man is more than an
+animal nature, containing a Sense and an Understanding; that he is also
+a spiritual person, having an _Eye_, the pure Reason, which can _see_
+straight to the central Truth, with a clearness and in a light which
+dims and pales the noonday sun, know also that, and how, these
+difficulties, insoluble to the lower faculties, are, in this noble
+alembic, finally dissolved.
+
+2. As Mr. Spencer follows his teachers in the psychology of man's
+faculties, so does he also in the use of terms. Like them, he employs
+only such terms as are pertinent to the Sense and Understanding. So also
+with them he is at fault, in that he raises questions which no Sense or
+Understanding could suggest even, questions whose very presence are
+decisive that a Pure Reason is organic in man; and then is guilty of
+applying to them terms entirely impertinent,--terms belonging only to
+those lower tribunals before which these questions can never come. For
+instance, he always employs the word "conceive" to express the effort of
+the mind in presenting to itself the subjects now under discussion. In
+some form of noun, verb, or adjective, this word seems to have rained
+upon his pages; while such terms as "infinite period," "infinitely
+divisible," "absolutely incompressible," "infinitesimal," and the like,
+dot them repeatedly. Let us revert, then, a moment to the positions
+attained in an earlier portion of this work. It was there found that the
+word conceive was _utterly irrelevant_ to any subject except to objects
+of Sense and the Understanding in its work of classifying them, or
+generalizing from them, so, also, with regard to the other terms quoted,
+it was found that they not only presented no object of thought to the
+mind, but that the words had no relation to each other, and could not
+properly be used together. For instance, infinite has no more relation
+to, and can no more qualify period, than the points of the compass are
+pertinent to, and can qualify the affections. The phrase, infinite
+period, is simply absurd, and so also are the others. The words infinite
+and absolute have nothing to do with amount of any sort. They can be
+pertinent only to God and his _a priori_ ideas. Many, perhaps most of
+the criticisms in detail we shall have to make, will be based on this
+single misuse of words; which yet grows naturally out of that denial and
+perversion of faculties which Mr. Spencer, in common with the other
+Limitist writers, has attempted. On the other hand, it is to be
+remembered, that, if we arrive at the truth at all, we must _intuit_ it;
+we must either see it as a simple _a priori_ idea, or as a logical
+deduction from such ideas.
+
+3. A third, and graver error on Mr. Spencer's part is, that he goes on
+propounding his questions, and asserting that they are insoluble,
+apparently as unconscious as a sleeper in an enchanted castle that they
+have all been solved, or at least that the principles on which it would
+seem that they could be solved have been stated by a man of no mean
+ability,--Dr. Hickok,--and that until the proposed solutions are
+thoroughly analyzed and shown to be unsound, his own pages are idle. He
+implies that there is no cognition higher than a conception, when some
+very respectable writers have named intuitions as incomparably superior.
+He speaks of the Understanding as if it were without question the
+highest faculty of man's intellect, when no less a person than Coleridge
+said it would satisfy his life's labor to have introduced into English
+thinking the distinction between the Understanding, as "the faculty
+judging according to sense," and the Reason, as "the power of universal
+and necessary convictions," which, being such, must necessarily rank far
+above the other. And finally he uses the words and phrases above
+disallowed, and the faculties to which they belong, in an attempt to
+prove, by the citation of a few items in an experience, what had already
+been demonstrated by another in a process of as pure reasoning as
+Calculus. No one, it is believed, can master the volume heretofore
+alluded to, entitled "Rational Psychology," and so appreciate the
+_demonstration_ therein contained, of the utter incompetency of the
+Sense or Understanding to solve such questions as Mr. Spencer has raised
+by his incident of the partridge, (p. 69,) and the utter irrelevancy to
+them of the efforts of those faculties, without feeling how tame and
+unsatisfactory in comparison is the evidence drawn from a few facts in a
+sensuous experience. One cares not to see a half dozen proofs, more or
+less that a theory is fallacious who has learned that, and why, the
+theory _cannot_ be true. Let us now take up in order the chapters
+heretofore mentioned.
+
+
+
+
+"ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS."
+
+
+The summing up of certain reflections with which this chapter opens,
+concludes thus: "But that when our symbolic conceptions are such that no
+cumulative or indirect processes of thought can enable us to ascertain
+that there are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made
+whose fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether vicious and
+illusive, and in no way distinguishable from pure fictions,"--p. 29. So
+far very good; but his use of it is utterly unsound. "And now to
+consider the bearings of this general truth on our immediate
+topic--Ultimate Religious Ideas." But this "general truth" has _no_
+bearings upon "ultimate religious ideas"; how then can you consider
+them? _No_ ideas, and most of all religious ideas, are conceptions, or
+the results of conceptions--or are the products of "cumulative or
+indirect processes of thought." They are not results or products _at
+all_. They are organic, are the spontaneous presentation of what is
+inborn, and so must be directly seen to be known at all. Man might pile
+up "cumulative processes of thought" for unnumbered ages, and might form
+most exact conceptions of objects of Sense,--conceptions are not
+possible of others,--and he could never creep up to the least and
+faintest religious idea.
+
+On the next page, speaking of "suppositions respecting the origin of the
+Universe," Mr. Spencer says, "The deeper question is, whether any one of
+them is even conceivable in the true sense of that word. Let us
+successively test them." This is not necessary. It has already been
+_demonstrated_ that a conception, or any effort of the Understanding,
+cannot touch, or have relation to such topics. But it does not follow,
+therefore, that no one of them is cognizable at all; which he implies.
+Take the abstract notion of self-existence, for example. No "vague
+symbolic conceptions," or any conception at all, of it _can be formed_.
+A conception is possible only "under relation, difference, and
+plurality." _This_ is a pure, simple idea, and so can only be known in
+itself by a seeing--an immediate intuition. It is seen by itself, as out
+of all relation. It is seen as simple, and so is learned by no
+difference. It is seen as a unit, and so out of all plurality. The
+discursive faculty cannot pass over it, because there are in it no
+various points upon which that faculty may fasten. It may, perhaps,
+better be expressed by the words pure independence. Again, it is _not_
+properly "existence without a beginning," but rather, existence out of
+all relation to beginning; and so it is an idea, out of all relation to
+those faculties which are confined to objects that did begin. Because we
+can "by no mental effort" "form a conception of existence without a
+beginning," it does not follow that we cannot _see_ that a Being
+existing out of all relation to beginning _is_. "To this let us add"
+that the intuition of such a Being is a complete "explanation of the
+Universe," and does make it "easier to understand" "that it existed an
+hour ago, a day ago, a year ago"; for we see that this Being primarily
+is _out of all relation to time_, that there is no such thing as an
+"infinite period," the phrase being absurd; but that through all the
+procession of events which we call time he _is_; and that before that
+procession began--when there was no time, he was. Thus we see that all
+events are based upon Him who is independent; and that time, in our
+general use of it, is but the measure of what He produces. We arrive,
+then, at the conclusion that the Universe is not self-existent, not
+because self-existence cannot be object to the human mind, and be
+clearly seen to be an attribute of one Being, but because the Universe
+is primarily object to faculties in that mind, which cannot entertain
+such a notion at all; and because this notion is _seen_ to be a
+necessary idea in the province of that higher faculty which entertains
+as objects both the idea and the Being to whom it primarily belongs.
+
+The theory that the Universe is self-existent is Pantheism, and not the
+theory that it is self-created, though this latter, in Mr. Spencer's
+definition of it, seems only a phase of the other. To say that
+"self-creation is potential existence passing into actual existence by
+some inherent necessity," is only to remove self-existence one step
+farther back, as he himself shows. Potential existence is either no
+existence at all, or it is positive existence. If it is no existence,
+then we have true self-creation; which is, that out of nothing, and with
+no cause, actual existence starts itself. This is not only unthinkable,
+but absurd. But if potential existence is positive, it needs to be
+accounted for as much as actual. While, then, there can be no doubt as
+to the validity of the conclusions to which Mr. Spencer arrives,
+respecting the entire incompetency of the hypotheses of self-existence
+and self-creation, to account for the Universe, the distinction made
+above between self-existence as a true and self-creation as a pseudo
+idea, and the fact that the true idea is a _reality_, should never be
+lost sight of. By failing to discriminate--as in the Understanding he
+could not do--between them, and by concluding both as objects alike
+impossible to the human intellect, and for the same reasons, he has also
+decided that the "commonly received or theistic hypothesis"--creation by
+external agency--is equally untenable. In his examination of this, he
+starts as usual with his ever-present, fallacious assumption, that this
+is a "conception"; that it can be, _is_ founded upon a "cumulative
+process of thought, or the fulfilment of predictions based on it."
+These words, phrases, and notions, are all irrelevant. It is not a
+conception, process, or prediction that we want; it is a _sight_. Hence,
+no assumptions have to be made or granted. No "proceedings of a human
+artificer" _can in the least degree_ "vaguely symbolize to us" the
+"method after which the Universe" was "shaped." This differed in _kind_
+from all possible human methods, and had not one element in common with
+them.
+
+Mr. Spencer's remarks at this point upon Space do not appear to be well
+grounded. "An immeasurable void"--Space--is not an entity, is _no_
+thing, and therefore cannot "exist," neither is any explanation for it
+needed. His question, "how came it so?" takes, then, this form: How came
+immeasurable nothing to be nothing? Nothing needs no "explanation." It
+is only _some_ thing which must be accounted for. The theory of creation
+by external agency being, then, an adequate one to account for the
+Universe, supplies the following statement. That Being who is primarily
+out of all relation, produced, from himself, and by his immanent
+power, into nothing--Space, room, the condition of material
+existence,--something, matter and the Universe became. "The genesis of
+the universe" having thus been explained and seen to be "the result of
+external agency," we are ready to furnish for the question, "how came
+there to be an external agency?" that true answer, which we have already
+shadowed forth. That pure spiritual Person who is necessarily existent,
+or self-existent, _i. e._ who possess pure independence as an essential
+attribute, whose being is thus fixed, and is therefore without the
+province of power, is the external agency which is needed. This Person,
+differing in kind from the Universe, cannot be found in it, nor
+concluded from it, but can only be known by being seen, and can only be
+seen because man possesses the endowment of a spiritual _Eye_, like in
+kind to His own All-seeing eye, by which spiritual things may be
+discerned. This Person, being thus seen immediately, is known in a far
+more satisfactory mode than he could be by any generalizations of the
+Understanding, could he be represented in these at all. The knowledge of
+Him is, like His self, _immutable_. We KNOW that we stand on the eternal
+Rock. Our eye is illuminated with the unwavering Light which radiates
+from the throne of God. Nor is this any hallucination of the rhapsodist.
+It is the simple experience which every one enjoys who looks at pure
+truth in itself. It is the Pure Reason seeing, by an immediate
+intuition, God as pure spirit, revealed directly to itself. It is, then,
+because self-existence is a pure, simple idea, organic in man, and seen
+by him to be an attribute of God, that God is known to be the Creator of
+the Universe. Having attained to this truth, we readily see that the
+conclusions which Mr. Spencer states on pages 35, 36, as that
+"self-existence is rigorously inconceivable"; that the theistic
+hypothesis equally with the others is "literally unthinkable"; that "our
+conception of self-existence can be formed only by joining with it the
+notion of unlimited duration through past time"; so far as they imply
+our destitution of knowledge on these topics, are the opposite of the
+facts. We _see_, though we cannot "conceive," self-existence. The
+theistic hypothesis becomes, therefore, literally thinkable. We see,
+also, that unlimited duration is an absurdity; that duration must be
+limited; and that self-existence involves existence out of all relation
+to duration.
+
+Mr. Spencer then turns to the nature of the Universe, and says: "We find
+ourselves on the one hand obliged to make certain assumptions, and yet,
+on the other hand, we find these assumptions cannot be represented in
+thought." Upon this it may be remarked:
+
+1. What are here called assumptions are properly assertions, which man
+makes, and cannot help making, except he deny himself;--necessary
+convictions, first truths, first principles, _a priori_ ideas. They are
+organic, and so are the foundation of all knowledge. They are not
+results learned from lessons, but are _primary_, and conditional to an
+ability to learn. But supposing them to be assumptions, having, at
+most, no more groundwork than a vague guess, there devolves a labor
+which Mr. Spencer and his coadjutors have never attempted, and which, we
+are persuaded, they would find the most difficult of all, viz., to
+account for the fact of these assumptions. For the question is pertinent
+and urgent;
+
+2. How came these assumptions to suggest themselves? Where, for
+instance, did the notion of self come from? Analyze the rocks, study
+plants and their growth, become familiar with animals and their habits,
+or exhaust the Sense in an examination of man, and one can find no
+notion of self. Yet the notion is, and is peculiar to man. How does it
+arise? Is it "created by the slow action of natural causes?" How comes
+it to belong, then, to the rudest aboriginal equally with the most
+civilized and cultivated? Was it "created" from nothing or from
+something? If from something, how came that something to be? We might
+ask, Does not the presentation of any phenomenon involve the actuality
+of a somewhat, in which that phenomenon inheres, and of a receptivity by
+which it is appreciated? Does not the fact of this assumption, as a
+mental phenomenon, involve the higher fact of some mental ground, some
+form, some capacity, which is both organic to the mind, and organized in
+the mind, in accordance with which the assumption is, and which
+determines what it must be? Or are we to believe that these assumptions
+are mere happenings, without law, and for which no reason can be
+assigned? Again we press the question, How came these assumptions to
+suggest themselves?
+
+3. "These assumptions cannot be represented in thought." If "thought" is
+restricted to that mental operation of the Understanding by which it
+generalizes in accordance with the Sense, the statement is true. But if
+it is meant, as seems to be implied, that the notions expressed in these
+assumptions are not, cannot be, clearly and definitely known at all by
+the mind, then it is directly contrary to the truth. The ideas presented
+by the phrases are, as was seen above, clear and definite.
+
+Since Mr. Spencer has quoted _in extenso_, and with entire approbation,
+what Mr. Mansel says respecting "the Cause, the Absolute, and the
+Infinite," we have placed the full examination of these topics in our
+remarks upon Mr. Mansel's writings, and shall set down only a few brief
+notes here.
+
+Upon this topic Mr. Spencer admits that "we are obliged to suppose
+_some_ cause"; or, in other words, that the notion of cause is organic.
+Then we must "inevitably commit ourselves to the hypothesis of a First
+Cause." Then, this First Cause "must be infinite." Then, "it must be
+independent;" "or, to use the established word, it must be absolute."
+One would almost suppose that a _rational_ man penned these decisions,
+instead of one who denies that he has a _reason_. The illusion is
+quickly dispelled, however, by the objections he lifts out of the dingy
+ground-room of the Understanding. It is curious to observe in these
+pages a fact which we have noticed before, in speaking of Sir William
+Hamilton's works, viz.: how, on the same page, and in the same sentence,
+the workings of the Understanding and Reason will run along side by
+side, the former all the while befogging and hindering the latter. Mr.
+Spencer's conclusions which we have quoted, and his objections which we
+are to answer, are a striking exemplification of this. Frequently in his
+remarks he uses the words limited and unlimited, as synonymous with
+finite and infinite, when they are not so, and cannot be used
+interchangeably with propriety. The former belong wholly in the Sense
+and Understanding. The latter belong wholly in the Pure Reason. The
+former pertain to material objects, to mental images of them, or to
+number. The latter qualify only spiritual persons, and have no
+pertinence elsewhere. Limitation is the conception of an object _as
+bounded_. Illimitation is the conception of an object as without
+boundaries. Rigidly, it is a simple negation of boundaries, and gives
+nothing positive in the Concept. Finity or finiteness corresponds in the
+Reason to limitation in the Sense and Understanding. It does not refer
+to boundaries at all. It belongs only to created spiritual persons, and
+expresses the fact that they are partial, and must grow and learn. Only
+by its place in the antithesis does infinity correspond in the Reason to
+illimitation in the lower faculties. It is _positive_, and is that
+quality of the pure spirit which is otherwise known as _universality_.
+It expresses the idea of _all possible endowments in perfect harmony_.
+From his misuse of these terms Mr. Spencer is led to speak in an
+irrelevant manner upon the question, "Is the First Cause finite or
+infinite?" He uses words and treats the whole matter as if it were a
+question of material substance, which might be "bounded," with a "region
+surrounding its boundaries," and the like, which are as out of place as
+to say white love or yellow kindness. His methods of thought on these
+topics are also gravely erroneous. He attempts an analysis by the
+logical Understanding, where a synthesis by the Reason is required,--a
+synthesis which has already been given by our Creator to man as an
+original idea. It is not necessary to examine some limited thing, or all
+limited things, and wander around their boundaries to learn that the
+First Cause is infinite. We need to make no discursus, but only to look
+the idea of first cause through and through, and thoroughly analyze it,
+to find all the truth. By such a process we would find all that Mr.
+Spencer concedes that "we are obliged to suppose," and further, that
+such a being _must be_ self-existent. And this conviction would be so
+strong that the mind would rest itself in this decision: "A thousand
+phantasmagoria of the imagination may be wrong," says the soul, "but
+this I know must be true, or there is no truth in the Universe."
+
+One sentence in the paragraph now under consideration deserves special
+notice. It is this. "But if we admit that there can be some thing
+uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for anything." This
+"assumes" the truth of a major premise all _things_ are substantially
+alike. If the word "thing" is restricted to its exact limits,--objects
+of sense,--then the sentence pertains wholly to the Sense and
+Understanding, and is true. But if, as it would seem, the implication is
+meant that there are no other entities which can be object to the mind
+except such "things," then it is a clear _petitio principii_. For the
+very question at issue is, whether, in fact, there is not one
+entity--"thing"--which so differs in kind from all others, that it is
+uncaused, _i. e._ self-existent; and whether the admission that that
+entity is uncaused does not, because of this seen difference, satisfy
+the mind, and furnish a reasonable ground on which to account for the
+subordinate causes which we observe by the Sense.
+
+In speaking of the First Cause as "independent," he says, "but it can
+have no necessary relation within itself. There can be nothing in it
+which determines change, and yet nothing which prevents change. For if
+it contains something which imposes such necessities or restraints, this
+something must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is absurd.
+Thus, the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, total,
+including within itself all power, and transcending all law." We cannot
+criticize this better, and mark how curiously truth and error are mixed
+in it, than by so parodying it that only truth shall be stated. The
+First Cause possesses within himself all possible relations as belonging
+to his necessary ideals. Hence, change, in the exact sense of that term,
+is impossible to him, for there is nothing for him to _change to_. This
+is not invalidated by his passing from inaction to action; for creation
+involves no change in God's nature or attributes, and so no real or
+essential change, which is here meant. But he is the permanent, through
+whom all changes become. He is not, then, a _simple_ unit, but is an
+organized Being, who is ground for, and comprehends in a unity, all
+possible laws, forms, and relations, as necessary elements of his
+necessary existence,--as endowments which necessarily belong to him, and
+are conditional of his pure independence. Hence, these restraints are
+not "imposed" upon him, except as his existence is imposed upon him.
+They belong to his Self, and are conditional of his being. So, then,
+instead of "transcending all law," he is the embodiment of all law; and
+his perfection is, that possessing this endowment, he accords his
+conduct thereto. A being who should "transcend all law" would have no
+reason why he should act, and no form how he should act, neither would
+he be an organism, but would be pure lawlessness or pure chaos. Pure
+chaos cannot organize order; pure lawlessness cannot establish law; and
+so could not be the First Cause. As Mr. Spencer truly says, "we have no
+alternative but to regard this First Cause as Infinite and Absolute."
+
+And now having learned, by a true diagnosis of the mental activities,
+that the positions we have gained are fixed, final, irrevocable; and
+further, that they are not the "results" of "reasonings," but that first
+there was a seeing, and then an analysis of what was seen, and that the
+seeing is _true_, though every other experience be false; we _know_ that
+our position is not "illusive," but that we stand on the rock; and that
+what we have seen is no "symbolic conception of the illegitimate order,"
+but is pure truth.
+
+For the further consideration of this subject, the reader is referred
+back to our remarks on that passage in Mr. Mansel's work, which Mr.
+Spencer has quoted.
+
+A few remarks upon his summing up, p. 43 _et seq._, will complete the
+review of this chapter. "Passing over the consideration of credibility,
+and confining ourselves to that of" consistency, we would find in any
+rigorous analysis, that Atheism and Pantheism are self-contradictory;
+but we _have found_ that Theism, "when rigorously analyzed," presents an
+absolutely consistent system, in which all the difficulties of the
+Understanding are explained to the person by the Reason, and is entirely
+thinkable. Such a system, based upon the necessary convictions of man,
+and justly commanding that these shall be the fixed standard, in
+accordance with which all doubts and queries shall be dissolved and
+decided, gives a rational satisfaction to man, and discloses to him his
+eternal REST.
+
+In proceeding to his final fact, which he derives as the permanent in
+all religions, Mr. Spencer overlooks another equally permanent, equally
+common, and incomparably more important fact, viz: that Fetishism,
+Polytheism, Pantheism, and Monotheism,--all religions alike assert _that
+a god created the Universe_. In other words, the great common element,
+in all the popular modes of accounting for the vast system of things in
+which we live is, _that it is the product of an agency external to
+itself, and that the external agency is personal_. Take the case of the
+rude aboriginal, who "assumes a separate personality behind every
+phenomenon." He does not attempt to account for all objects. His mind is
+too infantile, and he is too degraded to suspect that those material
+objects which appear permanent need to be accounted for. It is only the
+changes which seem to him to need a reason. Behind each change he
+imagines a sort of personal power, superior to it and man, which
+produces it, and this satisfies him. He inquires no further; yet he
+looks in the same direction as the Monotheist. In this crude form of
+belief, which is named Fetishism, we see that essential idea which can
+be readily traced through all forms of religion, that some _personal_
+being, external, and superior to the things that be, produced them. Nor
+is Atheism a proper exception to this law. For Atheism is not a
+religion, but the denial of all religion. It is not a doctrine of God,
+but is a denial that there is any God; and what is most in point, it
+never was a _popular_ belief, but is only a philosophical Sahara over
+which a few caravans of speculative doubters and negatists wander.
+Neither can Hindu pantheism be quoted against the position taken: for
+Brahm is not the Universe; neither are Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva. Brahm
+does not lose his individuality because the Universe is evolved from
+him. _Now_ he is thought of as one, and the Universe as another,
+although the Universe is thought to be a part of his essence, and
+hereafter to be reabsorbed by him. _Now_, this part of his essence which
+was _produced_ through Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, is _individualized_;
+and so is one, while he is another. Thus, here also, the idea of a
+proper external agency is preserved. The facts, then, are decisively in
+favor of the proposition above laid down. "_Our_ investigation"
+discloses "a fundamental verity in each religion." And the facts and the
+verity find no consistent ground except in a pure Theism, and there they
+do find perfect consistency and harmony.
+
+It is required, finally, in closing the discussion of this chapter, to
+account for the fact that, upon a single idea so many theories of God
+have fastened themselves; or better, perhaps, that a single idea has
+developed itself in so many forms. This cannot better be done than in
+the language of that metaphysician, not second to Plato, the apostle
+Paul. In his Epistle to the Romans, beginning at the 19th verse of the
+1st chapter, he says: "Because that which may be known of God is
+manifest to them; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible
+things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being
+understood by the things which are made, even his eternal power and
+Godhead, so that they are without excuse. Because that, when they knew
+God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became
+vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened:
+professing themselves to be wise they became fools, and changed the
+glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible
+man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." This
+passage, which would be worthy the admiring study of ages, did it
+possess no claim to be the teaching of that Being whom Mr. Spencer
+asserts it is _impossible for us to know_, gives us in a popular form
+the truth. Man, having organic in his mind the idea of God, and having
+in the Universe an ample manifestation to the Sense, of the eternal
+power and Godhead of the Creator of that Universe, corresponding to that
+idea, perverted the manifestation to the Sense, and degraded the idea in
+the Reason, to the service of base passion. By this degradation and
+perversion the organic idea became so bedizened with the finery of
+fancy formed in the Understanding, under the direction of the animal
+nature, as to be lost to the popular mind,--the trappings only being
+seen. When once the truth was thus lost sight of, and with it all that
+restraint which a knowledge of the true God would impose, men became
+vain in their imaginations; their fancy ran riot in all directions.
+Cutting loose from all law, they plunged into every excess which could
+be invented; and out of such a stimulated and teeming brain all manner
+of vagaries were devised. This was the first stage; and of it we find
+some historic hints in the biblical account of the times, during and
+previous to the life of Abraham. Where secular history begins the human
+race had passed into the second stage. Crystallization had begun.
+Students were commencing the search for truth. Religion was taking upon
+itself more distinct forms. The organic idea, which could not be wholly
+obliterated, formed itself distinctly in the consciousness of some
+gifted individuals, and philosophy began. Philosophy in its purest form,
+as taught by Socrates and Plato, presented again the lost idea of pure
+Theism. But the spirituality which enabled them to see the truth, lifted
+them so far above the common people, that they could affect only a few.
+And what was most disheartening, that same degradation which originally
+lost to man the truth, now prevented him from receiving it. Thus it was
+that by a binding of the Reason to the wheels of Passion, and discursing
+through the world with the Understanding at the beck of the Sense, the
+many forms of religion became.
+
+
+
+
+"ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS."
+
+
+On a former page we have already attempted a positive answer to the
+question, "What are Space and Time," with which Mr. Spencer opens this
+chapter. It was there found that, in general terms, they are _a priori_
+conditions of created being; and, moreover, that they possess
+characteristics suitable to what they condition, just as the _a priori_
+conditions of the spiritual person possess characteristics suitable to
+what they condition. It was further found that this general law is, from
+the necessity of the case, realized both within the mind and without it;
+that it is, must be, the form of thought for the perceiving subject,
+corresponding to the condition of existence for the perceived object. It
+also appeared that the Universe as object, and the Sense and
+Understanding as faculties in the subject, thus corresponded; and
+further, that these faculties could never transcend and comprehend Space
+and Time, because these were the very conditions of their being;
+moreover, that by them all spaces and times must be considered with
+reference to the Universe, and apart from it could not be examined by
+them at all. Yet it was further found that the Universe might in the
+presence of the Reason be abstracted; and that, then, pure Space and
+Time still remained as pure _a priori_ conditions, the one as _room_,
+the other as _opportunity_, for the coming of created being. Space and
+Time being such conditions, _and nothing more_, are entities only in the
+same sense that the multiplication table and the moral law are entities.
+They are _conditions_ suited to what they condition. In the light of
+this result let us examine Mr. Spencer's teachings respecting them.
+
+Strictly speaking, Space and Time do not "exist." If they exist (ex
+sto), they must stand out somewhere and when. This of course involves
+the being of a where and a when in which they can stand out; and that
+where and when must needs be accounted for, and so on _ad infinitum_.
+Again, Mr. Spencer would seem to speak, in his usual style, as if they,
+in existing "objectively," had a _formal_ objective existence. Yet this,
+in the very statement of it, appears absurd. The mind apprehends many
+objects, which do not "exist." They only are. Thus, as has just been
+said, Space and Time, as conditions of created being, _are_. They are
+entities but not existences. They are _a priori_ entities, and so are
+_necessarily_. By this they stand in the same category with all pure
+laws, all first principles.
+
+"Moreover, to deny that Space and Time are things, and so by implication
+to call them nothings, involves the absurdity that there are two kinds
+of nothings." This sentence "involves the absurdity" of assuming that
+"nothing" is an entity. If I say that Space is nothing, I say that it
+presents no content for a concept, and cannot, because there is no
+content to be presented. It is then _blank_. Just so of Time. As
+nothings they are, then, both equally blank, and destitute of meaning.
+Now if Mr. Spencer wishes to hold that nothing represented by one word,
+differs from nothing represented by another, we would not lay a straw in
+his way, but yet would be much surprised if he led a large company.
+
+Again, having decided that they are neither "nonentities nor the
+attributes of entities, we have no choice but to consider them as
+entities." But he then goes on to speak of them as "things," evidently
+using the word in the same sense as if applying it to a material object,
+as an apple or stone; thereby implying that entity and thing in that
+sense are synonymous terms. Upon this leap in the dark, this blunder in
+the use of language, he proceeds to build up a mountain of difficulties.
+But once take away this foundation, once cease attempting "to represent
+them in thought as things," and his difficulties vanish. Space is a
+condition. Perhaps receptivity, indivisibility, and illimitability are
+attributes. If so, it has attributes, for these certainly belong to it.
+But whether these shall be called attributes or not, it is certain that
+Space is, is a pure condition, is thus a positive object to the Reason,
+is qualified by the characteristics named above; and all this without
+any contradiction or other insuperable difficulty arising thereby. On
+the ground now established, we learn that extension and Space are _not_
+"convertible terms." Extension is an attribute of matter. Space is a
+condition of phenomena. It is only all _physical_ "entities which we
+actually know as such" that "are limited." From our standpoint, that
+Space is _no_ thing, such remarks as "We find ourselves totally unable
+to form any mental image of unbounded Space," appear painfully absurd.
+"We find ourselves" just as "totally unable to form any mental image of
+unbounded" love. Such phrases as "mental image" have _no relevancy_ to
+either Space or Time. In criticizing Kant's doctrine, which we have
+found _true_ as far as it goes, Mr. Spencer evinces a surprising lack of
+knowledge of the facts in question. "In the first place," he says, "to
+assert that Space and Time, as we are conscious of them, are subjective
+conditions, is by implication to assert that they are not objective
+realities." But the conclusion does not follow. If the reader will take
+the trouble to construct the syllogism on which this is based, he will
+at once perceive the absurdity of the logic. It may be said in general
+that all conditions of a thinking being are both subjective and
+objective: they are conditions of his being--subjective; and they are
+objects of his examination and cognizance--objective. Is not the
+multiplication table an objective reality, _i. e._, would it not remain
+if he be destroyed? And yet is it not also a subjective law; and so was
+it not originally discovered by introspection and reflection? Again he
+says, "for that consciousness of Space and Time which we cannot rid
+ourselves of, is the consciousness of them as existing objectively." Now
+the fact is, that primarily we do not have _any_ consciousness of Space
+and Time. _Consciousness has to do with phenomena._ When examining the
+material Universe, the _objects_, and the objects as at a distance from
+each other and as during, are what we are conscious of. For instance, I
+view the planets Jupiter and Saturn. They appear as objects in my
+consciousness. There is a distance between them; but this distance _is_
+not, except as they _are_. If they are not, the word distance has no
+meaning with reference to them. Take them away, and I have no
+consciousness of distance as remaining. These planets continue in
+existence. They endure. This endurance we call time, but if they should
+cease, one could not think of endurance in connection with them as
+remaining. Here we most freely and willingly agree with Mr. Spencer that
+"the question is, What does consciousness directly testify?" but he will
+find that consciousness on this side of the water testifies very
+differently from his consciousness: as for instance in the two articles
+in the "North American Review," heretofore alluded to. Here, "the direct
+testimony of consciousness is," that spaces and times within the
+Universe are without the mind; that Space and Time, as _a priori_
+conditions for the possibility of formal object and during event, are
+also without the mind; but the "testimony" is none the less clear and
+"direct" that Space and Time are laws of thought in the mind
+corresponding to the actualities without the mind. And the question may
+be asked, it is believed with great force, If this last were not so, how
+could the mind take any cognizance of the actuality? Again, most truly,
+Space and Time "cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the
+mind to become non-existent." Much more strongly than this should the
+truth be uttered. They could not become non-existent if the Universe
+with every sentient being, yea, even--to make an impossible
+supposition--if the Deity himself, should cease to be. In this they
+differ no whit from the laws of Mathematics, of Logic, and of Morals.
+These too would remain as well. Thus is again enforced the truth, which
+has been stated heretofore, that Space and Time, as _a priori_
+conditions of the Universe, stand in precisely the same relation to
+material object and during event that the multiplication table does to
+intellect, or the moral law to a spiritual person. It will now be
+doubtless plain that Mr. Spencer's remarks sprang directly from the
+lower faculties. The Sense in its very organization possesses Space and
+Time as void forms into which objects may come. So also the
+Understanding possesses the notional as connecting into a totality.
+These faculties cannot be in a living man without acting. Activity is
+their law. Hence images are ever arising and _must_ arise in the Sense,
+and be connected in the Understanding, and all this in the forms and
+conditions of Space and Time. He who thinks continually in these
+conditions will always _imagine_ that Space and Time are only without
+him--because he will be thinking only in the iron prison-house of the
+imagining faculty--and so cannot transcend the conditions it imposes.
+Now how shall one see these conditions? They do "exist objectively"; or,
+to phrase it better, they have a true being independent of our minds. In
+this sense, as we have seen, every _a priori_ condition must be
+objective to the mind. What is objective to the Sense is not Space but a
+space, _i. e._ a part of Space limited by matter; and, after all, it is
+the boundaries which are the true object rather than the space, which
+cannot be "conceived" of if the boundaries be removed. Without further
+argument, is it not evident that there Space, like all other _a priori_
+conditions, is object only to the Reason, and that as a condition of
+material existence?
+
+At the bottom of page 49 we have another of Mr. Spencer's psychological
+errors:--"For if Space and Time are forms of thought, they can never be
+thought of; since it is impossible for anything to be at once the _form_
+of thought and the matter of thought." Although this topic has been
+amply discussed elsewhere, it may not be uninstructive to recur to it
+again. Exactly the opposite of Mr. Spencer's remark is the truth. The
+question at issue here is one of those profound and subtile ones which
+cannot be approached by argument, but can be decided only by a _seeing_.
+It is a psychological question pertaining to the profoundest depths of
+our being. If one says, "I see the forms of thought," and another, "I
+cannot see them," neither impeaches the other. All that is left is to
+stimulate the dull faculty of the one until he can see. The following
+reflections may help us to see. Mr. Spencer's remark implies that we
+have no higher faculty than the Sense and the Understanding. It implies,
+also, that we can never have any _self_-knowledge, in the fundamental
+signification of that phrase. We can observe the conduct of the mind,
+and study and classify the results; but the laws, the constitution of
+the activity itself must forever remain closed to us. As was said, when
+speaking of this subject under a different phase, the eye cannot see and
+study itself. It is a mechanical organism, capable only of reaction as
+acted upon, capable only of seeing results, but never able to penetrate
+to the hidden springs which underlie the event. Just so is it with the
+Sense and Understanding. They are mere mechanical faculties capable of
+acting as they are acted upon, but never able to go behind the
+appearance to its final source. On such a hypothesis as this all science
+is impossible, but most of all a science of the human mind. If man is
+enclosed by such walls, no knowledge of his central self can be gained.
+He may know what he _does_; but what he _is_, is as inscrutable to him
+as what God is. As such a being, he is only a higher order of brute. He
+has some dim perceptions, some vague feelings, but he has no
+_knowledge_; he is _sure_ of nothing. He can reach no ground which is
+ultimate, no _Rock_ which he knows is _immutable_. Is man such a being?
+The longings and aspirations of the ages roll back an unceasing NO! He
+is capable of placing himself before himself, of analyzing that self to
+the very groundwork of his being. All the laws of his constitution, all
+the forms of his activity, he can clearly and amply place before himself
+and know them. And how is this? It is because God has endowed him with
+an EYE like unto His own, which enables man to be self-comprehending, as
+He is self-comprehending,--the Reason, with which man may read himself
+as a child reads a book; that man can make "the _form_ of thought the
+_matter_ of thought." True, the Understanding is shut out from any
+consideration of the forms of thought; but man is not simply or mainly
+an Understanding. He is, in his highest being, a spiritual person, whom
+God has endowed with the faculty of VISION; and the great organic evil,
+which the fall wrought into the world, was this very denial of the
+spiritual light, and this crowding down and out of sight, of the
+spiritual person beneath the animal nature, this denial of the essential
+faculties of such person, and this elevation of the lower faculties of
+the animal nature, the Sense and Understanding, into the highest place,
+which is involved in all such teachings as we are criticizing.
+
+Mr. Spencer's remarks upon "Matter" are no nearer the truth. In almost
+his first sentence there is a grievous logical _faux pas_. He says:
+"Matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not; no third
+possibility can be named." Yet we will name one, as follows: _The
+divisibility of matter has no relation to infinity_. And this _third_
+supposition happens to be the truth. But it will be said that the
+question should be stated thus: Either there is a limit to the
+divisibility of matter, or there is no limit. This statement is
+exhaustive, because limitation belongs to matter. Of these alternatives
+there can be no hesitation which one to choose. There is a limit to the
+divisibility of matter. This answer cannot be given by the physical
+sense; for no one questions but what it is incapable of finding a limit.
+The mental sense could not give it, because it is a question of actual
+substance and not of ideal forms. The Reason gives the answer. Matter is
+limited at both extremes. Its amount is definite, as are its final
+elements. These "ultimate parts" have "an under and an upper surface, a
+right and a left side." When, then, one of these parts shall be broken,
+what results? Not _pieces_, as the materialist, thinking only in the
+Sense, would have us believe. When a final "part" shall be broken, there
+will remain _no matter_,--to the sense nothing. To it, the result would
+be annihilation. But the Reason declares that there would be left _God's
+power_ in its simplicity,--that final Unit out of which all diversity
+becomes.
+
+The subsequent difficulties raised respecting the solidity of Matter may
+be explained thus. And for convenience sake, we will limit the term
+Matter to such substances as are object to the physical sense, like
+granite, while Force shall be used to comprise those finer substances,
+like the Ether, which are impalpable to the physical sense. Matter is
+composed of very minute ultimate particles which do not touch, but which
+are held together by Force. The space between the atoms, which would
+otherwise be _in vacuo_, is _full_ of Force. We might be more exhaustive
+in our analysis, and say--which would be true--that a space-filling
+force composes the Universe; and that Matter is only Force in one of its
+modifications. But without this the other statement is sufficient. When,
+then, a portion of matter is compressed, the force which holds the
+ultimate particles in their places is overcome by an external force, and
+these particles are brought nearer together. Now, how is it with the
+moving body and the collision? Bisect a line and see the truth.
+
+        C
+    A--------B
+        1
+
+A body with a mass of 4 is moving with a velocity of 4 along the line
+from A to B. At C it meets another body with a mass of 4 at rest. From
+thence the two move on towards B with a velocity of 2. What has
+happened? In the body there was a certain amount of force, which set it
+in motion and kept it in motion. And just here let us make a point. _No
+force is ever lost or destroyed. It is only transferred._ When a bullet
+is fired from a gun, it possesses at one _point_ a maximum of force.
+From that point this force is steadily _transferred_ to the air and
+other substances, until all that it received from the powder is spent.
+But at any one point in its flight, the sum of the force which has been
+transferred since the maximum, and of the force yet to be transferred,
+will always equal the maximum. Now, how is it respecting the question
+raised by Mr. Spencer? The instant of contact is a point in time, _not a
+period_, and the transfer of force is instantaneous. C, then, is a
+_point_, not a period, and the velocity on the one side is 4 and the
+other side 2, while the momentum or force is exactly equal throughout
+the line. If it is said that this proves that a body can pass from one
+velocity to another without passing through the intermediate velocities,
+we cannot help it. The above are the facts, and they give the truth. The
+following sentence of Mr. Spencer is, at least, careless. "For when, of
+two such units, one moving at velocity 4 strikes another at rest, the
+striking unit must have its velocity 4 instantaneously reduced to
+velocity 2; must pass from velocity 4 to velocity 2 without any lapse of
+time, and without passing through intermediate velocities; must be
+moving with velocities 4 and 2 at the same instant, which is
+impossible." If there is any sense in the remark, "instantaneously" must
+mean a _point_ of time _without period_. For, if any period is allowed,
+the sentence has no meaning, since during that period "the striking
+unit" passes through all "intermediate velocities." But if by
+instantaneously he means _without period_, then the last clause of the
+sentence is illogical, since instant there evidently means a period. For
+if it means point, then it contradicts the first clause. There, it is
+asserted that 4 was "_reduced_" to 2, _i. e._ that at one point the
+velocity was 4, and at the next point it was 2, and that there was _no
+time_ between. If 4 was instantaneously reduced to 2, then the velocity
+2 was next after the velocity 4, and not coeval with it. Thus it appears
+that these two clauses which were meant to be synonymous are
+contradictory.
+
+Bearing in mind what we have heretofore learned respecting atoms, we
+shall not be troubled by the objections to the Newtonian theory which
+follow. In reply to the question, "What is the constitution of these
+units?" the answer, "We have no alternative but to regard each of them
+as a small piece of matter," would be true if the Sense was the only
+faculty which could examine them. But even upon this theory Mr.
+Spencer's remarks "respecting the parts of which each atom consists,"
+are entirely out of place; for the hypothesis that it is an ultimate
+atom excludes the supposition of "parts," since that phrase has no
+meaning except it refers to a final, indivisible, material unit. All
+that the Sense could say, would be, "What this atom is I know not, but
+that it is, and _is not divisible_, I believe." But when we see by the
+Reason that the ultimate atom, when dissolved, becomes God's power, all
+difficulty in the question vanishes. Having thus answered the above
+objections, it is unnecessary to notice the similar ones raised against
+Boscovich's theory, which is a modification of that of Newton.
+
+Mr. Spencer next examines certain phenomena of motion. The fact that he
+seeks for absolute motion by the _physical sense_, a faculty which was
+only given us to perceive relative--phenomenal--motion, and is, _in its
+kind_, incapable of finding the absolute motion, (for if it should see
+it, it could not _know_ it,) is sufficient to condemn all that he has
+said on this subject. For the presentations which he has made of the
+phenomena given us by the Sense does not exhaust the subject. The
+perplexities therein developed are all resolvable, as will appear
+further on. The phenomena adduced on page 55 are, then, merely
+_appearances_ in the physical sense; and the motion is merely relative.
+In the first instance, the captain walks East with reference to the ship
+and globe. In the second, he walks East with reference to the ship; the
+ship sails West with reference to the globe; while the resultant motion
+is, that he is _stationary_ with reference to this larger object. What,
+then, can the Sense give us? Only resultant motion, at the most. So we
+see that "our ideas of Motion" are not "illusive," but _deficient_. The
+motion is just what it appears, measured from a given object. It is
+_relative_, and this is all the Sense _can_ give. Our author
+acknowledges that "we tacitly assume that there are real motions"; that
+"we take for granted that there are fixed points in space, with respect
+to which all motions are absolute; and we find it impossible to rid
+ourselves of this idea." A question instantly arises, and it seems to be
+one which he is bound to entertain, viz: How comes this idea to be? We
+press this question upon Mr. Spencer, being persuaded that he will find
+it much more perplexing than those he has entertained. Undoubtedly,
+"absolute motion cannot even be imagined." _No_ motion can be imagined,
+though the moving body may be. But by no means does it follow, "much
+less known." This involves that the knowing faculty is inferior to, and
+more circumscribed than, the imagining faculty, when the very opposite
+is the fact. Neither does it follow from what is said in the paragraph
+beginning with, "For motion is change of place," that "while we are
+obliged to think that there is absolute motion, we find absolute motion
+incomprehensible." The Universe is limited and bounded, and is a sphere.
+We _may_ assume that the centre of the sphere is at rest. Instantly
+absolute motion becomes comprehensible, for it is motion measured from
+that point. Surely there can be no harm in the _supposition_. The Reason
+shows us that the supposition is the truth; and that that centre is the
+throne of the eternal God. In this view not only is motion, apart from
+the "limitations of space," totally unthinkable, but it is absolutely
+impossible. Motion _cannot_ be, except as a formal body is. Hence, to
+speak of motion in "unlimited space" is simply absurd. Formal object
+_cannot_ be, except as _thereby_ a limit is established in Space. Hence
+it is evident that "absolute motion" is not motion with reference to
+"unlimited Space," which would be the same as motion without a moving;
+but is motion with reference to that point fixed in Space, around which
+all things revolve, but which is itself at perfect rest.
+
+"Another insuperable difficulty presents itself, when we contemplate the
+transfer of Motion." Motion is simply the moving of a body, and _cannot
+be transferred_. The _force_ which causes the motion is what is
+transferred. All that can be said of motion is, that it is, that it
+increases, that it diminishes, that it ceases. If the moving body
+impinges upon another moving body, and causes it to move, it is not
+motion that is transferred, but the force which causes the motion. The
+motion in the impinging body is diminished, and a new motion is begun in
+the body which was at rest. Again it is asked: "In what respect does a
+body after impact differ from itself before impact?" And further on:
+"The motion you say has been communicated. But how? What has been
+communicated? The striking body has not transferred a _thing_ to the
+body struck; and it is equally out of the question to say that it has
+transferred an _attribute_." Observe now that a somewhat is
+unquestionably communicated; and the question is:--What is it? Query.
+Does Mr Spencer mean to comprehend the Universe in "thing" and
+"attribute"? He would seem to. If he does, he gives a decision by
+assertion without explanation or proof, which involves the very question
+at issue, which is, Is the somewhat transferred a "thing" or an
+"attribute"; and a decision directly contrary to the acknowledgment that
+a somewhat has been communicated? On the above-named hypothesis his
+statement should be as follows: A somewhat has been communicated.
+"Thing" and "attribute" comprise all the Universe. Neither a thing, nor
+an attribute has been communicated, _i. e._ no somewhat has been
+communicated; which contradicts the evidence and the acknowledgment. If
+on the other hand Mr. Spencer means that "thing" and "attribute"
+comprise only a part of the Universe, then the question is not fairly
+met. It may be more convenient for the moment to conclude the Universe
+in the two terms thing and attribute; and then, as attribute is
+essential to the object it qualifies, and so cannot be communicated, it
+will follow that a thing has been communicated. This thing we call
+force. It is not in hand now to inquire what force is. It is manifest to
+the Sense that the body is in a different state after impact, than it
+was before. Something has been put into the body, which, though not
+directly appreciable to the Sense, is indirectly appreciable by the
+results, and which is as real an addition as water is to a bowl, when
+poured in. Before the impact the body was destitute of that kind of
+force--motor force would be a convenient term--which tended to move it.
+After the impact a sufficiency of that force was present to produce the
+motion. It may be asked, where does this force go to when the motion
+diminishes till the body stops. It passes into the substances which
+cause the diminution until there is no surplus in the moving body, and
+at the point of equilibrium motion ceases. If it be now asked, where
+does this force ultimately go to, it is to be said that it comes from
+God, and goes to God, who is the Final. The Sense gives only subordinate
+answers, but the Reason leads us to the Supreme.
+
+If the view adopted be true, Mr. Spencer's halving and halving again
+"the rate of movement forever," is irrelevant. It is not a _mental
+operation_ but an _actual fact_ which is to be accounted for. Take a
+striking illustration. A ball lying on smooth ice is struck with a
+hockey. Away it goes skimming over the glassy surface with a steadily
+diminishing velocity till it ceases. It starts, it proceeds, it stops.
+These are the facts; and the mental operation must accord with them.
+There is put into the ball, at the instant of contact, a certain amount
+of motor force. From that instant onward, that force flows out of the
+ball into the resisting substances by which it is surrounded, until none
+is left. And it is just as pertinent to ask how all the water can flow
+out of a pail, as how all the motor force can flow out of a moving
+substance. "The smallest movement is separated" by no more of "an
+impassable gap from no movement," _than it is from a larger movement
+above it_. That which will account for a movement four becoming two,
+will account for a movement two becoming zero. The "puzzle," then, may
+be explained thus. Time is the procession of events. Let it be
+represented by a line. Take a point in that line, which will then mark
+its division but represent _no period_. On one side of that point is
+rest; on the other motion. That point is the point of contact, and
+occupies no period. At this point the motion is maximum. The force
+instantly begins to flow off, and continues in a steady stream until
+none is left, and the body is again at rest. Here, also, we take a
+point. This is the point of zero. It again divides the line. Before the
+bisection is motion; after the bisection is rest. All this cannot be
+perceived by the Sense, nor conceived by the Understanding. It is seen
+by the Reason. Now observe the actual phenomenon. The ball starts,
+proceeds, stops. From maximum to zero there is a steady diminution, or
+nearly enough so for the experiment; at least the diminution can be
+averaged for the illustration. Then comparing motion with time, the same
+difficulty falls upon the one as the other. If the motion is halved, the
+time must be; and so, "mentally," it is impossible to imagine how a
+moment of time can pass. To the halving faculty--the Sense--this is
+true, and so we are compelled to correct our course of procedure. This
+it is. The Sense and Understanding being impotent to discover an
+absolute unit of any kind, the Sense _assumes_ for itself what meets all
+practical want--a standard unit, by which it measures parts in Space and
+Time. So motion must be measured by some assumed standard; and as, like
+time,--duration,--it can be represented by a line, let them have a
+common standard. Suppose, then, that the ball's flight occupies ten
+minutes of time. The line from m to z will be divided into ten exactly
+equal spaces; and it will be no more difficult to account for the flow
+of force from 10 to 9, than from 1 to 0. Also let it be observed that
+the force, like time, is a unit, which the Sense, for its convenience,
+divides into parts; but that neither those parts, nor any parts, have
+any real existence. As Time is an indivisible whole, measured off for
+convenience, so any given force is such a whole, and is so measured off.
+All this appearing and measuring are phenomenal in the Sense. It is the
+Reason which sees that they can be _only_ phenomenal, and that behind
+the appearance is pure Spirit--God, who is primarily out of all
+relation.
+
+On page 58, near the close of his illustration of the chair, Mr. Spencer
+says: "It suffices to remark that since the force as known to us is an
+affection of consciousness, we cannot conceive the force as existing in
+the chair under the same form without endowing the chair with
+consciousness." This very strange assertion can only be true, provided a
+major premiss, No force can be conceived to exist without involving an
+affection of consciousness in the object in which it _apparently_
+inheres, is true. Such a premiss seems worse than absurd; it seems
+silly. We cannot learn that force exists, without our consciousness is
+affected thereby; but this is a very different thing from our being
+unable to conceive of a force as _existing_, without there is a
+consciousness in the object through which it _appears_. If Mr. Spencer
+had said that no force can be, without being exerted, and no force can
+be exerted, without an affection of the consciousness of the exertor, he
+would have uttered the truth. We would then have the following result.
+Primarily all force is exerted by the Deity; and he is conscious
+thereof. He draws the chair down just as really as though the hand were
+visible. Secondarily spiritual persons are endowed by their Creator with
+the ability to exert his force for their uses, and so I lift the chair.
+The great error, which appears on every page of Mr. Spencer's book and
+invalidates all his conclusions, shows itself fully here. He presents
+images from the Sense, and then tries to satisfy the Reason--the faculty
+which calls for an absolute account--by the analyses of that Sense. His
+attempt to "halve the rate," his remark that "the smallest movement is
+separated by an impassable gap from no movement," and many such, are
+only pertinent to the Sense, can never be explained by the Sense, and
+are found by the Reason to need, and be capable of, no such kind of
+explanation as the Sense attempts; but that the phenomena are
+appearances in _wholes_, whose partitions cannot be absolute, and that
+these wholes are accounted for by the being of an absolute and infinite
+Person--God, who is utterly impalpable to the Sense, and can be known
+only by the Reason.
+
+The improper use of the Sense mentioned above, is, if possible, more
+emphatically exemplified in the remarks upon "the connection between
+Force and Matter." "Our ultimate test of Matter is the ability to
+resist." This is true to the Sense, but no farther. "Resist" what? Other
+matter, of course. Thus is the sensuousness made manifest. In the Sense,
+then, we have a material object. But Force is not object to the Sense
+directly, but only indirectly by its effects through Matter. The Sense,
+in its percept, deems the force other than the matter. Hence it is
+really no more difficult for the Sense to answer the question, How could
+the Sun send a force through 95,000,000 of miles of void to the Earth
+and hold it, than through solid rock that distance? All that the Sense
+_can do_ is to present the phenomena. It is utterly impotent to account
+for the least of them.
+
+In the following passage, on page 61, Mr. Spencer seems to have been
+unaccountably led astray. He says: "Let the atoms be twice as far apart,
+and their attractions and repulsions will both be reduced to one fourth
+of their present amounts. Let them be brought within half the distance,
+and then attractions and repulsions will both be quadrupled. Whence it
+follows that this matter will as readily as not assume any other
+density; and can offer no resistance to any external agents." Now if
+this be true, there can be no "external agents" to which to offer any
+"resistance." It is simply to assert that all force neutralizes itself;
+and that matter is impossible. But the conclusion does not "follow." It
+is evidently based on the supposition that the "attractions and
+repulsions" are _contra_-acting forces which exactly balance each other,
+and so the molecules are held in their position by _no_ force. Instead
+of this, they are _co_-acting forces, which are wholly expended in
+holding the molecules in their places. The repulsions, then, are
+expended in resisting pressure from without which seeks to crowd the
+particles in upon themselves and thus disturb their equilibrium; while
+the attractions are expended in holding the particles down to their
+natural distance from each other when any disturbing force attempts to
+separate them. Hence, referring to the two cases mentioned, in the first
+instance the power of resistance is reduced to one fourth, and this
+corresponds with the fact; and in the second instance the power of
+resistance is increased fourfold, and this corresponds with the fact.
+
+We thus arrive at the end of Mr. Spencer's remarks concerning the
+material Universe and of our strictures thereon. Perhaps the reader's
+mind cannot better be satisfied as to the validity of these strictures
+than by presenting an outline of the system furnished by the Reason, and
+upon which they are based.
+
+The Reason gives, by a direct and immediate intuition, and as a
+necessary _a priori_ idea, God. This is a _spontaneous_, synthetical
+act, precisely the same in kind with that which gives a simple _a
+priori_ principle, as idea. In it the Reason intuits, not a single
+principle seen to be necessary simply, but the fact that all possible
+principles _must_ be combined in a perfectly harmonious unity, in a
+single Being, who thereby possesses all possible endowments; and so is
+utterly independent, and is seen to be the absolute and infinite Person,
+the perfect Spirit. This act is no conclusion of the One from the many
+in a synthetical judgment, but is entirely different. It is the
+necessary seeing of the many in the One; and so is not a judgment but an
+intuition, not a guess but a certainty. God, then, is known, when known
+at all, not "by plurality, difference, and relation," but by an
+_immediate_ insight into his unity, and so is directly known as he is.
+And the whole Universe is, that creatures might be, to whom this
+revelation was possible. Among the other necessary endowments which this
+intuition reveals, is that of immanent power commensurate with his
+dignity, and adequate to realize in actual creatures the necessary _a
+priori_ ideas, which he also possesses as endowments. Power is, then, a
+simple idea, incapable of analysis; and which cannot therefore be
+defined, except by synonymous terms; and to which President Hopkins's
+remark upon moral obligation is equally pertinent; viz: "that we can
+only state the occasion on which it arises." From these data the _a
+priori_ idea of the Universe may be developed as follows:--
+
+God, the absolute and infinite Person, possesses, as inherent endowment
+forever immanent in himself, Universal Genius; which is at once capacity
+and faculty, in which he sees, and by which he sees, all possible ideas,
+and these in all possible combinations or ideals. Thus has he all
+possible knowledge. From the various ideal systems which thus are, he,
+having perfect wisdom, and according his choice to the behest of his own
+worth, selects that one which is thus seen to be best; and thereby
+determines the forms and laws under which the Universe shall become. He
+also possesses, as inherent endowment, all power; _i. e._ the ability to
+realize every one of his ideals; but _not_ the ability to violate the
+natural laws of his being, as to make two and two five. The ideal system
+is only ideal: the power is simply power; and so long as the two remain
+isolated, no-thing will be. Therefore, in order to the realization of
+his ideal, it must be combined with the power; _i. e._, the power must
+be organized according to the ideal. How, then, can the power, having
+been sent forth from God, be organized? Thus. If the power goes forth in
+its simplicity, it will be expended uselessly, because there is no
+substance upon which it may be exercised. It follows, then, that, if
+exercised at all, it must be exercised upon _itself_. When, therefore,
+God would create the Universe, he sent forth two "pencils," or columns
+of power, of equal and sufficient volume, which, acting upon each other
+from opposite directions, just held each other in balance, and thus
+force was. These two "pencils," thus balancing each other, would result
+in a sphere of "space-filling force." The point of contact would
+determine the first place in Space, and the first point in Time; from
+which, if attainable, an absolute measure of each could be made. All we
+have now attained is the single duality "space-filling force," which is
+wholly homogeneous, is of sufficient volume to constitute the Universe,
+and yet by no means _is_ the Universe. There is only Chaos, "without
+form and void, and darkness" is "upon the face of the deep." Now must
+"the Spirit of God move upon the face of the waters"; then through vast
+and to us immeasurable periods of time, through cycle and epicycle, the
+work of organization will go on. Ever moving under forms laid down in
+the _a priori_ ideal, God's power turns upon itself, as out of the crush
+of elemental chaos the Universe is being evolved. During this process,
+whatever of the force is to act under the law of heat in the _a priori_
+ideal, assumes that form and the heat force becomes; whatever is to act
+under the law of magnetism, assumes that form, and magnetic force
+becomes; so of light, and the various forms of matter. At length, in the
+revolution of the cycles, the Universe attains that degree of
+preparation which fits it for living things to be, and the life force is
+organized; and by degrees all its various forms are brought forth. After
+another vast period that point is reached when an animal may be
+organized, which shall be the dwelling-place for a time of a being whose
+life is utterly different in kind from any animal life, and man appears.
+Now in all these vast processes, be it observed that God is personally
+present, that the first energy was his, and that every subsequent
+energizing act is his special and personal act. He organized the
+duality, force. He then organized this force into heat-force,
+light-force, magnetic-force, matter-force, life-force, and soul-force.
+And so it is that his personal supervision and energy is actually
+present in every atom of the Universe. When we turn from this process of
+thought to the sensible facts, and speak of granite, sandstone, schist,
+clay, herbage, animals, yes, of the thousand kinds of substance which
+appear to the eye, it is to be remembered that all these are but _forms
+to the Sense_ of that "reason-conception," force,--that primal duality,
+which power acting upon itself becomes. Now as the machine can never
+carve any other image than those for which it is specially constructed,
+and must work just as it is made to work, so the Sense, which is purely
+mechanical, can never do any other than the work for which it was made,
+can never transcend the laws of its organization. It can only give
+forms--results, but is impotent to go behind them. It can only say _that
+things are_, but never say _what_ or _why_ they are.
+
+Seen in the light of the theory which has thus been presented, Mr.
+Spencer's difficulties vanish. Matter is force. Motion is matter
+affected by another form of force. The "puzzle" of motion and rest is
+only phenomenal to the Sense; it is an appearance of force acting
+through another force. It may also be said that the Universe is solid
+force. There is no void in it. There is no nook, no crevice or cranny,
+that is not full of force. To seek, then, for some medium through which
+force may traverse vast distances, is the perfection of superfluity.
+From centre to circumference it is present, and controls all things, and
+is all things. So it is no more difficult to see how force reaches forth
+and holds worlds in their place, than how it draws down the pebble which
+a boy has thrown into the air. It is no substance which must travel over
+the distance, it is rather an inflexible rod which swings the worlds
+round in their orbits. Whether, then, we look at calcined crags or
+lilies of the valley, whether astronomy, or geology, or chemistry be our
+study, the objects grouped under those sciences will be found to be
+equally the results of this one force, acting under different laws, and
+taking upon itself different forms, and becoming different objects.
+
+That faculty and that line of thought, which have given so readily the
+solution of the difficulties brought to view by Mr. Spencer's
+examination of the outer world, will afford us an easier solution, if
+possible, of the difficulties which he has raised respecting the inner
+world. That which is not of us, but is far from us, may perchance be
+imperfectly known; but ourselves, what we are, and the laws of our
+being, may be certainly and accurately known. And this is the highest
+knowledge. It may be important, as an element of culture, that we become
+acquainted with many facts respecting the outer world. It cannot but be
+of the utmost importance, that we know ourselves; for thus only can we
+fulfil the behest of that likeness to God, in which we were originally
+created. We seek for, we may obtain, we _have obtained_ knowledge in the
+inner world,--a knowledge sure, steadfast, immutable.
+
+It seems to be more than a mere verbal criticism, rather a fundamental
+one, that it is not "our states of consciousness" which "occur in
+succession"; but that the modifications in our consciousness so occur.
+Consciousness is _one_, and retains that oneness throughout all
+modifications. These occur in the unity, as items of experience affect
+it. Is this series of modifications "of consciousness infinite or
+finite"? To this question experience _can_ give no answer. All
+experiments are irrelevant; because these can only be after the faculty
+of consciousness is. They can go no further back than the _forms_ of the
+activity. These they may find, but they cannot account for. A law lies
+on all those powers by which an experiment may be made, which forever
+estops them from attaining to the substance of the power which lies back
+of the form. The eye cannot examine itself. The Sense, as mental
+capacity for the reception of impressions, cannot analyze its
+constituents. The Understanding, as connective faculty concluding in
+judgments, is impotent to discover why it must judge one way and not
+another. It is only when we ascend to the Reason that we reach the
+region of true knowledge. Here, overlooking, analyzing all the conduct
+of the lower powers, and holding the self right in the full blaze of the
+Eye of self, Man attains a true and fundamental _self-knowledge_. From
+this Mount of Vision we know that infinity and finiteness have no
+pertinence to modifications of consciousness, or in fact to any series.
+We attain to the further knowledge that this series is, _must be_,
+limited; because the constituted beings, in whom it in each case
+inheres, are limited, and had a beginning. It matters not now to inquire
+how a self-conscious person could be created. It is sufficient to know
+that one has been created. This fact involves the further fact that
+consciousness, as an actuality, began in the order of nature, after the
+being to whom it belongs as endowment, or, in other words, an
+organization must be, before the modifications which inhere in that
+organization can become. The attainment of this as necessary law is far
+more satisfactory than any experience could be, were it possible; for we
+can never know but that an experience may be modified; but a law given
+in the intuition is immutable. The fact, ascertained many pages back,
+that the subject and the object are identical under the final
+examination of the Reason, enables us to attain the present end of the
+chain. The question is one of fact, and is purely psychological. It
+cannot be passed upon, or in any way interfered with, by logical
+processes. It is only by examination, by seeing, that the truth can be
+known. Faraday ridiculed as preposterous the pretension that a vessel
+propelled by steam could cross the ocean, and demonstrated, to his
+entire satisfaction, the impossibility of the event. Yet the Savannah
+crossed, and laughed at him. Just so here, all arguing is folly. The
+question is one of fact in experience. And upon it the soul gives
+undoubted answer, as we have stated. Nor is it so difficult, as some
+would have us believe, to see how this may be. Consciousness is an
+indivisible unity, and, as we have before seen, may best be defined as
+the light in which the person intuits his own acts and activities. This
+unity is abiding, and is ground for the modifications. It is, then,
+_now_, and the person now knows what the present modification _is_. The
+person does not need to look to memory and learn what the former
+modification was. It immediately knows what the modification _is_ now.
+Thus a simple attainment of the psychological truth through a careful
+examination dispels as a morning mist the whole cloud of Mr. Spencer's
+difficulties. Well might President Hopkins say, "The only question is,
+what is it that consciousness gives? If we say that it does thus give
+both the subject and the object, that simple affirmation sweeps away in
+a moment the whole basis of the ideal and skeptical philosophy. It
+becomes as the spear of Ithuriel, and its simple touch will change what
+seemed whole continents of solid speculation into mere banks of German
+fog." We have learned, then, that it is not possible, or necessary,
+either to "perceive" or "conceive" the terminations of consciousness,
+because this involves the discovery, by _mechanical_ faculties, of their
+own being and state before they became activities on the one hand, which
+is a contradiction, and on the other an utter transcending of the sphere
+of their capability, the attempt to do which would be a greater folly
+than would be that of the hand to see Jupiter. But we have intuited the
+law, which declares the necessity of a beginning for us and all
+creatures; and we ever live in the light of the present end. When, then,
+Mr. Spencer says that "Consciousness implies perpetual change and the
+perpetual establishment of relations between its successive phases," we
+know that he has uttered a fundamental psychological error, in fact,
+that almost the opposite is the truth. Consciousness is the permanent,
+the abiding, the changeless. It is the light of the personal Eye. Into
+it all changes come; but they are only _incidental_. In the finite and
+partial person, they come, because such person _must grow_; and so,
+because of his partiality and incompleteness, they become necessary
+incidents; but let there be a Person having all knowledge, who therefore
+cannot learn, having all perfection, who therefore cannot change, and it
+is plain that these facts in no way interfere with his consciousness.
+All variety is immanent in its light, and no change can come into it
+because _there is no change to come_; but this Person sees _all_ his
+endowments _at once_, in the unity of this his light, just as we see
+_some_ of our endowments in the unity of this our light. The change is
+not in the consciousness, but in the objects which come into it. This
+view also disposes of the theory that "any mental affection must be
+known as like these foregoing ones or unlike those"; that, "if it is not
+thought of in connection with others--not distinguished or identified by
+comparison with others, it is not recognized--is not a state of
+consciousness at all." Such comparison we have found only incidental in
+consciousness, pertaining to things in the Sense and Understanding and
+not essential. Thus does a true psychology dissipate all these
+difficulties as a true cosmology explained the perplexities "of Motion
+and Rest."
+
+Take another step and we can answer the question "What is this that
+thinks?" It is a spiritual person. What, then, is a spiritual person? A
+substance--a kind of force--the nature of which we need inquire about no
+further than to know that it is suitable to the use which is made of it,
+which is organized, according to a set of constituting laws, into such
+spiritual person. The substance without the laws would be simple
+substance, and nothing more. The laws without the substance would be
+only laws, and could give no being having no ground in which to inhere.
+But the substance as ground and the complete set of laws as inhering in
+the ground, and being its organization when combined, become a spiritual
+person who thinks. The _ego_, that is the sense of personality, is only
+one of the forms of activity of this being, and therefore cannot be said
+to think. The pages now before us are all vitiated by the theory that
+"successive impressions and ideas constitute consciousness." Once attain
+to the true psychology of the person, and learn that consciousness is as
+stated above,--an abiding light into which modifications come,--and
+there arises no difficulty in believing in the reality of self, and in
+entirely justifying that belief by Reason. Yea, more, from such a
+standpoint it is utter unreason, the height of folly, to doubt for an
+instant, for immanent and central in the light of Reason lies the solemn
+fact of man's selfhood. We arrive, then, directly at Mr. Spencer's
+conclusion, that "Clearly, a true cognition of self implies a state in
+which the knowing and the known are one--in which subject and object are
+identified," and we _know_ that such a state is an actuality. Mr. Mansel
+may hold that such an assertion is the annihilation of both, but he is
+wholly wrong. The Savannah has crossed the Atlantic.
+
+We attain, then, exactly the opposite result from Mr. Spencer. We have
+seen that "Ultimate Scientific Ideas are all" presentative "of
+realities" which can "be comprehended." We have, indeed, found it to be
+true, that, "after no matter how great a progress in the colligation of
+facts and the establishment of generalizations ever wider and
+wider,--after the merging of limited and derivative truths in truths
+that are larger and deeper, has been carried no matter how far,--the
+fundamental truth remains as much beyond reach as ever." But having
+learned this, we do not arrive at the conclusion that "the explanation
+of that which is explicable does but bring out into greater clearness
+the inexplicableness of that which remains behind." On the other hand we
+know that such a conclusion is erroneous, and _that the method by which
+it is reached is a false method, and utterly irrelevant to the object
+sought_. Could this lesson but be thoroughly learned, Mr. Spencer's
+work, and our work, would not have been in vain. Only by a method
+differing from this IN KIND--a method in which there is no "colligation
+of facts," and no "generalizations" concluded therefrom, but a simple,
+direct insight into Pure Truth--can "the fundamental truth" be known;
+and thus it may be known by every human soul. "_God made man in his own
+image._" In our scheme there is ample room for the man of Science, with
+the eye of Sense, to run through the Universe, and gather facts. With
+telescope and microscope, he may pursue them, and capture innumerable
+multitudes of them. But having done this, we count it folly to attempt
+to generalize truth therefrom. But holding up the facts in the clear
+light of Reason, and searching them through and through, we _see_ in
+them the immutable principle, known by a spontaneous, immediate,
+intuitive knowledge to be immutable, and thus we "_know the truth_."
+
+
+
+
+"THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE."
+
+
+In the opening of this chapter, Mr. Spencer states the result, which, in
+his opinion, philosophy has attained as follows: "All possible
+conceptions have been one by one tried and found wanting; and so the
+entire field of speculation has been gradually exhausted without
+positive result; the only result arrived at being the negative one above
+stated--that the reality existing behind all appearances is, and must
+ever be, unknown." He then sets down a considerable list of names of
+philosophers, who are claimed by Sir William Hamilton as supporters of
+that position. Such a parade of names may be grateful to the feelings of
+the Limitists, but it is no support to their cause. The questions at
+issue are of such a nature that no array of dignities, of learning, of
+profound _opinions_, can have a feather's weight in the decision. For
+instance, take Problem XLVII, of the first book of Euclid. What weight
+have human opinion with reference to its validity? Though a thousand
+mathematicians should deny its truth, it would be just as convincing as
+now; and when a thousand mathematicians assert its truth, they add no
+item to the vividness of the conviction. The school-boy, who never heard
+of one of them, when he first reads it, knows it must be so, and that
+this is an inevitable necessity, beyond the possibility of any power or
+will to change. On principles simple, fixed, and final, just like those
+of mathematics, seen by the same Eye and known with the same
+intellectual certainty, and by logical processes just as pure,
+conclusive, _demonstrative_ as those of geometry, _and by such alone_,
+can the questions now before us be settled. But though names and
+opinions have no weight in the final decision, though a demonstration is
+demanded and must be given, still it is interesting to note the absence
+of two names, representatives of a class, which must ever awaken, among
+the devout and pure-hearted, attention and love, and whose teachings,
+however unnoticed by Mr. Spencer, are a leaven working in the minds and
+hearts of men, which develop with continually increasing distinctness
+the solemn and sublime truth, that the human mind is capable of absolute
+knowledge. Plato, with serious, yea, sad countenance, the butt of jeer
+and scoff from the wits and comedians of his day, went about teaching
+those who hung upon his lips, that in every human soul were Ideas which
+God had implanted, and which were final truth. And Jesus Christ, with a
+countenance more beautifully serious, more sweetly sad, said to those
+Jews which believed on him, "If ye continue in my word, then are ye my
+disciples indeed; _and ye shall know the truth_, and the truth shall
+make you free." It may seem to men who grope about in the dismal cavern
+of the animal nature--the Sense and Understanding--wise to refuse the
+light, and reject the truths of the Pure Reason and the God-man, and to
+call the motley conglomeration of facts which they gather, but cannot
+explain, philosophy; but no soul which craves "the Higher Life" will,
+can be satisfied with such attainments. It yearns for, it cries after,
+yea, with ceaseless iteration it urges its supplication for the highest
+truth; and it shall attain to it, because God, in giving the tongue to
+cry, gave also the Eye to see. The Spiritual person in man, made in the
+very image of God, can never be satisfied till, stripped of the weight
+of the animal nature, it sees with its own Eye the Pure Reason, God as
+the Highest Truth. And to bring it by culture, by every possible
+manifestation of his wondrous nature, up to this high Mount of Vision,
+is one object of God in his system of the Universe.
+
+The teaching of the Word--that august personage, "who came forth from
+God, and went to God," has been alluded to above. It deserves more than
+an allusion, more than any notice which can be given it here. It is
+astonishing, though perhaps not wholly unaccountable, that the writings
+of the apostles John and Paul have received so little attention from
+the metaphysicians of the world, as declarations of metaphysical truths.
+Even the most devout students of them do not seem to have appreciated
+their inestimable value in this regard. The reason for this undoubtedly
+is, that their transcendent importance as declarations of religious
+truth has shone with such dazzling effulgence upon the eyes of those who
+have loved them, that the lesser, but harmoniously combining beams of a
+true spiritual philosophy have been unnoticed in the glory of the nobler
+light. It will not, therefore, we trust, be deemed irreverent to say
+that, laying aside all questions of the Divinity of Christ, or of the
+inspiration of the Bible, and considering the writings of John and Paul
+merely as human productions, written at some time nobody knows when, and
+by some men nobody knows who, they are the most wonderful revelations,
+the profoundest metaphysical treatises the world has ever seen. In them
+the highest truths, those most difficult of attainment by processes of
+reflection, are stated in simple, clear language, and _they answer
+exactly to the teachings of the Reason_. Upon this, President Hopkins
+says: "The identity which we found in the last lecture between the
+teaching of the constitution of man and the law of God, was not sought.
+The result was reached because the analysis would go there. I was myself
+surprised at the exactness of the coincidence." Nor is this coincidence
+to be observed simply in the statement of the moral law. In all
+questions pertaining to man's nature and state, the two will be found in
+exact accord. No law is affirmed by either, but is accorded to by the
+other. In fine, whoever wrote the Book must have had an accurate and
+exhaustive knowledge of Man, about whom he wrote. Without any reference
+then to their religious bearings, but simply as expositions of
+metaphysical truths, the writings of the two authors named deserve our
+most careful attention. What we seek for are laws, final, fixed laws,
+which are seen by a direct intuition to be such; and these writings are
+of great value, because they cultivate and assist the Reason in its
+search for these highest Truths.
+
+One need have no hesitation, then, in rejecting the authority of Mr.
+Spencer's names, aye, even if they were a thousand more. We seek for,
+and can obtain, that which he cannot give us--a demonstration; which he
+cannot give us because he denies the very existence of that faculty by
+which alone a demonstration is possible. As his empiricism is worthless,
+so is his rationality. No "deduction" from any "_product_ of thought, or
+process of thought," is in any way applicable to the question in hand.
+Intuitions are the mental actions needed. Light is neither product nor
+process. We pass over, then, his whole illustration of the partridge. It
+proves nothing. He leads us through an interminable series of questions
+to no goal; and says there is none. He gives the soul a stone, when it
+cries for bread. One sentence of his is doubtless true. "Manifestly, as
+the _most_ general cognition at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a
+more general one, it cannot be understood." Of course not. When the
+Understanding has attained to the last generalization _by these very
+terms_, it cannot go any farther. But by no means does his conclusion
+follow, that "Of necessity, therefore, explanation must eventually bring
+us down to the inexplicable. The deepest truth which we can get at must
+be unaccountable. Comprehension must become something other than
+comprehension, before the ultimate fact can be comprehended." How shall
+we account for the last generalization, and show this conclusion to be
+false? Thus. Hitherto there have been, properly speaking, no
+comprehensions, only perceptions in the Sense and connections in the
+Understanding. "The sense _distinguishes_ quality and _conjoins_
+quantity; the understanding _connects_ phenomena; the reason
+_comprehends_ the whole operation of both." The Reason, then, overseeing
+the operations of the lower faculties, and possessing within itself the
+_a priori_ laws in accordance with which they are, _sees_ directly and
+immediately why they are, and thus comprehends and accounts for them. It
+sees that there is an end to every process of generalization; and it
+then sees, what the Understanding could never guess, that _after_--in
+the order of our procedure--the last generalization there is an eternal
+truth, in accordance with which process and conclusion were and must be.
+There remains, then, no inexplicable, for the final truth is seen and
+known in its very self.
+
+The passages quoted at this point from Hamilton and Mansel have been
+heretofore examined, and need no further notice. We will pass on then to
+his subsequent reflections upon them. It is worthy of remark, as a
+general criticism upon these comments, that there is scarcely one, if
+there is a single expression in the remainder of this chapter, which
+does not refer to the animal nature and its functions. The illustrations
+are from the material world, and the terms and expressions are suited
+thereto. With reference to objects in the Sense, and connections in the
+Understanding, the "fundamental condition of thought," which Mr. Spencer
+supplies, is unquestionably valuable. There is "likeness" as well as
+"relation, plurality, and difference." But observe that both these laws
+alike are pertinent only to the Sense and Understanding, that they
+belong to _things in nature_, and consequently have no pertinence to the
+questions now before us. We are discussing _ideas_, not _things_; and
+those are simple, and can only be seen, while these are complex, and may
+be perceived, distinguished, and conceived. If any one shall doubt that
+Mr. Spencer is wholly occupied with things in nature, it would seem that
+after having read p. 80, he could doubt no longer. "Animals," "species
+or genus," "mammals, birds, reptiles, or fishes," are objects by which
+he illustrates his subject. And one is forced to exclaim, "How can he
+speak of such things when they have nothing to do with the matter in
+hand? What have God and infinity and absoluteness to do with 'mammals,
+birds, reptiles, or fishes'? If we can know only these, why speak of
+those?" It would seem that the instant they are thus set together and
+contrasted, the soul must cry out with an irrepressible cry, "It is by
+an utterly different faculty, and in entirely other modes, that I dwell
+upon God and the questions concerning him. These modes of the animal
+nature, by which I know 'mammals,' are different in kind from those of
+the spiritual person, by which I know God and the eternal truth." And
+when this distinction becomes clearly appreciated and fixed in one's
+mind, and the query arises, how could a man so confound the two, and
+make utter confusion of the subject, as the Limitists have done, he can
+hardly refrain from quoting Romans I. 20 _et seq._ against them.
+
+Let us observe now Mr. Spencer's corollary. "A cognition of the Real as
+distinguished from the Phenomenal must, if it exists, conform to this
+law of cognition in general. The First Cause, the Infinite, the
+Absolute, to be known at all, must be classed. To be positively thought
+of, it must be thought of as such or such--as of this or that kind." To
+begin with the law which is here asserted, is _not_ a "general" law, and
+so does not lie upon all cognition. It is only a special law, and lies
+only upon a particular kind of cognition. This has been already
+abundantly shown; yet we reproduce one line of proof. No mathematical
+law comes under his law of cognition; neither can he, nor any other
+Limitist, make it appear that it does so come. His law is law only for
+things in nature, and not for principles. Since then all ideas are known
+in themselves--are _self-evident_, and since God, infinity, and
+absoluteness are ideas, they are known in themselves, and need not be
+classed. So his corollary falls to the ground. Can we have any "sensible
+experience" of God? Most certainly not. Yet we can have just as much a
+sensible experience of him as of any other person--of parent, wife, or
+child. Did you ever see a person--a soul? No. Can you see--"have
+sensible experience of"--a soul? No. What is it, then, that we have such
+experience of? Plainly the body--that material frame through which the
+soul manifests itself. The Universe is that material system through
+which God manifests himself to those spiritual persons whom he has made;
+and that manifestation is the same in kind as that of a created soul
+through the body which is given it. It follows then,--and not only from
+this, but it may be shown by further illustration,--that every other
+person is just as really inscrutable to us as God is; and further, that,
+if we can study and comprehend the soul of our wife or child, we can
+with equal certainty study, and to some extent comprehend, the soul of
+God. Or, in other words, if man is only an animal nature, having a Sense
+and Understanding, all personality is an insoluble mystery; all
+spiritual persons are alike utterly inscrutable. And this is so,
+because, upon the hypothesis taken, man is destitute of any faculty
+which can catch a glimpse of such object. A Sense and Understanding can
+no more see, or in any possible manner take cognizance of, a spiritual
+person than a man born blind can see the sun. Again, we say he is
+destitute of the faculty. Will Mr. Spencer deny the fact of the idea of
+personality? Will he assert that man has no such notion? Let him once
+admit that he has, and in that admission is involved the admission of
+the reality of that faculty by which we know God, for the faculty which
+cognizes personality, and cognizes God, is one and the same.
+
+Although we do not like certain of Mr. Spencer's terms, yet, to please
+him, we will use them. Some conclusions, then, may be expressed thus:
+God as the Deity cannot be "classed"; he is unique. This is involved in
+the very terms by which we designate him. Yet we cognize him, but this
+is by an immediate intuition, in which we know him as he is in himself.
+"We shall see him as he is," says the apostle; and some foretastes of
+that transcendent revelation are vouchsafed us here on earth. But the
+infinite Person, _as person_, must be "assimilated" with other persons.
+Yet his infinity and absoluteness, _as such_, cannot be "grouped." And
+yet again, _as qualities_, they can be "grouped" with other qualities.
+Unquestionably between the Creator, _as such_, and the created, _as
+such_, "there must be a distinction transcending any of the distinctions
+existing between different divisions of the created." God as
+self-existent differs in kind from man as dependent, and this difference
+continues irrevocable; while that same God and that same man are _alike_
+in kind _as persons_. This is true, because all spiritual persons are
+composite beings; and while the essential elements of a spiritual person
+are common to created persons and the uncreated Person, there are
+_other_ characteristics, _not essential_ to personality, which belong
+some to the created, and some to the uncreated, and differentiate them.
+Or, in other words, God as person, and man as person, are alike. Yet
+they are diverse in kind, and so diverse in kind that it is out of the
+range of possibility for that diversity to be removed. How can this be
+explained? Evidently thus. There are _qualities_ transfusing the
+personality which cannot be interchangeable, and which constitute the
+diversity. Personality is _form_ of being. Qualities transfuse the form.
+Absoluteness and infinity are qualities which belong to one Person, and
+are such that they thereby exclude the possibility of their belonging to
+any other person; and so they constitute that one to whom they belong,
+unique and supreme. Dependence and partiality are also qualities of a
+spiritual person, but are qualities of the created spiritual person, and
+are such as must always subordinate that person to the other. In each
+instance it is, "_in the nature of things_," impossible for either to
+pass over and become the other. Each is what he is by the terms of his
+being, and must stay so.
+
+But from all this it by no means follows that the dependent spiritual
+person can have no knowledge of the independent spiritual Person. On the
+other hand, it is the high glory of the independent spiritual Person,
+that he can create another being "in his own image," to whom he can
+communicate a knowledge of himself. "Like as a father pitieth his
+children, so Jehovah pitieth them that fear him." Out of the fact of
+his Father-hood and our childhood, comes that solemn, and, to the loving
+soul, joyful fact, that he teaches us the highest knowledge just as
+really as our earthly parents teach us earthly knowledge. This he could
+not do if we had not the capacity to receive the knowledge; and we could
+not have had the capacity, except he had been able, in "the nature of
+things," and willing to bestow it upon us. While, then, God as "the
+Unconditioned cannot be classed," and so as unconditioned we do not know
+him "as of such or such kind," after the manner of the Understanding,
+yet we may, do, "see him as he is," do know that he is, and is
+unconditioned, through the insight of the Reason, the eye of the
+spiritual person, and what it is to be unconditioned.
+
+We now reach a passage which has filled us with unqualified amazement.
+As much as we had familiarized ourselves with the materialistic
+teachings of the Limitists, we confess that we were utterly unprepared
+to meet, even in Mr. Spencer's writings, a theory of man so ineffably
+degrading, and uttered with so calm and naive an unconsciousness of the
+degradation it involved, as the following. Although for want of room his
+illustrations are omitted, it is believed that the following extracts
+give a fair and ample presentation of his doctrine.
+
+"All vital actions, considered not separately but in their ensemble,
+have for their final purpose the balancing of certain outer processes by
+certain inner processes.
+
+"There are unceasing external forces, tending to bring the matter of
+which organic bodies consist, into that state of stable equilibrium
+displayed by inorganic bodies; there are internal forces by which this
+tendency is constantly antagonized; and the perpetual changes which
+constitute Life may be regarded as incidental to the maintenance of the
+antagonism....
+
+"When we contemplate the lower kinds of life, we see that the
+correspondences thus maintained are direct and simple; as in a plant,
+the vitality of which mainly consists in osmotic and chemical actions
+responding to the coexistence of light, heat, water, and carbonic acid
+around it. But in animals, and especially in the higher orders of them,
+the correspondences become extremely complex. Materials for growth and
+repair not being, like those which plants require, everywhere present,
+but being widely dispersed and under special forms, have to be formed,
+to be secured, and to be reduced to a fit state for assimilation....
+
+"What is that process by which food when swallowed is reduced to a fit
+form for assimilation, but a set of mechanical and chemical actions
+responding to the mechanical and chemical actions which distinguish the
+food? Whence it becomes manifest, that, while Life in its simplest form
+is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with
+certain outer physico-chemical actions, each advance to a higher form of
+Life consists in a better preservation of this primary correspondence by
+the establishment of other correspondences. Divesting this conception of
+all superfluities, and reducing it to its most abstract shape, we see
+that Life is definable as the continuous adjustment of internal
+relations to external relations. And when we so define it, we discover
+that the physical and the psychial life are equally comprehended by the
+definition. We perceive that this, which we call intelligence, shows
+itself when the external relations to which the internal ones are
+adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in time and space;
+that every advance in Intelligence essentially consists in the
+establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved
+adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science are
+resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so
+cooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence
+and sequence that occur externally....
+
+"And lastly let it be noted that what we call _truth_, guiding us to
+successful action and the consequent maintenance of life, is simply the
+accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations; while
+_error_, leading to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence
+of such accurate correspondence.
+
+"If, then, Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in
+its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal
+relations to external relations, the necessarily relative character of
+our knowledge becomes obvious. The simplest cognition being the
+establishment of some connection between subjective states, answering to
+some connection between objective agencies; and each successively more
+complex cognition being the establishment of some more involved
+connection of such states, answering to some more involved connection of
+such agencies; it is clear that the process, no matter how far it be
+carried, can never bring within the reach of Intelligence either the
+states themselves or the agencies themselves."
+
+Or, to condense Mr. Spencer's whole teaching into a few plain every-day
+words, Man is an animal, and only an animal, differing nowhat from the
+dog and chimpanzee, except in the fact that his life "consists in the
+establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved
+adjustments," than the life of said dog and chimpanzee. Mark
+particularly the sententious diction of this newly arisen sage. Forget
+not one syllable of the profound and most important knowledge he would
+impart. "Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in
+its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal
+relations to external relations." See, there is not a limit, not a
+qualification to the assertion! Now turn back a page or two, reader, if
+thou hast this wonderful philosophy by thee, and gazing, as into a cage
+in a menagerie, see the being its author would teach thee that thou art.
+From the highest to the lowest forms, life is one. In its lower forms,
+life is a set of "direct and simple" "correspondences." "But in animals,
+_and especially in the higher orders of them_," and, of course, most
+especially in the human animal as the highest order, "the
+correspondences become extremely complex." As much as to say, reader,
+you are not exactly a plant, nor are you yet of quite so low a type as
+the chimpanzee aforesaid; but the difference is no serious matter. You
+do not differ half as much from the chimpanzee as the chimpanzee does
+from the forest he roves in. All the difference there is between you and
+him is, that the machinery by which "the continuous adjustment of
+internal relations to external relations" is carried on, is more
+"complex" in you than in the chimpanzee. He roams the forest, inhabits
+some cave or hollow tree, and lives on the food which nature
+spontaneously offers to his hairy hand. You cut down the forest,
+construct a house, and live on the food which some degree of skill has
+prepared. He constructs no clothing, nor any covering to shield him from
+the inclemency of the weather, but is satisfied with tawny, shaggy
+covering, which nature has provided. You on the contrary are destitute
+of such a covering, and rob the sheep, and kill the silk-worm, to supply
+the lack. But in all this there is no _difference in kind_. The
+mechanism by which life is sustained in you is more "complex," it is
+true, than that by which life is sustained in him; there arise,
+therefore, larger needs, and the corresponding "intelligence" to supply
+those needs. But sweet thought, cheering thought, oh how it supports the
+soul! Your life in its highest form is only this animal life,--is only
+the constructive force by which that "extremely complex" machinery
+carries on "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external
+relations." All other notions of life are "superfluities."
+
+Reader, in view of the teaching of this new and widely heralded sage,
+how many "superfluities" must you and I strip off from our "conception"
+of life! And with what bitter disappointment and deep sadness should we
+take up our lamentation for man, and say: How art thou fallen, oh man!
+thou noblest denizen of earth; yea, how art thou cast down to the
+ground. But a little ago we believed thee a spiritual being; that thou
+hadst a nature too noble to rot with the beasts among the clods; that
+thou wast made fit to live with angels and thy Creator, God. But a
+little ago we believed thee possessed of a psychical life--a soul; that
+thou wouldst live forever beyond the stars; and that this soul's life
+was wholly occupied in the consideration of "heavenly and divine
+things." A little ago we believed in holiness, and that thou,
+consecrating thyself to pure and loving employments, shouldst become
+purer and more beautiful, nobler and more lovely, until perfect love
+should cast out all fear, and thou shouldst then see God face to face,
+and rejoice in the sunlight of his smiling countenance. But all this is
+changed now. Our belief has been found to be a cheat, a bitter mockery
+to the soul. We have sat at the feet of the English sage, and learned
+how dismally different is our destiny. Painful is it, oh reader, to
+listen; and the words of our teacher sweep like a sirocco over the
+heart; yet we cannot choose but hear.
+
+"The pyschical life"--the life of the soul, "the immortal spark of
+fire,"--and the physical life "are _equally_ definable as the continuous
+adjustment of internal relations to external relations." We had supposed
+that intelligence in its highest forms was wholly occupied with the
+contemplation of God and his laws, and the great end of being, and all
+those tremendous questions which we had thought fitted to occupy the
+activities of a spiritual person. We are undeceived now. We find we have
+shot towards the pole opposite to the truth. Now "we perceive that this
+which we call Intelligence shows itself when the external relations to
+which the internal ones are adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and
+remote in time or space; that _every advance in Intelligence essentially
+consists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more
+involved adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science_
+are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so
+cooerdinated as _exactly to tally_ with certain relations of coexistence
+and sequence that occur externally." In such relations consists the life
+of the "caterpillar." In such relations, _only a little "more
+complex,"_ consists the life of "the sparrow." Such relations only does
+"the fowler" observe; such only does "the chemist" know. This is the
+path by which we are led to the last, the highest "truth" which man can
+attain. Thus do we learn "that what we call _truth_, guiding us to
+successful action, and the consequent maintenance of life, is _simply_
+the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations; while
+error, leading to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence of
+such accurate correspondence." What a noble life, oh, reader, what an
+exalted destiny thine is here declared to be! The largest effort of
+thine intelligence, "the highest achievement of science," yea, the total
+object of the life of thy soul,--thy "psychial" life,--is to attain such
+exceeding skill in the construction of a shelter, in the fitting of
+apparel, in the preparation of food, in a word, in securing "the
+accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations," and thus
+in attaining the "_truth_" which shall guide "us to successful action
+and the consequent maintenance of life," that we shall secure forever
+our animal existence on earth. Study patiently thy lesson, oh human
+animal! Con it o'er and o'er. Who knows but thou mayest yet attain to
+this acme of the perfection of thy nature, though it be far below what
+thou hadst once fondly expected,--mayest attain a perfect knowledge of
+the "_truth_," and a perfect skill in the application of that truth, _i.
+e._ in "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external
+relations"; and so be guided "to successful action, and the consequent
+maintenance of life," whereby thou shalt elude forever that merciless
+hunter who pursues thee,--the grim man-stalker, the skeleton Death. But
+when bending all thy energies, yea, all the powers of thy soul, to this
+task, thou mayest recur at some unfortunate moment to the dreams and
+aspirations which have hitherto lain like golden sunlight on thy
+pathway. Let no vain regret for what seemed thy nobler destiny ever
+sadden thy day, or deepen the darkness of thy night. True, thou didst
+deem thyself capable of something higher than "the continuous
+adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; didst often
+occupy thyself with contemplating those "things which eye hath not seen,
+nor ear heard"; didst deem thyself a son of God, and "a joint-heir with
+Jesus Christ," "of things incorruptible and undefiled, and which fade
+not away, eternal in the heavens"; didst sometimes seem to see, with
+faith's triumphant gaze, those glorious scenes which thou wouldst
+traverse when in the spirit-land thou shouldst lead a pure spiritual
+life with other spirits, where all earthliness had been stripped off,
+all tears had been wiped away, and perfect holiness was thine through
+all eternity. But all these visions were only dreams; they wholly
+deluded thee. We have learned from the lips of this latest English sage
+that thy god is thy belly, and that thou must mind earthly things, so as
+to keep up "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external
+relations." Such being thy lot, and to fulfil such a lot being "the
+highest achievement of science," permit not thyself to be disturbed by
+those old-fashioned and sometimes troublesome notions that "_truth_" and
+those "achievements" pertained to a spiritual person in spiritual
+relations to God as the moral Governor of the Universe; that man was
+bound to know the truth and obey it; that his "errors" were violations
+of perfect law,--the truth he knew,--were _crimes_ against Him who is
+"of too pure eyes to behold iniquity, and cannot look upon sin with the
+least degree of allowance"; that for these crimes there impended a just
+penalty--an appalling punishment; and that the only real "failure" was
+the failure to repent of and forsake the crimes, and thus escape the
+penalty. Far other is the fact, as thou wilt learn from this wise man's
+book. As he teaches us, the only "error" we can make, is, to miss in
+maintaining perfectly "the continuous adjustment of internal relations
+to external relations,"--is to eat too much roast beef and plum-pudding
+at dinner, or to wear too scanty or too thick clothing, or to expose
+one's self imprudently in a storm, or by some other carelessness which
+may produce "the absence of such accurate correspondence" as shall
+secure unending life, and so lead to his only "failure"--the advance
+"towards death." When, then, oh reader! by some unfortunate mischance,
+some "error" into which thine ignorance hath led thee, thou hast
+rendered thy "failure" inevitable, and art surely descending "towards
+death," hesitate not to sing with heedless hilarity the old Epicurean
+song, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."
+
+    Sing and be gay
+    The livelong day,
+    Thinking no whit of to-morrow.
+    Enjoy while you may
+    All pleasure and play,
+    For after death is no sorrow.
+
+Thou hast committed thine only "error" in not maintaining "the accurate
+correspondence"; thou hast fallen upon thine only "failure," the
+inevitable advance "towards death." Than death no greater evil can
+befall thee, and that is already sure. Then let "dance and song," and
+"women and wine," bestow some snatches of pleasure upon thy fleeting
+days.
+
+Delightful philosophy, is it not, reader? Poor unfortunate man, and
+especially poor, befooled, cheated, hopeless Christian man, who has
+these many years cherished those vain, deceitful dreams of which we
+spoke a little ago! To be brought down from such lofty aspirations; to
+be made to know that he is only an animal; that "Life in all its
+manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in its highest forms, consists
+in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external
+relations." Do you not join with me in pitying him?
+
+And such is the philosophy which is heralded to us from over the sea as
+the newly found and wonderful truth, which is to satisfy the hungering
+soul of man and still its persistent cry for bread. And this is the
+teacher, mocking that painful cry with such chaff, whom newspaper after
+newspaper, and periodical after periodical on this side the water, even
+to those we love best and cherish most, have pronounced one of the
+profoundest essayists of the day. Perhaps he can give us some sage
+remarks upon "laughter," as it is observed in the human animal, and on
+that point compare therewith other animals. But, speaking in all
+sincerity after the manner of the Book of Common Prayer, we can but say,
+"From all such philosophers and philosophies, good Lord deliver us."
+
+Few, perhaps none of our readers, will desire to see a denial in terms
+of such a theory. When a man, aspiring to be a philosopher, advances the
+doctrine that not only is "Life in its simplest form"--the animal
+life--"the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with
+certain outer physico-chemical actions," but that "_each advance to a
+higher form of Life_ consists in a better preservation of this primary
+correspondence"; and when, proceeding further, and to be explicit, he
+asserts that not only "the physical," _but also "the psychical life_ are
+_equally_" but "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to
+external relations"; and when, still further to insult man, and to utter
+his insult in the most positive, extreme, and unmistakable terms, he
+asserts "that even the highest achievements of science are resolvable
+into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so cooerdinated as
+exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that
+occur externally,"--that is, that the highest science is the attainment
+of a perfect cuisine; in a word, when a human being in this nineteenth
+century offers to his fellows as the loftiest attainment of philosophy
+the tenet that the highest form of life cognizable by man is an animal
+life, and that man can have no other knowledge of himself than as an
+animal, of a little higher grade, it is true, than other animals, but
+not different in kind, then the healthy soul, when such a doctrine is
+presented to it, will reject it as instantaneously as a healthy stomach
+rejects a roll of tobacco.
+
+With what a sense of relief does one turn from a system of philosophy
+which, when stripped of its garb of well-chosen words and large
+sounding, plausible phrases, appears in such vile shape and hideous
+proportions, to the teachings of that pure and noble instructor of our
+youth, that man who, by his gentle, benignant mien, so beautifully
+illustrates the spirit and life of the Apostle John,--Rev. Mark Hopkins,
+D. D., President of Williams College. No one who has read his "Lectures
+on Moral Science," and no lover of truth should fail to do so, will
+desire an apology for inserting the following extract, wherein is
+presented a theory upon which the soul of man can rest, as at home the
+soldier rests, who has just been released from the Libby or Salisbury
+charnel-house.
+
+"And here, again, we have three great forces with their products. These
+are the vegetable, the animal, and the rational life.
+
+"Of these, vegetable life is the lowest. Its products are as strictly
+conditional for animal life as chemical affinity is for vegetable, for
+the animal is nourished by nothing that has not been previously
+elaborated by the vegetable. 'The profit of the earth is for all; the
+king himself is served by the field.'
+
+"Again, we have the animal and sensitive life, capable of enjoyment and
+suffering, and having the instincts necessary to its preservation.
+_This_, as man is now constituted, _is conditional for his rational
+life_. The rational has its roots in that, and manifests itself only
+through the organization which that builds up.
+
+"_We have, then, finally and highest of all, this rational and moral
+life, by which man is made in the image of God._ In man, as thus
+constituted, we first find a being who is capable of choosing his own
+end, or, rather, of choosing or rejecting the end indicated by his whole
+nature. This is moral freedom, _and in this is the precise point of
+transition from all that is below to that which is highest_. For
+everything below man the end is necessitated. Whatever choice there may
+be in the agency of animals of means for the attainment of their
+end,--and they have one somewhat wide,--they have none in respect to the
+end itself. This, for our purpose, and for all purposes, is the
+characteristic distinction, so long sought, between man and the brute.
+Man determines his own end; the end of the brute is necessitated. Up to
+man everything is driven to its end by a force working from without or
+from behind; but for him the pillar of cloud and of fire puts itself in
+front, and he follows it or not, as he chooses.
+
+"In the above cases it will be seen that the process is one of the
+addition of new forces, with a constant limitation of the field within
+which the forces act.... It is to be noticed, however, that while the
+field of each added and superior force is narrowed, yet nothing is
+dropped. Each lower force shoots through, and combines itself with all
+that is higher. Because he is rational, man is not the less subject to
+gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity. He has also the organic
+life that belongs to the animal. In him none of these are dropped; _but
+the rational life is united with and superinduced upon all these_, so
+that man is not only a microcosm, but is the natural head and ruler of
+the world. He partakes of all that is below him, _and becomes man by the
+addition of something higher_.... Here, then, is our model and law. Have
+we a lower sensitive and animal nature? Let that nature be cherished and
+expanded by all its innocent and legitimate enjoyments, for it is an
+end. But--and here we find the limit--let it be cherished _only as
+subservient to the higher intellectual life_, for it is also a means."
+The italics are ours.
+
+Satisfactory, true, and self-sustained as is this theory,--and it is one
+which like a granite Gothic spire lifts itself high and calm into the
+atmosphere, standing firm and immovable in its own clear and
+self-evident truth, unshaken by a thousand assaulting materialistic
+storms,--we would buttress it with the utterances of other of the
+earth's noble ones; and this we do not because it is in any degree
+needful, but because our mind loves to linger round the theme, and to
+gather the concurrent thought of various rarely endowed minds upon this
+subject. Exactly in point is the following--one of many passages which
+might be selected from the works of that profoundest of English
+metaphysicians and theologians, S. T. Coleridge:--
+
+"And here let me observe that the difficulty and delicacy of this
+investigation are greatly increased by our not considering the
+understanding (even our own) in itself, and as it would be were it not
+accompanied with and modified by the cooeperation of the will, the moral
+feeling, and that faculty, perhaps best distinguished by the name of
+Reason, of determining that which is universal and necessary, of fixing
+laws and principles whether speculative or practical, and of
+contemplating a final purpose or end. This intelligent will--having a
+self-conscious purpose, under the guidance and light of the reason, by
+which its acts are made to bear as a whole upon some end in and for
+itself, and to which the understanding is subservient as an organ or the
+faculty of selecting and appropriating the means--seems best to account
+for that progressiveness of the human race, _which so evidently marks an
+insurmountable distinction and impassable barrier between man and the
+inferior animals, but which would be inexplicable, were there no
+other difference than in the degree of their intellectual
+faculties_."--_Works_, Vol. I. p. 371. The italics are ours.
+
+The attention of the reader may with profit be also directed to the
+words of another metaphysician, who has been much longer known, and has
+enjoyed a wider fame than either of those just mentioned; and whose
+teachings, however little weight they may seem to have with Mr. Spencer,
+have been these many years, and still are received and studied with
+profound respect and loving carefulness by multitudes of persons. We
+refer to the apostle Paul, "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to
+those who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after
+the spirit." That is, who do not walk after the law of the animal
+nature, but who do walk after the law of the spiritual person, for it is
+of this great psychological distinction that the apostle so fully and
+continually speaks. "For they that are after the flesh do mind the
+things of the flesh; but they that are after the spirit, the things of
+the spirit. For the minding of the flesh is death, but the minding of
+the spirit is life and peace; because the minding of the flesh as enmity
+against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can
+be." _Romans_ VIII. 1, 5, 6, 7. This I say, then, "Walk in the spirit
+and fulfil not the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the
+spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one
+to the other."--_Galatians_ V. 16, 17.
+
+Upon these passages it should be remarked, by way of explanation, that
+our translators in writing the word spirit with a capital, and thus
+intimating that it is the Holy Spirit of God which is meant, have led
+their readers astray. The apostle's repeated use of that term, in
+contrasting the flesh with the spirit, appears decisive of the fact that
+he is contrasting, in all such passages, the animal nature with the
+spiritual person. But if any one is startled by this position and thinks
+to reject it, let him bear in mind that the law of the spiritual person
+in man and of the Holy Spirit of God is _identical_.
+
+The reader will hardly desire from us what his own mind will have
+already accomplished--the construction in our own terms, and the
+contrasting of the system above embodied with that presented by Mr.
+Spencer. The human being, Man, is a twofold being, "flesh" and "spirit,"
+an animal nature and a spiritual person. In the animal nature are the
+Sense and the Understanding. In the spiritual person are the Reason, the
+spiritual Sensibilities, and the Will. The animal nature is common to
+man and the brutes. The spiritual person is common to man and God. It is
+manifest, then, that there is "an insurmountable distinction and
+impassable barrier" not only "between man and the inferior animals," but
+between man as spiritual person, and man as animal nature, and that this
+is a greater distinction than any other in the Universe, except that
+which exists between the Creator and the created. What relation, then,
+do these so widely diverse natures bear to each other? Evidently that
+which President Hopkins has assigned. "Because he is rational, man is
+not the less subject to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity.
+He has also the organic life that belongs to the plant, and the
+sensitive and instinctive life that belongs to the animal." Thus far his
+life "is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions
+with certain outer physico-chemical actions,"--undoubtedly "consists in
+the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations";
+and being the highest order of animal, his life "consists in the
+establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved
+adjustments" than that of any other animal. What, then, is this life
+for? "This, as man is now constituted, is _conditional for his rational
+life_." "The rational life is united with and _superinduced upon all
+these_." As God made man, and in the natural order, the "flesh," the
+animal life, is wholly subordinate to the "spirit," the spiritual life.
+And the spirit, or spiritual person of which Paul writes so much,--does
+this also, this "Intelligence in its highest form," consist "in the
+continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"? Are
+the words of the apostle a cheat, a lie, when he says, "For if ye live
+after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye through the spirit"--_i. e._ by
+living with the help of the Holy Spirit, in accordance with the law of
+the spiritual person--"do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live?"
+And are Mr. Spencer's words, in which he teaches exactly the opposite
+doctrine, true? wherein he says: "And lastly let it be noted that what
+we call truth," &c., (see _ante_, p. 168,) wherein he teaches that "if
+ye live after the flesh," if you are guided by "_truth_," if you are
+able perfectly to maintain "the accurate correspondence of subjective to
+objective relations," "ye shall not surely die," you will attain to what
+is _successful action_, the preservation of "life," of "the continuous
+adjustment of internal relations to external relations," of the animal
+life, and thus your bodies will live forever--the highest good for man;
+but if you "mortify the deeds of the body," if you pay little heed to
+"the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations,"
+you will meet with "_error_, leading to failure and therefore towards
+death,"--the death of the body, the highest evil which can befall
+man,--and so "ye shall" not "live." Proceeding in the direction already
+taken, we find that in his normal condition the spiritual person would
+not be chiefly, much less exclusively, occupied with attending to "the
+continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations," but
+would only regard these in so far as is necessary to preserve the body
+as the ground through which, in accordance with the present dispensation
+of God's providence, that person may exert himself and employ his
+energies upon those objects which belong to his peculiar sphere, even
+the laws and duties of spiritual beings. The person would indeed employ
+his superior faculties to assist the lower nature in the preservation of
+its animal life, but this only as a means. God has ordained that through
+this means that person shall develop and manifest himself; yet the life,
+continuance in being, of the soul, is in no way dependent on this means.
+Strip away the whole animal nature, take from man his body, his Sense
+and Understanding, leave him--as he would then be--with no possible
+medium of communication with the Universe, and he, the I am, the
+spiritual person, would remain intact, as active as ever. He would have
+lost none of his capacity to see laws and appreciate their force; he
+would feel the _bindingness_ of obligation just as before; and finally,
+he would be just as able as in the earlier state to make a choice of an
+ultimate end, though he would be unable to make a single motion towards
+putting that choice into effect. The spiritual person, then, being such
+that he has in himself no element of decomposition, has no need, for the
+preservation of his own existence, to be continually occupied with
+efforts to maintain "the accurate correspondence of subjective to
+objective relations." Yet activity is his law, and, moreover, an
+activity having objects which accord with this his indestructible
+nature. With what then will such a being naturally occupy himself? There
+is for him no danger of decay. He possesses within himself the laws and
+ideals of his action. As such, and created, he is near of kin to that
+august Being in whoso image he was created. His laws are the created
+person's laws. The end of the Creator should be that also of the
+created. But God is infinite, while the soul starts a babe, an
+undeveloped germ, and must begin to learn at the alphabet of knowledge.
+What nobler, what more sublime and satisfactory occupation could this
+being, endowed with the faculties of a God, find, than to employ all his
+power in the contemplation of the eternal laws of the Universe, _i. e._
+to the acquisition of an intimate acquaintance with himself and God; and
+to bend all his energies to the realization by his own efforts of that
+part in the Universe which God had assigned him, _i. e._, to accord his
+will entirely with God's will. This course of life, a spiritual person
+standing in his normal relation to an animal nature, would pursue as
+spontaneously as if it were the law of his being. But this which we have
+portrayed is not the course which human beings do pursue. By no means.
+One great evil, at least, that "the Fall" brought upon the race of man,
+is, that human beings are born into the world with the spiritual person
+all submerged by the animal nature; or, to use Paul's figure, the spirit
+is enslaved by the flesh; and such is the extent of this that many,
+perhaps most, men are born and grow up and die, and never know that they
+have any souls; and finally there arise, as there have arisen through
+all the ages, just such philosophers as Sir William Hamilton and Mr.
+Spencer, who in substance deny that men are spiritual persons at all,
+who say that the highest knowledge is a generalization in the
+Understanding, a form of a knowledge common to man and the brutes, and
+that "the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental
+relations of coexistence and sequence, so cooerdinated as exactly to
+tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur
+externally." It is this evil, organic in man, that Paul portrays so
+vividly; and it is against men who teach such doctrines that he thunders
+his maledictions.
+
+We have spoken above of the spiritual person as diverse from, superior
+to, and superinduced upon, the animal nature. This is his _position_ in
+the logical order. We have also spoken of him as submerged under the
+animal nature, as enslaved to the flesh. By such figures do we strive to
+express the awfully degraded _condition_ in which every human being is
+born into the world. And mark, this is simply a natural degradation. Let
+us then, as philosophers, carry our examination one step farther and
+ask: In this state of things what would be the fitting occupation of the
+spiritual person. Is it that "continuous adjustment"? He turns from it
+with loathing. Already he has served the "flesh" a long and grievous
+bondage. Manifestly, then, he should struggle with all his might to
+regain his normal condition to become naturally good as well as morally
+good,--he should fill his soul with thoughts of God, and then he should
+make every rational exertion to induce others to follow in his
+footsteps.
+
+We attain, then, a far different result from Mr. Spencer. "The highest
+achievements of science" for us, our "truth," guiding us "to successful
+action," is that pure _a priori_ truth, the eternal law of God which is
+written in us, and given to us for our guidance to what is truly
+"successful action,"--the accordance of our wills with the will of God.
+
+What we now reach, and what yet remains to be considered of this
+chapter, is that passage in which Mr. Spencer enounces, as he believes,
+a new principle of philosophy, a principle which will symmetrize and
+complete the Hamiltonian system, and thus establish it as the true and
+final science for mankind. Since we do not view this principle in the
+same light with Mr. Spencer, and especially since it is our intention to
+turn it upon what he has heretofore written, and demolish that with it,
+there might arise a feeling in many minds that the whole passage should
+be quoted, that there might be no doubt as to his meaning. This we
+should willingly do, did our space permit. Yet it seems not in the least
+necessary. That part of the passage which contains the gist of the
+subject, followed by a candid epitome of his arguments and
+illustrations, would appear to be ample for a fair and sufficiently full
+presentation of his theory, and for a basis upon which we might safely
+build our criticism. These then will be given.
+
+"There still remains the final question--What must we say concerning
+that which transcends knowledge? Are we to rest wholly in the
+consciousness of phenomena? Is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly
+from our minds everything but the relative; or must we also believe in
+something beyond the relative?
+
+"The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits of our
+intelligence we are rigorously confined within the relative; and that
+anything transcending the relative can be thought of only as a pure
+negation, or as a non-existence. 'The _absolute_ is conceived merely by
+a negation of conceivability,' writes Sir William Hamilton. 'The
+_Absolute_ and the _Infinite_,' says Mr. Mansel, 'are thus, like the
+_Inconceivable_ and the _Imperceptible_, names indicating, not an object
+of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the
+conditions under which consciousness is possible.' From each of which
+extracts may be deduced the conclusion, that, since reason cannot
+warrant us in affirming the positive existence of what is cognizable
+only as a negation, we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence
+of anything beyond phenomena.
+
+"Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I think, a grave
+error. If the premiss be granted, the inference must doubtless be
+admitted; but the premiss, in the form presented by Sir William Hamilton
+and Mr. Mansel, is not strictly true. Though, in the foregoing pages,
+the arguments used by these writers to show that the Absolute is
+unknowable, have been approvingly quoted; and though these arguments
+have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing, yet there remains to
+be stated a qualification, which saves us from that scepticism otherwise
+necessitated. It is not to be denied that so long as we confine
+ourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question, the propositions
+quoted above must be accepted in their entirety; but when we contemplate
+its more general, or psychological aspect, we find that these
+propositions are imperfect statements of the truth; omitting, or
+rather excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To speak
+specifically:--Besides that _definite_ consciousness of which Logic
+formulates the laws, there is also an _indefinite_ consciousness which
+cannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides the
+thoughts which, though incomplete, admit of completion, there are
+thoughts which it is impossible to complete, and yet which are still
+real, in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect.
+
+"Observe in the first place, that every one of the arguments by which
+the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates
+the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we
+cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there _is_
+an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn _what_ the
+Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption _that_ it is; and the
+making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to
+the mind, not as a nothing but as a something. Similarly with every step
+in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld. The Noumenon,
+everywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is throughout
+necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to
+conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without
+at the same time conceiving a Reality of which they are appearances; for
+appearance without reality is unthinkable." After carrying on this train
+of argument a little further, he reaches this just and decisive result.
+"Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a _definite_ consciousness
+of the Absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an
+indefinite consciousness of it." Carrying the argument further, he says:
+"Perhaps the best way of showing that, by the necessary conditions of
+thought, we are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness
+of this which transcends distinct consciousness, is to analyze our
+conception of the antithesis between Relative and Absolute." He follows
+the presentation of certain "antinomies of thought" with an extract from
+Sir William Hamilton's words, in which the logician enounces his
+doctrine that in "correlatives" "the positive alone is real, the
+negative is only an abstraction of the other"; or, in other words, the
+one gives a substance of some kind in the mind, the other gives simply
+nothingness, void, absolute negation. Criticizing this, Mr. Spencer is
+unquestionably right in saying: "Now the assertion that of such
+contradictories 'the negative is _only_ an abstraction of the
+other'--'is _nothing else_ than its negation'--is not true. In such
+correlatives as Equal and Unequal, it is obvious enough that the
+negative concept contains something besides the negation of the positive
+one; for the things of which equality is denied are not abolished from
+consciousness by the denial. And the fact overlooked by Sir William
+Hamilton is, that the like holds, even with those correlatives of which
+the negative is inconceivable, in the strict sense of the word."
+Proceeding with his argument, he establishes, by ample illustration, the
+fact that a "something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-relative
+or Absolute." He afterwards shows plainly by quotations, "that both Sir
+William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel do," in certain places, "distinctly
+imply that our consciousness of the Absolute, indefinite though it is,
+is positive not negative." Further on he argues thus: "Though Philosophy
+condemns successively each attempted conception of the Absolute; though
+it proves to us that the Absolute is not this, nor that, nor that;
+though in obedience to it we negative, one after another, each idea as
+it arises; yet as we cannot expel the entire contents of consciousness,
+there ever remains behind an element which passes into new shapes. The
+continual negation of each particular form and limit simply results in
+the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits, and so
+ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed and unlimited."
+Thus he brings us to "the ultimate difficulty--How can there possibly be
+constituted a consciousness of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its
+very nature, consciousness is possible only under forms and limits?"
+This he accounts for by by hypostatizing a "raw material" in
+consciousness which is, must be, present. He presents his conclusion as
+follows: "By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element is
+at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. Our
+consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned
+consciousness, or raw material of thought, to which in thinking we give
+definite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence
+is the very basis of our intelligence." ...
+
+"To sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument:--We have seen how, in
+the very assertion that all our knowledge, properly so called, is
+Relative, there is involved the assertion that there exists a
+Non-relative. We have seen how, in each step of the argument by which
+this doctrine is established, the same assumption is made. We have seen
+how, from the very necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that
+the Relative itself is inconceivable, except as related to a real
+Non-relative. We have seen that, unless a real Non-relative or Absolute
+be postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute, and so brings the
+argument to a contradiction. And on contemplating the process of
+thought, we have equally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the
+consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances; and how, from
+this impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that
+actuality."
+
+The approval which has been accorded to certain of the arguments adduced
+by Mr. Spencer in favor of his especial point, that the Absolute is a
+positive somewhat in consciousness, and to that point as established,
+must not be supposed to apply also to that hypothesis of "indefinite
+consciousness" by which he attempts to reconcile this position with his
+former teachings. On the contrary, it will be our purpose hereafter to
+show that this hypothesis is a complete fallacy.
+
+As against the positions taken by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel,
+Mr. Spencer's argument may unquestionably be deemed decisive. Admitting
+the logical accuracy of their reasoning, he very justly turns from the
+logical to the psychological aspect of the subject, takes exception to
+their premiss, shows conclusively that it is fallacious, and gives an
+approximate, though unfortunately a very partial and defective
+presentation of the truth. Indeed, the main issue which must now be made
+with him is whether the position he has here taken, and which he puts
+forth as that peculiar element in his philosophical system, that new
+truth, which shall harmonize Hamiltonian Limitism with the facts of
+human nature, is not, when carried to its logical results, in
+diametrical and irreconcilable antagonism to that whole system, and all
+that he has before written, and so does not annihilate them. It will be
+our present endeavor to show that such is the result.
+
+Perhaps we cannot better examine Mr. Spencer's theory than, first, to
+take up what we believe to be the element of truth in it, and carry out
+this to its logical results; and afterwards to present what seem to be
+the elements of error, and show them to be such.
+
+1. "We are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of"
+"the Absolute." Without criticizing his use here of consciousness as if
+it were a faculty of knowledge, and remembering that we cannot have a
+consciousness of anything without having a knowledge commensurate with
+that consciousness, we will see that Mr. Spencer's assertion is
+tantamount to saying, We have a positive knowledge that the Absolute is.
+It does not seem that he himself can disallow this. Grant this, and our
+whole system follows, as does also the fallacy of his own. Our argument
+will proceed thus. Logic is the science of the pure laws of thought, and
+is mathematically accurate, and is absolute. Being such, it is law for
+all intellect, for God as well as man. But three positions can be taken.
+Either it is true for the Deity, or else it is false for him, or else
+it has no reference to him. In the last instance God is Chaos; in the
+second he and man are in organic contradiction, and he created man so;
+the first is the one now advocated. The second and third hypotheses
+refute themselves in the statement of them. Nothing remains but the
+position taken that the laws of Logic lie equally on God and man. One of
+those laws is, that, if any assertion is true, all that is logically
+involved in it is true; in other words, all truth is in absolute and
+perfect harmony. This is fundamental to the possibility of Logic. Now
+apply this law to the psychological premiss of Mr. Spencer, that we have
+a positive knowledge that the Absolute is. A better form of expression
+would be, The absolute Being is. It follows then that he is in a _mode_,
+has a _formal_ being. But three hypotheses are possible. He is in no
+mode, he is in one mode; he is in all modes. If he is in no mode, there
+is no form, no order, no law for his being; which is to say, he is
+Chaos. Chaos is not God, for Chaos cannot organize an orderly being, and
+men are orderly beings, and were created. If he is in all modes, he is
+in a state of utter contradiction. God "is all in every part." He is
+then all infinite, and all finite. Infinity and finiteness are
+contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities. God is wholly possessed
+of contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities, which is more than
+unthinkable--it is absurd. He is, must be, then, in one mode. Let us
+pause here for a moment and observe that we have clearly established,
+from Mr. Spencer's own premiss, the fact that God _is limited_. He must
+be in one mode to the exclusion of all other modes. He is limited then
+by the necessity to be what he is; and if he could become what he is
+not, he would not have been absolute. Since he is absolute, he is, to
+the exclusion of the possibility of any other independent Being. Other
+beings are, and must therefore be, dependent on and subordinate to him.
+Since he is superior to all other beings he must be in the highest
+possible mode of being. Personality is the highest possible mode of
+being. This will appear from the following considerations. A person,
+possesses the reason and law of his action, and the capacity to act,
+within himself, and is thus a _final cause_. No higher form of being
+than this can be needed, and so by the law of parsimony a hypothesis of
+any other must be excluded. God is then a person.
+
+We have now brought the argument to that point where its connection with
+the system advocated in this treatise is manifest. If the links are well
+wrought, and the chain complete, not only is this system firmly grounded
+upon Mr. Spencer's premiss, but, as was intimated on an early page, he
+has in this his special point given partial utterance to what, once
+established, involves the fallacy not only of all he has written before,
+but as well of the whole Limitist Philosophy. It remains now to remark
+upon the errors in his form of expressing the truth.
+
+2. Mr. Spencer's error is twofold. He treats of consciousness as a
+faculty of knowledge. He speaks of a "vague," an "indefinite
+consciousness." Let us examine these in their order.
+
+_a._ He treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge. In this he
+uses the term in the inexact, careless, popular manner, rather than with
+due precision. As has been observed on a former page, consciousness is
+the light in which the person sees his faculties act. Thus some feeling
+is affected. This feeling is cognized by the intellectual faculty, and
+of this the person is conscious. Hence it is an elliptical expression to
+say "I am conscious of the feeling." The full form being "I am conscious
+that I know the feeling." Thus is it with all man's activities. Applying
+this to the case in hand, it appears, not that we are conscious of the
+Absolute, but that we are conscious that the proper intellectual
+faculty, the Pure Reason, presents what absoluteness is, and that the
+absolute Person is, and through this presentation--intuition--the
+spiritual person knows these facts. We repeat, then, our position:
+consciousness is the indivisible unity, the light in which the person
+sees all his faculties and capacities act; and so is to be considered as
+different in kind from them all as the peculiar and unique endowment of
+a spiritual person.
+
+_b._ Mr. Spencer speaks of a "vague," an "indefinite consciousness." The
+expression "vague consciousness" being a popular and very common one,
+deserves a careful examination, and this we hope to give it, keeping in
+mind meantime the position already attained.
+
+The phrase is used in some such connection as this, "I have a vague or
+undefined consciousness of impending evil." Let us analyze this
+experience. In doing so it will be observed that the consciousness, or
+rather the seeing by the person in the light of consciousness, is
+positive, clear, and definite, and is the apprehension of a feeling.
+Again, the feeling is positive and distinct; it is a feeling of dread,
+of threatening danger. What, then, is vague--is undefined? This. That
+cause which produces the feeling lies without the reach of the cognitive
+faculties, and of course cannot be known; because what produces the
+feeling is unknown, the intellectual apprehension experiences a sense of
+vagueness; and this it instinctively carries over and applies to the
+feeling. Yet really the sense of vagueness arises from an ignorance of
+the cause of the feeling. Strictly speaking, then, it is not
+consciousness that is vague; and so Mr. Spencer's "_indefinite_
+consciousness, which cannot be formulated," has no foundation in fact.
+But this may be shown by another line of thought. Consciousness is
+commensurate with knowledge, _i. e._, man can have no knowledge except
+he is conscious of that knowledge; neither can he have any consciousness
+except he knows that the consciousness is, and what the consciousness
+is, _i. e._, what he is conscious of. Now all knowledge is definite; it
+is only ignorance that is indefinite. When we say that our knowledge of
+an object is indefinite, we mean that we partly know its
+characteristics, and are partly ignorant of them. Thus then also the
+result above stated follows; and what Mr. Spencer calls "_indefinite_
+consciousness" is a "_definite_ consciousness" that we partly know, and
+are partly ignorant of the object under consideration.
+
+In the last paragraph but one, of the chapter now under consideration,
+Mr. Spencer makes a most extraordinary assertion respecting
+consciousness, which, when examined in the light of the positions we
+have advocated, affords another decisive evidence of the fallacy of his
+theory. We quote it again, that the reader may not miss of giving it
+full attention. "By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental
+element is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily
+indestructible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally
+_the unconditioned consciousness_, or _raw material of thought_, to
+which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an
+ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our
+intelligence." Upon reading this passage, the question spontaneously
+arises, What does the writer mean? and it is a question which is not so
+easily answered. More than one interpretation may be assigned, as will
+appear upon examination. A problem is given. To find what the "raw
+material of thought" is. Since man has thoughts, there must be in him
+the "raw material of thought"--the crude thought-ore which he smelts
+down in the blast-furnace of the Understanding, giving forth in its
+stead the refined metal--exact thought. We must then proceed to attain
+our answer by analyzing man's natural organization.
+
+Since man is a complex, constituted being, there is necessarily a
+logical order to the parts which are combined in the complexity. He may
+be considered as a substance in which a constitution inheres, _i. e._,
+which is organized according to a _set_ of fixed laws, and that set of
+laws may be stated in their logical order. It is sufficient, however,
+for our purpose to consider him as an organized substance, the
+organization being such that he is a person--a selfhood, _self-active_
+and capable of self-examination. The raw material of _all_ the
+activities of such a person is this organized substance. Take away the
+substance, and there remains only the set of laws as _abstract_ ideas.
+Again, take away the set of laws, and the substance is simple,
+unorganized substance. In the combining of the two the person becomes.
+These, then, are all there is of the person, and therefore in these must
+the raw material be. From this position it follows directly that any
+capacity or faculty, or, in general, every activity of the person, is
+the substance acting in accordance with the law which determines that
+form of the activity. To explain the term, form of activity. There is a
+_set_ of laws. Each law, by itself, is a simple law, and is incapable of
+organizing a substance into a being. But when these laws are considered,
+as they naturally stand in the Divine Reason, in relation to each other,
+it is seen that this, their standing together, constitutes ideals, or
+forms of being and activity. To illustrate from an earthly object. The
+law of gravitation alone could not organize a Universe; neither could
+the law of cohesion, nor of centripetal, nor centrifugal force, nor any
+other one law. All these laws must be acting together,--or rather all
+these laws must stand together in perfect harmony, according to their
+own nature, thus constituting an ideal form, in accordance with which
+God may create this Universe. For an illustration of our topic in its
+highest form, the reader is referred to those pages of Dr. Hickok's
+"Rational Psychology," where he analyzes personality into its elements
+of Spontaneity, Autonomy, and Liberty. From that examination it is
+sufficiently evident that either of these alone cannot organize a
+person, but that all three must be present in order to constitute such a
+being. There are, then, various forms of activity in the person, as
+Reason, Sensibility, and Will, in each of which the organized substance
+acts in a mode or form, and this form is determined by the set of
+organizing laws. Consciousness also is such a form. The "raw material of
+thought," then, must be this substance considered under the peculiar
+form of activity which we call consciousness, but _before the substance
+thus formulated has been awakened into activity by those circumstances
+which are naturally suited to it, for bringing it into action_. Now,
+by the very terms of the statement it is evident that the substance thus
+organized in this form, or, to use the common term, consciousness
+considered apart from and prior to its activity, can never be known _by
+experience_, i. e., _we can never be conscious of an unconscious state_.
+"Unconditioned consciousness" is consciousness considered as quiescent
+because in it have been awakened no "definite forms"--no "thinking." "In
+the nature of things," then, it is impossible to be conscious of an
+"unconditioned consciousness." Yet Mr. Spencer says that "our
+consciousness of the unconditioned," which he has already asserted and
+proved, is a "positive," and therefore an active state; is identical
+with, is "literally the unconditioned consciousness," or consciousness
+in its quiescent state, considered before it had been awakened into
+activity, which is far more absurd than what was just above shown to be
+a contradiction.
+
+To escape such a result, a less objectionable interpretation may be
+given to the dictum in hand. It may be said that it looks upon
+consciousness only as an activity, and in the logical order after its
+action has begun. We are, then, conscious, and in this is positive
+action, but no definite object is present which gives a form in
+consciousness, and so consciousness _returns upon itself_. We are
+conscious that we are conscious, which is an awkward way of saying that
+we are self-conscious, or, more concisely yet, that we are conscious;
+for accurately this is all, and this is the same as to say that the
+subject and object are identical in this act. The conclusion from this
+hypothesis is one which we judge Mr. Spencer will be very loath to
+accept, and yet it seems logically to follow. Indeed, in a sentence we
+are about to quote, he seems to make a most marked distinction between
+self-consciousness and this "consciousness of the unconditioned," which
+he calls its "obverse."
+
+But whatever Mr. Spencer's notion of the "raw material of thought" is,
+what more especially claims our attention and is most strange, is his
+application of that notion. To present this more clearly, we will quote
+further from the passage already under examination. "As we can in
+successive mental acts get rid of all particular conditions, and replace
+them by others, but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance of
+consciousness, which is conditioned anew in every thought, there ever
+remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently and
+independently of conditions. At the same time that by the laws of
+thought we are rigorously prevented from forming a conception of
+absolute existence, we are by the laws of thought equally prevented from
+ridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute existence: this
+consciousness being, as we here see, the obverse of our
+self-consciousness." Now, by comparing this extract with the other,
+which it immediately follows, it seems plain that Mr. Spencer uses as
+synonymous the phrases "consciousness of the unconditioned,"
+"unconditioned consciousness," "raw material of thought,"
+"undifferentiated substance of consciousness," and "consciousness of
+absolute existence." Let us note, now, certain conclusions, which seem
+to follow from this use of language. We are conscious "of absolute
+existence." No person can be conscious except he is conscious of some
+state or condition of his being. Absolute existence is, therefore, a
+state or condition of our being. Also this "consciousness of absolute
+existence"--as it seems _our_ absolute existence--is the "raw material
+of thought." But, again, as was shown above, this "raw material," this
+"undifferentiated substance of consciousness," if it is anything, is
+consciousness considered as capacity, and in the logical order before it
+becomes, or is, active; and it further appeared that of this quiescent
+state we could have no knowledge by experience. But since the above
+phrases are synonymous, it follows that "consciousness of absolute
+existence" is the "undifferentiated substance of consciousness," is a
+consciousness of which we can have no knowledge by experience, is a
+consciousness of which we can have no consciousness. Is this
+philosophy?
+
+It would be but fair to suppose that there is some fact which Mr.
+Spencer has endeavored to express in the language we are criticizing.
+There is such a fact, a statement of which will complete this criticism.
+Unquestionably, in self-examination, a man may abstract all "successive
+mental acts," may consider himself as he is, in the logical order before
+he _has experiences_. In this he will find "that an ever-present sense
+of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence"; or, in other
+words, that it is an organic law of our being that there cannot be an
+experience without a being to entertain the experience; and hence that
+it is impossible for a man to think or act, except on the assumption
+that he is. But all this has nothing to do with a "consciousness of the
+unconditioned," or of "absolute existence"; for our existence is not
+absolute, and it is _our_ existence of which we are conscious. The
+reality and abidingness of _our_ existence is ground for _our_
+experience, nothing more. Even if it were possible for us to have a
+consciousness of our state before any experience, or to actually now
+abstract all experience, and be conscious of our consciousness
+unmodified by any object, _i. e._ to be conscious of unconsciousness,
+this would not be a "consciousness of absolute existence." We could find
+no more in it, and deduce no more from it, than that our existence was
+involved in our experience. Such a consciousness would indeed appear
+"unconditioned" by the coming into it of any activity, which would
+give a form in it; but this would give us no notion of true
+unconditionedness--true "absolute existence." This consciousness, though
+undisturbed by any experience, would yet be conditioned, would have been
+created, and be dependent upon God for continuance in existence, and for
+a chance to come into circumstances, where it could be modified by
+experiences, and so could grow. While, then, Mr. Spencer's theory gives
+us the fact of the notion of the necessity of our existence to our
+experience, it in no way accounts for the fact of our consciousness of
+the unconditioned, be that what it may.
+
+But to return from this considerable digression to the result which was
+attained a few pages back, viz: that what Mr. Spencer calls
+"_indefinite_ consciousness" is a "_definite_ consciousness" that we
+partly know, and are partly ignorant of the object under consideration.
+Let this conclusion be applied to the topic which immediately concerns
+us,--the character of God.
+
+But three suppositions are possible. Either we know nothing of God, not
+even that he is; or we have a partial knowledge of him, we know that he
+is, and all which we can logically deduce from this; or we know him
+exhaustively. The latter, no one pretends, and therefore it needs no
+notice. The first, even if our own arguments are not deemed
+satisfactory, has been thoroughly refuted by Mr. Spencer, and so is to
+be set aside. Only the second remains. Respecting this, his position is
+that we know that God is and no more. Admit this for a moment. We are
+conscious then of a positive, certain, inalienable knowledge that God
+is; but that with reference to any and all questions which may arise
+concerning him we are in total ignorance. Here, again, it is apparent
+that it is not our consciousness or knowledge that is vague; it is our
+ignorance.
+
+We might suggest the question--of what use can it be to man to know that
+God is, and be utterly and necessarily, yea, organically ignorant of
+what he is? Let the reader answer the question to his own mind. It is
+required to show how the theory advocated in this book will appear in
+the light of the second hypothesis above stated.
+
+Man knows that God is, and what God is so far as he can logically deduce
+it from this premiss; but, in so far as God is such, that he cannot be
+thus known, except wherein he makes a direct revelation to us, he must
+be forever inscrutable. To illustrate. If the fact that God is, be
+admitted, it logically follows that he must be self-existent.
+Self-existence is a positive idea in the Reason, and so here is a second
+element of knowledge respecting the Deity. Thus we may go on through
+all that it is possible to deduce, and the system thus wrought will be
+The Science of Natural Theology, a science as pure and sure as pure
+equations. Its results will be what God must be. Looking into the
+Universe we will find what must be corresponding with what is, and our
+knowledge will be complete. Again, in many regards God may be utterly
+inscrutable to us, since he may possess characteristics which we cannot
+attain by logical deductions. For instance, let it be granted that the
+doctrine of the Trinity is true--that there are three persons in one
+Godhead. This would be a fact which man could never attain, could never
+make the faintest guess at. He might, unaided, attain to the belief that
+God would forgive; he might, with the profound and sad-eyed man of
+Greece, become convinced that some god must come from heaven to lead men
+to the truth; but the notion of the Trinity could never come to him,
+except God himself with carefulness revealed it. Respecting those
+matters of which we cannot know except by revelation, this only can be
+demanded; and this by inherent endowment man has a right to demand; viz:
+that what is revealed shall not contradict the law already "written in
+the heart." Yet, once more, there are certain characteristics of God
+that must forever be utterly inscrutable to every created being, and
+this, because such is their nature and relation to the Deity, that one
+cannot be endowed with a faculty capable of attaining the knowledge in
+question. Such for instance are the questions, How is God self-existent,
+how could he be eternal, how exercise his power, and the like? These are
+questions respecting which no possible reason can arise why we should
+know them, except the gratification of curiosity, which in reality is no
+reason at all, and therefore the inability in question is no detriment
+to man.
+
+By the discussion which may now be brought to a close, two positions
+seem to be established. 1. That we have, as Mr. Spencer affirms, a
+positive consciousness that the absolute Being is, and that this and all
+which we can logically deduce from this are objects of knowledge to us;
+in other words, that the system advocated in this volume directly
+follows from that premiss. 2. That any doctrine of "indefinite
+consciousness" is erroneous, that the vagueness is not in consciousness,
+but in our knowledge; and further, that the hypothesis of a
+consciousness of the "raw material of thought" is absurd.
+
+
+
+
+"THE RECONCILIATION."
+
+
+It would naturally seem, that, after what is believed to be the thorough
+refutation of the limitist scheme, which has been given in the preceding
+comments on Mr. Spencer's three philosophical chapters, the one named in
+our heading would need scarce more than a notice. But so far is this
+from being the case, that some of the worst features in the results of
+his system stand out in clearest relief here. Before proceeding to
+consider these, let us note a most important admission. He speaks of his
+conclusion as bringing "the results of speculation into harmony with
+those of common sense," and then makes the, for him, extraordinary
+statement, "Common Sense asserts the existence of reality." In these two
+remarks it would appear to be implied that Common Sense is a final
+standard with which any position most be reconciled. The question
+instantly arises, What is Common Sense? The writer has never seen a
+definition, and would submit for the reader's consideration the
+following.
+
+Common Sense _is the practical Pure Reason_; it is that faculty by which
+the spiritual person sees in the light of consciousness the _a priori_
+law as inherent in the fact presented by the Sense.
+
+For the sake of completeness its complement may be defined thus:
+
+Judgment is the practical Understanding; it is that faculty by which
+the spiritual person selects such means as he thinks so conformed to
+that law thus intuited, as to be best suited to accomplish the object in
+view.
+
+A man has good Common Sense, who quickly sees the informing law in the
+fact; and good judgment, who skilfully selects and adapts his means to
+the circumstances of the case, and the end sought. Of course it will not
+be understood that it is herein implied that every person who exercises
+this faculty has a defined and systematic knowledge of it.
+
+The reader will readily see the results which directly follow from Mr.
+Spencer's premiss. It is true that "Common Sense asserts the existence
+of a reality," and this assertion is true; but with equal truth does it
+assert the law of logic; that, if a premiss is true, _all that is
+logically involved in it is true_. It appears, then, that Mr. Spencer
+has unwittingly acknowledged the fundamental principle of what may be
+called the Coleridgian system, the psychological fact of the Pure
+Reason, and thus again has furnished a basis for the demolition of his
+own.
+
+It was said above that some of the evil results of Mr. Spencer's system
+assumed in this chapter their worst phases. This remark is illustrated
+in the following extract: "We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as
+a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon; phenomena
+being, so far as we can ascertain, unlimited in their diffusion, we are
+obliged to regard this Power as omnipresent; and criticism teaches us
+that this Power is wholly incomprehensible. In this consciousness of an
+Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power we have just that consciousness on
+which Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and
+Science coalesce." The evils referred to may be developed as follows:
+"We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some
+Power by which we are acted upon." This may be expressed in another form
+thus: Every phenomenon is a manifestation of some Power by which we are
+acted upon. Some doubt may arise respecting the precise meaning of this
+sentence, unless the exact signification of the term phenomenon be
+ascertained. It might be confined to material appearances, appreciable
+by one of the five senses. But the context seems to leave no doubt but
+that Mr. Spencer uses it in the wider sense of every somewhat in the
+Universe, since he speaks of "phenomena" as "unlimited." Putting the
+definition for the term, the sentence stands: Every somewhat in the
+Universe is "a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon."
+It follows, then, that there is no somewhat in the Universe, except we
+are acted upon by it. Our being arises to be accounted for. Either we
+began to be, and were created, or the ground of our being is in
+ourselves, our being is pure independence, and nothing further is to be
+asked. This latter will be rejected. Then we were created. But we were
+not created by Mr. Spencer's "some Power," because it only _acts upon
+us_. In his creation, man was not acted upon, because there was no man
+to be acted upon; but in that act a being was originated _who might be
+acted upon_. Then, however, we came into being, another than "some
+Power" was the cause of us. But the act of creating man was a somewhat.
+Every somewhat _in_ the Universe is "a manifestation of some Power."
+This is not such a manifestation. Therefore the creation of man took
+place outside the Universe. Or does Mr. Spencer prefer to say that the
+creation of man is "a manifestation of some Power acting upon" him!
+
+The position above taken seems the more favorable one for Mr. Spencer.
+If, to avoid the difficulties which spring from it, he limits the term
+phenomenon, as for instance to material appearances, then his assertion
+that phenomena are unlimited is a contradiction, and he has no ground on
+which to establish the omnipresence of his Power.
+
+But another line of criticism may be pursued. Strictly speaking, all
+events are phenomena. Let there be named an event which is universally
+known and acknowledged, and which, in the nature of the case, cannot be
+"a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon," and in that
+statement also will the errors of the passage under consideration be
+established. The experience by the human soul of a sense of guilt, of a
+consciousness of ill-desert, is such an event. No "Power" can make a
+sinless soul feel guilty; no "Power" _can relieve a sinful soul from
+feeling guilty_. The feeling of guilt does not arise from the defiance
+of Power, _it arises from the violation of Law_. And not only may this
+experience be named, but every other experience of the moral nature of
+man. In this connection let it be observed that Mr. Spencer always
+elsewhere uses the term phenomenon to represent material phenomena in
+the material universe. Throughout all his pages the reader is challenged
+to find a single instance in which he attempts to account for any other
+phenomena than these and their concomitants, the affections of the
+intellect in the animal nature. Indeed, so thoroughly is his philosophy
+vitiated by this omission, that one could never learn from anything he
+has said in these pages, that man had a moral nature at all, that there
+were any phenomena of sin and repentance which needed to be accounted
+for. In this, Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel are just as bad as he.
+Yet in this the Limitists have done well; it is impossible, on the basis
+of their system, to render such an account. To test the matter, the
+following problem is presented.
+
+To account, on the basis of the Limitist Philosophy, for the fact that
+the nations of men have universally made public acknowledgment of their
+guilt, in having violated the law of a superior being; and that they
+have offered propitiatory sacrifices therefor, except in the case of
+those persons and nations who have received the Bible, or have learned
+through the Koran one of its leading features, that there is but one
+God, and who in either case believe that the needful sacrifice has
+already been made.
+
+Another pernicious result of the system under examination is, that it
+affords no better ground for the doctrine of Deity's omnipresence than
+_experience_. Mr. Spencer's words are: "phenomena being, _so far as we
+can ascertain_, unlimited in their diffusion, we are obliged to regard
+this Power as omnipresent." Now, if he, or one of his friends, should
+happen to get wings some day, and should just take a turn through space,
+and should happen also to find a limit to phenomena, and, skirting in
+astonishment along that boundary, should happen to light upon an open
+place and a bridge, which invited them to pass across to another sphere
+or system of phenomena, made by another "Power,"--said bridge being
+constructed "'alf and 'alf" by the two aforesaid Powers,--then there
+would be nothing to do but for the said explorer to fly back again to
+England, as fast as ever he could, and relate to all the other Limitists
+his new experience; and they, having no ground on which to argue against
+or above experience, must needs receive the declaration of their
+colaborator, with its inevitable conclusion, that the Power by which we
+are here acted upon is limited, and so is not omnipresent. But when,
+instead of such a fallacious philosophy, men shall receive the doctrine,
+based not upon human experience, but upon God's inborn ideas that
+phenomena are limited and God is omnipresent, and that upon these facts
+experience can afford no decision, we shall begin to eliminate the real
+difficulties of philosophy, and to approach the attainment of the unison
+between human philosophy and the Divine Philosophy.
+
+Attached to the above is the conclusion reached by Mr. Spencer in an
+earlier part of his work, that "criticism teaches us that this Power is
+wholly incomprehensible." We might, it is believed, ask with pertinence,
+What better, then, is man than the brute? But the subject is recurred to
+at this time, only to quote against this position a sentence from a
+somewhat older book than "First Principles," a book which, did it
+deserve no other regard than as a human production, would seem, from its
+perfect agreement with the facts of human nature, to be the true basis
+for all philosophy. The sentence is this: "Beloved, let us love one
+another, for love is of God; and every one that loveth, is born of God,
+_and_ KNOWETH GOD."
+
+But the gross materialism of Mr. Spencer's philosophy presents its worst
+phase in his completed doctrine of God. Mark. A "phenomenon" is "a
+manifestation of some Power." "In this consciousness of an
+Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power we have just that consciousness on
+which Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and
+Science coalesce." An "Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power" is all the
+Deity Mr. Spencer allows to mankind. This Power is omnipresent, so that
+we can never escape it; and incomprehensible, so that we can never know
+the law of its action, or even if it have a law. At any moment it may
+fall on us and crush us. At any moment this globe may become one vast
+Vesuvius, and all its cities Herculaneums and Pompeiis. Of such a Deity
+the children of men may either live in continual dread, or in continual
+disregard; they may either spend their lives clad in sackcloth, or
+purple and fine linen; bread and water may be their fare, or their table
+may be spread like that of Dives; by merciless mortification of the
+flesh, by scourges and iron chains, they may seek to propitiate, if
+possible, this incomprehensible, omnipresent Power; or, reckless of
+consequences, they may laugh and dance and be gay, saying, we know
+nothing of this Power, he may crush us any moment, let us take the good
+of life while we can. The symbols of such a Deity are the "rough and
+ragged rocks," the hills, the snow-crowned mountains Titan-piled; the
+avalanche starting with ominous thunder, to rush with crash and roar and
+terrible destruction upon the hapless village beneath it; the flood
+gathering its waters from vast ranges of hills into a single valley,
+spreading into great lakes, drowning cattle, carrying off houses and
+their agonized inhabitants, sweeping away dams, rending bridges from
+their foundations, in fine, ruthlessly destroying the little gatherings
+of man, and leaving the country, over which its devastating waters
+flowed, a mournful desolation; and finally, perhaps the completest
+symbol of all may be found in that collection of the united streams and
+lakes of tens upon tens of thousands of miles of the earth's surface,
+into the aorta of the world, over the rough, rocky bed of which the
+crowded waters rush and roar, with rage and foam, until they come
+suddenly to the swift tremendous plunge of Niagara.
+
+It should be further noticed, that this philosophy is in direct
+antagonism with that of the Bible,--that, if Spencerianism is true, the
+Bible is a falsehood and cheat. Instead of Mr. Spencer's "Power," the
+Bible presents us a doctrine of God as follows: "And God said unto
+Moses, I AM THAT I AM. And he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the
+children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you."--_Exodus_ IV. 14. This
+declaration, the most highly metaphysical of any but one man ever heard,
+all the Limitists, even devout Mr. Mansel, either in distinct terms, or
+by implication, deny. That other declaration is this: "Beloved, let us
+love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born
+of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; _for God
+is love_."--1 _John_ IV. 7, 8. Direct as is the antagonism between the
+two philosophies now presented, the later one appears in an especially
+bad light from the fact, that, being very recent and supported by a mere
+handful of men, its advocates have utterly neglected to take any notice
+of the other and elder one, although the adherents of this may be
+numbered by millions, and among them have been and are many of the
+ablest of earth's thinkers. True, the great majority of Bible readers do
+not study it as a philosophical treatise, but rather as a book of
+religious and spiritual instruction; yet, since it is the most
+profoundly philosophical book which has ever been in the hands of man,
+and professedly teaches us not only the philosophy of man, but also the
+philosophy of God, it certainly would seem that the advocates of the new
+and innovating system should have taken up that one which it sought to
+supplant, and have made an attempt, commensurate with the magnitude of
+the work before them, to show its position to be fallacious and
+unworthy of regard. Instead of this they have nowhere recognized the
+existence even of this philosophy except in the single instance of a
+quotation by Mr. Mansel, in which he seems tacitly to acknowledge the
+antagonism we have noted. In Mr. Spencer's volume this neglect is
+especially noteworthy. Judging from internal evidence, one would much
+sooner conclude that it was written by a Hindu pundit, in a temple of
+Buddha, than by an Englishman, in a land of Bibles and Christian
+churches. Now, although the Bible may stand in his estimation no higher
+than the Bahgavat-Gita, yet the mere fact that it is, and that it
+presents a most profound philosophy, which is so largely received in his
+own and neighboring nations, made it imperative upon him not only to
+take some notice of it, but to meet and answer it, as we have indicated
+above.
+
+Another fault in Mr. Spencer's philosophy, one which he will be less
+willing to admit, perhaps, than the above, and, at the same time, one
+which will be more likely forcibly to move a certain class of mind, is,
+that it is in direct antagonism to human nature. Not only is the Bible a
+falsehood and a cheat, if Mr. Spencer's philosophical system is true,
+but human nature is equally a falsehood and a cheat. To specify. Human
+nature universally considers God, or its gods, as persons; or, in other
+words, all human beings, or at least with very rare exceptions,
+spontaneously ascribe personality to Deity. This position is in no wise
+negatived by the fact of the Buddhist priesthood of India, or of a class
+of philosophical atheists in any other country. Man is endowed with the
+power of self-education; and if an individual sees, in the religion in
+which he is brought up, some inconsistency, which he, thinking it, as it
+may be, integral, for philosophical reasons rejects, and all religion
+with it, he may educate himself into speculative atheism. But no child
+is an atheist. Not even Shelley became such, until he had dashed against
+some of the distorted and monstrous _human_ theologies of his day. But
+counting all the Buddhists, and all the German atheists, and all the
+English atheists, and all the American atheists, and all other atheists
+wherever they may be found, they will not number one tenth of the human
+race. On what ground can the unanimity of the other nine tenths be
+accounted for? There appears none possible, but that the notion that God
+is a person, _is organic in human nature_. Another equally universal and
+spontaneous utterance of mankind is, that there is a likeness, in some
+way, between God and man. There are the grossest, and in many instances
+most degrading modes of representing this; but under them all, and
+through them all, the indelible notion appears. The unanimity and
+pertinacity of this notion, appearing in every part of the globe, and
+under every variety of circumstance, and reappearing after every
+revolution, which, tearing down old customs and worships, established
+new ones, can without doubt only be accounted for on the precise ground
+of the other,--that the notion _is organic in man_. A third utterance of
+the human race, standing in the same category with these two, is, that
+the Deity can be propitiated by sacrifice. This also has had revolting,
+yea most hideous and unrighteous forms of expression, even to human
+sacrifices. But the notion has remained indestructible through all ages,
+and must therefore be accounted for, as have been the others. Over
+against the I AM, which human nature presents and the Bible supports;
+over against Him in whose image man and the Bible say man was created;
+and over against Him who, those two still agreeing witnesses also
+affirm, is moved by his great heart of Love to have mercy on those
+creatures who come to him with repentance, Mr. Spencer gives us, as the
+result of _Science_, an incomprehensible omnipresent _Power_; only a
+Power, nothing more; and that "utterly inscrutable." For our part,
+whatever others may do, we will believe in human nature and the Bible.
+On the truthfulness of these two witnesses, as on the Central Rock in
+the Universe, we plant ourselves. Here do we find our Gibraltar.
+
+Mr. Spencer further says that on the consciousness of this Power
+"Religion dwells." Now, so far is this assertion from according with the
+fact, that on his hypothesis it is impossible to account for the
+presence of religion as a constitutive element of the human race.
+Religion was primarily worship, the reverential acknowledgment, by the
+sinless creature, of the authority of the Creator, combined with the
+adoration of His absolute Holiness; but since sin has marred the race,
+it has been coupled with the offering in some forms of a propitiatory
+sacrifice. But if the Deity is only Power; or equally, if this is all
+the notion we can form of him, we are utterly at a loss to find aught in
+him to worship, much less can we account for the fact of the religious
+nature in us, and most of all are we confounded by the persistent
+assertion, by this religions nature, of the personality and mercy of
+God, for Power can be neither personal nor merciful.
+
+Mr. Spencer proceeds to strengthen as well as he can his position by
+stating that "from age to age Science has continually defeated it
+(Religion) wherever they have come into collision, and has obliged it to
+relinquish one or more of its positions." In this assertion, also, he
+manifests either a want of acquaintance with the facts or a failure to
+comprehend their significance. Religion may properly be divided into two
+classes.
+
+1. Those religions which have appeared to grow up spontaneously among
+men, having all the errors and deformities which a fleshly imagination
+would produce.
+
+2. The religion of Jesus Christ.
+
+1. From the three great ideas mentioned above, no Science has ever
+driven even the religions of this class. It has, indeed, corrected many
+_forms of expression_, and has sometimes driven _individuals_, who
+failed to distinguish between the form, and the idea which the form
+overlies, into a rejection of the truth itself.
+
+2. Respecting the religion of Jesus Christ, Mr. Spencer's remark has no
+shadow of foundation. Since the beginning of its promulgation by
+Jehovah, and especially since the completion of that promulgation by
+our Saviour and his apostles, not one whit of its practical law or its
+philosophy has been abated; nay, more, to-day, in these American States,
+there may be found a more widespread, thoroughly believed, firmly held,
+and intelligent conviction of God's personality, and personal
+supervision of the affairs of men, of his Fatherhood, and of that
+fatherhood exercised in bringing "order out of confusion," in so
+conducting the most terrible of conflicts, that it shall manifestly
+redound, not only to the glory of himself, but to the very best good of
+man, so manifestly to so great a good, that all the loss of life, and
+all the suffering, is felt to be not worthy to be compared to the good
+achieved, and that too _most strongly by the sufferers_, than was ever
+before manifested by any nation under heaven. The truth is, that, in
+spite of all its efforts to the contrary, criticism has ever been
+utterly impotent to eliminate from human thinking the elements we have
+presented. Its utmost triumph has been to force a change in the form of
+expression; and in the Bible it meets with forms of expression which it
+ever has been, is now, and ever shall be, as helpless to change as a
+paralytic would be to overturn the Himalaya.
+
+The discussion of the topic immediately in hand may perhaps be now
+properly closed with the simple allusion to a single fact. Just as far
+as a race of human beings descends in the gradations of degradation,
+just so far does it come to look upon Deity simply as power. African
+Fetishism is the doctrine that Deity is an incomprehensible power,
+rendered into the form of a popular religion; only the religion stands
+one step higher than the philosophy, in that it assumes a sort of
+personality for the Power.
+
+On page 102 the following extract will be found: "And now observe that
+all along, the agent which has effected the purification has been
+Science. We habitually overlook the fact that this has been one of its
+functions. Religion ignores its immense debt to Science; and Science is
+scarcely at all conscious how much Religion owes it. Yet it is
+demonstrable that every step by which Religion has progressed from its
+first low conception to the comparatively high one it has now reached,
+Science has helped it, or rather forced it to take; and that even now,
+Science is urging further steps in the same direction." In this passage
+half truths are so sweepingly asserted as universal that it becomes
+simply untrue. The evil may be stand under two heads.
+
+1. It is too philosophical. Mr. Spencer undertakes to be altogether too
+profound. Since he has observed that certain changes for the better have
+been made in some human religions, by the study of the natural sciences,
+he jumps to the conclusion that religion has been under a state of
+steady growth; and of course readily assumes--for there is not a shadow
+of other basis for his assertion--that the "first" "conception" of
+religion was very "low." This assumption we utterly deny, and demand of
+Mr. Spencer his proof. For ourselves we are willing to come down from
+the impregnable fortresses of the Bible upon the common ground of the
+Grecian Mythology, and on this do battle against him. In this we are
+taught that the Golden Age came _first_, in which was a life of spotless
+purity; after which were the silver and brazen ages, and the Iron Age in
+which was crime, and the "low conception" of religion came _last_. How
+marked is the general agreement of this with the Bible account!
+
+2. But more and worse may be charged on this passage than that it is too
+philosophical. Mr. Spencer constructs his philosophy first and cuts his
+facts to match it. This is a common mistake among men, and which they
+are unconscious of. Now the fact is, Science was _not_ "the agent which
+effected the purification." Religion owes a very small debt to Science.
+Science can never be more than a supplement, "a handmaid" to Religion.
+Religion's first position was not a low one, but nearly the highest.
+Afterwards it sunk very low; but men sunk it there. Science never
+"helped it" or "forced it" one atom upwards. Science alone only degrades
+Religion and gives new wings and hands to crime. This will be
+especially manifest to those who remember what Mr. Spencer's doctrine of
+Science is. He says: "That even the _highest_ achievements of Science
+are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so
+cooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence
+and sequence that occur externally." Of course the highest _object_ of
+Science will be "_truth_"; and this, our teacher tells us, "is simply
+the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations." To
+interpret. A science of medicine, a science of ablutions, a science of
+clothing, a science of ventilation, a science of temperature, and to
+some largely, to many chiefly, a science of _cookery_ do, combined,
+constitute Science, and the preservation of the body is its highest
+attainment. Is this Science "the agent which has effected the
+purification of Religion?" What then is the truth?
+
+"Lo this have I found, that God hath made man upright; but they have
+sought out many inventions."--_Eccl._ VII. 29. The first religion was a
+communion with God. The Creator taught man, as a father would his
+children. But when man sinned, he began to seek out many inventions, and
+sank to that awful state of degradation hinted at in the fragmentary
+sketches of the popular manners and customs of the times of
+Abraham,--_Gen._ XII. XXV.; which Paul epitomizes with such fiery vigor
+in the first chapter of Romans, and which may be found fully paralleled
+in our own day. At the proper time, God took mankind in hand, and began
+to develop his great plan for giving purity to religion. So he raised up
+Moses, and gave to Israel the Levitical law. Or if Mr. Spencer shall
+deny the biblical account of the origin of the five books of Moses, he
+at least cannot deny that they have a being; and, placing them on the
+same ground of examination and criticism as Herodotus, that they were
+written more than a thousand years before the Christian era. Now mark.
+Whoever wrote them, they remained as they were first framed, and no one
+of the prophets, who came after, added one new idea. They only
+emphasized and amplified "The Law." So far then as this part of
+Religion was concerned, Science never helped a particle. Yea, more, the
+words to Moses in the wilderness were never paralleled in the utterances
+of man before the Christian era.
+
+"In the fulness of time God sent his own Son." However defective was the
+former dispensation, he, who appeared to most of the men of his day as
+only a carpenter's son, declared to mankind the final and perfect truth.
+As the system taught by Moses was not the result of any philosophical
+developments, but was incomparably superior to the religion of the most
+civilized people of the world, at whose court Moses was brought up, and
+was manifestly constructed _de novo_, and from some kind of revelation,
+so this, which the carpenter's son taught, was incomparably superior to
+any utterance which the human soul had up to that time, or has since,
+made. It comes forth at once complete and pure. It utters the highest
+principles in the simplest language. Indeed, nothing new was left to say
+when John finished his writing; and the canon might well be closed. And
+since that day, has Religion advanced? Not a syllable. The purest water
+is drank at the old fountain. But it will be said that the cause of
+Religion among men has advanced. Very true, but Science did not advance
+it. You can yet count the years on your fingers since men of Science
+generally ceased to be strenuously hostile to Religion. Religion, in
+every instance, has advanced just where it has gone back, and drank at
+the old fountains. Who, then, has purified Religion? God is "the agent
+which has effected the purification." God is he to whom Religion owes
+"its immense debt," not Science. He it is who has brought her up to her
+present high position.
+
+When, now, we see how completely Mr. Spencer--to use a commonplace but
+very forcible phrase--has "ruled God out of the ring," how impertinent
+seems his rebuke, administered a few pages further on, in the passage
+beginning, "Volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious," to
+those who believe that God means what he says, and that men may know
+him. These men at least stand on a far higher plane than he who teaches
+that an "incomprehensible omnipresent Power" is all there is for us to
+worship, and his words will sound to them like the crackling of thorns
+under a pot.
+
+There does not appear in this chapter any further topic that has not
+already been touched upon. With these remarks, then, the examination of
+this chapter, and of Mr. Spencer's First Principles, may be closed.
+
+
+
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+
+If it has ever been the reader's lot to examine Paley's "Evidences of
+Christianity," or the "Sermons of President Dwight on the Existence of
+God"; and if he has risen from their perusal with a feeling of utter
+unsatisfaction, enduring the same craving for a sure truth harassing as
+before, he will have partly shared the experience which drove the author
+forward, until he arrived at the foundation principles of this treatise.
+Those works, and all of that class are, for the object they have in
+view, worthless; not because the various statements they make are
+untrue, not because elegant language and beauty of style are wanting;
+but because they are radically defective in that, their _method_ is
+irrelevant to the subject in hand; because in all the arguments that
+have been or can be brought forward there is nothing decisive and final;
+because the skeptic can thrust the sharp sword of his criticism through
+every one of them; because, in fine, the very root of the matter, their
+method itself is false, and men have attempted to establish by a series
+of arguments what must be ground for the possibility of an argument, and
+can only be established by the opposite, the _a priori_ method. Though
+the Limitist Philosophy has no positive value, it has this negative one,
+that it has established, by the most thorough-going criticism, the
+worthlessness of the _a posteriori_ processes of thought on the matter
+in hand. Yea, more, the existence of _any_ spiritual person cannot be
+proved in that way. You can prove that the boy's body climbs the tree;
+but never that he has a soul. This is always taken for granted. Lest the
+author should appear singular in this view, he would call the attention
+of the reader to a passage in Coleridge's writings in which he at once
+sets forth the beauty of the style and incompetency of the logic of Dr.
+Paley's book. "I have, I am aware, in this present work, furnished
+occasion for a charge of having expressed myself with slight and
+irreverence of celebrated names, especially of the late Dr. Paley. O, if
+I were fond and ambitious of literary honor, of public applause, how
+well content should I be to excite but one third of the admiration
+which, in my inmost being, I feel for the head and heart of Paley! And
+how gladly would I surrender all hope of contemporary praise, could I
+even approach to the incomparable grace, propriety, and persuasive
+facility of his writings! But on this very account, I feel myself bound
+in conscience _to throw the whole force of my intellect in the way of
+this triumphal car_, on which the tutelary genius of modern idolatry is
+borne, even at the risk of being crushed under the wheels."
+
+Instead of the method now condemned, there is one taught us in the Book,
+and the only one taught us there, which is open to every human being,
+for which every human being has the faculty, and respecting which all
+that is needed is, that the person exercise what he already has. The boy
+could not learn his arithmetic, except he set himself resolutely to his
+task; and no man can learn of God, except he also fulfils the
+conditions, except he consecrate himself wholly to the acquisition of
+this knowledge, except his soul is poured out in love to God; "for every
+one that _loveth, is born of God, and knoweth God_." We come then to the
+knowledge of God by a direct and immediate act of the soul. The Reason,
+the Sensibility, and the Will, give forth their combined and highest
+action in the attainment of this knowledge. As an intellectual
+achievement, this is the highest possible to the Reason. She attains
+then, to the Ultima Thule of all effort, and of this she is fully
+conscious. Nor is there awakened any feverish complaining that there are
+no more worlds to conquer. In the contemplation of the ineffable
+Goodness she finds her everlasting occupation, and her eternal rest.
+Plainly, then, both Reason and Revelation teach but a single, and that
+the _a priori_ method, by which to establish for man the fact of the
+being of God. Let us buttress this conclusion with other lines of
+thought.
+
+Reader, now that it is suggested to you, does it not seem in the highest
+degree improbable, that the most important truths which can pertain to
+man, truths which do not concern primarily the affairs of this life, but
+of his most exalted life, the life of the spiritual person as the
+companion of its Creator, should be based upon an inferior, less
+satisfactory, and less adequate foundation of knowledge, than those of
+our childhood's studies, of the arithmetic and the algebra? The boy who
+cons the first pages of his arithmetical text-book, soon learns what he
+knows to be _self-evident_ truths. He who should offer to _prove_ the
+truth of the multiplication-table, would only expose himself to
+ridicule. When the boy has attained to youth, and advanced in his
+studies, the pages of the algebra and geometry are laid before him, and
+he finds new and higher orders of self-evident truths. Would any
+evidence, any argument, strengthen his conviction of the validity of the
+axioms? Yea, rather, if one should begin to offer arguments, would he
+not instinctively and rightfully feel that the confession was thereby
+tacitly made, that self-evidence was not satisfactory; and would he not,
+finding his spontaneous impulse, and his education, so contradictory, be
+_liable_ to fall into complete skepticism? If now there be this
+spontaneous, yea, abiding, yea, unalterable, yea, universal conviction
+respecting matters of subordinate importance, can it be possible,--I
+repeat the question, for it seems to carry with it irresistibly its own
+and the decisive answer,--can it be possible that the decisions of
+questions of the highest moment, that the knowledge of the principles of
+our moral being and of the moral government to which we are amenable,
+and most of all of the Governor who is at once Creator, Lawgiver, and
+Judge, is not based on at least equally spontaneous, yea, abiding, yea,
+unalterable, yea, universal convictions? And when the teacher seemingly,
+and may it not with truth be said _actually_, distrusting the
+reliability of such a conviction, goes about to bolster up his belief,
+and the belief of his pupil, in the existence of God, and thereto rakes
+together, with painstaking labor, many sticks and straws of evidence,
+instead of looking up to the truth which shines directly down upon him
+with steady ineffable effulgence, is it at all strange that the
+sharper-eyed pupil, keenly appreciating the contradiction between his
+spontaneous conviction and his teaching, should become uncertain which
+to follow, a doubter, and finally a confirmed skeptic? If, then, it is
+incredible that the fundamental principles of man's moral nature--that
+to which all the other elements of his being are subordinate, and for
+which they were created--are established on inferior grounds, and those
+less satisfactory than the grounds of other principles; and if, on the
+other hand, the conviction is irresistible, that they are established on
+the highest grounds, and since the truths of mathematics are also based
+on the highest ground, self-evidence, and since there can be none higher
+than the highest, it follows that the moral principles of the Universe,
+so far as they can be known by man, have _precisely the same foundation
+of truthfulness as the principles of mathematics--they are_
+SELF-EVIDENT.
+
+But some good Reader will check at the result now attained because it
+involves the position that the human Reason is the final standard of
+truth for man. Good reader, this position is involved, and is true; and
+for the sake of Christ's religion it must be taken. The only possible
+ground for a thoroughly satisfactory and thoroughly unanswerable
+Christian Philosophy, is the principle that _The human Reason is the
+final standard of truth for man_.
+
+It has been customary for the devout Bible-reader to esteem that book as
+his final standard; and to such an extent in many instances has his
+reverential regard for it been carried, that the expression will hardly
+be too strong for truth, that it has become an object of worship; and
+upon the mind of such a one the above assertion will produce a shock.
+While the author would treat with respect every religious feeling, he
+would still remind such a person that the Bible is the moral school-book
+of the spiritual person in man, which God himself prepared for man's
+use, and must in every case be inferior and subordinate to the being
+whom it was meant to educate; and furthermore, that, by the very fact of
+making man, God established in him the standard, and the right to
+require that this fact be recognized. Mark, God made the standard and
+thus established the right. This principle may be supported by the
+following considerations:
+
+1. The church universally has acted upon it; and none have employed it
+more vigorously than those who have in terms most bitterly opposed it.
+One of the class just referred to affirms that the Bible is the standard
+of truth. "Admit," says a friend standing by, "that it would be if it
+were what it purports to be; but what evidence is there that this is the
+case." Thereupon the champion presents evidence from the fathers, and
+evidence from the book itself; and finally closes by saying, that such
+an array of evidence is ample to satisfy any _reasonable_ man of its
+truth and validity. His argument is undoubtedly satisfactory; but if he
+has not appealed to a reasonable man, _i. e._ to the Reason, _i. e._, if
+he has not acknowledged a standard for _the_ standard, and thus has not
+tacitly, unconsciously and yet decisively employed the Reason as the
+highest standard of truth, then his conduct has for us no adequate
+expression.
+
+2. Nicodemus and Christ, in express terms, recognized the validity of
+this standard. Said the ruler to Christ, "We know that thou art a
+teacher come from God: for no man can do these miracles that thou doest,
+except God be with him."--_John_ III. 2. In these words, he both
+recognized the validity of the standard, and the fact that its
+requirements had been met. But decisively emphatic are the words of our
+Saviour: "If I had not done among them the works which none other man
+did, they had not had sin: but now have they both seen and hated both me
+and my Father."--_John_ XV. 24. As if he had said, "While I appeared
+among them simply as a man, I had no right to claim from them a belief
+in my mission; but when I had given them adequate and ample evidence of
+my heavenly character, when, in a word, I had by my works satisfied all
+the rational demands for evidence which they could make, then no excuse
+remained for their rejection of me."
+
+The doctrine of this treatise, that man may know the truth, and know
+God, is one which will never be too largely reflected upon by the human
+mind, or too fully illustrated in human thought. In no better strain can
+we bring our work to a close than by offering some reflections on those
+words of Jesus Christ which have formed the title of our book.
+
+"Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, 'If ye continue in
+my word, _then_ are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth,
+and the truth shall make you free.'"--_John_ VIII. 31, 32. Throughout
+all the acts of Christ, as recorded in John and especially during the
+last days of his life, there may be traced the marks of a super-human
+effort to express to the Jews, in the most skilful manner, the nature
+and purport of his mission. He appeared to them a man; and yet it would
+seem as if the Godhead in him struggled with language to overcome its
+infirmities, and express with perfectest skill his extraordinary
+character and work. But "he came unto his own, and his own received him
+not." Being then such, even the Divine Man, Jesus Christ possessed in
+his own right _an absolute and exhaustive metaphysic_. We study out some
+laws in some of their applications; he knew all laws in all their
+applications. In these his last days he was engaged in making the most
+profound and highly philosophical revelations to his followers that one
+being ever made to another. Or does the reader prefer to call them
+religious? Very well: for here Religion and Philosophy are identical.
+Being engaged in such a labor, it is certain that no merely human
+teacher ever used words with the careful balancing, the skilful
+selection, the certain exactitude, that Jesus did. Hence in the most
+emphatic sense may it be said, that, whether he used figurative or
+literal language, he meant just what he said. The terms used in the text
+quoted are literal terms, and undoubtedly the passage is to be taken in
+its most literal signification. In these words then, in this passage of
+the highest philosophical import, is to be found the basis of the whole
+_a priori_ philosophy. They were spoken of the most important truths,
+those which pertain to the soul's everlasting welfare; but as the
+greater includes the less, so do they include all lesser science. In
+positive and unmistakable terms has Christ declared the fact of
+knowledge. God knows all truth. In so far as we also know the truth, in
+so far are we like him. And mark, this is knowledge, a purely
+intellectual act. Love is indeed a _condition_ of the act, but it is not
+the very act itself.
+
+On this subject it is believed that the Christian church has failed to
+assert the most accurate doctrine. Too generally has this knowledge been
+termed a spiritual knowledge, meaning thereby, a sort of an impression
+of happiness made upon the spiritual sensibility; and this state of
+bliss has been represented as in the highest degree desirable. Beyond
+all question it is true, that, when the spiritual person, with the eye
+of Reason, sees, and thus knows the truth, seeing it and knowing it
+because his whole being, will, and intellect is consecrated to, wrapt in
+the effort, and he is searching for it as for hid treasures, there will
+roll over his soul some ripples of that ineffable Delight which is a
+boundless ocean in Deity. But this state of the Sensibility follows
+after, and is dependent upon, the act of love, and the act of knowledge.
+There should be, there was made in Christ's mind, a distinction in the
+various psychical modifications of him who had sold all that he had to
+buy the one pearl. The words of Christ are to be taken, then, as the
+words of the perfect philosopher, and the perfect religionist. Bearing,
+as he did, the destiny of a world on his heart, and burdened beyond all
+utterance by the mighty load, his soul was full of the theme for which
+he was suffering, he could speak to man only of his highest needs and
+his highest capabilities. The truth which man may know, then, is not
+only eternal,--all truth is eternal,--but it is that eternal truth most
+important to him, the _a priori_ laws of the spiritual person and of all
+his relations. The what he is, the why he is, and the what he ought to
+become, are the objects of his examination. When, then, a spiritual
+person has performed his highest act, the act of unconditional and
+entire consecration to the search after the truth, _i. e._ to God; and
+when, having done this he ever after puts away all lusts of the flesh,
+he shall in this condition become absorbed, wrapt away in the
+contemplation of the truth; then his spiritual eye will be open, and
+will dart with its far-glancing, searching gaze throughout the mysteries
+of the Universe, and he will know the truth. Before, when he was
+absorbed in the pursuit of the things of Sense, he could see almost no
+_a priori_ principles at all, and what he did see, only in their
+practical bearing upon those material and transitory things which perish
+with their using; but now balancing himself on tireless pinion in the
+upper ether, anon he stoops to notice the largest and highest and most
+important of those objects which formerly with so much painful and
+painstaking labor he climbed the rugged heights of sense to examine, and
+having touched upon them cursorily, to supply the need of the hour, he
+again spreads his powerful God-given wings of faith and love, and soars
+upward, upward, upward, towards the eternal Sun, the infinite Person,
+the final Truth, God. Then does he come to comprehend, "to KNOW, with
+all saints, what is the height and depth and length and breadth of the
+love of God." Then do the pure _a priori_ laws, especially those of the
+relations of spiritual persons, _i. e._ of the moral government of God,
+come full into the field of his vision. Then in the clear blaze, in the
+noonday effulgence of the ineffable, eternal Sun, does he see the Law
+which binds God as it binds man,--that Law so terrible in its demands
+upon him who had violated it, that the infinite Person himself could
+find no other way of escape for sinning man but in sending "his
+only-begotten Son into the world." And he who is lifted up to this
+knowledge needs no other revelation. All other knowledge is a child's
+lesson-book to him. All lower study is tasteless; all lower life is
+neglected, forgotten. He studies forever the pure equations of truth; he
+lives in the bosom of God. Such an one may all his life-long have been
+utterly ignorant of books. A poor negro on some rice plantation, he may
+have learned of God only by the hearing of the ear, but by one act, in a
+moment, in the twinkling of an eye, he has passed all the gradations of
+earthly knowledge, and taken his seat on the topmost form in heaven. He
+received little instruction from men; but forevermore God is his
+teacher.
+
+This of which we have been speaking is, be it remembered, no rhapsody of
+the imagination. It is a simple literal fact respecting man's intellect.
+It is the same in kind, though of far nobler import, as if upon this act
+of consecration there should be revealed to every consecrated one, in a
+sudden overwhelming burst of light, the whole _a priori_ system of the
+physical Universe. This is not so revealed because it is not essential,
+and so would only gratify curiosity. The other and the higher is
+revealed, because it is essential to man's spiritual life.
+
+In the culminating act, then, of a spiritual person, in the unreserved,
+the absolute consecration of the whole being to the search after truth,
+do we find that common goal to which an _a priori_ philosophy inevitably
+leads us, and which the purest, Christ's, religion teaches us. Thus does
+it appear that in their highest idea Philosophy and Religion are
+identical. The Rock upon which both alike are grounded is eternal. The
+principles of both have the highest possible evidence, for they are
+self-evident; and, having them given by the intuition of the Reason, a
+man can cipher out the whole natural scheme of the Universe as he would
+cipher out a problem in equations. He has not done it, because he is
+wicked; and God has given him the Bible, as the mathematical astronomy
+of the moral heavens, as a school-book to lead him back to the goal of
+his lost purity.
+
+How beautiful, then, art thou, O Religion, supernal daughter of the
+Deity! how noble in thy magnificent preeminence! how dazzling in thy
+transcendent loveliness! Thou sittest afar on a throne of pearl; thy
+diadem the Morning Stars, thy robe the glory of God. Founded is thy
+throne on Eternity; and from eternity to eternity all thy laws are
+enduring truth. Sitting thus, O Queen, more firmly throned than the
+snow-capped mountains, calmer than the ocean's depths, in the surety of
+thy self-conscious integrity and truth, thou mayest, with mien of
+noblest dignity, in unwavering confidence, throw down the gauntlet of
+thy challenge to the assembled doubters of the Universe.
+
+It may be that to some minds, unaccustomed to venturing out fearlessly
+on the ocean of thought, with an unwavering trust in the pole-star truth
+in the human soul, certain of the positions attained and maintained in
+this volume will seem to involve the destruction of all essential
+distinction between the Creator and the created. If the universe is a
+definite and limited object, some created being may, at some period,
+come to know every atom of it. Moreover, if there is a definite number
+of the qualities and attributes--the endowments of Deity, some one may
+learn the number, and what they are, and come at length to have a
+knowledge equal to God's knowledge. Even if this possibility should be
+admitted,--which it is not, for a reason to appear further on,--yet it
+would in no way involve that the creature had, in any the least degree,
+reduced the difference in _kind_ which subsists between him and the
+Creator. A consideration of the following distinctive marks will, it
+would seem, be decisive upon this point.
+
+God is self-existent. His creatures are dependent upon him.
+Self-existence is an essential, inherent, untransferable attribute of
+Deity; and so is not a possible attainment for any creature. Every
+creature is necessarily dependent upon the Creator every moment, for his
+continuance in being. Let him attain ever so high a state of knowledge;
+let him, if the supposition were rational, acquire a knowledge equal to
+that of Deity; let him be endowed with all the power he could use, and
+he would not have made, nor could he make an effort even, in the
+direction of removing his dependence upon his Creator. In the very
+height of his glory, in the acme of his attainment, it would need only
+that God rest an instant, cease to sustain him, and he would not be, he
+would have gone out, as the light goes out on a burner when one turns
+the faucet.
+
+Again, the mode by which their knowledge is attained is different in
+kind; and the creature never can acquire the Creator's mode. The Deity
+possesses his knowledge as a necessary endowment, given to him at once,
+by a spontaneous intuition. Hence he could never learn, for there was no
+knowledge which he did not already possess. Thus he is out of all
+relation to Time. The creature, on the other hand, can never acquire any
+knowledge except through processes; and, what is more, can never review
+the knowledge already acquired, except by a process which occupies a
+time. This relation of the creature to Time is organic; and this
+distinction between the creature and Creator is thus also irremovable.
+
+Another organic distinction is that observed in the mode of seeing
+ideals. The Divine Reason not only gives ideas, _a priori_ laws, but it
+gives all possible images, which those laws, standing in their natural
+relations to each other, can become. Thus all ideals are realized to
+him, whether the creative energy goes forth, and power is organized in
+accordance therewith, or not. Here again the creature is of the opposite
+kind. The creature can never have an idea until he has been educated by
+contact with a material universe; and then can never construct an ideal,
+except he have first seen the elements of that ideal realized in
+material forms. To illustrate: The infant has no ideas; and there is no
+radical difference between the beginning of a human being and any other
+created spiritual person. He has a rudimentary Reason, but it must grow
+before it can make its presentations, and the means of its education
+must be a material system. Let a spiritual person be created, and set in
+the Universe, utterly isolated, with no medium of communication, and it
+would stay forever just what it was at the beginning, a dry seed. The
+necessity of alliance with a material Universe is equally apparent in
+the mature spiritual person. Such a one cannot construct a single ideal,
+except he have seen all the elements already in material forms. He who
+will attempt to construct an ideal of any _thing_, which never has been,
+as a griffin, and not put into it any form of animals which have been on
+earth, will immediately appreciate the unquestionableness of this
+position. Therefore it is that no one can, "by searching, find out God."
+The creature can only learn what the Creator declares to him.
+
+Still another element of distinction, equally marked and decisive as
+those just named, may be mentioned. The Deity possesses as inherent and
+immanent endowment Power, or the ability of himself to realize his
+ideals in objects. Thus is he the Creator. If this were not so, there
+could have been no Universe, for there was no substance and no one to
+furnish a substance but he. The creature, on the other hand, cannot
+receive as a gift, neither attain by culture the power to create. Hence
+he can only realize his ideals in materials furnished to his hand.
+Pigments and brushes and chisels and marble must be before painters and
+sculptors can become.
+
+Each and every one of the distinctions above made is _organic_. They
+cannot be eliminated. In fact their removal is not a possible object of
+effort. The creature may _wish_ them removed; but no line of thought can
+be studied out by which a movement can be made towards the attainment of
+that wish. It would seem, then, that, such being the facts, the fullest
+scope might fearlessly be allowed to the legitimate use of every power
+of the creature. Such, it is believed, is God's design.
+
+THE END.
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's Note:
+
+
+Archaic/multiple spellings and punctuation of the original have been
+maintained.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Know the Truth; A critique of the
+Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation, by Jesse H. Jones
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