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You may copy it, give it + away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg + License online at www.gutenberg.org/license</p> + </availability> + </publicationStmt> + <sourceDesc> + <bibl> + Created electronically. + </bibl> + </sourceDesc> + </fileDesc> + <encodingDesc> + </encodingDesc> + <profileDesc> + <langUsage> + <language id="en"></language> + <language id="de"></language> + <language id="la"></language> + <language id="fr"></language> + <language id="el"></language> + </langUsage> + </profileDesc> + <revisionDesc> + <change> + <date value="2012-03-05">March 5, 2012</date> + <respStmt> + <name> + Produced by Odessa Paige Turner, David King, and the Online + Distributed Proofreading Team at <http://www.pgdp.net/>. + (This book was produced from scanned images of public domain + material from the Google Print project.) + </name> + </respStmt> + <item>Project Gutenberg TEI edition 1</item> + </change> + </revisionDesc> +</teiHeader> + +<pgExtensions> + <pgStyleSheet> + .boxed { x-class: boxed } + .shaded { x-class: shaded } + .rules { x-class: rules; rules: all } + .indent { margin-left: 2 } + .bold { font-weight: bold } + .italic { font-style: italic } + .smallcaps { font-variant: small-caps } + </pgStyleSheet> + + <pgCharMap formats="txt.iso-8859-1"> + <char id="U0x2014"> + <charName>mdash</charName> + <desc>EM DASH</desc> + <mapping>--</mapping> + </char> + <char id="U0x2003"> + <charName>emsp</charName> + <desc>EM SPACE</desc> + <mapping> </mapping> + </char> + <char id="U0x2026"> + <charName>hellip</charName> + <desc>HORIZONTAL ELLIPSIS</desc> + <mapping>...</mapping> + </char> + </pgCharMap> +</pgExtensions> + +<text lang="en"> + <front> + <div> + <divGen type="pgheader" /> + </div> + <div> + <divGen type="encodingDesc" /> + </div> + + <div rend="page-break-before: always"> + <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">Hegel's Philosophy of Mind</p> + <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">By</p> + <p rend="font-size: x-large; text-align: center">Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel</p> + <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">Translated From</p> + <p rend="font-size: x-large; text-align: center">The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">With</p> + <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">Five Introductory Essays</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">By</p> + <p rend="font-size: x-large; text-align: center">William Wallace, M.A., LL.D.</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">Fellow of Merton College, and Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">Oxford</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">Clarendon Press</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">1894</p> + </div> + <div rend="page-break-before: always"> + <head>Contents</head> + <divGen type="toc" /> + </div> + + </front> +<body> + +<pb n='v'/><anchor id='Pgv'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Preface.</head> + +<p> +I here offer a translation of the third or last part of +Hegel's encyclopaedic sketch of philosophy,—the <hi rend='italic'>Philosophy +of Mind</hi>. The volume, like its subject, stands +complete in itself. But it may also be regarded as +a supplement or continuation of the work begun in my +version of his <hi rend='italic'>Logic</hi>. I have not ventured upon the +<hi rend='italic'>Philosophy of Nature</hi> which lies between these two. +That is a province, to penetrate into which would +require an equipment of learning I make no claim to,—a +province, also, of which the present-day interest would +be largely historical, or at least bound up with historical +circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +The translation is made from the German text given +in the Second Part of the Seventh Volume of Hegel's +Collected Works, occasionally corrected by comparison +with that found in the second and third editions (of 1827 +and 1830) published by the author. I have reproduced +only Hegel's own paragraphs, and entirely omitted the +<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Zusätze</foreign> of the editors. These addenda—which are in +origin lecture-notes—to the paragraphs are, in the text +of the Collected Works, given for the first section only. +The psychological part which they accompany has been +barely treated elsewhere by Hegel: but a good popular +<pb n='vi'/><anchor id='Pgvi'/> +exposition of it will be found in Erdmann's <hi rend='italic'>Psychologische +Briefe</hi>. The second section was dealt with at +greater length by Hegel himself in his <hi rend='italic'>Philosophy of +Law</hi> (1820). The topics of the third section are largely +covered by his lectures on Art, Religion, and History +of Philosophy. +</p> + +<p> +I do not conceal from myself that the text offers +a hard nut to crack. Yet here and there, even through +the medium of the translation, I think some light cannot +fail to come to an earnest student. Occasionally, too, +as, for instance, in §§ 406, 459, 549, and still more in +§§ 552, 573, at the close of which might stand the +words <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Liberavi animam meam</foreign>, the writer really <q>lets +himself go,</q> and gives his mind freely on questions +where speculation comes closely in touch with life. +</p> + +<p> +In the <hi rend='italic'>Five Introductory Essays</hi> I have tried sometimes +to put together, and sometimes to provide with +collateral elucidation, some points in the Mental Philosophy. +I shall not attempt to justify the selection of +subjects for special treatment further than to hope that +they form a more or less connected group, and to refer +for a study of some general questions of system and +method to my <hi rend='italic'>Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's +Philosophy</hi> which appear almost simultaneously with +this volume. +</p> + +<p> +<hi rend='smallcaps'>Oxford</hi>,<lb/> +<hi rend='italic'>December, 1893</hi>. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='xi'/><anchor id='Pgxi'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Five Introductory Essays In Psychology And Ethics.</head> + +<pb n='xiii'/><anchor id='Pgxiii'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Essay I. On The Scope Of A Philosophy Of Mind.</head> + +<p> +The art of finding titles, and of striking out headings +which catch the eye or ear, and lead the mind by easy +paths of association to the subject under exposition, was +not one of Hegel's gifts. A stirring phrase, a vivid or +picturesque turn of words, he often has. But his lists +of contents, when they cease to be commonplace, are +apt to run into the bizarre and the grotesque. Generally, +indeed, his rubrics are the old and (as we may be +tempted to call them) insignificant terms of the text-books. +But, in Hegel's use of them, these conventional +designations are charged with a highly individualised +meaning. They may mean more—they may mean less—than +they habitually pass for: but they unquestionably +specify their meaning with a unique and almost +personal flavour. And this can hardly fail to create +and to disappoint undue expectations. +</p> + +<div> +<head>(i.) Philosophy and its Parts.</head> + +<p> +Even the main divisions of his system show this +conservatism in terminology. The names of the three +parts of the Encyclopaedia are, we may say, non-significant +<pb n='xiv'/><anchor id='Pgxiv'/> +of their peculiar contents. And that for +a good reason. What Hegel proposes to give is no +novel or special doctrine, but the universal philosophy +which has passed on from age to age, here narrowed +and there widened, but still essentially the same. It +is conscious of its continuity and proud of its identity +with the teachings of Plato and Aristotle. +</p> + +<p> +The earliest attempts of the Greek philosophers to +present philosophy in a complete and articulated order—attempts +generally attributed to the Stoics, the schoolmen +of antiquity—made it a tripartite whole. These +three parts were Logic, Physics, and Ethics. In their +entirety they were meant to form a cycle of unified +knowledge, satisfying the needs of theory as well as +practice. As time went on, however, the situation +changed: and if the old names remained, their scope +and value suffered many changes. New interests and +curiosities, due to altered circumstances, brought other +departments of reality under the focus of investigation +besides those which had been primarily discussed under +the old names. Inquiries became more specialised, +and each tended to segregate itself from the rest as an +independent field of science. The result was that in +modern times the territory still marked by the ancient +titles had shrunk to a mere phantom of its former bulk. +Almost indeed things had come to such a pass that the +time-honoured figures had sunk into the misery of <foreign rend='italic'>rois +fainéants</foreign>; while the real business of knowledge was +discharged by the younger and less conventional lines +of research which the needs and fashions of the time +had called up. Thus Logic, in the narrow formal sense, +was turned into an <q>art</q> of argumentation and a system +of technical rules for the analysis and synthesis of +academical discussion. Physics or Natural Philosophy +restricted itself to the elaboration of some metaphysical +<pb n='xv'/><anchor id='Pgxv'/> +postulates or hypotheses regarding the general modes +of physical operation. And Ethics came to be a very +unpractical discussion of subtleties regarding moral +faculty and moral standard. Meanwhile a theory of +scientific method and of the laws governing the growth +of intelligence and formation of ideas grew up, and left +the older logic to perish of formality and inanition. +The successive departments of physical science, each +in turn asserting its independence, finally left Natural +Philosophy no alternative between clinging to its outworn +hypotheses and abstract generalities, or identifying +itself (as Newton in his great book put it) with the +<hi rend='italic'>Principia Mathematica</hi> of the physical sciences. Ethics, +in its turn, saw itself, on one hand, replaced by psychological +inquiries into the relations between the feelings +and the will and the intelligence; while, on the other +hand, a host of social, historical, economical, and other +researches cut it off from the real facts of human life, +and left it no more than the endless debates on the +logical and metaphysical issues involved in free-will +and conscience, duty and merit. +</p> + +<p> +It has sometimes been said that Kant settled this +controversy between the old departments of philosophy +and the new branches of science. And the settlement, +it is implied, consisted in assigning to the philosopher +a sort of police and patrol duty in the commonwealth +of science. He was to see that boundaries were duly +respected, and that each science kept strictly to its own +business. For this purpose each branch of philosophy +was bound to convert itself into a department of criticism—an +examination of first principles in the several +provinces of reality or experience—with a view to get +a distinct conception of what they were, and thus define +exactly the lines on which the structures of more +detailed science could be put up solidly and safely. +<pb n='xvi'/><anchor id='Pgxvi'/> +This plan offered tempting lines to research, and sounded +well. But on further reflection there emerge one or +two difficulties, hard to get over. Paradoxical though +it may seem, one cannot rightly estimate the capacity +and range of foundations, before one has had some +familiarity with the buildings erected upon them. Thus +you are involved in a circle: a circle which is probably +inevitable, but which for that reason it is well to recognise +at once. Then—what is only another way of saying +the same thing—it is impossible to draw an inflexible +line between premises of principle and conclusions of +detail. There is no spot at which criticism can stop, +and, having done its business well, hand on the remaining +task to dogmatic system. It was an instinctive +feeling of this implication of system in what professed +only to be criticism which led the aged Kant to +ignore his own previous professions that he offered as +yet no system, and when Fichte maintained himself to +be erecting the fabric for which Kant had prepared the +ground, to reply by the counter-declaration that the +criticism was the system—that <q>the curtain was the +picture.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The Hegelian philosophy is an attempt to combine +criticism with system, and thus realise what Kant had +at least foretold. It is a system which is self-critical, +and systematic only through the absoluteness of its +criticism. In Hegel's own phrase, it is an immanent +and an incessant dialectic, which from first to last allows +finality to no dogmatic rest, but carries out Kant's +description of an Age of Criticism, in which nothing, +however majestic and sacred its authority, can plead +for exception from the all-testing <foreign rend='italic'>Elenchus</foreign>. Then, on +the other hand, Hegel refuses to restrict philosophy +and its branches to anything short of the totality. He +takes in its full sense that often-used phrase—the Unity +<pb n='xvii'/><anchor id='Pgxvii'/> +of Knowledge. Logic becomes the all-embracing +research of <q>first principles,</q>—the principles which +regulate physics and ethics. The old divisions between +logic and metaphysic, between induction and deduction, +between theory of reasoning and theory of knowledge,—divisions +which those who most employed them were +never able to show the reason and purpose of—because +indeed they had grown up at various times and by +<q>natural selection</q> through a vast mass of incidents: +these are superseded and merged in one continuous +theory of real knowledge considered under its abstract +or formal aspect,—of organised and known reality in +its underlying thought-system. But these first principles +were only an abstraction from complete reality—the +reality which nature has when unified by mind—and +they presuppose the total from which they are derived. +The realm of pure thought is only the ghost of the +Idea—of the unity and reality of knowledge, and it +must be reindued with its flesh and blood. The logical +world is (in Kantian phrase) only the <emph>possibility</emph> of +Nature and Mind. It comes first—because it is a system +of First Principles: but these first principles could +only be elicited by a philosophy which has realised the +meaning of a mental experience, gathered by interpreting +the facts of Nature. +</p> + +<p> +Natural Philosophy is no longer—according to Hegel's +view of it—merely a scheme of mathematical ground-work. +That may be its first step. But its scope is +a complete unity (which is not a mere aggregate) of the +branches of natural knowledge, exploring both the +inorganic and the organic world. In dealing with this +endless problem, philosophy seems to be baulked by an +impregnable obstacle to its progress. Every day the +advance of specialisation renders any comprehensive or +synoptic view of the totality of science more and more +<pb n='xviii'/><anchor id='Pgxviii'/> +impossible. No doubt we talk readily enough of Science. +But here, if anywhere, we may say there is no Science, +but only sciences. The generality of science is a proud +fiction or a gorgeous dream, variously told and interpreted +according to the varying interest and proclivity +of the scientist. The sciences, or those who specially +expound them, know of no unity, no philosophy of +science. They are content to remark that in these +days the thing is impossible, and to pick out the faults +in any attempts in that direction that are made outside +their pale. Unfortunately for this contention, the thing +is done by us all, and, indeed, has to be done. If not +as men of science, yet as men—as human beings—we +have to put together things and form some total estimate +of the drift of development, of the unity of nature. To +get a notion, not merely of the general methods and +principles of the sciences, but of their results and +teachings, and to get this not as a mere lot of fragments, +but with a systematic unity, is indispensable in some +degree for all rational life. The life not founded on +science is not the life of man. But he will not find +what he wants in the text-books of the specialist, who +is obliged to treat his subject, as Plato says, <q>under +the pressure of necessity,</q> and who dare not look on it +in its quality <q>to draw the soul towards truth, and to +form the philosophic intellect so as to uplift what we +now unduly keep down<note place='foot'>Plato, <hi rend='italic'>Rep.</hi> 527.</note>.</q> If the philosopher in this +province does his work but badly, he may plead the +novelty of the task to which he comes as a pioneer or +even an architect. He finds little that he can directly +utilise. The materials have been gathered and prepared +for very special aims; and the great aim of science—that +human life may be made a higher, an ampler, and +<pb n='xix'/><anchor id='Pgxix'/> +happier thing,—has hardly been kept in view at all, +except in its more materialistic aspects. To the philosopher +the supreme interest of the physical sciences is +that man also belongs to the physical universe, or that +Mind and Matter as we know them are (in Mr. Spencer's +language) <q>at once antithetical and inseparable.</q> He +wants to find the place of Man,—but of Man as Mind—in +Nature. +</p> + +<p> +If the scope of Natural Philosophy be thus expanded +to make it the unity and more than the synthetic aggregate +of the several physical sciences—to make it the +whole which surpasses the addition of all their fragments, +the purpose of Ethics has not less to be deepened +and widened. Ethics, under that title, Hegel knows +not. And for those who cannot recognise anything +unless it be clearly labelled, it comes natural to record +their censure of Hegelianism for ignoring or disparaging +ethical studies. But if we take the word in that wide +sense which common usage rather justifies than adopts, +we may say that the whole philosophy of Mind is +a moral philosophy. Its subject is the moral as opposed +to the physical aspect of reality: the inner and ideal +life as opposed to the merely external and real materials +of it: the world of intelligence and of humanity. It +displays Man in the several stages of that process by +which he expresses the full meaning of nature, or discharges +the burden of that task which is implicit in him +from the first. It traces the steps of that growth by +which what was no better than a fragment of nature—an +intelligence located (as it seemed) in one piece of +matter—comes to realise the truth of it and of himself. +That truth is his ideal and his obligation: but it is also—such +is the mystery of his birthright—his idea and +possession. He—like the natural universe—is (as the +<hi rend='italic'>Logic</hi> has shown) a principle of unification, organisation, +<pb n='xx'/><anchor id='Pgxx'/> +idealisation: and his history (in its ideal completeness) +is the history of the process by which he, the typical +man, works the fragments of reality (and such mere +reality must be always a collection of fragments) into +the perfect unity of a many-sided character. Thus the +philosophy of mind, beginning with man as a sentient +organism, the focus in which the universe gets its first +dim confused expression through mere feeling, shows +how he <q>erects himself above himself</q> and realises +what ancient thinkers called his kindred with the divine. +</p> + +<p> +In that total process of the mind's liberation and +self-realisation the portion specially called Morals is +but one, though a necessary, stage. There are, said +Porphyry and the later Platonists, four degrees in the +path of perfection and self-accomplishment. And first, +there is the career of honesty and worldly prudence, +which makes the duty of the citizen. Secondly, there +is the progress in purity which casts earthly things +behind, and reaches the angelic height of passionless +serenity. And the third step is the divine life which +by intellectual energy is turned to behold the truth of +things. Lastly, in the fourth grade, the mind, free +and sublime in self-sustaining wisdom, makes itself an +<q>exemplar</q> of virtue, and is even a <q>father of Gods.</q> +Even so, it may be said, the human mind is the subject +of a complicated Teleology,—the field ruled by a multifarious +Ought, psychological, aesthetical, social and +religious. To adjust their several claims cannot be the +object of any science, if adjustment means to supply +a guide in practice. But it is the purpose of such +a teleology to show that social requirements and moral +duty as ordinarily conceived do not exhaust the range +of obligation,—of the supreme ethical Ought. How +that can best be done is however a question of some +difficulty. For the ends under examination do not +<pb n='xxi'/><anchor id='Pgxxi'/> +fall completely into a serial order, nor does one involve +others in such a way as to destroy their independence. +You cannot absolve psychology as if it stood independent +of ethics or religion, nor can aesthetic considerations +merely supervene on moral. Still, it may +be said, the order followed by Hegel seems on the +whole liable to fewer objections than others. +</p> + +<p> +Mr. Herbert Spencer, the only English philosopher +who has even attempted a <emph>System</emph> of Philosophy, may in +this point be compared with Hegel. He also begins with +a <hi rend='italic'>First Principles</hi>,—a work which, like Hegel's <hi rend='italic'>Logic</hi>, +starts by presenting Philosophy as the supreme arbiter +between the subordinate principles of Religion and +Science, which are in it <q>necessary correlatives.</q> The +positive task of philosophy is (with some inconsistency +or vagueness) presented, in the next place, as a <q>unification +of knowledge.</q> Such a unification has to make +explicit the implicit unity of known reality: because +<q>every thought involves a whole system of thoughts.</q> +And such a programme might again suggest the Logic. +But unfortunately Mr. Spencer does not (and he has +Francis Bacon to justify him here) think it worth his +while to toil up the weary, but necessary, mount of +Purgatory which is known to us as Logic. With +a naïve realism, he builds on Cause and Power, and +above all on Force, that <q>Ultimate of Ultimates,</q> which +seems to be, however marvellously, a denizen both of the +Known and the Unknowable world. In the known world +this Ultimate appears under two forms, matter and +motion, and the problem of science and philosophy is +to lay down in detail and in general the law of their +continuous redistribution, of the segregation of motion +from matter, and the inclusion of motion into matter. +</p> + +<p> +Of this process, which has no beginning and no end,—the +rhythm of generation and corruption, attraction +<pb n='xxii'/><anchor id='Pgxxii'/> +and repulsion, it may be said that it is properly not +a first principle of all knowledge, but the general or +fundamental portion of Natural Philosophy to which +Mr. Spencer next proceeds. Such a philosophy, +however, he gives only in part: viz. as a Biology, dealing +with organic (and at a further stage and under other +names, with supra-organic) life. And that the Philosophy +of Nature should take this form, and carry both the +First Principles and the later portions of the system +with it, as parts of a philosophy of evolution, is what +we should have expected from the contemporaneous +interests of science<note place='foot'>The prospectus of the <hi rend='italic'>System of Synthetic Philosophy</hi> is dated +1860. Darwin's <hi rend='italic'>Origin of Species</hi> is 1859. But such ideas, both in +Mr. Spencer and others, are earlier than Darwin's book.</note>. Even a one-sided attempt to give +speculative unity to those researches, which get—for +reasons the scientific specialist seldom asks—the title of +biological, is however worth noting as a recognition of +the necessity of a <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Natur-philosophie</foreign>,—a speculative +science of Nature. +</p> + +<p> +The third part of the Hegelian System corresponds +to what in the <hi rend='italic'>Synthetic Philosophy</hi> is known as Psychology, +Ethics, and Sociology. And here Mr. Spencer +recognises that something new has turned up. Psychology +is <q>unique</q> as a science: it is a <q>double science,</q> +and as a whole quite <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>sui generis</foreign>. Whether perhaps all +these epithets would not, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>mutatis mutandis</foreign>, have to be +applied also to Ethics and Sociology, if these are to do +their full work, he does not say. In what this doubleness +consists he even finds it somewhat difficult to show. +For, as his fundamental philosophy does not on this +point go beyond noting some pairs of verbal antitheses, +and has no sense of unity except in the imperfect shape +of a <q>relation<note place='foot'>Hegel's <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Verhältniss</foreign>, the supreme category of what is called +actuality: where object is necessitated by outside object.</note></q> between two things which are <q>antithetical +<pb n='xxiii'/><anchor id='Pgxxiii'/> +and inseparable,</q> he is perplexed by phrases +such as <q>in</q> and <q>out of</q> consciousness, and stumbles +over the equivocal use of <q>inner</q> to denote both mental +(or non-spatial) in general, and locally sub-cuticular in +special. Still, he gets so far as to see that the law of +consciousness is that in it neither feelings nor relations +have independent subsistence, and that the unit of mind +does not begin till what he calls two feelings are made +one. The phraseology may be faulty, but it shows an +inkling of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>. Unfortunately it is apparently +forgotten; and the language too often reverts into the +habit of what he calls the <q>objective,</q> i.e. purely +physical, sciences. +</p> + +<p> +Mr. Spencer's conception of Psychology restricts it to +the more general physics of the mind. For its more concrete +life he refers us to Sociology. But his Sociology +is yet unfinished: and from the plan of its inception, +and the imperfect conception of the ends and means of +its investigation, hardly admits of completion in any +systematic sense. To that incipiency is no doubt due +its excess in historical or anecdotal detail—detail, however, +too much segregated from its social context, and +in general its tendency to neglect normal and central +theory for incidental and peripheral facts. Here, too, +there is a weakness in First Principles and a love of +catchwords, which goes along with the fallacy that +illustration is proof. Above all, it is evident that the +great fact of religion overhangs Mr. Spencer with the +attraction of an unsolved and unacceptable problem. +He cannot get the religious ideas of men into co-ordination +with their scientific, aesthetic, and moral doctrines; +and only betrays his sense of the high importance of the +former by placing them in the forefront of inquiry, as +due to the inexperience and limitations of the so-called +primitive man. That is hardly adequate recognition of +<pb n='xxiv'/><anchor id='Pgxxiv'/> +the religious principle: and the defect will make itself +seriously felt, should he ever come to carry out the +further stage of his prospectus dealing with <q>the growth +and correlation of language, knowledge, morals, and +aesthetics.</q> +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(ii.) Mind and Morals.</head> + +<p> +A Mental Philosophy—if we so put what might also +be rendered a Spiritual Philosophy, or Philosophy of +Spirit—may to an English reader suggest something +much narrower than it actually contains. A Philosophy +of the Human Mind—if we consult English specimens—would +not imply much more than a psychology, and +probably what is called an inductive psychology. But +as Hegel understands it, it covers an unexpectedly wide +range of topics, the whole range from Nature to Spirit. +Besides Subjective Mind, which would seem on first +thoughts to exhaust the topics of psychology, it goes on +to Mind as Objective, and finally to Absolute mind. +And such combinations of words may sound either self-contradictory +or meaningless. +</p> + +<p> +The first Section deals with the range of what is +usually termed Psychology. That term indeed is employed +by Hegel, in a restricted sense, to denote the +last of the three sub-sections in the discussion of Subjective +Mind. The Mind, which is the topic of psychology +proper, cannot be assumed as a ready-made object, +or datum. A Self, a self-consciousness, an intelligent +and volitional agent, if it be the birthright of man, is +a birthright which he has to realise for himself, to earn +and to make his own. To trace the steps by which +<pb n='xxv'/><anchor id='Pgxxv'/> +mind in its stricter acceptation, as will and intelligence, +emerges from the general animal sensibility which is +the crowning phase of organic life, and the final problem +of biology, is the work of two preliminary sub-sections—the +first entitled <hi rend='italic'>Anthropology</hi>, the second +the <hi rend='italic'>Phenomenology of Mind</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +The subject of Anthropology, as Hegel understands +it, is the Soul—the raw material of consciousness, the +basis of all higher mental life. This is a borderland, +where the ground is still debateable between Nature +and Mind: it is the region of feeling, where the sensibility +has not yet been differentiated to intelligence. +Soul and body are here, as the phrase goes, in communion: +the inward life is still imperfectly disengaged +from its natural co-physical setting. Still one with +nature, it submits to natural influences and natural +vicissitudes: is not as yet master of itself, but the half-passive +receptacle of a foreign life, of a general vitality, +of a common soul not yet fully differentiated into individuality. +But it is awaking to self-activity: it is +emerging to Consciousness,—to distinguish itself, as +aware and conscious, from the facts of life and sentiency +of which it is aware. +</p> + +<p> +From this region of psychical physiology or physiological +psychology, Hegel in the second sub-section of +his first part takes us to the <q>Phenomenology of Mind,</q>—to +Consciousness. The sentient soul is also conscious—but +in a looser sense of that word<note place='foot'>Cf. Herbart, <hi rend='italic'>Werke</hi> (ed. Kehrbach), iv. 372. This consciousness +proper is what Leibniz called <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'><q>Apperception,</q> la connaissance réflexive +de l'état intérieur (Nouveaux Essais)</foreign>.</note>: it has feelings, +but can scarcely be said <emph>itself</emph> to know that it has them. +As consciousness, the Soul has come to separate what +it is from what it feels. The distinction emerges of +a subject which is conscious, and an object <emph>of</emph> which it +<pb n='xxvi'/><anchor id='Pgxxvi'/> +is conscious. And the main thing is obviously the +relationship between the two, or the Consciousness +itself, as tending to distinguish itself alike from its subject +and its object. Hence, perhaps, may be gathered +why it is called Phenomenology of Mind. Mind as yet +is not yet more than emergent or apparent: nor yet +self-possessed and self-certified. No longer, however, +one with the circumambient nature which it feels, it sees +itself set against it, but only as a passive recipient of it, +a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>tabula rasa</foreign> on which external nature is reflected, or +to which phenomena are presented. No longer, on the +other hand, a mere passive instrument of suggestion +from without, its instinct of life, its <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nisus</foreign> of self-assertion +is developed, through antagonism to a like <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nisus</foreign>, +into the consciousness of self-hood, of a Me and Mine +as set against a Thee and Thine. But just in proportion +as it is so developed in opposition to and recognition +of other equally self-centred selves, it has passed beyond +the narrower characteristic of Consciousness proper. +It is no longer mere intelligent perception or reproduction +of a world, but it is life, with perception (or apperception) +of that life. It has returned in a way to its +original unity with nature, but it is now the sense of its +self-hood—the consciousness of itself as the focus in +which subjective and objective are at one. Or, to put +it in the language of the great champion of Realism<note place='foot'>Herbart, <hi rend='italic'>Werke</hi>, vi. 55 (ed. Kehrbach).</note>, +the standpoint of Reason or full-grown Mind is this: +<q>The world which appears to us is our percept, therefore +in us. The real world, out of which we explain the +phenomenon, is our thought: therefore in us.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The third sub-section of the theory of Subjective +Mind—the Psychology proper—deals with Mind. This +is the real, independent Psyché—hence the special +<pb n='xxvii'/><anchor id='Pgxxvii'/> +appropriation of the term Psychology. <q>The Soul,</q> +says Herbart, <q>no doubt dwells in a body: there are, +moreover, corresponding states of the one and the other: +but nothing corporeal occurs in the Soul, nothing purely +mental, which we could reckon to our Ego, occurs in +the body: the affections of the body are no representations +of the Ego, and our pleasant and unpleasant +feelings do not immediately lie in the organic life they +favour or hinder.</q> Such a Soul, so conceived, is an +intelligent and volitional self, a being of intellectual and +<q>active</q> powers or phenomena: it is a Mind. And +<q>Mind,</q> adds Hegel<note place='foot'>p. <ref target='Pg059'>59</ref> (§ 440).</note>, <q>is just this elevation above +Nature and physical modes and above the complication +with an external object.</q> Nothing is <emph>external</emph> to +it: it is rather the internalising of all externality. In +this psychology proper, we are out of any immediate +connexion with physiology. <q>Psychology as such,</q> +remarks Herbart, <q>has its questions common to it with +Idealism</q>—with the doctrine that all reality is mental +reality. It traces, in Hegel's exposition of it, the steps +of the way by which mind realises that independence +which is its characteristic stand-point. On the intellectual +side that independence is assured in language,—the +system of signs by which the intelligence stamps external +objects as its own, made part of its inner world. A +science, some one has said, is after all only <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>une langue +bien faite</foreign>. So, reversing the saying, we may note that +a language is an inwardised and mind-appropriated +world. On the active side, the independence of mind +is seen in self-enjoyment, in happiness, or self-content, +where impulse and volition have attained satisfaction in +equilibrium, and the soul possesses itself in fullness. +Such a mind<note place='foot'>p. <ref target='Pg063'>63</ref> (§ 440).</note>, which has made the world its certified +<pb n='xxviii'/><anchor id='Pgxxviii'/> +possession in language, and which enjoys itself in self-possession +of soul, called happiness, is a free Mind. +And that is the highest which Subjective Mind can reach. +</p> + +<p> +At this point, perhaps, having rounded off by a +liberal sweep the scope of psychology, the ordinary +mental philosophy would stop. Hegel, instead of +finishing, now goes on to the field of what he calls +Objective Mind. For as yet it has been only the story +of a preparation, an inward adorning and equipment, +and we have yet to see what is to come of it in actuality. +Or rather, we have yet to consider the social forms on +which this preparation rests. The mind, self-possessed +and sure of itself or free, is so only through the objective +shape which its main development runs parallel +with. An intelligent Will, or a practical reason, was +the last word of the psychological development. But +a reason which is practical, or a volition which is +intelligent, is realised by action which takes regular +shapes, and by practice which transforms the world. +The theory of Objective Mind delineates the new form +which nature assumes under the sway of intelligence and +will. That intellectual world realises itself by transforming +the physical into a social and political world, the +given natural conditions of existence into a freely-instituted +system of life, the primitive struggle of kinds +for subsistence into the ordinances of the social state. +Given man as a being possessed of will and intelligence, +this inward faculty, whatever be its degree, will try to +impress itself on nature and to reproduce itself in a +legal, a moral, and social world. The kingdom of deed +replaces, or rises on the foundation of, the kingdom of +word: and instead of the equilibrium of a well-adjusted +soul comes the harmonious life of a social organism. +We are, in short, in the sphere of Ethics and Politics, +of Jurisprudence and Morals, of Law and Conscience. +</p> + +<pb n='xxix'/><anchor id='Pgxxix'/> + +<p> +Here,—as always in Hegel's system—there is a triad +of steps. First the province of Law or Right. But if +we call it Law, we must keep out of sight the idea of +a special law-giver, of a conscious imposition of laws, +above all by a political superior. And if we call it +Right, we must remember that it is neutral, inhuman, +abstract right: the right whose principle is impartial +and impassive uniformity, equality, order;—not moral +right, or the equity which takes cognisance of circumstances, +of personal claims, and provides against its own +hardness. The intelligent will of Man, throwing itself +upon the mere gifts of nature as their appointed master, +creates the world of Property—of things instrumental, +and regarded as adjectival, to the human personality. +But the autonomy of Reason (which is latent in the will) +carries with it certain consequences. As it acts, it also, +by its inherent quality of uniformity or universality, +enacts for itself a law and laws, and creates the realm +of formal equality or order-giving law. But this is +a <emph>mere</emph> equality: which is not inconsistent with what in +other respects may be excess of inequality. What one +does, if it is really to be treated as done, others may or +even must do: each act creates an expectation of continuance +and uniformity of behaviour. The doer is +bound by it, and others are entitled to do the like. The +material which the person appropriates creates a system +of obligation. Thus is constituted—in the natural give +and take of rational Wills—in the inevitable course of +human action and reaction,—a system of rights and duties. +This law of equality—the basis of justice, and the seed +of benevolence—is the scaffolding or perhaps rather the +rudimentary framework of society and moral life. Or +it is the bare skeleton which is to be clothed upon by +the softer and fuller outlines of the social tissues and +the ethical organs. +</p> + +<pb n='xxx'/><anchor id='Pgxxx'/> + +<p> +And thus the first range of Objective Mind postulates +the second, which Hegel calls <q>Morality.</q> The word is +to be taken in its strict sense as a protest against the +quasi-physical order of law. It is the morality of conscience +and of the good will, of the inner rectitude of +soul and purpose, as all-sufficient and supreme. Here +is brought out the complementary factor in social life: +the element of liberty, spontaneity, self-consciousness. +The motto of mere inward morality (as opposed to the +spirit of legality) is (in Kant's words): <q>There is nothing +without qualification good, in heaven or earth, but only +a good will.</q> The essential condition of goodness is +that the action be done with purpose and intelligence, +and in full persuasion of its goodness by the conscience +of the agent. The characteristic of Morality thus +described is its essential inwardness, and the sovereignty +of the conscience over all heteronomy. Its justification +is that it protests against the authority of a mere +external or objective order, subsisting and ruling in +separation from the subjectivity. Its defect is the turn +it gives to this assertion of the rights of subjective conscience: +briefly in the circumstance that it tends to set +up a mere individualism against a mere universalism, +instead of realising the unity and essential interdependence +of the two. +</p> + +<p> +The third sub-section of the theory of Objective +Mind describes a state of affairs in which this antithesis +is explicitly overcome. This is the moral life +in a social community. Here law and usage prevail +and provide the fixed permanent scheme of life: but +the law and the usage are, in their true or ideal conception, +only the unforced expression of the mind and +will of those who live under them. And, on the other +hand, the mind and will of the individual members of +such a community are pervaded and animated by its +<pb n='xxxi'/><anchor id='Pgxxxi'/> +universal spirit. In such a community, and so constituting +it, the individual is at once free and equal, and +that because of the spirit of fraternity, which forms its +spiritual link. In the world supposed to be governed +by mere legality the idea of right is exclusively prominent; +and when that is the case, it may often happen +that <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>summum jus summa injuria</foreign>. In mere morality, +the stress falls exclusively on the idea of inward freedom, +or the necessity of the harmony of the judgment and +the will, or the dependence of conduct upon conscience. +In the union of the two, in the moral community +as normally constituted, the mere idea of right is replaced, +or controlled and modified, by the idea of equity—a +balance as it were between the two preceding, +inasmuch as motive and purpose are employed to +modify and interpret strict right. But this effect—this +harmonisation—is brought about by the predominance +of a new idea—the principle of benevolence,—a +principle however which is itself modified by the +fundamental idea of right or law<note place='foot'>These remarks refer to four out of the five Herbartian ethical +ideas. See also Leibniz, who (in 1693, <hi rend='italic'>De Notionibus juris et justitiae</hi>) +had given the following definitions: <q>Caritas est benevolentia universalis. +Justitia est caritas sapientis. Sapientia est scientia felicitatis.</q> +The jus naturae has three grades: the lowest, jus strictum; the +second, aequitas (or caritas, in the narrower sense); and the highest, +pietas, which is honeste, i.e. pie vivere.</note> into a wise or +regulated kindliness. +</p> + +<p> +But what Hegel chiefly deals with under this head is +the interdependence of form and content, of social order +and personal progress. In the picture of an ethical +organisation or harmoniously-alive moral community he +shows us partly the underlying idea which gave room for +the antithesis between law and conscience, and partly +the outlines of the ideal in which that conflict becomes +only the instrument of progress. This organisation +<pb n='xxxii'/><anchor id='Pgxxxii'/> +has three grades or three typical aspects. These are +the Family, Civil Society, and the State. The first of +these, the Family, must be taken to include those +primary unities of human life where the natural affinity +of sex and the natural ties of parentage are the preponderant +influence in forming and maintaining the +social group. This, as it were, is the soul-nucleus of +social organisation: where the principle of unity is an +instinct, a feeling, an absorbing solidarity. Next comes +what Hegel has called Civil Society,—meaning however +by civil the antithesis to political, the society of those +who may be styled <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>bourgeois</foreign>, not <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>citoyens</foreign>:—and meaning +by society the antithesis to community. There are +other natural influences binding men together besides +those which form the close unities of the family, gens, +tribe, or clan. Economical needs associate human +beings within a much larger radius—in ways capable of +almost indefinite expansion—but also in a way much +less intense and deep. Civil Society is the more or +less loosely organised aggregate of such associations, +which, if, on one hand, they keep human life from +stagnating in the mere family, on another, accentuate +more sharply the tendency to competition and the +struggle for life. Lastly, in the Political State comes +the synthesis of family and society. Of the family; in +so far as the State tends to develope itself on the +nature-given unit of the Nation (an extended family, +supplementing as need arises real descent by fictitious +incorporations), and has apparently never permanently +maintained itself except on the basis of a predominant +common nationality. Of society; in so far as the +extension and dispersion of family ties have left free +room for the differentiation of many other sides of +human interest and action, and given ground for the +full development of individuality. In consequence of +<pb n='xxxiii'/><anchor id='Pgxxxiii'/> +this, the State (and such a state as Hegel describes is +essentially the idea or ideal of the modern State)<note place='foot'>To which the Greek πόλις, the Latin civitas or respublica, were +only approximations. Hegel <emph>is not writing a history</emph>. If he were, it +would be necessary for him to point out how far the individual +instance, e.g. Rome, or Prussia, corresponded to its Idea.</note> has +a certain artificial air about it. It can only be maintained +by the free action of intelligence: it must +make its laws public: it must bring to consciousness +the principles of its constitution, and create agencies +for keeping up unity of organisation through the several +separate provinces or contending social interests, each +of which is inclined to insist on the right of home +mis-rule. +</p> + +<p> +The State—which in its actuality must always be +a quasi-national state—is thus the supreme unity of +Nature and Mind. Its natural basis in land, language, +blood, and the many ties which spring therefrom, has +to be constantly raised into an intelligent unity through +universal interests. But the elements of race and of +culture have no essential connexion, and they perpetually +incline to wrench themselves asunder. Blood +and judgment are for ever at war in the state as in the +individual<note place='foot'>Shakespeare's phrase, as in <hi rend='italic'>Othello</hi>, iii. 2; <hi rend='italic'>Lover's Complaint</hi>, +v. 24.</note>: the cosmopolitan interest, to which the +maxim is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Ubi bene, ibi patria</foreign>, resists the national, which +adopts the patriotic watchword of Hector<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Iliad</hi>, xii. 243.</note>. The State +however has another source of danger in the very +principle that gave it birth. It arose through antagonism: +it was baptised on the battlefield, and it only +lives as it is able to assert itself against a foreign foe. +And this circumstance tends to intensify and even +pervert its natural basis of nationality:—tends to give +the very conception of the political a negative and +<pb n='xxxiv'/><anchor id='Pgxxxiv'/> +superficial look. But, notwithstanding all these drawbacks, +the State in its Idea is entitled to the name +Hobbes gave it,—the Mortal God. Here in a way +culminates the obviously objective,—we may almost +say, visible and tangible—development of Man and +Mind. Here it attains a certain completeness—a union +of reality and of ideality: a quasi-immortality, a quasi-universality. +What the individual person could not do +unaided, he can do in the strength of his commonwealth. +Much that in the solitary was but implicit or potential, +is in the State actualised. +</p> + +<p> +But the God of the State is a mortal God. It is but +a national and a limited mind. To be actual, one must +at least begin by restricting oneself. Or, rather actuality +is rational, but always with a conditioned and a relative +rationality<note place='foot'>See Hegel's <hi rend='italic'>Logic</hi>, pp. 257 seq.</note>: it is in the realm of action and re-action,—in +the realm of change and nature. It has warring +forces outside it,—warring forces inside it. Its unity +is never perfect: because it never produces a true +identity of interests within, or maintains an absolute +independence without. Thus the true and real State—the +State in its Idea—the realisation of concrete +humanity,—of Mind as the fullness and unity of nature—is +not reached in any single or historical State: but +floats away, when we try to seize it, into the endless +progress of history. Always indeed the State, the historical +and objective, points beyond itself. It does so +first in the succession of times. <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die Weltgeschichte ist +das Weltgericht.</foreign><note place='foot'>See p. <ref target='Pg153'>153</ref> (§ 550).</note> And in that doom of the world the +eternal blast sweeps along the successive generations of +the temporal, one expelling another from the stage +of time—each because it is inadequate to the Idea +which it tried to express, and has succumbed to an +<pb n='xxxv'/><anchor id='Pgxxxv'/> +enemy from without because it was not a real and true +unity within. +</p> + +<p> +But if temporal flees away before another temporal, +it abides in so far as it has, however inadequately, +given expression and visible reality—as it points inward +and upward—to the eternal. The earthly state is +also the city of God; and if the republic of Plato seems +to find scant admission into the reality of flesh and +blood, it stands eternal as a witness in the heaven of +idea. Behind the fleeting succession of consulates and +dictatures, of aristocracy and empire, feuds of plebeian +with patrician, in that apparent anarchy of powers +which the so-called Roman constitution is to the superficial +observer, there is the eternal Rome, one, strong, +victorious, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>semper eadem</foreign>: the Rome of Virgil and +Justinian, the ghost whereof still haunts with memories +the seven-hilled city, but which with full spiritual presence +lives in the law, the literature, the manners of +the modern world. To find fitter expression for this +Absolute Mind than it has in the Ethical community—to +reach that reality of which the moral world is but +one-sidedly representative—is the work of Art, Religion, +and Philosophy. And to deal with these efforts to find +the truth and the unity of Mind and Nature is the +subject of Hegel's third Section. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(iii.) Religion and Philosophy.</head> + +<p> +It may be well at this point to guard against a misconception +of this serial order of exposition<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel</hi>, chaps. xviii, xxvi.</note>. As stage +is seen to follow stage, the historical imagination, which +<pb n='xxxvi'/><anchor id='Pgxxxvi'/> +governs our ordinary current of ideas, turns the logical +dependence into a time-sequence. But it is of course +not meant that the later stage follows the earlier in +history. The later is the more real, and therefore the +more fundamental. But we can only understand by +abstracting and then transcending our abstractions, or +rather by showing how the abstraction implies relations +which force us to go further and beyond our arbitrary +arrest. Each stage therefore either stands to that +preceding it as an antithesis, which inevitably dogs its +steps as an accusing spirit, or it is the conjunction of +the original thesis with the antithesis, in a union which +should not be called synthesis because it is a closer +fusion and true marriage of minds. A truth and reality, +though fundamental, is only appreciated at its true +value and seen in all its force where it appears as the +reconciliation and reunion of partial and opposing +points of view. Thus, e.g., the full significance of the +State does not emerge so long as we view it in isolation +as a supposed single state, but only as it is seen in the +conflict of history, in its actual <q>energy</q> as a world-power +among powers, always pointing beyond itself to a something +universal which it fain would be, and yet cannot +be. Or, again, there never was a civil or economic +society which existed save under the wing of a state, or +in one-sided assumption of state powers to itself: and +a family is no isolated and independent unit belonging +to a supposed patriarchal age, but was always mixed +up with, and in manifold dependence upon, political and +civil combinations. The true family, indeed, far from +preceding the state in time, presupposes the political +power to give it its precise sphere and its social +stability: as is well illustrated by that typical form of +it presented in the Roman state. +</p> + +<p> +So, again, religion does not supervene upon an +<pb n='xxxvii'/><anchor id='Pgxxxvii'/> +already existing political and moral system and invest +it with an additional sanction. The true order would +be better described as the reverse. The real basis of +social life, and even of intelligence, is religion. As +some thinkers quaintly put it, the known rests and lives +on the bosom of the Unknowable. But when we say +that, we must at once guard against a misconception. +There are religions of all sorts; and some of them +which are most heard of in the modern world only +exist or survive in the shape of a traditional name and +venerated creed which has lost its power. Nor is +a religion necessarily committed to a definite conception +of a supernatural—of a personal power outside the +order of Nature. But in all cases, religion is a faith +and a theory which gives unity to the facts of life, and +gives it, not because the unity is in detail proved or +detected, but because life and experience in their +deepest reality inexorably demand and evince such +a unity to the heart. The religion of a time is not its +nominal creed, but its dominant conviction of the +meaning of reality, the principle which animates all +its being and all its striving, the faith it has in the +laws of nature and the purpose of life. Dimly or +clearly felt and perceived, religion has for its principle +(one cannot well say, its object) not the unknowable, +but the inner unity of life and knowledge, of act and +consciousness, a unity which is certified in its every +knowledge, but is never fully demonstrable by the +summation of all its ascertained items. As such a felt +and believed synthesis of the world and life, religion is +the unity which gives stability and harmony to the +social sphere; just as morality in its turn gives a +partial and practical realisation to the ideal of religion. +But religion does not merely establish and sanction +morality; it also frees it from a certain narrowness it +<pb n='xxxviii'/><anchor id='Pgxxxviii'/> +always has, as of the earth. Or, otherwise put, morality +has to the keener inspection something in it which is +more than the mere moral injunction at first indicates. +Beyond the moral, in its stricter sense, as the obligatory +duty and the obedience to law, rises and expands the +beautiful and the good: a beautiful which is disinterestedly +loved, and a goodness which has thrown +off all utilitarian relativity, and become a free self-enhancing +joy. The true spirit of religion sees in the +divine judgment not a mere final sanction to human +morality which has failed of its earthly close, not the +re-adjustment of social and political judgments in accordance +with our more conscientious inner standards, +but a certain, though, for our part-by-part vision, +incalculable proportion between what is done and +suffered. And in this liberation of the moral from +its restrictions, Art renders no slight aid. Thus in +different ways, religion presupposes morality to fill +up its vacant form, and morality presupposes religion +to give its laws an ultimate sanction, which at the same +time points beyond their limitations. +</p> + +<p> +But art, religion, and philosophy still rest on the +national culture and on the individual mind. However +much they rise in the heights of the ideal world, they +never leave the reality of life and circumstance behind, +and float in the free empyrean. Yet there are degrees +of universality, degrees in which they reach what they +promised. As the various psychical <emph>nuclei</emph> of an individual +consciousness tend through the course of experience +to gather round a central idea and by fusion +and assimilation form a complete mental organisation; +so, through the march of history, there grows up a +complication and a fusion of national ideas and aspirations, +which, though still retaining the individuality and +restriction of a concrete national life, ultimately present +<pb n='xxxix'/><anchor id='Pgxxxix'/> +an organisation social, aesthetic, and religious which is +a type of humanity in its universality and completeness. +Always moving in the measure and on the lines of the +real development of its social organisation, the art and +religion of a nation tend to give expression to what +social and political actuality at its best but imperfectly +sets in existence. They come more and more to be, not +mere competing fragments as set side by side with +those of others, but comparatively equal and complete +representations of the many-sided and many-voiced +reality of man and the world. Yet always they live +and flourish in reciprocity with the fullness of practical +institutions and individual character. An abstractly +universal art and religion is a delusion—until all diversities +of geography and climate, of language and temperament, +have been made to disappear. If these +energies are in power and reality and not merely in +name, they cannot be applied like a panacea or put on +like a suit of ready-made clothes. If alive, they grow +with individualised type out of the social situation: and +they can only attain a vulgar and visible universality, +so far as they attach themselves to some simple and +uniform aspects,—a part tolerably identical everywhere—in +human nature in all times and races. +</p> + +<p> +Art, according to Hegel's account, is the first of the +three expressions of Absolute Mind. But the key-note +to the whole is to be found in Religion<note place='foot'>As stated in p. 167 (<hi rend='italic'>Encycl.</hi> § 554). Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Phenom. d. Geistes</hi>, cap. vii, +which includes the Religion of Art, and the same point of view is +explicit in the first edition of the <hi rend='italic'>Encyclopaedia</hi>.</note>: or Religion +is the generic description of that phase of mind which +has found rest in the fullness of attainment and is no +longer a struggle and a warfare, but a fruition. <q>It is +the conviction of all nations,</q> he says<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Philosophie der Religion</hi> (<hi rend='italic'>Werke</hi>, xi. 5).</note>, <q>that in the +<pb n='xl'/><anchor id='Pgxl'/> +religious consciousness they hold their truth; and they +have always regarded religion as their dignity and as +the Sunday of their life. Whatever excites our doubts +and alarms, all grief and all anxiety, all that the petty +fields of finitude can offer to attract us, we leave behind +on the shoals of time: and as the traveller on the +highest peak of a mountain range, removed from every +distinct view of the earth's surface, quietly lets his vision +neglect all the restrictions of the landscape and the +world; so in this pure region of faith man, lifted above +the hard and inflexible reality, sees it with his mind's +eye reflected in the rays of the mental sun to an image +where its discords, its lights and shades, are softened +to eternal calm. In this region of mind flow the waters +of forgetfulness, from which Psyche drinks, and in +which she drowns all her pain: and the darknesses of +this life are here softened to a dream-image, and transfigured +into a mere setting for the splendours of the +Eternal.'</q> +</p> + +<p> +If we take Religion, in this extended sense, we find +it is the sense, the vision, the faith, the certainty of the +eternal in the changeable, of the infinite in the finite, of +the reality in appearance, of the truth in error. It is +freedom from the distractions and pre-occupations of +the particular details of life; it is the sense of permanence, +repose, certainty, rounding off, toning down and +absorbing the vicissitude, the restlessness, the doubts +of actual life. Such a victory over palpable reality has +no doubt its origin—its embryology—in phases of +mind which have been already discussed in the first +section. Religion will vary enormously according to +the grade of national mood of mind and social development +in which it emerges. But whatever be the peculiarities +of its original swaddling-clothes, its cardinal +note will be a sense of dependence on, and independence +<pb n='xli'/><anchor id='Pgxli'/> +in, something more permanent, more august, more of +a surety and stay than visible and variable nature and +man,—something also which whether God or devil, or +both in one, holds the keys of life and death, of weal and +woe, and holds them from some safe vantage-ground +above the lower realms of change. By this central being +the outward and the inward, past and present and to +come, are made one. And as already indicated, Religion, +emerging, as it does, from social man, from mind ethical, +will retain traces of the two <foreign rend='italic'>foci</foreign> in society: the individual +subjectivity and the objective community. Retain +them however only as traces, which still show in the +actually envisaged reconciliation. For that is what +religion does to morality. It carries a step higher the +unity or rather combination gained in the State: it is +the fuller harmony of the individual and the collectivity. +The moral conscience rests in certainty and fixity on +the religious. +</p> + +<p> +But Religion (thus widely understood as the faith in +sempiternal and all-explaining reality) at first appears +under a guise of Art. The poem and the pyramid, the +temple-image and the painting, the drama and the fairy +legend, these are religion: but they are, perhaps, religion +as Art. And that means that they present the eternal +under sensible representations, the work of an artist, +and in a perishable material of limited range. Yet even +the carvers of a long-past day whose works have been +disinterred from the plateaux of Auvergne knew that +they gave to the perishable life around them a quasi-immortality: +and the myth-teller of a savage tribe +elevated the incident of a season into a perennial power +of love and fear. The cynic may remind us that from +the finest picture of the artist, readily +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +<lg> +<l rend='margin-left: 26'><q rend='pre'>We turn</q></l> +<l><q rend='post'>To yonder girl that fords the burn.</q></l> +</lg> +</quote> + +<pb n='xlii'/><anchor id='Pgxlii'/> + +<p> +And yet it may be said in reply to the cynic that, had it +not been for the deep-imprinted lesson of the artist, it +would have been but a brutal instinct that would have +drawn our eyes. The artist, the poet, the musician, +reveal the meaning, the truth, the reality of the world: +they teach us, they help us, backward younger brothers, +to see, to hear, to feel what our rude senses had failed +to detect. They enact the miracle of the loaves and +fishes, again and again: out of the common limited +things of every day they produce a bread of life in +which the generations continue to find nourishment. +</p> + +<p> +But if Art embodies for us the unseen and the eternal, +it embodies it in the stone, the colour, the tone, and +the word: and these are by themselves only dead +matter. To the untutored eye and taste the finest +picture-gallery is only a weariness: when the national +life has drifted away, the sacred book and the image +are but idols and enigmas. <q>The statues are now +corpses from which the vivifying soul has fled, and the +hymns are words whence faith has departed: the tables +of the Gods are without spiritual meat and drink, and +games and feasts no longer afford the mind its joyful +union with the being of being. The works of the Muse +lack that intellectual force which knew itself strong and +real by crushing gods and men in its winepress. They +are now (in this iron age) what they are for us,—fair +fruits broken from the tree, and handed to us by a +kindly destiny. But the gift is like the fruits which +the girl in the picture presents: she does not give the +real life of their existence, not the tree which bore +them, not the earth and the elements which entered +into their substance, nor the climate which formed their +quality, nor the change of seasons which governed the +process of their growth. Like her, Destiny in giving +us the works of ancient art does not give us their world, +<pb n='xliii'/><anchor id='Pgxliii'/> +not the spring and summer of the ethical life in which +they blossomed and ripened, but solely a memory and +a suggestion of this actuality. Our act in enjoying +them, therefore, is not a Divine service: were it so, our +mind would achieve its perfect and satisfying truth. +All that we do is a mere externalism, which from these +fruits wipes off some rain-drop, some speck of dust, and +which, in place of the inward elements of moral actuality +that created and inspired them, tries from the dead +elements of their external reality, such as language and +historical allusion, to set up a tedious mass of scaffolding, +not in order to live ourselves into them, but only to form +a picture of them in our minds. But as the girl who +proffers the plucked fruits is more and nobler than the +natural element with all its details of tree, air, light, +&c. which first yielded them, because she gathers all +this together, in a nobler way, into the glance of the +conscious eye and the gesture which proffers them; so +the spirit of destiny which offers us those works of art +is more than the ethical life and actuality of the ancient +people: for it is the inwardising of that mind which in +them was still self-estranged and self-dispossessed:—it +is the spirit of tragic destiny, the destiny which collects +all those individualised gods and attributes of substance +into the one Pantheon. And that temple of all the +gods is Mind conscious of itself as mind<note place='foot'>Hegel, <hi rend='italic'>Phenomenologie des Geistes</hi> (<hi rend='italic'>Werke</hi>, ii. 545). The meeting-ground +of the Greek spirit, as it passed through Rome, with Christianity.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Religion enters into its more adequate form when it +ceases to appear in the guise of Art and realises that +the kingdom of God is within, that the truth must be +<emph>felt</emph>, the eternal <emph>inwardly</emph> revealed, the holy one apprehended +by <emph>faith</emph><note place='foot'>Ib., p. 584.</note>, not by outward vision. Eye hath +not seen, nor ear heard, the things of God. They cannot +<pb n='xliv'/><anchor id='Pgxliv'/> +be presented, or delineated: they come only in the +witness of the spirit. The human soul itself is the only +worthy temple of the Most High, whom heaven, and +the heaven of heavens, cannot contain. Here in truth +God has come down to dwell with men; and the Son +of Man, caught up in the effusion of the Spirit, can in +all assurance and all humility claim that he is divinified. +Here apparently Absolute Mind is reached: the soul +knows no limitation, no struggle: in time it is already +eternal. Yet, there is, according to Hegel, a flaw,—not +in the essence and the matter, but in the manner and +mode in which the ordinary religious consciousness +represents to itself, or pictures that unification which it +feels and experiences. +</p> + +<p> +<q>In religion then this unification of ultimate Being +with the Self is implicitly reached. But the religious +consciousness, if it has this symbolic idea of its reconciliation, +still has it as a mere symbol or representation. +It attains the satisfaction by tacking on to its pure +negativity, and that externally, the positive signification +of its unity with the ultimate Being: its satisfaction +remains therefore tainted by the antithesis of another +world. Its own reconciliation, therefore, is presented to +its consciousness as something far away, something far +away in the future: just as the reconciliation which the +other Self accomplished appears as a far-away thing in +the past. The one Divine Man had but an implicit +father and only an actual mother; conversely the universal +divine man, the community, has its own deed +and knowledge for its father, but for its mother only +the eternal Love, which it only <emph>feels</emph>, but does not +<emph>behold</emph> in its consciousness as an actual immediate object. +Its reconciliation therefore is in its heart, but still at +variance with its consciousness, and its actuality still +has a flaw. In its field of consciousness the place of +<pb n='xlv'/><anchor id='Pgxlv'/> +implicit reality or side of pure mediation is taken by the +reconciliation that lies far away behind: the place of the +actually present, or the side of immediacy and existence, +is filled by the world which has still to wait for its +transfiguration to glory. Implicitly no doubt the world +is reconciled with the eternal Being; and that Being, it +is well known, no longer looks upon the object as alien +to it, but in its love sees it as like itself. But for +self-consciousness +this immediate presence is not yet set in +the full light of mind. In its immediate consciousness +accordingly the spirit of the community is parted from +its religious: for while the religious consciousness +declares that they are implicitly not parted, this implicitness +is not raised to reality and not yet grown to +absolute self-certainty<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Phenomenologie des Geistes</hi> (<hi rend='italic'>Werke</hi>, ii. 572). Thus Hegelian idealism +claims to be the philosophical counterpart of the central dogma +of Christianity.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Religion therefore, which as it first appeared in art-worship +had yet to realise its essential inwardness or +spirituality, so has now to overcome the antithesis in which +its (the religious) consciousness stands to the secular. +For the peculiarly religious type of mind is distinguished +by an indifference and even hostility, more or less veiled, +to art, to morality and the civil state, to science and to +nature. Strong in the certainty of faith, or of its implicit +rest in God, it resents too curious inquiry into +the central mystery of its union, and in its distincter +consciousness sets the foundation of faith on the +evidence of a fact, which, however, it in the same +breath declares to be unique and miraculous, the central +event of the ages, pointing back in its reference to the +first days of humanity, and forward in the future to the +winding-up of the business of terrestrial life. Philosophy, +according to Hegel's conception of it, does but +<pb n='xlvi'/><anchor id='Pgxlvi'/> +draw the conclusion supplied by the premisses of religion: +it supplements and rounds off into coherence +the religious implications. The unique events in Judea +nearly nineteen centuries ago are for it also the first +step in a new revelation of man's relationship to God: +but while it acknowledges the transcendent interest of +that age, it lays main stress on the permanent truth +then revealed, and it insists on the duty of carrying out +the principle there awakened to all the depth and +breadth of its explication. Its task—its supreme task—is +to <emph>explicate religion</emph>. But to do so is to show that +religion is no exotic, and no <emph>mere</emph> revelation from an +external source. It is to show that religion is the +truth, the complete reality, of the mind that lived in +Art, that founded the state and sought to be dutiful and +upright: the truth, the crowning fruit of all scientific +knowledge, of all human affections, of all secular consciousness. +Its lesson ultimately is that there is nothing +essentially common or unclean: that the holy is not +parted off from the true and the good and the beautiful. +</p> + +<p> +Religion thus expanded descends from its abstract or +<q>intelligible</q> world, to which it had retired from art and +science, and the affairs of ordinary life. Its God—as +a true God—is not of the dead alone, but also of the +living: not a far-off supreme and ultimate Being, but +also a man among men. Philosophy thus has to break +down the middle partition-wall of life, the fence between +secular and sacred. It is but religion come to its +maturity, made at home in the world, and no longer +a stranger and a wonder. Religion has pronounced in +its inmost heart and faith of faith, that the earth is the +Lord's, and that day unto day shows forth the divine +handiwork. But the heart of unbelief, of little faith, +has hardly uttered the word, than it forgets its assurance +and leans to the conviction that the prince of this world +<pb n='xlvii'/><anchor id='Pgxlvii'/> +is the Spirit of Evil. The mood of Théodicée is also—but +with a difference—the mood of philosophy. It +asserts the ways of Providence: but its providence is +not the God of the Moralist, or the ideal of the Artist, +or rather is not these only, but also the Law of Nature, +and more than that. Its aim is the Unity of History. +The words have sometimes been lightly used to mean +that events run on in one continuous flow, and that +there are no abrupt, no ultimate beginnings, parting +age from age. But the Unity of History in its full +sense is beyond history: it is history <q>reduced</q> from +the expanses of time to the eternal present: its thousand +years made one day,—made even the glance of a +moment. The theme of the Unity of History—in the +full depth of unity and the full expanse of history—is +the theme of Hegelian philosophy. It traces the +process in which Mind has to be all-inclusive, self-upholding, +one with the Eternal reality. +</p> + +<p> +<q>That process of the mind's self-realisation</q> says +Hegel in the close of his <hi rend='italic'>Phenomenology</hi>, <q>exhibits +a lingering movement and succession of minds, a gallery +of images, each of which, equipped with the complete +wealth of mind, only seems to linger because the Self +has to penetrate and to digest this wealth of its +Substance. As its perfection consists in coming +completely to <emph>know</emph> what it <emph>is</emph> (its substance), this knowledge +is its self-involution in which it deserts its +outward existence and surrenders its shape to recollection. +Thus self-involved, it is sunk in the night of its +self-consciousness: but in that night its vanished being +is preserved, and that being, thus in idea preserved,—old, +but now new-born of the spirit,—is the new sphere +of being, a new world, a new phase of mind. In this +new phase it has again to begin afresh and from the +beginning, and again nurture itself to maturity from its +<pb n='xlviii'/><anchor id='Pgxlviii'/> +own resources, as if for it all that preceded were lost, +and it had learned nothing from the experience of the +earlier minds. Yet is that recollection a preservation +of experience: it is the quintessence, and in fact a higher +form, of the substance. If therefore this new mind +appears only to count on its own resources, and to start +quite fresh and blank, it is at the same time on a higher +grade that it starts. The intellectual and spiritual +realm, which is thus constructed in actuality, forms +a succession in time, where one mind relieved another +of its watch, and each took over the kingdom of the +world from the preceding. The purpose of that succession +is to reveal the depth, and that depth is the absolute +comprehension of mind: this revelation is therefore to +uplift its depth, to spread it out in breadth, so negativing +this self-involved Ego, wherein it is self-dispossessed +or reduced to substance. But it is also its time: the +course of time shows this dispossession itself dispossessed, +and thus in its extension it is no less in its +depth, the self. The way to that goal,—absolute self-certainty—or +the mind knowing itself as mind—is the +inwardising of the minds, as they severally are in +themselves, and as they accomplish the organisation of +their realm. Their conservation,—regarded on the side +of its free and apparently contingent succession of fact—is +history: on the side of their comprehended +organisation, again, it is the science of mental phenomenology: +the two together, comprehended history, form +at once the recollection and the grave-yard of the +absolute Mind, the actuality, truth, and certitude of his +throne, apart from which he were lifeless and alone.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Such in brief outline—lingering most on the points +where Hegel has here been briefest—is the range of +the Philosophy of Mind. Its aim is to comprehend, +not to explain: to put together in intelligent unity, +<pb n='xlix'/><anchor id='Pgxlix'/> +not to analyse into a series of elements. For it +psychology is not an analysis or description of mental +phenomena, of laws of association, of the growth of +certain powers and ideas, but a <q>comprehended history</q> +of the formation of subjective mind, of the intelligent, +feeling, willing self or ego. For it Ethics is part and +only part of the great scheme or system of self-development; +but continuing into greater concreteness the +normal endowment of the individual mind, and but +preparing the ground on which religion may be most +effectively cultivated. And finally Religion itself, +released from its isolation and other-world sacrosanctity, +is shown to be only the crown of life, the +ripest growth of actuality, and shown to be so by +philosophy, whilst it is made clear that religion is the +basis of philosophy, or that a philosophy can only go as +far as the religious stand-point allows. The hierarchy, +if so it be called, of the spiritual forces is one where +none can stand alone, or claim an abstract and independent +supremacy. The truth of egoism is the truth of +altruism: the truly moral is the truly religious: and +each is not what it professes to be unless it anticipate +the later, or include the earlier. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(iv.) Mind or Spirit.</head> + +<p> +It may be said, however, that for such a range of +subjects the term Mind is wretchedly inadequate and +common-place, and that the better rendering of the title +would be Philosophy of Spirit. It may be admitted +that Mind is not all that could be wished. But neither +is Spirit blameless. And, it may be added, Hegel's +<pb n='l'/><anchor id='Pgl'/> +own term <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Geist</foreign> has to be unduly strained to cover so +wide a region. It serves—and was no doubt meant to +serve—as a sign of the conformity of his system with +the religion which sees in God no other-world being, +but our very self and mind, and which worships him in +spirit and in truth. And if the use of a word like this +could allay the <q>ancient variance</q> between the religious +and the philosophic mood, it would be but churlish +perhaps to refuse the sign of compliance and compromise. +But whatever may be the case in German,—and +even there the new wine was dangerous to the old +wine-skin—it is certain that to average English ears +the word Spiritual would carry us over the medium line +into the proper land of religiosity. And to do that, as +we have seen, is to sin against the central idea: the idea +that religion is of one blood with the whole mental family, +though the most graciously complete of all the sisters. +Yet, however the word may be chosen, the philosophy +of Hegel, like the august lady who appeared in vision +to the emprisoned Boëthius, has on her garment a sign +which <q>signifies the life which is on earth,</q> as also a sign +which signifies the <q>right law of heaven</q>; if her right-hand +holds the <q>book of the justice of the King +omnipotent,</q> the sceptre in her left is <q>corporal +judgment against sin<note place='foot'>From the old Provençal <hi rend='italic'>Lay of Boëthius</hi>.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +There is indeed no sufficient reason for contemning +the term Mind. If Inductive Philosophy of the Human +Mind has—perhaps to a dainty taste—made the word +unsavoury, that is no reason for refusing to give it all +the wealth of soul and heart, of intellect and will. The +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>mens aeterna</foreign> which, if we hear Tacitus, expressed the +Hebrew conception of the spirituality of God, and the +Νοῦς which Aristotelianism set supreme in the Soul, +are not the mere or abstract intelligence, which late-acquired +<pb n='li'/><anchor id='Pgli'/> +habits of abstraction have made out of them. +If the reader will adopt the term (in want of a better) in its +widest scope, we may shelter ourselves under the example +of Wordsworth. His theme is—as he describes it in +the <hi rend='italic'>Recluse</hi>—<q>the Mind and Man</q>: his +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +<lg> +<l rend='margin-left: 20'><q rend='pre'>voice proclaims</q></l> +<l>How exquisitely the individual Mind</l> +<l>(And the progressive powers perhaps no less</l> +<l>Of the whole species) to the external World</l> +<l>Is fitted;—and how exquisitely too</l> +<l>The external World is fitted to the Mind;</l> +<l>And the creation (by no lower name</l> +<l>Can it be called) which they with blended might</l> +<l><q rend='post'>Accomplish.</q></l> +</lg> +</quote> + +<p> +The verse which expounds that <q>high argument</q> +speaks +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +<lg> +<l><q rend='pre'>Of Truth, of Grandeur, Beauty, Love and Hope</q></l> +<l><q rend='post'>And melancholy Fear subdued by Faith.</q></l> +</lg> +</quote> + +<p> +And the poet adds: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +<lg> +<l rend='margin-left: 26'><q rend='pre'>As we look</q></l> +<l>Into our Minds, into the Mind of Man—</l> +<l>My haunt, and the main region of my song;</l> +<l>Beauty—a living Presence of the earth</l> +<l>Surpassing the most fair ideal forms</l> +<l><q rend='post'>... waits upon my steps.</q></l> +</lg> +</quote> + +<p> +The reality duly seen in the spiritual vision +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +<lg> +<l rend='margin-left: 16'><q rend='pre'>That inspires</q></l> +<l>The human Soul of universal earth</l> +<l><q rend='post'>Dreaming of things to come</q></l> +</lg> +</quote> + +<p> +will be a greater glory than the ideals of imaginative +fiction ever fancied: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +<lg> +<l><q rend='pre'>For the discerning intellect of Man,</q></l> +<l>When wedded to this goodly universe</l> +<l>In love and holy passion, shall find these</l> +<l><q rend='post'>A simple produce of the common day.</q></l> +</lg> +</quote> + +<pb n='lii'/><anchor id='Pglii'/> + +<p> +If Wordsworth, thus, as it were, echoing the great +conception of Francis Bacon, +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +<lg> +<l><q rend='pre'>Would chant, in lonely peace, the spousal verse</q></l> +<l><q rend='post'>Of this great consummation,</q></l> +</lg> +</quote> + +<p> +perhaps the poet and the essayist may help us with +Hegel to rate the Mind—the Mind of Man—at its +highest value. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='liii'/><anchor id='Pgliii'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Essay II. Aims And Methods Of Psychology.</head> + +<p> +It is not going too far to say that in common estimation +psychology has as yet hardly reached what Kant +has called the steady walk of science—<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>der sichere Gang +der Wissenschaft</foreign>. To assert this is not, of course, to +throw any doubts on the importance of the problems, or +on the intrinsic value of the results, in the studies which +have been prosecuted under that name. It is only to +note the obvious fact that a number of inquiries of +somewhat discrepant tone, method, and tendency have +all at different times covered themselves under the +common title of psychological, and that the work of +orientation is as yet incomplete. Such a destiny seems +inevitable, when a name is coined rather as the title of +an unexplored territory, than fixed on to describe an +accomplished fact. +</p> + +<div> +<head>(i.) Psychology as a Science and as a +Part of Philosophy.</head> + +<p> +The <hi rend='italic'>De Anima</hi> of Aristotle, gathering up into one +the work of Plato and his predecessors, may be said to +lay the foundation of psychology. But even in it, we +can already see that there are two elements or aspects +struggling for mastery: two elements not unrelated or +<pb n='liv'/><anchor id='Pgliv'/> +independent, but hard to keep fairly and fully in unity. +On one hand there is the conception of Soul as a part +of Nature, as a grade of existence in the physical or +natural universe,—in the universe of things which +suffer growth and change, which are never entirely +<q>without matter,</q> and are always attached to or present +in body. From this point of view Aristotle urged that +a sound and realistic psychology must, e.g. in its +definition of a passion, give the prominent place to its +physical (or material) expression, and not to its mental +form or significance. It must remember, he said, that +the phenomena or <q>accidents</q> are what really throw +light on the nature or the <q>substance</q> of the Soul. On +the other hand, there are two points to be considered. +There is, first of all, the counterpoising remark that the +conception of Soul as such, as a unity and common +characteristic, will be determinative of the phenomena +or <q>accidents,</q>—will settle, as it were, what we are to +observe and look for, and how we are to describe our +observations. And by the <emph>conception</emph> of Soul, is meant +not <emph>a</emph> soul, as a thing or agent (subject) which has +properties attaching to it; but soul, as the generic +feature, the universal, which is set as a stamp on +everything that claims to be psychical. In other words, +Soul is one, not as a single thing contrasted with its +attributes, activities, or exercises of force (such single +thing will be shown by logic to be a metaphysical fiction); +but as the unity of form and character, the comprehensive +and identical feature, which is present in all its manifestations +and exercises. But there is a second consideration. +The question is asked by Aristotle whether it is completely +and strictly accurate to put Soul under the +category of natural objects. There is in it, or of it, +perhaps, something, and something essential to it, which +belongs to the order of the eternal and self-active: +<pb n='lv'/><anchor id='Pglv'/> +something which is <q>form</q> and <q>energy</q> quite unaffected +by and separate from <q>matter.</q> How this is related to +the realm of the perishable and changeable is a problem +on which Aristotle has been often (and with some reason) +believed to be obscure, if not even inconsistent<note place='foot'>It is the doctrine of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>intellectus agens</foreign>, or <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in actu</foreign>; the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>actus +purus</foreign> of the Schoolmen.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +In these divergent elements which come to the fore +in Aristotle's treatment we have the appearance of +a radical difference of conception and purpose as to +psychology. He himself does a good deal to keep them +both in view. But it is evident that here already we +have the contrast between a purely physical or (in the +narrower sense) <q>scientific</q> psychology, empirical and +realistic in treatment, and a more philosophical—what +in certain quarters would be called a speculative or +metaphysical—conception of the problem. There is +also in Aristotle the antithesis of a popular or superficial, +and an accurate or analytic, psychology. The former +is of a certain use in dealing, say, with questions of +practical ethics and education: the latter is of more +strictly scientific interest. Both of these distinctions—that +between a speculative and an empirical, and that +between a scientific and a popular treatment—affect the +subsequent history of the study. Psychology is sometimes +understood to mean the results of casual observation +of our own minds by what is termed introspection, +and by the interpretation of what we may observe in +others. Such observations are in the first place carried +on under the guidance of distinctions or points of view +supplied by the names in common use. We interrogate +our own consciousness as to what facts or relations of +facts correspond to the terms of our national language. +Or we attempt—what is really an inexhaustible quest—to +get definite divisions between them, and clear-cut +<pb n='lvi'/><anchor id='Pglvi'/> +definitions. Inquiries like these which start from +popular distinctions fall a long way short of science: +and the inquirer will find that accidental and essential +properties are given in the same handful of conclusions. +Yet there is always much value in these attempts to +get our minds cleared: and it is indispensable for all +inquiries that all alleged or reported facts of mind +should be realised and reproduced in our own mental +experience. And this is especially the case in psychology, +just because here we cannot get the object +outside us, we cannot get or make a diagram, and +unless we give it reality by re-constructing it,—by +re-interrogating our own experience, our knowledge +of it will be but wooden and mechanical. And the +term introspection need not be too seriously taken: it +means much more than watching passively an internal +drama; and is quite as well describable as mental +projection, setting out what was within, and so as it +were hidden and involved, before ourselves in the field +of mental vision. Here, as always, the essential point +is to get ourselves well out of the way of the object +observed, and to stand, figuratively speaking, quite on +one side. +</p> + +<p> +But even at the best, such a popular or empirical psychology +has no special claim to be ranked as science. It +may no doubt be said that at least it collects, describes, +or notes down facts. But even this is not so certain +as it seems. Its so-called facts are very largely fictions, +or so largely interpolated with error, that they cannot +be safely used for construction. If psychology is to +accomplish anything valuable, it must go more radically +to work. It must—at least in a measure—discard from +its preliminary view the data of common and current +distinctions, and try to get at something more primary +or ultimate as its starting-point. And this it may do in +<pb n='lvii'/><anchor id='Pglvii'/> +two ways. It may, in the one case, follow the example +of the physical sciences. In these it is the universal +practice to assume that the explanation of complex and +concrete facts is to be attained by (<hi rend='italic'>a</hi>) postulating certain +simple elements (which we may call atoms, molecules, +and perhaps units or monads), which are supposed to +be clearly conceivable and to justify themselves by intrinsic +intelligibility, and by (<hi rend='italic'>b</hi>) assuming that these +elements are compounded and combined according to +laws which again are in the last resort self-evident, or +such that they seem to have an obvious and palpable +lucidity. Further, such laws being always axioms or +plain postulates of mechanics (for these alone possess +this feature of self-evident intelligibility), they are subject +to and invite all the aids and refinements of the +higher mathematical calculus. What the primary and +self-explicative bits of psychical reality may be, is a +further question on which there may be some dispute. +They may be, so to say, taken in a more physical or in +a more metaphysical way: i.e. more as units of nerve-function +or more as elements of ideative-function. And +there may be differences as to how far and in what +provinces the mathematical calculus may be applicable. +But, in any case, there will be a strong tendency in +psychology, worked on this plan, to follow, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>mutatis +mutandis</foreign>, and at some distance perhaps, the analogy of +material physics. In both the justification of the +postulated units and laws will be their ability to describe +and systematise the observed phenomena in a uniform +and consistent way. +</p> + +<p> +The other way in which psychology gets a foundation +and ulterior certainty is different, and goes deeper. +After all, the <q>scientific</q> method is only a way in which +the facts of a given sphere are presented in thoroughgoing +interconnexion, each reduced to an exact multiple +<pb n='lviii'/><anchor id='Pglviii'/> +or fraction of some other, by an inimitably continued +subtraction and addition of an assumed homogeneous +element, found or assumed to be perfectly imaginable +(conceivable). But we may also consider the province +in relation to the whole sphere of reality, may ask what +is its place and meaning in the whole, what reality is in +the end driving at or coming to be, and how far this +special province contributes to that end. If we do this, +we attach psychology to philosophy, or, if we prefer so +to call it, to metaphysics, as in the former way we +established it on the principles generally received as +governing the method of the physical sciences. +</p> + +<p> +This—the relation of psychology to fundamental +philosophy—is a question which also turns up in dealing +with Ethics. There is on the part of those engaged +in either of these inquiries a certain impatience against +the intermeddling (which is held to be only muddling) +of metaphysics with them. It is clear that in a very +decided way both psychology and ethics can, up to some +extent at least, be treated as what is called empirical +(or, to use the more English phrase, inductive) sciences. +On many hands they are actually so treated: and not +without result. Considering the tendency of metaphysical +inquiries, it may be urged that it is well to avoid preliminary +criticism of the current conceptions and beliefs +about reality which these sciences imply. Yet such +beliefs are undoubtedly present and effective. Schopenhauer +has popularised the principle that the pure +empiricist is a fiction, that man is a radically metaphysical +animal, and that he inevitably turns what he +receives into a part of a dogmatic creed—a conviction +how things ought to be. Almost without effort there +grows up in him, or flows in upon him, a belief and a +system of beliefs as to the order and values of things. +Every judgment, even in logic, rests on such an order +<pb n='lix'/><anchor id='Pglix'/> +of truth. He need not be able to formulate his creed: +it will influence him none the less: nay, his faith will +probably seem more a part of the solid earth and common +reality, the less it has been reduced to a determinate +creed or to a code of principles. For such +formulation presupposes doubt and scepticism, which it +beats back by mere assertion. Each human being +has such a background of convictions which govern +his actions and conceptions, and of which it so startles +him to suggest the possibility of a doubt, that he turns +away in dogmatic horror. Such ruling ideas vary, +from man to man, and from man to woman—if we consider +them in all their minuteness. But above all they +constitute themselves in a differently organised system +or aggregate according to the social and educational +stratum to which an individual belongs. Each group, +engaged in a common task, it may be in the study of a +part of nature, is ideally bound and obliged by a common +language, and special standards of truth and reality +for its own. Such a group of ideas is what Bacon +would have called a scientific fetich or <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>idolum theatri</foreign>. A +scientific <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>idolum</foreign> is a traditional belief or dogma as to +principles, values, and methods, which has so thoroughly +pervaded the minds of those engaged in a branch of +inquiry, that they no longer recognise its hypothetical +character,—its relation of means to the main end of their +function. +</p> + +<p> +Such a collected and united theory of reality (it +is what Hegel has designated the Idea) is what is +understood by a natural metaphysic. It has nothing +necessarily to do with a supersensible or a supernatural, +if these words mean a ghostly, materialised, but super-finely-materialised +nature, above and beyond the present. +But that there is a persistent tendency to conceive +the unity and coherence, the theoretic idea of reality, +<pb n='lx'/><anchor id='Pglx'/> +in this pseudo-sensuous (i.e. super-sensuous) form, is +of course a well-known fact. For the present, however, +this aberration—this idol of the tribe—may be left out +of sight. By a metaphysic or fundamental philosophy, is, +in the present instance, meant a system of first principles—a +secular and cosmic creed: a belief in ends and +values, a belief in truth—again premising that the system +in question is, for most, a rudely organised and +almost inarticulate mass of belief and hope, conviction +and impression. It is, in short, a <emph>natural</emph> metaphysic: +a metaphysic, that is, which has but an imperfect +coherence, which imperfectly realises both its nature +and its limits. +</p> + +<p> +In certain parts, however, it is more and better than +this crude background of belief. Each science—or at +least every group of sciences—has a more definite system +or aggregate of first principles, axioms, and conceptions +belonging to it. It has, that is,—and here +in a much distincter way—its special standard of reality, +its peculiar forms of conceiving things, its distinctions +between the actual and the apparent, &c. Here again +it will probably be found that the scientific specialist is +hardly conscious that these are principles and concepts: +on the contrary, they will be supposed self-evident and +ultimate facts, foundations of being. Instead of being +treated as modes of conception, more or less justified by +their use and their results, these categories will be +regarded as fundamental facts, essential conditions of +all reality. Like popular thought in its ingrained +categories, the specialist cannot understand the possibility +of any limitation to his radical ideas of reality. +To him they are not hypotheses, but principles. The +scientific specialist may be as convinced of the universal +application of his peculiar categories, as the Chinese or +the Eskimo that his standards are natural and final. +</p> + +<pb n='lxi'/><anchor id='Pglxi'/> + +<p> +Under such metaphysical or extra-empirical presuppositions +all investigation, whether it be crudely empirical +or (in the physical sense) scientific, is carried on. +And when so carried on, it is said to be prosecuted +apart from any interference from metaphysic. Such +a naïve or natural metaphysic, not raised to explicit +consciousness, not followed as an imposed rule, but +governing with the strength of an immanent faith, does +not count for those who live under it as a metaphysic +at all. M. Jourdain was amazed suddenly to learn he +had been speaking prose for forty years without knowing +it. But in the present case there is something +worse than amazement sure to be excited by the news. +For the critic who thus reveals the secrets of the +scientist's heart is pretty sure to go on to say that a +good deal of this naïve unconscious metaphysic is incoherent, +contradictory, even bad: that it requires correction, +revision, and readjustment, and has by criticism +to be made one and harmonious. That readjustment or +criticism which shall eliminate contradiction and produce +unity, is the aim of the <emph>science</emph> of metaphysic—the +science of the meta-physical element in physical +knowledge: what Hegel has chosen to call the Science +of Logic (in the wide sense of the term). This higher +Logic, this <emph>science</emph> of metaphysic, is the process to revise +and harmonise in systematic completeness the +imperfect or misleading and partial estimates of reality +which are to be found in popular and scientific thought. +</p> + +<p> +In the case of the run of physical sciences this +revision is less necessary; and for no very recondite +reason. Every science by its very nature deals with a +special, a limited topic. It is confined to a part or +aspect of reality. Its propositions are not complete +truths; they apply to an artificial world, to a part +expressly cut off from the concrete reality. Its principles +<pb n='lxii'/><anchor id='Pglxii'/> +are generally cut according to their cloth,—according +to the range in which they apply. The only +danger that can well arise is if these categories are +transplanted without due reservations, and made of +universal application, i.e. if the scientist elects on his +speciality to pronounce <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>de omnibus rebus</foreign>. But in the +case of psychology and ethics the harmlessness of +natural metaphysics will be less certain. Here a +general human or universal interest is almost an inevitable +coefficient: especially if they really rise to the +full sweep of the subject. For as such they both seem +to deal not with a part of reality, but with the very +centre and purpose of all reality. In them we are not +dealing with topics of secondary interest, but with the +very heart of the human problem. Here the questions +of reality and ideals, of unity and diversity, and of the +evaluation of existence, come distinctly to the fore. If +psychology is to answer the question, What am I? +and ethics the question, What ought I to do? they +can hardly work without some formulated creed of +metaphysical character, without some preliminary criticisms +of current first principles. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(ii.) Herbart.</head> + +<p> +The German thinker, who has given perhaps the +most fruitful stimulus to the scientific study of psychology +in modern times—Johann Friedrich Herbart—is +after all essentially a philosopher, and not a mere +scientist, even in his psychology. His psychological +inquiry, that is, stands in intimate connexion with the +last questions of all intelligence, with metaphysics and +<pb n='lxiii'/><anchor id='Pglxiii'/> +ethics. The business of philosophy, says Herbart, is +to touch up and finish off conceptions (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Bearbeitung der +Begriffe</foreign>)<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Einleitung in die Philosophie</hi>, §§ 1, 2.</note>. It finds, as it supervenes upon the unphilosophical +world, that mere and pure facts (if there +ever are or were such purisms) have been enveloped +in a cloud of theory, have been construed into some +form of unity, but have been imperfectly, inadequately +construed: and that the existing concepts in current +use need to be corrected, supplemented and readjusted. +It has, accordingly, for its work to <q>reconcile experience +with itself<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Psychologie als Wissenschaft</hi>, Vorrede.</note>,</q> and to elicit <q>the hidden pre-suppositions +without which the fact of experience is unthinkable.</q> +Psychology, then, as a branch of this philosophic enterprise, +has to readjust the facts discovered in inner +experience. For mere uncritical experience or merely +empirical knowledge only offers <emph>problems</emph>; it suggests +gaps, which indeed further reflection serves at first +only to deepen into contradictions. Such a psychology +is <q>speculative</q>: i.e. it is not content to accept the +mere given, but goes forward and backward to find +something that will make the fact intelligible. It employs +totally different methods from the <q>classification, +induction, analogy</q> familiar to the logic of the empirical +sciences. Its <q>principles,</q> therefore, are not given +facts: but facts which have been manipulated and +adjusted so as to lose their self-contradictory quality: +they are facts <q>reduced,</q> by introducing the omitted +relationships which they postulate if they are to be +true and self-consistent<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Einleitung in die Philosophie</hi>, §§ 11, 12.</note>. While it is far from rejecting +or ignoring experience, therefore, psychology cannot +strictly be said to build upon it alone. It uses experimental +fact as an unfinished datum,—or it sees in +<pb n='lxiv'/><anchor id='Pglxiv'/> +experience a torso which betrays its imperfection, and +suggests completing. +</p> + +<p> +The starting-point, it may be said, of Herbart's psychology +is a question which to the ordinary psychologist +(and to the so-called scientific psychologist) has a +secondary, if it have any interest. It was, he says, the +problem of Personality, the problem of the Self or Ego, +which first led to his characteristic conception of psychological +method. <q>My first discovery,</q> he tells us<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Einleitung in die Philosophie</hi>, § 18: cf. <hi rend='italic'>Werke</hi>, ed. Kehrbach, v. 108.</note>, +<q>was that the Self was neither primitive nor independent, +but must be the most dependent and most conditioned +thing one can imagine. The second was that +the elementary ideas of an intelligent being, if they +were ever to reach the pitch of self-consciousness, +must be either all, or at least in part, opposed to each +other, and that they must check or block one another +in consequence of this opposition. Though held in +check, however, these ideas were not to be supposed +lost: they subsist as endeavours or tendencies to +return into the position of actual idea, as soon as the +check became, for any reason, either in whole or in +part inoperative. This check could and must be calculated, +and thus it was clear that psychology required +a mathematical as well as a metaphysical foundation.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The place of the conception of the Ego in Kant's +and Fichte's theory of knowledge is well known. Equally +well known is Kant's treatment of the soul-reality or +soul-substance in his examination of Rational Psychology. +Whereas the (logical) unity of consciousness, +or <q>synthetic unity of apperception,</q> is assumed as a +fundamental starting-point in explanation of our objective +judgments, or of our knowledge of objective +existence, its real (as opposed to its formal) foundation +in a <q>substantial</q> soul is set aside as an illegitimate +<pb n='lxv'/><anchor id='Pglxv'/> +interpretation of, or inference from, the facts of inner +experience. The belief in the separate unity and persistence +of the soul, said Kant, is not a scientifically-warranted +conclusion. Its true place is as an ineffaceable +postulate of the faith which inspires human life +and action. Herbart did not rest content with either of +these—as he believed—dogmatic assumptions of his +master. He did not fall in cheerfully with the idealism +which seemed ready to dispense with a soul, or which +justified its acceptance of empirical reality by referring +to the fundamental unity of the function of judgment. +With a strong bent towards fully-differentiated and individualised +experience Herbart conjoined a conviction of +the need of logical analysis to prevent us being carried +away by the first-come and inadequate generalities. +The Ego which, in its extremest abstraction, he found +defined as the unity of subject and object, did not seem +to him to offer the proper guarantees of reality: it was +itself a problem, full of contradictions, waiting for solution. +On the other hand, the real Ego, or self of +concrete experience, is very much more than this logical +abstract, and differs widely from individual to individual, +and apparently from time to time even in the +same individual. Our self, of which we talk so fluently, +as one and the self-same—how far does it really possess +the continuity and identity with which we credit it? +Does it not rather seem to be an ideal which we gradually +form and set before ourselves as the standard for +measuring our attainments of the moment,—the perfect +fulfilment of that oneness of being and purpose and +knowledge which we never reach? Sometimes even +it seems no better than a name which we move along +the varying phenomena of our inner life, at one time +identifying it with the power which has gained the +victory in a moral struggle, at another with that which +<pb n='lxvi'/><anchor id='Pglxvi'/> +has been defeated<note place='foot'>Cf. Plato's remarks on the problem in the word Self-control. +<hi rend='italic'>Republ.</hi> 430-1.</note>, according as the attitude of the +moment makes us throw now one, now another, aspect +of mental activity in the foreground. +</p> + +<p> +The other—or logical Ego—the mere identity of +subject and object,—when taken in its utter abstractness +and simplicity, shrivels up to something very small +indeed—to a something which is little better than +nothing. The mere <emph>I</emph> which is not contra-distinguished +by a <emph>Thou</emph> and a <emph>He</emph>—which is without all definiteness +of predication (the I=I of Fichte and Schelling)—is +only as it were a point of being cut off from all its +connexions in reality, and treated as if it were or could +be entirely independent. It is an identity in which +subject and object have not yet appeared: it is not a real +I, though we may still retain the name. It is—as +Hegel's <hi rend='italic'>Logic</hi> will tell us—exactly definable as Being, +which is as yet Nothing: the impossible edge of abstraction +on which we try—and in vain—to steady ourselves +at the initial point of thought. And to reach or stand +at that intangible, ungraspable point, which slips away +as we approach, and transmutes itself as we hold it, is +not the natural beginning, but the result of introspection +and reflection on the concrete self. But with this aspect +of the question we are not now concerned. +</p> + +<p> +That the unity of the Self as an intelligent and moral +being, that the Ego of self-consciousness was an ideal +and a product of development, was what Herbart soon +became convinced of. The unity of Self is even as given +in mature experience an imperfect fact. It is a fact, +that is, which does not come up to what it promised, and +which requires to be supplemented, or philosophically +justified. Here and everywhere the custom of life +carries us over gaps which yawn deep to the eye of +<pb n='lxvii'/><anchor id='Pglxvii'/> +philosophic reflection: even though accident and illness +force them not unfrequently even upon the blindest. +To trace the process of unification towards this unity—to +trace, if you like, even the formation of the concept of +such unity, as a governing and guiding principle in life +and conduct, comes to be the problem of the psychologist, +in the largest sense of that problem. From Soul +(<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Seele</foreign>) to Mind or Spirit (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Geist</foreign>) is for Herbart, as for +Hegel, the course of psychology<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Lehrbuch der Psychologie</hi>, §§ 202, 203.</note>. The growth and +development of mind, the formation of a self, the realisation +of a personality, is for both the theme which +psychology has to expound. And Herbart, not less +than Hegel, had to bear the censure that such a conception +of mental reality as a growth would destroy +personality<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Allgemeine Metaphysik</hi>, Vorrede.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +But with so much common in the general plan, the +two thinkers differ profoundly in their special mode of +carrying out the task. Or, rather, they turn their +strength on different departments of the whole. Herbart's +great practical interest had been the theory of +education: <q>paedagogic</q> is the subject of his first important +writings. The inner history of ideas—the processes +which are based on the interaction of elements in the +individual soul—are what he specially traces. Hegel's +interests, on the contrary, are more towards the greater +process, the unities of historical life, and the correlations +of the powers of art, religion, and philosophy that +work therein. He turns to the macrocosm, almost as +naturally as Herbart does to the microcosm. Thus, +even in Ethics, while Herbart gives a delicate analysis +of the distinct aspects or elements in the Ethical idea,—the +diverse headings under which the disinterested spectator +within the breast measures with purely aesthetic +<pb n='lxviii'/><anchor id='Pglxviii'/> +eye his approach to unity and strength of purpose, +Hegel seems to hurry away from the field of moral sense +or conscience to throw himself on the social and political +organisation of the moral life. The General Paedagogic +of Herbart has its pendant in Hegel's Philosophy of Law +and of History. +</p> + +<p> +At an early period Herbart had become impressed +with the necessity of applying mathematics to psychology<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik</hi> (1806), § 13.</note>. +To the usual objection, that psychical facts do +not admit of measurement, he had a ready reply. We +can calculate even on hypothetical assumptions: indeed, +could we measure, we should scarcely take the trouble +to calculate<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Werke</hi>, ed. Kehrbach (<hi rend='italic'>Ueber die Möglichkeit</hi>, &c), v. 96.</note>. To calculate (i.e. to deduce mathematically) +is to perform a general experiment, and to perform +it in the medium where there is least likelihood of error +or disturbance. There may be anomalies enough +apparent in the mental life: there may be the great +anomalies of Genius and of Freedom of Will; but the +Newton and the Kepler of psychology will show by +calculation on assumed conditions of psychic nature +that these aberrations can be explained by mechanical +laws. <q>The human Soul is no puppet-theatre: our +wishes and resolutions are no marionettes: no juggler +stands behind; but our true and proper life lies in our +volition, and this life has its rule not outside, but in +itself: it has its own purely mental rule, by no means +borrowed from the material world. But this rule is in +it sure and fixed; and on account of this its fixed +quality it has more similarity to (what is otherwise +heterogeneous) the laws of impact and pressure than +to the marvels of an alleged inexplicable freedom<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Ibid.</hi>, p. 100.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Psychology then deals with a real, which exhibits +<pb n='lxix'/><anchor id='Pglxix'/> +phenomena analogous in several respects to those +discussed by statics and mechanics. Its foundation is +a statics and mechanics of the Soul,—as this real is +called. We begin by presupposing as the ultimate +reality, underlying the factitious and generally imperfect +unity of self-consciousness and mind, an essential +and primary unity—the unity of an absolutely simple or +individual point of being—a real point which amongst +other points asserts itself, maintains itself. It has +a character of its own, but that character it only shows +in and through a development conditioned by external +influences. The specific nature of the soul-reality is to +be representative, to produce, or manifest itself in, +ideas (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Vorstellungen</foreign>). But the character only emerges +into actuality in the conflict of the soul-atom with other +ultimate realities in the congregation of things. A soul +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign> or isolated is not possessed of ideas. It is merely +blank, undeveloped, formal unity, of which nothing can +be said. But like other realities it defines and characterises +itself by antithesis, by resistance: it shows what +it is by its behaviour in the struggle for existence. It +acts in self-defence: and its peculiar style or weapon of +self-defence is an idea or representation. The way the +Soul maintains itself is by turning the assailant into an +idea<note place='foot'>One might almost fancy Herbart was translating into a general +philosophic thesis the words in which Goethe has described how he +overcame a real trouble by transmuting it into an ideal shape, e.g. +<hi rend='italic'>Wahrheit und Dichtung</hi>, cap. xii.</note>: and each idea is therefore a <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Selbsterhaltung</foreign> of +the Soul. The Soul is thus enriched—to appearance +or incidentally: and the assailant is annexed. In this +way the one Soul may develop or evolve or express an +innumerable variety of ideas: for in response to whatever +it meets, the living and active Soul ideates, or +gives rise to a representation. Thus, while the soul is +<pb n='lxx'/><anchor id='Pglxx'/> +one, its ideas or representations are many. Taken +separately, they each express the psychic self-conservation. +But brought in relation with each other, as so +many acts or self-affirmations of the one soul, they +behave as forces, and tend to thwart or check each +other. It is as forces, as reciprocally arresting or fostering +each other, that ideas are objects of science. When +a representation is thus held in check, it is reduced to +a mere endeavour or active tendency to represent. +Thus there arises a distinction between representations +proper, and those imperfect states or acts which are +partly or wholly held in abeyance. But the latent phase +of an idea is as essential to a thorough understanding +of it as what appears. It is the great blunder of empirical +psychology to ignore what is sunk below the surface +of consciousness. And to Herbart consciousness is +not the condition but rather the product of ideas, which +are primarily forces. +</p> + +<p> +But representations are not merely in opposition,—impinging +and resisting. The same reason which +makes them resist, viz. that they are or would fain be +acts of the one soul, but are more or less incompatible, +leads them in other circumstances to form combinations +with each other. These combinations are of two sorts. +They are, first, complications, or <q>complexions</q>: +a number of ideas combine by quasi-addition and juxtaposition +to form a total. Second, there is fusion: ideas +presenting certain degrees of contrast enter into a union +where the parts are no longer separately perceptible. +It is easy to see how the problems of psychology now +assume the form of a statics and mechanics of the mind. +Quantitative data are to be sought in the strength of +each separate single idea, and the degree in which two +or more ideas block each other: in the degree of combination +between ideas, and the number of ideas in +<pb n='lxxi'/><anchor id='Pglxxi'/> +a combination: and in the terms of relation between +the members of a series of ideas. A statical theory has +to show the conditions required for what we may call +the ideal state of equilibrium of the <q>idea-forces</q>: to +determine, that is, the ultimate degree of obscuration +suffered by any two ideas of different strength, and the +conditions of their permanent combination or fusion. +A mechanics of the mind will, on the contrary, deal with +the rate at which these processes are brought about, the +velocity with which in the movement of mind ideas are +obscured or reawakened, &c. +</p> + +<p> +It is fortunately unnecessary, here, to go further into +details. What Herbart proposes is not a method for +the mathematical measurement of psychic facts: it is +a theory of mechanics and statics specially adapted to +the peculiarities of psychical phenomena, where the +forces are given with no sine or cosine, where instead +of gravitation we have the constant effort (as it were +elasticity) of each idea to revert to its unchecked state. +He claims—in short—practically to be a Kepler and +Newton of the mind, and in so doing to justify the +vague professions of more than one writer on mind—above +all, perhaps of David Hume, who goes beyond +mere professions—to make mental science follow the +example of physics. And a main argument in favour of +his enterprise is the declaration of Kant that no body of +knowledge can claim to be a science except in such +proportion as it is mathematical. And the peculiarity +of this enterprise is that self-consciousness, the Ego, is +not allowed to interfere with the free play of psychic +forces. The Ego is—psychologically—the result, the +product, and the varying product of that play. The +play of forces is no doubt a unity: but its unity lies not +in the synthesis of consciousness, but in the essential +unity of Soul. And Soul is in its essence neither +<pb n='lxxii'/><anchor id='Pglxxii'/> +consciousness, nor self-consciousness, nor mind: but +something on the basis of whose unity these are built +up and developed<note place='foot'>Herbart's language is almost identical with Hegel's: <hi rend='italic'>Encycl.</hi> § 389 +(p. 12). Cf. Spencer, <hi rend='italic'>Psychology</hi>, i. 192. <q>Feelings are in all cases +the materials out of which the superior tracts of consciousness and +intellect are evolved.</q></note>. The mere <q>representation</q> does +not include the further supervenience of consciousness: +it represents, but it is not as yet necessary that we +should also be conscious that there is representation. +It is, in the phrase of Leibniz, perception: but not +apperception. It is mere straight-out, not as yet reflected, +representation. Gradually there emerges through +the operation of mechanical psychics a nucleus, a +floating unity, a fixed or definite central aggregate. +</p> + +<p> +The suggestion of mathematical method has been +taken up by subsequent inquirers (as it was pursued +even before Herbart's time), but not in the sense he +meant. Experimentation has now taken a prominent +place in psychology. But in proportion as it has done +so, psychology has lost its native character, and thrown +itself into the arms of physiology. What Herbart calculated +were actions and reactions of idea-forces: what +the modern experimental school proposes to measure are +to a large extent the velocities of certain physiological +processes, the numerical specification of certain facts. +Such ascertainments are unquestionably useful; as +numerical precision is in other departments. But, +taken in themselves, they do not carry us one bit +further on the way to science. As experiments, further,—to +note a point discussed elsewhere<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel</hi>, ch. xvii.</note>—their +value depends on the point of view, on the theory which +has led to them, on the value of the general scheme for +which they are intended to provide a special new +<pb n='lxxiii'/><anchor id='Pglxxiii'/> +determination. In many cases they serve to give +a vivid reality to what was veiled under a general +phrase. The truth looks so much more real when it is +put in figures: as the size of a huge tree when set +against a rock; or as when Milton bodies out his fallen +angel by setting forth the ratio between his spear and +the tallest Norway pine. But until the general relationship +between soul and body is more clearly formulated, +such statistics will have but a value of curiosity. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(iii.) The Faculty-Psychology and its Critics.</head> + +<p> +What Herbart (as well as Hegel) finds perpetual +ground for objecting to is the talk about mental faculties. +This objection is part of a general characteristic +of all the higher philosophy; and the recurrence of it +gives an illustration of how hard it is for any class of +men to see themselves as others see them. If there be +anything the vulgar believe to be true of philosophy, it +is that it deals in distant and abstruse generalities, that +it neglects the shades of individuality and reality, and +launches out into unsubstantial general ideas. But it +would be easy to gather from the great thinkers an +anthology of passages in which they hold it forth as the +great work of philosophy to rescue our conceptions +from the indefiniteness and generality of popular conception, +and to give them real, as opposed to a merely +nominal, individuality. +</p> + +<p> +The Wolffian school, which Herbart (not less than +Kant) found in possession of the field, and which in +Germany may be taken to represent only a slight +variant of the half-and-half attitude of vulgar thought, +<pb n='lxxiv'/><anchor id='Pglxxiv'/> +was entrenched in the psychology of faculties. Empirical +psychology, said Wolff<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Psychologia Empirica</hi>, § 29.</note>, tells the number and +character of the soul's faculties: rational psychology +will tell what they <q>properly</q> are, and how they subsist +in soul. It is assumed that there are general receptacles +or tendencies of mental operation which in course of +time get filled or qualified in a certain way: and that +when this question is disposed of, it still remains to fix +on the metaphysical bases of these facts. +</p> + +<p> +That a doctrine of faculties should fix itself in psychology +is not so wonderful. In the non-psychical +world objects are easily discriminated in space, and the +individual thing lasts through a time. But a phase of +mind is as such fleeting and indeterminate: its individual +features which come from its <q>object</q> tend soon to +vanish in memory: all freshness of definite characters +wears off, and there is left behind only a vague <q>recept</q> +of the one and same in many, a sort of hypostatised +representative, faint but persistent, of what in experience +was an ever-varying succession. We generalise here +as elsewhere: but elsewhere the many singulars remain +to confront us more effectually. But in Mind the +immense variety of real imagination, memory, judgment +is forgotten, and the name in each case reduced to +a meagre abstract. Thus the identity in character and +operation, having been cut off from the changing elements +in its real action, is transmuted into a substantial +somewhat, a subsistent faculty. The relationship of one +to another of the powers thus by abstraction and fancy +created becomes a problem of considerable moment, +their causal relations in particular: till in the end they +stand outside and independent of each other, engaged, +as Herbart says, in a veritable <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>bellum omnium contra +omnes</foreign>. +</p> + +<pb n='lxxv'/><anchor id='Pglxxv'/> + +<p> +But this hypostatising of faculties becomes a source +of still further difficulties when it is taken in connexion +with the hypostasis of the Soul or Self or Ego. To +Aristotle the Soul in its general aspect is Energy or +Essence; and its individual phases are energies. But +in the hands of the untrained these conceptions came to +be considerably displaced. Essence or Substance came +to be understood (as may be seen in Locke, and still +more in loose talk) as a something,—a substratum,—or +peculiar nature—(of which <emph>in itself</emph> nothing further +could be said<note place='foot'>As is also the case with Herbart's metaphysical reality of the Soul.</note> but which notwithstanding was permanent +and perhaps imperishable): this something +subsistent exhibited certain properties or activities. +There thus arose, on one hand, the Soul-thing,—a +substance misunderstood and sensualised with a supernatural +sensuousness,—a denizen of the transcendental +or even of the transcendent world: and, on the other +hand, stood the actual manifestations, the several exhibitions +of this force, the assignable and describable +psychic facts. We are accordingly brought before the +problem of how this one substance or essence stands to +the several entities or hypostases known as faculties. +And we still have in the rear the further problem of +how these abstract entities stand to the real and concrete +single acts and states of soul and mind. +</p> + +<p> +This hypostatising of faculties, and this distinction +of the <q>Substantial</q> soul from its <q>accidentia</q> or +phenomena, had grown—through the materialistic proclivities +of popular conception—from the indications +found in Aristotle. It attained its climax, perhaps in +the Wolffian school in Germany, but it has been the +resort of superficial psychology in all ages. For while +it, on one hand, seemed to save the substantial Soul on +whose incorruptibility great issues were believed to +<pb n='lxxvi'/><anchor id='Pglxxvi'/> +hinge, it held out, on the other, an open hand to the +experimental inquirer, whom it bade freely to search +amongst the phenomena. But if it was the refuge of +pusillanimity, it was also the perpetual object of censure +from all the greater and bolder spirits. Thus, the +psychology of Hobbes may be hasty and crude, but +it is at least animated by a belief that the mental life +is continuous, and not cut off by abrupt divisions +severing the mental faculties. The <q>image</q> (according +to his materialistically coloured psychology) which, +when it is a strong motion, is called sense, passes, +as it becomes weaker or decays, into imagination, and +gives rise, by its various complications and associations +with others, to reminiscence, experience, expectation. +Similarly, the voluntary motion which is an effect or +a phase of imagination, beginning at first in small +motions—called by themselves <q>endeavours,</q> and in +relation to their cause <q>appetites</q> or <q>desires<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Human Nature</hi>, vii. 2. <q>Pleasure, Love, and appetite, which is +also called desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the +same thing....</q> Deliberation is (ch. xii. 1) the <q>alternate succession +of appetite and fears.</q></note></q>—leads +on cumulatively to Will, which is the <q>last appetite in +deliberating.</q> Spinoza, his contemporary, speaks in +the same strain<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Eth.</hi> ii. 48 Schol.</note>. <q>Faculties of intellect, desire, love, &c., +are either utterly fictitious, or nothing but metaphysical +entities, or universals which we are in the habit of +forming from particulars. Will and intellect are thus +supposed to stand to this or that idea, this or that +volition, in the same way as stoniness to this or that +stone, or as man to Peter or Paul.</q> They are supposed +to be a general something which gets defined and +detached. But, in the mind, or in the cogitant soul, +there are no such things. There are only ideas: and +<pb n='lxxvii'/><anchor id='Pglxxvii'/> +by an <q>idea</q> we are to understand not an image on the +retina or in the brain, not a <q>dumb something, like +a painting on a panel<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Eth.</hi> ii. 43 Schol.: cf. 49 Schol.</note>,</q> but a mode of thinking, or even +the act of intellection itself. The ideas <emph>are</emph> the mind: +mind does not <emph>have</emph> ideas. Further, every <q>idea,</q> as +such, <q>involves affirmation or negation,</q>—is not an +image, but an act of judgment—contains, as we should +say, an implicit reference to actuality,—a reference +which in volition is made explicit. Thus (concludes +the corollary of Eth. ii. 49) <q>Will and Intellect are one +and the same.</q> But in any case the <q>faculties</q> as such +are no better than <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>entia rationis</foreign> (i.e. auxiliary modes of +representing facts). +</p> + +<p> +Leibniz speaks no less distinctly and sanely in this +direction. <q>True powers are never mere possibilities: +they are always tendency and action.</q> The <q>Monad</q>—that +is the quasi-intelligent unit of existence,—is essentially +activity, and its actions are perceptions and +appetitions, i.e. tendencies to pass from one perceptive +state or act to another. It is out of the variety, the +complication, and relations of these miniature or little +perceptions and appetitions, that the conspicuous phenomena +of consciousness are to be explained, and not by +supposing them due to one or other faculty. The soul +is a unity, a self-developing unity, a unity which at each +stage of its existence shows itself in a perception or +idea,—each such perception however being, to repeat +the oft quoted phrase, <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>plein de l'avenir et chargé du +passé</foreign>:—each, in other words, is not stationary, but +active and urgent, a progressive force, as well as a +representative element. Above all, Leibniz has the +view that the soul gives rise to all its ideas from itself: +that its life is its own production, not a mere inheritance +of ideas which it has from birth and nature, nor +<pb n='lxxviii'/><anchor id='Pglxxviii'/> +a mere importation into an empty room from without, +but a necessary result of its own constitution acting in +necessary (predetermined) reciprocity and harmony +with the rest of the universe. +</p> + +<p> +But Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, were most attentively +heard in the passages where they favoured +or combatted the dominant social and theological +prepossessions. Their glimpses of truer insight and +even their palpable contributions in the line of a true +psychology were ignored or forgotten. More attention, +perhaps, was attracted by an attempt of a very different +style. This was the system of Condillac, who, as +Hegel says (p. <ref target='Pg061'>61</ref>), made an unmistakable attempt to +show the necessary interconnexion of the several +modes of mental activity. In his <hi rend='italic'>Traité des Sensations</hi> +(1754), following on his <hi rend='italic'>Essai sur l'origine des +connaissances humaines</hi> (1746), he tried to carry out +systematically the deduction or derivation of all our +ideas from sense, or to trace the filiation of all our +faculties from sensation. Given a mind with no other +power than sensibility, the problem is to show how it +acquires all its other faculties. Let us then suppose +a sentient animal to which is offered a single sensation, +or one sensation standing out above the others. In +such circumstances the sensation <q>becomes</q> (<foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>devient</foreign>) +attention: or a sensation <q>is</q> (<foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>est</foreign>) attention, either +because it is alone, or because it is more lively than +all the rest. Again: before such a being, let us set +two sensations: to perceive or feel (<foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>apercevoir ou sentir</foreign>) +the two sensations is the same thing (<foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>c'est la même +chose</foreign>). If one of the sensations is not present, but +a sensation made already, then to perceive it is memory. +Memory, then, is only <q>transformed sensation</q> (<foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>sensation +transformée</foreign>). Further, suppose we attend to both +ideas, this is <q>the same thing</q> as to compare them. +<pb n='lxxix'/><anchor id='Pglxxix'/> +And to compare them we must see difference or resemblance. +This is judgment. <q>Thus sensation becomes +successively attention, comparison, judgment.</q> And—by +further steps of the equating process—it appears +that sensation again <q>becomes</q> an act of reflection. +And the same may be said of imagination and reasoning: +all are transformed sensations. +</p> + +<p> +If this is so with the intelligence, it is equally the +case with the Will. To feel and not feel well or ill +is impossible. Coupling then this feeling of pleasure +or pain with the sensation and its transformations, we +get the series of phases ranging from desire, to passion, +hope, will. <q>Desire is only the action of the same +faculties as are attributed to the understanding.</q> A +lively desire is a passion: a desire, accompanied with +a belief that nothing stands in its way, is a volition. +But combine these affective with the intellectual processes +already noticed, and you have thinking (<foreign rend='italic'>penser</foreign>)<note place='foot'>This wide scope of thinking (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>cogitatio</foreign>, <foreign rend='italic'>penser</foreign>) is at least as old as +the Cartesian school: and should be kept in view, as against a tendency +to narrow its range to the mere intellect.</note>. +Thus thought in its entirety is, only and always, transformed +sensation. +</p> + +<p> +Something not unlike this, though scarcely so simply +and directly doctrinaire, is familiar to us in some +English psychology, notably James Mill's<note place='foot'>e.g. <hi rend='italic'>Analysis of the Human Mind</hi>, ch. xxiv. <q>Attention is but +another name for the interesting character of the idea;</q> ch. xix. +<q>Desire and the idea of a pleasurable sensation are convertible terms.</q></note>. Taken in +their literal baldness, these identifications may sound +strained,—or trifling. But if we look beyond the +words, we can detect a genuine instinct for maintaining +and displaying the unity and continuity of mental +life through all its modifications,—coupled unfortunately +with a bias sometimes in favour of reducing higher or +more complex states of mind to a mere prolongation +<pb n='lxxx'/><anchor id='Pglxxx'/> +of lower and beggarly rudiments. But otherwise such +analyses are useful as aids against the tendency of +inert thought to take every name in this department +as a distinguishable reality: the tendency to part will +from thought—ideas from emotion—and even imagination +from reason, as if either could be what it professed +without the other. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(iv.) Methods and Problems of Psychology.</head> + +<p> +The difficulties of modern psychology perhaps lie +in other directions, but they are not less worth guarding +against. They proceed mainly from failure or +inability to grasp the central problem of psychology, +and a disposition to let the pen (if it be a book on the +subject) wander freely through the almost illimitable +range of instance, illustration, and application. Though +it is true that the proper study of mankind is man, it is +hardly possible to say what might not be brought under +this head. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Homo sum, nihil a me alienum puto</foreign>, it might +be urged. Placed in a sort of middle ground between +physiology (summing up all the results of physical +science) and general history (including the contributions +of all the branches of sociology), the psychologist +need not want for material. He can wander into ethics, +aesthetic, and logic, into epistemology and metaphysics. +And it cannot be said with any conviction that he is +actually trespassing, so long as the ground remains so +ill-fenced and vaguely enclosed. A desultory collection +of observations on traits of character, anecdotes +of mental events, mixed up with hypothetical descriptions +of how a normal human being may be supposed +<pb n='lxxxi'/><anchor id='Pglxxxi'/> +to develop his so-called faculties, and including some +dictionary-like verbal distinctions, may make a not +uninteresting and possibly bulky work entitled Psychology. +</p> + +<p> +It is partly a desire of keeping up to date which is +responsible for the copious extracts or abstracts from +treatises on the anatomy and functions of the nerve-system, +which, accompanied perhaps by a diagram of +the brain, often form the opening chapter of a work +on psychology. Even if these researches had achieved +a larger number of authenticated results than they as +yet have, they would only form an appendix and an +illustration to the proper subject<note place='foot'>As Mr. Spencer says (<hi rend='italic'>Psychology</hi>, i. 141), <q>Objective psychology +can have no existence as such without borrowing its data from subjective +psychology.</q></note>. As they stand, and +so long as they remain largely hypothetical, the use of +them in psychology only fosters the common delusion +that, when we can picture out in material outlines a +theory otherwise unsupported, it has gained some +further witness in its favour. It is quite arguable +indeed that it may be useful to cut out a section from +general human biology which should include the parts +of it that were specially interesting in connexion with +the expression or generation of thought, emotion, and +desire. But in that case, there is a blunder in singling +out the brain alone, and especially the organs of sense +and voluntary motion,—except for the reason that this +province of psycho-physics alone has been fairly mapped +out. The preponderant half of the soul's life is linked +to other parts of the physical system. Emotion and +volition, and the general tone of the train of ideas, if +they are to be connected with their expression and +physical accompaniment (or aspect), would require a +sketch of the heart and lungs, as well as the digestive +<pb n='lxxxii'/><anchor id='Pglxxxii'/> +system in general. Nor these alone. Nerve analysis +(especially confined to the larger system), though most +modern, is not alone important, as Plato and Aristotle +well saw. So that if biology is to be adapted for +psychological use (and if psychology deals with more +than cognitive processes), a liberal amount of physiological +information seems required. +</p> + +<p> +Experimental psychology is a term used with a +considerable laxity of content; and so too is that of +physiological psychology, or psycho-physics. And the +laxity mainly arises because there is an uncertainty as +to what is principal and what secondary in the inquiry. +Experiment is obviously a help to observation: and so +far as the latter is practicable, the former would seem +to have a chance of introduction. But in any case, +experiment is only a means to an end and only practicable +under the guidance of hypothesis and theory. Its +main value would be in case the sphere of psychology +were completely paralleled with one province of physiology. +It was long ago maintained by Spinoza and (in +a way by) Leibniz, that there is no mental phenomenon +without its bodily equivalent, pendant, or correspondent. +The <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ordo rerum</foreign> (the molecular system of movements) +is, he held, the same as the order of ideas. But it is +only at intervals, under special conditions, or when +they reach a certain magnitude, that ideas emerge into +full consciousness. As consciousness presents them, +they are often discontinuous, and abrupt: and they do +not always carry with them their own explanation. +Hence if we are confined to the larger phenomena of +consciousness alone, our science is imperfect: many +things seem anomalous; above all, perhaps, will, attention, +and the like. We have seen how Herbart (partly +following the hints of Leibniz), attempted to get over +this difficulty by the hypothesis of idea-forces which +<pb n='lxxxiii'/><anchor id='Pglxxxiii'/> +generate the forms and matter of consciousness by +their mutual impact and resistance. Physiological +psychology substitutes for Herbart's reals and his +idea-forces a more materialistic sort of reality; perhaps +functions of nerve-cells, or other analogous +entities. There, it hopes one day to discover the +underlying continuity of event which in the upper +range of consciousness is often obscured, and then the +process would be, as the phrase goes, explained: we +should be able to picture it out without a gap. +</p> + +<p> +These large hopes may have a certain fulfilment. They +may lead to the withdrawal of some of the fictitious +mental processes which are still described in works of +psychology. But on the whole they can only have +a negative and auxiliary value. The value, that is, +of helping to confute feigned connexions and to suggest +truer. They will be valid against the mode of thought +which, when Psyché fails us for an explanation, turns +to body, and interpolates soul between the states of +body: the mode which, in an older phraseology, jumps +from final causes to physical, and from physical (or +efficient) to final. Here, as elsewhere, the physical +has its place: and here, more than in many places, +the physical has been unfairly treated. But the whole +subject requires a discussion of the so-called <q>relations</q> +of soul and body: a subject on which popular conceptions +and so-called science are radically obscure. +</p> + +<p> +<q>But the danger which threatens experimental psychology,</q> +says Münsterberg, <q rend='pre'>is that, in investigating +details, the connexion with questions of principle may +be so lost sight of that the investigation finally lands +at objects scientifically quite worthless<note place='foot'>The same failure to note that experiment is valuable only where +general points of view are defined, is a common fault in biology.</note>. Psychology +<pb n='lxxxiv'/><anchor id='Pglxxxiv'/> +forgets only too easily that all those numerical statistics +which experiment allows us to form are only means for +psychological analysis and interpretation, not ends in +themselves. It piles up numbers and numbers, and +fails to ask whether the results so formed have any +theoretical value whatever: it seeks answers before +a question has been clearly and distinctly framed; +whereas the value of experimental answers always +depends on the exactitude with which the question is +put. Let me remind the reader, how one inquirer after +another made many thousand experiments on the +estimation of small intervals of time, without a single +one of them raising the question what the precise +point was which these experiments sought to measure, +what was the psychological occurrence in the case, or +what psychological phenomena were employed as the +standard of time-intervals. And so each had his own +arbitrary standard of measurement, each of them piled +up mountains of numbers, each demonstrated that his +predecessor was wrong; but neither Estel nor Mehner +have carried the problem of the time-sense a single +step further.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>This must be all changed, if we are not to drift into +the barrenest scholastic.... Everywhere out of the +correct perception that problems of principle demand +the investigation of detailed phenomena, and that the +latter investigation must proceed in comparative +independence of the question of principles, there has +grown the false belief that the description of detail +phenomena is the ultimate aim of science. And so, +side by side with details which are of importance to +principles, we have others, utterly indifferent and +theoretically worthless, treated with the same zeal. To +the solution of their barren problems the old Schoolmen +applied a certain acuteness; but in order to turn out +<pb n='lxxxv'/><anchor id='Pglxxxv'/> +masses of numbers from barren experiments, all that is +needed is a certain insensibility to fits of ennui. Let +numbers be less collected for their own sake: and +instead, let the problems be so brought to a point that +the answers may possess the character of principles. +Let each experiment be founded on far more theoretical +considerations, then the number of the experiments +may be largely diminished<note place='foot'>Münsterberg, <hi rend='italic'>Aufgaben und Methoden der Psychologie</hi>, p. 144.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +What is thus said of a special group of inquiries by +one of the foremost of the younger psychologists, is +not without its bearings on all the departments in which +psychology can learn. For physiological, or what is +technically called psychological, experiment, is co-ordinate +with many other sources of information. +Much, for instance, is to be learnt by a careful study +of language by those who combine sound linguistic +knowledge with psychological training. It is in +language, spoken and written, that we find at once +the great instrument and the great document of the +distinctively human progress from a mere <foreign lang='el' rend='italic'>Psyche</foreign> to +a mature <foreign lang='el' rend='italic'>Nous</foreign>, from Soul to Mind. Whether we look +at the varieties of its structure under different ethnological +influences, or at the stages of its growth in a +nation and an individual, we get light from language +on the differentiation and consolidation of ideas. But +here again it is easy to lose oneself in the world of +etymology, or to be carried away into the enticing +questions of real and ideal philology. +</p> + +<p> +<q>The human being of the psychologist,</q> says Herbart<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Lehrbuch der Psychologie</hi>, § 54 (2nd ed.), or § 11 (1st ed.).</note>, +<q>is the social and civilised human being who stands on +the apex of the whole history through which his race +has passed. In him is found visibly together all the +multiplicity of elements, which, under the name of +<pb n='lxxxvi'/><anchor id='Pglxxxvi'/> +mental faculties, are regarded as a universal inheritance +of humanity. Whether they are originally in conjunction, +whether they are originally a multiplicity, is a +point on which the facts are silent. The savage and +the new-born child give us far less occasion to admire +the range of their mind than do the nobler animals. +But the psychologists get out of this difficulty by the +unwarranted assumption that all the higher mental +activities exist potentially in children and savages—though +not in the animals—as a rudimentary predisposition +or psychical endowment. Of such a nascent +intellect, a nascent reason, and nascent moral sense, +they find recognisable traces in the scanty similarities +which the behaviour of child or savage offers to those of +civilised man. We cannot fail to note that in their +descriptions they have before them a special state of +man, and one which, far from accurately defined, merely +follows the general impression made upon us by those +beings we name civilised. An extremely fluctuating +character inevitably marks this total impression. For +there are no general facts:—the genuine psychological +documents lie in the momentary states of individuals: +and there is an immeasurably long way from these to +the height of the universal concept of man in general.</q> +</p> + +<p> +And yet Man in general,—Man as man and therefore +as mind—the concept of Man—normal and ideal man—the +complete and adequate Idea of man—is the true +terminus of the psychological process; and whatever be +the difficulties in the way, it is the only proper goal of +the science. Only it has to be built up, constructed, +evolved, developed,—and not assumed as a datum of +popular imagination. We want a concept, concrete and +real, of Man and of Mind, which shall give its proper +place to each of the elements that, in the several +examples open to detailed observation, are presented +<pb n='lxxxvii'/><anchor id='Pglxxxvii'/> +with unfair or exaggerated prominence. The savage +and the child are not to be left out as free from +contributing to form the ideal: virtues here are not +more important than vices, and are certainly not likely +to be so informing: even the insane and the idiot show +us what human intelligence is and requires: and the +animals are also within the sweep of psychology. Man +is not its theatre to the exclusion of woman; if it +records the results of introspection of the Me, it will +find vast and copious quarries in the various modes in +which an individual identifies himself with others as +We. And even the social and civilised man gets his +designation, as usual, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a potiori</foreign>. He is more civilised +and social than others: perhaps rather more civilised +than not. But always, in some measure, he is at the +same time unsocial or anti-social, and uncivilised. +Each unit in the society of civilisation has to the +outside observer—and sometimes even to his own +self-detached and impartial survey—a certain oddity +or fixity, a gleam of irrationality, which shows him to +fall short of complete sanity or limpid and mobile +intelligence. He has not wholly put off the savage,—least +of all, says the cynic, in his relations with the +other sex. He carries with him even to the grave +some grains of the recklessness and petulance of +childhood. And rarely, if ever, can it be said of him +that he has completely let the ape and tiger die. +</p> + +<p> +But that is only one way of looking at the matter—and +one which, perhaps, is more becoming to the +pathologist and the cynic, than to the psychologist. +Each of these stages of psychical development, even +if that development be obviously describable as degeneration, +has something which, duly adjusted, has its +place and function in the theory of the normally-complete +human mind. The animal, the savage, and +<pb n='lxxxviii'/><anchor id='Pglxxxviii'/> +the child,—each has its part there. It is a mutilated, +one-sided and superficial advance in socialisation which +cuts off the civilised creature from the natural stem of +his ancestry, from the large freedom, the immense +<emph>insouciance</emph>, the childlikeness of his first estate. There +is something, again, wanting in the man who utterly +lacks the individualising realism and tenderness of the +woman, as in the woman who can show no comprehension +of view or bravery of enterprise. Even pathological +states of mind are not mere anomalies and mere +degenerations. Nature perhaps knows no proper +degenerations, but only by-ways and intricacies in the +course of development. Still less is the vast enormity +or irregularity of genius to be ignored. It is all—to +the philosophic mind—a question of degree and proportion,—though +often the proportion seems to exceed +the scale of our customary denominators. If an +element is latent or quiescent (in arrest), that is no +index to its absolute amount: <q>we know not what's +resisted.</q> Let us by all means keep proudly to our +happy mediocrity of faculty, and step clear of insanity +or idiotcy on one hand, and from genius or heroism on +the other. But the careful observer will notwithstanding +note how delicately graded and how intricately +combined are the steps which connect extremes +so terribly disparate. It is only vulgar ignorance which +turns away in hostility or contempt from the imbecile +and the deranged, and only a worse than vulgar +sciolism which sees in genius and the hero nothing +but an aberration from its much-prized average. +Criminalistic anthropology, or the psychology of the +criminal, may have indulged in much frantic exaggeration +as to the doom which nature and heredity have +pronounced over the fruit of the womb even before it +entered the shores of light: yet they have at least +<pb n='lxxxix'/><anchor id='Pglxxxix'/> +served to discredit the free and easy assumption of the +abstract averagist, and shown how little the penalties +of an unbending law meet the requirements of social +well-being. +</p> + +<p> +Yet, if psychology be willing to learn in all these and +other provinces of the estate of man, it must remember +that, once it goes beyond the narrow range in which the +interpretations of symbol and expression have become +familiar, it is constantly liable to blunder in the inevitable +effort to translate observation into theory. The +happy mean between making too much of palpable +differences and hurrying on to a similar rendering of +similar signs is the rarest of gifts. Or, perhaps, it were +truer to say it is the latest and most hardly won of +acquirements. To learn to observe—observe with mind—is +not a small thing. There are rules for it—both rules +of general scope and, above all, rules in each special +department. But like all <q>major premisses</q> in practice, +everything depends on the power of judgment, the tact, +the skill, the <q>gift</q> of applying them. They work not +as mere rules to be conned by rote, but as principles +assimilated into constituents of the mental life-blood: +rules which serve only as condensed reminders and +hints of habits of thought and methods of research +which have grown up in action and reflection. To +observe we must comprehend: yet we can only +comprehend by observing. We all know how unintelligible—save +for epochs of ampler reciprocity, and +it may be even of acquired unity of interest—the two +sexes are for each other. Parents can remember how +mysteriously minded they found their own elders; and +in most cases they have to experience the depth of the +gulf which in certain directions parts them from their +children's hearts. Even in civilised Europe, the +ordinary member of each nation has an underlying +<pb n='xc'/><anchor id='Pgxc'/> +conviction (which at moments of passion or surprise +will rise and find harsh utterance) that the foreigner is +queer, irrational, and absurd. If the foreigner, further, +be so far removed as a Chinaman (or an Australian +<q>black</q>), there is hardly anything too vile, meaningless, +or inhuman which the European will not readily believe +in the case of one who, it may be, in turn describes him +as a <q>foreign devil.</q> It can only be in a fit of noble +chivalry that the British rank and file can so far +temporise with its insular prejudice as to admit of +<q>Fuzzy-wuzzy</q> that +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +<q>He's a poor benighted 'eathen—but a first-class fightin' man.</q> +</quote> + +<p> +Not every one is an observer who chooses to dub +himself so, nor is it in a short lapse of time and with +condescension for foreign habits, that any observer +whatever can become a trustworthy reporter of the +ideas some barbarian tribe holds concerning the things +of earth and air, and the hidden things of spirits and +gods. The <q>interviewer</q> no doubt is a useful being +when it is necessary to find <q>copy,</q> or when sharp-drawn +characters and picturesque incidents are needed +to stimulate an inert public, ever open to be interested +in some new thing. But he is a poor contributor to +the stored materials of science. +</p> + +<p> +It is of other stuff that true science is made. And if +even years of nominal intercourse and spatial juxtaposition +sometimes leave human beings, as regards +their inner selves, in the position of strangers still, +what shall be said of the attempt to discern the psychic +life of animals? Will the touch of curiosity which +prompts us to watch the proceedings of the strange +creatures,—will a course of experimentation on their +behaviour under artificial conditions,—justify us in +drawing liberal conclusions as to why they so behaved, +<pb n='xci'/><anchor id='Pgxci'/> +and what they thought and felt about it? It is necessary +in the first place to know what to observe, and +how, and above all what for. But that presumed, we +must further live with the animals not only as their +masters and their examiners, but as their friends and +fellow-creatures; we must be able—and so lightly that +no effort is discernable—to lay aside the burden and +garb of civilisation; we must possess that stamp of +sympathy and similarity which invites confidence, and +breaks down the reserve which our poor relations, +whether human or others, offer to the first approaches +of a strange superior. It is probable that in that case +we should have less occasion to wonder at their oddities +or to admire their sagacity. But a higher and more +philosophical wonder might, as in other cases when we +get inside the heart of our subject, take the place of the +cheap and childish love of marvels, or of the vulgar +straining after comic traits. +</p> + +<p> +Of all this mass of materials the psychologist proper +can directly make only a sparing use. Even as illustrations, +his data must not be presented too often in all +their crude and undigested individuality, or he runs +the risk of leaving one-sided impressions. Every single +instance, individualised and historical,—unless it be +exhibited by that true art of genius which we cannot +expect in the average psychologist—narrows, even +though it be but slightly, the complete and all-sided +truth. Anecdotes are good, and to the wise they convey +a world of meaning, but to lesser minds they sometimes +suggest anything but the points they should accentuate. +Without the detail of individual realistic study there is +no psychology worth the name. History, story, we must +have: but at the same time, with the philosopher, we +must say, I don't give much weight to stories. And +this is what will always—except in rare instances where +<pb n='xcii'/><anchor id='Pgxcii'/> +something like genius is conjoined with it—make esoteric +science hard and unpopular. It dare not—if it is true +to its idea—rest on any amount of mere instances, as +isolated, unreduced facts. Yet it can only have real +power so far as it concentrates into itself the life-blood +of many instances, and indeed extracts the pith and +unity of all instances. +</p> + +<p> +Nor, on the other hand, can it turn itself too directly +and intently towards practical applications. All this +theory of mental progress from the animate soul to the +fullness of religion and science deals solely with the +universal process of education: <q>the education of +humanity</q> we may call it: the way in which mind +is made true and real<note place='foot'>See p. <ref target='Pg011'>11</ref> (§ 387).</note>. It is therefore a question of +intricacy and of time how to carry over this general +theory into the arena of education as artificially +directed and planned. To try to do so at a single +step would be to repeat the mistake of Plato, if Plato +may be taken to suppose (which seems incredible) that +a theoretical study of the dialectics of truth and goodness +would enable his rulers, without the training of +special experience, to undertake the supreme tasks of +legislation or administration. All politics, like all +education, rests on these principles of the means and +conditions of mental growth: but the schooling of +concrete life, though it may not develop the faculty +of formulating general laws, will often train better for +the management of the relative than a mere logical +Scholastic in first or absolute principles. +</p> + +<p> +In conclusion, there are one or two points which +seem of cardinal importance for the progress of psychology. +(1) Its difference from the physical sciences has +to be set out: in other words, the peculiarity of psychical +fact. It will not do merely to say that experience marks +<pb n='xciii'/><anchor id='Pgxciii'/> +out these boundaries with sufficient clearness. On the +contrary, the terms consciousness, feeling, mind, &c., +are evidently to many psychologists mere names. In +particular, the habits of physical research when introduced +into mental study lead to a good deal of what +can only be called mythology. (2) There should be a +clearer recognition of the problem of the relations of +mental unity to mental elements. But to get that, a more +thorough logical and metaphysical preparation is needed +than is usually supposed necessary. The doctrine of +identity and necessity, of universal and individual, has +to be faced, however tedious. (3) The distinction between +first-grade and second-grade elements and factors in the +mental life has to be realised. The mere idea as presentative +or immediate has to be kept clear of the more +logico-reflective, or normative ideas, which belong to +judgment and reasoning. And the number of these +grades in mental development seems endless. (4) But, +also, a separation is required—were it but temporary—between +what may be called principles, and what is +detail. At present, in psychology, <q>principles</q> is a +word almost without meaning. A complete all-explaining +system is of course impossible at present and +may always be so. Yet if an effort of thought could be +concentrated on cardinal issues, and less padding of +conventional and traditional detail were foisted in, much +might thereby be done to make detailed research fruitful. +(5) And finally, perhaps, if psychology be a philosophical +study, some hint as to its purpose and problem +would be desirable. If it is only an abstract branch of +science, of course, no such hint is in place. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='xciv'/><anchor id='Pgxciv'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Essay III. On Some Psychological Aspects Of Ethics.</head> + +<p> +Allusion has already been made to the question of +the boundaries between logic and psychology, between +logic and ethics, ethics and psychology, and psychology +and epistemology. Each of these occasionally comes to +cover ground that seems more appropriate to the others. +Logic is sometimes restricted to denote the study of the +conditions of derivative knowledge, of the canons of +inference and the modes of proof. If taken more +widely as the science of thought-form, it is supposed +to imply a world of fixed or stereotyped relations +between ideas, a system of stable thoughts governed +by inflexible laws in an absolute order of immemorial +or eternal truth. As against such fixity, psychology is +supposed to deal with these same ideas as products—as +growing out of a living process of thought—having a +history behind them and perhaps a prospect of further +change. The genesis so given may be either a mere +chronicle-history, or it may be a philosophical development. +In the former case, it would note the occasions +of incident and circumstance, the reactions of mind and +environment, under which the ideas were formed. Such +<pb n='xcv'/><anchor id='Pgxcv'/> +a psychological genesis of several ideas is found in the +Second Book of Locke's Essay. In the latter case, +the account would be more concerned with the inner +movement, the action and reaction in ideas themselves, +considered not as due to casual occurrences, but as +self-developing by an organic growth. But in either +case, ideas would be shown not to be ready-made and +independently existing kinds in a world of idea-things, +and not to form an unchanging diagram or framework, +but to be a growth, to have a history, and a development. +Psychology in this sense would be a dynamical, +as opposed to the supposed statical, treatment of ideas +and concepts in logic. But it may be doubted how far it +is well to call this psychology: unless psychology deals +with the contents of the mental life, in their meaning +and purpose, instead of, as seems proper, merely in their +character of psychic events. Such psychology is rather +an evolutionist logic,—a dialectic process more than an +analytic of a datum. +</p> + +<p> +In the same way, ethics may be brought into one kind +of contact with psychology. Ethics, like logic, may be +supposed to presuppose and to deal with a certain inflexible +scheme of requirements, a world of moral order +governed by invariable or universal law; an eternal +kingdom of right, existing independently of human +wills, but to be learned and followed out in uncompromising +obedience. As against this supposed +absolute order, psychology may be said to show the +genesis of the idea of obligation and duty, the growth +of the authority of conscience, the formation of ideals, +the relativity of moral ideas. Here also it may reach +this conclusion, by a more external or a more internal +mode of argument. It may try to show, in other words, +that circumstances give rise to these forms of estimating +conduct, or it may argue that they are a necessary +<pb n='xcvi'/><anchor id='Pgxcvi'/> +development in the human being, constituted as he is. +It may again be doubted whether this is properly called +psychology. Yet its purport seems ultimately to be +that the objective order is misconceived when it is +regarded as an external or quasi-physical order: as a +law written up and sanctioned with an external authority—as, +in Kant's words, a heteronomy. If that order is +objective, it is so because it is also in a sense subjective: +if it is above the mere individuality of the individual, it +is still in a way identical with his true or universal self-hood. +Thus <q>psychological</q> here means the recognition +that the logical and the moral law is an autonomy: that +it is not given, but though necessary, necessary by the +inward movement of the mind. The metaphor of law +is, in brief, misleading. For, according to a common, +though probably an erroneous, analysis of that term, the +essence of a law in the political sphere is to be a species +of command. And that is rather a one-sidedly practical +or aesthetic way of looking at it. The essence of law +in general, and the precondition of every law in special, +is rather uniformity and universality, self-consistency +and absence of contradiction: or, in other words, +rationality. Its essential opposite—or its contradiction +in essence—is a privilege, an attempt at isolating a case +from others. It need not indeed always require bare +uniformity—require i.e. the same act to be done by +different people: but it must always require that every +thing within its operation shall be treated on principles +of utter and thorough harmony and consistency. It +requires each thing to be treated on public principles +and with publicity: nothing apart and mere singular, as +a mere incident or as a world by itself. Differently it +may be treated, but always on grounds of common well-being, +as part of an embracing system. +</p> + +<p> +There is probably another sense, however, in which +<pb n='xcvii'/><anchor id='Pgxcvii'/> +psychology comes into close relation with ethics. If +we look on man as a microcosm, his inner system will +more or less reproduce the system of the larger world. +The older psychology used to distinguish an upper or +superior order of faculties from a lower or inferior. +Thus in the intellectual sphere, the intellect, judgment, +and reason were set above the senses, imagination, and +memory. Among the active powers, reasonable will, +practical reason and conscience were ranked as paramount +over the appetites and desires and emotions. +And this use of the word <q>faculty</q> is as old as Plato, +who regards science as a superior faculty to opinion +or imagination. But this application—which seems a +perfectly legitimate one—does not, in the first instance, +belong to psychology at all. No doubt it is psychically +presented: but it has an other source. It springs from +an appreciation, a judgment of the comparative truth +or reality of what the so-called psychical act means or +expresses. Such faculties are powers in a hierarchy +of means and ends and presuppose a normative or +critical function which has classified reality. Psychically, +the elements which enter into knowledge are +not other than those which belong to opinion: but +they are nearer an adequate rendering of reality, +they are truer, or nearer the Idea. And in the main +we may say, that is truer or more real which succeeds +in more completely organising and unifying elements—which +rises more and more above the selfish or isolated +part into the thorough unity of all parts. +</p> + +<p> +The superior faculty is therefore the more thorough +organisation of that which is elsewhere less harmoniously +systematised. Opinion is fragmentary and partial: it +begins abruptly and casually from the unknown, and +runs off no less abruptly into the unknown. Knowledge, +on the contrary, is unified: and its unity gives it its +<pb n='xcviii'/><anchor id='Pgxcviii'/> +strength and superiority. The powers which thus exist +are the subjective counterparts of objectively valuable +products. Thus, reason is the subjective counterpart of +a world in which all the constituents are harmonised +and fall into due relationship. It is a product or result, +which is not psychologically, but logically or morally +important. It is a faculty, because it means that actually +its possessor has ordered and systematised his life or +his ideas of things. Psychologically, it, like unreason, +is a compound of elements: but in the case of reason +the composition is unendingly and infinitely consistent; +it is knowledge completely unified. The distinction +then is not in the strictest sense psychological: for it +has an aesthetic or normative character; it is logical or +ethical: it denotes that the idea or the act is an approach +to truth or goodness. And so, when Butler or Plato +distinguishes reason or reflection from appetites and +affections, and even from self-love or from the heart +which loves and hates, this is not exactly a psychological +division in the narrower sense. That is to say: these +are, in Plato's words, not merely <q>parts,</q> but quite as +much <q>kinds</q> and <q>forms</q> of soul. They denote +degrees in that harmonisation of mind and soul which +reproduces the permanent and complete truth of things. +For example, self-love, as Butler describes it, has but +a partial and narrowed view of the worth of acts: it is +engrossing and self-involved: it cannot take in the full +dependence of the narrower interest on the larger and +eternal self. So, in Plato, the man of heart is but +a nature which by fits and starts, or with steady but +limited vision, realises the larger life. These parts or +kinds are not separate and co-existent faculties: but +grades in the co-ordination and unification of the same +one human nature. +</p> + +<pb n='xcix'/><anchor id='Pgxcix'/> + +<div> +<head>(i.) Psychology and Epistemology.</head> + +<p> +Psychology however in the strict sense is extremely +difficult to define. Those who describe it as the +<q>science of mind,</q> the <q>phenomenology of consciousness,</q> +seem to give it a wider scope than they really +mean. The psychologist of the straiter sect tends, on +the other hand, to carry us beyond mind and consciousness +altogether. His, it has been said, is a psychology +without a Psyché. For him Mind, Soul, and Consciousness +are only current and convenient names to designate +the field, the ground on which the phenomena +he observes are supposed to transact themselves. But +they must not on any account interfere with the +operations; any more than Nature in general may +interfere with strictly physical inquiries, or Life and +vital force with the theories of biology. The so-called +Mind is only to be regarded as a stage on which certain +events represent themselves. In this field, or on this +stage, there are certain relatively ultimate elements, +variously called ideas, presentations, feelings, or states +of consciousness. But these elements, though called +ideas, must not be supposed more than mechanical or +dynamical elements; consciousness is rather their product, +a product which presupposes certain operations +and relations between them. If we are to be strictly +scientific, we must, it is urged, treat the factors of +consciousness as not themselves conscious: we must +regard them as quasi-objective, or in abstraction from +the consciousness which surveys them. The Ego must +sink into a mere receptacle or arena of psychic event; +its independent meaning or purport is to be ignored, +as beside the question. +</p> + +<p> +When this line is once fixed upon, it seems inevitable +to go farther. Comte was inclined to treat psychology +<pb n='c'/><anchor id='Pgc'/> +as falling between two stools: it must, he thought, +draw all its content either from physiology on the one +hand, or from social factors on the other. The dominant +or experimental psychology of the present day seems +inclined, without however formulating any very definite +statement, to pronounce for the former alternative. It +does not indeed adopt the materialistic view that mind +is only a function of matter. Its standpoint rather is +that the psychical presents itself even to unskilled +observation as dependent on (i.e. not independent of) or +as concomitant with certain physical or corporeal facts. +It adds that the more accurately trained the observer +becomes, the more he comes to discover a corporeal +aspect even where originally he had not surmised its +existence, and to conclude that the two cycles of +psychical and physical event never interfere with each +other: that soul does not intervene in bodily process, +nor body take up and carry on psychical. If it is said +that the will moves the limbs, he replies that the will +which moves is really certain formerly unnoticed movements +of nerve and muscle which are felt or interpreted +as a discharge of power. If the ocular impression is +said to cause an impression on the mind, he replies that +any fact hidden under that phrase refers to a change in +the molecules of the brain. He will therefore conclude +that for the study of psychical phenomena the physical +basis, as it may be called, is all important. Only so +can observation really deal with fact capable of description +and measurement. Thus psychology, it may be +said, tends to become a department of physiology. +From another standpoint, biology may be said to receive +its completion in psychology. How much either phrase +means, however, will depend on the estimate we form +of biology. If biology is only the study of mechanical +and chemical phenomena on the peculiar field known as +<pb n='ci'/><anchor id='Pgci'/> +an organism, and if that organism is only treated as an +environment which may be ignored, then psychology, +put on the same level, is not the full science of mind, +any more than the other is the full study of life. They +both have narrowed their subject to suit the abstract +scheme of the laboratory, where the victim of experiment +is either altered by mutilation and artificial restrictions, +or is dead. If, on the contrary, biology has a substantial +unity of its own to which mechanical and +chemical considerations are subordinate and instrumental, +psychology may even take part with physiology +without losing its essential rank. But in that case, we +must, as Spinoza said<note place='foot'>Cf. Nietzsche, <hi rend='italic'>Also sprach Zarathustra</hi>, i. 43. <q>There is more +reason in thy body than in thy best wisdom.</q></note>, think less mechanically of the +animal frame, and recognise (after the example of +Schelling) something truly inward (i.e. not merely +locally inside the skin) as the supreme phase or +characteristic of life. We must, in short, recognise +sensibility as the culmination of the physiological and +the beginning of the psychological. +</p> + +<p> +To the strictly scientific psychologist, as has been +noted—or to the psychology which imitates optical and +electrical science—ideas are only psychical events: they +are not ideas <emph>of</emph> anything, relative, i.e. to something else; +they have no meaning, and no reference to a reality +beyond themselves. They are presentations;—not +representations of something outside consciousness. +They are appearances: but not appearances of something: +they do not reveal anything beyond themselves. +They are, we may almost say, a unique kind of physical +phenomena. If we say they are presentations of something, +we only mean that in the presented something, +in the felt something, the wished something, we separate +the quality or form or aspect of presentativeness, of +<pb n='cii'/><anchor id='Pgcii'/> +feltness, of wishedness, and consider this aspect by +itself. There are grades, relations, complications, of +such presentations or in such presentedness: and with +the description and explanation of these, psychology is +concerned. They are fainter or stronger, more or less +correlated and antithetical. Presentation (or ideation), +in short, is the name of a train of event, which has its +peculiarities, its laws, its systems, its history. +</p> + +<p> +All reality, it may be said, subsists in such presentation; +it is for a consciousness, or in a consciousness. All +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>esse</foreign>, in its widest sense, is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>percipi</foreign>. And yet, it seems but +the commonest of experiences to say that all that is +presented is not reality. It <emph>is</emph>, it has a sort of being,—is +somehow presumed to exist: but it is not reality. And +this reference and antithesis to <emph>what</emph> is presented is +implied in all such terms as <q>ideas,</q> <q>feelings,</q> <q>states of +consciousness</q>: they are distinguished from and related +to objects of sense or external facts, to something, as it +is called, outside consciousness. Thoughts and ideas +are set against things and realities. In their primitive +stage both the child and the savage seem to recognise +no such difference. What they imagine is, as we might +say, on the same plane with what they touch and feel. +They do not, as we reproachfully remark, recognise the +difference between fact and fiction. All of us indeed +are liable to lapses into the same condition. A strong +passion, a keen hope or fear, as we say, invests its +objects with reality: even a sanguine moment presents +as fact what calmer reflection disallows as fancy. +With natural and sane intelligences, however, the +recrudescence of barbarous imagination is soon dispelled, +and the difference between hallucinations and +realities is established. With the utterly wrecked in +mind, the reality of hallucinations becomes a permanent +or habitual state. With the child and the untrained it +<pb n='ciii'/><anchor id='Pgciii'/> +is a recurrent and a disturbing influence: and it need +hardly be added that the circle of these <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>decepti deceptores</foreign>—people +with the <q>lie in the Soul</q>—is a large one. +There thus emerges a distinction of vast importance, +that of truth and falsehood, of reality and unreality, or +between representation and reality. There arise two +worlds, the world of ideas, and the world of reality +which it is supposed to represent, and, in many cases, to +represent badly. +</p> + +<p> +With this distinction we are brought across the +problem sometimes called Epistemological. Strictly +speaking, it is really part of a larger problem: the +problem of what—if Greek compounds must be used—may +be styled Aletheiology—the theory of truth and +reality: what Hegel called Logic, and what many +others have called Metaphysics. As it is ordinarily +taken up, <q>ideas</q> are believed to be something <emph>in us</emph> which +is representative or symbolical of something truly real +<emph>outside us</emph>. This inward something is said to be the +first and immediate object of knowledge<note place='foot'>This language is very characteristic of the physicists who dabble +in psychology and imagine they are treading in the steps of Kant, if +not even verifying what they call his guesswork: cf. Ziehen, <hi rend='italic'>Physiol. +Psychologie</hi>, 2nd ed. p. 212. <q>In every case there is given us only +the psychical series of sensations and their memory-images, and it is +only a universal hypothesis if we assume beside this psychical series +a material series standing in causal relation to it.... The material +series is not given equally originally with the psychical.</q></note>, and gives us—in +a mysterious way we need not here discuss—the +mediate knowledge of the reality, which is sometimes +said to cause it. Ideas in the Mind, or in the Subject, +or in us, bear witness to something outside the mind,—trans-subjective—beyond +us. The Mind, Subject, or +Ego, in this parallelism is evidently in some way identified +with our corporeal organism: perhaps even located, +and provided with a <q>seat,</q> in some defined space of that +<pb n='civ'/><anchor id='Pgciv'/> +organism. It is, however, the starting-point of the +whole distinction that ideas <emph>do not</emph>, no less than they +do, conform or correspond to this supra-conscious or +extra-conscious world of real things. Truth or falsehood +arises, according to these assumptions, according +as psychical image or idea corresponds or not to physical +fact. But how, unless by some miraculous second-sight, +where the supreme consciousness, directly contemplating +by intuition the true and independent reality, +turns to compare with this immediate vision the results +of the mediate processes conducted along the organs of +sense,—how this agreement or disagreement of copy +and original, of idea and reality, can be detected, it is +impossible to say. +</p> + +<p> +As has been already noted, the mischief lies in the +hypostatisation of ideas as something existing in abstraction +from things—and, of things, in abstraction from +ideas. They are two abstractions, the first by the +realist, the second by the idealist called subjective and +psychological. To the realist, things exist by themselves, +and they manage to produce a copy of +themselves (more or less exact, or symbolical) in <emph>our</emph> +mind, i.e. in a materialistically-spiritual or a spiritualistically-material +locus which holds <q>images</q> and ideas. +To the psychological idealist, ideas have a substantive +and primary right to existence, them alone do we really +know, and from them we more or less legitimately are +said (but probably no one takes this seriously) to infer +or postulate a world of permanent things. Now ideas +have no substantive existence as a sort of things, or +even images of things anywhere. All this is pure +mythology. It is said by comparative mythologists that +in some cases the epithet or quality of some deity has +been substantialised (hypostatised) into a separate god, +who, however (so still to keep up the unity), is regarded +<pb n='cv'/><anchor id='Pgcv'/> +as a relative, a son, or daughter, of the original. So the +phrase <q>ideas of things</q> has been taken literally as if it +was double. But to have an idea of a thing merely +means that we know it, or think it. An idea is not +given: it is a thing which is given in the idea. An +idea is not an additional and intervening object of our +knowledge or supposed knowledge. That a thing is +our object of thought is another word for its being our +idea, and that means we know it. +</p> + +<p> +The distinction between truth and falsehood, between +reality and appearance, is not arrived at by comparing +what we have before us in our mind with some inaccessible +reality beyond. It is a distinction that grows +up with the growth and organisation of our presentations—with +their gradual systematisation and unification in +one consciousness. But this consciousness which thinks, +i.e. judges and reasons, is something superior to the +contrast of physical and psychical: superior, i.e. in so +far as it includes and surveys the antithesis, without +superseding it. It is the <q>transcendental unity of +consciousness</q> of Kant—his synthetic unity of apperception. +It means that all ideas ultimately derive their +reality from their coherence with each other in an all-embracing +or infinite idea. Real in a sense ideas +always are, but with an imperfect reality. Thus the +education to truth is not—such a thing would be meaningless—ended +by a rough and ready recommendation +to compare our ideas with facts: it must teach the art +which discovers facts. And the teaching may have to +go through many grades or provinces: in each of which +it is possible to acquire a certain virtuosoship without +being necessarily an adept in another. It is through +what is called the development of intellect, judgment, +and reasoning that the faculty of truth-detecting or +truth-selecting comes. And the common feature of all +<pb n='cvi'/><anchor id='Pgcvi'/> +of these is, so to say, their superiority to the psychological +mechanism, not in the sense of working without +it and directly, but of being the organising unity or +unifier and controller and judge of that mechanism. +The certainty and necessity of truth and knowledge do +not come from a constraint from the external thing +which forces the inner idea into submission; they come +from the inner necessity of conformity and coherence +in the organism of experience. We in fact had better +speak of ideas as experience—as felt reality: a reality +however which has its degrees and perhaps even its +provinces. All truth comes with the reasoned judgment, +i.e. the syllogism—i.e. with the institution or discovery +of relations of fact or element to fact or element, +immediate or derivative, partial and less partial, up to +its ideal coherence in one Idea. It is because this +coherence is so imperfectly established in many human +beings that their knowledge is so indistinguishable from +opinion, and that they separate so loosely truth from +error. They have not worked their way into a definitely +articulated system, where there are no gaps, no abrupt +transitions: their mental order is so loosely put together +that divergences and contradictions which vex another +drop off ineffectual from them. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(ii.) Kant, Fichte, and Hegel.</head> + +<p> +This was the idealism which Kant taught and Fichte +promoted. Of the other idealism there are no doubt +abundant traces in the language of Kant: and they +were greedily fastened on by Schopenhauer. To him +the doctrine, that the world is my idea, is adequately +represented when it is translated into the phrase that +<pb n='cvii'/><anchor id='Pgcvii'/> +the world is a phantasmagoria of my brain; and escape +from the subjective idealism thus initiated is found by +him only through a supposed revelation of immediate +being communicated in the experience of will. But +according to the more consistently interpreted Kant, +the problem of philosophy consists in laying bare the +supreme law or conditions of consciousness on which +depend the validity of our knowledge, our estimates of +conduct, and our aesthetic standards. And these roots +of reality are for Kant in the mind—or, should we +rather say—in mind—in <q>Consciousness in General.</q> +In the <hi rend='italic'>Criticism of Pure Reason</hi> the general drift of +his examination is to show that the great things or +final realities which are popularly supposed to stand +in self-subsistent being, as ultimate and all-comprehensive +objects set up for knowledge, are not <q>things</q> +as popularly supposed, but imperative and inevitable +ideas. They are not objects to be known—(these are +always finite): but rather the unification, the basis, or +condition, and the completion of all knowledge. To +know them—in the ordinary petty sense of knowledge—is +as absurd and impossible as it would be, in the +Platonic scheme of reality, to know the idea of good +which is <q>on the further side of knowledge and being.</q> +God and the Soul—and the same would be true of the +World (though modern speculators sometimes talk as +if they had it at least within their grasp)—are not mere +<emph>objects</emph> of knowledge. It would be truer to say they are +that by which we know, and they are what in us knows: +they make knowledge possible, and actual. Kant has +sometimes spoken of them as the objects of a faith of +reason. What he means is that reason only issues in +knowledge because of and through this inevitable law +of reason bidding us go on for ever in our search, +because there can be nothing isolated and nowhere +<pb n='cviii'/><anchor id='Pgcviii'/> +any <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ne plus ultra</foreign> in science, which is infinite and yet +only justified as it postulates or commands unity. +</p> + +<p> +Kant's central idea is that truth, beauty, goodness, +are not dependent on some qualities of the object, but +on the universal nature or law of consciousness. Beauty +is not an attribute of things in their abstractness: but +of things as ideas of a subject, and depends on the +proportion and symmetry in the play of human faculty. +Goodness is not conformity to an outward law, but is +obligatory on us through that higher nature which is +our truer being. Truth is not conformity of ideas with +supposed trans-subjective things, but coherence and +stability in the system of ideas. The really infinite +world is not out there, but in here—in consciousness +in general, which is the denial of all limitation, of all +finality, of all isolation. God is the essential and +inherent unity and unifier of spirit and nature—the +surety that the world in all its differentiations is one. +The Soul is not an essential entity, but the infinite +fruitfulness and freshness of mental life, which forbids +us stopping at anything short of complete continuity and +unity. The Kingdom of God—the Soul—the moral law—is +within us: within us, as supreme, supra-personal +and infinite intelligences, even amid all our littleness +and finitude. Even happiness which we stretch our +arms after is not really beyond us, but is the essential +self which indeed we can only reach in detail. It is so +both in knowledge and in action. Each knowledge and +enjoyment in reality is limited and partial, but it is made +stable, and it gets a touch of infinitude, by the larger idea +which it helps to realise. Only indeed in that antithesis +between the finite and the infinite does the real live. +Every piece of knowledge is real, only because it +assumes <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>pro tempore</foreign> certain premisses which are given: +every actual beauty is set in some defect of aesthetic +<pb n='cix'/><anchor id='Pgcix'/> +completeness: every actually good deed has to get its +foil in surrounding badness. The real is always partial +and incomplete. But it has the basis or condition of its +reality in an idea—in a transcendental unity of consciousness, +which is so to say a law, or a system and an +order, which imposes upon it the condition of conformity +and coherence; but a conformity which is essential and +implicit in it. +</p> + +<p> +Fichte has called his system a <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Wissenschaftslehre</foreign>—a +theory of knowledge. Modern German used the word +<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Wissenschaft</foreign>, as modern English uses the word Science, +to denote the certified knowledge of piecemeal fact, the +partial unification of elements still kept asunder. But +by <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Wissen</foreign>, as opposed to <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Erkennen</foreign>, is meant the I know, +am aware and sure, am in contact with reality, as opposed +to the derivative and conditional reference of something +to something else which explains it. The former is a +wider term: it denotes all consciousness of objective +truth, the certainty which claims to be necessary and +universal, which pledges its whole self for its assertion. +Fichte thus unifies and accentuates the common element +in the Kantian criticisms. In the first of these Kant +had begun by explaining the nature and limitation of +empirical science. It was essentially conditioned by +the given sensation—dependent i.e. on an unexplained +and preliminary element. This is what makes it science +in the strict or narrow sense of the term: its being set, +as it were, in the unknown, the felt, the sense-datum. +The side of reality is thus the side of limitation and of +presupposition. But what makes it truth and knowledge +in general, on the other hand,—as distinct from <emph>a</emph> truth +(i.e. partial truth) and a knowledge,—is the ideal element—the +mathematical, the logical, the rational law,—or in +one word, the universal and formal character. So too +every real action is on one hand the product of an +<pb n='cx'/><anchor id='Pgcx'/> +impulse, a dark, merely given, immediate tendency to +be, and without that would be nothing: but on the other +hand it is only an intelligent and moral action in so far +as it has its constitution from an intelligence, a formal +system, which determine its place and function. +</p> + +<p> +It is on the latter or ideal element that Kant makes +the emphasis increasingly turn. Not truths, duties, +beauties, but truth, duty, beauty, form his theme. The +formal element—the logical or epistemological condition +of knowledge and morality and of beauty—is what he +(and still more Fichte) considers the prime question +of fundamental philosophy. His philosophy is an +attempt to get at the organism of our fundamental +belief—the construction, from the very base, of our +conception of reality, of our primary certainty. In +technical language, he describes our essential nature as +a Subject-object. It is the unity of an I am which is +also I know that I am: an I will which is also I am +conscious of my will<note place='foot'>It is the same radical feature of consciousness which is thus +noted by Mr. Spencer, <hi rend='italic'>Psychology</hi>, i. 475. <q>Perception and sensation +are ever tending to exclude each other but never succeed.</q> <q>Cognition +and feeling are antithetical and inseparable.</q> <q>Consciousness +continues only in virtue of this conflict.</q> Cf. Plato's resolution in +the <hi rend='italic'>Philebus</hi> of the contest between intelligence and feeling (pleasure).</note>. Here there is a radical disunion +and a supersession of that disunion. Action and contemplation +are continually outrunning each other. The +I will rests upon one I know, and works up to another: +the I know reflects upon an I will, and includes it as +an element in its idea. +</p> + +<p> +Kant had brought into use the term Deduction, and +Fichte follows him. The term leads to some confusion: +for in English, by its modern antithesis to induction, +it suggests <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> methods in all their iniquity. It +means a kind of jugglery which brings an endless series +<pb n='cxi'/><anchor id='Pgcxi'/> +out of one small term. Kant has explained that he +uses it in the lawyer's sense in which a claim is justified +by being traced step by step back to some acknowledged +and accepted right<note place='foot'>It is the quasi-Aristotelian ἀπαγωγή, defined as the step from one +proposition to another, the knowledge of which will set the first +proposition in a full light.</note>. It is a regressive method which +shows us that if the original datum is to be accepted it +carries along with it the legitimation of the consequence. +This method Fichte applies to psychology. Begin, he +says like Condillac, with the barest nucleus of soul-life; +the mere sentiency, or feeling: the contact, as it were, +with being, at a single point. But such a mere point +is unthinkable. You find, as Mr. Spencer says, that +<q>Thought</q> (or Consciousness) <q>cannot be framed out of +one term only.</q> <q>Every sensation to be known as one +must be perceived.</q> Such is the nature of the Ego—a +subject which insists on each part being qualified by the +whole and so transformed. As Mr. Spencer, again, puts +it, the mind not merely tends to revive, to associate, to +assimilate, to represent its own presentations, but it +carries on this process infinitely and in ever higher +multiples. Ideas as it were are growing in complexity +by re-presenting: i.e. by embracing and enveloping +elements which cannot be found existing in separation. +In the mind there is no mere presentation, no bare +sensation. Such a unit is a fiction or hypothesis we +employ, like the atom, for purposes of explanation. The +pure sensation therefore—which you admit because you +must have something to begin with, not a mere nothing, +but something so simple that it seems to stand out clear +and indisputable—this pure sensation, when you think +of it, forces you to go a good deal further. Even to be +itself, it must be more than itself. It is like the pure +or mere being of the logicians. Admit the simple +<pb n='cxii'/><anchor id='Pgcxii'/> +sensation—and you have admitted everything which +is required to make sensation a possible reality. But +you do not—in the sense of vulgar logic—deduce what +follows out of the beginning. From that, taken by itself, +you will get only itself: mere being will give you only +nothing, to the end of the chapter. But, as the phrase +is, sensation is an element in a consciousness: it is, +when you think of it, always more than you called it: +there is a curious <q>continuity</q> about the phenomena, +which makes real isolation impossible. +</p> + +<p> +Of course this <q>deduction</q> is not history: it is logic. +It says, if you posit sensation, then in doing so, you +posit a good deal more. You have imagination, reason, +and many more, all involved in your original assumption. +And there is a further point to be noted. You +cannot really stop even at reason, at intelligence and +will, if you take these in the full sense. You must +realise that these only exist as part and parcel of a +reasonable world. An individual intelligence presupposes +a society of intelligences. The successive steps +in this argument are presented by Fichte in the chief +works of his earlier period (1794-98). The works of +that period form a kind of trilogy of philosophy, by +which the faint outlines of the absolute selfhood is +shown acquiring definite consistency in the moral +organisation of society. First comes the <q>Foundation +for the collective philosophy.</q> It shows how our conception +of reality and our psychical organisation are +inevitably presupposed in the barest function of intelligence, +in the abstractest forms of logical law. Begin +where you like, with the most abstract and formal point +of consciousness, you are forced, as you dwell upon it +(you identifying yourself with the thought you realise), +to go step by step on till you accept as a self-consistent +and self-explanatory unity all that your cognitive and +<pb n='cxiii'/><anchor id='Pgcxiii'/> +volitional nature claims to own as its birthright. +Only in such an intelligent will is perception and +sensation possible. Next came the <q>Foundation of +Natural Law, on the principles of the general theory.</q> +Here the process of deduction is carried a step further. +If man is to realise himself as an intelligence with an +inherent bent to action, then he must be conceived as +a person among persons, as possessed of rights, as +incapable of acting without at the same moment claiming +for his acts recognition, generality, and logical +consecution. The reference, which in the conception +of a practical intelligence was implicit,—the reference +to fellow-agents, to a world in which law rules—is thus, +by the explicit recognition of these references, made +a fact patent and positive—<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>gesetzt</foreign>,—expressly instituted +in the way that the nature and condition of things +postulates. But this is not all: we step from the +formal and absolute into the material and relative. If +man is to be a real intelligence, he must be an intelligence +served by organs. <q>The rational being cannot +realise its efficient individuality, unless it ascribes to +itself a material body</q>: a body, moreover, in which +Fichte believes he can show that the details of structure +and organs are equally with the general corporeity +predetermined by reason<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Grundlage des Naturrechts</hi>, § 5.</note>. In the same way it is shown +that the social and political organisation is required +for the realisation—the making positive and yet +coherent—of the rights of all individuals. You deduce +society by showing it is required to make a genuine +individual man. Thirdly came the <q>System of Ethics.</q> +Here it is further argued that, at least in a certain +respect<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>System der Sittenlehre</hi>, § 8, iv.</note>, in spite of my absolute reason and my absolute +freedom, I can only be fully real as a part of Nature: +<pb n='cxiv'/><anchor id='Pgcxiv'/> +that my reason is realised in a creature of appetite +and impulse. From first to last this deduction is one +process which may be said to have for its object to +determine <q>the conditions of self-hood or egoity.</q> It +is the deduction of the concrete and empirical moral +agent—the actual ego of actual life—from the abstract, +unconditioned ego, which in order to be actual must +condescend to be at once determining and determined. +</p> + +<p> +In all of this Fichte makes—especially formally—a +decided advance upon Kant. In Ethics Kant in particular, +(—especially for readers who never got beyond +the beginning of his moral treatise and were overpowered +by the categorical imperative of duty) had +found the moral initiative or dynamic apparently in the +other world. The voice of duty seemed to speak from +a region outside and beyond the individual conscience. +In a sense it must do so: but it comes from a consciousness +which is, and yet is more than, the individual. +It is indeed true that appearances here are deceptive: +and that the idea of autonomy, the self-legislation of +reason, is trying to become the central conception of +Kant's Ethics. Still it is Fichte's merit to have seen +this clearly, to have held it in view unfalteringly, and +to have carried it out in undeviating system or deduction. +Man, intelligent, social, ethical, is a being all of +one piece and to be explained entirely immanently, or +from himself. Law and ethics are no accident either +to sense or to intelligence—nothing imposed by mere +external or supernal authority<note place='foot'>Even though religion (according to Kant) conceive them as divine +commands.</note>. Society is not a brand-new +order of things supervening upon and superseding +a state of nature, where the individual was entirely +self-supporting. Morals, law, society, are all necessary +steps (necessary i.e. in logic, and hence in the long run +<pb n='cxv'/><anchor id='Pgcxv'/> +also inevitable in course of time) to complete the full +evolution or realisation of a human being. The same +conditions as make man intelligent make him social +and moral. He does not proceed so far as to become +intelligent and practical, under terms of natural and +logical development, then to fall into the hands of a +foreign influence, an accident <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ab extra</foreign>, which causes +him to become social and moral. Rather he is intelligent, +because he is a social agent. +</p> + +<p> +Hence, in Fichte, the absence of the ascetic element +so often stamping its character on ethics, and representing +the moral life as the enemy of the natural, or +as mainly a struggle to subdue the sensibility and the +flesh. With Kant,—as becomes his position of mere +inquirer—the sensibility has the place of a predominant +and permanent foreground. Reason, to his way +of talking, is always something of an intruder, a +stranger from a far-off world, to be feared even when +obeyed: sublime, rather than beautiful. From the land +of sense which we habitually occupy, the land of reason +is a country we can only behold from afar: or if we +can be said to have a standpoint in it, that is only +a figurative way of saying that though it is really over +the border, we can act—it would sometimes seem by +a sort of make-believe—as if we were already there. +But these moments of high enthusiasm are rare; and +Kant commends sobriety and warns against high-minded +<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Schwärmerei</foreign>, or over-strained Mysticism. For +us it is reserved to struggle with a recalcitrant selfhood, +a grovelling sensibility: it were only fantastic +extravagance, fit for <q>fair souls</q> who unfortunately +often lapse into <q>fair sinners,</q> should we fancy ourselves +already anchored in the haven of untempted +rest and peace. +</p> + +<p> +When we come to Fichte, we find another spirit +<pb n='cxvi'/><anchor id='Pgcxvi'/> +breathing. We have passed from the age of Frederick +the Great to the age of the French Revolution; and +the breeze that burst in the War of Liberation is +already beginning to freshen the air. Boldly he pronounces +the primacy of that faith of reason whereby not +merely the just but all shall live. Your will shall show +you what you really are. You are essentially a rational +will, or a will-reason. Your sensuous nature, of impulse +and appetite, far from being the given and found +obstacle to the realisation of reason,—which Kant +strictly interpreted might sometimes seem to imply—(and +in this point Schopenhauer carries out the implications +of Kant)—is really the condition or mode of +being which reason assumes, or rises up to, in order to +be a practical or moral being. Far from the body and +the sensible needs being a stumbling-block to hamper +the free fullness of rationality and morality, the truth +rather is that it is only by body and sense, by flesh +and blood, that the full moral and rational life can be +realised<note place='foot'>Cf. Hegel's <hi rend='italic'>Werke</hi>, vii. 2, p. 236 (Lecture-note on § 410). <q>We +must treat as utterly empty the fancy of those who suppose that +properly man should have no organic body,</q> &c.; and see p. <ref target='Pg159'>159</ref> of +the present work.</note>. Or, to put it otherwise, if human reason +(intelligence and will) is to be more than a mere and +empty inner possibility, if man is to be a real and +concrete cognitive and volitional being, he must be +a member of an ethical and actual society, which lives +by bread, and which marries and has children. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(iii.) Psychology in Ethics.</head> + +<p> +In this way, for Fichte, and through Fichte still +more decidedly for Hegel, both psychology and ethics +<pb n='cxvii'/><anchor id='Pgcxvii'/> +breathe an opener and ampler air than they often +enjoy. Psychology ceases to be a mere description +of psychic events, and becomes the history of the self-organising +process of human reason. Ethics loses its +cloistered, negative, unnatural aspect, and becomes +a name for some further conditions of the same +development, essentially postulated to complete or +supplement its shortcomings. Psychology—taken in +this high philosophical acceptation—thus leads on to +Ethics; and Ethics is parted by no impassable line +from Psychology. That, at least, is what must happen +if they are still to retain a place in philosophy: for, +as Kant says<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Criticism of Pure Reason</hi>, Architectonic.</note>, <q>under the government of reason our +cognitions cannot form a rhapsody, but must constitute +a system, in which alone can they support and further +its essential aims.</q> As parts of such a system, they +carry out their special work in subordination to, and +in the realisation of, a single Idea—and therefore in +essential interconnexion. From that interconnecting +band we may however in detail-enquiry dispense ourselves; +and then we have the empirical or inductive +sciences of psychology and ethics. But even with +these, the necessity of the situation is such that it is +only a question of degree how far we lose sight of +the philosophical horizon, and entrench ourselves in +special enquiry. Something of the philosophic largeness +must always guide us; even when, to further the +interests of the whole, it is necessary for the special +enquirer to bury himself entirely in his part. So long +as each part is sincerely and thoroughly pursued, and +no part is neglected, there is an indwelling reason in +the parts which will in the long run tend to constitute +the total. +</p> + +<p> +A philosophical psychology will show us how the +<pb n='cxviii'/><anchor id='Pgcxviii'/> +sane intelligence and the rational will are, at least +approximately, built up out of elements, and through +stages and processes, which modify and complement, +as they may also arrest and perplex, each other. The +unity, coherence, and completeness of the intelligent +self is not, as vulgar irreflectiveness supposes and +somewhat angrily maintains, a full-grown thing or +agent, of whose actions and modes of behaviour the +psychologist has to narrate the history,—a history +which is too apt to degenerate into the anecdotal and +the merely interesting. This unity of self has to be +<q>deduced,</q> as Fichte would say: it has to be shown +as the necessary result which certain elements in a +certain order will lead to<note place='foot'>Spencer, <hi rend='italic'>Psychology</hi>, i. 291: <q>Mind can be understood only by +observing how mind is evolved.</q></note>. A normal mind, self-possessed, +developed and articulated, yet thoroughly +one, a real microcosm, or true and full monad, which +under the mode of its individuality still represents the +universe: that is, what psychology has to show as the +product of factors and processes. And it is clearly +something great and good, something valuable, and +already possessing, by implication we may say, an +ethical character. +</p> + +<p> +In philosophy, at least, it is difficult, or rather impossible +to draw a hard and fast line which shall demarcate +ethical from non-ethical characters,—to separate them +from other intellectual and reasonable motives. Kant, +as we know, attempted to do so: but with the result +that he was forced to add a doubt whether a purely +moral act could ever be said to exist<note place='foot'>Cf. Spencer, <hi rend='italic'>Principles of Ethics</hi>, i. 339: <q>The ethical sentiment +proper is, in the great mass of cases, scarcely discernible.</q></note>; or rather to +express the certainty that if it did it was for ever +inaccessible to observation. All such designations of +<pb n='cxix'/><anchor id='Pgcxix'/> +the several <q>factors</q> or <q>moments</q> in reality, as has +been hinted, are only <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a potiori</foreign>. But they are misused +when it is supposed that they connote abrupt and total +discontinuity. And Kant, after all, only repeated in +his own terminology an old and inveterate habit of +thought:—the habit which in Stoicism seemed to see +sage and foolish utterly separated, and which in the +straiter sects of Christendom fenced off saint absolutely +from sinner. It is a habit to which Hegel, and even his +immediate predecessors, are radically opposed. With +Herder, he might say, <q>Ethics is only a higher physics +of the mind<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel</hi>, p. 143.</note>.</q> This—the truth in Spinozism—no doubt +demands some emphasis on the word <q>higher</q>: and it +requires us to read ethics (or something like it) into +physics; but it is a step on the right road,—the step +which Utilitarianism and Evolutionism had (however +awkwardly) got their foot upon, and which <q>transcendent</q> +ethics seems unduly afraid of committing itself to. +Let us say, if we like, that the mind is more than mere +nature, and that it is no proper object of a merely +natural science. But let us remember that a merely +natural science is only a fragment of science: let us +add that the <emph>merely</emph> natural is an abstraction which in +part denaturalises and mutilates the larger nature—a +nature which includes the natural mind, and cannot +altogether exclude the ethical. +</p> + +<p> +What have been called <q>formal duties<note place='foot'>Windelband (W.), <hi rend='italic'>Präludien</hi> (1884), p. 288.</note></q> seem to +fall under this range—the province of a philosophical +psychology which unveils the conditions of personality. +Under that heading may be put self-control, consistency, +resolution, energy, forethought, prudence, and the like. +The due proportion of faculty, the correspondence of +head and heart, the vivacity and quickness of sympathy, +<pb n='cxx'/><anchor id='Pgcxx'/> +the ease and simplicity of mental tone, the due vigour +of memory and the grace of imagination, sweetness of +temper, and the like, are parts of the same group<note place='foot'>Cf. Plato, <hi rend='italic'>Republic</hi>, p. 486.</note>. +They are lovely, and of good report: they are praise +and virtue. If it be urged that they are only natural +gifts and graces, that objection cuts two ways. The +objector may of course be reminded that religion tones +down the self-complacency of morality. Yet, first, even +apart from that, it may be said that of virtues, which +stand independent of natural conditions—of external +supply of means (as Aristotle would say)—nothing can +be known and nothing need be said. And secondly, +none of these qualities are mere gifts;—all require +exercise, habituation, energising, to get and keep them. +How much and how little in each case is nature's and +how much ours is a problem which has some personal +interest—due perhaps to a rather selfish and envious +curiosity. But on the broad field of experience and +history we may perhaps accept the—apparently one-sided—proverb +that <q>Each man is the architect of his +own fortune.</q> Be this as it may, it will not do to +deny the ethical character of these <q>formal duties</q> on +the ground e.g. that self-control, prudence, and even +sweetness of temper may be used for evil ends,—that +one may smile and smile, and yet be a villain. That—let +us reply,—on one hand, is a fault (if fault it be) +incidental to all virtues in detail (for every single quality +has its defect): nay it may be a limitation attaching to +the whole ethical sphere: and, secondly, its inevitable +limitation does not render the virtue in any case one +whit less genuine so far as it goes. And yet of such +virtues it may be said, as Hume<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Human Nature: Morals</hi>, Part III.</note> would say (who calls +them <q>natural,</q> as opposed to the more artificial merits +<pb n='cxxi'/><anchor id='Pgcxxi'/> +of justice and its kin), that they please in themselves, or +in the mere contemplation, and without any regard to +their social effects. But they please as entering into +our idea of complete human nature, of mind and spirit +as will and intellect. +</p> + +<p> +The moralists of last century sometimes divided the +field of ethics by assigning to man three grades or kinds +of duty: duties to himself, duties to society, and duties +to God. For the distinction there is a good deal to be +said: there are also faults to be found with it. It may +be said, amongst other things, that to speak of duties to +self is a metaphorical way of talking, and that God lies +out of the range of human duty altogether, except in so +far as religious service forms a part of social obligation. +It may be urged that man is essentially a social being, +and that it is only in his relations to other such beings +that his morality can find a sphere. The sphere of +morality, according to Dr. Bain, embraces whatever +<q>society has seen fit to enforce with all the rigour of +positive inflictions. Positive good deeds and self-sacrifice +... transcend the region of morality proper +and occupy a sphere of their own<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Emotion and Will</hi>, ch. xv. § 23.</note>.</q> And there is little +doubt that this restriction is in accordance with a main +current of usage. It may even be said that there are +tendencies towards a narrower usage still, which would +restrict the term to questions affecting the relations of +the sexes. But, without going so far, we may accept +the standpoint which finds in the phrase <q>popular or +social</q> sanction, as equivalent to the moral sanction, a +description of the average level of common opinion on +the topic. The morality of an age or country thus denotes, +first, the average requirement in act and behaviour +imposed by general consent on the members of a community, +and secondly, the average performance of the +<pb n='cxxii'/><anchor id='Pgcxxii'/> +members in response to these requirements. Generally +speaking the two will be pretty much the same. If the +society is in a state of equilibrium, there will be a +palpable agreement between what all severally expect +and what all severally perform. On the other hand, as +no society is ever in complete equilibrium, this harmony +will never be perfect and may often be widely departed +from. In what is called a single community, if it reach +a considerable bulk, there are (in other words) often a +number of minor societies, more or less thwarting and +modifying each other; and different observers, who +belong in the main to one or other of these subordinate +groups, may elicit from the facts before them a somewhat +different social code, and a different grade of +social observance. Still, with whatever diversity of +detail, the important feature of such social ethics is that +the stress is laid on the performance of certain acts, in +accordance with the organisation of society. So long +as the required compliance is given, public opinion is +satisfied, and morality has got its due. +</p> + +<p> +But in two directions this conception of morality needs +to be supplementing. There is, on one hand, what is +called duty to God. The phrase is not altogether appropriate: +for it follows too closely the analogy of social +requirement, and treats Deity as an additional and +social authority,—a lord paramount over merely human +sovereigns. But though there may be some use in the +analogy, to press the conception is seriously to narrow +the divine character and the scope of religion. As in +similar cases, we cannot change one term without altering +its correlative. And therefore to describe our relation +to God under the name of duty is to narrow and falsify +that relation. The word is no longer applicable in this +connexion without a strain, and where it exists it +indicates the survival of a conception of theocracy: +<pb n='cxxiii'/><anchor id='Pgcxxiii'/> +of God regarded as a glorification of the magistrate, as +king of kings and lord of lords. It is the social world—and +indeed we may say the outside of the social world—that +is the sphere of duties. Duty is still with these +reductions a great august name: but in literal strictness +it only rules over the medial sphere of life, the sphere +which lies between the individual as such and his +universal humanity<note place='foot'>It is characteristic of the Kantian doctrine to absolutise the +conception of Duty and make it express the essence of the whole +ethical idea.</note>. Beyond duty, lies the sphere +of conscience and of religion. And that is not the +mere insistence by the individual to have a voice and +a vote in determining the social order. It is the sense +that the social order, however omnipotent it may seem, +is limited and finite, and that man has in him a kindred +with the Eternal. +</p> + +<p> +It is not very satisfactory, either, as Aristotle and +others have pointed out, to speak of man's duties to +himself. The phrase is analogical, like the other. But +it has the merit, like that of duty to God, of reminding us +that the ordinary latitude occupied by morality is not +all that comes under the larger scope of ethics. The +<q>ethics of individual life</q> is a subject which Mr. Spencer +has touched upon: and by this title, he means that, +besides his general relationship to others, a human +being has to mind his own health, food, and amusement, +and has duties as husband and parent. But, after +all, these are not matters of peculiarly individual interest. +They rather refer to points which society at certain +epochs leaves to the common sense of the agent,—apparently +on an assumption that he is the person +chiefly interested. And these points—as the Greeks +taught long ago—are of fundamental importance: they +are the very bases of life. Yet the comparative neglect +<pb n='cxxiv'/><anchor id='Pgcxxiv'/> +in which so-called civilised societies<note place='foot'>Which are still, as the Socialist Fourier says, states of social +incoherence, specially favourable to falsehood.</note> hold the precepts +of wisdom in relation to bodily health and vigour, in +regard to marriage and progeny, serve to illustrate the +doctrine of the ancient Stoics that πάντα ὑπόληψις, or the +modern idealist utterance that the World is my idea. +More and more as civilisation succeeds in its disruption +of man from nature, it shows him governed not by bare +facts and isolated experiences, but by the systematic idea +under which all things are subsumed. He loses the +naïveté of the natural man, which takes each fact as +it came, all alike good: he becomes sentimental, and +artificial, sees things under a conventional point of +view, and would rather die than not be in the fashion. +And this tendency is apparently irresistible. Yet the +mistake lies in the one-sidedness of sentiment and convention. +Not the domination of the idea is evil; but +the domination of a partial and fragmentary idea: and +this is what constitutes the evil of artificiality. And +the correction must lie not in a return to nature, but in +the reconstruction of a wider and more comprehensive +idea: an idea which shall be the unity and system of all +nature; not a fantastic idealism, but an attempt to do +justice to the more realist as well as the idealist sides +of life. +</p> + +<p> +There is however another side of individualist ethics +which needs even more especial enforcement. It is the +formation of +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +<lg> +<l><q rend='pre'>The reason firm, the temperate will,</q></l> +<l><q rend='post'>Endurance, foresight, strength and skill:</q></l> +</lg> +</quote> + +<p> +the healthy mind in a healthy body. Ethics is only too +apt to suppose that will and intelligence are assumptions +which need no special justification. But the truth is that +they vary from individual to individual in degree and +<pb n='cxxv'/><anchor id='Pgcxxv'/> +structure. It is the business of ethical psychology to give +to these vague attributions the definiteness of a normal +standard: to show what proportions are required to justify +the proper title of reason and will—to show what reason +and will really are if they do what they are encouraged +or expected to do. It talks of the diseases of will and +personality: it must also set forth their educational +ideal. The first problem of Ethics, it may be said, is +the question of the will and its freedom. But to say +this is of course not to say that, unless freedom of will +be understood in some special sense, ethics becomes +impossible. If the moral law is the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ratio cognoscendi</foreign> +of freedom, then must our conception of morality and +of freedom hang together. And it will clearly be +indispensable to begin by some attempt to discover +in what sense man may be in the most general way +described as a moral agent—as an intelligent will, or +(more briefly, yet synonymously) as a will. <q>The soil +of law and morality,</q> says Hegel<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Rechtsphilosophie</hi>, § 4.</note>, <q>is the intelligent life: +and its more precise place and starting-point the will, +which is free, in the sense that freedom is its substance +and characteristic, and the system of law the realm of +freedom realised, the world of intelligence produced out +of itself as a second nature.</q> Such a freedom is a freedom +made and acquired, the work of the mind's self-realisation, +not to be taken as a given fact of consciousness +which must be believed<note place='foot'>Cf. Schelling, ii. 12: <q>There are no <emph>born</emph> sons of freedom.</q></note>. To have a will—in other +words, to have freedom, is the consummation—and +let us add, only the formal or ideal consummation—of +a process by which man raises himself out of his +absorption in sensation and impulse, establishes within +himself a mental realm, an organism of ideas, a self-consciousness, +and a self. +</p> + +<pb n='cxxvi'/><anchor id='Pgcxxvi'/> + +<p> +The vulgar apprehension of these things seems to +assume that we have by nature, or are born with, a +general faculty or set of general faculties, which we +subsequently fill up and embody by the aid of experience. +We possess—they seem to imply—so many +<q>forms</q> and <q>categories</q> latent in our minds ready to +hold and contain the raw materials supplied from without. +According to this view we have all a will and an +intelligence: the difference only is that some put more +into them, and some put less. But such a separation of +the general form from its contents is a piece of pure +mythology. It is perhaps true and safe to say that +the human being is of such a character that will and +intelligence are in the ordinary course inevitably +produced. But the forms which grow up are the more +and more definite and systematic organisation of a graded +experience, of series of ideas, working themselves up +again and again in representative and re-representative +degree, till they constitute a mental or inner world of +their own. The will is thus the title appropriate to the +final stage of a process, by which sensation and impulse +have polished and perfected themselves by union and +opposition, by differentiation and accompanying redintegration, +till they assume characters quite unsurmised in +their earliest aspects, and yet only the consolidation or +self-realisation of implications. Thus the mental faculties +are essentially acquired powers,—acquired not from +without, but by action which generates the faculties it +seems to imply. The process of mind is a process which +creates individual centres, raises them to completer independence;—which +produces an inner life more and +more self-centered and also more and more equal to +the universe which it has embodied. And will and +intelligence are an important stage in that process. +</p> + +<p> +Herbart (as was briefly hinted at in the first essay) +<pb n='cxxvii'/><anchor id='Pgcxxvii'/> +has analysed ethical appreciation (which may or may +not be accompanied by approbation) into five distinct +standard ideas. These are the ideas of inward liberty, +of perfection, of right, benevolence, and equity. Like +Hume, he regards the moral judgment as in its purity +a kind of aesthetic pronouncement on the agreement +or proportion of certain activities in relations to each +other. Two of these standard ideas,—that of inward +liberty and of perfection—seem to belong to the +sphere at present under review. They emerge as +conditions determining the normal development of +human nature to an intelligent and matured personality. +By inward freedom Herbart means the harmony between +the will and the intellect: what Aristotle has named +<q>practical truth or reality,</q> and what he describes in his +conception of wisdom or moral intelligence,—the power +of discerning the right path and of pursuing it with will +and temper: the unity, clear but indissoluble, of will +and discernment. By the idea of perfection Herbart +means the sense of proportion and of propriety which is +awakened by comparing a progress in development or +an increase in strength with its earlier stages of promise +and imperfection. The pleasure such perception affords +works in two ways: it is a satisfaction in achievement +past, and a stimulus to achievement yet to come. +</p> + +<p> +Such ideas of inward liberty and of growth in ability +or in performance govern (at least in part) our judgment +of the individual, and have an ethical significance. +Indeed, if the cardinal feature of the ethical sentiment +be the inwardness and independence of its approbation +and obligation, these ideas lie at the root of all true +morality. Inward harmony and inward progress, lucidity +of conscience and the resolution which knows no finality +of effort, are the very essence of moral life. Yet, if +ethics is to include in the first instance social relationships +<pb n='cxxviii'/><anchor id='Pgcxxviii'/> +and external utilities and sanctions, these conditions +of true life must rather be described as pre-ethical. +The truth seems to be that here we get to a range of +ethics which is far wider than what is ordinarily called +practice and conduct. At this stage logic, aesthetic, and +ethic, are yet one: the true, the good, and the beautiful +are still held in their fundamental unity. An ethics of +wide principle precedes its narrower social application; +and whereas in ordinary usage the social provinciality +is allowed to prevail, here the higher ethics emerge +clear and imperial above the limitations of local and +temporal duty. +</p> + +<p> +And though it is easy to step into exaggeration, it is +still well to emphasise this larger conception of ethics. +The moral principle of the <q>maximising of life,</q> as it +has been called<note place='foot'>Simmel (G.), <hi rend='italic'>Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft</hi>, i. 184.</note>, may be open to misconception (—so, +unfortunately are all moral principles when stated in +the effrontery of isolation): but it has its truth in the +conviction that all moral evil is marked by a tendency +to lower or lessen the total vitality. So too Friedrich +Nietzsche's maxim, <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Sei vornehm</foreign><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Jenseits von Gut und Böse</hi>, p. 225.</note>, ensue distinction, +and above all things be not common or vulgar (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>gemein</foreign>), +will easily lend itself to distortion. But it is good advice +for all that, even though it may be difficult to define +in a general formula wherein distinction consists, to +mark the boundary between self-respect and vanity or +obstinacy, or to say wherein lies the beauty and dignity +of human nature. Kant has laid it down as the principle +of duty to ask ourselves if in our act we are prepared to +universalise the maxim implied by our conduct. And +that this—which essentially bids us look at an act in the +whole of its relations and context—is a safeguard against +some forms of moral evil, is certain. But there is an +<pb n='cxxix'/><anchor id='Pgcxxix'/> +opposite—or rather an apparently opposite—principle +which bids us be individual, be true to our own +selves, and never allow ourselves to be dismayed from +our own unique responsibility. Perhaps the two +principles are not so far apart as they seem. In any +case true individuality is the last word and the first +word in ethics; though, it may be added, there is a good +deal to be said between the two termini. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(iv.) An Excursus on Greek Ethics.</head> + +<p> +It is in these regions that Greek ethics loves to linger; +on the duty of the individual to himself, to be perfectly +lucid and true, and to rise to ever higher heights of +achievement. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Ceteris paribus</foreign>, there is felt to be something +meritorious in superiority, something good:—even +were it that you are master, and another is slave. Thus +naïvely speaks Aristotle<note place='foot'>Aristot. <hi rend='italic'>Polit.</hi> i. 6.</note>. To a modern, set amid so +many conflicting ideals, perhaps, the immense possibilities +of yet further growth might suggest themselves with +overpowering force. To him the idea of perfection takes +the form of an idea of perfectibility: and sometimes it +smites down his conceit in what he has actually done, +and impresses a sense of humility in comparison with +what yet remains unaccomplished. An ancient Greek +apparently was little haunted by these vistas of possibilities +of progress through worlds beyond worlds. A +comparatively simple environment, a fixed and definite +mental horizon, had its plain and definite standards, or +at least seemed to have such. There were fewer cases +of the man, unattached or faintly attached to any +<pb n='cxxx'/><anchor id='Pgcxxx'/> +definite profession—moving about in worlds half realised—who +has grown so common in a more developed +civilisation. The ideals of the Greek were clearly +descried: each man had his definite function or work +to perform: and to do it better than the average, or than +he himself habitually had done, that was perfection, +excellence, virtue. For virtue to the Greek is essentially +ability and respectability: promise of excellent performance: +capacity to do better than others. Virtue is +praiseworthy or meritorious character and quality: it +is achievement at a higher rate, as set against one's past +and against others' average. +</p> + +<p> +The Greek moralists sometimes distinguish and +sometimes combine moral virtue and wisdom, ἀρετή and +φρόνησις: capacity to perform, and wisdom to guide +that capacity. To the ordinary Greek perhaps the +emphasis fell on the former, on the attainment of all +recognised good quality which became a man, all that +was beautiful and honourable, all that was appropriate, +glorious, and fame-giving; and that not for any special +reference to its utilitarian qualities. Useful, of course, +such qualities were: but that was not in question at the +time. In the more liberal commonwealths of ancient +Greece there was little or no anxious care to control +the education of its citizens, so as to get direct service, +overt contribution to the public good. A suspicious +Spartan legislation might claim to do that. But in the +free air of Athens all that was required was loyalty, +good-will—εὔνοια—to the common weal; it might be +even a sentiment of human kindliness, of fraternity of +spirit and purpose. Everything beyond and upon that +basis was left to free development. Let each carry out +to the full the development of his powers in the line +which national estimation points out. He is—nature +and history alike emphasise that fact beyond the reach +<pb n='cxxxi'/><anchor id='Pgcxxxi'/> +of doubt, for all except the outlaw and the casual +stranger—a member of a community, and as such has +a governing instinct and ideal which animates him. +But he is also a self-centered individual, with special +endowments of nature, in his own person and in the +material objects which are his. A purely individualist +or selfish use of them is not—to the normal Greek—even +dreamed of. He is too deeply rooted in the substance +of his community for that: or it is on the ground and +in the atmosphere of an assured community that his +individuality is to be made to flourish. Nature has +secured that his individuality shall rest securely in the +presupposition of his citizenship. It seems, therefore, +as if he were left free and independent in his personal +search for perfection, for distinction. His place is fixed +for him: <foreign rend='italic'>Spartam nactus es; hanc orna</foreign>: his duty is his +virtue. That duty, as Plato expresses it, is to do his +own deeds—and not meddle with others. Nature and +history have arranged that others, in other posts, shall +do theirs: that all severally shall energise their function. +The very word <q>duty</q> seems out of place; if, at +least, duty suggests external obligation, an order imposed +and a debt to be discharged. If there be a task-master +and a creditor, it is the inflexible order of nature +and history:—or, to be more accurate, of nature, the +indwelling and permanent reality of things. But the +obligation to follow nature is scarcely felt as a yoke of +constraint. A man's virtue is to perform his work and +to perform it well: to do what he is specially capable of +doing, and therefore specially charged to do. +</p> + +<p> +Nowhere has this character of Greek ethics received +more classical expression than in the Republic of Plato. +In the prelude to his subject—which is the nature of +Right and Morality—Plato has touched briefly on certain +popular and inadequate views. There is the view +<pb n='cxxxii'/><anchor id='Pgcxxxii'/> +that Right has its province in performance of certain +single and external acts—in business honesty and commercial +straightforwardness. There is the view that +it is rendering to each what is due to him; that it +consists in the proper reciprocity of services, in the +balance of social give and take. There is the critical +or hyper-critical view which, from seeing so much that +is called justice to be in harmony with the interest of +the predominant social order, bluntly identifies mere +force or strength as the ground of right. And there +are views which regard it as due to social conventions +and artifices, to the influence of education, to political +arrangements and the operation of irrational prejudices. +To all these views Plato objects: not because they are +false—for they are all in part, often in large part, true—but +because they are inadequate and do not go to the +root of the matter. The foundations of right lie, he +says, not in external act, but in the inner man: not in +convention, but in nature: not in relation to others, +but in the constitution of the soul itself. That ethical +idea—the idea of right—which seems most obviously +to have its centre outside the individual, to live and +grow only in the relations between individuals, Plato +selects in order to show the independent royalty of the +single human soul. The world, as Hume afterwards, +called justice artificial: Plato will prove it natural. +In a way he joins company with those who bid us drive +out the spectre of duty, of obligation coming upon the +soul from social authority, from traditional idea, from +religious sanctions. He preaches—or he is about to +preach—the autonomy of the will. +</p> + +<p> +The four cardinal virtues of Plato's list are the qualities +which go to make a healthy, normal, natural human +soul, fit for all activity, equipped with all arms for the +battle of life. They tell us what such a soul is, not +<pb n='cxxxiii'/><anchor id='Pgcxxxiii'/> +what it does. They are the qualities which unless +a soul has, and has them each perfect, yet all co-operant, +its mere outward and single acts have no +virtue or merit, but are only lucky accidents at the best. +On the other hand, if a man has these constitutive +qualities, he will act in the social world, and act well. +Plato has said scornful things of mere outward and +verbal truthfulness, and has set at the very lowest pitch +of degradation the <q>lie in the soul.</q> His <q>temperance</q> +or <q>self-restraint,</q> if it be far from breathing any suggestion +of self-suppression or self-assertion, is still farther +from any suspicion of asceticism, or war against the +flesh. It is the noble harmony of the ruling and the +ruled, which makes the latter a partner of the sovereign, +and takes from the dictates of the ruler any touch of +coercion. It is literally sanity of soul, integrity and +purity of spirit; it is what has been sometimes called +the beautiful soul—the indiscerptible unity of reason +and impulse. Plato's bravery, again, is fortitude and +consistency of soul, the full-blooded heart which is fixed +in reason, the zeal which is according to knowledge, +unflinching loyalty to the idea, the spirit which burns in +the martyrs to truth and humanity: yet withal with +gentleness and courtesy and noble urbanity in its +immediate train. And his truthfulness is that inner +lucidity which cannot be self-deceived, the spirit which +is a safeguard against fanaticism and hypocrisy, the +sunlike warmth of intelligence without which the heart +is a darkness full of unclean things. +</p> + +<p> +The full development and crowning grace of such +a manly nature Aristotle has tried to present in the +character of the Great-souled man—him whom Plato +has called the true king by divine right, or the autocrat +by the patent of nature. Like all such attempts to +delineate a type in the terms necessarily single and +<pb n='cxxxiv'/><anchor id='Pgcxxxiv'/> +successive of abstract analysis, it tends occasionally to +run into caricature, and to give partial aspects an absurd +prominency. Only the greatest of artists could cope +with such a task, though that artist may be found perhaps +classed among the historians. Yet it is possible +to form some conception of the ideal which Aristotle +would set before us. The Great-souled man <emph>is</emph> great, +and he dare not deny the witness of his spirit. He +is one who does not quail before the anger and seek the +applause of popular opinion: he holds his head as his +own, and as high as his undimmed self-consciousness +shows it is worth. There has been said to him by +the reason within him the word that Virgil erewhile +addressed to Dante: +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +<lg> +<l><q rend='pre'>Libero, dritto, e sano è il tuo arbitrio</q></l> +<l>E fallo fora non fare a suo cenno;</l> +<l><q rend='post'>Per ch' io te sopra te corono e mitrio.</q></l> +</lg> +</quote> + +<p> +He is his own Emperor and his own Pope. He is the +perfected man, in whom is no darkness, whose soul +is utter clearness, and complete harmony. Calm in self-possessed +majesty, he stands, if need be, <foreign rend='italic'>contra mundum</foreign>: +but rather, with the world beneath his feet. The chatter +of personality has no interest for him. Bent upon the +best, lesser competitions for distinction have no attraction +for him. To the vulgar he will seem cold, self-confined: +in his apartness and distinction they will see +the signs of a <q>prig.</q> His look will be that of one who +pities men—rather than loves them: and should he +speak ill of a foe, it is rather out of pride of heart and +unbroken spirit than because these things touch him. +Such an one, in many ways, was the Florentine poet +himself. +</p> + +<p> +If the Greek world in general thus conceived ἀρετή as the +full bloom of manly excellence (we all know how slightly—witness +the remarks in the Periclean oration—Greeks, +<pb n='cxxxv'/><anchor id='Pgcxxxv'/> +in their public and official utterances, rated womanliness), +the philosophers had a further point to emphasise. +That was what they variously called knowledge, prudence, +reason, insight, intelligence, wisdom, truth. +From Socrates to Aristotle, from Aristotle to the Stoics +and Epicureans, and from the Stoics to the Neo-Platonists, +this is the common theme: the supremacy +of knowledge, its central and essential relation to +virtue. They may differ—perhaps not so widely as +current prejudice would suppose—as to how this knowledge +is to be defined, what kind of knowledge it is, +how acquired and maintained, and so on. But in essentials +they are at one. None of them, of course, mean +that in order to right conduct nothing more is needed +than to learn and remember what is right, the precepts +and commandments of ordinary morality. Memory is +not knowledge, especially when it is out of mind. Even +an ancient philosopher was not wholly devoid of common +sense. They held—what they supposed was a +fact of observation and reflection—that all action was +prompted by feelings of the values of things, by a desire +of something good or pleasing to self, and aimed at +self-satisfaction and self-realisation, but that there was +great mistake in what thus afforded satisfaction. +People chose to act wrongly or erroneously, because +they were, first, mistaken about themselves and what +they wanted, and, secondly, mistaken in the means +which would give them satisfaction. But this second +point was secondary. The main thing was to know +yourself, what you really were; in Plato's words, to +<q>see the soul as it is, and know whether it have one +form only or many, or what its nature is; to look upon +it with the eye of reason in its original purity.</q> Self-deception, +confusion, that worst ignorance which is +unaware of itself, false estimation—these are the radical +<pb n='cxxxvi'/><anchor id='Pgcxxxvi'/> +evils of the natural man. To these critics the testimony +of consciousness was worthless, unless corroborated. +To cure this mental confusion, this blindness of will +and judgment, is the task set for philosophy: to give +inward light, to teach true self-measurement. In one +passage, much misunderstood, Plato has called this +philosophic art the due measurement of pleasures and +pains. It should scarcely have been possible to mistake +the meaning. But, with the catchwords of Utilitarianism +ringing in their ears, the commentators ran straight +contrary to the true teaching of the <hi rend='italic'>Protagoras</hi>, consentient +as it is with that of the <hi rend='italic'>Phaedo</hi> and the +<hi rend='italic'>Philebus</hi>. To measure, one must have a standard: and +if Plato has one lesson always for us, it is that a sure +standard the multitude have not, but only confusion. +The so-called pleasures and pains of the world's experiences +are so entitled for different reasons, for contrary +aims, and with no unity or harmony of judgment. They +are—not a fact to be accepted, but—a problem for +investigation: their reality is in question, their genuineness, +solidity and purity: and till you have settled that, +you cannot measure, for you may be measuring vacuity +under the idea that there is substance. You have still +to get at the unit—i.e. the reality of pleasure. It was +not Plato's view that pleasure was a separate and independent +entity: that it was exactly as it was felt. Each +pleasure is dependent for its pleasurable quality on the +consciousness it belongs to, and has only a relative +truth and reality. Bentham has written about computing +the value of a <q>lot</q> of pleasures and pains. But +Plato had his mind on an earlier and more fundamental +problem, what is the truth and reality of pleasure; and +his fullest but not his only essay towards determining +the value or estimating the meaning of pleasure in the +scale of being is that given in the <hi rend='italic'>Philebus</hi>. +</p> + +<pb n='cxxxvii'/><anchor id='Pgcxxxvii'/> + +<p> +This then is the knowledge which Greek philosophy +meant: not mere intellect—though, of course, there is +always a danger of theoretical inquiry degenerating into +abstract and formal dogma. But of the meaning there +can be no serious doubt. It is a knowledge, says Plato, +to which the method of mathematical science—the most +perfect he can find acknowledged—is only an <foreign rend='italic'>ouverture</foreign>, +or perhaps, only the preliminary tuning of the strings. +It is a knowledge not eternally hypothetical—a system +of sequences which have no sure foundation. It is +a knowledge which rests upon the conviction and belief +of the <q>idea of good</q>: a kind of knowledge which does +not come by direct teaching, which is not mere theory, +but implies a lively conviction, a personal apprehension, +a crisis which is a kind of <q>conversion,</q> or <q>inspiration.</q> +It is as it were the prize of a great contest, in which the +sword that conquers is the sword of dialectic: a sword +whereof the property is, like that of Ithuriel's spear, to +lay bare all deceptions and illusions of life. Or, to vary +the metaphor: the son of man is like the prince in the +fairy tale who goes forth to win the true queen; but +there are many false pretenders decked out to deceive +his unwary eyes and foolish heart. Yet in himself +there is a power of discernment: there is something +kindred with the truth:—the witness of the Spirit—and +all that education and discipline can do is to remove +obstacles, especially the obstacles within the self which +perturb the sight and mislead the judgment. Were not +the soul originally possessed of and dominated by the +idea of good, it could never discern it elsewhere. On +this original kindred depends all the process of education; +the influence of which therefore is primarily +negative or auxiliary. Thus the process of history and +experience,—which the work of education only reproduces +in an accelerated <foreign rend='italic'>tempo</foreign>—serves but to bring out +<pb n='cxxxviii'/><anchor id='Pgcxxxviii'/> +the implicit reason within into explicit conformity with +the rationality of the world. +</p> + +<p> +Knowledge, then, in this ethical sphere means the +harmony of will, emotion, intellect: it means the clear +light which has no illusions and no deceptions. And +to those who feel that much of their life and of the +common life is founded on prejudice and illusion, such +white light will occasionally seem hard and steely. At +its approach they fear the loss of the charm of that +twilight hour ere the day has yet begun, or before the +darkness has fully settled down. Thus the heart and +feelings look upon the intellect as an enemy of sentiment. +And Plato himself is not without anticipations of such +an issue. Yet perhaps we may add that the danger is +in part an imaginary one, and only arises because +intelligence takes its task too lightly, and encroaches +beyond its proper ground. Philosophy, in other words, +mistakes its place when it sets itself up as a dogmatic +system of life. Its function is to comprehend, and from +comprehension to criticise, and through criticising to +unify. It has no positive and additional teaching of its +own: no addition to the burden of life and experience. +And experience it must respect. Its work is to maintain +the organic or super-organic interconnexion between +all the spheres of life and all the forms of reality. It +has to prevent stagnation and absorption of departments—to +keep each in its proper place, but not more than +its place, and yet to show how each is not independent +of the others. And this is what the philosopher or +ancient sage would be. If he is passionless, it is not +that he has no passions, but that they no longer perturb +and mislead. If his controlling spirit be reason, it is +not the reason of the so-called <q>rationalist,</q> but the +reason which seeks in patience to comprehend, and to +be at home in, a world it at first finds strange. And if +<pb n='cxxxix'/><anchor id='Pgcxxxix'/> +he is critical of others, he is still more critical of +himself: critical however not for criticism's sake +(which is but a poor thing), but because through +criticism the faith of reason may be more fully justified. +To the last, if he is true to his mission and +faithful to his loyalty to reality, he will have the +simplicity of the child. +</p> + +<p> +Whether therefore we agree or not with Plato's +reduction of Right and Duty to self-actualisation, we +may at least admit that in the idea of perfection or +excellence, combined with the idea of knowledge or +inward lucidity, he has got the fundamental ideas on +which further ethical development must build. Self-control, +self-knowledge, internal harmony, are good: +and so are the development of our several faculties and +of the totality of them to the fullest pitch of excellence. +But their value does not lie entirely in themselves, or +rather there is implicit in them a reference to something +beyond themselves. They take for granted something +which, because it is so taken, may also be ignored and +neglected, just because it seems so obvious. And that +implication is the social humanity in which they are the +spirits of light and leading. +</p> + +<p> +To lay the stress on ἀρετή or excellence tends to +leave out of sight the force of duty; and to emphasise +knowledge is allowed to disparage the heart and feelings. +The mind—even of a philosopher—finds a difficulty in +holding very different points of view in one, and where +it is forced from one to another, tends to forget the +earlier altogether. Thus when the ethical philosopher, +presupposing as an absolute or unquestionable fact that +man the individual was rooted in the community, +proceeded to discuss the problem of the best and completest +individual estate, he was easily led to lose sight +of the fundamental and governing condition altogether. +<pb n='cxl'/><anchor id='Pgcxl'/> +From the moment that Aristotle lays down the thesis +that man is naturally social, to the moment when he +asks how the bare ideal of excellence in character and +life can become an actuality, the community in which +man lives has retired out of sight away into the background. +And it only comes in, as it first appears, as +the paedagogue to bring us to morality. And Plato, +though professedly he is speaking of the community, +and is well aware that the individual can only be saved +by the salvation of the community, is constantly falling +back into another problem—the development of an +individual soul. He feels the strength of the egoistic +effort after perfection, and his essay in the end tends to +lose sight altogether of its second theme. Instead of +a man he gives us a mere philosopher, a man, that is, not +living with his country's life, instinct with the heart and +feeling of humanity, inspired by art and religion, but +a being set apart and exalted above his fellows,—charged +no doubt in theory with the duty of saving +them, of acting vicariously as the mediator between +them and the absolute truth—but really tending more +and more to seclude himself on the <foreign rend='italic'>edita templa</foreign> of the +world, on the high-towers of speculation. +</p> + +<p> +And what Plato and Aristotle did, so to speak, +against their express purpose and effort, yet did, +because the force of contemporary tendency was +irresistible—that the Stoa and Epicurus did more +openly and professedly. With a difference in theory, +it is true, owing to the difference in the surroundings. +Virtue in the older day of the free and glorious commonwealth +had meant physical and intellectual achievement, +acts done in the public eye, and of course for the public +good—a good with which the agent was identified at +least in heart and soul, if not in his explicit consciousness. +In later and worse days, when the political +<pb n='cxli'/><anchor id='Pgcxli'/> +world, with the world divine, had withdrawn from +actual identity with the central heart of the individual, +and stood over-against him as a strange power and little +better than a nuisance, virtue came to be counted as +endurance, indifference, negative independence against +a cold and a perplexing world. But even still, virtue is +excellence: it is to rise above the ignoble level: to assert +self-liberty against accident and circumstance—to attain +self-controlled, self-satisfying independence—and to +become God-like in its seclusion. Yet in two directions +even it had to acknowledge something beyond the +individual. The Epicurean—following out a suggestion +of Aristotle—recognised the help which the free society +of friends gave to the full development of the single +seeker after a self-satisfying and complete life. The +Stoic, not altogether refusing such help, tended rather +to rest his single self on a fellowship of ideal sort, on +the great city of gods and men, the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>civitas Dei</foreign>. Thus, +in separate halves, the two schools, into which Greek +ethics was divided, gave expression to the sense that +a new and higher community was needed—to the sense +that the visible actual community no longer realised its +latent idea. The Stoic emphasised the all-embracing +necessity, the absolute comprehensiveness of the moral +kingdom. The Epicurean saw more clearly that, if the +everlasting city came from heaven, it could only visibly +arise by initiation upon the earth. Christianity—in its +best work—was a conjunction of the liberty with +the necessity, of the human with the divine. +</p> + +<p> +More interesting, perhaps, it is to note the misconception +of reason and knowledge which grew up. +Knowledge came more and more to be identified with +the reflective and critical consciousness, which is outside +reality and life, and judges it from a standpoint of its +own. It came to be esteemed only in its formal and +<pb n='cxlii'/><anchor id='Pgcxlii'/> +abstract shape, and at the expense of the heart and +feelings. The antithesis of philosophy (or knowledge +strictly so called) according to Plato was mere opinion, +accidental and imperfect knowledge. The knowledge +which is truly valuable is a knowledge which presupposes +the full reality of life, and is the more and +more completely articulated theory of it as a whole. It +is—abstractly taken—a mere form of unity which has +no value except in uniting: it is—taken concretely—the +matter, we may say, in complete unity. It is ideal and +perfect harmony of thought, appetite, and emotion: or +putting it otherwise, the philosopher is one who is not +merely a creature of appetite and production, not merely +a creature of feeling and practical energy, but a creature, +who to both of these superadds an intelligence which +sets eyes in the blind forehead of these other powers, +and thus, far from superseding them altogether, only +raises them into completeness, and realises all that is +worthy in their implicit natures. Always these two +impulsive tendencies of our nature are guided by some +sort of ideas and intelligence, by beliefs and opinions. +But they, like their guides, are sporadically emergent, +unconnected, and therefore apt to be contradictory. It +is to such erratic and occasional ideas, half-truths and +deceptions, that philosophy is opposed. Unfortunately +for all parties, the antithesis is carried farther. Philosophy +and the philosopher are further set in opposition +to the faith of the heart, the intimacy and intensity of +feeling, the depth of love and trust, which in practice +often go along with imperfect ideas. The philosopher +is made one who has emancipated himself from the heart +and feelings,—a pure intelligence, who is set above all +creeds, contemplating all, and holding none. Consistency +and clearness become his idol, to be worshipped +at any cost, save one sacrifice: and that one sacrifice is +<pb n='cxliii'/><anchor id='Pgcxliii'/> +the sacrifice of his own self-conceit. For consistency +generally means that all is made to harmonise with +one assumed standpoint, and that whatever presents +discrepancies with this alleged standard is ruthlessly +thrown away. Such a philosophy mistakes its function, +which is not, as Heine scoffs, to make an intelligible +system by rejecting the discordant fragments of life, but +to follow reverently, if slowly, in the wake of experience. +Such a <q>perfect sage,</q> with his parade of reasonableness, +may often assume the post of a dictator. +</p> + +<p> +And, above all, intelligence is only half itself when it +is not also will. And both are more than mere consciousness. +Plato—whom we refer to, because he is +the coryphaeus of all the diverse host of Greek philosophy—seems +to overestimate or rather to misconceive +the place of knowledge. That it is the supreme and +crowning grace of the soul, he sees. But he tends to +identify it with the supreme or higher soul:—as Aristotle +did after him, to be followed by the Stoics and +Neo-Platonists. For them the supreme, or almost +supreme reality is the intelligence or reason: the soul +is only on a second grade of reality, on the borders of +the natural or physical world. When Plato takes that +line, he turns towards the path of asceticism, and treats +the philosophic life as a preparation for that truer life +when intelligence shall be all in all, for that better land +where <q>divine dialogues</q> shall form the staple and substance +of spiritual existence. Aristotle,—who less often +treads these solitudes,—still extols the theoretic life, +when the body and its needs trouble no more, when the +activity of reason—the theory of theory—is attained at +least as entirely as mortal conditions allow man to be +deified. Of the <q>apathy</q> and the reasonable conformity +of the Stoics, or of the purely negative character of +Epicurean happiness (the excision of all that pained) +<pb n='cxliv'/><anchor id='Pgcxliv'/> +we need not here speak. And in Plotinus and Proclus +the deification of mere reason is at any rate the dominant +note; whatever protests the larger Greek nature +in the former may from time to time offer. The truth +which philosophy should have taught was that Mind +or intelligence was the element where the inner life +culminated and expanded and flourished: the error +which it often tended to spread was that intelligence +was the higher life of which all other was a degenerate +shortcoming, and something valuable on its own +account. +</p> + +<p> +It may be that thus to interpret Plato is to do him an +injustice. It has been sometimes said that his division +of parts or kinds of soul—or his distinction between its +fighting horses—tends to destroy the unity of mental life. +But perhaps this was exactly what he wanted to convey. +There are—we may paraphrase his meaning—three +kinds of human being, three types of human life. +There is the man or the life of appetite and the flesh: +there is the man of noble emotion and energetic depth +of soul: there is the life of reasonable pursuits and +organised principle. Or, we may take his meaning to +be that there are three elements or provinces of mental +life, which in all except a few are but imperfectly +coherent and do not reach a true or complete unity. +Some unity there always is: but in the life of mere +appetite and impulse, even when these impulses are +our nobler sentiments of love and hatred, the unity falls +very far short. Or, as he puts the theme elsewhere, +the soul has a passion for self-completion, a love of +beauty, which in most is but a misleading lust. It is +the business of the philosophic life to re-create or to +foster this unity: or philosophy is the persistent search +of the soul for its lost unity, the search to see that unity +which is always its animating principle, its inner faith. +<pb n='cxlv'/><anchor id='Pgcxlv'/> +When the soul has reached this ideal—if it can be supposed +to attain it (and of this the strong-souled ancient +philosophers feel no doubt),—then a change must take +place. The love of beauty is not suppressed; it is only +made self-assured and its object freed from all imperfection. +It is not that passion has ceased; but its +nature is so transfigured, that it seems worthy of a +nobler name, which yet we cannot give. To such a life, +where battle and conflict are as such unknown, we +cannot longer give the title of life: and we say that +philosophy is in life a rehearsal of death<note place='foot'>Plato, <hi rend='italic'>Phaedo</hi>.</note>. And yet if +there be no battle, there is not for that reason mere +inaction. Hence, as the Republic concludes, the true +philosopher is the complete man. He is the truth and +reality which the appetitive and emotional man were +seeking after and failed to realise. It is true they at +first will not see this. But the whole long process of +philosophy is the means to induce this conviction. And +for Plato it remains clear that through experience, +through wisdom, and through abstract deduction, the +philosopher will justify his claim to him who hath ears +to hear and heart to understand. If that be so, the +asceticism of Plato is not a mere war upon flesh and +sense as such, but upon flesh and sense as imperfect +truth, fragmentary reality, which suppose themselves +complete, though they are again and again confuted by +experience, by wisdom, and by mere calculation,—a war +against their blindness and shortsightedness. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='cxlvi'/><anchor id='Pgcxlvi'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Essay IV. Psycho-Genesis.</head> + +<p> +<q>The key,</q> says Carus, <q>for the ascertainment of the +nature of the conscious psychical life lies in the region +of the unconscious<note place='foot'>Carus, <hi rend='italic'>Psyche</hi>, p. 1.</note>.</q> The view which these words take +is at least as old as the days of Leibniz. It means that +the mental world does not abruptly emerge a full-grown +intelligence, but has a genesis, and follows a law of +development: that its life may be described as the +differentiation (with integration) of a simple or indifferentiated +mass. The terms conscious and unconscious, +indeed, with their lax popular uses, leave the door wide +open for misconception. But they may serve to mark +that the mind is to be understood only in a certain +relation (partly of antithesis) to nature, and the soul +only in reference to the body. The so-called <q>superior +faculties</q>—specially characteristic of humanity—are +founded upon, and do not abruptly supersede, the +lower powers which are supposed to be specially +obvious in the animals<note place='foot'>See Arist., <hi rend='italic'>Anal. Post.</hi> ii. 19 (ed. Berl. 100, a. 10).</note>. The individual and specific +phenomena of consciousness, which the psychologist is +generally supposed to study, rest upon a deeper, less +explicated, more indefinite, life of sensibility, which in +its turn fades away by immeasurable gradations into +something irresponsive to the ordinary tests for sensation +and life. +</p> + +<pb n='cxlvii'/><anchor id='Pgcxlvii'/> + +<p> +And yet the moment we attempt to leave the daylight +of consciousness for the darker sides of sub-conscious +life, the risks of misinterpretation multiply. The problem +is to some extent the same as confronts the student +of the ideas and principles of primitive races. There, +the temptation of seeing things through the <q>spectacles +of civilisation</q> is almost irresistible. So in psychology +we are apt to import into the life of sensation and +feeling the distinctions and relations of subsequent +intellection. Nor is the difficulty lessened by Hegel's +method which deals with soul, sentiency, and consciousness +as grades or general characteristics in a developmental +advance. He borrows his illustrations from +many quarters, from morbid and anomalous states of +consciousness,—less from the cases of savages, children +and animals. These illustrations may be called a loose +induction. But it requires a much more powerful +instrument than mere induction to build up a scientific +system; a framework of general principle or theory is +the only basis on which to build theory by the allegation +of facts, however numerous. Yet in philosophic science, +which is systematised knowledge, all facts strictly so +described will find their place and be estimated at their +proper value. +</p> + +<div> +<head>(i.) Primitive Sensibility.</head> + +<p> +Psychology (with Hegel) takes up the work of science +from biology. The mind comes before it as the supreme +product of the natural world, the finest flower of organic +life, the <q>truth</q> of the physical process. As such it is +called by the time-honoured name of Soul. If we +further go on to say that the soul is the principle of life, +<pb n='cxlviii'/><anchor id='Pgcxlviii'/> +we must not understand this vital principle to be something +over and above the life of which it is the principle. +Such a locally-separable principle is an addition which +is due to the analogy of mechanical movement, where +a detached agent sets in motion and directs the +machinery. But in the organism the principle is not +thus detachable as a thing or agent. By calling Soul +the principle of life we rather mean that in the vital +organism, so far as it <emph>lives</emph>, all the real variety, separation, +and discontinuity of parts must be reduced to unity +and identity, or as Hegel would say, to <emph>ideality</emph>. To +live is thus to keep all differences fluid and permeable +in the fire of the life-process. Or to use a familiar term +of logic, the Soul is the concept or intelligible unity +of the organic body. But to call it a concept might +suggest that it is only the conception through which <emph>we</emph> +represent to ourselves the variety in unity of the organism. +The soul, however, is more than a mere concept: +and life is more than a mere mode of description for +a group of movements forming an objective unity. It +is a unity, subjective and objective. The organism is +one life, controlling difference: and it is also one by +our effort to comprehend it. The Soul therefore is +in Hegelian language described as the Idea rather than +the concept of the organic body. Life is the generic +title for this subject-object: but the life may be merely +physical, or it may be intellectual and practical, or it +may be absolute, i.e. will and know all that it is, and be +all that it knows and wills. +</p> + +<p> +Up to this point the world is what is called an +external, which is here taken to mean (not a world +external to the individual, but) a self-externalised world. +That is to say, it is the observer who has hitherto by +his interpretation of his perceptions supplied the <q>Spirit +in Nature.</q> In itself the external world has no inside, +<pb n='cxlix'/><anchor id='Pgcxlix'/> +no centre: it is we who read into it the conception of +a life-history. We are led to believe that a principle +of unity is always at work throughout the physical +world—even in the mathematical laws of natural operation. +It is only intelligible and credible to us as +a system, a continuous and regular development. But +that system is only a hypothetical idea, though it is held +to be a conclusion to which all the evidence seems +unequivocally to point. And, even in organic life, the +unity, though more perfect and palpable than in the +mechanical and inorganic world, is only a perception, +a vision,—a necessary mode of realising the unity of +the facts. The phenomenon of life reveals as in a picture +and an ocular demonstration the conformity of +inward and outward, the identity of whole and parts, +of power and utterance. But it is still outside the +observer. In the function of sensibility and sentiency, +however, we stand as it were on the border-line between +biology and psychology. At one step we have been +brought within the harmony, and are no longer mere +observers and reflecters. The sentient not merely is, +but is aware that it is. Hitherto as life, it only is the +unity in diversity, and diversity in unity, for the outsider, +i.e. only implicitly: now it is so for itself, or +consciously. And in the first stage it does not know, +but feels or is sentient. Here, for the first time, is +created the distinction of inward and outward. Loosely +indeed we may, like Mr. Spencer, speak of outward +and inward in physiology: but strictly speaking, what +Goethe says is true, <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Natur hat weder Kern noch Schaale</foreign><note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>The Logic of Hegel</hi>, notes &c., p. 421.</note>. +Nature in the narrower sense knows no distinction of +the inward and outward in its phenomena: it is a purely +superficial order and succession of appearance and +event. The Idea which has been visible to an intelligent +<pb n='cl'/><anchor id='Pgcl'/> +percipient in the types and laws of the natural +world, now <emph>is</emph>, actually is—is in and for itself—but +at first in a minimum of content, a mere point of light, +or rather the dawn which has yet to expand into the +full day. +</p> + +<p> +Spinoza has asserted that <q>all individual bodies are +animate, though in different degrees<note place='foot'><q>Omnia individua corpora quamvis diversis gradibus animata +sunt.</q> <hi rend='italic'>Eth.</hi> ii. 13. schol.</note>.</q> Now it is to +a great extent this diversity of degree on which the +main interest turns. Yet it is well to remember that +the abrupt and trenchant separations which popular +practice loves are overridden to a deeper view by an +essential unity of idea, reducing them to indifference. +If, that is, we take seriously the Spinozist unity of +Substance, and the continual correlation (to call it no +more) of extension and consciousness therein, we cannot +avoid the conclusion which even Bacon would +admit of something describable as attraction and perception, +something subduing diversity to unity. But +whether it be well to name this soul or life is a different +matter. It may indeed only be taken to mean that all +true being must be looked on as a real unity and individuality, +must, that is, be conceived as manifesting +itself in organisation, must be referred to a self-centred +and self-developing activity. But this—which is the +fundamental thesis of idealism—is hardly all that is +meant. Rather Spinoza would imply that all things +which form a real unity must have life—must have +inner principle and unifying reality: and what he +teaches is closely akin to the Leibnitian doctrine that +every substantial existence reposes upon a monad, +a unity which is at once both a force and a cognition, +a <q>representation</q> and an appetite or <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nisus</foreign> to act. +<pb n='cli'/><anchor id='Pgcli'/> +When Fechner in a series of works<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Nanna</hi> (1848): <hi rend='italic'>Zendavesta</hi> (1851): <hi rend='italic'>Ueber die Seelenfrage</hi> (1861).</note> expounds and +defends the hypothesis that plants and planets are not +destitute of soul, any more than man and animals, +he only gives a more pronounced expression to this +idealisation or spiritualisation of the natural world. +But for the moment the point to be noted is that all +of this idealistic doctrine is an inference, or a development +which finds its <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>point d'appui</foreign> in the fact of sensation. +And the problem of the Philosophy of Mind is +just to trace the process whereby a mere shock of +sensation has grown into a conception and a faith in the +goodness, beauty and intelligence of the world. +</p> + +<p> +Schopenhauer has put the point with his usual picturesqueness. +Outward nature presents nothing but a +play of forces. At first, however, this force shows +merely the mechanical phenomena of pressure and +impact, and its theory is sufficiently described by mathematical +physics. But in the process of nature force +assumes higher types, types where it loses a certain +amount of its externality<note place='foot'>Described by S. as the rise from mere physical <emph>cause</emph> to physiological +<emph>stimulus</emph> (Reiz), to psychical <emph>motive</emph>.</note>, till in the organic world it +acquires a peculiar phase which Schopenhauer calls +<emph>Will</emph>, meaning by that, however, an organising and controlling +power, a tendency or <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nisus</foreign> to be and live, which +is persistent and potent, but without consciousness. +This blind force, which however has a certain coherence +and purposiveness, is in the animal organism +endowed with a new character, in consequence of the +emergence of a new organ. This organ, the brain and +nervous system, causes the evolution into clear day of +an element which has been growing more and more +urgent. The gathering tendency of force to return +into itself is now complete: the cycle of operation is +<pb n='clii'/><anchor id='Pgclii'/> +formed: and the junction of the two currents issues +in the spark of sensation. The blind force now becomes +seeing. +</p> + +<p> +But at first—and this is the point we have to emphasise—its +powers of vision are limited. Sensibility is +either a local and restricted phenomenon: or, in so +far as it is not local, it is vague and indefinite, and +hardly entitled to the name of sensibility. Either it +is a dim, but far-reaching, sympathy with environing +existence, and in that case only so-called blind will or +feeling: or if it is clear, is locally confined, and at +first within very narrow limits. Neither of these points +must be lost sight of. On the one hand feeling has +to be regarded as the dull and confused stirring of an +almost infinite sympathy with the world—a pulse which +has come from the far-distant movements of the universe, +and bears with it, if but as a possibility, the +wealth of an infinite message. On the other hand, +feeling at first only becomes real, in this boundless +ideality to which its possibilities extend, by restricting +itself to one little point and from several points organising +itself to a unity of bodily feeling, till it can go on +from thence to embrace the universe in distinct and +articulate comprehension. +</p> + +<p> +Soul, says Hegel, is not a separate and additional +something over and above the rest of nature: it is +rather nature's <q>'universal immaterialism, and simple +ideal life<note place='foot'>Infra, p. <ref target='Pg012'>12</ref>.</note>.</q> There were ancient philosophers who spoke +of the soul as a self-adjusting number,—as a harmony, +or equilibrium<note place='foot'>Aristot., <hi rend='italic'>De Anima</hi>, i. c. 4, 5.</note>—and the moderns have added considerably +to the list of these analogical definitions. +As definitions they obviously fall short. Yet these +things give, as it were, by anticipation, an image of +soul, as the <q>ideality,</q> which reduces the manifold to +<pb n='cliii'/><anchor id='Pgcliii'/> +unity. The adhesions and cohesions of matter, its +gravitating attractions, its chemical affinities and electrical +polarities, the intricate out-and-in of organic structure, +are all preludes to the true incorporating unity +which is the ever-immanent supersession of the endless +self-externalism and successionalism of physical reality. +But in sentiency, feeling, or sensibility, the unity which +all of these imply without reaching, is explicitly present. +It is implicitly an all-embracing unity: an infinite,—which +has no doors and no windows, for the good +reason that it needs none, because it has nothing outside +it, because it <q>expresses</q> and <q>envelopes</q> (however +confusedly at first) the whole universe. Thus, +even if, with localising phraseology, we may describe +mind, where it <emph>appears</emph> emerging in the natural world, +as a mere feeble and incidental outburst,—a rebellion +breaking out as in some petty province or isolated region +against the great law of the physical realm—we are in +so speaking taking only an external standpoint. But +with the rise of mind in nature the bond of externalism +is implicitly overcome. To it, and where it really is, +there is nothing outside, nothing transcendent. Everything +which is said to be outside mind is only outside +a localised and limited mind—outside a mind which is +imperfectly and abstractly realised—not outside mind +absolutely. Mind is the absolute negation of externality: +not a mere relative negative, as the organism +may be biologically described as inner in respect of the +environment. To accomplish this negation in actuality, to +bring the multiplicity and externality of things into the +unity and identity of one Idea, is the process of development +of mind from animal sensibility to philosophic +knowledge, from appetite to art,—the process of culture +through the social state under the influence of religion. +</p> + +<p> +Sentiency or psychic matter (mind-stuff), to begin +<pb n='cliv'/><anchor id='Pgcliv'/> +with, is in some respects like the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>tabula rasa</foreign> of the +empiricists. It is the possibility—but the real possibility—of +intelligence rather than intelligence itself. It +is the monotonous undifferentiated inwardness—a faint +self-awareness and self-realisation of the material world, +but at first a mere vague <emph>psychical protoplasm</emph> and without +defined nucleus, without perceptible organisation or +separation of structures. If there is self-awareness, it +is not yet discriminated into a distinct and unified self, +not yet differentiated and integrated,—soul in the condition +of a mere <q>Is,</q> which, however, is nothing determinate. +It is very much in the situation of Condillac's +statue-man—<foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>une statue organisée intérieurement comme +nous, et animée d'un esprit privé de toute espèce d'idées</foreign>: +alike at least so far that the rigid uniformity of the +latter's envelope prevents all articulated organisation +of its faculties. The foundation under all the diversity +and individuality in the concrete intelligent and volitional +life is a common feeling,—a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>sensus communis</foreign>—a +general and indeterminate susceptibility to influence, +a sympathy responsive, but responsive vaguely +and equivocally, to all the stimuli of the physical environment. +There was once a time, according to primitive +legend, when man understood the language of +beast and bird, and even surprised the secret converse +of trees and flowers. Such fancies are but the exaggeration +of a solidarity of conscious life which seems to +spread far in the sub-conscious realm, and to narrow the +individual's soul into limited channels as it rises into +clear self-perception, +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +<lg> +<l><q rend='pre'>As thro' the frame that binds him in</q></l> +<l><q rend='post'>His isolation grows defined.</q></l> +</lg> +</quote> + +<p> +It may be a mere dream that, as Goethe feigns of +Makaria in his romance<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre</hi>, i. 10.</note>, there are men and women in +<pb n='clv'/><anchor id='Pgclv'/> +sympathy with the vicissitudes of the starry regions: +and hypotheses of lunar influence, or dogmas of astrological +destiny, may count to the present guardians of +the sciences as visionary superstitions. Yet science in +these regions has no reason to be dogmatic; her function +hitherto can only be critical; and even for that, her +data are scanty and her principles extremely general. +The influences on the mental mood and faculty, produced +by climate and seasons, by local environment and +national type, by individual peculiarities, by the differences +of age and sex, and by the alternation of night +and day, of sleep and waking, are less questionable. +It is easy no doubt to ignore or forget them: easy to +remark how indefinable and incalculable they are. But +that does not lessen their radical and inevitable impress +in the determination of the whole character. <q>The +sum of our existence, divided by reason, never comes +out exact, but always leaves a marvellous remainder<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre</hi>, iv. 18.</note>.</q> +Irrational this residue is, in the sense that it is inexplicable, +and incommensurable with the well-known +quantities of conscious and voluntarily organised life. +But a scientific psychology, which is adequate to the +real and concrete mind, should never lose sight of the +fact that every one of its propositions in regard to the +more advanced phases of intellectual development is +thoroughly and in indefinable ways modified by these +preconditions. When that is remembered, it will be +obvious how complicated is the problem of adapting +psychology for the application to education, and how +dependent the solution of that problem is upon an +experiential familiarity with the data of individual and +national temperament and character. +</p> + +<p> +The first stage in mental development is the establishment +of regular and uniform relations between soul and +<pb n='clvi'/><anchor id='Pgclvi'/> +body: it is the differentiation of organs and the integration +of function: the balance between sensation and +movement, between the afferent and efferent processes +of sensitivity. Given a potential soul, the problem is to +make it actual in an individual body. It is the business +of a physical psychology to describe in detail the steps +by which the body we are attached to is made inward +as our idea through the several organs and their +nervous appurtenances: whereas a psychical physiology +would conversely explain the corresponding processes +for the expression of the emotions and for the objectification +of the volitions. Thus soul inwardises (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>erinnert</foreign>) +or envelops body: which body <q>expresses</q> or develops +soul. The actual soul is the unity of both, is the +percipient individual. The solidarity or <q>communion</q> +of body and soul is here the dominant fact: the soul +sentient of changes in its peripheral organs, and transmitting +emotion and volition into physical effect. It is +on this psychical unity,—the unity which is the soul of +the diversity of body—that all the subsequent developments +of mind rest. Sensation is thus the <foreign rend='italic'>prius</foreign>—or +basis—of all mental life: the organisation of soul in +body and of body in soul. It is the process which +historically has been prepared in the evolution of animal +life from those undifferentiated forms where specialised +organs are yet unknown, and which each individual +has further to realise and complete for himself, by +learning to see and hear, and use his limbs. At first, +moreover, it begins from many separate centres and +only through much collision and mutual compliance +arrives at comparative uniformity and centralisation. +The common basis of united sensibility supplied by +the one organism has to be made real and effective, +and it is so at first by sporadic and comparatively independent +developments. If self-hood means reference +<pb n='clvii'/><anchor id='Pgclvii'/> +to self of what is prima facie not self, and projection of +self therein, there is in primitive sensibility only the +germ or possibility of self-hood. In the early phases of +psychic development the centre is fluctuating and ill-defined, +and it takes time and trouble to co-ordinate or +unify the various starting-points of sensibility<note place='foot'>Works like Preyer's <hi rend='italic'>Seele des Kindes</hi> illustrate this aspect of +mental evolution; its acquirement of definite and correlated functions.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +This consolidation of inward life may be looked at +either formally or concretely. Under the first head, it +means the growth of a central unity of apperception. +In the second case, it means a peculiar aggregate of +ideas and sentiments. There is growing up within him +what we may call the individuality of the individual,—an +irrational, i.e. not consciously intelligent, nether-self +or inner soul, a firm aggregation of hopes and +wishes, of views and feelings, or rather of tendencies +and temperament, of character hereditary and acquired. +It is the law of the natural will or character which from +an inaccessible background dominates our action,—which, +because it is not realised and formulated in consciousness, +behaves like a guardian spirit, or genius, or +destiny within us. This genius is the sub-conscious unity +of the sensitive life—the manner of man which unknown +to ourselves we are,—and which influences us against +our nominal or formal purposes. So far as this predominates, +our ends, rough hew them how we will, are +given by a force which is not really, i.e. with full +consciousness, ours: by a mass of ingrained prejudice +and unreasoned sympathies, of instincts and passions, +of fancies and feelings, which have condensed and +organised themselves into a natural power. As the +child in the mother's womb is responsive to her psychic +influences, so the development of a man's psychic +life is guided by feelings centred in objects and agents +<pb n='clviii'/><anchor id='Pgclviii'/> +external to him, who form the genius presiding over his +development. His soul, to that extent, is really in +another: he himself is selfless, and when his stay is +removed the principle of his life is gone<note place='foot'>Cf. the end of Caleb Balderstone (in <hi rend='italic'>The Bride of Lammermoor</hi>): +<q>With a fidelity sometimes displayed by the canine race, but seldom +by human beings, he pined and died.</q></note>. He is but +a bundle of impressions, held together by influences and +ties which in years before consciousness proper began +made him what he is. Such is the involuntary adaptation +to example and environment, which establishes in the +depths below personality a self which becomes hereafter +the determinant of action. Early years, in which the +human being is naturally susceptible, build up by +imitation, by pliant obedience, an image, a system, +reproducing the immediate surroundings. The soul, +as yet selfless, and ready to accept any imprint, readily +moulds itself into the likeness of an authoritative +influence. +</p> + +<p> +The step by which the universality or unity of the +self is realised in the variety of its sensation is Habit. +Habit gives us a definite standing-ground in the flux of +single impressions: it is the identification of ourselves +with what is most customary and familiar: an identification +which takes place by practice and repetition. If it +circumscribes us to one little province of being, it on +the other frees us from the vague indeterminateness +where we are at the mercy of every passing mood. It +makes thus much of our potential selves our very own, +our acquisition and permanent possession. It, above all, +makes us free and at one with our bodily part, so that +henceforth we start as a subjective unit of body and +soul. We have now as the result of the anthropological +process a self or ego, an individual consciousness able +to reflect and compare, setting itself on one side (a soul +<pb n='clix'/><anchor id='Pgclix'/> +in bodily organisation), and on the other setting an +object of consciousness, or external world, a world of +other things. All this presupposes that the soul has +actualised itself by appropriating and acquiring as its +expression and organ the physical sensibility which +is its body. By restricting and establishing itself, it +has gained a fixed standpoint. No doubt it has localised +and confined itself, but it is no longer at the disposal +of externals and accident: it has laid the foundation +for higher developments. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(ii.) Anomalies of Psychical Life.</head> + +<p> +Psychology, as we have seen, goes for information +regarding the earlier stages of mental growth to the +child and the animal,—perhaps also to the savage. So +too sociology founds certain conclusions upon the observations +of savage customs and institutions, or on the +earlier records of the race. In both cases with a limitation +caused by the externality and fragmentariness of +the facts and the need of interpreting them through our +own conscious experiences. There is however another +direction in which corresponding inquiries may be pursued; +and where the danger of the conclusions arrived +at, though not perhaps less real, is certainly of a different +kind. In sociology we can observe—and almost +experiment upon—the phenomena of the lapsed, degenerate +and criminal classes. The advantage of such +observation is that the object of study can be made to +throw greater light on his own inner states. He is +a little of the child and a little of the savage, but these +aspects co-exist with other features which put him more +on a level with the intelligent observer. Similar pathological +<pb n='clx'/><anchor id='Pgclx'/> +regions are open to us in the case of psychology. +There the anomalous and morbid conditions of mind +co-exist with a certain amount of mature consciousness. +So presented, they are thrown out into relief. They +form the negative instances which serve to corroborate +our positive inductions. The regularly concatenated +and solid structure of normal mind is under abnormal +and deranged conditions thrown into disorder, and its +constituents are presented in their several isolation. +Such phenomena are relapses into more rudimentary +grades: but with the difference that they are set in the +midst of a more advanced phase of intellectual life. +</p> + +<p> +Even amongst candid and honest-minded students of +psychology there is a certain reluctance to dabble in +researches into the night-side of the mental range. +Herbart is an instance of this shrinking. The region +of the Unconscious seemed—and to many still seems—a +region in which the charlatan and the dupe can and +must play into each other's hands. Once in the whirl +of spiritualist and crypto-psychical inquiry you could +not tell how far you might be carried. The facts moreover +were of a peculiar type. Dependent as they seemed +to be on the frame of mind of observers and observed, +they defied the ordinary criteria of detached and +abstract observation. You can only observe them, it +is urged, when you believe; scepticism destroys them. +Now there is a widespread natural impatience against +what Bacon has called <q>monodical</q> phenomena, phenomena +i.e. which claim to come under a special law +of their own, or to have a private and privileged sphere. +And this impatience cuts the Gordian knot by a determination +to treat all instances which oppose its hitherto +ascertained laws as due to deception and fraud, or, +at the best, to incompetent observation, confusions of +memory, and superstitions of ignorance. Above all, +<pb n='clxi'/><anchor id='Pgclxi'/> +great interests of religion and personality seemed to +connect themselves with these revelations—interests, at +any rate, to which our common humanity thrills; it +seemed as if, in this region beyond the customary range +of the conscious and the seen, one might learn something +of the deeper realities which lie in the unseen. +But to feel that so much was at stake was naturally +unfavourable to purely dispassionate observation. +</p> + +<p> +The philosophers were found—as might have been +expected—amongst those most strongly attracted by +these problems. Even Kant had been fascinated by +the spiritualism of Swedenborg, though he finally turned +away sceptical. At least as early as 1806 Schelling had +been interested by Ritter's researches into the question +of telepathy, or the power of the human will to produce +without mechanical means of conveyance an effect at +a distance. He was looking forward to the rise of +a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Physica coelestis</foreign>, or New Celestial Physics, which +should justify the old magic. About the same date his +brother Karl published an essay on Animal Magnetism. +The novel phenomena of galvanism and its congeners +suggested vast possibilities in the range of the physical +powers, especially of the physical powers of the +human psyche as a natural agent. The divining-rod +was revived. Clairvoyance and somnambulism were +carefully studied, and the curative powers of animal +magnetism found many advocates<note place='foot'>See Windischmann's letters in <hi rend='italic'>Briefe von und an Hegel</hi>.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Interest in these questions went naturally with the +new conception of the place of Man in Nature, and +of Nature as the matrix of mind<note place='foot'>Cf. <hi rend='italic'>Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel</hi>, chaps. xii-xiv.</note>. But it had been +acutely stimulated by the performances and professions +of Mesmer at Vienna and Paris in the last quarter of +the eighteenth century. These—though by no means +<pb n='clxii'/><anchor id='Pgclxii'/> +really novel—had forced the artificial world of science +and fashion to discuss the claim advanced for a new +force which, amongst other things, could cure ailments +that baffled the ordinary practitioner. This new force—mainly +because of the recent interest in the remarkable +advances of magnetic and electrical research—was conceived +as a fluid, and called Animal Magnetism. At +one time indeed Mesmer actually employed a magnet +in the manipulation by which he induced the peculiar +condition in his patients. The accompaniments of his +procedure were in many respects those of the quack-doctor; +and with the quack indeed he was often classed. +A French commission of inquiry appointed to examine +into his performances reported in 1784 that, while there +was no doubt as to the reality of many of the phenomena, +and even of the cures, there was no evidence for the +alleged new physical force, and declared the effects to +be mainly attributable to the influence of imagination. +And with the mention of this familiar phrase, further +explanation was supposed to be rendered superfluous. +</p> + +<p> +In France political excitement allowed the mesmeric +theory and practice to drop out of notice till the fall +of the first Empire. But in Germany there was a considerable +amount of investigations and hypotheses into +these mystical phenomena, though rarely by the ordinary +routine workers in the scientific field. The phenomena +where they were discussed were studied and interpreted +in two directions. Some theorists, like Jung-Stilling, +Eschenmayer, Schubert, and Kerner, took the more +metaphysicist and spiritualistic view: they saw in them +the witness to a higher truth, to the presence and operation +in this lower world of a higher and spiritual matter, +a so-called ether. Thus Animal Magnetism supplied +a sort of physical theory of the other world and the +other life. Jung-Stilling, e.g. in his <q>Theory of Spirit-lore.</q> +<pb n='clxiii'/><anchor id='Pgclxiii'/> +(1808), regarded the spiritualistic phenomena as +a justification of—what he believed to be—the Kantian +doctrine that in the truly real and persistent world space +and time are no more. The other direction of inquiry +kept more to the physical field. Ritter (whose researches +interested both Schelling and Hegel) supposed he had +detected the new force underlying mesmerism and the +like, and gave to it the name of Siderism (1808); while +Amoretti of Milan named the object of his experiments +Animal Electrometry (1816). Kieser<note place='foot'>Kieser's <hi rend='italic'>Tellurismus</hi> is, according to Schopenhauer, <q>the fullest +and most thorough text-book of Animal Magnetism.</q></note>, again (1826) spoke +of Tellurism, and connected animal magnetism with the +play of general terrestrial forces in the human being. +</p> + +<p> +At a later date (1857) Schindler, in his <q>Magical +Spirit-life,</q> expounded a theory of mental polarity. +The psychical life has two poles or centres,—its day-pole, +around which revolves our ordinary and superficial +current of ideas, and its night-pole, round which gathers +the sub-conscious and deeper group of beliefs and +sentiments. Either life has a memory, a consciousness, +a world of its own: and they flourish to a large +extent inversely to each other. The day-world has +for its organs of receiving information the ordinary +senses. But the magical or night-world of the soul has +its feelers also, which set men directly in telepathic +rapport with influences, however distant, exerted by the +whole world: and through this <q>inner sense</q> which +serves to concentrate in itself all the telluric forces +(—a sense which in its various aspects we name +instinct, presentiment, conscience) is constructed the +fabric of our sub-conscious system. Through it man is +a sort of résumé of all the cosmic life, in secret affinity +and sympathy with all natural processes; and by the +will which stands in response therewith he can exercise +<pb n='clxiv'/><anchor id='Pgclxiv'/> +a directly creative action on external nature. In +normal and healthy conditions the two currents of +psychic life run on harmonious but independent. But +in the phenomena of somnambulism, clairvoyance, and +delirium, the magic region becomes preponderant, and +comes into collision with the other. The dark-world +emerges into the realm of day as a portentous power: +and there is the feeling of a double personality, or of an +indwelling genius, familiar spirit, or demon. +</p> + +<p> +To the ordinary physicist the so-called <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Actio in +distans</foreign> was a hopeless stumbling-block. If he did not +comprehend the transmission (as it is called) of force +where there was immediate contact, he was at least +perfectly familiar with the outer aspect of it as a +condition of his limited experience. It needed one +beyond the mere hodman of science to say with +Laplace: <q>We are so far from knowing all the agents +of nature, that it would be very unphilosophical to deny +the existence of phenomena solely because they are +inexplicable in the present state of our knowledge.</q> +Accordingly mesmerism and its allied manifestations +were generally abandoned to the bohemians of science, +and to investigators with dogmatic bias. It was still +employed as a treatment for certain ailments: and +philosophers, as different as Fichte and Schopenhauer<note place='foot'>Cf. Fichte, <hi rend='italic'>Nachgelassene Werke</hi>, iii. 295 (<hi rend='italic'>Tagebuch über den +animalischen Magnetismus</hi>, 1813), and Schopenhauer, <hi rend='italic'>Der Wille in +der Natur</hi>.</note>, +watched its fate with attention. But the herd of +professional scientists fought shy of it. The experiments +of Braid at Manchester in 1841 gradually helped +to give research into the subject a new character. +Under the name of Hypnotism (or, rather at first +Neuro-hypnotism) he described the phenomena of the +magnetic sleep (induced through prolonged staring at +<pb n='clxv'/><anchor id='Pgclxv'/> +a bright object), such as abnormal rigidity of body, +perverted sensibility, and the remarkable obedience +of the subject to the command or suggestions of the +operator. Thirty years afterwards, the matter became +an object of considerable experimental and theoretic +work in France, at the rival schools of Paris and +Nancy; and the question, mainly under the title of +hypnotism, though the older name is still occasionally +heard, has been for several years brought prominently +under public notice. +</p> + +<p> +It cannot be said that the net results of these observations +and hypotheses are of a very definitive character. +While a large amount of controversy has been waged +on the comparative importance of the several methods +and instruments by which the hypnotic or mesmeric +trance may be induced, and a scarcely less wide range +of divergence prevails with regard to the physiological +and pathological conditions in connexion with which it +has been most conspicuously manifested, there has been +less anxiety shown to determine its precise psychical +nature, or its significance in mental development. And +yet the better understanding of these aspects may +throw light on several points connected with primitive +religion and the history of early civilisation, indeed over +the whole range of what is called <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Völkerpsychologie</foreign>. +Indeed this is one of the points which may be said +to emerge out of the confusion of dispute. Phenomena +at least analogous to those styled hypnotic have +a wide range in the anthropological sphere<note place='foot'>Bernheim: <hi rend='italic'>La suggestion domine toute l'histoire de l'humanité</hi>.</note>: and the +proper characters which belong to them will only be +caught by an observer who examines them in the +widest variety of examples. Another feature which has +been put in prominence is what has been called <q>psychological +automatism.</q> And in this name two points +<pb n='clxvi'/><anchor id='Pgclxvi'/> +seem to deserve note. The first is the spontaneous +and as it were mechanical consecution of mental states +in the soul whence the interfering effect of voluntary +consciousness has been removed. And the second is the +unfailing or accurate regularity, so contrary to the +hesitating and uncertain procedure of our conscious +and reasoned action, which so often is seen in the +unreflecting and unreasoned movements. To this +invariable sequence of psychical movement the superior +control and direction by the intelligent self has to adapt +itself, just as it respects the order of physical laws. +</p> + +<p> +But, perhaps, the chief conclusion to be derived from +hypnotic experience is the value of suggestion or +suggestibility. Even cool thinkers like Kant have +recognised how much mere mental control has to do +with bodily state,—how each of us, in this way, is often +for good or for ill his own physician. An idea is a force, +and is only inactive in so far as it is held in check by +other ideas. <q>There is no such thing as hypnotism,</q> +says one: <q>there are only different degrees of suggestibility.</q> +This may be to exaggerate: yet it serves to +impress the comparatively secondary character of many +of the circumstances on which the specially mesmeric +or hypnotic experimentalist is apt to lay exclusive stress. +The methods may probably vary according to circumstances. +But the essence of them all is to get the +patient out of the general frame and system of ideas +and perceptions in which his ordinary individuality is +encased. Considering how for all of us the reality of +concrete life is bound up with our visual perceptions, +how largely our sanity depends upon the spatial idea, +and how that depends on free ocular range, we +can understand that darkness and temporary loss +of vision are powerful auxiliaries in the hypnotic +process, as in magical and superstitious rites. But +<pb n='clxvii'/><anchor id='Pgclxvii'/> +a great deal short of this may serve to establish +influence. The mind of the majority of human beings, +but especially of the young, may be compared to +a vacant seat waiting for some one to fill it. +</p> + +<p> +In Hegel's view hypnotic phenomena produce a kind +of temporary and artificial atavism. Mechanical or +chemical means, or morbid conditions of body, may +cause even for the intelligent adult a relapse into +states of mind closely resembling those exhibited by +the primitive or the infantile sensibility. The intelligent +personality, where powers are bound up with +limitations and operate through a chain of means and +ends, is reduced to its primitively undifferentiated +condition. Not that it is restored to its infantile +simplicity; but that all subsequent acquirements operate +only as a concentrated individuality, or mass of will +and character, released from the control of the self-possessed +mind, and invested (by the latter's withdrawal) +with a new quasi-personality of their own. +With the loss of the world of outward things, there +may go, it is supposed, a clearer perception of the +inward and particularly of the organic life. The Soul +contains the form of unity which other experiences had +impressed upon it: but this form avails in its subterranean +existence where it creates a sort of inner self. +And this inner self is no longer, like the embodied self +of ordinary consciousness, an intelligence served by +organs, and proceeding by induction and inference. +Its knowledge is not mediated or carried along specific +channels: it does not build up, piecemeal, by successive +steps of synthesis and analysis, by gradual idealisation, +the organised totality of its intellectual world. The +somnambulist and the clairvoyant see without eyes, and +carry their vision directly into regions where the waking +consciousness of orderly intelligence cannot enter. +<pb n='clxviii'/><anchor id='Pgclxviii'/> +But that region is not the world of our higher ideas,—of +art, religion, and philosophy. It is still the sensitivity—that +realm of sensitivity which is ordinarily covered by +unconsciousness. Such sensitive clairvoyants may, as +it were, hear themselves growing; they may discern the +hidden quivers and pulses of blood and tissue, the seats +of secret pain and all the unrevealed workings in the +dark chambers of the flesh. But always their vision +seems confined to that region, and will fall short of the +world of light and ideal truth. It is towards the nature-bond +of sensitive solidarity with earth, and flowers, and +trees, the life that <q>rolls through all things,</q> not towards +the spiritual unity which broods over the world and +<q>impels all thinking things,</q> that these immersions in +the selfless universe lead us. +</p> + +<p> +What Hegel chiefly sees in these phenomena is their +indication, even on the natural side of man, of that +ideality of the material, which it is the work of intelligence +to produce in the more spiritual life, in the +fully-developed mind. The latter is the supreme over-soul, +that Absolute Mind which in our highest moods, +aesthetic and religious, we approximate to. But mind, +as it tends towards the higher end to <q>merge itself in +light,</q> to identify itself yet not wholly lost, but retained, +in the fullness of undivided intellectual being, so at the +lower end it springs from a natural and underlying +unity, the immense solidarity of nether-soul, the great +Soul of Nature—the <q>Substance</q> which is to be raised +into the <q>Subject</q> which is true divinity. Between +these two unities, the nature-given nether-soul and +the spirit-won over-soul, lies the conscious life of +man: a process of differentiation which narrows and +of redintegration which enlarges,—which alternately +builds up an isolated personality and dissolves it in +a common intelligence and sympathy. It is because +<pb n='clxix'/><anchor id='Pgclxix'/> +mental or tacit <q>suggestion</q><note place='foot'>An instance from an unexpected quarter, in Eckermann's conversations +with Goethe: <q>In my young days I have experienced +cases enough, where on lonely walks there came over me a powerful +yearning for a beloved girl, and I thought of her so long till she +actually came to meet me.</q> (Conversation of Oct. 7, 1827.)</note> (i.e. will-influence +exercised without word or sign, or other sensible +mode of connexion), thought-transference, or thought-reading +(which is more than dexterous apprehension of +delicate muscular signs), exteriorisation or transposition +of sensibility into objects primarily non-sensitive, +clairvoyance (i.e. the power of describing, as if +from direct perception, objects or events removed +in space beyond the recognised limits of sensation), +and somnambulism, so far as it implies lucid vision with +sealed eyes,—it is because these things seem to show +the essential ideality of matter, that Hegel is interested +in them. The ordinary conditions of consciousness +and even of practical life in society are a derivative and +secondary state; a product of processes of individualism, +which however are never completed, and leave a large +margin for idealising intelligence to fulfil. From a state +which is not yet personality to a state which is more +than can be described as personality—lies the mental +movement. So Fichte, too, had regarded the power of +the somnambulist as laying open a world underlying +the development of egoity and self-consciousness<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Gleichsam in einer Vorwelt, einer diese Welt schaffenden Welt</foreign> +(<hi rend='italic'>Nachgelassene Werke</hi>, iii. 321).</note>: <q>the +merely sensuous man is still in somnambulism,</q> only +a somnambulism of waking hours: <q>the true waking is +the life in God, to be free in him, all else is sleep and +dream.</q> <q>Egoity,</q> he adds, <q>is a merely <emph>formal</emph> principle, +utterly, and never qualitative (i.e. the essence and +universal force).</q> For Schopenhauer, too, the experiences +of animal magnetism had seemed to prove the +<pb n='clxx'/><anchor id='Pgclxx'/> +absolute supernatural power of the radical will in its +superiority to the intellectual categories of space, time, +and causal sequence: to prove the reality of the metaphysical +which is at the basis of all conscious divisions. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(iii.) The Development of Inner Freedom.</head> + +<p> +The result of the first range in the process of psycho-genesis +was to make the body a sign and utterance of +the Soul, with a fixed and determinate type. The +<q>anthropological process</q> has defined and settled the +mere general sentiency of soul into an individualised +shape, a localised and limited self, a bundle of habits. +It has made the soul an Ego or self: a power which +looks out upon the world as a spectator, lifted above +immanence in the general tide of being, but only so +lifted because it has made itself one in the world of +objects, a thing among things. The Mind has reached +the point of view of reflection. Instead of a general +identifiability with all nature, it has encased itself in +a limited range, from which it looks forth on what is +now other than itself. If previously it was mere inward +sensibility, it is now sense, perceptive of an object here +and now, of an external world. The step has involved +some price: and that price is, that it has attained independence +and self-hood at the cost of surrendering the +content it had hitherto held in one with itself. It is +now a blank receptivity, open to the impressions of an +outside world: and the changes which take place in its +process of apprehension seem to it to be given from +outside. The world it perceives is a world of isolated +and independent objects: and it takes them as they +<pb n='clxxi'/><anchor id='Pgclxxi'/> +are given. But a closer insistance on the perception +develops the implicit intelligence, which makes it possible. +The percipient mind is no mere recipiency or +susceptibility with its forms of time and space: it is +spontaneously active, it is the source of categories, or is +an apperceptive power,—an understanding. Consciousness, +thus discovered to be a creative or constructive +faculty, is strictly speaking self-consciousness<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Selbst-bewusstsein</foreign> is not self-consciousness, in the vulgar sense +of brooding over feelings and self: but consciousness which is active +and outgoing, rather than receptive and passive. It is practical, as +opposed to theoretical.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +Self-consciousness appears at first in the selfish or +narrowly egoistic form of appetite and impulse. The +intelligence which claims to mould and construe the +world of objects—which, in Kant's phrase, professes +to give us nature—is implicitly the lord of that world. +And that supremacy it carries out as appetite—as +destruction. The self is but a bundle of wants—its +supremacy over things is really subjection to them: the +satisfaction of appetite is baffled by a new desire which +leaves it as it was before. The development of self-consciousness +to a more adequate shape is represented +by Hegel as taking place through the social struggle +for existence. Human beings, too, are in the first +instance to the uninstructed appetite or the primitive +self-consciousness (which is simply a succession of individual +desires for satisfaction of natural want) only +things,—adjectival to that self's individual existence. +To them, too, his primary relation is to appropriate and +master them. Might precedes right. But the social +struggle for existence forces him to recognise something +other which is kindred to himself,—a limiting +principle, another self which has to form an element in +his calculations, not to be neglected. And gradually, +<pb n='clxxii'/><anchor id='Pgclxxii'/> +we may suppose, the result is the division of humanity +into two levels, a ruling lordly class, and a class of +slaves,—a state of inequality in which each knows that +his appetite is in some measure checked by a more or +less permanent other. Lastly, perhaps soonest in the +inferior order, there is fashioned the perception that its +self-seeking in its isolated appetites is subject to an +abiding authority, a continuing consciousness. There +grows up a social self—a sense of general humanity +and solidarity with other beings—a larger self with +which each identifies himself, a common ground. +Understanding was selfish intelligence: practical in the +egoistic sense. In the altruistic or universal sense +practical, a principle social and unifying character, +intelligence is Reason. +</p> + +<p> +Thus, Man, beginning as a percipient consciousness, +apprehending single objects in space and time, and as +an appetitive self bent upon single gratifications, has +ended as a rational being,—a consciousness purged of +its selfishness and isolation, looking forward openly and +impartially on the universe of things and beings. He +has ceased to be a mere animal, swallowed up in the +moment and the individual, using his intelligence only +in selfish satisfactions. He is no longer bound down +by the struggle for existence, looking on everything as +a mere thing, a mere means. He has erected himself +above himself and above his environment, but that +because he occupies a point of view at which he and +his environment are no longer purely antithetical and +exclusive<note place='foot'>The more detailed exposition of this Phenomenology of Mind is +given in the book with that title: Hegel's <hi rend='italic'>Werke</hi>, ii. pp. 71-316.</note>. He has reached what is really the moral +standpoint: the point i.e. at which he is inspired by +a universal self-consciousness, and lives in that peaceful +world where the antitheses of individualities and of outward +<pb n='clxxiii'/><anchor id='Pgclxxiii'/> +and inward have ceased to trouble. <q>The natural +man,</q> says Hegel<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>System der Sittlichkeit</hi>, p. 15 (see Essay V).</note>, <q>sees in the woman flesh of his flesh: +the moral and spiritual man sees spirit of his spirit in the +moral and spiritual being and by its means.</q> Hitherto +we have been dealing with something falling below the +full truth of mind: the region of immediate sensibility +with its thorough immersion of mind in body, first of +all, and secondly its gradual progress to a general +standpoint. It is only in the third part of Subjective +mind that we are dealing with the psychology of a being +who in the human sense knows and wills, i.e. apprehends +general truth, and carries out ideal purposes. +</p> + +<p> +Thus, for the third time, but now on a higher plane, +that of intelligence and rationality, is traced the process +of development or realisation by which reason becomes +reasoned knowledge and rational will, a free or autonomous +intelligence. And, as before, the starting-point, +alike in theoretical and practical mind, is feeling—or +immediate knowledge and immediate sense of Ought. +The basis of thought is an immediate perception—a +sensuous affection or given something, and the basis +of the idea of a general satisfaction is the natural claim +to determine the outward existence conformably to +individual feeling. In intelligent perception or intuition +the important factor is attention, which raises it above +mere passive acceptance and awareness of a given fact. +Attention thus involves on one hand the externality of +its object, and on the other affirms its dependence on +the act of the subject: it sets the objects before and out +of itself, in space and time, but yet in so doing it shows +itself master of the objects. If perception presuppose +attention, in short, they cease to be wholly outward: +we make them ours, and the space and time they fill are +projected by us. So attended to, they are appropriated, +<pb n='clxxiv'/><anchor id='Pgclxxiv'/> +inwardised and recollected: they take their place in +a mental place and mental time: they receive a general +or de-individualised character in the memory-image. +These are retained as mental property, but retained +actually only in so far they are revivable and revived. +Such revival is the work of imagination working by the +so-called laws of association. But the possession of its +ideas thus inwardised and recollected by the mind is +largely a matter of chance. The mind is not really +fully master of them until it has been able to give them +a certain objectivity, by replacing the mental image by +a vocal, i.e. a sensible sign. By means of words, intelligence +turns its ideas or representations into quasi-realities: +it creates a sort of superior sense-world, the +world of language, where ideas live a potential, which is +also an actual, life. Words are sensibles, but they are +sensibles which completely lose themselves in their +meaning. As sensibles, they render possible that +verbal memory which is the handmaid of thought: but +which also as merely mechanical can leave thought +altogether out of account. It is through words that +thought is made possible: for it alone permits the +movement through ideas without being distracted +through a multitude of associations. In them thought +has an instrument completely at its own level, but still +only a machine, and in memory the working of that +machine. We think in names, not in general images, +but in terms which only serve as vehicles for mental +synthesis and analysis. +</p> + +<p> +It is as such a thinking being—a being who can use +language, and manipulate general concepts or take +comprehensive views, that man is a rational will. A +concept of something to be done—a feeling even of +some end more or less comprehensive in its quality, is +the implication of what can be called will. At first +<pb n='clxxv'/><anchor id='Pgclxxv'/> +indeed its material may be found as immediately given +and all its volitionality may lie in the circumstance that +the intelligent being sets this forward as a governing +and controlling Ought. Its vehicle, in short, may be +mere impulse, or inclination, and even passion: but it +is the choice and the purposive adoption of means +to the given end. Gradually it attains to the idea of +a general satisfaction, or of happiness. And this end +seems positive and definite. It soon turns out however +to be little but a prudent and self-denying superiority to +particular passions and inclinations in the interest of +a comprehensive ideal. The free will or intelligence +has so far only a negative and formal value: it is the +perfection of an autonomous and freely self-developing +mind. Such a mind, which in language has acquired +the means of realising an intellectual system of things +superior to the restrictions of sense, and which has +emancipated reason from the position of slave to +inclination, is endued with the formal conditions of +moral conduct. Such a mind will transform its own +primarily physical dependence into an image of the law +of reason and create the ethical life: and in the strength +of that establishment will go forth to conquer the world +into a more and more adequate realisation of the +eternal Idea. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='clxxvi'/><anchor id='Pgclxxvi'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Essay V. Ethics And Politics.</head> + +<p> +<q>In dealing,</q> says Hegel, <q>with the Idea of the State, +we must not have before our eyes a particular state, or +a particular institution: we must rather study the Idea, +this actual God, on his own account. Every State, +however bad we may find it according to our principles, +however defective we may discover this or that feature +to be, still contains, particularly if it belongs to the +mature states of our time, all the essential factors of its +existence. But as it is easier to discover faults than +to comprehend the affirmative, people easily fall into +the mistake of letting individual aspects obscure the +intrinsic organism of the State itself. The State is no +ideal work of art: it stands in the everyday world, in +the sphere, that is, of arbitrary act, accident, and error, +and a variety of faults may mar the regularity of its +traits. But the ugliest man, the criminal, a sick man +and a cripple, is after all a living man; the affirmative, +Life, subsists in spite of the defect: and this affirmative +is here the theme<note place='foot'>Hegel's <hi rend='italic'>Werke</hi>, viii. 313, and cf. the passage quoted in my <hi rend='italic'>Logic +of Hegel</hi>, notes, pp. 384, 385.</note>.</q> <q>It is the theme of philosophy,</q> +he adds, <q>to ascertain the substance which is immanent +in the show of the temporal and transient, and the +eternal which is present.</q> +</p> + +<pb n='clxxvii'/><anchor id='Pgclxxvii'/> + +<div> +<head>(i.) Hegel as a Political Critic.</head> + +<p> +But if this is true, it is also to be remembered that +the philosopher is, like other men, the son of his age, +and estimates the value of reality from preconceptions +and aspirations due to his generation. The historical +circumstances of his nation as well as the personal +experiences of his life help to determine his horizon, +even in the effort to discover the hidden pulse and +movement of the social organism. This is specially +obvious in political philosophy. The conception of +ethics and politics which is presented in the <hi rend='italic'>Encyclopaedia</hi> +was in 1820 produced with more detail as the +<hi rend='italic'>Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts</hi>. Appearing, as +it did, two years after his appointment to a professorship +at Berlin, and in the midst of a political struggle +between the various revolutionary and conservative +powers and parties of Germany, the book became, and +long remained, a target for embittered criticism. The +so-called War of Liberation or national movement to +shake off the French yoke was due to a coalition of +parties, and had naturally been in part supported by +tendencies and aims which went far beyond the ostensive +purpose either of leaders or of combatants. Aspirations +after a freer state were entwined with radical and +socialistic designs to reform the political hierarchy +of the Fatherland: high ideals and low vulgarities were +closely intermixed: and the noble enthusiasm of youth +was occasionally played on by criminal and anarchic intriguers. +In a strong and wise and united Germany +some of these schemes might have been tolerated. But +strength, wisdom, and unity were absent. In the existing +tension between Austria and Prussia for the leadership, +in the ill-adapted and effete constitutions of the several +principalities which were yet expected to realise the +<pb n='clxxviii'/><anchor id='Pgclxxviii'/> +advance which had taken place in society and ideas +during the last thirty years, the outlook on every hand +seemed darker and more threatening than it might +have otherwise done. Governments, which had lost +touch with their peoples, suspected conspiracy and +treason: and a party in the nation credited their rulers +with gratuitous designs against private liberty and rights. +There was a vast but ill-defined enthusiasm in the +breasts of the younger world, and it was shared by +many of their teachers. It seemed to their immense +aspirations that the war of liberation had failed of its +true object and left things much as they were. The +volunteers had not fought for the political systems of +Austria or Prussia, or for the three-and-thirty princes +of Germany: but for ideas, vague, beautiful, stimulating. +To such a mood the continuance of the old +system was felt as a cruel deception and a reaction. +The governments on their part had not realised the full +importance of the spirit that had been aroused, and +could not at a moment's notice set their house in order, +even had there been a clearer outlook for reform than +was offered. They too had suffered, and had realised +their insecurity: and were hardly in a mood to open +their gates to the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +Coming on such a situation of affairs, Hegel's book +would have been likely in any case to provoke criticism. +For it took up a line of political theory which was little +in accord with the temper of the age. The conception +of the state which it expounded is not far removed in +essentials from the conception which now dominates +the political life of the chief European nations. But in +his own time it came upon ears which were naturally +disposed to misconceive it. It was unacceptable to the +adherents of the <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>ancien régime</foreign>, as much as to the +liberals. It was declared by one party to be a glorification +<pb n='clxxix'/><anchor id='Pgclxxix'/> +of the Prussian state: by another to rationalise +the sanctities of authority. It was pointed out that the +new professor was a favourite of the leading minister, +that his influence was dominant in scholastic appointments, +and that occasional gratuities from the crown +proved his acceptability. A contemporary professor, +Fries, remarked that Hegel's theory of the state had +grown <q>not in the gardens of science but on the dung-hill +of servility.</q> Hegel himself was aware that he +had planted a blow in the face of a <q>shallow and pretentious +sect,</q> and that his book had <q>given great +offence to the demagogic folk.</q> Alike in religious and +political life he was impatient of sentimentalism, of +rhetorical feeling, of wordy enthusiasm. A positive +storm of scorn burst from him at much-promising and +little-containing declamation that appealed to the pathos +of ideas, without sense of the complex work of construction +and the system of principles which were needed +to give them reality. His impatience of demagogic +gush led him (in the preface) into a tactless attack on +Fries, who was at the moment in disgrace for his participation +in the demonstration at the Wartburg. It +led him to an attack on the bumptiousness of those who +held that conscientious conviction was ample justification +for any proceeding:—an attack which opponents +were not unwilling to represent as directed against the +principle of conscience itself. +</p> + +<p> +Yet Hegel's views on the nature of political unity +were not new. Their nucleus had been formed nearly +twenty years before. In the years that immediately +followed the French revolution he had gone through the +usual anarchic stage of intelligent youth. He had wondered +whether humanity might not have had a nobler +destiny, had fate given supremacy to some heresy rather +than the orthodox creed of Christendom. He had +<pb n='clxxx'/><anchor id='Pgclxxx'/> +seen religion in the past <q>teaching what despotism +wished,—contempt of the human race, its incapacity for +anything good<note place='foot'>Hegel's <hi rend='italic'>Briefe</hi>, i. 15.</note>.</q> But his earliest reflections on political +power belong to a later date, and are inspired, not so +much by the vague ideals of humanitarianism, as by +the spirit of national patriotism. They are found in +a <q>Criticism of the German Constitution</q> apparently +dating from the year 1802<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Kritik der Verfassung Deutschlands</hi>, edited by G. Mollat (1893). +Parts of this were already given by Haym and Rosenkranz. The +same editor has also in this year published, though not quite in full, +Hegel's <hi rend='italic'>System der Sittlichkeit</hi>, to which reference is made in what +follows.</note>. It is written after the +peace of Lunéville had sealed for Germany the loss +of her provinces west of the Rhine, and subsequent +to the disasters of the German arms at Hohenlinden +and Marengo. It is almost contemporaneous with the +measures of 1803 and 1804, which affirmed the dissolution +of the <q>Holy Roman Empire</q> of German name. +The writer of this unpublished pamphlet sees his +country in a situation almost identical with that which +Macchiavelli saw around him in Italy. It is abused by +petty despots, distracted by mean particularist ambitions, +at the mercy of every foreign power. It was such +a scene which, as Hegel recalls, had prompted and +justified the drastic measures proposed in the <hi rend='italic'>Prince</hi>,—measures +which have been ill-judged by the closet +moralist, but evince the high statesmanship of the +Florentine. In the <hi rend='italic'>Prince</hi>, an intelligent reader can +see <q>the enthusiasm of patriotism underlying the cold +and dispassionate doctrines.</q> Macchiavelli dared to +declare that Italy must become a state, and to assert +that <q>there is no higher duty for a state than to maintain +itself, and to punish relentlessly every author of anarchy,—the +supreme, and perhaps sole political crime.</q> And +<pb n='clxxxi'/><anchor id='Pgclxxxi'/> +like teaching, Hegel adds, is needed for Germany. +Only, he concludes, no mere demonstration of the insanity +of utter separation of the particular from his kin +will ever succeed in converting the particularists from +their conviction of the absoluteness of personal and +private rights. <q>Insight and intelligence always excite +so much distrust that force alone avails to justify them; +then man yields them obedience<note place='foot'>In which some may find a prophecy of the effects of <q>blood and +iron</q> in 1866.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>The German political edifice,</q> says the writer, <q>is +nothing else but the sum of the rights which the single +parts have withdrawn from the whole; and this justice, +which is ever on the watch to prevent the state having +any power left, is the essence of the constitution.</q> The +Peace of Westphalia had but served to constitute or +stereotype anarchy: the German empire had by that +instrument divested itself of all rights of political unity, +and thrown itself on the goodwill of its members. What +then, it may be asked, is, in Hegel's view, the indispensable +minimum essential to a state? And the answer will +be, organised strength,—a central and united force. +<q>The strength of a country lies neither in the multitude +of its inhabitants and fighting men, nor in its fertility, +nor in its size, but solely in the way its parts are by +reasonable combination made a single political force +enabling everything to be used for the common defence.</q> +Hegel speaks scornfully of <q>the philanthropists +and moralists who decry politics as an endeavour +and an art to seek private utility at the cost of right</q>: +he tells them that <q>it is foolish to oppose the interest or +(as it is expressed by the more morally-obnoxious word) +the utility of the state to its right</q>: that the <q>rights of +a state are the utility of the state as established and +recognised by compacts</q>: and that <q>war</q> (which they +<pb n='clxxxii'/><anchor id='Pgclxxxii'/> +would fain abolish or moralise) <q>has to decide not +which of the rights asserted by either party is the true +right (—for both parties have a true right), but which +right has to give way to the other.</q> +</p> + +<p> +It is evident from these propositions that Hegel takes +that view of political supremacy which has been associated +with the name of Hobbes. But his views also +reproduce the Platonic king of men, <q>who can rule and +dare not lie.</q> <q>All states,</q> he declares, <q>are founded by +the sublime force of great men, not by physical strength. +The great man has something in his features which +others would gladly call their lord. They obey him +against their will. Their immediate will is his will, +but their conscious will is otherwise.... This is the +prerogative of the great man to ascertain and to express +the absolute will. All gather round his banner. He is +their God.</q> <q>The state,</q> he says again, <q>is the self-certain +absolute mind which recognises no definite +authority but its own: which acknowledges no abstract +rules of good and bad, shameful and mean, craft and +deception.</q> So also Hobbes describes the prerogatives +of the sovereign Leviathan. But the Hegelian God +immanent in the state is a higher power than Hobbes +knows: he is no mortal, but in his truth an immortal +God. He speaks by (what in this early essay is called) +the Absolute Government<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Die Absolute Regierung</hi>: in the <hi rend='italic'>System der Sittlichkeit</hi>, p. 32: +cf. p. 55. Hegel himself compares it to Fichte's <hi rend='italic'>Ephorate</hi>.</note>: the government of the +Law—the true impersonal sovereign,—distinct alike +from the single ruler and the multitude of the ruled. +<q>It is absolutely only universality as against particular. +As this absolute, ideal, universal, compared to which +everything else is a particular, it is the phenomenon +of God. Its words are his decision, and it can appear +<pb n='clxxxiii'/><anchor id='Pgclxxxiii'/> +and exist under no other form.... The Absolute +government is divine, self-sanctioned and not made<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Die Absolute Regierung</hi>, l.c. pp. 37, 38.</note>.</q> +The real strength—the real connecting-mean which +gives life to sovereign and to subject—is intelligence +free and entire, independent both of what individuals +feel and believe and of the quality of the ruler. <q>The +spiritual bond,</q> he says in a lower form of speech, <q>is +public opinion: it is the true legislative body, national +assembly, declaration of the universal will which lives +in the execution of all commands.</q> This still small +voice of public opinion is the true and real parliament: +not literally making laws, but revealing them. If we +ask, where does this public opinion appear and how +does it disengage itself from the masses of partisan +judgment? Hegel answers,—and to the surprise of those +who have not entered into the spirit of his age<note place='foot'>Some idea of his meaning may perhaps be gathered by comparison +with passages in <hi rend='italic'>Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre</hi>, ii. 1, 2.</note>—it +is embodied in the Aged and the Priests. Both of these +have ceased to live in the real world: they are by +nature and function disengaged from the struggles of +particular existence, have risen above the divergencies +of social classes. They breathe the ether of pure contemplation. +<q>The sunset of life gives them mystical +lore,</q> or at least removes from old age the distraction +of selfishness: while the priest is by function set apart +from the divisions of human interest. Understood in +a large sense, Hegel's view is that the real voice of +experience is elicited through those who have attained +indifference to the distorting influence of human parties, +and who see life steadily and whole. +</p> + +<p> +If this utterance shows the little belief Hegel had in +the ordinary methods of legislation through <q>representative</q> +bodies, and hints that the real <emph>substance</emph> of political +<pb n='clxxxiv'/><anchor id='Pgclxxxiv'/> +life is deeper than the overt machinery of political +operation, it is evident that this theory of <q>divine right</q> +is of a different stamp from what used to go under that +name. And, again, though the power of the central +state is indispensable, he is far from agreeing with the +so-called bureaucratic view that <q>a state is a machine +with a single spring which sets in motion all the rest of +the machinery.</q> <q>Everything,</q> he says, <q>which is not +directly required to organise and maintain the force +for giving security without and within must be left by +the central government to the freedom of the citizens. +Nothing ought to be so sacred in the eyes of a government +as to leave alone and to protect, without regard to +utilities, the free action of the citizens in such matters +as do not affect its fundamental aim: for this freedom +is itself sacred<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Kritik der Verfassung</hi>, p. 20.</note>.</q> He is no friend of paternal bureaucracy. +<q>The pedantic craving to settle every detail, +the mean jealousy against estates and corporations +administrating and directing their own affairs, the base +fault-finding with all independent action on the part of +the citizens, even when it has no immediate bearing +on the main political interest, has been decked out with +reasons to show that no penny of public expenditure, +made for a country of twenty or thirty millions' population, +can be laid out, without first being, not permitted, +but commanded, controlled and revised by the supreme +government.</q> You can see, he remarks, in the first +village after you enter Prussian territory the lifeless and +wooden routine which prevails. The whole country +suffers also from the way religion has been mixed +up with political rights, and a particular creed pronounced +by law indispensable both for sovereign and +full-privileged subject. In a word, the unity and vigour +of the state is quite compatible with considerable latitude +<pb n='clxxxv'/><anchor id='Pgclxxxv'/> +and divergence in laws and judicature, in the +imposition and levying of taxes, in language, manners, +civilisation and religion. Equality in all these points is +desirable for social unity: but it is not indispensable +for political strength. +</p> + +<p> +This decided preference for the unity of the state +against the system of checks and counterchecks, which +sometimes goes by the name of a constitution, came out +clearly in Hegel's attitude in discussing the dispute +between the Würtembergers and their sovereign in +1815-16. Würtemberg, with its complicated aggregation +of local laws, had always been a paradise of lawyers, +and the feudal rights or privileges of the local oligarchies—the +so-called <q>good old law</q>—were the boast of +the country. All this had however been aggravated by +the increase of territory received in 1805: and the +king, following the examples set by France and even +by Bavaria, promulgated of his own grace a <q>constitution</q> +remodelling the electoral system of the country. +Immediately an outcry burst out against the attempt to +destroy the ancient liberties. Uhland tuned his lyre to +the popular cry: Rückert sang on the king's side. To +Hegel the contest presented itself as a struggle between +the attachment to traditional rights, merely because they +are old, and the resolution to carry out reasonable +reform whether it be agreeable to the reformed or not: +or rather he saw in it resistance of particularism, of +separation, clinging to use and wont, and basing itself +on formal pettifogging objections, against the spirit of +organisation. Anything more he declined to see. And +probably he was right in ascribing a large part of the +opposition to inertia, to vanity and self-interest, combined +with the want of political perception of the needs +of Würtemberg and Germany. But on the other hand, +he failed to remember the insecurity and danger of such +<pb n='clxxxvi'/><anchor id='Pgclxxxvi'/> +<q>gifts of the Danai</q>: he forgot the sense of free-born +men that a constitution is not something to be +granted (<foreign rend='italic'>octroyé</foreign>) as a grace, but something that +must come by the spontaneous act of the innermost +self of the community. He dealt rather with the +formal arguments which were used to refuse progress, +than with the underlying spirit which prompted +the opposition<note place='foot'>In some respects Bacon's attitude in the struggle between royalty +and parliament may be compared.</note>. +</p> + +<p> +The philosopher lives (as Plato has well reminded +us) too exclusively within the ideal. Bent on the essential +nucleus of institutions, he attaches but slight importance +to the variety of externals, and fails to realise the +practice of the law-courts. He forgets that what weighs +lightly in logic, may turn the scale in real life and experience. +For feeling and sentiment he has but scant +respect: he is brusque and uncompromising: and +cannot realise all the difficulties and dangers that beset +the Idea in the mazes of the world, and may ultimately +quite alter a plan which at first seemed independent +of petty details. Better than other men perhaps he +recognises in theory how the mere universal only exists +complete in an individual shape: but more than other +men he forgets these truths of insight, when the business +of life calls for action or for judgment. He cannot +at a moment's notice remember that he is, if not, as +Cicero says, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in faece Romuli</foreign>, the member of a degenerate +commonwealth, at least living in a world where +good and evil are not, as logic presupposes, sharply +divided but intricately intertwined. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='clxxxvii'/><anchor id='Pgclxxxvii'/> + +<div> +<head>(ii.) The Ethics and Religion of the State.</head> + +<p> +This idealism of political theory is illustrated by the +sketch of the Ethical Life which he drew up about +1802. Under the name of <q>Ethical System</q> it presents +in concentrated or undeveloped shape the doctrine +which subsequently swelled into the <q>Philosophy of +Mind.</q> At a later date he worked out more carefully as +introduction the psychological genesis of moral and +intelligent man, and he separated out more distinctly +as a sequel the universal powers which give to social +life its higher characters. In the earlier sketch the +Ethical Part stands by itself, with the consequence that +Ethics bears a meaning far exceeding all that had been +lately called moral. The word <q>moral</q> itself he avoids<note place='foot'>Just as Schopenhauer, on the contrary, always says <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>moralisch</foreign>—never +<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>sittlich</foreign>.</note>. +It savours of excessive subjectivity, of struggle, of duty +and conscience. It has an ascetic ring about it—an +aspect of negation, which seeks for abstract holiness, +and turns its back on human nature. Kant's words +opposing duty to inclination, and implying that moral +goodness involves a struggle, an antagonism, a victory, +seem to him (and to his time) one-sided. That aspect +of negation accordingly which Kant certainly began +with, and which Schopenhauer magnified until it became +the all-in-all of Ethics, Hegel entirely subordinates. +Equally little does he like the emphasis on the supremacy +of insight, intention, conscience: they lead, he thinks, +to a view which holds the mere fact of conviction to +be all-important, as if it mattered not what we thought +and believed and did, so long as we were sincere in our +belief. All this emphasis on the good-will, on the +imperative of duty, on the rights of conscience, has, +he admits, its justification in certain circumstances, as +<pb n='clxxxviii'/><anchor id='Pgclxxxviii'/> +against mere legality, or mere natural instinctive goodness; +but it has been overdone. Above all, it errs by +an excess of individualism. It springs from an attitude +of reflection,—in which the individual, isolated in his +conscious and superficial individuality, yet tries—but +probably tries in vain—to get somewhat in touch with +a universal which he has allowed to slip outside him, +forgetting that it is the heart and substance of his life. +Kant, indeed, hardly falls under this condemnation. +For he aims at showing that the rational will inevitably +creates as rational a law or universal; that the individual +act becomes self-regulative, and takes its part in +constituting a system or realm of duty. +</p> + +<p> +Still, on the whole, <q>morality</q> in this narrower sense +belongs to an age of reflection, and is formal or nominal +goodness rather than the genuine and full reality. It +is the protest against mere instinctive or customary +virtue, which is but compliance with traditional authority, +and compliance with it as if it were a sort of quasi-natural +law. Moralising reflection is the awakening +of subjectivity and of a deeper personality. The age +which thus precedes morality is not an age in which +kindness, or love, or generosity is unknown. And if +Hegel says that <q>Morality,</q> strictly so called, began +with Socrates, he does not thereby accuse the pre-Socratic +Greeks of inhumanity. But what he does say +is that such ethical life as existed was in the main +a thing of custom and law: of law, moreover, which +was not set objectively forward, but left still in the +stage of uncontradicted usage, a custom which was +a second nature, part of the essential and quasi-physical +ordinance of life. The individual had not yet learned +to set his self-consciousness against these usages and +ask for their justification. These are like the so-called +law of the Medes and Persians which alters not: customs +<pb n='clxxxix'/><anchor id='Pgclxxxix'/> +of immemorial antiquity and unquestionable sway. +They are part of a system of things with which for +good or evil the individual is utterly identified, bound +as it were hand and foot. These are, as a traveller +says<note place='foot'>Grey (G.), <hi rend='italic'>Journals of two Expeditions of Discovery in North-West +and Western Australia</hi>, ii. 220.</note>, <q>oral and unwritten traditions which teach that +certain rules of conduct are to be observed under +certain penalties; and without the aid of fixed records, +or the intervention of a succession of authorised +depositaries and expounders, these laws have been +transmitted to father and son, through unknown generations, +and are fixed in the minds of the people as +sacred and unalterable.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The antithesis then in Hegel, as in Kant, is between +Law and Morality, or rather Legality and Morality,—two +abstractions to which human development is +alternately prone to attach supreme importance. The +first stage in the objectivation of intelligence or in the +evolution of personality is the constitution of mere, +abstract, or strict right. It is the creation of institutions +and uniformities, i.e. of laws, or rights, which +express definite and stereotyped modes of behaviour. +Or, if we look at it from the individual's standpoint, we +may say his consciousness awakes to find the world +parcelled out under certain rules and divisions, which +have objective validity, and govern him with the same +absolute authority as do the circumstances of physical +nature. Under their influence every rank and individual +is alike forced to bow: to each his place and +function is assigned by an order or system which claims +an inviolable and eternal supremacy. It is not the +same place and function for each: but for each the +position and duties are predetermined in this metaphysically-physical +order. The situation and its duties +<pb n='cxc'/><anchor id='Pgcxc'/> +have been created by super-human and natural ordinance. +As the Platonic myth puts it, each order in the +social hierarchy has been framed underground by +powers that turned out men of gold, and silver, and +baser metal: or as the Norse legend tells, they are the +successive offspring of the white God, Heimdal, in his +dealings with womankind. +</p> + +<p> +The central idea of the earlier social world is the +supremacy of rights—but not of right. The sum (for it +cannot be properly called a system) of rights is a self-subsistent +world, to which man is but a servant; and +a second peculiarity of it is its inequality. If all are +equal before the laws, this only means here that the +laws, with their absolute and thorough inequality, are +indifferent to the real and personal diversities of individuals. +Even the so-called equality of primitive law is +of the <q>Eye-for-eye, Tooth-for-tooth</q> kind; it takes no +note of special circumstances; it looks abstractly and +rudely at facts, and maintains a hard and fast uniformity, +which seems the height of unfairness. Rule +stands by rule, usage beside usage,—a mere aggregate +or multitude of petty tyrants, reduced to no unity or +system, and each pressing with all the weight of an +absolute mandate. The pettiest bit of ceremonial law +is here of equal dignity with the most far-reaching +principle of political obligation. +</p> + +<p> +In the essay already referred to, Hegel has designated +something analogous to this as Natural or +Physical Ethics, or as Ethics in its relative or comparative +stage. Here Man first shows his superiority +to nature, or enters on his properly ethical function, +by transforming the physical world into his possession. +He makes himself the lord of natural objects—stamping +them as his, and not their own, making them his permanent +property, his tools, his instruments of exchange +<pb n='cxci'/><anchor id='Pgcxci'/> +and production. The fundamental ethical act is appropriation +by labour, and the first ethical world is the +creation of an economic system, the institution of property. +For property, or at least possession and appropriation, +is the dominant idea, with its collateral and +sequent principles. And at first, even human beings +are treated on the same method as other things: as +objects in a world of objects or aggregate of things: +as things to be used and acquired, as means and instruments,—not +in any sense as ends in themselves. It is +a world in which the relation of master and slave is +dominant,—where owner and employer is set in antithesis +against his tools and chattels. But the Nemesis +of his act issues in making the individual the servant of +his so-called property. He has become an objective +power by submitting himself to objectivity: he has +literally put himself into the object he has wrought, and +is now a thing among things: for what he owns, what +he has appropriated, determines what he is. The real +powers in the world thus established are the laws of +possession-holding: the laws dominate man: and he is +only freed from dependence on casual externals, by +making himself thoroughly the servant of his possessions. +</p> + +<p> +The only salvation, and it is but imperfect, that can +be reached on this stage is by the family union. The +sexual tie, is at first entirely on a level with the other +arrangements of the sphere. The man or woman is but +a chattel and a tool; a casual appropriation which gradually +is transformed into a permanent possession and +a permanent bond<note place='foot'>With some variation of ownership, perhaps, according to the +prevalence of so-called matriarchal or patriarchal households.</note>. But, as the family constituted +itself, it helped to afford a promise of better things. +An ideal interest—the religion of the household—extending +<pb n='cxcii'/><anchor id='Pgcxcii'/> +beyond the individual, and beyond the +moment,—binding past and present, and parents to +offspring, gave a new character to the relation of property. +Parents and children form a unity, which overrides +and essentially permeates their <q>difference</q> from +each other: there is no exchange, no contract, nor, in +the stricter sense, property between the members. In +the property-idea they are lifted out of their isolation, +and in the continuity of family life there is a certain +analogue of immortality. But, says Hegel, <q>though the +family be the highest totality of which Nature is capable, +the absolute identity is in it still inward, and is not +instituted in absolute form; and hence, too, the reproduction +of the totality is an appearance, the appearance +of the children<note place='foot'>Cf. the custom in certain tribes which names the father after his +child: as if the son first gave his father legitimate position in society.</note>.</q> <q>The power and the intelligence, the +<q>difference</q> of the parents, stands in inverse proportion +to the youth and vigour of the child: and these +two sides of life flee from and are sequent on each +other, and are reciprocally external<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>System der Sittlichkeit</hi>, p. 8.</note>.</q> Or, as we may +put it, the god of the family is a departed ancestor, +a ghost in the land of the dead: it has not really +a continuous and unified life. In such a state of +society—a state of nature—and in its supreme form, the +family, there is no adequate principle which though real +shall still give ideality and unity to the self-isolating +aspects of life. There is wanted something which shall +give expression to its <q>indifference,</q> which shall control +the tendency of this partial moralisation to sink at +every moment into individuality, and lift it from its immersion +in nature. Family life and economic groups +(—for these two, which Hegel subsequently separates, +are here kept close together) need an ampler and wider +<pb n='cxciii'/><anchor id='Pgcxciii'/> +life to keep them from stagnating in their several +selfishnesses. +</p> + +<p> +This freshening and corrective influence they get in +the first instance from deeds of violence and crime. +Here is the <q>negative unsettling</q> of the narrow fixities, +of the determinate conditions or relationships into which +the preceding processes of labour and acquisition have +tended to stereotype life. The harsh restriction brings +about its own undoing. Man may subject natural +objects to his formative power, but the wild rage of +senseless devastation again and again bursts forth to +restore the original formlessness. He may build up +his own pile of wealth, store up his private goods, but +the thief and the robber with the instincts of barbarian +socialism tread on his steps: and every stage of appropriation +has for its sequel a crop of acts of dispossession. +He may secure by accumulation his future life; but the +murderer for gain's sake cuts it short. And out of all +this as a necessary consequence stands avenging justice. +And in the natural world of ethics—where true moral +life has not yet arisen—this is mere retaliation or the +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>lex talionis</foreign>;—the beginning of an endless series of vengeance +and counter-vengeance, the blood-feud. Punishment, +in the stricter sense of the term,—which looks +both to antecedents and effects in character—cannot yet +come into existence; for to punish there must be something +superior to individualities, an ethical idea embodied +in an institution, to which the injurer and the injured +alike belong. But as yet punishment is only vengeance, +the personal and natural equivalent, the physical +reaction against injury, perhaps regulated and formulated +by custom and usage, but not essentially altered +from its purely retaliatory character. These crimes—or +transgressions—are thus by Hegel quaintly conceived +as storms which clear the air—which shake the individualist +<pb n='cxciv'/><anchor id='Pgcxciv'/> +out of his slumber. The scene in which transgression +thus acts is that of the so-called state of nature, +where particularism was rampant: where moral right +was not, but only the right of nature, of pre-occupation, +of the stronger, of the first maker and discoverer. Crime +is thus the <q>dialectic</q> which shakes the fixity of practical +arrangements, and calls for something in which the idea +of a higher unity, a permanent substance of life, shall +find realisation. +</p> + +<p> +The <q>positive supersession<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Aufhebung</foreign> (<emph>positive</emph>) as given in <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>absolute Sittlichkeit</foreign>.</note></q> of individualism and +naturalism in ethics is by Hegel called <q>Absolute +Ethics.</q> Under this title he describes the ethics and +religion of the state—a religion which is immanent in +the community, and an ethics which rises superior +to particularity. The picture he draws is a romance +fashioned upon the model of the Greek commonwealth +as that had been idealised by Greek literature and by +the longings of later ages for a freer life. It is but one +of the many modes in which Helena—to quote Goethe—has +fascinated the German Faust. He dreams himself +away from the prosaic worldliness of a German municipality +to the unfading splendour of the Greek city +with its imagined coincidence of individual will with +universal purpose. There is in such a commonwealth +no pain of surrender and of sacrifice, and no subsequent +compensation: for, at the very moment of resigning self-will +to common aims, he enjoys it retained with the +added zest of self-expansion. He is not so left to himself +as to feel from beyond the restraint of a law which +controls—even if it wisely and well controls—individual +effort. There is for his happy circumstances no possibility +of doing otherwise. Or, it may be, Hegel has +reminiscences from the ideals of other nations than the +Greek. He recalls the Israelite depicted by the Law-adoring +<pb n='cxcv'/><anchor id='Pgcxcv'/> +psalmist, whose delight is to do the will of the +Lord, whom the zeal of God's house has consumed, +whose whole being runs on in one pellucid stream with +the universal and eternal stream of divine commandment. +Such a frame of spirit, where the empirical +consciousness with all its soul and strength and mind +identifies its mission into conformity with the absolute +order, is the mood of absolute Ethics. It is what some +have spoken of as the True life, as the Eternal life; in +it, says Hegel, the individual exists <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>auf ewige Weise</foreign><note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>System der Sittlichkeit</hi>, p. 15.</note>, as +it were <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>sub specie aeternitatis</foreign>: his life is hid with his +fellows in the common life of his people. His every +act, and thought, and will, get their being and significance +from a reality which is established in him as +a permanent spirit. It is there that he, in the fuller +sense, attains αὐτάρκεια, or finds himself no longer a mere +part, but an ideal totality. This totality is realised under +the particular form of a Nation (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Volk</foreign>), which in the visible +sphere represents (or rather is, as a particular) the +absolute and infinite. Such a unity is neither the mere +sum of isolated individuals, nor a mere majority ruling +by numbers: but the fraternal and organic commonwealth +which brings all classes and all rights from their +particularistic independence into an ideal identity and +indifference<note place='foot'>This phraseology shows the influence of Schelling, with whom +he was at this epoch associated. See <hi rend='italic'>Prolegomena to the Study of +Hegel</hi>, ch. xiv.</note>. Here all are not merely equal before the +laws: but the law itself is a living and organic unity, +self-correcting, subordinating and organising, and no +longer merely defining individual privileges and so-called +liberties. <q>In such conjunction of the universal +with the particularity lies the divinity of a nation: or, if +we give this universal a separate place in our ideas, +<pb n='cxcvi'/><anchor id='Pgcxcvi'/> +it is the God of the nation.</q> But in this complete +accordance between concept and intuition, between +visible and invisible, where symbol and significate are +one, religion and ethics are indistinguishable. It is the +old conception (and in its highest sense) of Theocracy<note place='foot'>Cf. the intermediate function assigned (see above, p. <ref target='Pgclxxxiii'>clxxxiii</ref>) to +the priests and the aged.</note>. +God is the national head and the national life: and in +him all individuals have their <q>difference</q> rendered +<q>indifferent.</q> <q>Such an ethical life is absolute truth, +for untruth is only in the fixture of a single mode: but +in the everlasting being of the nation all singleness is +superseded. It is absolute culture; for in the eternal +is the real and empirical annihilation and prescription of +all limited modality. It is absolute disinterestedness: +for in the eternal there is nothing private and personal. +It, and each of its movements, is the highest beauty: +for beauty is but the eternal made actual and given +concrete shape. It is without pain, and blessed: for in +it all difference and all pain is superseded. It is the +divine, absolute, real, existing and being, under no veil; +nor need one first raise it up into the ideality of divinity, +and extract it from the appearance and empirical intuition; +but it is, and immediately, absolute intuition<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>System der Sittlichkeit</hi>, p. 19.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +If we compare this language with the statement of the +Encyclopaedia we can see how for the moment Hegel's +eye is engrossed with the glory of the ideal nation. In +it, the moral life embraces and is co-extensive with religion, +art and science: practice and theory are at one: +life in the idea knows none of those differences which, +in the un-ideal world, make art and morality often antithetical, +and set religion at variance with science. It +is, as we have said, a memory of Greek and perhaps +Hebrew ideals. Or rather it is by the help of such +<pb n='cxcvii'/><anchor id='Pgcxcvii'/> +memories the affirmation of the essential unity of life—the +true, complete, many-sided life—which is the presupposition +and idea that culture and morals rest upon +and from which they get their supreme sanction, i.e. their +constitutive principle and unity. Even in the Encyclopaedia<note place='foot'>See <hi rend='italic'>infra</hi>, p. <ref target='Pg156'>156</ref>.</note> +Hegel endeavours to guard against the severance +of morality and art and philosophy which may be rashly +inferred in consequence of his serial order of treatment. +<q>Religion,</q> he remarks, <q>is the very substance of the +moral life itself and of the state.... The ethical life is +the divine spirit indwelling in consciousness, as it is +actually present in a nation and its individual members.</q> +Yet, as we see, there is a distinction. The process of +history carries out a judgment on nation after nation, +and reveals the divine as not only immanent in the +ethical life but as ever expanding the limited national +spirit till it become a spirit of universal humanity. +Still—and this is perhaps for each time always the +more important—the national unity—not indeed as +a multitude, nor as a majority—is the supreme real +appearance of the Eternal and Absolute. +</p> + +<p> +Having thus described the nation as an organic +totality, he goes on to point out that the political constitution +shows this character by forming a triplicity of +political orders. In one of these there is but a silent, +practical identity, in faith and trust, with the totality: in +the second there is a thorough disruption of interest +into particularity: and in the third, there is a living and +intellectual identity or indifference, which combines the +widest range of individual development with the completest +unity of political loyalty. This last order is that +which lives in conscious identification of private with +public duty: all that it does has a universal and public +function. Such a body is the ideal Nobility—the +<pb n='cxcviii'/><anchor id='Pgcxcviii'/> +nobility which is the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>servus servorum Dei</foreign>, the supreme +servant of humanity. Its function is to maintain general +interests, to give the other orders (peasantry and industrials) +security,—receiving in return from these others +the means of subsistence. <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>Noblesse oblige</foreign> gives the +death-blow to particular interests, and imposes the duty +of exhibiting, in the clearest form, the supreme reality +of absolute morality, and of being to the rest an +unperturbed ideal of aesthetic, ethical, religious, and +philosophical completeness. +</p> + +<p> +It is here alone, in this estate which is absolutely +disinterested, that the virtues appear in their true +light. To the ordinary moralising standpoint they seem +severally to be, in their separation, charged with independent +value. But from the higher point of view the +existence, and still more the accentuation of single +virtues, is a mark of incompleteness. Even quality, it +has been said, involves its defects: it can only shine by +eclipsing or reflecting something else. The completely +moral is not the sum of the several virtues, but the +reduction of them to indifference. It is thus that when +Plato tries to get at the unity of virtue, their aspect of +difference tends to be subordinated. <q>The movement of +absolute morality runs through all the virtues, but settles +fixedly in none.</q> It is more than love <emph>to</emph> fatherland, and +nation, and laws:—that still implies a relation to something +and involves a difference. For love—the mortal +passion, where <q>self is not annulled</q>—is the process of +approximation, while unity is not yet attained, but wished +and aimed at: and when it is complete—and become +<q>such love as spirits know<note place='foot'>Wordsworth's <hi rend='italic'>Laodamia</hi>.</note></q>—it gives place to a calmer +rest and an active immanence. The absolute morality +is <emph>life in</emph> the fatherland and for the nation. In the individual +however it is the process upward and inward +<pb n='cxcix'/><anchor id='Pgcxcix'/> +that we see, not the consummation. Then the identity +appears as an ideal, as a tendency not yet accomplished +to its end, a possibility not yet made fully actual. At +bottom—in the divine substance in which the individual +inheres—the identity is present: but in the appearance, +we have only the passage from possible to +actual, a passage which has the aspect of a struggle. +Hence the moral act appears as a virtue, with merit or +desert. It is accordingly the very characteristic of +virtue to signalise its own incompleteness: it emerges +into actuality only through antagonism, and with a taint +of imperfection clinging to it. Thus, in the field of +absolute morality, if the virtues appear, it is only in their +transiency. If they were undisputedly real in morality, +they would not separately show. To feel that you have +done well implies that you have not done wholly well: +self-gratulation in meritorious deed is the re-action +from the shudder at feeling that the self was not wholly +good. +</p> + +<p> +The essential unity of virtue—its negative character +as regards all the empirical variety of virtues—is seen +in the excellences required by the needs of war. These +military requirements demonstrate the mere relativity +and therefore non-virtuousness of the special virtues. +They equally protest against the common beliefs in the +supreme dignity of labour and its utilities. But if bravery +or soldierlike virtue be essentially a virtue of virtues, +it is only a negative virtue after all. It is the blast of +the universal sweeping away all the habitations and +fixed structures of particularist life. If it is a unity of +virtue, it is only a negative unity—an indifference. If +it avoid the parcelling of virtue into a number of +imperfect and sometimes contradictory parts, it does so +only to present a bare negation. The soldier, therefore, +if in potentiality the unity of all the virtues, may +<pb n='cc'/><anchor id='Pgcc'/> +tend in practice to represent the ability to do without +any of them<note place='foot'><p><q>For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' <q>Chuck him out, the brute!</q><lb/> +But it's <q>Saviour of 'is country</q> when the guns begin to shoot.</q></p></note>. +</p> + +<p> +The home of these <q>relative</q> virtues—of morality in +the ordinary sense—is the life of the second order in +the commonwealth: the order of industry and commerce. +In this sphere the idea of the universal is +gradually lost to view: it becomes, says Hegel, only +a thought or a creature of the mind, which does not +affect practice. The materialistic worker of civilisation +does not see further than the empirical existence of +individuals: his horizon is limited by the family, and +his final ideal is a competency of comfort in possessions +and revenues. The supreme universal to which he +attains as the climax of his evolution is only money. +But it is only with the vaster development of commerce +that this terrible consequence ensues. At first as +a mere individual, he has higher aims, though not the +highest. He has a limited ideal determined by his +special sphere of work. To win respect—the character +for a limited truthfulness and honesty and skilful work—is +his ambition. He lives in a conceit of his performance—his +utility—the esteem of his special circle. To +his commercial soul the military order is a scarecrow +and a nuisance: military honour is but trash. Yet if +his range of idea is narrow and engrossing in details, +his aim is to get worship, to be recognised as the best +in his little sphere. But with the growth of the trading +spirit his character changes: he becomes the mere +capitalist, is denationalised, has no definite work and +can claim no individualised function. Money now +measures all things: it is the sole ultimate reality. It +<pb n='cci'/><anchor id='Pgcci'/> +transforms everything into a relation of contract: even +vengeance is equated in terms of money. Its motto is, +The Exchanges must be honoured, though honour and +morality may go to the dogs. So far as it is concerned, +there is no nation, but a federation of shopkeepers. +Such an one is the <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>bourgeois</foreign> (the <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Bürger</foreign>, as distinct +from the peasant or <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Bauer</foreign> and the <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Adel</foreign>). As an +artisan—i.e. a mere industrial, he knows no country, +but at best the reputation and interest of his own guild-union +with its partial object. He is narrow, but honest +and respectable. As a mere commercial agent, he knows +no country: his field is the world, but the world not in +its concreteness and variety, but in the abstract aspect +of a money-bag and an exchange. The larger totality +is indeed not altogether out of sight. But if he contribute +to the needy, either his sacrifice is lifeless in +proportion as it becomes general, or loses generality as +it becomes lively. As regards his general services to +the great life of his national state<note place='foot'><q>I can assure you,</q> said Werner (the merchant), <q>that I never +reflected on the State in my life. My tolls, charges and dues I have +paid for no other reason than that it was established usage.</q> (<hi rend='italic'>Wilh. +Meisters Lehrjahre</hi>, viii. 2.)</note>, they are unintelligently +and perhaps grudgingly rendered. +</p> + +<p> +Of the peasant order Hegel has less to say. On one +side the <q>country</q> as opposed to the <q>town</q> has a closer +natural sympathy with the common and general interest: +and the peasantry is the undifferentiated, solid and +sound, basis of the national life. It forms the submerged +mass, out of which the best soldiers are made, +and which out of the depths of earth brings forward +nourishment as well as all the materials of elementary +necessity. Faithfulness and loyalty are its virtues: +but it is personal allegiance to a commanding superior,—not +to a law or a general view—for the peasant is +<pb n='ccii'/><anchor id='Pgccii'/> +weak in comprehensive intelligence, though shrewd in +detailed observation. +</p> + +<p> +Of the purely political function of the state Hegel in +this sketch says almost nothing. But under the head of +the general government of the state he deals with its +social functions. For a moment he refers to the well-known +distinction of the legislative, judicial and executive +powers. But it is only to remark that <q>in every +governmental act all three are conjoined. They are +abstractions, none of which can get a reality of its +own,—which, in other words, cannot be constituted +and organised as powers. Legislation, judicature, and +executive are something completely formal, empty, and +contentless.... Whether the others are or are not bare +abstractions, empty activities, depends entirely on the +executive power; and this is absolutely the government<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>System der Sittlichkeit</hi>, p. 40.</note>.</q> +Treating government as the organic movement +by which the universal and the particular in the commonwealth +come into relations, he finds that it presents +three forms, or gives rise to three systems. The highest +and last of these is the <q>educational</q> system. By this +he understands all that activity by which the intelligence +of the state tries directly to mould and guide the character +and fortunes of its members: all the means of +culture and discipline, whether in general or for individuals, +all training to public function, to truthfulness, +to good manners. Under the same head come conquest +and colonisation as state agencies. The second system +is the judicial, which instead of, like the former, aiming +at the formation or reformation of its members is satisfied +by subjecting individual transgression to a process +of rectification by the general principle. With regard +to the system of judicature, Hegel argues for a variety +of procedure to suit different ranks, and for a corresponding +<pb n='cciii'/><anchor id='Pgcciii'/> +modification of penalties. <q>Formal rigid +equality is just what does not spare the character. The +same penalty which in one estate brings no infamy causes +in another a deep and irremediable hurt.</q> And with +regard to the after life of the transgressor who has +borne his penalty: <q>Punishment is the reconciliation +of the law with itself. No further reproach for his +crime can be addressed to the person who has undergone +his punishment. He is restored to membership +of his estate<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>System der Sittlichkeit</hi>, p. 65.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +In the first of the three systems, the economic system, +or <q>System of wants,</q> the state seems at first hardly to +appear in its universal and controlling function at all. +Here the individual depends for the satisfaction of his +physical needs on a blind, unconscious destiny, on the +obscure and incalculable properties of supply and +demand in the whole interconnexion of commodities. +But even this is not all. With the accumulation of +wealth in inequality, and the growth of vast capitals, +there is substituted for the dependence of the individual +on the general resultant of a vast number of agencies +a dependence on one enormously rich individual, who +can control the physical destinies of a nation. But +a nation, truly speaking, is there no more. The industrial +order has parted into a mere abstract workman on +one hand, and the <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>grande richesse</foreign> on the other. <q>It +has lost its capacity of an organic absolute intuition and +of respect for the divine—external though its divinity be: +and there sets in the bestiality of contempt for all that is +noble. The mere wisdomless universal, the mass of +wealth, is the essential: and the ethical principle, the +absolute bond of the nation, is vanished; and the nation +is dissolved<note place='foot'><hi rend='italic'>Ibid.</hi> p. 46.</note>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +It would be a long and complicated task to sift, in +<pb n='cciv'/><anchor id='Pgcciv'/> +these ill-digested but profound suggestions, the real +meaning from the formal statement. They are, like +Utopia, beyond the range of practical politics. The +modern reader, whose political conceptions are limited +by contemporary circumstance, may find them archaic, +medieval, quixotic. But for those who behind the +words and forms can see the substance and the +idea, they will perhaps come nearer the conception of +ideal commonwealth than many reforming programmes. +Compared with the maturer statements of the <hi rend='italic'>Philosophy +of Law</hi>, they have the faults of the Romantic age to +which their inception belongs. Yet even in that later +exposition there is upheld the doctrine of the supremacy +of the eternal State against everything particular, class-like, +and temporary; a doctrine which has made +Hegel—as it made Fichte—a voice in that <q>professorial +socialism</q> which is at least as old as Plato. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='003'/><anchor id='Pg003'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Introduction.</head> + +<p> +§ 377. The knowledge of Mind is the highest and +hardest, just because it is the most <q>concrete</q> of +sciences. The significance of that <q>absolute</q> commandment, +<emph>Know thyself</emph>—whether we look at it in itself +or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance—is +not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect +of the <emph>particular</emph> capacities, character, propensities, and +foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands +means that of man's genuine reality—of what is essentially +and ultimately true and real—of mind as the true +and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of +mental philosophy to teach what is called <emph>knowledge of +men</emph>—the knowledge whose aim is to detect the <emph>peculiarities</emph>, +passions, and foibles of other men, and lay +bare what are called the recesses of the human heart. +Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, +unless on the assumption that we know the <emph>universal</emph>—man +as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And +for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant +and <emph>untrue</emph> aspects of mental life, it fails to reach +the underlying essence of them all—the mind itself. +</p> + +<pb n='004'/><anchor id='Pg004'/> + +<p> +§ 378. Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, +Rational Psychology, has been already alluded to in +the Introduction to the Logic as an <emph>abstract</emph> and +generalising metaphysic of the subject. <emph>Empirical</emph> (or +inductive) psychology, on the other hand, deals with +the <q>concrete</q> mind: and, after the revival of the +sciences, when observation and experience had been +made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete +reality, such psychology was worked on the same +lines as other sciences. In this way it came about +that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the +inductive science, and so prevented from getting any +concrete embodiment or detail: whilst at the same time +the inductive science clung to the conventional common-sense +metaphysic, with its analysis into forces, various +activities, &c., and rejected any attempt at a <q>speculative</q> +treatment. +</p> + +<p> +The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his +discussions on its special aspects and states, are for +this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps +even the sole, work of philosophical value on this +topic. The main aim of a philosophy of mind can +only be to re-introduce unity of idea and principle into +the theory of mind, and so re-interpret the lesson of +those Aristotelian books. +</p> + +<p> +§ 379. Even our own sense of the mind's <emph>living</emph> unity +naturally protests against any attempt to break it up +into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the +same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each +other. But the craving for a <emph>comprehension</emph> of the +unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come across +distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, +antitheses between free <emph>psychic</emph> agency and the +corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we equally +note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the +<pb n='005'/><anchor id='Pg005'/> +other. In modern times especially the phenomena of +<emph>animal magnetism</emph> have given, even in experience, +a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity +of soul, and of the power of its <q>ideality.</q> Before +these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common +sense were struck with confusion; and the necessity +of a <q>speculative</q> examination with a view to the +removal of difficulties was more directly forced upon +the student. +</p> + +<p> +§ 380. The <q>concrete</q> nature of mind involves for the +observer the peculiar difficulty that the several grades +and special types which develop its intelligible unity in +detail are not left standing as so many separate +existences confronting its more advanced aspects. It is +otherwise in external nature. There, matter and movement, +for example, have a manifestation all their own—it +is the solar system; and similarly the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>differentiae</foreign> of +sense-perception have a sort of earlier existence in the +properties of <emph>bodies</emph>, and still more independently in +the four elements. The species and grades of mental +evolution, on the contrary, lose their separate existence +and become factors, states and features in the higher +grades of development. As a consequence of this, +a lower and more abstract aspect of mind betrays the +presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. +Under the guise of sensation, e.g., we may find the very +highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. +And so sensation, which is but a mere form and +vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the +proper seat and, as it were, the source of those moral +and religious principles with which it is charged; and +the moral and religious principles thus modified may +seem to call for treatment as species of sensation. But +at the same time, when lower grades of mental life are +under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire +<pb n='006'/><anchor id='Pg006'/> +to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct +attention to more advanced grades for which they are +mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by +anticipation which properly belong to later stages of +development (e.g. in dealing with natural awaking from +sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in +dealing with mental derangement we must speak of +intellect). +</p> + +<div> +<head>What Mind (or Spirit) is.</head> + +<p> +§ 381. From our point of view Mind has for its <emph>presupposition</emph> +Nature, of which it is the truth, and for that +reason its <foreign rend='italic'>absolute prius</foreign>. In this its truth Nature is +vanished, and mind has resulted as the <q>Idea</q> entered +on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of +the Idea are one—either is the intelligent unity, the +notion. This identity is <emph>absolute negativity</emph>—for whereas +in Nature the intelligent unity has its objectivity perfect +but externalised, this self-externalisation has been +nullified and the unity in that way been made one +and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it +is this identity only so far as it is a return out of +nature. +</p> + +<p> +§ 382. For this reason the essential, but formally +essential, feature of mind is Liberty: i.e. it is the +notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered +as this formal aspect, it <emph>may</emph> withdraw itself from everything +external and from its own externality, its very +existence; it can thus submit to infinite <emph>pain</emph>, the +negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, +it can keep itself affirmative in this negativity and +possess its own identity. All this is possible so long +as it is considered in its abstract self-contained +universality. +</p> + +<p> +§ 383. This universality is also its determinate sphere +<pb n='007'/><anchor id='Pg007'/> +of being. Having a being of its own, the universal +is self-particularising, whilst it still remains self-identical. +Hence the special mode of mental being is +<q><emph>manifestation</emph>.</q> The spirit is not some one mode or +meaning which finds utterance or externality only in +a form distinct from itself: it does not manifest or +reveal <emph>something</emph>, but its very mode and meaning is this +revelation. And thus in its mere possibility Mind is at +the same moment an infinite, <q>absolute,</q> <emph>actuality</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 384. <emph>Revelation</emph>, taken to mean the revelation of the +<emph>abstract</emph> Idea, is an unmediated transition to Nature +which <emph>comes</emph> to be. As Mind is free, its manifestation +is to <emph>set forth</emph> Nature as <emph>its</emph> world; but because it is +reflection, it, in thus setting forth its world, at the +same time <emph>presupposes</emph> the world as a nature independently +existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal +is thus to create a world as its being—a being in +which the mind procures the <emph>affirmation</emph> and <emph>truth</emph> of +its freedom. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>The Absolute is Mind</emph> (Spirit)—this is the supreme +definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and +to grasp its meaning and burthen was, we may say, the +ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: +it was the point to which turned the impulse of all +religion and science: and it is this impulse that must +explain the history of the world. The word <q>Mind</q> +(Spirit)—and some glimpse of its meaning—was found at +an early period: and the spirituality of God is the lesson +of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own +element of intelligible unity to get hold of what was +thus given as a mental image, and what implicitly is the +ultimate reality: and that problem is not genuinely, and +by rational methods, solved so long as liberty and +intelligible unity is not the theme and the soul of +philosophy. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='008'/><anchor id='Pg008'/> + +<div> +<head>Subdivision.</head> + +<p> +§ 385. The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three +stages:— +</p> + +<p> +(1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the <emph>ideal</emph> +totality of the Idea—i.e. it has before it all that its +notion contains: its being is to be self-contained and +free. This is <emph>Mind Subjective</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +(2) In the form of <emph>reality</emph>: realised, i.e. in a <emph>world</emph> +produced and to be produced by it: in this world +freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. +This is <emph>Mind Objective</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +(3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and, of mind +as ideality and concept, which essentially and actually +is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolute +truth. This is <emph>Mind Absolute</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 386. The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind +embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea; +thus finitude here means the disproportion between the +concept and the reality—but with the qualification that +it is a shadow cast by the mind's own light—a show or +illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barrier +to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realise and +become conscious of freedom as <emph>its</emph> very being, i.e. to +be fully <emph>manifested</emph>. The several steps of this activity, +on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is +the function of the finite mind to linger, and through +which it has to pass, are steps in its liberation. In the +full truth of that liberation is given the identification of +the three stages—finding a world presupposed before +us, generating a world as our own creation, and gaining +freedom from it and in it. To the infinite form of this +truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness +of it. +</p> + +<p> +A rigid application of the category of finitude by +<pb n='009'/><anchor id='Pg009'/> +the abstract logician is chiefly seen in dealing with +Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict +logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, +to adhere to the point of view of finitude, and the wish +to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity, if not of +insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a <emph>modesty</emph> +of thought, as treats the finite as something altogether +fixed and <emph>absolute</emph>, is the worst of virtues; and to stick +to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most +unsound sort of theory. The category of finitude was +at a much earlier period elucidated and explained at its +place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logic +for the more specific though still simple thought-forms +of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete +forms, has merely to show that the finite <emph>is not</emph>, i.e. is +not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence +to something higher. This finitude of the spheres so +far examined is the dialectic that makes a thing have +its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the +intelligent unity and the <emph>implicit</emph> Eternal, is itself just +the consummation of that internal act by which nullity +is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the +modesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity—the +finite—in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore +vanity. In the course of the mind's development we +shall see this vanity appear as <emph>wickedness</emph> at that turning-point +at which mind has reached its extreme immersion +in its subjectivity and its most central contradiction. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='010'/><anchor id='Pg010'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Section I. Mind Subjective.</head> + +<p> +§ 387. Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is +mind as <emph>cognitive</emph>: Cognition, however, being taken here +not as a merely logical category of the Idea (§ 223), but +in the sense appropriate to the <emph>concrete</emph> mind. +</p> + +<p> +Subjective mind is:— +</p> + +<p> +(A) Immediate or implicit: a soul—the Spirit in +<emph>Nature</emph>—the object treated by <emph>Anthropology</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +(B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical reflection +into itself and into other things: mind in correlation +or particularisation: consciousness—the object treated +by the <emph>Phenomenology of Mind</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +(C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent +subject—the object treated by <emph>Psychology</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +In the Soul is the <emph>awaking of Consciousness</emph>: Consciousness +sets itself up as Reason, awaking at one +bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason +by its activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the +consciousness of its intelligent unity. +</p> + +<p> +For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension +each modification it presents is an advance of <emph>development</emph>: +and so in mind every character under which it +appears is a stage in a process of specification and +development, a step forward towards its goal, in order +<pb n='011'/><anchor id='Pg011'/> +to make itself into, and to realise in itself, what it +implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, +and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at +the beginning (and so for the observer) it is <emph>for itself</emph>—for +the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. +The ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what +the mind or soul is, what happens to it, what it does. +The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which +displays such features as its acts and utterances, from +which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and +powers it possesses—all without being aware that the +act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it +with that character in our conception and makes it reach +a higher stage of being than it explicitly had before. +</p> + +<p> +We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from +the progress here studied what we call education and +instruction. The sphere of education is the individual's +only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist +in them. But in the philosophic theory of mind, mind +is studied as self-instruction and self-education in very +essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the +process which brings it forward to itself, links it in unity +with itself, and so makes it actual mind. +</p> + +<pb n='012'/><anchor id='Pg012'/> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Sub-Section A. Anthropology. The Soul.</head> + +<p> +§ 388. Spirit (Mind) <emph>came into</emph> being as the truth of +Nature. But not merely is it, as such a result, to be +held the true and real first of what went before: this +becoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion +the special meaning of <q><emph>free judgment</emph>.</q> Mind, thus come +into being, means therefore that Nature in its own self +realises its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that +Mind presupposes itself no longer as the universality +which in corporal individuality is always self-externalised, +but as a universality which in its concretion and totality +is one and simple. At such a stage it is not yet mind, +but <emph>soul</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 389. The soul is no separate immaterial entity. +Wherever there is Nature, the soul is its universal +immaterialism, its simple <q>ideal</q> life. Soul is the <emph>substance</emph> +or <q>absolute</q> basis of all the particularising and +individualising of mind: it is in the soul that mind +finds the material on which its character is wrought, +and the soul remains the pervading, identical ideality +of it all. But as it is still conceived thus abstractly, the +soul is only the <emph>sleep</emph> of mind—the passive νοῦς of +Aristotle, which is potentially all things. +</p> + +<p> +The question of the immateriality of the soul has no +interest, except where, on the one hand, matter is +<pb n='013'/><anchor id='Pg013'/> +regarded as something <emph>true</emph>, and mind conceived as a +<emph>thing</emph>, on the other. But in modern times even the +physicists have found matters grow thinner in their +hands: they have come upon <emph>imponderable</emph> matters, like +heat, light, &c., to which they might perhaps add space +and time. These <q>imponderables,</q> which have lost the +property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and, in a sense, +even the capacity of offering resistance, have still, however, +a sensible existence and outness of part to part; +whereas the <emph><q>vital</q> matter</emph>, which may also be found +enumerated among them, not merely lacks gravity, but +even every other aspect of existence which might lead us +to treat it as material. The fact is that in the Idea of +Life the self-externalism of nature is <emph>implicitly</emph> at an end: +subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life—with +this proviso, however, that its existence or objectivity +is still at the same time forfeited to the sway of +self-externalism. It is otherwise with Mind. There, in +the intelligible unity which exists as freedom, as absolute +negativity, and not as the immediate or natural individual, +the object or the reality of the intelligible unity is the +unity itself; and so the self-externalism, which is the +fundamental feature of matter, has been completely +dissipated and transmuted into universality, or the +subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. Mind is the +existent truth of matter—the truth that matter itself has +no truth. +</p> + +<p> +A cognate question is that of the <emph>community of soul +and body</emph>. This community (interdependence) was +assumed as a <emph>fact</emph>, and the only problem was how to +<emph>comprehend</emph> it. The usual answer, perhaps, was to call +it an <emph>incomprehensible</emph> mystery; and, indeed, if we take +them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely +independent, they are as impenetrable to each other as +one piece of matter to another, each being supposed +<pb n='014'/><anchor id='Pg014'/> +to be found only in the pores of the other, i.e. where +the other is not: whence Epicurus, when attributing to +the gods a residence in the pores, was consistent in not +imposing on them any connexion with the world. +A somewhat different answer has been given by all +philosophers since this relation came to be expressly +discussed. Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and +Leibnitz have all indicated God as this <foreign rend='italic'>nexus</foreign>. They +meant that the finitude of soul and matter were only +ideal and unreal distinctions; and, so holding, these +philosophers took God, not, as so often is done, merely as +another word for the incomprehensible, but rather as the +sole true identity of finite mind and matter. But either +this identity, as in the case of Spinoza, is too abstract, +or, as in the case of Leibnitz, though his Monad of +monads brings things into being, it does so only by an +act of judgment or choice. Hence, with Leibnitz, the +result is a distinction between soul and the corporeal +(or material), and the identity is only like the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>copula</foreign> of +a judgment, and does not rise or develop into system, +into the absolute syllogism. +</p> + +<p> +§ 390. The Soul is at first— +</p> + +<p> +(<hi rend='italic'>a</hi>) In its immediate natural mode—the natural soul, +which only <emph>is</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +(<hi rend='italic'>b</hi>) Secondly, it is a soul which <emph>feels</emph>, as individualised, +enters into correlation with its immediate being, and, in +the modes of that being, retains an abstract independence. +</p> + +<p> +(<hi rend='italic'>c</hi>) Thirdly, its immediate being—or corporeity—is +moulded into it, and with that corporeity it exists as +<emph>actual</emph> soul. +</p> + +<div> +<head>(a) The Physical Soul<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Natürliche Seele.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 391. The soul universal, described, it may be, as an +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>anima mundi</foreign>, a world-soul, must not be fixed on that +<pb n='015'/><anchor id='Pg015'/> +account as a single subject; it is rather the universal +<emph>substance</emph> which has its actual truth only in individuals +and single subjects. Thus, when it presents itself as +a single soul, it is a single soul which <emph>is</emph> merely: its +only modes are modes of natural life. These have, so +to speak, behind its ideality a free existence: i.e. they +are natural objects for consciousness, but objects to +which the soul as such does not behave as to something +external. These features rather are <emph>physical +qualities</emph> of which it finds itself possessed. +</p> + +<div> +<head>(α) Physical Qualities<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Natürliche Qualitäten.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 392. While still a <q>substance</q> (i.e. a physical soul) +the mind (1) takes part in the general planetary life, +feels the difference of climates, the changes of the +seasons and the periods of the day, &c. This life of +nature for the main shows itself only in occasional +strain or disturbance of mental tone. +</p> + +<p> +In recent times a good deal has been said of the +cosmical, sidereal, and telluric life of man. In such +a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: +their specific characters and their particular phases of +growth depend, in many cases completely, and always +more or less, upon it. In the case of man these points +of dependence lose importance, just in proportion to his +civilisation, and the more his whole frame of soul is +based upon a substructure of mental freedom. The +history of the world is not bound up with revolutions +in the solar system, any more than the destinies of +individuals with the positions of the planets. +</p> + +<p> +The difference of climate has a more solid and +vigorous influence. But the response to the changes +of the seasons and hours of the day is found only in +faint changes of mood, which come expressly to the +<pb n='016'/><anchor id='Pg016'/> +fore only in morbid states (including insanity) and at +periods when the self-conscious life suffers depression. +</p> + +<p> +In nations less intellectually emancipated, which +therefore live more in harmony with nature, we find +amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility +<emph>a few</emph> real cases of such sympathy, and on that foundation +what seems to be marvellous prophetic vision of +coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. +But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold, even these +few and slight susceptibilities, based upon participation +in the common life of nature, disappear. Animals and +plants, on the contrary, remain for ever subject to such +influences. +</p> + +<p> +§ 393. (2) According to the concrete differences of +the terrestrial globe, the general planetary life of the +nature-governed mind specialises itself and breaks up +into the several nature-governed minds which, on the +whole, give expression to the nature of the geographical +continents and constitute the diversities of <emph>race</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +The contrast between the earth's poles, the land +towards the north pole being more aggregated and +preponderant over sea, whereas in the southern hemisphere +it runs out in sharp points, widely distant from +each other, introduces into the differences of continents +a further modification which Treviranus (<hi rend='italic'>Biology</hi>, Part +II) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. +</p> + +<p> +§ 394. This diversity descends into specialities, that +may be termed <emph>local</emph> minds—shown in the outward +modes of life and occupation, bodily structure and +disposition, but still more in the inner tendency and +capacity of the intellectual and moral character of the +several peoples. +</p> + +<p> +Back to the very beginnings of national history we see +the several nations each possessing a persistent type of +its own. +</p> + +<pb n='017'/><anchor id='Pg017'/> + +<p> +§ 395. (3) The soul is further de-universalised into +the individualised subject. But this subjectivity is here +only considered as a differentiation and singling out of +the modes which nature gives; we find it as the special +temperament, talent, character, physiognomy, or other +disposition and idiosyncrasy, of families or single +individuals. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(β) Physical Alterations.</head> + +<p> +§ 396. Taking the soul as an individual, we find its +diversities, as alterations in it, the one permanent subject, +and as stages in its development. As they are at once +physical and mental diversities, a more concrete definition +or description of them would require us to anticipate +an acquaintance with the formed and matured +mind. +</p> + +<p> +The (1) first of these is the natural lapse of the ages +in man's life. He begins with <emph>Childhood</emph>—mind wrapt up +in itself. His next step is the fully-developed antithesis, +the strain and struggle of a universality which is still +subjective (as seen in ideals, fancies, hopes, ambitions) +against his immediate individuality. And that individuality +marks both the world which, as it exists, fails to +meet his ideal requirements, and the position of the +individual himself, who is still short of independence +and not fully equipped for the part he has to play +(<emph>Youth</emph>). Thirdly, we see man in his true relation to +his environment, recognising the objective necessity +and reasonableness of the world as he finds it,—a +world no longer incomplete, but able in the work +which it collectively achieves to afford the individual +a place and a security for his performance. By his +share in this collective work he first is really <emph>somebody</emph>, +gaining an effective existence and an objective value +(<emph>Manhood</emph>). Last of all comes the finishing touch to +<pb n='018'/><anchor id='Pg018'/> +this unity with objectivity: a unity which, while on its +realist side it passes into the <emph>inertia</emph> of deadening habit, +on its idealist side gains freedom from the limited +interests and entanglements of the outward present +(<emph>Old Age</emph>). +</p> + +<p> +§ 397. (2) Next we find the individual subject to +a <emph>real</emph> antithesis, leading it to seek and find <emph>itself</emph> in +<emph>another</emph> individual. This—the <emph>sexual relation</emph>—on a +physical basis, shows, on its one side, subjectivity +remaining in an instinctive and emotional harmony of +moral life and love, and not pushing these tendencies +to an extreme <emph>universal</emph> phase, in purposes political, +scientific or artistic; and on the other, shows an active +half, where the individual is the vehicle of a struggle of +universal and objective interests with the given conditions +(both of his own existence and of that of the +external world), carrying out these universal principles +into a unity with the world which is his own +work. The sexual tie acquires its moral and spiritual +significance and function in the <emph>family</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 398. (3) When the individuality, or self-centralised +being, distinguishes itself from its <emph>mere</emph> being, this immediate +judgment is the <emph>waking</emph> of the soul, which confronts +its self-absorbed natural life, in the first instance, as one +natural quality and state confronts another state, viz. +<emph>sleep</emph>.—The waking is not merely for the observer, or +externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the <emph>judgment</emph> +(primary partition) of the individual soul—which +is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to +its mere existence, distinguishing itself from its still +undifferentiated universality. The waking state includes +generally all self-conscious and rational activity in which +the mind realises its own distinct self.—Sleep is an +invigoration of this activity—not as a merely negative +rest from it, but as a return back from the world of +<pb n='019'/><anchor id='Pg019'/> +specialisation, from dispersion into phases where it has +grown hard and stiff,—a return into the general nature +of subjectivity, which is the substance of those specialised +energies and their absolute master. +</p> + +<p> +The distinction between sleep and waking is one of +those <emph>posers</emph>, as they may be called, which are often +addressed to philosophy:—Napoleon, e.g., on a visit to +the University of Pavia, put this question to the class of +ideology. The characterisation given in the section is +abstract; it primarily treats waking merely as a natural +fact, containing the mental element <foreign rend='italic'>implicite</foreign> but not +yet as invested with a special being of its own. If we are +to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals +it remains the same), we must take the self-existence +of the individual soul in its higher aspects as +the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. The +difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states +properly arises, only when we also take into account the +dreams in sleep and describe these dreams, as well as +the mental representations in the sober waking consciousness, +under one and the same title of mental representations. +Thus superficially classified as states of mental +representation the two coincide, because we have lost +sight of the difference; and in the case of any assignable +distinction of waking consciousness, we can always +return to the trivial remark that all this is nothing more +than mental idea. But the concrete theory of the +waking soul in its realised being views it as <emph>consciousness</emph> +and <emph>intellect</emph>: and the world of intelligent consciousness +is something quite different from a picture of mere +ideas and images. The latter are in the main only +externally conjoined, in an unintelligent way, by the +laws of the so-called <emph>Association of Ideas</emph>; though here +and there of course logical principles may also be +operative. But in the waking state man behaves +<pb n='020'/><anchor id='Pg020'/> +essentially as a concrete ego, an intelligence: and +because of this intelligence his sense-perception stands +before him as a concrete totality of features in which +each member, each point, takes up its place as at the +same time determined through and with all the rest. +Thus the facts embodied in his sensation are authenticated, +not by his mere subjective representation and +distinction of the facts as something external from the +person, but by virtue of the concrete interconnexion in +which each part stands with all parts of this complex. +The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this +mutual corroboration of each single factor of its content +by all the others in the picture as perceived. The +consciousness of this interdependence need not be +explicit and distinct. Still this general setting to all +sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling +of self.—In order to see the difference of dreaming and +waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction +between subjectivity and objectivity of mental representation +(the latter depending upon determination through +categories): remembering, as already noted, that what +is actually present in mind need not be therefore +explicitly realised in consciousness, just as little as the +exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand +before consciousness in the shape of proofs of God's +existence, although, as before explained, these proofs +only serve to express the net worth and content of that +feeling. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(γ) Sensibility<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Empfindung.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_399'/> +§ 399. Sleep and waking are, primarily, it is true, not +mere alterations, but <emph>alternating</emph> conditions (a progression +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in infinitum</foreign>). This is their formal and +negative relationship: but in it the <emph>affirmative</emph> relationship +<pb n='021'/><anchor id='Pg021'/> +is also involved. In the self-certified existence of +waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an <q>ideal</q> +factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature, +where they are implicitly as in their substance, are +<emph>found</emph> by the waking soul, in its own self, and, be it +noted, for itself. The fact that these particulars, though +as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the +self-identity of our self-centred being, are yet simply +contained in its simplicity, is what we call sensibility. +</p> + +<p> +§ 400. Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull +stirring, the inarticulate breathing, of the spirit through +its unconscious and unintelligent individuality, where +every definite feature is still <q>immediate,</q>—neither +specially developed in its content nor set in distinction +as objective to subject, but treated as belonging to its +most special, its natural peculiarity. The content of +sensation is thus limited and transient, belonging as it +does to natural, immediate being,—to what is therefore +qualitative and finite. +</p> + +<p> +<emph>Everything is in sensation</emph> (feeling): if you will, everything +that emerges in conscious intelligence and in +reason has its source and origin in sensation; for +source and origin just means the first immediate +manner in which a thing appears. Let it not be +enough to have principles and religion only in the +head: they must also be in the heart, in the feeling. +What we merely have in the head is in consciousness, +in a general way: the facts of it are objective—set over +against consciousness, so that as it is put in me (my +abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from +me (from my concrete subjectivity). But if put in +the feeling, the fact is a mode of my individuality, +however crude that individuality be in such a form: it +is thus treated as my <emph>very own</emph>. My own is something +inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this +<pb n='022'/><anchor id='Pg022'/> +immediate unity of the soul with its underlying self +in all its definite content is just this inseparability; +which however yet falls short of the ego of developed +consciousness, and still more of the freedom of rational +mind-life. It is with a quite different intensity and +permanency that the will, the conscience, and the +character, are our very own, than can ever be true of +feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and +this we need no philosophy to tell us. No doubt it is +correct to say that above everything the <emph>heart</emph> must +be good. But feeling and heart is not the form by +which anything is legitimated as religious, moral, true, +just, &c., and an appeal to heart and feeling either means +nothing or means something bad. This should hardly +need enforcing. Can any experience be more trite than +that feelings and hearts are also bad, evil, godless, mean, +&c.? That the heart is the source only of such feelings +is stated in the words: <q>From the heart proceed evil +thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, blasphemy, &c.</q> +In such times when <q>scientific</q> theology and philosophy +make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good, +moral, and religious, it is necessary to remind them +of these trite experiences; just as it is nowadays +necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic +property by which man is distinguished from the beasts, +and that he has feeling in common with them. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_401'/> +§ 401. What the sentient soul finds within it is, on +one hand, the naturally immediate, as <q>ideally</q> in it and +made its own. On the other hand and conversely, what +originally belongs to the central individuality (which as +further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and +free mind) get the features of the natural corporeity, and +is so felt. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. +One, where what at first is a corporeal affection (e.g. +of the eye or of any bodily part whatever) is made +<pb n='023'/><anchor id='Pg023'/> +feeling (sensation) by being driven inward, memorised +in the soul's self-centred part. Another, where affections +originating in the mind and belonging to it, are in +order to be felt, and to be as if found, invested with +corporeity. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in +the subject: it is felt in the soul. The detailed specification +of the former branch of sensibility is seen in the +system of the senses. But the other or inwardly originated +modes of feeling no less necessarily systematise +themselves; and their corporisation, as put in the living +and concretely developed natural being, works itself out, +following the special character of the mental mode, in +a special system of bodily organs. +</p> + +<p> +Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the +individual mind in the life of its bodily part. The senses +form the simple system of corporeity specified. (<hi rend='italic'>a</hi>) The +<q>ideal</q> side of physical things breaks up into two—because +in it, as immediate and not yet subjective +ideality, distinction appears as mere variety—the senses +of definite <emph>light</emph>, § 287—and of <emph>sound</emph>, § 300. The <q>real</q> +aspect similarly is with its difference double: (<hi rend='italic'>b</hi>) the +senses of smell and taste, §§ 321, 322; (<hi rend='italic'>c</hi>) the sense +of solid reality, of heavy matter, of heat and shape. +Around the centre of the sentient individuality these +specifications arrange themselves more simply than when +they are developed in the natural corporeity. +</p> + +<p> +The system by which the internal sensation comes to +give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be +treated in detail in a peculiar science—a <emph>psychical physiology</emph>. +Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied +in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness +of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of +internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also +in the distinct parallelism which underlies the symbolical +employment of sensations, e.g. of colours, tones, smells. +<pb n='024'/><anchor id='Pg024'/> +But the most interesting side of a psychical physiology +would lie in studying not the mere sympathy, but more +definitely the bodily form adopted by certain mental +modifications, especially the passions or emotions. We +should have, e.g., to explain the line of connexion by which +anger and courage are felt in the breast, the blood, the +<q>irritable</q> system, just as thinking and mental occupation +are felt in the head, the centre of the 'sensible' +system. We should want a more satisfactory explanation +than hitherto of the most familiar connexions by +which tears, and voice in general, with its varieties of +language, laughter, sighs, with many other specialisations +lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy, +are formed from their mental source. In physiology +the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts +subservient to the animal organism; but they form at +the same time a physical system for the expression of +mental states, and in this way they get quite another +interpretation. +</p> + +<p> +§ 402. Sensations, just because they are immediate +and are found existing, are single and transient aspects +of psychic life,—alterations in the substantiality of the +soul, set in its self-centred life, with which that substance +is one. But this self-centred being is not merely +a formal factor of sensation: the soul is virtually +a reflected totality of sensations—it feels <emph>in itself</emph> the +total substantiality which it <emph>virtually</emph> is—it is a soul +which feels. +</p> + +<p> +In the usage of ordinary language, sensation and +feeling are not clearly distinguished: still we do +not speak of the sensation,—but of the feeling (sense) +of right, of self; sentimentality (sensibility) is connected +with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasises +rather the side of passivity—the fact that we +find ourselves feeling, i.e. the immediacy of mode in +<pb n='025'/><anchor id='Pg025'/> +feeling—whereas feeling at the same time rather notes +the fact that it is <emph>we ourselves</emph> who feel. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(b) The Feeling Soul.—(Soul as Sentiency.)<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die fühlende Seele.</foreign></note></head> + +<p> +§ 403. The feeling or sentient individual is the simple +<q>ideality</q> or subjective side of sensation. What it has +to do, therefore, is to raise its substantiality, its merely +virtual filling-up, to the character of subjectivity, to take +possession of it, to realise its mastery over its own. +As sentient, the soul is no longer a mere natural, but +an inward, individuality: the individuality which in the +merely substantial totality was only formal to it has to +be liberated and made independent. +</p> + +<p> +Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and +still more of the mind) if we are to understand it, must +that feature of <q>ideality</q> be kept in view, which represents +it as the <emph>negation</emph> of the real, but a negation, where the +real is put past, virtually retained, although it does not +<emph>exist</emph>. The feature is one with which we are familiar in +regard to our mental ideas or to memory. Every +individual is an infinite treasury of sensations, ideas, +acquired lore, thoughts, &c.; and yet the ego is one +and uncompounded, a deep featureless characterless +mine, in which all this is stored up, without existing. +It is only when <emph>I</emph> call to mind <emph>an</emph> idea, that I bring +it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. +Sometimes, in sickness, ideas and information, supposed +to have been forgotten years ago, because for so long +they had not been brought into consciousness, once +more come to light. They were not in our possession, +nor by such reproduction as occurs in sickness do they +for the future come into our possession; and yet they +<pb n='026'/><anchor id='Pg026'/> +were in us and continue to be in us still. Thus a person +can never know how much of things he once learned he +really has in him, should he have once forgotten them: +they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such, +but only to his implicit self. And under all the superstructure +of specialised and instrumental consciousness +that may subsequently be added to it, the individuality +always remains this single-souled inner life. At the +present stage this singleness is, primarily, to be defined as +one of feeling—as embracing the corporeal in itself: thus +denying the view that this body is something material, +with parts outside parts and outside the soul. Just as +the number and variety of mental representations is no +argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego; +so the <q>real</q> outness of parts in the body has no truth +for the sentient soul. As sentient, the soul is characterised +as immediate, and so as natural and corporeal: +but the outness of parts and sensible multiplicity of this +corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the +intelligible unity) not as anything real, and therefore +not as a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity +<emph>in existence</emph>,—the existent speculative principle. Thus +in the body it is one simple, omnipresent unity. +As to the representative faculty the body is but <emph>one</emph> +representation, and the infinite variety of its material +structure and organisation is reduced to the <emph>simplicity</emph> of +one definite conception: so in the sentient soul, the +corporeity, and all that outness of parts to parts which +belongs to it, is reduced to <emph>ideality</emph> (the <emph>truth</emph> of the +natural multiplicity). The soul is virtually the totality +of nature: as an individual soul it is a monad: it is +itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world,—that +world being included in it and filling it up; and to +that world it stands but as to itself. +</p> + +<p> +§ 404. As <emph>individual</emph>, the soul is exclusive and always +<pb n='027'/><anchor id='Pg027'/> +exclusive: any difference there is, it brings within +itself. What is differentiated from it is as yet no +external object (as in consciousness), but only the +aspects of its own sentient totality, &c. In this partition +(judgment) of itself it is always subject: its object is its +substance, which is at the same time its predicate. This +<emph>substance</emph> is still the content of its natural life, but +turned into the content of the individual sensation-laden +soul; yet as the soul is in that content still particular, +the content is its particular world, so far as that is, in +an implicit mode, included in the ideality of the +subject. +</p> + +<p> +By itself, this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: +its features are not developed to conscious and +intelligent content: so far it is formal and only formal. +It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as +a <emph>form</emph> and appears as a special <emph>state</emph> of mind (§ 350), to +which the soul, which has already advanced to consciousness +and intelligence, may again sink down. +But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more +subordinate and abstract one, it implies a want of +adaptation, which is <emph>disease</emph>. In the present stage we +must treat, first, of the abstract psychical modifications +by themselves, secondly, as morbid states of mind: +the latter being only explicable by means of the +former. +</p> + +<div> +<head>(α) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy.</head> + +<p> +§ 405. (αα) Though the sensitive individuality is +undoubtedly a monadic individual, it is because +immediate, not yet as <emph>its self</emph> not a true subject +reflected into itself, and is therefore passive. Hence +the individuality of its true self is a different subject +from it—a subject which may even exist as another +individual. By the self-hood of the latter it—a substance, +<pb n='028'/><anchor id='Pg028'/> +which is only a non-independent predicate—is +then set in vibration and controlled without the least +resistance on its part. This other subject by which it +is so controlled may be called its <emph>genius</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition +of the child in its mother's womb:—a condition neither +merely bodily nor merely mental, but psychical—a +correlation of soul to soul. Here are two individuals, +yet in undivided psychic unity: the one as yet no <emph>self</emph>, +as yet nothing impenetrable, incapable of resistance: +the other is its actuating subject, the <emph>single</emph> self of the +two. The mother is the <emph>genius</emph> of the child; for by +genius we commonly mean the total mental self-hood, +as it has existence of its own, and constitutes the +subjective substantiality of some one else who is only +externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal +independence. The underlying essence of the genius +is the sum total of existence, of life, and of character, not +as a mere possibility, or capacity, or virtuality, but as +efficiency and realised activity, as concrete subjectivity. +</p> + +<p> +If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of +the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments, +and as connected with the mother by means +of umbilical cord, placenta, &c., all that is presented +to the senses and reflection are certain anatomical +and physiological facts—externalities and instrumentalities +in the sensible and material which are insignificant +as regards the main point, the psychical relationship. +What ought to be noted as regards this psychical +tie are not merely the striking effects communicated +to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions, +injuries, &c. of the mother, but the whole psychical +<emph>judgment</emph> (partition) of the underlying nature, by which +the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) +can suffer disruption in twain, so that the child has not +<pb n='029'/><anchor id='Pg029'/> +merely got <emph>communicated</emph> to it, but has originally +received morbid dispositions as well as other pre-dispositions +of shape, temper, character, talent, idiosyncrasies, +&c. +</p> + +<p> +Sporadic examples and traces of this <emph>magic</emph> tie appear +elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life, +say between friends, especially female friends with +delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show +<q>magnetic</q> phenomena), between husband and wife +and between members of the same family. +</p> + +<p> +The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate +subjectivity, which, in the case cited of this sentient +life in the ordinary course of nature, is visibly present +as another and a different individual. But this sensitive +totality is meant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to +subjectivity in one and the same individual: which +is then its indwelling consciousness, self-possessed, +intelligent, and reasonable. For such a consciousness +the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and +only implicitly existent material; and the self-possessed +subjectivity is the rational, self-conscious, controlling +genius thereof. But this sensitive nucleus includes not +merely the purely unconscious, congenital disposition +and temperament, but within its enveloping simplicity +it acquires and retains also (in habit, as to which +see later) all further ties and essential relationships, +fortunes, principles—everything in short belonging to +the character, and in whose elaboration self-conscious +activity has most effectively participated. The sensitivity +is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is +condensed. The total individual under this concentrated +aspect is distinct from the existing and actual play of +his consciousness, his secular ideas, developed interests, +inclinations, &c. As contrasted with this looser aggregate +of means and methods the more intensive form of +<pb n='030'/><anchor id='Pg030'/> +individuality is termed the genius, whose decision is +ultimate whatever may be the show of reasons, intentions, +means, of which the more public consciousness is so +liberal. This concentrated individuality also reveals +itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and +soul of feeling. A man is said to be heartless and +unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possession +and acts according to his permanent purposes, be they +great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a +good-hearted man, on the other hand, means rather one +who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment, even +when it is of narrow range and is wholly made up +of particularities. Of such good nature or goodness +of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself +than the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>indulgere genio</foreign>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 406. (ββ) The sensitive life, when it becomes a +<emph>form</emph> or <emph>state</emph> of the self-conscious, educated, self-possessed +human being is a disease. The individual +in such a morbid state stands in direct contact +with the concrete contents of his own self, whilst he +keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of +the causal order of things apart as a distinct state of +mind. This morbid condition is seen in <emph>magnetic +somnambulism</emph> and cognate states. +</p> + +<p> +In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible +to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states +as the nature of the remarkable condition produced +chiefly by animal magnetism—to show, in other words, +that it is in harmony with the facts. To that end the +phenomena, so complex in their nature and so very +different one from another, would have first of all to be +brought under their general points of view. The facts, +it might seem, first of all call for verification. But such +a verification would, it must be added, be superfluous +for those on whose account it was called for: for they +<pb n='031'/><anchor id='Pg031'/> +facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the +narratives—infinitely numerous though they be and +accredited by the education and character of the +witnesses—to be mere deception and imposture. The +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted +that no testimony can avail against them, and they have +even denied what they had seen with their own eyes. +In order to believe in this department even what one +sees with these eyes, and still more to understand it, +the first requisite is not to be in bondage to the hard +and fast categories of the practical intellect. The chief +points on which the discussion turns may here be +given: +</p> + +<p> +(α) To the <emph>concrete</emph> existence of the individual belongs +the aggregate of his fundamental <emph>interests</emph>, both the +essential and the particular empirical ties which connect +him with other men and the world at large. This +totality forms <emph>his</emph> actuality, in the sense that it lies in +fact immanent in him; it has already been called his +<emph>genius</emph>. This genius is not the free mind which wills +and thinks: the form of sensitivity, in which the +individual here appears immersed, is, on the contrary, +a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. +The first conclusion to which these considerations lead, +with reference to the contents of consciousness in the +somnambulist stage, is that it is only the range of his +individually moulded world (of his private interests and +narrow relationships) which appear there. Scientific +theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths +require a different soil,—require an intelligence which +has risen out of the inarticulate mass of mere sensitivity +to free consciousness. It is foolish therefore to expect +revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist +state. +</p> + +<p> +(β) Where a human being's senses and intellect are +<pb n='032'/><anchor id='Pg032'/> +sound, he is fully and intelligently alive to that reality +of his which gives concrete filling to his individuality: +but he is awake to it in the form of interconnexion +between himself and the features of that reality conceived +as an external and a separate world, and he is aware that +this world is in itself also a complex of interconnexions +of a practically intelligible kind. In his subjective +ideas and plans he has also before him this causally +connected scheme of things he calls his world and +the series of means which bring his ideas and his +purposes into adjustment with the objective existences, +which are also means and ends to each other. At the +same time, this world which is outside him has its +threads in him to such a degree that it is these threads +which make him what he really is: he too would become +extinct if these externalities were to disappear, unless +by the aid of religion, subjective reason, and character, +he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and independent +of them. But, then, in the latter case he is less +susceptible of the psychical state here spoken of.—As +an illustration of that identity with the surroundings +may be noted the effect produced by the death of +beloved relatives, friends, &c. on those left behind, so +that the one dies or pines away with the loss of the +other. (Thus Cato, after the downfall of the Roman +republic, could live no longer: his inner reality was +neither wider than higher than it.) Compare home-sickness, +and the like. +</p> + +<p> +(γ) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness, +the world outside it and its relationship to that +world is under a veil, and the soul is thus sunk in sleep +(in magnetic sleep, in catalepsy, and other diseases, +e.g. those connected with female development, or at the +approach of death, &c.), then that <emph>immanent actuality</emph> +of the individual remains the same substantial total +<pb n='033'/><anchor id='Pg033'/> +as before, but now as a purely sensitive life with an +inward vision and an inward consciousness. And because +it is the adult, formed, and developed consciousness which +is degraded into this state of sensitivity, it retains along +with its content a certain nominal self-hood, a formal +vision and awareness, which however does not go so far +as the conscious judgment or discernment by which its +contents, when it is healthy and awake, exist for it as +an outward objectivity. The individual is thus a monad +which is inwardly aware of its actuality—a genius which +beholds itself. The characteristic point in such knowledge +is that the very same facts (which for the healthy +consciousness are an objective practical reality, and to +know which, in its sober moods, it needs the intelligent +chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) +are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. +This perception is a sort of <emph>clairvoyance</emph>; for it is +a consciousness living in the undivided substantiality of +the genius, and finding itself in the very heart of the +interconnexion, and so can dispense with the series of +conditions, external one to another, which lead up to +the result,—conditions which cool reflection has in +succession to traverse and in so doing feels the limits +of its own individual externality. But such clairvoyance—just +because its dim and turbid vision does not +present the facts in a rational interconnexion—is for +that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency +of feeling and fancy, &c.—not to mention that foreign +<emph>suggestions</emph> (see later) intrude into its vision. It is thus +impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants +really see preponderates over what they deceive themselves +in.—But it is absurd to treat this visionary state +as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state, capable +of conveying general truths<note place='foot'>Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to +the state of sober consciousness than many moderns, who supposed +that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorised +their belief in the sublimity of the revelations of somnambulistic +vision. Plato says in the <hi rend='italic'>Timaeus</hi> (p. 71), <q>The author of our +being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a +measure of truth, and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of +divination by dreams). And herein is a proof that God has given +the art of divination, not to the wisdom, but, to the foolishness of man; +for no man when in his wits attains prophetic truth and inspiration; +but when he receives the inspired word, either his intelligence is +enthralled by sleep, or he is demented by some distemper or possession +(enthusiasm).</q> Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily +conditions on which such visionary knowledge depends, and the +possibility of the truth of the dreams, but also the inferiority of +them to the reasonable frame of mind.</note>. +</p> + +<pb n='034'/><anchor id='Pg034'/> + +<p> +(δ) An essential feature of this sensitivity, with its +absence of intelligent and volitional personality, is this, +that it is a state of passivity, like that of the child in the +womb. The patient in this condition is accordingly +made, and continues to be, subject to the power of +another person, the magnetiser; so that when the two +are thus in psychical <emph>rapport</emph>, the selfless individual, +not really a <q>person,</q> has for his subjective consciousness +the consciousness of the other. This latter self-possessed +individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the +former, and the genius which may even supply him +with a train of ideas. That the somnambulist perceives +in himself tastes and smells which are present in the +person with whom he stands <foreign rend='italic'>en rapport</foreign>, and that he is +aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions +of the latter as if they were his own, shows the +substantial identity which the soul (which even in +its concreteness is also truly immaterial) is capable of +holding with another. When the substance of both is +thus made one, there is only one subjectivity of +consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality, +but it is empty, not on the spot, not actual: and this +nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas +<pb n='035'/><anchor id='Pg035'/> +from the sensations and ideas of the other, in whom it +sees, smells, tastes, reads, and hears. It is further to +be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus +brought into <emph>rapport</emph> with two genii and a twofold set of +ideas, his own and that of the magnetiser. But it is +impossible to say precisely which sensations and which +visions he, in this nominal perception, receives, beholds +and brings to knowledge from his own inward self, and +which from the suggestions of the person with whom +he stands in relation. This uncertainty may be the +source of many deceptions, and accounts among other +things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself +among somnambulists from different countries and +under <emph>rapport</emph> with persons of different education, as +regards their views on morbid states and the methods +of cure, or medicines for them, as well as on scientific +and intellectual topics. +</p> + +<p> +(ε) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast +to external objectivity, so within itself the subject +is so entirely one that all varieties of sensation +have disappeared, and hence, when the activity of the +sense-organs is asleep, the <q>common sense,</q> or <q>general +feeling</q> specifies itself to several functions; one sees +and hears with the fingers, and especially with the pit of +the stomach, &c. +</p> + +<p> +To comprehend a thing means in the language of +practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of +means intervening between a phenomenon and some +other existence on which it depends,—to discover what +is called the ordinary course of nature, in compliance +with the laws and relations of the intellect, e.g. causality, +reasons, &c. The purely sensitive life, on the contrary, +even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness, +as in the morbid state alluded to, is just this form of +immediacy, without any distinctions between subjective +<pb n='036'/><anchor id='Pg036'/> +and objective, between intelligent personality and objective +world, and without the aforementioned finite ties +between them. Hence to understand this intimate conjunction, +which, though all-embracing, is without any +definite points of attachment, is impossible, so long as +we assume independent personalities, independent one +of another and of the objective world which is their +content—so long as we assume the absolute spatial and +material externality of one part of being to another. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(β) Self-feeling (Sense of Self)<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Selbstgefühl.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 407. (αα) The sensitive totality is, in its capacity of +individual, essentially the tendency to distinguish itself +in itself, and to wake up to the <emph>judgment in itself</emph>, in +virtue of which it has <emph>particular</emph> feelings and stands as +a <emph>subject</emph> in respect of these aspects of itself. The subject +as such gives these feelings a place as <emph>its own</emph> in +itself. In these private and personal sensations it is +immersed, and at the same time, because of the <q>ideality</q> +of the particulars, it combines itself in them with itself +as a subjective unit. In this way it is <emph>self-feeling</emph>, and is +so at the same time only in the <emph>particular feeling</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 408. (ββ) In consequence of the immediacy, which +still marks the self-feeling, i.e. in consequence of the +element of corporeality which is still undetached from +the mental life, and as the feeling too is itself particular +and bound up with a special corporeal form, it follows +that although the subject has been brought to acquire +intelligent consciousness, it is still susceptible of disease, +so far as to remain fast in a <emph>special</emph> phase of its self-feeling, +unable to refine it to <q>ideality</q> and get the better +of it. The fully-furnished self of intelligent consciousness +is a conscious subject, which is consistent in itself +<pb n='037'/><anchor id='Pg037'/> +according to an order and behaviour which follows from +its individual position and its connexion with the external +world, which is no less a world of law. But when it is +engrossed with a single phase of feeling, it fails to +assign that phase its proper place and due subordination +in the individual system of the world which a conscious +subject is. In this way the subject finds itself in +contradiction between the totality systematised in its +consciousness, and the single phase or fixed idea which +is not reduced to its proper place and rank. This is +Insanity or mental Derangement. +</p> + +<p> +In considering insanity we must, as in other cases, +anticipate the full-grown and intelligent conscious subject, +which is at the same time the <emph>natural</emph> self of <emph>self-feeling</emph>. +In such a phase the self can be liable to the +contradiction between its own free subjectivity and +a particularity which, instead of being <q>idealised</q> in the +former, remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. Mind +as such is free, and therefore not susceptible of this +malady. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as +a soul, as a thing; and it is only as a thing, i.e. as +something natural and existent, that it is liable to +insanity—the settled fixture of some finite element in it. +Insanity is therefore a psychical disease, i.e. a disease +of body and mind alike: the commencement may +appear to start from one more than other, and so +also may the cure. +</p> + +<p> +The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active +and present consciousness of the ordered whole of his +individual world, into the system of which he subsumes +each special content of sensation, idea, desire, inclination, +&c., as it arises, so as to insert them in their +proper place. He is the <emph>dominant genius</emph> over these +particularities. Between this and insanity the difference +is like that between waking and dreaming: only that in +<pb n='038'/><anchor id='Pg038'/> +insanity the dream falls within the waking limits, and +so makes part of the actual self-feeling. Error and that +sort of thing is a proposition consistently admitted to +a place in the objective interconnexion of things. In +the concrete, however, it is often difficult to say where +it begins to become derangement. A violent, but groundless +and senseless outburst of hatred, &c., may, in +contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and +stability of character, make its victim seem to be beside +himself with frenzy. But the main point in derangement +is the contradiction which a feeling with a fixed +corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of +adjustments forming the concrete consciousness. The +mind which is in a condition of mere <emph>being</emph>, and where +such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness, is +diseased. The contents which are set free in this reversion +to mere nature are the self-seeking affections of the +heart, such as vanity, pride, and the rest of the passions—fancies +and hopes—merely personal love and hatred. +When the influence of self-possession and of general +principles, moral and theoretical, is relaxed, and ceases +to keep the natural temper under lock and key, the +earthly elements are set free—that evil which is always +latent in the heart, because the heart as immediate is +natural and selfish. It is the evil genius of man which +gains the upper hand in insanity, but in distinction +from and contrast to the better and more intelligent +part, which is there also. Hence this state is mental +derangement and distress. The right psychical treatment +therefore keeps in view the truth that insanity is +not an abstract <emph>loss</emph> of reason (neither in the point of +intelligence nor of will and its responsibility), but only +derangement, only a contradiction in a still subsisting +reason;—just as physical disease is not an abstract, +i.e. mere and total, loss of health (if it were that, it +<pb n='039'/><anchor id='Pg039'/> +would be death), but a contradiction in it. This humane +treatment, no less benevolent than reasonable (the +services of Pinel towards which deserve the highest +acknowledgment), presupposes the patient's rationality, +and in that assumption has the sound basis for dealing +with him on this side—just as in the case of bodily +disease the physician bases his treatment on the vitality +which as such still contains health. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(γ) Habit<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Gewohnheit.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 409. Self-feeling, immersed in the detail of the feelings +(in simple sensations, and also desires, instincts, +passions, and their gratification), is undistinguished +from them. But in the self there is latent a simple +self-relation of ideality, a nominal universality (which +is the truth of these details): and as so universal, +the self is to be stamped upon, and made appear in, this +life of feeling, yet so as to distinguish itself from the +particular details, and be a realised universality. But +this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the +specific feelings and desires; what they specifically +contain is as yet left out of account. And so too the +particularity is, as now regarded, equally formal; it +counts only as the <emph>particular being</emph> or immediacy of the +soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract +realisation. This particular being of the soul is the +factor of its corporeity; here we have it breaking with +this corporeity, distinguishing it from itself,—itself +a <emph>simple</emph> being,—and becoming the <q>ideal,</q> subjective +substantiality of it,—just as in its latent notion (§ 359) +it was the substance, and the mere substance, of it. +</p> + +<p> +But this abstract realisation of the soul in its corporeal +vehicle is not yet the self—not the existence of the +<pb n='040'/><anchor id='Pg040'/> +universal which is for the universal. It is the corporeity +reduced to its mere <emph>ideality</emph>; and so far only +does corporeity belong to the soul as such. That is +to say, as space and time—the abstract one-outside-another, +as, in short, empty space and empty time—are +only subjective form—pure act of intuition; so that pure +being (which through the supersession in it of the +particularity of the corporeity, or of the immediate corporeity +as such has realised itself) is mere intuition and +no more, lacking consciousness, but the basis of consciousness. +And consciousness it becomes, when the +corporeity, of which it is the subjective substance, and +which still continues to exist, and that as a barrier for +it, has been absorbed by it, and it has been invested +with the character of self-centred subject. +</p> + +<p> +§ 410. The soul's making itself an abstract universal +being, and reducing the particulars of feelings (and of +consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habit. +In this manner the soul has the contents in possession, +and contains them in such manner that in these features +it is not as sentient, nor does it stand in relationship +with them as distinguishing itself from them, nor is +absorbed in them, but has them and moves in them, +without feeling or consciousness of the fact. The soul +is freed from them, so far as it is not interested in or +occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms +as its possession, it is at the same time open to be +otherwise occupied and engaged—say with feeling and +with mental consciousness in general. +</p> + +<p> +This process of building up the particular and corporeal +expressions of feeling into the being of the soul +appears as a <emph>repetition</emph> of them, and the generation of +habit as <emph>practice</emph>. For, this being of the soul, if in +respect of the natural particular phase it be called an +abstract universality to which the former is transmuted, +<pb n='041'/><anchor id='Pg041'/> +is a reflexive universality (§ 175); i.e. the one and the +same, that recurs in a series of units of sensation, is reduced +to unity, and this abstract unity expressly stated. +</p> + +<p> +Habit, like memory, is a difficult point in mental +organisation: habit is the mechanism of self-feeling, as +memory is the mechanism of intelligence. The natural +qualities and alterations of age, sleep and waking, are +<q>immediately</q> natural: habit, on the contrary, is the +mode of feeling (as well as intelligence, will, &c., so far +as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and +mechanical existence. Habit is rightly called a second +nature; nature, because it is an immediate being of the +soul; a second nature, because it is an immediacy +created by the soul, impressing and moulding the corporeality +which enters into the modes of feeling as such +and into the representations and volitions so far as +they have taken corporeal form (§ <ref target='Section_401'>401</ref>). +</p> + +<p> +In habit the human being's mode of existence is +<q>natural,</q> and for that reason not free; but still free, so +far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by habit +reduced to a mere being of <emph>his</emph>, and he is no longer +involuntarily attracted or repelled by it, and so no +longer interested, occupied, or dependent in regard to +it. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely +formal, as habit merely attaches to the being of the soul; +partly only relative, so far as it strictly speaking arises +only in the case of bad habits, or so far as a habit is +opposed by another purpose: whereas the habit of +right and goodness is an embodiment of liberty. The +main point about Habit is that by its means man gets +emancipated from the feelings, even in being affected +by them. The different forms of this may be described +as follows: (α) The <emph>immediate</emph> feeling is negated and +treated as indifferent. One who gets inured against +external sensations (frost, heat, weariness of the limbs, +<pb n='042'/><anchor id='Pg042'/> +&c., sweet tastes, &c.), and who hardens the heart +against misfortune, acquires a strength which consists +in this, that although the frost, &c.—or the misfortune—is +felt, the affection is deposed to a mere externality +and immediacy; the universal psychical life keeps +its own abstract independence in it, and the self-feeling +as such, consciousness, reflection, and any other +purposes and activity, are no longer bothered with it. +(β) There is indifference towards the satisfaction: the +desires and impulses are by the <emph>habit</emph> of their satisfaction +deadened. This is the rational liberation from them; +whereas monastic renunciation and forcible interference +do not free from them, nor are they in conception +rational. Of course in all this it is assumed that the +impulses are kept as the finite modes they naturally +are, and that they, like their satisfaction, are subordinated +as partial factors to the reasonable will. (γ) In +habit regarded as <emph>aptitude</emph>, or skill, not merely has the +abstract psychical life to be kept intact <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign>, but it has +to be imposed as a subjective aim, to be made a power +in the bodily part, which is rendered subject and +thoroughly pervious to it. Conceived as having the +inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon +it, the body is treated as an immediate externality and +a barrier. Thus comes out the more decided rupture +between the soul as simple self-concentration, and its +earlier naturalness and immediacy; it has lost its +original and immediate identity with the bodily nature, +and as external has first to be reduced to that position. +Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly +specific way (§ <ref target='Section_401'>401</ref>); and the immediate portion of body +is a particular possibility for a specific aim (a particular +aspect of its differentiated structure, a particular organ +of its organic system). To mould such an aim in the +organic body is to bring out and express the <q>ideality</q> +<pb n='043'/><anchor id='Pg043'/> +which is implicit in matter always, and especially so in +the specific bodily part, and thus to enable the soul, +under its volitional and conceptual characters, to exist +as substance in its corporeity. In this way an aptitude +shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious, +made into an instrument, so that when the conception +(e.g. a series of musical notes) is in me, then without +resistance and with ease the body gives them correct +utterance. +</p> + +<p> +The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of +mental action. The most external of them, i.e. the +spatial direction of an individual, viz. his upright +posture, has been by will made a habit—a position +taken without adjustment and without consciousness—which +continues to be an affair of his persistent will; +for the man stands only because and in so far as he +wills to stand, and only so long as he wills it without +consciousness. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete +habit which, without an express adjustment, combines +in a single act the several modifications of sensation, +consciousness, intuition, intelligence, &c., which make +it up. Thinking, too, however free and active in its +own pure element it becomes, no less requires habit +and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of immediacy), +by which it is the property of my single self where I can +freely and in all directions range. It is through this +habit that I come to realise my <emph>existence</emph> as a thinking +being. Even here, in this spontaneity of self-centred +thought, there is a partnership of soul and body (hence, +want of habit and too-long-continued thinking cause +headache); habit diminishes this feeling, by making +the natural function an immediacy of the soul. Habit +on an ampler scale, and carried out in the strictly +intellectual range, is recollection and memory, whereof +we shall speak later. +</p> + +<pb n='044'/><anchor id='Pg044'/> + +<p> +Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless, +casual and particular. And it is true that the form +of habit, like any other, is open to anything we chance +to put into it; and it is habit of living which brings on +death, or, if quite abstract, is death itself: and yet habit +is indispensable for the <emph>existence</emph> of all intellectual life +in the individual, enabling the subject to be a concrete +immediacy, an <q>ideality</q> of soul—enabling the matter +of consciousness, religious, moral, &c., to be his as <emph>this</emph> +self, <emph>this</emph> soul, and no other, and be neither a mere +latent possibility, nor a transient emotion or idea, nor +an abstract inwardness, cut off from action and reality, +but part and parcel of his being. In scientific studies +of the soul and the mind, habit is usually passed over—either +as something contemptible—or rather for the +further reason that it is one of the most difficult +questions of psychology. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(c) The Actual Soul.<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die wirkliche Seele.</foreign></note></head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_411'/> +§ 411. The Soul, when its corporeity has been moulded +and made thoroughly its own, finds itself there a <emph>single</emph> +subject; and the corporeity is an externality which stands +as a predicate, in being related to which, it is related +to itself. This externality, in other words, represents +not itself, but the soul, of which it is the <emph>sign</emph>. In this +identity of interior and exterior, the latter subject to the +former, the soul is <emph>actual</emph>: in its corporeity it has its +free shape, in which it <emph>feels itself</emph> and makes <emph>itself felt</emph>, +and which as the Soul's work of art has <emph>human</emph> pathognomic +and physiognomic expression. +</p> + +<p> +Under the head of human expression are included, +e.g., the upright figure in general, and the formation of +the limbs, especially the hand, as the absolute instrument, +<pb n='045'/><anchor id='Pg045'/> +of the mouth—laughter, weeping, &c., and the note of +mentality diffused over the whole, which at once +announces the body at the externality of a higher nature. +This note is so slight, indefinite, and inexpressible a +modification, because the figure in its externality is +something immediate and natural, and can therefore +only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the +mind, unable to represent it in its actual universality. +Seen from the animal world, the human figure is the +supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. +But for the mind it is only its first appearance, while +language is its perfect expression. And the human +figure, though its proximate phase of existence, is at the +same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality +something contingent to it. To try to raise physiognomy +and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of +sciences, was therefore one of the vainest fancies, still +vainer than a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>signatura rerum</foreign>, which supposed the +shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal +virtue. +</p> + +<p> +§ 412. Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and +unreality of matter; for the soul, in its concentrated +self, cuts itself off from its immediate being, placing the +latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering +resistance to its moulding influence. The soul, thus +setting in opposition its being to its (conscious) self, +absorbing it, and making it its own, has lost the meaning +of mere soul, or the <q>immediacy</q> of mind. The actual +soul with its sensation and its concrete self-feeling +turned into habit, has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of +its qualities; in this externality it has recollected and +inwardised itself, and is infinite self-relation. This free +universality thus made explicit shows the soul awaking +to the higher stage of the ego, or abstract universality +in so far as it is <emph>for</emph> the abstract universality. In this +<pb n='046'/><anchor id='Pg046'/> +way it gains the position of thinker and subject—specially +a subject of the judgment in which the ego +excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural +features as an object, a world external to it,—but with +such respect to that object that in it it is immediately +reflected into itself. Thus soul rises to become +<emph>Consciousness</emph>. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='047'/><anchor id='Pg047'/> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Sub-Section B. Phenomenology Of Mind. Consciousness.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_413'/> +§ 413. Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational +grade of mind: the grade of mind as <emph>appearance</emph>. +<emph>Ego</emph> is infinite self-relation of mind, but as subjective +or as self-certainty. The immediate identity of the +natural soul has been raised to this pure <q>ideal</q> self-identity; +and what the former <emph>contained</emph> is for this self-subsistent +reflection set forth as an <emph>object</emph>. The pure +abstract freedom of mind lets go from it its specific +qualities,—the soul's natural life—to an equal freedom as +an independent <emph>object</emph>. It is of this latter, as external to +it, that the <emph>ego</emph> is in the first instance aware (conscious), +and as such it is Consciousness. Ego, as this absolute +negativity, is implicitly the identity in the otherness: +the <emph>ego</emph> is itself that other and stretches over the object +(as if that object were implicitly cancelled)—it is one +side of the relationship and the whole relationship—the +light, which manifests itself and something else +too. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_414'/> +§ 414. The self-identity of the mind, thus first made +<pb n='048'/><anchor id='Pg048'/> +explicit as the Ego, is only its abstract formal identity. +As <emph>soul</emph> it was under the phase of <emph>substantial</emph> universality; +now, as subjective reflection in itself, it is referred +to this substantiality as to its negative, something dark +and beyond it. Hence consciousness, like reciprocal +dependence in general, is the contradiction between the +independence of the two sides and their identity in +which they are merged into one. The mind as ego is +<emph>essence</emph>; but since reality, in the sphere of essence, is +represented as in immediate being and at the same time +as <q>ideal,</q> it is as consciousness only the <emph>appearance</emph> +(phenomenon) of mind. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_415'/> +§ 415. As the ego is by itself only a formal identity, +the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity, i.e. the +successive steps in further specification of consciousness, +does not to it seem to be its own activity, but is implicit, +and to the ego it seems an alteration of the object. +Consciousness consequently appears differently modified +according to the difference of the given object; and +the gradual specification of consciousness appears as a +variation in the characteristics of its objects. Ego, the +subject of consciousness, is thinking: the logical process +of modifying the object is what is identical in subject +and object, their absolute interdependence, what makes +the object the subject's own. +</p> + +<p> +The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately +described as having viewed the mind as consciousness, +and as containing the propositions only of a <emph>phenomenology</emph> +(not of a <emph>philosophy</emph>) of mind. The Ego Kant +regards as reference to something away and beyond +(which in its abstract description is termed the thing-at-itself); +and it is only from this finite point of view that +he treats both intellect and will. Though in the notion +of a power of <emph>reflective</emph> judgment he touches upon the +<emph>Idea</emph> of mind—a subject-objectivity, an <emph>intuitive intellect</emph>, +<pb n='049'/><anchor id='Pg049'/> +&c., and even the Idea of Nature, still this Idea is again +deposed to an appearance, i.e. to a subjective maxim +(§ 58). Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly +appreciated Kantism when he treated it as a theory of +consciousness (under the name of <q>faculty of ideation</q>). +Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is only +something set over against the ego, only defined as in <emph>consciousness</emph>: +it is made no more than an infinite <q>shock,</q> +i.e. a thing-in-itself. Both systems therefore have clearly +not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it +actually and essentially is, but only as it is in reference +to something else. +</p> + +<p> +As against Spinozism, again, it is to be noted that the +mind in the judgment by which it <q>constitutes</q> itself an +ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualitative affection) +has emerged from substance, and that the philosophy, +which gives this judgment as the absolute characteristic +of mind, has emerged from Spinozism. +</p> + +<p> +§ 416. The aim of conscious mind is to make its +appearance identical with its essence, to raise its <emph>self-certainty +to truth</emph>. The <emph>existence</emph> of mind in the stage of +consciousness is finite, because it is merely a nominal +self-relation, or mere certainty. The object is only +abstractly characterised as <emph>its</emph>; in other words, in the +object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is +reflected into itself: hence its existence there has still +a content, which is not as its own. +</p> + +<p> +§ 417. The grades of this elevation of certainty to +truth are three in number: first (<hi rend='italic'>a</hi>) consciousness in +general, with an object set against it; (<hi rend='italic'>b</hi>) self-consciousness, +for which <emph>ego</emph> is the object; (<hi rend='italic'>c</hi>) unity of consciousness +and self-consciousness, where the mind sees itself +embodied in the object and sees itself as implicitly +and explicitly determinate, as Reason, the <emph>notion</emph> of +mind. +</p> + +<pb n='050'/><anchor id='Pg050'/> + +<div> +<head>(a) Consciousness Proper<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Das Bewußtsein als solches</foreign>: (a) <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Das sinnliche Bewußtsein.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<div> +<head>(α) Sensuous consciousness.</head> + +<p> +§ 418. Consciousness is, first, <emph>immediate</emph> consciousness, +and its reference to the object accordingly the simple and +underived certainty of it. The object similarly, being +immediate, an existent, reflected in itself, is further +characterised as immediately singular. This is sense-consciousness. +</p> + +<p> +Consciousness—as a case of correlation—comprises +only the categories belonging to the abstract ego or +formal thinking; and these it treats as features of the +object (§ <ref target='Section_415'>415</ref>). Sense-consciousness therefore is aware +of the object as an existent, a something, an existing +thing, a singular, and so on. It appears as wealthiest +in matter, but as poorest in thought. That wealth of +matter is made out of sensations: they are the <emph>material</emph> +of consciousness (§ <ref target='Section_414'>414</ref>), the substantial and qualitative, +what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds +<emph>in itself</emph>. This material the ego (the reflection of the +soul in itself) separates from itself, and puts it first +under the category of being. Spatial and temporal +Singularness, <emph>here</emph> and <emph>now</emph> (the terms by which +in the Phenomenology of the Mind (W. II. p. 73), +I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly +belongs to <emph>intuition</emph>. At present the object is at first to +be viewed only in its correlation to <emph>consciousness</emph>, i.e. +a something <emph>external</emph> to it, and not yet as external on +its own part, or as being beside and out of itself. +</p> + +<p> +§ 419. The <emph>sensible</emph> as somewhat becomes an <emph>other</emph>: the +reflection in itself of this <emph>somewhat</emph>, the <emph>thing</emph>, has <emph>many</emph> +properties; and as a single (thing) in its immediacy has +several <emph>predicates</emph>. The muchness of the sense-singular +<pb n='051'/><anchor id='Pg051'/> +thus becomes a breadth—a variety of relations, reflectional +attributes, and universalities. These are logical +terms introduced by the thinking principle, i.e. in this +case by the Ego, to describe the sensible. But the Ego +as itself apparent sees in all this characterisation +a change in the object; and self-consciousness, so construing +the object, is sense-perception. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(β) Sense-perception<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Wahrnehmung.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 420. Consciousness, having passed beyond the +sensibility, wants to take the object in its truth, not as +merely immediate, but as mediated, reflected in itself, +and universal. Such an object is a combination of +sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which +thought defines concrete relations and connexions. +Hence the identity of consciousness with the object +passes from the abstract identity of <q>I am sure</q> to the +definite identity of <q>I know, and am aware.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The particular grade of consciousness on which +Kantism conceives the mind is perception: which is also +the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness, +and more or less by the sciences. The sensuous +certitudes of single apperceptions or observations form +the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated to +truth, by being regarded in their bearings, reflected +upon, and on the lines of definite categories turned at +the same time into something necessary and universal, +viz. <emph>experiences</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 421. This conjunction of individual and universal is +admixture—the individual remains at the bottom hard +and unaffected by the universal, to which however it is +related. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions—between +the single things of sense apperception, which +form the alleged ground of general experience, and the +<pb n='052'/><anchor id='Pg052'/> +universality which has a higher claim to be the essence +and ground—between the individuality of a thing which, +taken in its concrete content, constitutes its independence +and the various properties which, free from +this negative link and from one another, are independent +universal <emph>matters</emph> (§ 123). This contradiction of the +finite which runs through all forms of the logical +spheres turns out most concrete, when the somewhat is +defined as <emph>object</emph> (§ 194 seqq.). +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(γ) The Intellect<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Der Verstand.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 422. The proximate <emph>truth</emph> of perception is that it is +the object which is an <emph>appearance</emph>, and that the object's +reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsistent +inward and universal. The consciousness of such an +object is <emph>intellect</emph>. This inward, as we called it, of the thing +is on one hand the suppression of the multiplicity of +the sensible, and, in that manner, an abstract identity: on +the other hand, however, it also for that reason contains +the multiplicity, but as an interior <q>simple</q> difference, +which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. +This simple difference is the realm of <emph>the laws</emph> of +the phenomena—a copy of the phenomenon, but brought +to rest and universality. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_423'/> +§ 423. The law, at first stating the mutual dependence +of universal, permanent terms, has, in so far as +its distinction is the inward one, its necessity on its own +part; the one of the terms, as not externally different +from the other, lies immediately in the other. But in +this manner the interior distinction is, what it is in +truth, the distinction on its own part, or the distinction +which is none. With this new form-characteristic, on +the whole, consciousness <emph>implicitly</emph> vanishes: for consciousness +as such implies the reciprocal independence +<pb n='053'/><anchor id='Pg053'/> +of subject and object. The ego in its judgment has +an object which is not distinct from it,—it has itself. +Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(b) Self-consciousness<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Selbstbewußtsein.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 424. <emph>Self-consciousness</emph> is the truth of consciousness: +the latter is a consequence of the former, all consciousness +of an other object being as a matter of fact also +self-consciousness. The object is my idea: I am aware +of the object as mine; and thus in it I am aware of me. +The formula of self-consciousness is I = I:—abstract +freedom, pure <q>ideality.</q> In so far it lacks <q>reality</q>: +for as it is its own object, there is strictly speaking no +object, because there is no distinction between it and +the object. +</p> + +<p> +§ 425. Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation +of consciousness, and for that reason it is burdened +with an external object, or, nominally, with the negation +of it. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent +stage, consciousness: it is the contradiction of +itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. But +the latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I +potentially suppressed; and hence as this certitude of +self against the object it is the <emph>impulse</emph> to realise its +implicit nature, by giving its abstract self-awareness +content and objectivity, and in the other direction to +free itself from its sensuousness, to set aside the given +objectivity and identify it with itself. The two processes +are one and the same, the identification of its consciousness +and self-consciousness. +</p> + +<div> +<head>(α) Appetite or Instinctive Desire<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die Begierde.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 426. Self-consciousness, in its immediacy, is a singular, +and a desire (appetite),—the contradiction implied +<pb n='054'/><anchor id='Pg054'/> +in its abstraction which should yet be objective,—or +in its immediacy which has the shape of an external +object and should be subjective. The certitude of one's +self, which issues from the suppression of mere consciousness, +pronounces the <emph>object</emph> null: and the outlook +of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies +the abstract ideality of such self-consciousness as null. +</p> + +<p> +§ 427. Self-consciousness, therefore, knows itself implicit +in the object, which in this outlook is conformable +to the appetite. In the negation of the two one-sided +moments by the ego's own activity, this identity comes +to be <emph>for</emph> the ego. To this activity the object, which +implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-less, can +make no resistance: the dialectic, implicit in it, towards +self-suppression exists in this case as that activity of the +ego. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective, +the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness and +becomes objective to itself. +</p> + +<p> +§ 428. The product of this process is the fast conjunction +of the ego with itself, its satisfaction realised, and +itself made actual. On the external side it continues, in +this return upon itself, primarily describable as an individual, +and maintains itself as such; because its bearing +upon the self-less object is purely negative, the latter, +therefore, being merely consumed. Thus appetite in its +satisfaction is always destructive, and in its content +selfish: and as the satisfaction has only happened in +the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again +generated in the very act of satisfaction. +</p> + +<p> +§ 429. But on the inner side, or implicitly, the sense +of self which the ego gets in the satisfaction does not +remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere individuality; +on the contrary,—as negation of <emph>immediacy</emph> +and individuality the result involves a character of +universality and of the identity of self-consciousness +<pb n='055'/><anchor id='Pg055'/> +with its object. The judgment or diremption of this +self-consciousness is the consciousness of a <q><emph>free</emph></q> object, +in which ego is aware of itself as an ego, which however +is <emph>also</emph> still outside it. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(β) Self-consciousness Recognitive<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Das anerkennende Selbstbewußtsein.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_430'/> +§ 430. Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness, +at first immediately as one of two things +for another. In that other as ego I behold myself, +and yet also an immediately existing object, another +ego absolutely independent of me and opposed to me. +(The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness +was only a first step in the suppression, and it merely +led to the characterisation of it as <emph>particular</emph>.) This +contradiction gives either self-consciousness the impulse +to <emph>show</emph> itself as a free self, and to exist as such for +the other:—the process of <emph>recognition</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 431. The process is a battle. I cannot be aware of +me as myself in another individual, so long as I see in +that other an other and an immediate existence: and +I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this +immediacy of his. But in like measure <emph>I</emph> cannot be +recognised as immediate, except so far as I overcome +the mere immediacy on my own part, and thus give +existence to my freedom. But this immediacy is at the +same time the corporeity of self-consciousness, in which +as in its sign and tool the latter has its own <emph>sense of +self</emph>, and its being <emph>for others</emph>, and the means for entering +into relation with them. +</p> + +<p> +§ 432. The fight of recognition is a life and death +struggle: either self-consciousness imperils the other's +like, and incurs a like peril for its own—but only peril, +for either is no less bent on maintaining his life, as the +existence of his freedom. Thus the death of one, +<pb n='056'/><anchor id='Pg056'/> +though by the abstract, therefore rude, negation of +immediacy, it, from one point of view, solves the contradiction, +is yet, from the essential point of view (i.e. +the outward and visible recognition), a new contradiction +(for that recognition is at the same time undone by the +other's death) and a greater than the other. +</p> + +<p> +§ 433. But because life is as requisite as liberty to the +solution, the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided +negation with inequality. While the one combatant +prefers life, retains his single self-consciousness, +but surrenders his claim for recognition, the other holds +fast to his self-assertion and is recognised by the former +as his superior. Thus arises the status of <emph>master and +slave</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +In the battle for recognition and the subjugation +under a master, we see, on their phenomenal side, the +emergence of man's social life and the commencement +of political union. <emph>Force</emph>, which is the basis of this +phenomenon, is not on that account a basis of right, but +only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passage +from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and +selfish isolation into the state of universal self-consciousness. +Force, then, is the external or phenomenal +commencement of states, not their underlying and +essential principle. +</p> + +<p> +§ 434. This status, in the first place, implies <emph>common</emph> +wants and common concern for their satisfaction,—for +the means of mastery, the slave, must likewise +be kept in life. In place of the rude destruction of the +immediate object there ensues acquisition, preservation, +and formation of it, as the instrumentality in which the +two extremes of independence and non-independence are +welded together. The form of universality thus arising +in satisfying the want, creates a <emph>permanent</emph> means and +a provision which takes care for and secures the future. +</p> + +<pb n='057'/><anchor id='Pg057'/> + +<p> +§ 435. But secondly, when we look to the distinction +of the two, the master beholds in the slave and his servitude +the supremacy of his <emph>single</emph> self-hood, and that by +the suppression of immediate self-hood, a suppression, +however, which falls on another. This other, the +slave, however, in the service of the master, works off +his individualist self-will, overcomes the inner immediacy +of appetite, and in this divestment of self and in +<q>the fear of his lord</q> makes <q>the beginning of wisdom</q>—the +passage to universal self-consciousness. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(γ) Universal Self-consciousness.</head> + +<p> +§ 436. Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative +awareness of self in an other self: each self as a free +individuality has his own <q>absolute</q> independence, yet +in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite +without distinguishing itself from that other. Each is +thus universal self-conscious and objective; each has +<q>real</q> universality in the shape of reciprocity, so far as +each knows itself recognised in the other freeman, and +is aware of this in so far as it recognises the other and +knows him to be free. +</p> + +<p> +This universal re-appearance of self-consciousness—the +notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as +a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason +universal—is the form of consciousness which lies at +the root of all true mental or spiritual life—in family, +fatherland, state, and of all virtues, love, friendship, +valour, honour, fame. But this appearance of the +underlying essence may be severed from that essential, +and be maintained apart in worthless honour, idle +fame, &c. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_437'/> +§ 437. This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness +implies in the first instance the individuals mutually +<pb n='058'/><anchor id='Pg058'/> +throwing light upon each other. But the difference +between those who are thus identified is mere vague +diversity—or rather it is a difference which is none. +Hence its truth is the fully and really existent universality +and objectivity of self-consciousness,—which is +<emph>Reason</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +Reason, as the <emph>Idea</emph> (§ 213) as it here appears, is to be +taken as meaning that the distinction between notion +and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of +a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or +consciousness, and the object subsisting external and +opposed to it. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(c) Reason<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die Vernunft.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 438. The essential and actual truth which reason is, +lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the +notion, with its objectivity and universality. The +universality of reason, therefore, whilst it signifies that +the object, which was only given in consciousness <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>quâ</foreign> +consciousness, is now itself universal, permeating and +encompassing the ego, also signifies that the pure ego +is the pure form which overlaps the object, and encompasses +it without it. +</p> + +<p> +§ 439. Self-consciousness, thus certified that its +determinations are no less objective, or determinations +of the very being of things, than they are its own +thoughts, is Reason, which as such an identity is not +only the absolute <emph>substance</emph>, but the <emph>truth</emph> that knows it. +For truth here has, as its peculiar mode and immanent +form, the self-centred pure notion, ego, the certitude of +self as infinite universality. Truth, aware of what it is, +is mind (spirit). +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='059'/><anchor id='Pg059'/> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Sub-Section C. Psychology. Mind<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Der Geist.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 440. Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and +consciousness,—the former a simple immediate totality, +the latter now an infinite form which is not, like consciousness, +restricted by that content, and does not +stand in mere correlation to it as to its object, but is +an awareness of this substantial totality, neither subjective +nor objective. Mind, therefore, starts only +from its own being and is in correlation only with its +own features. +</p> + +<p> +Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or +general modes of mental activity <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>quâ</foreign> mental—mental +vision, ideation, remembering, &c., desires, &c.—apart +both from the content, which on the phenomenal side +is found in empirical ideation, in thinking also and in +desire and will, and from the two forms in which these +modes exist, viz. in the soul as a physical mode, and in +consciousness itself as a separately existent object of +that consciousness. This, however, is not an arbitrary +abstraction by the psychologist. Mind is just this elevation +above nature and physical modes, and above the +<pb n='060'/><anchor id='Pg060'/> +complication with an external object—in one word, above +the material, as its concept has just shown. All it has +now to do is to realise this notion of its freedom, and get +rid of the <emph>form</emph> of immediacy with which it once more +begins. The content which is elevated to intuitions is +<emph>its</emph> sensations: it is <emph>its</emph> intuitions also which are transmuted +into representations, and its representations which +are transmuted again into thoughts, &c. +</p> + +<p> +§ 441. The soul is finite, so far as its features are +immediate or con-natural. Consciousness is finite, in so +far as it has an object. Mind is finite, in so far as, +though it no longer has an object, it has a mode in its +knowledge; i.e., it is finite by means of its immediacy, +or, what is the same thing, by being subjective or only +a notion. And it is a matter of no consequence, which +is defined as its notion, and which as the reality of +that notion. Say that its notion is the utterly infinite +objective reason, then its reality is knowledge or <emph>intelligence</emph>: +say that knowledge is its notion, then its reality +is that reason, and the realisation of knowledge consists +in appropriating reason. Hence the finitude of mind is +to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to +get hold of the full reality of its reason, or, equally, in +the (temporary) failure of reason to attain full manifestation +in knowledge. Reason at the same time is +only infinite so far as it is <q>absolute</q> freedom; so far, +that is, as presupposing itself for its knowledge to work +upon, it thereby reduces itself to finitude, and appears +as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy, +of comprehending itself, and being a rational knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +§ 442. The progress of mind is <emph>development</emph>, in so far +as its existent phase, viz. knowledge, involves as its +intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete +autonomy which is rationality; in which case the action +of translating this purpose into reality is strictly only +<pb n='061'/><anchor id='Pg061'/> +a nominal passage over into manifestation, and is even +there a return into itself. So far as knowledge which +has not shaken off its original quality of <emph>mere</emph> knowledge +is only abstract or formal, the goal of mind is to give +it objective fulfilment, and thus at the same time produce +its freedom. +</p> + +<p> +The development here meant is not that of the +individual (which has a certain <emph>anthropological</emph> character), +where faculties and forces are regarded as successively +emerging and presenting themselves in external +existence—a series of steps, on the ascertainment on +which there was for a long time great stress laid (by +the system of Condillac), as if a conjectural natural +emergence could exhibit the origin of these faculties +and <emph>explain</emph> them. In Condillac's method there is an +unmistakable intention to show how the <emph>several</emph> modes +of mental activity could be made intelligible without +losing sight of mental unity, and to exhibit their necessary +interconnexion. But the categories employed in doing +so are of a wretched sort. Their ruling principle is +that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as the <foreign rend='italic'>prius</foreign> +or the initial basis, but that the later phases that follow +this starting-point present themselves as emerging in +a solely <emph>affirmative</emph> manner, and the negative aspect +of mental activity, by which this material is transmuted +into mind and destroyed <emph>as</emph> a sensible, is misconceived +and overlooked. As the theory of Condillac states it, +the sensible is not merely the empirical first, but is left +as if it were the true and essential foundation. +</p> + +<p> +Similarly, if the activities of mind are treated as mere +manifestations, forces, perhaps in terms stating their +utility or suitability for some other interest of head or +heart, there is no indication of the true final aim of the +whole business. That can only be the intelligible unity +of mind, and its activity can only have itself as aim; i.e. +<pb n='062'/><anchor id='Pg062'/> +its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy +or subjectivity, to reach and get hold of itself, and to +liberate itself to itself. In this way the so-called +faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be +treated as steps of this liberation. And this is the +only <emph>rational</emph> mode of studying the mind and its various +activities. +</p> + +<p> +§ 443. As consciousness has for its object the stage +which preceded it, viz. the natural soul (§ <ref target='Section_413'>413</ref>), so mind +has or rather makes consciousness its object: i.e. +whereas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the +ego with its other (§ <ref target='Section_415'>415</ref>), the mind realises that identity +as the concrete unity which it and it only knows. Its +productions are governed by the principle of all reason +that the contents are at once potentially existent, and +are the mind's own, in freedom. Thus, if we consider +the initial aspect of mind, that aspect is twofold—as +<emph>being</emph> and as <emph>its own</emph>: by the one, the mind finds in +itself something which <emph>is</emph>, by the other it affirms it to +be only <emph>its own</emph>. The way of mind is therefore +</p> + +<p> +(<hi rend='italic'>a</hi>) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational +as its immediate affection which it must render its own: +or it has to free knowledge from its pre-supposedness +and therefore from its abstractness, and make the +affection subjective. When the affection has been +rendered its own, and the knowledge consequently +characterised as free intelligence, i.e. as having its full +and free characterisation in itself, it is +</p> + +<p> +(<hi rend='italic'>b</hi>) Will: <emph>practical</emph> mind, which in the first place is +likewise formal—i.e. its content is at first <emph>only</emph> its own, +and is immediately willed; and it proceeds next to +liberate its volition from its subjectivity, which is the +one-sided form of its contents, so that it +</p> + +<p> +(<hi rend='italic'>c</hi>) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of +both its defects of one-sidedness. +</p> + +<pb n='063'/><anchor id='Pg063'/> + +<p> +§ 444. The theoretical as well as the practical mind +still fall under the general range of Mind Subjective. +They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. +Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely +nominal productivity. Inwards, the theoretical mind +produces only its <q>ideal</q> world, and gains abstract +autonomy within; while the practical, while it has to do +with autonomous products, with a material which is its +own, has a material which is only nominally such, and +therefore a restricted content, for which it gains the +form of universality. Outwards, the subjective mind +(which as a unity of soul and consciousness, is thus +also a reality,—a reality at once anthropological and +conformable to consciousness) has for its products, in +the theoretical range, the <emph>word</emph>, and in the practical +(not yet deed and action, but) <emph>enjoyment</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +Psychology, like logic, is one of those sciences which +in modern times have yet derived least profit from the +more general mental culture and the deeper conception +of reason. It is still extremely ill off. The turn +which the Kantian philosophy has taken has given it +greater importance: it has, and that in its empirical +condition, been claimed as the basis of metaphysics, +which is to consist of nothing but the empirical +apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human +consciousness, merely as facts, just as they are given. +This position of psychology, mixing it up with forms +belonging to the range of consciousness and with +anthropology, has led to no improvement in its own +condition: but it has had the further effect that, both for +the mind as such, and for metaphysics and philosophy +generally, all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain +the necessity of essential and actual reality, to get at +the notion and the truth. +</p> + +<pb n='064'/><anchor id='Pg064'/> + +<div> +<head>(a) Theoretical mind.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_445'/> +§ 445. Intelligence<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die Intelligenz.</foreign></note> <emph>finds</emph> itself determined: this is its +apparent aspect from which in its immediacy it starts. +But as knowledge, intelligence consists in treating +what is found as its own. Its activity has to do with +the empty form—the pretence of <emph>finding</emph> reason: and its +aim is to realise its concept or to be reason actual, +along with which the content is realised as rational. +This activity is <emph>cognition</emph>. The nominal knowledge, +which is only certitude, elevates itself, as reason is +concrete, to definite and conceptual knowledge. The +course of this elevation is itself rational, and consists in +a necessary passage (governed by the concept) of one +grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty +of mind) into another. The refutation which such cognition +gives of the semblance that the rational is <emph>found</emph>, +starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence in its +capability of rational knowledge, and in the possibility +of being able to appropriate the reason, which it and the +content virtually is. +</p> + +<p> +The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often +incorrectly taken to mean that each has a fixed and +separate existence of its own, as if volition could be +without intelligence, or the activity of intelligence could +be without will. The possibility of a culture of the +intellect which leaves the heart untouched, as it is said, +and of the heart without the intellect—of hearts which +in one-sided way want intellect, and heartless intellects—only +proves at most that bad and radically untrue +existences occur. But it is not philosophy which should +take such untruths of existence and of mere imagining +for truth—take the worthless for the essential nature. +A host of other phrases used of intelligence, e.g. that it +<pb n='065'/><anchor id='Pg065'/> +receives and accepts impressions from outside, that +ideas arise through the causal operations of external +things upon it, &c., belong to a point of view utterly +alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic +study. +</p> + +<p> +A favourite reflectional form is that of powers and +faculties of soul, intelligence, or mind. Faculty, like +power or force, is the fixed quality of any object of +thought, conceived as reflected into self. Force (§ 136) +is no doubt the infinity of form—of the inward and the +outward: but its essential finitude involves the indifference +of content to form (ib. note). In this lies +the want of organic unity which by this reflectional +form, treating mind as a <q>lot</q> of forces, is brought into +mind, as it is by the same method brought into nature. +Any aspect which can be distinguished in mental action +is stereotyped as an independent entity, and the mind +thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. It +makes absolutely no difference if we substitute the +expression <q>activities</q> for powers and faculties. Isolate +the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere +aggregate, and treat their essential correlation as an +external incident. +</p> + +<p> +The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has +been called <emph>cognition</emph> (knowledge). Yet this does not +mean intelligence <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>inter alia</foreign> knows,—besides which +it also intuites, conceives, remembers, imagines, &c. +To take up such a position is in the first instance part +and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just +censured; but it is also in addition connected with the +great question of modern times, as to whether true +knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible,—which, +if answered in the negative, must lead to abandoning +the effort. The numerous aspects and reasons and +modes of phrase with which external reflection swells +<pb n='066'/><anchor id='Pg066'/> +the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: +the more external the attitude of understanding in the +question, the more diffuse it makes a simple object. +At the present place the simple concept of cognition is +what confronts the quite general assumption taken up +by the question, viz. the assumption that the possibility +of true knowledge in general is in dispute, and the +assumption that it is possible for us at our will either to +prosecute or to abandon cognition. The concept or +possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence +itself, as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition +itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. It +follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligence +and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of +knowing or not. But cognition is genuine, just so far as +it realises itself, or makes the concept its own. This +nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly +where cognition has it. The stages of its realising +activity are intuition, conception, memory, &c.: these +activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim +is solely the concept of cognition (§ <ref target='Section_445'>445</ref> note). If they +are isolated, however, then an impression is implied +that they are useful for something else than cognition, +or that they severally procure a cognitive satisfaction +of their own; and that leads to a glorification of the +delights of intuition, remembrance, imagination. It +is true that even as isolated (i.e. as non-intelligent), +intuition, imagination, &c. can afford a certain satisfaction: +what physical nature succeeds in doing by its +fundamental quality—its out-of-selfness,—exhibiting +the elements or factors of immanent reason external to +each other,—that the intelligence can do by voluntary act, +but the same result may happen where the intelligence +is itself only natural and untrained. But the <emph>true satisfaction</emph>, +it is admitted, is only afforded by an intuition +<pb n='067'/><anchor id='Pg067'/> +permeated by intellect and mind, by rational conception, +by products of imagination which are permeated by +reason and exhibit ideas—in a word, by <emph>cognitive</emph> +intuition, cognitive conception, &c. The truth ascribed +to such satisfaction lies in this, that intuition, conception, +&c. are not isolated, and exist only as <q>moments</q> in +the totality of cognition itself. +</p> + +<div> +<head>(α) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Anschauung.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 446. The mind which as soul is physically conditioned,—which +as consciousness stands to this condition +on the same terms as to an outward object,—but +which as intelligence <emph>finds itself</emph> so characterised—is +(1) an inarticulate embryonic life, in which it is to itself +as it were palpable and has the whole <emph>material</emph> of its +knowledge. In consequence of the immediacy in +which it is thus originally, it is in this stage only as +an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. It +thus appears as mind in the guise of <emph>feeling</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +If feeling formerly turned up (§ <ref target='Section_399'>399</ref>) as a mode of +the <emph>soul's</emph> existence, the finding of it or its immediacy +was in that case essentially to be conceived as a congenital +or corporeal condition; whereas at present it is +only to be taken abstractly in the general sense of +immediacy. +</p> + +<p> +§ 447. The characteristic form of feeling is that though +it is a mode of some <q>affection,</q> this mode is simple. +Hence feeling, even should its import be most sterling +and true, has the form of casual particularity,—not to +mention that its import may also be the most scanty +and most untrue. +</p> + +<p> +It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in +its feeling the material of its ideas, but the statement +<pb n='068'/><anchor id='Pg068'/> +is more usually understood in a sense the opposite +of that which it has here. In contrast with the simplicity +of feeling it is usual rather to assume that the +primary mental phase is judgment generally, or the +distinction of consciousness into subject and object; +and the special quality of sensation is derived from an +independent <emph>object</emph>, external or internal. With us, in the +truth of mind, the mere consciousness point of view, as +opposed to true mental <q>idealism,</q> is swallowed up, and +the matter of feeling has rather been supposed already +as <emph>immanent</emph> in the mind.—It is commonly taken for +granted that as regards content there is more in feeling +than in thought: this being specially affirmed of moral +and religious feelings. Now the material, which the +mind as it feels is to itself, is <emph>here</emph> the result and the +mature result of a fully organised reason: hence under +the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed +all spiritual content whatever. But the form of selfish +singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the +lowest and worst vehicle it can have—one in which it is +not found as a free and infinitely universal principle, but +rather as subjective and private, in content and value +entirely contingent. Trained and sterling feeling is the +feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the +consciousness of the true differences of things, of +their essential relationships and real characters; and it +is with such a mind that this rectified material enters +into its feeling and receives this form. Feeling is the +immediate, as it were the closest, contact in which the +thinking subject can stand to a given content. Against +that content the subject re-acts first of all with its particular +self-feeling, which though it <emph>may</emph> be of more +sterling value and of wider range than a onesided +intellectual standpoint, may just as likely be narrow +and poor; and in any case is the form of the particular +<pb n='069'/><anchor id='Pg069'/> +and subjective. If a man on any topic appeals not +to the nature and notion of the thing, or at least to +reasons—to the generalities of common sense—but to +his feeling, the only thing to do is to let him alone, +because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or +part in common rationality, and shuts himself up in his +own isolated subjectivity—his private and particular +self. +</p> + +<p> +§ 448. (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into +elements, we have the one factor in <emph>Attention</emph>—the +abstract <emph>identical</emph> direction of mind (in feeling, as also in +all other more advanced developments of it)—an active +self-collection—the factor of fixing it as our own, but +with an as yet only nominal autonomy of intelligence. +Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. +The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling, +as contrasted with this inwardness of mind, with the character +of something existent, but as a <emph>negative</emph> or as the +abstract otherness of itself. Intelligence thus defines +the content of sensation as something that is out of +itself, projects it into time and space, which are the +forms in which it is intuitive. To the view of consciousness +the material is only an object of consciousness, +a relative other: from mind it receives the rational +characteristic of being <emph>its very other</emph> (§§ 147, 254). +</p> + +<p> +§ 449. (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity +of the two factors, that is to say, when it is at once self-collected +in this externally existing material, and yet in +this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness, it is +<emph>Intuition</emph> or Mental Vision. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_450'/> +§ 450. At and towards this its own out-of-selfness, +intelligence no less essentially directs its attention. In +this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself, a recollection +of itself. Thus intuition becomes a concretion +of the material with the intelligence, which makes it its +<pb n='070'/><anchor id='Pg070'/> +own, so that it no longer needs this immediacy, no +longer needs to find the content. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(β) Representation (or Mental Idea)<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Vorstellung.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_451'/> +§ 451. Representation is this recollected or inwardised +intuition, and as such is the middle between that stage +of intelligence where it finds itself immediately subject +to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom, +or, as thought. The representation is the property +of intelligence; with a preponderating subjectivity, however, +as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast +with the immediacy, and the representation cannot +as it stands be said to <emph>be</emph>. The path of intelligence in +representations is to render the immediacy inward, to +invest itself with intuitive action in itself, and at the +same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness, +and inwardly divest itself of it; so as to be in itself +in an externality of its own. But as representation +begins from intuition and the ready-found material of +intuition, the intuitional contrast still continues to affect +its activity, and makes its concrete products still +<q>syntheses,</q> which do not grow to the concrete immanence +of the notion till they reach the stage of +thought. +</p> + +<div> +<head>(αα) Recollection<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die Erinnerung.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 452. Intelligence, as it at first recollects the intuition, +places the content of feeling in its own inwardness—in +a space and a time of its own. In this way that content +is (1) an <emph>image</emph> or picture, liberated from its original +immediacy and abstract singleness amongst other things, +and received into the universality of the ego. The +<pb n='071'/><anchor id='Pg071'/> +image loses the full complement of features proper to +intuition, and is arbitrary or contingent, isolated, we +may say, from the external place, time, and immediate +context in which the intuition stood. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_453'/> +§ 453. (2) The image is of itself transient, and intelligence +itself is as attention its time and also its place, its when +and where. But intelligence is not only consciousness +and actual existence, but <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>quâ</foreign> intelligence is the subject +and the potentiality of its own specialisations. The +image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent, +but stored up out of consciousness. +</p> + +<p> +To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit +in which is stored a world of infinitely many images +and representations, yet without being in consciousness, +is from the one point of view the universal postulate +which bids us treat the notion as concrete, in the way +we treat e.g. the germ as affirmatively containing, in +virtual possibility, all the qualities that come into +existence in the subsequent development of the tree. +Inability to grasp a universal like this, which, though +intrinsically concrete, still continues <emph>simple</emph>, is what has +led people to talk about special fibres and areas as +receptacles of particular ideas. It was felt that what +was diverse should in the nature of things have a local +habitation peculiar to itself. But whereas the reversion +of the germ from its existing specialisations to its simplicity +in a purely potential existence takes place only +in another germ,—the germ of the fruit; intelligence <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>quâ</foreign> +intelligence shows the potential coming to free existence +in its development, and yet at the same time +collecting itself in its inwardness. Hence from the +other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as +this sub-conscious mine, i.e. as the <emph>existent</emph> universal +in which the different has not yet been realised in its +separations. And it is indeed this potentiality which +<pb n='072'/><anchor id='Pg072'/> +is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_454'/> +§ 454. (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs, +if it is to exist, an actual intuition: and what is strictly +called Remembrance is the reference of the image to +an intuition,—and that as a subsumption of the immediate +single intuition (impression) under what is in +point of form universal, under the representation (idea) +with the same content. Thus intelligence recognises +the specific sensation and the intuition of it as what +is already its own,—in them it is still within itself: at +the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) +internal image is also an immediate object of intuition, +by which it is authenticated. The image, which +in the mine of intelligence was only its <emph>property</emph>, now +that it has been endued with externality, comes actually +into its <emph>possession</emph>. And so the image is at once rendered +distinguishable from the intuition and separable +from the blank night in which it was originally submerged. +Intelligence is thus the force which can give +forth its property, and dispense with external intuition +for its existence in it. This <q>synthesis</q> of the internal +image with the recollected existence is <emph>representation</emph> +proper: by this synthesis the internal now has the +qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence +and to have its existence in it. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(ββ) Imagination<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die Einbildungskraft.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_455'/> +§ 455. (1) The intelligence which is active in this +possession is the <emph>reproductive imagination</emph>, where the +images issue from the inward world belonging to the +ego, which is now the power over them. The images +are in the first instance referred to this external, immediate +<pb n='073'/><anchor id='Pg073'/> +time and space which is treasured up along with +them. But it is solely in the conscious subject, where +it is treasured up, that the image has the individuality +in which the features composing it are conjoined: +whereas their original concretion, i.e. at first only in +space and time, as a <emph>unit</emph> of intuition, has been broken +up. The content reproduced, belonging as it does to +the self-identical unity of intelligence, and an out-put +from its universal mine, has a general idea (representation) +to supply the link of association for the images +which according to circumstances are more abstract or +more concrete ideas. +</p> + +<p> +The so-called <emph>laws of the association of ideas</emph> were +objects of great interest, especially during that outburst +of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous +with the decline of philosophy. In the first place, it is +not <emph>Ideas</emph> (properly so called) which are associated. +Secondly, these modes of relation are not <emph>laws</emph>, just for +the reason that there are so many laws about the +same thing, as to suggest a caprice and a contingency +opposed to the very nature of law. It is a matter of +chance whether the link of association is something +pictorial, or an intellectual category, such as likeness +and contrast, reason and consequence. The train of +images and representations suggested by association +is the sport of vacant-minded ideation, where, though +intelligence shows itself by a certain formal universality, +the matter is entirely pictorial.—Image and idea, +if we leave out of account the more precise definition +of those forms given above, present also a distinction +in content. The former is the more consciously-concrete +idea, whereas the idea (representation), whatever be its +content (from image, notion, or idea), has always the +peculiarity, though belonging to intelligence, of being +in respect of its content given and immediate. It is still +<pb n='074'/><anchor id='Pg074'/> +true of this idea or representation, as of all intelligence, +that it finds its material, as a matter of fact, to <emph>be</emph> so and +so; and the universality which the aforesaid material +receives by ideation is still abstract. Mental representation +is the mean in the syllogism of the elevation of +intelligence, the link between the two significations of +self-relatedness—viz. <emph>being</emph> and <emph>universality</emph>, which in +consciousness receive the title of object and subject. +Intelligence complements what is merely found by the +attribution of universality, and the internal and its +own by the attribution of being, but a being of its own +institution. (On the distinction of representations and +thoughts, see Introd. to the Logic, § 20 note.) +</p> + +<p> +Abstraction, which occurs in the ideational activity by +which general ideas are produced (and ideas <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>quâ</foreign> ideas +virtually have the form of generality), is frequently +explained as the incidence of many similar images one +upon another and is supposed to be thus made intelligible. +If this super-imposing is to be no mere accident +and without principle, a force of attraction in like images +must be assumed, or something of the sort, which at the +same time would have the negative power of rubbing +off the dissimilar elements against each other. This +force is really intelligence itself,—the self-identical ego +which by its internalising recollection gives the images +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ipso facto</foreign> generality, and subsumes the single intuition +under the already internalised image (§ <ref target='Section_453'>453</ref>). +</p> + +<p> +§ 456. Thus even the association of ideas is to be +treated as a subsumption of the individual under the +universal, which forms their connecting link. But here +intelligence is more than merely a general form: its +inwardness is an internally definite, concrete subjectivity +with a substance and value of its own, derived from +some interest, some latent concept or Ideal principle, so +far as we may by anticipation speak of such. Intelligence +<pb n='075'/><anchor id='Pg075'/> +is the power which wields the stores of images +and ideas belonging to it, and which thus (2) freely +combines and subsumes these stores in obedience to its +peculiar tenor. Such is creative imagination<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Phantasie.</foreign></note>—symbolic, +allegoric, or poetical imagination—where the +intelligence gets a definite embodiment in this store +of ideas and informs them with its general tone. +These more or less concrete, individualised creations +are still <q>syntheses</q>: for the material, in which the subjective +principles and ideas get a mentally pictorial +existence, is derived from the data of intuition. +</p> + +<p> +§ 457. In creative imagination intelligence has been so +far perfected as to need no helps for intuition. Its self-sprung +ideas have pictorial existence. This pictorial +creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective—still +lacks the side of existence. But as the creation +unites the internal idea with the vehicle of materialisation, +intelligence has therein <emph>implicitly</emph> returned both +to identical self-relation and to immediacy. As reason, +its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum +in itself (§§ <ref target='Section_445'>445</ref>, <ref target='Section_455'>455</ref>), i.e. to universalise it; and now +its action as reason (§ <ref target='Section_458'>458</ref>) is from the present point +directed towards giving the character of an existent to +what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. +In other words, it aims at making itself <emph>be</emph> and be a fact. +Acting on this view, it is self-uttering, intuition-producing: +the imagination which creates signs. +</p> + +<p> +Productive imagination is the centre in which the +universal and being, one's own and what is picked up, +internal and external, are completely welded into one. +The preceding <q>syntheses</q> of intuition, recollection, &c., +are unifications of the same factors, but they are <q>syntheses</q>; +it is not till creative imagination that intelligence +ceases to be the vague mine and the universal, +<pb n='076'/><anchor id='Pg076'/> +and becomes an individuality, a concrete subjectivity, in +which the self-reference is defined both to being and to +universality. The creations of imagination are on all +hands recognised as such combinations of the mind's +own and inward with the matter of intuition; what +further and more definite aspects they have is a matter +for other departments. For the present this internal +studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these +abstract aspects.—Imagination, when regarded as the +agency of this unification, is reason, but only a nominal +reason, because the matter or theme it embodies is to +imagination <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>quâ</foreign> imagination a matter of indifference; +whilst reason <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>quâ</foreign> reason also insists upon the <emph>truth</emph> of +its content. +</p> + +<p> +Another point calling for special notice is that, when +imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image +and intuition, and this is expressed by saying that it +gives the former the character of an <emph>existent</emph>, the phrase +must not seem surprising that intelligence makes itself +<emph>be</emph> as a <emph>thing</emph>; for its ideal import is itself, and so is +the aspect which it imposes upon it. The image +produced by imagination of an object is a bare mental +or subjective intuition: in the sign or symbol it adds +intuitability proper; and in mechanical memory it +completes, so far as it is concerned, this form of <emph>being</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_458'/> +§ 458. In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an +independent representation with an intuition, the matter +of the latter is, in the first instance, something accepted, +somewhat immediate or given (e.g. the colour of the +cockade, &c.). But in the fusion of the two elements, +the intuition does not count positively or as representing +itself, but as representative of something else. It is an +image, which has received as its soul and meaning an +independent mental representation. This intuition is +the <emph>Sign</emph>. +</p> + +<pb n='077'/><anchor id='Pg077'/> + +<p> +The sign is some immediate intuition, representing +a totally different import from what naturally belongs to +it; it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been +conveyed, and where it is conserved. The <emph>sign</emph> is +different from the <emph>symbol</emph>: for in the symbol the original +characters (in essence and conception) of the visible +object are more or less identical with the import which +it bears as symbol; whereas in the sign, strictly +so-called, the natural attributes of the intuition, and the +connotation of which it is a sign, have nothing to do +with each other. Intelligence therefore gives proof +of wider choice and ampler authority in the use of +intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) +rather than as symbolical. +</p> + +<p> +In logic and psychology, signs and language are +usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix, without +any trouble being taken to display their necessity and +systematic place in the economy of intelligence. The +right place for the sign is that just given: where intelligence—which +as intuiting generates the form of time +and space, but is apparently recipient of sensible +matter, out of which it forms ideas—now gives its own +original ideas a definite existence from itself, treating +the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own +property, deleting the connotation which properly and +naturally belongs to it, and conferring on it an other +connotation as its soul and import. This sign-creating +activity may be distinctively named <q>productive</q> +Memory (the primarily abstract <q>Mnemosyne</q>); since +memory, which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable +and synonymous with remembrance (recollection), +and even with conception and imagination, has +always to do with signs only. +</p> + +<p> +§ 459. The intuition—in its natural phase a something +given and given in space—acquires, when employed as +<pb n='078'/><anchor id='Pg078'/> +a sign, the peculiar characteristic of existing only as +superseded and sublimated. Such is the negativity of +intelligence; and thus the truer phase of the intuition +used as a sign is existence in <emph>time</emph> (but its existence +vanishes in the moment of being), and if we consider +the rest of its external psychical quality, its <emph>institution</emph> +by intelligence, but an institution growing out of its +(anthropological) own naturalness. This institution of +the natural is the vocal note, where the inward idea +manifests itself in adequate utterance. The vocal note +which receives further articulation to express specific +ideas—speech and, its system, language—gives to +sensations, intuitions, conceptions, a second and higher +existence than they naturally possess,—invests them +with the right of existence in the ideational realm. +</p> + +<p> +Language here comes under discussion only in the +special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting +its ideas in an external medium. If language had +to be treated in its concrete nature, it would be necessary +for its vocabulary or material part to recall the +anthropological or psycho-physiological point of view +(§ <ref target='Section_401'>401</ref>), and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate +the standpoint of analytic understanding. With +regard to the elementary <emph>material</emph> of language, while on +one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared, on +the other the principle of imitation has been restricted +to the slight range it actually covers—that of vocal +objects. Yet one may still hear the German language +praised for its wealth—that wealth consisting in its +special expression for special sounds—<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Rauschen</foreign>, <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Sausen</foreign>, +<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Knarren</foreign>, &c.;—there have been collected more than +a hundred such words, perhaps: the humour of the +moment creates fresh ones when it pleases. Such +superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality +contributes nothing to form the real wealth of a cultivated +<pb n='079'/><anchor id='Pg079'/> +language. The strictly raw material of language +itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than +a symbolism referring to external objects; it depends, +i.e. on anthropological articulation, as it were the +posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. For +each vowel and consonant accordingly, as well as for +their more abstract elements (the posture of lips, palate, +tongue in each) and for their combinations, people have +tried to find the appropriate signification. But these +dull sub-conscious beginnings are deprived of their +original importance and prominence by new influences, +it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilisation. +Having been originally sensuous intuitions, +they are reduced to signs, and thus have only traces +left of their original meaning, if it be not altogether +extinguished. As to the <emph>formal</emph> element, again, it is +the work of analytic intellect which informs language +with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives +rise to grammar. The study of languages still in their +original state, which we have first really begun to make +acquaintance with in modern times, has shown on this +point that they contain a very elaborate grammar and +express distinctions which are lost or have been largely +obliterated in the languages of more civilised nations. +It seems as if the language of the most civilised nations +has the most imperfect grammar, and that the same +language has a more perfect grammar when the nation +is in a more uncivilised state than when it reaches +a higher civilisation. (Cf. W. von Humboldt's <hi rend='italic'>Essay +on the Dual</hi>.) +</p> + +<p> +In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language, +we may touch, only in passing, upon written language,—a +further development in the particular sphere of +language which borrows the help of an externally +practical activity. It is from the province of immediate +<pb n='080'/><anchor id='Pg080'/> +spatial intuition to which written language proceeds +that it takes and produces the signs (§ <ref target='Section_454'>454</ref>). In particular, +hieroglyphics uses spatial figures to designate +<emph>ideas</emph>; alphabetical writing, on the other hand, uses +them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. +Alphabetical writing thus consists of signs of signs,—the +words or concrete signs of vocal language being +analysed into their simple elements, which severally +receive designation.—Leibnitz's practical mind misled +him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete +written language, formed on the hieroglyphic method +(and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic +writing, as in our signs for the numbers, the planets, +the chemical elements, &c.), would have as a universal +language for the intercourse of nations and especially +of scholars. But we may be sure that it was rather the +intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in +Phoenicia, and still takes place in Canton—see <hi rend='italic'>Macartney's +Travels</hi> by Staunton) which occasioned the need +of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. At +any rate a comprehensive hieroglyphic language for +ever completed is impracticable. Sensible objects no +doubt admit of permanent signs; but, as regards signs +for mental objects, the progress of thought and the +continual development of logic lead to changes in the +views of their internal relations and thus also of their +nature; and this would involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical +denotation. Even in the case of sense-objects +it happens that their names, i.e. their signs in vocal +language, are frequently changed, as e.g. in chemistry +and mineralogy. Now that it has been forgotten what +names properly are, viz. externalities which of themselves +have no sense, and only get signification as +signs, and now that, instead of names proper, people +ask for terms expressing a sort of definition, which is +<pb n='081'/><anchor id='Pg081'/> +frequently changed capriciously and fortuitously, the +denomination, i.e. the composite name formed of signs +of their generic characters or other supposed characteristic +properties, is altered in accordance with the differences +of view with regard to the genus or other supposed +specific property. It is only a stationary civilisation, +like the Chinese, which admits of the hieroglyphic +language of that nation; and its method of writing +moreover can only be the lot of that small part of +a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental +culture.—The progress of the vocal language depends +most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing; by +means of which only does vocal language acquire the +precision and purity of its articulation. The imperfection +of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: +numbers of its words possess several utterly different +meanings, as many as ten and twenty, so that, in speaking, +the distinction is made perceptible merely by accent +and intensity, by speaking low and soft or crying out. +The European, learning to speak Chinese, falls into the +most ridiculous blunders before he has mastered these +absurd refinements of accentuation. Perfection here +consists in the opposite of that <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>parler sans accent</foreign> which +in Europe is justly required of an educated speaker. +The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese +vocal language from reaching that objective precision +which is gained in articulation by alphabetic writing. +</p> + +<p> +Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more +intelligent: in it the <emph>word</emph>—the mode, peculiar to the +intellect, of uttering its ideas most worthily—is brought +to consciousness and made an object of reflection. +Engaging the attention of intelligence, as it does, it is +analysed; the work of sign-making is reduced to its +few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) +in which the sense-factor in speech is brought to +<pb n='082'/><anchor id='Pg082'/> +the form of universality, at the same time that in this +elementary phase it acquires complete precision and +purity. Thus alphabetic writing retains at the same +time the advantage of vocal language, that the ideas +have names strictly so called: the name is the simple +sign for the exact idea, i.e. the simple plain idea, not +decomposed into its features and compounded out of +them. Hieroglyphics, instead of springing from the +direct analysis of sensible signs, like alphabetic writing, +arise from an antecedent analysis of ideas. Thus +a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to +their elements, or simple logical terms, so that from the +elementary signs chosen to express these (as, in the case +of the Chinese <foreign rend='italic'>Koua</foreign>, the simple straight stroke, and +the stroke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system +would be generated by their composition. This feature +of hieroglyphic—the analytical designations of ideas—which +misled Leibnitz to regard it as preferable to +alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the +fundamental desideratum of language,—the name. To +want a name means that for the immediate idea (which, +however ample a connotation it may include, is still for +the mind simple in the name), we require a simple +immediate sign which for its own sake does not suggest +anything, and has for its sole function to signify and +represent sensibly the simple idea as such. It is not +merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence +that lingers over the simplicity of ideas and redintegrates +them from the more abstract factors into which +they have been analysed: thought too reduces to +the form of a simple thought the concrete connotation +which it <q>resumes</q> and reunites from the mere aggregate +of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. Both +alike require such signs, simple in respect of their +meaning: signs, which though consisting of several +<pb n='083'/><anchor id='Pg083'/> +letters or syllables and even decomposed into such, yet +do not exhibit a combination of several ideas.—What +has been stated is the principle for settling the value +of these written languages. It also follows that in +hieroglyphics the relations of concrete mental ideas to +one another must necessarily be tangled and perplexed, +and that the analysis of these (and the proximate +results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears +to be possible in the most various and divergent ways. +Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another +formation of the written name; just as in modern times +(as already noted, even in the region of sense) muriatic +acid has undergone several changes of name. A +hieroglyphic written language would require a philosophy +as stationary as is the civilisation of the +Chinese. +</p> + +<p> +What has been said shows the inestimable and not +sufficiently appreciated educational value of learning to +read and write an alphabetic character. It leads the +mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the +more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract +elements, and contributes much to give stability and +independence to the inward realm of mental life. +Acquired habit subsequently effaces the peculiarity by +which alphabetic writing appears, in the interest of vision, +as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility; it +makes them a sort of hieroglyphic to us, so that in +using them we need not consciously realise them by +means of tones, whereas people unpractised in reading +utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning +in the sound. Thus, while (with the faculty which +transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the +capacity of abstraction gained by the first practice +remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading +and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which +<pb n='084'/><anchor id='Pg084'/> +is in time) and the visible (which is in space), each have +their own basis, one no less authoritative than the other. +But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only +a <emph>single</emph> basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful +relation to each other: the visible language is related to +the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence expresses itself +immediately and unconditionally by speaking.—The instrumental +function of the comparatively non-sensuous +element of tone for all ideational work shows itself +further as peculiarly important in memory which forms +the passage from representation to thought. +</p> + +<p> +§ 460. The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual +production) with its signification, is primarily a +single transient product; and conjunction of the idea +(which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) +is itself outward. The reduction of this outwardness +to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(γγ) Memory<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Gedächtniß.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 461. Under the shape of memory the course of +intelligence passes through the same inwardising +(recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the +<emph>word</emph>, as representation in general does in dealing with +the first immediate intuition (§ <ref target='Section_451'>451</ref>). (1) Making its own +the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this +inwardising (memorising) elevates the <emph>single</emph> synthesis +to a universal, i.e. permanent, synthesis, in which name +and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders +the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. +Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being +identified, form one representation: the representation +in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets +existence for its import: all this being the work of +memory which retains names (retentive Memory). +</p> + +<pb n='085'/><anchor id='Pg085'/> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_462'/> +§ 462. The name is thus the thing so far as it exists +and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, +<emph>Reproductive</emph> memory has and recognises the thing, and +with the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and +image. The name, as giving an <emph>existence</emph> to the content +in intelligence, is the externality of intelligence to itself; +and the inwardising or recollection of the name, i.e. +of an intuition of intellectual origin, is at the same time +a self-externalisation to which intelligence reduces itself +on its own ground. The association of the particular +names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, +representative, or cogitant,—series of which the intelligence +traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks. +</p> + +<p> +Given the name lion, we need neither the actual +vision of the animal, nor its image even: the name +alone, if we <emph>understand</emph> it, is the unimaged simple +representation. We <emph>think</emph> in names. +</p> + +<p> +The recent attempts—already, as they deserved, forgotten—to +rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, +consist in transforming names into images, and thus +again deposing memory to the level of imagination. +The place of the power of memory is taken by a +permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the +imagination, to which is then attached the series of +ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. +Considering the heterogeneity between the import of +these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed +with which the attachment has to be made, the attachment +cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, +and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind +put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but +what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, +seeing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote +every other series of ideas, and so those previously +attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically +<pb n='086'/><anchor id='Pg086'/> +impressed is not like what is retained in memory really +got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, +from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited, +but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy.—Mnemonic +is connected with the common prepossession +about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination; +as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual +activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has +ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition,—the +immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it +has rather to do with an object which is the product of +intelligence itself,—such a <emph>without book</emph><note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Auswendiges.</foreign></note> as remains +locked up in the <emph>within-book</emph><note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Inwendiges.</foreign></note> of intelligence, and is, +within intelligence, only its outward and existing side. +</p> + +<p> +§ 463. (3) As the interconnexion of the names lies in +the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the +reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; and +intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete +and simple return into self. But intelligence is +the universal,—the single plain truth of its particular +self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of +them abolishes that distinction between meaning and +name. This extreme inwardising of representation is +the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it +renders itself the mere <emph>being</emph>, the universal space of +names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, +which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at +the same time the power over the different names,—the +link which, having nothing in itself, fixes in itself series +of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as +they merely <emph>are</emph>, and intelligence is here itself this +<emph>being</emph> of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity,—memory; +which, on account of the complete +<pb n='087'/><anchor id='Pg087'/> +externality in which the members of such series stand +to one another, and because it is itself this externality +(subjective though that be), is called mechanical (§ 195). +</p> + +<p> +A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned +by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. +The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is +therefore of course accentless. The correct accent, +if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this +introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs +the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out +the reciter. The faculty of conning by rote series of +words, with no principle governing their succession, +or which are separately meaningless, e.g. a series of +proper names, is so supremely marvellous, because it is +the very essence of mind to have its wits about it; +whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and +its action is like machinery. But it is only as uniting +subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits +about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in +intuition been at first so external as to pick up its +facts ready-made, and in representation inwardises or +recollects this datum and makes it its own,—it proceeds +as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what +is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus +one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, +is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it.—It is +only a step further to treat memory as mechanical—the +act implying no intelligence—in which case it is +only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for +other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing +we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. +</p> + +<p> +§ 464. If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the +mere name as an existent requires something else,—to +be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in +the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once +<pb n='088'/><anchor id='Pg088'/> +that external objectivity and the meaning. In this way +intelligence is explicitly made an <emph>existence</emph> of this +identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity +which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this +manner the passage into the function of <emph>thought</emph>, which +no longer has a <emph>meaning</emph>, i.e. its objectivity is no longer +severed from the subjective, and its inwardness does not +need to go outside for its existence. +</p> + +<p> +The German language has etymologically assigned +memory (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Gedächtniß</foreign>), of which it has become a foregone +conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position +of direct kindred with thought (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Gedanke</foreign>).—It is not +matter of chance that the young have a better memory +than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for +the sake of utility. The young have a good memory +because they have not yet reached the stage of reflection; +their memory is exercised with or without design so as +to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or +to pure space in which the fact, the implicit content, may +reign and unfold itself with no antithesis to a subjective +inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally +combined with a good memory. But empirical statements +of this sort help little towards a knowledge of +what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the +position and meaning of memory and to understand its +organic interconnexion with thought is one of the +hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the +theory of mind. Memory <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>quâ</foreign> memory is itself the +merely <emph>external</emph> mode, or merely <emph>existential</emph> aspect of +thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The +passage from it to thought is to our view and implicitly +the identity of reason with this existential mode: an +identity from which it follows that reason only exists in +a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus +active reason is <emph>Thinking</emph>. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='089'/><anchor id='Pg089'/> + +<div> +<head>(γ) Thinking<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Das Denken.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 465. Intelligence is recognitive: it cognises an intuition, +but only because that intuition is already its own +(§ <ref target='Section_454'>454</ref>); and in the name it re-discovers the fact (§ <ref target='Section_462'>462</ref>): +but now it finds <emph>its</emph> universal in the double signification +of the universal as such, and of the universal as +immediate or as being,—finds i.e. the genuine universal +which is its own unity overlapping and including its +other, viz. being. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on +its own part cognitive: <emph>virtually</emph> it is the universal,—its +product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain identity +of subjective and objective. It knows that what is +<emph>thought</emph>, <emph>is</emph>, and that what <emph>is</emph>, only <emph>is</emph> in so far as it is +a thought (§ <ref target='Section_521'>521</ref>); the thinking of intelligence is to <emph>have +thoughts</emph>: these are as its content and object. +</p> + +<p> +§ 466. But cognition by thought is still in the first +instance formal: the universality and its being is the +plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts therefore +are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the +representations which have been inwardised to thoughts +are so far still the given content. +</p> + +<p> +§ 467. As dealing with this given content, thought is +(α) <emph>understanding</emph> with its formal identity, working up +the representations, that have been memorised, into +species, genera, laws, forces, &c., in short into categories,—thus +indicating that the raw material does not get the +truth of its being save in these thought-forms. As +intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (β) essentially +an act of partition,—<emph>judgment</emph>, which however does not +break up the concept again into the old antithesis of +universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines +supplied by the interconnexions peculiar to the concept. +Thirdly (γ), thought supersedes the formal distinction and +<pb n='090'/><anchor id='Pg090'/> +institutes at the same time an identity of the differences,—thus +being nominal <emph>reason</emph> or inferential understanding. +Intelligence, as the act of thought, cognises. +And (α) understanding out of its generalities (the +categories) <emph>explains</emph> the individual, and is then said to +comprehend or understand itself: (β) in the judgment it +explains the individual to be an universal (species, genus). +In these forms the <emph>content</emph> appears as given: (γ) but in +inference (syllogism) it characterises a content from +itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the +perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still +attaching to formal thought has vanished. +</p> + +<p> +In <emph>Logic</emph> there was thought, but in its implicitness, +and as reason develops itself in this distinction-lacking +medium. So in <emph>consciousness</emph> thought occurs as a stage +(§ <ref target='Section_437'>437</ref> note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical +distinction, as it had taken shape within the +mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and +again in these different parts of philosophy, because +these parts are different only through the medium they +are in and the antithesis they imply; while thought is +this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth +the antithesis return. +</p> + +<p> +§ 468. Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates +an immediate mode of being, is, now that it has completed +<emph>taking possession</emph>, in its own <emph>property</emph>: the last +negation of immediacy has implicitly required that the +intelligence shall itself determine its content. Thus +thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of +<emph>content</emph>. But when intelligence is aware that it is +determinative of the content, which is <emph>its</emph> mode no less +than it is a mode of being, it is Will. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='091'/><anchor id='Pg091'/> + +<div> +<head>(b) Mind Practical<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Der praktische Geist.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 469. As will, the mind is aware that it is the author +of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. +Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuality form +the side of existence or of <emph>reality</emph> for the Idea of +mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas +as cognition it is on the soil of notional generality. +Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, +and in the widest sense free: this is its characteristic +trait. Its finitude lies in the formalism that the +spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than +a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with +matured reason. It is the function of the essential will +to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is +therefore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with +its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading +character, content, and aim, as well as its sphere of +existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must +always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can +make itself objective mind is to rise to be a thinking +will,—to give itself the content which it can only have +as it thinks itself. +</p> + +<p> +True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in +the will finding its purpose in a universal content, not +in subjective or selfish interests. But such a content is +only possible in thought and through thought: it is +nothing short of absurd to seek to banish thought from +the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. +</p> + +<p> +§ 470. Practical mind, considered at first as formal +or immediate will, contains a double ought—(1) in the +contrast which the new mode of being projected outward +by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its +old existence and condition,—an antagonism which in +<pb n='092'/><anchor id='Pg092'/> +consciousness grows to correlation with external objects. +(2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, +is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: +the latter, therefore, virtually constitutes an obligation +on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute +it in point of matter;—a distinction which only exists +for the observer. +</p> + +<div> +<head>(α) Practical Sense or Feeling<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Der praktische Gefühl.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 471. The autonomy of the practical mind at first is +immediate and therefore formal, i.e. it <emph>finds</emph> itself as an +<emph>individuality</emph> determined in <emph>its</emph> inward <emph>nature</emph>. It is thus +<q>practical feeling,</q> or instinct of action. In this phase, +as it is at bottom a subjectivity simply identical with +reason, it has no doubt a rational content, but a content +which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also +natural, contingent and subjective,—a content which +may be determined quite as much by mere personalities +of want and opinion, &c., and by the subjectivity which +selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be +virtually in conformity with reason. +</p> + +<p> +An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) +of right and morality, as well as of religion, which man +is alleged to possess,—to his benevolent dispositions,—and +even to his heart generally,—i.e. to the subject so +far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. +So far as this appeal implies (1) that these ideas +are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling +is opposed to the logical understanding, it, and not the +partial abstractions of the latter, <emph>may</emph> be the <emph>totality</emph>—the +appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other +hand feeling too <emph>may</emph> be onesided, unessential and bad. +The rational, which exists in the shape of rationality +when it is apprehended by thought, is the same content +<pb n='093'/><anchor id='Pg093'/> +as the <emph>good</emph> practical feeling has, but presented in its +universality and necessity, in its objectivity and truth. +</p> + +<p> +Thus it is on the one hand <emph>silly</emph> to suppose that in the +passage from feeling to law and duty there is any loss +of import and excellence; it is this passage which lets +feeling first reach its truth. It is equally silly to consider +intellect as superfluous or even harmful to feeling, +heart, and will; the truth and, what is the same thing, +the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be +at home in the universality of intellect, and not in the +singleness of feeling as feeling. If feelings are of the +right sort, it is because of their quality or content,—which +is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal +or has its source in the thinking mind. The difficulty +for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the +separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several +faculties of feeling and thinking mind, and coming to +see that in the human being there is only <emph>one</emph> reason, +in feeling, volition, and thought. Another difficulty +connected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas +which are the special property of the thinking mind, +viz. God, law and morality, can also be <emph>felt</emph>. But +feeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar +individuality of the subject, in which these facts, like +any other objective facts (which consciousness also sets +over against itself), may be placed. +</p> + +<p> +On the other hand, it is <emph>suspicious</emph> or even worse to +cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent +rationality of law, right and duty; because all that the +former holds more than the latter is only the particular +subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. For the same +reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the +feelings to deal with anything beyond their form, and to +discuss their content; for the latter, when thought, is +precisely what constitutes, in their universality and +<pb n='094'/><anchor id='Pg094'/> +necessity, the rights and duties which are the true works +of mental autonomy. So long as we study practical +feelings and dispositions specially, we have only to deal +with the selfish, bad, and evil; it is these alone which +belong to the individuality which retains its opposition +to the universal: their content is the reverse of rights +and duties, and precisely in that way do they—but only +in antithesis to the latter—retain a speciality of their own. +</p> + +<p> +§ 472. The <q>Ought</q> of practical feeling is the claim of +its essential autonomy to control some existing mode of +fact—which is assumed to be worth nothing save as +adapted to that claim. But as both, in their immediacy, +lack objective determination, this relation of the +<emph>requirement</emph> to existent fact is the utterly subjective and +superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. +</p> + +<p> +Delight, joy, grief, &c., shame, repentance, contentment, +&c., are partly only modifications of the formal +<q>practical feeling</q> in <emph>general</emph>, but are partly different in +the features that give the special tone and character +mode to their <q>Ought.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the +world, so far at least as evil is understood to mean +what is disagreeable and painful merely, arises on this +stage of the formal practical feeling. Evil is nothing +but the incompatibility between what is and what ought +to be. <q>Ought</q> is an ambiguous term,—indeed infinitely +so, considering that casual aims may also come +under the form of Ought. But where the objects sought +are thus casual, evil only executes what is rightfully due +to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they +themselves were radically evil. The finitude of life and +mind is seen in their judgment: the contrary which +is separated from them they also have as a negative in +them, and thus they are the contradiction called evil. In +the dead there is neither evil nor pain: for in inorganic +<pb n='095'/><anchor id='Pg095'/> +nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not confront +its existence and does not in the difference at the same +time remain its permanent subject. Whereas in life, +and still more in mind, we have this immanent distinction +present: hence arises the Ought: and this +negativity, subjectivity, ego, freedom are the principles +of evil and pain. Jacob Böhme viewed egoity (selfhood) +as pain and torment, and as the fountain of nature and +of spirit. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(β) The Impulses and Choice<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Der Triebe und die Willkühr.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 473. The practical ought is a <q>real</q> judgment. +Will, which is essentially self-determination, finds in the +conformity—as immediate and merely <emph>found</emph> to hand—of +the existing mode to its requirement a negation, and +something inappropriate to it. If the will is to satisfy +itself, if the implicit unity of the universality and +the special mode is to be realised, the conformity of its +inner requirement and of the existent thing ought to be +its act and institution. The will, as regards the form of +its content, is at first still a natural will, directly +identical with its specific mode:—natural <emph>impulse</emph> and +<emph>inclination</emph>. Should, however, the totality of the practical +spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted +forms of impulse, each being always in conflict to another, +it is <emph>passion</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 474. Inclinations and passions embody the same +constituent features as the practical feeling. Thus, +while on one hand they are based on the rational +nature of the mind; they on the other, as part and +parcel of the still subjective and single will, are infected +with contingency, and appear as particular to stand to +the individual and to each other in an external relation +and with a necessity which creates bondage. +</p> + +<pb n='096'/><anchor id='Pg096'/> + +<p> +The special note in <emph>passion</emph> is its restriction to one +special mode of volition, in which the whole subjectivity +of the individual is merged, be the value of that mode +what it may. In consequence of this formalism, passion +is neither good nor bad; the title only states that +a subject has thrown his whole soul,—his interests of +intellect, talent, character, enjoyment,—on one aim and +object. Nothing great has been and nothing great can +be accomplished without passion. It is only a dead, too +often, indeed, a hypocritical moralising which inveighs +against the form of passion as such. +</p> + +<p> +But with regard to the inclinations, the question is +directly raised, Which are good and bad?—Up to what +degree the good continue good;—and (as there are +many, each with its private range) In what way have +they, being all in one subject and hardly all, as experience +shows, admitting of gratification, to suffer at least +reciprocal restriction? And, first of all, as regards the +numbers of these impulses and propensities, the case is +much the same as with the psychical powers, whose +aggregate is to form the mind theoretical,—an aggregate +which is now increased by the host of impulses. The +nominal rationality of impulse and propensity lies +merely in their general impulse not to be subjective +merely, but to get realised, overcoming the subjectivity +by the subject's own agency. Their genuine rationality +cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection +which pre-supposes a number of <emph>independent</emph> innate +tendencies and immediate instincts, and therefore is +wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. +But the immanent <q>reflection</q> of mind itself carries it +beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy, +and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity, +in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation, +as rights and duties. It is this objectification which +<pb n='097'/><anchor id='Pg097'/> +evinces their real value, their mutual connexions, and +their truth. And thus it was a true perception when +Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole +nature under its right) showed that the full reality of +justice could be exhibited only in the <emph>objective</emph> phase of +justice, viz. in the construction of the State as the +ethical life. +</p> + +<p> +The answer to the question, therefore, What are the +good and rational propensities, and how they are to be +co-ordinated with each other? resolves itself into an +exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced +by the mind when developing itself as <emph>objective</emph> +mind—a development in which the <emph>content</emph> of autonomous +action loses its contingency and optionality. The +discussion of the true intrinsic worth of the impulses, +inclinations, and passions is thus essentially the theory +of legal, moral, and social <emph>duties</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 475. The subject is the act of satisfying impulses, +an act of (at least) formal rationality, as it translates +them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is +<emph>purpose</emph>) into objectivity, where the subject is made to +close with itself. If the content of the impulse is +distinguished as the thing or business from this act of +carrying it out, and we regard the thing which has been +brought to pass as containing the element of subjective +individuality and its action, this is what is called the +<emph>interest</emph>. Nothing therefore is brought about without +interest. +</p> + +<p> +An action is an aim of the subject, and it is his +agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject +were in this way in the most disinterested action, +i.e. unless he had an interest in it, there would be no +action at all.—The impulses and inclinations are sometimes +depreciated by being contrasted with the baseless +chimera of a happiness, the free gift of nature, where +<pb n='098'/><anchor id='Pg098'/> +wants are supposed to find their satisfaction without +the agent doing anything to produce a conformity +between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. +They are sometimes contrasted, on the whole +to their disadvantage, with the morality of duty for +duty's sake. But impulse and passion are the very +life-blood of all action: they are needed if the agent is +really to be in his aim and the execution thereof. The +morality concerns the content of the aim, which as such +is the universal, an inactive thing, that finds its actualising +in the agent; and finds it only when the aim is +immanent in the agent, is his interest and—should it +claim to engross his whole efficient subjectivity—his +passion. +</p> + +<p> +§ 476. The will, as thinking and implicitly free, distinguishes +itself from the particularity of the impulses, +and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought +above their diversified content. It is thus <q>reflecting</q> +will. +</p> + +<p> +§ 477. Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased +to be a mere datum: the reflective will now sees it as +its own, because it closes with it and thus gives itself +specific individuality and actuality. It is now on the +standpoint of <emph>choosing</emph> between inclinations, and is +option or <emph>choice</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 478. Will as choice claims to be free, reflected +into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate +autonomy. However, as the content, in which its +former universality concludes itself to actuality, is +nothing but the content of the impulses and appetites, +it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. It +realises itself in a particularity, which it regards at the +same time as a nullity, and finds a satisfaction in what +it has at the same time emerged from. As thus contradictory, +it is the process of distracting and suspending +<pb n='099'/><anchor id='Pg099'/> +one desire or enjoyment by another,—and one satisfaction, +which is just as much no satisfaction, by +another, without end. But the truth of the particular +satisfactions is the universal, which under the name of +<emph>happiness</emph> the thinking will makes its aim. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(γ) Happiness<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die Glückseligkeit.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_479'/> +§ 479. In this idea, which reflection and comparison +have educed, of a universal satisfaction, the impulses, +so far as their particularity goes, are reduced to a mere +negative; and it is held that in part they are to be +sacrificed to each other for the behoof that aim, partly +sacrificed to that aim directly, either altogether or in +part. Their mutual limitation, on one hand, proceeds +from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: +on the other hand, as happiness has its sole +<emph>affirmative</emph> contents in the springs of action, it is on +them that the decision turns, and it is the subjective +feeling and good pleasure which must have the casting +vote as to where happiness is to be placed. +</p> + +<p> +§ 480. Happiness is the mere abstract and merely +imagined universality of things desired,—a universality +which only ought to be. But the particularity of the +satisfaction which just as much <emph>is</emph> as it is abolished, and +the abstract singleness, the option which gives or does +not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happiness, find +their truth in the intrinsic <emph>universality</emph> of the will, i.e. its +very autonomy or freedom. In this way choice is will +only as pure subjectivity, which is pure and concrete at +once, by having for its contents and aim only that +infinite mode of being—freedom itself. In this truth of +its autonomy, where concept and object are one, the +will is an <emph>actually free will</emph>. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='100'/><anchor id='Pg100'/> + +<div> +<head>Free Mind<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Der freie Geist.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 481. Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and +practical mind: a free will, which realises its own freedom +of will now that the formalism, fortuitousness, and +contractedness of the practical content up to this point +have been superseded. By superseding the adjustments +of means therein contained, the will is the <emph>immediate +individuality</emph> self-instituted,—an individuality, however, +also purified of all that interferes with its universalism, +i.e. with freedom itself. This universalism the will has +as its object and aim, only so far as it thinks itself, +knows this its concept, and is <emph>will</emph> as free <emph>intelligence</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 482. The mind which knows itself as free and wills +itself as this its object, i.e. which has its true being for +characteristic and aim, is in the first instance the rational +will in general, or <emph>implicit</emph> Idea, and because implicit +only the <emph>notion</emph> of absolute mind. As <emph>abstract</emph> Idea +again, it is existent only in the <emph>immediate</emph> will—it is the +<emph>existential</emph> side of reason,—the <emph>single</emph> will as aware of +this its universality constituting its contents and aim, +and of which it is only the formal activity. If the will, +therefore, in which the Idea thus appears is only finite, +that will is also the act of developing the Idea, and of +investing its self-unfolding content with an existence +which, as realising the idea, is <emph>actuality</emph>. It is thus +<q>Objective</q> Mind. +</p> + +<p> +No Idea is so generally recognised as indefinite, +ambiguous, and open to the greatest misconceptions (to +which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of +Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation +of its meaning. Remembering that free mind +is <emph>actual</emph> mind, we can see how misconceptions about it +are of tremendous consequence in practice. When +individuals and nations have once got in their heads +<pb n='101'/><anchor id='Pg101'/> +the abstract concept of full-blown liberty, there is +nothing like it in its uncontrollable strength, just +because it is the very essence of mind, and that as its +very actuality. Whole continents, Africa and the East, +have never had this idea, and are without it still. The +Greeks and Romans, Plato and Aristotle, even the +Stoics, did not have it. On the contrary, they saw that +it is only by birth (as e.g. an Athenian or Spartan +citizen), or by strength of character, education, or +philosophy (—the sage is free even as a slave and in +chains) that the human being is actually free. It was +through Christianity that this idea came into the world. +According to Christianity, the individual <emph>as such</emph> has an +infinite value as the object and aim of divine love, +destined as mind to live in absolute relationship +with God himself, and have God's mind dwelling in +him: i.e. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. +If, in religion as such, man is aware of this +relationship to the absolute mind as his true being, he +has also, even when he steps into the sphere of secular +existence, the divine mind present with him, as the +substance of the state of the family, &c. These institutions +are due to the guidance of that spirit, and are constituted +after its measure; whilst by their existence the +moral temper comes to be indwelling in the individual, +so that in this sphere of particular existence, of present +sensation and volition, he is <emph>actually</emph> free. +</p> + +<p> +If to be aware of the idea—to be aware, i.e. that men +are aware of freedom as their essence, aim, and object—is +matter of <emph>speculation</emph>, still this very idea itself is the +actuality of men—not something which they <emph>have</emph>, as +men, but which they <emph>are</emph>. Christianity in its adherents +has realised an ever-present sense that they are not +and cannot be slaves; if they are made slaves, if the +decision as regards their property rests with an arbitrary +<pb n='102'/><anchor id='Pg102'/> +will, not with laws or courts of justice, they would find +the very substance of their life outraged. This will to +liberty is no longer an <emph>impulse</emph> which demands its satisfaction, +but the permanent character—the spiritual consciousness +grown into a non-impulsive nature. But this +freedom, which the content and aim of freedom has, is +itself only a notion—a principle of the mind and heart, +intended to develope into an objective phase, into legal, +moral, religious, and not less into scientific actuality. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='103'/><anchor id='Pg103'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Section II. Mind Objective.</head> + +<p> +§ 483. The objective Mind is the absolute Idea, but +only existing <foreign rend='italic'>in posse</foreign>: and as it is thus on the +territory of finitude, its actual rationality retains the +aspect of external apparency. The free will finds itself +immediately confronted by differences which arise from +the circumstance that freedom is its <emph>inward</emph> function +and aim, and is in relation to an external and already +subsisting objectivity, which splits up into different +heads: viz. anthropological data (i.e. private and +personal needs), external things of nature which exist +for consciousness, and the ties of relation between +individual wills which are conscious of their own +diversity and particularity. These aspects constitute +the external material for the embodiment of the will. +</p> + +<p> +§ 484. But the purposive action of this will is to realise +its concept, Liberty, in these externally-objective aspects, +making the latter a world moulded by the former, which +in it is thus at home with itself, locked together with it: +the concept accordingly perfected to the Idea. Liberty, +shaped into the actuality of a world, receives the <emph>form of +Necessity</emph> the deeper substantial nexus of which is the +system or organisation of the principles of liberty, +whilst its phenomenal nexus is power or authority, +<pb n='104'/><anchor id='Pg104'/> +and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousness. +</p> + +<p> +§ 485. This unity of the rational will with the single +will (this being the peculiar and immediate medium in +which the former is actualised) constitutes the simple +actuality of liberty. As it (and its content) belongs to +thought, and is the virtual <emph>universal</emph>, the content has its +right and true character only in the form of universality. +When invested with this character for the intelligent +consciousness, or instituted as an authoritative power, +it is a <emph>Law</emph><note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Gesess.</foreign></note>. When, on the other hand, the content +is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness, attaching +to it in the practical feeling and in impulse, and is +set and grafted in the individual will, not in the form +of impulse, but in its universality, so as to become its +habit, temper and character, it exists as manner and +custom, or <emph>Usage</emph><note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Sitte.</foreign></note>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 486. This <q>reality,</q> in general, where free will has +<emph>existence</emph>, is the <emph>Law</emph> (Right),—the term being taken in +a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juristic +law, but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. +These conditions, in relation to the <emph>subjective</emph> will, +where they, being universal, ought to have and can +only have their existence, are its <emph>Duties</emph>; whereas as +its temper and habit they are <emph>Manners</emph>. What is +a right is also a duty, and what is a duty, is also a right. +For a mode of existence is a right, only as a consequence +of the free substantial will: and the same content of fact, +when referred to the will distinguished as subjective +and individual, is a duty. It is the same content which +the subjective consciousness recognises as a duty, and +brings into existence in these several wills. The +finitude of the objective will thus creates the semblance +of a distinction between rights and duties. +</p> + +<pb n='105'/><anchor id='Pg105'/> + +<p> +In the phenomenal range right and duty are <foreign rend='italic'>correlata</foreign>, +at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds +a duty in some one else. But, in the light of the +concept, my right to a thing is not merely possession, but +as possession by a <emph>person</emph> it is <emph>property</emph>, or legal possession, +and it is a <emph>duty</emph> to possess things as <emph>property</emph>, i.e. to be +as a person. Translated into the phenomenal relationship, +viz. relation to another person—this grows into +the duty of some one <emph>else</emph> to respect <emph>my</emph> right. In the +morality of the conscience, duty in general is in me—a +free subject—at the same time a right of my subjective +will or disposition. But in this individualist moral +sphere, there arises the division between what is only +inward purpose (disposition or intention), which only +has its being in me and is merely subjective duty, and +the actualisation of that purpose: and with this division +a contingency and imperfection which makes the +inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. In social +ethics these two parts have reached their truth, their +absolute unity; although even right and duty return to +one another and combine by means of certain adjustments +and under the guise of necessity. The rights of +the father of the family over its members are equally +duties towards them; just as the children's duty of +obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of +manhood. The penal judicature of a government, its +rights of administration, &c., are no less its duties to +punish, to administer, &c.; as the services of the +members of the State in dues, military services, &c., are +duties and yet their right to the protection of their +private property and of the general substantial life in +which they have their root. All the aims of society +and the State are the private aim of the individuals. +But the set of adjustments, by which their duties come +back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right, +<pb n='106'/><anchor id='Pg106'/> +produces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity +is increased by the variety of shapes which value assumes +in the course of exchange, though it remains intrinsically +the same. Still it holds fundamentally good that he +who has no rights has no duties and <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>vice versa</foreign>. +</p> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Distribution.</head> + +<p> +§ 487. The free will is +</p> + +<p> +A. itself at first immediate, and hence as a single +being—the <emph>person</emph>: the existence which the person +gives to its liberty is <emph>property</emph>. The <emph>Right as</emph> right +(law) is <emph>formal, abstract right</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +B. When the will is reflected into self, so as to have +its existence inside it, and to be thus at the same time +characterised as a <emph>particular</emph>, it is the right of the +<emph>subjective</emph> will, <emph>morality</emph> of the individual conscience. +</p> + +<p> +C. When the free will is the substantial will, made +actual in the subject and conformable to its concept +and rendered a totality of necessity,—it is the ethics of +actual life in family, civil society, and state. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='107'/><anchor id='Pg107'/> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Sub-Section A. Law.<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Das Recht.</foreign></note></head> + +<div> +<head>(a) Property.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_488'/> +§ 488. Mind, in the immediacy of its self-secured +liberty, is an individual, but one that knows its +individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a <emph>person</emph>, in +whom the inward sense of this freedom, as in itself still +abstract and empty, has its particularity and fulfilment +not yet on its own part, but on an external <emph>thing</emph>. This +thing, as something devoid of will, has no rights against +the subjectivity of intelligence and volition, and is by +that subjectivity made adjectival to it, the external sphere +of its liberty;—<emph>possession</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 489. By the judgment of possession, at first in +the outward appropriation, the thing acquires the predicate +of <q>mine.</q> But this predicate, on its own +account merely <q>practical,</q> has here the signification +that I import my personal will into the thing. As so +characterised, possession is <emph>property</emph>, which as possession +is a <emph>means</emph>, but as existence of the personality is +an <emph>end</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 490. In his property the person is brought into +union with itself. But the thing is an abstractly +external thing, and the I in it is abstractly external. +The concrete return of me into me in the externality is +<pb n='108'/><anchor id='Pg108'/> +that I, the infinite self-relation, am as a person the +repulsion of me from myself, and have the existence of +my personality in the <emph>being of other persons</emph>, in my +relation to them and in my recognition by them, which +is thus mutual. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_491'/> +§ 491. The thing is the <emph>mean</emph> by which the extremes +meet in one. These extremes are the persons who, in +the knowledge of their identity as free, are simultaneously +mutually independent. For them my will has its +<emph>definite recognisable existence</emph> in the thing by the immediate +bodily act of taking possession, or by the formation +of the thing or, it may be, by mere designation +of it. +</p> + +<p> +§ 492. The casual aspect of property is that I place +my will in <emph>this</emph> thing: so far my will is <emph>arbitrary</emph>, I can +just as well put it in it as not,—just as well withdraw it +as not. But so far as my will lies in a thing, it is only +I who can withdraw it: it is only with my will that +the thing can pass to another, whose property it +similarly becomes only with his will:—<emph>Contract</emph>. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(b) Contract.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_493'/> +§ 493. The two wills and their agreement in the contract +are as an <emph>internal</emph> state of mind different from its +realisation in the <emph>performance</emph>. The comparatively +<q>ideal</q> utterance (of contract) in the <emph>stipulation</emph> contains +the actual surrender of a property by the one, its +changing hands, and its acceptance by the other will. +The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not +need the performance of the one or the other to become +so—otherwise we should have an infinite regress or +infinite division of thing, labour, and time. The utterance +in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. The +inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will +which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation, +<pb n='109'/><anchor id='Pg109'/> +and in that realm the word is deed and thing (§ <ref target='Section_462'>462</ref>)—the +full and complete deed, since here the conscientiousness +of the will does not come under consideration +(as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception), +and the will refers only to the external thing. +</p> + +<p> +§ 494. Thus in the stipulation we have the <emph>substantial</emph> +being of the contract standing out in distinction from +its real utterance in the performance, which is brought +down to a mere sequel. In this way there is put into +the thing or performance a distinction between its +immediate specific <emph>quality</emph> and its substantial being or +<emph>value</emph>, meaning by value the quantitative terms into +which that qualitative feature has been translated. +One piece of property is thus made comparable with +another, and may be made equivalent to a thing which +is (in quality) wholly heterogeneous. It is thus treated +in general as an abstract, universal thing or commodity. +</p> + +<p> +§ 495. The contract, as an agreement which has +a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity, +involves at the same time the giving to this <q>accidental</q> +will a positive fixity. This will may just as well not be +conformable to law (right), and, in that case, produces +a <emph>wrong</emph>: by which however the absolute law (right) +is not superseded, but only a relationship originated of +right to wrong. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>(c) Right versus Wrong.</head> + +<p> +§ 496. Law (right) considered as the realisation of +liberty in externals, breaks up into a multiplicity of +relations to this external sphere and to other persons +(§§ <ref target='Section_491'>491</ref>, <ref target='Section_493'>493</ref> seqq.). In this way there are (1) several +titles or grounds at law, of which (seeing that property +both on the personal and the real side is exclusively +individual) only one is the right, but which, because they +face each other, each and all are invested with a <emph>show</emph> +<pb n='110'/><anchor id='Pg110'/> +of right, against which the former is defined as the +intrinsically right. +</p> + +<p> +§ 497. Now so long as (compared against this show) +the one intrinsically right, still presumed identical +with the several titles, is affirmed, willed, and recognised, +the only diversity lies in this, that the special +thing is subsumed under the one law or right by +the <emph>particular</emph> will of <emph>these</emph> several persons. This is +naïve, non-malicious wrong. Such wrong in the several +claimants is a simple <emph>negative judgment</emph>, expressing +the <emph>civil suit</emph>. To settle it there is required a third +judgment, which, as the judgment of the intrinsically +right, is disinterested, and a power of giving the one +right existence as against that semblance. +</p> + +<p> +§ 498. But (2) if the semblance of right is willed as +such <emph>against</emph> right intrinsical by the particular will, +which thus becomes <emph>wicked</emph>, then the external <emph>recognition</emph> +of right is separated from the right's true value; +and while the former only is respected, the latter is +violated. This gives the wrong of <emph>fraud</emph>—the infinite +judgment as identical (§ 173),—where the nominal +relation is retained, but the sterling value is let slip. +</p> + +<p> +§ 499. (3) Finally, the particular will sets itself in +opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right +itself as well as its recognition or semblance. [Here +there is a negatively infinite judgment (§ 173) in which +there is denied the class as a whole, and not merely the +particular mode—in this case the apparent recognition.] +Thus the will is violently wicked, and commits +a <emph>crime</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_500'/> +§ 500. As an outrage on right, such an action is +essentially and actually null. In it the agent, as +a volitional and intelligent being, sets up a law—a law +however which is nominal and recognised by him only—a +universal which holds good <emph>for him</emph>, and under which +<pb n='111'/><anchor id='Pg111'/> +he has at the same time subsumed himself by his +action. To display the nullity of such an act, to carry +out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic +right, in the first instance by means of a subjective +individual will, is the work of <emph>Revenge</emph>. But, revenge, +starting from the interest of an immediate particular +personality, is at the same time only a new outrage; +and so on without end. This progression, like the +last, abolishes itself in a third judgment, which is +disinterested—<emph>punishment</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 501. The instrumentality by which authority is given +to intrinsic right is (α) that a particular will, that of the +judge, being conformable to the right, has an interest to +turn against the crime (—which in the first instance, in +revenge, is a matter of chance), and (β) that an executive +power (also in the first instance casual) negates the +negation of right that was created by the criminal. +This negation of right has its existence in the will of +the criminal; and consequently revenge or punishment +directs itself against the person or property of the +criminal and exercises <emph>coercion</emph> upon him. It is in this +legal sphere that coercion in general has possible +scope,—compulsion against the thing, in seizing and +maintaining it against another's seizure: for in this +sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals +as such, or in corporeity, and can be seized +only in this quarter. But more than <emph>possible</emph> compulsion +is not, so long as I can withdraw myself as +free from every mode of existence, even from the +range of all existence, i.e. from life. It is legal only +as abolishing a first and original compulsion. +</p> + +<p> +§ 502. A distinction has thus emerged between the +law (right) and the subjective will. The <q>reality</q> of +right, which the personal will in the first instance gives +itself in immediate wise, is seen to be due to the +<pb n='112'/><anchor id='Pg112'/> +instrumentality of the subjective will,—whose influence +as on one hand it gives existence to the essential right, +so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself +to it. Conversely, the claim of the subjective will to be +in this abstraction a power over the law of right is null +and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially +only so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable +will. As such it is <emph>morality</emph><note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Moralität.</foreign></note> proper. +</p> + +<p> +The phrase <q>Law of Nature,</q> or Natural Right<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Naturrecht.</foreign></note>, +in use for the philosophy of law involves the ambiguity +that it may mean either right as something existing +ready-formed in nature, or right as governed by the +nature of things, i.e. by the notion. The former +used to be the common meaning, accompanied with the +fiction of a <emph>state of nature</emph>, in which the law of nature +should hold sway; whereas the social and political state +rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and +a sacrifice of natural rights. The real fact is that the +whole law and its every article are based on free personality +alone,—on self-determination or autonomy, which +is the very contrary of determination by nature. The +law of nature—strictly so called—is for that reason the +predominance of the strong and the reign of force, and +a state of nature a state of violence and wrong, of which +nothing truer can be said than that one ought to depart +from it. The social state, on the other hand, is the +condition in which alone right has its actuality: what is +to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and +violence of the state of nature. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='113'/><anchor id='Pg113'/> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Sub-Section B. The Morality Of Conscience<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Moralität.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_503'/> +§ 503. The free individual, who, in mere law, counts +only as a <emph>person</emph>, is now characterised as a <emph>subject</emph>, +a will reflected into itself so that, be its affection what +it may, it is distinguished (as existing in it) as <emph>its own</emph> +from the existence of freedom in an external thing. +Because the affection of the will is thus inwardised, +the will is at the same time made a particular, and +there arise further particularisations of it and relations +of these to one another. This affection is partly +the essential and implicit will, the reason of the will, +the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is +the existent volition, which is before us and throws itself +into actual deeds, and thus comes into relationship with +the former. The subjective will is <emph>morally</emph> free, so far as +these features are its inward institution, its own, and +willed by it. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is +an <emph>action</emph>, in the externality of which it only admits as +its own, and allows to be imputed to it, so much as it +has consciously willed. +</p> + +<p> +This subjective or <q>moral</q> freedom is what a European +especially calls freedom. In virtue of the right thereto +a man must possess a personal knowledge of the distinction +between good and evil in general: ethical and +<pb n='114'/><anchor id='Pg114'/> +religious principles shall not merely lay their claim on +him as external laws and precepts of authority to be +obeyed, but have their assent, recognition, or even +justification in his heart, sentiment, conscience, intelligence, +&c. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its +supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. +</p> + +<p> +The <q>moral</q> must be taken in the wider sense in +which it does not signify the morally good merely. In +French <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>le moral</foreign> is opposed to <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>le physique</foreign>, and means +the mental or intellectual in general. But here the +moral signifies volitional mode, so far as it is in the +interior of the will in general; it thus includes purpose +and intention,—and also moral wickedness. +</p> + +<div> +<head>a. Purpose<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Der Vorsatz.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 504. So far as the action comes into immediate +touch with <emph>existence</emph>, <emph>my part</emph> in it is to this extent +formal, that external existence is also <emph>independent</emph> of the +agent. This externality can pervert his action and +bring to light something else than lay in it. Now, +though any alteration as such, which is set on foot +by the subject's action, is its <emph>deed</emph><note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>That.</foreign></note>, still the subject +does not for that reason recognise it as its <emph>action</emph><note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Handlung.</foreign></note>, +but only admits as its own that existence in the deed +which lay in its knowledge and will, which was its +<emph>purpose</emph>. Only for that does it hold itself <emph>responsible</emph>. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>b. Intention and Welfare<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die Absicht und das Wohl.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 505. As regards its empirically concrete <emph>content</emph> +(1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and +connexions. In point of <emph>form</emph>, the agent must have +known and willed the action in its essential feature, +embracing these individual points. This is the right of +<pb n='115'/><anchor id='Pg115'/> +<emph>intention</emph>. While <emph>purpose</emph> affects only the immediate +fact of existence, <emph>intention</emph> regards the underlying +essence and aim thereof. (2) The agent has no less +the right to see that the particularity of content in the +action, in point of its matter, is not something external +to him, but is a particularity of his own,—that it contains +his needs, interests, and aims. These aims, when +similarly comprehended in a single aim, as in happiness +(§ <ref target='Section_479'>479</ref>), constitute his <emph>well-being</emph>. This is the right to +well-being. Happiness (good fortune) is distinguished +from well-being only in this, that happiness implies +no more than some sort of immediate existence, +whereas well-being regards it as also justified as +regards morality. +</p> + +<p> +§ 506. But the essentiality of the intention is in the +first instance the abstract form of generality. Reflection +can put in this form this and that particular aspect in the +empirically-concrete action, thus making it essential to +the intention or restricting the intention to it. In this +way the supposed essentiality of the intention and the +real essentiality of the action may be brought into the +greatest contradiction—e.g. a good intention in case of +a crime. Similarly well-being is abstract and may be +set on this or that: as appertaining to this single agent, +it is always something particular. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>c. Goodness and Wickedness<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Das Gute und das Böse.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 507. The truth of these particularities and the concrete +unity of their formalism is the content of the +universal, essential and actual, will,—the law and +underlying essence of every phase of volition, the +essential and actual good. It is thus the absolute final +aim of the world, and <emph>duty</emph> for the agent who <emph>ought</emph> +<pb n='116'/><anchor id='Pg116'/> +to have <emph>insight</emph> into the <emph>good</emph>, make it his <emph>intention</emph> and +bring it about by his activity. +</p> + +<p> +§ 508. But though the good is the universal of will—a +universal determined in itself,—and thus including in +it particularity,—still so far as this particularity is in the +first instance still abstract, there is no principle at hand +to determine it. Such determination therefore starts +up also outside that universal; and as heteronomy or +determinance of a will which is free and has rights of +its own, there awakes here the deepest contradiction. (α) +In consequence of the indeterminate determinism of the +good, there are always <emph>several sorts</emph> of good and <emph>many +kinds of duties</emph>, the variety of which is a dialectic of one +against another and brings them into <emph>collision</emph>. At the +same time because good is one, they <emph>ought</emph> to stand in +harmony; and yet each of them, though it is a particular +duty, is as good and as duty absolute. It falls upon the +agent to be the dialectic which, superseding this absolute +claim of each, concludes such a combination of +them as excludes the rest. +</p> + +<p> +§ 509. (β) To the agent, who in his existent sphere +of liberty is essentially as a <emph>particular</emph>, his <emph>interest and +welfare</emph> must, on account of that existent sphere of +liberty, be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. But +at the same time in aiming at the good, which is the not-particular +but only universal of the will, the particular +interest <emph>ought not</emph> to be a constituent motive. On +account of this independency of the two principles of +action, it is likewise an accident whether they harmonise. +And yet they <emph>ought</emph> to harmonise, because the agent, as +individual and universal, is always fundamentally one +identity. +</p> + +<p> +(γ) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his +existence; it is also a form of his existence to be an +abstract self-certainty, an abstract reflection of freedom +<pb n='117'/><anchor id='Pg117'/> +into himself. He is thus distinct from the reason in +the will, and capable of making the universal itself +a particular and in that way a semblance. The good +is thus reduced to the level of a mere <q>may happen</q> for +the agent, who can therefore resolve itself to somewhat +opposite to the good, can be wicked. +</p> + +<p> +§ 510. (δ) The external objectivity, following the distinction +which has arisen in the subjective will (§ <ref target='Section_503'>503</ref>), +constitutes a peculiar world of its own,—another extreme +which stands in no rapport with the internal +will-determination. It is thus a matter of chance, +whether it harmonises with the subjective aims, whether +the good is realised, and the wicked, an aim essentially +and actually null, nullified in it: it is no less matter +of chance whether the agent finds in it his well-being, +and more precisely whether in the world the good agent +is happy and the wicked unhappy. But at the same time +the world <emph>ought</emph> to allow the good action, the essential +thing, to be carried out in it; it <emph>ought</emph> to grant the good +agent the satisfaction of his particular interest, and +refuse it to the wicked; just as it <emph>ought</emph> also to make the +wicked itself null and void. +</p> + +<p> +§ 511. The all-round contradiction, expressed by this +repeated <emph>ought</emph>, with its absoluteness which yet at the +same time is <emph>not</emph>—contains the most abstract 'analysis' +of the mind in itself, its deepest descent into itself. The +only relation the self-contradictory principles have to +one another is in the abstract certainty of self; and for +this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will, good, +right, and duty, no more exist than not. The subjectivity +alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. +This pure self-certitude, rising to its pitch, appears in +the two directly inter-changing forms—of <emph>Conscience</emph> +and <emph>Wickedness</emph>. The former is the will of goodness; +but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is the +<pb n='118'/><anchor id='Pg118'/> +<emph>non-objective</emph>, non-universal, the unutterable; and over +which the agent is conscious that <emph>he</emph> in his <emph>individuality</emph> +has the decision. Wickedness is the same awareness +that the single self possesses the decision, so far as the +single self does not merely remain in this abstraction, +but takes up the content of a subjective interest contrary +to the good. +</p> + +<p> +§ 512. This supreme pitch of the <q><emph>phenomenon</emph></q> of will,—sublimating +itself to this absolute vanity—to a goodness, +which has no objectivity, but is only sure of itself, +and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of +the universal—collapses by its own force. Wickedness, +as the most intimate reflection of subjectivity itself, in +opposition to the objective and universal, (which it treats +as mere sham,) is the same as the good sentiment of +abstract goodness, which reserves to the subjectivity the +determination thereof:—the utterly abstract semblance, +the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. The +result, the truth of this semblance, is, on its negative +side, the absolute nullity of this volition which would +fain hold its own against the good, and of the good, +which would only be abstract. On the affirmative side, +in the notion, this semblance thus collapsing is the same +simple universality of the will, which is the good. The +subjectivity, in this its <emph>identity</emph> with the good, is only the +infinite form, which actualises and developes it. In this +way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two +independent sides,—the standpoint of the <emph>ought</emph>, is +abandoned, and we have passed into the field of ethical +life. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='119'/><anchor id='Pg119'/> + +<div> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Sub-Section C. The Moral Life, Or Social Ethics<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die Sittlichkeit.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_513'/> +§ 513. The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective—the +truth of the subjective and objective spirit itself. +The failure of the latter consists—partly in having its +freedom <emph>immediately</emph> in reality, in something external +therefore, in a thing,—partly in the abstract universality +of its goodness. The failure of spirit subjective +similarly consists in this, that it is, as against the +universal, abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. +When these two imperfections are suppressed, +subjective <emph>freedom</emph> exists as the covertly and +overtly <emph>universal</emph> rational will, which is sensible of +itself and actively disposed in the consciousness of the +individual subject, whilst its practical operation and +immediate universal <emph>actuality</emph> at the same time exist as +moral usage, manner and custom,—where self-conscious +<emph>liberty</emph> has become <emph>nature</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 514. The consciously free substance, in which the +absolute <q>ought</q> is no less an <q>is,</q> has actuality as the +spirit of a nation. The abstract disruption of this +spirit singles it out into <emph>persons</emph>, whose independence it +however controls and entirely dominates from within. +But the person, as an intelligent being, feels that +underlying essence to be his own very being—ceases +when so minded to be a mere accident of it—looks upon +<pb n='120'/><anchor id='Pg120'/> +it as his absolute final aim. In its actuality he sees not +less an achieved present, than somewhat he brings it +about by his action,—yet somewhat which without all +question <emph>is</emph>. Thus, without any selective reflection, the +person performs its duty as <emph>his own</emph> and as something +which <emph>is</emph>; and in this necessity <emph>he</emph> has himself and his +actual freedom. +</p> + +<p> +§ 515. Because the substance is the absolute unity of +individuality and universality of freedom, it follows that +the actuality and action of each individual to keep and +to take care of his own being, while it is on one hand +conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex +alone he exists, is on the other a transition into +a universal product.—The social disposition of the individuals +is their sense of the substance, and of the +identity of all their interests with the total; and that the +other individuals mutually know each other and are +actual only in this identity, is confidence (trust)—the +genuine ethical temper. +</p> + +<p> +§ 516. The relations between individuals in the several +situations to which the substance is particularised form +their <emph>ethical duties</emph>. The ethical personality, i.e. the +subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life, +is <emph>virtue</emph>. In relation to the bare facts of external being, +to <emph>destiny</emph>, virtue does not treat them as a mere negation, +and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to +substantial objectivity, to the total of ethical actuality, +it exists as confidence, as deliberate work for the community, +and the capacity of sacrificing self thereto; +whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social +circumstance, it is in the first instance justice and then +benevolence. In the latter sphere, and in its attitude +to its own visible being and corporeity, the individuality +expresses its special character, temperament, &c. as +personal <emph>virtues</emph>. +</p> + +<pb n='121'/><anchor id='Pg121'/> + +<p> +§ 517. The ethical substance is +</p> + +<p> +AA. as <q>immediate</q> or <emph>natural</emph> mind,—the <emph>Family</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +BB. The <q>relative</q> totality of the <q>relative</q> relations +of the individuals as independent persons to one +another in a formal universality—<emph>Civil Society</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +CC. The self-conscious substance, as the mind developed +to an organic actuality—the <emph>Political Constitution</emph>. +</p> + +<div> +<head>AA. The Family.</head> + +<p> +§ 518. The ethical spirit, in its <emph>immediacy</emph>, contains +the <emph>natural</emph> factor that the individual has its substantial +existence in its natural universal, i.e. in its kind. This +is the sexual tie, elevated however to a spiritual significance,—the +unanimity of love and the temper of trust. +In the shape of the family, mind appears as feeling. +</p> + +<p> +§ 519. (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears +at the same time as a difference of intellectual and +moral type. With their exclusive individualities these +personalities combine to form a <emph>single person</emph>: the subjective +union of hearts, becoming a <q>substantial</q> unity, +makes this union an ethical tie—<emph>Marriage</emph>. The 'substantial' +union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible +personal bond—monogamic marriage: the bodily conjunction +is a sequel to the moral attachment. A further +sequel is community of personal and private interests. +</p> + +<p> +§ 520. (2) By the community in which the various +members constituting the family stand in reference to +property, that property of the one person (representing +the family) acquires an ethical interest, as do also its +industry, labour, and care for the future. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_521'/> +§ 521. The ethical principle which is conjoined with +the natural generation of the children, and which was +assumed to have primary importance in first forming the +marriage union, is actually realised in the second or +<pb n='122'/><anchor id='Pg122'/> +spiritual birth of the children,—in educating them to +independent personality. +</p> + +<p> +§ 522. (3) The children, thus invested with independence, +leave the concrete life and action of the +family to which they primarily belong, acquire an +existence of their own, destined however to found +anew such an actual family. Marriage is of course +broken up by the <emph>natural</emph> element contained in it, the +death of husband and wife: but even their union of +hearts, as it is a mere <q>substantiality</q> of feeling, contains +the germ of liability to chance and decay. In virtue of +such fortuitousness, the members of the family take up to +each other the status of persons; and it is thus that the +family finds introduced into it for the first time the +element, originally foreign to it, of <emph>legal</emph> regulation. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>BB. Civil Society<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 523. As the substance, being an intelligent substance, +particularises itself abstractly into many persons +(the family is only a single person), into families or +individuals, who exist independent and free, as private +persons, it loses its ethical character: for these +persons as such have in their consciousness and as +their aim not the absolute unity, but their own petty +selves and particular interests. Thus arises the system +of <emph>atomistic</emph>: by which the substance is reduced to +a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting +extremes and their particular interests. The +developed totality of this connective system is the state +as civil society, or <emph>state external</emph>. +</p> + +<div> +<head>a. The System of Wants<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Das System der Bedürfnisse.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 524. (α) The particularity of the persons includes in +<pb n='123'/><anchor id='Pg123'/> +the first instance their wants. The possibility of satisfying +these wants is here laid on the social fabric, +the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. +In the condition of things in which this +method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realised, +immediate seizure (§ <ref target='Section_488'>488</ref>) of external objects as means +thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are +already property. To acquire them is only possible by +the intervention, on one hand, of the possessors' will, +which as particular has in view the satisfaction of their +variously defined interests; while on the other hand it +is conditioned by the ever continued production of +fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' <emph>own +labour</emph>. This instrument, by which the labour of all +facilitates satisfaction of wants, constitutes the general +stock. +</p> + +<p> +§ 525. (β) The glimmer of universal principle in this +particularity of wants is found in the way intellect +creates differences in them, and thus causes an indefinite +multiplication both of wants and of means for +their different phases. Both are thus rendered more +and more abstract. This <q>morcellement</q> of their content +by abstraction gives rise to the <emph>division of labour</emph>. The +habit of this abstraction in enjoyment, information, +feeling and demeanour, constitutes training in this +sphere, or nominal culture in general. +</p> + +<p> +§ 526. The labour which thus becomes more abstract +tends on one hand by its uniformity to make labour +easier and to increase production,—on another to limit +each person to a single kind of technical skill, and thus +produce more unconditional dependence on the social +system. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanical, +and gets the capability of letting the machine take the +place of human labour. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_527'/> +§ 527. (γ) But the concrete division of the general +<pb n='124'/><anchor id='Pg124'/> +stock—which is also a general business (of the whole +society)—into particular masses determined by the +factors of the notion,—masses each of which possesses +its own basis of subsistence, and a corresponding mode +of labour, of needs, and of means for satisfying +them, besides of aims and interests, as well as of +mental culture and habit—constitutes the difference +of Estates (orders or ranks). Individuals apportion +themselves to these according to natural talent, skill, +option and accident. As belonging to such a definite +and stable sphere, they have their actual existence, +which as existence is essentially a particular; and in +it they have their social morality, which is <emph>honesty</emph>, +their recognition and their <emph>honour</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +Where civil society, and with it the State, exists, +there arise the several estates in their difference: for +the universal substance, as vital, <emph>exists</emph> only so far as it +organically <emph>particularises</emph> itself. The history of constitutions +is the history of the growth of these estates, +of the legal relationships of individuals to them, and +of these estates to one another and to their centre. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_528'/> +§ 528. To the <q>substantial,</q> natural estate the fruitful +soil and ground supply a natural and stable capital; +its action gets direction and content through natural +features, and its moral life is founded on faith and +trust. The second, the <q>reflected</q> estate has as its +allotment the social capital, the medium created by the +action of middlemen, of mere agents, and an ensemble of +contingencies, where the individual has to depend on +his subjective skill, talent, intelligence and industry. +The third, <q>thinking</q> estate has for its business the +general interests; like the second it has a subsistence +procured by means of its own skill, and like the +first a certain subsistence, certain however because +guaranteed through the whole society. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='125'/><anchor id='Pg125'/> + +<div> +<head>b. Administration of Justice<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die Rechtspflege.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_529'/> +§ 529. When matured through the operation of +natural need and free option into a system of universal +relationships and a regular course of external +necessity, the principle of casual particularity gets +that stable articulation which liberty requires in +the shape of <emph>formal right</emph>. (1) The actualisation +which right gets in this sphere of mere practical +intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness +as the stable universal, that it be known and stated +in its specificality with the voice of authority—the +<emph>Law</emph><note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Geseß.</foreign></note>. +</p> + +<p> +The <emph>positive</emph> element in laws concerns only their +form of <emph>publicity</emph> and <emph>authority</emph>—which makes it possible +for them to be known by all in a customary and external +way. Their content <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per se</foreign> may be reasonable—or it +may be unreasonable and so wrong. But when right, +in the course of definite manifestation, is developed in +detail, and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness, +this analysis, because of the finitude of its materials, +falls into the falsely infinite progress: the <emph>final</emph> definiteness, +which is absolutely essential and causes a break +in this progress of unreality, can in this sphere of +finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency +and arbitrariness. Thus whether three years, +ten thalers, or only 2-1/2, 2-3/4, 2-4/5 years, and so on +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>, be the right and just thing, can by no +means be decided on intelligible principles,—and +yet it should be decided. Hence, though of course +only at the final points of deciding, on the side of +external existence, the <q>positive</q> principle naturally +enters law as contingency and arbitrariness. This +happens and has from of old happened in all legislations: +<pb n='126'/><anchor id='Pg126'/> +the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of +it, and not be misled by the talk and the pretence as if +the ideal of law were, or could be, to be, at <emph>every</emph> point, +determined through reason or legal intelligence, on +purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. It is +a futile perfectionism to have such expectations and to +make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. +</p> + +<p> +There are some who look upon laws as an evil and +a profanity, and who regard governing and being +governed from natural love, hereditary, divinity or +nobility, by faith and trust, as the genuine order of life, +while the reign of law is held an order of corruption +and injustice. These people forget that the stars—and +the cattle too—are governed and well governed too +by laws;—laws however which are only internally in +these objects, not <emph>for them</emph>, not as laws <emph>set to</emph> them:—whereas +it is man's privilege to <emph>know</emph> his law. They +forget therefore that he can truly obey only such known +law,—even as his law can only be a just law, as it is +a <emph>known</emph> law;—though in other respects it must be in +its essential content contingency and caprice, or at +least be mixed and polluted with such elements. +</p> + +<p> +The same empty requirement of perfection is employed +for an opposite thesis—viz. to support the opinion that a +code is impossible or impracticable. In this case there +comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential +and universal provisions in one class with the particular +detail. The finite material is definable on and on to +the false infinite: but this advance is not, as in the +mental images of space, a generation of new spatial +characteristics of the same quality as those preceding +them, but an advance into greater and ever greater +speciality by the acumen of the analytic intellect, which +discovers new distinctions, which again make new +decisions necessary. To provisions of this sort one may +<pb n='127'/><anchor id='Pg127'/> +give the name of <emph>new</emph> decisions or <emph>new</emph> laws; but in +proportion to the gradual advance in specialisation the +interest and value of these provisions declines. They +fall within the already subsisting <q>substantial,</q> general +laws, like improvements on a floor or a door, within +the house—which though something <emph>new</emph>, are not a new +<emph>house</emph>. But there is a contrary case. If the legislation +of a rude age began with single provisos, which go on +by their very nature always increasing their number, +there arises, with the advance in multitude, the need of +a simpler code,—the need i.e. of embracing that lot of +singulars in their general features. To find and be able +to express these principles well beseems an intelligent +and civilised nation. Such a gathering up of single +rules into general forms, first really deserving the name +of laws, has lately been begun in some directions by the +English Minister Peel, who has by so doing gained the +gratitude, even the admiration, of his countrymen. +</p> + +<p> +§ 530. (2) The positive form of Laws—to be <emph>promulgated +and made known</emph> as laws—is a condition of the <emph>external +obligation</emph> to obey them; inasmuch as, being laws of +strict right, they touch only the abstract will,—itself at +bottom external—not the moral or ethical will. The +subjectivity to which the will has in this direction a right +is here only publicity. This subjective existence is as +existence of the essential and developed truth in this +sphere of Right at the same time an externally objective +existence, as universal authority and necessity. +</p> + +<p> +The legality of property and of private transactions +concerned therewith—in consideration of the principle +that all law must be promulgated, recognised, and thus +become authoritative—gets its universal guarantee +through <emph>formalities</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 531. (3) Legal forms get the necessity, to which +objective existence determines itself, in the <emph>judicial +<pb n='128'/><anchor id='Pg128'/> +system</emph>. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the +<emph>court</emph>—to the individualised right—as <emph>proven</emph>:—a process +in which there may be a difference between what +is abstractly right and what is provably right. The +court takes cognisance and action in the interest of +right as such, deprives the existence of right of its +contingency, and in particular transforms this existence,—as +this exists as revenge—into <emph>punishment</emph> (§ <ref target='Section_500'>500</ref>). +</p> + +<p> +The comparison of the two species, or rather two +elements in the judicial conviction, bearing on the actual +state of the case in relation to the accused,—(1) according +as that conviction is based on mere circumstances +and other people's witness alone,—or (2) in addition +requires the confession of the accused, constitutes the +main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. +It is an essential point that the two ingredients of a +judicial cognisance, the judgment as to the state of the +fact, and the judgment as application of the law to it, +should, as at bottom different sides, be exercised as +<emph>different functions</emph>. By the said institution they are +allotted even to bodies differently qualified,—from the +one of which individuals belonging to the official +judiciary are expressly excluded. To carry this +separation of functions up to this separation in the +courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the +main point remains only the separate performance of +these essentially different functions.—It is a more +important point whether the confession of the accused is +or is not to be made a condition of penal judgment. The +institution of the jury-court loses sight of this condition. +The point is that on this ground certainty is completely +inseparable from truth: but the confession is to be +regarded as the very acmé of certainty-giving which +in its nature is subjective. The final decision therefore +lies with the confession. To this therefore the accused +<pb n='129'/><anchor id='Pg129'/> +has an absolute right, if the proof is to be made final and +the judges to be convinced. No doubt this factor is +incomplete, because it is only one factor; but still more +incomplete is the other when no less abstractly taken,—viz. +mere circumstantial evidence. The jurors are +essentially judges and pronounce a judgment. In so far, +then, as all they have to go on are such objective proofs, +whilst at the same time their defect of certainty +(incomplete in so far as it is only <emph>in them</emph>) is admitted, +the jury-court shows traces of its barbaric origin in a +confusion and admixture between objective proofs and +subjective or so-called <q>moral</q> conviction.—It is easy +to call <emph>extraordinary</emph> punishments an absurdity; but +the fault lies rather with the shallowness which takes +offence at a mere name. Materially the principle +involves the difference of objective probation according +as it goes with or without the factor of absolute +certification which lies in confession. +</p> + +<p> +§ 532. The function of judicial administration is only +to actualise to necessity the abstract side of personal +liberty in civil society. But this actualisation rests at +first on the particular subjectivity of the judge, since +here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it +with right in the abstract. Conversely, the blind +necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the +consciousness of the universal, and worked from that +period of view. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>c. Police and Corporation<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die Polizei und die Corporation.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 533. Judicial administration naturally has no concern +with such part of actions and interests as belongs only to +particularity, and leaves to chance not only the occurrence +of crimes but also the care for public weal. In +civil society the sole end is to satisfy want—and that, +<pb n='130'/><anchor id='Pg130'/> +because it is man's want, in a uniform general way, so +as to <emph>secure</emph> this satisfaction. But the machinery of +social necessity leaves in many ways a casualness +about this satisfaction. This is due to the variability of +the wants themselves, in which opinion and subjective +good-pleasure play a great part. It results also from +circumstances of locality, from the connexions between +nation and nation, from errors and deceptions which +can be foisted upon single members of the social circulation +and are capable of creating disorder in it,—as also +and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals +to take advantage of that general stock. The onward +march of this necessity also sacrifices the very particularities +by which it is brought about, and does not itself +contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction +of individuals. So far as concerns them, it <emph>may</emph> be +far from beneficial: yet here the individuals are the +morally-justifiable end. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_534'/> +§ 534. To keep in view this general end, to ascertain +the way in which the powers composing that social +necessity act, and their variable ingredients, and to +maintain that end in them and against them, is the +work of an institution which assumes on <emph>one</emph> hand, +to the concrete of civil society, the position of an +external universality. Such an order acts with the +power of an external state, which, in so far as it is +rooted in the higher or substantial state, appears as +state <q>police.</q> On the <emph>other</emph> hand, in this sphere of +particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial +universality and the only carrying of it out is restricted +to the business of particular branches and interests. +Thus we have the <emph>corporation</emph>, in which the particular +citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of +his stock, whilst at the same time he in it emerges +from his single private interest, and has a conscious +<pb n='131'/><anchor id='Pg131'/> +activity for a comparatively universal end, just as in his +legal and professional duties he has his social morality. +</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>CC. The State.</head> + +<p> +§ 535. The State is the <emph>self-conscious</emph> ethical substance, +the unification of the family principle with that of civil +society. The same unity, which is in the family as +a feeling of love, is its essence, receiving however at the +same time through the second principle of conscious +and spontaneously active volition the <emph>form</emph> of conscious +universality. This universal principle, with all its +evolution in detail, is the absolute aim and content of +the knowing subject, which thus identifies itself in its +volition with the system of reasonableness. +</p> + +<p> +§ 536. The state is (α) its inward structure as a self-relating +development—constitutional (inner-state) law: +(β) a particular individual, and therefore in connexion +with other particular individuals,—international (outer-state) +law; (γ) but these particular minds are only +stages in the general development of mind in its +actuality: universal history. +</p> + +<div> +<head>α. Constitutional Law<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Inneres Staatsrecht.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 537. The essence of the state is the universal, self-originated +and self-developed,—the reasonable spirit of +will; but, as self-knowing and self-actualising, sheer subjectivity, +and—as an actuality—one individual. Its <emph>work</emph> +generally—in relation to the extreme of individuality as +the multitude of individuals—consists in a double function. +First it maintains them as persons, thus making +right a necessary actuality, then it promotes their welfare, +which each originally takes care of for himself, but +which has a thoroughly general side; it protects the +<pb n='132'/><anchor id='Pg132'/> +family and guides civil society. Secondly, it carries +back both, and the whole disposition and action of the +individual—whose tendency is to become a centre of +his own—into the life of the universal substance; and, +in this direction, as a free power it interferes with those +subordinate spheres and retains them in substantial +immanence. +</p> + +<p> +§ 538. The laws express the special provisions for +objective freedom. First, to the immediate agent, his +independent self-will and particular interest, they are +restrictions. But, secondly, they are an absolute final +end and the universal work: hence they are a product +of the <q>functions</q> of the various orders which +parcel themselves more and more out of the general +particularising, and are a fruit of all the acts and +private concerns of individuals. Thirdly, they are the +substance of the volition of individuals—which volition +is thereby free—and of their disposition: being as such +exhibited as current usage. +</p> + +<p> +§ 539. As a living mind, the state only is as an +organised whole, differentiated into particular agencies, +which, proceeding from the one notion (though not +known as notion) of the reasonable will, continually +produce it as their result. The <emph>constitution</emph> is this +articulation or organisation of state-power. It provides +for the reasonable will,—in so far as it is in the +individuals only <emph>implicitly</emph> the universal will,—coming +to a consciousness and an understanding of itself +and being <emph>found</emph>; also for that will being put in +actuality, through the action of the government and its +several branches, and not left to perish, but protected +both against <emph>their</emph> casual subjectivity and against that +of the individuals. The constitution is existent <emph>justice</emph>,—the +actuality of liberty in the development all its +reasonable provisions. +</p> + +<pb n='133'/><anchor id='Pg133'/> + +<p> +Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into +which is frequently concentrated what should form the +fundamental principle, the final aim and result of the +constitution. However true this is, the defect of these +terms is their utter abstractness: if stuck to in this +abstract form, they are principles which either prevent +the rise of the concreteness of the state, i.e. its articulation +into a constitution and a government in general, +or destroy them. With the state there arises inequality, +the difference of governing powers and of governed, +magistracies, authorities, directories, &c. The principle +of equality, logically carried out, rejects all differences, +and thus allows no sort of political condition to exist. +Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the +state, but as the most abstract also the most superficial, +and for that very reason naturally the most familiar. It +is important therefore to study them closer. +</p> + +<p> +As regards, first, Equality, the familiar proposition, +All men are by nature equal, blunders by confusing the +<q>natural</q> with the <q>notion.</q> It ought rather to read: +<emph>By nature</emph> men are only unequal. But the notion of +liberty, as it exists as such, without further specification +and development, is abstract subjectivity, as a person +capable of property (§ <ref target='Section_488'>488</ref>). This single abstract feature +of personality constitutes the actual <emph>equality</emph> of human +beings. But that this freedom should exist, that it +should be <emph>man</emph> (and not as in Greece, Rome, &c. <emph>some</emph> +men) that is recognised and legally regarded as +a person, is so little <emph>by nature</emph>, that it is rather only +a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest +principle of mind, and of the universality and expansion +of this consciousness. That the citizens are equal +before the law contains a great truth, but which so +expressed is a tautology: it only states that the legal +status in general exists, that the laws rule. But, as +<pb n='134'/><anchor id='Pg134'/> +regards the concrete, the citizens—besides their +personality—are equal before the law only in these points +when they are otherwise equal <emph>outside the law</emph>. Only +that equality which (in whatever way it be) they, as +it happens, otherwise have in property, age, physical +strength, talent, skill, &c.—or even in crime, can and +ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the +law:—only it can make them—as regards taxation, military +service, eligibility to office, &c.—punishment, &c.—equal +in the concrete. The laws themselves, except +in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality, +presuppose unequal conditions, and provide for +the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting +therefrom. +</p> + +<p> +As regards Liberty, it is originally taken partly in +a negative sense against arbitrary intolerance and lawless +treatment, partly in the affirmative sense of subjective +freedom; but this freedom is allowed great +latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action +for his particular ends, and as regards his claim to +have a personal intelligence and a personal share in +general affairs. Formerly the legally defined rights, +private as well as public rights of a nation, town, &c. +were called its <q>liberties.</q> Really, every genuine law +is a liberty: it contains a reasonable principle of +objective mind; in other words, it embodies a liberty. +Nothing has become, on the contrary, more familiar than +the idea that each must <emph>restrict</emph> his liberty in relation to +the liberty of others: that the state is a condition of +such reciprocal restriction, and that the laws are +restrictions. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed +as only casual good-pleasure and self-will. Hence it +has also been said that <q>modern</q> nations are only +susceptible of equality, or of equality more than liberty: +and that for no other reason than that, with an assumed +<pb n='135'/><anchor id='Pg135'/> +definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of all in +political affairs and actions), it was impossible to make +ends meet in actuality—which is at once more reasonable +and more powerful than abstract presuppositions. +On the contrary, it should be said that it is just the +great development and maturity of form in modern +states which produces the supreme concrete inequality +of individuals in actuality: while, through the deeper +reasonableness of laws and the greater stability of the +legal state, it gives rise to greater and more stable liberty, +which it can without incompatibility allow. Even the +superficial distinction of the words liberty and equality +points to the fact that the former tends to inequality: +whereas, on the contrary, the current notions of liberty +only carry us back to equality. But the more we fortify +liberty,—as security of property, as possibility for each +to develop and make the best of his talents and good +qualities, the more it gets taken for granted: and then +the sense and appreciation of liberty especially turns in +a <emph>subjective</emph> direction. By this is meant the liberty to +attempt action on every side, and to throw oneself at +pleasure in action for particular and for general +intellectual interests, the removal of all checks on the +individual particularity, as well as the inward liberty +in which the subject has principles, has an insight and +conviction of his own, and thus gains moral independence. +But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme +differentiation in which men are unequal and make +themselves more unequal by education; and on another +it only grows up under conditions of that objective +liberty, and is and could grow to such height only in +modern states. If, with this development of particularity, +there be simultaneous and endless increase of the +number of wants, and of the difficulty of satisfying them, +of the lust of argument and the fancy of detecting faults, +<pb n='136'/><anchor id='Pg136'/> +with its insatiate vanity, it is all but part of that indiscriminating +relaxation of individuality in this sphere +which generates all possible complications, and must +deal with them as it can. Such a sphere is of course +also the field of restrictions, because liberty is there +under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing, and +has therefore to restrict itself: and that, not merely with +regard to the naturalness, self-will and self-conceit, +of others, but especially and essentially with regard to +reasonable liberty. +</p> + +<p> +The term political liberty, however, is often used to +mean formal participation in the public affairs of state +by the will and action even of those individuals who +otherwise find their chief function in the particular +aims and business of civil society. And it has in part +become usual to give the title constitution only to the +side of the state which concerns such participation of +these individuals in general affairs, and to regard +a state, in which this is not formally done, as a state +without a constitution. On this use of the term, the +only thing to remark is that by constitution must be +understood the determination of rights, i.e. of liberties +in general, and the organisation of the actualisation of +them; and that political freedom in the above sense can +in any case only constitute a part of it. Of it the +following paragraphs will speak. +</p> + +<p> +§ 540. The guarantee of a constitution (i.e. the +necessity that the laws be reasonable, and their +actualisation secured) lies in the collective spirit of +the nation,—especially in the specific way in which +it is itself conscious of its reason. (Religion is that +consciousness in its absolute substantiality.) But the +guarantee lies also at the same time in the actual +organisation or development of that principle in suitable +institutions. The constitution presupposes that consciousness +<pb n='137'/><anchor id='Pg137'/> +of the collective spirit, and conversely that +spirit presupposes the constitution: for the actual spirit +only has a definite consciousness of its principles, in so +far as it has them actually existent before it. +</p> + +<p> +The question—To whom (to what authority and how +organised) belongs the power to make a constitution? is +the same as the question, Who has to make the spirit of +a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that +of the collective spirit, as if the latter exists or has +existed without a constitution, and your fancy only +proves how superficially you have apprehended the +nexus between the spirit in its self-consciousness and +in its actuality. What is thus called <q>making</q> a +<q>constitution,</q> is—just because of this inseparability—a +thing that has never happened in history, just as +little as the making of a code of laws. A constitution +only develops from the national spirit identically with +that spirit's own development, and runs through at the +same time with it the grades of formation and the +alterations required by its concept. It is the indwelling +spirit and the history of the nation (and, be it added, +the history is only that spirit's history) by which constitutions +have been and are made. +</p> + +<p> +§ 541. The really living totality,—that which preserves, +in other words continually produces the state in general +and its constitution, is the <emph>government</emph>. The organisation +which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the +family and of the 'estates' of civil society. The government +is the <emph>universal</emph> part of the constitution, i.e. the +part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts, +but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those +general aims of the whole which rise above the function +of the family and of civil society. The organisation of +the government is likewise its differentiation into powers, +as their peculiarities have a basis in principle; yet +<pb n='138'/><anchor id='Pg138'/> +without that difference losing touch with the <emph>actual unity</emph> +they have in the notion's subjectivity. +</p> + +<p> +As the most obvious categories of the notion are those +of <emph>universality</emph> and <emph>individuality</emph> and their relationship +that of <emph>subsumption</emph> of individual under universal, it has +come about that in the state the legislative and executive +power have been so distinguished as to make the former +exist apart as the absolute superior, and to subdivide +the latter again into administrative (government) power +and judicial power, according as the laws are applied to +public or private affairs. The <emph>division</emph> of these powers +has been treated as <emph>the</emph> condition of political equilibrium, +meaning by division their <emph>independence</emph> one of another +in existence,—subject always however to the above-mentioned +subsumption of the powers of the individual +under the power of the general. The theory of such +<q>division</q> unmistakably implies the elements of the +notion, but so combined by <q>understanding</q> as to result +in an absurd collocation, instead of the self-redintegration +of the living spirit. The one essential canon to make +liberty deep and real is to give every business +belonging to the general interests of the state a separate +organisation wherever they are essentially distinct. +Such real division must be: for liberty is only deep +when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these +differences manifested in existence. But to make the +business of legislation an independent power—to make +it the first power, with the further proviso that all +citizens shall have part therein, and the government be +merely executive and dependent, presupposes ignorance +that the true idea, and therefore the living and spiritual +actuality, is the self-redintegrating notion, in other words, +the subjectivity which contains in it universality as only +one of its moments. (A mistake still greater, if it goes +with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental +<pb n='139'/><anchor id='Pg139'/> +laws were still one day to make,—in a state of society, +which includes an already existing development of +differences.) Individuality is the first and supreme +principle <emph>which</emph> makes itself fall through the state's +organisation. Only through the government, and by its +embracing in itself the particular businesses (including +the abstract legislative business, which taken apart is +also particular), is the state <emph>one</emph>. These, as always, are +the terms on which the different elements essentially +and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic +of <q>reason,</q> as opposed to the external footing they +stand on in 'understanding,' which never gets beyond +subsuming the individual and particular under the +universal. What disorganises the unity of logical +reason, equally disorganises actuality. +</p> + +<p> +§ 542. In the government—regarded as organic totality—the +sovereign power (principate) is (<hi rend='italic'>a</hi>) <emph>subjectivity</emph> as +the <emph>infinite</emph> self-unity of the notion in its development;—the +all-sustaining, all-decreeing will of the state, its +highest peak and all-pervasive unity. In the perfect +form of the state, in which each and every element of +the notion has reached free existence, this subjectivity +is not a so-called <q>moral person,</q> or a decree issuing +from a majority (forms in which the unity of the +decreeing will has not an <emph>actual</emph> existence), but an +actual individual,—the will of a decreeing individual,—<emph>monarchy</emph>. +The monarchical constitution is therefore +the constitution of developed reason: all other +constitutions belong to lower grades of the development +and realisation of reason. +</p> + +<p> +The unification of all concrete state-powers into one +existence, as in the patriarchal society,—or, as in +a democratic constitution, the participation of all in all +affairs—impugns the principle of the division of powers, +i.e. the developed liberty of the constituent factors of +<pb n='140'/><anchor id='Pg140'/> +the Idea. But no whit less must the division (the +working out of these factors each to a free totality) be +reduced to <q>ideal</q> unity, i.e. to <emph>subjectivity</emph>. The mature +differentiation or realisation of the Idea means, essentially, +that this subjectivity should grow to be a <emph>real</emph> +<q>moment,</q> an <emph>actual</emph> existence; and this actuality is not +otherwise than as the individuality of the monarch—the +subjectivity of abstract and final decision existent in +<emph>one</emph> person. All those forms of collective decreeing and +willing,—a common will which shall be the sum and the +resultant (on aristocratical or democratical principles) of +the atomistic of single wills, have on them the mark of +the unreality of an abstraction. Two points only are +all-important, first to see the necessity of each of the +notional factors, and secondly the form in which it is +actualised. It is only the nature of the speculative +notion which can really give light on the matter. That +subjectivity—being the <q>moment</q> which emphasises the +need of abstract deciding in general—partly leads on to +the proviso that the name of the monarch appear as the +bond and sanction under which everything is done in +the government;—partly, being simple self-relation, +has attached to it the characteristic of <emph>immediacy</emph>, and +then of <emph>nature</emph>—whereby the destination of individuals +for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. +</p> + +<p> +§ 543. (<hi rend='italic'>b</hi>) In the <emph>particular</emph> government-power there +emerges, first, the division of state-business into its +branches (otherwise defined), legislative power, administration +of justice or judicial power, administration and +police, and its consequent distribution between particular +boards or offices, which having their business appointed +by law, to that end and for that reason, possess independence +of action, without at the same time ceasing to +stand under higher supervision. Secondly, too, there +<pb n='141'/><anchor id='Pg141'/> +arises the participation of <emph>several</emph> in state-business, who +together constitute the <q>general order</q> (§ <ref target='Section_528'>528</ref>) in so far +as they take on themselves the charge of universal ends +as the essential function of their particular life;—the +further condition for being able to take individually part +in this business being a certain training, aptitude, and +skill for such ends. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_544'/> +§ 544. The estates-collegium or provincial council is +an institution by which all such as belong to civil +society in general, and are to that degree private +persons, participate in the governmental power, especially +in legislation—viz. such legislation as concerns +the universal scope of those interests which do not, like +peace and war, involve the, as it were, personal interference +and action of the State as one man, and therefore +do not belong specially to the province of the +sovereign power. By virtue of this participation subjective +liberty and conceit, with their general opinion, +can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the +satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. +</p> + +<p> +The division of constitutions into democracy, aristocracy +and monarchy, is still the most definite statement +of their difference in relation to sovereignty. They +must at the same time be regarded as necessary +structures in the path of development,—in short, in +the history of the State. Hence it is superficial and +absurd to represent them as an object of <emph>choice</emph>. The +pure forms—necessary to the process of evolution—are, +in so far as they are finite and in course of change, +conjoined both with forms of their degeneration,—such +as ochlocracy, &c., and with earlier transition-forms. +These two forms are not to be confused with those +legitimate structures. Thus, it may be—if we look only +to the fact that the will of one individual stands at +the head of the state—oriental despotism is included +<pb n='142'/><anchor id='Pg142'/> +under the vague name monarchy,—as also feudal +monarchy, to which indeed even the favourite name +of <q>constitutional monarchy</q> cannot be refused. The +true difference of these forms from genuine monarchy +depends on the true value of those principles of +right which are in vogue and have their actuality and +guarantee in the state-power. These principles are +those expounded earlier, liberty of property, and +above all personal liberty, civil society, with its industry +and its communities, and the regulated efficiency of the +particular bureaux in subordination to the laws. +</p> + +<p> +The question which is most discussed is in what +sense we are to understand the participation of private +persons in state affairs. For it is as private persons +that the members of bodies of estates are primarily to +be taken, be they treated as mere individuals, or as +representatives of a number of people or of the nation. +The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as +the <emph>nation</emph>: but as such an aggregate it is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>vulgus</foreign>, not +<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>populus</foreign>: and in this direction, it is the one sole aim of +the state that a nation should <emph>not</emph> come to existence, +to power and action, <emph>as such an aggregate</emph>. Such a +condition of a nation is a condition of lawlessness, +demoralisation, brutishness: in it the nation would only +be a shapeless, wild, blind force, like that of the stormy, +elemental sea, which however is not self-destructive, as +the nation—a spiritual element—would be. Yet such +a condition may be often heard described as that of true +freedom. If there is to be any sense in embarking +upon the question of the participation of private persons +in public affairs, it is not a brutish mass, but an already +organised nation—one in which a governmental power +exists—which should be presupposed. The desirability +of such participation however is not to be put in the +superiority of particular intelligence, which private +<pb n='143'/><anchor id='Pg143'/> +persons are supposed to have over state officials—the +contrary may be the case—nor in the superiority of +their good will for the general best. The members of +civil society as such are rather people who find +their nearest duty in their private interest and (as +especially in the feudal society) in the interest of their +privileged corporation. Take the case of <emph>England</emph> +which, because private persons have a predominant +share in public affairs, has been regarded as having +the freest of all constitutions. Experience shows that +that country—as compared with the other civilised +states of Europe—is the most backward in civil and +criminal legislation, in the law and liberty of property, +in arrangements for art and science, and that objective +freedom or rational right is rather <emph>sacrificed</emph> to formal +right and particular private interest; and that this +happens even in the institutions and possessions +supposed to be dedicated to religion. The desirability +of private persons taking part in public affairs is partly +to be put in their concrete, and therefore more urgent, +sense of general wants. But the true motive is the +right of the collective spirit to appear as an <emph>externally +universal</emph> will, acting with orderly and express efficacy +for the public concerns. By this satisfaction of this +right it gets its own life quickened, and at the same time +breathes fresh life in the administrative officials; who +thus have it brought home to them that not merely have +they to enforce duties but also to have regard to rights. +Private citizens are in the state the incomparably +greater number, and form the multitude of such as are +recognised as persons. Hence the will-reason exhibits +its existence in them as a preponderating majority of +freemen, or in its <q>reflectional</q> universality, which has its +actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. +But it has already been noted as a <q>moment</q> +<pb n='144'/><anchor id='Pg144'/> +of civil society (§§ <ref target='Section_527'>527</ref>, <ref target='Section_534'>534</ref>) that the individuals rise +from external into substantial universality, and form +a <emph>particular</emph> kind,—the Estates: and it is not in the +inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the +<emph>democratic</emph> fashion of election), but as organic factors, as +estates, that they enter upon that participation. In the +state a power or agency must never appear and act as +a formless, inorganic shape, i.e. basing itself on the +principle of multeity and mere numbers. +</p> + +<p> +Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated +as the <emph>legislative power</emph>, so far as they form only one +branch of that power,—a branch in which the special +government-officials have an <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ex officio</foreign> share, while the +sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. In +a civilised state moreover legislation can only be a +further modification of existing law, and so-called new +laws can only deal with minutiae of detail and particularities +(cf. § <ref target='Section_529'>529</ref>, note), the main drift of which has been +already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice +of the law-courts. The so-called <emph>financial law</emph>, in so far +as it requires the assent of the estates, is really a +government affair: it is only improperly called a law, +in the general sense of embracing a wide, indeed the +whole, range of the external means of government. +The finances deal with what in their nature are only +particular needs, ever newly recurring, even if they +touch on the sum total of such needs. If the main part +of the requirement were—as it very likely is—regarded +as permanent, the provision for it would have more the +nature of a law: but to be a law, it would have to be +made once for all, and not be made yearly, or every few +years, afresh. The part which varies according to time +and circumstances concerns in reality the smallest part +of the amount, and the provisions with regard to it have +even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may +<pb n='145'/><anchor id='Pg145'/> +be only this slight variable part which is matter of +dispute, and can be subjected to a varying yearly +estimate. It is this last then which falsely bears the +high-sounding name of the <q><emph>Grant</emph></q> of the <emph>Budget</emph>, i.e. +of the whole of the finances. A law for one year and +made each year has even to the plain man something +palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and +developed universal, as content of a true law, from the +reflectional universality which only externally embraces +what in its nature is many. To give the name of a law +to the annual fixing of financial requirements only +serves—with the presupposed separation of legislative +from executive—to keep up the illusion of that +separation having real existence, and to conceal the +fact that the legislative power, when it makes a decree +about finance, is really engaged with strict executive +business. But the importance attached to the power +of from time to time granting <q>supply,</q> on the ground that +the assembly of estates possesses in it a <emph>check</emph> on the +government, and thus a guarantee against injustice +and violence,—this importance is in one way rather +plausible than real. The financial measures necessary +for the state's subsistence cannot be made conditional on +any other circumstances, nor can the state's subsistence +be put yearly in doubt. It would be a parallel absurdity +if the government were e.g. to grant and arrange the +judicial institutions always for a limited time merely; +and thus, by the threat of suspending the activity of such +an institution and the fear of a consequent state of +brigandage, reserve for itself a means of coercing +private individuals. Then again, the pictures of +a condition of affairs, in which it might be useful and +necessary to have in hand means of compulsion, are +partly based on the false conception of a contract +between rulers and ruled, and partly presuppose the +<pb n='146'/><anchor id='Pg146'/> +possibility of such a divergence in spirit between these +two parties as would make constitution and government +quite out of the question. If we suppose the empty +possibility of getting <emph>help</emph> by such compulsive means +brought into existence, such help would rather be the +derangement and dissolution of the state, in which +there would no longer be a government, but only +parties, and the violence and oppression of one party +would only be helped away by the other. To fit together +the several parts of the state into a constitution +after the fashion of mere understanding—i.e. to adjust +within it the machinery of a balance of powers external +to each other—is to contravene the fundamental idea of +what a state is. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_545'/> +§ 545. The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate +actuality as a single nation marked by physical +conditions. As a single individual it is exclusive +against other like individuals. In their mutual relations, +waywardness and chance have a place; for each person +in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is +only postulated between them, and not actually existent. +This independence of a central authority reduces +disputes between them to terms of mutual violence, +a <emph>state of war</emph>, to meet which the general estate in +the community assumes the particular function of +maintaining the state's independence against other +states, and becomes the estate of bravery. +</p> + +<p> +§ 546. This state of war shows the omnipotence of +the state in its individuality—an individuality that goes +even to abstract negativity. Country and fatherland +then appear as the power by which the particular +independence of individuals and their absorption in the +external existence of possession and in natural life is +convicted of its own nullity,—as the power which procures +the maintenance of the general substance by the +<pb n='147'/><anchor id='Pg147'/> +patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this +natural and particular existence,—so making nugatory +the nugatoriness that confronts it. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>β. External Public Law<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Das äußere Staatsrecht.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 547. In the game of war the independence of States +is at stake. In one case the result may be the mutual +recognition of free national individualities (§ <ref target='Section_430'>430</ref>): and +by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever, both +this general recognition, and the special claims of nations +on one another, are settled and fixed. External state-rights +rest partly on these positive treaties, but to that +extent contain only rights falling short of true actuality +(§ <ref target='Section_545'>545</ref>): partly on so-called <emph>international</emph> law, the general +principle of which is its presupposed recognition by +the several States. It thus restricts their otherwise +unchecked action against one another in such a way +that the possibility of peace is left; and distinguishes +individuals as private persons (non-belligerents) from +the state. In general, international law rests on social +usage. +</p> + +</div> + +<div> +<head>γ. Universal History<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die Weltgeschichte.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 548. As the mind of a special nation is actual +and its liberty is under natural conditions, it admits +on this nature-side the influence of geographical and +climatic qualities. It is in time; and as regards its +range and scope, has essentially a <emph>particular</emph> principle +on the lines of which it must run through a development +of its consciousness and its actuality. It has, in short, +a history of its own. But as a restricted mind its independence +is something secondary; it passes into universal +world-history, the events of which exhibit the dialectic +of the several national minds,—the judgment of the +world. +</p> + +<pb n='148'/><anchor id='Pg148'/> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_549'/> +§ 549. This movement is the path of liberation for the +spiritual substance, the deed by which the absolute +final aim of the world is realised in it, and the merely +implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. +It is thus the revelation and actuality of its +essential and completed essence, whereby it becomes +to the outward eye a universal spirit—a world-mind. As +this development is in time and in real existence, as it +is a history, its several stages and steps are the national +minds, each of which, as single and endued by nature +with a specific character, is appointed to occupy only +one grade, and accomplish one task in the whole deed. +</p> + +<p> +The presupposition that history has an essential +and actual end, from the principles of which certain +characteristic results logically flow, is called an <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> +view of it, and philosophy is reproached with <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> +history-writing. On this point, and on history-writing +in general, this note must go into further detail. +That history, and above all universal history, is founded +on an essential and actual aim, which actually is and +will be realised in it—the plan of Providence; that, in +short, there is Reason in history, must be decided on +strictly philosophical ground, and thus shown to be +essentially and in fact necessary. To presuppose such +aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions +or thoughts are arbitrarily adopted, and when a determined +attempt is made to force events and actions into +conformity with such conceptions. For such <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> +methods of treatment at the present day, however, those +are chiefly to blame who profess to be purely historical, +and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to +raise their voice against the habit of philosophising, first +in general, and then in history. Philosophy is to them +a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of all +arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. Such <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> +<pb n='149'/><anchor id='Pg149'/> +history-writing has sometimes burst out in quarters +where one would least have expected it, especially on +the philological side, and in Germany more than in +France and England, where the art of historical writing +has gone through a process of purification to a firmer +and maturer character. Fictions, like that of a primitive +age and its primitive people, possessed from the +first of the true knowledge of God and all the sciences,—of +sacerdotal races,—and, when we come to minutiae, +of a Roman epic, supposed to be the source of the +legends which pass current for the history of ancient +Rome, &c., have taken the place of the pragmatising +which detected psychological motives and associations. +There is a wide circle of persons who seem to consider +it incumbent on a <emph>learned</emph> and <emph>ingenious</emph> historian +drawing from the original sources to concoct such baseless +fancies, and form bold combinations of them from +a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts, +in defiance of the best-accredited history. +</p> + +<p> +Setting aside this subjective treatment of history, we +find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us +to import into history an <emph>objective purpose</emph>. This is after +all synonymous with what <emph>seems</emph> to be the still more +legitimate demand that the historian should proceed +with <emph>impartiality</emph>. This is a requirement often and +especially made on the <emph>history of philosophy</emph>: where it is +insisted there should be no prepossession in favour of +an idea or opinion, just as a judge should have no +special sympathy for one of the contending parties. In +the case of the judge it is at the same time assumed +that he would administer his office ill and foolishly, if +he had not an interest, and an exclusive interest in +justice, if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim, +or if he declined to judge at all. This requirement +which we may make upon the judge may be called +<pb n='150'/><anchor id='Pg150'/> +<emph>partiality</emph> for justice; and there is no difficulty here +in distinguishing it from <emph>subjective</emph> partiality. But in +speaking of the impartiality required from the historian, +this self-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear, +and rejects both kinds of interest. It demands +that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim +and view by which he may sort out, state and criticise +events, but shall narrate them exactly in the casual +mode he finds them, in their incoherent and unintelligent +particularity. Now it is at least admitted that +a history must have an object, e.g. Rome and its fortunes, +or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roman +empire. But little reflection is needed to discover that +this is the presupposed end which lies at the basis of +the events themselves, as of the critical examination +into their comparative importance, i.e. their nearer or +more remote relation to it. A history without such aim +and such criticism would be only an imbecile mental +divagation, not as good as a fairy tale, for even children +expect a <foreign rend='italic'>motif</foreign> in their stories, a purpose at least +dimly surmiseable with which events and actions are +put in relation. +</p> + +<p> +In the existence of a <emph>nation</emph> the substantial aim is to +be a state and preserve itself as such. A nation with +no state formation, (a <emph>mere nation</emph>), has strictly speaking +no history,—like the nations which existed before +the rise of states and others which still exist in a condition +of savagery. What happens to a nation, and takes +place within it, has its essential significance in relation +to the state: whereas the mere particularities of individuals +are at the greatest distance from the true object +of history. It is true that the general spirit of an age +leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated +individuals, and even their particularities are but the +very distant and the dim media through which the +<pb n='151'/><anchor id='Pg151'/> +collective light still plays in fainter colours. Ay, even +such singularities as a petty occurrence, a word, express +not a subjective particularity, but an age, a nation, +a civilisation, in striking portraiture and brevity; and +to select such trifles shows the hand of a historian of +genius. But, on the other hand, the main mass of +singularities is a futile and useless mass, by the painstaking +accumulation of which the objects of real historical +value are overwhelmed and obscured. The essential +characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained +in the great events. It was a correct instinct +which sought to banish such portraiture of the particular +and the gleaning of insignificant traits, into the <emph>Novel</emph> +(as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott, &c.). +Where the picture presents an unessential aspect of +life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it with an +unessential material, such as the romance takes from +private events and subjective passions. But to take +the individual pettinesses of an age and of the persons +in it, and, in the interest of so-called truth, weave +them into the picture of general interests, is not only +against taste and judgment, but violates the principles +of objective truth. The only truth for mind is the +substantial and underlying essence, and not the +trivialities of external existence and contingency. It is +therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificancies +are duly vouched for by documents, or, as in the +romance, invented to suit the character and ascribed +to this or that name and circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +The point of interest of <emph>Biography</emph>—to say a word +on that here—appears to run directly counter to any +universal scope and aim. But biography too has for its +background the historical world, with which the individual +is intimately bound up: even purely personal +originality, the freak of humour, &c. suggests by allusion +<pb n='152'/><anchor id='Pg152'/> +that central reality and has its interest heightened by +the suggestion. The mere play of sentiment, on the +contrary, has another ground and interest than history. +</p> + +<p> +The requirement of impartiality addressed to the +history of philosophy (and also, we may add, to the +history of religion, first in general, and secondly, to +church history) generally implies an even more decided +bar against presupposition of any objective aim. As the +State was already called the point to which in political +history criticism had to refer all events, so here the +<q><emph>Truth</emph></q> must be the object to which the several deeds +and events of the spirit would have to be referred. +What is actually done is rather to make the contrary +presupposition. Histories with such an object as +religion or philosophy are understood to have only +subjective aims for their theme, i.e. only opinions and +mere ideas, not an essential and realised object like the +truth. And that with the mere excuse that there is no +truth. On this assumption the sympathy with truth +appears as only a partiality of the usual sort, +a partiality for opinion and mere ideas, which all alike +have no stuff in them, and are all treated as indifferent. +In that way historical truth means but correctness—an +accurate report of externals, without critical treatment +save as regards this correctness—admitting, in this +case, only qualitative and quantitative judgments, no +judgments of necessity or notion (cf. notes to §§ 172 and +175). But, really, if Rome or the German empire, +&c. are an actual and genuine object of political +history, and the aim to which the phenomena are to be +related and by which they are to be judged; then in +universal history the genuine spirit, the consciousness +of it and of its essence, is even in a higher degree +a true and actual object and theme, and an aim to +which all other phenomena are essentially and actually +<pb n='153'/><anchor id='Pg153'/> +subservient. Only therefore through their relationship +to it, i.e. through the judgment in which they are +subsumed under it, while it inheres in them, have they +their value and even their existence. It is the spirit +which not merely broods <emph>over</emph> history as over the waters, +but lives in it and is alone its principle of movement: +and in the path of that spirit, liberty, i.e. a development +determined by the notion of spirit, is the guiding +principle and only its notion its final aim, i.e. truth. +For Spirit is consciousness. Such a doctrine—or in +other words that Reason is in history—will be partly +at least a plausible faith, partly it is a cognition of +philosophy. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_550'/> +§ 550. This liberation of mind, in which it proceeds +to come to itself and to realise its truth, and the +business of so doing, is the supreme right, the absolute +Law. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is +a vehicle for the contemporary development of the +collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the objective +actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its +will. Against this absolute will the other particular +natural minds have no rights: <emph>that</emph> nation dominates +the world: but yet the universal will steps onward +over its property for the time being, as over a special +grade, and then delivers it over to its chance and doom. +</p> + +<p> +§ 551. To such extent as this business of actuality +appears as an action, and therefore as a work of +<emph>individuals</emph>, these individuals, as regards the substantial +issue of their labour, are <emph>instruments</emph>, and their subjectivity, +which is what is peculiar to them, is the empty +form of activity. What they personally have gained +therefore through the individual share they took in the +substantial business (prepared and appointed independently +of them) is a formal universality or subjective +mental idea—<emph>Fame</emph>, which is their reward. +</p> + +<pb n='154'/><anchor id='Pg154'/> + +<p> +§ 552. The national spirit contains nature-necessity, +and stands in external existence (§ <ref target='Section_423'>423</ref>): the ethical +substance, potentially infinite, is actually a particular +and limited substance (§§ <ref target='Section_549'>549</ref>, <ref target='Section_450'>550</ref>); on its subjective +side it labours under contingency, in the shape of its +unreflective natural usages, and its content is presented +to it as something <emph>existing</emph> in time and tied to +an external nature and external world. The spirit, +however, (which <emph>thinks</emph> in this moral organism) overrides +and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching +to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal +interests, in the system of laws and usages. It +rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. Such apprehension, +however, still has the immanent limitedness +of the national spirit. But the spirit which thinks in +universal history, stripping off at the same time those +limitations of the several national minds and its own +temporal restrictions, lays hold of its concrete universality, +and rises to apprehend the absolute mind, as +the eternally actual truth in which the contemplative +reason enjoys freedom, while the necessity of nature +and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its +revelation and the vessels of its honour. +</p> + +<p> +The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation +to God have been spoken of in the Introduction to the +Logic (cf. especially § 51, note). As regards the starting-point +of that elevation, Kant has on the whole adopted +the most correct, when he treats belief in God as +proceeding from the practical Reason. For that starting-point +contains the material or content which constitutes +the content of the notion of God. But the true concrete +material is neither Being (as in the cosmological) nor +mere action by design (as in the physico-theological +proof) but the Mind, the absolute characteristic and +function of which is effective reason, i.e. the self-determining +<pb n='155'/><anchor id='Pg155'/> +and self-realising notion itself,—Liberty. +That the elevation of subjective mind to God which +these considerations give is by Kant again deposed to +a <emph>postulate</emph>—a mere <q>ought</q>—is the peculiar perversity, +formerly noticed, of calmly and simply reinstating as +true and valid that very antithesis of finitude, the +supersession of which into truth is the essence of that +elevation. +</p> + +<p> +As regards the <q>mediation</q> which, as it has been +already shown (§ 192, cf. § 204 note), that elevation to +God really involves, the point specially calling for note +is the <q>moment</q> of negation through which the essential +content of the starting-point is purged of its finitude so +as to come forth free. This factor, abstract in the +formal treatment of logic, now gets its most concrete +interpretation. The finite, from which the start is now +made, is the real ethical self-consciousness. The negation +through which that consciousness raises its spirit to +its truth, is the purification, <emph>actually</emph> accomplished in +the ethical world, whereby its conscience is purged of +subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishness +of desire. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity +only issue from the moral life: religion is that life +rising to think, i.e. becoming aware of the free universality +of its concrete essence. Only from the moral +life and by the moral life is the Idea of God seen to be +free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefore it is +vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. +</p> + +<p> +But—as is the case with all speculative process—this +development of one thing out of another means +that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather +the absolute <foreign rend='italic'>prius</foreign> of what it appears to be mediated +by, and what is here in mind known as its truth. +</p> + +<p> +Here then is the place to go more deeply into the +reciprocal relations between the state and religion, and +<pb n='156'/><anchor id='Pg156'/> +in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is +familiar and current on the topic. It is evident and +apparent from what has preceded that moral life is +the state retracted into its inner heart and substance, +while the state is the organisation and actualisation of +moral life; and that religion is the very substance of +the moral life itself and of the state. At this rate, the +state rests on the ethical sentiment, and that on the +religious. If religion then is the consciousness of +<emph><q>absolute</q> truth</emph>, then whatever is to rank as right and +justice, as law and duty, i.e. as <emph>true</emph> in the world of free +will, can be so esteemed only as it is participant in that +truth, as it is subsumed under it and is its sequel. But +if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion, then +perforce religion must have the <emph>genuine</emph> content; i.e. the +idea of God it knows must be the true and real. The +ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelling in self-consciousness, +as it is actually present in a nation and +its individual members. This self-consciousness retiring +upon itself out of its empirical actuality and bringing +its truth to consciousness, has in its <emph>faith</emph> and in its +<emph>conscience</emph> only what it has consciously secured in +its spiritual actuality. The two are inseparable: there +cannot be two kinds of conscience, one religious and +another ethical, differing from the former in body and +value of truth. But in point of form, i.e. for thought +and knowledge—(and religion and ethical life belong to +intelligence and are a thinking and knowing)—the body +of religious truth, as the pure self-subsisting and therefore +supreme truth, exercises a sanction over the moral +life which lies in empirical actuality. Thus for self-consciousness +religion is the <q>basis</q> of moral life and +of the state. It has been the monstrous blunder of +our times to try to look upon these inseparables as +separable from one another, and even as mutually +<pb n='157'/><anchor id='Pg157'/> +indifferent. The view taken of the relationship of +religion and the state has been that, whereas the state +had an independent existence of its own, springing from +some force and power, religion was a later addition, something +desirable perhaps for strengthening the political +bulwarks, but purely subjective in individuals:—or it +may be, religion is treated as something without effect on +the moral life of the state, i.e. its reasonable law and +constitution which are based on a ground of their own. +</p> + +<p> +As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated, +it may be worth while to note the separation +as it appears on the side of religion. It is primarily +a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness +takes to the body of truth. So long as this body of +truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of self-consciousness +in its actuality, then self-consciousness +in this content has the certainty of itself and is free. +But if this present self-consciousness is lacking, then +there may be created, in point of form, a condition of +spiritual slavery, even though the <emph>implicit</emph> content of +religion is absolute spirit. This great difference (to +cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian +religion itself, even though here it is not the nature-element +in which the idea of God is embodied, and +though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into +its central dogma and sole theme of a God who is +known in spirit and in truth. And yet in Catholicism +this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition +to the self-conscious spirit. And, first of all, God is +in the <q>host</q> presented to religious adoration as an +<emph>external thing</emph>. (In the Lutheran Church, on the contrary, +the host as such is not at first consecrated, but in +the moment of enjoyment, i.e. in the annihilation of its +externality, and in the act of faith, i.e. in the free self-certain +spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted +<pb n='158'/><anchor id='Pg158'/> +to be present God.) From that first and supreme status +of externalisation flows every other phase of externality,—of +bondage, non-spirituality, and superstition. It +leads to a laity, receiving its knowledge of divine +truth, as well as the direction of its will and conscience +from without and from another order—which order +again does not get possession of that knowledge in +a spiritual way only, but to that end essentially requires +an external consecration. It leads to the non-spiritual +style of praying—partly as mere moving of the lips, +partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of +directly addressing God, and prays others to pray—addressing +his devotion to miracle-working images, +even to bones, and expecting miracles from them. +It leads, generally, to justification by external works, +a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts, and +even to be capable of being transferred to others. All +this binds the spirit under an externalism by which the +very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at +its source, and law and justice, morality and conscience, +responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. +</p> + +<p> +Along with this principle of spiritual bondage, and +these applications of it in the religious life, there can +only go in the legislative and constitutional system +a legal and moral bondage, and a state of lawlessness +and immorality in political life. Catholicism has been +loudly praised and is still often praised—logically +enough—as the one religion which secures the stability +of governments. But in reality this applies only to +governments which are bound up with institutions +founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit +which should have legal and moral liberty), i.e. with +institutions that embody injustice and with a morally +corrupt and barbaric state of society. But these +governments are not aware that in fanaticism they +<pb n='159'/><anchor id='Pg159'/> +have a terrible power, which does not rise in hostility +against them, only so long as and only on condition that +they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and +immorality. But in mind there is a very different +power available against that externalism and dismemberment +induced by a false religion. Mind collects +itself into its inward free actuality. Philosophy +awakes in the spirit of governments and nations the +wisdom to discern what is essentially and actually right +and reasonable in the real world. It was well to call +these products of thought, and in a special sense +Philosophy, the wisdom of the world<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Weltweisheit.</foreign></note>; for thought +makes the spirit's truth an actual present, leads it into +the real world, and thus liberates it in its actuality +and in its own self. +</p> + +<p> +Thus set free, the content of religion assumes quite +another shape. So long as the form, i.e. our consciousness +and subjectivity, lacked liberty, it followed necessarily +that self-consciousness was conceived as not +immanent in the ethical principles which religion +embodies, and these principles were set at such a distance +as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual +self-consciousness. In this unreality ethical content +gets the name of <emph>Holiness</emph>. But once the divine spirit +introduces itself into actuality, and actuality emancipates +itself to spirit, then what in the world was a postulate of +holiness is supplanted by the actuality of <emph>moral</emph> life. +Instead of the vow of chastity, <emph>marriage</emph> now ranks as +the ethical relation; and, therefore, as the highest on +this side of humanity stands the family. Instead of the +vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of +assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the +poor, i.e. whosoever enriches them) is the precept of +action to acquire goods through one's own intelligence +<pb n='160'/><anchor id='Pg160'/> +and industry,—of honesty in commercial dealing, and in +the use of property,—in short moral life in the socio-economic +sphere. And instead of the vow of obedience, +true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal +arrangements of the state—an obedience which is itself +the true freedom, because the state is a self-possessed, +self-realising reason—in short, moral life in the state. +Thus, and thus only, can law and morality exist. The +precept of religion, <q>Give to Caesar what is Caesar's +and to God what is God's</q> is not enough: the question +is to settle what is Caesar's, what belongs to the secular +authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the +secular no less than the ecclesiastical authority have +claimed almost everything as their own. The divine +spirit must interpenetrate the entire secular life: +whereby wisdom is concrete within it, and it carries the +terms of its own justification. But that concrete +indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organisations. +It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity +of a celibate order;—the morality of economic and +industrial action against the sanctity of poverty and +its indolence;—the morality of an obedience dedicated +to the law of the state as against the sanctity +of an obedience from which law and duty are absent +and where conscience is enslaved. With the growing +need for law and morality and the sense of the +spirit's essential liberty, there sets in a conflict of +spirit with the religion of unfreedom. It is no +use to organise political laws and arrangements on +principles of equity and reason, so long as in religion +the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. A free +state and a slavish religion are incompatible. It is silly +to suppose that we may try to allot them separate +spheres, under the impression that their diverse natures +will maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another +<pb n='161'/><anchor id='Pg161'/> +and not break out in contradiction and battle. Principles +of civil freedom can be but abstract and superficial, +and political institutions deduced from them must be, if +taken alone, untenable, so long as those principles in +their wisdom mistake religion so much as not to know +that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their +last and supreme sanction in the religious conscience +in subsumption under the consciousness of <q>absolute</q> +truth. Let us suppose even that, no matter how, a code +of law should arise, so to speak <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, founded on +principles of reason, but in contradiction with an established +religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom; +still, as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in +the hands of individual members of the government, +and of the various classes of the administrative <emph>personnel</emph>, +it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract +and empty assumption that the individuals will act only +according to the letter or meaning of the law, and not +in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience +and supreme obligation lies. Opposed to what +religion pronounces holy, the laws appear something +made by human hands: even though backed by penalties +and externally introduced, they could offer no lasting +resistance to the contradiction and attacks of the religious +spirit. Such laws, however sound their provisions may +be, thus founder on the conscience, whose spirit is +different from the spirit of the laws and refuses to +sanction them. It is nothing but a modern folly to try +to alter a corrupt moral organisation by altering its +political constitution and code of laws without changing +the religion,—to make a revolution without having +made a reformation, to suppose that a political constitution +opposed to the old religion could live in peace and +harmony with it and its sanctities, and that stability +could be procured for the laws by external guarantees, +<pb n='162'/><anchor id='Pg162'/> +e.g. so-called <q>chambers,</q> and the power given them to +fix the budget, &c. (cf. § <ref target='Section_544'>544</ref> note). At best it is only +a temporary expedient—when it is obviously too great +a task to descend into the depths of the religious spirit +and to raise that same spirit to its truth—to seek to +separate law and justice from religion. Those guarantees +are but rotten bulwarks against the consciences of +the persons charged with administering the laws—among +which laws these guarantees are included. It +is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction +to seek to bind and subject to the secular code the +religious conscience to which mere human law is +a thing profane. +</p> + +<p> +The perception had dawned upon Plato with great +clearness of the gulf which in his day had commenced +to divide the established religion and the political constitution, +on one hand, from those deeper requirements +which, on the other hand, were made upon religion and +politics by liberty which had learnt to recognise its +inner life. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine +constitution and a sound political life have their deeper +foundation on the Idea,—on the essentially and actually +universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. +Now to see and ascertain what these are is +certainly the function and the business of <emph>philosophy</emph>. +It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into +the celebrated or notorious passage where he makes +Socrates emphatically state that philosophy and political +power must coincide, that the Idea must be regent, if +the distress of nations is to see its end. What Plato +thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea—which +implicitly indeed is the free self-determining +thought—could not get into consciousness save only in +the form of a thought; that the substance of the thought +could only be true when set forth as a universal, and +<pb n='163'/><anchor id='Pg163'/> +as such brought to consciousness under its most +abstract form. +</p> + +<p> +To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness +with the point of view from which the relationship +of state and religion is here regarded, the notional +differences on which everything turns must be recalled +to mind. The first of these is that in natural things +their substance or genus is different from their existence +in which that substance is as subject: further that this +subjective existence of the genus is distinct from that +which it gets, when specially set in relief as genus, or, +to put it simply, as the universal in a mental concept +or idea. This additional <q>individuality</q>—the soil on +which the universal and underlying principle <emph>freely</emph> and +expressly exists,—is the intellectual and thinking <emph>self</emph>. +In the case of <emph>natural</emph> things their truth and reality does +not get the form of universality and essentiality through +themselves, and their <q>individuality</q> is not itself the +form: the form is only found in subjective thinking, +which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality +an existence of its own. In man's case it is otherwise: +his truth and reality is the free mind itself, and +it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. This +absolute nucleus of man—mind intrinsically concrete—is +just this—to have the form (to have thinking) itself +for a content. To the height of the thinking consciousness +of this principle Aristotle ascended in his notion +of the entelechy of thought, (which is νοῆσις τῆς νοήσεως), +thus surmounting the Platonic Idea (the genus, or +essential being). But thought always—and that on +account of this very principle—contains the immediate +self-subsistence of subjectivity no less than it contains +universality; the genuine Idea of the intrinsically +concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its +terms (subjective consciousness) as under the other +<pb n='164'/><anchor id='Pg164'/> +(universality): and in the one as in the other it is the +same substantial content. Under the subjective form, +however, fall feeling, intuition, pictorial representation: +and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the +consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first +reached and apprehended in this form: in other words, +it must exist in its immediate reality as religion, +earlier than it does as philosophy. Philosophy is +a later development from this basis (just as Greek +philosophy itself is later than Greek religion), and in +fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending +in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit +which first manifests itself in religion. But Greek +philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to +Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality +of the Idea could take up none but a hostile +attitude to an imaginative polytheism, and to the +gladsome and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. +The <emph>form</emph> in its infinite truth, the <emph>subjectivity</emph> of mind, +broke forth at first only as a subjective free <emph>thinking</emph>, +which was not yet identical with the <emph>substantiality</emph> +itself,—and thus this underlying principle was not yet +apprehended as <emph>absolute mind</emph>. Thus religion might +appear as first purified only through philosophy,—through +pure self-existent thought: but the form pervading +this underlying principle—the form which +philosophy attacked—was that creative imagination. +</p> + +<p> +Political power, which is developed similarly, but +earlier than philosophy, from religion, exhibits the +onesidedness, which in the actual world may infect +its <emph>implicitly</emph> true Idea, as demoralisation. Plato, in +common with all his thinking contemporaries, perceived +this demoralisation of democracy and the defectiveness +even of its principle; he set in relief accordingly the +underlying principle of the state, but could not work +<pb n='165'/><anchor id='Pg165'/> +into his idea of it the infinite form of subjectivity, which +still escaped his intelligence. His state is therefore, on +its own showing, wanting in subjective liberty (§ <ref target='Section_503'>503</ref> note, +§ <ref target='Section_513'>513</ref>, &c.). The truth which should be immanent in the +state, should knit it together and control it, he, for these +reasons, got hold of only the form of thought-out truth, +of philosophy; and hence he makes that utterance that +<q>so long as philosophers do not rule in the states, or +those who are now called kings and rulers do not +soundly and comprehensively philosophise, so long +neither the state nor the race of men can be liberated +from evils,—so long will the idea of the political constitution +fall short of possibility and not see the light of +the sun.</q> It was not vouchsafed to Plato to go on so +far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring +up in the world and hold sway in political life, so long +the genuine principle of the state had not come into +actuality. But so long too this principle could not +emerge even in thought, nor could thought lay hold of +the genuine idea of the state,—the idea of the substantial +moral life, with which is identical the liberty of an +independent self-consciousness. Only in the principle +of mind, which is aware of its own essence, is implicitly +in absolute liberty, and has its actuality in the act of +self-liberation, does the absolute possibility and necessity +exist for political power, religion, and the principles of +philosophy coinciding in one, and for accomplishing the +reconciliation of actuality in general with the mind, of the +state with the religious conscience as well as with the +philosophical consciousness. Self-realising subjectivity +is in this case absolutely identical with substantial +universality. Hence religion as such, and the state as +such,—both as forms in which the principle exists—each +contain the absolute truth: so that the truth, in its +philosophic phase, is after all only in one of its forms. +<pb n='166'/><anchor id='Pg166'/> +But even religion, as it grows and expands, lets other +aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand +also (§ <ref target='Section_500'>500</ref> sqq.). As it is left therefore behind, +in its first immediate, and so also one-sided phase, +Religion may, or rather <emph>must</emph>, appear in its existence +degraded to sensuous externality, and thus in the +sequel become an influence to oppress liberty of spirit +and to deprave political life. Still the principle has in +it the infinite <q>elasticity</q> of the <q>absolute</q> form, so as +to overcome this depraving of the form-determination +(and of the content by these means), and to bring about +the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. Thus ultimately, +in the Protestant conscience the principles of the +religious and of the ethical conscience come to be one +and the same: the free spirit learning to see itself in +its reasonableness and truth. In the Protestant state, +the constitution and the code, as well as their several +applications, embody the principle and the development +of the moral life, which proceeds and can only proceed +from the truth of religion, when reinstated in its +original principle and in that way as such first become +actual. The moral life of the state and the religious +spirituality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees +of strength. +</p> + +</div> +</div> +</div> +</div> + +<pb n='167'/><anchor id='Pg167'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Section III. Absolute Mind<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Der absolute Geist.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 553. The <emph>notion</emph> of mind has its <emph>reality</emph> in the mind. +If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as +the consciousness of the absolute Idea, then the necessary +aspect is that the <emph>implicitly</emph> free intelligence be in +its actuality liberated to its notion, if that actuality is to +be a vehicle worthy of it. The subjective and the +objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on +which this aspect of <emph>reality</emph> or existence rises to +maturity. +</p> + +<p> +§ 554. The absolute mind, while it is self-centred +<emph>identity</emph>, is always also identity returning and ever +returned into itself: if it is the one and universal +<emph>substance</emph> it is so as a spirit, discerning itself into +a self and a consciousness, for which it is as substance. +<emph>Religion</emph>, as this supreme sphere may be in +general designated, if it has on one hand to be studied +as issuing from the subject and having its home in the +subject, must no less be regarded as objectively issuing +from the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. +</p> + +<p> +That here, as always, belief or faith is not opposite +<pb n='168'/><anchor id='Pg168'/> +to consciousness or knowledge, but rather to a sort of +knowledge, and that belief is only a particular form of +the latter, has been remarked already (§ 63 note). If +nowadays there is so little consciousness of God, +and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon, while +people speak so much more of the subjective side of +religion, i.e. of God's indwelling in us, and if that and +not the truth as such is called for,—in this there is at +least the correct principle that God must be apprehended +as spirit in his community. +</p> + +<p> +§ 555. The subjective consciousness of the absolute +spirit is essentially and intrinsically a process, the +immediate and substantial unity of which is the <emph>Belief</emph> +in the witness of the spirit as the <emph>certainty</emph> of objective +truth. Belief, at once this immediate unity and containing +it as a reciprocal dependence of these different +terms, has in <emph>devotion</emph>—the implicit or more explicit act +of worship (<foreign rend='italic'>cultus</foreign>)—passed over into the process of +superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation, +the process of authenticating that first certainty by +this intermediation, and of gaining its concrete determination, +viz. reconciliation, the actuality of the spirit. +</p> + +<pb n='169'/><anchor id='Pg169'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Sub-Section A. Art.</head> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_556'/> +§ 556. As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes +shape, its immediacy produces the factor of finitude in +Art. On one hand that is, it breaks up into a work of +external common existence, into the subject which produces +that work, and the subject which contemplates and +worships it. But, on the other hand, it is the concrete +<emph>contemplation</emph> and mental picture of implicitly absolute +spirit as the <emph>Ideal</emph>. In this ideal, or the concrete shape +born of the subjective spirit, its natural immediacy, +which is only a <emph>sign</emph> of the Idea, is so transfigured by +the informing spirit in order to express the Idea, that +the figure shows it and it alone:—the shape or form of +<emph>Beauty</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 557. The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful,—the +<emph>form of immediacy</emph> as such,—at the same time +<emph>qualifies</emph> what it <emph>embodies</emph>: and the God (of art) has with +his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of +a natural medium or natural phase of existence—He +contains the so-called <emph>unity</emph> of nature and spirit—i.e. +the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form—hence +not the spiritual unity, in which the natural would +be put only as <q>ideal,</q> as superseded in spirit, and the +spiritual content would be only in self-relation. It is +not the absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. +On the subjective side the community has of course an +<pb n='170'/><anchor id='Pg170'/> +ethical life, aware, as it is, of the spirituality of its +essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are +in it elevated to substantial liberty. But with the +stigma of immediacy upon it, the subject's liberty is +only a <emph>manner of life</emph>, without the infinite self-reflection +and the subjective inwardness of <emph>conscience</emph>. These +considerations govern in their further developments the +devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. +</p> + +<p> +§ 558. For the objects of contemplation it has to +produce, Art requires not only an external given +material—(under which are also included subjective +images and ideas), but—for the expression of spiritual +truth—must use the given forms of nature with a significance +which art must divine and possess (cf. § <ref target='Section_411'>411</ref>). Of +all such forms the human is the highest and the true, +because only in it can the spirit have its corporeity +and thus its visible expression. +</p> + +<p> +This disposes of the principle of the <emph>imitation of +nature</emph> in art: a point on which it is impossible to come +to an understanding while a distinction is left thus +abstract,—in other words, so long as the natural is only +taken in its externality, not as the <q>characteristic</q> +meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. +</p> + +<p> +§ 559. In such single shapes the <q>absolute</q> mind +cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the +spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universality, +when steps are taken to specify its fullness in +detail, breaks up into an indeterminate polytheism. +With the essential restrictedness of its content, Beauty +in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision +or image by the spiritual principle,—something formal, +so that the thought embodied, or the idea, can, like the +material which it uses to work in, be of the most diverse +and unessential kind, and still the work be something +beautiful and a work of art. +</p> + +<pb n='171'/><anchor id='Pg171'/> + +<p> +§ 560. The one-sidedness of <emph>immediacy</emph> on the part of the +Ideal involves the opposite one-sidedness (§ <ref target='Section_556'>556</ref>) that it +is something <emph>made</emph> by the artist. The subject or agent +is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is +only then an expression of the God, when there is no +sign of subjective particularity in it, and the net power +of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the +world, without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. +But as liberty only goes as far as there is +thought, the action inspired with the fullness of this +indwelling power, the artist's <emph>enthusiasm</emph>, is like a foreign +force under which he is bound and passive; the artistic +<emph>production</emph> has on its part the form of natural immediacy, +it belongs to the <emph>genius</emph> or particular endowment of the +artist,—and is at the same time a labour concerned with +technical cleverness and mechanical externalities. The +work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free +option, and the artist is the master of the God. +</p> + +<p> +§ 561. In work so inspired the reconciliation appears +so obvious in its initial stage that it is without more ado +accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness, which +is thus self-confident and of good cheer, without the +depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the +absolute essence. On the further side of the perfection +(which is reached in such reconciliation, in the beauty +of <emph>classical art</emph>) lies the art of sublimity,—<emph>symbolic art</emph>, +in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet +found, and the thought as going forth and wrestling +with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to +it, and yet all the while toiling to work itself into it. +The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet +reached the infinite form, is not yet known, not yet +conscious of itself, as free spirit. The artist's theme +only is as the abstract God of pure thought, or an effort +towards him,—a restless and unappeased effort which +<pb n='172'/><anchor id='Pg172'/> +throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to +find its goal. +</p> + +<p> +§ 562. In another way the Idea and the sensuous +figure it appears in are incompatible; and that is where +the infinite form, subjectivity, is not as in the first +extreme a mere superficial personality, but its inmost +depth, and God is known not as only seeking his form +or satisfying himself in an external form, but as only +finding himself in himself, and thus giving himself his +adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. <emph>Romantic +art</emph> gives up the task of showing him as such in external +form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only +condescending to appearance, and the divine as the +heart of hearts in an externality from which it always +disengages itself. Thus the external can here appear +as contingent towards its significance. +</p> + +<p> +The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical +necessity in the progress by which the Being, known +as the Absolute, assumes fuller and firmer features; +it has to note to what particular feature the kind of +cultus corresponds,—and then to see how the secular +self-consciousness, the consciousness of what is the +supreme vocation of man,—in short how the nature of a +nation's moral life, the principle of its law, of its actual +liberty, and of its constitution, as well as of its art and +science, corresponds to the principle which constitutes +the substance of a religion. That all these elements of +a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality, +that one spirit creates and informs them, is a truth on +which follows the further truth that the history of +religions coincides with the world-history. +</p> + +<p> +As regards the close connexion of art with the various +religions it may be specially noted that <emph>beautiful</emph> art can +only belong to those religions in which the spiritual +principle, though concrete and intrinsically free, is not +<pb n='173'/><anchor id='Pg173'/> +yet absolute. In religions where the Idea has not yet +been revealed and known in its free character, though +the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative +visibility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being, +and though art is the sole organ in which the abstract +and radically indistinct content,—a mixture from natural +and spiritual sources,—can try to bring itself to consciousness;—still +this art is defective; its form is +defective because its subject-matter and theme is so,—for +the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not +being immanent in it. The representations of this +symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity—for +the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull, and +hence has not the power freely to transmute the external +to significance and shape. Beautiful art, on the contrary, +has for its condition the self-consciousness of the free +spirit,—the consciousness that compared with it the +natural and sensuous has no standing of its own: it +makes the natural wholly into the mere expression of +spirit, which is thus the inner form that gives utterance +to itself alone. +</p> + +<p> +But with a further and deeper study, we see that +the advent of art, in a religion still in the bonds of +sensuous externality, shows that such religion is on the +decline. At the very time it seems to give religion the +supreme glorification, expression and brilliancy, it has +lifted the religion away over its limitation. In the +sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in +giving expression the artistic genius and the spectator +find themselves at home, with their personal sense and +feeling, satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and +the consciousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and +attained. Beautiful art, from its side, has thus performed +the same service as philosophy: it has purified the spirit +from its thraldom. The older religion in which the +<pb n='174'/><anchor id='Pg174'/> +need of fine art, and just for that reason, is first +generated, looks up in its principle to an other-world +which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored +by its devotees are hideous idols regarded as wonder-working +talismans, which point to the unspiritual +objectivity of that other world,—and bones perform a +similar or even a better service than such images. +But even fine art is only a grade of liberation, not the +supreme liberation itself.—The genuine objectivity, +which is only in the medium of thought,—the medium +in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit, and +where the liberation is accompanied with reverence,—is +still absent in the sensuous beauty of the work of art, +still more in that external, unbeautiful sensuousness. +</p> + +<p> +§ 563. Beautiful Art, like the religion peculiar to it, +has its future in true religion. The restricted value of +the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the universality +identical with the infinite form;—the vision in +which consciousness has to depend upon the senses +passes into a self-mediating knowledge, into an existence +which is itself knowledge,—into <emph>revelation</emph>. Thus +the principle which gives the Idea its content is that it +embody free intelligence, and as <q>absolute</q> <emph>spirit it +is for the spirit</emph>. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='175'/><anchor id='Pg175'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Sub-Section B. Revealed Religion<note place='foot'><foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Die geoffenbarte Religion.</foreign></note>.</head> + +<p> +§ 564. It lies essentially in the notion of religion,—the +religion i.e. whose content is absolute mind—that +it be <emph>revealed</emph>, and, what is more, revealed <emph>by God</emph>. +Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is +mind) is a self-determining principle, as infinite self-realising +form,—it therefore is manifestation out and +out. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the +spirit, and in the absolute religion it is the absolute +spirit which manifests no longer abstract elements of +its being but itself. +</p> + +<p> +The old conception—due to a one-sided survey +of human life—of Nemesis, which made the divinity +and its action in the world only a levelling power, +dashing to pieces everything high and great,—was confronted +by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that +God is not <emph>envious</emph>. The same answer may be given to +the modern assertions that man cannot ascertain God. +These assertions (and more than assertions they are +not) are the more illogical, because made within a religion +which is expressly called the revealed; for +according to them it would rather be the religion in +which nothing of God was revealed, in which he had +not revealed himself, and those belonging to it would be +the heathen <q>who know not God.</q> If the word of God +<pb n='176'/><anchor id='Pg176'/> +is taken in earnest in religion at all, it is from Him, the +theme and centre of religion, that the method of divine +knowledge may and must begin: and if self-revelation +is refused Him, then the only thing left to constitute His +nature would be to ascribe envy to Him. But clearly if +the word Mind is to have a meaning, it implies the +revelation of Him. +</p> + +<p> +If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of +the divine Mind for those who are not content with the +homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought,—at +first only <q>rationalising</q> reflection, but afterwards, as +in duty bound, to speculative comprehension, it may +almost create surprise that so many, and especially theologians +whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas, +have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting +anything offered them for this behoof. And nothing +serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion +that man knows nothing of God. To know what +God as spirit is—to apprehend this accurately and +distinctly in thoughts—requires careful and thorough +speculation. It includes, in its fore-front, the propositions: +God is God only so far as he knows himself: +his self-knowledge is, further, his self-consciousness in +man, and man's knowledge <emph>of</emph> God, which proceeds to +man's self-knowledge in God.—See the profound elucidation +of these propositions in the work from which +they are taken: <hi rend='italic'>Aphorisms on Knowing and Not-knowing, +&c.</hi>, by C. F. G—l.: Berlin 1829. +</p> + +<p> +§ 565. When the immediacy and sensuousness of +shape and knowledge is superseded, God is, in point +of content, the essential and actual spirit of nature and +spirit, while in point of form he is, first of all, presented +to consciousness as a mental representation. This +quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of +his content, on one hand, a separate being, making them +<pb n='177'/><anchor id='Pg177'/> +presuppositions towards each other, and phenomena +which succeed each other; their relationship it makes +a series of events according to finite reflective categories. +But, on the other hand, such a form of finite representationalism +is also overcome and superseded in the faith +which realises one spirit and in the devotion of worship. +</p> + +<p> +§ 566. In this separating, the form parts from the content: +and in the form the different functions of the +notion part off into special spheres or media, in each +of which the absolute spirit exhibits itself; (α) as +eternal content, abiding self-centred, even in its manifestation; +(β) as distinction of the eternal essence from +its manifestation, which by this difference becomes +the phenomenal world into which the content enters; +(γ) as infinite return, and reconciliation with the eternal +being, of the world it gave away—the withdrawal of +the eternal from the phenomenal into the unity of +its fullness. +</p> + +<p> +§ 567. (α) Under the <q>moment</q> of <emph>Universality</emph>,—the +sphere of pure thought or the abstract medium of +essence,—it is therefore the absolute spirit, which is +at first the presupposed principle, not however staying +aloof and inert, but (as underlying and essential power +under the reflective category of causality) creator of +heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather +only begetting himself as his <emph>son</emph>, with whom, though +different, he still remains in original identity,—just as, +again, this differentiation of him from the universal +essence eternally supersedes itself, and, though this +mediating of a self-superseding mediation, the first +substance is essentially as <emph>concrete individuality</emph> and +subjectivity,—is the <emph>Spirit</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +§ 568. (β) Under the <q>moment</q> of <emph>particularity</emph>, or of +judgment, it is this concrete eternal being which is presupposed: +its movement is the creation of the phenomenal +<pb n='178'/><anchor id='Pg178'/> +world. The eternal <q>moment</q> of mediation—of the +only Son—divides itself to become the antithesis of +two separate worlds. On one hand is heaven and earth, +the elemental and the concrete nature,—on the other +hand, standing in action and reaction with such nature, +the spirit, which therefore is finite. That spirit, as the +extreme of inherent negativity, completes its independence +till it becomes wickedness, and is that extreme +through its connexion with a confronting nature and +through its own naturalness thereby investing it. Yet, +amid that naturalness, it is, when it thinks, directed +towards the Eternal, though, for that reason, only +standing to it in an external connexion. +</p> + +<p> +§ 569. (γ) Under the <q>moment</q> of <emph>individuality</emph> as +such,—of subjectivity and the notion itself, in which +the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its +identical ground, the place of presupposition (1) is taken +by the <emph>universal</emph> substance, as actualised out of its +abstraction into an <emph>individual</emph> self-consciousness. This +individual, who as such is identified with the essence,—(in +the Eternal sphere he is called the Son)—is +transplanted into the world of time, and in him wickedness +is implicitly overcome. Further, this immediate, +and thus sensuous, existence of the absolutely concrete +is represented as putting himself in judgment and +expiring in the pain of <emph>negativity</emph>, in which he, as infinite +subjectivity, keeps himself unchanged, and thus, as +absolute return from that negativity and as universal +unity of universal and individual essentiality, has +realised his being as the Idea of the spirit, eternal, +but alive and present in the world. +</p> + +<p> +§ 570. (2) This objective totality of the divine man +who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition +for the <emph>finite</emph> immediacy of the single subject. +For such subject therefore it is at first an Other, an object +<pb n='179'/><anchor id='Pg179'/> +of contemplating vision,—but the vision of implicit +truth, through which witness of the spirit in him, he, +on account of his immediate nature, at first characterised +himself as nought and wicked. But, secondly, +after the example of his truth, by means of the faith on +the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of +universal and individual essence, he is also the movement +to throw off his immediacy, his natural man and +self-will, to close himself in unity with that example +(who is his implicit life) in the pain of negativity, and +thus to know himself made one with the essential Being. +Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation +brings about its own indwelling in self-consciousness, +and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting +spirit who is all in all. +</p> + +<p> +§ 571. These three syllogisms, constituting the one +syllogism of the absolute self-mediation of spirit, are +the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle +of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. From this its +separation into parts, with a temporal and external +sequence, the unfolding of the mediation contracts itself +in the result,—where the spirit closes in unity with +itself,—not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional +feeling, but even to thought. In the immanent +simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion, +yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence +of the universal, simple, and eternal spirit in itself. In +this form of truth, truth is the object of <emph>philosophy</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +If the result—the realised Spirit in which all meditation +has superseded itself—is taken in a merely formal, +contentless sense, so that the spirit is not also at the +same time known as <emph>implicitly</emph> existent and objectively +self-unfolding;—then that infinite subjectivity is the +merely formal self-consciousness, knowing itself in itself +as absolute,—Irony. Irony, which can make every +<pb n='180'/><anchor id='Pg180'/> +objective reality nought and vain, is itself the emptiness +and vanity, which from itself, and therefore by +chance and its own good pleasure, gives itself direction +and content, remains master over it, is not bound +by it,—and, with the assertion that it stands on the +very summit of religion and philosophy, falls rather +back into the vanity of wilfulness. It is only in proportion +as the pure infinite form, the self-centred +manifestation, throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity +in which it is the vanity of thought, that it is +the free thought which has its infinite characteristic +at the same time as essential and actual content, and +has that content as an object in which it is also free. +Thinking, so far, is only the formal aspect of the +absolute content. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='181'/><anchor id='Pg181'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Sub-Section C. Philosophy.</head> + +<p> +§ 572. This science is the unity of Art and Religion. +Whereas the vision-method of Art, external in point of +form, is but subjective production and shivers the substantial +content into many separate shapes, and whereas +Religion, with its separation into parts, opens it out in +mental picture, and mediates what is thus opened out; +Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make +a total, but even unifies them into the simple spiritual +vision, and then in that raises them to self-conscious +thought. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible +unity (cognised by thought) of art and religion, in which +the diverse elements in the content are cognised as +necessary, and this necessary as free. +</p> + +<p> +§ 573. Philosophy thus characterises itself as a cognition +of the necessity in the content of the absolute +picture-idea, as also of the necessity in the two forms—on +one hand, immediate vision and its poetry, and +the objective and external revelation presupposed by +representation,—on the other hand, first the subjective +retreat inwards, then the subjective movement of faith +and its final identification with the presupposed object. +This cognition is thus the <emph>recognition</emph> of this content +and its form; it is the liberation from the one-sidedness +of the forms, elevation of them into the absolute form, +<pb n='182'/><anchor id='Pg182'/> +which determines itself to content, remains identical +with it, and is in that the cognition of that essential and +actual necessity. This movement, which philosophy is, +finds itself already accomplished, when at the close it +seizes its own notion,—i.e. only <emph>looks back</emph> on its +knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite +exposition of the reciprocal relations of philosophy and +religion. The whole question turns entirely on the +difference of the forms of speculative thought from the +forms of mental representation and <q>reflecting</q> intellect. +But it is the whole cycle of philosophy, and of +logic in particular, which has not merely taught and +made known this difference, but also criticised it, or +rather has let its nature develop and judge itself by +these very categories. It is only by an insight into the +value of these forms that the true and needful conviction +can be gained, that the content of religion and philosophy +is the same,—leaving out, of course, the further details +of external nature and finite mind which fall outside +the range of religion. But religion is the truth <emph>for all +men</emph>: faith rests on the witness of the spirit, which +as witnessing is the spirit in man. This witness—the +underlying essence in all humanity—takes, when driven +to expound itself, its first definite form under those +acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness +and intellect otherwise employs. In this way the +truth becomes liable to the terms and conditions of +finitude in general. This does not prevent the spirit, +even in employing sensuous ideas and finite categories +of thought, from retaining its content (which as religion +is essentially speculative,) with a tenacity which does +violence to them, and acts <emph>inconsistently</emph> towards them. +By this inconsistency it corrects their defects. Nothing +easier therefore for the <q>Rationalist</q> than to point out +<pb n='183'/><anchor id='Pg183'/> +contradictions in the exposition of the faith, and then to +prepare triumphs for its principle of formal identity. If +the spirit yields to this finite reflection, which has usurped +the title of reason and philosophy—(<q>Rationalism</q>)—it +strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality +nought. Religion in that case is completely in the right +in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy +and treating them as enemies. But it is another thing +when religion sets herself against comprehending reason, +and against philosophy in general, and specially against +a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative, and so +religious. Such an opposition proceeds from failure +to appreciate the difference indicated and the value of +spiritual form in general, and particularly of the logical +form; or, to be more precise, still from failure to note +the distinction of the content—which may be in both the +same—from these forms. It is on the ground of form +that philosophy has been reproached and accused by +the religious party; just as conversely its speculative +content has brought the same charges upon it from +a self-styled philosophy—and from a pithless orthodoxy. +It had too little of God in it for the former; too much +for the latter. +</p> + +<p> +The charge of <emph>Atheism</emph>, which used often to be brought +against philosophy (that it has <emph>too little</emph> of God), has +grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge of +Pantheism, that it has <emph>too much</emph> of him:—so much so, +that it is treated not so much as an imputation, but as +a proved fact, or a sheer fact which needs no proof. +Piety, in particular, which with its pious airs of superiority +fancies itself free to dispense with proof, goes +hand in hand with empty rationalism—(which means to +be so much opposed to it, though both repose really on +the same habit of mind)—in the wanton assertion, +almost as if it merely mentioned a notorious fact, that +<pb n='184'/><anchor id='Pg184'/> +Philosophy is the All-one doctrine, or Pantheism. It +must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and +theology when they accused a philosophical system +(e.g. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism, though +the former imputation at the first glance looks more +cruel and insidious (cf. § 71 note). The imputation of +Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real +God, and arises because the popular idea does not detect +in the philosophical notion the peculiar form to which +it is attached. Philosophy indeed can recognise its own +forms in the categories of religious consciousness, and +even its own teaching in the doctrine of religion—which +therefore it does not disparage. But the converse is not +true: the religious consciousness does not apply the +criticism of thought to itself, does not comprehend itself, +and is therefore, as it stands, exclusive. To impute +Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part +of the modern habit of mind—of the new piety and +new theology. For them philosophy has too much +of God:—so much so, that, if we believe them, it asserts +that God is everything and everything is God. This +new theology, which makes religion only a subjective +feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature, +thus retains nothing more than a God in general without +objective characteristics. Without interest of its own +for the concrete, fulfilled notion of God, it treats it only +as an interest which <emph>others</emph> once had, and hence treats +what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature +as something merely historical. The indeterminate +God is to be found in all religions; every kind of piety +(§ 72)—that of the Hindoo to asses, cows,—or to dalai-lamas,—that +of the Egyptians to the ox—is always +adoration of an object which, with all its absurdities, +also contains the generic abstract, God in General. If +this theory needs no more than such a God, so as to +<pb n='185'/><anchor id='Pg185'/> +find God in everything called religion, it must at least +find such a God recognised even in philosophy, and can +no longer accuse it of Atheism. The mitigation of the +reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its +ground therefore in the superficial idea to which this +mildness has attenuated and emptied God. As that +popular idea clings to its abstract universality, from +which all definite quality is excluded, all such definiteness +is only the non-divine, the secularity of things, +thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. +On such a presupposition, even after philosophy has +maintained God's absolute universality, and the consequent +untruth of the being of external things, the +hearer clings as he did before to his belief that secular +things still keep their being, and form all that is definite +in the divine universality. He thus changes that +universality into what he calls the pantheistic:—<emph>Everything +is</emph>—(empirical things, without distinction, whether +higher or lower in the scale, <emph>are</emph>)—all possess substantiality; +and so—thus he understands philosophy—each +and every secular thing is God. It is only his own +stupidity, and the falsifications due to such misconception, +which generate the imagination and the allegation +of such pantheism. +</p> + +<p> +But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is +Pantheism, are unable and unwilling to see this—for it +is just to see the notion that they refuse—they should +before everything have verified the alleged fact that +<emph>any one philosopher, or any one man</emph>, had really ascribed +substantial or objective and inherent reality to <emph>all</emph> things +and regarded them as God:—that such an idea had +ever come into the hand of any body but themselves. +This allegation I will further elucidate in this exoteric +discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down +the evidence. If we want to take so-called Pantheism +<pb n='186'/><anchor id='Pg186'/> +in its most poetical, most sublime, or if you will, its +grossest shape, we must, as is well known, consult the +oriental poets: and the most copious delineations of it +are found in Hindoo literature. Amongst the abundant +resources open to our disposal on this topic, I select—as +the most authentic statement accessible—the +Bhagavat-Gita, and amongst its effusions, prolix and +reiterative <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad nauseam</foreign>, some of the most telling passages. +In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel, p. 162) Krishna +says of himself<note place='foot'>[The citation given by Hegel from Schlegel's translation is here +replaced by the version (in one or two points different) in the <hi rend='italic'>Sacred +Books of the East</hi>, vol. viii.]</note>:—<q>I am the self, seated in the hearts of +all beings. I am the beginning and the middle and the +end also of all beings ... I am the beaming sun +amongst the shining ones, and the moon among the +lunar mansions.... Amongst the Vedas I am the Sâma-Veda: +I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness +in living beings. And I am Sankara (Siva) among +the Rudras, ... Meru among the high-topped mountains, +... the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains).... +Among beasts I am the lord of beasts.... +Among letters I am the letter A.... I am the spring +among the seasons.... I am also that which is the seed +of all things: there is nothing moveable or immoveable +which can exist without me.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Even in these totally sensuous delineations, Krishna +(and we must not suppose there is, besides Krishna, +still God, or a God besides; as he said before he was +Siva, or Indra, so it is afterwards said that Brahma +too is in him) makes himself out to be—not everything, +but only—the most excellent of everything. +Everywhere there is a distinction drawn between +external, unessential existences, and one essential +amongst them, which he is. Even when, at the beginning +<pb n='187'/><anchor id='Pg187'/> +of the passage, he is said to be the beginning, +middle, and end of living things, this totality is distinguished +from the living things themselves as single +existences. Even such a picture which extends deity far +and wide in its existence cannot be called pantheism: we +must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical +world, everything is reduced to a limited number of +essential existences, to a polytheism. But even what +has been quoted shows that these very substantialities +of the externally-existent do not retain the independence +entitling them to be named Gods; even Siva, Indra, &c. +melt into the one Krishna. +</p> + +<p> +This reduction is more expressly made in the following +scene (7th Lesson, p. 7 sqq.). Krishna says: <q>I am +the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe. +There is nothing else higher than myself; all this is +woven upon me, like numbers of pearls upon a thread. +I am the taste in water;... I am the light of the sun +and the moon; I am <q>Om</q> in all the Vedas.... I am +life in all beings.... I am the discernment of the discerning +ones.... I am also the strength of the strong.</q> +Then he adds: <q>The whole universe deluded by these +three states of mind developed from the qualities [sc. +goodness, passion, darkness] does not know me who +am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of +mine,</q> [even the Maya is <emph>his</emph>, nothing independent], +<q>developed from the qualities is divine and difficult to +transcend. Those cross beyond this delusion who +resort to me alone.</q> Then the picture gathers itself +up in a simple expression: <q>At the end of many lives, +the man possessed of knowledge approaches me, (believing) +that Vasudeva is everything. Such a high-souled +mind is very hard to find. Those who are +deprived of knowledge by various desires approach other +divinities... Whichever form of deity one worships with +<pb n='188'/><anchor id='Pg188'/> +faith, from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires +really given by me. But the fruit thus obtained by those +of little judgment is perishable.... The undiscerning +ones, not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible +essence, than which there is nothing higher, think +me who am unperceived to have become perceptible.</q> +</p> + +<p> +This <q>All,</q> which Krishna calls himself, is not, any +more than the Eleatic One, and the Spinozan Substance, +the Every-thing. This every-thing, rather, the +infinitely-manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in +all these pictures, but defined as the <q>accidental,</q> without +essential being of its very own, but having its truth +in the substance, the One which, as different from that +accidental, is alone the divine and God. Hindooism +however has the higher conception of Brahma, the +pure unity of thought in itself, where the empirical +everything of the world, as also those proximate substantialities, +called Gods, vanish. On that account +Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindoo +religion as at bottom a Monotheism. That this description +is not incorrect is clear from these short +citations. But so little concrete is this divine unity—spiritual +as its idea of God is—so powerless its grip, +so to speak—that Hindooism, with a monstrous inconsistency, +is also the maddest of polytheisms. But the +idolatry of the wretched Hindoo, when he adores the +ape, or other creature, is still a long way from that +wretched fancy of a Pantheism, to which everything is +God, and God everything. Hindoo monotheism moreover +is itself an example how little comes of mere +monotheism, if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate +in itself. For that unity, if it be intrinsically abstract +and therefore empty, tends of itself to let whatever is +concrete, outside it—be it as a lot of Gods or as secular, +empirical individuals—keep its independence. That pantheism +<pb n='189'/><anchor id='Pg189'/> +indeed—on the shallow conception of it—might +with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: +for if God, as it says, is identical with the world, then +as there is only one world there would be in that +pantheism only one God. Perhaps the empty numerical +unity must be predicated of the world: but such +abstract predication of it has no further special interest; +on the contrary, a mere numerical unity just means that +its <emph>content</emph> is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. +But it is that delusion with the empty unity, +which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea +of pantheism. It is only the picture—floating in the +indefinite blue—of the world as <emph>one thing</emph>, <emph>the all</emph>, that +could ever be considered capable of combining with +God: only on that assumption could philosophy be +supposed to teach that God is the world: for if the +world were taken as it is, as everything, as the endless +lot of empirical existence, then it would hardly have +been even held possible to suppose a pantheism which +asserted of such stuff that it is God. +</p> + +<p> +But to go back again to the question of fact. If we +want to see the consciousness of the One—not as with +the Hindoos split between the featureless unity of +abstract thought, on one hand, and on the other, the +long-winded weary story of its particular detail, but—in +its finest purity and sublimity, we must consult the +Mohammedans. If e.g. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi +in particular, we find the unity of the soul with +the One set forth, and that unity described as love, +this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and +vulgar, a transfiguration of the natural and the spiritual, +in which the externalism and transitoriness of immediate +nature, and of empirical secular spirit, is discarded +and absorbed<note place='foot'><p>In order to give a clearer impression of it, I cannot refrain from +quoting a few passages, which may at the same time give some +indication of the marvellous skill of Rückert, from whom they are +taken, as a translator. [For Rückert's verses a version is here +substituted in which I have been kindly helped by Miss May Kendall.] +</p> +<p> +III. +</p> +<p> +I saw but One through all heaven's starry spaces gleaming:<lb/> +I saw but One in all sea billows wildly streaming.<lb/> +I looked into the heart, a waste of worlds, a sea,—<lb/> +I saw a thousand dreams,—yet One amid all dreaming.<lb/> +And earth, air, water, fire, when thy decree is given,<lb/> +Are molten into One: against thee none hath striven.<lb/> +There is no living heart but beats unfailingly<lb/> +In the one song of praise to thee, from earth and heaven. +</p> +<p> +V. +</p> +<p> +As one ray of thy light appears the noonday sun,<lb/> +But yet thy light and mine eternally are one.<lb/> +As dust beneath thy feet the heaven that rolls on high:<lb/> +Yet only one, and one for ever, thou and I.<lb/> +The dust may turn to heaven, and heaven to dust decay;<lb/> +Yet art thou one with me, and shalt be one for aye.<lb/> +How may the words of life that fill heaven's utmost part<lb/> +Rest in the narrow casket of one poor human heart?<lb/> +How can the sun's own rays, a fairer gleam to fling,<lb/> +Hide in a lowly husk, the jewel's covering?<lb/> +How may the rose-grove all its glorious bloom unfold,<lb/> +Drinking in mire and slime, and feeding on the mould?<lb/> +How can the darksome shell that sips the salt sea stream<lb/> +Fashion a shining pearl, the sunlight's joyous beam?<lb/> +Oh, heart! should warm winds fan thee, should'st thou floods endure,<lb/> +One element are wind and flood; but be thou pure. +</p> +<p> +IX. +</p> +<p> +I'll tell thee how from out the dust God moulded man,—<lb/> +Because the breath of Love He breathed into his clay:<lb/> +I'll tell thee why the spheres their whirling paths began,—<lb/> +They mirror to God's throne Love's glory day by day:<lb/> +I'll tell thee why the morning winds blow o'er the grove,—<lb/> +It is to bid Love's roses bloom abundantly:<lb/> +I'll tell thee why the night broods deep the earth above,—<lb/> +Love's bridal tent to deck with sacred canopy:<lb/> +All riddles of the earth dost thou desire to prove?—<lb/> +To every earthly riddle is Love alone the key. +</p> +<p> +XV. +</p> +<p> +Life shrinks from Death in woe and fear,<lb/> +Though Death ends well Life's bitter need:<lb/> +So shrinks the heart when Love draws near,<lb/> +As though 'twere Death in very deed:<lb/> +For wheresoever Love finds room,<lb/> +There Self, the sullen tyrant, dies.<lb/> +So let him perish in the gloom,—<lb/> +Thou to the dawn of freedom rise. +</p> +<p> +In this poetry, which soars over all that is external and sensuous, +who would recognise the prosaic ideas current about so-called +pantheism—ideas which let the divine sink to the external and +the sensuous? The copious extracts which Tholuck, in his work +<hi rend='italic'>Anthology from the Eastern Mystics</hi>, gives us from the poems of +Jelaleddin and others, are made from the very point of view now +under discussion. In his Introduction, Herr Tholuck proves how +profoundly his soul has caught the note of mysticism; and there, +too, he points out the characteristic traits of its oriental phase, in +distinction from that of the West and Christendom. With all their +divergence, however, they have in common the mystical character. The +conjunction of Mysticism with so-called Pantheism, as he says (p. 53), +implies that inward quickening of soul and spirit which inevitably +tends to annihilate that external <emph>Everything</emph>, which Pantheism is +usually held to adore. But beyond that, Herr Tholuck leaves +matters standing at the usual indistinct conception of Pantheism; +a profounder discussion of it would have had, for the author's +emotional Christianity, no direct interest; but we see that personally +he is carried away by remarkable enthusiasm for a mysticism +which, in the ordinary phrase, entirely deserves the epithet Pantheistic. +Where, however, he tries philosophising (p. 12), he does +not get beyond the standpoint of the <q>rationalist</q> metaphysic with +its uncritical categories.</p></note>. +</p> + +<pb n='190'/><anchor id='Pg190'/> + +<p> +I refrain from accumulating further examples of the +religious and poetic conceptions which it is customary +to call pantheistic. Of the philosophies to which that +name is given, the Eleatic, or Spinozist, it has been +<pb n='191'/><anchor id='Pg191'/> +remarked earlier (§ 50, note) that so far are they from +identifying God with the world and making him finite, +that in these systems this <q>everything</q> has no truth, +and that we should rather call them monotheistic, or, in +relation to the popular idea of the world, acosmical. +<pb n='192'/><anchor id='Pg192'/> +They are most accurately called systems which apprehend +the Absolute only as substance. Of the oriental, +especially the Mohammedan, modes of envisaging God, +we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as +the utterly universal genus which dwells in the species +or existences, but dwells so potently that these existences +have no actual reality. The fault of all these +modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of +defining substance as subject and as mind. +</p> + +<p> +These systems and modes of pictorial conception +originate from the one need common to all philosophies +and all religions of getting an idea of God, and, +secondly, of the relationship of God and the world. +(In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination +of God's nature determines his relations with +the world.) The <q>reflective</q> understanding begins by +rejecting all systems and modes of conception, which, +whether they spring from heart, imagination or speculation, +express the interconnexion of God and the +world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness, +he is as essence parted from appearance, +as infinite from the finite. But, after this partition, the +conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation +to the essence, the finite to the infinite, and so on: and +thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature +of this relation. It is in the reflective form that the +whole difficulty of the affair lies, and that causes this +relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. +The close of philosophy is not the place, even in +a general exoteric discussion, to waste a word on +what a <q>notion</q> means. But as the view taken of this +relation is closely connected with the view taken of +philosophy generally and with all imputations against +it, we may still add the remark that though philosophy +certainly has to do with unity in general, it is not however +<pb n='193'/><anchor id='Pg193'/> +with abstract unity, mere identity, and the empty +absolute, but with concrete unity (the notion), and that +in its whole course it has to do with nothing else;—that +each step in its advance is a peculiar term or phase of +this concrete unity, and that the deepest and last +expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. +Would-be judges and critics of philosophy might be +recommended to familiarise themselves with these +phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted +with them, at least to know so much that of these terms +there are a great many, and that amongst them there +is great variety. But they show so little acquaintance +with them—and still less take trouble about it—that, +when they hear of unity—and relation <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ipso facto</foreign> implies +unity—they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate +unity, and lose sight of the chief point of interest—the +special mode in which the unity is qualified. +Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry +identity is its principle and result, and that it is the +system of identity. Sticking fast to the undigested +thought of identity, they have laid hands on, not the +concrete unity, the notion and content of philosophy, +but rather its reverse. In the philosophical field they +proceed, as in the physical field the physicist; who also +is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous +properties and matters—or usually matters alone, +(for the properties get transformed into matters also +for the physicist)—and that these matters (elements) +<emph>also</emph> stand in <emph>relation</emph> to one another. But the question +is, Of what kind is this relation? Every peculiarity +and the whole difference of natural things, inorganic +and living, depend solely on the different modes of +this unity. But instead of ascertaining these different +modes, the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes +up only one, the most external and the worst, viz. +<pb n='194'/><anchor id='Pg194'/> +<emph>composition</emph>, applies only it in the whole range of natural +structures, which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. +</p> + +<p> +The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious +inference from this shallow identity. All that those who +employ this invention of their own to accuse philosophy +gather from the study of God's <emph>relation</emph> to the world is +that the one, but only the one factor of this category +of relation—and that the factor of indeterminateness—is +identity. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception, +and assert—falsely as a fact—that philosophy +teaches the identity of God and the world. And as in +their judgment either of the two,—the world as much +as God—has the same solid substantiality as the other, +they infer that in the philosophic Idea God is <emph>composed</emph> +of God and the world. Such then is the idea they form +of pantheism, and which they ascribe to philosophy. +Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending +of thoughts to go beyond such categories, they import +them into philosophy, where they are utterly unknown; +they thus infect it with the disease against which they +subsequently raise an outcry. If any difficulty emerge +in comprehending God's relation to the world, they at +once and very easily escape it by admitting that this +relation contains for them an inexplicable contradiction; +and that hence, they must stop at the vague conception +of such relation, perhaps under the more familiar names +of, e.g. omnipresence, providence, &c. Faith in their use +of the term means no more than a refusal to define the +conception, or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. +That men and classes of untrained intellect are +satisfied with such indefiniteness, is what one expects; +but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective +study is satisfied, in matters admitted to be of superior, +if not even of supreme interest, with indefinite ideas, it +is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest +<pb n='195'/><anchor id='Pg195'/> +with the subject. But if those who cling to this crude +<q>rationalism</q> were in earnest, e.g. with God's omnipresence, +so far as to realise their faith thereon in +a definite mental idea, in what difficulties would they +be involved by their belief in the true reality of the things +of sense! They would hardly like, as Epicurus does, to +let God dwell in the interspaces of things, i.e. in the +pores of the physicists,—said pores being the negative, +something supposed to exist <emph>beside</emph> the material reality. +This very <q>Beside</q> would give their pantheism its +spatiality,—their everything, conceived as the mutual exclusion +of parts in space. But in ascribing to God, in his +relation to the world, an action on and in the space thus +filled on the world and in it, they would endlessly split +up the divine actuality into infinite materiality. They +would really thus have the misconception they call pantheism +or all-one-doctrine, only as the necessary sequel +of their misconceptions of God and the world. But to put +that sort of thing, this stale gossip of oneness or identity, +on the shoulders of philosophy, shows such recklessness +about justice and truth that it can only be explained +through the difficulty of getting into the head thoughts +and notions, i.e. not abstract unity, but the many-shaped +modes specified. If statements as to facts are put forward, +and the facts in question are thoughts and notions, it is +indispensable to get hold of their meaning. But even the +fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous, +now that it has long been a foregone conclusion +that philosophy is pantheism, a system of identity, an +All-one doctrine, and that the person therefore who +might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely +unaware of a matter of common notoriety, or as prevaricating +for a purpose. On account of this chorus of +assertions, then, I have believed myself obliged to speak +at more length and exoterically on the outward and +<pb n='196'/><anchor id='Pg196'/> +inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion +is the only method available in dealing with the +external apprehension of notions as mere facts,—by +which notions are perverted into their opposite. The +esoteric study of God and identity, as of cognitions and +notions, is philosophy itself. +</p> + +<p> +§ 574. This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking +Idea, the truth aware of itself (§ 236),—the logical +system, but with the signification that it is universality +approved and certified in concrete content as in its +actuality. In this way the science has gone back to its +beginning: its result is the logical system but as +a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgment, +in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning +an immediate,—and thus out of the <emph>appearance</emph> which +it had there—it has risen into its pure principle and +thus also into its proper medium. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_575'/> +§ 575. It is this appearing which originally gives the +motive of the further development. The first appearance +is formed by the syllogism, which is based on the +Logical system as starting-point, with Nature for the +middle term which couples the Mind with it. The +Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. +Nature, standing between the Mind and its essence, +sunders itself, not indeed to extremes of finite abstraction, +nor itself to something away from them and independent,—which, +as other than they, only serves as a link +between them: for the syllogism is <emph>in the Idea</emph> and Nature +is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative +factor, and as implicitly the Idea. Still the mediation +of the notion has the external form of <emph>transition</emph>, and the +science of Nature presents itself as the course of +necessity, so that it is only in the one extreme that the +liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. +</p> + +<p> +<anchor id='Section_576'/> +§ 576. In the second syllogism this appearance is so +<pb n='197'/><anchor id='Pg197'/> +far superseded, that that syllogism is the standpoint of +the Mind itself, which—as the mediating agent in the +process—presupposes Nature and couples it with the +Logical principle. It is the syllogism where Mind +reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as +a subjective cognition, of which liberty is the aim, and +which is itself the way to produce it. +</p> + +<p> +§ 577. The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy, +which has self-knowing reason, the absolutely-universal, +for its middle term: a middle, which divides itself into +Mind and Nature, making the former its presupposition, +as process of the Idea's subjective activity, and the latter +its universal extreme, as process of the objectively and +implicitly existing Idea. The self-judging of the Idea +into its two appearances (§§ <ref target='Section_575'>575</ref>, <ref target='Section_576'>576</ref>) characterises both +as its (the self-knowing reason's) manifestations: and in +it there is a unification of the two aspects:—it is the +nature of the fact, the notion, which causes the movement +and development, yet this same movement is +equally the action of cognition. The eternal Idea, in +full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, +engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. +</p> + +<quote rend='display'> +Ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα +τοῦ μάλιστα. Αὑτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ +νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. +Τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς. Ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων. +Ὥστ᾽ ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον τούτου ὂ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ +ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. Εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς +ἀεί, θαυμαστόν; εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. Ἔχει δὲ ὡδί. +Καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει; ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια; +ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. Φαμὲν δὲ +τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ +ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ; τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός. +(<hi rend='smallcaps'>Arist.</hi> <hi rend='italic'>Met.</hi> XI. 7.) +</quote> + +</div> + +</div> + +<pb n='199'/><anchor id='Pg199'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Index.</head> + +<lg> +<l>Absolute (the), <ref target='Pgxlviii'>xlviii</ref>, <ref target='Pg007'>7</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Abstraction, <ref target='Pg074'>74</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Accent, <ref target='Pg081'>81</ref>, <ref target='Pg087'>87</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Ages of man, <ref target='Pg017'>17</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Alphabets, <ref target='Pg081'>81</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Altruism, <ref target='Pg057'>57</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Animal magnetism, clxi, <ref target='Pg005'>5</ref>, <ref target='Pg029'>29</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Anthropology, <ref target='Pgxxv'>xxv</ref>, <ref target='Pglxxxviii'>lxxxviii</ref>, <ref target='Pg012'>12</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Appetite, <ref target='Pg053'>53</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Aristotle</hi>, <ref target='Pgliii'>liii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxxiii'>cxxxiii</ref>, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref>, <ref target='Pg063'>63</ref>, <ref target='Pg163'>163</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Art, <ref target='Pgxxxix'>xxxix</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pg169'>169</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Asceticism, <ref target='Pgcxv'>cxv</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxliii'>cxliii</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxxxvii'>clxxxvii</ref>, <ref target='Pg159'>159</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Association of ideas, <ref target='Pg073'>73</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Atheism, <ref target='Pg183'>183</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Athens, <ref target='Pgcxxx'>cxxx</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Attention, <ref target='Pgclxxiii'>clxxiii</ref>, <ref target='Pg069'>69</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Automatism (psychological), <ref target='Pgclxv'>clxv</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Bacon</hi> (Fr.), <ref target='Pgxxi'>xxi</ref>, <ref target='Pglii'>lii</ref>, <ref target='Pglix'>lix</ref>, <ref target='Pgclx'>clx</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Bain</hi> (A.), <ref target='Pgcxxi'>cxxi</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Beauty, <ref target='Pg169'>169</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Bhagavat-Gita, <ref target='Pg186'>186</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Biography, <ref target='Pg151'>151</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Body and Soul (relations of), <ref target='Pglxxxii'>lxxxii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxvi'>cxvi</ref>, <ref target='Pgclvi'>clvi</ref>, <ref target='Pg013'>13</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Boëthius</hi>, <ref target='Pgl'>l</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Böhme</hi> (J.), <ref target='Pg095'>95</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Braid</hi> (J.), <ref target='Pgclxiv'>clxiv</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Bravery, <ref target='Pgcxcix'>cxcix</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Budget, <ref target='Pg144'>144</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Capitalism, <ref target='Pgcci'>cci</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Cardinal virtues, <ref target='Pgcxxxii'>cxxxii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Categories, <ref target='Pglx'>lx</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Catholicism, <ref target='Pg157'>157</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Children, <ref target='Pglxxxvii'>lxxxvii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcii'>cii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Chinese language, <ref target='Pg081'>81</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Choice, <ref target='Pg098'>98</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Christianity, <ref target='Pgxliv'>xliv</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxli'>cxli</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxxix'>clxxix</ref>, <ref target='Pg007'>7</ref>, <ref target='Pg101'>101</ref>, <ref target='Pg157'>157</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Clairvoyance, <ref target='Pgclviii'>clviii</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxi'>clxi</ref>, <ref target='Pg033'>33</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Cognition, <ref target='Pg064'>64</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Commercial morality, <ref target='Pgcci'>cci</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Comte</hi> (C.), <ref target='Pgxcix'>xcix</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Condillac</hi>, <ref target='Pglxxviii'>lxxviii</ref>, <ref target='Pg061'>61</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Conscience, <ref target='Pgxxx'>xxx</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxii'>cxxii</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxxxvii'>clxxxvii</ref>, <ref target='Pg117'>117</ref>, <ref target='Pg156'>156</ref>, <ref target='Pg161'>161</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Consciousness, <ref target='Pgxxv'>xxv</ref>, <ref target='Pgxcix'>xcix</ref>, <ref target='Pg047'>47</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Constitution of the State, <ref target='Pg132'>132</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Contract, <ref target='Pg108'>108</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Corporation, <ref target='Pg130'>130</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Crime, <ref target='Pgcxciii'>cxciii</ref>, <ref target='Pg109'>109</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Criticism, <ref target='Pgxvi'>xvi</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxxviii'>cxxxviii</ref>, <ref target='Pg149'>149</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Custom, <ref target='Pgclxxxix'>clxxxix</ref>, <ref target='Pg104'>104</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Dante</hi>, <ref target='Pgcxxxiv'>cxxxiv</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Deduction (Kantian and Fichtean), <ref target='Pgcx'>cx</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Democracy, <ref target='Pg141'>141</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Development, <ref target='Pg060'>60</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Disease (mental), <ref target='Pg027'>27</ref>, <ref target='Pg037'>37</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Duty, <ref target='Pgcxiv'>cxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxix'>cxix</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxi'>cxxi</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgcxxxi'>cxxxi</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxxix'>cxxxix</ref>, <ref target='Pg097'>97</ref>, <ref target='Pg104'>104</ref>, <ref target='Pg116'>116</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Economics, <ref target='Pg122'>122</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Education, <ref target='Pgxcii'>xcii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxxvii'>cxxxvii</ref>, <ref target='Pg011'>11</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Ego (the), <ref target='Pglxiv'>lxiv</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pg047'>47</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Egoism, <ref target='Pg055'>55</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Eleaticism, <ref target='Pg190'>190</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>England, <ref target='Pg143'>143</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Epicureanism, <ref target='Pgcxli'>cxli</ref>, <ref target='Pg195'>195</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Epistemology, <ref target='Pgciii'>ciii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Equality (political and social), <ref target='Pgcxc'>cxc</ref>, <ref target='Pg133'>133</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Equity, <ref target='Pgxxxi'>xxxi</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<pb n='200'/><anchor id='Pg200'/> + +<lg> +<l>Estates, <ref target='Pg123'>123</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Ethics, <ref target='Pgxv'>xv</ref>, <ref target='Pgxix'>xix</ref>, <ref target='Pgxxx'>xxx</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgxcv'>xcv</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxiii'>cxiii</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgcxc'>cxc</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pg113'>113</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Experience, <ref target='Pg051'>51</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Experimental psychology, <ref target='Pglxxxi'>lxxxi</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgc'>c</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Expression (mental), <ref target='Pg023'>23</ref>, <ref target='Pg045'>45</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Faculties of Mind, <ref target='Pglxxiii'>lxxiii</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgxcvii'>xcvii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxvi'>cxxvi</ref>, <ref target='Pg058'>58</ref>, <ref target='Pg065'>65</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Faith, <ref target='Pgcvii'>cvii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Faith-cure, <ref target='Pgclxi'>clxi</ref>, <ref target='Pg035'>35</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Fame, <ref target='Pg153'>153</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Family, <ref target='Pgxxxii'>xxxii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxcii'>cxcii</ref>, <ref target='Pg121'>121</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Fechner</hi> (G. T.), <ref target='Pgcli'>cli</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Feeling, <ref target='Pg022'>22</ref>, <ref target='Pg068'>68</ref>, <ref target='Pg092'>92</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Fichte</hi> (J. G.), <ref target='Pgcvi'>cvi</ref>, <ref target='Pgcix'>cix</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgclxiv'>clxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxix'>clxix</ref>, <ref target='Pg049'>49</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Finance, <ref target='Pg144'>144</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Finitude, <ref target='Pg008'>8</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Fraud, <ref target='Pg110'>110</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<anchor id='Index-Freedom'/> +<l>Freedom, <ref target='Pgcxxv'>cxxv</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgclxxv'>clxxv</ref>, <ref target='Pg006'>6</ref>, <ref target='Pg099'>99</ref>, <ref target='Pg113'>113</ref>, <ref target='Pg133'>133</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Fries</hi>, <ref target='Pgclxxix'>clxxix</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Genius (the), <ref target='Pgclvii'>clvii</ref>, <ref target='Pg028'>28</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>German language, <ref target='Pg078'>78</ref>, <ref target='Pg088'>88</ref>:</l> +<l rend='margin-left: 2'>politics, <ref target='Pgclxxvii'>clxxvii</ref>;</l> +<l rend='margin-left: 2'>empire, <ref target='Pgclxxxi'>clxxxi</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>God, <ref target='Pgxxxiv'>xxxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pgxli'>xli</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxii'>cxxii</ref>, <ref target='Pg020'>20</ref>, <ref target='Pg154'>154</ref>, <ref target='Pg176'>176</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Goethe</hi>, <ref target='Pgcliv'>cliv</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxix'>clxix</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Goodness, <ref target='Pg115'>115</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Government, <ref target='Pg137'>137</ref>;</l> +<l rend='margin-left: 2'>forms of, <ref target='Pg141'>141</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Greek ethics, <ref target='Pgcxxix'>cxxix</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgcxciv'>cxciv</ref>;</l> +<l rend='margin-left: 2'>religion, <ref target='Pg164'>164</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Habit, <ref target='Pgclviii'>clviii</ref>, <ref target='Pg039'>39</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Happiness, <ref target='Pg099'>99</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Herbart</hi>, <ref target='Pglxii'>lxii</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pglxxxv'>lxxxv</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxvii'>cxxvii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Hieroglyphics, <ref target='Pg080'>80</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>History, <ref target='Pgxxxiv'>xxxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pgxlvii'>xlvii</ref>, <ref target='Pgxci'>xci</ref>, <ref target='Pg147'>147</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Hobbes</hi>, <ref target='Pglxxvi'>lxxvi</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxxxii'>clxxxii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Holiness, <ref target='Pg159'>159</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Honour, <ref target='Pg124'>124</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Humboldt</hi> (W. v.), <ref target='Pg079'>79</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Hume</hi>, <ref target='Pglxxi'>lxxi</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxx'>cxx</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Hypnotism, <ref target='Pgclxiv'>clxiv</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pg031'>31</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Idea (Platonic), <ref target='Pg163'>163</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Idealism, <ref target='Pgciv'>civ</ref>; political, <ref target='Pgclxxxvi'>clxxxvi</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Ideality, <ref target='Pgclxviii'>clxviii</ref>, <ref target='Pg025'>25</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Ideas, <ref target='Pglxix'>lxix</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgci'>ci</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Imagination, <ref target='Pg072'>72</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Immaterialism, <ref target='Pgclii'>clii</ref>, <ref target='Pg012'>12</ref>, <ref target='Pg045'>45</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Impulse, <ref target='Pg095'>95</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Individualist ethics, <ref target='Pgcxx'>cxx</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Individuality in the State, <ref target='Pg139'>139</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Industrialism, <ref target='Pgcc'>cc</ref>, <ref target='Pg123'>123</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Insanity, <ref target='Pg037'>37</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Intention, <ref target='Pg114'>114</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>International Law, <ref target='Pg147'>147</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Intuition, <ref target='Pg067'>67</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Irony, <ref target='Pg179'>179</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Jelaleddin-Rumi</hi>, <ref target='Pg189'>189</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Judgment, <ref target='Pg089'>89</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Judicial system, <ref target='Pg127'>127</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Jung-Stilling</hi>, <ref target='Pgclxii'>clxii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Juries, <ref target='Pg128'>128</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Kant</hi> (I.), <ref target='Pgxv'>xv</ref>, <ref target='Pglxiv'>lxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pglxxi'>lxxi</ref>, <ref target='Pgxcvi'>xcvi</ref>, <ref target='Pgcvii'>cvii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxviii'>cxxviii</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxxxviii'>clxxxviii</ref>, <ref target='Pg020'>20</ref>, <ref target='Pg048'>48</ref>, <ref target='Pg051'>51</ref>, <ref target='Pg063'>63</ref>, <ref target='Pg154'>154</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Kieser</hi>, <ref target='Pgclxiii'>clxiii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Knowledge, <ref target='Pgcv'>cv</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxxv'>cxxxv</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxli'>cxli</ref>, <ref target='Pg064'>64</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Krishna, <ref target='Pg186'>186</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Labour, <ref target='Pg123'>123</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Language, <ref target='Pgclxxiv'>clxxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pg079'>79</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Laplace</hi>, <ref target='Pgclxiv'>clxiv</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<anchor id='Index-Law'/> +<l>Law, <ref target='Pgxxix'>xxix</ref>, <ref target='Pgxcvi'>xcvi</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxc'>cxc</ref>, <ref target='Pg104'>104</ref>, <ref target='Pg125'>125</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Legality, <ref target='Pgxxx'>xxx</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxxxix'>clxxxix</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Legislation, <ref target='Pg125'>125</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Leibniz</hi>, <ref target='Pglxxii'>lxxii</ref>, <ref target='Pglxxvii'>lxxvii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxlvi'>cxlvi</ref>, <ref target='Pg014'>14</ref>, <ref target='Pg080'>80</ref>, <ref target='Pg082'>82</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Liberty, see <ref target='Index-Freedom'>Freedom</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Life, <ref target='Pg013'>13</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Logic, <ref target='Pgxiv'>xiv</ref>, <ref target='Pgxvii'>xvii</ref>, <ref target='Pglxi'>lxi</ref>, <ref target='Pgxcv'>xcv</ref>, <ref target='Pg196'>196</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Lutheranism, <ref target='Pg157'>157</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Macchiavelli</hi>, <ref target='Pgclxxx'>clxxx</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Magic, <ref target='Pgclxi'>clxi</ref>, <ref target='Pg029'>29</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Manifestation, <ref target='Pg007'>7</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Manners, <ref target='Pg104'>104</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Marriage, <ref target='Pg121'>121</ref>, <ref target='Pg159'>159</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Master and slave, <ref target='Pg056'>56</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Mathematics in psychology, <ref target='Pglxviii'>lxviii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Medium, <ref target='Pg034'>34</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Memory, <ref target='Pgclxxiv'>clxxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pg070'>70</ref>, <ref target='Pg084'>84</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Mesmer</hi>, <ref target='Pgclxi'>clxi</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Metaphysic, <ref target='Pglviii'>lviii</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Mill</hi> (James), <ref target='Pglxxix'>lxxix</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<pb n='201'/><anchor id='Pg201'/> + +<lg> +<l>Mind (= Spirit), <ref target='Pgxlix'>xlix</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pg058'>58</ref>, <ref target='Pg196'>196</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Mnemonics, <ref target='Pg085'>85</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Monarchy, <ref target='Pg139'>139</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Monasticism, <ref target='Pg159'>159</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Monotheism, <ref target='Pg188'>188</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Morality, <ref target='Pgxxx'>xxx</ref>, <ref target='Pgxxxviii'>xxxviii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxi'>cxxi</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxxxviii'>clxxxviii</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgcxcviii'>cxcviii</ref>, <ref target='Pg113'>113</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Münsterberg</hi> (H.), <ref target='Pglxxxiii'>lxxxiii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Napoleon</hi>, <ref target='Pg019'>19</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Nationality, <ref target='Pg142'>142</ref>, <ref target='Pg150'>150</ref>, <ref target='Pg154'>154</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxcv'>cxcv</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Natural Philosophy, <ref target='Pgxv'>xv</ref>, <ref target='Pgxvii'>xvii</ref>, <ref target='Pgxxii'>xxii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Natural rights, <ref target='Pg112'>112</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Nature, <ref target='Pgcxx'>cxx</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxiv'>cxxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pg012'>12</ref>, <ref target='Pg133'>133</ref>, <ref target='Pg196'>196</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Nemesis, <ref target='Pg174'>174</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Nietzsche</hi> (F.), <ref target='Pgcxxviii'>cxxviii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Nobility, <ref target='Pgcxcvii'>cxcvii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Observation, <ref target='Pglxxxix'>lxxxix</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Orders (social), <ref target='Pgcxcvii'>cxcvii</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pg124'>124</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Ought, <ref target='Pgclxxv'>clxxv</ref>, <ref target='Pg094'>94</ref>, <ref target='Pg116'>116</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Pain, <ref target='Pg006'>6</ref>, <ref target='Pg094'>94</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Pantheism, <ref target='Pg184'>184</ref>, <ref target='Pg194'>194</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Parliament, <ref target='Pg142'>142</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Passion, <ref target='Pg095'>95</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Peasantry, <ref target='Pgcci'>cci</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Peel</hi> (Sir R.), <ref target='Pg127'>127</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Perception, <ref target='Pg067'>67</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Perfection, <ref target='Pgcxxvii'>cxxvii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxix'>cxxix</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Person, <ref target='Pg107'>107</ref>, <ref target='Pg119'>119</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Personality, <ref target='Pglxiv'>lxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxvii'>clxvii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Philosophy, <ref target='Pgxiv'>xiv</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxvii'>cxvii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxxviii'>cxxxviii</ref>, <ref target='Pg159'>159</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pg179'>179</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Phrenology, <ref target='Pg035'>35</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Physiology, <ref target='Pglxxxi'>lxxxi</ref>, <ref target='Pgc'>c</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Pinel</hi>, <ref target='Pg039'>39</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Plato</hi>, <ref target='Pgxcviii'>xcviii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxxi'>cxxxi</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxxv'>cxxxv</ref>, <ref target='Pg033'>33</ref>, <ref target='Pg097'>97</ref>, <ref target='Pg102'>102</ref>, <ref target='Pg162'>162</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Pleasure, <ref target='Pgcxxxvi'>cxxxvi</ref>, <ref target='Pg094'>94</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Plotinus</hi>, <ref target='Pgcxliv'>cxliv</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Police, <ref target='Pg130'>130</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Porphyry</hi>, <ref target='Pgxx'>xx</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Positivity of laws, <ref target='Pg125'>125</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Powers (political), <ref target='Pgccii'>ccii</ref>, <ref target='Pg138'>138</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Practice, <ref target='Pg092'>92</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Property, <ref target='Pgxxix'>xxix</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxcii'>cxcii</ref>, <ref target='Pg107'>107</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Protestantism, <ref target='Pg166'>166</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Prussia, <ref target='Pgclxxviii'>clxxviii</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxxxiv'>clxxxiv</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Psychiatry, <ref target='Pg033'>33</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Psychology, <ref target='Pgxxii'>xxii</ref>, <ref target='Pgxxiv'>xxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pglii'>lii</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pglxiii'>lxiii</ref>, <ref target='Pglxxxvi'>lxxxvi</ref>, <ref target='Pgxcv'>xcv</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxvii'>cxvii</ref>, <ref target='Pg004'>4</ref>, <ref target='Pg058'>58</ref>, <ref target='Pg063'>63</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Psycho-physics, <ref target='Pgclvi'>clvi</ref>, <ref target='Pg023'>23</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Punishment, <ref target='Pgcxciii'>cxciii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcciii'>cciii</ref>, <ref target='Pg111'>111</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Purpose, <ref target='Pg097'>97</ref>, <ref target='Pg114'>114</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Races, <ref target='Pg016'>16</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Rationalism, <ref target='Pgclxv'>clxv</ref>, <ref target='Pg183'>183</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Reason, <ref target='Pgcxv'>cxv</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxliii'>cxliii</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxxii'>clxxii</ref>, <ref target='Pg058'>58</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Recollection, <ref target='Pg070'>70</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Reinhold</hi>, <ref target='Pg049'>49</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Religion, <ref target='Pgxxxvii'>xxxvii</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgcxcvi'>cxcvi</ref>, <ref target='Pg155'>155</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pg167'>167</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Representation, <ref target='Pgcxi'>cxi</ref>, <ref target='Pg070'>70</ref>;</l> +<l rend='margin-left: 2'>political, <ref target='Pgclxxxiii'>clxxxiii</ref>, <ref target='Pg142'>142</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Responsibility, <ref target='Pg114'>114</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Revelation, <ref target='Pg007'>7</ref>, <ref target='Pg175'>175</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Right, <ref target='Pgxxix'>xxix</ref>, <ref target='Pg104'>104</ref> (see <ref target='Index-Law'>Law</ref>).</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Ritter</hi>, <ref target='Pgclxi'>clxi</ref>, clxiii.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Romances, <ref target='Pg151'>151</ref>:</l> +<l rend='margin-left: 2'>romantic art, <ref target='Pg172'>172</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Savages, <ref target='Pglxxxvii'>lxxxvii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcii'>cii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Schelling</hi>, <ref target='Pgclxi'>clxi</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Schindler</hi>, <ref target='Pgclxiii'>clxiii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Schopenhauer</hi>, <ref target='Pgcvi'>cvi</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxvi'>cxvi</ref>, <ref target='Pgcli'>cli</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxiv'>clxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxix'>clxix</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxxxvii'>clxxxvii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Science, <ref target='Pgxviii'>xviii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Scott</hi> (Sir W.), <ref target='Pg151'>151</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Self-consciousness, <ref target='Pgclxxi'>clxxi</ref>, <ref target='Pg053'>53</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Sensibility and sensation, <ref target='Pg020'>20</ref>, <ref target='Pg050'>50</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Sex, <ref target='Pg018'>18</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Siderism, <ref target='Pgclxiii'>clxiii</ref>, <ref target='Pg015'>15</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Signs (in language), <ref target='Pg076'>76</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Skill (acquired), <ref target='Pg042'>42</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Slavery, <ref target='Pg056'>56</ref>, <ref target='Pg101'>101</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Sleep, <ref target='Pg018'>18</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Society, <ref target='Pgxxxii'>xxxii</ref>, <ref target='Pg056'>56</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Sociology, <ref target='Pgxxiii'>xxiii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Somnambulism, <ref target='Pg030'>30</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Soul, <ref target='Pgliv'>liv</ref>, <ref target='Pglxix'>lxix</ref>, <ref target='Pglxxv'>lxxv</ref>, <ref target='Pg026'>26</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Spencer</hi> (H.), <ref target='Pgxxi'>xxi</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgcxi'>cxi</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxiii'>cxxiii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxliv'>cxliv</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Spinoza</hi>, <ref target='Pglxxvi'>lxxvi</ref>, <ref target='Pgci'>ci</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxix'>cxix</ref>, <ref target='Pgcl'>cl</ref>, <ref target='Pg014'>14</ref>, <ref target='Pg049'>49</ref>, <ref target='Pg188'>188</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Spiritualism, <ref target='Pgclxii'>clxii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>State, <ref target='Pgxxxii'>xxxii</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pgclxxvi'>clxxvi</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxxxiii'>clxxxiii</ref>, <ref target='Pg131'>131</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Stoicism, <ref target='Pgcxix'>cxix</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxiv'>cxxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxi'>cxi</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxliii'>cxliii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Suggestion, <ref target='Pgclxv'>clxv</ref> seqq., <ref target='Pg033'>33</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<pb n='202'/><anchor id='Pg202'/> + +<lg> +<l>Superstition, <ref target='Pg158'>158</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Syllogism, <ref target='Pg090'>90</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Symbol, <ref target='Pg077'>77</ref>, <ref target='Pg171'>171</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Sympathy, <ref target='Pgclv'>clv</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Telepathy, <ref target='Pgclxi'>clxi</ref>, <ref target='Pg034'>34</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Tellurism, <ref target='Pgclxiii'>clxiii</ref>, <ref target='Pg015'>15</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Theology, <ref target='Pg155'>155</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Thinking, <ref target='Pgclxxiv'>clxxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pg089'>89</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Tholuck</hi>, <ref target='Pg191'>191</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Trinity, <ref target='Pg177'>177</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Truth, <ref target='Pgcv'>cv</ref>, <ref target='Pg182'>182</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Unconscious (the), <ref target='Pgcxlvi'>cxlvi</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Understanding, <ref target='Pg052'>52</ref>, <ref target='Pg089'>89</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Universalising, <ref target='Pgcxxviii'>cxxviii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Utilitarianism, <ref target='Pgcxxxvi'>cxxxvi</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Value, <ref target='Pg109'>109</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Virtues, <ref target='Pgcxxxi'>cxxxi</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxcviii'>cxcviii</ref>, <ref target='Pg120'>120</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>War, <ref target='Pgcxcix'>cxcix</ref>, <ref target='Pg146'>146</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Wartburg, <ref target='Pgclxxix'>clxxix</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Welfare, <ref target='Pg114'>114</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Wickedness, <ref target='Pg009'>9</ref>, <ref target='Pg094'>94</ref>, <ref target='Pg117'>117</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Will, <ref target='Pgxxviii'>xxviii</ref>, <ref target='Pgcxxv'>cxxv</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxxv'>clxxv</ref>, <ref target='Pg062'>62</ref>, <ref target='Pg090'>90</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Wolff</hi>, <ref target='Pglxxiii'>lxxiii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Words, <ref target='Pgclxxiv'>clxxiv</ref>, <ref target='Pg079'>79</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l><hi rend='italic'>Wordsworth</hi>, <ref target='Pgli'>li</ref>, <ref target='Pgclxviii'>clxviii</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Written language, <ref target='Pg081'>81</ref> seqq.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Wrong, <ref target='Pg109'>109</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +<lg> +<l>Würtemberg, <ref target='Pgclxxxv'>clxxxv</ref>.</l> +</lg> + +</div> + +</body> +<back rend="page-break-before: right"> + <div id="footnotes"> + <index index="toc" /> + <index index="pdf" /> + <head>Footnotes</head> + <divGen type="footnotes"/> + </div> + <div rend="page-break-before: right"> + <divGen type="pgfooter" /> + </div> +</back> +</text> +</TEI.2> |