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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Hegel's Philosophy of Mind by Georg Wilhelm
+Friedrich Hegel
+
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no
+restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under
+the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or
+online at http://www.gutenberg.org/license
+
+
+
+Title: Hegel's Philosophy of Mind
+
+Author: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
+
+Release Date: March 5, 2012 [Ebook #39064]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO 8859-1
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND***
+
+
+
+
+
+                        Hegel's Philosophy of Mind
+
+                                    By
+
+                      Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
+
+                             Translated From
+
+             The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences
+
+                                   With
+
+                         Five Introductory Essays
+
+                                    By
+
+                       William Wallace, M.A., LL.D.
+
+Fellow of Merton College, and Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the
+                           University of Oxford
+
+                                  Oxford
+
+                             Clarendon Press
+
+                                   1894
+
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+Preface.
+Five Introductory Essays In Psychology And Ethics.
+   Essay I. On The Scope Of A Philosophy Of Mind.
+   Essay II. Aims And Methods Of Psychology.
+   Essay III. On Some Psychological Aspects Of Ethics.
+   Essay IV. Psycho-Genesis.
+   Essay V. Ethics And Politics.
+Introduction.
+Section I. Mind Subjective.
+   Sub-Section A. Anthropology. The Soul.
+   Sub-Section B. Phenomenology Of Mind. Consciousness.
+   Sub-Section C. Psychology. Mind.
+Section II. Mind Objective.
+   Distribution.
+   Sub-Section A. Law.
+   Sub-Section B. The Morality Of Conscience.
+   Sub-Section C. The Moral Life, Or Social Ethics.
+Section III. Absolute Mind.
+   Sub-Section A. Art.
+   Sub-Section B. Revealed Religion.
+   Sub-Section C. Philosophy.
+Index.
+Footnotes
+
+
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+I here offer a translation of the third or last part of Hegel's
+encyclopaedic sketch of philosophy,--the _Philosophy of Mind_. The volume,
+like its subject, stands complete in itself. But it may also be regarded
+as a supplement or continuation of the work begun in my version of his
+_Logic_. I have not ventured upon the _Philosophy of Nature_ which lies
+between these two. That is a province, to penetrate into which would
+require an equipment of learning I make no claim to,--a province, also, of
+which the present-day interest would be largely historical, or at least
+bound up with historical circumstances.
+
+The translation is made from the German text given in the Second Part of
+the Seventh Volume of Hegel's Collected Works, occasionally corrected by
+comparison with that found in the second and third editions (of 1827 and
+1830) published by the author. I have reproduced only Hegel's own
+paragraphs, and entirely omitted the _Zusätze_ of the editors. These
+addenda--which are in origin lecture-notes--to the paragraphs are, in the
+text of the Collected Works, given for the first section only. The
+psychological part which they accompany has been barely treated elsewhere
+by Hegel: but a good popular exposition of it will be found in Erdmann's
+_Psychologische Briefe_. The second section was dealt with at greater
+length by Hegel himself in his _Philosophy of Law_ (1820). The topics of
+the third section are largely covered by his lectures on Art, Religion,
+and History of Philosophy.
+
+I do not conceal from myself that the text offers a hard nut to crack. Yet
+here and there, even through the medium of the translation, I think some
+light cannot fail to come to an earnest student. Occasionally, too, as,
+for instance, in §§ 406, 459, 549, and still more in §§ 552, 573, at the
+close of which might stand the words _Liberavi animam meam_, the writer
+really "lets himself go," and gives his mind freely on questions where
+speculation comes closely in touch with life.
+
+In the _Five Introductory Essays_ I have tried sometimes to put together,
+and sometimes to provide with collateral elucidation, some points in the
+Mental Philosophy. I shall not attempt to justify the selection of
+subjects for special treatment further than to hope that they form a more
+or less connected group, and to refer for a study of some general
+questions of system and method to my _Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's
+Philosophy_ which appear almost simultaneously with this volume.
+
+OXFORD,
+_December, 1893_.
+
+
+
+
+
+FIVE INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS.
+
+
+
+
+Essay I. On The Scope Of A Philosophy Of Mind.
+
+
+The art of finding titles, and of striking out headings which catch the
+eye or ear, and lead the mind by easy paths of association to the subject
+under exposition, was not one of Hegel's gifts. A stirring phrase, a vivid
+or picturesque turn of words, he often has. But his lists of contents,
+when they cease to be commonplace, are apt to run into the bizarre and the
+grotesque. Generally, indeed, his rubrics are the old and (as we may be
+tempted to call them) insignificant terms of the text-books. But, in
+Hegel's use of them, these conventional designations are charged with a
+highly individualised meaning. They may mean more--they may mean less--than
+they habitually pass for: but they unquestionably specify their meaning
+with a unique and almost personal flavour. And this can hardly fail to
+create and to disappoint undue expectations.
+
+
+
+(i.) Philosophy and its Parts.
+
+
+Even the main divisions of his system show this conservatism in
+terminology. The names of the three parts of the Encyclopaedia are, we may
+say, non-significant of their peculiar contents. And that for a good
+reason. What Hegel proposes to give is no novel or special doctrine, but
+the universal philosophy which has passed on from age to age, here
+narrowed and there widened, but still essentially the same. It is
+conscious of its continuity and proud of its identity with the teachings
+of Plato and Aristotle.
+
+The earliest attempts of the Greek philosophers to present philosophy in a
+complete and articulated order--attempts generally attributed to the
+Stoics, the schoolmen of antiquity--made it a tripartite whole. These three
+parts were Logic, Physics, and Ethics. In their entirety they were meant
+to form a cycle of unified knowledge, satisfying the needs of theory as
+well as practice. As time went on, however, the situation changed: and if
+the old names remained, their scope and value suffered many changes. New
+interests and curiosities, due to altered circumstances, brought other
+departments of reality under the focus of investigation besides those
+which had been primarily discussed under the old names. Inquiries became
+more specialised, and each tended to segregate itself from the rest as an
+independent field of science. The result was that in modern times the
+territory still marked by the ancient titles had shrunk to a mere phantom
+of its former bulk. Almost indeed things had come to such a pass that the
+time-honoured figures had sunk into the misery of _rois fainéants_; while
+the real business of knowledge was discharged by the younger and less
+conventional lines of research which the needs and fashions of the time
+had called up. Thus Logic, in the narrow formal sense, was turned into an
+"art" of argumentation and a system of technical rules for the analysis
+and synthesis of academical discussion. Physics or Natural Philosophy
+restricted itself to the elaboration of some metaphysical postulates or
+hypotheses regarding the general modes of physical operation. And Ethics
+came to be a very unpractical discussion of subtleties regarding moral
+faculty and moral standard. Meanwhile a theory of scientific method and of
+the laws governing the growth of intelligence and formation of ideas grew
+up, and left the older logic to perish of formality and inanition. The
+successive departments of physical science, each in turn asserting its
+independence, finally left Natural Philosophy no alternative between
+clinging to its outworn hypotheses and abstract generalities, or
+identifying itself (as Newton in his great book put it) with the
+_Principia Mathematica_ of the physical sciences. Ethics, in its turn, saw
+itself, on one hand, replaced by psychological inquiries into the
+relations between the feelings and the will and the intelligence; while,
+on the other hand, a host of social, historical, economical, and other
+researches cut it off from the real facts of human life, and left it no
+more than the endless debates on the logical and metaphysical issues
+involved in free-will and conscience, duty and merit.
+
+It has sometimes been said that Kant settled this controversy between the
+old departments of philosophy and the new branches of science. And the
+settlement, it is implied, consisted in assigning to the philosopher a
+sort of police and patrol duty in the commonwealth of science. He was to
+see that boundaries were duly respected, and that each science kept
+strictly to its own business. For this purpose each branch of philosophy
+was bound to convert itself into a department of criticism--an examination
+of first principles in the several provinces of reality or experience--with
+a view to get a distinct conception of what they were, and thus define
+exactly the lines on which the structures of more detailed science could
+be put up solidly and safely. This plan offered tempting lines to
+research, and sounded well. But on further reflection there emerge one or
+two difficulties, hard to get over. Paradoxical though it may seem, one
+cannot rightly estimate the capacity and range of foundations, before one
+has had some familiarity with the buildings erected upon them. Thus you
+are involved in a circle: a circle which is probably inevitable, but which
+for that reason it is well to recognise at once. Then--what is only another
+way of saying the same thing--it is impossible to draw an inflexible line
+between premises of principle and conclusions of detail. There is no spot
+at which criticism can stop, and, having done its business well, hand on
+the remaining task to dogmatic system. It was an instinctive feeling of
+this implication of system in what professed only to be criticism which
+led the aged Kant to ignore his own previous professions that he offered
+as yet no system, and when Fichte maintained himself to be erecting the
+fabric for which Kant had prepared the ground, to reply by the
+counter-declaration that the criticism was the system--that "the curtain
+was the picture."
+
+The Hegelian philosophy is an attempt to combine criticism with system,
+and thus realise what Kant had at least foretold. It is a system which is
+self-critical, and systematic only through the absoluteness of its
+criticism. In Hegel's own phrase, it is an immanent and an incessant
+dialectic, which from first to last allows finality to no dogmatic rest,
+but carries out Kant's description of an Age of Criticism, in which
+nothing, however majestic and sacred its authority, can plead for
+exception from the all-testing _Elenchus_. Then, on the other hand, Hegel
+refuses to restrict philosophy and its branches to anything short of the
+totality. He takes in its full sense that often-used phrase--the Unity of
+Knowledge. Logic becomes the all-embracing research of "first
+principles,"--the principles which regulate physics and ethics. The old
+divisions between logic and metaphysic, between induction and deduction,
+between theory of reasoning and theory of knowledge,--divisions which those
+who most employed them were never able to show the reason and purpose
+of--because indeed they had grown up at various times and by "natural
+selection" through a vast mass of incidents: these are superseded and
+merged in one continuous theory of real knowledge considered under its
+abstract or formal aspect,--of organised and known reality in its
+underlying thought-system. But these first principles were only an
+abstraction from complete reality--the reality which nature has when
+unified by mind--and they presuppose the total from which they are derived.
+The realm of pure thought is only the ghost of the Idea--of the unity and
+reality of knowledge, and it must be reindued with its flesh and blood.
+The logical world is (in Kantian phrase) only the _possibility_ of Nature
+and Mind. It comes first--because it is a system of First Principles: but
+these first principles could only be elicited by a philosophy which has
+realised the meaning of a mental experience, gathered by interpreting the
+facts of Nature.
+
+Natural Philosophy is no longer--according to Hegel's view of it--merely a
+scheme of mathematical ground-work. That may be its first step. But its
+scope is a complete unity (which is not a mere aggregate) of the branches
+of natural knowledge, exploring both the inorganic and the organic world.
+In dealing with this endless problem, philosophy seems to be baulked by an
+impregnable obstacle to its progress. Every day the advance of
+specialisation renders any comprehensive or synoptic view of the totality
+of science more and more impossible. No doubt we talk readily enough of
+Science. But here, if anywhere, we may say there is no Science, but only
+sciences. The generality of science is a proud fiction or a gorgeous
+dream, variously told and interpreted according to the varying interest
+and proclivity of the scientist. The sciences, or those who specially
+expound them, know of no unity, no philosophy of science. They are content
+to remark that in these days the thing is impossible, and to pick out the
+faults in any attempts in that direction that are made outside their pale.
+Unfortunately for this contention, the thing is done by us all, and,
+indeed, has to be done. If not as men of science, yet as men--as human
+beings--we have to put together things and form some total estimate of the
+drift of development, of the unity of nature. To get a notion, not merely
+of the general methods and principles of the sciences, but of their
+results and teachings, and to get this not as a mere lot of fragments, but
+with a systematic unity, is indispensable in some degree for all rational
+life. The life not founded on science is not the life of man. But he will
+not find what he wants in the text-books of the specialist, who is obliged
+to treat his subject, as Plato says, "under the pressure of necessity,"
+and who dare not look on it in its quality "to draw the soul towards
+truth, and to form the philosophic intellect so as to uplift what we now
+unduly keep down(1)." If the philosopher in this province does his work
+but badly, he may plead the novelty of the task to which he comes as a
+pioneer or even an architect. He finds little that he can directly
+utilise. The materials have been gathered and prepared for very special
+aims; and the great aim of science--that human life may be made a higher,
+an ampler, and happier thing,--has hardly been kept in view at all, except
+in its more materialistic aspects. To the philosopher the supreme interest
+of the physical sciences is that man also belongs to the physical
+universe, or that Mind and Matter as we know them are (in Mr. Spencer's
+language) "at once antithetical and inseparable." He wants to find the
+place of Man,--but of Man as Mind--in Nature.
+
+If the scope of Natural Philosophy be thus expanded to make it the unity
+and more than the synthetic aggregate of the several physical sciences--to
+make it the whole which surpasses the addition of all their fragments, the
+purpose of Ethics has not less to be deepened and widened. Ethics, under
+that title, Hegel knows not. And for those who cannot recognise anything
+unless it be clearly labelled, it comes natural to record their censure of
+Hegelianism for ignoring or disparaging ethical studies. But if we take
+the word in that wide sense which common usage rather justifies than
+adopts, we may say that the whole philosophy of Mind is a moral
+philosophy. Its subject is the moral as opposed to the physical aspect of
+reality: the inner and ideal life as opposed to the merely external and
+real materials of it: the world of intelligence and of humanity. It
+displays Man in the several stages of that process by which he expresses
+the full meaning of nature, or discharges the burden of that task which is
+implicit in him from the first. It traces the steps of that growth by
+which what was no better than a fragment of nature--an intelligence located
+(as it seemed) in one piece of matter--comes to realise the truth of it and
+of himself. That truth is his ideal and his obligation: but it is
+also--such is the mystery of his birthright--his idea and possession.
+He--like the natural universe--is (as the _Logic_ has shown) a principle of
+unification, organisation, idealisation: and his history (in its ideal
+completeness) is the history of the process by which he, the typical man,
+works the fragments of reality (and such mere reality must be always a
+collection of fragments) into the perfect unity of a many-sided character.
+Thus the philosophy of mind, beginning with man as a sentient organism,
+the focus in which the universe gets its first dim confused expression
+through mere feeling, shows how he "erects himself above himself" and
+realises what ancient thinkers called his kindred with the divine.
+
+In that total process of the mind's liberation and self-realisation the
+portion specially called Morals is but one, though a necessary, stage.
+There are, said Porphyry and the later Platonists, four degrees in the
+path of perfection and self-accomplishment. And first, there is the career
+of honesty and worldly prudence, which makes the duty of the citizen.
+Secondly, there is the progress in purity which casts earthly things
+behind, and reaches the angelic height of passionless serenity. And the
+third step is the divine life which by intellectual energy is turned to
+behold the truth of things. Lastly, in the fourth grade, the mind, free
+and sublime in self-sustaining wisdom, makes itself an "exemplar" of
+virtue, and is even a "father of Gods." Even so, it may be said, the human
+mind is the subject of a complicated Teleology,--the field ruled by a
+multifarious Ought, psychological, aesthetical, social and religious. To
+adjust their several claims cannot be the object of any science, if
+adjustment means to supply a guide in practice. But it is the purpose of
+such a teleology to show that social requirements and moral duty as
+ordinarily conceived do not exhaust the range of obligation,--of the
+supreme ethical Ought. How that can best be done is however a question of
+some difficulty. For the ends under examination do not fall completely
+into a serial order, nor does one involve others in such a way as to
+destroy their independence. You cannot absolve psychology as if it stood
+independent of ethics or religion, nor can aesthetic considerations merely
+supervene on moral. Still, it may be said, the order followed by Hegel
+seems on the whole liable to fewer objections than others.
+
+Mr. Herbert Spencer, the only English philosopher who has even attempted a
+_System_ of Philosophy, may in this point be compared with Hegel. He also
+begins with a _First Principles_,--a work which, like Hegel's _Logic_,
+starts by presenting Philosophy as the supreme arbiter between the
+subordinate principles of Religion and Science, which are in it "necessary
+correlatives." The positive task of philosophy is (with some inconsistency
+or vagueness) presented, in the next place, as a "unification of
+knowledge." Such a unification has to make explicit the implicit unity of
+known reality: because "every thought involves a whole system of
+thoughts." And such a programme might again suggest the Logic. But
+unfortunately Mr. Spencer does not (and he has Francis Bacon to justify
+him here) think it worth his while to toil up the weary, but necessary,
+mount of Purgatory which is known to us as Logic. With a naïve realism, he
+builds on Cause and Power, and above all on Force, that "Ultimate of
+Ultimates," which seems to be, however marvellously, a denizen both of the
+Known and the Unknowable world. In the known world this Ultimate appears
+under two forms, matter and motion, and the problem of science and
+philosophy is to lay down in detail and in general the law of their
+continuous redistribution, of the segregation of motion from matter, and
+the inclusion of motion into matter.
+
+Of this process, which has no beginning and no end,--the rhythm of
+generation and corruption, attraction and repulsion, it may be said that
+it is properly not a first principle of all knowledge, but the general or
+fundamental portion of Natural Philosophy to which Mr. Spencer next
+proceeds. Such a philosophy, however, he gives only in part: viz. as a
+Biology, dealing with organic (and at a further stage and under other
+names, with supra-organic) life. And that the Philosophy of Nature should
+take this form, and carry both the First Principles and the later portions
+of the system with it, as parts of a philosophy of evolution, is what we
+should have expected from the contemporaneous interests of science(2).
+Even a one-sided attempt to give speculative unity to those researches,
+which get--for reasons the scientific specialist seldom asks--the title of
+biological, is however worth noting as a recognition of the necessity of a
+_Natur-philosophie_,--a speculative science of Nature.
+
+The third part of the Hegelian System corresponds to what in the
+_Synthetic Philosophy_ is known as Psychology, Ethics, and Sociology. And
+here Mr. Spencer recognises that something new has turned up. Psychology
+is "unique" as a science: it is a "double science," and as a whole quite
+_sui generis_. Whether perhaps all these epithets would not, _mutatis
+mutandis_, have to be applied also to Ethics and Sociology, if these are
+to do their full work, he does not say. In what this doubleness consists
+he even finds it somewhat difficult to show. For, as his fundamental
+philosophy does not on this point go beyond noting some pairs of verbal
+antitheses, and has no sense of unity except in the imperfect shape of a
+"relation(3)" between two things which are "antithetical and inseparable,"
+he is perplexed by phrases such as "in" and "out of" consciousness, and
+stumbles over the equivocal use of "inner" to denote both mental (or
+non-spatial) in general, and locally sub-cuticular in special. Still, he
+gets so far as to see that the law of consciousness is that in it neither
+feelings nor relations have independent subsistence, and that the unit of
+mind does not begin till what he calls two feelings are made one. The
+phraseology may be faulty, but it shows an inkling of the _a priori_.
+Unfortunately it is apparently forgotten; and the language too often
+reverts into the habit of what he calls the "objective," i.e. purely
+physical, sciences.
+
+Mr. Spencer's conception of Psychology restricts it to the more general
+physics of the mind. For its more concrete life he refers us to Sociology.
+But his Sociology is yet unfinished: and from the plan of its inception,
+and the imperfect conception of the ends and means of its investigation,
+hardly admits of completion in any systematic sense. To that incipiency is
+no doubt due its excess in historical or anecdotal detail--detail, however,
+too much segregated from its social context, and in general its tendency
+to neglect normal and central theory for incidental and peripheral facts.
+Here, too, there is a weakness in First Principles and a love of
+catchwords, which goes along with the fallacy that illustration is proof.
+Above all, it is evident that the great fact of religion overhangs Mr.
+Spencer with the attraction of an unsolved and unacceptable problem. He
+cannot get the religious ideas of men into co-ordination with their
+scientific, aesthetic, and moral doctrines; and only betrays his sense of
+the high importance of the former by placing them in the forefront of
+inquiry, as due to the inexperience and limitations of the so-called
+primitive man. That is hardly adequate recognition of the religious
+principle: and the defect will make itself seriously felt, should he ever
+come to carry out the further stage of his prospectus dealing with "the
+growth and correlation of language, knowledge, morals, and aesthetics."
+
+
+
+(ii.) Mind and Morals.
+
+
+A Mental Philosophy--if we so put what might also be rendered a Spiritual
+Philosophy, or Philosophy of Spirit--may to an English reader suggest
+something much narrower than it actually contains. A Philosophy of the
+Human Mind--if we consult English specimens--would not imply much more than
+a psychology, and probably what is called an inductive psychology. But as
+Hegel understands it, it covers an unexpectedly wide range of topics, the
+whole range from Nature to Spirit. Besides Subjective Mind, which would
+seem on first thoughts to exhaust the topics of psychology, it goes on to
+Mind as Objective, and finally to Absolute mind. And such combinations of
+words may sound either self-contradictory or meaningless.
+
+The first Section deals with the range of what is usually termed
+Psychology. That term indeed is employed by Hegel, in a restricted sense,
+to denote the last of the three sub-sections in the discussion of
+Subjective Mind. The Mind, which is the topic of psychology proper, cannot
+be assumed as a ready-made object, or datum. A Self, a self-consciousness,
+an intelligent and volitional agent, if it be the birthright of man, is a
+birthright which he has to realise for himself, to earn and to make his
+own. To trace the steps by which mind in its stricter acceptation, as will
+and intelligence, emerges from the general animal sensibility which is the
+crowning phase of organic life, and the final problem of biology, is the
+work of two preliminary sub-sections--the first entitled _Anthropology_,
+the second the _Phenomenology of Mind_.
+
+The subject of Anthropology, as Hegel understands it, is the Soul--the raw
+material of consciousness, the basis of all higher mental life. This is a
+borderland, where the ground is still debateable between Nature and Mind:
+it is the region of feeling, where the sensibility has not yet been
+differentiated to intelligence. Soul and body are here, as the phrase
+goes, in communion: the inward life is still imperfectly disengaged from
+its natural co-physical setting. Still one with nature, it submits to
+natural influences and natural vicissitudes: is not as yet master of
+itself, but the half-passive receptacle of a foreign life, of a general
+vitality, of a common soul not yet fully differentiated into
+individuality. But it is awaking to self-activity: it is emerging to
+Consciousness,--to distinguish itself, as aware and conscious, from the
+facts of life and sentiency of which it is aware.
+
+From this region of psychical physiology or physiological psychology,
+Hegel in the second sub-section of his first part takes us to the
+"Phenomenology of Mind,"--to Consciousness. The sentient soul is also
+conscious--but in a looser sense of that word(4): it has feelings, but can
+scarcely be said _itself_ to know that it has them. As consciousness, the
+Soul has come to separate what it is from what it feels. The distinction
+emerges of a subject which is conscious, and an object _of_ which it is
+conscious. And the main thing is obviously the relationship between the
+two, or the Consciousness itself, as tending to distinguish itself alike
+from its subject and its object. Hence, perhaps, may be gathered why it is
+called Phenomenology of Mind. Mind as yet is not yet more than emergent or
+apparent: nor yet self-possessed and self-certified. No longer, however,
+one with the circumambient nature which it feels, it sees itself set
+against it, but only as a passive recipient of it, a _tabula rasa_ on
+which external nature is reflected, or to which phenomena are presented.
+No longer, on the other hand, a mere passive instrument of suggestion from
+without, its instinct of life, its _nisus_ of self-assertion is developed,
+through antagonism to a like _nisus_, into the consciousness of self-hood,
+of a Me and Mine as set against a Thee and Thine. But just in proportion
+as it is so developed in opposition to and recognition of other equally
+self-centred selves, it has passed beyond the narrower characteristic of
+Consciousness proper. It is no longer mere intelligent perception or
+reproduction of a world, but it is life, with perception (or apperception)
+of that life. It has returned in a way to its original unity with nature,
+but it is now the sense of its self-hood--the consciousness of itself as
+the focus in which subjective and objective are at one. Or, to put it in
+the language of the great champion of Realism(5), the standpoint of Reason
+or full-grown Mind is this: "The world which appears to us is our percept,
+therefore in us. The real world, out of which we explain the phenomenon,
+is our thought: therefore in us."
+
+The third sub-section of the theory of Subjective Mind--the Psychology
+proper--deals with Mind. This is the real, independent Psyché--hence the
+special appropriation of the term Psychology. "The Soul," says Herbart,
+"no doubt dwells in a body: there are, moreover, corresponding states of
+the one and the other: but nothing corporeal occurs in the Soul, nothing
+purely mental, which we could reckon to our Ego, occurs in the body: the
+affections of the body are no representations of the Ego, and our pleasant
+and unpleasant feelings do not immediately lie in the organic life they
+favour or hinder." Such a Soul, so conceived, is an intelligent and
+volitional self, a being of intellectual and "active" powers or phenomena:
+it is a Mind. And "Mind," adds Hegel(6), "is just this elevation above
+Nature and physical modes and above the complication with an external
+object." Nothing is _external_ to it: it is rather the internalising of
+all externality. In this psychology proper, we are out of any immediate
+connexion with physiology. "Psychology as such," remarks Herbart, "has its
+questions common to it with Idealism"--with the doctrine that all reality
+is mental reality. It traces, in Hegel's exposition of it, the steps of
+the way by which mind realises that independence which is its
+characteristic stand-point. On the intellectual side that independence is
+assured in language,--the system of signs by which the intelligence stamps
+external objects as its own, made part of its inner world. A science, some
+one has said, is after all only _une langue bien faite_. So, reversing the
+saying, we may note that a language is an inwardised and mind-appropriated
+world. On the active side, the independence of mind is seen in
+self-enjoyment, in happiness, or self-content, where impulse and volition
+have attained satisfaction in equilibrium, and the soul possesses itself
+in fullness. Such a mind(7), which has made the world its certified
+possession in language, and which enjoys itself in self-possession of
+soul, called happiness, is a free Mind. And that is the highest which
+Subjective Mind can reach.
+
+At this point, perhaps, having rounded off by a liberal sweep the scope of
+psychology, the ordinary mental philosophy would stop. Hegel, instead of
+finishing, now goes on to the field of what he calls Objective Mind. For
+as yet it has been only the story of a preparation, an inward adorning and
+equipment, and we have yet to see what is to come of it in actuality. Or
+rather, we have yet to consider the social forms on which this preparation
+rests. The mind, self-possessed and sure of itself or free, is so only
+through the objective shape which its main development runs parallel with.
+An intelligent Will, or a practical reason, was the last word of the
+psychological development. But a reason which is practical, or a volition
+which is intelligent, is realised by action which takes regular shapes,
+and by practice which transforms the world. The theory of Objective Mind
+delineates the new form which nature assumes under the sway of
+intelligence and will. That intellectual world realises itself by
+transforming the physical into a social and political world, the given
+natural conditions of existence into a freely-instituted system of life,
+the primitive struggle of kinds for subsistence into the ordinances of the
+social state. Given man as a being possessed of will and intelligence,
+this inward faculty, whatever be its degree, will try to impress itself on
+nature and to reproduce itself in a legal, a moral, and social world. The
+kingdom of deed replaces, or rises on the foundation of, the kingdom of
+word: and instead of the equilibrium of a well-adjusted soul comes the
+harmonious life of a social organism. We are, in short, in the sphere of
+Ethics and Politics, of Jurisprudence and Morals, of Law and Conscience.
+
+Here,--as always in Hegel's system--there is a triad of steps. First the
+province of Law or Right. But if we call it Law, we must keep out of sight
+the idea of a special law-giver, of a conscious imposition of laws, above
+all by a political superior. And if we call it Right, we must remember
+that it is neutral, inhuman, abstract right: the right whose principle is
+impartial and impassive uniformity, equality, order;--not moral right, or
+the equity which takes cognisance of circumstances, of personal claims,
+and provides against its own hardness. The intelligent will of Man,
+throwing itself upon the mere gifts of nature as their appointed master,
+creates the world of Property--of things instrumental, and regarded as
+adjectival, to the human personality. But the autonomy of Reason (which is
+latent in the will) carries with it certain consequences. As it acts, it
+also, by its inherent quality of uniformity or universality, enacts for
+itself a law and laws, and creates the realm of formal equality or
+order-giving law. But this is a _mere_ equality: which is not inconsistent
+with what in other respects may be excess of inequality. What one does, if
+it is really to be treated as done, others may or even must do: each act
+creates an expectation of continuance and uniformity of behaviour. The
+doer is bound by it, and others are entitled to do the like. The material
+which the person appropriates creates a system of obligation. Thus is
+constituted--in the natural give and take of rational Wills--in the
+inevitable course of human action and reaction,--a system of rights and
+duties. This law of equality--the basis of justice, and the seed of
+benevolence--is the scaffolding or perhaps rather the rudimentary framework
+of society and moral life. Or it is the bare skeleton which is to be
+clothed upon by the softer and fuller outlines of the social tissues and
+the ethical organs.
+
+And thus the first range of Objective Mind postulates the second, which
+Hegel calls "Morality." The word is to be taken in its strict sense as a
+protest against the quasi-physical order of law. It is the morality of
+conscience and of the good will, of the inner rectitude of soul and
+purpose, as all-sufficient and supreme. Here is brought out the
+complementary factor in social life: the element of liberty, spontaneity,
+self-consciousness. The motto of mere inward morality (as opposed to the
+spirit of legality) is (in Kant's words): "There is nothing without
+qualification good, in heaven or earth, but only a good will." The
+essential condition of goodness is that the action be done with purpose
+and intelligence, and in full persuasion of its goodness by the conscience
+of the agent. The characteristic of Morality thus described is its
+essential inwardness, and the sovereignty of the conscience over all
+heteronomy. Its justification is that it protests against the authority of
+a mere external or objective order, subsisting and ruling in separation
+from the subjectivity. Its defect is the turn it gives to this assertion
+of the rights of subjective conscience: briefly in the circumstance that
+it tends to set up a mere individualism against a mere universalism,
+instead of realising the unity and essential interdependence of the two.
+
+The third sub-section of the theory of Objective Mind describes a state of
+affairs in which this antithesis is explicitly overcome. This is the moral
+life in a social community. Here law and usage prevail and provide the
+fixed permanent scheme of life: but the law and the usage are, in their
+true or ideal conception, only the unforced expression of the mind and
+will of those who live under them. And, on the other hand, the mind and
+will of the individual members of such a community are pervaded and
+animated by its universal spirit. In such a community, and so constituting
+it, the individual is at once free and equal, and that because of the
+spirit of fraternity, which forms its spiritual link. In the world
+supposed to be governed by mere legality the idea of right is exclusively
+prominent; and when that is the case, it may often happen that _summum jus
+summa injuria_. In mere morality, the stress falls exclusively on the idea
+of inward freedom, or the necessity of the harmony of the judgment and the
+will, or the dependence of conduct upon conscience. In the union of the
+two, in the moral community as normally constituted, the mere idea of
+right is replaced, or controlled and modified, by the idea of equity--a
+balance as it were between the two preceding, inasmuch as motive and
+purpose are employed to modify and interpret strict right. But this
+effect--this harmonisation--is brought about by the predominance of a new
+idea--the principle of benevolence,--a principle however which is itself
+modified by the fundamental idea of right or law(8) into a wise or
+regulated kindliness.
+
+But what Hegel chiefly deals with under this head is the interdependence
+of form and content, of social order and personal progress. In the picture
+of an ethical organisation or harmoniously-alive moral community he shows
+us partly the underlying idea which gave room for the antithesis between
+law and conscience, and partly the outlines of the ideal in which that
+conflict becomes only the instrument of progress. This organisation has
+three grades or three typical aspects. These are the Family, Civil
+Society, and the State. The first of these, the Family, must be taken to
+include those primary unities of human life where the natural affinity of
+sex and the natural ties of parentage are the preponderant influence in
+forming and maintaining the social group. This, as it were, is the
+soul-nucleus of social organisation: where the principle of unity is an
+instinct, a feeling, an absorbing solidarity. Next comes what Hegel has
+called Civil Society,--meaning however by civil the antithesis to
+political, the society of those who may be styled _bourgeois_, not
+_citoyens_:--and meaning by society the antithesis to community. There are
+other natural influences binding men together besides those which form the
+close unities of the family, gens, tribe, or clan. Economical needs
+associate human beings within a much larger radius--in ways capable of
+almost indefinite expansion--but also in a way much less intense and deep.
+Civil Society is the more or less loosely organised aggregate of such
+associations, which, if, on one hand, they keep human life from stagnating
+in the mere family, on another, accentuate more sharply the tendency to
+competition and the struggle for life. Lastly, in the Political State
+comes the synthesis of family and society. Of the family; in so far as the
+State tends to develope itself on the nature-given unit of the Nation (an
+extended family, supplementing as need arises real descent by fictitious
+incorporations), and has apparently never permanently maintained itself
+except on the basis of a predominant common nationality. Of society; in so
+far as the extension and dispersion of family ties have left free room for
+the differentiation of many other sides of human interest and action, and
+given ground for the full development of individuality. In consequence of
+this, the State (and such a state as Hegel describes is essentially the
+idea or ideal of the modern State)(9) has a certain artificial air about
+it. It can only be maintained by the free action of intelligence: it must
+make its laws public: it must bring to consciousness the principles of its
+constitution, and create agencies for keeping up unity of organisation
+through the several separate provinces or contending social interests,
+each of which is inclined to insist on the right of home mis-rule.
+
+The State--which in its actuality must always be a quasi-national state--is
+thus the supreme unity of Nature and Mind. Its natural basis in land,
+language, blood, and the many ties which spring therefrom, has to be
+constantly raised into an intelligent unity through universal interests.
+But the elements of race and of culture have no essential connexion, and
+they perpetually incline to wrench themselves asunder. Blood and judgment
+are for ever at war in the state as in the individual(10): the
+cosmopolitan interest, to which the maxim is _Ubi bene, ibi patria_,
+resists the national, which adopts the patriotic watchword of Hector(11).
+The State however has another source of danger in the very principle that
+gave it birth. It arose through antagonism: it was baptised on the
+battlefield, and it only lives as it is able to assert itself against a
+foreign foe. And this circumstance tends to intensify and even pervert its
+natural basis of nationality:--tends to give the very conception of the
+political a negative and superficial look. But, notwithstanding all these
+drawbacks, the State in its Idea is entitled to the name Hobbes gave
+it,--the Mortal God. Here in a way culminates the obviously objective,--we
+may almost say, visible and tangible--development of Man and Mind. Here it
+attains a certain completeness--a union of reality and of ideality: a
+quasi-immortality, a quasi-universality. What the individual person could
+not do unaided, he can do in the strength of his commonwealth. Much that
+in the solitary was but implicit or potential, is in the State actualised.
+
+But the God of the State is a mortal God. It is but a national and a
+limited mind. To be actual, one must at least begin by restricting
+oneself. Or, rather actuality is rational, but always with a conditioned
+and a relative rationality(12): it is in the realm of action and
+re-action,--in the realm of change and nature. It has warring forces
+outside it,--warring forces inside it. Its unity is never perfect: because
+it never produces a true identity of interests within, or maintains an
+absolute independence without. Thus the true and real State--the State in
+its Idea--the realisation of concrete humanity,--of Mind as the fullness and
+unity of nature--is not reached in any single or historical State: but
+floats away, when we try to seize it, into the endless progress of
+history. Always indeed the State, the historical and objective, points
+beyond itself. It does so first in the succession of times. _Die
+Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht._(13) And in that doom of the world the
+eternal blast sweeps along the successive generations of the temporal, one
+expelling another from the stage of time--each because it is inadequate to
+the Idea which it tried to express, and has succumbed to an enemy from
+without because it was not a real and true unity within.
+
+But if temporal flees away before another temporal, it abides in so far as
+it has, however inadequately, given expression and visible reality--as it
+points inward and upward--to the eternal. The earthly state is also the
+city of God; and if the republic of Plato seems to find scant admission
+into the reality of flesh and blood, it stands eternal as a witness in the
+heaven of idea. Behind the fleeting succession of consulates and
+dictatures, of aristocracy and empire, feuds of plebeian with patrician,
+in that apparent anarchy of powers which the so-called Roman constitution
+is to the superficial observer, there is the eternal Rome, one, strong,
+victorious, _semper eadem_: the Rome of Virgil and Justinian, the ghost
+whereof still haunts with memories the seven-hilled city, but which with
+full spiritual presence lives in the law, the literature, the manners of
+the modern world. To find fitter expression for this Absolute Mind than it
+has in the Ethical community--to reach that reality of which the moral
+world is but one-sidedly representative--is the work of Art, Religion, and
+Philosophy. And to deal with these efforts to find the truth and the unity
+of Mind and Nature is the subject of Hegel's third Section.
+
+
+
+(iii.) Religion and Philosophy.
+
+
+It may be well at this point to guard against a misconception of this
+serial order of exposition(14). As stage is seen to follow stage, the
+historical imagination, which governs our ordinary current of ideas, turns
+the logical dependence into a time-sequence. But it is of course not meant
+that the later stage follows the earlier in history. The later is the more
+real, and therefore the more fundamental. But we can only understand by
+abstracting and then transcending our abstractions, or rather by showing
+how the abstraction implies relations which force us to go further and
+beyond our arbitrary arrest. Each stage therefore either stands to that
+preceding it as an antithesis, which inevitably dogs its steps as an
+accusing spirit, or it is the conjunction of the original thesis with the
+antithesis, in a union which should not be called synthesis because it is
+a closer fusion and true marriage of minds. A truth and reality, though
+fundamental, is only appreciated at its true value and seen in all its
+force where it appears as the reconciliation and reunion of partial and
+opposing points of view. Thus, e.g., the full significance of the State
+does not emerge so long as we view it in isolation as a supposed single
+state, but only as it is seen in the conflict of history, in its actual
+"energy" as a world-power among powers, always pointing beyond itself to a
+something universal which it fain would be, and yet cannot be. Or, again,
+there never was a civil or economic society which existed save under the
+wing of a state, or in one-sided assumption of state powers to itself: and
+a family is no isolated and independent unit belonging to a supposed
+patriarchal age, but was always mixed up with, and in manifold dependence
+upon, political and civil combinations. The true family, indeed, far from
+preceding the state in time, presupposes the political power to give it
+its precise sphere and its social stability: as is well illustrated by
+that typical form of it presented in the Roman state.
+
+So, again, religion does not supervene upon an already existing political
+and moral system and invest it with an additional sanction. The true order
+would be better described as the reverse. The real basis of social life,
+and even of intelligence, is religion. As some thinkers quaintly put it,
+the known rests and lives on the bosom of the Unknowable. But when we say
+that, we must at once guard against a misconception. There are religions
+of all sorts; and some of them which are most heard of in the modern world
+only exist or survive in the shape of a traditional name and venerated
+creed which has lost its power. Nor is a religion necessarily committed to
+a definite conception of a supernatural--of a personal power outside the
+order of Nature. But in all cases, religion is a faith and a theory which
+gives unity to the facts of life, and gives it, not because the unity is
+in detail proved or detected, but because life and experience in their
+deepest reality inexorably demand and evince such a unity to the heart.
+The religion of a time is not its nominal creed, but its dominant
+conviction of the meaning of reality, the principle which animates all its
+being and all its striving, the faith it has in the laws of nature and the
+purpose of life. Dimly or clearly felt and perceived, religion has for its
+principle (one cannot well say, its object) not the unknowable, but the
+inner unity of life and knowledge, of act and consciousness, a unity which
+is certified in its every knowledge, but is never fully demonstrable by
+the summation of all its ascertained items. As such a felt and believed
+synthesis of the world and life, religion is the unity which gives
+stability and harmony to the social sphere; just as morality in its turn
+gives a partial and practical realisation to the ideal of religion. But
+religion does not merely establish and sanction morality; it also frees it
+from a certain narrowness it always has, as of the earth. Or, otherwise
+put, morality has to the keener inspection something in it which is more
+than the mere moral injunction at first indicates. Beyond the moral, in
+its stricter sense, as the obligatory duty and the obedience to law, rises
+and expands the beautiful and the good: a beautiful which is
+disinterestedly loved, and a goodness which has thrown off all utilitarian
+relativity, and become a free self-enhancing joy. The true spirit of
+religion sees in the divine judgment not a mere final sanction to human
+morality which has failed of its earthly close, not the re-adjustment of
+social and political judgments in accordance with our more conscientious
+inner standards, but a certain, though, for our part-by-part vision,
+incalculable proportion between what is done and suffered. And in this
+liberation of the moral from its restrictions, Art renders no slight aid.
+Thus in different ways, religion presupposes morality to fill up its
+vacant form, and morality presupposes religion to give its laws an
+ultimate sanction, which at the same time points beyond their limitations.
+
+But art, religion, and philosophy still rest on the national culture and
+on the individual mind. However much they rise in the heights of the ideal
+world, they never leave the reality of life and circumstance behind, and
+float in the free empyrean. Yet there are degrees of universality, degrees
+in which they reach what they promised. As the various psychical _nuclei_
+of an individual consciousness tend through the course of experience to
+gather round a central idea and by fusion and assimilation form a complete
+mental organisation; so, through the march of history, there grows up a
+complication and a fusion of national ideas and aspirations, which, though
+still retaining the individuality and restriction of a concrete national
+life, ultimately present an organisation social, aesthetic, and religious
+which is a type of humanity in its universality and completeness. Always
+moving in the measure and on the lines of the real development of its
+social organisation, the art and religion of a nation tend to give
+expression to what social and political actuality at its best but
+imperfectly sets in existence. They come more and more to be, not mere
+competing fragments as set side by side with those of others, but
+comparatively equal and complete representations of the many-sided and
+many-voiced reality of man and the world. Yet always they live and
+flourish in reciprocity with the fullness of practical institutions and
+individual character. An abstractly universal art and religion is a
+delusion--until all diversities of geography and climate, of language and
+temperament, have been made to disappear. If these energies are in power
+and reality and not merely in name, they cannot be applied like a panacea
+or put on like a suit of ready-made clothes. If alive, they grow with
+individualised type out of the social situation: and they can only attain
+a vulgar and visible universality, so far as they attach themselves to
+some simple and uniform aspects,--a part tolerably identical everywhere--in
+human nature in all times and races.
+
+Art, according to Hegel's account, is the first of the three expressions
+of Absolute Mind. But the key-note to the whole is to be found in
+Religion(15): or Religion is the generic description of that phase of mind
+which has found rest in the fullness of attainment and is no longer a
+struggle and a warfare, but a fruition. "It is the conviction of all
+nations," he says(16), "that in the religious consciousness they hold
+their truth; and they have always regarded religion as their dignity and
+as the Sunday of their life. Whatever excites our doubts and alarms, all
+grief and all anxiety, all that the petty fields of finitude can offer to
+attract us, we leave behind on the shoals of time: and as the traveller on
+the highest peak of a mountain range, removed from every distinct view of
+the earth's surface, quietly lets his vision neglect all the restrictions
+of the landscape and the world; so in this pure region of faith man,
+lifted above the hard and inflexible reality, sees it with his mind's eye
+reflected in the rays of the mental sun to an image where its discords,
+its lights and shades, are softened to eternal calm. In this region of
+mind flow the waters of forgetfulness, from which Psyche drinks, and in
+which she drowns all her pain: and the darknesses of this life are here
+softened to a dream-image, and transfigured into a mere setting for the
+splendours of the Eternal.'"
+
+If we take Religion, in this extended sense, we find it is the sense, the
+vision, the faith, the certainty of the eternal in the changeable, of the
+infinite in the finite, of the reality in appearance, of the truth in
+error. It is freedom from the distractions and pre-occupations of the
+particular details of life; it is the sense of permanence, repose,
+certainty, rounding off, toning down and absorbing the vicissitude, the
+restlessness, the doubts of actual life. Such a victory over palpable
+reality has no doubt its origin--its embryology--in phases of mind which
+have been already discussed in the first section. Religion will vary
+enormously according to the grade of national mood of mind and social
+development in which it emerges. But whatever be the peculiarities of its
+original swaddling-clothes, its cardinal note will be a sense of
+dependence on, and independence in, something more permanent, more august,
+more of a surety and stay than visible and variable nature and
+man,--something also which whether God or devil, or both in one, holds the
+keys of life and death, of weal and woe, and holds them from some safe
+vantage-ground above the lower realms of change. By this central being the
+outward and the inward, past and present and to come, are made one. And as
+already indicated, Religion, emerging, as it does, from social man, from
+mind ethical, will retain traces of the two _foci_ in society: the
+individual subjectivity and the objective community. Retain them however
+only as traces, which still show in the actually envisaged reconciliation.
+For that is what religion does to morality. It carries a step higher the
+unity or rather combination gained in the State: it is the fuller harmony
+of the individual and the collectivity. The moral conscience rests in
+certainty and fixity on the religious.
+
+But Religion (thus widely understood as the faith in sempiternal and
+all-explaining reality) at first appears under a guise of Art. The poem
+and the pyramid, the temple-image and the painting, the drama and the
+fairy legend, these are religion: but they are, perhaps, religion as Art.
+And that means that they present the eternal under sensible
+representations, the work of an artist, and in a perishable material of
+limited range. Yet even the carvers of a long-past day whose works have
+been disinterred from the plateaux of Auvergne knew that they gave to the
+perishable life around them a quasi-immortality: and the myth-teller of a
+savage tribe elevated the incident of a season into a perennial power of
+love and fear. The cynic may remind us that from the finest picture of the
+artist, readily
+
+
+                              "We turn
+    To yonder girl that fords the burn."
+
+
+And yet it may be said in reply to the cynic that, had it not been for the
+deep-imprinted lesson of the artist, it would have been but a brutal
+instinct that would have drawn our eyes. The artist, the poet, the
+musician, reveal the meaning, the truth, the reality of the world: they
+teach us, they help us, backward younger brothers, to see, to hear, to
+feel what our rude senses had failed to detect. They enact the miracle of
+the loaves and fishes, again and again: out of the common limited things
+of every day they produce a bread of life in which the generations
+continue to find nourishment.
+
+But if Art embodies for us the unseen and the eternal, it embodies it in
+the stone, the colour, the tone, and the word: and these are by themselves
+only dead matter. To the untutored eye and taste the finest
+picture-gallery is only a weariness: when the national life has drifted
+away, the sacred book and the image are but idols and enigmas. "The
+statues are now corpses from which the vivifying soul has fled, and the
+hymns are words whence faith has departed: the tables of the Gods are
+without spiritual meat and drink, and games and feasts no longer afford
+the mind its joyful union with the being of being. The works of the Muse
+lack that intellectual force which knew itself strong and real by crushing
+gods and men in its winepress. They are now (in this iron age) what they
+are for us,--fair fruits broken from the tree, and handed to us by a kindly
+destiny. But the gift is like the fruits which the girl in the picture
+presents: she does not give the real life of their existence, not the tree
+which bore them, not the earth and the elements which entered into their
+substance, nor the climate which formed their quality, nor the change of
+seasons which governed the process of their growth. Like her, Destiny in
+giving us the works of ancient art does not give us their world, not the
+spring and summer of the ethical life in which they blossomed and ripened,
+but solely a memory and a suggestion of this actuality. Our act in
+enjoying them, therefore, is not a Divine service: were it so, our mind
+would achieve its perfect and satisfying truth. All that we do is a mere
+externalism, which from these fruits wipes off some rain-drop, some speck
+of dust, and which, in place of the inward elements of moral actuality
+that created and inspired them, tries from the dead elements of their
+external reality, such as language and historical allusion, to set up a
+tedious mass of scaffolding, not in order to live ourselves into them, but
+only to form a picture of them in our minds. But as the girl who proffers
+the plucked fruits is more and nobler than the natural element with all
+its details of tree, air, light, &c. which first yielded them, because she
+gathers all this together, in a nobler way, into the glance of the
+conscious eye and the gesture which proffers them; so the spirit of
+destiny which offers us those works of art is more than the ethical life
+and actuality of the ancient people: for it is the inwardising of that
+mind which in them was still self-estranged and self-dispossessed:--it is
+the spirit of tragic destiny, the destiny which collects all those
+individualised gods and attributes of substance into the one Pantheon. And
+that temple of all the gods is Mind conscious of itself as mind(17)."
+
+Religion enters into its more adequate form when it ceases to appear in
+the guise of Art and realises that the kingdom of God is within, that the
+truth must be _felt_, the eternal _inwardly_ revealed, the holy one
+apprehended by _faith_(18), not by outward vision. Eye hath not seen, nor
+ear heard, the things of God. They cannot be presented, or delineated:
+they come only in the witness of the spirit. The human soul itself is the
+only worthy temple of the Most High, whom heaven, and the heaven of
+heavens, cannot contain. Here in truth God has come down to dwell with
+men; and the Son of Man, caught up in the effusion of the Spirit, can in
+all assurance and all humility claim that he is divinified. Here
+apparently Absolute Mind is reached: the soul knows no limitation, no
+struggle: in time it is already eternal. Yet, there is, according to
+Hegel, a flaw,--not in the essence and the matter, but in the manner and
+mode in which the ordinary religious consciousness represents to itself,
+or pictures that unification which it feels and experiences.
+
+"In religion then this unification of ultimate Being with the Self is
+implicitly reached. But the religious consciousness, if it has this
+symbolic idea of its reconciliation, still has it as a mere symbol or
+representation. It attains the satisfaction by tacking on to its pure
+negativity, and that externally, the positive signification of its unity
+with the ultimate Being: its satisfaction remains therefore tainted by the
+antithesis of another world. Its own reconciliation, therefore, is
+presented to its consciousness as something far away, something far away
+in the future: just as the reconciliation which the other Self
+accomplished appears as a far-away thing in the past. The one Divine Man
+had but an implicit father and only an actual mother; conversely the
+universal divine man, the community, has its own deed and knowledge for
+its father, but for its mother only the eternal Love, which it only
+_feels_, but does not _behold_ in its consciousness as an actual immediate
+object. Its reconciliation therefore is in its heart, but still at
+variance with its consciousness, and its actuality still has a flaw. In
+its field of consciousness the place of implicit reality or side of pure
+mediation is taken by the reconciliation that lies far away behind: the
+place of the actually present, or the side of immediacy and existence, is
+filled by the world which has still to wait for its transfiguration to
+glory. Implicitly no doubt the world is reconciled with the eternal Being;
+and that Being, it is well known, no longer looks upon the object as alien
+to it, but in its love sees it as like itself. But for self-consciousness
+this immediate presence is not yet set in the full light of mind. In its
+immediate consciousness accordingly the spirit of the community is parted
+from its religious: for while the religious consciousness declares that
+they are implicitly not parted, this implicitness is not raised to reality
+and not yet grown to absolute self-certainty(19)."
+
+Religion therefore, which as it first appeared in art-worship had yet to
+realise its essential inwardness or spirituality, so has now to overcome
+the antithesis in which its (the religious) consciousness stands to the
+secular. For the peculiarly religious type of mind is distinguished by an
+indifference and even hostility, more or less veiled, to art, to morality
+and the civil state, to science and to nature. Strong in the certainty of
+faith, or of its implicit rest in God, it resents too curious inquiry into
+the central mystery of its union, and in its distincter consciousness sets
+the foundation of faith on the evidence of a fact, which, however, it in
+the same breath declares to be unique and miraculous, the central event of
+the ages, pointing back in its reference to the first days of humanity,
+and forward in the future to the winding-up of the business of terrestrial
+life. Philosophy, according to Hegel's conception of it, does but draw the
+conclusion supplied by the premisses of religion: it supplements and
+rounds off into coherence the religious implications. The unique events in
+Judea nearly nineteen centuries ago are for it also the first step in a
+new revelation of man's relationship to God: but while it acknowledges the
+transcendent interest of that age, it lays main stress on the permanent
+truth then revealed, and it insists on the duty of carrying out the
+principle there awakened to all the depth and breadth of its explication.
+Its task--its supreme task--is to _explicate religion_. But to do so is to
+show that religion is no exotic, and no _mere_ revelation from an external
+source. It is to show that religion is the truth, the complete reality, of
+the mind that lived in Art, that founded the state and sought to be
+dutiful and upright: the truth, the crowning fruit of all scientific
+knowledge, of all human affections, of all secular consciousness. Its
+lesson ultimately is that there is nothing essentially common or unclean:
+that the holy is not parted off from the true and the good and the
+beautiful.
+
+Religion thus expanded descends from its abstract or "intelligible" world,
+to which it had retired from art and science, and the affairs of ordinary
+life. Its God--as a true God--is not of the dead alone, but also of the
+living: not a far-off supreme and ultimate Being, but also a man among
+men. Philosophy thus has to break down the middle partition-wall of life,
+the fence between secular and sacred. It is but religion come to its
+maturity, made at home in the world, and no longer a stranger and a
+wonder. Religion has pronounced in its inmost heart and faith of faith,
+that the earth is the Lord's, and that day unto day shows forth the divine
+handiwork. But the heart of unbelief, of little faith, has hardly uttered
+the word, than it forgets its assurance and leans to the conviction that
+the prince of this world is the Spirit of Evil. The mood of Théodicée is
+also--but with a difference--the mood of philosophy. It asserts the ways of
+Providence: but its providence is not the God of the Moralist, or the
+ideal of the Artist, or rather is not these only, but also the Law of
+Nature, and more than that. Its aim is the Unity of History. The words
+have sometimes been lightly used to mean that events run on in one
+continuous flow, and that there are no abrupt, no ultimate beginnings,
+parting age from age. But the Unity of History in its full sense is beyond
+history: it is history "reduced" from the expanses of time to the eternal
+present: its thousand years made one day,--made even the glance of a
+moment. The theme of the Unity of History--in the full depth of unity and
+the full expanse of history--is the theme of Hegelian philosophy. It traces
+the process in which Mind has to be all-inclusive, self-upholding, one
+with the Eternal reality.
+
+"That process of the mind's self-realisation" says Hegel in the close of
+his _Phenomenology_, "exhibits a lingering movement and succession of
+minds, a gallery of images, each of which, equipped with the complete
+wealth of mind, only seems to linger because the Self has to penetrate and
+to digest this wealth of its Substance. As its perfection consists in
+coming completely to _know_ what it _is_ (its substance), this knowledge
+is its self-involution in which it deserts its outward existence and
+surrenders its shape to recollection. Thus self-involved, it is sunk in
+the night of its self-consciousness: but in that night its vanished being
+is preserved, and that being, thus in idea preserved,--old, but now
+new-born of the spirit,--is the new sphere of being, a new world, a new
+phase of mind. In this new phase it has again to begin afresh and from the
+beginning, and again nurture itself to maturity from its own resources, as
+if for it all that preceded were lost, and it had learned nothing from the
+experience of the earlier minds. Yet is that recollection a preservation
+of experience: it is the quintessence, and in fact a higher form, of the
+substance. If therefore this new mind appears only to count on its own
+resources, and to start quite fresh and blank, it is at the same time on a
+higher grade that it starts. The intellectual and spiritual realm, which
+is thus constructed in actuality, forms a succession in time, where one
+mind relieved another of its watch, and each took over the kingdom of the
+world from the preceding. The purpose of that succession is to reveal the
+depth, and that depth is the absolute comprehension of mind: this
+revelation is therefore to uplift its depth, to spread it out in breadth,
+so negativing this self-involved Ego, wherein it is self-dispossessed or
+reduced to substance. But it is also its time: the course of time shows
+this dispossession itself dispossessed, and thus in its extension it is no
+less in its depth, the self. The way to that goal,--absolute
+self-certainty--or the mind knowing itself as mind--is the inwardising of
+the minds, as they severally are in themselves, and as they accomplish the
+organisation of their realm. Their conservation,--regarded on the side of
+its free and apparently contingent succession of fact--is history: on the
+side of their comprehended organisation, again, it is the science of
+mental phenomenology: the two together, comprehended history, form at once
+the recollection and the grave-yard of the absolute Mind, the actuality,
+truth, and certitude of his throne, apart from which he were lifeless and
+alone."
+
+Such in brief outline--lingering most on the points where Hegel has here
+been briefest--is the range of the Philosophy of Mind. Its aim is to
+comprehend, not to explain: to put together in intelligent unity, not to
+analyse into a series of elements. For it psychology is not an analysis or
+description of mental phenomena, of laws of association, of the growth of
+certain powers and ideas, but a "comprehended history" of the formation of
+subjective mind, of the intelligent, feeling, willing self or ego. For it
+Ethics is part and only part of the great scheme or system of
+self-development; but continuing into greater concreteness the normal
+endowment of the individual mind, and but preparing the ground on which
+religion may be most effectively cultivated. And finally Religion itself,
+released from its isolation and other-world sacrosanctity, is shown to be
+only the crown of life, the ripest growth of actuality, and shown to be so
+by philosophy, whilst it is made clear that religion is the basis of
+philosophy, or that a philosophy can only go as far as the religious
+stand-point allows. The hierarchy, if so it be called, of the spiritual
+forces is one where none can stand alone, or claim an abstract and
+independent supremacy. The truth of egoism is the truth of altruism: the
+truly moral is the truly religious: and each is not what it professes to
+be unless it anticipate the later, or include the earlier.
+
+
+
+(iv.) Mind or Spirit.
+
+
+It may be said, however, that for such a range of subjects the term Mind
+is wretchedly inadequate and common-place, and that the better rendering
+of the title would be Philosophy of Spirit. It may be admitted that Mind
+is not all that could be wished. But neither is Spirit blameless. And, it
+may be added, Hegel's own term _Geist_ has to be unduly strained to cover
+so wide a region. It serves--and was no doubt meant to serve--as a sign of
+the conformity of his system with the religion which sees in God no
+other-world being, but our very self and mind, and which worships him in
+spirit and in truth. And if the use of a word like this could allay the
+"ancient variance" between the religious and the philosophic mood, it
+would be but churlish perhaps to refuse the sign of compliance and
+compromise. But whatever may be the case in German,--and even there the new
+wine was dangerous to the old wine-skin--it is certain that to average
+English ears the word Spiritual would carry us over the medium line into
+the proper land of religiosity. And to do that, as we have seen, is to sin
+against the central idea: the idea that religion is of one blood with the
+whole mental family, though the most graciously complete of all the
+sisters. Yet, however the word may be chosen, the philosophy of Hegel,
+like the august lady who appeared in vision to the emprisoned Boëthius,
+has on her garment a sign which "signifies the life which is on earth," as
+also a sign which signifies the "right law of heaven"; if her right-hand
+holds the "book of the justice of the King omnipotent," the sceptre in her
+left is "corporal judgment against sin(20)."
+
+There is indeed no sufficient reason for contemning the term Mind. If
+Inductive Philosophy of the Human Mind has--perhaps to a dainty taste--made
+the word unsavoury, that is no reason for refusing to give it all the
+wealth of soul and heart, of intellect and will. The _mens aeterna_ which,
+if we hear Tacitus, expressed the Hebrew conception of the spirituality of
+God, and the {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} which Aristotelianism set supreme in the Soul, are not
+the mere or abstract intelligence, which late-acquired habits of
+abstraction have made out of them. If the reader will adopt the term (in
+want of a better) in its widest scope, we may shelter ourselves under the
+example of Wordsworth. His theme is--as he describes it in the
+_Recluse_--"the Mind and Man": his
+
+
+                        "voice proclaims
+    How exquisitely the individual Mind
+    (And the progressive powers perhaps no less
+    Of the whole species) to the external World
+    Is fitted;--and how exquisitely too
+    The external World is fitted to the Mind;
+    And the creation (by no lower name
+    Can it be called) which they with blended might
+    Accomplish."
+
+
+The verse which expounds that "high argument" speaks
+
+
+    "Of Truth, of Grandeur, Beauty, Love and Hope
+    And melancholy Fear subdued by Faith."
+
+
+And the poet adds:
+
+
+                              "As we look
+    Into our Minds, into the Mind of Man--
+    My haunt, and the main region of my song;
+    Beauty--a living Presence of the earth
+    Surpassing the most fair ideal forms
+    ... waits upon my steps."
+
+
+The reality duly seen in the spiritual vision
+
+
+                    "That inspires
+    The human Soul of universal earth
+    Dreaming of things to come"
+
+
+will be a greater glory than the ideals of imaginative fiction ever
+fancied:
+
+
+    "For the discerning intellect of Man,
+    When wedded to this goodly universe
+    In love and holy passion, shall find these
+    A simple produce of the common day."
+
+
+If Wordsworth, thus, as it were, echoing the great conception of Francis
+Bacon,
+
+
+    "Would chant, in lonely peace, the spousal verse
+    Of this great consummation,"
+
+
+perhaps the poet and the essayist may help us with Hegel to rate the
+Mind--the Mind of Man--at its highest value.
+
+
+
+
+Essay II. Aims And Methods Of Psychology.
+
+
+It is not going too far to say that in common estimation psychology has as
+yet hardly reached what Kant has called the steady walk of science--_der
+sichere Gang der Wissenschaft_. To assert this is not, of course, to throw
+any doubts on the importance of the problems, or on the intrinsic value of
+the results, in the studies which have been prosecuted under that name. It
+is only to note the obvious fact that a number of inquiries of somewhat
+discrepant tone, method, and tendency have all at different times covered
+themselves under the common title of psychological, and that the work of
+orientation is as yet incomplete. Such a destiny seems inevitable, when a
+name is coined rather as the title of an unexplored territory, than fixed
+on to describe an accomplished fact.
+
+
+
+(i.) Psychology as a Science and as a Part of Philosophy.
+
+
+The _De Anima_ of Aristotle, gathering up into one the work of Plato and
+his predecessors, may be said to lay the foundation of psychology. But
+even in it, we can already see that there are two elements or aspects
+struggling for mastery: two elements not unrelated or independent, but
+hard to keep fairly and fully in unity. On one hand there is the
+conception of Soul as a part of Nature, as a grade of existence in the
+physical or natural universe,--in the universe of things which suffer
+growth and change, which are never entirely "without matter," and are
+always attached to or present in body. From this point of view Aristotle
+urged that a sound and realistic psychology must, e.g. in its definition
+of a passion, give the prominent place to its physical (or material)
+expression, and not to its mental form or significance. It must remember,
+he said, that the phenomena or "accidents" are what really throw light on
+the nature or the "substance" of the Soul. On the other hand, there are
+two points to be considered. There is, first of all, the counterpoising
+remark that the conception of Soul as such, as a unity and common
+characteristic, will be determinative of the phenomena or
+"accidents,"--will settle, as it were, what we are to observe and look for,
+and how we are to describe our observations. And by the _conception_ of
+Soul, is meant not _a_ soul, as a thing or agent (subject) which has
+properties attaching to it; but soul, as the generic feature, the
+universal, which is set as a stamp on everything that claims to be
+psychical. In other words, Soul is one, not as a single thing contrasted
+with its attributes, activities, or exercises of force (such single thing
+will be shown by logic to be a metaphysical fiction); but as the unity of
+form and character, the comprehensive and identical feature, which is
+present in all its manifestations and exercises. But there is a second
+consideration. The question is asked by Aristotle whether it is completely
+and strictly accurate to put Soul under the category of natural objects.
+There is in it, or of it, perhaps, something, and something essential to
+it, which belongs to the order of the eternal and self-active: something
+which is "form" and "energy" quite unaffected by and separate from
+"matter." How this is related to the realm of the perishable and
+changeable is a problem on which Aristotle has been often (and with some
+reason) believed to be obscure, if not even inconsistent(21).
+
+In these divergent elements which come to the fore in Aristotle's
+treatment we have the appearance of a radical difference of conception and
+purpose as to psychology. He himself does a good deal to keep them both in
+view. But it is evident that here already we have the contrast between a
+purely physical or (in the narrower sense) "scientific" psychology,
+empirical and realistic in treatment, and a more philosophical--what in
+certain quarters would be called a speculative or metaphysical--conception
+of the problem. There is also in Aristotle the antithesis of a popular or
+superficial, and an accurate or analytic, psychology. The former is of a
+certain use in dealing, say, with questions of practical ethics and
+education: the latter is of more strictly scientific interest. Both of
+these distinctions--that between a speculative and an empirical, and that
+between a scientific and a popular treatment--affect the subsequent history
+of the study. Psychology is sometimes understood to mean the results of
+casual observation of our own minds by what is termed introspection, and
+by the interpretation of what we may observe in others. Such observations
+are in the first place carried on under the guidance of distinctions or
+points of view supplied by the names in common use. We interrogate our own
+consciousness as to what facts or relations of facts correspond to the
+terms of our national language. Or we attempt--what is really an
+inexhaustible quest--to get definite divisions between them, and clear-cut
+definitions. Inquiries like these which start from popular distinctions
+fall a long way short of science: and the inquirer will find that
+accidental and essential properties are given in the same handful of
+conclusions. Yet there is always much value in these attempts to get our
+minds cleared: and it is indispensable for all inquiries that all alleged
+or reported facts of mind should be realised and reproduced in our own
+mental experience. And this is especially the case in psychology, just
+because here we cannot get the object outside us, we cannot get or make a
+diagram, and unless we give it reality by re-constructing it,--by
+re-interrogating our own experience, our knowledge of it will be but
+wooden and mechanical. And the term introspection need not be too
+seriously taken: it means much more than watching passively an internal
+drama; and is quite as well describable as mental projection, setting out
+what was within, and so as it were hidden and involved, before ourselves
+in the field of mental vision. Here, as always, the essential point is to
+get ourselves well out of the way of the object observed, and to stand,
+figuratively speaking, quite on one side.
+
+But even at the best, such a popular or empirical psychology has no
+special claim to be ranked as science. It may no doubt be said that at
+least it collects, describes, or notes down facts. But even this is not so
+certain as it seems. Its so-called facts are very largely fictions, or so
+largely interpolated with error, that they cannot be safely used for
+construction. If psychology is to accomplish anything valuable, it must go
+more radically to work. It must--at least in a measure--discard from its
+preliminary view the data of common and current distinctions, and try to
+get at something more primary or ultimate as its starting-point. And this
+it may do in two ways. It may, in the one case, follow the example of the
+physical sciences. In these it is the universal practice to assume that
+the explanation of complex and concrete facts is to be attained by (_a_)
+postulating certain simple elements (which we may call atoms, molecules,
+and perhaps units or monads), which are supposed to be clearly conceivable
+and to justify themselves by intrinsic intelligibility, and by (_b_)
+assuming that these elements are compounded and combined according to laws
+which again are in the last resort self-evident, or such that they seem to
+have an obvious and palpable lucidity. Further, such laws being always
+axioms or plain postulates of mechanics (for these alone possess this
+feature of self-evident intelligibility), they are subject to and invite
+all the aids and refinements of the higher mathematical calculus. What the
+primary and self-explicative bits of psychical reality may be, is a
+further question on which there may be some dispute. They may be, so to
+say, taken in a more physical or in a more metaphysical way: i.e. more as
+units of nerve-function or more as elements of ideative-function. And
+there may be differences as to how far and in what provinces the
+mathematical calculus may be applicable. But, in any case, there will be a
+strong tendency in psychology, worked on this plan, to follow, _mutatis
+mutandis_, and at some distance perhaps, the analogy of material physics.
+In both the justification of the postulated units and laws will be their
+ability to describe and systematise the observed phenomena in a uniform
+and consistent way.
+
+The other way in which psychology gets a foundation and ulterior certainty
+is different, and goes deeper. After all, the "scientific" method is only
+a way in which the facts of a given sphere are presented in thoroughgoing
+interconnexion, each reduced to an exact multiple or fraction of some
+other, by an inimitably continued subtraction and addition of an assumed
+homogeneous element, found or assumed to be perfectly imaginable
+(conceivable). But we may also consider the province in relation to the
+whole sphere of reality, may ask what is its place and meaning in the
+whole, what reality is in the end driving at or coming to be, and how far
+this special province contributes to that end. If we do this, we attach
+psychology to philosophy, or, if we prefer so to call it, to metaphysics,
+as in the former way we established it on the principles generally
+received as governing the method of the physical sciences.
+
+This--the relation of psychology to fundamental philosophy--is a question
+which also turns up in dealing with Ethics. There is on the part of those
+engaged in either of these inquiries a certain impatience against the
+intermeddling (which is held to be only muddling) of metaphysics with
+them. It is clear that in a very decided way both psychology and ethics
+can, up to some extent at least, be treated as what is called empirical
+(or, to use the more English phrase, inductive) sciences. On many hands
+they are actually so treated: and not without result. Considering the
+tendency of metaphysical inquiries, it may be urged that it is well to
+avoid preliminary criticism of the current conceptions and beliefs about
+reality which these sciences imply. Yet such beliefs are undoubtedly
+present and effective. Schopenhauer has popularised the principle that the
+pure empiricist is a fiction, that man is a radically metaphysical animal,
+and that he inevitably turns what he receives into a part of a dogmatic
+creed--a conviction how things ought to be. Almost without effort there
+grows up in him, or flows in upon him, a belief and a system of beliefs as
+to the order and values of things. Every judgment, even in logic, rests on
+such an order of truth. He need not be able to formulate his creed: it
+will influence him none the less: nay, his faith will probably seem more a
+part of the solid earth and common reality, the less it has been reduced
+to a determinate creed or to a code of principles. For such formulation
+presupposes doubt and scepticism, which it beats back by mere assertion.
+Each human being has such a background of convictions which govern his
+actions and conceptions, and of which it so startles him to suggest the
+possibility of a doubt, that he turns away in dogmatic horror. Such ruling
+ideas vary, from man to man, and from man to woman--if we consider them in
+all their minuteness. But above all they constitute themselves in a
+differently organised system or aggregate according to the social and
+educational stratum to which an individual belongs. Each group, engaged in
+a common task, it may be in the study of a part of nature, is ideally
+bound and obliged by a common language, and special standards of truth and
+reality for its own. Such a group of ideas is what Bacon would have called
+a scientific fetich or _idolum theatri_. A scientific _idolum_ is a
+traditional belief or dogma as to principles, values, and methods, which
+has so thoroughly pervaded the minds of those engaged in a branch of
+inquiry, that they no longer recognise its hypothetical character,--its
+relation of means to the main end of their function.
+
+Such a collected and united theory of reality (it is what Hegel has
+designated the Idea) is what is understood by a natural metaphysic. It has
+nothing necessarily to do with a supersensible or a supernatural, if these
+words mean a ghostly, materialised, but super-finely-materialised nature,
+above and beyond the present. But that there is a persistent tendency to
+conceive the unity and coherence, the theoretic idea of reality, in this
+pseudo-sensuous (i.e. super-sensuous) form, is of course a well-known
+fact. For the present, however, this aberration--this idol of the tribe--may
+be left out of sight. By a metaphysic or fundamental philosophy, is, in
+the present instance, meant a system of first principles--a secular and
+cosmic creed: a belief in ends and values, a belief in truth--again
+premising that the system in question is, for most, a rudely organised and
+almost inarticulate mass of belief and hope, conviction and impression. It
+is, in short, a _natural_ metaphysic: a metaphysic, that is, which has but
+an imperfect coherence, which imperfectly realises both its nature and its
+limits.
+
+In certain parts, however, it is more and better than this crude
+background of belief. Each science--or at least every group of sciences--has
+a more definite system or aggregate of first principles, axioms, and
+conceptions belonging to it. It has, that is,--and here in a much
+distincter way--its special standard of reality, its peculiar forms of
+conceiving things, its distinctions between the actual and the apparent,
+&c. Here again it will probably be found that the scientific specialist is
+hardly conscious that these are principles and concepts: on the contrary,
+they will be supposed self-evident and ultimate facts, foundations of
+being. Instead of being treated as modes of conception, more or less
+justified by their use and their results, these categories will be
+regarded as fundamental facts, essential conditions of all reality. Like
+popular thought in its ingrained categories, the specialist cannot
+understand the possibility of any limitation to his radical ideas of
+reality. To him they are not hypotheses, but principles. The scientific
+specialist may be as convinced of the universal application of his
+peculiar categories, as the Chinese or the Eskimo that his standards are
+natural and final.
+
+Under such metaphysical or extra-empirical presuppositions all
+investigation, whether it be crudely empirical or (in the physical sense)
+scientific, is carried on. And when so carried on, it is said to be
+prosecuted apart from any interference from metaphysic. Such a naïve or
+natural metaphysic, not raised to explicit consciousness, not followed as
+an imposed rule, but governing with the strength of an immanent faith,
+does not count for those who live under it as a metaphysic at all. M.
+Jourdain was amazed suddenly to learn he had been speaking prose for forty
+years without knowing it. But in the present case there is something worse
+than amazement sure to be excited by the news. For the critic who thus
+reveals the secrets of the scientist's heart is pretty sure to go on to
+say that a good deal of this naïve unconscious metaphysic is incoherent,
+contradictory, even bad: that it requires correction, revision, and
+readjustment, and has by criticism to be made one and harmonious. That
+readjustment or criticism which shall eliminate contradiction and produce
+unity, is the aim of the _science_ of metaphysic--the science of the
+meta-physical element in physical knowledge: what Hegel has chosen to call
+the Science of Logic (in the wide sense of the term). This higher Logic,
+this _science_ of metaphysic, is the process to revise and harmonise in
+systematic completeness the imperfect or misleading and partial estimates
+of reality which are to be found in popular and scientific thought.
+
+In the case of the run of physical sciences this revision is less
+necessary; and for no very recondite reason. Every science by its very
+nature deals with a special, a limited topic. It is confined to a part or
+aspect of reality. Its propositions are not complete truths; they apply to
+an artificial world, to a part expressly cut off from the concrete
+reality. Its principles are generally cut according to their
+cloth,--according to the range in which they apply. The only danger that
+can well arise is if these categories are transplanted without due
+reservations, and made of universal application, i.e. if the scientist
+elects on his speciality to pronounce _de omnibus rebus_. But in the case
+of psychology and ethics the harmlessness of natural metaphysics will be
+less certain. Here a general human or universal interest is almost an
+inevitable coefficient: especially if they really rise to the full sweep
+of the subject. For as such they both seem to deal not with a part of
+reality, but with the very centre and purpose of all reality. In them we
+are not dealing with topics of secondary interest, but with the very heart
+of the human problem. Here the questions of reality and ideals, of unity
+and diversity, and of the evaluation of existence, come distinctly to the
+fore. If psychology is to answer the question, What am I? and ethics the
+question, What ought I to do? they can hardly work without some formulated
+creed of metaphysical character, without some preliminary criticisms of
+current first principles.
+
+
+
+(ii.) Herbart.
+
+
+The German thinker, who has given perhaps the most fruitful stimulus to
+the scientific study of psychology in modern times--Johann Friedrich
+Herbart--is after all essentially a philosopher, and not a mere scientist,
+even in his psychology. His psychological inquiry, that is, stands in
+intimate connexion with the last questions of all intelligence, with
+metaphysics and ethics. The business of philosophy, says Herbart, is to
+touch up and finish off conceptions (_Bearbeitung der Begriffe_)(22). It
+finds, as it supervenes upon the unphilosophical world, that mere and pure
+facts (if there ever are or were such purisms) have been enveloped in a
+cloud of theory, have been construed into some form of unity, but have
+been imperfectly, inadequately construed: and that the existing concepts
+in current use need to be corrected, supplemented and readjusted. It has,
+accordingly, for its work to "reconcile experience with itself(23)," and
+to elicit "the hidden pre-suppositions without which the fact of
+experience is unthinkable." Psychology, then, as a branch of this
+philosophic enterprise, has to readjust the facts discovered in inner
+experience. For mere uncritical experience or merely empirical knowledge
+only offers _problems_; it suggests gaps, which indeed further reflection
+serves at first only to deepen into contradictions. Such a psychology is
+"speculative": i.e. it is not content to accept the mere given, but goes
+forward and backward to find something that will make the fact
+intelligible. It employs totally different methods from the
+"classification, induction, analogy" familiar to the logic of the
+empirical sciences. Its "principles," therefore, are not given facts: but
+facts which have been manipulated and adjusted so as to lose their
+self-contradictory quality: they are facts "reduced," by introducing the
+omitted relationships which they postulate if they are to be true and
+self-consistent(24). While it is far from rejecting or ignoring
+experience, therefore, psychology cannot strictly be said to build upon it
+alone. It uses experimental fact as an unfinished datum,--or it sees in
+experience a torso which betrays its imperfection, and suggests
+completing.
+
+The starting-point, it may be said, of Herbart's psychology is a question
+which to the ordinary psychologist (and to the so-called scientific
+psychologist) has a secondary, if it have any interest. It was, he says,
+the problem of Personality, the problem of the Self or Ego, which first
+led to his characteristic conception of psychological method. "My first
+discovery," he tells us(25), "was that the Self was neither primitive nor
+independent, but must be the most dependent and most conditioned thing one
+can imagine. The second was that the elementary ideas of an intelligent
+being, if they were ever to reach the pitch of self-consciousness, must be
+either all, or at least in part, opposed to each other, and that they must
+check or block one another in consequence of this opposition. Though held
+in check, however, these ideas were not to be supposed lost: they subsist
+as endeavours or tendencies to return into the position of actual idea, as
+soon as the check became, for any reason, either in whole or in part
+inoperative. This check could and must be calculated, and thus it was
+clear that psychology required a mathematical as well as a metaphysical
+foundation."
+
+The place of the conception of the Ego in Kant's and Fichte's theory of
+knowledge is well known. Equally well known is Kant's treatment of the
+soul-reality or soul-substance in his examination of Rational Psychology.
+Whereas the (logical) unity of consciousness, or "synthetic unity of
+apperception," is assumed as a fundamental starting-point in explanation
+of our objective judgments, or of our knowledge of objective existence,
+its real (as opposed to its formal) foundation in a "substantial" soul is
+set aside as an illegitimate interpretation of, or inference from, the
+facts of inner experience. The belief in the separate unity and
+persistence of the soul, said Kant, is not a scientifically-warranted
+conclusion. Its true place is as an ineffaceable postulate of the faith
+which inspires human life and action. Herbart did not rest content with
+either of these--as he believed--dogmatic assumptions of his master. He did
+not fall in cheerfully with the idealism which seemed ready to dispense
+with a soul, or which justified its acceptance of empirical reality by
+referring to the fundamental unity of the function of judgment. With a
+strong bent towards fully-differentiated and individualised experience
+Herbart conjoined a conviction of the need of logical analysis to prevent
+us being carried away by the first-come and inadequate generalities. The
+Ego which, in its extremest abstraction, he found defined as the unity of
+subject and object, did not seem to him to offer the proper guarantees of
+reality: it was itself a problem, full of contradictions, waiting for
+solution. On the other hand, the real Ego, or self of concrete experience,
+is very much more than this logical abstract, and differs widely from
+individual to individual, and apparently from time to time even in the
+same individual. Our self, of which we talk so fluently, as one and the
+self-same--how far does it really possess the continuity and identity with
+which we credit it? Does it not rather seem to be an ideal which we
+gradually form and set before ourselves as the standard for measuring our
+attainments of the moment,--the perfect fulfilment of that oneness of being
+and purpose and knowledge which we never reach? Sometimes even it seems no
+better than a name which we move along the varying phenomena of our inner
+life, at one time identifying it with the power which has gained the
+victory in a moral struggle, at another with that which has been
+defeated(26), according as the attitude of the moment makes us throw now
+one, now another, aspect of mental activity in the foreground.
+
+The other--or logical Ego--the mere identity of subject and object,--when
+taken in its utter abstractness and simplicity, shrivels up to something
+very small indeed--to a something which is little better than nothing. The
+mere _I_ which is not contra-distinguished by a _Thou_ and a _He_--which is
+without all definiteness of predication (the I=I of Fichte and
+Schelling)--is only as it were a point of being cut off from all its
+connexions in reality, and treated as if it were or could be entirely
+independent. It is an identity in which subject and object have not yet
+appeared: it is not a real I, though we may still retain the name. It
+is--as Hegel's _Logic_ will tell us--exactly definable as Being, which is as
+yet Nothing: the impossible edge of abstraction on which we try--and in
+vain--to steady ourselves at the initial point of thought. And to reach or
+stand at that intangible, ungraspable point, which slips away as we
+approach, and transmutes itself as we hold it, is not the natural
+beginning, but the result of introspection and reflection on the concrete
+self. But with this aspect of the question we are not now concerned.
+
+That the unity of the Self as an intelligent and moral being, that the Ego
+of self-consciousness was an ideal and a product of development, was what
+Herbart soon became convinced of. The unity of Self is even as given in
+mature experience an imperfect fact. It is a fact, that is, which does not
+come up to what it promised, and which requires to be supplemented, or
+philosophically justified. Here and everywhere the custom of life carries
+us over gaps which yawn deep to the eye of philosophic reflection: even
+though accident and illness force them not unfrequently even upon the
+blindest. To trace the process of unification towards this unity--to trace,
+if you like, even the formation of the concept of such unity, as a
+governing and guiding principle in life and conduct, comes to be the
+problem of the psychologist, in the largest sense of that problem. From
+Soul (_Seele_) to Mind or Spirit (_Geist_) is for Herbart, as for Hegel,
+the course of psychology(27). The growth and development of mind, the
+formation of a self, the realisation of a personality, is for both the
+theme which psychology has to expound. And Herbart, not less than Hegel,
+had to bear the censure that such a conception of mental reality as a
+growth would destroy personality(28).
+
+But with so much common in the general plan, the two thinkers differ
+profoundly in their special mode of carrying out the task. Or, rather,
+they turn their strength on different departments of the whole. Herbart's
+great practical interest had been the theory of education: "paedagogic" is
+the subject of his first important writings. The inner history of
+ideas--the processes which are based on the interaction of elements in the
+individual soul--are what he specially traces. Hegel's interests, on the
+contrary, are more towards the greater process, the unities of historical
+life, and the correlations of the powers of art, religion, and philosophy
+that work therein. He turns to the macrocosm, almost as naturally as
+Herbart does to the microcosm. Thus, even in Ethics, while Herbart gives a
+delicate analysis of the distinct aspects or elements in the Ethical
+idea,--the diverse headings under which the disinterested spectator within
+the breast measures with purely aesthetic eye his approach to unity and
+strength of purpose, Hegel seems to hurry away from the field of moral
+sense or conscience to throw himself on the social and political
+organisation of the moral life. The General Paedagogic of Herbart has its
+pendant in Hegel's Philosophy of Law and of History.
+
+At an early period Herbart had become impressed with the necessity of
+applying mathematics to psychology(29). To the usual objection, that
+psychical facts do not admit of measurement, he had a ready reply. We can
+calculate even on hypothetical assumptions: indeed, could we measure, we
+should scarcely take the trouble to calculate(30). To calculate (i.e. to
+deduce mathematically) is to perform a general experiment, and to perform
+it in the medium where there is least likelihood of error or disturbance.
+There may be anomalies enough apparent in the mental life: there may be
+the great anomalies of Genius and of Freedom of Will; but the Newton and
+the Kepler of psychology will show by calculation on assumed conditions of
+psychic nature that these aberrations can be explained by mechanical laws.
+"The human Soul is no puppet-theatre: our wishes and resolutions are no
+marionettes: no juggler stands behind; but our true and proper life lies
+in our volition, and this life has its rule not outside, but in itself: it
+has its own purely mental rule, by no means borrowed from the material
+world. But this rule is in it sure and fixed; and on account of this its
+fixed quality it has more similarity to (what is otherwise heterogeneous)
+the laws of impact and pressure than to the marvels of an alleged
+inexplicable freedom(31)."
+
+Psychology then deals with a real, which exhibits phenomena analogous in
+several respects to those discussed by statics and mechanics. Its
+foundation is a statics and mechanics of the Soul,--as this real is called.
+We begin by presupposing as the ultimate reality, underlying the
+factitious and generally imperfect unity of self-consciousness and mind,
+an essential and primary unity--the unity of an absolutely simple or
+individual point of being--a real point which amongst other points asserts
+itself, maintains itself. It has a character of its own, but that
+character it only shows in and through a development conditioned by
+external influences. The specific nature of the soul-reality is to be
+representative, to produce, or manifest itself in, ideas
+(_Vorstellungen_). But the character only emerges into actuality in the
+conflict of the soul-atom with other ultimate realities in the
+congregation of things. A soul _per se_ or isolated is not possessed of
+ideas. It is merely blank, undeveloped, formal unity, of which nothing can
+be said. But like other realities it defines and characterises itself by
+antithesis, by resistance: it shows what it is by its behaviour in the
+struggle for existence. It acts in self-defence: and its peculiar style or
+weapon of self-defence is an idea or representation. The way the Soul
+maintains itself is by turning the assailant into an idea(32): and each
+idea is therefore a _Selbsterhaltung_ of the Soul. The Soul is thus
+enriched--to appearance or incidentally: and the assailant is annexed. In
+this way the one Soul may develop or evolve or express an innumerable
+variety of ideas: for in response to whatever it meets, the living and
+active Soul ideates, or gives rise to a representation. Thus, while the
+soul is one, its ideas or representations are many. Taken separately, they
+each express the psychic self-conservation. But brought in relation with
+each other, as so many acts or self-affirmations of the one soul, they
+behave as forces, and tend to thwart or check each other. It is as forces,
+as reciprocally arresting or fostering each other, that ideas are objects
+of science. When a representation is thus held in check, it is reduced to
+a mere endeavour or active tendency to represent. Thus there arises a
+distinction between representations proper, and those imperfect states or
+acts which are partly or wholly held in abeyance. But the latent phase of
+an idea is as essential to a thorough understanding of it as what appears.
+It is the great blunder of empirical psychology to ignore what is sunk
+below the surface of consciousness. And to Herbart consciousness is not
+the condition but rather the product of ideas, which are primarily forces.
+
+But representations are not merely in opposition,--impinging and resisting.
+The same reason which makes them resist, viz. that they are or would fain
+be acts of the one soul, but are more or less incompatible, leads them in
+other circumstances to form combinations with each other. These
+combinations are of two sorts. They are, first, complications, or
+"complexions": a number of ideas combine by quasi-addition and
+juxtaposition to form a total. Second, there is fusion: ideas presenting
+certain degrees of contrast enter into a union where the parts are no
+longer separately perceptible. It is easy to see how the problems of
+psychology now assume the form of a statics and mechanics of the mind.
+Quantitative data are to be sought in the strength of each separate single
+idea, and the degree in which two or more ideas block each other: in the
+degree of combination between ideas, and the number of ideas in a
+combination: and in the terms of relation between the members of a series
+of ideas. A statical theory has to show the conditions required for what
+we may call the ideal state of equilibrium of the "idea-forces": to
+determine, that is, the ultimate degree of obscuration suffered by any two
+ideas of different strength, and the conditions of their permanent
+combination or fusion. A mechanics of the mind will, on the contrary, deal
+with the rate at which these processes are brought about, the velocity
+with which in the movement of mind ideas are obscured or reawakened, &c.
+
+It is fortunately unnecessary, here, to go further into details. What
+Herbart proposes is not a method for the mathematical measurement of
+psychic facts: it is a theory of mechanics and statics specially adapted
+to the peculiarities of psychical phenomena, where the forces are given
+with no sine or cosine, where instead of gravitation we have the constant
+effort (as it were elasticity) of each idea to revert to its unchecked
+state. He claims--in short--practically to be a Kepler and Newton of the
+mind, and in so doing to justify the vague professions of more than one
+writer on mind--above all, perhaps of David Hume, who goes beyond mere
+professions--to make mental science follow the example of physics. And a
+main argument in favour of his enterprise is the declaration of Kant that
+no body of knowledge can claim to be a science except in such proportion
+as it is mathematical. And the peculiarity of this enterprise is that
+self-consciousness, the Ego, is not allowed to interfere with the free
+play of psychic forces. The Ego is--psychologically--the result, the
+product, and the varying product of that play. The play of forces is no
+doubt a unity: but its unity lies not in the synthesis of consciousness,
+but in the essential unity of Soul. And Soul is in its essence neither
+consciousness, nor self-consciousness, nor mind: but something on the
+basis of whose unity these are built up and developed(33). The mere
+"representation" does not include the further supervenience of
+consciousness: it represents, but it is not as yet necessary that we
+should also be conscious that there is representation. It is, in the
+phrase of Leibniz, perception: but not apperception. It is mere
+straight-out, not as yet reflected, representation. Gradually there
+emerges through the operation of mechanical psychics a nucleus, a floating
+unity, a fixed or definite central aggregate.
+
+The suggestion of mathematical method has been taken up by subsequent
+inquirers (as it was pursued even before Herbart's time), but not in the
+sense he meant. Experimentation has now taken a prominent place in
+psychology. But in proportion as it has done so, psychology has lost its
+native character, and thrown itself into the arms of physiology. What
+Herbart calculated were actions and reactions of idea-forces: what the
+modern experimental school proposes to measure are to a large extent the
+velocities of certain physiological processes, the numerical specification
+of certain facts. Such ascertainments are unquestionably useful; as
+numerical precision is in other departments. But, taken in themselves,
+they do not carry us one bit further on the way to science. As
+experiments, further,--to note a point discussed elsewhere(34)--their value
+depends on the point of view, on the theory which has led to them, on the
+value of the general scheme for which they are intended to provide a
+special new determination. In many cases they serve to give a vivid
+reality to what was veiled under a general phrase. The truth looks so much
+more real when it is put in figures: as the size of a huge tree when set
+against a rock; or as when Milton bodies out his fallen angel by setting
+forth the ratio between his spear and the tallest Norway pine. But until
+the general relationship between soul and body is more clearly formulated,
+such statistics will have but a value of curiosity.
+
+
+
+(iii.) The Faculty-Psychology and its Critics.
+
+
+What Herbart (as well as Hegel) finds perpetual ground for objecting to is
+the talk about mental faculties. This objection is part of a general
+characteristic of all the higher philosophy; and the recurrence of it
+gives an illustration of how hard it is for any class of men to see
+themselves as others see them. If there be anything the vulgar believe to
+be true of philosophy, it is that it deals in distant and abstruse
+generalities, that it neglects the shades of individuality and reality,
+and launches out into unsubstantial general ideas. But it would be easy to
+gather from the great thinkers an anthology of passages in which they hold
+it forth as the great work of philosophy to rescue our conceptions from
+the indefiniteness and generality of popular conception, and to give them
+real, as opposed to a merely nominal, individuality.
+
+The Wolffian school, which Herbart (not less than Kant) found in
+possession of the field, and which in Germany may be taken to represent
+only a slight variant of the half-and-half attitude of vulgar thought, was
+entrenched in the psychology of faculties. Empirical psychology, said
+Wolff(35), tells the number and character of the soul's faculties:
+rational psychology will tell what they "properly" are, and how they
+subsist in soul. It is assumed that there are general receptacles or
+tendencies of mental operation which in course of time get filled or
+qualified in a certain way: and that when this question is disposed of, it
+still remains to fix on the metaphysical bases of these facts.
+
+That a doctrine of faculties should fix itself in psychology is not so
+wonderful. In the non-psychical world objects are easily discriminated in
+space, and the individual thing lasts through a time. But a phase of mind
+is as such fleeting and indeterminate: its individual features which come
+from its "object" tend soon to vanish in memory: all freshness of definite
+characters wears off, and there is left behind only a vague "recept" of
+the one and same in many, a sort of hypostatised representative, faint but
+persistent, of what in experience was an ever-varying succession. We
+generalise here as elsewhere: but elsewhere the many singulars remain to
+confront us more effectually. But in Mind the immense variety of real
+imagination, memory, judgment is forgotten, and the name in each case
+reduced to a meagre abstract. Thus the identity in character and
+operation, having been cut off from the changing elements in its real
+action, is transmuted into a substantial somewhat, a subsistent faculty.
+The relationship of one to another of the powers thus by abstraction and
+fancy created becomes a problem of considerable moment, their causal
+relations in particular: till in the end they stand outside and
+independent of each other, engaged, as Herbart says, in a veritable
+_bellum omnium contra omnes_.
+
+But this hypostatising of faculties becomes a source of still further
+difficulties when it is taken in connexion with the hypostasis of the Soul
+or Self or Ego. To Aristotle the Soul in its general aspect is Energy or
+Essence; and its individual phases are energies. But in the hands of the
+untrained these conceptions came to be considerably displaced. Essence or
+Substance came to be understood (as may be seen in Locke, and still more
+in loose talk) as a something,--a substratum,--or peculiar nature--(of which
+_in itself_ nothing further could be said(36) but which notwithstanding
+was permanent and perhaps imperishable): this something subsistent
+exhibited certain properties or activities. There thus arose, on one hand,
+the Soul-thing,--a substance misunderstood and sensualised with a
+supernatural sensuousness,--a denizen of the transcendental or even of the
+transcendent world: and, on the other hand, stood the actual
+manifestations, the several exhibitions of this force, the assignable and
+describable psychic facts. We are accordingly brought before the problem
+of how this one substance or essence stands to the several entities or
+hypostases known as faculties. And we still have in the rear the further
+problem of how these abstract entities stand to the real and concrete
+single acts and states of soul and mind.
+
+This hypostatising of faculties, and this distinction of the "Substantial"
+soul from its "accidentia" or phenomena, had grown--through the
+materialistic proclivities of popular conception--from the indications
+found in Aristotle. It attained its climax, perhaps in the Wolffian school
+in Germany, but it has been the resort of superficial psychology in all
+ages. For while it, on one hand, seemed to save the substantial Soul on
+whose incorruptibility great issues were believed to hinge, it held out,
+on the other, an open hand to the experimental inquirer, whom it bade
+freely to search amongst the phenomena. But if it was the refuge of
+pusillanimity, it was also the perpetual object of censure from all the
+greater and bolder spirits. Thus, the psychology of Hobbes may be hasty
+and crude, but it is at least animated by a belief that the mental life is
+continuous, and not cut off by abrupt divisions severing the mental
+faculties. The "image" (according to his materialistically coloured
+psychology) which, when it is a strong motion, is called sense, passes, as
+it becomes weaker or decays, into imagination, and gives rise, by its
+various complications and associations with others, to reminiscence,
+experience, expectation. Similarly, the voluntary motion which is an
+effect or a phase of imagination, beginning at first in small
+motions--called by themselves "endeavours," and in relation to their cause
+"appetites" or "desires(37)"--leads on cumulatively to Will, which is the
+"last appetite in deliberating." Spinoza, his contemporary, speaks in the
+same strain(38). "Faculties of intellect, desire, love, &c., are either
+utterly fictitious, or nothing but metaphysical entities, or universals
+which we are in the habit of forming from particulars. Will and intellect
+are thus supposed to stand to this or that idea, this or that volition, in
+the same way as stoniness to this or that stone, or as man to Peter or
+Paul." They are supposed to be a general something which gets defined and
+detached. But, in the mind, or in the cogitant soul, there are no such
+things. There are only ideas: and by an "idea" we are to understand not an
+image on the retina or in the brain, not a "dumb something, like a
+painting on a panel(39)," but a mode of thinking, or even the act of
+intellection itself. The ideas _are_ the mind: mind does not _have_ ideas.
+Further, every "idea," as such, "involves affirmation or negation,"--is not
+an image, but an act of judgment--contains, as we should say, an implicit
+reference to actuality,--a reference which in volition is made explicit.
+Thus (concludes the corollary of Eth. ii. 49) "Will and Intellect are one
+and the same." But in any case the "faculties" as such are no better than
+_entia rationis_ (i.e. auxiliary modes of representing facts).
+
+Leibniz speaks no less distinctly and sanely in this direction. "True
+powers are never mere possibilities: they are always tendency and action."
+The "Monad"--that is the quasi-intelligent unit of existence,--is
+essentially activity, and its actions are perceptions and appetitions,
+i.e. tendencies to pass from one perceptive state or act to another. It is
+out of the variety, the complication, and relations of these miniature or
+little perceptions and appetitions, that the conspicuous phenomena of
+consciousness are to be explained, and not by supposing them due to one or
+other faculty. The soul is a unity, a self-developing unity, a unity which
+at each stage of its existence shows itself in a perception or idea,--each
+such perception however being, to repeat the oft quoted phrase, _plein de
+l'avenir et chargé du passé_:--each, in other words, is not stationary, but
+active and urgent, a progressive force, as well as a representative
+element. Above all, Leibniz has the view that the soul gives rise to all
+its ideas from itself: that its life is its own production, not a mere
+inheritance of ideas which it has from birth and nature, nor a mere
+importation into an empty room from without, but a necessary result of its
+own constitution acting in necessary (predetermined) reciprocity and
+harmony with the rest of the universe.
+
+But Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, were most attentively heard in the
+passages where they favoured or combatted the dominant social and
+theological prepossessions. Their glimpses of truer insight and even their
+palpable contributions in the line of a true psychology were ignored or
+forgotten. More attention, perhaps, was attracted by an attempt of a very
+different style. This was the system of Condillac, who, as Hegel says (p.
+61), made an unmistakable attempt to show the necessary interconnexion of
+the several modes of mental activity. In his _Traité des Sensations_
+(1754), following on his _Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines_
+(1746), he tried to carry out systematically the deduction or derivation
+of all our ideas from sense, or to trace the filiation of all our
+faculties from sensation. Given a mind with no other power than
+sensibility, the problem is to show how it acquires all its other
+faculties. Let us then suppose a sentient animal to which is offered a
+single sensation, or one sensation standing out above the others. In such
+circumstances the sensation "becomes" (_devient_) attention: or a
+sensation "is" (_est_) attention, either because it is alone, or because
+it is more lively than all the rest. Again: before such a being, let us
+set two sensations: to perceive or feel (_apercevoir ou sentir_) the two
+sensations is the same thing (_c'est la même chose_). If one of the
+sensations is not present, but a sensation made already, then to perceive
+it is memory. Memory, then, is only "transformed sensation" (_sensation
+transformée_). Further, suppose we attend to both ideas, this is "the same
+thing" as to compare them. And to compare them we must see difference or
+resemblance. This is judgment. "Thus sensation becomes successively
+attention, comparison, judgment." And--by further steps of the equating
+process--it appears that sensation again "becomes" an act of reflection.
+And the same may be said of imagination and reasoning: all are transformed
+sensations.
+
+If this is so with the intelligence, it is equally the case with the Will.
+To feel and not feel well or ill is impossible. Coupling then this feeling
+of pleasure or pain with the sensation and its transformations, we get the
+series of phases ranging from desire, to passion, hope, will. "Desire is
+only the action of the same faculties as are attributed to the
+understanding." A lively desire is a passion: a desire, accompanied with a
+belief that nothing stands in its way, is a volition. But combine these
+affective with the intellectual processes already noticed, and you have
+thinking (_penser_)(40). Thus thought in its entirety is, only and always,
+transformed sensation.
+
+Something not unlike this, though scarcely so simply and directly
+doctrinaire, is familiar to us in some English psychology, notably James
+Mill's(41). Taken in their literal baldness, these identifications may
+sound strained,--or trifling. But if we look beyond the words, we can
+detect a genuine instinct for maintaining and displaying the unity and
+continuity of mental life through all its modifications,--coupled
+unfortunately with a bias sometimes in favour of reducing higher or more
+complex states of mind to a mere prolongation of lower and beggarly
+rudiments. But otherwise such analyses are useful as aids against the
+tendency of inert thought to take every name in this department as a
+distinguishable reality: the tendency to part will from thought--ideas from
+emotion--and even imagination from reason, as if either could be what it
+professed without the other.
+
+
+
+(iv.) Methods and Problems of Psychology.
+
+
+The difficulties of modern psychology perhaps lie in other directions, but
+they are not less worth guarding against. They proceed mainly from failure
+or inability to grasp the central problem of psychology, and a disposition
+to let the pen (if it be a book on the subject) wander freely through the
+almost illimitable range of instance, illustration, and application.
+Though it is true that the proper study of mankind is man, it is hardly
+possible to say what might not be brought under this head. _Homo sum,
+nihil a me alienum puto_, it might be urged. Placed in a sort of middle
+ground between physiology (summing up all the results of physical science)
+and general history (including the contributions of all the branches of
+sociology), the psychologist need not want for material. He can wander
+into ethics, aesthetic, and logic, into epistemology and metaphysics. And
+it cannot be said with any conviction that he is actually trespassing, so
+long as the ground remains so ill-fenced and vaguely enclosed. A desultory
+collection of observations on traits of character, anecdotes of mental
+events, mixed up with hypothetical descriptions of how a normal human
+being may be supposed to develop his so-called faculties, and including
+some dictionary-like verbal distinctions, may make a not uninteresting and
+possibly bulky work entitled Psychology.
+
+It is partly a desire of keeping up to date which is responsible for the
+copious extracts or abstracts from treatises on the anatomy and functions
+of the nerve-system, which, accompanied perhaps by a diagram of the brain,
+often form the opening chapter of a work on psychology. Even if these
+researches had achieved a larger number of authenticated results than they
+as yet have, they would only form an appendix and an illustration to the
+proper subject(42). As they stand, and so long as they remain largely
+hypothetical, the use of them in psychology only fosters the common
+delusion that, when we can picture out in material outlines a theory
+otherwise unsupported, it has gained some further witness in its favour.
+It is quite arguable indeed that it may be useful to cut out a section
+from general human biology which should include the parts of it that were
+specially interesting in connexion with the expression or generation of
+thought, emotion, and desire. But in that case, there is a blunder in
+singling out the brain alone, and especially the organs of sense and
+voluntary motion,--except for the reason that this province of
+psycho-physics alone has been fairly mapped out. The preponderant half of
+the soul's life is linked to other parts of the physical system. Emotion
+and volition, and the general tone of the train of ideas, if they are to
+be connected with their expression and physical accompaniment (or aspect),
+would require a sketch of the heart and lungs, as well as the digestive
+system in general. Nor these alone. Nerve analysis (especially confined to
+the larger system), though most modern, is not alone important, as Plato
+and Aristotle well saw. So that if biology is to be adapted for
+psychological use (and if psychology deals with more than cognitive
+processes), a liberal amount of physiological information seems required.
+
+Experimental psychology is a term used with a considerable laxity of
+content; and so too is that of physiological psychology, or
+psycho-physics. And the laxity mainly arises because there is an
+uncertainty as to what is principal and what secondary in the inquiry.
+Experiment is obviously a help to observation: and so far as the latter is
+practicable, the former would seem to have a chance of introduction. But
+in any case, experiment is only a means to an end and only practicable
+under the guidance of hypothesis and theory. Its main value would be in
+case the sphere of psychology were completely paralleled with one province
+of physiology. It was long ago maintained by Spinoza and (in a way by)
+Leibniz, that there is no mental phenomenon without its bodily equivalent,
+pendant, or correspondent. The _ordo rerum_ (the molecular system of
+movements) is, he held, the same as the order of ideas. But it is only at
+intervals, under special conditions, or when they reach a certain
+magnitude, that ideas emerge into full consciousness. As consciousness
+presents them, they are often discontinuous, and abrupt: and they do not
+always carry with them their own explanation. Hence if we are confined to
+the larger phenomena of consciousness alone, our science is imperfect:
+many things seem anomalous; above all, perhaps, will, attention, and the
+like. We have seen how Herbart (partly following the hints of Leibniz),
+attempted to get over this difficulty by the hypothesis of idea-forces
+which generate the forms and matter of consciousness by their mutual
+impact and resistance. Physiological psychology substitutes for Herbart's
+reals and his idea-forces a more materialistic sort of reality; perhaps
+functions of nerve-cells, or other analogous entities. There, it hopes one
+day to discover the underlying continuity of event which in the upper
+range of consciousness is often obscured, and then the process would be,
+as the phrase goes, explained: we should be able to picture it out without
+a gap.
+
+These large hopes may have a certain fulfilment. They may lead to the
+withdrawal of some of the fictitious mental processes which are still
+described in works of psychology. But on the whole they can only have a
+negative and auxiliary value. The value, that is, of helping to confute
+feigned connexions and to suggest truer. They will be valid against the
+mode of thought which, when Psyché fails us for an explanation, turns to
+body, and interpolates soul between the states of body: the mode which, in
+an older phraseology, jumps from final causes to physical, and from
+physical (or efficient) to final. Here, as elsewhere, the physical has its
+place: and here, more than in many places, the physical has been unfairly
+treated. But the whole subject requires a discussion of the so-called
+"relations" of soul and body: a subject on which popular conceptions and
+so-called science are radically obscure.
+
+"But the danger which threatens experimental psychology," says
+Münsterberg, "is that, in investigating details, the connexion with
+questions of principle may be so lost sight of that the investigation
+finally lands at objects scientifically quite worthless(43). Psychology
+forgets only too easily that all those numerical statistics which
+experiment allows us to form are only means for psychological analysis and
+interpretation, not ends in themselves. It piles up numbers and numbers,
+and fails to ask whether the results so formed have any theoretical value
+whatever: it seeks answers before a question has been clearly and
+distinctly framed; whereas the value of experimental answers always
+depends on the exactitude with which the question is put. Let me remind
+the reader, how one inquirer after another made many thousand experiments
+on the estimation of small intervals of time, without a single one of them
+raising the question what the precise point was which these experiments
+sought to measure, what was the psychological occurrence in the case, or
+what psychological phenomena were employed as the standard of
+time-intervals. And so each had his own arbitrary standard of measurement,
+each of them piled up mountains of numbers, each demonstrated that his
+predecessor was wrong; but neither Estel nor Mehner have carried the
+problem of the time-sense a single step further.
+
+"This must be all changed, if we are not to drift into the barrenest
+scholastic.... Everywhere out of the correct perception that problems of
+principle demand the investigation of detailed phenomena, and that the
+latter investigation must proceed in comparative independence of the
+question of principles, there has grown the false belief that the
+description of detail phenomena is the ultimate aim of science. And so,
+side by side with details which are of importance to principles, we have
+others, utterly indifferent and theoretically worthless, treated with the
+same zeal. To the solution of their barren problems the old Schoolmen
+applied a certain acuteness; but in order to turn out masses of numbers
+from barren experiments, all that is needed is a certain insensibility to
+fits of ennui. Let numbers be less collected for their own sake: and
+instead, let the problems be so brought to a point that the answers may
+possess the character of principles. Let each experiment be founded on far
+more theoretical considerations, then the number of the experiments may be
+largely diminished(44)."
+
+What is thus said of a special group of inquiries by one of the foremost
+of the younger psychologists, is not without its bearings on all the
+departments in which psychology can learn. For physiological, or what is
+technically called psychological, experiment, is co-ordinate with many
+other sources of information. Much, for instance, is to be learnt by a
+careful study of language by those who combine sound linguistic knowledge
+with psychological training. It is in language, spoken and written, that
+we find at once the great instrument and the great document of the
+distinctively human progress from a mere _Psyche_ to a mature _Nous_, from
+Soul to Mind. Whether we look at the varieties of its structure under
+different ethnological influences, or at the stages of its growth in a
+nation and an individual, we get light from language on the
+differentiation and consolidation of ideas. But here again it is easy to
+lose oneself in the world of etymology, or to be carried away into the
+enticing questions of real and ideal philology.
+
+"The human being of the psychologist," says Herbart(45), "is the social
+and civilised human being who stands on the apex of the whole history
+through which his race has passed. In him is found visibly together all
+the multiplicity of elements, which, under the name of mental faculties,
+are regarded as a universal inheritance of humanity. Whether they are
+originally in conjunction, whether they are originally a multiplicity, is
+a point on which the facts are silent. The savage and the new-born child
+give us far less occasion to admire the range of their mind than do the
+nobler animals. But the psychologists get out of this difficulty by the
+unwarranted assumption that all the higher mental activities exist
+potentially in children and savages--though not in the animals--as a
+rudimentary predisposition or psychical endowment. Of such a nascent
+intellect, a nascent reason, and nascent moral sense, they find
+recognisable traces in the scanty similarities which the behaviour of
+child or savage offers to those of civilised man. We cannot fail to note
+that in their descriptions they have before them a special state of man,
+and one which, far from accurately defined, merely follows the general
+impression made upon us by those beings we name civilised. An extremely
+fluctuating character inevitably marks this total impression. For there
+are no general facts:--the genuine psychological documents lie in the
+momentary states of individuals: and there is an immeasurably long way
+from these to the height of the universal concept of man in general."
+
+And yet Man in general,--Man as man and therefore as mind--the concept of
+Man--normal and ideal man--the complete and adequate Idea of man--is the true
+terminus of the psychological process; and whatever be the difficulties in
+the way, it is the only proper goal of the science. Only it has to be
+built up, constructed, evolved, developed,--and not assumed as a datum of
+popular imagination. We want a concept, concrete and real, of Man and of
+Mind, which shall give its proper place to each of the elements that, in
+the several examples open to detailed observation, are presented with
+unfair or exaggerated prominence. The savage and the child are not to be
+left out as free from contributing to form the ideal: virtues here are not
+more important than vices, and are certainly not likely to be so
+informing: even the insane and the idiot show us what human intelligence
+is and requires: and the animals are also within the sweep of psychology.
+Man is not its theatre to the exclusion of woman; if it records the
+results of introspection of the Me, it will find vast and copious quarries
+in the various modes in which an individual identifies himself with others
+as We. And even the social and civilised man gets his designation, as
+usual, _a potiori_. He is more civilised and social than others: perhaps
+rather more civilised than not. But always, in some measure, he is at the
+same time unsocial or anti-social, and uncivilised. Each unit in the
+society of civilisation has to the outside observer--and sometimes even to
+his own self-detached and impartial survey--a certain oddity or fixity, a
+gleam of irrationality, which shows him to fall short of complete sanity
+or limpid and mobile intelligence. He has not wholly put off the
+savage,--least of all, says the cynic, in his relations with the other sex.
+He carries with him even to the grave some grains of the recklessness and
+petulance of childhood. And rarely, if ever, can it be said of him that he
+has completely let the ape and tiger die.
+
+But that is only one way of looking at the matter--and one which, perhaps,
+is more becoming to the pathologist and the cynic, than to the
+psychologist. Each of these stages of psychical development, even if that
+development be obviously describable as degeneration, has something which,
+duly adjusted, has its place and function in the theory of the
+normally-complete human mind. The animal, the savage, and the child,--each
+has its part there. It is a mutilated, one-sided and superficial advance
+in socialisation which cuts off the civilised creature from the natural
+stem of his ancestry, from the large freedom, the immense _insouciance_,
+the childlikeness of his first estate. There is something, again, wanting
+in the man who utterly lacks the individualising realism and tenderness of
+the woman, as in the woman who can show no comprehension of view or
+bravery of enterprise. Even pathological states of mind are not mere
+anomalies and mere degenerations. Nature perhaps knows no proper
+degenerations, but only by-ways and intricacies in the course of
+development. Still less is the vast enormity or irregularity of genius to
+be ignored. It is all--to the philosophic mind--a question of degree and
+proportion,--though often the proportion seems to exceed the scale of our
+customary denominators. If an element is latent or quiescent (in arrest),
+that is no index to its absolute amount: "we know not what's resisted."
+Let us by all means keep proudly to our happy mediocrity of faculty, and
+step clear of insanity or idiotcy on one hand, and from genius or heroism
+on the other. But the careful observer will notwithstanding note how
+delicately graded and how intricately combined are the steps which connect
+extremes so terribly disparate. It is only vulgar ignorance which turns
+away in hostility or contempt from the imbecile and the deranged, and only
+a worse than vulgar sciolism which sees in genius and the hero nothing but
+an aberration from its much-prized average. Criminalistic anthropology, or
+the psychology of the criminal, may have indulged in much frantic
+exaggeration as to the doom which nature and heredity have pronounced over
+the fruit of the womb even before it entered the shores of light: yet they
+have at least served to discredit the free and easy assumption of the
+abstract averagist, and shown how little the penalties of an unbending law
+meet the requirements of social well-being.
+
+Yet, if psychology be willing to learn in all these and other provinces of
+the estate of man, it must remember that, once it goes beyond the narrow
+range in which the interpretations of symbol and expression have become
+familiar, it is constantly liable to blunder in the inevitable effort to
+translate observation into theory. The happy mean between making too much
+of palpable differences and hurrying on to a similar rendering of similar
+signs is the rarest of gifts. Or, perhaps, it were truer to say it is the
+latest and most hardly won of acquirements. To learn to observe--observe
+with mind--is not a small thing. There are rules for it--both rules of
+general scope and, above all, rules in each special department. But like
+all "major premisses" in practice, everything depends on the power of
+judgment, the tact, the skill, the "gift" of applying them. They work not
+as mere rules to be conned by rote, but as principles assimilated into
+constituents of the mental life-blood: rules which serve only as condensed
+reminders and hints of habits of thought and methods of research which
+have grown up in action and reflection. To observe we must comprehend: yet
+we can only comprehend by observing. We all know how unintelligible--save
+for epochs of ampler reciprocity, and it may be even of acquired unity of
+interest--the two sexes are for each other. Parents can remember how
+mysteriously minded they found their own elders; and in most cases they
+have to experience the depth of the gulf which in certain directions parts
+them from their children's hearts. Even in civilised Europe, the ordinary
+member of each nation has an underlying conviction (which at moments of
+passion or surprise will rise and find harsh utterance) that the foreigner
+is queer, irrational, and absurd. If the foreigner, further, be so far
+removed as a Chinaman (or an Australian "black"), there is hardly anything
+too vile, meaningless, or inhuman which the European will not readily
+believe in the case of one who, it may be, in turn describes him as a
+"foreign devil." It can only be in a fit of noble chivalry that the
+British rank and file can so far temporise with its insular prejudice as
+to admit of "Fuzzy-wuzzy" that
+
+
+    "He's a poor benighted 'eathen--but a first-class fightin' man."
+
+
+Not every one is an observer who chooses to dub himself so, nor is it in a
+short lapse of time and with condescension for foreign habits, that any
+observer whatever can become a trustworthy reporter of the ideas some
+barbarian tribe holds concerning the things of earth and air, and the
+hidden things of spirits and gods. The "interviewer" no doubt is a useful
+being when it is necessary to find "copy," or when sharp-drawn characters
+and picturesque incidents are needed to stimulate an inert public, ever
+open to be interested in some new thing. But he is a poor contributor to
+the stored materials of science.
+
+It is of other stuff that true science is made. And if even years of
+nominal intercourse and spatial juxtaposition sometimes leave human
+beings, as regards their inner selves, in the position of strangers still,
+what shall be said of the attempt to discern the psychic life of animals?
+Will the touch of curiosity which prompts us to watch the proceedings of
+the strange creatures,--will a course of experimentation on their behaviour
+under artificial conditions,--justify us in drawing liberal conclusions as
+to why they so behaved, and what they thought and felt about it? It is
+necessary in the first place to know what to observe, and how, and above
+all what for. But that presumed, we must further live with the animals not
+only as their masters and their examiners, but as their friends and
+fellow-creatures; we must be able--and so lightly that no effort is
+discernable--to lay aside the burden and garb of civilisation; we must
+possess that stamp of sympathy and similarity which invites confidence,
+and breaks down the reserve which our poor relations, whether human or
+others, offer to the first approaches of a strange superior. It is
+probable that in that case we should have less occasion to wonder at their
+oddities or to admire their sagacity. But a higher and more philosophical
+wonder might, as in other cases when we get inside the heart of our
+subject, take the place of the cheap and childish love of marvels, or of
+the vulgar straining after comic traits.
+
+Of all this mass of materials the psychologist proper can directly make
+only a sparing use. Even as illustrations, his data must not be presented
+too often in all their crude and undigested individuality, or he runs the
+risk of leaving one-sided impressions. Every single instance,
+individualised and historical,--unless it be exhibited by that true art of
+genius which we cannot expect in the average psychologist--narrows, even
+though it be but slightly, the complete and all-sided truth. Anecdotes are
+good, and to the wise they convey a world of meaning, but to lesser minds
+they sometimes suggest anything but the points they should accentuate.
+Without the detail of individual realistic study there is no psychology
+worth the name. History, story, we must have: but at the same time, with
+the philosopher, we must say, I don't give much weight to stories. And
+this is what will always--except in rare instances where something like
+genius is conjoined with it--make esoteric science hard and unpopular. It
+dare not--if it is true to its idea--rest on any amount of mere instances,
+as isolated, unreduced facts. Yet it can only have real power so far as it
+concentrates into itself the life-blood of many instances, and indeed
+extracts the pith and unity of all instances.
+
+Nor, on the other hand, can it turn itself too directly and intently
+towards practical applications. All this theory of mental progress from
+the animate soul to the fullness of religion and science deals solely with
+the universal process of education: "the education of humanity" we may
+call it: the way in which mind is made true and real(46). It is therefore
+a question of intricacy and of time how to carry over this general theory
+into the arena of education as artificially directed and planned. To try
+to do so at a single step would be to repeat the mistake of Plato, if
+Plato may be taken to suppose (which seems incredible) that a theoretical
+study of the dialectics of truth and goodness would enable his rulers,
+without the training of special experience, to undertake the supreme tasks
+of legislation or administration. All politics, like all education, rests
+on these principles of the means and conditions of mental growth: but the
+schooling of concrete life, though it may not develop the faculty of
+formulating general laws, will often train better for the management of
+the relative than a mere logical Scholastic in first or absolute
+principles.
+
+In conclusion, there are one or two points which seem of cardinal
+importance for the progress of psychology. (1) Its difference from the
+physical sciences has to be set out: in other words, the peculiarity of
+psychical fact. It will not do merely to say that experience marks out
+these boundaries with sufficient clearness. On the contrary, the terms
+consciousness, feeling, mind, &c., are evidently to many psychologists
+mere names. In particular, the habits of physical research when introduced
+into mental study lead to a good deal of what can only be called
+mythology. (2) There should be a clearer recognition of the problem of the
+relations of mental unity to mental elements. But to get that, a more
+thorough logical and metaphysical preparation is needed than is usually
+supposed necessary. The doctrine of identity and necessity, of universal
+and individual, has to be faced, however tedious. (3) The distinction
+between first-grade and second-grade elements and factors in the mental
+life has to be realised. The mere idea as presentative or immediate has to
+be kept clear of the more logico-reflective, or normative ideas, which
+belong to judgment and reasoning. And the number of these grades in mental
+development seems endless. (4) But, also, a separation is required--were it
+but temporary--between what may be called principles, and what is detail.
+At present, in psychology, "principles" is a word almost without meaning.
+A complete all-explaining system is of course impossible at present and
+may always be so. Yet if an effort of thought could be concentrated on
+cardinal issues, and less padding of conventional and traditional detail
+were foisted in, much might thereby be done to make detailed research
+fruitful. (5) And finally, perhaps, if psychology be a philosophical
+study, some hint as to its purpose and problem would be desirable. If it
+is only an abstract branch of science, of course, no such hint is in
+place.
+
+
+
+
+Essay III. On Some Psychological Aspects Of Ethics.
+
+
+Allusion has already been made to the question of the boundaries between
+logic and psychology, between logic and ethics, ethics and psychology, and
+psychology and epistemology. Each of these occasionally comes to cover
+ground that seems more appropriate to the others. Logic is sometimes
+restricted to denote the study of the conditions of derivative knowledge,
+of the canons of inference and the modes of proof. If taken more widely as
+the science of thought-form, it is supposed to imply a world of fixed or
+stereotyped relations between ideas, a system of stable thoughts governed
+by inflexible laws in an absolute order of immemorial or eternal truth. As
+against such fixity, psychology is supposed to deal with these same ideas
+as products--as growing out of a living process of thought--having a history
+behind them and perhaps a prospect of further change. The genesis so given
+may be either a mere chronicle-history, or it may be a philosophical
+development. In the former case, it would note the occasions of incident
+and circumstance, the reactions of mind and environment, under which the
+ideas were formed. Such a psychological genesis of several ideas is found
+in the Second Book of Locke's Essay. In the latter case, the account would
+be more concerned with the inner movement, the action and reaction in
+ideas themselves, considered not as due to casual occurrences, but as
+self-developing by an organic growth. But in either case, ideas would be
+shown not to be ready-made and independently existing kinds in a world of
+idea-things, and not to form an unchanging diagram or framework, but to be
+a growth, to have a history, and a development. Psychology in this sense
+would be a dynamical, as opposed to the supposed statical, treatment of
+ideas and concepts in logic. But it may be doubted how far it is well to
+call this psychology: unless psychology deals with the contents of the
+mental life, in their meaning and purpose, instead of, as seems proper,
+merely in their character of psychic events. Such psychology is rather an
+evolutionist logic,--a dialectic process more than an analytic of a datum.
+
+In the same way, ethics may be brought into one kind of contact with
+psychology. Ethics, like logic, may be supposed to presuppose and to deal
+with a certain inflexible scheme of requirements, a world of moral order
+governed by invariable or universal law; an eternal kingdom of right,
+existing independently of human wills, but to be learned and followed out
+in uncompromising obedience. As against this supposed absolute order,
+psychology may be said to show the genesis of the idea of obligation and
+duty, the growth of the authority of conscience, the formation of ideals,
+the relativity of moral ideas. Here also it may reach this conclusion, by
+a more external or a more internal mode of argument. It may try to show,
+in other words, that circumstances give rise to these forms of estimating
+conduct, or it may argue that they are a necessary development in the
+human being, constituted as he is. It may again be doubted whether this is
+properly called psychology. Yet its purport seems ultimately to be that
+the objective order is misconceived when it is regarded as an external or
+quasi-physical order: as a law written up and sanctioned with an external
+authority--as, in Kant's words, a heteronomy. If that order is objective,
+it is so because it is also in a sense subjective: if it is above the mere
+individuality of the individual, it is still in a way identical with his
+true or universal self-hood. Thus "psychological" here means the
+recognition that the logical and the moral law is an autonomy: that it is
+not given, but though necessary, necessary by the inward movement of the
+mind. The metaphor of law is, in brief, misleading. For, according to a
+common, though probably an erroneous, analysis of that term, the essence
+of a law in the political sphere is to be a species of command. And that
+is rather a one-sidedly practical or aesthetic way of looking at it. The
+essence of law in general, and the precondition of every law in special,
+is rather uniformity and universality, self-consistency and absence of
+contradiction: or, in other words, rationality. Its essential opposite--or
+its contradiction in essence--is a privilege, an attempt at isolating a
+case from others. It need not indeed always require bare
+uniformity--require i.e. the same act to be done by different people: but
+it must always require that every thing within its operation shall be
+treated on principles of utter and thorough harmony and consistency. It
+requires each thing to be treated on public principles and with publicity:
+nothing apart and mere singular, as a mere incident or as a world by
+itself. Differently it may be treated, but always on grounds of common
+well-being, as part of an embracing system.
+
+There is probably another sense, however, in which psychology comes into
+close relation with ethics. If we look on man as a microcosm, his inner
+system will more or less reproduce the system of the larger world. The
+older psychology used to distinguish an upper or superior order of
+faculties from a lower or inferior. Thus in the intellectual sphere, the
+intellect, judgment, and reason were set above the senses, imagination,
+and memory. Among the active powers, reasonable will, practical reason and
+conscience were ranked as paramount over the appetites and desires and
+emotions. And this use of the word "faculty" is as old as Plato, who
+regards science as a superior faculty to opinion or imagination. But this
+application--which seems a perfectly legitimate one--does not, in the first
+instance, belong to psychology at all. No doubt it is psychically
+presented: but it has an other source. It springs from an appreciation, a
+judgment of the comparative truth or reality of what the so-called
+psychical act means or expresses. Such faculties are powers in a hierarchy
+of means and ends and presuppose a normative or critical function which
+has classified reality. Psychically, the elements which enter into
+knowledge are not other than those which belong to opinion: but they are
+nearer an adequate rendering of reality, they are truer, or nearer the
+Idea. And in the main we may say, that is truer or more real which
+succeeds in more completely organising and unifying elements--which rises
+more and more above the selfish or isolated part into the thorough unity
+of all parts.
+
+The superior faculty is therefore the more thorough organisation of that
+which is elsewhere less harmoniously systematised. Opinion is fragmentary
+and partial: it begins abruptly and casually from the unknown, and runs
+off no less abruptly into the unknown. Knowledge, on the contrary, is
+unified: and its unity gives it its strength and superiority. The powers
+which thus exist are the subjective counterparts of objectively valuable
+products. Thus, reason is the subjective counterpart of a world in which
+all the constituents are harmonised and fall into due relationship. It is
+a product or result, which is not psychologically, but logically or
+morally important. It is a faculty, because it means that actually its
+possessor has ordered and systematised his life or his ideas of things.
+Psychologically, it, like unreason, is a compound of elements: but in the
+case of reason the composition is unendingly and infinitely consistent; it
+is knowledge completely unified. The distinction then is not in the
+strictest sense psychological: for it has an aesthetic or normative
+character; it is logical or ethical: it denotes that the idea or the act
+is an approach to truth or goodness. And so, when Butler or Plato
+distinguishes reason or reflection from appetites and affections, and even
+from self-love or from the heart which loves and hates, this is not
+exactly a psychological division in the narrower sense. That is to say:
+these are, in Plato's words, not merely "parts," but quite as much "kinds"
+and "forms" of soul. They denote degrees in that harmonisation of mind and
+soul which reproduces the permanent and complete truth of things. For
+example, self-love, as Butler describes it, has but a partial and narrowed
+view of the worth of acts: it is engrossing and self-involved: it cannot
+take in the full dependence of the narrower interest on the larger and
+eternal self. So, in Plato, the man of heart is but a nature which by fits
+and starts, or with steady but limited vision, realises the larger life.
+These parts or kinds are not separate and co-existent faculties: but
+grades in the co-ordination and unification of the same one human nature.
+
+
+
+(i.) Psychology and Epistemology.
+
+
+Psychology however in the strict sense is extremely difficult to define.
+Those who describe it as the "science of mind," the "phenomenology of
+consciousness," seem to give it a wider scope than they really mean. The
+psychologist of the straiter sect tends, on the other hand, to carry us
+beyond mind and consciousness altogether. His, it has been said, is a
+psychology without a Psyché. For him Mind, Soul, and Consciousness are
+only current and convenient names to designate the field, the ground on
+which the phenomena he observes are supposed to transact themselves. But
+they must not on any account interfere with the operations; any more than
+Nature in general may interfere with strictly physical inquiries, or Life
+and vital force with the theories of biology. The so-called Mind is only
+to be regarded as a stage on which certain events represent themselves. In
+this field, or on this stage, there are certain relatively ultimate
+elements, variously called ideas, presentations, feelings, or states of
+consciousness. But these elements, though called ideas, must not be
+supposed more than mechanical or dynamical elements; consciousness is
+rather their product, a product which presupposes certain operations and
+relations between them. If we are to be strictly scientific, we must, it
+is urged, treat the factors of consciousness as not themselves conscious:
+we must regard them as quasi-objective, or in abstraction from the
+consciousness which surveys them. The Ego must sink into a mere receptacle
+or arena of psychic event; its independent meaning or purport is to be
+ignored, as beside the question.
+
+When this line is once fixed upon, it seems inevitable to go farther.
+Comte was inclined to treat psychology as falling between two stools: it
+must, he thought, draw all its content either from physiology on the one
+hand, or from social factors on the other. The dominant or experimental
+psychology of the present day seems inclined, without however formulating
+any very definite statement, to pronounce for the former alternative. It
+does not indeed adopt the materialistic view that mind is only a function
+of matter. Its standpoint rather is that the psychical presents itself
+even to unskilled observation as dependent on (i.e. not independent of) or
+as concomitant with certain physical or corporeal facts. It adds that the
+more accurately trained the observer becomes, the more he comes to
+discover a corporeal aspect even where originally he had not surmised its
+existence, and to conclude that the two cycles of psychical and physical
+event never interfere with each other: that soul does not intervene in
+bodily process, nor body take up and carry on psychical. If it is said
+that the will moves the limbs, he replies that the will which moves is
+really certain formerly unnoticed movements of nerve and muscle which are
+felt or interpreted as a discharge of power. If the ocular impression is
+said to cause an impression on the mind, he replies that any fact hidden
+under that phrase refers to a change in the molecules of the brain. He
+will therefore conclude that for the study of psychical phenomena the
+physical basis, as it may be called, is all important. Only so can
+observation really deal with fact capable of description and measurement.
+Thus psychology, it may be said, tends to become a department of
+physiology. From another standpoint, biology may be said to receive its
+completion in psychology. How much either phrase means, however, will
+depend on the estimate we form of biology. If biology is only the study of
+mechanical and chemical phenomena on the peculiar field known as an
+organism, and if that organism is only treated as an environment which may
+be ignored, then psychology, put on the same level, is not the full
+science of mind, any more than the other is the full study of life. They
+both have narrowed their subject to suit the abstract scheme of the
+laboratory, where the victim of experiment is either altered by mutilation
+and artificial restrictions, or is dead. If, on the contrary, biology has
+a substantial unity of its own to which mechanical and chemical
+considerations are subordinate and instrumental, psychology may even take
+part with physiology without losing its essential rank. But in that case,
+we must, as Spinoza said(47), think less mechanically of the animal frame,
+and recognise (after the example of Schelling) something truly inward
+(i.e. not merely locally inside the skin) as the supreme phase or
+characteristic of life. We must, in short, recognise sensibility as the
+culmination of the physiological and the beginning of the psychological.
+
+To the strictly scientific psychologist, as has been noted--or to the
+psychology which imitates optical and electrical science--ideas are only
+psychical events: they are not ideas _of_ anything, relative, i.e. to
+something else; they have no meaning, and no reference to a reality beyond
+themselves. They are presentations;--not representations of something
+outside consciousness. They are appearances: but not appearances of
+something: they do not reveal anything beyond themselves. They are, we may
+almost say, a unique kind of physical phenomena. If we say they are
+presentations of something, we only mean that in the presented something,
+in the felt something, the wished something, we separate the quality or
+form or aspect of presentativeness, of feltness, of wishedness, and
+consider this aspect by itself. There are grades, relations,
+complications, of such presentations or in such presentedness: and with
+the description and explanation of these, psychology is concerned. They
+are fainter or stronger, more or less correlated and antithetical.
+Presentation (or ideation), in short, is the name of a train of event,
+which has its peculiarities, its laws, its systems, its history.
+
+All reality, it may be said, subsists in such presentation; it is for a
+consciousness, or in a consciousness. All _esse_, in its widest sense, is
+_percipi_. And yet, it seems but the commonest of experiences to say that
+all that is presented is not reality. It _is_, it has a sort of being,--is
+somehow presumed to exist: but it is not reality. And this reference and
+antithesis to _what_ is presented is implied in all such terms as "ideas,"
+"feelings," "states of consciousness": they are distinguished from and
+related to objects of sense or external facts, to something, as it is
+called, outside consciousness. Thoughts and ideas are set against things
+and realities. In their primitive stage both the child and the savage seem
+to recognise no such difference. What they imagine is, as we might say, on
+the same plane with what they touch and feel. They do not, as we
+reproachfully remark, recognise the difference between fact and fiction.
+All of us indeed are liable to lapses into the same condition. A strong
+passion, a keen hope or fear, as we say, invests its objects with reality:
+even a sanguine moment presents as fact what calmer reflection disallows
+as fancy. With natural and sane intelligences, however, the recrudescence
+of barbarous imagination is soon dispelled, and the difference between
+hallucinations and realities is established. With the utterly wrecked in
+mind, the reality of hallucinations becomes a permanent or habitual state.
+With the child and the untrained it is a recurrent and a disturbing
+influence: and it need hardly be added that the circle of these _decepti
+deceptores_--people with the "lie in the Soul"--is a large one. There thus
+emerges a distinction of vast importance, that of truth and falsehood, of
+reality and unreality, or between representation and reality. There arise
+two worlds, the world of ideas, and the world of reality which it is
+supposed to represent, and, in many cases, to represent badly.
+
+With this distinction we are brought across the problem sometimes called
+Epistemological. Strictly speaking, it is really part of a larger problem:
+the problem of what--if Greek compounds must be used--may be styled
+Aletheiology--the theory of truth and reality: what Hegel called Logic, and
+what many others have called Metaphysics. As it is ordinarily taken up,
+"ideas" are believed to be something _in us_ which is representative or
+symbolical of something truly real _outside us_. This inward something is
+said to be the first and immediate object of knowledge(48), and gives
+us--in a mysterious way we need not here discuss--the mediate knowledge of
+the reality, which is sometimes said to cause it. Ideas in the Mind, or in
+the Subject, or in us, bear witness to something outside the
+mind,--trans-subjective--beyond us. The Mind, Subject, or Ego, in this
+parallelism is evidently in some way identified with our corporeal
+organism: perhaps even located, and provided with a "seat," in some
+defined space of that organism. It is, however, the starting-point of the
+whole distinction that ideas _do not_, no less than they do, conform or
+correspond to this supra-conscious or extra-conscious world of real
+things. Truth or falsehood arises, according to these assumptions,
+according as psychical image or idea corresponds or not to physical fact.
+But how, unless by some miraculous second-sight, where the supreme
+consciousness, directly contemplating by intuition the true and
+independent reality, turns to compare with this immediate vision the
+results of the mediate processes conducted along the organs of sense,--how
+this agreement or disagreement of copy and original, of idea and reality,
+can be detected, it is impossible to say.
+
+As has been already noted, the mischief lies in the hypostatisation of
+ideas as something existing in abstraction from things--and, of things, in
+abstraction from ideas. They are two abstractions, the first by the
+realist, the second by the idealist called subjective and psychological.
+To the realist, things exist by themselves, and they manage to produce a
+copy of themselves (more or less exact, or symbolical) in _our_ mind, i.e.
+in a materialistically-spiritual or a spiritualistically-material locus
+which holds "images" and ideas. To the psychological idealist, ideas have
+a substantive and primary right to existence, them alone do we really
+know, and from them we more or less legitimately are said (but probably no
+one takes this seriously) to infer or postulate a world of permanent
+things. Now ideas have no substantive existence as a sort of things, or
+even images of things anywhere. All this is pure mythology. It is said by
+comparative mythologists that in some cases the epithet or quality of some
+deity has been substantialised (hypostatised) into a separate god, who,
+however (so still to keep up the unity), is regarded as a relative, a son,
+or daughter, of the original. So the phrase "ideas of things" has been
+taken literally as if it was double. But to have an idea of a thing merely
+means that we know it, or think it. An idea is not given: it is a thing
+which is given in the idea. An idea is not an additional and intervening
+object of our knowledge or supposed knowledge. That a thing is our object
+of thought is another word for its being our idea, and that means we know
+it.
+
+The distinction between truth and falsehood, between reality and
+appearance, is not arrived at by comparing what we have before us in our
+mind with some inaccessible reality beyond. It is a distinction that grows
+up with the growth and organisation of our presentations--with their
+gradual systematisation and unification in one consciousness. But this
+consciousness which thinks, i.e. judges and reasons, is something superior
+to the contrast of physical and psychical: superior, i.e. in so far as it
+includes and surveys the antithesis, without superseding it. It is the
+"transcendental unity of consciousness" of Kant--his synthetic unity of
+apperception. It means that all ideas ultimately derive their reality from
+their coherence with each other in an all-embracing or infinite idea. Real
+in a sense ideas always are, but with an imperfect reality. Thus the
+education to truth is not--such a thing would be meaningless--ended by a
+rough and ready recommendation to compare our ideas with facts: it must
+teach the art which discovers facts. And the teaching may have to go
+through many grades or provinces: in each of which it is possible to
+acquire a certain virtuosoship without being necessarily an adept in
+another. It is through what is called the development of intellect,
+judgment, and reasoning that the faculty of truth-detecting or
+truth-selecting comes. And the common feature of all of these is, so to
+say, their superiority to the psychological mechanism, not in the sense of
+working without it and directly, but of being the organising unity or
+unifier and controller and judge of that mechanism. The certainty and
+necessity of truth and knowledge do not come from a constraint from the
+external thing which forces the inner idea into submission; they come from
+the inner necessity of conformity and coherence in the organism of
+experience. We in fact had better speak of ideas as experience--as felt
+reality: a reality however which has its degrees and perhaps even its
+provinces. All truth comes with the reasoned judgment, i.e. the
+syllogism--i.e. with the institution or discovery of relations of fact or
+element to fact or element, immediate or derivative, partial and less
+partial, up to its ideal coherence in one Idea. It is because this
+coherence is so imperfectly established in many human beings that their
+knowledge is so indistinguishable from opinion, and that they separate so
+loosely truth from error. They have not worked their way into a definitely
+articulated system, where there are no gaps, no abrupt transitions: their
+mental order is so loosely put together that divergences and
+contradictions which vex another drop off ineffectual from them.
+
+
+
+(ii.) Kant, Fichte, and Hegel.
+
+
+This was the idealism which Kant taught and Fichte promoted. Of the other
+idealism there are no doubt abundant traces in the language of Kant: and
+they were greedily fastened on by Schopenhauer. To him the doctrine, that
+the world is my idea, is adequately represented when it is translated into
+the phrase that the world is a phantasmagoria of my brain; and escape from
+the subjective idealism thus initiated is found by him only through a
+supposed revelation of immediate being communicated in the experience of
+will. But according to the more consistently interpreted Kant, the problem
+of philosophy consists in laying bare the supreme law or conditions of
+consciousness on which depend the validity of our knowledge, our estimates
+of conduct, and our aesthetic standards. And these roots of reality are
+for Kant in the mind--or, should we rather say--in mind--in "Consciousness in
+General." In the _Criticism of Pure Reason_ the general drift of his
+examination is to show that the great things or final realities which are
+popularly supposed to stand in self-subsistent being, as ultimate and
+all-comprehensive objects set up for knowledge, are not "things" as
+popularly supposed, but imperative and inevitable ideas. They are not
+objects to be known--(these are always finite): but rather the unification,
+the basis, or condition, and the completion of all knowledge. To know
+them--in the ordinary petty sense of knowledge--is as absurd and impossible
+as it would be, in the Platonic scheme of reality, to know the idea of
+good which is "on the further side of knowledge and being." God and the
+Soul--and the same would be true of the World (though modern speculators
+sometimes talk as if they had it at least within their grasp)--are not mere
+_objects_ of knowledge. It would be truer to say they are that by which we
+know, and they are what in us knows: they make knowledge possible, and
+actual. Kant has sometimes spoken of them as the objects of a faith of
+reason. What he means is that reason only issues in knowledge because of
+and through this inevitable law of reason bidding us go on for ever in our
+search, because there can be nothing isolated and nowhere any _ne plus
+ultra_ in science, which is infinite and yet only justified as it
+postulates or commands unity.
+
+Kant's central idea is that truth, beauty, goodness, are not dependent on
+some qualities of the object, but on the universal nature or law of
+consciousness. Beauty is not an attribute of things in their abstractness:
+but of things as ideas of a subject, and depends on the proportion and
+symmetry in the play of human faculty. Goodness is not conformity to an
+outward law, but is obligatory on us through that higher nature which is
+our truer being. Truth is not conformity of ideas with supposed
+trans-subjective things, but coherence and stability in the system of
+ideas. The really infinite world is not out there, but in here--in
+consciousness in general, which is the denial of all limitation, of all
+finality, of all isolation. God is the essential and inherent unity and
+unifier of spirit and nature--the surety that the world in all its
+differentiations is one. The Soul is not an essential entity, but the
+infinite fruitfulness and freshness of mental life, which forbids us
+stopping at anything short of complete continuity and unity. The Kingdom
+of God--the Soul--the moral law--is within us: within us, as supreme,
+supra-personal and infinite intelligences, even amid all our littleness
+and finitude. Even happiness which we stretch our arms after is not really
+beyond us, but is the essential self which indeed we can only reach in
+detail. It is so both in knowledge and in action. Each knowledge and
+enjoyment in reality is limited and partial, but it is made stable, and it
+gets a touch of infinitude, by the larger idea which it helps to realise.
+Only indeed in that antithesis between the finite and the infinite does
+the real live. Every piece of knowledge is real, only because it assumes
+_pro tempore_ certain premisses which are given: every actual beauty is
+set in some defect of aesthetic completeness: every actually good deed has
+to get its foil in surrounding badness. The real is always partial and
+incomplete. But it has the basis or condition of its reality in an idea--in
+a transcendental unity of consciousness, which is so to say a law, or a
+system and an order, which imposes upon it the condition of conformity and
+coherence; but a conformity which is essential and implicit in it.
+
+Fichte has called his system a _Wissenschaftslehre_--a theory of knowledge.
+Modern German used the word _Wissenschaft_, as modern English uses the
+word Science, to denote the certified knowledge of piecemeal fact, the
+partial unification of elements still kept asunder. But by _Wissen_, as
+opposed to _Erkennen_, is meant the I know, am aware and sure, am in
+contact with reality, as opposed to the derivative and conditional
+reference of something to something else which explains it. The former is
+a wider term: it denotes all consciousness of objective truth, the
+certainty which claims to be necessary and universal, which pledges its
+whole self for its assertion. Fichte thus unifies and accentuates the
+common element in the Kantian criticisms. In the first of these Kant had
+begun by explaining the nature and limitation of empirical science. It was
+essentially conditioned by the given sensation--dependent i.e. on an
+unexplained and preliminary element. This is what makes it science in the
+strict or narrow sense of the term: its being set, as it were, in the
+unknown, the felt, the sense-datum. The side of reality is thus the side
+of limitation and of presupposition. But what makes it truth and knowledge
+in general, on the other hand,--as distinct from _a_ truth (i.e. partial
+truth) and a knowledge,--is the ideal element--the mathematical, the
+logical, the rational law,--or in one word, the universal and formal
+character. So too every real action is on one hand the product of an
+impulse, a dark, merely given, immediate tendency to be, and without that
+would be nothing: but on the other hand it is only an intelligent and
+moral action in so far as it has its constitution from an intelligence, a
+formal system, which determine its place and function.
+
+It is on the latter or ideal element that Kant makes the emphasis
+increasingly turn. Not truths, duties, beauties, but truth, duty, beauty,
+form his theme. The formal element--the logical or epistemological
+condition of knowledge and morality and of beauty--is what he (and still
+more Fichte) considers the prime question of fundamental philosophy. His
+philosophy is an attempt to get at the organism of our fundamental
+belief--the construction, from the very base, of our conception of reality,
+of our primary certainty. In technical language, he describes our
+essential nature as a Subject-object. It is the unity of an I am which is
+also I know that I am: an I will which is also I am conscious of my
+will(49). Here there is a radical disunion and a supersession of that
+disunion. Action and contemplation are continually outrunning each other.
+The I will rests upon one I know, and works up to another: the I know
+reflects upon an I will, and includes it as an element in its idea.
+
+Kant had brought into use the term Deduction, and Fichte follows him. The
+term leads to some confusion: for in English, by its modern antithesis to
+induction, it suggests _a priori_ methods in all their iniquity. It means
+a kind of jugglery which brings an endless series out of one small term.
+Kant has explained that he uses it in the lawyer's sense in which a claim
+is justified by being traced step by step back to some acknowledged and
+accepted right(50). It is a regressive method which shows us that if the
+original datum is to be accepted it carries along with it the legitimation
+of the consequence. This method Fichte applies to psychology. Begin, he
+says like Condillac, with the barest nucleus of soul-life; the mere
+sentiency, or feeling: the contact, as it were, with being, at a single
+point. But such a mere point is unthinkable. You find, as Mr. Spencer
+says, that "Thought" (or Consciousness) "cannot be framed out of one term
+only." "Every sensation to be known as one must be perceived." Such is the
+nature of the Ego--a subject which insists on each part being qualified by
+the whole and so transformed. As Mr. Spencer, again, puts it, the mind not
+merely tends to revive, to associate, to assimilate, to represent its own
+presentations, but it carries on this process infinitely and in ever
+higher multiples. Ideas as it were are growing in complexity by
+re-presenting: i.e. by embracing and enveloping elements which cannot be
+found existing in separation. In the mind there is no mere presentation,
+no bare sensation. Such a unit is a fiction or hypothesis we employ, like
+the atom, for purposes of explanation. The pure sensation therefore--which
+you admit because you must have something to begin with, not a mere
+nothing, but something so simple that it seems to stand out clear and
+indisputable--this pure sensation, when you think of it, forces you to go a
+good deal further. Even to be itself, it must be more than itself. It is
+like the pure or mere being of the logicians. Admit the simple
+sensation--and you have admitted everything which is required to make
+sensation a possible reality. But you do not--in the sense of vulgar
+logic--deduce what follows out of the beginning. From that, taken by
+itself, you will get only itself: mere being will give you only nothing,
+to the end of the chapter. But, as the phrase is, sensation is an element
+in a consciousness: it is, when you think of it, always more than you
+called it: there is a curious "continuity" about the phenomena, which
+makes real isolation impossible.
+
+Of course this "deduction" is not history: it is logic. It says, if you
+posit sensation, then in doing so, you posit a good deal more. You have
+imagination, reason, and many more, all involved in your original
+assumption. And there is a further point to be noted. You cannot really
+stop even at reason, at intelligence and will, if you take these in the
+full sense. You must realise that these only exist as part and parcel of a
+reasonable world. An individual intelligence presupposes a society of
+intelligences. The successive steps in this argument are presented by
+Fichte in the chief works of his earlier period (1794-98). The works of
+that period form a kind of trilogy of philosophy, by which the faint
+outlines of the absolute selfhood is shown acquiring definite consistency
+in the moral organisation of society. First comes the "Foundation for the
+collective philosophy." It shows how our conception of reality and our
+psychical organisation are inevitably presupposed in the barest function
+of intelligence, in the abstractest forms of logical law. Begin where you
+like, with the most abstract and formal point of consciousness, you are
+forced, as you dwell upon it (you identifying yourself with the thought
+you realise), to go step by step on till you accept as a self-consistent
+and self-explanatory unity all that your cognitive and volitional nature
+claims to own as its birthright. Only in such an intelligent will is
+perception and sensation possible. Next came the "Foundation of Natural
+Law, on the principles of the general theory." Here the process of
+deduction is carried a step further. If man is to realise himself as an
+intelligence with an inherent bent to action, then he must be conceived as
+a person among persons, as possessed of rights, as incapable of acting
+without at the same moment claiming for his acts recognition, generality,
+and logical consecution. The reference, which in the conception of a
+practical intelligence was implicit,--the reference to fellow-agents, to a
+world in which law rules--is thus, by the explicit recognition of these
+references, made a fact patent and positive--_gesetzt_,--expressly
+instituted in the way that the nature and condition of things postulates.
+But this is not all: we step from the formal and absolute into the
+material and relative. If man is to be a real intelligence, he must be an
+intelligence served by organs. "The rational being cannot realise its
+efficient individuality, unless it ascribes to itself a material body": a
+body, moreover, in which Fichte believes he can show that the details of
+structure and organs are equally with the general corporeity predetermined
+by reason(51). In the same way it is shown that the social and political
+organisation is required for the realisation--the making positive and yet
+coherent--of the rights of all individuals. You deduce society by showing
+it is required to make a genuine individual man. Thirdly came the "System
+of Ethics." Here it is further argued that, at least in a certain
+respect(52), in spite of my absolute reason and my absolute freedom, I can
+only be fully real as a part of Nature: that my reason is realised in a
+creature of appetite and impulse. From first to last this deduction is one
+process which may be said to have for its object to determine "the
+conditions of self-hood or egoity." It is the deduction of the concrete
+and empirical moral agent--the actual ego of actual life--from the abstract,
+unconditioned ego, which in order to be actual must condescend to be at
+once determining and determined.
+
+In all of this Fichte makes--especially formally--a decided advance upon
+Kant. In Ethics Kant in particular, (--especially for readers who never got
+beyond the beginning of his moral treatise and were overpowered by the
+categorical imperative of duty) had found the moral initiative or dynamic
+apparently in the other world. The voice of duty seemed to speak from a
+region outside and beyond the individual conscience. In a sense it must do
+so: but it comes from a consciousness which is, and yet is more than, the
+individual. It is indeed true that appearances here are deceptive: and
+that the idea of autonomy, the self-legislation of reason, is trying to
+become the central conception of Kant's Ethics. Still it is Fichte's merit
+to have seen this clearly, to have held it in view unfalteringly, and to
+have carried it out in undeviating system or deduction. Man, intelligent,
+social, ethical, is a being all of one piece and to be explained entirely
+immanently, or from himself. Law and ethics are no accident either to
+sense or to intelligence--nothing imposed by mere external or supernal
+authority(53). Society is not a brand-new order of things supervening upon
+and superseding a state of nature, where the individual was entirely
+self-supporting. Morals, law, society, are all necessary steps (necessary
+i.e. in logic, and hence in the long run also inevitable in course of
+time) to complete the full evolution or realisation of a human being. The
+same conditions as make man intelligent make him social and moral. He does
+not proceed so far as to become intelligent and practical, under terms of
+natural and logical development, then to fall into the hands of a foreign
+influence, an accident _ab extra_, which causes him to become social and
+moral. Rather he is intelligent, because he is a social agent.
+
+Hence, in Fichte, the absence of the ascetic element so often stamping its
+character on ethics, and representing the moral life as the enemy of the
+natural, or as mainly a struggle to subdue the sensibility and the flesh.
+With Kant,--as becomes his position of mere inquirer--the sensibility has
+the place of a predominant and permanent foreground. Reason, to his way of
+talking, is always something of an intruder, a stranger from a far-off
+world, to be feared even when obeyed: sublime, rather than beautiful. From
+the land of sense which we habitually occupy, the land of reason is a
+country we can only behold from afar: or if we can be said to have a
+standpoint in it, that is only a figurative way of saying that though it
+is really over the border, we can act--it would sometimes seem by a sort of
+make-believe--as if we were already there. But these moments of high
+enthusiasm are rare; and Kant commends sobriety and warns against
+high-minded _Schwärmerei_, or over-strained Mysticism. For us it is
+reserved to struggle with a recalcitrant selfhood, a grovelling
+sensibility: it were only fantastic extravagance, fit for "fair souls" who
+unfortunately often lapse into "fair sinners," should we fancy ourselves
+already anchored in the haven of untempted rest and peace.
+
+When we come to Fichte, we find another spirit breathing. We have passed
+from the age of Frederick the Great to the age of the French Revolution;
+and the breeze that burst in the War of Liberation is already beginning to
+freshen the air. Boldly he pronounces the primacy of that faith of reason
+whereby not merely the just but all shall live. Your will shall show you
+what you really are. You are essentially a rational will, or a
+will-reason. Your sensuous nature, of impulse and appetite, far from being
+the given and found obstacle to the realisation of reason,--which Kant
+strictly interpreted might sometimes seem to imply--(and in this point
+Schopenhauer carries out the implications of Kant)--is really the condition
+or mode of being which reason assumes, or rises up to, in order to be a
+practical or moral being. Far from the body and the sensible needs being a
+stumbling-block to hamper the free fullness of rationality and morality,
+the truth rather is that it is only by body and sense, by flesh and blood,
+that the full moral and rational life can be realised(54). Or, to put it
+otherwise, if human reason (intelligence and will) is to be more than a
+mere and empty inner possibility, if man is to be a real and concrete
+cognitive and volitional being, he must be a member of an ethical and
+actual society, which lives by bread, and which marries and has children.
+
+
+
+(iii.) Psychology in Ethics.
+
+
+In this way, for Fichte, and through Fichte still more decidedly for
+Hegel, both psychology and ethics breathe an opener and ampler air than
+they often enjoy. Psychology ceases to be a mere description of psychic
+events, and becomes the history of the self-organising process of human
+reason. Ethics loses its cloistered, negative, unnatural aspect, and
+becomes a name for some further conditions of the same development,
+essentially postulated to complete or supplement its shortcomings.
+Psychology--taken in this high philosophical acceptation--thus leads on to
+Ethics; and Ethics is parted by no impassable line from Psychology. That,
+at least, is what must happen if they are still to retain a place in
+philosophy: for, as Kant says(55), "under the government of reason our
+cognitions cannot form a rhapsody, but must constitute a system, in which
+alone can they support and further its essential aims." As parts of such a
+system, they carry out their special work in subordination to, and in the
+realisation of, a single Idea--and therefore in essential interconnexion.
+From that interconnecting band we may however in detail-enquiry dispense
+ourselves; and then we have the empirical or inductive sciences of
+psychology and ethics. But even with these, the necessity of the situation
+is such that it is only a question of degree how far we lose sight of the
+philosophical horizon, and entrench ourselves in special enquiry.
+Something of the philosophic largeness must always guide us; even when, to
+further the interests of the whole, it is necessary for the special
+enquirer to bury himself entirely in his part. So long as each part is
+sincerely and thoroughly pursued, and no part is neglected, there is an
+indwelling reason in the parts which will in the long run tend to
+constitute the total.
+
+A philosophical psychology will show us how the sane intelligence and the
+rational will are, at least approximately, built up out of elements, and
+through stages and processes, which modify and complement, as they may
+also arrest and perplex, each other. The unity, coherence, and
+completeness of the intelligent self is not, as vulgar irreflectiveness
+supposes and somewhat angrily maintains, a full-grown thing or agent, of
+whose actions and modes of behaviour the psychologist has to narrate the
+history,--a history which is too apt to degenerate into the anecdotal and
+the merely interesting. This unity of self has to be "deduced," as Fichte
+would say: it has to be shown as the necessary result which certain
+elements in a certain order will lead to(56). A normal mind,
+self-possessed, developed and articulated, yet thoroughly one, a real
+microcosm, or true and full monad, which under the mode of its
+individuality still represents the universe: that is, what psychology has
+to show as the product of factors and processes. And it is clearly
+something great and good, something valuable, and already possessing, by
+implication we may say, an ethical character.
+
+In philosophy, at least, it is difficult, or rather impossible to draw a
+hard and fast line which shall demarcate ethical from non-ethical
+characters,--to separate them from other intellectual and reasonable
+motives. Kant, as we know, attempted to do so: but with the result that he
+was forced to add a doubt whether a purely moral act could ever be said to
+exist(57); or rather to express the certainty that if it did it was for
+ever inaccessible to observation. All such designations of the several
+"factors" or "moments" in reality, as has been hinted, are only _a
+potiori_. But they are misused when it is supposed that they connote
+abrupt and total discontinuity. And Kant, after all, only repeated in his
+own terminology an old and inveterate habit of thought:--the habit which in
+Stoicism seemed to see sage and foolish utterly separated, and which in
+the straiter sects of Christendom fenced off saint absolutely from sinner.
+It is a habit to which Hegel, and even his immediate predecessors, are
+radically opposed. With Herder, he might say, "Ethics is only a higher
+physics of the mind(58)." This--the truth in Spinozism--no doubt demands
+some emphasis on the word "higher": and it requires us to read ethics (or
+something like it) into physics; but it is a step on the right road,--the
+step which Utilitarianism and Evolutionism had (however awkwardly) got
+their foot upon, and which "transcendent" ethics seems unduly afraid of
+committing itself to. Let us say, if we like, that the mind is more than
+mere nature, and that it is no proper object of a merely natural science.
+But let us remember that a merely natural science is only a fragment of
+science: let us add that the _merely_ natural is an abstraction which in
+part denaturalises and mutilates the larger nature--a nature which includes
+the natural mind, and cannot altogether exclude the ethical.
+
+What have been called "formal duties(59)" seem to fall under this
+range--the province of a philosophical psychology which unveils the
+conditions of personality. Under that heading may be put self-control,
+consistency, resolution, energy, forethought, prudence, and the like. The
+due proportion of faculty, the correspondence of head and heart, the
+vivacity and quickness of sympathy, the ease and simplicity of mental
+tone, the due vigour of memory and the grace of imagination, sweetness of
+temper, and the like, are parts of the same group(60). They are lovely,
+and of good report: they are praise and virtue. If it be urged that they
+are only natural gifts and graces, that objection cuts two ways. The
+objector may of course be reminded that religion tones down the
+self-complacency of morality. Yet, first, even apart from that, it may be
+said that of virtues, which stand independent of natural conditions--of
+external supply of means (as Aristotle would say)--nothing can be known and
+nothing need be said. And secondly, none of these qualities are mere
+gifts;--all require exercise, habituation, energising, to get and keep
+them. How much and how little in each case is nature's and how much ours
+is a problem which has some personal interest--due perhaps to a rather
+selfish and envious curiosity. But on the broad field of experience and
+history we may perhaps accept the--apparently one-sided--proverb that "Each
+man is the architect of his own fortune." Be this as it may, it will not
+do to deny the ethical character of these "formal duties" on the ground
+e.g. that self-control, prudence, and even sweetness of temper may be used
+for evil ends,--that one may smile and smile, and yet be a villain.
+That--let us reply,--on one hand, is a fault (if fault it be) incidental to
+all virtues in detail (for every single quality has its defect): nay it
+may be a limitation attaching to the whole ethical sphere: and, secondly,
+its inevitable limitation does not render the virtue in any case one whit
+less genuine so far as it goes. And yet of such virtues it may be said, as
+Hume(61) would say (who calls them "natural," as opposed to the more
+artificial merits of justice and its kin), that they please in themselves,
+or in the mere contemplation, and without any regard to their social
+effects. But they please as entering into our idea of complete human
+nature, of mind and spirit as will and intellect.
+
+The moralists of last century sometimes divided the field of ethics by
+assigning to man three grades or kinds of duty: duties to himself, duties
+to society, and duties to God. For the distinction there is a good deal to
+be said: there are also faults to be found with it. It may be said,
+amongst other things, that to speak of duties to self is a metaphorical
+way of talking, and that God lies out of the range of human duty
+altogether, except in so far as religious service forms a part of social
+obligation. It may be urged that man is essentially a social being, and
+that it is only in his relations to other such beings that his morality
+can find a sphere. The sphere of morality, according to Dr. Bain, embraces
+whatever "society has seen fit to enforce with all the rigour of positive
+inflictions. Positive good deeds and self-sacrifice ... transcend the
+region of morality proper and occupy a sphere of their own(62)." And there
+is little doubt that this restriction is in accordance with a main current
+of usage. It may even be said that there are tendencies towards a narrower
+usage still, which would restrict the term to questions affecting the
+relations of the sexes. But, without going so far, we may accept the
+standpoint which finds in the phrase "popular or social" sanction, as
+equivalent to the moral sanction, a description of the average level of
+common opinion on the topic. The morality of an age or country thus
+denotes, first, the average requirement in act and behaviour imposed by
+general consent on the members of a community, and secondly, the average
+performance of the members in response to these requirements. Generally
+speaking the two will be pretty much the same. If the society is in a
+state of equilibrium, there will be a palpable agreement between what all
+severally expect and what all severally perform. On the other hand, as no
+society is ever in complete equilibrium, this harmony will never be
+perfect and may often be widely departed from. In what is called a single
+community, if it reach a considerable bulk, there are (in other words)
+often a number of minor societies, more or less thwarting and modifying
+each other; and different observers, who belong in the main to one or
+other of these subordinate groups, may elicit from the facts before them a
+somewhat different social code, and a different grade of social
+observance. Still, with whatever diversity of detail, the important
+feature of such social ethics is that the stress is laid on the
+performance of certain acts, in accordance with the organisation of
+society. So long as the required compliance is given, public opinion is
+satisfied, and morality has got its due.
+
+But in two directions this conception of morality needs to be
+supplementing. There is, on one hand, what is called duty to God. The
+phrase is not altogether appropriate: for it follows too closely the
+analogy of social requirement, and treats Deity as an additional and
+social authority,--a lord paramount over merely human sovereigns. But
+though there may be some use in the analogy, to press the conception is
+seriously to narrow the divine character and the scope of religion. As in
+similar cases, we cannot change one term without altering its correlative.
+And therefore to describe our relation to God under the name of duty is to
+narrow and falsify that relation. The word is no longer applicable in this
+connexion without a strain, and where it exists it indicates the survival
+of a conception of theocracy: of God regarded as a glorification of the
+magistrate, as king of kings and lord of lords. It is the social world--and
+indeed we may say the outside of the social world--that is the sphere of
+duties. Duty is still with these reductions a great august name: but in
+literal strictness it only rules over the medial sphere of life, the
+sphere which lies between the individual as such and his universal
+humanity(63). Beyond duty, lies the sphere of conscience and of religion.
+And that is not the mere insistence by the individual to have a voice and
+a vote in determining the social order. It is the sense that the social
+order, however omnipotent it may seem, is limited and finite, and that man
+has in him a kindred with the Eternal.
+
+It is not very satisfactory, either, as Aristotle and others have pointed
+out, to speak of man's duties to himself. The phrase is analogical, like
+the other. But it has the merit, like that of duty to God, of reminding us
+that the ordinary latitude occupied by morality is not all that comes
+under the larger scope of ethics. The "ethics of individual life" is a
+subject which Mr. Spencer has touched upon: and by this title, he means
+that, besides his general relationship to others, a human being has to
+mind his own health, food, and amusement, and has duties as husband and
+parent. But, after all, these are not matters of peculiarly individual
+interest. They rather refer to points which society at certain epochs
+leaves to the common sense of the agent,--apparently on an assumption that
+he is the person chiefly interested. And these points--as the Greeks taught
+long ago--are of fundamental importance: they are the very bases of life.
+Yet the comparative neglect in which so-called civilised societies(64)
+hold the precepts of wisdom in relation to bodily health and vigour, in
+regard to marriage and progeny, serve to illustrate the doctrine of the
+ancient Stoics that {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, or the modern idealist utterance that
+the World is my idea. More and more as civilisation succeeds in its
+disruption of man from nature, it shows him governed not by bare facts and
+isolated experiences, but by the systematic idea under which all things
+are subsumed. He loses the naïveté of the natural man, which takes each
+fact as it came, all alike good: he becomes sentimental, and artificial,
+sees things under a conventional point of view, and would rather die than
+not be in the fashion. And this tendency is apparently irresistible. Yet
+the mistake lies in the one-sidedness of sentiment and convention. Not the
+domination of the idea is evil; but the domination of a partial and
+fragmentary idea: and this is what constitutes the evil of artificiality.
+And the correction must lie not in a return to nature, but in the
+reconstruction of a wider and more comprehensive idea: an idea which shall
+be the unity and system of all nature; not a fantastic idealism, but an
+attempt to do justice to the more realist as well as the idealist sides of
+life.
+
+There is however another side of individualist ethics which needs even
+more especial enforcement. It is the formation of
+
+
+    "The reason firm, the temperate will,
+    Endurance, foresight, strength and skill:"
+
+
+the healthy mind in a healthy body. Ethics is only too apt to suppose that
+will and intelligence are assumptions which need no special justification.
+But the truth is that they vary from individual to individual in degree
+and structure. It is the business of ethical psychology to give to these
+vague attributions the definiteness of a normal standard: to show what
+proportions are required to justify the proper title of reason and will--to
+show what reason and will really are if they do what they are encouraged
+or expected to do. It talks of the diseases of will and personality: it
+must also set forth their educational ideal. The first problem of Ethics,
+it may be said, is the question of the will and its freedom. But to say
+this is of course not to say that, unless freedom of will be understood in
+some special sense, ethics becomes impossible. If the moral law is the
+_ratio cognoscendi_ of freedom, then must our conception of morality and
+of freedom hang together. And it will clearly be indispensable to begin by
+some attempt to discover in what sense man may be in the most general way
+described as a moral agent--as an intelligent will, or (more briefly, yet
+synonymously) as a will. "The soil of law and morality," says Hegel(65),
+"is the intelligent life: and its more precise place and starting-point
+the will, which is free, in the sense that freedom is its substance and
+characteristic, and the system of law the realm of freedom realised, the
+world of intelligence produced out of itself as a second nature." Such a
+freedom is a freedom made and acquired, the work of the mind's
+self-realisation, not to be taken as a given fact of consciousness which
+must be believed(66). To have a will--in other words, to have freedom, is
+the consummation--and let us add, only the formal or ideal consummation--of
+a process by which man raises himself out of his absorption in sensation
+and impulse, establishes within himself a mental realm, an organism of
+ideas, a self-consciousness, and a self.
+
+The vulgar apprehension of these things seems to assume that we have by
+nature, or are born with, a general faculty or set of general faculties,
+which we subsequently fill up and embody by the aid of experience. We
+possess--they seem to imply--so many "forms" and "categories" latent in our
+minds ready to hold and contain the raw materials supplied from without.
+According to this view we have all a will and an intelligence: the
+difference only is that some put more into them, and some put less. But
+such a separation of the general form from its contents is a piece of pure
+mythology. It is perhaps true and safe to say that the human being is of
+such a character that will and intelligence are in the ordinary course
+inevitably produced. But the forms which grow up are the more and more
+definite and systematic organisation of a graded experience, of series of
+ideas, working themselves up again and again in representative and
+re-representative degree, till they constitute a mental or inner world of
+their own. The will is thus the title appropriate to the final stage of a
+process, by which sensation and impulse have polished and perfected
+themselves by union and opposition, by differentiation and accompanying
+redintegration, till they assume characters quite unsurmised in their
+earliest aspects, and yet only the consolidation or self-realisation of
+implications. Thus the mental faculties are essentially acquired
+powers,--acquired not from without, but by action which generates the
+faculties it seems to imply. The process of mind is a process which
+creates individual centres, raises them to completer independence;--which
+produces an inner life more and more self-centered and also more and more
+equal to the universe which it has embodied. And will and intelligence are
+an important stage in that process.
+
+Herbart (as was briefly hinted at in the first essay) has analysed ethical
+appreciation (which may or may not be accompanied by approbation) into
+five distinct standard ideas. These are the ideas of inward liberty, of
+perfection, of right, benevolence, and equity. Like Hume, he regards the
+moral judgment as in its purity a kind of aesthetic pronouncement on the
+agreement or proportion of certain activities in relations to each other.
+Two of these standard ideas,--that of inward liberty and of perfection--seem
+to belong to the sphere at present under review. They emerge as conditions
+determining the normal development of human nature to an intelligent and
+matured personality. By inward freedom Herbart means the harmony between
+the will and the intellect: what Aristotle has named "practical truth or
+reality," and what he describes in his conception of wisdom or moral
+intelligence,--the power of discerning the right path and of pursuing it
+with will and temper: the unity, clear but indissoluble, of will and
+discernment. By the idea of perfection Herbart means the sense of
+proportion and of propriety which is awakened by comparing a progress in
+development or an increase in strength with its earlier stages of promise
+and imperfection. The pleasure such perception affords works in two ways:
+it is a satisfaction in achievement past, and a stimulus to achievement
+yet to come.
+
+Such ideas of inward liberty and of growth in ability or in performance
+govern (at least in part) our judgment of the individual, and have an
+ethical significance. Indeed, if the cardinal feature of the ethical
+sentiment be the inwardness and independence of its approbation and
+obligation, these ideas lie at the root of all true morality. Inward
+harmony and inward progress, lucidity of conscience and the resolution
+which knows no finality of effort, are the very essence of moral life.
+Yet, if ethics is to include in the first instance social relationships
+and external utilities and sanctions, these conditions of true life must
+rather be described as pre-ethical. The truth seems to be that here we get
+to a range of ethics which is far wider than what is ordinarily called
+practice and conduct. At this stage logic, aesthetic, and ethic, are yet
+one: the true, the good, and the beautiful are still held in their
+fundamental unity. An ethics of wide principle precedes its narrower
+social application; and whereas in ordinary usage the social provinciality
+is allowed to prevail, here the higher ethics emerge clear and imperial
+above the limitations of local and temporal duty.
+
+And though it is easy to step into exaggeration, it is still well to
+emphasise this larger conception of ethics. The moral principle of the
+"maximising of life," as it has been called(67), may be open to
+misconception (--so, unfortunately are all moral principles when stated in
+the effrontery of isolation): but it has its truth in the conviction that
+all moral evil is marked by a tendency to lower or lessen the total
+vitality. So too Friedrich Nietzsche's maxim, _Sei vornehm_(68), ensue
+distinction, and above all things be not common or vulgar (_gemein_), will
+easily lend itself to distortion. But it is good advice for all that, even
+though it may be difficult to define in a general formula wherein
+distinction consists, to mark the boundary between self-respect and vanity
+or obstinacy, or to say wherein lies the beauty and dignity of human
+nature. Kant has laid it down as the principle of duty to ask ourselves if
+in our act we are prepared to universalise the maxim implied by our
+conduct. And that this--which essentially bids us look at an act in the
+whole of its relations and context--is a safeguard against some forms of
+moral evil, is certain. But there is an opposite--or rather an apparently
+opposite--principle which bids us be individual, be true to our own selves,
+and never allow ourselves to be dismayed from our own unique
+responsibility. Perhaps the two principles are not so far apart as they
+seem. In any case true individuality is the last word and the first word
+in ethics; though, it may be added, there is a good deal to be said
+between the two termini.
+
+
+
+(iv.) An Excursus on Greek Ethics.
+
+
+It is in these regions that Greek ethics loves to linger; on the duty of
+the individual to himself, to be perfectly lucid and true, and to rise to
+ever higher heights of achievement. _Ceteris paribus_, there is felt to be
+something meritorious in superiority, something good:--even were it that
+you are master, and another is slave. Thus naïvely speaks Aristotle(69).
+To a modern, set amid so many conflicting ideals, perhaps, the immense
+possibilities of yet further growth might suggest themselves with
+overpowering force. To him the idea of perfection takes the form of an
+idea of perfectibility: and sometimes it smites down his conceit in what
+he has actually done, and impresses a sense of humility in comparison with
+what yet remains unaccomplished. An ancient Greek apparently was little
+haunted by these vistas of possibilities of progress through worlds beyond
+worlds. A comparatively simple environment, a fixed and definite mental
+horizon, had its plain and definite standards, or at least seemed to have
+such. There were fewer cases of the man, unattached or faintly attached to
+any definite profession--moving about in worlds half realised--who has grown
+so common in a more developed civilisation. The ideals of the Greek were
+clearly descried: each man had his definite function or work to perform:
+and to do it better than the average, or than he himself habitually had
+done, that was perfection, excellence, virtue. For virtue to the Greek is
+essentially ability and respectability: promise of excellent performance:
+capacity to do better than others. Virtue is praiseworthy or meritorious
+character and quality: it is achievement at a higher rate, as set against
+one's past and against others' average.
+
+The Greek moralists sometimes distinguish and sometimes combine moral
+virtue and wisdom, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~} and {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}: capacity to perform, and wisdom to
+guide that capacity. To the ordinary Greek perhaps the emphasis fell on
+the former, on the attainment of all recognised good quality which became
+a man, all that was beautiful and honourable, all that was appropriate,
+glorious, and fame-giving; and that not for any special reference to its
+utilitarian qualities. Useful, of course, such qualities were: but that
+was not in question at the time. In the more liberal commonwealths of
+ancient Greece there was little or no anxious care to control the
+education of its citizens, so as to get direct service, overt contribution
+to the public good. A suspicious Spartan legislation might claim to do
+that. But in the free air of Athens all that was required was loyalty,
+good-will--{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}--to the common weal; it might be even a sentiment of human
+kindliness, of fraternity of spirit and purpose. Everything beyond and
+upon that basis was left to free development. Let each carry out to the
+full the development of his powers in the line which national estimation
+points out. He is--nature and history alike emphasise that fact beyond the
+reach of doubt, for all except the outlaw and the casual stranger--a member
+of a community, and as such has a governing instinct and ideal which
+animates him. But he is also a self-centered individual, with special
+endowments of nature, in his own person and in the material objects which
+are his. A purely individualist or selfish use of them is not--to the
+normal Greek--even dreamed of. He is too deeply rooted in the substance of
+his community for that: or it is on the ground and in the atmosphere of an
+assured community that his individuality is to be made to flourish. Nature
+has secured that his individuality shall rest securely in the
+presupposition of his citizenship. It seems, therefore, as if he were left
+free and independent in his personal search for perfection, for
+distinction. His place is fixed for him: _Spartam nactus es; hanc orna_:
+his duty is his virtue. That duty, as Plato expresses it, is to do his own
+deeds--and not meddle with others. Nature and history have arranged that
+others, in other posts, shall do theirs: that all severally shall energise
+their function. The very word "duty" seems out of place; if, at least,
+duty suggests external obligation, an order imposed and a debt to be
+discharged. If there be a task-master and a creditor, it is the inflexible
+order of nature and history:--or, to be more accurate, of nature, the
+indwelling and permanent reality of things. But the obligation to follow
+nature is scarcely felt as a yoke of constraint. A man's virtue is to
+perform his work and to perform it well: to do what he is specially
+capable of doing, and therefore specially charged to do.
+
+Nowhere has this character of Greek ethics received more classical
+expression than in the Republic of Plato. In the prelude to his
+subject--which is the nature of Right and Morality--Plato has touched
+briefly on certain popular and inadequate views. There is the view that
+Right has its province in performance of certain single and external
+acts--in business honesty and commercial straightforwardness. There is the
+view that it is rendering to each what is due to him; that it consists in
+the proper reciprocity of services, in the balance of social give and
+take. There is the critical or hyper-critical view which, from seeing so
+much that is called justice to be in harmony with the interest of the
+predominant social order, bluntly identifies mere force or strength as the
+ground of right. And there are views which regard it as due to social
+conventions and artifices, to the influence of education, to political
+arrangements and the operation of irrational prejudices. To all these
+views Plato objects: not because they are false--for they are all in part,
+often in large part, true--but because they are inadequate and do not go to
+the root of the matter. The foundations of right lie, he says, not in
+external act, but in the inner man: not in convention, but in nature: not
+in relation to others, but in the constitution of the soul itself. That
+ethical idea--the idea of right--which seems most obviously to have its
+centre outside the individual, to live and grow only in the relations
+between individuals, Plato selects in order to show the independent
+royalty of the single human soul. The world, as Hume afterwards, called
+justice artificial: Plato will prove it natural. In a way he joins company
+with those who bid us drive out the spectre of duty, of obligation coming
+upon the soul from social authority, from traditional idea, from religious
+sanctions. He preaches--or he is about to preach--the autonomy of the will.
+
+The four cardinal virtues of Plato's list are the qualities which go to
+make a healthy, normal, natural human soul, fit for all activity, equipped
+with all arms for the battle of life. They tell us what such a soul is,
+not what it does. They are the qualities which unless a soul has, and has
+them each perfect, yet all co-operant, its mere outward and single acts
+have no virtue or merit, but are only lucky accidents at the best. On the
+other hand, if a man has these constitutive qualities, he will act in the
+social world, and act well. Plato has said scornful things of mere outward
+and verbal truthfulness, and has set at the very lowest pitch of
+degradation the "lie in the soul." His "temperance" or "self-restraint,"
+if it be far from breathing any suggestion of self-suppression or
+self-assertion, is still farther from any suspicion of asceticism, or war
+against the flesh. It is the noble harmony of the ruling and the ruled,
+which makes the latter a partner of the sovereign, and takes from the
+dictates of the ruler any touch of coercion. It is literally sanity of
+soul, integrity and purity of spirit; it is what has been sometimes called
+the beautiful soul--the indiscerptible unity of reason and impulse. Plato's
+bravery, again, is fortitude and consistency of soul, the full-blooded
+heart which is fixed in reason, the zeal which is according to knowledge,
+unflinching loyalty to the idea, the spirit which burns in the martyrs to
+truth and humanity: yet withal with gentleness and courtesy and noble
+urbanity in its immediate train. And his truthfulness is that inner
+lucidity which cannot be self-deceived, the spirit which is a safeguard
+against fanaticism and hypocrisy, the sunlike warmth of intelligence
+without which the heart is a darkness full of unclean things.
+
+The full development and crowning grace of such a manly nature Aristotle
+has tried to present in the character of the Great-souled man--him whom
+Plato has called the true king by divine right, or the autocrat by the
+patent of nature. Like all such attempts to delineate a type in the terms
+necessarily single and successive of abstract analysis, it tends
+occasionally to run into caricature, and to give partial aspects an absurd
+prominency. Only the greatest of artists could cope with such a task,
+though that artist may be found perhaps classed among the historians. Yet
+it is possible to form some conception of the ideal which Aristotle would
+set before us. The Great-souled man _is_ great, and he dare not deny the
+witness of his spirit. He is one who does not quail before the anger and
+seek the applause of popular opinion: he holds his head as his own, and as
+high as his undimmed self-consciousness shows it is worth. There has been
+said to him by the reason within him the word that Virgil erewhile
+addressed to Dante:
+
+
+    "Libero, dritto, e sano è il tuo arbitrio
+    E fallo fora non fare a suo cenno;
+    Per ch' io te sopra te corono e mitrio."
+
+
+He is his own Emperor and his own Pope. He is the perfected man, in whom
+is no darkness, whose soul is utter clearness, and complete harmony. Calm
+in self-possessed majesty, he stands, if need be, _contra mundum_: but
+rather, with the world beneath his feet. The chatter of personality has no
+interest for him. Bent upon the best, lesser competitions for distinction
+have no attraction for him. To the vulgar he will seem cold,
+self-confined: in his apartness and distinction they will see the signs of
+a "prig." His look will be that of one who pities men--rather than loves
+them: and should he speak ill of a foe, it is rather out of pride of heart
+and unbroken spirit than because these things touch him. Such an one, in
+many ways, was the Florentine poet himself.
+
+If the Greek world in general thus conceived {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~} as the full bloom of
+manly excellence (we all know how slightly--witness the remarks in the
+Periclean oration--Greeks, in their public and official utterances, rated
+womanliness), the philosophers had a further point to emphasise. That was
+what they variously called knowledge, prudence, reason, insight,
+intelligence, wisdom, truth. From Socrates to Aristotle, from Aristotle to
+the Stoics and Epicureans, and from the Stoics to the Neo-Platonists, this
+is the common theme: the supremacy of knowledge, its central and essential
+relation to virtue. They may differ--perhaps not so widely as current
+prejudice would suppose--as to how this knowledge is to be defined, what
+kind of knowledge it is, how acquired and maintained, and so on. But in
+essentials they are at one. None of them, of course, mean that in order to
+right conduct nothing more is needed than to learn and remember what is
+right, the precepts and commandments of ordinary morality. Memory is not
+knowledge, especially when it is out of mind. Even an ancient philosopher
+was not wholly devoid of common sense. They held--what they supposed was a
+fact of observation and reflection--that all action was prompted by
+feelings of the values of things, by a desire of something good or
+pleasing to self, and aimed at self-satisfaction and self-realisation, but
+that there was great mistake in what thus afforded satisfaction. People
+chose to act wrongly or erroneously, because they were, first, mistaken
+about themselves and what they wanted, and, secondly, mistaken in the
+means which would give them satisfaction. But this second point was
+secondary. The main thing was to know yourself, what you really were; in
+Plato's words, to "see the soul as it is, and know whether it have one
+form only or many, or what its nature is; to look upon it with the eye of
+reason in its original purity." Self-deception, confusion, that worst
+ignorance which is unaware of itself, false estimation--these are the
+radical evils of the natural man. To these critics the testimony of
+consciousness was worthless, unless corroborated. To cure this mental
+confusion, this blindness of will and judgment, is the task set for
+philosophy: to give inward light, to teach true self-measurement. In one
+passage, much misunderstood, Plato has called this philosophic art the due
+measurement of pleasures and pains. It should scarcely have been possible
+to mistake the meaning. But, with the catchwords of Utilitarianism ringing
+in their ears, the commentators ran straight contrary to the true teaching
+of the _Protagoras_, consentient as it is with that of the _Phaedo_ and
+the _Philebus_. To measure, one must have a standard: and if Plato has one
+lesson always for us, it is that a sure standard the multitude have not,
+but only confusion. The so-called pleasures and pains of the world's
+experiences are so entitled for different reasons, for contrary aims, and
+with no unity or harmony of judgment. They are--not a fact to be accepted,
+but--a problem for investigation: their reality is in question, their
+genuineness, solidity and purity: and till you have settled that, you
+cannot measure, for you may be measuring vacuity under the idea that there
+is substance. You have still to get at the unit--i.e. the reality of
+pleasure. It was not Plato's view that pleasure was a separate and
+independent entity: that it was exactly as it was felt. Each pleasure is
+dependent for its pleasurable quality on the consciousness it belongs to,
+and has only a relative truth and reality. Bentham has written about
+computing the value of a "lot" of pleasures and pains. But Plato had his
+mind on an earlier and more fundamental problem, what is the truth and
+reality of pleasure; and his fullest but not his only essay towards
+determining the value or estimating the meaning of pleasure in the scale
+of being is that given in the _Philebus_.
+
+This then is the knowledge which Greek philosophy meant: not mere
+intellect--though, of course, there is always a danger of theoretical
+inquiry degenerating into abstract and formal dogma. But of the meaning
+there can be no serious doubt. It is a knowledge, says Plato, to which the
+method of mathematical science--the most perfect he can find
+acknowledged--is only an _ouverture_, or perhaps, only the preliminary
+tuning of the strings. It is a knowledge not eternally hypothetical--a
+system of sequences which have no sure foundation. It is a knowledge which
+rests upon the conviction and belief of the "idea of good": a kind of
+knowledge which does not come by direct teaching, which is not mere
+theory, but implies a lively conviction, a personal apprehension, a crisis
+which is a kind of "conversion," or "inspiration." It is as it were the
+prize of a great contest, in which the sword that conquers is the sword of
+dialectic: a sword whereof the property is, like that of Ithuriel's spear,
+to lay bare all deceptions and illusions of life. Or, to vary the
+metaphor: the son of man is like the prince in the fairy tale who goes
+forth to win the true queen; but there are many false pretenders decked
+out to deceive his unwary eyes and foolish heart. Yet in himself there is
+a power of discernment: there is something kindred with the truth:--the
+witness of the Spirit--and all that education and discipline can do is to
+remove obstacles, especially the obstacles within the self which perturb
+the sight and mislead the judgment. Were not the soul originally possessed
+of and dominated by the idea of good, it could never discern it elsewhere.
+On this original kindred depends all the process of education; the
+influence of which therefore is primarily negative or auxiliary. Thus the
+process of history and experience,--which the work of education only
+reproduces in an accelerated _tempo_--serves but to bring out the implicit
+reason within into explicit conformity with the rationality of the world.
+
+Knowledge, then, in this ethical sphere means the harmony of will,
+emotion, intellect: it means the clear light which has no illusions and no
+deceptions. And to those who feel that much of their life and of the
+common life is founded on prejudice and illusion, such white light will
+occasionally seem hard and steely. At its approach they fear the loss of
+the charm of that twilight hour ere the day has yet begun, or before the
+darkness has fully settled down. Thus the heart and feelings look upon the
+intellect as an enemy of sentiment. And Plato himself is not without
+anticipations of such an issue. Yet perhaps we may add that the danger is
+in part an imaginary one, and only arises because intelligence takes its
+task too lightly, and encroaches beyond its proper ground. Philosophy, in
+other words, mistakes its place when it sets itself up as a dogmatic
+system of life. Its function is to comprehend, and from comprehension to
+criticise, and through criticising to unify. It has no positive and
+additional teaching of its own: no addition to the burden of life and
+experience. And experience it must respect. Its work is to maintain the
+organic or super-organic interconnexion between all the spheres of life
+and all the forms of reality. It has to prevent stagnation and absorption
+of departments--to keep each in its proper place, but not more than its
+place, and yet to show how each is not independent of the others. And this
+is what the philosopher or ancient sage would be. If he is passionless, it
+is not that he has no passions, but that they no longer perturb and
+mislead. If his controlling spirit be reason, it is not the reason of the
+so-called "rationalist," but the reason which seeks in patience to
+comprehend, and to be at home in, a world it at first finds strange. And
+if he is critical of others, he is still more critical of himself:
+critical however not for criticism's sake (which is but a poor thing), but
+because through criticism the faith of reason may be more fully justified.
+To the last, if he is true to his mission and faithful to his loyalty to
+reality, he will have the simplicity of the child.
+
+Whether therefore we agree or not with Plato's reduction of Right and Duty
+to self-actualisation, we may at least admit that in the idea of
+perfection or excellence, combined with the idea of knowledge or inward
+lucidity, he has got the fundamental ideas on which further ethical
+development must build. Self-control, self-knowledge, internal harmony,
+are good: and so are the development of our several faculties and of the
+totality of them to the fullest pitch of excellence. But their value does
+not lie entirely in themselves, or rather there is implicit in them a
+reference to something beyond themselves. They take for granted something
+which, because it is so taken, may also be ignored and neglected, just
+because it seems so obvious. And that implication is the social humanity
+in which they are the spirits of light and leading.
+
+To lay the stress on {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~} or excellence tends to leave out of sight the
+force of duty; and to emphasise knowledge is allowed to disparage the
+heart and feelings. The mind--even of a philosopher--finds a difficulty in
+holding very different points of view in one, and where it is forced from
+one to another, tends to forget the earlier altogether. Thus when the
+ethical philosopher, presupposing as an absolute or unquestionable fact
+that man the individual was rooted in the community, proceeded to discuss
+the problem of the best and completest individual estate, he was easily
+led to lose sight of the fundamental and governing condition altogether.
+From the moment that Aristotle lays down the thesis that man is naturally
+social, to the moment when he asks how the bare ideal of excellence in
+character and life can become an actuality, the community in which man
+lives has retired out of sight away into the background. And it only comes
+in, as it first appears, as the paedagogue to bring us to morality. And
+Plato, though professedly he is speaking of the community, and is well
+aware that the individual can only be saved by the salvation of the
+community, is constantly falling back into another problem--the development
+of an individual soul. He feels the strength of the egoistic effort after
+perfection, and his essay in the end tends to lose sight altogether of its
+second theme. Instead of a man he gives us a mere philosopher, a man, that
+is, not living with his country's life, instinct with the heart and
+feeling of humanity, inspired by art and religion, but a being set apart
+and exalted above his fellows,--charged no doubt in theory with the duty of
+saving them, of acting vicariously as the mediator between them and the
+absolute truth--but really tending more and more to seclude himself on the
+_edita templa_ of the world, on the high-towers of speculation.
+
+And what Plato and Aristotle did, so to speak, against their express
+purpose and effort, yet did, because the force of contemporary tendency
+was irresistible--that the Stoa and Epicurus did more openly and
+professedly. With a difference in theory, it is true, owing to the
+difference in the surroundings. Virtue in the older day of the free and
+glorious commonwealth had meant physical and intellectual achievement,
+acts done in the public eye, and of course for the public good--a good with
+which the agent was identified at least in heart and soul, if not in his
+explicit consciousness. In later and worse days, when the political world,
+with the world divine, had withdrawn from actual identity with the central
+heart of the individual, and stood over-against him as a strange power and
+little better than a nuisance, virtue came to be counted as endurance,
+indifference, negative independence against a cold and a perplexing world.
+But even still, virtue is excellence: it is to rise above the ignoble
+level: to assert self-liberty against accident and circumstance--to attain
+self-controlled, self-satisfying independence--and to become God-like in
+its seclusion. Yet in two directions even it had to acknowledge something
+beyond the individual. The Epicurean--following out a suggestion of
+Aristotle--recognised the help which the free society of friends gave to
+the full development of the single seeker after a self-satisfying and
+complete life. The Stoic, not altogether refusing such help, tended rather
+to rest his single self on a fellowship of ideal sort, on the great city
+of gods and men, the _civitas Dei_. Thus, in separate halves, the two
+schools, into which Greek ethics was divided, gave expression to the sense
+that a new and higher community was needed--to the sense that the visible
+actual community no longer realised its latent idea. The Stoic emphasised
+the all-embracing necessity, the absolute comprehensiveness of the moral
+kingdom. The Epicurean saw more clearly that, if the everlasting city came
+from heaven, it could only visibly arise by initiation upon the earth.
+Christianity--in its best work--was a conjunction of the liberty with the
+necessity, of the human with the divine.
+
+More interesting, perhaps, it is to note the misconception of reason and
+knowledge which grew up. Knowledge came more and more to be identified
+with the reflective and critical consciousness, which is outside reality
+and life, and judges it from a standpoint of its own. It came to be
+esteemed only in its formal and abstract shape, and at the expense of the
+heart and feelings. The antithesis of philosophy (or knowledge strictly so
+called) according to Plato was mere opinion, accidental and imperfect
+knowledge. The knowledge which is truly valuable is a knowledge which
+presupposes the full reality of life, and is the more and more completely
+articulated theory of it as a whole. It is--abstractly taken--a mere form of
+unity which has no value except in uniting: it is--taken concretely--the
+matter, we may say, in complete unity. It is ideal and perfect harmony of
+thought, appetite, and emotion: or putting it otherwise, the philosopher
+is one who is not merely a creature of appetite and production, not merely
+a creature of feeling and practical energy, but a creature, who to both of
+these superadds an intelligence which sets eyes in the blind forehead of
+these other powers, and thus, far from superseding them altogether, only
+raises them into completeness, and realises all that is worthy in their
+implicit natures. Always these two impulsive tendencies of our nature are
+guided by some sort of ideas and intelligence, by beliefs and opinions.
+But they, like their guides, are sporadically emergent, unconnected, and
+therefore apt to be contradictory. It is to such erratic and occasional
+ideas, half-truths and deceptions, that philosophy is opposed.
+Unfortunately for all parties, the antithesis is carried farther.
+Philosophy and the philosopher are further set in opposition to the faith
+of the heart, the intimacy and intensity of feeling, the depth of love and
+trust, which in practice often go along with imperfect ideas. The
+philosopher is made one who has emancipated himself from the heart and
+feelings,--a pure intelligence, who is set above all creeds, contemplating
+all, and holding none. Consistency and clearness become his idol, to be
+worshipped at any cost, save one sacrifice: and that one sacrifice is the
+sacrifice of his own self-conceit. For consistency generally means that
+all is made to harmonise with one assumed standpoint, and that whatever
+presents discrepancies with this alleged standard is ruthlessly thrown
+away. Such a philosophy mistakes its function, which is not, as Heine
+scoffs, to make an intelligible system by rejecting the discordant
+fragments of life, but to follow reverently, if slowly, in the wake of
+experience. Such a "perfect sage," with his parade of reasonableness, may
+often assume the post of a dictator.
+
+And, above all, intelligence is only half itself when it is not also will.
+And both are more than mere consciousness. Plato--whom we refer to, because
+he is the coryphaeus of all the diverse host of Greek philosophy--seems to
+overestimate or rather to misconceive the place of knowledge. That it is
+the supreme and crowning grace of the soul, he sees. But he tends to
+identify it with the supreme or higher soul:--as Aristotle did after him,
+to be followed by the Stoics and Neo-Platonists. For them the supreme, or
+almost supreme reality is the intelligence or reason: the soul is only on
+a second grade of reality, on the borders of the natural or physical
+world. When Plato takes that line, he turns towards the path of
+asceticism, and treats the philosophic life as a preparation for that
+truer life when intelligence shall be all in all, for that better land
+where "divine dialogues" shall form the staple and substance of spiritual
+existence. Aristotle,--who less often treads these solitudes,--still extols
+the theoretic life, when the body and its needs trouble no more, when the
+activity of reason--the theory of theory--is attained at least as entirely
+as mortal conditions allow man to be deified. Of the "apathy" and the
+reasonable conformity of the Stoics, or of the purely negative character
+of Epicurean happiness (the excision of all that pained) we need not here
+speak. And in Plotinus and Proclus the deification of mere reason is at
+any rate the dominant note; whatever protests the larger Greek nature in
+the former may from time to time offer. The truth which philosophy should
+have taught was that Mind or intelligence was the element where the inner
+life culminated and expanded and flourished: the error which it often
+tended to spread was that intelligence was the higher life of which all
+other was a degenerate shortcoming, and something valuable on its own
+account.
+
+It may be that thus to interpret Plato is to do him an injustice. It has
+been sometimes said that his division of parts or kinds of soul--or his
+distinction between its fighting horses--tends to destroy the unity of
+mental life. But perhaps this was exactly what he wanted to convey. There
+are--we may paraphrase his meaning--three kinds of human being, three types
+of human life. There is the man or the life of appetite and the flesh:
+there is the man of noble emotion and energetic depth of soul: there is
+the life of reasonable pursuits and organised principle. Or, we may take
+his meaning to be that there are three elements or provinces of mental
+life, which in all except a few are but imperfectly coherent and do not
+reach a true or complete unity. Some unity there always is: but in the
+life of mere appetite and impulse, even when these impulses are our nobler
+sentiments of love and hatred, the unity falls very far short. Or, as he
+puts the theme elsewhere, the soul has a passion for self-completion, a
+love of beauty, which in most is but a misleading lust. It is the business
+of the philosophic life to re-create or to foster this unity: or
+philosophy is the persistent search of the soul for its lost unity, the
+search to see that unity which is always its animating principle, its
+inner faith. When the soul has reached this ideal--if it can be supposed to
+attain it (and of this the strong-souled ancient philosophers feel no
+doubt),--then a change must take place. The love of beauty is not
+suppressed; it is only made self-assured and its object freed from all
+imperfection. It is not that passion has ceased; but its nature is so
+transfigured, that it seems worthy of a nobler name, which yet we cannot
+give. To such a life, where battle and conflict are as such unknown, we
+cannot longer give the title of life: and we say that philosophy is in
+life a rehearsal of death(70). And yet if there be no battle, there is not
+for that reason mere inaction. Hence, as the Republic concludes, the true
+philosopher is the complete man. He is the truth and reality which the
+appetitive and emotional man were seeking after and failed to realise. It
+is true they at first will not see this. But the whole long process of
+philosophy is the means to induce this conviction. And for Plato it
+remains clear that through experience, through wisdom, and through
+abstract deduction, the philosopher will justify his claim to him who hath
+ears to hear and heart to understand. If that be so, the asceticism of
+Plato is not a mere war upon flesh and sense as such, but upon flesh and
+sense as imperfect truth, fragmentary reality, which suppose themselves
+complete, though they are again and again confuted by experience, by
+wisdom, and by mere calculation,--a war against their blindness and
+shortsightedness.
+
+
+
+
+Essay IV. Psycho-Genesis.
+
+
+"The key," says Carus, "for the ascertainment of the nature of the
+conscious psychical life lies in the region of the unconscious(71)." The
+view which these words take is at least as old as the days of Leibniz. It
+means that the mental world does not abruptly emerge a full-grown
+intelligence, but has a genesis, and follows a law of development: that
+its life may be described as the differentiation (with integration) of a
+simple or indifferentiated mass. The terms conscious and unconscious,
+indeed, with their lax popular uses, leave the door wide open for
+misconception. But they may serve to mark that the mind is to be
+understood only in a certain relation (partly of antithesis) to nature,
+and the soul only in reference to the body. The so-called "superior
+faculties"--specially characteristic of humanity--are founded upon, and do
+not abruptly supersede, the lower powers which are supposed to be
+specially obvious in the animals(72). The individual and specific
+phenomena of consciousness, which the psychologist is generally supposed
+to study, rest upon a deeper, less explicated, more indefinite, life of
+sensibility, which in its turn fades away by immeasurable gradations into
+something irresponsive to the ordinary tests for sensation and life.
+
+And yet the moment we attempt to leave the daylight of consciousness for
+the darker sides of sub-conscious life, the risks of misinterpretation
+multiply. The problem is to some extent the same as confronts the student
+of the ideas and principles of primitive races. There, the temptation of
+seeing things through the "spectacles of civilisation" is almost
+irresistible. So in psychology we are apt to import into the life of
+sensation and feeling the distinctions and relations of subsequent
+intellection. Nor is the difficulty lessened by Hegel's method which deals
+with soul, sentiency, and consciousness as grades or general
+characteristics in a developmental advance. He borrows his illustrations
+from many quarters, from morbid and anomalous states of
+consciousness,--less from the cases of savages, children and animals. These
+illustrations may be called a loose induction. But it requires a much more
+powerful instrument than mere induction to build up a scientific system; a
+framework of general principle or theory is the only basis on which to
+build theory by the allegation of facts, however numerous. Yet in
+philosophic science, which is systematised knowledge, all facts strictly
+so described will find their place and be estimated at their proper value.
+
+
+
+(i.) Primitive Sensibility.
+
+
+Psychology (with Hegel) takes up the work of science from biology. The
+mind comes before it as the supreme product of the natural world, the
+finest flower of organic life, the "truth" of the physical process. As
+such it is called by the time-honoured name of Soul. If we further go on
+to say that the soul is the principle of life, we must not understand this
+vital principle to be something over and above the life of which it is the
+principle. Such a locally-separable principle is an addition which is due
+to the analogy of mechanical movement, where a detached agent sets in
+motion and directs the machinery. But in the organism the principle is not
+thus detachable as a thing or agent. By calling Soul the principle of life
+we rather mean that in the vital organism, so far as it _lives_, all the
+real variety, separation, and discontinuity of parts must be reduced to
+unity and identity, or as Hegel would say, to _ideality_. To live is thus
+to keep all differences fluid and permeable in the fire of the
+life-process. Or to use a familiar term of logic, the Soul is the concept
+or intelligible unity of the organic body. But to call it a concept might
+suggest that it is only the conception through which _we_ represent to
+ourselves the variety in unity of the organism. The soul, however, is more
+than a mere concept: and life is more than a mere mode of description for
+a group of movements forming an objective unity. It is a unity, subjective
+and objective. The organism is one life, controlling difference: and it is
+also one by our effort to comprehend it. The Soul therefore is in Hegelian
+language described as the Idea rather than the concept of the organic
+body. Life is the generic title for this subject-object: but the life may
+be merely physical, or it may be intellectual and practical, or it may be
+absolute, i.e. will and know all that it is, and be all that it knows and
+wills.
+
+Up to this point the world is what is called an external, which is here
+taken to mean (not a world external to the individual, but) a
+self-externalised world. That is to say, it is the observer who has
+hitherto by his interpretation of his perceptions supplied the "Spirit in
+Nature." In itself the external world has no inside, no centre: it is we
+who read into it the conception of a life-history. We are led to believe
+that a principle of unity is always at work throughout the physical
+world--even in the mathematical laws of natural operation. It is only
+intelligible and credible to us as a system, a continuous and regular
+development. But that system is only a hypothetical idea, though it is
+held to be a conclusion to which all the evidence seems unequivocally to
+point. And, even in organic life, the unity, though more perfect and
+palpable than in the mechanical and inorganic world, is only a perception,
+a vision,--a necessary mode of realising the unity of the facts. The
+phenomenon of life reveals as in a picture and an ocular demonstration the
+conformity of inward and outward, the identity of whole and parts, of
+power and utterance. But it is still outside the observer. In the function
+of sensibility and sentiency, however, we stand as it were on the
+border-line between biology and psychology. At one step we have been
+brought within the harmony, and are no longer mere observers and
+reflecters. The sentient not merely is, but is aware that it is. Hitherto
+as life, it only is the unity in diversity, and diversity in unity, for
+the outsider, i.e. only implicitly: now it is so for itself, or
+consciously. And in the first stage it does not know, but feels or is
+sentient. Here, for the first time, is created the distinction of inward
+and outward. Loosely indeed we may, like Mr. Spencer, speak of outward and
+inward in physiology: but strictly speaking, what Goethe says is true,
+_Natur hat weder Kern noch Schaale_(73). Nature in the narrower sense
+knows no distinction of the inward and outward in its phenomena: it is a
+purely superficial order and succession of appearance and event. The Idea
+which has been visible to an intelligent percipient in the types and laws
+of the natural world, now _is_, actually is--is in and for itself--but at
+first in a minimum of content, a mere point of light, or rather the dawn
+which has yet to expand into the full day.
+
+Spinoza has asserted that "all individual bodies are animate, though in
+different degrees(74)." Now it is to a great extent this diversity of
+degree on which the main interest turns. Yet it is well to remember that
+the abrupt and trenchant separations which popular practice loves are
+overridden to a deeper view by an essential unity of idea, reducing them
+to indifference. If, that is, we take seriously the Spinozist unity of
+Substance, and the continual correlation (to call it no more) of extension
+and consciousness therein, we cannot avoid the conclusion which even Bacon
+would admit of something describable as attraction and perception,
+something subduing diversity to unity. But whether it be well to name this
+soul or life is a different matter. It may indeed only be taken to mean
+that all true being must be looked on as a real unity and individuality,
+must, that is, be conceived as manifesting itself in organisation, must be
+referred to a self-centred and self-developing activity. But this--which is
+the fundamental thesis of idealism--is hardly all that is meant. Rather
+Spinoza would imply that all things which form a real unity must have
+life--must have inner principle and unifying reality: and what he teaches
+is closely akin to the Leibnitian doctrine that every substantial
+existence reposes upon a monad, a unity which is at once both a force and
+a cognition, a "representation" and an appetite or _nisus_ to act. When
+Fechner in a series of works(75) expounds and defends the hypothesis that
+plants and planets are not destitute of soul, any more than man and
+animals, he only gives a more pronounced expression to this idealisation
+or spiritualisation of the natural world. But for the moment the point to
+be noted is that all of this idealistic doctrine is an inference, or a
+development which finds its _point d'appui_ in the fact of sensation. And
+the problem of the Philosophy of Mind is just to trace the process whereby
+a mere shock of sensation has grown into a conception and a faith in the
+goodness, beauty and intelligence of the world.
+
+Schopenhauer has put the point with his usual picturesqueness. Outward
+nature presents nothing but a play of forces. At first, however, this
+force shows merely the mechanical phenomena of pressure and impact, and
+its theory is sufficiently described by mathematical physics. But in the
+process of nature force assumes higher types, types where it loses a
+certain amount of its externality(76), till in the organic world it
+acquires a peculiar phase which Schopenhauer calls _Will_, meaning by
+that, however, an organising and controlling power, a tendency or _nisus_
+to be and live, which is persistent and potent, but without consciousness.
+This blind force, which however has a certain coherence and purposiveness,
+is in the animal organism endowed with a new character, in consequence of
+the emergence of a new organ. This organ, the brain and nervous system,
+causes the evolution into clear day of an element which has been growing
+more and more urgent. The gathering tendency of force to return into
+itself is now complete: the cycle of operation is formed: and the junction
+of the two currents issues in the spark of sensation. The blind force now
+becomes seeing.
+
+But at first--and this is the point we have to emphasise--its powers of
+vision are limited. Sensibility is either a local and restricted
+phenomenon: or, in so far as it is not local, it is vague and indefinite,
+and hardly entitled to the name of sensibility. Either it is a dim, but
+far-reaching, sympathy with environing existence, and in that case only
+so-called blind will or feeling: or if it is clear, is locally confined,
+and at first within very narrow limits. Neither of these points must be
+lost sight of. On the one hand feeling has to be regarded as the dull and
+confused stirring of an almost infinite sympathy with the world--a pulse
+which has come from the far-distant movements of the universe, and bears
+with it, if but as a possibility, the wealth of an infinite message. On
+the other hand, feeling at first only becomes real, in this boundless
+ideality to which its possibilities extend, by restricting itself to one
+little point and from several points organising itself to a unity of
+bodily feeling, till it can go on from thence to embrace the universe in
+distinct and articulate comprehension.
+
+Soul, says Hegel, is not a separate and additional something over and
+above the rest of nature: it is rather nature's "'universal immaterialism,
+and simple ideal life(77)." There were ancient philosophers who spoke of
+the soul as a self-adjusting number,--as a harmony, or equilibrium(78)--and
+the moderns have added considerably to the list of these analogical
+definitions. As definitions they obviously fall short. Yet these things
+give, as it were, by anticipation, an image of soul, as the "ideality,"
+which reduces the manifold to unity. The adhesions and cohesions of
+matter, its gravitating attractions, its chemical affinities and
+electrical polarities, the intricate out-and-in of organic structure, are
+all preludes to the true incorporating unity which is the ever-immanent
+supersession of the endless self-externalism and successionalism of
+physical reality. But in sentiency, feeling, or sensibility, the unity
+which all of these imply without reaching, is explicitly present. It is
+implicitly an all-embracing unity: an infinite,--which has no doors and no
+windows, for the good reason that it needs none, because it has nothing
+outside it, because it "expresses" and "envelopes" (however confusedly at
+first) the whole universe. Thus, even if, with localising phraseology, we
+may describe mind, where it _appears_ emerging in the natural world, as a
+mere feeble and incidental outburst,--a rebellion breaking out as in some
+petty province or isolated region against the great law of the physical
+realm--we are in so speaking taking only an external standpoint. But with
+the rise of mind in nature the bond of externalism is implicitly overcome.
+To it, and where it really is, there is nothing outside, nothing
+transcendent. Everything which is said to be outside mind is only outside
+a localised and limited mind--outside a mind which is imperfectly and
+abstractly realised--not outside mind absolutely. Mind is the absolute
+negation of externality: not a mere relative negative, as the organism may
+be biologically described as inner in respect of the environment. To
+accomplish this negation in actuality, to bring the multiplicity and
+externality of things into the unity and identity of one Idea, is the
+process of development of mind from animal sensibility to philosophic
+knowledge, from appetite to art,--the process of culture through the social
+state under the influence of religion.
+
+Sentiency or psychic matter (mind-stuff), to begin with, is in some
+respects like the _tabula rasa_ of the empiricists. It is the
+possibility--but the real possibility--of intelligence rather than
+intelligence itself. It is the monotonous undifferentiated inwardness--a
+faint self-awareness and self-realisation of the material world, but at
+first a mere vague _psychical protoplasm_ and without defined nucleus,
+without perceptible organisation or separation of structures. If there is
+self-awareness, it is not yet discriminated into a distinct and unified
+self, not yet differentiated and integrated,--soul in the condition of a
+mere "Is," which, however, is nothing determinate. It is very much in the
+situation of Condillac's statue-man--_une statue organisée intérieurement
+comme nous, et animée d'un esprit privé de toute espèce d'idées_: alike at
+least so far that the rigid uniformity of the latter's envelope prevents
+all articulated organisation of its faculties. The foundation under all
+the diversity and individuality in the concrete intelligent and volitional
+life is a common feeling,--a _sensus communis_--a general and indeterminate
+susceptibility to influence, a sympathy responsive, but responsive vaguely
+and equivocally, to all the stimuli of the physical environment. There was
+once a time, according to primitive legend, when man understood the
+language of beast and bird, and even surprised the secret converse of
+trees and flowers. Such fancies are but the exaggeration of a solidarity
+of conscious life which seems to spread far in the sub-conscious realm,
+and to narrow the individual's soul into limited channels as it rises into
+clear self-perception,
+
+
+    "As thro' the frame that binds him in
+    His isolation grows defined."
+
+
+It may be a mere dream that, as Goethe feigns of Makaria in his
+romance(79), there are men and women in sympathy with the vicissitudes of
+the starry regions: and hypotheses of lunar influence, or dogmas of
+astrological destiny, may count to the present guardians of the sciences
+as visionary superstitions. Yet science in these regions has no reason to
+be dogmatic; her function hitherto can only be critical; and even for
+that, her data are scanty and her principles extremely general. The
+influences on the mental mood and faculty, produced by climate and
+seasons, by local environment and national type, by individual
+peculiarities, by the differences of age and sex, and by the alternation
+of night and day, of sleep and waking, are less questionable. It is easy
+no doubt to ignore or forget them: easy to remark how indefinable and
+incalculable they are. But that does not lessen their radical and
+inevitable impress in the determination of the whole character. "The sum
+of our existence, divided by reason, never comes out exact, but always
+leaves a marvellous remainder(80)." Irrational this residue is, in the
+sense that it is inexplicable, and incommensurable with the well-known
+quantities of conscious and voluntarily organised life. But a scientific
+psychology, which is adequate to the real and concrete mind, should never
+lose sight of the fact that every one of its propositions in regard to the
+more advanced phases of intellectual development is thoroughly and in
+indefinable ways modified by these preconditions. When that is remembered,
+it will be obvious how complicated is the problem of adapting psychology
+for the application to education, and how dependent the solution of that
+problem is upon an experiential familiarity with the data of individual
+and national temperament and character.
+
+The first stage in mental development is the establishment of regular and
+uniform relations between soul and body: it is the differentiation of
+organs and the integration of function: the balance between sensation and
+movement, between the afferent and efferent processes of sensitivity.
+Given a potential soul, the problem is to make it actual in an individual
+body. It is the business of a physical psychology to describe in detail
+the steps by which the body we are attached to is made inward as our idea
+through the several organs and their nervous appurtenances: whereas a
+psychical physiology would conversely explain the corresponding processes
+for the expression of the emotions and for the objectification of the
+volitions. Thus soul inwardises (_erinnert_) or envelops body: which body
+"expresses" or develops soul. The actual soul is the unity of both, is the
+percipient individual. The solidarity or "communion" of body and soul is
+here the dominant fact: the soul sentient of changes in its peripheral
+organs, and transmitting emotion and volition into physical effect. It is
+on this psychical unity,--the unity which is the soul of the diversity of
+body--that all the subsequent developments of mind rest. Sensation is thus
+the _prius_--or basis--of all mental life: the organisation of soul in body
+and of body in soul. It is the process which historically has been
+prepared in the evolution of animal life from those undifferentiated forms
+where specialised organs are yet unknown, and which each individual has
+further to realise and complete for himself, by learning to see and hear,
+and use his limbs. At first, moreover, it begins from many separate
+centres and only through much collision and mutual compliance arrives at
+comparative uniformity and centralisation. The common basis of united
+sensibility supplied by the one organism has to be made real and
+effective, and it is so at first by sporadic and comparatively independent
+developments. If self-hood means reference to self of what is prima facie
+not self, and projection of self therein, there is in primitive
+sensibility only the germ or possibility of self-hood. In the early phases
+of psychic development the centre is fluctuating and ill-defined, and it
+takes time and trouble to co-ordinate or unify the various starting-points
+of sensibility(81).
+
+This consolidation of inward life may be looked at either formally or
+concretely. Under the first head, it means the growth of a central unity
+of apperception. In the second case, it means a peculiar aggregate of
+ideas and sentiments. There is growing up within him what we may call the
+individuality of the individual,--an irrational, i.e. not consciously
+intelligent, nether-self or inner soul, a firm aggregation of hopes and
+wishes, of views and feelings, or rather of tendencies and temperament, of
+character hereditary and acquired. It is the law of the natural will or
+character which from an inaccessible background dominates our
+action,--which, because it is not realised and formulated in consciousness,
+behaves like a guardian spirit, or genius, or destiny within us. This
+genius is the sub-conscious unity of the sensitive life--the manner of man
+which unknown to ourselves we are,--and which influences us against our
+nominal or formal purposes. So far as this predominates, our ends, rough
+hew them how we will, are given by a force which is not really, i.e. with
+full consciousness, ours: by a mass of ingrained prejudice and unreasoned
+sympathies, of instincts and passions, of fancies and feelings, which have
+condensed and organised themselves into a natural power. As the child in
+the mother's womb is responsive to her psychic influences, so the
+development of a man's psychic life is guided by feelings centred in
+objects and agents external to him, who form the genius presiding over his
+development. His soul, to that extent, is really in another: he himself is
+selfless, and when his stay is removed the principle of his life is
+gone(82). He is but a bundle of impressions, held together by influences
+and ties which in years before consciousness proper began made him what he
+is. Such is the involuntary adaptation to example and environment, which
+establishes in the depths below personality a self which becomes hereafter
+the determinant of action. Early years, in which the human being is
+naturally susceptible, build up by imitation, by pliant obedience, an
+image, a system, reproducing the immediate surroundings. The soul, as yet
+selfless, and ready to accept any imprint, readily moulds itself into the
+likeness of an authoritative influence.
+
+The step by which the universality or unity of the self is realised in the
+variety of its sensation is Habit. Habit gives us a definite
+standing-ground in the flux of single impressions: it is the
+identification of ourselves with what is most customary and familiar: an
+identification which takes place by practice and repetition. If it
+circumscribes us to one little province of being, it on the other frees us
+from the vague indeterminateness where we are at the mercy of every
+passing mood. It makes thus much of our potential selves our very own, our
+acquisition and permanent possession. It, above all, makes us free and at
+one with our bodily part, so that henceforth we start as a subjective unit
+of body and soul. We have now as the result of the anthropological process
+a self or ego, an individual consciousness able to reflect and compare,
+setting itself on one side (a soul in bodily organisation), and on the
+other setting an object of consciousness, or external world, a world of
+other things. All this presupposes that the soul has actualised itself by
+appropriating and acquiring as its expression and organ the physical
+sensibility which is its body. By restricting and establishing itself, it
+has gained a fixed standpoint. No doubt it has localised and confined
+itself, but it is no longer at the disposal of externals and accident: it
+has laid the foundation for higher developments.
+
+
+
+(ii.) Anomalies of Psychical Life.
+
+
+Psychology, as we have seen, goes for information regarding the earlier
+stages of mental growth to the child and the animal,--perhaps also to the
+savage. So too sociology founds certain conclusions upon the observations
+of savage customs and institutions, or on the earlier records of the race.
+In both cases with a limitation caused by the externality and
+fragmentariness of the facts and the need of interpreting them through our
+own conscious experiences. There is however another direction in which
+corresponding inquiries may be pursued; and where the danger of the
+conclusions arrived at, though not perhaps less real, is certainly of a
+different kind. In sociology we can observe--and almost experiment upon--the
+phenomena of the lapsed, degenerate and criminal classes. The advantage of
+such observation is that the object of study can be made to throw greater
+light on his own inner states. He is a little of the child and a little of
+the savage, but these aspects co-exist with other features which put him
+more on a level with the intelligent observer. Similar pathological
+regions are open to us in the case of psychology. There the anomalous and
+morbid conditions of mind co-exist with a certain amount of mature
+consciousness. So presented, they are thrown out into relief. They form
+the negative instances which serve to corroborate our positive inductions.
+The regularly concatenated and solid structure of normal mind is under
+abnormal and deranged conditions thrown into disorder, and its
+constituents are presented in their several isolation. Such phenomena are
+relapses into more rudimentary grades: but with the difference that they
+are set in the midst of a more advanced phase of intellectual life.
+
+Even amongst candid and honest-minded students of psychology there is a
+certain reluctance to dabble in researches into the night-side of the
+mental range. Herbart is an instance of this shrinking. The region of the
+Unconscious seemed--and to many still seems--a region in which the charlatan
+and the dupe can and must play into each other's hands. Once in the whirl
+of spiritualist and crypto-psychical inquiry you could not tell how far
+you might be carried. The facts moreover were of a peculiar type.
+Dependent as they seemed to be on the frame of mind of observers and
+observed, they defied the ordinary criteria of detached and abstract
+observation. You can only observe them, it is urged, when you believe;
+scepticism destroys them. Now there is a widespread natural impatience
+against what Bacon has called "monodical" phenomena, phenomena i.e. which
+claim to come under a special law of their own, or to have a private and
+privileged sphere. And this impatience cuts the Gordian knot by a
+determination to treat all instances which oppose its hitherto ascertained
+laws as due to deception and fraud, or, at the best, to incompetent
+observation, confusions of memory, and superstitions of ignorance. Above
+all, great interests of religion and personality seemed to connect
+themselves with these revelations--interests, at any rate, to which our
+common humanity thrills; it seemed as if, in this region beyond the
+customary range of the conscious and the seen, one might learn something
+of the deeper realities which lie in the unseen. But to feel that so much
+was at stake was naturally unfavourable to purely dispassionate
+observation.
+
+The philosophers were found--as might have been expected--amongst those most
+strongly attracted by these problems. Even Kant had been fascinated by the
+spiritualism of Swedenborg, though he finally turned away sceptical. At
+least as early as 1806 Schelling had been interested by Ritter's
+researches into the question of telepathy, or the power of the human will
+to produce without mechanical means of conveyance an effect at a distance.
+He was looking forward to the rise of a _Physica coelestis_, or New
+Celestial Physics, which should justify the old magic. About the same date
+his brother Karl published an essay on Animal Magnetism. The novel
+phenomena of galvanism and its congeners suggested vast possibilities in
+the range of the physical powers, especially of the physical powers of the
+human psyche as a natural agent. The divining-rod was revived.
+Clairvoyance and somnambulism were carefully studied, and the curative
+powers of animal magnetism found many advocates(83).
+
+Interest in these questions went naturally with the new conception of the
+place of Man in Nature, and of Nature as the matrix of mind(84). But it
+had been acutely stimulated by the performances and professions of Mesmer
+at Vienna and Paris in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.
+These--though by no means really novel--had forced the artificial world of
+science and fashion to discuss the claim advanced for a new force which,
+amongst other things, could cure ailments that baffled the ordinary
+practitioner. This new force--mainly because of the recent interest in the
+remarkable advances of magnetic and electrical research--was conceived as a
+fluid, and called Animal Magnetism. At one time indeed Mesmer actually
+employed a magnet in the manipulation by which he induced the peculiar
+condition in his patients. The accompaniments of his procedure were in
+many respects those of the quack-doctor; and with the quack indeed he was
+often classed. A French commission of inquiry appointed to examine into
+his performances reported in 1784 that, while there was no doubt as to the
+reality of many of the phenomena, and even of the cures, there was no
+evidence for the alleged new physical force, and declared the effects to
+be mainly attributable to the influence of imagination. And with the
+mention of this familiar phrase, further explanation was supposed to be
+rendered superfluous.
+
+In France political excitement allowed the mesmeric theory and practice to
+drop out of notice till the fall of the first Empire. But in Germany there
+was a considerable amount of investigations and hypotheses into these
+mystical phenomena, though rarely by the ordinary routine workers in the
+scientific field. The phenomena where they were discussed were studied and
+interpreted in two directions. Some theorists, like Jung-Stilling,
+Eschenmayer, Schubert, and Kerner, took the more metaphysicist and
+spiritualistic view: they saw in them the witness to a higher truth, to
+the presence and operation in this lower world of a higher and spiritual
+matter, a so-called ether. Thus Animal Magnetism supplied a sort of
+physical theory of the other world and the other life. Jung-Stilling, e.g.
+in his "Theory of Spirit-lore." (1808), regarded the spiritualistic
+phenomena as a justification of--what he believed to be--the Kantian
+doctrine that in the truly real and persistent world space and time are no
+more. The other direction of inquiry kept more to the physical field.
+Ritter (whose researches interested both Schelling and Hegel) supposed he
+had detected the new force underlying mesmerism and the like, and gave to
+it the name of Siderism (1808); while Amoretti of Milan named the object
+of his experiments Animal Electrometry (1816). Kieser(85), again (1826)
+spoke of Tellurism, and connected animal magnetism with the play of
+general terrestrial forces in the human being.
+
+At a later date (1857) Schindler, in his "Magical Spirit-life," expounded
+a theory of mental polarity. The psychical life has two poles or
+centres,--its day-pole, around which revolves our ordinary and superficial
+current of ideas, and its night-pole, round which gathers the
+sub-conscious and deeper group of beliefs and sentiments. Either life has
+a memory, a consciousness, a world of its own: and they flourish to a
+large extent inversely to each other. The day-world has for its organs of
+receiving information the ordinary senses. But the magical or night-world
+of the soul has its feelers also, which set men directly in telepathic
+rapport with influences, however distant, exerted by the whole world: and
+through this "inner sense" which serves to concentrate in itself all the
+telluric forces (--a sense which in its various aspects we name instinct,
+presentiment, conscience) is constructed the fabric of our sub-conscious
+system. Through it man is a sort of résumé of all the cosmic life, in
+secret affinity and sympathy with all natural processes; and by the will
+which stands in response therewith he can exercise a directly creative
+action on external nature. In normal and healthy conditions the two
+currents of psychic life run on harmonious but independent. But in the
+phenomena of somnambulism, clairvoyance, and delirium, the magic region
+becomes preponderant, and comes into collision with the other. The
+dark-world emerges into the realm of day as a portentous power: and there
+is the feeling of a double personality, or of an indwelling genius,
+familiar spirit, or demon.
+
+To the ordinary physicist the so-called _Actio in distans_ was a hopeless
+stumbling-block. If he did not comprehend the transmission (as it is
+called) of force where there was immediate contact, he was at least
+perfectly familiar with the outer aspect of it as a condition of his
+limited experience. It needed one beyond the mere hodman of science to say
+with Laplace: "We are so far from knowing all the agents of nature, that
+it would be very unphilosophical to deny the existence of phenomena solely
+because they are inexplicable in the present state of our knowledge."
+Accordingly mesmerism and its allied manifestations were generally
+abandoned to the bohemians of science, and to investigators with dogmatic
+bias. It was still employed as a treatment for certain ailments: and
+philosophers, as different as Fichte and Schopenhauer(86), watched its
+fate with attention. But the herd of professional scientists fought shy of
+it. The experiments of Braid at Manchester in 1841 gradually helped to
+give research into the subject a new character. Under the name of
+Hypnotism (or, rather at first Neuro-hypnotism) he described the phenomena
+of the magnetic sleep (induced through prolonged staring at a bright
+object), such as abnormal rigidity of body, perverted sensibility, and the
+remarkable obedience of the subject to the command or suggestions of the
+operator. Thirty years afterwards, the matter became an object of
+considerable experimental and theoretic work in France, at the rival
+schools of Paris and Nancy; and the question, mainly under the title of
+hypnotism, though the older name is still occasionally heard, has been for
+several years brought prominently under public notice.
+
+It cannot be said that the net results of these observations and
+hypotheses are of a very definitive character. While a large amount of
+controversy has been waged on the comparative importance of the several
+methods and instruments by which the hypnotic or mesmeric trance may be
+induced, and a scarcely less wide range of divergence prevails with regard
+to the physiological and pathological conditions in connexion with which
+it has been most conspicuously manifested, there has been less anxiety
+shown to determine its precise psychical nature, or its significance in
+mental development. And yet the better understanding of these aspects may
+throw light on several points connected with primitive religion and the
+history of early civilisation, indeed over the whole range of what is
+called _Völkerpsychologie_. Indeed this is one of the points which may be
+said to emerge out of the confusion of dispute. Phenomena at least
+analogous to those styled hypnotic have a wide range in the
+anthropological sphere(87): and the proper characters which belong to them
+will only be caught by an observer who examines them in the widest variety
+of examples. Another feature which has been put in prominence is what has
+been called "psychological automatism." And in this name two points seem
+to deserve note. The first is the spontaneous and as it were mechanical
+consecution of mental states in the soul whence the interfering effect of
+voluntary consciousness has been removed. And the second is the unfailing
+or accurate regularity, so contrary to the hesitating and uncertain
+procedure of our conscious and reasoned action, which so often is seen in
+the unreflecting and unreasoned movements. To this invariable sequence of
+psychical movement the superior control and direction by the intelligent
+self has to adapt itself, just as it respects the order of physical laws.
+
+But, perhaps, the chief conclusion to be derived from hypnotic experience
+is the value of suggestion or suggestibility. Even cool thinkers like Kant
+have recognised how much mere mental control has to do with bodily
+state,--how each of us, in this way, is often for good or for ill his own
+physician. An idea is a force, and is only inactive in so far as it is
+held in check by other ideas. "There is no such thing as hypnotism," says
+one: "there are only different degrees of suggestibility." This may be to
+exaggerate: yet it serves to impress the comparatively secondary character
+of many of the circumstances on which the specially mesmeric or hypnotic
+experimentalist is apt to lay exclusive stress. The methods may probably
+vary according to circumstances. But the essence of them all is to get the
+patient out of the general frame and system of ideas and perceptions in
+which his ordinary individuality is encased. Considering how for all of us
+the reality of concrete life is bound up with our visual perceptions, how
+largely our sanity depends upon the spatial idea, and how that depends on
+free ocular range, we can understand that darkness and temporary loss of
+vision are powerful auxiliaries in the hypnotic process, as in magical and
+superstitious rites. But a great deal short of this may serve to establish
+influence. The mind of the majority of human beings, but especially of the
+young, may be compared to a vacant seat waiting for some one to fill it.
+
+In Hegel's view hypnotic phenomena produce a kind of temporary and
+artificial atavism. Mechanical or chemical means, or morbid conditions of
+body, may cause even for the intelligent adult a relapse into states of
+mind closely resembling those exhibited by the primitive or the infantile
+sensibility. The intelligent personality, where powers are bound up with
+limitations and operate through a chain of means and ends, is reduced to
+its primitively undifferentiated condition. Not that it is restored to its
+infantile simplicity; but that all subsequent acquirements operate only as
+a concentrated individuality, or mass of will and character, released from
+the control of the self-possessed mind, and invested (by the latter's
+withdrawal) with a new quasi-personality of their own. With the loss of
+the world of outward things, there may go, it is supposed, a clearer
+perception of the inward and particularly of the organic life. The Soul
+contains the form of unity which other experiences had impressed upon it:
+but this form avails in its subterranean existence where it creates a sort
+of inner self. And this inner self is no longer, like the embodied self of
+ordinary consciousness, an intelligence served by organs, and proceeding
+by induction and inference. Its knowledge is not mediated or carried along
+specific channels: it does not build up, piecemeal, by successive steps of
+synthesis and analysis, by gradual idealisation, the organised totality of
+its intellectual world. The somnambulist and the clairvoyant see without
+eyes, and carry their vision directly into regions where the waking
+consciousness of orderly intelligence cannot enter. But that region is not
+the world of our higher ideas,--of art, religion, and philosophy. It is
+still the sensitivity--that realm of sensitivity which is ordinarily
+covered by unconsciousness. Such sensitive clairvoyants may, as it were,
+hear themselves growing; they may discern the hidden quivers and pulses of
+blood and tissue, the seats of secret pain and all the unrevealed workings
+in the dark chambers of the flesh. But always their vision seems confined
+to that region, and will fall short of the world of light and ideal truth.
+It is towards the nature-bond of sensitive solidarity with earth, and
+flowers, and trees, the life that "rolls through all things," not towards
+the spiritual unity which broods over the world and "impels all thinking
+things," that these immersions in the selfless universe lead us.
+
+What Hegel chiefly sees in these phenomena is their indication, even on
+the natural side of man, of that ideality of the material, which it is the
+work of intelligence to produce in the more spiritual life, in the
+fully-developed mind. The latter is the supreme over-soul, that Absolute
+Mind which in our highest moods, aesthetic and religious, we approximate
+to. But mind, as it tends towards the higher end to "merge itself in
+light," to identify itself yet not wholly lost, but retained, in the
+fullness of undivided intellectual being, so at the lower end it springs
+from a natural and underlying unity, the immense solidarity of
+nether-soul, the great Soul of Nature--the "Substance" which is to be
+raised into the "Subject" which is true divinity. Between these two
+unities, the nature-given nether-soul and the spirit-won over-soul, lies
+the conscious life of man: a process of differentiation which narrows and
+of redintegration which enlarges,--which alternately builds up an isolated
+personality and dissolves it in a common intelligence and sympathy. It is
+because mental or tacit "suggestion"(88) (i.e. will-influence exercised
+without word or sign, or other sensible mode of connexion),
+thought-transference, or thought-reading (which is more than dexterous
+apprehension of delicate muscular signs), exteriorisation or transposition
+of sensibility into objects primarily non-sensitive, clairvoyance (i.e.
+the power of describing, as if from direct perception, objects or events
+removed in space beyond the recognised limits of sensation), and
+somnambulism, so far as it implies lucid vision with sealed eyes,--it is
+because these things seem to show the essential ideality of matter, that
+Hegel is interested in them. The ordinary conditions of consciousness and
+even of practical life in society are a derivative and secondary state; a
+product of processes of individualism, which however are never completed,
+and leave a large margin for idealising intelligence to fulfil. From a
+state which is not yet personality to a state which is more than can be
+described as personality--lies the mental movement. So Fichte, too, had
+regarded the power of the somnambulist as laying open a world underlying
+the development of egoity and self-consciousness(89): "the merely sensuous
+man is still in somnambulism," only a somnambulism of waking hours: "the
+true waking is the life in God, to be free in him, all else is sleep and
+dream." "Egoity," he adds, "is a merely _formal_ principle, utterly, and
+never qualitative (i.e. the essence and universal force)." For
+Schopenhauer, too, the experiences of animal magnetism had seemed to prove
+the absolute supernatural power of the radical will in its superiority to
+the intellectual categories of space, time, and causal sequence: to prove
+the reality of the metaphysical which is at the basis of all conscious
+divisions.
+
+
+
+(iii.) The Development of Inner Freedom.
+
+
+The result of the first range in the process of psycho-genesis was to make
+the body a sign and utterance of the Soul, with a fixed and determinate
+type. The "anthropological process" has defined and settled the mere
+general sentiency of soul into an individualised shape, a localised and
+limited self, a bundle of habits. It has made the soul an Ego or self: a
+power which looks out upon the world as a spectator, lifted above
+immanence in the general tide of being, but only so lifted because it has
+made itself one in the world of objects, a thing among things. The Mind
+has reached the point of view of reflection. Instead of a general
+identifiability with all nature, it has encased itself in a limited range,
+from which it looks forth on what is now other than itself. If previously
+it was mere inward sensibility, it is now sense, perceptive of an object
+here and now, of an external world. The step has involved some price: and
+that price is, that it has attained independence and self-hood at the cost
+of surrendering the content it had hitherto held in one with itself. It is
+now a blank receptivity, open to the impressions of an outside world: and
+the changes which take place in its process of apprehension seem to it to
+be given from outside. The world it perceives is a world of isolated and
+independent objects: and it takes them as they are given. But a closer
+insistance on the perception develops the implicit intelligence, which
+makes it possible. The percipient mind is no mere recipiency or
+susceptibility with its forms of time and space: it is spontaneously
+active, it is the source of categories, or is an apperceptive power,--an
+understanding. Consciousness, thus discovered to be a creative or
+constructive faculty, is strictly speaking self-consciousness(90).
+
+Self-consciousness appears at first in the selfish or narrowly egoistic
+form of appetite and impulse. The intelligence which claims to mould and
+construe the world of objects--which, in Kant's phrase, professes to give
+us nature--is implicitly the lord of that world. And that supremacy it
+carries out as appetite--as destruction. The self is but a bundle of
+wants--its supremacy over things is really subjection to them: the
+satisfaction of appetite is baffled by a new desire which leaves it as it
+was before. The development of self-consciousness to a more adequate shape
+is represented by Hegel as taking place through the social struggle for
+existence. Human beings, too, are in the first instance to the
+uninstructed appetite or the primitive self-consciousness (which is simply
+a succession of individual desires for satisfaction of natural want) only
+things,--adjectival to that self's individual existence. To them, too, his
+primary relation is to appropriate and master them. Might precedes right.
+But the social struggle for existence forces him to recognise something
+other which is kindred to himself,--a limiting principle, another self
+which has to form an element in his calculations, not to be neglected. And
+gradually, we may suppose, the result is the division of humanity into two
+levels, a ruling lordly class, and a class of slaves,--a state of
+inequality in which each knows that his appetite is in some measure
+checked by a more or less permanent other. Lastly, perhaps soonest in the
+inferior order, there is fashioned the perception that its self-seeking in
+its isolated appetites is subject to an abiding authority, a continuing
+consciousness. There grows up a social self--a sense of general humanity
+and solidarity with other beings--a larger self with which each identifies
+himself, a common ground. Understanding was selfish intelligence:
+practical in the egoistic sense. In the altruistic or universal sense
+practical, a principle social and unifying character, intelligence is
+Reason.
+
+Thus, Man, beginning as a percipient consciousness, apprehending single
+objects in space and time, and as an appetitive self bent upon single
+gratifications, has ended as a rational being,--a consciousness purged of
+its selfishness and isolation, looking forward openly and impartially on
+the universe of things and beings. He has ceased to be a mere animal,
+swallowed up in the moment and the individual, using his intelligence only
+in selfish satisfactions. He is no longer bound down by the struggle for
+existence, looking on everything as a mere thing, a mere means. He has
+erected himself above himself and above his environment, but that because
+he occupies a point of view at which he and his environment are no longer
+purely antithetical and exclusive(91). He has reached what is really the
+moral standpoint: the point i.e. at which he is inspired by a universal
+self-consciousness, and lives in that peaceful world where the antitheses
+of individualities and of outward and inward have ceased to trouble. "The
+natural man," says Hegel(92), "sees in the woman flesh of his flesh: the
+moral and spiritual man sees spirit of his spirit in the moral and
+spiritual being and by its means." Hitherto we have been dealing with
+something falling below the full truth of mind: the region of immediate
+sensibility with its thorough immersion of mind in body, first of all, and
+secondly its gradual progress to a general standpoint. It is only in the
+third part of Subjective mind that we are dealing with the psychology of a
+being who in the human sense knows and wills, i.e. apprehends general
+truth, and carries out ideal purposes.
+
+Thus, for the third time, but now on a higher plane, that of intelligence
+and rationality, is traced the process of development or realisation by
+which reason becomes reasoned knowledge and rational will, a free or
+autonomous intelligence. And, as before, the starting-point, alike in
+theoretical and practical mind, is feeling--or immediate knowledge and
+immediate sense of Ought. The basis of thought is an immediate
+perception--a sensuous affection or given something, and the basis of the
+idea of a general satisfaction is the natural claim to determine the
+outward existence conformably to individual feeling. In intelligent
+perception or intuition the important factor is attention, which raises it
+above mere passive acceptance and awareness of a given fact. Attention
+thus involves on one hand the externality of its object, and on the other
+affirms its dependence on the act of the subject: it sets the objects
+before and out of itself, in space and time, but yet in so doing it shows
+itself master of the objects. If perception presuppose attention, in
+short, they cease to be wholly outward: we make them ours, and the space
+and time they fill are projected by us. So attended to, they are
+appropriated, inwardised and recollected: they take their place in a
+mental place and mental time: they receive a general or de-individualised
+character in the memory-image. These are retained as mental property, but
+retained actually only in so far they are revivable and revived. Such
+revival is the work of imagination working by the so-called laws of
+association. But the possession of its ideas thus inwardised and
+recollected by the mind is largely a matter of chance. The mind is not
+really fully master of them until it has been able to give them a certain
+objectivity, by replacing the mental image by a vocal, i.e. a sensible
+sign. By means of words, intelligence turns its ideas or representations
+into quasi-realities: it creates a sort of superior sense-world, the world
+of language, where ideas live a potential, which is also an actual, life.
+Words are sensibles, but they are sensibles which completely lose
+themselves in their meaning. As sensibles, they render possible that
+verbal memory which is the handmaid of thought: but which also as merely
+mechanical can leave thought altogether out of account. It is through
+words that thought is made possible: for it alone permits the movement
+through ideas without being distracted through a multitude of
+associations. In them thought has an instrument completely at its own
+level, but still only a machine, and in memory the working of that
+machine. We think in names, not in general images, but in terms which only
+serve as vehicles for mental synthesis and analysis.
+
+It is as such a thinking being--a being who can use language, and
+manipulate general concepts or take comprehensive views, that man is a
+rational will. A concept of something to be done--a feeling even of some
+end more or less comprehensive in its quality, is the implication of what
+can be called will. At first indeed its material may be found as
+immediately given and all its volitionality may lie in the circumstance
+that the intelligent being sets this forward as a governing and
+controlling Ought. Its vehicle, in short, may be mere impulse, or
+inclination, and even passion: but it is the choice and the purposive
+adoption of means to the given end. Gradually it attains to the idea of a
+general satisfaction, or of happiness. And this end seems positive and
+definite. It soon turns out however to be little but a prudent and
+self-denying superiority to particular passions and inclinations in the
+interest of a comprehensive ideal. The free will or intelligence has so
+far only a negative and formal value: it is the perfection of an
+autonomous and freely self-developing mind. Such a mind, which in language
+has acquired the means of realising an intellectual system of things
+superior to the restrictions of sense, and which has emancipated reason
+from the position of slave to inclination, is endued with the formal
+conditions of moral conduct. Such a mind will transform its own primarily
+physical dependence into an image of the law of reason and create the
+ethical life: and in the strength of that establishment will go forth to
+conquer the world into a more and more adequate realisation of the eternal
+Idea.
+
+
+
+
+Essay V. Ethics And Politics.
+
+
+"In dealing," says Hegel, "with the Idea of the State, we must not have
+before our eyes a particular state, or a particular institution: we must
+rather study the Idea, this actual God, on his own account. Every State,
+however bad we may find it according to our principles, however defective
+we may discover this or that feature to be, still contains, particularly
+if it belongs to the mature states of our time, all the essential factors
+of its existence. But as it is easier to discover faults than to
+comprehend the affirmative, people easily fall into the mistake of letting
+individual aspects obscure the intrinsic organism of the State itself. The
+State is no ideal work of art: it stands in the everyday world, in the
+sphere, that is, of arbitrary act, accident, and error, and a variety of
+faults may mar the regularity of its traits. But the ugliest man, the
+criminal, a sick man and a cripple, is after all a living man; the
+affirmative, Life, subsists in spite of the defect: and this affirmative
+is here the theme(93)." "It is the theme of philosophy," he adds, "to
+ascertain the substance which is immanent in the show of the temporal and
+transient, and the eternal which is present."
+
+
+
+(i.) Hegel as a Political Critic.
+
+
+But if this is true, it is also to be remembered that the philosopher is,
+like other men, the son of his age, and estimates the value of reality
+from preconceptions and aspirations due to his generation. The historical
+circumstances of his nation as well as the personal experiences of his
+life help to determine his horizon, even in the effort to discover the
+hidden pulse and movement of the social organism. This is specially
+obvious in political philosophy. The conception of ethics and politics
+which is presented in the _Encyclopaedia_ was in 1820 produced with more
+detail as the _Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts_. Appearing, as it
+did, two years after his appointment to a professorship at Berlin, and in
+the midst of a political struggle between the various revolutionary and
+conservative powers and parties of Germany, the book became, and long
+remained, a target for embittered criticism. The so-called War of
+Liberation or national movement to shake off the French yoke was due to a
+coalition of parties, and had naturally been in part supported by
+tendencies and aims which went far beyond the ostensive purpose either of
+leaders or of combatants. Aspirations after a freer state were entwined
+with radical and socialistic designs to reform the political hierarchy of
+the Fatherland: high ideals and low vulgarities were closely intermixed:
+and the noble enthusiasm of youth was occasionally played on by criminal
+and anarchic intriguers. In a strong and wise and united Germany some of
+these schemes might have been tolerated. But strength, wisdom, and unity
+were absent. In the existing tension between Austria and Prussia for the
+leadership, in the ill-adapted and effete constitutions of the several
+principalities which were yet expected to realise the advance which had
+taken place in society and ideas during the last thirty years, the outlook
+on every hand seemed darker and more threatening than it might have
+otherwise done. Governments, which had lost touch with their peoples,
+suspected conspiracy and treason: and a party in the nation credited their
+rulers with gratuitous designs against private liberty and rights. There
+was a vast but ill-defined enthusiasm in the breasts of the younger world,
+and it was shared by many of their teachers. It seemed to their immense
+aspirations that the war of liberation had failed of its true object and
+left things much as they were. The volunteers had not fought for the
+political systems of Austria or Prussia, or for the three-and-thirty
+princes of Germany: but for ideas, vague, beautiful, stimulating. To such
+a mood the continuance of the old system was felt as a cruel deception and
+a reaction. The governments on their part had not realised the full
+importance of the spirit that had been aroused, and could not at a
+moment's notice set their house in order, even had there been a clearer
+outlook for reform than was offered. They too had suffered, and had
+realised their insecurity: and were hardly in a mood to open their gates
+to the enemy.
+
+Coming on such a situation of affairs, Hegel's book would have been likely
+in any case to provoke criticism. For it took up a line of political
+theory which was little in accord with the temper of the age. The
+conception of the state which it expounded is not far removed in
+essentials from the conception which now dominates the political life of
+the chief European nations. But in his own time it came upon ears which
+were naturally disposed to misconceive it. It was unacceptable to the
+adherents of the _ancien régime_, as much as to the liberals. It was
+declared by one party to be a glorification of the Prussian state: by
+another to rationalise the sanctities of authority. It was pointed out
+that the new professor was a favourite of the leading minister, that his
+influence was dominant in scholastic appointments, and that occasional
+gratuities from the crown proved his acceptability. A contemporary
+professor, Fries, remarked that Hegel's theory of the state had grown "not
+in the gardens of science but on the dung-hill of servility." Hegel
+himself was aware that he had planted a blow in the face of a "shallow and
+pretentious sect," and that his book had "given great offence to the
+demagogic folk." Alike in religious and political life he was impatient of
+sentimentalism, of rhetorical feeling, of wordy enthusiasm. A positive
+storm of scorn burst from him at much-promising and little-containing
+declamation that appealed to the pathos of ideas, without sense of the
+complex work of construction and the system of principles which were
+needed to give them reality. His impatience of demagogic gush led him (in
+the preface) into a tactless attack on Fries, who was at the moment in
+disgrace for his participation in the demonstration at the Wartburg. It
+led him to an attack on the bumptiousness of those who held that
+conscientious conviction was ample justification for any proceeding:--an
+attack which opponents were not unwilling to represent as directed against
+the principle of conscience itself.
+
+Yet Hegel's views on the nature of political unity were not new. Their
+nucleus had been formed nearly twenty years before. In the years that
+immediately followed the French revolution he had gone through the usual
+anarchic stage of intelligent youth. He had wondered whether humanity
+might not have had a nobler destiny, had fate given supremacy to some
+heresy rather than the orthodox creed of Christendom. He had seen religion
+in the past "teaching what despotism wished,--contempt of the human race,
+its incapacity for anything good(94)." But his earliest reflections on
+political power belong to a later date, and are inspired, not so much by
+the vague ideals of humanitarianism, as by the spirit of national
+patriotism. They are found in a "Criticism of the German Constitution"
+apparently dating from the year 1802(95). It is written after the peace of
+Lunéville had sealed for Germany the loss of her provinces west of the
+Rhine, and subsequent to the disasters of the German arms at Hohenlinden
+and Marengo. It is almost contemporaneous with the measures of 1803 and
+1804, which affirmed the dissolution of the "Holy Roman Empire" of German
+name. The writer of this unpublished pamphlet sees his country in a
+situation almost identical with that which Macchiavelli saw around him in
+Italy. It is abused by petty despots, distracted by mean particularist
+ambitions, at the mercy of every foreign power. It was such a scene which,
+as Hegel recalls, had prompted and justified the drastic measures proposed
+in the _Prince_,--measures which have been ill-judged by the closet
+moralist, but evince the high statesmanship of the Florentine. In the
+_Prince_, an intelligent reader can see "the enthusiasm of patriotism
+underlying the cold and dispassionate doctrines." Macchiavelli dared to
+declare that Italy must become a state, and to assert that "there is no
+higher duty for a state than to maintain itself, and to punish
+relentlessly every author of anarchy,--the supreme, and perhaps sole
+political crime." And like teaching, Hegel adds, is needed for Germany.
+Only, he concludes, no mere demonstration of the insanity of utter
+separation of the particular from his kin will ever succeed in converting
+the particularists from their conviction of the absoluteness of personal
+and private rights. "Insight and intelligence always excite so much
+distrust that force alone avails to justify them; then man yields them
+obedience(96)."
+
+"The German political edifice," says the writer, "is nothing else but the
+sum of the rights which the single parts have withdrawn from the whole;
+and this justice, which is ever on the watch to prevent the state having
+any power left, is the essence of the constitution." The Peace of
+Westphalia had but served to constitute or stereotype anarchy: the German
+empire had by that instrument divested itself of all rights of political
+unity, and thrown itself on the goodwill of its members. What then, it may
+be asked, is, in Hegel's view, the indispensable minimum essential to a
+state? And the answer will be, organised strength,--a central and united
+force. "The strength of a country lies neither in the multitude of its
+inhabitants and fighting men, nor in its fertility, nor in its size, but
+solely in the way its parts are by reasonable combination made a single
+political force enabling everything to be used for the common defence."
+Hegel speaks scornfully of "the philanthropists and moralists who decry
+politics as an endeavour and an art to seek private utility at the cost of
+right": he tells them that "it is foolish to oppose the interest or (as it
+is expressed by the more morally-obnoxious word) the utility of the state
+to its right": that the "rights of a state are the utility of the state as
+established and recognised by compacts": and that "war" (which they would
+fain abolish or moralise) "has to decide not which of the rights asserted
+by either party is the true right (--for both parties have a true right),
+but which right has to give way to the other."
+
+It is evident from these propositions that Hegel takes that view of
+political supremacy which has been associated with the name of Hobbes. But
+his views also reproduce the Platonic king of men, "who can rule and dare
+not lie." "All states," he declares, "are founded by the sublime force of
+great men, not by physical strength. The great man has something in his
+features which others would gladly call their lord. They obey him against
+their will. Their immediate will is his will, but their conscious will is
+otherwise.... This is the prerogative of the great man to ascertain and to
+express the absolute will. All gather round his banner. He is their God."
+"The state," he says again, "is the self-certain absolute mind which
+recognises no definite authority but its own: which acknowledges no
+abstract rules of good and bad, shameful and mean, craft and deception."
+So also Hobbes describes the prerogatives of the sovereign Leviathan. But
+the Hegelian God immanent in the state is a higher power than Hobbes
+knows: he is no mortal, but in his truth an immortal God. He speaks by
+(what in this early essay is called) the Absolute Government(97): the
+government of the Law--the true impersonal sovereign,--distinct alike from
+the single ruler and the multitude of the ruled. "It is absolutely only
+universality as against particular. As this absolute, ideal, universal,
+compared to which everything else is a particular, it is the phenomenon of
+God. Its words are his decision, and it can appear and exist under no
+other form.... The Absolute government is divine, self-sanctioned and not
+made(98)." The real strength--the real connecting-mean which gives life to
+sovereign and to subject--is intelligence free and entire, independent both
+of what individuals feel and believe and of the quality of the ruler. "The
+spiritual bond," he says in a lower form of speech, "is public opinion: it
+is the true legislative body, national assembly, declaration of the
+universal will which lives in the execution of all commands." This still
+small voice of public opinion is the true and real parliament: not
+literally making laws, but revealing them. If we ask, where does this
+public opinion appear and how does it disengage itself from the masses of
+partisan judgment? Hegel answers,--and to the surprise of those who have
+not entered into the spirit of his age(99)--it is embodied in the Aged and
+the Priests. Both of these have ceased to live in the real world: they are
+by nature and function disengaged from the struggles of particular
+existence, have risen above the divergencies of social classes. They
+breathe the ether of pure contemplation. "The sunset of life gives them
+mystical lore," or at least removes from old age the distraction of
+selfishness: while the priest is by function set apart from the divisions
+of human interest. Understood in a large sense, Hegel's view is that the
+real voice of experience is elicited through those who have attained
+indifference to the distorting influence of human parties, and who see
+life steadily and whole.
+
+If this utterance shows the little belief Hegel had in the ordinary
+methods of legislation through "representative" bodies, and hints that the
+real _substance_ of political life is deeper than the overt machinery of
+political operation, it is evident that this theory of "divine right" is
+of a different stamp from what used to go under that name. And, again,
+though the power of the central state is indispensable, he is far from
+agreeing with the so-called bureaucratic view that "a state is a machine
+with a single spring which sets in motion all the rest of the machinery."
+"Everything," he says, "which is not directly required to organise and
+maintain the force for giving security without and within must be left by
+the central government to the freedom of the citizens. Nothing ought to be
+so sacred in the eyes of a government as to leave alone and to protect,
+without regard to utilities, the free action of the citizens in such
+matters as do not affect its fundamental aim: for this freedom is itself
+sacred(100)." He is no friend of paternal bureaucracy. "The pedantic
+craving to settle every detail, the mean jealousy against estates and
+corporations administrating and directing their own affairs, the base
+fault-finding with all independent action on the part of the citizens,
+even when it has no immediate bearing on the main political interest, has
+been decked out with reasons to show that no penny of public expenditure,
+made for a country of twenty or thirty millions' population, can be laid
+out, without first being, not permitted, but commanded, controlled and
+revised by the supreme government." You can see, he remarks, in the first
+village after you enter Prussian territory the lifeless and wooden routine
+which prevails. The whole country suffers also from the way religion has
+been mixed up with political rights, and a particular creed pronounced by
+law indispensable both for sovereign and full-privileged subject. In a
+word, the unity and vigour of the state is quite compatible with
+considerable latitude and divergence in laws and judicature, in the
+imposition and levying of taxes, in language, manners, civilisation and
+religion. Equality in all these points is desirable for social unity: but
+it is not indispensable for political strength.
+
+This decided preference for the unity of the state against the system of
+checks and counterchecks, which sometimes goes by the name of a
+constitution, came out clearly in Hegel's attitude in discussing the
+dispute between the Würtembergers and their sovereign in 1815-16.
+Würtemberg, with its complicated aggregation of local laws, had always
+been a paradise of lawyers, and the feudal rights or privileges of the
+local oligarchies--the so-called "good old law"--were the boast of the
+country. All this had however been aggravated by the increase of territory
+received in 1805: and the king, following the examples set by France and
+even by Bavaria, promulgated of his own grace a "constitution" remodelling
+the electoral system of the country. Immediately an outcry burst out
+against the attempt to destroy the ancient liberties. Uhland tuned his
+lyre to the popular cry: Rückert sang on the king's side. To Hegel the
+contest presented itself as a struggle between the attachment to
+traditional rights, merely because they are old, and the resolution to
+carry out reasonable reform whether it be agreeable to the reformed or
+not: or rather he saw in it resistance of particularism, of separation,
+clinging to use and wont, and basing itself on formal pettifogging
+objections, against the spirit of organisation. Anything more he declined
+to see. And probably he was right in ascribing a large part of the
+opposition to inertia, to vanity and self-interest, combined with the want
+of political perception of the needs of Würtemberg and Germany. But on the
+other hand, he failed to remember the insecurity and danger of such "gifts
+of the Danai": he forgot the sense of free-born men that a constitution is
+not something to be granted (_octroyé_) as a grace, but something that
+must come by the spontaneous act of the innermost self of the community.
+He dealt rather with the formal arguments which were used to refuse
+progress, than with the underlying spirit which prompted the
+opposition(101).
+
+The philosopher lives (as Plato has well reminded us) too exclusively
+within the ideal. Bent on the essential nucleus of institutions, he
+attaches but slight importance to the variety of externals, and fails to
+realise the practice of the law-courts. He forgets that what weighs
+lightly in logic, may turn the scale in real life and experience. For
+feeling and sentiment he has but scant respect: he is brusque and
+uncompromising: and cannot realise all the difficulties and dangers that
+beset the Idea in the mazes of the world, and may ultimately quite alter a
+plan which at first seemed independent of petty details. Better than other
+men perhaps he recognises in theory how the mere universal only exists
+complete in an individual shape: but more than other men he forgets these
+truths of insight, when the business of life calls for action or for
+judgment. He cannot at a moment's notice remember that he is, if not, as
+Cicero says, _in faece Romuli_, the member of a degenerate commonwealth,
+at least living in a world where good and evil are not, as logic
+presupposes, sharply divided but intricately intertwined.
+
+
+
+(ii.) The Ethics and Religion of the State.
+
+
+This idealism of political theory is illustrated by the sketch of the
+Ethical Life which he drew up about 1802. Under the name of "Ethical
+System" it presents in concentrated or undeveloped shape the doctrine
+which subsequently swelled into the "Philosophy of Mind." At a later date
+he worked out more carefully as introduction the psychological genesis of
+moral and intelligent man, and he separated out more distinctly as a
+sequel the universal powers which give to social life its higher
+characters. In the earlier sketch the Ethical Part stands by itself, with
+the consequence that Ethics bears a meaning far exceeding all that had
+been lately called moral. The word "moral" itself he avoids(102). It
+savours of excessive subjectivity, of struggle, of duty and conscience. It
+has an ascetic ring about it--an aspect of negation, which seeks for
+abstract holiness, and turns its back on human nature. Kant's words
+opposing duty to inclination, and implying that moral goodness involves a
+struggle, an antagonism, a victory, seem to him (and to his time)
+one-sided. That aspect of negation accordingly which Kant certainly began
+with, and which Schopenhauer magnified until it became the all-in-all of
+Ethics, Hegel entirely subordinates. Equally little does he like the
+emphasis on the supremacy of insight, intention, conscience: they lead, he
+thinks, to a view which holds the mere fact of conviction to be
+all-important, as if it mattered not what we thought and believed and did,
+so long as we were sincere in our belief. All this emphasis on the
+good-will, on the imperative of duty, on the rights of conscience, has, he
+admits, its justification in certain circumstances, as against mere
+legality, or mere natural instinctive goodness; but it has been overdone.
+Above all, it errs by an excess of individualism. It springs from an
+attitude of reflection,--in which the individual, isolated in his conscious
+and superficial individuality, yet tries--but probably tries in vain--to get
+somewhat in touch with a universal which he has allowed to slip outside
+him, forgetting that it is the heart and substance of his life. Kant,
+indeed, hardly falls under this condemnation. For he aims at showing that
+the rational will inevitably creates as rational a law or universal; that
+the individual act becomes self-regulative, and takes its part in
+constituting a system or realm of duty.
+
+Still, on the whole, "morality" in this narrower sense belongs to an age
+of reflection, and is formal or nominal goodness rather than the genuine
+and full reality. It is the protest against mere instinctive or customary
+virtue, which is but compliance with traditional authority, and compliance
+with it as if it were a sort of quasi-natural law. Moralising reflection
+is the awakening of subjectivity and of a deeper personality. The age
+which thus precedes morality is not an age in which kindness, or love, or
+generosity is unknown. And if Hegel says that "Morality," strictly so
+called, began with Socrates, he does not thereby accuse the pre-Socratic
+Greeks of inhumanity. But what he does say is that such ethical life as
+existed was in the main a thing of custom and law: of law, moreover, which
+was not set objectively forward, but left still in the stage of
+uncontradicted usage, a custom which was a second nature, part of the
+essential and quasi-physical ordinance of life. The individual had not yet
+learned to set his self-consciousness against these usages and ask for
+their justification. These are like the so-called law of the Medes and
+Persians which alters not: customs of immemorial antiquity and
+unquestionable sway. They are part of a system of things with which for
+good or evil the individual is utterly identified, bound as it were hand
+and foot. These are, as a traveller says(103), "oral and unwritten
+traditions which teach that certain rules of conduct are to be observed
+under certain penalties; and without the aid of fixed records, or the
+intervention of a succession of authorised depositaries and expounders,
+these laws have been transmitted to father and son, through unknown
+generations, and are fixed in the minds of the people as sacred and
+unalterable."
+
+The antithesis then in Hegel, as in Kant, is between Law and Morality, or
+rather Legality and Morality,--two abstractions to which human development
+is alternately prone to attach supreme importance. The first stage in the
+objectivation of intelligence or in the evolution of personality is the
+constitution of mere, abstract, or strict right. It is the creation of
+institutions and uniformities, i.e. of laws, or rights, which express
+definite and stereotyped modes of behaviour. Or, if we look at it from the
+individual's standpoint, we may say his consciousness awakes to find the
+world parcelled out under certain rules and divisions, which have
+objective validity, and govern him with the same absolute authority as do
+the circumstances of physical nature. Under their influence every rank and
+individual is alike forced to bow: to each his place and function is
+assigned by an order or system which claims an inviolable and eternal
+supremacy. It is not the same place and function for each: but for each
+the position and duties are predetermined in this metaphysically-physical
+order. The situation and its duties have been created by super-human and
+natural ordinance. As the Platonic myth puts it, each order in the social
+hierarchy has been framed underground by powers that turned out men of
+gold, and silver, and baser metal: or as the Norse legend tells, they are
+the successive offspring of the white God, Heimdal, in his dealings with
+womankind.
+
+The central idea of the earlier social world is the supremacy of
+rights--but not of right. The sum (for it cannot be properly called a
+system) of rights is a self-subsistent world, to which man is but a
+servant; and a second peculiarity of it is its inequality. If all are
+equal before the laws, this only means here that the laws, with their
+absolute and thorough inequality, are indifferent to the real and personal
+diversities of individuals. Even the so-called equality of primitive law
+is of the "Eye-for-eye, Tooth-for-tooth" kind; it takes no note of special
+circumstances; it looks abstractly and rudely at facts, and maintains a
+hard and fast uniformity, which seems the height of unfairness. Rule
+stands by rule, usage beside usage,--a mere aggregate or multitude of petty
+tyrants, reduced to no unity or system, and each pressing with all the
+weight of an absolute mandate. The pettiest bit of ceremonial law is here
+of equal dignity with the most far-reaching principle of political
+obligation.
+
+In the essay already referred to, Hegel has designated something analogous
+to this as Natural or Physical Ethics, or as Ethics in its relative or
+comparative stage. Here Man first shows his superiority to nature, or
+enters on his properly ethical function, by transforming the physical
+world into his possession. He makes himself the lord of natural
+objects--stamping them as his, and not their own, making them his permanent
+property, his tools, his instruments of exchange and production. The
+fundamental ethical act is appropriation by labour, and the first ethical
+world is the creation of an economic system, the institution of property.
+For property, or at least possession and appropriation, is the dominant
+idea, with its collateral and sequent principles. And at first, even human
+beings are treated on the same method as other things: as objects in a
+world of objects or aggregate of things: as things to be used and
+acquired, as means and instruments,--not in any sense as ends in
+themselves. It is a world in which the relation of master and slave is
+dominant,--where owner and employer is set in antithesis against his tools
+and chattels. But the Nemesis of his act issues in making the individual
+the servant of his so-called property. He has become an objective power by
+submitting himself to objectivity: he has literally put himself into the
+object he has wrought, and is now a thing among things: for what he owns,
+what he has appropriated, determines what he is. The real powers in the
+world thus established are the laws of possession-holding: the laws
+dominate man: and he is only freed from dependence on casual externals, by
+making himself thoroughly the servant of his possessions.
+
+The only salvation, and it is but imperfect, that can be reached on this
+stage is by the family union. The sexual tie, is at first entirely on a
+level with the other arrangements of the sphere. The man or woman is but a
+chattel and a tool; a casual appropriation which gradually is transformed
+into a permanent possession and a permanent bond(104). But, as the family
+constituted itself, it helped to afford a promise of better things. An
+ideal interest--the religion of the household--extending beyond the
+individual, and beyond the moment,--binding past and present, and parents
+to offspring, gave a new character to the relation of property. Parents
+and children form a unity, which overrides and essentially permeates their
+"difference" from each other: there is no exchange, no contract, nor, in
+the stricter sense, property between the members. In the property-idea
+they are lifted out of their isolation, and in the continuity of family
+life there is a certain analogue of immortality. But, says Hegel, "though
+the family be the highest totality of which Nature is capable, the
+absolute identity is in it still inward, and is not instituted in absolute
+form; and hence, too, the reproduction of the totality is an appearance,
+the appearance of the children(105)." "The power and the intelligence, the
+'difference' of the parents, stands in inverse proportion to the youth and
+vigour of the child: and these two sides of life flee from and are sequent
+on each other, and are reciprocally external(106)." Or, as we may put it,
+the god of the family is a departed ancestor, a ghost in the land of the
+dead: it has not really a continuous and unified life. In such a state of
+society--a state of nature--and in its supreme form, the family, there is no
+adequate principle which though real shall still give ideality and unity
+to the self-isolating aspects of life. There is wanted something which
+shall give expression to its "indifference," which shall control the
+tendency of this partial moralisation to sink at every moment into
+individuality, and lift it from its immersion in nature. Family life and
+economic groups (--for these two, which Hegel subsequently separates, are
+here kept close together) need an ampler and wider life to keep them from
+stagnating in their several selfishnesses.
+
+This freshening and corrective influence they get in the first instance
+from deeds of violence and crime. Here is the "negative unsettling" of the
+narrow fixities, of the determinate conditions or relationships into which
+the preceding processes of labour and acquisition have tended to
+stereotype life. The harsh restriction brings about its own undoing. Man
+may subject natural objects to his formative power, but the wild rage of
+senseless devastation again and again bursts forth to restore the original
+formlessness. He may build up his own pile of wealth, store up his private
+goods, but the thief and the robber with the instincts of barbarian
+socialism tread on his steps: and every stage of appropriation has for its
+sequel a crop of acts of dispossession. He may secure by accumulation his
+future life; but the murderer for gain's sake cuts it short. And out of
+all this as a necessary consequence stands avenging justice. And in the
+natural world of ethics--where true moral life has not yet arisen--this is
+mere retaliation or the _lex talionis_;--the beginning of an endless series
+of vengeance and counter-vengeance, the blood-feud. Punishment, in the
+stricter sense of the term,--which looks both to antecedents and effects in
+character--cannot yet come into existence; for to punish there must be
+something superior to individualities, an ethical idea embodied in an
+institution, to which the injurer and the injured alike belong. But as yet
+punishment is only vengeance, the personal and natural equivalent, the
+physical reaction against injury, perhaps regulated and formulated by
+custom and usage, but not essentially altered from its purely retaliatory
+character. These crimes--or transgressions--are thus by Hegel quaintly
+conceived as storms which clear the air--which shake the individualist out
+of his slumber. The scene in which transgression thus acts is that of the
+so-called state of nature, where particularism was rampant: where moral
+right was not, but only the right of nature, of pre-occupation, of the
+stronger, of the first maker and discoverer. Crime is thus the "dialectic"
+which shakes the fixity of practical arrangements, and calls for something
+in which the idea of a higher unity, a permanent substance of life, shall
+find realisation.
+
+The "positive supersession(107)" of individualism and naturalism in ethics
+is by Hegel called "Absolute Ethics." Under this title he describes the
+ethics and religion of the state--a religion which is immanent in the
+community, and an ethics which rises superior to particularity. The
+picture he draws is a romance fashioned upon the model of the Greek
+commonwealth as that had been idealised by Greek literature and by the
+longings of later ages for a freer life. It is but one of the many modes
+in which Helena--to quote Goethe--has fascinated the German Faust. He dreams
+himself away from the prosaic worldliness of a German municipality to the
+unfading splendour of the Greek city with its imagined coincidence of
+individual will with universal purpose. There is in such a commonwealth no
+pain of surrender and of sacrifice, and no subsequent compensation: for,
+at the very moment of resigning self-will to common aims, he enjoys it
+retained with the added zest of self-expansion. He is not so left to
+himself as to feel from beyond the restraint of a law which controls--even
+if it wisely and well controls--individual effort. There is for his happy
+circumstances no possibility of doing otherwise. Or, it may be, Hegel has
+reminiscences from the ideals of other nations than the Greek. He recalls
+the Israelite depicted by the Law-adoring psalmist, whose delight is to do
+the will of the Lord, whom the zeal of God's house has consumed, whose
+whole being runs on in one pellucid stream with the universal and eternal
+stream of divine commandment. Such a frame of spirit, where the empirical
+consciousness with all its soul and strength and mind identifies its
+mission into conformity with the absolute order, is the mood of absolute
+Ethics. It is what some have spoken of as the True life, as the Eternal
+life; in it, says Hegel, the individual exists _auf ewige Weise_(108), as
+it were _sub specie aeternitatis_: his life is hid with his fellows in the
+common life of his people. His every act, and thought, and will, get their
+being and significance from a reality which is established in him as a
+permanent spirit. It is there that he, in the fuller sense, attains
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, or finds himself no longer a mere part, but an ideal totality.
+This totality is realised under the particular form of a Nation (_Volk_),
+which in the visible sphere represents (or rather is, as a particular) the
+absolute and infinite. Such a unity is neither the mere sum of isolated
+individuals, nor a mere majority ruling by numbers: but the fraternal and
+organic commonwealth which brings all classes and all rights from their
+particularistic independence into an ideal identity and indifference(109).
+Here all are not merely equal before the laws: but the law itself is a
+living and organic unity, self-correcting, subordinating and organising,
+and no longer merely defining individual privileges and so-called
+liberties. "In such conjunction of the universal with the particularity
+lies the divinity of a nation: or, if we give this universal a separate
+place in our ideas, it is the God of the nation." But in this complete
+accordance between concept and intuition, between visible and invisible,
+where symbol and significate are one, religion and ethics are
+indistinguishable. It is the old conception (and in its highest sense) of
+Theocracy(110). God is the national head and the national life: and in him
+all individuals have their "difference" rendered "indifferent." "Such an
+ethical life is absolute truth, for untruth is only in the fixture of a
+single mode: but in the everlasting being of the nation all singleness is
+superseded. It is absolute culture; for in the eternal is the real and
+empirical annihilation and prescription of all limited modality. It is
+absolute disinterestedness: for in the eternal there is nothing private
+and personal. It, and each of its movements, is the highest beauty: for
+beauty is but the eternal made actual and given concrete shape. It is
+without pain, and blessed: for in it all difference and all pain is
+superseded. It is the divine, absolute, real, existing and being, under no
+veil; nor need one first raise it up into the ideality of divinity, and
+extract it from the appearance and empirical intuition; but it is, and
+immediately, absolute intuition(111)."
+
+If we compare this language with the statement of the Encyclopaedia we can
+see how for the moment Hegel's eye is engrossed with the glory of the
+ideal nation. In it, the moral life embraces and is co-extensive with
+religion, art and science: practice and theory are at one: life in the
+idea knows none of those differences which, in the un-ideal world, make
+art and morality often antithetical, and set religion at variance with
+science. It is, as we have said, a memory of Greek and perhaps Hebrew
+ideals. Or rather it is by the help of such memories the affirmation of
+the essential unity of life--the true, complete, many-sided life--which is
+the presupposition and idea that culture and morals rest upon and from
+which they get their supreme sanction, i.e. their constitutive principle
+and unity. Even in the Encyclopaedia(112) Hegel endeavours to guard
+against the severance of morality and art and philosophy which may be
+rashly inferred in consequence of his serial order of treatment.
+"Religion," he remarks, "is the very substance of the moral life itself
+and of the state.... The ethical life is the divine spirit indwelling in
+consciousness, as it is actually present in a nation and its individual
+members." Yet, as we see, there is a distinction. The process of history
+carries out a judgment on nation after nation, and reveals the divine as
+not only immanent in the ethical life but as ever expanding the limited
+national spirit till it become a spirit of universal humanity. Still--and
+this is perhaps for each time always the more important--the national
+unity--not indeed as a multitude, nor as a majority--is the supreme real
+appearance of the Eternal and Absolute.
+
+Having thus described the nation as an organic totality, he goes on to
+point out that the political constitution shows this character by forming
+a triplicity of political orders. In one of these there is but a silent,
+practical identity, in faith and trust, with the totality: in the second
+there is a thorough disruption of interest into particularity: and in the
+third, there is a living and intellectual identity or indifference, which
+combines the widest range of individual development with the completest
+unity of political loyalty. This last order is that which lives in
+conscious identification of private with public duty: all that it does has
+a universal and public function. Such a body is the ideal Nobility--the
+nobility which is the _servus servorum Dei_, the supreme servant of
+humanity. Its function is to maintain general interests, to give the other
+orders (peasantry and industrials) security,--receiving in return from
+these others the means of subsistence. _Noblesse oblige_ gives the
+death-blow to particular interests, and imposes the duty of exhibiting, in
+the clearest form, the supreme reality of absolute morality, and of being
+to the rest an unperturbed ideal of aesthetic, ethical, religious, and
+philosophical completeness.
+
+It is here alone, in this estate which is absolutely disinterested, that
+the virtues appear in their true light. To the ordinary moralising
+standpoint they seem severally to be, in their separation, charged with
+independent value. But from the higher point of view the existence, and
+still more the accentuation of single virtues, is a mark of
+incompleteness. Even quality, it has been said, involves its defects: it
+can only shine by eclipsing or reflecting something else. The completely
+moral is not the sum of the several virtues, but the reduction of them to
+indifference. It is thus that when Plato tries to get at the unity of
+virtue, their aspect of difference tends to be subordinated. "The movement
+of absolute morality runs through all the virtues, but settles fixedly in
+none." It is more than love _to_ fatherland, and nation, and laws:--that
+still implies a relation to something and involves a difference. For
+love--the mortal passion, where "self is not annulled"--is the process of
+approximation, while unity is not yet attained, but wished and aimed at:
+and when it is complete--and become "such love as spirits know(113)"--it
+gives place to a calmer rest and an active immanence. The absolute
+morality is _life in_ the fatherland and for the nation. In the individual
+however it is the process upward and inward that we see, not the
+consummation. Then the identity appears as an ideal, as a tendency not yet
+accomplished to its end, a possibility not yet made fully actual. At
+bottom--in the divine substance in which the individual inheres--the
+identity is present: but in the appearance, we have only the passage from
+possible to actual, a passage which has the aspect of a struggle. Hence
+the moral act appears as a virtue, with merit or desert. It is accordingly
+the very characteristic of virtue to signalise its own incompleteness: it
+emerges into actuality only through antagonism, and with a taint of
+imperfection clinging to it. Thus, in the field of absolute morality, if
+the virtues appear, it is only in their transiency. If they were
+undisputedly real in morality, they would not separately show. To feel
+that you have done well implies that you have not done wholly well:
+self-gratulation in meritorious deed is the re-action from the shudder at
+feeling that the self was not wholly good.
+
+The essential unity of virtue--its negative character as regards all the
+empirical variety of virtues--is seen in the excellences required by the
+needs of war. These military requirements demonstrate the mere relativity
+and therefore non-virtuousness of the special virtues. They equally
+protest against the common beliefs in the supreme dignity of labour and
+its utilities. But if bravery or soldierlike virtue be essentially a
+virtue of virtues, it is only a negative virtue after all. It is the blast
+of the universal sweeping away all the habitations and fixed structures of
+particularist life. If it is a unity of virtue, it is only a negative
+unity--an indifference. If it avoid the parcelling of virtue into a number
+of imperfect and sometimes contradictory parts, it does so only to present
+a bare negation. The soldier, therefore, if in potentiality the unity of
+all the virtues, may tend in practice to represent the ability to do
+without any of them(114).
+
+The home of these "relative" virtues--of morality in the ordinary sense--is
+the life of the second order in the commonwealth: the order of industry
+and commerce. In this sphere the idea of the universal is gradually lost
+to view: it becomes, says Hegel, only a thought or a creature of the mind,
+which does not affect practice. The materialistic worker of civilisation
+does not see further than the empirical existence of individuals: his
+horizon is limited by the family, and his final ideal is a competency of
+comfort in possessions and revenues. The supreme universal to which he
+attains as the climax of his evolution is only money. But it is only with
+the vaster development of commerce that this terrible consequence ensues.
+At first as a mere individual, he has higher aims, though not the highest.
+He has a limited ideal determined by his special sphere of work. To win
+respect--the character for a limited truthfulness and honesty and skilful
+work--is his ambition. He lives in a conceit of his performance--his
+utility--the esteem of his special circle. To his commercial soul the
+military order is a scarecrow and a nuisance: military honour is but
+trash. Yet if his range of idea is narrow and engrossing in details, his
+aim is to get worship, to be recognised as the best in his little sphere.
+But with the growth of the trading spirit his character changes: he
+becomes the mere capitalist, is denationalised, has no definite work and
+can claim no individualised function. Money now measures all things: it is
+the sole ultimate reality. It transforms everything into a relation of
+contract: even vengeance is equated in terms of money. Its motto is, The
+Exchanges must be honoured, though honour and morality may go to the dogs.
+So far as it is concerned, there is no nation, but a federation of
+shopkeepers. Such an one is the _bourgeois_ (the _Bürger_, as distinct
+from the peasant or _Bauer_ and the _Adel_). As an artisan--i.e. a mere
+industrial, he knows no country, but at best the reputation and interest
+of his own guild-union with its partial object. He is narrow, but honest
+and respectable. As a mere commercial agent, he knows no country: his
+field is the world, but the world not in its concreteness and variety, but
+in the abstract aspect of a money-bag and an exchange. The larger totality
+is indeed not altogether out of sight. But if he contribute to the needy,
+either his sacrifice is lifeless in proportion as it becomes general, or
+loses generality as it becomes lively. As regards his general services to
+the great life of his national state(115), they are unintelligently and
+perhaps grudgingly rendered.
+
+Of the peasant order Hegel has less to say. On one side the "country" as
+opposed to the "town" has a closer natural sympathy with the common and
+general interest: and the peasantry is the undifferentiated, solid and
+sound, basis of the national life. It forms the submerged mass, out of
+which the best soldiers are made, and which out of the depths of earth
+brings forward nourishment as well as all the materials of elementary
+necessity. Faithfulness and loyalty are its virtues: but it is personal
+allegiance to a commanding superior,--not to a law or a general view--for
+the peasant is weak in comprehensive intelligence, though shrewd in
+detailed observation.
+
+Of the purely political function of the state Hegel in this sketch says
+almost nothing. But under the head of the general government of the state
+he deals with its social functions. For a moment he refers to the
+well-known distinction of the legislative, judicial and executive powers.
+But it is only to remark that "in every governmental act all three are
+conjoined. They are abstractions, none of which can get a reality of its
+own,--which, in other words, cannot be constituted and organised as powers.
+Legislation, judicature, and executive are something completely formal,
+empty, and contentless.... Whether the others are or are not bare
+abstractions, empty activities, depends entirely on the executive power;
+and this is absolutely the government(116)." Treating government as the
+organic movement by which the universal and the particular in the
+commonwealth come into relations, he finds that it presents three forms,
+or gives rise to three systems. The highest and last of these is the
+"educational" system. By this he understands all that activity by which
+the intelligence of the state tries directly to mould and guide the
+character and fortunes of its members: all the means of culture and
+discipline, whether in general or for individuals, all training to public
+function, to truthfulness, to good manners. Under the same head come
+conquest and colonisation as state agencies. The second system is the
+judicial, which instead of, like the former, aiming at the formation or
+reformation of its members is satisfied by subjecting individual
+transgression to a process of rectification by the general principle. With
+regard to the system of judicature, Hegel argues for a variety of
+procedure to suit different ranks, and for a corresponding modification of
+penalties. "Formal rigid equality is just what does not spare the
+character. The same penalty which in one estate brings no infamy causes in
+another a deep and irremediable hurt." And with regard to the after life
+of the transgressor who has borne his penalty: "Punishment is the
+reconciliation of the law with itself. No further reproach for his crime
+can be addressed to the person who has undergone his punishment. He is
+restored to membership of his estate(117)."
+
+In the first of the three systems, the economic system, or "System of
+wants," the state seems at first hardly to appear in its universal and
+controlling function at all. Here the individual depends for the
+satisfaction of his physical needs on a blind, unconscious destiny, on the
+obscure and incalculable properties of supply and demand in the whole
+interconnexion of commodities. But even this is not all. With the
+accumulation of wealth in inequality, and the growth of vast capitals,
+there is substituted for the dependence of the individual on the general
+resultant of a vast number of agencies a dependence on one enormously rich
+individual, who can control the physical destinies of a nation. But a
+nation, truly speaking, is there no more. The industrial order has parted
+into a mere abstract workman on one hand, and the _grande richesse_ on the
+other. "It has lost its capacity of an organic absolute intuition and of
+respect for the divine--external though its divinity be: and there sets in
+the bestiality of contempt for all that is noble. The mere wisdomless
+universal, the mass of wealth, is the essential: and the ethical
+principle, the absolute bond of the nation, is vanished; and the nation is
+dissolved(118)."
+
+It would be a long and complicated task to sift, in these ill-digested but
+profound suggestions, the real meaning from the formal statement. They
+are, like Utopia, beyond the range of practical politics. The modern
+reader, whose political conceptions are limited by contemporary
+circumstance, may find them archaic, medieval, quixotic. But for those who
+behind the words and forms can see the substance and the idea, they will
+perhaps come nearer the conception of ideal commonwealth than many
+reforming programmes. Compared with the maturer statements of the
+_Philosophy of Law_, they have the faults of the Romantic age to which
+their inception belongs. Yet even in that later exposition there is upheld
+the doctrine of the supremacy of the eternal State against everything
+particular, class-like, and temporary; a doctrine which has made Hegel--as
+it made Fichte--a voice in that "professorial socialism" which is at least
+as old as Plato.
+
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+
+§ 377. The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it
+is the most "concrete" of sciences. The significance of that "absolute"
+commandment, _Know thyself_--whether we look at it in itself or under the
+historical circumstances of its first utterance--is not to promote mere
+self-knowledge in respect of the _particular_ capacities, character,
+propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands
+means that of man's genuine reality--of what is essentially and ultimately
+true and real--of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is
+it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called _knowledge of
+men_--the knowledge whose aim is to detect the _peculiarities_, passions,
+and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the
+human heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless,
+unless on the assumption that we know the _universal_--man as man, and,
+that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with
+casual, insignificant and _untrue_ aspects of mental life, it fails to
+reach the underlying essence of them all--the mind itself.
+
+§ 378. Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has
+been already alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an _abstract_
+and generalising metaphysic of the subject. _Empirical_ (or inductive)
+psychology, on the other hand, deals with the "concrete" mind: and, after
+the revival of the sciences, when observation and experience had been made
+the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology
+was worked on the same lines as other sciences. In this way it came about
+that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the inductive science, and
+so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detail: whilst at the
+same time the inductive science clung to the conventional common-sense
+metaphysic, with its analysis into forces, various activities, &c., and
+rejected any attempt at a "speculative" treatment.
+
+The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its
+special aspects and states, are for this reason still by far the most
+admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of philosophical value on this
+topic. The main aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to re-introduce
+unity of idea and principle into the theory of mind, and so re-interpret
+the lesson of those Aristotelian books.
+
+§ 379. Even our own sense of the mind's _living_ unity naturally protests
+against any attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or,
+what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each
+other. But the craving for a _comprehension_ of the unity is still further
+stimulated, as we soon come across distinctions between mental freedom and
+mental determinism, antitheses between free _psychic_ agency and the
+corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we equally note the intimate
+interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern times especially the
+phenomena of _animal magnetism_ have given, even in experience, a lively
+and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the power
+of its "ideality." Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical
+common sense were struck with confusion; and the necessity of a
+"speculative" examination with a view to the removal of difficulties was
+more directly forced upon the student.
+
+§ 380. The "concrete" nature of mind involves for the observer the
+peculiar difficulty that the several grades and special types which
+develop its intelligible unity in detail are not left standing as so many
+separate existences confronting its more advanced aspects. It is otherwise
+in external nature. There, matter and movement, for example, have a
+manifestation all their own--it is the solar system; and similarly the
+_differentiae_ of sense-perception have a sort of earlier existence in the
+properties of _bodies_, and still more independently in the four elements.
+The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their
+separate existence and become factors, states and features in the higher
+grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract
+aspect of mind betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher
+grade. Under the guise of sensation, e.g., we may find the very highest
+mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which
+is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be
+the proper seat and, as it were, the source of those moral and religious
+principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious
+principles thus modified may seem to call for treatment as species of
+sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental life are
+under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual
+cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades
+for which they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by
+anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in
+dealing with natural awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of
+consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of
+intellect).
+
+
+
+
+What Mind (or Spirit) is.
+
+
+§ 381. From our point of view Mind has for its _presupposition_ Nature, of
+which it is the truth, and for that reason its _absolute prius_. In this
+its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the "Idea" entered
+on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are
+one--either is the intelligent unity, the notion. This identity is
+_absolute negativity_--for whereas in Nature the intelligent unity has its
+objectivity perfect but externalised, this self-externalisation has been
+nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with
+itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a
+return out of nature.
+
+§ 382. For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of
+mind is Liberty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or
+self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it _may_ withdraw itself
+from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence;
+it can thus submit to infinite _pain_, the negation of its individual
+immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affirmative in this
+negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as
+it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality.
+
+§ 383. This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a
+being of its own, the universal is self-particularising, whilst it still
+remains self-identical. Hence the special mode of mental being is
+"_manifestation_." The spirit is not some one mode or meaning which finds
+utterance or externality only in a form distinct from itself: it does not
+manifest or reveal _something_, but its very mode and meaning is this
+revelation. And thus in its mere possibility Mind is at the same moment an
+infinite, "absolute," _actuality_.
+
+§ 384. _Revelation_, taken to mean the revelation of the _abstract_ Idea,
+is an unmediated transition to Nature which _comes_ to be. As Mind is
+free, its manifestation is to _set forth_ Nature as _its_ world; but
+because it is reflection, it, in thus setting forth its world, at the same
+time _presupposes_ the world as a nature independently existing. In the
+intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being--a
+being in which the mind procures the _affirmation_ and _truth_ of its
+freedom.
+
+_The Absolute is Mind_ (Spirit)--this is the supreme definition of the
+Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burthen
+was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy:
+it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science:
+and it is this impulse that must explain the history of the world. The
+word "Mind" (Spirit)--and some glimpse of its meaning--was found at an early
+period: and the spirituality of God is the lesson of Christianity. It
+remains for philosophy in its own element of intelligible unity to get
+hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what implicitly is the
+ultimate reality: and that problem is not genuinely, and by rational
+methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme
+and the soul of philosophy.
+
+
+
+
+Subdivision.
+
+
+§ 385. The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages:--
+
+(1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the _ideal_ totality of
+the Idea--i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is
+to be self-contained and free. This is _Mind Subjective_.
+
+(2) In the form of _reality_: realised, i.e. in a _world_ produced and to
+be produced by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape
+of necessity. This is _Mind Objective_.
+
+(3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and, of mind as ideality and
+concept, which essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself,
+mind in its absolute truth. This is _Mind Absolute_.
+
+§ 386. The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite
+mind. Mind is the infinite Idea; thus finitude here means the
+disproportion between the concept and the reality--but with the
+qualification that it is a shadow cast by the mind's own light--a show or
+illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barrier to itself, in
+order, by its removal, actually to realise and become conscious of freedom
+as _its_ very being, i.e. to be fully _manifested_. The several steps of
+this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the
+function of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass,
+are steps in its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given
+the identification of the three stages--finding a world presupposed before
+us, generating a world as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it
+and in it. To the infinite form of this truth the show purifies itself
+till it becomes a consciousness of it.
+
+A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician
+is chiefly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere
+matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern,
+to adhere to the point of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is
+reckoned a mark of audacity, if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in
+fact such a _modesty_ of thought, as treats the finite as something
+altogether fixed and _absolute_, is the worst of virtues; and to stick to
+a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most unsound sort of
+theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period elucidated
+and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logic
+for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in
+the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the
+finite _is not_, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an
+emergence to something higher. This finitude of the spheres so far
+examined is the dialectic that makes a thing have its cessation by another
+and in another: but Spirit, the intelligent unity and the _implicit_
+Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that internal act by which
+nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the modesty alluded
+to is a retention of this vanity--the finite--in opposition to the true: it
+is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we
+shall see this vanity appear as _wickedness_ at that turning-point at
+which mind has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its
+most central contradiction.
+
+
+
+
+
+SECTION I. MIND SUBJECTIVE.
+
+
+§ 387. Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as
+_cognitive_: Cognition, however, being taken here not as a merely logical
+category of the Idea (§ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the
+_concrete_ mind.
+
+Subjective mind is:--
+
+(A) Immediate or implicit: a soul--the Spirit in _Nature_--the object
+treated by _Anthropology_.
+
+(B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical reflection into itself and
+into other things: mind in correlation or particularisation:
+consciousness--the object treated by the _Phenomenology of Mind_.
+
+(C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject--the object
+treated by _Psychology_.
+
+In the Soul is the _awaking of Consciousness_: Consciousness sets itself
+up as Reason, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and
+this Reason by its activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the
+consciousness of its intelligent unity.
+
+For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification
+it presents is an advance of _development_: and so in mind every character
+under which it appears is a stage in a process of specification and
+development, a step forward towards its goal, in order to make itself
+into, and to realise in itself, what it implicitly is. Each step, again,
+is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was
+implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is _for
+itself_--for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. The
+ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what
+happens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made
+agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which
+we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it
+possesses--all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the
+soul is really invests it with that character in our conception and makes
+it reach a higher stage of being than it explicitly had before.
+
+We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here
+studied what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is
+the individual's only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist
+in them. But in the philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as
+self-instruction and self-education in very essence; and its acts and
+utterances are stages in the process which brings it forward to itself,
+links it in unity with itself, and so makes it actual mind.
+
+
+
+
+Sub-Section A. Anthropology. The Soul.
+
+
+§ 388. Spirit (Mind) _came into_ being as the truth of Nature. But not
+merely is it, as such a result, to be held the true and real first of what
+went before: this becoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion
+the special meaning of "_free judgment_." Mind, thus come into being,
+means therefore that Nature in its own self realises its untruth and sets
+itself aside: it means that Mind presupposes itself no longer as the
+universality which in corporal individuality is always self-externalised,
+but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and
+simple. At such a stage it is not yet mind, but _soul_.
+
+§ 389. The soul is no separate immaterial entity. Wherever there is
+Nature, the soul is its universal immaterialism, its simple "ideal" life.
+Soul is the _substance_ or "absolute" basis of all the particularising and
+individualising of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on
+which its character is wrought, and the soul remains the pervading,
+identical ideality of it all. But as it is still conceived thus
+abstractly, the soul is only the _sleep_ of mind--the passive {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} of
+Aristotle, which is potentially all things.
+
+The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest, except
+where, on the one hand, matter is regarded as something _true_, and mind
+conceived as a _thing_, on the other. But in modern times even the
+physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come
+upon _imponderable_ matters, like heat, light, &c., to which they might
+perhaps add space and time. These "imponderables," which have lost the
+property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and, in a sense, even the
+capacity of offering resistance, have still, however, a sensible existence
+and outness of part to part; whereas the "vital"_ matter_, which may also
+be found enumerated among them, not merely lacks gravity, but even every
+other aspect of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. The
+fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is
+_implicitly_ at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception
+of life--with this proviso, however, that its existence or objectivity is
+still at the same time forfeited to the sway of self-externalism. It is
+otherwise with Mind. There, in the intelligible unity which exists as
+freedom, as absolute negativity, and not as the immediate or natural
+individual, the object or the reality of the intelligible unity is the
+unity itself; and so the self-externalism, which is the fundamental
+feature of matter, has been completely dissipated and transmuted into
+universality, or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. Mind is
+the existent truth of matter--the truth that matter itself has no truth.
+
+A cognate question is that of the _community of soul and body_. This
+community (interdependence) was assumed as a _fact_, and the only problem
+was how to _comprehend_ it. The usual answer, perhaps, was to call it an
+_incomprehensible_ mystery; and, indeed, if we take them to be absolutely
+antithetical and absolutely independent, they are as impenetrable to each
+other as one piece of matter to another, each being supposed to be found
+only in the pores of the other, i.e. where the other is not: whence
+Epicurus, when attributing to the gods a residence in the pores, was
+consistent in not imposing on them any connexion with the world. A
+somewhat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this
+relation came to be expressly discussed. Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza,
+and Leibnitz have all indicated God as this _nexus_. They meant that the
+finitude of soul and matter were only ideal and unreal distinctions; and,
+so holding, these philosophers took God, not, as so often is done, merely
+as another word for the incomprehensible, but rather as the sole true
+identity of finite mind and matter. But either this identity, as in the
+case of Spinoza, is too abstract, or, as in the case of Leibnitz, though
+his Monad of monads brings things into being, it does so only by an act of
+judgment or choice. Hence, with Leibnitz, the result is a distinction
+between soul and the corporeal (or material), and the identity is only
+like the _copula_ of a judgment, and does not rise or develop into system,
+into the absolute syllogism.
+
+§ 390. The Soul is at first--
+
+(_a_) In its immediate natural mode--the natural soul, which only _is_.
+
+(_b_) Secondly, it is a soul which _feels_, as individualised, enters into
+correlation with its immediate being, and, in the modes of that being,
+retains an abstract independence.
+
+(_c_) Thirdly, its immediate being--or corporeity--is moulded into it, and
+with that corporeity it exists as _actual_ soul.
+
+
+
+(a) The Physical Soul(119).
+
+
+§ 391. The soul universal, described, it may be, as an _anima mundi_, a
+world-soul, must not be fixed on that account as a single subject; it is
+rather the universal _substance_ which has its actual truth only in
+individuals and single subjects. Thus, when it presents itself as a single
+soul, it is a single soul which _is_ merely: its only modes are modes of
+natural life. These have, so to speak, behind its ideality a free
+existence: i.e. they are natural objects for consciousness, but objects to
+which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. These
+features rather are _physical qualities_ of which it finds itself
+possessed.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) Physical Qualities(120).
+
+
+§ 392. While still a "substance" (i.e. a physical soul) the mind (1) takes
+part in the general planetary life, feels the difference of climates, the
+changes of the seasons and the periods of the day, &c. This life of nature
+for the main shows itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of
+mental tone.
+
+In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical, sidereal, and
+telluric life of man. In such a sympathy with nature the animals
+essentially live: their specific characters and their particular phases of
+growth depend, in many cases completely, and always more or less, upon it.
+In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance, just in
+proportion to his civilisation, and the more his whole frame of soul is
+based upon a substructure of mental freedom. The history of the world is
+not bound up with revolutions in the solar system, any more than the
+destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets.
+
+The difference of climate has a more solid and vigorous influence. But the
+response to the changes of the seasons and hours of the day is found only
+in faint changes of mood, which come expressly to the fore only in morbid
+states (including insanity) and at periods when the self-conscious life
+suffers depression.
+
+In nations less intellectually emancipated, which therefore live more in
+harmony with nature, we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of
+imbecility _a few_ real cases of such sympathy, and on that foundation
+what seems to be marvellous prophetic vision of coming conditions and of
+events arising therefrom. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold, even
+these few and slight susceptibilities, based upon participation in the
+common life of nature, disappear. Animals and plants, on the contrary,
+remain for ever subject to such influences.
+
+§ 393. (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe,
+the general planetary life of the nature-governed mind specialises itself
+and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which, on the whole,
+give expression to the nature of the geographical continents and
+constitute the diversities of _race_.
+
+The contrast between the earth's poles, the land towards the north pole
+being more aggregated and preponderant over sea, whereas in the southern
+hemisphere it runs out in sharp points, widely distant from each other,
+introduces into the differences of continents a further modification which
+Treviranus (_Biology_, Part II) has exhibited in the case of the flora and
+fauna.
+
+§ 394. This diversity descends into specialities, that may be termed
+_local_ minds--shown in the outward modes of life and occupation, bodily
+structure and disposition, but still more in the inner tendency and
+capacity of the intellectual and moral character of the several peoples.
+
+Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations
+each possessing a persistent type of its own.
+
+§ 395. (3) The soul is further de-universalised into the individualised
+subject. But this subjectivity is here only considered as a
+differentiation and singling out of the modes which nature gives; we find
+it as the special temperament, talent, character, physiognomy, or other
+disposition and idiosyncrasy, of families or single individuals.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) Physical Alterations.
+
+
+§ 396. Taking the soul as an individual, we find its diversities, as
+alterations in it, the one permanent subject, and as stages in its
+development. As they are at once physical and mental diversities, a more
+concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate
+an acquaintance with the formed and matured mind.
+
+The (1) first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. He
+begins with _Childhood_--mind wrapt up in itself. His next step is the
+fully-developed antithesis, the strain and struggle of a universality
+which is still subjective (as seen in ideals, fancies, hopes, ambitions)
+against his immediate individuality. And that individuality marks both the
+world which, as it exists, fails to meet his ideal requirements, and the
+position of the individual himself, who is still short of independence and
+not fully equipped for the part he has to play (_Youth_). Thirdly, we see
+man in his true relation to his environment, recognising the objective
+necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it,--a world no
+longer incomplete, but able in the work which it collectively achieves to
+afford the individual a place and a security for his performance. By his
+share in this collective work he first is really _somebody_, gaining an
+effective existence and an objective value (_Manhood_). Last of all comes
+the finishing touch to this unity with objectivity: a unity which, while
+on its realist side it passes into the _inertia_ of deadening habit, on
+its idealist side gains freedom from the limited interests and
+entanglements of the outward present (_Old Age_).
+
+§ 397. (2) Next we find the individual subject to a _real_ antithesis,
+leading it to seek and find _itself_ in _another_ individual. This--the
+_sexual relation_--on a physical basis, shows, on its one side,
+subjectivity remaining in an instinctive and emotional harmony of moral
+life and love, and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme _universal_
+phase, in purposes political, scientific or artistic; and on the other,
+shows an active half, where the individual is the vehicle of a struggle of
+universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of his
+own existence and of that of the external world), carrying out these
+universal principles into a unity with the world which is his own work.
+The sexual tie acquires its moral and spiritual significance and function
+in the _family_.
+
+§ 398. (3) When the individuality, or self-centralised being,
+distinguishes itself from its _mere_ being, this immediate judgment is the
+_waking_ of the soul, which confronts its self-absorbed natural life, in
+the first instance, as one natural quality and state confronts another
+state, viz. _sleep_.--The waking is not merely for the observer, or
+externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the _judgment_ (primary
+partition) of the individual soul--which is self-existing only as it
+relates its self-existence to its mere existence, distinguishing itself
+from its still undifferentiated universality. The waking state includes
+generally all self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind
+realises its own distinct self.--Sleep is an invigoration of this
+activity--not as a merely negative rest from it, but as a return back from
+the world of specialisation, from dispersion into phases where it has
+grown hard and stiff,--a return into the general nature of subjectivity,
+which is the substance of those specialised energies and their absolute
+master.
+
+The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those _posers_, as they
+may be called, which are often addressed to philosophy:--Napoleon, e.g., on
+a visit to the University of Pavia, put this question to the class of
+ideology. The characterisation given in the section is abstract; it
+primarily treats waking merely as a natural fact, containing the mental
+element _implicite_ but not yet as invested with a special being of its
+own. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in
+fundamentals it remains the same), we must take the self-existence of the
+individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as
+intelligent mind. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two
+states properly arises, only when we also take into account the dreams in
+sleep and describe these dreams, as well as the mental representations in
+the sober waking consciousness, under one and the same title of mental
+representations. Thus superficially classified as states of mental
+representation the two coincide, because we have lost sight of the
+difference; and in the case of any assignable distinction of waking
+consciousness, we can always return to the trivial remark that all this is
+nothing more than mental idea. But the concrete theory of the waking soul
+in its realised being views it as _consciousness_ and _intellect_: and the
+world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a
+picture of mere ideas and images. The latter are in the main only
+externally conjoined, in an unintelligent way, by the laws of the
+so-called _Association of Ideas_; though here and there of course logical
+principles may also be operative. But in the waking state man behaves
+essentially as a concrete ego, an intelligence: and because of this
+intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete totality
+of features in which each member, each point, takes up its place as at the
+same time determined through and with all the rest. Thus the facts
+embodied in his sensation are authenticated, not by his mere subjective
+representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the
+person, but by virtue of the concrete interconnexion in which each part
+stands with all parts of this complex. The waking state is the concrete
+consciousness of this mutual corroboration of each single factor of its
+content by all the others in the picture as perceived. The consciousness
+of this interdependence need not be explicit and distinct. Still this
+general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete
+feeling of self.--In order to see the difference of dreaming and waking we
+need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity and
+objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon
+determination through categories): remembering, as already noted, that
+what is actually present in mind need not be therefore explicitly realised
+in consciousness, just as little as the exaltation of the intellectual
+sense to God need stand before consciousness in the shape of proofs of
+God's existence, although, as before explained, these proofs only serve to
+express the net worth and content of that feeling.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) Sensibility(121).
+
+
+§ 399. Sleep and waking are, primarily, it is true, not mere alterations,
+but _alternating_ conditions (a progression _in infinitum_). This is their
+formal and negative relationship: but in it the _affirmative_ relationship
+is also involved. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere
+existence is implicit as an "ideal" factor: the features which make up its
+sleeping nature, where they are implicitly as in their substance, are
+_found_ by the waking soul, in its own self, and, be it noted, for itself.
+The fact that these particulars, though as a mode of mind they are
+distinguished from the self-identity of our self-centred being, are yet
+simply contained in its simplicity, is what we call sensibility.
+
+§ 400. Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring, the
+inarticulate breathing, of the spirit through its unconscious and
+unintelligent individuality, where every definite feature is still
+"immediate,"--neither specially developed in its content nor set in
+distinction as objective to subject, but treated as belonging to its most
+special, its natural peculiarity. The content of sensation is thus limited
+and transient, belonging as it does to natural, immediate being,--to what
+is therefore qualitative and finite.
+
+_Everything is in sensation_ (feeling): if you will, everything that
+emerges in conscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin
+in sensation; for source and origin just means the first immediate manner
+in which a thing appears. Let it not be enough to have principles and
+religion only in the head: they must also be in the heart, in the feeling.
+What we merely have in the head is in consciousness, in a general way: the
+facts of it are objective--set over against consciousness, so that as it is
+put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me
+(from my concrete subjectivity). But if put in the feeling, the fact is a
+mode of my individuality, however crude that individuality be in such a
+form: it is thus treated as my _very own_. My own is something inseparate
+from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with
+its underlying self in all its definite content is just this
+inseparability; which however yet falls short of the ego of developed
+consciousness, and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. It is
+with a quite different intensity and permanency that the will, the
+conscience, and the character, are our very own, than can ever be true of
+feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no
+philosophy to tell us. No doubt it is correct to say that above everything
+the _heart_ must be good. But feeling and heart is not the form by which
+anything is legitimated as religious, moral, true, just, &c., and an
+appeal to heart and feeling either means nothing or means something bad.
+This should hardly need enforcing. Can any experience be more trite than
+that feelings and hearts are also bad, evil, godless, mean, &c.? That the
+heart is the source only of such feelings is stated in the words: "From
+the heart proceed evil thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, blasphemy,
+&c." In such times when "scientific" theology and philosophy make the
+heart and feeling the criterion of what is good, moral, and religious, it
+is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences; just as it is
+nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic property
+by which man is distinguished from the beasts, and that he has feeling in
+common with them.
+
+§ 401. What the sentient soul finds within it is, on one hand, the
+naturally immediate, as "ideally" in it and made its own. On the other
+hand and conversely, what originally belongs to the central individuality
+(which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free
+mind) get the features of the natural corporeity, and is so felt. In this
+way we have two spheres of feeling. One, where what at first is a
+corporeal affection (e.g. of the eye or of any bodily part whatever) is
+made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward, memorised in the soul's
+self-centred part. Another, where affections originating in the mind and
+belonging to it, are in order to be felt, and to be as if found, invested
+with corporeity. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject:
+it is felt in the soul. The detailed specification of the former branch of
+sensibility is seen in the system of the senses. But the other or inwardly
+originated modes of feeling no less necessarily systematise themselves;
+and their corporisation, as put in the living and concretely developed
+natural being, works itself out, following the special character of the
+mental mode, in a special system of bodily organs.
+
+Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in
+the life of its bodily part. The senses form the simple system of
+corporeity specified. (_a_) The "ideal" side of physical things breaks up
+into two--because in it, as immediate and not yet subjective ideality,
+distinction appears as mere variety--the senses of definite _light_, §
+287--and of _sound_, § 300. The "real" aspect similarly is with its
+difference double: (_b_) the senses of smell and taste, §§ 321, 322; (_c_)
+the sense of solid reality, of heavy matter, of heat and shape. Around the
+centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arrange
+themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural
+corporeity.
+
+The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific
+bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science--a
+_psychical physiology_. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in
+the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate
+sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and
+unpleasant): as also in the distinct parallelism which underlies the
+symbolical employment of sensations, e.g. of colours, tones, smells. But
+the most interesting side of a psychical physiology would lie in studying
+not the mere sympathy, but more definitely the bodily form adopted by
+certain mental modifications, especially the passions or emotions. We
+should have, e.g., to explain the line of connexion by which anger and
+courage are felt in the breast, the blood, the "irritable" system, just as
+thinking and mental occupation are felt in the head, the centre of the
+'sensible' system. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than
+hitherto of the most familiar connexions by which tears, and voice in
+general, with its varieties of language, laughter, sighs, with many other
+specialisations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy, are
+formed from their mental source. In physiology the viscera and the organs
+are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism; but they
+form at the same time a physical system for the expression of mental
+states, and in this way they get quite another interpretation.
+
+§ 402. Sensations, just because they are immediate and are found existing,
+are single and transient aspects of psychic life,--alterations in the
+substantiality of the soul, set in its self-centred life, with which that
+substance is one. But this self-centred being is not merely a formal
+factor of sensation: the soul is virtually a reflected totality of
+sensations--it feels _in itself_ the total substantiality which it
+_virtually_ is--it is a soul which feels.
+
+In the usage of ordinary language, sensation and feeling are not clearly
+distinguished: still we do not speak of the sensation,--but of the feeling
+(sense) of right, of self; sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with
+sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasises rather the side of
+passivity--the fact that we find ourselves feeling, i.e. the immediacy of
+mode in feeling--whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact
+that it is _we ourselves_ who feel.
+
+
+
+(b) The Feeling Soul.--(Soul as Sentiency.)(122)
+
+
+§ 403. The feeling or sentient individual is the simple "ideality" or
+subjective side of sensation. What it has to do, therefore, is to raise
+its substantiality, its merely virtual filling-up, to the character of
+subjectivity, to take possession of it, to realise its mastery over its
+own. As sentient, the soul is no longer a mere natural, but an inward,
+individuality: the individuality which in the merely substantial totality
+was only formal to it has to be liberated and made independent.
+
+Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if
+we are to understand it, must that feature of "ideality" be kept in view,
+which represents it as the _negation_ of the real, but a negation, where
+the real is put past, virtually retained, although it does not _exist_.
+The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental
+ideas or to memory. Every individual is an infinite treasury of
+sensations, ideas, acquired lore, thoughts, &c.; and yet the ego is one
+and uncompounded, a deep featureless characterless mine, in which all this
+is stored up, without existing. It is only when _I_ call to mind _an_
+idea, that I bring it out of that interior to existence before
+consciousness. Sometimes, in sickness, ideas and information, supposed to
+have been forgotten years ago, because for so long they had not been
+brought into consciousness, once more come to light. They were not in our
+possession, nor by such reproduction as occurs in sickness do they for the
+future come into our possession; and yet they were in us and continue to
+be in us still. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once
+learned he really has in him, should he have once forgotten them: they
+belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such, but only to his
+implicit self. And under all the superstructure of specialised and
+instrumental consciousness that may subsequently be added to it, the
+individuality always remains this single-souled inner life. At the present
+stage this singleness is, primarily, to be defined as one of feeling--as
+embracing the corporeal in itself: thus denying the view that this body is
+something material, with parts outside parts and outside the soul. Just as
+the number and variety of mental representations is no argument for an
+extended and real multeity in the ego; so the "real" outness of parts in
+the body has no truth for the sentient soul. As sentient, the soul is
+characterised as immediate, and so as natural and corporeal: but the
+outness of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for
+the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real,
+and therefore not as a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity _in
+existence_,--the existent speculative principle. Thus in the body it is one
+simple, omnipresent unity. As to the representative faculty the body is
+but _one_ representation, and the infinite variety of its material
+structure and organisation is reduced to the _simplicity_ of one definite
+conception: so in the sentient soul, the corporeity, and all that outness
+of parts to parts which belongs to it, is reduced to _ideality_ (the
+_truth_ of the natural multiplicity). The soul is virtually the totality
+of nature: as an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the
+explicitly put totality of its particular world,--that world being included
+in it and filling it up; and to that world it stands but as to itself.
+
+§ 404. As _individual_, the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any
+difference there is, it brings within itself. What is differentiated from
+it is as yet no external object (as in consciousness), but only the
+aspects of its own sentient totality, &c. In this partition (judgment) of
+itself it is always subject: its object is its substance, which is at the
+same time its predicate. This _substance_ is still the content of its
+natural life, but turned into the content of the individual
+sensation-laden soul; yet as the soul is in that content still particular,
+the content is its particular world, so far as that is, in an implicit
+mode, included in the ideality of the subject.
+
+By itself, this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features
+are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is
+formal and only formal. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it
+is as a _form_ and appears as a special _state_ of mind (§ 350), to which
+the soul, which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence,
+may again sink down. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more
+subordinate and abstract one, it implies a want of adaptation, which is
+_disease_. In the present stage we must treat, first, of the abstract
+psychical modifications by themselves, secondly, as morbid states of mind:
+the latter being only explicable by means of the former.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy.
+
+
+§ 405. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic
+individual, it is because immediate, not yet as _its self_ not a true
+subject reflected into itself, and is therefore passive. Hence the
+individuality of its true self is a different subject from it--a subject
+which may even exist as another individual. By the self-hood of the latter
+it--a substance, which is only a non-independent predicate--is then set in
+vibration and controlled without the least resistance on its part. This
+other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its _genius_.
+
+In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its
+mother's womb:--a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental, but
+psychical--a correlation of soul to soul. Here are two individuals, yet in
+undivided psychic unity: the one as yet no _self_, as yet nothing
+impenetrable, incapable of resistance: the other is its actuating subject,
+the _single_ self of the two. The mother is the _genius_ of the child; for
+by genius we commonly mean the total mental self-hood, as it has existence
+of its own, and constitutes the subjective substantiality of some one else
+who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal
+independence. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum total of
+existence, of life, and of character, not as a mere possibility, or
+capacity, or virtuality, but as efficiency and realised activity, as
+concrete subjectivity.
+
+If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's
+existence as an embryo in its special integuments, and as connected with
+the mother by means of umbilical cord, placenta, &c., all that is
+presented to the senses and reflection are certain anatomical and
+physiological facts--externalities and instrumentalities in the sensible
+and material which are insignificant as regards the main point, the
+psychical relationship. What ought to be noted as regards this psychical
+tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon
+the child by violent emotions, injuries, &c. of the mother, but the whole
+psychical _judgment_ (partition) of the underlying nature, by which the
+female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in
+twain, so that the child has not merely got _communicated_ to it, but has
+originally received morbid dispositions as well as other pre-dispositions
+of shape, temper, character, talent, idiosyncrasies, &c.
+
+Sporadic examples and traces of this _magic_ tie appear elsewhere in the
+range of self-possessed conscious life, say between friends, especially
+female friends with delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show
+"magnetic" phenomena), between husband and wife and between members of the
+same family.
+
+The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity, which,
+in the case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature,
+is visibly present as another and a different individual. But this
+sensitive totality is meant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to
+subjectivity in one and the same individual: which is then its indwelling
+consciousness, self-possessed, intelligent, and reasonable. For such a
+consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only
+implicitly existent material; and the self-possessed subjectivity is the
+rational, self-conscious, controlling genius thereof. But this sensitive
+nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious, congenital disposition
+and temperament, but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and
+retains also (in habit, as to which see later) all further ties and
+essential relationships, fortunes, principles--everything in short
+belonging to the character, and in whose elaboration self-conscious
+activity has most effectively participated. The sensitivity is thus a soul
+in which the whole mental life is condensed. The total individual under
+this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing and actual play of
+his consciousness, his secular ideas, developed interests, inclinations,
+&c. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more
+intensive form of individuality is termed the genius, whose decision is
+ultimate whatever may be the show of reasons, intentions, means, of which
+the more public consciousness is so liberal. This concentrated
+individuality also reveals itself under the aspect of what is called the
+heart and soul of feeling. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling
+when he looks at things with self-possession and acts according to his
+permanent purposes, be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust
+interests: a good-hearted man, on the other hand, means rather one who is
+at the mercy of his individual sentiment, even when it is of narrow range
+and is wholly made up of particularities. Of such good nature or goodness
+of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the
+_indulgere genio_.
+
+§ 406. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) The sensitive life, when it becomes a _form_ or _state_ of the
+self-conscious, educated, self-possessed human being is a disease. The
+individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the
+concrete contents of his own self, whilst he keeps his self-possessed
+consciousness of self and of the causal order of things apart as a
+distinct state of mind. This morbid condition is seen in _magnetic
+somnambulism_ and cognate states.
+
+In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a
+demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable
+condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism--to show, in other words,
+that it is in harmony with the facts. To that end the phenomena, so
+complex in their nature and so very different one from another, would have
+first of all to be brought under their general points of view. The facts,
+it might seem, first of all call for verification. But such a verification
+would, it must be added, be superfluous for those on whose account it was
+called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring
+the narratives--infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the
+education and character of the witnesses--to be mere deception and
+imposture. The _a priori_ conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted
+that no testimony can avail against them, and they have even denied what
+they had seen with their own eyes. In order to believe in this department
+even what one sees with these eyes, and still more to understand it, the
+first requisite is not to be in bondage to the hard and fast categories of
+the practical intellect. The chief points on which the discussion turns
+may here be given:
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) To the _concrete_ existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of
+his fundamental _interests_, both the essential and the particular
+empirical ties which connect him with other men and the world at large.
+This totality forms _his_ actuality, in the sense that it lies in fact
+immanent in him; it has already been called his _genius_. This genius is
+not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity, in
+which the individual here appears immersed, is, on the contrary, a
+surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. The first
+conclusion to which these considerations lead, with reference to the
+contents of consciousness in the somnambulist stage, is that it is only
+the range of his individually moulded world (of his private interests and
+narrow relationships) which appear there. Scientific theories and
+philosophic conceptions or general truths require a different
+soil,--require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarticulate mass
+of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. It is foolish therefore to
+expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state.
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound, he is fully and
+intelligently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to
+his individuality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnexion
+between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external
+and a separate world, and he is aware that this world is in itself also a
+complex of interconnexions of a practically intelligible kind. In his
+subjective ideas and plans he has also before him this causally connected
+scheme of things he calls his world and the series of means which bring
+his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the objective existences,
+which are also means and ends to each other. At the same time, this world
+which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that it is
+these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become
+extinct if these externalities were to disappear, unless by the aid of
+religion, subjective reason, and character, he is in a remarkable degree
+self-supporting and independent of them. But, then, in the latter case he
+is less susceptible of the psychical state here spoken of.--As an
+illustration of that identity with the surroundings may be noted the
+effect produced by the death of beloved relatives, friends, &c. on those
+left behind, so that the one dies or pines away with the loss of the
+other. (Thus Cato, after the downfall of the Roman republic, could live no
+longer: his inner reality was neither wider than higher than it.) Compare
+home-sickness, and the like.
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness, the world outside
+it and its relationship to that world is under a veil, and the soul is
+thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep, in catalepsy, and other diseases,
+e.g. those connected with female development, or at the approach of death,
+&c.), then that _immanent actuality_ of the individual remains the same
+substantial total as before, but now as a purely sensitive life with an
+inward vision and an inward consciousness. And because it is the adult,
+formed, and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of
+sensitivity, it retains along with its content a certain nominal
+self-hood, a formal vision and awareness, which however does not go so far
+as the conscious judgment or discernment by which its contents, when it is
+healthy and awake, exist for it as an outward objectivity. The individual
+is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality--a genius which
+beholds itself. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the
+very same facts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective
+practical reality, and to know which, in its sober moods, it needs the
+intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are
+now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. This perception is
+a sort of _clairvoyance_; for it is a consciousness living in the
+undivided substantiality of the genius, and finding itself in the very
+heart of the interconnexion, and so can dispense with the series of
+conditions, external one to another, which lead up to the
+result,--conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and
+in so doing feels the limits of its own individual externality. But such
+clairvoyance--just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the
+facts in a rational interconnexion--is for that very reason at the mercy of
+every private contingency of feeling and fancy, &c.--not to mention that
+foreign _suggestions_ (see later) intrude into its vision. It is thus
+impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants really see
+preponderates over what they deceive themselves in.--But it is absurd to
+treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state,
+capable of conveying general truths(123).
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}) An essential feature of this sensitivity, with its absence of
+intelligent and volitional personality, is this, that it is a state of
+passivity, like that of the child in the womb. The patient in this
+condition is accordingly made, and continues to be, subject to the power
+of another person, the magnetiser; so that when the two are thus in
+psychical _rapport_, the selfless individual, not really a "person," has
+for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. This
+latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of
+the former, and the genius which may even supply him with a train of
+ideas. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which
+are present in the person with whom he stands _en rapport_, and that he is
+aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if
+they were his own, shows the substantial identity which the soul (which
+even in its concreteness is also truly immaterial) is capable of holding
+with another. When the substance of both is thus made one, there is only
+one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of
+individuality, but it is empty, not on the spot, not actual: and this
+nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the
+sensations and ideas of the other, in whom it sees, smells, tastes, reads,
+and hears. It is further to be noted on this point that the somnambulist
+is thus brought into _rapport_ with two genii and a twofold set of ideas,
+his own and that of the magnetiser. But it is impossible to say precisely
+which sensations and which visions he, in this nominal perception,
+receives, beholds and brings to knowledge from his own inward self, and
+which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stands in relation.
+This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions, and accounts among
+other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among
+somnambulists from different countries and under _rapport_ with persons of
+different education, as regards their views on morbid states and the
+methods of cure, or medicines for them, as well as on scientific and
+intellectual topics.
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external
+objectivity, so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all
+varieties of sensation have disappeared, and hence, when the activity of
+the sense-organs is asleep, the "common sense," or "general feeling"
+specifies itself to several functions; one sees and hears with the
+fingers, and especially with the pit of the stomach, &c.
+
+To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to
+be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and
+some other existence on which it depends,--to discover what is called the
+ordinary course of nature, in compliance with the laws and relations of
+the intellect, e.g. causality, reasons, &c. The purely sensitive life, on
+the contrary, even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness, as in
+the morbid state alluded to, is just this form of immediacy, without any
+distinctions between subjective and objective, between intelligent
+personality and objective world, and without the aforementioned finite
+ties between them. Hence to understand this intimate conjunction, which,
+though all-embracing, is without any definite points of attachment, is
+impossible, so long as we assume independent personalities, independent
+one of another and of the objective world which is their content--so long
+as we assume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of
+being to another.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) Self-feeling (Sense of Self)(124).
+
+
+§ 407. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) The sensitive totality is, in its capacity of individual,
+essentially the tendency to distinguish itself in itself, and to wake up
+to the _judgment in itself_, in virtue of which it has _particular_
+feelings and stands as a _subject_ in respect of these aspects of itself.
+The subject as such gives these feelings a place as _its own_ in itself.
+In these private and personal sensations it is immersed, and at the same
+time, because of the "ideality" of the particulars, it combines itself in
+them with itself as a subjective unit. In this way it is _self-feeling_,
+and is so at the same time only in the _particular feeling_.
+
+§ 408. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) In consequence of the immediacy, which still marks the
+self-feeling, i.e. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is
+still undetached from the mental life, and as the feeling too is itself
+particular and bound up with a special corporeal form, it follows that
+although the subject has been brought to acquire intelligent
+consciousness, it is still susceptible of disease, so far as to remain
+fast in a _special_ phase of its self-feeling, unable to refine it to
+"ideality" and get the better of it. The fully-furnished self of
+intelligent consciousness is a conscious subject, which is consistent in
+itself according to an order and behaviour which follows from its
+individual position and its connexion with the external world, which is no
+less a world of law. But when it is engrossed with a single phase of
+feeling, it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due
+subordination in the individual system of the world which a conscious
+subject is. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between
+the totality systematised in its consciousness, and the single phase or
+fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. This is
+Insanity or mental Derangement.
+
+In considering insanity we must, as in other cases, anticipate the
+full-grown and intelligent conscious subject, which is at the same time
+the _natural_ self of _self-feeling_. In such a phase the self can be
+liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a
+particularity which, instead of being "idealised" in the former, remains
+as a fixed element in self-feeling. Mind as such is free, and therefore
+not susceptible of this malady. But in older metaphysics mind was treated
+as a soul, as a thing; and it is only as a thing, i.e. as something
+natural and existent, that it is liable to insanity--the settled fixture of
+some finite element in it. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease, i.e.
+a disease of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start
+from one more than other, and so also may the cure.
+
+The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present
+consciousness of the ordered whole of his individual world, into the
+system of which he subsumes each special content of sensation, idea,
+desire, inclination, &c., as it arises, so as to insert them in their
+proper place. He is the _dominant genius_ over these particularities.
+Between this and insanity the difference is like that between waking and
+dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits,
+and so makes part of the actual self-feeling. Error and that sort of thing
+is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective
+interconnexion of things. In the concrete, however, it is often difficult
+to say where it begins to become derangement. A violent, but groundless
+and senseless outburst of hatred, &c., may, in contrast to a presupposed
+higher self-possession and stability of character, make its victim seem to
+be beside himself with frenzy. But the main point in derangement is the
+contradiction which a feeling with a fixed corporeal embodiment sets up
+against the whole mass of adjustments forming the concrete consciousness.
+The mind which is in a condition of mere _being_, and where such being is
+not rendered fluid in its consciousness, is diseased. The contents which
+are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking
+affections of the heart, such as vanity, pride, and the rest of the
+passions--fancies and hopes--merely personal love and hatred. When the
+influence of self-possession and of general principles, moral and
+theoretical, is relaxed, and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock
+and key, the earthly elements are set free--that evil which is always
+latent in the heart, because the heart as immediate is natural and
+selfish. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper hand in
+insanity, but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more
+intelligent part, which is there also. Hence this state is mental
+derangement and distress. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in
+view the truth that insanity is not an abstract _loss_ of reason (neither
+in the point of intelligence nor of will and its responsibility), but only
+derangement, only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason;--just as
+physical disease is not an abstract, i.e. mere and total, loss of health
+(if it were that, it would be death), but a contradiction in it. This
+humane treatment, no less benevolent than reasonable (the services of
+Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgment), presupposes the
+patient's rationality, and in that assumption has the sound basis for
+dealing with him on this side--just as in the case of bodily disease the
+physician bases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains
+health.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) Habit(125).
+
+
+§ 409. Self-feeling, immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple
+sensations, and also desires, instincts, passions, and their
+gratification), is undistinguished from them. But in the self there is
+latent a simple self-relation of ideality, a nominal universality (which
+is the truth of these details): and as so universal, the self is to be
+stamped upon, and made appear in, this life of feeling, yet so as to
+distinguish itself from the particular details, and be a realised
+universality. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of
+the specific feelings and desires; what they specifically contain is as
+yet left out of account. And so too the particularity is, as now regarded,
+equally formal; it counts only as the _particular being_ or immediacy of
+the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realisation.
+This particular being of the soul is the factor of its corporeity; here we
+have it breaking with this corporeity, distinguishing it from
+itself,--itself a _simple_ being,--and becoming the "ideal," subjective
+substantiality of it,--just as in its latent notion (§ 359) it was the
+substance, and the mere substance, of it.
+
+But this abstract realisation of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not
+yet the self--not the existence of the universal which is for the
+universal. It is the corporeity reduced to its mere _ideality_; and so far
+only does corporeity belong to the soul as such. That is to say, as space
+and time--the abstract one-outside-another, as, in short, empty space and
+empty time--are only subjective form--pure act of intuition; so that pure
+being (which through the supersession in it of the particularity of the
+corporeity, or of the immediate corporeity as such has realised itself) is
+mere intuition and no more, lacking consciousness, but the basis of
+consciousness. And consciousness it becomes, when the corporeity, of which
+it is the subjective substance, and which still continues to exist, and
+that as a barrier for it, has been absorbed by it, and it has been
+invested with the character of self-centred subject.
+
+§ 410. The soul's making itself an abstract universal being, and reducing
+the particulars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of
+its being is Habit. In this manner the soul has the contents in
+possession, and contains them in such manner that in these features it is
+not as sentient, nor does it stand in relationship with them as
+distinguishing itself from them, nor is absorbed in them, but has them and
+moves in them, without feeling or consciousness of the fact. The soul is
+freed from them, so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them:
+and whilst existing in these forms as its possession, it is at the same
+time open to be otherwise occupied and engaged--say with feeling and with
+mental consciousness in general.
+
+This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of
+feeling into the being of the soul appears as a _repetition_ of them, and
+the generation of habit as _practice_. For, this being of the soul, if in
+respect of the natural particular phase it be called an abstract
+universality to which the former is transmuted, is a reflexive
+universality (§ 175); i.e. the one and the same, that recurs in a series
+of units of sensation, is reduced to unity, and this abstract unity
+expressly stated.
+
+Habit, like memory, is a difficult point in mental organisation: habit is
+the mechanism of self-feeling, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence.
+The natural qualities and alterations of age, sleep and waking, are
+"immediately" natural: habit, on the contrary, is the mode of feeling (as
+well as intelligence, will, &c., so far as they belong to self-feeling)
+made into a natural and mechanical existence. Habit is rightly called a
+second nature; nature, because it is an immediate being of the soul; a
+second nature, because it is an immediacy created by the soul, impressing
+and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as
+such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken
+corporeal form (§ 401).
+
+In habit the human being's mode of existence is "natural," and for that
+reason not free; but still free, so far as the merely natural phase of
+feeling is by habit reduced to a mere being of _his_, and he is no longer
+involuntarily attracted or repelled by it, and so no longer interested,
+occupied, or dependent in regard to it. The want of freedom in habit is
+partly merely formal, as habit merely attaches to the being of the soul;
+partly only relative, so far as it strictly speaking arises only in the
+case of bad habits, or so far as a habit is opposed by another purpose:
+whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of liberty. The
+main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from the
+feelings, even in being affected by them. The different forms of this may
+be described as follows: ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) The _immediate_ feeling is negated and
+treated as indifferent. One who gets inured against external sensations
+(frost, heat, weariness of the limbs, &c., sweet tastes, &c.), and who
+hardens the heart against misfortune, acquires a strength which consists
+in this, that although the frost, &c.--or the misfortune--is felt, the
+affection is deposed to a mere externality and immediacy; the universal
+psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it, and the
+self-feeling as such, consciousness, reflection, and any other purposes
+and activity, are no longer bothered with it. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) There is indifference
+towards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the _habit_ of
+their satisfaction deadened. This is the rational liberation from them;
+whereas monastic renunciation and forcible interference do not free from
+them, nor are they in conception rational. Of course in all this it is
+assumed that the impulses are kept as the finite modes they naturally are,
+and that they, like their satisfaction, are subordinated as partial
+factors to the reasonable will. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) In habit regarded as _aptitude_, or
+skill, not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept intact _per
+se_, but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim, to be made a power in
+the bodily part, which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it.
+Conceived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed
+upon it, the body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier.
+Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple
+self-concentration, and its earlier naturalness and immediacy; it has lost
+its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature, and as
+external has first to be reduced to that position. Specific feelings can
+only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (§ 401); and the
+immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific aim
+(a particular aspect of its differentiated structure, a particular organ
+of its organic system). To mould such an aim in the organic body is to
+bring out and express the "ideality" which is implicit in matter always,
+and especially so in the specific bodily part, and thus to enable the
+soul, under its volitional and conceptual characters, to exist as
+substance in its corporeity. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity
+rendered completely pervious, made into an instrument, so that when the
+conception (e.g. a series of musical notes) is in me, then without
+resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance.
+
+The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. The
+most external of them, i.e. the spatial direction of an individual, viz.
+his upright posture, has been by will made a habit--a position taken
+without adjustment and without consciousness--which continues to be an
+affair of his persistent will; for the man stands only because and in so
+far as he wills to stand, and only so long as he wills it without
+consciousness. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which, without
+an express adjustment, combines in a single act the several modifications
+of sensation, consciousness, intuition, intelligence, &c., which make it
+up. Thinking, too, however free and active in its own pure element it
+becomes, no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form
+of immediacy), by which it is the property of my single self where I can
+freely and in all directions range. It is through this habit that I come
+to realise my _existence_ as a thinking being. Even here, in this
+spontaneity of self-centred thought, there is a partnership of soul and
+body (hence, want of habit and too-long-continued thinking cause
+headache); habit diminishes this feeling, by making the natural function
+an immediacy of the soul. Habit on an ampler scale, and carried out in the
+strictly intellectual range, is recollection and memory, whereof we shall
+speak later.
+
+Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless, casual and
+particular. And it is true that the form of habit, like any other, is open
+to anything we chance to put into it; and it is habit of living which
+brings on death, or, if quite abstract, is death itself: and yet habit is
+indispensable for the _existence_ of all intellectual life in the
+individual, enabling the subject to be a concrete immediacy, an "ideality"
+of soul--enabling the matter of consciousness, religious, moral, &c., to be
+his as _this_ self, _this_ soul, and no other, and be neither a mere
+latent possibility, nor a transient emotion or idea, nor an abstract
+inwardness, cut off from action and reality, but part and parcel of his
+being. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind, habit is usually
+passed over--either as something contemptible--or rather for the further
+reason that it is one of the most difficult questions of psychology.
+
+
+
+(c) The Actual Soul.(126)
+
+
+§ 411. The Soul, when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly
+its own, finds itself there a _single_ subject; and the corporeity is an
+externality which stands as a predicate, in being related to which, it is
+related to itself. This externality, in other words, represents not
+itself, but the soul, of which it is the _sign_. In this identity of
+interior and exterior, the latter subject to the former, the soul is
+_actual_: in its corporeity it has its free shape, in which it _feels
+itself_ and makes _itself felt_, and which as the Soul's work of art has
+_human_ pathognomic and physiognomic expression.
+
+Under the head of human expression are included, e.g., the upright figure
+in general, and the formation of the limbs, especially the hand, as the
+absolute instrument, of the mouth--laughter, weeping, &c., and the note of
+mentality diffused over the whole, which at once announces the body at the
+externality of a higher nature. This note is so slight, indefinite, and
+inexpressible a modification, because the figure in its externality is
+something immediate and natural, and can therefore only be an indefinite
+and quite imperfect sign for the mind, unable to represent it in its
+actual universality. Seen from the animal world, the human figure is the
+supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. But for the mind it is
+only its first appearance, while language is its perfect expression. And
+the human figure, though its proximate phase of existence, is at the same
+time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent to
+it. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to
+the rank of sciences, was therefore one of the vainest fancies, still
+vainer than a _signatura rerum_, which supposed the shape of a plant to
+afford indication of its medicinal virtue.
+
+§ 412. Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter; for
+the soul, in its concentrated self, cuts itself off from its immediate
+being, placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of
+offering resistance to its moulding influence. The soul, thus setting in
+opposition its being to its (conscious) self, absorbing it, and making it
+its own, has lost the meaning of mere soul, or the "immediacy" of mind.
+The actual soul with its sensation and its concrete self-feeling turned
+into habit, has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of its qualities; in
+this externality it has recollected and inwardised itself, and is infinite
+self-relation. This free universality thus made explicit shows the soul
+awaking to the higher stage of the ego, or abstract universality in so far
+as it is _for_ the abstract universality. In this way it gains the
+position of thinker and subject--specially a subject of the judgment in
+which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural
+features as an object, a world external to it,--but with such respect to
+that object that in it it is immediately reflected into itself. Thus soul
+rises to become _Consciousness_.
+
+
+
+
+Sub-Section B. Phenomenology Of Mind. Consciousness.
+
+
+§ 413. Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of
+mind: the grade of mind as _appearance_. _Ego_ is infinite self-relation
+of mind, but as subjective or as self-certainty. The immediate identity of
+the natural soul has been raised to this pure "ideal" self-identity; and
+what the former _contained_ is for this self-subsistent reflection set
+forth as an _object_. The pure abstract freedom of mind lets go from it
+its specific qualities,--the soul's natural life--to an equal freedom as an
+independent _object_. It is of this latter, as external to it, that the
+_ego_ is in the first instance aware (conscious), and as such it is
+Consciousness. Ego, as this absolute negativity, is implicitly the
+identity in the otherness: the _ego_ is itself that other and stretches
+over the object (as if that object were implicitly cancelled)--it is one
+side of the relationship and the whole relationship--the light, which
+manifests itself and something else too.
+
+§ 414. The self-identity of the mind, thus first made explicit as the Ego,
+is only its abstract formal identity. As _soul_ it was under the phase of
+_substantial_ universality; now, as subjective reflection in itself, it is
+referred to this substantiality as to its negative, something dark and
+beyond it. Hence consciousness, like reciprocal dependence in general, is
+the contradiction between the independence of the two sides and their
+identity in which they are merged into one. The mind as ego is _essence_;
+but since reality, in the sphere of essence, is represented as in
+immediate being and at the same time as "ideal," it is as consciousness
+only the _appearance_ (phenomenon) of mind.
+
+§ 415. As the ego is by itself only a formal identity, the dialectical
+movement of its intelligible unity, i.e. the successive steps in further
+specification of consciousness, does not to it seem to be its own
+activity, but is implicit, and to the ego it seems an alteration of the
+object. Consciousness consequently appears differently modified according
+to the difference of the given object; and the gradual specification of
+consciousness appears as a variation in the characteristics of its
+objects. Ego, the subject of consciousness, is thinking: the logical
+process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and
+object, their absolute interdependence, what makes the object the
+subject's own.
+
+The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed
+the mind as consciousness, and as containing the propositions only of a
+_phenomenology_ (not of a _philosophy_) of mind. The Ego Kant regards as
+reference to something away and beyond (which in its abstract description
+is termed the thing-at-itself); and it is only from this finite point of
+view that he treats both intellect and will. Though in the notion of a
+power of _reflective_ judgment he touches upon the _Idea_ of mind--a
+subject-objectivity, an _intuitive intellect_, &c., and even the Idea of
+Nature, still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance, i.e. to a
+subjective maxim (§ 58). Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly
+appreciated Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under
+the name of "faculty of ideation"). Fichte kept to the same point of view:
+his non-ego is only something set over against the ego, only defined as in
+_consciousness_: it is made no more than an infinite "shock," i.e. a
+thing-in-itself. Both systems therefore have clearly not reached the
+intelligible unity or the mind as it actually and essentially is, but only
+as it is in reference to something else.
+
+As against Spinozism, again, it is to be noted that the mind in the
+judgment by which it "constitutes" itself an ego (a free subject
+contrasted with its qualitative affection) has emerged from substance, and
+that the philosophy, which gives this judgment as the absolute
+characteristic of mind, has emerged from Spinozism.
+
+§ 416. The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with
+its essence, to raise its _self-certainty to truth_. The _existence_ of
+mind in the stage of consciousness is finite, because it is merely a
+nominal self-relation, or mere certainty. The object is only abstractly
+characterised as _its_; in other words, in the object it is only as an
+abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself: hence its existence
+there has still a content, which is not as its own.
+
+§ 417. The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in
+number: first (_a_) consciousness in general, with an object set against
+it; (_b_) self-consciousness, for which _ego_ is the object; (_c_) unity
+of consciousness and self-consciousness, where the mind sees itself
+embodied in the object and sees itself as implicitly and explicitly
+determinate, as Reason, the _notion_ of mind.
+
+
+
+(a) Consciousness Proper(127).
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) Sensuous consciousness.
+
+
+§ 418. Consciousness is, first, _immediate_ consciousness, and its
+reference to the object accordingly the simple and underived certainty of
+it. The object similarly, being immediate, an existent, reflected in
+itself, is further characterised as immediately singular. This is
+sense-consciousness.
+
+Consciousness--as a case of correlation--comprises only the categories
+belonging to the abstract ego or formal thinking; and these it treats as
+features of the object (§ 415). Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of
+the object as an existent, a something, an existing thing, a singular, and
+so on. It appears as wealthiest in matter, but as poorest in thought. That
+wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the _material_ of
+consciousness (§ 414), the substantial and qualitative, what the soul in
+its anthropological sphere is and finds _in itself_. This material the ego
+(the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itself, and puts it
+first under the category of being. Spatial and temporal Singularness,
+_here_ and _now_ (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (W.
+II. p. 73), I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly
+belongs to _intuition_. At present the object is at first to be viewed
+only in its correlation to _consciousness_, i.e. a something _external_ to
+it, and not yet as external on its own part, or as being beside and out of
+itself.
+
+§ 419. The _sensible_ as somewhat becomes an _other_: the reflection in
+itself of this _somewhat_, the _thing_, has _many_ properties; and as a
+single (thing) in its immediacy has several _predicates_. The muchness of
+the sense-singular thus becomes a breadth--a variety of relations,
+reflectional attributes, and universalities. These are logical terms
+introduced by the thinking principle, i.e. in this case by the Ego, to
+describe the sensible. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all this
+characterisation a change in the object; and self-consciousness, so
+construing the object, is sense-perception.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) Sense-perception(128).
+
+
+§ 420. Consciousness, having passed beyond the sensibility, wants to take
+the object in its truth, not as merely immediate, but as mediated,
+reflected in itself, and universal. Such an object is a combination of
+sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines
+concrete relations and connexions. Hence the identity of consciousness
+with the object passes from the abstract identity of "I am sure" to the
+definite identity of "I know, and am aware."
+
+The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind
+is perception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary
+consciousness, and more or less by the sciences. The sensuous certitudes
+of single apperceptions or observations form the starting-point: these are
+supposed to be elevated to truth, by being regarded in their bearings,
+reflected upon, and on the lines of definite categories turned at the same
+time into something necessary and universal, viz. _experiences_.
+
+§ 421. This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture--the
+individual remains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal, to
+which however it is related. It is therefore a tissue of
+contradictions--between the single things of sense apperception, which form
+the alleged ground of general experience, and the universality which has a
+higher claim to be the essence and ground--between the individuality of a
+thing which, taken in its concrete content, constitutes its independence
+and the various properties which, free from this negative link and from
+one another, are independent universal _matters_ (§ 123). This
+contradiction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical
+spheres turns out most concrete, when the somewhat is defined as _object_
+(§ 194 seqq.).
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) The Intellect(129).
+
+
+§ 422. The proximate _truth_ of perception is that it is the object which
+is an _appearance_, and that the object's reflection in self is on the
+contrary a self-subsistent inward and universal. The consciousness of such
+an object is _intellect_. This inward, as we called it, of the thing is on
+one hand the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible, and, in that
+manner, an abstract identity: on the other hand, however, it also for that
+reason contains the multiplicity, but as an interior "simple" difference,
+which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. This
+simple difference is the realm of _the laws_ of the phenomena--a copy of
+the phenomenon, but brought to rest and universality.
+
+§ 423. The law, at first stating the mutual dependence of universal,
+permanent terms, has, in so far as its distinction is the inward one, its
+necessity on its own part; the one of the terms, as not externally
+different from the other, lies immediately in the other. But in this
+manner the interior distinction is, what it is in truth, the distinction
+on its own part, or the distinction which is none. With this new
+form-characteristic, on the whole, consciousness _implicitly_ vanishes:
+for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject
+and object. The ego in its judgment has an object which is not distinct
+from it,--it has itself. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness.
+
+
+
+(b) Self-consciousness(130).
+
+
+§ 424. _Self-consciousness_ is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a
+consequence of the former, all consciousness of an other object being as a
+matter of fact also self-consciousness. The object is my idea: I am aware
+of the object as mine; and thus in it I am aware of me. The formula of
+self-consciousness is I = I:--abstract freedom, pure "ideality." In so far
+it lacks "reality": for as it is its own object, there is strictly
+speaking no object, because there is no distinction between it and the
+object.
+
+§ 425. Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness,
+and for that reason it is burdened with an external object, or, nominally,
+with the negation of it. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage,
+consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and
+as consciousness. But the latter aspect and the negation in general is in
+I = I potentially suppressed; and hence as this certitude of self against
+the object it is the _impulse_ to realise its implicit nature, by giving
+its abstract self-awareness content and objectivity, and in the other
+direction to free itself from its sensuousness, to set aside the given
+objectivity and identify it with itself. The two processes are one and the
+same, the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(131).
+
+
+§ 426. Self-consciousness, in its immediacy, is a singular, and a desire
+(appetite),--the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet
+be objective,--or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external
+object and should be subjective. The certitude of one's self, which issues
+from the suppression of mere consciousness, pronounces the _object_ null:
+and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies
+the abstract ideality of such self-consciousness as null.
+
+§ 427. Self-consciousness, therefore, knows itself implicit in the object,
+which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. In the negation of
+the two one-sided moments by the ego's own activity, this identity comes
+to be _for_ the ego. To this activity the object, which implicitly and for
+self-consciousness is self-less, can make no resistance: the dialectic,
+implicit in it, towards self-suppression exists in this case as that
+activity of the ego. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective,
+the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness and becomes objective
+to itself.
+
+§ 428. The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with
+itself, its satisfaction realised, and itself made actual. On the external
+side it continues, in this return upon itself, primarily describable as an
+individual, and maintains itself as such; because its bearing upon the
+self-less object is purely negative, the latter, therefore, being merely
+consumed. Thus appetite in its satisfaction is always destructive, and in
+its content selfish: and as the satisfaction has only happened in the
+individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the
+very act of satisfaction.
+
+§ 429. But on the inner side, or implicitly, the sense of self which the
+ego gets in the satisfaction does not remain in abstract
+self-concentration or in mere individuality; on the contrary,--as negation
+of _immediacy_ and individuality the result involves a character of
+universality and of the identity of self-consciousness with its object.
+The judgment or diremption of this self-consciousness is the consciousness
+of a "_free_" object, in which ego is aware of itself as an ego, which
+however is _also_ still outside it.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) Self-consciousness Recognitive(132).
+
+
+§ 430. Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness, at
+first immediately as one of two things for another. In that other as ego I
+behold myself, and yet also an immediately existing object, another ego
+absolutely independent of me and opposed to me. (The suppression of the
+singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression,
+and it merely led to the characterisation of it as _particular_.) This
+contradiction gives either self-consciousness the impulse to _show_ itself
+as a free self, and to exist as such for the other:--the process of
+_recognition_.
+
+§ 431. The process is a battle. I cannot be aware of me as myself in
+another individual, so long as I see in that other an other and an
+immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of
+this immediacy of his. But in like measure _I_ cannot be recognised as
+immediate, except so far as I overcome the mere immediacy on my own part,
+and thus give existence to my freedom. But this immediacy is at the same
+time the corporeity of self-consciousness, in which as in its sign and
+tool the latter has its own _sense of self_, and its being _for others_,
+and the means for entering into relation with them.
+
+§ 432. The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either
+self-consciousness imperils the other's like, and incurs a like peril for
+its own--but only peril, for either is no less bent on maintaining his
+life, as the existence of his freedom. Thus the death of one, though by
+the abstract, therefore rude, negation of immediacy, it, from one point of
+view, solves the contradiction, is yet, from the essential point of view
+(i.e. the outward and visible recognition), a new contradiction (for that
+recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater
+than the other.
+
+§ 433. But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution, the
+fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality.
+While the one combatant prefers life, retains his single
+self-consciousness, but surrenders his claim for recognition, the other
+holds fast to his self-assertion and is recognised by the former as his
+superior. Thus arises the status of _master and slave_.
+
+In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master, we see,
+on their phenomenal side, the emergence of man's social life and the
+commencement of political union. _Force_, which is the basis of this
+phenomenon, is not on that account a basis of right, but only the
+necessary and legitimate factor in the passage from the state of
+self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation into the state
+of universal self-consciousness. Force, then, is the external or
+phenomenal commencement of states, not their underlying and essential
+principle.
+
+§ 434. This status, in the first place, implies _common_ wants and common
+concern for their satisfaction,--for the means of mastery, the slave, must
+likewise be kept in life. In place of the rude destruction of the
+immediate object there ensues acquisition, preservation, and formation of
+it, as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and
+non-independence are welded together. The form of universality thus
+arising in satisfying the want, creates a _permanent_ means and a
+provision which takes care for and secures the future.
+
+§ 435. But secondly, when we look to the distinction of the two, the
+master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his
+_single_ self-hood, and that by the suppression of immediate self-hood, a
+suppression, however, which falls on another. This other, the slave,
+however, in the service of the master, works off his individualist
+self-will, overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite, and in this
+divestment of self and in "the fear of his lord" makes "the beginning of
+wisdom"--the passage to universal self-consciousness.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) Universal Self-consciousness.
+
+
+§ 436. Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self
+in an other self: each self as a free individuality has his own "absolute"
+independence, yet in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite
+without distinguishing itself from that other. Each is thus universal
+self-conscious and objective; each has "real" universality in the shape of
+reciprocity, so far as each knows itself recognised in the other freeman,
+and is aware of this in so far as it recognises the other and knows him to
+be free.
+
+This universal re-appearance of self-consciousness--the notion which is
+aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself
+and for that reason universal--is the form of consciousness which lies at
+the root of all true mental or spiritual life--in family, fatherland,
+state, and of all virtues, love, friendship, valour, honour, fame. But
+this appearance of the underlying essence may be severed from that
+essential, and be maintained apart in worthless honour, idle fame, &c.
+
+§ 437. This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the
+first instance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other.
+But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague
+diversity--or rather it is a difference which is none. Hence its truth is
+the fully and really existent universality and objectivity of
+self-consciousness,--which is _Reason_.
+
+Reason, as the _Idea_ (§ 213) as it here appears, is to be taken as
+meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies
+has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated
+notion or consciousness, and the object subsisting external and opposed to
+it.
+
+
+
+(c) Reason(133).
+
+
+§ 438. The essential and actual truth which reason is, lies in the simple
+identity of the subjectivity of the notion, with its objectivity and
+universality. The universality of reason, therefore, whilst it signifies
+that the object, which was only given in consciousness _quâ_
+consciousness, is now itself universal, permeating and encompassing the
+ego, also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form which overlaps the
+object, and encompasses it without it.
+
+§ 439. Self-consciousness, thus certified that its determinations are no
+less objective, or determinations of the very being of things, than they
+are its own thoughts, is Reason, which as such an identity is not only the
+absolute _substance_, but the _truth_ that knows it. For truth here has,
+as its peculiar mode and immanent form, the self-centred pure notion, ego,
+the certitude of self as infinite universality. Truth, aware of what it
+is, is mind (spirit).
+
+
+
+
+Sub-Section C. Psychology. Mind(134).
+
+
+§ 440. Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness,--the
+former a simple immediate totality, the latter now an infinite form which
+is not, like consciousness, restricted by that content, and does not stand
+in mere correlation to it as to its object, but is an awareness of this
+substantial totality, neither subjective nor objective. Mind, therefore,
+starts only from its own being and is in correlation only with its own
+features.
+
+Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental
+activity _quâ_ mental--mental vision, ideation, remembering, &c., desires,
+&c.--apart both from the content, which on the phenomenal side is found in
+empirical ideation, in thinking also and in desire and will, and from the
+two forms in which these modes exist, viz. in the soul as a physical mode,
+and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that
+consciousness. This, however, is not an arbitrary abstraction by the
+psychologist. Mind is just this elevation above nature and physical modes,
+and above the complication with an external object--in one word, above the
+material, as its concept has just shown. All it has now to do is to
+realise this notion of its freedom, and get rid of the _form_ of immediacy
+with which it once more begins. The content which is elevated to
+intuitions is _its_ sensations: it is _its_ intuitions also which are
+transmuted into representations, and its representations which are
+transmuted again into thoughts, &c.
+
+§ 441. The soul is finite, so far as its features are immediate or
+con-natural. Consciousness is finite, in so far as it has an object. Mind
+is finite, in so far as, though it no longer has an object, it has a mode
+in its knowledge; i.e., it is finite by means of its immediacy, or, what
+is the same thing, by being subjective or only a notion. And it is a
+matter of no consequence, which is defined as its notion, and which as the
+reality of that notion. Say that its notion is the utterly infinite
+objective reason, then its reality is knowledge or _intelligence_: say
+that knowledge is its notion, then its reality is that reason, and the
+realisation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. Hence the
+finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge
+to get hold of the full reality of its reason, or, equally, in the
+(temporary) failure of reason to attain full manifestation in knowledge.
+Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is "absolute"
+freedom; so far, that is, as presupposing itself for its knowledge to work
+upon, it thereby reduces itself to finitude, and appears as everlasting
+movement of superseding this immediacy, of comprehending itself, and being
+a rational knowledge.
+
+§ 442. The progress of mind is _development_, in so far as its existent
+phase, viz. knowledge, involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that
+utter and complete autonomy which is rationality; in which case the action
+of translating this purpose into reality is strictly only a nominal
+passage over into manifestation, and is even there a return into itself.
+So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of
+_mere_ knowledge is only abstract or formal, the goal of mind is to give
+it objective fulfilment, and thus at the same time produce its freedom.
+
+The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a
+certain _anthropological_ character), where faculties and forces are
+regarded as successively emerging and presenting themselves in external
+existence--a series of steps, on the ascertainment on which there was for a
+long time great stress laid (by the system of Condillac), as if a
+conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the origin of these faculties
+and _explain_ them. In Condillac's method there is an unmistakable
+intention to show how the _several_ modes of mental activity could be made
+intelligible without losing sight of mental unity, and to exhibit their
+necessary interconnexion. But the categories employed in doing so are of a
+wretched sort. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and
+with justice) as the _prius_ or the initial basis, but that the later
+phases that follow this starting-point present themselves as emerging in a
+solely _affirmative_ manner, and the negative aspect of mental activity,
+by which this material is transmuted into mind and destroyed _as_ a
+sensible, is misconceived and overlooked. As the theory of Condillac
+states it, the sensible is not merely the empirical first, but is left as
+if it were the true and essential foundation.
+
+Similarly, if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations,
+forces, perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some
+other interest of head or heart, there is no indication of the true final
+aim of the whole business. That can only be the intelligible unity of
+mind, and its activity can only have itself as aim; i.e. its aim can only
+be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity, to reach and get
+hold of itself, and to liberate itself to itself. In this way the
+so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated
+as steps of this liberation. And this is the only _rational_ mode of
+studying the mind and its various activities.
+
+§ 443. As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it,
+viz. the natural soul (§ 413), so mind has or rather makes consciousness
+its object: i.e. whereas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the
+ego with its other (§ 415), the mind realises that identity as the
+concrete unity which it and it only knows. Its productions are governed by
+the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially
+existent, and are the mind's own, in freedom. Thus, if we consider the
+initial aspect of mind, that aspect is twofold--as _being_ and as _its
+own_: by the one, the mind finds in itself something which _is_, by the
+other it affirms it to be only _its own_. The way of mind is therefore
+
+(_a_) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate
+affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from
+its pre-supposedness and therefore from its abstractness, and make the
+affection subjective. When the affection has been rendered its own, and
+the knowledge consequently characterised as free intelligence, i.e. as
+having its full and free characterisation in itself, it is
+
+(_b_) Will: _practical_ mind, which in the first place is likewise
+formal--i.e. its content is at first _only_ its own, and is immediately
+willed; and it proceeds next to liberate its volition from its
+subjectivity, which is the one-sided form of its contents, so that it
+
+(_c_) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects
+of one-sidedness.
+
+§ 444. The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the
+general range of Mind Subjective. They are not to be distinguished as
+active and passive. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely
+nominal productivity. Inwards, the theoretical mind produces only its
+"ideal" world, and gains abstract autonomy within; while the practical,
+while it has to do with autonomous products, with a material which is its
+own, has a material which is only nominally such, and therefore a
+restricted content, for which it gains the form of universality. Outwards,
+the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness, is thus
+also a reality,--a reality at once anthropological and conformable to
+consciousness) has for its products, in the theoretical range, the _word_,
+and in the practical (not yet deed and action, but) _enjoyment_.
+
+Psychology, like logic, is one of those sciences which in modern times
+have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the
+deeper conception of reason. It is still extremely ill off. The turn which
+the Kantian philosophy has taken has given it greater importance: it has,
+and that in its empirical condition, been claimed as the basis of
+metaphysics, which is to consist of nothing but the empirical apprehension
+and the analysis of the facts of human consciousness, merely as facts,
+just as they are given. This position of psychology, mixing it up with
+forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthropology, has
+led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the further
+effect that, both for the mind as such, and for metaphysics and philosophy
+generally, all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of
+essential and actual reality, to get at the notion and the truth.
+
+
+
+(a) Theoretical mind.
+
+
+§ 445. Intelligence(135) _finds_ itself determined: this is its apparent
+aspect from which in its immediacy it starts. But as knowledge,
+intelligence consists in treating what is found as its own. Its activity
+has to do with the empty form--the pretence of _finding_ reason: and its
+aim is to realise its concept or to be reason actual, along with which the
+content is realised as rational. This activity is _cognition_. The nominal
+knowledge, which is only certitude, elevates itself, as reason is
+concrete, to definite and conceptual knowledge. The course of this
+elevation is itself rational, and consists in a necessary passage
+(governed by the concept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a
+so-called faculty of mind) into another. The refutation which such
+cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is _found_, starts from
+the certitude or the faith of intelligence in its capability of rational
+knowledge, and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason,
+which it and the content virtually is.
+
+The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to
+mean that each has a fixed and separate existence of its own, as if
+volition could be without intelligence, or the activity of intelligence
+could be without will. The possibility of a culture of the intellect which
+leaves the heart untouched, as it is said, and of the heart without the
+intellect--of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect, and heartless
+intellects--only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences
+occur. But it is not philosophy which should take such untruths of
+existence and of mere imagining for truth--take the worthless for the
+essential nature. A host of other phrases used of intelligence, e.g. that
+it receives and accepts impressions from outside, that ideas arise through
+the causal operations of external things upon it, &c., belong to a point
+of view utterly alien to the mental level or to the position of
+philosophic study.
+
+A favourite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul,
+intelligence, or mind. Faculty, like power or force, is the fixed quality
+of any object of thought, conceived as reflected into self. Force (§ 136)
+is no doubt the infinity of form--of the inward and the outward: but its
+essential finitude involves the indifference of content to form (ib.
+note). In this lies the want of organic unity which by this reflectional
+form, treating mind as a "lot" of forces, is brought into mind, as it is
+by the same method brought into nature. Any aspect which can be
+distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity,
+and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. It makes
+absolutely no difference if we substitute the expression "activities" for
+powers and faculties. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the
+mind a mere aggregate, and treat their essential correlation as an
+external incident.
+
+The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called _cognition_
+(knowledge). Yet this does not mean intelligence _inter alia_
+knows,--besides which it also intuites, conceives, remembers, imagines, &c.
+To take up such a position is in the first instance part and parcel of
+that isolating of mental activity just censured; but it is also in
+addition connected with the great question of modern times, as to whether
+true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible,--which, if answered
+in the negative, must lead to abandoning the effort. The numerous aspects
+and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the
+bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the
+attitude of understanding in the question, the more diffuse it makes a
+simple object. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is
+what confronts the quite general assumption taken up by the question, viz.
+the assumption that the possibility of true knowledge in general is in
+dispute, and the assumption that it is possible for us at our will either
+to prosecute or to abandon cognition. The concept or possibility of
+cognition has come out as intelligence itself, as the certitude of reason:
+the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. It
+follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligence and yet at
+the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. But
+cognition is genuine, just so far as it realises itself, or makes the
+concept its own. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly
+where cognition has it. The stages of its realising activity are
+intuition, conception, memory, &c.: these activities have no other
+immanent meaning: their aim is solely the concept of cognition (§ 445
+note). If they are isolated, however, then an impression is implied that
+they are useful for something else than cognition, or that they severally
+procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own; and that leads to a
+glorification of the delights of intuition, remembrance, imagination. It
+is true that even as isolated (i.e. as non-intelligent), intuition,
+imagination, &c. can afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature
+succeeds in doing by its fundamental quality--its
+out-of-selfness,--exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason
+external to each other,--that the intelligence can do by voluntary act, but
+the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only natural
+and untrained. But the _true satisfaction_, it is admitted, is only
+afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind, by rational
+conception, by products of imagination which are permeated by reason and
+exhibit ideas--in a word, by _cognitive_ intuition, cognitive conception,
+&c. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this, that intuition,
+conception, &c. are not isolated, and exist only as "moments" in the
+totality of cognition itself.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(136).
+
+
+§ 446. The mind which as soul is physically conditioned,--which as
+consciousness stands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward
+object,--but which as intelligence _finds itself_ so characterised--is (1)
+an inarticulate embryonic life, in which it is to itself as it were
+palpable and has the whole _material_ of its knowledge. In consequence of
+the immediacy in which it is thus originally, it is in this stage only as
+an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. It thus appears as mind
+in the guise of _feeling_.
+
+If feeling formerly turned up (§ 399) as a mode of the _soul's_ existence,
+the finding of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be
+conceived as a congenital or corporeal condition; whereas at present it is
+only to be taken abstractly in the general sense of immediacy.
+
+§ 447. The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of
+some "affection," this mode is simple. Hence feeling, even should its
+import be most sterling and true, has the form of casual
+particularity,--not to mention that its import may also be the most scanty
+and most untrue.
+
+It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of
+its ideas, but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the
+opposite of that which it has here. In contrast with the simplicity of
+feeling it is usual rather to assume that the primary mental phase is
+judgment generally, or the distinction of consciousness into subject and
+object; and the special quality of sensation is derived from an
+independent _object_, external or internal. With us, in the truth of mind,
+the mere consciousness point of view, as opposed to true mental
+"idealism," is swallowed up, and the matter of feeling has rather been
+supposed already as _immanent_ in the mind.--It is commonly taken for
+granted that as regards content there is more in feeling than in thought:
+this being specially affirmed of moral and religious feelings. Now the
+material, which the mind as it feels is to itself, is _here_ the result
+and the mature result of a fully organised reason: hence under the head of
+feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content
+whatever. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the
+mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have--one in which it is not
+found as a free and infinitely universal principle, but rather as
+subjective and private, in content and value entirely contingent. Trained
+and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired
+the consciousness of the true differences of things, of their essential
+relationships and real characters; and it is with such a mind that this
+rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. Feeling
+is the immediate, as it were the closest, contact in which the thinking
+subject can stand to a given content. Against that content the subject
+re-acts first of all with its particular self-feeling, which though it
+_may_ be of more sterling value and of wider range than a onesided
+intellectual standpoint, may just as likely be narrow and poor; and in any
+case is the form of the particular and subjective. If a man on any topic
+appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing, or at least to
+reasons--to the generalities of common sense--but to his feeling, the only
+thing to do is to let him alone, because by his behaviour he refuses to
+have any lot or part in common rationality, and shuts himself up in his
+own isolated subjectivity--his private and particular self.
+
+§ 448. (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements, we have
+the one factor in _Attention_--the abstract _identical_ direction of mind
+(in feeling, as also in all other more advanced developments of it)--an
+active self-collection--the factor of fixing it as our own, but with an as
+yet only nominal autonomy of intelligence. Apart from such attention there
+is nothing for the mind. The other factor is to invest the special quality
+of feeling, as contrasted with this inwardness of mind, with the character
+of something existent, but as a _negative_ or as the abstract otherness of
+itself. Intelligence thus defines the content of sensation as something
+that is out of itself, projects it into time and space, which are the
+forms in which it is intuitive. To the view of consciousness the material
+is only an object of consciousness, a relative other: from mind it
+receives the rational characteristic of being _its very other_ (§§ 147,
+254).
+
+§ 449. (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors,
+that is to say, when it is at once self-collected in this externally
+existing material, and yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the
+out-of-selfness, it is _Intuition_ or Mental Vision.
+
+§ 450. At and towards this its own out-of-selfness, intelligence no less
+essentially directs its attention. In this its immediacy it is an awaking
+to itself, a recollection of itself. Thus intuition becomes a concretion
+of the material with the intelligence, which makes it its own, so that it
+no longer needs this immediacy, no longer needs to find the content.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) Representation (or Mental Idea)(137).
+
+
+§ 451. Representation is this recollected or inwardised intuition, and as
+such is the middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds
+itself immediately subject to modification and that where intelligence is
+in its freedom, or, as thought. The representation is the property of
+intelligence; with a preponderating subjectivity, however, as its right of
+property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy, and the
+representation cannot as it stands be said to _be_. The path of
+intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward, to
+invest itself with intuitive action in itself, and at the same time to get
+rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness, and inwardly divest itself of
+it; so as to be in itself in an externality of its own. But as
+representation begins from intuition and the ready-found material of
+intuition, the intuitional contrast still continues to affect its
+activity, and makes its concrete products still "syntheses," which do not
+grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reach the stage of
+thought.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) Recollection(138).
+
+
+§ 452. Intelligence, as it at first recollects the intuition, places the
+content of feeling in its own inwardness--in a space and a time of its own.
+In this way that content is (1) an _image_ or picture, liberated from its
+original immediacy and abstract singleness amongst other things, and
+received into the universality of the ego. The image loses the full
+complement of features proper to intuition, and is arbitrary or
+contingent, isolated, we may say, from the external place, time, and
+immediate context in which the intuition stood.
+
+§ 453. (2) The image is of itself transient, and intelligence itself is as
+attention its time and also its place, its when and where. But
+intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence, but _quâ_
+intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own
+specialisations. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent,
+but stored up out of consciousness.
+
+To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a
+world of infinitely many images and representations, yet without being in
+consciousness, is from the one point of view the universal postulate which
+bids us treat the notion as concrete, in the way we treat e.g. the germ as
+affirmatively containing, in virtual possibility, all the qualities that
+come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. Inability
+to grasp a universal like this, which, though intrinsically concrete,
+still continues _simple_, is what has led people to talk about special
+fibres and areas as receptacles of particular ideas. It was felt that what
+was diverse should in the nature of things have a local habitation
+peculiar to itself. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its
+existing specialisations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence
+takes place only in another germ,--the germ of the fruit; intelligence
+_quâ_ intelligence shows the potential coming to free existence in its
+development, and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness.
+Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this
+sub-conscious mine, i.e. as the _existent_ universal in which the
+different has not yet been realised in its separations. And it is indeed
+this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in
+mental representation.
+
+§ 454. (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs, if it is to exist,
+an actual intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the
+reference of the image to an intuition,--and that as a subsumption of the
+immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form
+universal, under the representation (idea) with the same content. Thus
+intelligence recognises the specific sensation and the intuition of it as
+what is already its own,--in them it is still within itself: at the same
+time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) internal image is also
+an immediate object of intuition, by which it is authenticated. The image,
+which in the mine of intelligence was only its _property_, now that it has
+been endued with externality, comes actually into its _possession_. And so
+the image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and
+separable from the blank night in which it was originally submerged.
+Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property, and
+dispense with external intuition for its existence in it. This "synthesis"
+of the internal image with the recollected existence is _representation_
+proper: by this synthesis the internal now has the qualification of being
+able to be presented before intelligence and to have its existence in it.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) Imagination(139).
+
+
+§ 455. (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the
+_reproductive imagination_, where the images issue from the inward world
+belonging to the ego, which is now the power over them. The images are in
+the first instance referred to this external, immediate time and space
+which is treasured up along with them. But it is solely in the conscious
+subject, where it is treasured up, that the image has the individuality in
+which the features composing it are conjoined: whereas their original
+concretion, i.e. at first only in space and time, as a _unit_ of
+intuition, has been broken up. The content reproduced, belonging as it
+does to the self-identical unity of intelligence, and an out-put from its
+universal mine, has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of
+association for the images which according to circumstances are more
+abstract or more concrete ideas.
+
+The so-called _laws of the association of ideas_ were objects of great
+interest, especially during that outburst of empirical psychology which
+was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. In the first place, it
+is not _Ideas_ (properly so called) which are associated. Secondly, these
+modes of relation are not _laws_, just for the reason that there are so
+many laws about the same thing, as to suggest a caprice and a contingency
+opposed to the very nature of law. It is a matter of chance whether the
+link of association is something pictorial, or an intellectual category,
+such as likeness and contrast, reason and consequence. The train of images
+and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacant-minded
+ideation, where, though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal
+universality, the matter is entirely pictorial.--Image and idea, if we
+leave out of account the more precise definition of those forms given
+above, present also a distinction in content. The former is the more
+consciously-concrete idea, whereas the idea (representation), whatever be
+its content (from image, notion, or idea), has always the peculiarity,
+though belonging to intelligence, of being in respect of its content given
+and immediate. It is still true of this idea or representation, as of all
+intelligence, that it finds its material, as a matter of fact, to _be_ so
+and so; and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by
+ideation is still abstract. Mental representation is the mean in the
+syllogism of the elevation of intelligence, the link between the two
+significations of self-relatedness--viz. _being_ and _universality_, which
+in consciousness receive the title of object and subject. Intelligence
+complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality, and
+the internal and its own by the attribution of being, but a being of its
+own institution. (On the distinction of representations and thoughts, see
+Introd. to the Logic, § 20 note.)
+
+Abstraction, which occurs in the ideational activity by which general
+ideas are produced (and ideas _quâ_ ideas virtually have the form of
+generality), is frequently explained as the incidence of many similar
+images one upon another and is supposed to be thus made intelligible. If
+this super-imposing is to be no mere accident and without principle, a
+force of attraction in like images must be assumed, or something of the
+sort, which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off
+the dissimilar elements against each other. This force is really
+intelligence itself,--the self-identical ego which by its internalising
+recollection gives the images _ipso facto_ generality, and subsumes the
+single intuition under the already internalised image (§ 453).
+
+§ 456. Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a
+subsumption of the individual under the universal, which forms their
+connecting link. But here intelligence is more than merely a general form:
+its inwardness is an internally definite, concrete subjectivity with a
+substance and value of its own, derived from some interest, some latent
+concept or Ideal principle, so far as we may by anticipation speak of
+such. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of images and
+ideas belonging to it, and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes
+these stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. Such is creative
+imagination(140)--symbolic, allegoric, or poetical imagination--where the
+intelligence gets a definite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs
+them with its general tone. These more or less concrete, individualised
+creations are still "syntheses": for the material, in which the subjective
+principles and ideas get a mentally pictorial existence, is derived from
+the data of intuition.
+
+§ 457. In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as
+to need no helps for intuition. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial
+existence. This pictorial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is
+subjective--still lacks the side of existence. But as the creation unites
+the internal idea with the vehicle of materialisation, intelligence has
+therein _implicitly_ returned both to identical self-relation and to
+immediacy. As reason, its first start was to appropriate the immediate
+datum in itself (§§ 445, 455), i.e. to universalise it; and now its action
+as reason (§ 458) is from the present point directed towards giving the
+character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete
+auto-intuition. In other words, it aims at making itself _be_ and be a
+fact. Acting on this view, it is self-uttering, intuition-producing: the
+imagination which creates signs.
+
+Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being,
+one's own and what is picked up, internal and external, are completely
+welded into one. The preceding "syntheses" of intuition, recollection,
+&c., are unifications of the same factors, but they are "syntheses"; it is
+not till creative imagination that intelligence ceases to be the vague
+mine and the universal, and becomes an individuality, a concrete
+subjectivity, in which the self-reference is defined both to being and to
+universality. The creations of imagination are on all hands recognised as
+such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of
+intuition; what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter
+for other departments. For the present this internal studio of
+intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract
+aspects.--Imagination, when regarded as the agency of this unification, is
+reason, but only a nominal reason, because the matter or theme it embodies
+is to imagination _quâ_ imagination a matter of indifference; whilst
+reason _quâ_ reason also insists upon the _truth_ of its content.
+
+Another point calling for special notice is that, when imagination
+elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition, and this is
+expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an
+_existent_, the phrase must not seem surprising that intelligence makes
+itself _be_ as a _thing_; for its ideal import is itself, and so is the
+aspect which it imposes upon it. The image produced by imagination of an
+object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symbol it
+adds intuitability proper; and in mechanical memory it completes, so far
+as it is concerned, this form of _being_.
+
+§ 458. In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent
+representation with an intuition, the matter of the latter is, in the
+first instance, something accepted, somewhat immediate or given (e.g. the
+colour of the cockade, &c.). But in the fusion of the two elements, the
+intuition does not count positively or as representing itself, but as
+representative of something else. It is an image, which has received as
+its soul and meaning an independent mental representation. This intuition
+is the _Sign_.
+
+The sign is some immediate intuition, representing a totally different
+import from what naturally belongs to it; it is the pyramid into which a
+foreign soul has been conveyed, and where it is conserved. The _sign_ is
+different from the _symbol_: for in the symbol the original characters (in
+essence and conception) of the visible object are more or less identical
+with the import which it bears as symbol; whereas in the sign, strictly
+so-called, the natural attributes of the intuition, and the connotation of
+which it is a sign, have nothing to do with each other. Intelligence
+therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in the use of
+intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather than
+as symbolical.
+
+In logic and psychology, signs and language are usually foisted in
+somewhere as an appendix, without any trouble being taken to display their
+necessity and systematic place in the economy of intelligence. The right
+place for the sign is that just given: where intelligence--which as
+intuiting generates the form of time and space, but is apparently
+recipient of sensible matter, out of which it forms ideas--now gives its
+own original ideas a definite existence from itself, treating the
+intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property, deleting
+the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it, and conferring
+on it an other connotation as its soul and import. This sign-creating
+activity may be distinctively named "productive" Memory (the primarily
+abstract "Mnemosyne"); since memory, which in ordinary life is often used
+as interchangeable and synonymous with remembrance (recollection), and
+even with conception and imagination, has always to do with signs only.
+
+§ 459. The intuition--in its natural phase a something given and given in
+space--acquires, when employed as a sign, the peculiar characteristic of
+existing only as superseded and sublimated. Such is the negativity of
+intelligence; and thus the truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is
+existence in _time_ (but its existence vanishes in the moment of being),
+and if we consider the rest of its external psychical quality, its
+_institution_ by intelligence, but an institution growing out of its
+(anthropological) own naturalness. This institution of the natural is the
+vocal note, where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utterance.
+The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific
+ideas--speech and, its system, language--gives to sensations, intuitions,
+conceptions, a second and higher existence than they naturally
+possess,--invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm.
+
+Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a
+product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium.
+If language had to be treated in its concrete nature, it would be
+necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the
+anthropological or psycho-physiological point of view (§ 401), and for the
+grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of analytic
+understanding. With regard to the elementary _material_ of language, while
+on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared, on the other the
+principle of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually
+covers--that of vocal objects. Yet one may still hear the German language
+praised for its wealth--that wealth consisting in its special expression
+for special sounds--_Rauschen_, _Sausen_, _Knarren_, &c.;--there have been
+collected more than a hundred such words, perhaps: the humour of the
+moment creates fresh ones when it pleases. Such superabundance in the
+realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothing to form the real
+wealth of a cultivated language. The strictly raw material of language
+itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referring to
+external objects; it depends, i.e. on anthropological articulation, as it
+were the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. For each vowel
+and consonant accordingly, as well as for their more abstract elements
+(the posture of lips, palate, tongue in each) and for their combinations,
+people have tried to find the appropriate signification. But these dull
+sub-conscious beginnings are deprived of their original importance and
+prominence by new influences, it may be by external agencies or by the
+needs of civilisation. Having been originally sensuous intuitions, they
+are reduced to signs, and thus have only traces left of their original
+meaning, if it be not altogether extinguished. As to the _formal_ element,
+again, it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with
+its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar.
+The study of languages still in their original state, which we have first
+really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times, has shown on this
+point that they contain a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions
+which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more
+civilised nations. It seems as if the language of the most civilised
+nations has the most imperfect grammar, and that the same language has a
+more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more uncivilised state than
+when it reaches a higher civilisation. (Cf. W. von Humboldt's _Essay on
+the Dual_.)
+
+In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language, we may touch, only
+in passing, upon written language,--a further development in the particular
+sphere of language which borrows the help of an externally practical
+activity. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which
+written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (§ 454). In
+particular, hieroglyphics uses spatial figures to designate _ideas_;
+alphabetical writing, on the other hand, uses them to designate vocal
+notes which are already signs. Alphabetical writing thus consists of signs
+of signs,--the words or concrete signs of vocal language being analysed
+into their simple elements, which severally receive
+designation.--Leibnitz's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the
+advantages which a complete written language, formed on the hieroglyphic
+method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing,
+as in our signs for the numbers, the planets, the chemical elements, &c.),
+would have as a universal language for the intercourse of nations and
+especially of scholars. But we may be sure that it was rather the
+intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia, and still
+takes place in Canton--see _Macartney's Travels_ by Staunton) which
+occasioned the need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. At
+any rate a comprehensive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is
+impracticable. Sensible objects no doubt admit of permanent signs; but, as
+regards signs for mental objects, the progress of thought and the
+continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their
+internal relations and thus also of their nature; and this would involve
+the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. Even in the case of
+sense-objects it happens that their names, i.e. their signs in vocal
+language, are frequently changed, as e.g. in chemistry and mineralogy. Now
+that it has been forgotten what names properly are, viz. externalities
+which of themselves have no sense, and only get signification as signs,
+and now that, instead of names proper, people ask for terms expressing a
+sort of definition, which is frequently changed capriciously and
+fortuitously, the denomination, i.e. the composite name formed of signs of
+their generic characters or other supposed characteristic properties, is
+altered in accordance with the differences of view with regard to the
+genus or other supposed specific property. It is only a stationary
+civilisation, like the Chinese, which admits of the hieroglyphic language
+of that nation; and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of
+that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental
+culture.--The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the
+habit of alphabetical writing; by means of which only does vocal language
+acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. The imperfection of
+the Chinese vocal language is notorious: numbers of its words possess
+several utterly different meanings, as many as ten and twenty, so that, in
+speaking, the distinction is made perceptible merely by accent and
+intensity, by speaking low and soft or crying out. The European, learning
+to speak Chinese, falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has
+mastered these absurd refinements of accentuation. Perfection here
+consists in the opposite of that _parler sans accent_ which in Europe is
+justly required of an educated speaker. The hieroglyphic mode of writing
+keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision
+which is gained in articulation by alphabetic writing.
+
+Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the
+_word_--the mode, peculiar to the intellect, of uttering its ideas most
+worthily--is brought to consciousness and made an object of reflection.
+Engaging the attention of intelligence, as it does, it is analysed; the
+work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary
+postures of articulation) in which the sense-factor in speech is brought
+to the form of universality, at the same time that in this elementary
+phase it acquires complete precision and purity. Thus alphabetic writing
+retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language, that the ideas
+have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact
+idea, i.e. the simple plain idea, not decomposed into its features and
+compounded out of them. Hieroglyphics, instead of springing from the
+direct analysis of sensible signs, like alphabetic writing, arise from an
+antecedent analysis of ideas. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas
+may be reduced to their elements, or simple logical terms, so that from
+the elementary signs chosen to express these (as, in the case of the
+Chinese _Koua_, the simple straight stroke, and the stroke broken into two
+parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their composition. This
+feature of hieroglyphic--the analytical designations of ideas--which misled
+Leibnitz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in
+antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language,--the name. To want
+a name means that for the immediate idea (which, however ample a
+connotation it may include, is still for the mind simple in the name), we
+require a simple immediate sign which for its own sake does not suggest
+anything, and has for its sole function to signify and represent sensibly
+the simple idea as such. It is not merely the image-loving and
+image-limited intelligence that lingers over the simplicity of ideas and
+redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into which they have
+been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought the
+concrete connotation which it "resumes" and reunites from the mere
+aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. Both alike
+require such signs, simple in respect of their meaning: signs, which
+though consisting of several letters or syllables and even decomposed into
+such, yet do not exhibit a combination of several ideas.--What has been
+stated is the principle for settling the value of these written languages.
+It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relations of concrete mental
+ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perplexed, and that
+the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must
+again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and
+divergent ways. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another
+formation of the written name; just as in modern times (as already noted,
+even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes
+of name. A hieroglyphic written language would require a philosophy as
+stationary as is the civilisation of the Chinese.
+
+What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated
+educational value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character.
+It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more
+formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements, and
+contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of
+mental life. Acquired habit subsequently effaces the peculiarity by which
+alphabetic writing appears, in the interest of vision, as a roundabout way
+to ideas by means of audibility; it makes them a sort of hieroglyphic to
+us, so that in using them we need not consciously realise them by means of
+tones, whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in
+order to catch its meaning in the sound. Thus, while (with the faculty
+which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of
+abstraction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is
+of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible
+(which is in time) and the visible (which is in space), each have their
+own basis, one no less authoritative than the other. But in the case of
+alphabetic writing there is only a _single_ basis: the two aspects occupy
+their rightful relation to each other: the visible language is related to
+the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence expresses itself immediately
+and unconditionally by speaking.--The instrumental function of the
+comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows
+itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage
+from representation to thought.
+
+§ 460. The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with
+its signification, is primarily a single transient product; and
+conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is
+outward) is itself outward. The reduction of this outwardness to
+inwardness is (verbal) Memory.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) Memory(141).
+
+
+§ 461. Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through
+the same inwardising (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of
+the _word_, as representation in general does in dealing with the first
+immediate intuition (§ 451). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in
+the sign, intelligence, by this inwardising (memorising) elevates the
+_single_ synthesis to a universal, i.e. permanent, synthesis, in which
+name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition
+(which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import
+(connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the
+representation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence
+for its import: all this being the work of memory which retains names
+(retentive Memory).
+
+§ 462. The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the
+ideational realm. (2) In the name, _Reproductive_ memory has and
+recognises the thing, and with the thing it has the name, apart from
+intuition and image. The name, as giving an _existence_ to the content in
+intelligence, is the externality of intelligence to itself; and the
+inwardising or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuition of
+intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalisation to which
+intelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the
+particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive,
+representative, or cogitant,--series of which the intelligence traverses as
+it feels, represents, or thinks.
+
+Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor
+its image even: the name alone, if we _understand_ it, is the unimaged
+simple representation. We _think_ in names.
+
+The recent attempts--already, as they deserved, forgotten--to rehabilitate
+the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images,
+and thus again deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of
+the power of memory is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images,
+fixed in the imagination, to which is then attached the series of ideas
+forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the
+heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent
+images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be made, the
+attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly
+accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being
+worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as
+quickly forgotten, seeing that the same tableau is used for getting by
+rote every other series of ideas, and so those previously attached to it
+are effaced. What is mnemonically impressed is not like what is retained
+in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within
+outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited, but is, so to
+speak, read off the tableau of fancy.--Mnemonic is connected with the
+common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and
+imagination; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity
+than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image
+derived from intuition,--the immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence;
+it has rather to do with an object which is the product of intelligence
+itself,--such a _without book_(142) as remains locked up in the
+_within-book_(143) of intelligence, and is, within intelligence, only its
+outward and existing side.
+
+§ 463. (3) As the interconnexion of the names lies in the meaning, the
+conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an
+(external) synthesis; and intelligence in this its externality has not
+made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the
+universal,--the single plain truth of its particular self-divestments; and
+its consummated appropriation of them abolishes that distinction between
+meaning and name. This extreme inwardising of representation is the
+supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the
+mere _being_, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless
+words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at
+the same time the power over the different names,--the link which, having
+nothing in itself, fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable
+order. So far as they merely _are_, and intelligence is here itself this
+_being_ of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity,--memory;
+which, on account of the complete externality in which the members of such
+series stand to one another, and because it is itself this externality
+(subjective though that be), is called mechanical (§ 195).
+
+A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one
+attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got
+by heart is therefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is
+introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the
+signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore
+easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of conning by rote series of
+words, with no principle governing their succession, or which are
+separately meaningless, e.g. a series of proper names, is so supremely
+marvellous, because it is the very essence of mind to have its wits about
+it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action
+is like machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity
+that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after
+it has in intuition been at first so external as to pick up its facts
+ready-made, and in representation inwardises or recollects this datum and
+makes it its own,--it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself,
+so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of
+the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in
+intelligence itself as a quality of it.--It is only a step further to treat
+memory as mechanical--the act implying no intelligence--in which case it is
+only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other
+purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper
+signification it has in the mind.
+
+§ 464. If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an
+existent requires something else,--to be interpreted by the representing
+intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once
+that external objectivity and the meaning. In this way intelligence is
+explicitly made an _existence_ of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly
+active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in
+this manner the passage into the function of _thought_, which no longer
+has a _meaning_, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed from the
+subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its
+existence.
+
+The German language has etymologically assigned memory (_Gedächtniß_), of
+which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the
+high position of direct kindred with thought (_Gedanke_).--It is not matter
+of chance that the young have a better memory than the old, nor is their
+memory solely exercised for the sake of utility. The young have a good
+memory because they have not yet reached the stage of reflection; their
+memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of
+their inner life to pure being or to pure space in which the fact, the
+implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesis to a
+subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined with
+a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a
+knowledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and
+meaning of memory and to understand its organic interconnexion with
+thought is one of the hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in
+the theory of mind. Memory _quâ_ memory is itself the merely _external_
+mode, or merely _existential_ aspect of thought, and thus needs a
+complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view and
+implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity
+from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the
+function of that subject. Thus active reason is _Thinking_.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) Thinking(144).
+
+
+§ 465. Intelligence is recognitive: it cognises an intuition, but only
+because that intuition is already its own (§ 454); and in the name it
+re-discovers the fact (§ 462): but now it finds _its_ universal in the
+double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as
+immediate or as being,--finds i.e. the genuine universal which is its own
+unity overlapping and including its other, viz. being. Thus intelligence
+is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: _virtually_ it is the
+universal,--its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain identity
+of subjective and objective. It knows that what is _thought_, _is_, and
+that what _is_, only _is_ in so far as it is a thought (§ 521); the
+thinking of intelligence is to _have thoughts_: these are as its content
+and object.
+
+§ 466. But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the
+universality and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The
+thoughts therefore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the
+representations which have been inwardised to thoughts are so far still
+the given content.
+
+§ 467. As dealing with this given content, thought is ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) _understanding_
+with its formal identity, working up the representations, that have been
+memorised, into species, genera, laws, forces, &c., in short into
+categories,--thus indicating that the raw material does not get the truth
+of its being save in these thought-forms. As intrinsically infinite
+negativity, thought is ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) essentially an act of partition,--_judgment_,
+which however does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis
+of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines supplied by the
+interconnexions peculiar to the concept. Thirdly ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}), thought supersedes
+the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the
+differences,--thus being nominal _reason_ or inferential understanding.
+Intelligence, as the act of thought, cognises. And ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) understanding out
+of its generalities (the categories) _explains_ the individual, and is
+then said to comprehend or understand itself: ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) in the judgment it
+explains the individual to be an universal (species, genus). In these
+forms the _content_ appears as given: ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) but in inference (syllogism) it
+characterises a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference.
+With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching
+to formal thought has vanished.
+
+In _Logic_ there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason
+develops itself in this distinction-lacking medium. So in _consciousness_
+thought occurs as a stage (§ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the
+antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own
+limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of
+philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they
+are in and the antithesis they imply; while thought is this one and the
+same centre, to which as to their truth the antithesis return.
+
+§ 468. Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of
+being, is, now that it has completed _taking possession_, in its own
+_property_: the last negation of immediacy has implicitly required that
+the intelligence shall itself determine its content. Thus thought, as free
+notion, is now also free in point of _content_. But when intelligence is
+aware that it is determinative of the content, which is _its_ mode no less
+than it is a mode of being, it is Will.
+
+
+
+(b) Mind Practical(145).
+
+
+§ 469. As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own
+conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this
+independency or individuality form the side of existence or of _reality_
+for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as
+cognition it is on the soil of notional generality. Supplying its own
+content, the will is self-possessed, and in the widest sense free: this is
+its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formalism that the
+spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and
+abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the
+function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal
+will, and it is therefore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with
+its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character,
+content, and aim, as well as its sphere of existence. The essential
+freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which
+will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a thinking will,--to
+give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks itself.
+
+True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its
+purpose in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests.
+But such a content is only possible in thought and through thought: it is
+nothing short of absurd to seek to banish thought from the moral,
+religious, and law-abiding life.
+
+§ 470. Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will,
+contains a double ought--(1) in the contrast which the new mode of being
+projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its
+old existence and condition,--an antagonism which in consciousness grows to
+correlation with external objects. (2) That first self-determination,
+being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking
+universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitutes an obligation
+on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it in point of
+matter;--a distinction which only exists for the observer.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) Practical Sense or Feeling(146).
+
+
+§ 471. The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and
+therefore formal, i.e. it _finds_ itself as an _individuality_ determined
+in _its_ inward _nature_. It is thus "practical feeling," or instinct of
+action. In this phase, as it is at bottom a subjectivity simply identical
+with reason, it has no doubt a rational content, but a content which as it
+stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and
+subjective,--a content which may be determined quite as much by mere
+personalities of want and opinion, &c., and by the subjectivity which
+selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in
+conformity with reason.
+
+An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality,
+as well as of religion, which man is alleged to possess,--to his benevolent
+dispositions,--and even to his heart generally,--i.e. to the subject so far
+as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this
+appeal implies (1) that these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2)
+that when feeling is opposed to the logical understanding, it, and not the
+partial abstractions of the latter, _may_ be the _totality_--the appeal has
+a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand feeling too _may_ be onesided,
+unessential and bad. The rational, which exists in the shape of
+rationality when it is apprehended by thought, is the same content as the
+_good_ practical feeling has, but presented in its universality and
+necessity, in its objectivity and truth.
+
+Thus it is on the one hand _silly_ to suppose that in the passage from
+feeling to law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence; it is
+this passage which lets feeling first reach its truth. It is equally silly
+to consider intellect as superfluous or even harmful to feeling, heart,
+and will; the truth and, what is the same thing, the actual rationality of
+the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect,
+and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. If feelings are of the
+right sort, it is because of their quality or content,--which is right only
+so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its source in the thinking
+mind. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off
+the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several faculties of
+feeling and thinking mind, and coming to see that in the human being there
+is only _one_ reason, in feeling, volition, and thought. Another
+difficulty connected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which
+are the special property of the thinking mind, viz. God, law and morality,
+can also be _felt_. But feeling is only the form of the immediate and
+peculiar individuality of the subject, in which these facts, like any
+other objective facts (which consciousness also sets over against itself),
+may be placed.
+
+On the other hand, it is _suspicious_ or even worse to cling to feeling
+and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law, right and duty;
+because all that the former holds more than the latter is only the
+particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. For the same reason
+it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with
+anything beyond their form, and to discuss their content; for the latter,
+when thought, is precisely what constitutes, in their universality and
+necessity, the rights and duties which are the true works of mental
+autonomy. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions
+specially, we have only to deal with the selfish, bad, and evil; it is
+these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition
+to the universal: their content is the reverse of rights and duties, and
+precisely in that way do they--but only in antithesis to the latter--retain
+a speciality of their own.
+
+§ 472. The "Ought" of practical feeling is the claim of its essential
+autonomy to control some existing mode of fact--which is assumed to be
+worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. But as both, in their
+immediacy, lack objective determination, this relation of the
+_requirement_ to existent fact is the utterly subjective and superficial
+feeling of pleasant or unpleasant.
+
+Delight, joy, grief, &c., shame, repentance, contentment, &c., are partly
+only modifications of the formal "practical feeling" in _general_, but are
+partly different in the features that give the special tone and character
+mode to their "Ought."
+
+The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world, so far at
+least as evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful
+merely, arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. Evil is
+nothing but the incompatibility between what is and what ought to be.
+"Ought" is an ambiguous term,--indeed infinitely so, considering that
+casual aims may also come under the form of Ought. But where the objects
+sought are thus casual, evil only executes what is rightfully due to the
+vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically
+evil. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgment: the
+contrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in
+them, and thus they are the contradiction called evil. In the dead there
+is neither evil nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity
+(concept) does not confront its existence and does not in the difference
+at the same time remain its permanent subject. Whereas in life, and still
+more in mind, we have this immanent distinction present: hence arises the
+Ought: and this negativity, subjectivity, ego, freedom are the principles
+of evil and pain. Jacob Böhme viewed egoity (selfhood) as pain and
+torment, and as the fountain of nature and of spirit.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) The Impulses and Choice(147).
+
+
+§ 473. The practical ought is a "real" judgment. Will, which is
+essentially self-determination, finds in the conformity--as immediate and
+merely _found_ to hand--of the existing mode to its requirement a negation,
+and something inappropriate to it. If the will is to satisfy itself, if
+the implicit unity of the universality and the special mode is to be
+realised, the conformity of its inner requirement and of the existent
+thing ought to be its act and institution. The will, as regards the form
+of its content, is at first still a natural will, directly identical with
+its specific mode:--natural _impulse_ and _inclination_. Should, however,
+the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the
+many restricted forms of impulse, each being always in conflict to
+another, it is _passion_.
+
+§ 474. Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as
+the practical feeling. Thus, while on one hand they are based on the
+rational nature of the mind; they on the other, as part and parcel of the
+still subjective and single will, are infected with contingency, and
+appear as particular to stand to the individual and to each other in an
+external relation and with a necessity which creates bondage.
+
+The special note in _passion_ is its restriction to one special mode of
+volition, in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged, be
+the value of that mode what it may. In consequence of this formalism,
+passion is neither good nor bad; the title only states that a subject has
+thrown his whole soul,--his interests of intellect, talent, character,
+enjoyment,--on one aim and object. Nothing great has been and nothing great
+can be accomplished without passion. It is only a dead, too often, indeed,
+a hypocritical moralising which inveighs against the form of passion as
+such.
+
+But with regard to the inclinations, the question is directly raised,
+Which are good and bad?--Up to what degree the good continue good;--and (as
+there are many, each with its private range) In what way have they, being
+all in one subject and hardly all, as experience shows, admitting of
+gratification, to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And, first of
+all, as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities, the case
+is much the same as with the psychical powers, whose aggregate is to form
+the mind theoretical,--an aggregate which is now increased by the host of
+impulses. The nominal rationality of impulse and propensity lies merely in
+their general impulse not to be subjective merely, but to get realised,
+overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. Their genuine
+rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which
+pre-supposes a number of _independent_ innate tendencies and immediate
+instincts, and therefore is wanting in a single principle and final
+purpose for them. But the immanent "reflection" of mind itself carries it
+beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy, and gives their
+contents a rationality and objectivity, in which they exist as necessary
+ties of social relation, as rights and duties. It is this objectification
+which evinces their real value, their mutual connexions, and their truth.
+And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he
+did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the full reality
+of justice could be exhibited only in the _objective_ phase of justice,
+viz. in the construction of the State as the ethical life.
+
+The answer to the question, therefore, What are the good and rational
+propensities, and how they are to be co-ordinated with each other?
+resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life
+produced by the mind when developing itself as _objective_ mind--a
+development in which the _content_ of autonomous action loses its
+contingency and optionality. The discussion of the true intrinsic worth of
+the impulses, inclinations, and passions is thus essentially the theory of
+legal, moral, and social _duties_.
+
+§ 475. The subject is the act of satisfying impulses, an act of (at least)
+formal rationality, as it translates them from the subjectivity of content
+(which so far is _purpose_) into objectivity, where the subject is made to
+close with itself. If the content of the impulse is distinguished as the
+thing or business from this act of carrying it out, and we regard the
+thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of
+subjective individuality and its action, this is what is called the
+_interest_. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest.
+
+An action is an aim of the subject, and it is his agency too which
+executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way in the most
+disinterested action, i.e. unless he had an interest in it, there would be
+no action at all.--The impulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated
+by being contrasted with the baseless chimera of a happiness, the free
+gift of nature, where wants are supposed to find their satisfaction
+without the agent doing anything to produce a conformity between immediate
+existence and his own inner requirements. They are sometimes contrasted,
+on the whole to their disadvantage, with the morality of duty for duty's
+sake. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: they
+are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution
+thereof. The morality concerns the content of the aim, which as such is
+the universal, an inactive thing, that finds its actualising in the agent;
+and finds it only when the aim is immanent in the agent, is his interest
+and--should it claim to engross his whole efficient subjectivity--his
+passion.
+
+§ 476. The will, as thinking and implicitly free, distinguishes itself
+from the particularity of the impulses, and places itself as simple
+subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. It is thus
+"reflecting" will.
+
+§ 477. Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum:
+the reflective will now sees it as its own, because it closes with it and
+thus gives itself specific individuality and actuality. It is now on the
+standpoint of _choosing_ between inclinations, and is option or _choice_.
+
+§ 478. Will as choice claims to be free, reflected into itself as the
+negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. However, as the content, in
+which its former universality concludes itself to actuality, is nothing
+but the content of the impulses and appetites, it is actual only as a
+subjective and contingent will. It realises itself in a particularity,
+which it regards at the same time as a nullity, and finds a satisfaction
+in what it has at the same time emerged from. As thus contradictory, it is
+the process of distracting and suspending one desire or enjoyment by
+another,--and one satisfaction, which is just as much no satisfaction, by
+another, without end. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is the
+universal, which under the name of _happiness_ the thinking will makes its
+aim.
+
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) Happiness(148).
+
+
+§ 479. In this idea, which reflection and comparison have educed, of a
+universal satisfaction, the impulses, so far as their particularity goes,
+are reduced to a mere negative; and it is held that in part they are to be
+sacrificed to each other for the behoof that aim, partly sacrificed to
+that aim directly, either altogether or in part. Their mutual limitation,
+on one hand, proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative
+considerations: on the other hand, as happiness has its sole _affirmative_
+contents in the springs of action, it is on them that the decision turns,
+and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which must have the
+casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed.
+
+§ 480. Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of
+things desired,--a universality which only ought to be. But the
+particularity of the satisfaction which just as much _is_ as it is
+abolished, and the abstract singleness, the option which gives or does not
+give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happiness, find their truth in the
+intrinsic _universality_ of the will, i.e. its very autonomy or freedom.
+In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity, which is pure and
+concrete at once, by having for its contents and aim only that infinite
+mode of being--freedom itself. In this truth of its autonomy, where concept
+and object are one, the will is an _actually free will_.
+
+
+
+Free Mind(149).
+
+
+§ 481. Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a
+free will, which realises its own freedom of will now that the formalism,
+fortuitousness, and contractedness of the practical content up to this
+point have been superseded. By superseding the adjustments of means
+therein contained, the will is the _immediate individuality_
+self-instituted,--an individuality, however, also purified of all that
+interferes with its universalism, i.e. with freedom itself. This
+universalism the will has as its object and aim, only so far as it thinks
+itself, knows this its concept, and is _will_ as free _intelligence_.
+
+§ 482. The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its
+object, i.e. which has its true being for characteristic and aim, is in
+the first instance the rational will in general, or _implicit_ Idea, and
+because implicit only the _notion_ of absolute mind. As _abstract_ Idea
+again, it is existent only in the _immediate_ will--it is the _existential_
+side of reason,--the _single_ will as aware of this its universality
+constituting its contents and aim, and of which it is only the formal
+activity. If the will, therefore, in which the Idea thus appears is only
+finite, that will is also the act of developing the Idea, and of investing
+its self-unfolding content with an existence which, as realising the idea,
+is _actuality_. It is thus "Objective" Mind.
+
+No Idea is so generally recognised as indefinite, ambiguous, and open to
+the greatest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a
+victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little
+appreciation of its meaning. Remembering that free mind is _actual_ mind,
+we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in
+practice. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the
+abstract concept of full-blown liberty, there is nothing like it in its
+uncontrollable strength, just because it is the very essence of mind, and
+that as its very actuality. Whole continents, Africa and the East, have
+never had this idea, and are without it still. The Greeks and Romans,
+Plato and Aristotle, even the Stoics, did not have it. On the contrary,
+they saw that it is only by birth (as e.g. an Athenian or Spartan
+citizen), or by strength of character, education, or philosophy (--the sage
+is free even as a slave and in chains) that the human being is actually
+free. It was through Christianity that this idea came into the world.
+According to Christianity, the individual _as such_ has an infinite value
+as the object and aim of divine love, destined as mind to live in absolute
+relationship with God himself, and have God's mind dwelling in him: i.e.
+man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. If, in religion as such,
+man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being,
+he has also, even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence, the
+divine mind present with him, as the substance of the state of the family,
+&c. These institutions are due to the guidance of that spirit, and are
+constituted after its measure; whilst by their existence the moral temper
+comes to be indwelling in the individual, so that in this sphere of
+particular existence, of present sensation and volition, he is _actually_
+free.
+
+If to be aware of the idea--to be aware, i.e. that men are aware of freedom
+as their essence, aim, and object--is matter of _speculation_, still this
+very idea itself is the actuality of men--not something which they _have_,
+as men, but which they _are_. Christianity in its adherents has realised
+an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves; if they are
+made slaves, if the decision as regards their property rests with an
+arbitrary will, not with laws or courts of justice, they would find the
+very substance of their life outraged. This will to liberty is no longer
+an _impulse_ which demands its satisfaction, but the permanent
+character--the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive nature.
+But this freedom, which the content and aim of freedom has, is itself only
+a notion--a principle of the mind and heart, intended to develope into an
+objective phase, into legal, moral, religious, and not less into
+scientific actuality.
+
+
+
+
+
+SECTION II. MIND OBJECTIVE.
+
+
+§ 483. The objective Mind is the absolute Idea, but only existing _in
+posse_: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude, its actual
+rationality retains the aspect of external apparency. The free will finds
+itself immediately confronted by differences which arise from the
+circumstance that freedom is its _inward_ function and aim, and is in
+relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity, which splits
+up into different heads: viz. anthropological data (i.e. private and
+personal needs), external things of nature which exist for consciousness,
+and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of
+their own diversity and particularity. These aspects constitute the
+external material for the embodiment of the will.
+
+§ 484. But the purposive action of this will is to realise its concept,
+Liberty, in these externally-objective aspects, making the latter a world
+moulded by the former, which in it is thus at home with itself, locked
+together with it: the concept accordingly perfected to the Idea. Liberty,
+shaped into the actuality of a world, receives the _form of Necessity_ the
+deeper substantial nexus of which is the system or organisation of the
+principles of liberty, whilst its phenomenal nexus is power or authority,
+and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousness.
+
+§ 485. This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being
+the peculiar and immediate medium in which the former is actualised)
+constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. As it (and its content)
+belongs to thought, and is the virtual _universal_, the content has its
+right and true character only in the form of universality. When invested
+with this character for the intelligent consciousness, or instituted as an
+authoritative power, it is a _Law_(150). When, on the other hand, the
+content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness, attaching to it in
+the practical feeling and in impulse, and is set and grafted in the
+individual will, not in the form of impulse, but in its universality, so
+as to become its habit, temper and character, it exists as manner and
+custom, or _Usage_(151).
+
+§ 486. This "reality," in general, where free will has _existence_, is the
+_Law_ (Right),--the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as
+the limited juristic law, but as the actual body of all the conditions of
+freedom. These conditions, in relation to the _subjective_ will, where
+they, being universal, ought to have and can only have their existence,
+are its _Duties_; whereas as its temper and habit they are _Manners_. What
+is a right is also a duty, and what is a duty, is also a right. For a mode
+of existence is a right, only as a consequence of the free substantial
+will: and the same content of fact, when referred to the will
+distinguished as subjective and individual, is a duty. It is the same
+content which the subjective consciousness recognises as a duty, and
+brings into existence in these several wills. The finitude of the
+objective will thus creates the semblance of a distinction between rights
+and duties.
+
+In the phenomenal range right and duty are _correlata_, at least in the
+sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in some one else. But,
+in the light of the concept, my right to a thing is not merely possession,
+but as possession by a _person_ it is _property_, or legal possession, and
+it is a _duty_ to possess things as _property_, i.e. to be as a person.
+Translated into the phenomenal relationship, viz. relation to another
+person--this grows into the duty of some one _else_ to respect _my_ right.
+In the morality of the conscience, duty in general is in me--a free
+subject--at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. But
+in this individualist moral sphere, there arises the division between what
+is only inward purpose (disposition or intention), which only has its
+being in me and is merely subjective duty, and the actualisation of that
+purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes
+the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. In social ethics these
+two parts have reached their truth, their absolute unity; although even
+right and duty return to one another and combine by means of certain
+adjustments and under the guise of necessity. The rights of the father of
+the family over its members are equally duties towards them; just as the
+children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty
+of manhood. The penal judicature of a government, its rights of
+administration, &c., are no less its duties to punish, to administer, &c.;
+as the services of the members of the State in dues, military services,
+&c., are duties and yet their right to the protection of their private
+property and of the general substantial life in which they have their
+root. All the aims of society and the State are the private aim of the
+individuals. But the set of adjustments, by which their duties come back
+to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right, produces an appearance of
+diversity: and this diversity is increased by the variety of shapes which
+value assumes in the course of exchange, though it remains intrinsically
+the same. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no rights has
+no duties and _vice versa_.
+
+
+
+
+Distribution.
+
+
+§ 487. The free will is
+
+A. itself at first immediate, and hence as a single being--the _person_:
+the existence which the person gives to its liberty is _property_. The
+_Right as_ right (law) is _formal, abstract right_.
+
+B. When the will is reflected into self, so as to have its existence
+inside it, and to be thus at the same time characterised as a
+_particular_, it is the right of the _subjective_ will, _morality_ of the
+individual conscience.
+
+C. When the free will is the substantial will, made actual in the subject
+and conformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity,--it is
+the ethics of actual life in family, civil society, and state.
+
+
+
+
+Sub-Section A. Law.(152)
+
+
+
+(a) Property.
+
+
+§ 488. Mind, in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty, is an
+individual, but one that knows its individuality as an absolutely free
+will: it is a _person_, in whom the inward sense of this freedom, as in
+itself still abstract and empty, has its particularity and fulfilment not
+yet on its own part, but on an external _thing_. This thing, as something
+devoid of will, has no rights against the subjectivity of intelligence and
+volition, and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it, the external
+sphere of its liberty;--_possession_.
+
+§ 489. By the judgment of possession, at first in the outward
+appropriation, the thing acquires the predicate of "mine." But this
+predicate, on its own account merely "practical," has here the
+signification that I import my personal will into the thing. As so
+characterised, possession is _property_, which as possession is a _means_,
+but as existence of the personality is an _end_.
+
+§ 490. In his property the person is brought into union with itself. But
+the thing is an abstractly external thing, and the I in it is abstractly
+external. The concrete return of me into me in the externality is that I,
+the infinite self-relation, am as a person the repulsion of me from
+myself, and have the existence of my personality in the _being of other
+persons_, in my relation to them and in my recognition by them, which is
+thus mutual.
+
+§ 491. The thing is the _mean_ by which the extremes meet in one. These
+extremes are the persons who, in the knowledge of their identity as free,
+are simultaneously mutually independent. For them my will has its
+_definite recognisable existence_ in the thing by the immediate bodily act
+of taking possession, or by the formation of the thing or, it may be, by
+mere designation of it.
+
+§ 492. The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in _this_
+thing: so far my will is _arbitrary_, I can just as well put it in it as
+not,--just as well withdraw it as not. But so far as my will lies in a
+thing, it is only I who can withdraw it: it is only with my will that the
+thing can pass to another, whose property it similarly becomes only with
+his will:--_Contract_.
+
+
+
+(b) Contract.
+
+
+§ 493. The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an
+_internal_ state of mind different from its realisation in the
+_performance_. The comparatively "ideal" utterance (of contract) in the
+_stipulation_ contains the actual surrender of a property by the one, its
+changing hands, and its acceptance by the other will. The contract is thus
+thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of the one or the
+other to become so--otherwise we should have an infinite regress or
+infinite division of thing, labour, and time. The utterance in the
+stipulation is complete and exhaustive. The inwardness of the will which
+surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of
+ideation, and in that realm the word is deed and thing (§ 462)--the full
+and complete deed, since here the conscientiousness of the will does not
+come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or
+is a deception), and the will refers only to the external thing.
+
+§ 494. Thus in the stipulation we have the _substantial_ being of the
+contract standing out in distinction from its real utterance in the
+performance, which is brought down to a mere sequel. In this way there is
+put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate
+specific _quality_ and its substantial being or _value_, meaning by value
+the quantitative terms into which that qualitative feature has been
+translated. One piece of property is thus made comparable with another,
+and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly
+heterogeneous. It is thus treated in general as an abstract, universal
+thing or commodity.
+
+§ 495. The contract, as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and
+deals with a casual commodity, involves at the same time the giving to
+this "accidental" will a positive fixity. This will may just as well not
+be conformable to law (right), and, in that case, produces a _wrong_: by
+which however the absolute law (right) is not superseded, but only a
+relationship originated of right to wrong.
+
+
+
+(c) Right versus Wrong.
+
+
+§ 496. Law (right) considered as the realisation of liberty in externals,
+breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to
+other persons (§§ 491, 493 seqq.). In this way there are (1) several
+titles or grounds at law, of which (seeing that property both on the
+personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the
+right, but which, because they face each other, each and all are invested
+with a _show_ of right, against which the former is defined as the
+intrinsically right.
+
+§ 497. Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically
+right, still presumed identical with the several titles, is affirmed,
+willed, and recognised, the only diversity lies in this, that the special
+thing is subsumed under the one law or right by the _particular_ will of
+_these_ several persons. This is naïve, non-malicious wrong. Such wrong in
+the several claimants is a simple _negative judgment_, expressing the
+_civil suit_. To settle it there is required a third judgment, which, as
+the judgment of the intrinsically right, is disinterested, and a power of
+giving the one right existence as against that semblance.
+
+§ 498. But (2) if the semblance of right is willed as such _against_ right
+intrinsical by the particular will, which thus becomes _wicked_, then the
+external _recognition_ of right is separated from the right's true value;
+and while the former only is respected, the latter is violated. This gives
+the wrong of _fraud_--the infinite judgment as identical (§ 173),--where the
+nominal relation is retained, but the sterling value is let slip.
+
+§ 499. (3) Finally, the particular will sets itself in opposition to the
+intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition
+or semblance. [Here there is a negatively infinite judgment (§ 173) in
+which there is denied the class as a whole, and not merely the particular
+mode--in this case the apparent recognition.] Thus the will is violently
+wicked, and commits a _crime_.
+
+§ 500. As an outrage on right, such an action is essentially and actually
+null. In it the agent, as a volitional and intelligent being, sets up a
+law--a law however which is nominal and recognised by him only--a universal
+which holds good _for him_, and under which he has at the same time
+subsumed himself by his action. To display the nullity of such an act, to
+carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right, in the
+first instance by means of a subjective individual will, is the work of
+_Revenge_. But, revenge, starting from the interest of an immediate
+particular personality, is at the same time only a new outrage; and so on
+without end. This progression, like the last, abolishes itself in a third
+judgment, which is disinterested--_punishment_.
+
+§ 501. The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right
+is ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) that a particular will, that of the judge, being conformable to the
+right, has an interest to turn against the crime (--which in the first
+instance, in revenge, is a matter of chance), and ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) that an executive
+power (also in the first instance casual) negates the negation of right
+that was created by the criminal. This negation of right has its existence
+in the will of the criminal; and consequently revenge or punishment
+directs itself against the person or property of the criminal and
+exercises _coercion_ upon him. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in
+general has possible scope,--compulsion against the thing, in seizing and
+maintaining it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has
+its existence immediately in externals as such, or in corporeity, and can
+be seized only in this quarter. But more than _possible_ compulsion is
+not, so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of
+existence, even from the range of all existence, i.e. from life. It is
+legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsion.
+
+§ 502. A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the
+subjective will. The "reality" of right, which the personal will in the
+first instance gives itself in immediate wise, is seen to be due to the
+instrumentality of the subjective will,--whose influence as on one hand it
+gives existence to the essential right, so may on the other cut itself off
+from and oppose itself to it. Conversely, the claim of the subjective will
+to be in this abstraction a power over the law of right is null and empty
+of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially only so far as that will
+in itself realises the reasonable will. As such it is _morality_(153)
+proper.
+
+The phrase "Law of Nature," or Natural Right(154), in use for the
+philosophy of law involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as
+something existing ready-formed in nature, or right as governed by the
+nature of things, i.e. by the notion. The former used to be the common
+meaning, accompanied with the fiction of a _state of nature_, in which the
+law of nature should hold sway; whereas the social and political state
+rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of
+natural rights. The real fact is that the whole law and its every article
+are based on free personality alone,--on self-determination or autonomy,
+which is the very contrary of determination by nature. The law of
+nature--strictly so called--is for that reason the predominance of the
+strong and the reign of force, and a state of nature a state of violence
+and wrong, of which nothing truer can be said than that one ought to
+depart from it. The social state, on the other hand, is the condition in
+which alone right has its actuality: what is to be restricted and
+sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the state of nature.
+
+
+
+
+Sub-Section B. The Morality Of Conscience(155).
+
+
+§ 503. The free individual, who, in mere law, counts only as a _person_,
+is now characterised as a _subject_, a will reflected into itself so that,
+be its affection what it may, it is distinguished (as existing in it) as
+_its own_ from the existence of freedom in an external thing. Because the
+affection of the will is thus inwardised, the will is at the same time
+made a particular, and there arise further particularisations of it and
+relations of these to one another. This affection is partly the essential
+and implicit will, the reason of the will, the essential basis of law and
+moral life: partly it is the existent volition, which is before us and
+throws itself into actual deeds, and thus comes into relationship with the
+former. The subjective will is _morally_ free, so far as these features
+are its inward institution, its own, and willed by it. Its utterance in
+deed with this freedom is an _action_, in the externality of which it only
+admits as its own, and allows to be imputed to it, so much as it has
+consciously willed.
+
+This subjective or "moral" freedom is what a European especially calls
+freedom. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal
+knowledge of the distinction between good and evil in general: ethical and
+religious principles shall not merely lay their claim on him as external
+laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed, but have their assent,
+recognition, or even justification in his heart, sentiment, conscience,
+intelligence, &c. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme
+aim and absolutely essential to it.
+
+The "moral" must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify
+the morally good merely. In French _le moral_ is opposed to _le physique_,
+and means the mental or intellectual in general. But here the moral
+signifies volitional mode, so far as it is in the interior of the will in
+general; it thus includes purpose and intention,--and also moral
+wickedness.
+
+
+
+a. Purpose(156).
+
+
+§ 504. So far as the action comes into immediate touch with _existence_,
+_my part_ in it is to this extent formal, that external existence is also
+_independent_ of the agent. This externality can pervert his action and
+bring to light something else than lay in it. Now, though any alteration
+as such, which is set on foot by the subject's action, is its _deed_(157),
+still the subject does not for that reason recognise it as its
+_action_(158), but only admits as its own that existence in the deed which
+lay in its knowledge and will, which was its _purpose_. Only for that does
+it hold itself _responsible_.
+
+
+
+b. Intention and Welfare(159).
+
+
+§ 505. As regards its empirically concrete _content_ (1) the action has a
+variety of particular aspects and connexions. In point of _form_, the
+agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature,
+embracing these individual points. This is the right of _intention_. While
+_purpose_ affects only the immediate fact of existence, _intention_
+regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. (2) The agent has no less
+the right to see that the particularity of content in the action, in point
+of its matter, is not something external to him, but is a particularity of
+his own,--that it contains his needs, interests, and aims. These aims, when
+similarly comprehended in a single aim, as in happiness (§ 479),
+constitute his _well-being_. This is the right to well-being. Happiness
+(good fortune) is distinguished from well-being only in this, that
+happiness implies no more than some sort of immediate existence, whereas
+well-being regards it as also justified as regards morality.
+
+§ 506. But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the
+abstract form of generality. Reflection can put in this form this and that
+particular aspect in the empirically-concrete action, thus making it
+essential to the intention or restricting the intention to it. In this way
+the supposed essentiality of the intention and the real essentiality of
+the action may be brought into the greatest contradiction--e.g. a good
+intention in case of a crime. Similarly well-being is abstract and may be
+set on this or that: as appertaining to this single agent, it is always
+something particular.
+
+
+
+c. Goodness and Wickedness(160).
+
+
+§ 507. The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their
+formalism is the content of the universal, essential and actual, will,--the
+law and underlying essence of every phase of volition, the essential and
+actual good. It is thus the absolute final aim of the world, and _duty_
+for the agent who _ought_ to have _insight_ into the _good_, make it his
+_intention_ and bring it about by his activity.
+
+§ 508. But though the good is the universal of will--a universal determined
+in itself,--and thus including in it particularity,--still so far as this
+particularity is in the first instance still abstract, there is no
+principle at hand to determine it. Such determination therefore starts up
+also outside that universal; and as heteronomy or determinance of a will
+which is free and has rights of its own, there awakes here the deepest
+contradiction. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) In consequence of the indeterminate determinism of the
+good, there are always _several sorts_ of good and _many kinds of duties_,
+the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them
+into _collision_. At the same time because good is one, they _ought_ to
+stand in harmony; and yet each of them, though it is a particular duty, is
+as good and as duty absolute. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic
+which, superseding this absolute claim of each, concludes such a
+combination of them as excludes the rest.
+
+§ 509. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) To the agent, who in his existent sphere of liberty is
+essentially as a _particular_, his _interest and welfare_ must, on account
+of that existent sphere of liberty, be essentially an aim and therefore a
+duty. But at the same time in aiming at the good, which is the
+not-particular but only universal of the will, the particular interest
+_ought not_ to be a constituent motive. On account of this independency of
+the two principles of action, it is likewise an accident whether they
+harmonise. And yet they _ought_ to harmonise, because the agent, as
+individual and universal, is always fundamentally one identity.
+
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence; it is
+also a form of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty, an abstract
+reflection of freedom into himself. He is thus distinct from the reason in
+the will, and capable of making the universal itself a particular and in
+that way a semblance. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere "may
+happen" for the agent, who can therefore resolve itself to somewhat
+opposite to the good, can be wicked.
+
+§ 510. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}) The external objectivity, following the distinction which has
+arisen in the subjective will (§ 503), constitutes a peculiar world of its
+own,--another extreme which stands in no rapport with the internal
+will-determination. It is thus a matter of chance, whether it harmonises
+with the subjective aims, whether the good is realised, and the wicked, an
+aim essentially and actually null, nullified in it: it is no less matter
+of chance whether the agent finds in it his well-being, and more precisely
+whether in the world the good agent is happy and the wicked unhappy. But
+at the same time the world _ought_ to allow the good action, the essential
+thing, to be carried out in it; it _ought_ to grant the good agent the
+satisfaction of his particular interest, and refuse it to the wicked; just
+as it _ought_ also to make the wicked itself null and void.
+
+§ 511. The all-round contradiction, expressed by this repeated _ought_,
+with its absoluteness which yet at the same time is _not_--contains the
+most abstract 'analysis' of the mind in itself, its deepest descent into
+itself. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one
+another is in the abstract certainty of self; and for this infinitude of
+subjectivity the universal will, good, right, and duty, no more exist than
+not. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding.
+This pure self-certitude, rising to its pitch, appears in the two directly
+inter-changing forms--of _Conscience_ and _Wickedness_. The former is the
+will of goodness; but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is the
+_non-objective_, non-universal, the unutterable; and over which the agent
+is conscious that _he_ in his _individuality_ has the decision. Wickedness
+is the same awareness that the single self possesses the decision, so far
+as the single self does not merely remain in this abstraction, but takes
+up the content of a subjective interest contrary to the good.
+
+§ 512. This supreme pitch of the "_phenomenon_" of will,--sublimating
+itself to this absolute vanity--to a goodness, which has no objectivity,
+but is only sure of itself, and a self-assurance which involves the
+nullification of the universal--collapses by its own force. Wickedness, as
+the most intimate reflection of subjectivity itself, in opposition to the
+objective and universal, (which it treats as mere sham,) is the same as
+the good sentiment of abstract goodness, which reserves to the
+subjectivity the determination thereof:--the utterly abstract semblance,
+the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. The result, the truth of
+this semblance, is, on its negative side, the absolute nullity of this
+volition which would fain hold its own against the good, and of the good,
+which would only be abstract. On the affirmative side, in the notion, this
+semblance thus collapsing is the same simple universality of the will,
+which is the good. The subjectivity, in this its _identity_ with the good,
+is only the infinite form, which actualises and developes it. In this way
+the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides,--the
+standpoint of the _ought_, is abandoned, and we have passed into the field
+of ethical life.
+
+
+
+
+Sub-Section C. The Moral Life, Or Social Ethics(161).
+
+
+§ 513. The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective--the truth of
+the subjective and objective spirit itself. The failure of the latter
+consists--partly in having its freedom _immediately_ in reality, in
+something external therefore, in a thing,--partly in the abstract
+universality of its goodness. The failure of spirit subjective similarly
+consists in this, that it is, as against the universal, abstractly
+self-determinant in its inward individuality. When these two imperfections
+are suppressed, subjective _freedom_ exists as the covertly and overtly
+_universal_ rational will, which is sensible of itself and actively
+disposed in the consciousness of the individual subject, whilst its
+practical operation and immediate universal _actuality_ at the same time
+exist as moral usage, manner and custom,--where self-conscious _liberty_
+has become _nature_.
+
+§ 514. The consciously free substance, in which the absolute "ought" is no
+less an "is," has actuality as the spirit of a nation. The abstract
+disruption of this spirit singles it out into _persons_, whose
+independence it however controls and entirely dominates from within. But
+the person, as an intelligent being, feels that underlying essence to be
+his own very being--ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it--looks
+upon it as his absolute final aim. In its actuality he sees not less an
+achieved present, than somewhat he brings it about by his action,--yet
+somewhat which without all question _is_. Thus, without any selective
+reflection, the person performs its duty as _his own_ and as something
+which _is_; and in this necessity _he_ has himself and his actual freedom.
+
+§ 515. Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and
+universality of freedom, it follows that the actuality and action of each
+individual to keep and to take care of his own being, while it is on one
+hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he
+exists, is on the other a transition into a universal product.--The social
+disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance, and of the
+identity of all their interests with the total; and that the other
+individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity,
+is confidence (trust)--the genuine ethical temper.
+
+§ 516. The relations between individuals in the several situations to
+which the substance is particularised form their _ethical duties_. The
+ethical personality, i.e. the subjectivity which is permeated by the
+substantial life, is _virtue_. In relation to the bare facts of external
+being, to _destiny_, virtue does not treat them as a mere negation, and is
+thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to substantial objectivity, to
+the total of ethical actuality, it exists as confidence, as deliberate
+work for the community, and the capacity of sacrificing self thereto;
+whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance, it
+is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. In the latter
+sphere, and in its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity, the
+individuality expresses its special character, temperament, &c. as
+personal _virtues_.
+
+§ 517. The ethical substance is
+
+AA. as "immediate" or _natural_ mind,--the _Family_.
+
+BB. The "relative" totality of the "relative" relations of the individuals
+as independent persons to one another in a formal universality--_Civil
+Society_.
+
+CC. The self-conscious substance, as the mind developed to an organic
+actuality--the _Political Constitution_.
+
+
+
+AA. The Family.
+
+
+§ 518. The ethical spirit, in its _immediacy_, contains the _natural_
+factor that the individual has its substantial existence in its natural
+universal, i.e. in its kind. This is the sexual tie, elevated however to a
+spiritual significance,--the unanimity of love and the temper of trust. In
+the shape of the family, mind appears as feeling.
+
+§ 519. (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as
+a difference of intellectual and moral type. With their exclusive
+individualities these personalities combine to form a _single person_: the
+subjective union of hearts, becoming a "substantial" unity, makes this
+union an ethical tie--_Marriage_. The 'substantial' union of hearts makes
+marriage an indivisible personal bond--monogamic marriage: the bodily
+conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. A further sequel is
+community of personal and private interests.
+
+§ 520. (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the
+family stand in reference to property, that property of the one person
+(representing the family) acquires an ethical interest, as do also its
+industry, labour, and care for the future.
+
+§ 521. The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural
+generation of the children, and which was assumed to have primary
+importance in first forming the marriage union, is actually realised in
+the second or spiritual birth of the children,--in educating them to
+independent personality.
+
+§ 522. (3) The children, thus invested with independence, leave the
+concrete life and action of the family to which they primarily belong,
+acquire an existence of their own, destined however to found anew such an
+actual family. Marriage is of course broken up by the _natural_ element
+contained in it, the death of husband and wife: but even their union of
+hearts, as it is a mere "substantiality" of feeling, contains the germ of
+liability to chance and decay. In virtue of such fortuitousness, the
+members of the family take up to each other the status of persons; and it
+is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time the
+element, originally foreign to it, of _legal_ regulation.
+
+
+
+BB. Civil Society(162).
+
+
+§ 523. As the substance, being an intelligent substance, particularises
+itself abstractly into many persons (the family is only a single person),
+into families or individuals, who exist independent and free, as private
+persons, it loses its ethical character: for these persons as such have in
+their consciousness and as their aim not the absolute unity, but their own
+petty selves and particular interests. Thus arises the system of
+_atomistic_: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of
+adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their particular
+interests. The developed totality of this connective system is the state
+as civil society, or _state external_.
+
+
+a. The System of Wants(163).
+
+
+§ 524. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance
+their wants. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the
+social fabric, the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction.
+In the condition of things in which this method of satisfaction by
+indirect adjustment is realised, immediate seizure (§ 488) of external
+objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are
+already property. To acquire them is only possible by the intervention, on
+one hand, of the possessors' will, which as particular has in view the
+satisfaction of their variously defined interests; while on the other hand
+it is conditioned by the ever continued production of fresh means of
+exchange by the exchangers' _own labour_. This instrument, by which the
+labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants, constitutes the general
+stock.
+
+§ 525. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of
+wants is found in the way intellect creates differences in them, and thus
+causes an indefinite multiplication both of wants and of means for their
+different phases. Both are thus rendered more and more abstract. This
+"morcellement" of their content by abstraction gives rise to the _division
+of labour_. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment, information,
+feeling and demeanour, constitutes training in this sphere, or nominal
+culture in general.
+
+§ 526. The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by
+its uniformity to make labour easier and to increase production,--on
+another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill, and thus
+produce more unconditional dependence on the social system. The skill
+itself becomes in this way mechanical, and gets the capability of letting
+the machine take the place of human labour.
+
+§ 527. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) But the concrete division of the general stock--which is also a
+general business (of the whole society)--into particular masses determined
+by the factors of the notion,--masses each of which possesses its own basis
+of subsistence, and a corresponding mode of labour, of needs, and of means
+for satisfying them, besides of aims and interests, as well as of mental
+culture and habit--constitutes the difference of Estates (orders or ranks).
+Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent,
+skill, option and accident. As belonging to such a definite and stable
+sphere, they have their actual existence, which as existence is
+essentially a particular; and in it they have their social morality, which
+is _honesty_, their recognition and their _honour_.
+
+Where civil society, and with it the State, exists, there arise the
+several estates in their difference: for the universal substance, as
+vital, _exists_ only so far as it organically _particularises_ itself. The
+history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates, of
+the legal relationships of individuals to them, and of these estates to
+one another and to their centre.
+
+§ 528. To the "substantial," natural estate the fruitful soil and ground
+supply a natural and stable capital; its action gets direction and content
+through natural features, and its moral life is founded on faith and
+trust. The second, the "reflected" estate has as its allotment the social
+capital, the medium created by the action of middlemen, of mere agents,
+and an ensemble of contingencies, where the individual has to depend on
+his subjective skill, talent, intelligence and industry. The third,
+"thinking" estate has for its business the general interests; like the
+second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill, and like
+the first a certain subsistence, certain however because guaranteed
+through the whole society.
+
+
+b. Administration of Justice(164).
+
+
+§ 529. When matured through the operation of natural need and free option
+into a system of universal relationships and a regular course of external
+necessity, the principle of casual particularity gets that stable
+articulation which liberty requires in the shape of _formal right_. (1)
+The actualisation which right gets in this sphere of mere practical
+intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable
+universal, that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice
+of authority--the _Law_(165).
+
+The _positive_ element in laws concerns only their form of _publicity_ and
+_authority_--which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a
+customary and external way. Their content _per se_ may be reasonable--or it
+may be unreasonable and so wrong. But when right, in the course of
+definite manifestation, is developed in detail, and its content analyses
+itself to gain definiteness, this analysis, because of the finitude of its
+materials, falls into the falsely infinite progress: the _final_
+definiteness, which is absolutely essential and causes a break in this
+progress of unreality, can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in
+a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. Thus whether three
+years, ten thalers, or only 2-1/2, 2-3/4, 2-4/5 years, and so on _ad
+infinitum_, be the right and just thing, can by no means be decided on
+intelligible principles,--and yet it should be decided. Hence, though of
+course only at the final points of deciding, on the side of external
+existence, the "positive" principle naturally enters law as contingency
+and arbitrariness. This happens and has from of old happened in all
+legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it, and not
+be misled by the talk and the pretence as if the ideal of law were, or
+could be, to be, at _every_ point, determined through reason or legal
+intelligence, on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. It is a futile
+perfectionism to have such expectations and to make such requirements in
+the sphere of the finite.
+
+There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity, and who
+regard governing and being governed from natural love, hereditary,
+divinity or nobility, by faith and trust, as the genuine order of life,
+while the reign of law is held an order of corruption and injustice. These
+people forget that the stars--and the cattle too--are governed and well
+governed too by laws;--laws however which are only internally in these
+objects, not _for them_, not as laws _set to_ them:--whereas it is man's
+privilege to _know_ his law. They forget therefore that he can truly obey
+only such known law,--even as his law can only be a just law, as it is a
+_known_ law;--though in other respects it must be in its essential content
+contingency and caprice, or at least be mixed and polluted with such
+elements.
+
+The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite
+thesis--viz. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or
+impracticable. In this case there comes in the additional absurdity of
+putting essential and universal provisions in one class with the
+particular detail. The finite material is definable on and on to the false
+infinite: but this advance is not, as in the mental images of space, a
+generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those
+preceding them, but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality by
+the acumen of the analytic intellect, which discovers new distinctions,
+which again make new decisions necessary. To provisions of this sort one
+may give the name of _new_ decisions or _new_ laws; but in proportion to
+the gradual advance in specialisation the interest and value of these
+provisions declines. They fall within the already subsisting
+"substantial," general laws, like improvements on a floor or a door,
+within the house--which though something _new_, are not a new _house_. But
+there is a contrary case. If the legislation of a rude age began with
+single provisos, which go on by their very nature always increasing their
+number, there arises, with the advance in multitude, the need of a simpler
+code,--the need i.e. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general
+features. To find and be able to express these principles well beseems an
+intelligent and civilised nation. Such a gathering up of single rules into
+general forms, first really deserving the name of laws, has lately been
+begun in some directions by the English Minister Peel, who has by so doing
+gained the gratitude, even the admiration, of his countrymen.
+
+§ 530. (2) The positive form of Laws--to be _promulgated and made known_ as
+laws--is a condition of the _external obligation_ to obey them; inasmuch
+as, being laws of strict right, they touch only the abstract will,--itself
+at bottom external--not the moral or ethical will. The subjectivity to
+which the will has in this direction a right is here only publicity. This
+subjective existence is as existence of the essential and developed truth
+in this sphere of Right at the same time an externally objective
+existence, as universal authority and necessity.
+
+The legality of property and of private transactions concerned
+therewith--in consideration of the principle that all law must be
+promulgated, recognised, and thus become authoritative--gets its universal
+guarantee through _formalities_.
+
+§ 531. (3) Legal forms get the necessity, to which objective existence
+determines itself, in the _judicial __ system_. Abstract right has to
+exhibit itself to the _court_--to the individualised right--as _proven_:--a
+process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly
+right and what is provably right. The court takes cognisance and action in
+the interest of right as such, deprives the existence of right of its
+contingency, and in particular transforms this existence,--as this exists
+as revenge--into _punishment_ (§ 500).
+
+The comparison of the two species, or rather two elements in the judicial
+conviction, bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the
+accused,--(1) according as that conviction is based on mere circumstances
+and other people's witness alone,--or (2) in addition requires the
+confession of the accused, constitutes the main point in the question of
+the so-called jury-courts. It is an essential point that the two
+ingredients of a judicial cognisance, the judgment as to the state of the
+fact, and the judgment as application of the law to it, should, as at
+bottom different sides, be exercised as _different functions_. By the said
+institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified,--from
+the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are
+expressly excluded. To carry this separation of functions up to this
+separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations:
+the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially
+different functions.--It is a more important point whether the confession
+of the accused is or is not to be made a condition of penal judgment. The
+institution of the jury-court loses sight of this condition. The point is
+that on this ground certainty is completely inseparable from truth: but
+the confession is to be regarded as the very acmé of certainty-giving
+which in its nature is subjective. The final decision therefore lies with
+the confession. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right, if
+the proof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. No doubt
+this factor is incomplete, because it is only one factor; but still more
+incomplete is the other when no less abstractly taken,--viz. mere
+circumstantial evidence. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a
+judgment. In so far, then, as all they have to go on are such objective
+proofs, whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in
+so far as it is only _in them_) is admitted, the jury-court shows traces
+of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between objective
+proofs and subjective or so-called "moral" conviction.--It is easy to call
+_extraordinary_ punishments an absurdity; but the fault lies rather with
+the shallowness which takes offence at a mere name. Materially the
+principle involves the difference of objective probation according as it
+goes with or without the factor of absolute certification which lies in
+confession.
+
+§ 532. The function of judicial administration is only to actualise to
+necessity the abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. But this
+actualisation rests at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge,
+since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right
+in the abstract. Conversely, the blind necessity of the system of wants is
+not lifted up into the consciousness of the universal, and worked from
+that period of view.
+
+
+c. Police and Corporation(166).
+
+
+§ 533. Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of
+actions and interests as belongs only to particularity, and leaves to
+chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public
+weal. In civil society the sole end is to satisfy want--and that, because
+it is man's want, in a uniform general way, so as to _secure_ this
+satisfaction. But the machinery of social necessity leaves in many ways a
+casualness about this satisfaction. This is due to the variability of the
+wants themselves, in which opinion and subjective good-pleasure play a
+great part. It results also from circumstances of locality, from the
+connexions between nation and nation, from errors and deceptions which can
+be foisted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable
+of creating disorder in it,--as also and especially from the unequal
+capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. The
+onward march of this necessity also sacrifices the very particularities by
+which it is brought about, and does not itself contain the affirmative aim
+of securing the satisfaction of individuals. So far as concerns them, it
+_may_ be far from beneficial: yet here the individuals are the
+morally-justifiable end.
+
+§ 534. To keep in view this general end, to ascertain the way in which the
+powers composing that social necessity act, and their variable
+ingredients, and to maintain that end in them and against them, is the
+work of an institution which assumes on _one_ hand, to the concrete of
+civil society, the position of an external universality. Such an order
+acts with the power of an external state, which, in so far as it is rooted
+in the higher or substantial state, appears as state "police." On the
+_other_ hand, in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the
+aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is
+restricted to the business of particular branches and interests. Thus we
+have the _corporation_, in which the particular citizen in his private
+capacity finds the securing of his stock, whilst at the same time he in it
+emerges from his single private interest, and has a conscious activity for
+a comparatively universal end, just as in his legal and professional
+duties he has his social morality.
+
+
+
+CC. The State.
+
+
+§ 535. The State is the _self-conscious_ ethical substance, the
+unification of the family principle with that of civil society. The same
+unity, which is in the family as a feeling of love, is its essence,
+receiving however at the same time through the second principle of
+conscious and spontaneously active volition the _form_ of conscious
+universality. This universal principle, with all its evolution in detail,
+is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject, which thus
+identifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness.
+
+§ 536. The state is ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) its inward structure as a self-relating
+development--constitutional (inner-state) law: ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) a particular individual,
+and therefore in connexion with other particular
+individuals,--international (outer-state) law; ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) but these particular
+minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality:
+universal history.
+
+
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}. Constitutional Law(167).
+
+
+§ 537. The essence of the state is the universal, self-originated and
+self-developed,--the reasonable spirit of will; but, as self-knowing and
+self-actualising, sheer subjectivity, and--as an actuality--one individual.
+Its _work_ generally--in relation to the extreme of individuality as the
+multitude of individuals--consists in a double function. First it maintains
+them as persons, thus making right a necessary actuality, then it promotes
+their welfare, which each originally takes care of for himself, but which
+has a thoroughly general side; it protects the family and guides civil
+society. Secondly, it carries back both, and the whole disposition and
+action of the individual--whose tendency is to become a centre of his
+own--into the life of the universal substance; and, in this direction, as a
+free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and retains them
+in substantial immanence.
+
+§ 538. The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom.
+First, to the immediate agent, his independent self-will and particular
+interest, they are restrictions. But, secondly, they are an absolute final
+end and the universal work: hence they are a product of the "functions" of
+the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the
+general particularising, and are a fruit of all the acts and private
+concerns of individuals. Thirdly, they are the substance of the volition
+of individuals--which volition is thereby free--and of their disposition:
+being as such exhibited as current usage.
+
+§ 539. As a living mind, the state only is as an organised whole,
+differentiated into particular agencies, which, proceeding from the one
+notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will, continually
+produce it as their result. The _constitution_ is this articulation or
+organisation of state-power. It provides for the reasonable will,--in so
+far as it is in the individuals only _implicitly_ the universal
+will,--coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and being
+_found_; also for that will being put in actuality, through the action of
+the government and its several branches, and not left to perish, but
+protected both against _their_ casual subjectivity and against that of the
+individuals. The constitution is existent _justice_,--the actuality of
+liberty in the development all its reasonable provisions.
+
+Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently
+concentrated what should form the fundamental principle, the final aim and
+result of the constitution. However true this is, the defect of these
+terms is their utter abstractness: if stuck to in this abstract form, they
+are principles which either prevent the rise of the concreteness of the
+state, i.e. its articulation into a constitution and a government in
+general, or destroy them. With the state there arises inequality, the
+difference of governing powers and of governed, magistracies, authorities,
+directories, &c. The principle of equality, logically carried out, rejects
+all differences, and thus allows no sort of political condition to exist.
+Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state, but as the
+most abstract also the most superficial, and for that very reason
+naturally the most familiar. It is important therefore to study them
+closer.
+
+As regards, first, Equality, the familiar proposition, All men are by
+nature equal, blunders by confusing the "natural" with the "notion." It
+ought rather to read: _By nature_ men are only unequal. But the notion of
+liberty, as it exists as such, without further specification and
+development, is abstract subjectivity, as a person capable of property (§
+488). This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual
+_equality_ of human beings. But that this freedom should exist, that it
+should be _man_ (and not as in Greece, Rome, &c. _some_ men) that is
+recognised and legally regarded as a person, is so little _by nature_,
+that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the
+deepest principle of mind, and of the universality and expansion of this
+consciousness. That the citizens are equal before the law contains a great
+truth, but which so expressed is a tautology: it only states that the
+legal status in general exists, that the laws rule. But, as regards the
+concrete, the citizens--besides their personality--are equal before the law
+only in these points when they are otherwise equal _outside the law_. Only
+that equality which (in whatever way it be) they, as it happens, otherwise
+have in property, age, physical strength, talent, skill, &c.--or even in
+crime, can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the
+law:--only it can make them--as regards taxation, military service,
+eligibility to office, &c.--punishment, &c.--equal in the concrete. The laws
+themselves, except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of
+personality, presuppose unequal conditions, and provide for the unequal
+legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom.
+
+As regards Liberty, it is originally taken partly in a negative sense
+against arbitrary intolerance and lawless treatment, partly in the
+affirmative sense of subjective freedom; but this freedom is allowed great
+latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his
+particular ends, and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence
+and a personal share in general affairs. Formerly the legally defined
+rights, private as well as public rights of a nation, town, &c. were
+called its "liberties." Really, every genuine law is a liberty: it
+contains a reasonable principle of objective mind; in other words, it
+embodies a liberty. Nothing has become, on the contrary, more familiar
+than the idea that each must _restrict_ his liberty in relation to the
+liberty of others: that the state is a condition of such reciprocal
+restriction, and that the laws are restrictions. To such habits of mind
+liberty is viewed as only casual good-pleasure and self-will. Hence it has
+also been said that "modern" nations are only susceptible of equality, or
+of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that,
+with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of all in
+political affairs and actions), it was impossible to make ends meet in
+actuality--which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract
+presuppositions. On the contrary, it should be said that it is just the
+great development and maturity of form in modern states which produces the
+supreme concrete inequality of individuals in actuality: while, through
+the deeper reasonableness of laws and the greater stability of the legal
+state, it gives rise to greater and more stable liberty, which it can
+without incompatibility allow. Even the superficial distinction of the
+words liberty and equality points to the fact that the former tends to
+inequality: whereas, on the contrary, the current notions of liberty only
+carry us back to equality. But the more we fortify liberty,--as security of
+property, as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his
+talents and good qualities, the more it gets taken for granted: and then
+the sense and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a _subjective_
+direction. By this is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side,
+and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general
+intellectual interests, the removal of all checks on the individual
+particularity, as well as the inward liberty in which the subject has
+principles, has an insight and conviction of his own, and thus gains moral
+independence. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme
+differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal
+by education; and on another it only grows up under conditions of that
+objective liberty, and is and could grow to such height only in modern
+states. If, with this development of particularity, there be simultaneous
+and endless increase of the number of wants, and of the difficulty of
+satisfying them, of the lust of argument and the fancy of detecting
+faults, with its insatiate vanity, it is all but part of that
+indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sphere which
+generates all possible complications, and must deal with them as it can.
+Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions, because liberty
+is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing, and has
+therefore to restrict itself: and that, not merely with regard to the
+naturalness, self-will and self-conceit, of others, but especially and
+essentially with regard to reasonable liberty.
+
+The term political liberty, however, is often used to mean formal
+participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even
+of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the
+particular aims and business of civil society. And it has in part become
+usual to give the title constitution only to the side of the state which
+concerns such participation of these individuals in general affairs, and
+to regard a state, in which this is not formally done, as a state without
+a constitution. On this use of the term, the only thing to remark is that
+by constitution must be understood the determination of rights, i.e. of
+liberties in general, and the organisation of the actualisation of them;
+and that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only
+constitute a part of it. Of it the following paragraphs will speak.
+
+§ 540. The guarantee of a constitution (i.e. the necessity that the laws
+be reasonable, and their actualisation secured) lies in the collective
+spirit of the nation,--especially in the specific way in which it is itself
+conscious of its reason. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute
+substantiality.) But the guarantee lies also at the same time in the
+actual organisation or development of that principle in suitable
+institutions. The constitution presupposes that consciousness of the
+collective spirit, and conversely that spirit presupposes the
+constitution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of
+its principles, in so far as it has them actually existent before it.
+
+The question--To whom (to what authority and how organised) belongs the
+power to make a constitution? is the same as the question, Who has to make
+the spirit of a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of
+the collective spirit, as if the latter exists or has existed without a
+constitution, and your fancy only proves how superficially you have
+apprehended the nexus between the spirit in its self-consciousness and in
+its actuality. What is thus called "making" a "constitution," is--just
+because of this inseparability--a thing that has never happened in history,
+just as little as the making of a code of laws. A constitution only
+develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own
+development, and runs through at the same time with it the grades of
+formation and the alterations required by its concept. It is the
+indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and, be it added, the
+history is only that spirit's history) by which constitutions have been
+and are made.
+
+§ 541. The really living totality,--that which preserves, in other words
+continually produces the state in general and its constitution, is the
+_government_. The organisation which natural necessity gives is seen in
+the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. The
+government is the _universal_ part of the constitution, i.e. the part
+which intentionally aims at preserving those parts, but at the same time
+gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole which rise
+above the function of the family and of civil society. The organisation of
+the government is likewise its differentiation into powers, as their
+peculiarities have a basis in principle; yet without that difference
+losing touch with the _actual unity_ they have in the notion's
+subjectivity.
+
+As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of _universality_
+and _individuality_ and their relationship that of _subsumption_ of
+individual under universal, it has come about that in the state the
+legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the
+former exist apart as the absolute superior, and to subdivide the latter
+again into administrative (government) power and judicial power, according
+as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. The _division_ of
+these powers has been treated as _the_ condition of political equilibrium,
+meaning by division their _independence_ one of another in
+existence,--subject always however to the above-mentioned subsumption of
+the powers of the individual under the power of the general. The theory of
+such "division" unmistakably implies the elements of the notion, but so
+combined by "understanding" as to result in an absurd collocation, instead
+of the self-redintegration of the living spirit. The one essential canon
+to make liberty deep and real is to give every business belonging to the
+general interests of the state a separate organisation wherever they are
+essentially distinct. Such real division must be: for liberty is only deep
+when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differences
+manifested in existence. But to make the business of legislation an
+independent power--to make it the first power, with the further proviso
+that all citizens shall have part therein, and the government be merely
+executive and dependent, presupposes ignorance that the true idea, and
+therefore the living and spiritual actuality, is the self-redintegrating
+notion, in other words, the subjectivity which contains in it universality
+as only one of its moments. (A mistake still greater, if it goes with the
+fancy that the constitution and the fundamental laws were still one day to
+make,--in a state of society, which includes an already existing
+development of differences.) Individuality is the first and supreme
+principle _which_ makes itself fall through the state's organisation. Only
+through the government, and by its embracing in itself the particular
+businesses (including the abstract legislative business, which taken apart
+is also particular), is the state _one_. These, as always, are the terms
+on which the different elements essentially and alone truly stand towards
+each other in the logic of "reason," as opposed to the external footing
+they stand on in 'understanding,' which never gets beyond subsuming the
+individual and particular under the universal. What disorganises the unity
+of logical reason, equally disorganises actuality.
+
+§ 542. In the government--regarded as organic totality--the sovereign power
+(principate) is (_a_) _subjectivity_ as the _infinite_ self-unity of the
+notion in its development;--the all-sustaining, all-decreeing will of the
+state, its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. In the perfect form of
+the state, in which each and every element of the notion has reached free
+existence, this subjectivity is not a so-called "moral person," or a
+decree issuing from a majority (forms in which the unity of the decreeing
+will has not an _actual_ existence), but an actual individual,--the will of
+a decreeing individual,--_monarchy_. The monarchical constitution is
+therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions
+belong to lower grades of the development and realisation of reason.
+
+The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence, as in the
+patriarchal society,--or, as in a democratic constitution, the
+participation of all in all affairs--impugns the principle of the division
+of powers, i.e. the developed liberty of the constituent factors of the
+Idea. But no whit less must the division (the working out of these factors
+each to a free totality) be reduced to "ideal" unity, i.e. to
+_subjectivity_. The mature differentiation or realisation of the Idea
+means, essentially, that this subjectivity should grow to be a _real_
+"moment," an _actual_ existence; and this actuality is not otherwise than
+as the individuality of the monarch--the subjectivity of abstract and final
+decision existent in _one_ person. All those forms of collective decreeing
+and willing,--a common will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on
+aristocratical or democratical principles) of the atomistic of single
+wills, have on them the mark of the unreality of an abstraction. Two
+points only are all-important, first to see the necessity of each of the
+notional factors, and secondly the form in which it is actualised. It is
+only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give light on
+the matter. That subjectivity--being the "moment" which emphasises the need
+of abstract deciding in general--partly leads on to the proviso that the
+name of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything
+is done in the government;--partly, being simple self-relation, has
+attached to it the characteristic of _immediacy_, and then of
+_nature_--whereby the destination of individuals for the dignity of the
+princely power is fixed by inheritance.
+
+§ 543. (_b_) In the _particular_ government-power there emerges, first,
+the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined),
+legislative power, administration of justice or judicial power,
+administration and police, and its consequent distribution between
+particular boards or offices, which having their business appointed by
+law, to that end and for that reason, possess independence of action,
+without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision.
+Secondly, too, there arises the participation of _several_ in
+state-business, who together constitute the "general order" (§ 528) in so
+far as they take on themselves the charge of universal ends as the
+essential function of their particular life;--the further condition for
+being able to take individually part in this business being a certain
+training, aptitude, and skill for such ends.
+
+§ 544. The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by
+which all such as belong to civil society in general, and are to that
+degree private persons, participate in the governmental power, especially
+in legislation--viz. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of
+those interests which do not, like peace and war, involve the, as it were,
+personal interference and action of the State as one man, and therefore do
+not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. By virtue of
+this participation subjective liberty and conceit, with their general
+opinion, can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the
+satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something.
+
+The division of constitutions into democracy, aristocracy and monarchy, is
+still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to
+sovereignty. They must at the same time be regarded as necessary
+structures in the path of development,--in short, in the history of the
+State. Hence it is superficial and absurd to represent them as an object
+of _choice_. The pure forms--necessary to the process of evolution--are, in
+so far as they are finite and in course of change, conjoined both with
+forms of their degeneration,--such as ochlocracy, &c., and with earlier
+transition-forms. These two forms are not to be confused with those
+legitimate structures. Thus, it may be--if we look only to the fact that
+the will of one individual stands at the head of the state--oriental
+despotism is included under the vague name monarchy,--as also feudal
+monarchy, to which indeed even the favourite name of "constitutional
+monarchy" cannot be refused. The true difference of these forms from
+genuine monarchy depends on the true value of those principles of right
+which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarantee in the
+state-power. These principles are those expounded earlier, liberty of
+property, and above all personal liberty, civil society, with its industry
+and its communities, and the regulated efficiency of the particular
+bureaux in subordination to the laws.
+
+The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand
+the participation of private persons in state affairs. For it is as
+private persons that the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be
+taken, be they treated as mere individuals, or as representatives of a
+number of people or of the nation. The aggregate of private persons is
+often spoken of as the _nation_: but as such an aggregate it is _vulgus_,
+not _populus_: and in this direction, it is the one sole aim of the state
+that a nation should _not_ come to existence, to power and action, _as
+such an aggregate_. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of
+lawlessness, demoralisation, brutishness: in it the nation would only be a
+shapeless, wild, blind force, like that of the stormy, elemental sea,
+which however is not self-destructive, as the nation--a spiritual
+element--would be. Yet such a condition may be often heard described as
+that of true freedom. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the
+question of the participation of private persons in public affairs, it is
+not a brutish mass, but an already organised nation--one in which a
+governmental power exists--which should be presupposed. The desirability of
+such participation however is not to be put in the superiority of
+particular intelligence, which private persons are supposed to have over
+state officials--the contrary may be the case--nor in the superiority of
+their good will for the general best. The members of civil society as such
+are rather people who find their nearest duty in their private interest
+and (as especially in the feudal society) in the interest of their
+privileged corporation. Take the case of _England_ which, because private
+persons have a predominant share in public affairs, has been regarded as
+having the freest of all constitutions. Experience shows that that
+country--as compared with the other civilised states of Europe--is the most
+backward in civil and criminal legislation, in the law and liberty of
+property, in arrangements for art and science, and that objective freedom
+or rational right is rather _sacrificed_ to formal right and particular
+private interest; and that this happens even in the institutions and
+possessions supposed to be dedicated to religion. The desirability of
+private persons taking part in public affairs is partly to be put in their
+concrete, and therefore more urgent, sense of general wants. But the true
+motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an _externally
+universal_ will, acting with orderly and express efficacy for the public
+concerns. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life
+quickened, and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative
+officials; who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they
+to enforce duties but also to have regard to rights. Private citizens are
+in the state the incomparably greater number, and form the multitude of
+such as are recognised as persons. Hence the will-reason exhibits its
+existence in them as a preponderating majority of freemen, or in its
+"reflectional" universality, which has its actuality vouchsafed it as a
+participation in the sovereignty. But it has already been noted as a
+"moment" of civil society (§§ 527, 534) that the individuals rise from
+external into substantial universality, and form a _particular_ kind,--the
+Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such
+(after the _democratic_ fashion of election), but as organic factors, as
+estates, that they enter upon that participation. In the state a power or
+agency must never appear and act as a formless, inorganic shape, i.e.
+basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers.
+
+Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the _legislative
+power_, so far as they form only one branch of that power,--a branch in
+which the special government-officials have an _ex officio_ share, while
+the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. In a civilised
+state moreover legislation can only be a further modification of existing
+law, and so-called new laws can only deal with minutiae of detail and
+particularities (cf. § 529, note), the main drift of which has been
+already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the
+law-courts. The so-called _financial law_, in so far as it requires the
+assent of the estates, is really a government affair: it is only
+improperly called a law, in the general sense of embracing a wide, indeed
+the whole, range of the external means of government. The finances deal
+with what in their nature are only particular needs, ever newly recurring,
+even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. If the main part of the
+requirement were--as it very likely is--regarded as permanent, the provision
+for it would have more the nature of a law: but to be a law, it would have
+to be made once for all, and not be made yearly, or every few years,
+afresh. The part which varies according to time and circumstances concerns
+in reality the smallest part of the amount, and the provisions with regard
+to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be only
+this slight variable part which is matter of dispute, and can be subjected
+to a varying yearly estimate. It is this last then which falsely bears the
+high-sounding name of the "_Grant_" of the _Budget_, i.e. of the whole of
+the finances. A law for one year and made each year has even to the plain
+man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and
+developed universal, as content of a true law, from the reflectional
+universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. To
+give the name of a law to the annual fixing of financial requirements only
+serves--with the presupposed separation of legislative from executive--to
+keep up the illusion of that separation having real existence, and to
+conceal the fact that the legislative power, when it makes a decree about
+finance, is really engaged with strict executive business. But the
+importance attached to the power of from time to time granting "supply,"
+on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a _check_ on
+the government, and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence,--this
+importance is in one way rather plausible than real. The financial
+measures necessary for the state's subsistence cannot be made conditional
+on any other circumstances, nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly
+in doubt. It would be a parallel absurdity if the government were e.g. to
+grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a limited time
+merely; and thus, by the threat of suspending the activity of such an
+institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage, reserve for
+itself a means of coercing private individuals. Then again, the pictures
+of a condition of affairs, in which it might be useful and necessary to
+have in hand means of compulsion, are partly based on the false conception
+of a contract between rulers and ruled, and partly presuppose the
+possibility of such a divergence in spirit between these two parties as
+would make constitution and government quite out of the question. If we
+suppose the empty possibility of getting _help_ by such compulsive means
+brought into existence, such help would rather be the derangement and
+dissolution of the state, in which there would no longer be a government,
+but only parties, and the violence and oppression of one party would only
+be helped away by the other. To fit together the several parts of the
+state into a constitution after the fashion of mere understanding--i.e. to
+adjust within it the machinery of a balance of powers external to each
+other--is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is.
+
+§ 545. The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality
+as a single nation marked by physical conditions. As a single individual
+it is exclusive against other like individuals. In their mutual relations,
+waywardness and chance have a place; for each person in the aggregate is
+autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them, and not
+actually existent. This independence of a central authority reduces
+disputes between them to terms of mutual violence, a _state of war_, to
+meet which the general estate in the community assumes the particular
+function of maintaining the state's independence against other states, and
+becomes the estate of bravery.
+
+§ 546. This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its
+individuality--an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity.
+Country and fatherland then appear as the power by which the particular
+independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence
+of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity,--as the
+power which procures the maintenance of the general substance by the
+patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and
+particular existence,--so making nugatory the nugatoriness that confronts
+it.
+
+
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}. External Public Law(168).
+
+
+§ 547. In the game of war the independence of States is at stake. In one
+case the result may be the mutual recognition of free national
+individualities (§ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever,
+both this general recognition, and the special claims of nations on one
+another, are settled and fixed. External state-rights rest partly on these
+positive treaties, but to that extent contain only rights falling short of
+true actuality (§ 545): partly on so-called _international_ law, the
+general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the several
+States. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one
+another in such a way that the possibility of peace is left; and
+distinguishes individuals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the
+state. In general, international law rests on social usage.
+
+
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}. Universal History(169).
+
+
+§ 548. As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under
+natural conditions, it admits on this nature-side the influence of
+geographical and climatic qualities. It is in time; and as regards its
+range and scope, has essentially a _particular_ principle on the lines of
+which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its
+actuality. It has, in short, a history of its own. But as a restricted
+mind its independence is something secondary; it passes into universal
+world-history, the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the several
+national minds,--the judgment of the world.
+
+§ 549. This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual
+substance, the deed by which the absolute final aim of the world is
+realised in it, and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and
+self-consciousness. It is thus the revelation and actuality of its
+essential and completed essence, whereby it becomes to the outward eye a
+universal spirit--a world-mind. As this development is in time and in real
+existence, as it is a history, its several stages and steps are the
+national minds, each of which, as single and endued by nature with a
+specific character, is appointed to occupy only one grade, and accomplish
+one task in the whole deed.
+
+The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end, from the
+principles of which certain characteristic results logically flow, is
+called an _a priori_ view of it, and philosophy is reproached with _a
+priori_ history-writing. On this point, and on history-writing in general,
+this note must go into further detail. That history, and above all
+universal history, is founded on an essential and actual aim, which
+actually is and will be realised in it--the plan of Providence; that, in
+short, there is Reason in history, must be decided on strictly
+philosophical ground, and thus shown to be essentially and in fact
+necessary. To presuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed
+conceptions or thoughts are arbitrarily adopted, and when a determined
+attempt is made to force events and actions into conformity with such
+conceptions. For such _a priori_ methods of treatment at the present day,
+however, those are chiefly to blame who profess to be purely historical,
+and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to raise their voice
+against the habit of philosophising, first in general, and then in
+history. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy
+of all arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. Such _a priori_
+history-writing has sometimes burst out in quarters where one would least
+have expected it, especially on the philological side, and in Germany more
+than in France and England, where the art of historical writing has gone
+through a process of purification to a firmer and maturer character.
+Fictions, like that of a primitive age and its primitive people, possessed
+from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sciences,--of
+sacerdotal races,--and, when we come to minutiae, of a Roman epic, supposed
+to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of
+ancient Rome, &c., have taken the place of the pragmatising which detected
+psychological motives and associations. There is a wide circle of persons
+who seem to consider it incumbent on a _learned_ and _ingenious_ historian
+drawing from the original sources to concoct such baseless fancies, and
+form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of
+out-of-the-way and trivial facts, in defiance of the best-accredited
+history.
+
+Setting aside this subjective treatment of history, we find what is
+properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an
+_objective purpose_. This is after all synonymous with what _seems_ to be
+the still more legitimate demand that the historian should proceed with
+_impartiality_. This is a requirement often and especially made on the
+_history of philosophy_: where it is insisted there should be no
+prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion, just as a judge should have
+no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. In the case of the
+judge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office
+ill and foolishly, if he had not an interest, and an exclusive interest in
+justice, if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim, or if he
+declined to judge at all. This requirement which we may make upon the
+judge may be called _partiality_ for justice; and there is no difficulty
+here in distinguishing it from _subjective_ partiality. But in speaking of
+the impartiality required from the historian, this self-satisfied insipid
+chatter lets the distinction disappear, and rejects both kinds of
+interest. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite
+aim and view by which he may sort out, state and criticise events, but
+shall narrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them, in their
+incoherent and unintelligent particularity. Now it is at least admitted
+that a history must have an object, e.g. Rome and its fortunes, or the
+Decline of the grandeur of the Roman empire. But little reflection is
+needed to discover that this is the presupposed end which lies at the
+basis of the events themselves, as of the critical examination into their
+comparative importance, i.e. their nearer or more remote relation to it. A
+history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbecile
+mental divagation, not as good as a fairy tale, for even children expect a
+_motif_ in their stories, a purpose at least dimly surmiseable with which
+events and actions are put in relation.
+
+In the existence of a _nation_ the substantial aim is to be a state and
+preserve itself as such. A nation with no state formation, (a _mere
+nation_), has strictly speaking no history,--like the nations which existed
+before the rise of states and others which still exist in a condition of
+savagery. What happens to a nation, and takes place within it, has its
+essential significance in relation to the state: whereas the mere
+particularities of individuals are at the greatest distance from the true
+object of history. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its
+imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals, and even their
+particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which
+the collective light still plays in fainter colours. Ay, even such
+singularities as a petty occurrence, a word, express not a subjective
+particularity, but an age, a nation, a civilisation, in striking
+portraiture and brevity; and to select such trifles shows the hand of a
+historian of genius. But, on the other hand, the main mass of
+singularities is a futile and useless mass, by the painstaking
+accumulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed
+and obscured. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is
+always contained in the great events. It was a correct instinct which
+sought to banish such portraiture of the particular and the gleaning of
+insignificant traits, into the _Novel_ (as in the celebrated romances of
+Walter Scott, &c.). Where the picture presents an unessential aspect of
+life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it with an unessential
+material, such as the romance takes from private events and subjective
+passions. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the
+persons in it, and, in the interest of so-called truth, weave them into
+the picture of general interests, is not only against taste and judgment,
+but violates the principles of objective truth. The only truth for mind is
+the substantial and underlying essence, and not the trivialities of
+external existence and contingency. It is therefore completely indifferent
+whether such insignificancies are duly vouched for by documents, or, as in
+the romance, invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that
+name and circumstances.
+
+The point of interest of _Biography_--to say a word on that here--appears to
+run directly counter to any universal scope and aim. But biography too has
+for its background the historical world, with which the individual is
+intimately bound up: even purely personal originality, the freak of
+humour, &c. suggests by allusion that central reality and has its interest
+heightened by the suggestion. The mere play of sentiment, on the contrary,
+has another ground and interest than history.
+
+The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy
+(and also, we may add, to the history of religion, first in general, and
+secondly, to church history) generally implies an even more decided bar
+against presupposition of any objective aim. As the State was already
+called the point to which in political history criticism had to refer all
+events, so here the "_Truth_" must be the object to which the several
+deeds and events of the spirit would have to be referred. What is actually
+done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. Histories with such an
+object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only subjective
+aims for their theme, i.e. only opinions and mere ideas, not an essential
+and realised object like the truth. And that with the mere excuse that
+there is no truth. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as
+only a partiality of the usual sort, a partiality for opinion and mere
+ideas, which all alike have no stuff in them, and are all treated as
+indifferent. In that way historical truth means but correctness--an
+accurate report of externals, without critical treatment save as regards
+this correctness--admitting, in this case, only qualitative and
+quantitative judgments, no judgments of necessity or notion (cf. notes to
+§§ 172 and 175). But, really, if Rome or the German empire, &c. are an
+actual and genuine object of political history, and the aim to which the
+phenomena are to be related and by which they are to be judged; then in
+universal history the genuine spirit, the consciousness of it and of its
+essence, is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme,
+and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually
+subservient. Only therefore through their relationship to it, i.e. through
+the judgment in which they are subsumed under it, while it inheres in
+them, have they their value and even their existence. It is the spirit
+which not merely broods _over_ history as over the waters, but lives in it
+and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit,
+liberty, i.e. a development determined by the notion of spirit, is the
+guiding principle and only its notion its final aim, i.e. truth. For
+Spirit is consciousness. Such a doctrine--or in other words that Reason is
+in history--will be partly at least a plausible faith, partly it is a
+cognition of philosophy.
+
+§ 550. This liberation of mind, in which it proceeds to come to itself and
+to realise its truth, and the business of so doing, is the supreme right,
+the absolute Law. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a
+vehicle for the contemporary development of the collective spirit in its
+actual existence: it is the objective actuality in which that spirit for
+the time invests its will. Against this absolute will the other particular
+natural minds have no rights: _that_ nation dominates the world: but yet
+the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being, as
+over a special grade, and then delivers it over to its chance and doom.
+
+§ 551. To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action,
+and therefore as a work of _individuals_, these individuals, as regards
+the substantial issue of their labour, are _instruments_, and their
+subjectivity, which is what is peculiar to them, is the empty form of
+activity. What they personally have gained therefore through the
+individual share they took in the substantial business (prepared and
+appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjective
+mental idea--_Fame_, which is their reward.
+
+§ 552. The national spirit contains nature-necessity, and stands in
+external existence (§ 423): the ethical substance, potentially infinite,
+is actually a particular and limited substance (§§ 549, 550); on its
+subjective side it labours under contingency, in the shape of its
+unreflective natural usages, and its content is presented to it as
+something _existing_ in time and tied to an external nature and external
+world. The spirit, however, (which _thinks_ in this moral organism)
+overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as
+national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests, in the
+system of laws and usages. It rises to apprehend itself in its
+essentiality. Such apprehension, however, still has the immanent
+limitedness of the national spirit. But the spirit which thinks in
+universal history, stripping off at the same time those limitations of the
+several national minds and its own temporal restrictions, lays hold of its
+concrete universality, and rises to apprehend the absolute mind, as the
+eternally actual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom,
+while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only
+ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour.
+
+The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been
+spoken of in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. especially § 51, note). As
+regards the starting-point of that elevation, Kant has on the whole
+adopted the most correct, when he treats belief in God as proceeding from
+the practical Reason. For that starting-point contains the material or
+content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. But the true
+concrete material is neither Being (as in the cosmological) nor mere
+action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind, the
+absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason, i.e.
+the self-determining and self-realising notion itself,--Liberty. That the
+elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by
+Kant again deposed to a _postulate_--a mere "ought"--is the peculiar
+perversity, formerly noticed, of calmly and simply reinstating as true and
+valid that very antithesis of finitude, the supersession of which into
+truth is the essence of that elevation.
+
+As regards the "mediation" which, as it has been already shown (§ 192, cf.
+§ 204 note), that elevation to God really involves, the point specially
+calling for note is the "moment" of negation through which the essential
+content of the starting-point is purged of its finitude so as to come
+forth free. This factor, abstract in the formal treatment of logic, now
+gets its most concrete interpretation. The finite, from which the start is
+now made, is the real ethical self-consciousness. The negation through
+which that consciousness raises its spirit to its truth, is the
+purification, _actually_ accomplished in the ethical world, whereby its
+conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the
+selfishness of desire. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue
+from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think, i.e. becoming
+aware of the free universality of its concrete essence. Only from the
+moral life and by the moral life is the Idea of God seen to be free
+spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefore it is vain to seek for true
+religion and religiosity.
+
+But--as is the case with all speculative process--this development of one
+thing out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is
+rather the absolute _prius_ of what it appears to be mediated by, and what
+is here in mind known as its truth.
+
+Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations
+between the state and religion, and in doing so to elucidate the
+terminology which is familiar and current on the topic. It is evident and
+apparent from what has preceded that moral life is the state retracted
+into its inner heart and substance, while the state is the organisation
+and actualisation of moral life; and that religion is the very substance
+of the moral life itself and of the state. At this rate, the state rests
+on the ethical sentiment, and that on the religious. If religion then is
+the consciousness of "absolute"_ truth_, then whatever is to rank as right
+and justice, as law and duty, i.e. as _true_ in the world of free will,
+can be so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth, as it is
+subsumed under it and is its sequel. But if the truly moral life is to be
+a sequel of religion, then perforce religion must have the _genuine_
+content; i.e. the idea of God it knows must be the true and real. The
+ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelling in self-consciousness, as
+it is actually present in a nation and its individual members. This
+self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical actuality and
+bringing its truth to consciousness, has in its _faith_ and in its
+_conscience_ only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual
+actuality. The two are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of
+conscience, one religious and another ethical, differing from the former
+in body and value of truth. But in point of form, i.e. for thought and
+knowledge--(and religion and ethical life belong to intelligence and are a
+thinking and knowing)--the body of religious truth, as the pure
+self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth, exercises a sanction over the
+moral life which lies in empirical actuality. Thus for self-consciousness
+religion is the "basis" of moral life and of the state. It has been the
+monstrous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as
+separable from one another, and even as mutually indifferent. The view
+taken of the relationship of religion and the state has been that, whereas
+the state had an independent existence of its own, springing from some
+force and power, religion was a later addition, something desirable
+perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks, but purely subjective in
+individuals:--or it may be, religion is treated as something without effect
+on the moral life of the state, i.e. its reasonable law and constitution
+which are based on a ground of their own.
+
+As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated, it may be worth
+while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. It is
+primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to
+the body of truth. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or
+indwelling spirit of self-consciousness in its actuality, then
+self-consciousness in this content has the certainty of itself and is
+free. But if this present self-consciousness is lacking, then there may be
+created, in point of form, a condition of spiritual slavery, even though
+the _implicit_ content of religion is absolute spirit. This great
+difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian
+religion itself, even though here it is not the nature-element in which
+the idea of God is embodied, and though nothing of the sort even enters as
+a factor into its central dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in
+spirit and in truth. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in
+actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. And, first
+of all, God is in the "host" presented to religious adoration as an
+_external thing_. (In the Lutheran Church, on the contrary, the host as
+such is not at first consecrated, but in the moment of enjoyment, i.e. in
+the annihilation of its externality, and in the act of faith, i.e. in the
+free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be
+present God.) From that first and supreme status of externalisation flows
+every other phase of externality,--of bondage, non-spirituality, and
+superstition. It leads to a laity, receiving its knowledge of divine
+truth, as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without
+and from another order--which order again does not get possession of that
+knowledge in a spiritual way only, but to that end essentially requires an
+external consecration. It leads to the non-spiritual style of
+praying--partly as mere moving of the lips, partly in the way that the
+subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God, and prays others to
+pray--addressing his devotion to miracle-working images, even to bones, and
+expecting miracles from them. It leads, generally, to justification by
+external works, a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts, and even
+to be capable of being transferred to others. All this binds the spirit
+under an externalism by which the very meaning of spirit is perverted and
+misconceived at its source, and law and justice, morality and conscience,
+responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root.
+
+Along with this principle of spiritual bondage, and these applications of
+it in the religious life, there can only go in the legislative and
+constitutional system a legal and moral bondage, and a state of
+lawlessness and immorality in political life. Catholicism has been loudly
+praised and is still often praised--logically enough--as the one religion
+which secures the stability of governments. But in reality this applies
+only to governments which are bound up with institutions founded on the
+bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral
+liberty), i.e. with institutions that embody injustice and with a morally
+corrupt and barbaric state of society. But these governments are not aware
+that in fanaticism they have a terrible power, which does not rise in
+hostility against them, only so long as and only on condition that they
+remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. But in mind there
+is a very different power available against that externalism and
+dismemberment induced by a false religion. Mind collects itself into its
+inward free actuality. Philosophy awakes in the spirit of governments and
+nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially and actually right and
+reasonable in the real world. It was well to call these products of
+thought, and in a special sense Philosophy, the wisdom of the world(170);
+for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present, leads it into the
+real world, and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self.
+
+Thus set free, the content of religion assumes quite another shape. So
+long as the form, i.e. our consciousness and subjectivity, lacked liberty,
+it followed necessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not
+immanent in the ethical principles which religion embodies, and these
+principles were set at such a distance as to seem to have true being only
+as negative to actual self-consciousness. In this unreality ethical
+content gets the name of _Holiness_. But once the divine spirit introduces
+itself into actuality, and actuality emancipates itself to spirit, then
+what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the
+actuality of _moral_ life. Instead of the vow of chastity, _marriage_ now
+ranks as the ethical relation; and, therefore, as the highest on this side
+of humanity stands the family. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up
+into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to
+the poor, i.e. whosoever enriches them) is the precept of action to
+acquire goods through one's own intelligence and industry,--of honesty in
+commercial dealing, and in the use of property,--in short moral life in the
+socio-economic sphere. And instead of the vow of obedience, true religion
+sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state--an
+obedience which is itself the true freedom, because the state is a
+self-possessed, self-realising reason--in short, moral life in the state.
+Thus, and thus only, can law and morality exist. The precept of religion,
+"Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's" is not enough:
+the question is to settle what is Caesar's, what belongs to the secular
+authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than
+the ecclesiastical authority have claimed almost everything as their own.
+The divine spirit must interpenetrate the entire secular life: whereby
+wisdom is concrete within it, and it carries the terms of its own
+justification. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical
+organisations. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a
+celibate order;--the morality of economic and industrial action against the
+sanctity of poverty and its indolence;--the morality of an obedience
+dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience
+from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. With
+the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's
+essential liberty, there sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of
+unfreedom. It is no use to organise political laws and arrangements on
+principles of equity and reason, so long as in religion the principle of
+unfreedom is not abandoned. A free state and a slavish religion are
+incompatible. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them
+separate spheres, under the impression that their diverse natures will
+maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in
+contradiction and battle. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract
+and superficial, and political institutions deduced from them must be, if
+taken alone, untenable, so long as those principles in their wisdom
+mistake religion so much as not to know that the maxims of the reason in
+actuality have their last and supreme sanction in the religious conscience
+in subsumption under the consciousness of "absolute" truth. Let us suppose
+even that, no matter how, a code of law should arise, so to speak _a
+priori_, founded on principles of reason, but in contradiction with an
+established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom; still, as
+the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members
+of the government, and of the various classes of the administrative
+_personnel_, it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty
+assumption that the individuals will act only according to the letter or
+meaning of the law, and not in the spirit of their religion where their
+inmost conscience and supreme obligation lies. Opposed to what religion
+pronounces holy, the laws appear something made by human hands: even
+though backed by penalties and externally introduced, they could offer no
+lasting resistance to the contradiction and attacks of the religious
+spirit. Such laws, however sound their provisions may be, thus founder on
+the conscience, whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and
+refuses to sanction them. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter
+a corrupt moral organisation by altering its political constitution and
+code of laws without changing the religion,--to make a revolution without
+having made a reformation, to suppose that a political constitution
+opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and
+its sanctities, and that stability could be procured for the laws by
+external guarantees, e.g. so-called "chambers," and the power given them
+to fix the budget, &c. (cf. § 544 note). At best it is only a temporary
+expedient--when it is obviously too great a task to descend into the depths
+of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth--to seek
+to separate law and justice from religion. Those guarantees are but rotten
+bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering
+the laws--among which laws these guarantees are included. It is indeed the
+height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the
+secular code the religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing
+profane.
+
+The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf
+which in his day had commenced to divide the established religion and the
+political constitution, on one hand, from those deeper requirements which,
+on the other hand, were made upon religion and politics by liberty which
+had learnt to recognise its inner life. Plato gets hold of the thought
+that a genuine constitution and a sound political life have their deeper
+foundation on the Idea,--on the essentially and actually universal and
+genuine principles of eternal righteousness. Now to see and ascertain what
+these are is certainly the function and the business of _philosophy_. It
+is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrated or
+notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that
+philosophy and political power must coincide, that the Idea must be
+regent, if the distress of nations is to see its end. What Plato thus
+definitely set before his mind was that the Idea--which implicitly indeed
+is the free self-determining thought--could not get into consciousness save
+only in the form of a thought; that the substance of the thought could
+only be true when set forth as a universal, and as such brought to
+consciousness under its most abstract form.
+
+To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point
+of view from which the relationship of state and religion is here
+regarded, the notional differences on which everything turns must be
+recalled to mind. The first of these is that in natural things their
+substance or genus is different from their existence in which that
+substance is as subject: further that this subjective existence of the
+genus is distinct from that which it gets, when specially set in relief as
+genus, or, to put it simply, as the universal in a mental concept or idea.
+This additional "individuality"--the soil on which the universal and
+underlying principle _freely_ and expressly exists,--is the intellectual
+and thinking _self_. In the case of _natural_ things their truth and
+reality does not get the form of universality and essentiality through
+themselves, and their "individuality" is not itself the form: the form is
+only found in subjective thinking, which in philosophy gives that
+universal truth and reality an existence of its own. In man's case it is
+otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself, and it comes to
+existence in his self-consciousness. This absolute nucleus of man--mind
+intrinsically concrete--is just this--to have the form (to have thinking)
+itself for a content. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this
+principle Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought,
+(which is {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}), thus surmounting the Platonic Idea (the
+genus, or essential being). But thought always--and that on account of this
+very principle--contains the immediate self-subsistence of subjectivity no
+less than it contains universality; the genuine Idea of the intrinsically
+concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms
+(subjective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the
+one as in the other it is the same substantial content. Under the
+subjective form, however, fall feeling, intuition, pictorial
+representation: and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the
+consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first reached and apprehended
+in this form: in other words, it must exist in its immediate reality as
+religion, earlier than it does as philosophy. Philosophy is a later
+development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than
+Greek religion), and in fact reaches its completion by catching and
+comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit
+which first manifests itself in religion. But Greek philosophy could set
+itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and
+the substantiality of the Idea could take up none but a hostile attitude
+to an imaginative polytheism, and to the gladsome and frivolous humours of
+its poetic creations. The _form_ in its infinite truth, the _subjectivity_
+of mind, broke forth at first only as a subjective free _thinking_, which
+was not yet identical with the _substantiality_ itself,--and thus this
+underlying principle was not yet apprehended as _absolute mind_. Thus
+religion might appear as first purified only through philosophy,--through
+pure self-existent thought: but the form pervading this underlying
+principle--the form which philosophy attacked--was that creative
+imagination.
+
+Political power, which is developed similarly, but earlier than
+philosophy, from religion, exhibits the onesidedness, which in the actual
+world may infect its _implicitly_ true Idea, as demoralisation. Plato, in
+common with all his thinking contemporaries, perceived this demoralisation
+of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle; he set in relief
+accordingly the underlying principle of the state, but could not work into
+his idea of it the infinite form of subjectivity, which still escaped his
+intelligence. His state is therefore, on its own showing, wanting in
+subjective liberty (§ 503 note, § 513, &c.). The truth which should be
+immanent in the state, should knit it together and control it, he, for
+these reasons, got hold of only the form of thought-out truth, of
+philosophy; and hence he makes that utterance that "so long as
+philosophers do not rule in the states, or those who are now called kings
+and rulers do not soundly and comprehensively philosophise, so long
+neither the state nor the race of men can be liberated from evils,--so long
+will the idea of the political constitution fall short of possibility and
+not see the light of the sun." It was not vouchsafed to Plato to go on so
+far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world
+and hold sway in political life, so long the genuine principle of the
+state had not come into actuality. But so long too this principle could
+not emerge even in thought, nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea
+of the state,--the idea of the substantial moral life, with which is
+identical the liberty of an independent self-consciousness. Only in the
+principle of mind, which is aware of its own essence, is implicitly in
+absolute liberty, and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation,
+does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power,
+religion, and the principles of philosophy coinciding in one, and for
+accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mind, of
+the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical
+consciousness. Self-realising subjectivity is in this case absolutely
+identical with substantial universality. Hence religion as such, and the
+state as such,--both as forms in which the principle exists--each contain
+the absolute truth: so that the truth, in its philosophic phase, is after
+all only in one of its forms. But even religion, as it grows and expands,
+lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (§ 500
+sqq.). As it is left therefore behind, in its first immediate, and so also
+one-sided phase, Religion may, or rather _must_, appear in its existence
+degraded to sensuous externality, and thus in the sequel become an
+influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life.
+Still the principle has in it the infinite "elasticity" of the "absolute"
+form, so as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and of
+the content by these means), and to bring about the reconciliation of the
+spirit in itself. Thus ultimately, in the Protestant conscience the
+principles of the religious and of the ethical conscience come to be one
+and the same: the free spirit learning to see itself in its reasonableness
+and truth. In the Protestant state, the constitution and the code, as well
+as their several applications, embody the principle and the development of
+the moral life, which proceeds and can only proceed from the truth of
+religion, when reinstated in its original principle and in that way as
+such first become actual. The moral life of the state and the religious
+spirituality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength.
+
+
+
+
+
+SECTION III. ABSOLUTE MIND(171).
+
+
+§ 553. The _notion_ of mind has its _reality_ in the mind. If this reality
+in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the
+absolute Idea, then the necessary aspect is that the _implicitly_ free
+intelligence be in its actuality liberated to its notion, if that
+actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. The subjective and the
+objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of
+_reality_ or existence rises to maturity.
+
+§ 554. The absolute mind, while it is self-centred _identity_, is always
+also identity returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one
+and universal _substance_ it is so as a spirit, discerning itself into a
+self and a consciousness, for which it is as substance. _Religion_, as
+this supreme sphere may be in general designated, if it has on one hand to
+be studied as issuing from the subject and having its home in the subject,
+must no less be regarded as objectively issuing from the absolute spirit
+which as spirit is in its community.
+
+That here, as always, belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or
+knowledge, but rather to a sort of knowledge, and that belief is only a
+particular form of the latter, has been remarked already (§ 63 note). If
+nowadays there is so little consciousness of God, and his objective
+essence is so little dwelt upon, while people speak so much more of the
+subjective side of religion, i.e. of God's indwelling in us, and if that
+and not the truth as such is called for,--in this there is at least the
+correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit in his community.
+
+§ 555. The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially
+and intrinsically a process, the immediate and substantial unity of which
+is the _Belief_ in the witness of the spirit as the _certainty_ of
+objective truth. Belief, at once this immediate unity and containing it as
+a reciprocal dependence of these different terms, has in _devotion_--the
+implicit or more explicit act of worship (_cultus_)--passed over into the
+process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation,
+the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation,
+and of gaining its concrete determination, viz. reconciliation, the
+actuality of the spirit.
+
+
+
+
+Sub-Section A. Art.
+
+
+§ 556. As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape, its
+immediacy produces the factor of finitude in Art. On one hand that is, it
+breaks up into a work of external common existence, into the subject which
+produces that work, and the subject which contemplates and worships it.
+But, on the other hand, it is the concrete _contemplation_ and mental
+picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the _Ideal_. In this ideal, or
+the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit, its natural immediacy,
+which is only a _sign_ of the Idea, is so transfigured by the informing
+spirit in order to express the Idea, that the figure shows it and it
+alone:--the shape or form of _Beauty_.
+
+§ 557. The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful,--the _form of
+immediacy_ as such,--at the same time _qualifies_ what it _embodies_: and
+the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon
+him of a natural medium or natural phase of existence--He contains the
+so-called _unity_ of nature and spirit--i.e. the immediate unity in
+sensuously intuitional form--hence not the spiritual unity, in which the
+natural would be put only as "ideal," as superseded in spirit, and the
+spiritual content would be only in self-relation. It is not the absolute
+spirit which enters this consciousness. On the subjective side the
+community has of course an ethical life, aware, as it is, of the
+spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are
+in it elevated to substantial liberty. But with the stigma of immediacy
+upon it, the subject's liberty is only a _manner of life_, without the
+infinite self-reflection and the subjective inwardness of _conscience_.
+These considerations govern in their further developments the devotion and
+the worship in the religion of fine art.
+
+§ 558. For the objects of contemplation it has to produce, Art requires
+not only an external given material--(under which are also included
+subjective images and ideas), but--for the expression of spiritual
+truth--must use the given forms of nature with a significance which art
+must divine and possess (cf. § 411). Of all such forms the human is the
+highest and the true, because only in it can the spirit have its
+corporeity and thus its visible expression.
+
+This disposes of the principle of the _imitation of nature_ in art: a
+point on which it is impossible to come to an understanding while a
+distinction is left thus abstract,--in other words, so long as the natural
+is only taken in its externality, not as the "characteristic" meaningful
+nature-form which is significant of spirit.
+
+§ 559. In such single shapes the "absolute" mind cannot be made explicit:
+in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose
+implicit universality, when steps are taken to specify its fullness in
+detail, breaks up into an indeterminate polytheism. With the essential
+restrictedness of its content, Beauty in general goes no further than a
+penetration of the vision or image by the spiritual principle,--something
+formal, so that the thought embodied, or the idea, can, like the material
+which it uses to work in, be of the most diverse and unessential kind, and
+still the work be something beautiful and a work of art.
+
+§ 560. The one-sidedness of _immediacy_ on the part of the Ideal involves
+the opposite one-sidedness (§ 556) that it is something _made_ by the
+artist. The subject or agent is the mere technical activity: and the work
+of art is only then an expression of the God, when there is no sign of
+subjective particularity in it, and the net power of the indwelling spirit
+is conceived and born into the world, without admixture and unspotted from
+its contingency. But as liberty only goes as far as there is thought, the
+action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling power, the artist's
+_enthusiasm_, is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive;
+the artistic _production_ has on its part the form of natural immediacy,
+it belongs to the _genius_ or particular endowment of the artist,--and is
+at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and
+mechanical externalities. The work of art therefore is just as much a work
+due to free option, and the artist is the master of the God.
+
+§ 561. In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its
+initial stage that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective
+self-consciousness, which is thus self-confident and of good cheer,
+without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute
+essence. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such
+reconciliation, in the beauty of _classical art_) lies the art of
+sublimity,--_symbolic art_, in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is
+not yet found, and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the
+figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it, and yet all the while
+toiling to work itself into it. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not
+yet reached the infinite form, is not yet known, not yet conscious of
+itself, as free spirit. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of
+pure thought, or an effort towards him,--a restless and unappeased effort
+which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its
+goal.
+
+§ 562. In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are
+incompatible; and that is where the infinite form, subjectivity, is not as
+in the first extreme a mere superficial personality, but its inmost depth,
+and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an
+external form, but as only finding himself in himself, and thus giving
+himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. _Romantic art_
+gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of
+beauty: it presents him as only condescending to appearance, and the
+divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always
+disengages itself. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towards
+its significance.
+
+The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the
+progress by which the Being, known as the Absolute, assumes fuller and
+firmer features; it has to note to what particular feature the kind of
+cultus corresponds,--and then to see how the secular self-consciousness,
+the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man,--in short how the
+nature of a nation's moral life, the principle of its law, of its actual
+liberty, and of its constitution, as well as of its art and science,
+corresponds to the principle which constitutes the substance of a
+religion. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one
+systematic totality, that one spirit creates and informs them, is a truth
+on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides
+with the world-history.
+
+As regards the close connexion of art with the various religions it may be
+specially noted that _beautiful_ art can only belong to those religions in
+which the spiritual principle, though concrete and intrinsically free, is
+not yet absolute. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed
+and known in its free character, though the craving for art is felt in
+order to bring in imaginative visibility to consciousness the idea of the
+supreme being, and though art is the sole organ in which the abstract and
+radically indistinct content,--a mixture from natural and spiritual
+sources,--can try to bring itself to consciousness;--still this art is
+defective; its form is defective because its subject-matter and theme is
+so,--for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being
+immanent in it. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain
+tastelessness and stolidity--for the principle it embodies is itself stolid
+and dull, and hence has not the power freely to transmute the external to
+significance and shape. Beautiful art, on the contrary, has for its
+condition the self-consciousness of the free spirit,--the consciousness
+that compared with it the natural and sensuous has no standing of its own:
+it makes the natural wholly into the mere expression of spirit, which is
+thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alone.
+
+But with a further and deeper study, we see that the advent of art, in a
+religion still in the bonds of sensuous externality, shows that such
+religion is on the decline. At the very time it seems to give religion the
+supreme glorification, expression and brilliancy, it has lifted the
+religion away over its limitation. In the sublime divinity to which the
+work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the
+spectator find themselves at home, with their personal sense and feeling,
+satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consciousness of free
+spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. Beautiful art, from its side, has
+thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the spirit
+from its thraldom. The older religion in which the need of fine art, and
+just for that reason, is first generated, looks up in its principle to an
+other-world which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its
+devotees are hideous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans, which
+point to the unspiritual objectivity of that other world,--and bones
+perform a similar or even a better service than such images. But even fine
+art is only a grade of liberation, not the supreme liberation itself.--The
+genuine objectivity, which is only in the medium of thought,--the medium in
+which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit, and where the liberation is
+accompanied with reverence,--is still absent in the sensuous beauty of the
+work of art, still more in that external, unbeautiful sensuousness.
+
+§ 563. Beautiful Art, like the religion peculiar to it, has its future in
+true religion. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and
+naturally into the universality identical with the infinite form;--the
+vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a
+self-mediating knowledge, into an existence which is itself
+knowledge,--into _revelation_. Thus the principle which gives the Idea its
+content is that it embody free intelligence, and as "absolute" _spirit it
+is for the spirit_.
+
+
+
+
+Sub-Section B. Revealed Religion(172).
+
+
+§ 564. It lies essentially in the notion of religion,--the religion i.e.
+whose content is absolute mind--that it be _revealed_, and, what is more,
+revealed _by God_. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is
+mind) is a self-determining principle, as infinite self-realising form,--it
+therefore is manifestation out and out. The spirit is only spirit in so
+far as it is for the spirit, and in the absolute religion it is the
+absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract elements of its being
+but itself.
+
+The old conception--due to a one-sided survey of human life--of Nemesis,
+which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling
+power, dashing to pieces everything high and great,--was confronted by
+Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not _envious_. The same
+answer may be given to the modern assertions that man cannot ascertain
+God. These assertions (and more than assertions they are not) are the more
+illogical, because made within a religion which is expressly called the
+revealed; for according to them it would rather be the religion in which
+nothing of God was revealed, in which he had not revealed himself, and
+those belonging to it would be the heathen "who know not God." If the word
+of God is taken in earnest in religion at all, it is from Him, the theme
+and centre of religion, that the method of divine knowledge may and must
+begin: and if self-revelation is refused Him, then the only thing left to
+constitute His nature would be to ascribe envy to Him. But clearly if the
+word Mind is to have a meaning, it implies the revelation of Him.
+
+If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for
+those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to
+thought,--at first only "rationalising" reflection, but afterwards, as in
+duty bound, to speculative comprehension, it may almost create surprise
+that so many, and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with
+these Ideas, have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything
+offered them for this behoof. And nothing serves better to shirk it than
+to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. To know what God as
+spirit is--to apprehend this accurately and distinctly in thoughts--requires
+careful and thorough speculation. It includes, in its fore-front, the
+propositions: God is God only so far as he knows himself: his
+self-knowledge is, further, his self-consciousness in man, and man's
+knowledge _of_ God, which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God.--See the
+profound elucidation of these propositions in the work from which they are
+taken: _Aphorisms on Knowing and Not-knowing, &c._, by C. F. G--l.: Berlin
+1829.
+
+§ 565. When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is
+superseded, God is, in point of content, the essential and actual spirit
+of nature and spirit, while in point of form he is, first of all,
+presented to consciousness as a mental representation. This
+quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content, on
+one hand, a separate being, making them presuppositions towards each
+other, and phenomena which succeed each other; their relationship it makes
+a series of events according to finite reflective categories. But, on the
+other hand, such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and
+superseded in the faith which realises one spirit and in the devotion of
+worship.
+
+§ 566. In this separating, the form parts from the content: and in the
+form the different functions of the notion part off into special spheres
+or media, in each of which the absolute spirit exhibits itself; ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) as
+eternal content, abiding self-centred, even in its manifestation; ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) as
+distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation, which by this
+difference becomes the phenomenal world into which the content enters; ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~})
+as infinite return, and reconciliation with the eternal being, of the
+world it gave away--the withdrawal of the eternal from the phenomenal into
+the unity of its fullness.
+
+§ 567. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) Under the "moment" of _Universality_,--the sphere of pure
+thought or the abstract medium of essence,--it is therefore the absolute
+spirit, which is at first the presupposed principle, not however staying
+aloof and inert, but (as underlying and essential power under the
+reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in
+this eternal sphere rather only begetting himself as his _son_, with whom,
+though different, he still remains in original identity,--just as, again,
+this differentiation of him from the universal essence eternally
+supersedes itself, and, though this mediating of a self-superseding
+mediation, the first substance is essentially as _concrete individuality_
+and subjectivity,--is the _Spirit_.
+
+§ 568. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}) Under the "moment" of _particularity_, or of judgment, it is
+this concrete eternal being which is presupposed: its movement is the
+creation of the phenomenal world. The eternal "moment" of mediation--of the
+only Son--divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds.
+On one hand is heaven and earth, the elemental and the concrete nature,--on
+the other hand, standing in action and reaction with such nature, the
+spirit, which therefore is finite. That spirit, as the extreme of inherent
+negativity, completes its independence till it becomes wickedness, and is
+that extreme through its connexion with a confronting nature and through
+its own naturalness thereby investing it. Yet, amid that naturalness, it
+is, when it thinks, directed towards the Eternal, though, for that reason,
+only standing to it in an external connexion.
+
+§ 569. ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}) Under the "moment" of _individuality_ as such,--of subjectivity
+and the notion itself, in which the contrast of universal and particular
+has sunk to its identical ground, the place of presupposition (1) is taken
+by the _universal_ substance, as actualised out of its abstraction into an
+_individual_ self-consciousness. This individual, who as such is
+identified with the essence,--(in the Eternal sphere he is called the
+Son)--is transplanted into the world of time, and in him wickedness is
+implicitly overcome. Further, this immediate, and thus sensuous, existence
+of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judgment
+and expiring in the pain of _negativity_, in which he, as infinite
+subjectivity, keeps himself unchanged, and thus, as absolute return from
+that negativity and as universal unity of universal and individual
+essentiality, has realised his being as the Idea of the spirit, eternal,
+but alive and present in the world.
+
+§ 570. (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of
+the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the _finite_ immediacy of
+the single subject. For such subject therefore it is at first an Other, an
+object of contemplating vision,--but the vision of implicit truth, through
+which witness of the spirit in him, he, on account of his immediate
+nature, at first characterised himself as nought and wicked. But,
+secondly, after the example of his truth, by means of the faith on the
+unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and
+individual essence, he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy,
+his natural man and self-will, to close himself in unity with that example
+(who is his implicit life) in the pain of negativity, and thus to know
+himself made one with the essential Being. Thus the Being of Beings (3)
+through this mediation brings about its own indwelling in
+self-consciousness, and is the actual presence of the essential and
+self-subsisting spirit who is all in all.
+
+§ 571. These three syllogisms, constituting the one syllogism of the
+absolute self-mediation of spirit, are the revelation of that spirit whose
+life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. From
+this its separation into parts, with a temporal and external sequence, the
+unfolding of the mediation contracts itself in the result,--where the
+spirit closes in unity with itself,--not merely to the simplicity of faith
+and devotional feeling, but even to thought. In the immanent simplicity of
+thought the unfolding still has its expansion, yet is all the while known
+as an indivisible coherence of the universal, simple, and eternal spirit
+in itself. In this form of truth, truth is the object of _philosophy_.
+
+If the result--the realised Spirit in which all meditation has superseded
+itself--is taken in a merely formal, contentless sense, so that the spirit
+is not also at the same time known as _implicitly_ existent and
+objectively self-unfolding;--then that infinite subjectivity is the merely
+formal self-consciousness, knowing itself in itself as absolute,--Irony.
+Irony, which can make every objective reality nought and vain, is itself
+the emptiness and vanity, which from itself, and therefore by chance and
+its own good pleasure, gives itself direction and content, remains master
+over it, is not bound by it,--and, with the assertion that it stands on the
+very summit of religion and philosophy, falls rather back into the vanity
+of wilfulness. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form, the
+self-centred manifestation, throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity
+in which it is the vanity of thought, that it is the free thought which
+has its infinite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual
+content, and has that content as an object in which it is also free.
+Thinking, so far, is only the formal aspect of the absolute content.
+
+
+
+
+Sub-Section C. Philosophy.
+
+
+§ 572. This science is the unity of Art and Religion. Whereas the
+vision-method of Art, external in point of form, is but subjective
+production and shivers the substantial content into many separate shapes,
+and whereas Religion, with its separation into parts, opens it out in
+mental picture, and mediates what is thus opened out; Philosophy not
+merely keeps them together to make a total, but even unifies them into the
+simple spiritual vision, and then in that raises them to self-conscious
+thought. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognised by
+thought) of art and religion, in which the diverse elements in the content
+are cognised as necessary, and this necessary as free.
+
+§ 573. Philosophy thus characterises itself as a cognition of the
+necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea, as also of the
+necessity in the two forms--on one hand, immediate vision and its poetry,
+and the objective and external revelation presupposed by
+representation,--on the other hand, first the subjective retreat inwards,
+then the subjective movement of faith and its final identification with
+the presupposed object. This cognition is thus the _recognition_ of this
+content and its form; it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the
+forms, elevation of them into the absolute form, which determines itself
+to content, remains identical with it, and is in that the cognition of
+that essential and actual necessity. This movement, which philosophy is,
+finds itself already accomplished, when at the close it seizes its own
+notion,--i.e. only _looks back_ on its knowledge.
+
+Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the
+reciprocal relations of philosophy and religion. The whole question turns
+entirely on the difference of the forms of speculative thought from the
+forms of mental representation and "reflecting" intellect. But it is the
+whole cycle of philosophy, and of logic in particular, which has not
+merely taught and made known this difference, but also criticised it, or
+rather has let its nature develop and judge itself by these very
+categories. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that
+the true and needful conviction can be gained, that the content of
+religion and philosophy is the same,--leaving out, of course, the further
+details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of
+religion. But religion is the truth _for all men_: faith rests on the
+witness of the spirit, which as witnessing is the spirit in man. This
+witness--the underlying essence in all humanity--takes, when driven to
+expound itself, its first definite form under those acquired habits of
+thought which his secular consciousness and intellect otherwise employs.
+In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and conditions of
+finitude in general. This does not prevent the spirit, even in employing
+sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought, from retaining its
+content (which as religion is essentially speculative,) with a tenacity
+which does violence to them, and acts _inconsistently_ towards them. By
+this inconsistency it corrects their defects. Nothing easier therefore for
+the "Rationalist" than to point out contradictions in the exposition of
+the faith, and then to prepare triumphs for its principle of formal
+identity. If the spirit yields to this finite reflection, which has
+usurped the title of reason and philosophy--("Rationalism")--it strips
+religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. Religion
+in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such
+reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. But it is another
+thing when religion sets herself against comprehending reason, and against
+philosophy in general, and specially against a philosophy of which the
+doctrine is speculative, and so religious. Such an opposition proceeds
+from failure to appreciate the difference indicated and the value of
+spiritual form in general, and particularly of the logical form; or, to be
+more precise, still from failure to note the distinction of the
+content--which may be in both the same--from these forms. It is on the
+ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the
+religious party; just as conversely its speculative content has brought
+the same charges upon it from a self-styled philosophy--and from a pithless
+orthodoxy. It had too little of God in it for the former; too much for the
+latter.
+
+The charge of _Atheism_, which used often to be brought against philosophy
+(that it has _too little_ of God), has grown rare: the more wide-spread
+grows the charge of Pantheism, that it has _too much_ of him:--so much so,
+that it is treated not so much as an imputation, but as a proved fact, or
+a sheer fact which needs no proof. Piety, in particular, which with its
+pious airs of superiority fancies itself free to dispense with proof, goes
+hand in hand with empty rationalism--(which means to be so much opposed to
+it, though both repose really on the same habit of mind)--in the wanton
+assertion, almost as if it merely mentioned a notorious fact, that
+Philosophy is the All-one doctrine, or Pantheism. It must be said that it
+was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a
+philosophical system (e.g. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism, though
+the former imputation at the first glance looks more cruel and insidious
+(cf. § 71 note). The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of
+a full and real God, and arises because the popular idea does not detect
+in the philosophical notion the peculiar form to which it is attached.
+Philosophy indeed can recognise its own forms in the categories of
+religious consciousness, and even its own teaching in the doctrine of
+religion--which therefore it does not disparage. But the converse is not
+true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of thought
+to itself, does not comprehend itself, and is therefore, as it stands,
+exclusive. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of
+the modern habit of mind--of the new piety and new theology. For them
+philosophy has too much of God:--so much so, that, if we believe them, it
+asserts that God is everything and everything is God. This new theology,
+which makes religion only a subjective feeling and denies the knowledge of
+the divine nature, thus retains nothing more than a God in general without
+objective characteristics. Without interest of its own for the concrete,
+fulfilled notion of God, it treats it only as an interest which _others_
+once had, and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete
+nature as something merely historical. The indeterminate God is to be
+found in all religions; every kind of piety (§ 72)--that of the Hindoo to
+asses, cows,--or to dalai-lamas,--that of the Egyptians to the ox--is always
+adoration of an object which, with all its absurdities, also contains the
+generic abstract, God in General. If this theory needs no more than such a
+God, so as to find God in everything called religion, it must at least
+find such a God recognised even in philosophy, and can no longer accuse it
+of Atheism. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of
+Pantheism has its ground therefore in the superficial idea to which this
+mildness has attenuated and emptied God. As that popular idea clings to
+its abstract universality, from which all definite quality is excluded,
+all such definiteness is only the non-divine, the secularity of things,
+thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. On such a
+presupposition, even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute
+universality, and the consequent untruth of the being of external things,
+the hearer clings as he did before to his belief that secular things still
+keep their being, and form all that is definite in the divine
+universality. He thus changes that universality into what he calls the
+pantheistic:--_Everything is_--(empirical things, without distinction,
+whether higher or lower in the scale, _are_)--all possess substantiality;
+and so--thus he understands philosophy--each and every secular thing is God.
+It is only his own stupidity, and the falsifications due to such
+misconception, which generate the imagination and the allegation of such
+pantheism.
+
+But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism, are
+unable and unwilling to see this--for it is just to see the notion that
+they refuse--they should before everything have verified the alleged fact
+that _any one philosopher, or any one man_, had really ascribed
+substantial or objective and inherent reality to _all_ things and regarded
+them as God:--that such an idea had ever come into the hand of any body but
+themselves. This allegation I will further elucidate in this exoteric
+discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evidence. If we
+want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical, most sublime, or if
+you will, its grossest shape, we must, as is well known, consult the
+oriental poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in
+Hindoo literature. Amongst the abundant resources open to our disposal on
+this topic, I select--as the most authentic statement accessible--the
+Bhagavat-Gita, and amongst its effusions, prolix and reiterative _ad
+nauseam_, some of the most telling passages. In the 10th Lesson (in
+Schlegel, p. 162) Krishna says of himself(173):--"I am the self, seated in
+the hearts of all beings. I am the beginning and the middle and the end
+also of all beings ... I am the beaming sun amongst the shining ones, and
+the moon among the lunar mansions.... Amongst the Vedas I am the
+Sâma-Veda: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living
+beings. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras, ... Meru among the
+high-topped mountains, ... the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed
+(mountains).... Among beasts I am the lord of beasts.... Among letters I
+am the letter A.... I am the spring among the seasons.... I am also that
+which is the seed of all things: there is nothing moveable or immoveable
+which can exist without me."
+
+Even in these totally sensuous delineations, Krishna (and we must not
+suppose there is, besides Krishna, still God, or a God besides; as he said
+before he was Siva, or Indra, so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is
+in him) makes himself out to be--not everything, but only--the most
+excellent of everything. Everywhere there is a distinction drawn between
+external, unessential existences, and one essential amongst them, which he
+is. Even when, at the beginning of the passage, he is said to be the
+beginning, middle, and end of living things, this totality is
+distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. Even
+such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be
+called pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple
+empirical world, everything is reduced to a limited number of essential
+existences, to a polytheism. But even what has been quoted shows that
+these very substantialities of the externally-existent do not retain the
+independence entitling them to be named Gods; even Siva, Indra, &c. melt
+into the one Krishna.
+
+This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson,
+p. 7 sqq.). Krishna says: "I am the producer and the destroyer of the
+whole universe. There is nothing else higher than myself; all this is
+woven upon me, like numbers of pearls upon a thread. I am the taste in
+water;... I am the light of the sun and the moon; I am 'Om' in all the
+Vedas.... I am life in all beings.... I am the discernment of the
+discerning ones.... I am also the strength of the strong." Then he adds:
+"The whole universe deluded by these three states of mind developed from
+the qualities [sc. goodness, passion, darkness] does not know me who am
+beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine," [even the Maya
+is _his_, nothing independent], "developed from the qualities is divine
+and difficult to transcend. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to
+me alone." Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression: "At
+the end of many lives, the man possessed of knowledge approaches me,
+(believing) that Vasudeva is everything. Such a high-souled mind is very
+hard to find. Those who are deprived of knowledge by various desires
+approach other divinities... Whichever form of deity one worships with
+faith, from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by
+me. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judgment is
+perishable.... The undiscerning ones, not knowing my transcendent and
+inexhaustible essence, than which there is nothing higher, think me who am
+unperceived to have become perceptible."
+
+This "All," which Krishna calls himself, is not, any more than the Eleatic
+One, and the Spinozan Substance, the Every-thing. This every-thing,
+rather, the infinitely-manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all
+these pictures, but defined as the "accidental," without essential being
+of its very own, but having its truth in the substance, the One which, as
+different from that accidental, is alone the divine and God. Hindooism
+however has the higher conception of Brahma, the pure unity of thought in
+itself, where the empirical everything of the world, as also those
+proximate substantialities, called Gods, vanish. On that account
+Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindoo religion as at bottom
+a Monotheism. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these
+short citations. But so little concrete is this divine unity--spiritual as
+its idea of God is--so powerless its grip, so to speak--that Hindooism, with
+a monstrous inconsistency, is also the maddest of polytheisms. But the
+idolatry of the wretched Hindoo, when he adores the ape, or other
+creature, is still a long way from that wretched fancy of a Pantheism, to
+which everything is God, and God everything. Hindoo monotheism moreover is
+itself an example how little comes of mere monotheism, if the Idea of God
+is not deeply determinate in itself. For that unity, if it be
+intrinsically abstract and therefore empty, tends of itself to let
+whatever is concrete, outside it--be it as a lot of Gods or as secular,
+empirical individuals--keep its independence. That pantheism indeed--on the
+shallow conception of it--might with a show of logic as well be called a
+monotheism: for if God, as it says, is identical with the world, then as
+there is only one world there would be in that pantheism only one God.
+Perhaps the empty numerical unity must be predicated of the world: but
+such abstract predication of it has no further special interest; on the
+contrary, a mere numerical unity just means that its _content_ is an
+infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. But it is that delusion with
+the empty unity, which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of
+pantheism. It is only the picture--floating in the indefinite blue--of the
+world as _one thing_, _the all_, that could ever be considered capable of
+combining with God: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed
+to teach that God is the world: for if the world were taken as it is, as
+everything, as the endless lot of empirical existence, then it would
+hardly have been even held possible to suppose a pantheism which asserted
+of such stuff that it is God.
+
+But to go back again to the question of fact. If we want to see the
+consciousness of the One--not as with the Hindoos split between the
+featureless unity of abstract thought, on one hand, and on the other, the
+long-winded weary story of its particular detail, but--in its finest purity
+and sublimity, we must consult the Mohammedans. If e.g. in the excellent
+Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular, we find the unity of the soul with the One
+set forth, and that unity described as love, this spiritual unity is an
+exaltation above the finite and vulgar, a transfiguration of the natural
+and the spiritual, in which the externalism and transitoriness of
+immediate nature, and of empirical secular spirit, is discarded and
+absorbed(174).
+
+I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic
+conceptions which it is customary to call pantheistic. Of the philosophies
+to which that name is given, the Eleatic, or Spinozist, it has been
+remarked earlier (§ 50, note) that so far are they from identifying God
+with the world and making him finite, that in these systems this
+"everything" has no truth, and that we should rather call them
+monotheistic, or, in relation to the popular idea of the world, acosmical.
+They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute only
+as substance. Of the oriental, especially the Mohammedan, modes of
+envisaging God, we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the
+utterly universal genus which dwells in the species or existences, but
+dwells so potently that these existences have no actual reality. The fault
+of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of
+defining substance as subject and as mind.
+
+These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one
+need common to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of
+God, and, secondly, of the relationship of God and the world. (In
+philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature
+determines his relations with the world.) The "reflective" understanding
+begins by rejecting all systems and modes of conception, which, whether
+they spring from heart, imagination or speculation, express the
+interconnexion of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in
+faith or consciousness, he is as essence parted from appearance, as
+infinite from the finite. But, after this partition, the conviction arises
+also that the appearance has a relation to the essence, the finite to the
+infinite, and so on: and thus arises the question of reflection as to the
+nature of this relation. It is in the reflective form that the whole
+difficulty of the affair lies, and that causes this relation to be called
+incomprehensible by the agnostic. The close of philosophy is not the
+place, even in a general exoteric discussion, to waste a word on what a
+"notion" means. But as the view taken of this relation is closely
+connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all
+imputations against it, we may still add the remark that though philosophy
+certainly has to do with unity in general, it is not however with abstract
+unity, mere identity, and the empty absolute, but with concrete unity (the
+notion), and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else;--that
+each step in its advance is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete
+unity, and that the deepest and last expression of unity is the unity of
+absolute mind itself. Would-be judges and critics of philosophy might be
+recommended to familiarise themselves with these phases of unity and to
+take the trouble to get acquainted with them, at least to know so much
+that of these terms there are a great many, and that amongst them there is
+great variety. But they show so little acquaintance with them--and still
+less take trouble about it--that, when they hear of unity--and relation
+_ipso facto_ implies unity--they rather stick fast at quite abstract
+indeterminate unity, and lose sight of the chief point of interest--the
+special mode in which the unity is qualified. Hence all they can say about
+philosophy is that dry identity is its principle and result, and that it
+is the system of identity. Sticking fast to the undigested thought of
+identity, they have laid hands on, not the concrete unity, the notion and
+content of philosophy, but rather its reverse. In the philosophical field
+they proceed, as in the physical field the physicist; who also is well
+aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties and
+matters--or usually matters alone, (for the properties get transformed into
+matters also for the physicist)--and that these matters (elements) _also_
+stand in _relation_ to one another. But the question is, Of what kind is
+this relation? Every peculiarity and the whole difference of natural
+things, inorganic and living, depend solely on the different modes of this
+unity. But instead of ascertaining these different modes, the ordinary
+physicist (chemist included) takes up only one, the most external and the
+worst, viz. _composition_, applies only it in the whole range of natural
+structures, which he thus renders for ever inexplicable.
+
+The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this
+shallow identity. All that those who employ this invention of their own to
+accuse philosophy gather from the study of God's _relation_ to the world
+is that the one, but only the one factor of this category of relation--and
+that the factor of indeterminateness--is identity. Thereupon they stick
+fast in this half-perception, and assert--falsely as a fact--that philosophy
+teaches the identity of God and the world. And as in their judgment either
+of the two,--the world as much as God--has the same solid substantiality as
+the other, they infer that in the philosophic Idea God is _composed_ of
+God and the world. Such then is the idea they form of pantheism, and which
+they ascribe to philosophy. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and
+apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories, they import them
+into philosophy, where they are utterly unknown; they thus infect it with
+the disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. If any
+difficulty emerge in comprehending God's relation to the world, they at
+once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains
+for them an inexplicable contradiction; and that hence, they must stop at
+the vague conception of such relation, perhaps under the more familiar
+names of, e.g. omnipresence, providence, &c. Faith in their use of the
+term means no more than a refusal to define the conception, or to enter on
+a closer discussion of the problem. That men and classes of untrained
+intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness, is what one expects; but
+when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is
+satisfied, in matters admitted to be of superior, if not even of supreme
+interest, with indefinite ideas, it is hard to decide whether the thinker
+is really in earnest with the subject. But if those who cling to this
+crude "rationalism" were in earnest, e.g. with God's omnipresence, so far
+as to realise their faith thereon in a definite mental idea, in what
+difficulties would they be involved by their belief in the true reality of
+the things of sense! They would hardly like, as Epicurus does, to let God
+dwell in the interspaces of things, i.e. in the pores of the
+physicists,--said pores being the negative, something supposed to exist
+_beside_ the material reality. This very "Beside" would give their
+pantheism its spatiality,--their everything, conceived as the mutual
+exclusion of parts in space. But in ascribing to God, in his relation to
+the world, an action on and in the space thus filled on the world and in
+it, they would endlessly split up the divine actuality into infinite
+materiality. They would really thus have the misconception they call
+pantheism or all-one-doctrine, only as the necessary sequel of their
+misconceptions of God and the world. But to put that sort of thing, this
+stale gossip of oneness or identity, on the shoulders of philosophy, shows
+such recklessness about justice and truth that it can only be explained
+through the difficulty of getting into the head thoughts and notions, i.e.
+not abstract unity, but the many-shaped modes specified. If statements as
+to facts are put forward, and the facts in question are thoughts and
+notions, it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. But even the
+fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous, now that it
+has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism, a system
+of identity, an All-one doctrine, and that the person therefore who might
+be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a matter of
+common notoriety, or as prevaricating for a purpose. On account of this
+chorus of assertions, then, I have believed myself obliged to speak at
+more length and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this
+alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in
+dealing with the external apprehension of notions as mere facts,--by which
+notions are perverted into their opposite. The esoteric study of God and
+identity, as of cognitions and notions, is philosophy itself.
+
+§ 574. This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea, the truth
+aware of itself (§ 236),--the logical system, but with the signification
+that it is universality approved and certified in concrete content as in
+its actuality. In this way the science has gone back to its beginning: its
+result is the logical system but as a spiritual principle: out of the
+presupposing judgment, in which the notion was only implicit and the
+beginning an immediate,--and thus out of the _appearance_ which it had
+there--it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into its proper
+medium.
+
+§ 575. It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the
+further development. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism,
+which is based on the Logical system as starting-point, with Nature for
+the middle term which couples the Mind with it. The Logical principle
+turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. Nature, standing between the Mind and
+its essence, sunders itself, not indeed to extremes of finite abstraction,
+nor itself to something away from them and independent,--which, as other
+than they, only serves as a link between them: for the syllogism is _in
+the Idea_ and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and
+negative factor, and as implicitly the Idea. Still the mediation of the
+notion has the external form of _transition_, and the science of Nature
+presents itself as the course of necessity, so that it is only in the one
+extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation.
+
+§ 576. In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded, that
+that syllogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself, which--as the
+mediating agent in the process--presupposes Nature and couples it with the
+Logical principle. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in
+the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition, of which liberty
+is the aim, and which is itself the way to produce it.
+
+§ 577. The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy, which has
+self-knowing reason, the absolutely-universal, for its middle term: a
+middle, which divides itself into Mind and Nature, making the former its
+presupposition, as process of the Idea's subjective activity, and the
+latter its universal extreme, as process of the objectively and implicitly
+existing Idea. The self-judging of the Idea into its two appearances (§§
+575, 576) characterises both as its (the self-knowing reason's)
+manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects:--it is
+the nature of the fact, the notion, which causes the movement and
+development, yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition.
+The eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself
+to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind.
+
+
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}
+    {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}
+    {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}
+    {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~}
+    {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI AND VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}
+    {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}
+    {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~}
+    {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~};
+    {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~}
+    {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~}
+    {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. (ARIST. _Met._ XI. 7.)
+
+
+
+
+
+INDEX.
+
+
+Absolute (the), xlviii, 7.
+
+Abstraction, 74.
+
+Accent, 81, 87.
+
+Ages of man, 17.
+
+Alphabets, 81.
+
+Altruism, 57.
+
+Animal magnetism, clxi, 5, 29 seqq.
+
+Anthropology, xxv, lxxxviii, 12 seqq.
+
+Appetite, 53.
+
+_Aristotle_, liii, cxxxiii, 4, 63, 163.
+
+Art, xxxix seqq., 169 seqq.
+
+Asceticism, cxv, cxliii, clxxxvii, 159.
+
+Association of ideas, 73.
+
+Atheism, 183.
+
+Athens, cxxx.
+
+Attention, clxxiii, 69.
+
+Automatism (psychological), clxv.
+
+_Bacon_ (Fr.), xxi, lii, lix, clx.
+
+_Bain_ (A.), cxxi.
+
+Beauty, 169.
+
+Bhagavat-Gita, 186 seqq.
+
+Biography, 151.
+
+Body and Soul (relations of), lxxxii, cxvi, clvi, 13.
+
+_Boëthius_, l.
+
+_Böhme_ (J.), 95.
+
+_Braid_ (J.), clxiv.
+
+Bravery, cxcix.
+
+Budget, 144.
+
+Capitalism, cci seqq.
+
+Cardinal virtues, cxxxii.
+
+Categories, lx.
+
+Catholicism, 157.
+
+Children, lxxxvii, cii.
+
+Chinese language, 81 seqq.
+
+Choice, 98.
+
+Christianity, xliv, cxli, clxxix, 7, 101, 157.
+
+Clairvoyance, clviii, clxi, 33.
+
+Cognition, 64.
+
+Commercial morality, cci.
+
+_Comte_ (C.), xcix.
+
+_Condillac_, lxxviii, 61.
+
+Conscience, xxx, cxxii, clxxxvii, 117, 156, 161.
+
+Consciousness, xxv, xcix, 47 seqq.
+
+Constitution of the State, 132.
+
+Contract, 108.
+
+Corporation, 130.
+
+Crime, cxciii, 109.
+
+Criticism, xvi, cxxxviii, 149.
+
+Custom, clxxxix, 104.
+
+_Dante_, cxxxiv.
+
+Deduction (Kantian and Fichtean), cx seqq.
+
+Democracy, 141.
+
+Development, 60.
+
+Disease (mental), 27, 37.
+
+Duty, cxiv, cxix, cxxi seqq., cxxxi, cxxxix, 97, 104, 116.
+
+Economics, 122.
+
+Education, xcii, cxxxvii, 11.
+
+Ego (the), lxiv seqq., 47 seqq.
+
+Egoism, 55.
+
+Eleaticism, 190.
+
+England, 143.
+
+Epicureanism, cxli, 195.
+
+Epistemology, ciii.
+
+Equality (political and social), cxc, 133.
+
+Equity, xxxi.
+
+Estates, 123.
+
+Ethics, xv, xix, xxx seqq., xcv, cxiii seqq., cxc seqq., 113 seqq.
+
+Experience, 51.
+
+Experimental psychology, lxxxi seqq., c.
+
+Expression (mental), 23, 45.
+
+Faculties of Mind, lxxiii seqq., xcvii, cxxvi, 58, 65.
+
+Faith, cvii.
+
+Faith-cure, clxi, 35.
+
+Fame, 153.
+
+Family, xxxii, cxcii, 121.
+
+_Fechner_ (G. T.), cli.
+
+Feeling, 22, 68, 92.
+
+_Fichte_ (J. G.), cvi, cix seqq., clxiv, clxix, 49.
+
+Finance, 144.
+
+Finitude, 8.
+
+Fraud, 110.
+
+Freedom, cxxv seqq., clxxv, 6, 99, 113, 133 seqq.
+
+_Fries_, clxxix.
+
+Genius (the), clvii, 28.
+
+German language, 78, 88:
+  politics, clxxvii;
+  empire, clxxxi.
+
+God, xxxiv, xli, cxxii, 20, 154, 176.
+
+_Goethe_, cliv, clxix.
+
+Goodness, 115.
+
+Government, 137;
+  forms of, 141.
+
+Greek ethics, cxxix seqq., cxciv;
+  religion, 164.
+
+Habit, clviii, 39.
+
+Happiness, 99.
+
+_Herbart_, lxii seqq., lxxxv, cxxvii.
+
+Hieroglyphics, 80.
+
+History, xxxiv, xlvii, xci, 147 seqq.
+
+_Hobbes_, lxxvi, clxxxii.
+
+Holiness, 159.
+
+Honour, 124.
+
+_Humboldt_ (W. v.), 79.
+
+_Hume_, lxxi, cxx.
+
+Hypnotism, clxiv seqq., 31 seqq.
+
+Idea (Platonic), 163.
+
+Idealism, civ; political, clxxxvi.
+
+Ideality, clxviii, 25.
+
+Ideas, lxix seqq., ci seqq.
+
+Imagination, 72.
+
+Immaterialism, clii, 12, 45.
+
+Impulse, 95.
+
+Individualist ethics, cxx seqq.
+
+Individuality in the State, 139.
+
+Industrialism, cc, 123.
+
+Insanity, 37.
+
+Intention, 114.
+
+International Law, 147.
+
+Intuition, 67.
+
+Irony, 179.
+
+_Jelaleddin-Rumi_, 189.
+
+Judgment, 89.
+
+Judicial system, 127.
+
+_Jung-Stilling_, clxii.
+
+Juries, 128.
+
+_Kant_ (I.), xv, lxiv, lxxi, xcvi, cvii, cxxviii, clxxxviii, 20, 48, 51,
+            63, 154.
+
+_Kieser_, clxiii.
+
+Knowledge, cv, cxxxv, cxli, 64.
+
+Krishna, 186 seqq.
+
+Labour, 123.
+
+Language, clxxiv, 79 seqq.
+
+_Laplace_, clxiv.
+
+Law, xxix, xcvi, cxc, 104, 125.
+
+Legality, xxx, clxxxix.
+
+Legislation, 125.
+
+_Leibniz_, lxxii, lxxvii, cxlvi, 14, 80, 82.
+
+Liberty, see Freedom.
+
+Life, 13.
+
+Logic, xiv, xvii, lxi, xcv, 196.
+
+Lutheranism, 157.
+
+_Macchiavelli_, clxxx.
+
+Magic, clxi, 29.
+
+Manifestation, 7.
+
+Manners, 104.
+
+Marriage, 121, 159.
+
+Master and slave, 56.
+
+Mathematics in psychology, lxviii.
+
+Medium, 34.
+
+Memory, clxxiv, 70, 84.
+
+_Mesmer_, clxi.
+
+Metaphysic, lviii seqq.
+
+_Mill_ (James), lxxix.
+
+Mind (= Spirit), xlix seqq., 58, 196.
+
+Mnemonics, 85.
+
+Monarchy, 139.
+
+Monasticism, 159.
+
+Monotheism, 188.
+
+Morality, xxx, xxxviii, cxxi, clxxxviii seqq., cxcviii, 113 seqq.
+
+_Münsterberg_ (H.), lxxxiii.
+
+_Napoleon_, 19.
+
+Nationality, 142, 150, 154, cxcv.
+
+Natural Philosophy, xv, xvii, xxii.
+
+Natural rights, 112.
+
+Nature, cxx, cxxiv, 12, 133, 196.
+
+Nemesis, 174.
+
+_Nietzsche_ (F.), cxxviii.
+
+Nobility, cxcvii.
+
+Observation, lxxxix.
+
+Orders (social), cxcvii seqq., 124.
+
+Ought, clxxv, 94, 116.
+
+Pain, 6, 94.
+
+Pantheism, 184, 194.
+
+Parliament, 142.
+
+Passion, 95.
+
+Peasantry, cci.
+
+_Peel_ (Sir R.), 127.
+
+Perception, 67.
+
+Perfection, cxxvii, cxxix.
+
+Person, 107, 119.
+
+Personality, lxiv, clxvii.
+
+Philosophy, xiv, cxvii, cxxxviii, 159 seqq., 179 seqq.
+
+Phrenology, 35.
+
+Physiology, lxxxi, c.
+
+_Pinel_, 39.
+
+_Plato_, xcviii, cxxxi, cxxxv, 33, 97, 102, 162.
+
+Pleasure, cxxxvi, 94.
+
+_Plotinus_, cxliv.
+
+Police, 130.
+
+_Porphyry_, xx.
+
+Positivity of laws, 125.
+
+Powers (political), ccii, 138.
+
+Practice, 92.
+
+Property, xxix, cxcii, 107.
+
+Protestantism, 166.
+
+Prussia, clxxviii, clxxxiv.
+
+Psychiatry, 33.
+
+Psychology, xxii, xxiv, lii seqq., lxiii, lxxxvi, xcv, cxvii, 4, 58, 63.
+
+Psycho-physics, clvi, 23.
+
+Punishment, cxciii, cciii, 111.
+
+Purpose, 97, 114.
+
+Races, 16.
+
+Rationalism, clxv, 183.
+
+Reason, cxv, cxliii, clxxii, 58.
+
+Recollection, 70.
+
+_Reinhold_, 49.
+
+Religion, xxxvii seqq., cxcvi, 155 seqq., 167 seqq.
+
+Representation, cxi, 70;
+  political, clxxxiii, 142.
+
+Responsibility, 114.
+
+Revelation, 7, 175.
+
+Right, xxix, 104 (see Law).
+
+_Ritter_, clxi, clxiii.
+
+Romances, 151:
+  romantic art, 172.
+
+Savages, lxxxvii, cii.
+
+_Schelling_, clxi.
+
+_Schindler_, clxiii.
+
+_Schopenhauer_, cvi, cxvi, cli, clxiv, clxix, clxxxvii.
+
+Science, xviii.
+
+_Scott_ (Sir W.), 151.
+
+Self-consciousness, clxxi, 53 seqq.
+
+Sensibility and sensation, 20, 50.
+
+Sex, 18.
+
+Siderism, clxiii, 15.
+
+Signs (in language), 76.
+
+Skill (acquired), 42.
+
+Slavery, 56, 101.
+
+Sleep, 18.
+
+Society, xxxii, 56.
+
+Sociology, xxiii.
+
+Somnambulism, 30.
+
+Soul, liv, lxix, lxxv, 26.
+
+_Spencer_ (H.), xxi seqq., cxi, cxxiii, cxliv.
+
+_Spinoza_, lxxvi, ci, cxix, cl, 14, 49, 188.
+
+Spiritualism, clxii.
+
+State, xxxii seqq., clxxvi, clxxxiii, 131 seqq.
+
+Stoicism, cxix, cxxiv, cxi, cxliii.
+
+Suggestion, clxv seqq., 33.
+
+Superstition, 158.
+
+Syllogism, 90.
+
+Symbol, 77, 171.
+
+Sympathy, clv.
+
+Telepathy, clxi, 34.
+
+Tellurism, clxiii, 15.
+
+Theology, 155.
+
+Thinking, clxxiv, 89.
+
+_Tholuck_, 191.
+
+Trinity, 177 seqq.
+
+Truth, cv, 182.
+
+Unconscious (the), cxlvi.
+
+Understanding, 52, 89.
+
+Universalising, cxxviii.
+
+Utilitarianism, cxxxvi.
+
+Value, 109.
+
+Virtues, cxxxi, cxcviii, 120.
+
+War, cxcix, 146.
+
+Wartburg, clxxix.
+
+Welfare, 114.
+
+Wickedness, 9, 94, 117.
+
+Will, xxviii, cxxv, clxxv, 62, 90.
+
+_Wolff_, lxxiii.
+
+Words, clxxiv, 79.
+
+_Wordsworth_, li, clxviii.
+
+Written language, 81 seqq.
+
+Wrong, 109.
+
+Würtemberg, clxxxv.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+
+    1 Plato, _Rep._ 527.
+
+    2 The prospectus of the _System of Synthetic Philosophy_ is dated
+      1860. Darwin's _Origin of Species_ is 1859. But such ideas, both in
+      Mr. Spencer and others, are earlier than Darwin's book.
+
+    3 Hegel's _Verhältniss_, the supreme category of what is called
+      actuality: where object is necessitated by outside object.
+
+    4 Cf. Herbart, _Werke_ (ed. Kehrbach), iv. 372. This consciousness
+      proper is what Leibniz called _« __Apperception,__ »__ la
+      connaissance réflexive de l'état intérieur (Nouveaux Essais)_.
+
+    5 Herbart, _Werke_, vi. 55 (ed. Kehrbach).
+
+    6 p. 59 (§ 440).
+
+    7 p. 63 (§ 440).
+
+    8 These remarks refer to four out of the five Herbartian ethical
+      ideas. See also Leibniz, who (in 1693, _De Notionibus juris et
+      justitiae_) had given the following definitions: "Caritas est
+      benevolentia universalis. Justitia est caritas sapientis. Sapientia
+      est scientia felicitatis." The jus naturae has three grades: the
+      lowest, jus strictum; the second, aequitas (or caritas, in the
+      narrower sense); and the highest, pietas, which is honeste, i.e. pie
+      vivere.
+
+    9 To which the Greek {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, the Latin civitas or respublica, were only
+      approximations. Hegel _is not writing a history_. If he were, it
+      would be necessary for him to point out how far the individual
+      instance, e.g. Rome, or Prussia, corresponded to its Idea.
+
+   10 Shakespeare's phrase, as in _Othello_, iii. 2; _Lover's Complaint_,
+      v. 24.
+
+_   11 Iliad_, xii. 243.
+
+   12 See Hegel's _Logic_, pp. 257 seq.
+
+   13 See p. 153 (§ 550).
+
+   14 Cf. _Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_, chaps. xviii, xxvi.
+
+   15 As stated in p. 167 (_Encycl._ § 554). Cf. _Phenom. d. Geistes_,
+      cap. vii, which includes the Religion of Art, and the same point of
+      view is explicit in the first edition of the _Encyclopaedia_.
+
+_   16 Philosophie der Religion_ (_Werke_, xi. 5).
+
+   17 Hegel, _Phenomenologie des Geistes_ (_Werke_, ii. 545). The
+      meeting-ground of the Greek spirit, as it passed through Rome, with
+      Christianity.
+
+   18 Ib., p. 584.
+
+_   19 Phenomenologie des Geistes_ (_Werke_, ii. 572). Thus Hegelian
+      idealism claims to be the philosophical counterpart of the central
+      dogma of Christianity.
+
+   20 From the old Provençal _Lay of Boëthius_.
+
+   21 It is the doctrine of the _intellectus agens_, or _in actu_; the
+      _actus purus_ of the Schoolmen.
+
+_   22 Einleitung in die Philosophie_, §§ 1, 2.
+
+_   23 Psychologie als Wissenschaft_, Vorrede.
+
+_   24 Einleitung in die Philosophie_, §§ 11, 12.
+
+_   25 Einleitung in die Philosophie_, § 18: cf. _Werke_, ed. Kehrbach, v.
+      108.
+
+   26 Cf. Plato's remarks on the problem in the word Self-control.
+      _Republ._ 430-1.
+
+_   27 Lehrbuch der Psychologie_, §§ 202, 203.
+
+_   28 Allgemeine Metaphysik_, Vorrede.
+
+_   29 Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik_ (1806), § 13.
+
+_   30 Werke_, ed. Kehrbach (_Ueber die Möglichkeit_, &c), v. 96.
+
+_   31 Ibid._, p. 100.
+
+   32 One might almost fancy Herbart was translating into a general
+      philosophic thesis the words in which Goethe has described how he
+      overcame a real trouble by transmuting it into an ideal shape, e.g.
+      _Wahrheit und Dichtung_, cap. xii.
+
+   33 Herbart's language is almost identical with Hegel's: _Encycl._ § 389
+      (p. 12). Cf. Spencer, _Psychology_, i. 192. "Feelings are in all
+      cases the materials out of which the superior tracts of
+      consciousness and intellect are evolved."
+
+_   34 Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_, ch. xvii.
+
+_   35 Psychologia Empirica_, § 29.
+
+   36 As is also the case with Herbart's metaphysical reality of the Soul.
+
+_   37 Human Nature_, vii. 2. "Pleasure, Love, and appetite, which is also
+      called desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the
+      same thing...." Deliberation is (ch. xii. 1) the "alternate
+      succession of appetite and fears."
+
+_   38 Eth._ ii. 48 Schol.
+
+_   39 Eth._ ii. 43 Schol.: cf. 49 Schol.
+
+   40 This wide scope of thinking (_cogitatio_, _penser_) is at least as
+      old as the Cartesian school: and should be kept in view, as against
+      a tendency to narrow its range to the mere intellect.
+
+   41 e.g. _Analysis of the Human Mind_, ch. xxiv. "Attention is but
+      another name for the interesting character of the idea;" ch. xix.
+      "Desire and the idea of a pleasurable sensation are convertible
+      terms."
+
+   42 As Mr. Spencer says (_Psychology_, i. 141), "Objective psychology
+      can have no existence as such without borrowing its data from
+      subjective psychology."
+
+   43 The same failure to note that experiment is valuable only where
+      general points of view are defined, is a common fault in biology.
+
+   44 Münsterberg, _Aufgaben und Methoden der Psychologie_, p. 144.
+
+_   45 Lehrbuch der Psychologie_, § 54 (2nd ed.), or § 11 (1st ed.).
+
+   46 See p. 11 (§ 387).
+
+   47 Cf. Nietzsche, _Also sprach Zarathustra_, i. 43. "There is more
+      reason in thy body than in thy best wisdom."
+
+   48 This language is very characteristic of the physicists who dabble in
+      psychology and imagine they are treading in the steps of Kant, if
+      not even verifying what they call his guesswork: cf. Ziehen,
+      _Physiol. Psychologie_, 2nd ed. p. 212. "In every case there is
+      given us only the psychical series of sensations and their
+      memory-images, and it is only a universal hypothesis if we assume
+      beside this psychical series a material series standing in causal
+      relation to it.... The material series is not given equally
+      originally with the psychical."
+
+   49 It is the same radical feature of consciousness which is thus noted
+      by Mr. Spencer, _Psychology_, i. 475. "Perception and sensation are
+      ever tending to exclude each other but never succeed." "Cognition
+      and feeling are antithetical and inseparable." "Consciousness
+      continues only in virtue of this conflict." Cf. Plato's resolution
+      in the _Philebus_ of the contest between intelligence and feeling
+      (pleasure).
+
+   50 It is the quasi-Aristotelian {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}, defined as the step from one
+      proposition to another, the knowledge of which will set the first
+      proposition in a full light.
+
+_   51 Grundlage des Naturrechts_, § 5.
+
+_   52 System der Sittenlehre_, § 8, iv.
+
+   53 Even though religion (according to Kant) conceive them as divine
+      commands.
+
+   54 Cf. Hegel's _Werke_, vii. 2, p. 236 (Lecture-note on § 410). "We
+      must treat as utterly empty the fancy of those who suppose that
+      properly man should have no organic body," &c.; and see p. 159 of
+      the present work.
+
+_   55 Criticism of Pure Reason_, Architectonic.
+
+   56 Spencer, _Psychology_, i. 291: "Mind can be understood only by
+      observing how mind is evolved."
+
+   57 Cf. Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 339: "The ethical sentiment
+      proper is, in the great mass of cases, scarcely discernible."
+
+_   58 Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_, p. 143.
+
+   59 Windelband (W.), _Präludien_ (1884), p. 288.
+
+   60 Cf. Plato, _Republic_, p. 486.
+
+_   61 Human Nature: Morals_, Part III.
+
+_   62 Emotion and Will_, ch. xv. § 23.
+
+   63 It is characteristic of the Kantian doctrine to absolutise the
+      conception of Duty and make it express the essence of the whole
+      ethical idea.
+
+   64 Which are still, as the Socialist Fourier says, states of social
+      incoherence, specially favourable to falsehood.
+
+_   65 Rechtsphilosophie_, § 4.
+
+   66 Cf. Schelling, ii. 12: "There are no _born_ sons of freedom."
+
+   67 Simmel (G.), _Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_, i. 184.
+
+_   68 Jenseits von Gut und Böse_, p. 225.
+
+   69 Aristot. _Polit._ i. 6.
+
+   70 Plato, _Phaedo_.
+
+   71 Carus, _Psyche_, p. 1.
+
+   72 See Arist., _Anal. Post._ ii. 19 (ed. Berl. 100, a. 10).
+
+   73 Cf. _The Logic of Hegel_, notes &c., p. 421.
+
+   74 "Omnia individua corpora quamvis diversis gradibus animata sunt."
+      _Eth._ ii. 13. schol.
+
+_   75 Nanna_ (1848): _Zendavesta_ (1851): _Ueber die Seelenfrage_ (1861).
+
+   76 Described by S. as the rise from mere physical _cause_ to
+      physiological _stimulus_ (Reiz), to psychical _motive_.
+
+   77 Infra, p. 12.
+
+   78 Aristot., _De Anima_, i. c. 4, 5.
+
+_   79 Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre_, i. 10.
+
+_   80 Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre_, iv. 18.
+
+   81 Works like Preyer's _Seele des Kindes_ illustrate this aspect of
+      mental evolution; its acquirement of definite and correlated
+      functions.
+
+   82 Cf. the end of Caleb Balderstone (in _The Bride of Lammermoor_):
+      "With a fidelity sometimes displayed by the canine race, but seldom
+      by human beings, he pined and died."
+
+   83 See Windischmann's letters in _Briefe von und an Hegel_.
+
+   84 Cf. _Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_, chaps. xii-xiv.
+
+   85 Kieser's _Tellurismus_ is, according to Schopenhauer, "the fullest
+      and most thorough text-book of Animal Magnetism."
+
+   86 Cf. Fichte, _Nachgelassene Werke_, iii. 295 (_Tagebuch über den
+      animalischen Magnetismus_, 1813), and Schopenhauer, _Der Wille in
+      der Natur_.
+
+   87 Bernheim: _La suggestion domine toute l'histoire de l'humanité_.
+
+   88 An instance from an unexpected quarter, in Eckermann's conversations
+      with Goethe: "In my young days I have experienced cases enough,
+      where on lonely walks there came over me a powerful yearning for a
+      beloved girl, and I thought of her so long till she actually came to
+      meet me." (Conversation of Oct. 7, 1827.)
+
+_   89 Gleichsam in einer Vorwelt, einer diese Welt schaffenden Welt_
+      (_Nachgelassene Werke_, iii. 321).
+
+_   90 Selbst-bewusstsein_ is not self-consciousness, in the vulgar sense
+      of brooding over feelings and self: but consciousness which is
+      active and outgoing, rather than receptive and passive. It is
+      practical, as opposed to theoretical.
+
+   91 The more detailed exposition of this Phenomenology of Mind is given
+      in the book with that title: Hegel's _Werke_, ii. pp. 71-316.
+
+_   92 System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 15 (see Essay V).
+
+   93 Hegel's _Werke_, viii. 313, and cf. the passage quoted in my _Logic
+      of Hegel_, notes, pp. 384, 385.
+
+   94 Hegel's _Briefe_, i. 15.
+
+_   95 Kritik der Verfassung Deutschlands_, edited by G. Mollat (1893).
+      Parts of this were already given by Haym and Rosenkranz. The same
+      editor has also in this year published, though not quite in full,
+      Hegel's _System der Sittlichkeit_, to which reference is made in
+      what follows.
+
+   96 In which some may find a prophecy of the effects of "blood and iron"
+      in 1866.
+
+_   97 Die Absolute Regierung_: in the _System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 32:
+      cf. p. 55. Hegel himself compares it to Fichte's _Ephorate_.
+
+_   98 Die Absolute Regierung_, l.c. pp. 37, 38.
+
+   99 Some idea of his meaning may perhaps be gathered by comparison with
+      passages in _Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre_, ii. 1, 2.
+
+_  100 Kritik der Verfassung_, p. 20.
+
+  101 In some respects Bacon's attitude in the struggle between royalty
+      and parliament may be compared.
+
+  102 Just as Schopenhauer, on the contrary, always says _moralisch_--never
+      _sittlich_.
+
+  103 Grey (G.), _Journals of two Expeditions of Discovery in North-West
+      and Western Australia_, ii. 220.
+
+  104 With some variation of ownership, perhaps, according to the
+      prevalence of so-called matriarchal or patriarchal households.
+
+  105 Cf. the custom in certain tribes which names the father after his
+      child: as if the son first gave his father legitimate position in
+      society.
+
+_  106 System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 8.
+
+_  107 Aufhebung_ (_positive_) as given in _absolute Sittlichkeit_.
+
+_  108 System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 15.
+
+  109 This phraseology shows the influence of Schelling, with whom he was
+      at this epoch associated. See _Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_,
+      ch. xiv.
+
+  110 Cf. the intermediate function assigned (see above, p. clxxxiii) to
+      the priests and the aged.
+
+_  111 System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 19.
+
+  112 See _infra_, p. 156.
+
+  113 Wordsworth's _Laodamia_.
+
+  114 "For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' 'Chuck him out, the
+      brute!'
+      But it's 'Saviour of 'is country' when the guns begin to shoot."
+
+  115 "I can assure you," said Werner (the merchant), "that I never
+      reflected on the State in my life. My tolls, charges and dues I have
+      paid for no other reason than that it was established usage."
+      (_Wilh. Meisters Lehrjahre_, viii. 2.)
+
+_  116 System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 40.
+
+_  117 System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 65.
+
+_  118 Ibid._ p. 46.
+
+_  119 Natürliche Seele._
+
+_  120 Natürliche Qualitäten._
+
+_  121 Empfindung._
+
+_  122 Die fühlende Seele._
+
+  123 Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the
+      state of sober consciousness than many moderns, who supposed that
+      the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorised their
+      belief in the sublimity of the revelations of somnambulistic vision.
+      Plato says in the _Timaeus_ (p. 71), "The author of our being so
+      ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measure of
+      truth, and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination
+      by dreams). And herein is a proof that God has given the art of
+      divination, not to the wisdom, but, to the foolishness of man; for
+      no man when in his wits attains prophetic truth and inspiration; but
+      when he receives the inspired word, either his intelligence is
+      enthralled by sleep, or he is demented by some distemper or
+      possession (enthusiasm)." Plato very correctly notes not merely the
+      bodily conditions on which such visionary knowledge depends, and the
+      possibility of the truth of the dreams, but also the inferiority of
+      them to the reasonable frame of mind.
+
+_  124 Selbstgefühl._
+
+_  125 Gewohnheit._
+
+_  126 Die wirkliche Seele._
+
+_  127 Das Bewußtsein als solches_: (a) _Das sinnliche Bewußtsein._
+
+_  128 Wahrnehmung._
+
+_  129 Der Verstand._
+
+_  130 Selbstbewußtsein._
+
+_  131 Die Begierde._
+
+_  132 Das anerkennende Selbstbewußtsein._
+
+_  133 Die Vernunft._
+
+_  134 Der Geist._
+
+_  135 Die Intelligenz._
+
+_  136 Anschauung._
+
+_  137 Vorstellung._
+
+_  138 Die Erinnerung._
+
+_  139 Die Einbildungskraft._
+
+_  140 Phantasie._
+
+_  141 Gedächtniß._
+
+_  142 Auswendiges._
+
+_  143 Inwendiges._
+
+_  144 Das Denken._
+
+_  145 Der praktische Geist._
+
+_  146 Der praktische Gefühl._
+
+_  147 Der Triebe und die Willkühr._
+
+_  148 Die Glückseligkeit._
+
+_  149 Der freie Geist._
+
+_  150 Gesess._
+
+_  151 Sitte._
+
+_  152 Das Recht._
+
+_  153 Moralität._
+
+_  154 Naturrecht._
+
+_  155 Moralität._
+
+_  156 Der Vorsatz._
+
+_  157 That._
+
+_  158 Handlung._
+
+_  159 Die Absicht und das Wohl._
+
+_  160 Das Gute und das Böse._
+
+_  161 Die Sittlichkeit._
+
+_  162 Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft._
+
+_  163 Das System der Bedürfnisse._
+
+_  164 Die Rechtspflege._
+
+_  165 Geseß._
+
+_  166 Die Polizei und die Corporation._
+
+_  167 Inneres Staatsrecht._
+
+_  168 Das äußere Staatsrecht._
+
+_  169 Die Weltgeschichte._
+
+_  170 Weltweisheit._
+
+_  171 Der absolute Geist._
+
+_  172 Die geoffenbarte Religion._
+
+  173 [The citation given by Hegel from Schlegel's translation is here
+      replaced by the version (in one or two points different) in the
+      _Sacred Books of the East_, vol. viii.]
+
+  174 In order to give a clearer impression of it, I cannot refrain from
+      quoting a few passages, which may at the same time give some
+      indication of the marvellous skill of Rückert, from whom they are
+      taken, as a translator. [For Rückert's verses a version is here
+      substituted in which I have been kindly helped by Miss May Kendall.]
+
+      III.
+
+      I saw but One through all heaven's starry spaces gleaming:
+      I saw but One in all sea billows wildly streaming.
+      I looked into the heart, a waste of worlds, a sea,--
+      I saw a thousand dreams,--yet One amid all dreaming.
+      And earth, air, water, fire, when thy decree is given,
+      Are molten into One: against thee none hath striven.
+      There is no living heart but beats unfailingly
+      In the one song of praise to thee, from earth and heaven.
+
+      V.
+
+      As one ray of thy light appears the noonday sun,
+      But yet thy light and mine eternally are one.
+      As dust beneath thy feet the heaven that rolls on high:
+      Yet only one, and one for ever, thou and I.
+      The dust may turn to heaven, and heaven to dust decay;
+      Yet art thou one with me, and shalt be one for aye.
+      How may the words of life that fill heaven's utmost part
+      Rest in the narrow casket of one poor human heart?
+      How can the sun's own rays, a fairer gleam to fling,
+      Hide in a lowly husk, the jewel's covering?
+      How may the rose-grove all its glorious bloom unfold,
+      Drinking in mire and slime, and feeding on the mould?
+      How can the darksome shell that sips the salt sea stream
+      Fashion a shining pearl, the sunlight's joyous beam?
+      Oh, heart! should warm winds fan thee, should'st thou floods
+      endure,
+      One element are wind and flood; but be thou pure.
+
+      IX.
+
+      I'll tell thee how from out the dust God moulded man,--
+      Because the breath of Love He breathed into his clay:
+      I'll tell thee why the spheres their whirling paths began,--
+      They mirror to God's throne Love's glory day by day:
+      I'll tell thee why the morning winds blow o'er the grove,--
+      It is to bid Love's roses bloom abundantly:
+      I'll tell thee why the night broods deep the earth above,--
+      Love's bridal tent to deck with sacred canopy:
+      All riddles of the earth dost thou desire to prove?--
+      To every earthly riddle is Love alone the key.
+
+      XV.
+
+      Life shrinks from Death in woe and fear,
+      Though Death ends well Life's bitter need:
+      So shrinks the heart when Love draws near,
+      As though 'twere Death in very deed:
+      For wheresoever Love finds room,
+      There Self, the sullen tyrant, dies.
+      So let him perish in the gloom,--
+      Thou to the dawn of freedom rise.
+
+      In this poetry, which soars over all that is external and sensuous,
+      who would recognise the prosaic ideas current about so-called
+      pantheism--ideas which let the divine sink to the external and the
+      sensuous? The copious extracts which Tholuck, in his work _Anthology
+      from the Eastern Mystics_, gives us from the poems of Jelaleddin and
+      others, are made from the very point of view now under discussion.
+      In his Introduction, Herr Tholuck proves how profoundly his soul has
+      caught the note of mysticism; and there, too, he points out the
+      characteristic traits of its oriental phase, in distinction from
+      that of the West and Christendom. With all their divergence,
+      however, they have in common the mystical character. The conjunction
+      of Mysticism with so-called Pantheism, as he says (p. 53), implies
+      that inward quickening of soul and spirit which inevitably tends to
+      annihilate that external _Everything_, which Pantheism is usually
+      held to adore. But beyond that, Herr Tholuck leaves matters standing
+      at the usual indistinct conception of Pantheism; a profounder
+      discussion of it would have had, for the author's emotional
+      Christianity, no direct interest; but we see that personally he is
+      carried away by remarkable enthusiasm for a mysticism which, in the
+      ordinary phrase, entirely deserves the epithet Pantheistic. Where,
+      however, he tries philosophising (p. 12), he does not get beyond the
+      standpoint of the "rationalist" metaphysic with its uncritical
+      categories.
+
+
+
+
+
+***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND***
+
+
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+March 5, 2012
+
+            Project Gutenberg TEI edition 1
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